From smago@uga.edu Wed Dec 2 10:22:39 2015 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Wed, 2 Dec 2015 18:22:39 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Updated JoLLE Poetry and Art Call In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Here is the most updated version of the JoLLE Spring 2016 Call for Poetry and Art! -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: JoLLE Poetry and Art Call S16 .docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 41089 bytes Desc: JoLLE Poetry and Art Call S16 .docx Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20151202/a3e3d5e2/attachment.bin From ewall@umich.edu Fri Dec 4 11:03:52 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2015 13:03:52 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy Message-ID: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> All For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing so I came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity in the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination that it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass in the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given concrete toward a new concrete.? I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being asked to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody is interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my wondering is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, in the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about and then a question. My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to see a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not a fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.? This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) seems to be very hard for people to do. My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws a point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This is its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her hand at the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of this is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step here seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm , I see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the mathematical concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged horse]. So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky have called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? There is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in your take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. Ed Wall From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Dec 4 14:04:33 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2015 14:04:33 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> Message-ID: <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> Ed, The title imagination (or) fantasy Is different from Imagination (equates) with fantasy. To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a distanciation?) and return to the mathematical concrete. Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the physical to the mathematical? If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in historical consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical (concrete) which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within the imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which originates as concrete. To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does one imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the actual can be mapped onto the physical with systems? Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? Larry -----Original Message----- From: "Ed Wall" Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy All For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing so I came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity in the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination that it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass in the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given concrete toward a new concrete.? I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being asked to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody is interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my wondering is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, in the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about and then a question. My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to see a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not a fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.? This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) seems to be very hard for people to do. My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws a point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This is its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her hand at the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of this is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step here seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm , I see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the mathematical concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged horse]. So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky have called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? There is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in your take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. Ed Wall From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Dec 4 15:28:46 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2015 15:28:46 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Hi Ed-- I share a lot of your questions. But one question i am more or less certain of, LSV did not equate imagination and fantasy. I know a couple of articles one of which is my own, which draws on LSV. The other is by the blind-deaf guy who finally got me to think more effectively about imagination which is currently a pre-occupation. What is very important reading the article by Suvorov is to put the word "imagination" everywhere the word, "representation" is used. I discuss the issue in a forward, but I was both clearly mistaken and moving in the right direction. Perhaps an example of the development of concept development from a pseudo-concept to a true concept? I had not yet matured to the point where I could totally deconstruct "voobrazhenie" to be translated as "into-image-making" and start to use it productively. To understand it as the central to all processes of coming to know. I even missed the fact that I was using a lousy dictionary because imagination was defined as perception or ideation (?sic?), not imagination. The Peleprat and Cole paper shows the influence of teaching a course on mediational theories of mind for many years to juniors in a Communication department. We have had a thread on here called imagination that existed for a flicker in the past. Francine Smolucha is an actual expert in this field who, lets hope, is reading. Happy to discuss imagination. :-) mike I highly recommend *The Work of the Imagination" by Paul Harris and there is a handbook of the development of imagination in ebook form that is very useful. I need to think more about your examples and will comment if I have anything potentially useful to say. mike On Fri, Dec 4, 2015 at 2:04 PM, Lplarry wrote: > Ed, > > The title imagination (or) fantasy > Is different from > Imagination (equates) with fantasy. > To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a distanciation?) and > return to the mathematical concrete. > Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the > physical to the mathematical? > If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in historical > consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical (concrete) > which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical > (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within the > imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? > It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. > Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which originates as > concrete. > To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. > Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does one > imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the actual can > be mapped onto the physical with systems? > Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? > Larry > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Ed Wall" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy > > All > > For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination > that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or > ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements > although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing so I > came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity in > the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination that > it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an > intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass in > the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, > imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given > concrete toward a new concrete.? > > I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion on > the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am wondering > whether part of what is going on is that children are being asked to > ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the elementary > school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody is interested I > can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my wondering is that for so > many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no stepping from > concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, in the abstract. > So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about and then a > question. > > My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to see a > winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a > somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not a > fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.? > This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then > look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another > example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through > imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) seems to > be very hard for people to do. > > My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws > something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws a > point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This is > its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her hand at > the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of this > is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step here > seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm , I > see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the mathematical > concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) > > [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged > horse]. > > So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with fantasy > (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky have called > my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? There is, I > note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in your take > on what Vygotsky?s take might be. > > Ed Wall > > > > > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: ETMCimagination.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 449147 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20151204/3c849018/attachment-0002.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Suvorov.formation.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 1379813 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20151204/3c849018/attachment-0003.pdf From glassman.13@osu.edu Fri Dec 4 16:47:34 2015 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Sat, 5 Dec 2015 00:47:34 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C2F64F@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Hi Ed, This is really interesting (at least to me). I have a little bit of a different interpretation of the quote from Vygotsky. It reminds me of how Vannevar Bush (the inspiration for the Internet and hypertext) described human thinking in the coming information revolution. You moved from one concrete piece of information to another - it was in the move between these points, what he referred to as an intuitive leap and perhaps this is what Vygotsky refers to as imagination. I s - a ee this description of imagination as being very close the what people often refer to as hypertext. The one thing, and I wonder if this is part of Vygotsky is that intuitive leaps are not random but part of purposeful activity, there is always a continuous relationship between point one and point two. One a related point the other day we were discussing in class what Dewey means by creativity. What we came up with was when somebody thinks of something they haven't thought of before. This process of creativity is that same for a three year old as it is for a world renowned scientist. The recognition that one plus one is two is similar to the discovery of quantum physic. Think about it a three year old staring at two separate things and the extraordinary imaginative leap that allows them to realize that two different things can become a single set of two. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall Sent: Friday, December 04, 2015 2:04 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy All For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing so I came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity in the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination that it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass in the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given concrete toward a new concrete.? I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being asked to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody is interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my wondering is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, in the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about and then a question. My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to see a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not a fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.? This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) seems to be very hard for people to do. My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws a point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This is its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her hand at the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of this is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step here seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm , I see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the mathematical concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged horse]. So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky have called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? There is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in your take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. Ed Wall From ewall@umich.edu Sat Dec 5 16:12:46 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sat, 5 Dec 2015 18:12:46 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C2F64F@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C2F64F@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Michael I have always been very much awed (when I learned to watch and listen) with the extraordinary leaps made by three year olds. The question I have been wondering about is what is entailed in that leap and the more I carefully try to describe it the more features it seems to share with imagination (at least, the version I think Vygotsky may, at times, have in mind and that of some others like Edward Casey who think very carefully about this). Casey, by the way, speaks about controlled imagination (and, of course, the more spontaneous version) Dewey says something about using imagination to sort of practice things prior to acting them out (I have the quote somewhere but can?t find it). The whole creativity thing is important, but I guess I?m think about the ?small? everyday moments of ?creativity.' I came to the Vygotsky quote after I had found references to a going from concrete to new concrete through imagination from others. So my interpretation was colored by this. Ed > On Dec 4, 2015, at 6:47 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > Hi Ed, > > This is really interesting (at least to me). I have a little bit of a different interpretation of the quote from Vygotsky. It reminds me of how Vannevar Bush (the inspiration for the Internet and hypertext) described human thinking in the coming information revolution. You moved from one concrete piece of information to another - it was in the move between these points, what he referred to as an intuitive leap and perhaps this is what Vygotsky refers to as imagination. I s - a ee this description of imagination as being very close the what people often refer to as hypertext. The one thing, and I wonder if this is part of Vygotsky is that intuitive leaps are not random but part of purposeful activity, there is always a continuous relationship between point one and point two. > > One a related point the other day we were discussing in class what Dewey means by creativity. What we came up with was when somebody thinks of something they haven't thought of before. This process of creativity is that same for a three year old as it is for a world renowned scientist. The recognition that one plus one is two is similar to the discovery of quantum physic. Think about it a three year old staring at two separate things and the extraordinary imaginative leap that allows them to realize that two different things can become a single set of two. > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall > Sent: Friday, December 04, 2015 2:04 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy > > All > > For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing so I came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity in the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination that it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass in the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given concrete toward a new concrete.? > > I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being asked to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody is interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my wondering is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, in the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about and then a question. > > My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to see a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not a fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.? This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) seems to be very hard for people to do. > > My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws a point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This is its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her hand at the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of this is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step here seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm , I see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the mathematical concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) > > [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged horse]. > > So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky have called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? There is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in your take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. > > Ed Wall > > > > > > > > > > > From ewall@umich.edu Sat Dec 5 16:23:56 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sat, 5 Dec 2015 18:23:56 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Mike This is helpful. At times the Riber edited version seems to read as if he did somewhat equate the two. Of course, fantasy is a complicated word also. I did look at what seemed to be a discussion around imagination in the archive, but it can sometimes be difficult to shift and it seemed better to ask. I think you could say there is concept development going on. However, what catches my attention is that on one side of a moment you have ?pseudo-concepts? (this doesn?t seem quite right) and on the other a concept. There is a leap and I am wondering about the make up of that leap. It is like saying intuition and describing the before and after. Anyway, as usual, all this is helpful and I will look into your pointers. There is clearly a sort of leap and I think one can make a case for it consisting, in part, of a sort of everyday imagination; however, there may be better ways to think about it. Ed > On Dec 4, 2015, at 5:28 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Hi Ed-- I share a lot of your questions. But one question i am more or less > certain of, LSV did not equate imagination and fantasy. I know a couple of > articles one of which > is my own, which draws on LSV. The other is by the blind-deaf guy who > finally got me to think more effectively about imagination which is > currently a pre-occupation. > > What is very important reading the article by Suvorov is to put the word > "imagination" everywhere the word, "representation" is used. I discuss the > issue in a forward, but I was both clearly mistaken and moving in the right > direction. > Perhaps an example of the development of concept development from a > pseudo-concept to a true concept? I had not yet matured to the point where > I could totally deconstruct "voobrazhenie" to be translated as > "into-image-making" and start to use it productively. To understand it as > the central to all processes of coming to know. I even missed the fact > that I was using a lousy dictionary because imagination was defined as > perception or ideation (?sic?), not imagination. > > The Peleprat and Cole paper shows the influence of teaching a course on > mediational theories of mind for many years to juniors in a Communication > department. We have had a thread on here called imagination that existed > for a flicker in the past. Francine Smolucha is an actual expert in this > field who, lets hope, is reading. > > Happy to discuss imagination. :-) > mike > > I highly recommend *The Work of the Imagination" by Paul Harris and there > is a handbook of the development of imagination in ebook form that is very > useful. I need to think more about your examples and will comment if I > have anything potentially useful to say. > > mike > > > On Fri, Dec 4, 2015 at 2:04 PM, Lplarry wrote: > >> Ed, >> >> The title imagination (or) fantasy >> Is different from >> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. >> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a distanciation?) and >> return to the mathematical concrete. >> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the >> physical to the mathematical? >> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in historical >> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical (concrete) >> which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical >> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within the >> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? >> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. >> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which originates as >> concrete. >> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. >> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does one >> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the actual can >> be mapped onto the physical with systems? >> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? >> Larry >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: "Ed Wall" >> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy >> >> All >> >> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination >> that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or >> ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements >> although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing so I >> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity in >> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination that >> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an >> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass in >> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, >> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given >> concrete toward a new concrete.? >> >> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion on >> the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am wondering >> whether part of what is going on is that children are being asked to >> ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the elementary >> school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody is interested I >> can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my wondering is that for so >> many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no stepping from >> concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, in the abstract. >> So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about and then a >> question. >> >> My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to see a >> winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a >> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not a >> fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.? >> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then >> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another >> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through >> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) seems to >> be very hard for people to do. >> >> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws >> something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws a >> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This is >> its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her hand at >> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of this >> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step here >> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm , I >> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the mathematical >> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) >> >> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged >> horse]. >> >> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with fantasy >> (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky have called >> my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? There is, I >> note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in your take >> on what Vygotsky?s take might be. >> >> Ed Wall >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > From ewall@umich.edu Sat Dec 5 16:46:12 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sat, 5 Dec 2015 18:46:12 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> Larry I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or exclusive. I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense if I understand Vygotsky correctly. I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps I wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the tendency to think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow extra-concrete. The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical context and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain things are ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that is?). I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean when you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, perhaps, would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy in your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final question. An approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other possibilities (smile). Ed > On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry wrote: > > Ed, > > The title imagination (or) fantasy > Is different from > Imagination (equates) with fantasy. > To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a distanciation?) and return to the mathematical concrete. > Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the physical to the mathematical? > If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in historical consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical (concrete) which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within the imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? > It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. > Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which originates as concrete. > To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. > Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does one imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the actual can be mapped onto the physical with systems? > Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? > Larry > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Ed Wall" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy > > All > > For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing so I came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity in the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination that it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass in the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given concrete toward a new concrete.? > > I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being asked to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody is interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my wondering is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, in the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about and then a question. > > My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to see a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not a fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.? This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) seems to be very hard for people to do. > > My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws a point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This is its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her hand at the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of this is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step here seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm , I see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the mathematical concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) > > [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged horse]. > > So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky have called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? There is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in your take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. > > Ed Wall > > > > > > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Dec 6 08:42:07 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2015 08:42:07 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> Message-ID: <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> Ed, mike, Michael, I will push my question to an earlier time period. Age 2 months. The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own activity . Question With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving into the image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? -----Original Message----- From: "Ed Wall" Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy Larry I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or exclusive. I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense if I understand Vygotsky correctly. I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps I wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the tendency to think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow extra-concrete. The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical context and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain things are ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that is?). I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean when you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, perhaps, would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy in your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final question. An approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other possibilities (smile). Ed > On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry wrote: > > Ed, > > The title imagination (or) fantasy > Is different from > Imagination (equates) with fantasy. > To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a distanciation?) and return to the mathematical concrete. > Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the physical to the mathematical? > If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in historical consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical (concrete) which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within the imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? > It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. > Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which originates as concrete. > To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. > Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does one imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the actual can be mapped onto the physical with systems? > Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? > Larry > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Ed Wall" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy > > All > > For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing so I came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity in the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination that it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass in the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given concrete toward a new concrete.? > > I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being asked to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody is interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my wondering is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, in the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about and then a question. > > My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to see a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not a fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.? This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) seems to be very hard for people to do. > > My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws a point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This is its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her hand at the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of this is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step here seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm , I see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the mathematical concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) > > [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged horse]. > > So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky have called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? There is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in your take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. > > Ed Wall > > > > > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Dec 6 09:11:09 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2015 09:11:09 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et al I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic beginnings builds off of the already highly functional sensory system. Assume vision as the sensory system in question. We know that in an important sense, the "simple" act of seeing what you might call a common object, for example your car in the driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves temporal and spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement that must be resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the process of image formation ceases to function. The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for that simplified account. In thinking about imagination I turn to Zaporozhets, Zinchenko and non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of enactive perception/cognition. It is also consistent with joint, mediated, activity as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go. I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic function and the human possibility for symbolic communication is co-incident and co-constitutive of distinctly human imagination. in brief mike On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry wrote: > Ed, mike, Michael, > I will push my question to an earlier time period. > Age 2 months. > The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own activity . > Question > With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving into the > image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? > Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Ed Wall" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy > > Larry > > I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or > exclusive. > > I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense if I > understand Vygotsky correctly. > > I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps I > wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the tendency to > think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow extra-concrete. > The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical context > and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain things are > ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that is?). > > I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of > systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. > > Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean when > you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, perhaps, > would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy > > Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy in > your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final question. An > approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other > possibilities (smile). > > Ed > > > On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > Ed, > > > > The title imagination (or) fantasy > > Is different from > > Imagination (equates) with fantasy. > > To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a distanciation?) > and return to the mathematical concrete. > > Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the > physical to the mathematical? > > If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in historical > consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical (concrete) > which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical > (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within the > imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? > > It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. > > Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which originates as > concrete. > > To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. > > Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does one > imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the actual can > be mapped onto the physical with systems? > > Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? > > Larry > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: "Ed Wall" > > Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy > > > > All > > > > For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination > that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or > ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements > although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing so I > came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity in > the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination that > it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an > intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass in > the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, > imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given > concrete toward a new concrete.? > > > > I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion > on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am > wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being asked > to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the > elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody is > interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my wondering > is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no > stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, in > the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about and > then a question. > > > > My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to see > a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a > somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not a > fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.? > This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then > look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another > example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through > imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) seems to > be very hard for people to do. > > > > My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws > something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws a > point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This is > its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her hand at > the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of this > is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step here > seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm , I > see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the mathematical > concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) > > > > [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged > horse]. > > > > So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with > fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky have > called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? There > is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in your > take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. > > > > Ed Wall > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From ewall@umich.edu Sun Dec 6 10:41:23 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2015 12:41:23 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Larry As I think, to an extent, that one can imagine taste, touch, sound, and smell (and, in a way, intellectually) focusing on ?image? seems to obscure. Thus, your question, doesn?t, in a way, make much sense to me. That doesn?t mean that it doesn?t to others. Also, I suspect you would, at least, need to take the baby and mother back to -2 months to get at an embryonic origin. Ed > On Dec 6, 2015, at 10:42 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > Ed, mike, Michael, > I will push my question to an earlier time period. > Age 2 months. > The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own activity . > Question > With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving into the image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? > Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Ed Wall" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy > > Larry > > I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or exclusive. > > I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense if I understand Vygotsky correctly. > > I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps I wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the tendency to think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow extra-concrete. The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical context and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain things are ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that is?). > > I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. > > Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean when you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, perhaps, would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy > > Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy in your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final question. An approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other possibilities (smile). > > Ed > >> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry wrote: >> >> Ed, >> >> The title imagination (or) fantasy >> Is different from >> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. >> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a distanciation?) and return to the mathematical concrete. >> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the physical to the mathematical? >> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in historical consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical (concrete) which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within the imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? >> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. >> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which originates as concrete. >> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. >> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does one imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the actual can be mapped onto the physical with systems? >> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? >> Larry >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: "Ed Wall" >> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy >> >> All >> >> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing so I came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity in the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination that it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass in the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given concrete toward a new concrete.? >> >> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being asked to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody is interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my wondering is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, in the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about and then a question. >> >> My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to see a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not a fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.? This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) seems to be very hard for people to do. >> >> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws a point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This is its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her hand at the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of this is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step here seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm , I see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the mathematical concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) >> >> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged horse]. >> >> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky have called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? There is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in your take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. >> >> Ed Wall >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Dec 6 11:45:17 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2015 11:45:17 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Soviet Psychology Overview Article Message-ID: This morning I stumbled over the attached historical overview of Soviet Psychology in relation to international psychology that I thought would be of interest to MCA-o-philes. http://www.edition-open-sources.org/studies/1/30/index.html fyi mike -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From ewall@umich.edu Sun Dec 6 12:02:16 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2015 14:02:16 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Mike As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the privileging of the ?image? in discussions of imagination. Additionally, although it has been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don?t think it was of the Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw on would disagree with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics. I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems useful! - and I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a huge emphasis in mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking less about the ?imaginal? than you or Larry. That doesn?t mean that what you and Larry are talking about might not usefully factor in especially your point about joint, mediated, activity. Ed > On Dec 6, 2015, at 11:11 AM, mike cole wrote: > > Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et al > > I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic beginnings builds off of > the already highly functional sensory system. Assume vision as the sensory > system in question. We know that in an important sense, the "simple" act of > seeing what you might call a common object, for example your car in the > driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves temporal and > spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement that must be > resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the process of image > formation ceases to function. > > The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for that simplified > account. In thinking about imagination I turn to Zaporozhets, Zinchenko and > non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of enactive > perception/cognition. It is also consistent with joint, mediated, activity > as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go. > > I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic function and the > human possibility for symbolic communication is co-incident and > co-constitutive of distinctly human imagination. > > in brief > mike > > On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry wrote: > >> Ed, mike, Michael, >> I will push my question to an earlier time period. >> Age 2 months. >> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own activity . >> Question >> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving into the >> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? >> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: "Ed Wall" >> Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy >> >> Larry >> >> I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or >> exclusive. >> >> I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense if I >> understand Vygotsky correctly. >> >> I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps I >> wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the tendency to >> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow extra-concrete. >> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical context >> and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain things are >> ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that is?). >> >> I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of >> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. >> >> Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean when >> you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, perhaps, >> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy >> >> Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy in >> your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final question. An >> approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other >> possibilities (smile). >> >> Ed >> >>> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry wrote: >>> >>> Ed, >>> >>> The title imagination (or) fantasy >>> Is different from >>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. >>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a distanciation?) >> and return to the mathematical concrete. >>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the >> physical to the mathematical? >>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in historical >> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical (concrete) >> which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical >> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within the >> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? >>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. >>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which originates as >> concrete. >>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. >>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does one >> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the actual can >> be mapped onto the physical with systems? >>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? >>> Larry >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: "Ed Wall" >>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy >>> >>> All >>> >>> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination >> that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or >> ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements >> although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing so I >> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity in >> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination that >> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an >> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass in >> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, >> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given >> concrete toward a new concrete.? >>> >>> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion >> on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am >> wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being asked >> to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the >> elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody is >> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my wondering >> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no >> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, in >> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about and >> then a question. >>> >>> My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to see >> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a >> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not a >> fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.? >> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then >> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another >> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through >> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) seems to >> be very hard for people to do. >>> >>> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws >> something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws a >> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This is >> its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her hand at >> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of this >> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step here >> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm , I >> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the mathematical >> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) >>> >>> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged >> horse]. >>> >>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with >> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky have >> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? There >> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in your >> take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. >>> >>> Ed Wall >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Dec 6 12:35:27 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2015 12:35:27 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> Message-ID: If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent. "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of Zinchenko's experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual system that prevented stabilized images from disappearing. He stabilized the image (here reified as a projection on the retina) but changed its color, thus defeating the retina's tendency to go grey. In those conditions, eye movements continue to trace the spatial coordinates of the image as if it were continuing to "feel it." These are very special circumstances, to be sure, but for they make it clear that what is called an image is a process (according to Suvorov, of stepping away from the world and then stepping back into it, but then he was blind and deaf). What we designate as "the image" is some form of materialized stabilization of the flow of into-image-making. Some structure in the flow of the always new. From just the blink of an eye to our image of the statue of liberty. This is an old idea but it fits with my intuition. I first encountered it reading Dewey who refers to "the poet" on the topic of experience. *Yet all experience is an arch wherehrough / Gleams that untraveled world whose margin fades / Forever and forever when I move. * *Tennyson, Ulysses* If you are interested, we could try to synch re/reading of some core common articles/chapters. This entire area of concern is of recent vintage for me and my ignorance is particularly keenly felt. mike On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:02 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > Mike > > As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the privileging of > the ?image? in discussions of imagination. Additionally, although it has > been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don?t think it was of the > Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw on would disagree > with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics. > I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems useful! - and > I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a huge emphasis in > mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking less about the > ?imaginal? than you or Larry. That doesn?t mean that what you and Larry are > talking about might not usefully factor in especially your point about > joint, mediated, activity. > > Ed > > > On Dec 6, 2015, at 11:11 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et al > > > > I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic beginnings builds off > of > > the already highly functional sensory system. Assume vision as the > sensory > > system in question. We know that in an important sense, the "simple" act > of > > seeing what you might call a common object, for example your car in the > > driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves temporal and > > spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement that must be > > resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the process of image > > formation ceases to function. > > > > The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for that simplified > > account. In thinking about imagination I turn to Zaporozhets, Zinchenko > and > > non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of enactive > > perception/cognition. It is also consistent with joint, mediated, > activity > > as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go. > > > > I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic function and the > > human possibility for symbolic communication is co-incident and > > co-constitutive of distinctly human imagination. > > > > in brief > > mike > > > > On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > >> Ed, mike, Michael, > >> I will push my question to an earlier time period. > >> Age 2 months. > >> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own activity . > >> Question > >> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving into the > >> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? > >> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: "Ed Wall" > >> Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM > >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy > >> > >> Larry > >> > >> I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or > >> exclusive. > >> > >> I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense if > I > >> understand Vygotsky correctly. > >> > >> I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps I > >> wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the > tendency to > >> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow > extra-concrete. > >> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical > context > >> and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain things > are > >> ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that is?). > >> > >> I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of > >> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. > >> > >> Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean when > >> you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, > perhaps, > >> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy > >> > >> Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy in > >> your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final question. An > >> approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other > >> possibilities (smile). > >> > >> Ed > >> > >>> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry wrote: > >>> > >>> Ed, > >>> > >>> The title imagination (or) fantasy > >>> Is different from > >>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. > >>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a distanciation?) > >> and return to the mathematical concrete. > >>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the > >> physical to the mathematical? > >>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in historical > >> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical (concrete) > >> which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical > >> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within the > >> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? > >>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. > >>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which originates > as > >> concrete. > >>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. > >>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does one > >> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the actual > can > >> be mapped onto the physical with systems? > >>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? > >>> Larry > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: "Ed Wall" > >>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM > >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy > >>> > >>> All > >>> > >>> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination > >> that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or > >> ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements > >> although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing so I > >> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity > in > >> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination > that > >> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an > >> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass > in > >> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, > >> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given > >> concrete toward a new concrete.? > >>> > >>> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion > >> on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am > >> wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being > asked > >> to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the > >> elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody > is > >> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my > wondering > >> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no > >> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, > in > >> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about > and > >> then a question. > >>> > >>> My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to see > >> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a > >> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not > a > >> fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.? > >> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then > >> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another > >> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through > >> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) > seems to > >> be very hard for people to do. > >>> > >>> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws > >> something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws a > >> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This > is > >> its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her hand > at > >> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of > this > >> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step > here > >> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm > , I > >> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the > mathematical > >> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) > >>> > >>> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged > >> horse]. > >>> > >>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with > >> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky > have > >> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? > There > >> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in > your > >> take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. > >>> > >>> Ed Wall > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Dec 6 12:53:37 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2015 12:53:37 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com> Ed, In mike's editorial notes introducing Suvorov's article mike focuses and draws our attention to a (gap) in American cognitive psychology. This gap results in a difficulty in translation of the term vo-obraz-zhenie. The suffix (zhenie) shifts the meaning (into-image) to (imaging) as process. Mike made a decision. Since he was addressing an American audience he left this meaning (imaging) to one side and replaced (imaging) with a substitute word (representation). I am now drawing attention to why American cognitive psychology is better able to understand and relate to (representation) than (imaging)? I suspect it is because of cultural historical circumstances that denigrated (imaging). I am returning to vo-obraz-zenhie and trying to honour (imaging) as expressing qualities that include the sensory experience but add other characteristics. Suvorov beliefs the fundamental act of cognition is the (stepping back) from the world, which WHEN RECOMBINED with original sensation, yields thought. So the place of (imaging) and mike's decision to replace with the word (representation) has a narrative to tell. My question is if (representation) looses a felt quality that (imaging) embodied and expressed as moving (into the image) better captures. Presentation and (re)presentation may be resting on this (imaging) that has a (felt) quality. The movement of referring, indicating as intentionally denotative presentational gestures may rest in a more primordial moment of (felt) moving within the image. To say that the mom and infant move mutually and call this process activity (shared actions) is not questioned. My question is if this activity is (imaginal) at this felt level of mutual synchronization (always marked but never identical) prior to being (presented). Are there qualities of vo-obraz-zenhie that (imaging) images better than (presentation) images? -----Original Message----- From: "Ed Wall" Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 10:43 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy Larry As I think, to an extent, that one can imagine taste, touch, sound, and smell (and, in a way, intellectually) focusing on ?image? seems to obscure. Thus, your question, doesn?t, in a way, make much sense to me. That doesn?t mean that it doesn?t to others. Also, I suspect you would, at least, need to take the baby and mother back to -2 months to get at an embryonic origin. Ed > On Dec 6, 2015, at 10:42 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > Ed, mike, Michael, > I will push my question to an earlier time period. > Age 2 months. > The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own activity . > Question > With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving into the image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? > Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Ed Wall" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy > > Larry > > I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or exclusive. > > I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense if I understand Vygotsky correctly. > > I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps I wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the tendency to think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow extra-concrete. The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical context and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain things are ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that is?). > > I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. > > Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean when you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, perhaps, would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy > > Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy in your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final question. An approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other possibilities (smile). > > Ed > >> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry wrote: >> >> Ed, >> >> The title imagination (or) fantasy >> Is different from >> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. >> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a distanciation?) and return to the mathematical concrete. >> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the physical to the mathematical? >> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in historical consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical (concrete) which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within the imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? >> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. >> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which originates as concrete. >> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. >> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does one imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the actual can be mapped onto the physical with systems? >> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? >> Larry >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: "Ed Wall" >> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy >> >> All >> >> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing so I came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity in the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination that it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass in the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given concrete toward a new concrete.? >> >> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being asked to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody is interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my wondering is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, in the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about and then a question. >> >> My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to see a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not a fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.? This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) seems to be very hard for people to do. >> >> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws a point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This is its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her hand at the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of this is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step here seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm , I see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the mathematical concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) >> >> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged horse]. >> >> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky have called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? There is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in your take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. >> >> Ed Wall >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > From ewall@umich.edu Sun Dec 6 13:13:23 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2015 15:13:23 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Mike My wondering has more to do with your focus on the visual and my examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be about the visual. However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well drawn) is a ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at least, it never was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. In fact, assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I can imagine it (smile). On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term ?image? in the way some use the word ?text.? That is, to take into account both external and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of what you say resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am finding that peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky. Ed > On Dec 6, 2015, at 2:35 PM, mike cole wrote: > > If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent. > > "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of Zinchenko's > experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual system that > prevented stabilized images from disappearing. He stabilized the image > (here reified as a projection on the retina) but changed its color, thus > defeating the retina's tendency to go grey. In those conditions, eye > movements continue to trace the spatial coordinates of the image as if it > were continuing to "feel it." > > These are very special circumstances, to be sure, but for they make it > clear that what is called an image is a process (according to Suvorov, of > stepping away from the world and then stepping back into it, but then he > was blind and deaf). > > What we designate as "the image" is some form of materialized stabilization > of the flow of into-image-making. Some structure in the flow of the always > new. From just the blink of an eye to our image of the statue of liberty. > > This is an old idea but it fits with my intuition. I first encountered it > reading Dewey who refers to "the poet" on the topic of experience. > > > > *Yet all experience is an arch wherehrough / Gleams that untraveled world > whose margin fades / Forever and forever when I move. * > > *Tennyson, Ulysses* > > > If you are interested, we could try to synch re/reading of some core common > articles/chapters. This entire area of concern is of recent vintage for me > and my ignorance is particularly keenly felt. > > mike > > On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:02 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >> Mike >> >> As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the privileging of >> the ?image? in discussions of imagination. Additionally, although it has >> been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don?t think it was of the >> Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw on would disagree >> with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics. >> I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems useful! - and >> I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a huge emphasis in >> mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking less about the >> ?imaginal? than you or Larry. That doesn?t mean that what you and Larry are >> talking about might not usefully factor in especially your point about >> joint, mediated, activity. >> >> Ed >> >>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 11:11 AM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et al >>> >>> I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic beginnings builds off >> of >>> the already highly functional sensory system. Assume vision as the >> sensory >>> system in question. We know that in an important sense, the "simple" act >> of >>> seeing what you might call a common object, for example your car in the >>> driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves temporal and >>> spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement that must be >>> resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the process of image >>> formation ceases to function. >>> >>> The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for that simplified >>> account. In thinking about imagination I turn to Zaporozhets, Zinchenko >> and >>> non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of enactive >>> perception/cognition. It is also consistent with joint, mediated, >> activity >>> as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go. >>> >>> I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic function and the >>> human possibility for symbolic communication is co-incident and >>> co-constitutive of distinctly human imagination. >>> >>> in brief >>> mike >>> >>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>> >>>> Ed, mike, Michael, >>>> I will push my question to an earlier time period. >>>> Age 2 months. >>>> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own activity . >>>> Question >>>> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving into the >>>> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? >>>> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: "Ed Wall" >>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM >>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy >>>> >>>> Larry >>>> >>>> I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or >>>> exclusive. >>>> >>>> I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense if >> I >>>> understand Vygotsky correctly. >>>> >>>> I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps I >>>> wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the >> tendency to >>>> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow >> extra-concrete. >>>> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical >> context >>>> and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain things >> are >>>> ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that is?). >>>> >>>> I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of >>>> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. >>>> >>>> Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean when >>>> you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, >> perhaps, >>>> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy >>>> >>>> Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy in >>>> your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final question. An >>>> approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other >>>> possibilities (smile). >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>>> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Ed, >>>>> >>>>> The title imagination (or) fantasy >>>>> Is different from >>>>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. >>>>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a distanciation?) >>>> and return to the mathematical concrete. >>>>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the >>>> physical to the mathematical? >>>>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in historical >>>> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical (concrete) >>>> which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical >>>> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within the >>>> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? >>>>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. >>>>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which originates >> as >>>> concrete. >>>>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. >>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does one >>>> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the actual >> can >>>> be mapped onto the physical with systems? >>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? >>>>> Larry >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: "Ed Wall" >>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM >>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy >>>>> >>>>> All >>>>> >>>>> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination >>>> that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or >>>> ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements >>>> although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing so I >>>> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity >> in >>>> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination >> that >>>> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an >>>> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass >> in >>>> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, >>>> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given >>>> concrete toward a new concrete.? >>>>> >>>>> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion >>>> on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am >>>> wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being >> asked >>>> to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the >>>> elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody >> is >>>> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my >> wondering >>>> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no >>>> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, >> in >>>> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about >> and >>>> then a question. >>>>> >>>>> My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to see >>>> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a >>>> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not >> a >>>> fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.? >>>> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then >>>> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another >>>> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through >>>> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) >> seems to >>>> be very hard for people to do. >>>>> >>>>> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws >>>> something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws a >>>> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This >> is >>>> its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her hand >> at >>>> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of >> this >>>> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step >> here >>>> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm >> , I >>>> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the >> mathematical >>>> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) >>>>> >>>>> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged >>>> horse]. >>>>> >>>>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with >>>> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky >> have >>>> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? >> There >>>> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in >> your >>>> take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. >>>>> >>>>> Ed Wall >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> >> >> > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Dec 6 13:50:58 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2015 13:50:58 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> Message-ID: I agree its helpful to be multi-nodal, Ed. Its just that the most ready-to-hand examples involve vision. I need to go back and read your initial examples. The blind-deaf naturally bring up tactile examples. The same "fading of the image," in this case a "feeling" might be the first time I held a potential girl friend's hand. Wow, what a lot of excitement! But if you keep holding hands, the feeling gradually dissipates and in order to re-experience your two hands have to move in relationship to each other, some might call it rubbing against each other. Stability of "the image" engenders its disappearance. It becomes part of the "infrastructure" and passes from view. Lots to ponder. mike On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 1:13 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > Mike > > My wondering has more to do with your focus on the visual and my > examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be about the visual. > However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well drawn) is a > ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at least, it never > was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. In fact, > assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I can imagine it > (smile). > On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term ?image? in the > way some use the word ?text.? That is, to take into account both external > and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of what you say > resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am finding that > peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky. > > Ed > > > On Dec 6, 2015, at 2:35 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent. > > > > "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of Zinchenko's > > experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual system that > > prevented stabilized images from disappearing. He stabilized the image > > (here reified as a projection on the retina) but changed its color, thus > > defeating the retina's tendency to go grey. In those conditions, eye > > movements continue to trace the spatial coordinates of the image as if it > > were continuing to "feel it." > > > > These are very special circumstances, to be sure, but for they make it > > clear that what is called an image is a process (according to Suvorov, of > > stepping away from the world and then stepping back into it, but then he > > was blind and deaf). > > > > What we designate as "the image" is some form of materialized > stabilization > > of the flow of into-image-making. Some structure in the flow of the > always > > new. From just the blink of an eye to our image of the statue of liberty. > > > > This is an old idea but it fits with my intuition. I first encountered it > > reading Dewey who refers to "the poet" on the topic of experience. > > > > > > > > *Yet all experience is an arch wherehrough / Gleams that untraveled world > > whose margin fades / Forever and forever when I move. * > > > > *Tennyson, Ulysses* > > > > > > If you are interested, we could try to synch re/reading of some core > common > > articles/chapters. This entire area of concern is of recent vintage for > me > > and my ignorance is particularly keenly felt. > > > > mike > > > > On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:02 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > >> Mike > >> > >> As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the privileging of > >> the ?image? in discussions of imagination. Additionally, although it has > >> been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don?t think it was of > the > >> Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw on would > disagree > >> with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics. > >> I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems useful! - > and > >> I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a huge emphasis > in > >> mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking less about the > >> ?imaginal? than you or Larry. That doesn?t mean that what you and Larry > are > >> talking about might not usefully factor in especially your point about > >> joint, mediated, activity. > >> > >> Ed > >> > >>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 11:11 AM, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>> Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et al > >>> > >>> I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic beginnings builds > off > >> of > >>> the already highly functional sensory system. Assume vision as the > >> sensory > >>> system in question. We know that in an important sense, the "simple" > act > >> of > >>> seeing what you might call a common object, for example your car in the > >>> driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves temporal and > >>> spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement that must be > >>> resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the process of image > >>> formation ceases to function. > >>> > >>> The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for that > simplified > >>> account. In thinking about imagination I turn to Zaporozhets, Zinchenko > >> and > >>> non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of enactive > >>> perception/cognition. It is also consistent with joint, mediated, > >> activity > >>> as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go. > >>> > >>> I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic function and > the > >>> human possibility for symbolic communication is co-incident and > >>> co-constitutive of distinctly human imagination. > >>> > >>> in brief > >>> mike > >>> > >>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry wrote: > >>> > >>>> Ed, mike, Michael, > >>>> I will push my question to an earlier time period. > >>>> Age 2 months. > >>>> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own activity . > >>>> Question > >>>> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving into > the > >>>> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? > >>>> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? > >>>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: "Ed Wall" > >>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM > >>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy > >>>> > >>>> Larry > >>>> > >>>> I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or > >>>> exclusive. > >>>> > >>>> I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense if > >> I > >>>> understand Vygotsky correctly. > >>>> > >>>> I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps I > >>>> wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the > >> tendency to > >>>> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow > >> extra-concrete. > >>>> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical > >> context > >>>> and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain things > >> are > >>>> ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that is?). > >>>> > >>>> I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of > >>>> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. > >>>> > >>>> Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean when > >>>> you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, > >> perhaps, > >>>> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy > >>>> > >>>> Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy in > >>>> your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final question. > An > >>>> approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other > >>>> possibilities (smile). > >>>> > >>>> Ed > >>>> > >>>>> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Ed, > >>>>> > >>>>> The title imagination (or) fantasy > >>>>> Is different from > >>>>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. > >>>>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a distanciation?) > >>>> and return to the mathematical concrete. > >>>>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the > >>>> physical to the mathematical? > >>>>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in historical > >>>> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical > (concrete) > >>>> which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical > >>>> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within the > >>>> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? > >>>>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. > >>>>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which originates > >> as > >>>> concrete. > >>>>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. > >>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does > one > >>>> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the actual > >> can > >>>> be mapped onto the physical with systems? > >>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? > >>>>> Larry > >>>>> > >>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > >>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM > >>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy > >>>>> > >>>>> All > >>>>> > >>>>> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of > imagination > >>>> that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or > >>>> ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements > >>>> although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing > so I > >>>> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and > Creativity > >> in > >>>> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination > >> that > >>>> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an > >>>> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a > pass > >> in > >>>> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, > >>>> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given > >>>> concrete toward a new concrete.? > >>>>> > >>>>> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion > >>>> on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am > >>>> wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being > >> asked > >>>> to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the > >>>> elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody > >> is > >>>> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my > >> wondering > >>>> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is > no > >>>> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to > speak, > >> in > >>>> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about > >> and > >>>> then a question. > >>>>> > >>>>> My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to see > >>>> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. > In a > >>>> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is > not > >> a > >>>> fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a > fraction.? > >>>> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and > then > >>>> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another > >>>> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through > >>>> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) > >> seems to > >>>> be very hard for people to do. > >>>>> > >>>>> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws > >>>> something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws > a > >>>> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This > >> is > >>>> its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her > hand > >> at > >>>> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of > >> this > >>>> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step > >> here > >>>> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. > (Hmm > >> , I > >>>> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the > >> mathematical > >>>> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) > >>>>> > >>>>> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged > >>>> horse]. > >>>>> > >>>>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with > >>>> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky > >> have > >>>> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? > >> There > >>>> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in > >> your > >>>> take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. > >>>>> > >>>>> Ed Wall > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Dec 6 14:41:10 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2015 14:41:10 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and re(present) our notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a metaphor not error. Ed, To continue with your reflection if image has some relation to how others use text. Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In other words can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The physical gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of letters on the page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or the visual marks making a circle-like shape. These different physical forms are not the foundational bedrock, they are the material. If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on parchment but as having a deeper process, Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual perceptions but rather having a deeper process. All the senses share in this process and engage with physically experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is that unifying process that includes all the senses but is not itself the senses. To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the collated pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a dialogue, to imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly have a unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the vital animating process lived (into). This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy of the visual sense. The relation of this image process to the language process is also multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. -----Original Message----- From: "Ed Wall" Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination Mike My wondering has more to do with your focus on the visual and my examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be about the visual. However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well drawn) is a ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at least, it never was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. In fact, assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I can imagine it (smile). On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term ?image? in the way some use the word ?text.? That is, to take into account both external and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of what you say resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am finding that peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky. Ed > On Dec 6, 2015, at 2:35 PM, mike cole wrote: > > If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent. > > "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of Zinchenko's > experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual system that > prevented stabilized images from disappearing. He stabilized the image > (here reified as a projection on the retina) but changed its color, thus > defeating the retina's tendency to go grey. In those conditions, eye > movements continue to trace the spatial coordinates of the image as if it > were continuing to "feel it." > > These are very special circumstances, to be sure, but for they make it > clear that what is called an image is a process (according to Suvorov, of > stepping away from the world and then stepping back into it, but then he > was blind and deaf). > > What we designate as "the image" is some form of materialized stabilization > of the flow of into-image-making. Some structure in the flow of the always > new. From just the blink of an eye to our image of the statue of liberty. > > This is an old idea but it fits with my intuition. I first encountered it > reading Dewey who refers to "the poet" on the topic of experience. > > > > *Yet all experience is an arch wherehrough / Gleams that untraveled world > whose margin fades / Forever and forever when I move. * > > *Tennyson, Ulysses* > > > If you are interested, we could try to synch re/reading of some core common > articles/chapters. This entire area of concern is of recent vintage for me > and my ignorance is particularly keenly felt. > > mike > > On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:02 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >> Mike >> >> As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the privileging of >> the ?image? in discussions of imagination. Additionally, although it has >> been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don?t think it was of the >> Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw on would disagree >> with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics. >> I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems useful! - and >> I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a huge emphasis in >> mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking less about the >> ?imaginal? than you or Larry. That doesn?t mean that what you and Larry are >> talking about might not usefully factor in especially your point about >> joint, mediated, activity. >> >> Ed >> >>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 11:11 AM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et al >>> >>> I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic beginnings builds off >> of >>> the already highly functional sensory system. Assume vision as the >> sensory >>> system in question. We know that in an important sense, the "simple" act >> of >>> seeing what you might call a common object, for example your car in the >>> driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves temporal and >>> spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement that must be >>> resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the process of image >>> formation ceases to function. >>> >>> The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for that simplified >>> account. In thinking about imagination I turn to Zaporozhets, Zinchenko >> and >>> non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of enactive >>> perception/cognition. It is also consistent with joint, mediated, >> activity >>> as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go. >>> >>> I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic function and the >>> human possibility for symbolic communication is co-incident and >>> co-constitutive of distinctly human imagination. >>> >>> in brief >>> mike >>> >>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>> >>>> Ed, mike, Michael, >>>> I will push my question to an earlier time period. >>>> Age 2 months. >>>> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own activity . >>>> Question >>>> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving into the >>>> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? >>>> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: "Ed Wall" >>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM >>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy >>>> >>>> Larry >>>> >>>> I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or >>>> exclusive. >>>> >>>> I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense if >> I >>>> understand Vygotsky correctly. >>>> >>>> I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps I >>>> wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the >> tendency to >>>> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow >> extra-concrete. >>>> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical >> context >>>> and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain things >> are >>>> ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that is?). >>>> >>>> I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of >>>> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. >>>> >>>> Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean when >>>> you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, >> perhaps, >>>> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy >>>> >>>> Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy in >>>> your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final question. An >>>> approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other >>>> possibilities (smile). >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>>> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Ed, >>>>> >>>>> The title imagination (or) fantasy >>>>> Is different from >>>>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. >>>>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a distanciation?) >>>> and return to the mathematical concrete. >>>>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the >>>> physical to the mathematical? >>>>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in historical >>>> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical (concrete) >>>> which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical >>>> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within the >>>> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? >>>>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. >>>>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which originates >> as >>>> concrete. >>>>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. >>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does one >>>> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the actual >> can >>>> be mapped onto the physical with systems? >>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? >>>>> Larry >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: "Ed Wall" >>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM >>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy >>>>> >>>>> All >>>>> >>>>> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination >>>> that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or >>>> ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements >>>> although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing so I >>>> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity >> in >>>> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination >> that >>>> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an >>>> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass >> in >>>> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, >>>> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given >>>> concrete toward a new concrete.? >>>>> >>>>> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion >>>> on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am >>>> wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being >> asked >>>> to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the >>>> elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody >> is >>>> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my >> wondering >>>> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no >>>> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, >> in >>>> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about >> and >>>> then a question. >>>>> >>>>> My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to see >>>> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a >>>> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not >> a >>>> fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.? >>>> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then >>>> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another >>>> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through >>>> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) >> seems to >>>> be very hard for people to do. >>>>> >>>>> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws >>>> something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws a >>>> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This >> is >>>> its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her hand >> at >>>> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of >> this >>>> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step >> here >>>> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm >> , I >>>> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the >> mathematical >>>> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) >>>>> >>>>> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged >>>> horse]. >>>>> >>>>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with >>>> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky >> have >>>> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? >> There >>>> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in >> your >>>> take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. >>>>> >>>>> Ed Wall >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> >> >> > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Dec 6 17:05:32 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2015 17:05:32 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Larry. Precisely the following point seems an important one to me. *My question is if (representation) looses a felt quality that (imaging) embodied and expressed as moving (into the image) better captures.* I think the answer is generally *yes.* I venture that what is left has lost some of its affective charge when "in motion." Perhaps the loss of affect is indexed by the fact that representational theories of mind tend strongly to be cognitive theories. In moving from a process into a product, from verbs to nouns, the prior fusion of affect and cognition are effaced. However, to leave at "all is flux" is not awfully useful. So, as I understand it, entifying, classifying, experimenting with the flow of experience seem to be essential to the cultural mode of thought, as characterized for example by LSV. Spoken words and more generally spoken discourse is are saturated with past cultural products constituting the present culturally mediated experience of the present. But all the words and all the pictures in the world will not efface the role of imagination in human experience. lots to think about mike On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:53 PM, Lplarry wrote: > Ed, > In mike's editorial notes introducing Suvorov's article mike focuses and > draws our attention to a (gap) in American cognitive psychology. This gap > results in a difficulty in translation of the term vo-obraz-zhenie. > The suffix (zhenie) shifts the meaning (into-image) to (imaging) as > process. > Mike made a decision. Since he was addressing an American audience he left > this meaning (imaging) to one side and replaced (imaging) with a substitute > word (representation). > I am now drawing attention to why American cognitive psychology is better > able to understand and relate to (representation) than (imaging)? > I suspect it is because of cultural historical circumstances that > denigrated (imaging). > I am returning to vo-obraz-zenhie and trying to honour (imaging) as > expressing qualities that include the sensory experience but add other > characteristics. > Suvorov beliefs the fundamental act of cognition is the (stepping back) > from the world, which WHEN RECOMBINED with original sensation, yields > thought. > So the place of (imaging) and mike's decision to replace with the word > (representation) has a narrative to tell. > My question is if (representation) looses a felt quality that (imaging) > embodied and expressed as moving (into the image) better captures. > Presentation and (re)presentation may be resting on this (imaging) that > has a (felt) quality. The movement of referring, indicating as > intentionally denotative presentational gestures may rest in a more > primordial moment of (felt) moving within the image. > To say that the mom and infant move mutually and call this process > activity (shared actions) is not questioned. > My question is if this activity is (imaginal) at this felt level of mutual > synchronization (always marked but never identical) prior to being > (presented). > Are there qualities of vo-obraz-zenhie that (imaging) images better than > (presentation) images? > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Ed Wall" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 10:43 AM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy > > Larry > > As I think, to an extent, that one can imagine taste, touch, sound, > and smell (and, in a way, intellectually) focusing on ?image? seems to > obscure. Thus, your question, doesn?t, in a way, make much sense to me. > That doesn?t mean that it doesn?t to others. Also, I suspect you would, at > least, need to take the baby and mother back to -2 months to get at an > embryonic origin. > > Ed > > > On Dec 6, 2015, at 10:42 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > Ed, mike, Michael, > > I will push my question to an earlier time period. > > Age 2 months. > > The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own activity . > > Question > > With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving into the > image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? > > Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: "Ed Wall" > > Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy > > > > Larry > > > > I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or > exclusive. > > > > I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense if > I understand Vygotsky correctly. > > > > I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps I > wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the tendency to > think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow extra-concrete. > The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical context > and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain things are > ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that is?). > > > > I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of > systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. > > > > Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean when > you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, perhaps, > would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy > > > > Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy in > your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final question. An > approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other > possibilities (smile). > > > > Ed > > > >> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry wrote: > >> > >> Ed, > >> > >> The title imagination (or) fantasy > >> Is different from > >> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. > >> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a distanciation?) > and return to the mathematical concrete. > >> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the > physical to the mathematical? > >> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in historical > consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical (concrete) > which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical > (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within the > imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? > >> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. > >> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which originates > as concrete. > >> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. > >> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does one > imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the actual can > be mapped onto the physical with systems? > >> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? > >> Larry > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: "Ed Wall" > >> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM > >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy > >> > >> All > >> > >> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination > that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or > ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements > although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing so I > came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity in > the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination that > it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an > intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass in > the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, > imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given > concrete toward a new concrete.? > >> > >> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion > on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am > wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being asked > to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the > elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody is > interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my wondering > is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no > stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, in > the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about and > then a question. > >> > >> My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to see > a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a > somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not a > fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.? > This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then > look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another > example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through > imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) seems to > be very hard for people to do. > >> > >> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws > something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws a > point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This is > its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her hand at > the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of this > is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step here > seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm , I > see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the mathematical > concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) > >> > >> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged > horse]. > >> > >> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with > fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky have > called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? There > is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in your > take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. > >> > >> Ed Wall > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Dec 6 19:07:28 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2015 19:07:28 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <5664f808.08e5420a.dadef.76cd@mx.google.com> Mike I fully concur with this summation that entifying, classifying, experimenting, be included in our understanding of imaging. The precise point is that there has been (something) lost while imaging was (in motion) towards representation. This (something) which is acknowledged as our human (nature) expressed within the metaphor of vo-obraz-zhenie and effective historicity. Is this a moment when representation is now (in motion) towards embracing this (something) which goes unacknowledged in representational (models). Could be a pregnant and fertile moment of remembering in anticipation of the motion of imaging. This precise point is Dewey's archway which we travel through while (in motion). Possible worlds form under (this) archway which Russian psychology may already acknowledge? Vasilyuk's explorations and psychology are possible openings under this archway. -----Original Message----- From: "mike cole" Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 5:08 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy Larry. Precisely the following point seems an important one to me. *My question is if (representation) looses a felt quality that (imaging) embodied and expressed as moving (into the image) better captures.* I think the answer is generally *yes.* I venture that what is left has lost some of its affective charge when "in motion." Perhaps the loss of affect is indexed by the fact that representational theories of mind tend strongly to be cognitive theories. In moving from a process into a product, from verbs to nouns, the prior fusion of affect and cognition are effaced. However, to leave at "all is flux" is not awfully useful. So, as I understand it, entifying, classifying, experimenting with the flow of experience seem to be essential to the cultural mode of thought, as characterized for example by LSV. Spoken words and more generally spoken discourse is are saturated with past cultural products constituting the present culturally mediated experience of the present. But all the words and all the pictures in the world will not efface the role of imagination in human experience. lots to think about mike On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:53 PM, Lplarry wrote: > Ed, > In mike's editorial notes introducing Suvorov's article mike focuses and > draws our attention to a (gap) in American cognitive psychology. This gap > results in a difficulty in translation of the term vo-obraz-zhenie. > The suffix (zhenie) shifts the meaning (into-image) to (imaging) as > process. > Mike made a decision. Since he was addressing an American audience he left > this meaning (imaging) to one side and replaced (imaging) with a substitute > word (representation). > I am now drawing attention to why American cognitive psychology is better > able to understand and relate to (representation) than (imaging)? > I suspect it is because of cultural historical circumstances that > denigrated (imaging). > I am returning to vo-obraz-zenhie and trying to honour (imaging) as > expressing qualities that include the sensory experience but add other > characteristics. > Suvorov beliefs the fundamental act of cognition is the (stepping back) > from the world, which WHEN RECOMBINED with original sensation, yields > thought. > So the place of (imaging) and mike's decision to replace with the word > (representation) has a narrative to tell. > My question is if (representation) looses a felt quality that (imaging) > embodied and expressed as moving (into the image) better captures. > Presentation and (re)presentation may be resting on this (imaging) that > has a (felt) quality. The movement of referring, indicating as > intentionally denotative presentational gestures may rest in a more > primordial moment of (felt) moving within the image. > To say that the mom and infant move mutually and call this process > activity (shared actions) is not questioned. > My question is if this activity is (imaginal) at this felt level of mutual > synchronization (always marked but never identical) prior to being > (presented). > Are there qualities of vo-obraz-zenhie that (imaging) images better than > (presentation) images? > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Ed Wall" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 10:43 AM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy > > Larry > > As I think, to an extent, that one can imagine taste, touch, sound, > and smell (and, in a way, intellectually) focusing on ?image? seems to > obscure. Thus, your question, doesn?t, in a way, make much sense to me. > That doesn?t mean that it doesn?t to others. Also, I suspect you would, at > least, need to take the baby and mother back to -2 months to get at an > embryonic origin. > > Ed > > > On Dec 6, 2015, at 10:42 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > Ed, mike, Michael, > > I will push my question to an earlier time period. > > Age 2 months. > > The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own activity . > > Question > > With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving into the > image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? > > Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: "Ed Wall" > > Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy > > > > Larry > > > > I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or > exclusive. > > > > I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense if > I understand Vygotsky correctly. > > > > I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps I > wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the tendency to > think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow extra-concrete. > The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical context > and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain things are > ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that is?). > > > > I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of > systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. > > > > Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean when > you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, perhaps, > would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy > > > > Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy in > your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final question. An > approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other > possibilities (smile). > > > > Ed > > > >> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry wrote: > >> > >> Ed, > >> > >> The title imagination (or) fantasy > >> Is different from > >> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. > >> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a distanciation?) > and return to the mathematical concrete. > >> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the > physical to the mathematical? > >> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in historical > consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical (concrete) > which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical > (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within the > imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? > >> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. > >> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which originates > as concrete. > >> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. > >> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does one > imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the actual can > be mapped onto the physical with systems? > >> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? > >> Larry > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: "Ed Wall" > >> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM > >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy > >> > >> All > >> > >> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination > that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or > ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements > although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing so I > came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity in > the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination that > it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an > intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass in > the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, > imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given > concrete toward a new concrete.? > >> > >> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion > on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am > wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being asked > to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the > elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody is > interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my wondering > is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no > stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, in > the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about and > then a question. > >> > >> My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to see > a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a > somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not a > fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.? > This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then > look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another > example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through > imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) seems to > be very hard for people to do. > >> > >> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws > something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws a > point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This is > its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her hand at > the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of this > is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step here > seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm , I > see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the mathematical > concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) > >> > >> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged > horse]. > >> > >> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with > fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky have > called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? There > is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in your > take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. > >> > >> Ed Wall > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From lemke.jay@gmail.com Sun Dec 6 19:51:19 2015 From: lemke.jay@gmail.com (Jay Lemke) Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2015 19:51:19 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] NEW SWEDISH MA IN PEREZHIVANIE Message-ID: Hi to all. Not been active on xmca for quite a while, and will take a bit to catch up. If that's even possible! Meanwhile, I forward greetings from recent LCHC alum Robert Lecusay, now working with Monica Nilsson and others in Sweden on early childhood development, emotion, perezhivanie at very early ages, etc. They are also offering a new MA (in English) focused on the Swedish approach to early childhood (daycare and education combined), with an emphasis on play, ZPDs, emotion and learning, etc. Here is a link, and I will forward a brochure (1MB) separately. https://ju.se/en/study-at-ju/our-programmes/master/educare-the-swedish-preschool-model.html Robert's current email is: robert.lecusay@ju.se Jay Lemke LCHC/Department of Communication University of California - San Diego www.jaylemke.com From lemke.jay@gmail.com Sun Dec 6 19:51:59 2015 From: lemke.jay@gmail.com (Jay Lemke) Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2015 19:51:59 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Brochure for new Swedish MA Message-ID: Jay Lemke LCHC/Department of Communication University of California - San Diego www.jaylemke.com -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: folder_educare_final.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 930972 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20151206/f0aa08bb/attachment-0001.pdf From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Mon Dec 7 00:34:00 2015 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 08:34:00 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy References: <1697128017.26739806.1449477240874.JavaMail.yahoo.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1697128017.26739806.1449477240874.JavaMail.yahoo@mail.yahoo.com> But all the words and all the pictures in the world will not efface the role of imagination in human experience. Mike , In your previous posts , you said of goal-oriented joint activity which presupposes the existence of the "ideal" and we also have the example of the best of the bees and the worst of the architects to the effect that the architect has the plan of the building in his imagination before the building has been erected and we additionally have the above saying of yours . To what extent is there an overlap ? Is there a matter of will and conscious awareness in one but not in the other ? Best Haydi -------------------------------------------- On Mon, 12/7/15, mike cole wrote: Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Date: Monday, December 7, 2015, 4:35 AM Larry. Precisely the following point seems an important one to me. *My question is if (representation) looses a felt quality that (imaging) embodied? and expressed as moving (into the image) better captures.* I think the answer is generally *yes.* I venture that what is left has lost some of its affective charge when "in motion." Perhaps the loss of affect is indexed by the fact that representational theories of mind tend strongly to be cognitive theories. In moving from a process into a product, from verbs to nouns, the prior fusion of affect and cognition are effaced. However, to leave at "all is flux" is not awfully useful. So, as I understand it,? entifying, classifying, experimenting with the flow of experience seem to be essential to the cultural mode of thought, as characterized for example by LSV. Spoken words and more generally spoken discourse is are saturated with past cultural products constituting the present culturally mediated experience of the present. But all the words and all the pictures in the world will not efface the role of imagination in human experience. lots to think about mike On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:53 PM, Lplarry wrote: > Ed, > In mike's editorial notes introducing Suvorov's article mike focuses and > draws our attention to a (gap) in American cognitive psychology. This gap > results in a difficulty in translation of the term vo-obraz-zhenie. > The suffix (zhenie) shifts the meaning (into-image) to (imaging) as > process. > Mike made a decision. Since he was addressing an American audience he left > this meaning (imaging) to one side and replaced (imaging) with a substitute > word (representation). > I am now drawing attention to why American cognitive psychology is better > able to understand and relate to (representation) than (imaging)? > I suspect it is because of cultural historical circumstances that > denigrated (imaging). > I am returning to vo-obraz-zenhie and trying to honour (imaging) as > expressing qualities that include the sensory experience but add other > characteristics. > Suvorov beliefs the fundamental act of cognition is the (stepping back) > from the world, which WHEN RECOMBINED with original sensation, yields > thought. > So the place of (imaging) and mike's decision to replace with the word > (representation) has a narrative to tell. > My question is if (representation) looses a felt quality that (imaging) > embodied? and expressed as moving (into the image) better captures. > Presentation and (re)presentation may be resting on this (imaging) that > has a (felt) quality. The movement of referring, indicating as > intentionally denotative presentational gestures may? rest in a more > primordial moment of (felt) moving within the image. > To say that the mom and infant move mutually and call this process > activity (shared actions) is not questioned. > My question is if this activity is (imaginal) at this felt level of mutual > synchronization (always marked but never identical) prior to being > (presented). > Are there qualities of vo-obraz-zenhie that (imaging) images better than > (presentation) images? > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Ed Wall" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 10:43 AM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy > > Larry > >? ? ? As I think, to an extent, that one can imagine taste, touch, sound, > and smell (and, in a way, intellectually) focusing on ?image? seems to > obscure. Thus, your question, doesn?t, in a way, make much sense to me. > That doesn?t mean that it doesn?t to others. Also, I suspect you would, at > least, need to take the baby and mother back to -2 months to get at an > embryonic origin. > > Ed > > > On Dec 6, 2015, at? 10:42 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > Ed, mike, Michael, > > I will push my question to an earlier time period. > > Age 2 months. > > The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own activity . > > Question > > With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving into the > image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? > > Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: "Ed Wall" > > Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy > > > > Larry > > > >? ???I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or > exclusive. > > > >? ???I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense if > I understand Vygotsky correctly. > > > >? ???I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps I > wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the tendency to > think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow extra-concrete. > The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical context > and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain things are > ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that is?). > > > >? ? ? I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of > systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. > > > >? ? ???Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean when > you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, perhaps, > would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy > > > >? ? ???Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy in > your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final question. An > approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other > possibilities (smile). > > > > Ed > > > >> On Dec 4, 2015, at? 4:04 PM, Lplarry wrote: > >> > >> Ed, > >> > >> The title imagination (or) fantasy > >> Is different from > >> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. > >> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a distanciation?) > and return to the mathematical concrete. > >> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the > physical to the mathematical? > >> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in historical > consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical (concrete) > which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical > (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within the > imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? > >> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. > >> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which originates > as concrete. > >> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. > >> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does one > imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the actual can > be mapped onto the physical with systems? > >> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? > >> Larry > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: "Ed Wall" > >> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM > >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >> Subject: [Xmca-l]? Imagination or Fantasy > >> > >> All > >> > >>? ? For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination > that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or > ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements > although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing so I > came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity in > the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination that > it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an > intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass in > the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, > imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given > concrete toward a new concrete.? > >> > >>???I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion > on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am > wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being asked > to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the > elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody is > interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my wondering > is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no > stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, in > the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about and > then a question. > >> > >>? My first example:? It is possible that we would all agree that to see > a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a > somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not a > fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.? > This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then > look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another > example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through > imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) seems to > be very hard for people to do. > >> > >>? My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws > something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws a > point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This is > its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her hand at > the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of this > is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step here > seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm , I > see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the mathematical > concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) > >> > >> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged > horse]. > >> > >>???So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with > fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky have > called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? There > is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in your > take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. > >> > >> Ed Wall > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Mon Dec 7 00:44:16 2015 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 08:44:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NEW SWEDISH MA IN PEREZHIVANIE In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311039A3802@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Many thanks for passing this on, Jay. We have been struggling to set up an international masters programme but the fees we have to charge make it difficult to get the numbers we need. This will be very attractive to some of our students as EU citizens pay no tuition fees in Sweden. All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Jay Lemke Sent: 07 December 2015 03:51 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] NEW SWEDISH MA IN PEREZHIVANIE Hi to all. Not been active on xmca for quite a while, and will take a bit to catch up. If that's even possible! Meanwhile, I forward greetings from recent LCHC alum Robert Lecusay, now working with Monica Nilsson and others in Sweden on early childhood development, emotion, perezhivanie at very early ages, etc. They are also offering a new MA (in English) focused on the Swedish approach to early childhood (daycare and education combined), with an emphasis on play, ZPDs, emotion and learning, etc. Here is a link, and I will forward a brochure (1MB) separately. https://ju.se/en/study-at-ju/our-programmes/master/educare-the-swedish-preschool-model.html Robert's current email is: robert.lecusay@ju.se Jay Lemke LCHC/Department of Communication University of California - San Diego www.jaylemke.com ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Dec 7 07:27:14 2015 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 15:27:14 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Soviet Psychology Overview Article In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: It seems completely nuts to describe the soviet research program as a failure. They demonstrated far more success than any other endeavour in scientific psychology that I have studied. Most psychology projects can't even establish a coherent theory, let alone apply it. They are forever wading around in hypotheses and impressions, or focusing upon incoherent slices of phenomena without regard to its origins. "Psychology today is undergoing a transformation. It is becoming an international science, which aspires to uncover universal laws of human behavior and cognition as well as to account for their cultural variation. How can we understand the transformation of concepts, ideas, and approaches involved in this process? In this chapter, I examine a historical precedent for the globalization of psychology. In the 1920s?1930s, a group of Soviet researchers led by L.S. Vygotsky proposed a new kind of scientific psychology that would be international in scope. It was revolutionary in its assumption that the study of mind and behavior, in phylo- and ontogenesis, had to be grounded in the study of the cultural and material conditions in which people live. Although this research program as such largely failed, the Soviet psychologists contributed much of value, and their ideas were taken up?and transformed?by Western psychologists. These ideas form the basis of the genuinely international psychology that is only just emerging today, and to which the ?cultural-historical? psychology of the Soviets was a precursor." http://www.edition-open-access.de/studies/1/30/index.html#2 Best, Huw On 6 December 2015 at 19:45, mike cole wrote: > This morning I stumbled over the attached historical overview of Soviet > Psychology in relation to international psychology that I thought would be > of interest to MCA-o-philes. > > http://www.edition-open-sources.org/studies/1/30/index.html > > fyi > mike > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Dec 7 08:10:42 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 08:10:42 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Soviet Psychology Overview Article In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5665af9d.8700620a.2f8b6.fffffe6e@mx.google.com> Mike, The entire edited volume seems a treasure trove of tracing the formation and dissemination of knowledge(s) moving through time. A profound work of scholarship. -----Original Message----- From: "Huw Lloyd" Sent: ?2015-?12-?07 7:40 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Soviet Psychology Overview Article It seems completely nuts to describe the soviet research program as a failure. They demonstrated far more success than any other endeavour in scientific psychology that I have studied. Most psychology projects can't even establish a coherent theory, let alone apply it. They are forever wading around in hypotheses and impressions, or focusing upon incoherent slices of phenomena without regard to its origins. "Psychology today is undergoing a transformation. It is becoming an international science, which aspires to uncover universal laws of human behavior and cognition as well as to account for their cultural variation. How can we understand the transformation of concepts, ideas, and approaches involved in this process? In this chapter, I examine a historical precedent for the globalization of psychology. In the 1920s?1930s, a group of Soviet researchers led by L.S. Vygotsky proposed a new kind of scientific psychology that would be international in scope. It was revolutionary in its assumption that the study of mind and behavior, in phylo- and ontogenesis, had to be grounded in the study of the cultural and material conditions in which people live. Although this research program as such largely failed, the Soviet psychologists contributed much of value, and their ideas were taken up?and transformed?by Western psychologists. These ideas form the basis of the genuinely international psychology that is only just emerging today, and to which the ?cultural-historical? psychology of the Soviets was a precursor." http://www.edition-open-access.de/studies/1/30/index.html#2 Best, Huw On 6 December 2015 at 19:45, mike cole wrote: > This morning I stumbled over the attached historical overview of Soviet > Psychology in relation to international psychology that I thought would be > of interest to MCA-o-philes. > > http://www.edition-open-sources.org/studies/1/30/index.html > > fyi > mike > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Dec 7 09:34:39 2015 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 17:34:39 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> Message-ID: Hi Ed, I imagine that a large part of the problem is the starting place of the "mathematical" (in the sense of the contexts you reference) employment of space. The relation between the concrete and the imagination can be explored by considering imagination as the history of concrete actions and activity. This means undertaking measurements (i.e. mathematics with units) in the contexts of problems to achieve 'concrete' notions of quantity etc (Davydov). Imagination can then be used to access and orient to these historically achieved understandings. The implication here is that the space of imagination is the space of relations, and that the abstract 'mathematical space' is (initially at least) an obstruction. Note that problem (activity) oriented actions are important to facilitate the synthesis of a richly structured space (set of relations). Presumably, the teacher in compliance with the package of education in busily propagating the formal patterns of 'maths' which has little to do with the process of doing maths. (Problems are not usually part of the package of education). According to this manner of reasoning, the reason why some of the kids understand the lessons is that they are either well-practiced in the "concrete" manipulation of objects or well drilled in formal pattern matching. In other words, their capacity to do maths is more a function of their home environment than what they encounter in school. I think you'll agree that from this vantage that space, imagination and orientation are all cognate terms. The problem (which is the same problem as the zoped) is that the packaging of education "invades" this space, rather than helping to construct it. >From what I can gather, packaging is an idea of capitalism and that the 'truer' an education is, the freer it is from packaging. Nevertheless, without the problems of packaging one would not be in a position to appreciate an idea in distinction to the habits, dogmas and packages of one's times... Best, Huw On 4 December 2015 at 19:03, Ed Wall wrote: > All > > For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination > that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or > ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements > although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing so I > came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity in > the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination that > it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an > intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass in > the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, > imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given > concrete toward a new concrete.? > > I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion on > the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am wondering > whether part of what is going on is that children are being asked to > ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the elementary > school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody is interested I > can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my wondering is that for so > many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no stepping from > concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, in the abstract. > So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about and then a > question. > > My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to see a > winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a > somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not a > fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.? > This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then > look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another > example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through > imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) seems to > be very hard for people to do. > > My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws > something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws a > point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This is > its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her hand at > the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of this > is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step here > seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm , I > see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the mathematical > concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) > > [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged > horse]. > > So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with fantasy > (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky have called > my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? There is, I > note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in your take > on what Vygotsky?s take might be. > > Ed Wall > > > > > > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 7 09:45:20 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 09:45:20 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Soviet Psychology Overview Article In-Reply-To: <5665af9d.8700620a.2f8b6.fffffe6e@mx.google.com> References: <5665af9d.8700620a.2f8b6.fffffe6e@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Yes, Huw. I found that odd too. Perhaps it is the date? I also posted it on a Russian site. It will be interesting to see what they have to say. Yes, Larry, that is an amazing archive. I did not have time to peruse it. mike On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 8:10 AM, Lplarry wrote: > Mike, > The entire edited volume seems a treasure trove of tracing the formation > and dissemination of knowledge(s) moving through time. A profound work of > scholarship. > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Huw Lloyd" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?07 7:40 AM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Soviet Psychology Overview Article > > It seems completely nuts to describe the soviet research program as a > failure. They demonstrated far more success than any other endeavour in > scientific psychology that I have studied. Most psychology projects can't > even establish a coherent theory, let alone apply it. They are forever > wading around in hypotheses and impressions, or focusing upon incoherent > slices of phenomena without regard to its origins. > > "Psychology today is undergoing a transformation. It is becoming an > international science, which aspires to uncover universal laws of human > behavior and cognition as well as to account for their cultural variation. > How can we understand the transformation of concepts, ideas, and approaches > involved in this process? In this chapter, I examine a historical precedent > for the globalization of psychology. In the 1920s?1930s, a group of Soviet > researchers led by L.S. Vygotsky proposed a new kind of scientific > psychology that would be international in scope. It was revolutionary in > its assumption that the study of mind and behavior, in phylo- and > ontogenesis, > had to be grounded in the study of the cultural and material conditions in > which people live. Although this research program as such largely failed, > the Soviet psychologists contributed much of value, and their ideas were > taken up?and transformed?by Western psychologists. These ideas form the > basis of the genuinely international psychology that is only just emerging > today, and to which the ?cultural-historical? psychology of the Soviets was > a precursor." > > http://www.edition-open-access.de/studies/1/30/index.html#2 > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > On 6 December 2015 at 19:45, mike cole wrote: > > > This morning I stumbled over the attached historical overview of Soviet > > Psychology in relation to international psychology that I thought would > be > > of interest to MCA-o-philes. > > > > http://www.edition-open-sources.org/studies/1/30/index.html > > > > fyi > > mike > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 7 09:59:04 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 09:59:04 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Job in Socio-cultural Lifespan Development Message-ID: This is an interesting job opportunity for someone interested in culture and development. mike -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: LPSOE Ad Text 2015.docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 18497 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20151207/1701812a/attachment.bin From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 7 10:05:36 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 18:05:36 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com>, Message-ID: Greetings, I would like to offer a few ideas to the mix in this discussion about imagination vs. representation. Representation as a word has posed a problem in understanding modes of thought and cognition, and most of all, and I realize I am preaching to the choir, it tends to commodify the thought as an object as-if coming off a conveyor belt, a finished product in isolation. And as Mike points out, there is no conveyance of affect in this thought factory of representations, nor cultural-historical influences. The usage of "representation" also has tended to give legs to the mind-brain, which hasn't been helpful in our understanding (I'm sorry to mix my metaphors, but I think it makes a great picture). The brain becomes the CPU of the body. I'd also like to offer a few concepts that derive from Vedic theory of mind, and these are the vritti, and the samskara. Vritti translates roughly from Sanskrit as "thought-modification." I find this concept incredibly powerful for many reasons. First, it bypasses all Cartesian artifacts and constructs in how we think about mind. Second, it copes nicely with the problem that Ed and Mike are discussing text vs image. Third, it seems to have intuited neurological activity in the brain and body, thus uniting mind with movement, embodied thinking, affective thought, etc. And there are likely other benefits that I've not yet considered. So what is a vritti? In the Vedic paradigm, as I understand it, the mind is very subtle material, like light is subtle, and thus it interacts with the gross body while both are interacting with the world. Considering the mind as material means that it is not separate from the body, it is just more subtle and therefore we are talking about degrees of physicality rather than mind being an entity that exists somewhere else and a body is connected to that mind through the pineal gland, etc, which to this day I've never been able to get my head around. ;) The second concept that is useful is samskara, which is an impression in the mind. We can be born with samskaras, but also activities and thoughts can create samskaras. Some can be deeper and more fixed, or transient and shallow, or anywhere along those two continuums. Further, the notion of samskara as impression can be useful when considering obsessive thinking, plasticity, and various forms of learning. I don't think samskara need be fixed to the mind, perhaps also to the body, but I'm not sure. Considering samskara, it might be useful to think of the way sand can have impressions made upon it by the wind or the tide or... a child's shovel and pail. When the child creates a sandcastle with the tools of the shovel and pail, at that very point the sandcastle becomes is recognizable, it is considered a vritti (and the word crowns the deed). Likewise when the child takes the very same sand destroying the castle and then creates a starfish and it becomes recognizable as such, then it is another vritti. The important takeaway here is that the material *does not change*, but the shape *does*. That's why it is a "thought-modification." Clay as material could be another useful metaphor, in that sense. The potter at the wheel takes a lump of clay and makes a vase and then transforms the vase into a bowl, and finally a plate. Analogously, these would be three vrittis. However, the reason the vritti need not be visual is that its material is "mind" itself (consider mind "as-if sand" or "as-if clay"), with mind itself processing all perceptual information. With the same "sand" it creates the thought-shapes for sound, touch, smell, and taste, not only sight. But these are combined, not isolated as individual percepts in any kind of units. This also gets away from the traps of right-brain/left-brain theory, as come to think of it. Memory and doubt are also aspects of mind, and this might be where the affect comes in, because of the recognition of language, emotional content from the past, meaning, etc, all these various mental processes become part of the vritti. I'd also like to offer that Kant's notion of givenness also helps in this conception, because it is the appearances of external objects we perceive and feel that as-if shape the vritti as well as memory, doubt, recognition, and so forth. In this sense there is a kind of overlap of the external world onto the mind. But the reverse can be true as well. That is, the mind can "as-if" overlap onto the world. I'd say this is imagination. It could also be fantasy, but that seems to have a different affective stance than imagination. Imagination still possesses that self-awareness that it is imagined. Fantasy seems to not have that in its extreme manifestation, thereby taking what is imagined in place of the external world. I'm not sure what the technical term is for the moment of neural activity when we see the brain light up in a particular pattern in the brain (and likely body, but we lack the means to detect this as we do with an fMRI scan of the brain), but it does have a particular shape when there is, say, more visual stimulation than aural. The "material" of that thought is an electrical impulse, which is subtle, like light. So I think these terms are very insightful, and they can help free us from Cartesian conceptions and that's why I like them so much. They also do not conflict with Vygotsky's work, as far as I can tell. Kind regards, Annalisa From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Dec 7 15:59:14 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 16:59:14 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <85F7B213-B91B-4DBE-B300-EF85B31D6217@gmail.com> Annalis, I think the following from your post relates to something that I have been thinking about imagination and fantasy since Ed Wall started the thread: ?...the mind can "as-if" overlap onto the world. I'd say this is imagination. It could also be fantasy, but that seems to have a different affective stance than imagination. Imagination still possesses that self-awareness that it is imagined. Fantasy seems to not have that in its extreme manifestation, thereby taking what is imagined in place of the external world.? For me fantasy lacks grounding. Ed Wall quoted Vygotsky: > ?It is characteristic for imagination that it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass in the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given concrete toward a new concrete.? It seems to me that Imagination gets back to a new concrete and that fantasy does not, because, as you say, it takes ?what is imagined in place of the real world?. I think this can apply to both individuals and groups. And I wonder if it would be valid to take another concept from the ?Vedic paradigm? that you reference, and that is the idea of ?mara?, a state of mind that takes illusion for reality. I have attached an RFP that I have had on my desktop for over a year that offers grants for ??for research and interventions projects on the measurement and improvement of imagination.? The diagram at the end of the RFP, and the overall tone of the RFP, seems to me to be infused with the commodification that you highlight in your post. Tellingly, ?representation? is a term constantly used in the RFP. It also seems fair to say that the RFP construes imaginative and creative mind work as individual work, rather than something that needs involvement in collaborative projects. To me, this idea of measuring the habits, shall we say, of individuals has as much chance of creatively addressing problems of the world as current efforts to improve education by testing our way to the top. It?s mara, or so it seems to me. Henry -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Imagination RFP_FINAL.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 418090 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20151207/024c4823/attachment.pdf -------------- next part -------------- > On Dec 7, 2015, at 11:05 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Greetings, > > I would like to offer a few ideas to the mix in this discussion about imagination vs. representation. > > Representation as a word has posed a problem in understanding modes of thought and cognition, and most of all, and I realize I am preaching to the choir, it tends to commodify the thought as an object as-if coming off a conveyor belt, a finished product in isolation. And as Mike points out, there is no conveyance of affect in this thought factory of representations, nor cultural-historical influences. > > The usage of "representation" also has tended to give legs to the mind-brain, which hasn't been helpful in our understanding (I'm sorry to mix my metaphors, but I think it makes a great picture). The brain becomes the CPU of the body. > > I'd also like to offer a few concepts that derive from Vedic theory of mind, and these are the vritti, and the samskara. > > Vritti translates roughly from Sanskrit as "thought-modification." I find this concept incredibly powerful for many reasons. > > First, it bypasses all Cartesian artifacts and constructs in how we think about mind. > > Second, it copes nicely with the problem that Ed and Mike are discussing text vs image. > > Third, it seems to have intuited neurological activity in the brain and body, thus uniting mind with movement, embodied thinking, affective thought, etc. > > And there are likely other benefits that I've not yet considered. > > So what is a vritti? > > In the Vedic paradigm, as I understand it, the mind is very subtle material, like light is subtle, and thus it interacts with the gross body while both are interacting with the world. Considering the mind as material means that it is not separate from the body, it is just more subtle and therefore we are talking about degrees of physicality rather than mind being an entity that exists somewhere else and a body is connected to that mind through the pineal gland, etc, which to this day I've never been able to get my head around. ;) > > The second concept that is useful is samskara, which is an impression in the mind. We can be born with samskaras, but also activities and thoughts can create samskaras. Some can be deeper and more fixed, or transient and shallow, or anywhere along those two continuums. > > Further, the notion of samskara as impression can be useful when considering obsessive thinking, plasticity, and various forms of learning. I don't think samskara need be fixed to the mind, perhaps also to the body, but I'm not sure. > > Considering samskara, it might be useful to think of the way sand can have impressions made upon it by the wind or the tide or... a child's shovel and pail. > > When the child creates a sandcastle with the tools of the shovel and pail, at that very point the sandcastle becomes is recognizable, it is considered a vritti (and the word crowns the deed). Likewise when the child takes the very same sand destroying the castle and then creates a starfish and it becomes recognizable as such, then it is another vritti. The important takeaway here is that the material *does not change*, but the shape *does*. That's why it is a "thought-modification." > > Clay as material could be another useful metaphor, in that sense. The potter at the wheel takes a lump of clay and makes a vase and then transforms the vase into a bowl, and finally a plate. Analogously, these would be three vrittis. > > However, the reason the vritti need not be visual is that its material is "mind" itself (consider mind "as-if sand" or "as-if clay"), with mind itself processing all perceptual information. With the same "sand" it creates the thought-shapes for sound, touch, smell, and taste, not only sight. But these are combined, not isolated as individual percepts in any kind of units. > > This also gets away from the traps of right-brain/left-brain theory, as come to think of it. > > Memory and doubt are also aspects of mind, and this might be where the affect comes in, because of the recognition of language, emotional content from the past, meaning, etc, all these various mental processes become part of the vritti. > > I'd also like to offer that Kant's notion of givenness also helps in this conception, because it is the appearances of external objects we perceive and feel that as-if shape the vritti as well as memory, doubt, recognition, and so forth. In this sense there is a kind of overlap of the external world onto the mind. But the reverse can be true as well. That is, the mind can "as-if" overlap onto the world. I'd say this is imagination. It could also be fantasy, but that seems to have a different affective stance than imagination. Imagination still possesses that self-awareness that it is imagined. Fantasy seems to not have that in its extreme manifestation, thereby taking what is imagined in place of the external world. > > I'm not sure what the technical term is for the moment of neural activity when we see the brain light up in a particular pattern in the brain (and likely body, but we lack the means to detect this as we do with an fMRI scan of the brain), but it does have a particular shape when there is, say, more visual stimulation than aural. The "material" of that thought is an electrical impulse, which is subtle, like light. > > So I think these terms are very insightful, and they can help free us from Cartesian conceptions and that's why I like them so much. They also do not conflict with Vygotsky's work, as far as I can tell. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > From ewall@umich.edu Mon Dec 7 16:57:21 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 18:57:21 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> Larry and Mike Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to both of you in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a conversation that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably good, but it is a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little larger than what I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that I need to, one might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that bear on the, perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up. Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will reread it). I found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a large grain size (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look at things). A few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms and are offered in the hope that they might be useful. 1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; however, looking at how words are used (a philosophy of language, so to speak) often does a better job of opening things up. 2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did not make your list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to mention Avicenna. 3. I have the impression you are using the term ?stable? as a somewhat replacement of Vygotsky?s concrete; I like that as ?concrete' seems to have very different meanings for different people. I will try to use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in my replies tooters. 4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of Hellen Keller. I wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a thin gap is because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a suspicion that he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I am fairly sure Keller was. 5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than too thin although the metaphor of filling still seems reasonable 6. In a way you don?t seem to quite come out and say it (or I missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is not necessarily creative and I would add that it is quite everyday. Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as they occur. Ed > On Dec 6, 2015, at 4:41 PM, Lplarry wrote: > > Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and re(present) our notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a metaphor not error. > Ed, > To continue with your reflection if image has some relation to how others use text. Actually I don?t think image has some relation to how others use text. I twas speculating as whether there is some commonality between how Mike is using using image and how others are using text. I said this because I struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary in mathematics and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to problems that presently catch my attention. > Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In other words can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The physical gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of letters on the page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or the visual marks making a circle-like shape. I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size is too large. That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I now realize was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to view imagination. I don?t mean your perspective is lacking; it just seems to result in different questions than I would/do ask. > These different physical forms are not the foundational bedrock, they are the material. > If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on parchment but as having a deeper process, > Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual perceptions but rather having a deeper process. My initial reaction is ?Why are you saying this?" If I ever thought the contrary, I can?t remember. This is just common sense. The interesting thing about what you say is that you seem to using ?imagine? in a non visual fashion which was largely my initial point. > All the senses share in this process and engage with physically experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is that unifying process that includes all the senses but is not itself the senses. I would say that all senses can participate in this process. Also physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too strong although physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints of a sort on imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I don?t physically experience a platonic circle. > To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the collated pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a dialogue, to imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly have a unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the vital animating process lived (into). Here is where my example wasn?t helpful. I did not mean one ?sees' the marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks is too large a grain size) on the board as having certain properties consistent with those of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a sort of sense. The teacher?s language seems to prove the imaging and the moving to new stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people don?t make the leaps. > This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy of the visual sense. Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none of the sensory modes > The relation of this image process to the language process is also multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. This doesn?t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, doesn?t follow for me. Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable perspective. It is just one that, to a degree, I either don?t share or seems to be the wrong grain size. > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Ed Wall" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > Mike > > My wondering has more to do with your focus on the visual and my examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be about the visual. However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well drawn) is a ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at least, it never was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. In fact, assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I can imagine it (smile). > On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term ?image? in the way some use the word ?text.? That is, to take into account both external and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of what you say resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am finding that peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky. > > Ed > >> On Dec 6, 2015, at 2:35 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent. >> >> "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of Zinchenko's >> experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual system that >> prevented stabilized images from disappearing. He stabilized the image >> (here reified as a projection on the retina) but changed its color, thus >> defeating the retina's tendency to go grey. In those conditions, eye >> movements continue to trace the spatial coordinates of the image as if it >> were continuing to "feel it." >> >> These are very special circumstances, to be sure, but for they make it >> clear that what is called an image is a process (according to Suvorov, of >> stepping away from the world and then stepping back into it, but then he >> was blind and deaf). >> >> What we designate as "the image" is some form of materialized stabilization >> of the flow of into-image-making. Some structure in the flow of the always >> new. From just the blink of an eye to our image of the statue of liberty. >> >> This is an old idea but it fits with my intuition. I first encountered it >> reading Dewey who refers to "the poet" on the topic of experience. >> >> >> >> *Yet all experience is an arch wherehrough / Gleams that untraveled world >> whose margin fades / Forever and forever when I move. * >> >> *Tennyson, Ulysses* >> >> >> If you are interested, we could try to synch re/reading of some core common >> articles/chapters. This entire area of concern is of recent vintage for me >> and my ignorance is particularly keenly felt. >> >> mike >> >> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:02 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >> >>> Mike >>> >>> As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the privileging of >>> the ?image? in discussions of imagination. Additionally, although it has >>> been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don?t think it was of the >>> Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw on would disagree >>> with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics. >>> I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems useful! - and >>> I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a huge emphasis in >>> mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking less about the >>> ?imaginal? than you or Larry. That doesn?t mean that what you and Larry are >>> talking about might not usefully factor in especially your point about >>> joint, mediated, activity. >>> >>> Ed >>> >>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 11:11 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et al >>>> >>>> I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic beginnings builds off >>> of >>>> the already highly functional sensory system. Assume vision as the >>> sensory >>>> system in question. We know that in an important sense, the "simple" act >>> of >>>> seeing what you might call a common object, for example your car in the >>>> driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves temporal and >>>> spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement that must be >>>> resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the process of image >>>> formation ceases to function. >>>> >>>> The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for that simplified >>>> account. In thinking about imagination I turn to Zaporozhets, Zinchenko >>> and >>>> non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of enactive >>>> perception/cognition. It is also consistent with joint, mediated, >>> activity >>>> as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go. >>>> >>>> I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic function and the >>>> human possibility for symbolic communication is co-incident and >>>> co-constitutive of distinctly human imagination. >>>> >>>> in brief >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>>> >>>>> Ed, mike, Michael, >>>>> I will push my question to an earlier time period. >>>>> Age 2 months. >>>>> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own activity . >>>>> Question >>>>> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving into the >>>>> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? >>>>> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: "Ed Wall" >>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM >>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy >>>>> >>>>> Larry >>>>> >>>>> I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or >>>>> exclusive. >>>>> >>>>> I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense if >>> I >>>>> understand Vygotsky correctly. >>>>> >>>>> I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps I >>>>> wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the >>> tendency to >>>>> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow >>> extra-concrete. >>>>> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical >>> context >>>>> and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain things >>> are >>>>> ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that is?). >>>>> >>>>> I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of >>>>> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. >>>>> >>>>> Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean when >>>>> you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, >>> perhaps, >>>>> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy >>>>> >>>>> Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy in >>>>> your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final question. An >>>>> approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other >>>>> possibilities (smile). >>>>> >>>>> Ed >>>>> >>>>>> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Ed, >>>>>> >>>>>> The title imagination (or) fantasy >>>>>> Is different from >>>>>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. >>>>>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a distanciation?) >>>>> and return to the mathematical concrete. >>>>>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the >>>>> physical to the mathematical? >>>>>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in historical >>>>> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical (concrete) >>>>> which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical >>>>> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within the >>>>> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? >>>>>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. >>>>>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which originates >>> as >>>>> concrete. >>>>>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. >>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does one >>>>> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the actual >>> can >>>>> be mapped onto the physical with systems? >>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? >>>>>> Larry >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" >>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM >>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy >>>>>> >>>>>> All >>>>>> >>>>>> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination >>>>> that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or >>>>> ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements >>>>> although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing so I >>>>> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity >>> in >>>>> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination >>> that >>>>> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an >>>>> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass >>> in >>>>> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, >>>>> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given >>>>> concrete toward a new concrete.? >>>>>> >>>>>> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion >>>>> on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am >>>>> wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being >>> asked >>>>> to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the >>>>> elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody >>> is >>>>> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my >>> wondering >>>>> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no >>>>> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, >>> in >>>>> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about >>> and >>>>> then a question. >>>>>> >>>>>> My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to see >>>>> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a >>>>> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not >>> a >>>>> fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.? >>>>> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then >>>>> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another >>>>> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through >>>>> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) >>> seems to >>>>> be very hard for people to do. >>>>>> >>>>>> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws >>>>> something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws a >>>>> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This >>> is >>>>> its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her hand >>> at >>>>> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of >>> this >>>>> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step >>> here >>>>> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm >>> , I >>>>> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the >>> mathematical >>>>> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) >>>>>> >>>>>> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged >>>>> horse]. >>>>>> >>>>>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with >>>>> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky >>> have >>>>> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? >>> There >>>>> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in >>> your >>>>> take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. >>>>>> >>>>>> Ed Wall >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Dec 7 17:02:14 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 17:02:14 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: <85F7B213-B91B-4DBE-B300-EF85B31D6217@gmail.com> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com> <85F7B213-B91B-4DBE-B300-EF85B31D6217@gmail.com> Message-ID: <56662c33.8e4b620a.52420.208d@mx.google.com> Henry, Can we (mark) fantasy on one side as clearly distinguish able from the imaginal on the other side a priori?? OR do we require the community of interpreters (stepping back) and then re(combining) with the cultural imaginary and then deciding what aspects of the imaginal to call (fantasy)? I am exploring the margins here. Example: This week American Experience on PBS produced a documentary on the Pilgrims What aspects of their dream were fantasy and what aspects imaginal and prescient? Bradford their leader for 20 years composed the (text) that was a (re)combination of Bradford's stepping back process. But what was left out is as revealing as what was included. This book was lost for over a 100 years and then became a canonical text in which future generations (re)imagined the American origin story. Now is it clear we have moved away from fantasy to the side of the imaginal?. I am inclined to imagine the imaginal underlying all this process. Stepping back is imaginal, fantasy is imaginal, the community of interpreters is imaginal. Marking what is on one side and what on the other side is imaginal. Yet, to say (all is flux) is not useful and so we create structures and functions and disciplines and human sciences (in order to) regulate ourselves and create shared meaning. I would add this is all (true) and it is useful to imagine structures, systems, models, theories as this stepping back process and re(engagement) with our structures models, etc. All this is also imaginal and we live into these structures, models, and expressions in order to regulate ourselves. What opens out if we acknowledge the imaginal at work in our social constrctions/imaginary. Precisely, as mike mentioned what opens under dewey's archway is (felt Sens). Sens in French is more that (sense). It includes direction and orientation through living into the image. THIS requires stepping back and reflecting on structures, systems, and their origins to add the felt dimension to this imaginal process of living into the image. I will add this reflection (itself) is a tradition. Larry -----Original Message----- From: "HENRY SHONERD" Sent: ?2015-?12-?07 4:01 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy Annalis, I think the following from your post relates to something that I have been thinking about imagination and fantasy since Ed Wall started the thread: ?...the mind can "as-if" overlap onto the world. I'd say this is imagination. It could also be fantasy, but that seems to have a different affective stance than imagination. Imagination still possesses that self-awareness that it is imagined. Fantasy seems to not have that in its extreme manifestation, thereby taking what is imagined in place of the external world.? For me fantasy lacks grounding. Ed Wall quoted Vygotsky: > ?It is characteristic for imagination that it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass in the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given concrete toward a new concrete.? It seems to me that Imagination gets back to a new concrete and that fantasy does not, because, as you say, it takes ?what is imagined in place of the real world?. I think this can apply to both individuals and groups. And I wonder if it would be valid to take another concept from the ?Vedic paradigm? that you reference, and that is the idea of ?mara?, a state of mind that takes illusion for reality. I have attached an RFP that I have had on my desktop for over a year that offers grants for ??for research and interventions projects on the measurement and improvement of imagination.? The diagram at the end of the RFP, and the overall tone of the RFP, seems to me to be infused with the commodification that you highlight in your post. Tellingly, ?representation? is a term constantly used in the RFP. It also seems fair to say that the RFP construes imaginative and creative mind work as individual work, rather than something that needs involvement in collaborative projects. To me, this idea of measuring the habits, shall we say, of individuals has as much chance of creatively addressing problems of the world as current efforts to improve education by testing our way to the top. It?s mara, or so it seems to me. Henry From ewall@umich.edu Mon Dec 7 17:04:22 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 19:04:22 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> Message-ID: <00A77A37-4787-48DC-93F7-C2679FE88E93@umich.edu> Huw Let me try to answer your comments as they occur. I think your concerns are important, but, to a degree, mine are somewhat otherwise. Ed > On Dec 7, 2015, at 11:34 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > Hi Ed, > > I imagine that a large part of the problem is the starting place of the > "mathematical" (in the sense of the contexts you reference) employment of > space. > I really have no idea as to what problem you are referring to (I can?t even imagine it). > The relation between the concrete and the imagination can be explored by > considering imagination as the history of concrete actions and activity. > This means undertaking measurements (i.e. mathematics with units) in the > contexts of problems to achieve 'concrete' notions of quantity etc > (Davydov). Imagination can then be used to access and orient to these > historically achieved understandings. > Your definition of imagination as a sort of history does not work particularly well for me nor has too much support in the literature. I have thought much about Davydov and although I believe the reports and papers I have pursued, I am not particular convinced that using notions of quantity necessary is a panacea. I see similar results in other classrooms without that particular curricular focus. That said, there are characteristics of Davydov curriculum which are, one might say, necessary (it is a bit hard to tell as it is hard to find accounts of .extended classroom interaction or even a teacher?s text). However, more to the point, I would not necessarily use notions of quantity with, for example, sixth graders who lacked the benefit of a Davydov curricular approach in the first grade. I would, however, use something ?stable? and I would focus on mathematical structure. > The implication here is that the space of imagination is the space of > relations, and that the abstract 'mathematical space' is (initially at > least) an obstruction. Note that problem (activity) oriented actions are > important to facilitate the synthesis of a richly structured space (set of > relations). > I admit to not knowing where you got the idea of an ?abstract mathematical space.? I know that people sometimes say things like this, but it has always seemed rhetorical. I also know that people like to talk about a richly structured or connected space of relations. I don?t have a problem with this, but the grain size seems too large for the questions I am asking. > Presumably, the teacher in compliance with the package of education in > busily propagating the formal patterns of 'maths' which has little to do > with the process of doing maths. (Problems are not usually part of the > package of education). > I have no idea why you brought this up although this is true of some teachers (often I might add since they don?t know otherwise so perhaps it is less compliance than you think) > According to this manner of reasoning, the reason why some of the kids > understand the lessons is that they are either well-practiced in the > "concrete" manipulation of objects or well drilled in formal pattern > matching. In other words, their capacity to do maths is more a function of > their home environment than what they encounter in school. > There are lessons and there are lessons. If the purpose of a lesson is to reproduce the thinking of the teacher/text, then what you say makes sense. This goes for Davydov?s curriculum as well as others. > I think you'll agree that from this vantage that space, imagination and > orientation are all cognate terms. The problem (which is the same problem > as the zoped) is that the packaging of education "invades" this space, > rather than helping to construct it. > I seem to be in another conversation, this time about the packing of education. I am okay with you taking this vantage, but I don?t think it is that simple so I tend not to do so. Perhaps a story is in order. A number of years ago I heard a fairly well known early childhood educator speak. She had gone to Berkeley for her teachers training and picked up the vantage you seem to speak of (and there is nothing wrong with that). She went into teaching - and loved it - and made worthwhile efforts to act out her new convictions. About three-quarters of the way through the years, a colleague and experienced teacher asked her if her class knew, say 'thingy x? as the next year it would be assumed they did. She realized that they didn?t as her focus had been otherwise and there was no time to do something about it. She took what she view her failure quite seriously - and I happen to agree as I don?t think you can do this to kids no matter what your good intentions - and went back to graduate school to pick up what she had missed. Maxine Greene relates a similar situation in ?Oneself as a Stranger.? My point is not that you are wrong, but I am a teacher and, while I agree without reservation the ?packing? is more than a problem, I choose to support those who are doing something about the packing? while focusing my attention on the child who sits in the classroom we two share. >> From what I can gather, packaging is an idea of capitalism and that the > 'truer' an education is, the freer it is from packaging. Nevertheless, > without the problems of packaging one would not be in a position to > appreciate an idea in distinction to the habits, dogmas and packages of > one's times? > ?Packing' isn?t the problem I find myself most concerned about (and I am not arguing it is less important); teaching in the now is. This is a moral decision on my part. > Best, > Huw > > > > On 4 December 2015 at 19:03, Ed Wall wrote: > >> All >> >> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of imagination >> that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or >> ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements >> although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing so I >> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and Creativity in >> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for imagination that >> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an >> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a pass in >> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, >> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a given >> concrete toward a new concrete.? >> >> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion on >> the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am wondering >> whether part of what is going on is that children are being asked to >> ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the elementary >> school that are possibly a little more obvious (if somebody is interested I >> can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my wondering is that for so >> many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there is no stepping from >> concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to speak, in the abstract. >> So let me give two examples of what I am wondering about and then a >> question. >> >> My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to see a >> winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. In a >> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is not a >> fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a fraction.? >> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and then >> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another >> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through >> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) seems to >> be very hard for people to do. >> >> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws >> something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then draws a >> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, "This is >> its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her hand at >> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None of this >> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step here >> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. (Hmm , I >> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the mathematical >> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) >> >> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a winged >> horse]. >> >> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with fantasy >> (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky have called >> my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? There is, I >> note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in your take >> on what Vygotsky?s take might be. >> >> Ed Wall >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> From ewall@umich.edu Mon Dec 7 17:05:03 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 19:05:03 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <95C126D7-CAC2-4AA2-B72E-8827AAF9FCB1@umich.edu> Annalisa What I would like to see is an analysis of imagination or representation from the point of view of each of the six systems of Indian philosophy: Nyaya; Vaisheeshika; Sankhya; Yoga; Karma Mimansa; and Vedanta. It is said that knowledge is true only when it is acceptable in the light of each of these six systems. I had thoughts about doing such an analysis in the past, but realized it would be quite! nontrivial. Are you applying (smile)! Ed > On Dec 7, 2015, at 12:05 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Greetings, > > I would like to offer a few ideas to the mix in this discussion about imagination vs. representation. > > Representation as a word has posed a problem in understanding modes of thought and cognition, and most of all, and I realize I am preaching to the choir, it tends to commodify the thought as an object as-if coming off a conveyor belt, a finished product in isolation. And as Mike points out, there is no conveyance of affect in this thought factory of representations, nor cultural-historical influences. > > The usage of "representation" also has tended to give legs to the mind-brain, which hasn't been helpful in our understanding (I'm sorry to mix my metaphors, but I think it makes a great picture). The brain becomes the CPU of the body. > > I'd also like to offer a few concepts that derive from Vedic theory of mind, and these are the vritti, and the samskara. > > Vritti translates roughly from Sanskrit as "thought-modification." I find this concept incredibly powerful for many reasons. > > First, it bypasses all Cartesian artifacts and constructs in how we think about mind. > > Second, it copes nicely with the problem that Ed and Mike are discussing text vs image. > > Third, it seems to have intuited neurological activity in the brain and body, thus uniting mind with movement, embodied thinking, affective thought, etc. > > And there are likely other benefits that I've not yet considered. > > So what is a vritti? > > In the Vedic paradigm, as I understand it, the mind is very subtle material, like light is subtle, and thus it interacts with the gross body while both are interacting with the world. Considering the mind as material means that it is not separate from the body, it is just more subtle and therefore we are talking about degrees of physicality rather than mind being an entity that exists somewhere else and a body is connected to that mind through the pineal gland, etc, which to this day I've never been able to get my head around. ;) > > The second concept that is useful is samskara, which is an impression in the mind. We can be born with samskaras, but also activities and thoughts can create samskaras. Some can be deeper and more fixed, or transient and shallow, or anywhere along those two continuums. > > Further, the notion of samskara as impression can be useful when considering obsessive thinking, plasticity, and various forms of learning. I don't think samskara need be fixed to the mind, perhaps also to the body, but I'm not sure. > > Considering samskara, it might be useful to think of the way sand can have impressions made upon it by the wind or the tide or... a child's shovel and pail. > > When the child creates a sandcastle with the tools of the shovel and pail, at that very point the sandcastle becomes is recognizable, it is considered a vritti (and the word crowns the deed). Likewise when the child takes the very same sand destroying the castle and then creates a starfish and it becomes recognizable as such, then it is another vritti. The important takeaway here is that the material *does not change*, but the shape *does*. That's why it is a "thought-modification." > > Clay as material could be another useful metaphor, in that sense. The potter at the wheel takes a lump of clay and makes a vase and then transforms the vase into a bowl, and finally a plate. Analogously, these would be three vrittis. > > However, the reason the vritti need not be visual is that its material is "mind" itself (consider mind "as-if sand" or "as-if clay"), with mind itself processing all perceptual information. With the same "sand" it creates the thought-shapes for sound, touch, smell, and taste, not only sight. But these are combined, not isolated as individual percepts in any kind of units. > > This also gets away from the traps of right-brain/left-brain theory, as come to think of it. > > Memory and doubt are also aspects of mind, and this might be where the affect comes in, because of the recognition of language, emotional content from the past, meaning, etc, all these various mental processes become part of the vritti. > > I'd also like to offer that Kant's notion of givenness also helps in this conception, because it is the appearances of external objects we perceive and feel that as-if shape the vritti as well as memory, doubt, recognition, and so forth. In this sense there is a kind of overlap of the external world onto the mind. But the reverse can be true as well. That is, the mind can "as-if" overlap onto the world. I'd say this is imagination. It could also be fantasy, but that seems to have a different affective stance than imagination. Imagination still possesses that self-awareness that it is imagined. Fantasy seems to not have that in its extreme manifestation, thereby taking what is imagined in place of the external world. > > I'm not sure what the technical term is for the moment of neural activity when we see the brain light up in a particular pattern in the brain (and likely body, but we lack the means to detect this as we do with an fMRI scan of the brain), but it does have a particular shape when there is, say, more visual stimulation than aural. The "material" of that thought is an electrical impulse, which is subtle, like light. > > So I think these terms are very insightful, and they can help free us from Cartesian conceptions and that's why I like them so much. They also do not conflict with Vygotsky's work, as far as I can tell. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 7 17:27:21 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 17:27:21 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: <95C126D7-CAC2-4AA2-B72E-8827AAF9FCB1@umich.edu> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com> <95C126D7-CAC2-4AA2-B72E-8827AAF9FCB1@umich.edu> Message-ID: Ed and Huw. The best English descriptions of Davydovian math education is in the work of Jean Schmitau. She has articles in a couple of places, one in MCA. She has fuller accounts that are, I believe, referenced there. Otherwise, Galina Zuckerman, whose English is terrific, is the person I would turn to in search of concrete, detailed, description. Can we keep this thread on imagination? Maybe Imagination in Education could be a thread? Maybe Imagination and Indian Philosophy could be another subject line? Following the threads and the way they mutually inform each other in the course of the discussion would be facilitated, for me at least, by keeping Imagination as the lead word to be followed by constituent "and" identifier. As in Imagination and Indian Philosophy. Can we self organize to have such a complex discussion using the existing, to hand, technologies? The topic of imagination seems a fitting one on which to try out the idea. A great variety of histories appear to lead to this common discussion point, but they are almost mutually interpretable ( I know zero about Indian philosophy + what I am reading here. I do know that the when Varela, Rosch, and others at Berkeley ignited the embodied cognition movement, it was Eastern religions that they drew upon. mike On imagination. What is the precise reference for the concrete-concrete form of imagination? I found the discussion about distinguishing fantasy as a form of imagination very helpful. On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 5:05 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > Annalisa > > What I would like to see is an analysis of imagination or > representation from the point of view of each of the six systems of Indian > philosophy: Nyaya; Vaisheeshika; Sankhya; Yoga; Karma Mimansa; and Vedanta. > It is said that knowledge is true only when it is acceptable in the light > of each of these six systems. I had thoughts about doing such an analysis > in the past, but realized it would be quite! nontrivial. Are you applying > (smile)! > > Ed > > > On Dec 7, 2015, at 12:05 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > Greetings, > > > > I would like to offer a few ideas to the mix in this discussion about > imagination vs. representation. > > > > Representation as a word has posed a problem in understanding modes of > thought and cognition, and most of all, and I realize I am preaching to the > choir, it tends to commodify the thought as an object as-if coming off a > conveyor belt, a finished product in isolation. And as Mike points out, > there is no conveyance of affect in this thought factory of > representations, nor cultural-historical influences. > > > > The usage of "representation" also has tended to give legs to the > mind-brain, which hasn't been helpful in our understanding (I'm sorry to > mix my metaphors, but I think it makes a great picture). The brain becomes > the CPU of the body. > > > > I'd also like to offer a few concepts that derive from Vedic theory of > mind, and these are the vritti, and the samskara. > > > > Vritti translates roughly from Sanskrit as "thought-modification." I > find this concept incredibly powerful for many reasons. > > > > First, it bypasses all Cartesian artifacts and constructs in how we > think about mind. > > > > Second, it copes nicely with the problem that Ed and Mike are discussing > text vs image. > > > > Third, it seems to have intuited neurological activity in the brain and > body, thus uniting mind with movement, embodied thinking, affective > thought, etc. > > > > And there are likely other benefits that I've not yet considered. > > > > So what is a vritti? > > > > In the Vedic paradigm, as I understand it, the mind is very subtle > material, like light is subtle, and thus it interacts with the gross body > while both are interacting with the world. Considering the mind as material > means that it is not separate from the body, it is just more subtle and > therefore we are talking about degrees of physicality rather than mind > being an entity that exists somewhere else and a body is connected to that > mind through the pineal gland, etc, which to this day I've never been able > to get my head around. ;) > > > > The second concept that is useful is samskara, which is an impression in > the mind. We can be born with samskaras, but also activities and thoughts > can create samskaras. Some can be deeper and more fixed, or transient and > shallow, or anywhere along those two continuums. > > > > Further, the notion of samskara as impression can be useful when > considering obsessive thinking, plasticity, and various forms of learning. > I don't think samskara need be fixed to the mind, perhaps also to the body, > but I'm not sure. > > > > Considering samskara, it might be useful to think of the way sand can > have impressions made upon it by the wind or the tide or... a child's > shovel and pail. > > > > When the child creates a sandcastle with the tools of the shovel and > pail, at that very point the sandcastle becomes is recognizable, it is > considered a vritti (and the word crowns the deed). Likewise when the child > takes the very same sand destroying the castle and then creates a starfish > and it becomes recognizable as such, then it is another vritti. The > important takeaway here is that the material *does not change*, but the > shape *does*. That's why it is a "thought-modification." > > > > Clay as material could be another useful metaphor, in that sense. The > potter at the wheel takes a lump of clay and makes a vase and then > transforms the vase into a bowl, and finally a plate. Analogously, these > would be three vrittis. > > > > However, the reason the vritti need not be visual is that its material > is "mind" itself (consider mind "as-if sand" or "as-if clay"), with mind > itself processing all perceptual information. With the same "sand" it > creates the thought-shapes for sound, touch, smell, and taste, not only > sight. But these are combined, not isolated as individual percepts in any > kind of units. > > > > This also gets away from the traps of right-brain/left-brain theory, as > come to think of it. > > > > Memory and doubt are also aspects of mind, and this might be where the > affect comes in, because of the recognition of language, emotional content > from the past, meaning, etc, all these various mental processes become part > of the vritti. > > > > I'd also like to offer that Kant's notion of givenness also helps in > this conception, because it is the appearances of external objects we > perceive and feel that as-if shape the vritti as well as memory, doubt, > recognition, and so forth. In this sense there is a kind of overlap of the > external world onto the mind. But the reverse can be true as well. That is, > the mind can "as-if" overlap onto the world. I'd say this is imagination. > It could also be fantasy, but that seems to have a different affective > stance than imagination. Imagination still possesses that self-awareness > that it is imagined. Fantasy seems to not have that in its extreme > manifestation, thereby taking what is imagined in place of the external > world. > > > > I'm not sure what the technical term is for the moment of neural > activity when we see the brain light up in a particular pattern in the > brain (and likely body, but we lack the means to detect this as we do with > an fMRI scan of the brain), but it does have a particular shape when there > is, say, more visual stimulation than aural. The "material" of that thought > is an electrical impulse, which is subtle, like light. > > > > So I think these terms are very insightful, and they can help free us > from Cartesian conceptions and that's why I like them so much. They also do > not conflict with Vygotsky's work, as far as I can tell. > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From ewall@umich.edu Mon Dec 7 17:38:10 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 19:38:10 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com> <95C126D7-CAC2-4AA2-B72E-8827AAF9FCB1@umich.edu> Message-ID: <48B4ED6B-07B4-4081-BEC1-C4361DE83FCF@umich.edu> Mike I have read Schmitau and contacted the people in Hawaii, but I don?t know about Zuckerman. I have, by the way, desperately tried to stick to my original subject line. People on this list have far to much imagination (smile). Ed > On Dec 7, 2015, at 7:27 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Ed and Huw. > > The best English descriptions of Davydovian math education is in the work > of Jean Schmitau. She has articles in a couple of places, one in MCA. She > has fuller accounts that are, I believe, referenced there. Otherwise, > Galina Zuckerman, whose English is terrific, is the person I would turn to > in search of concrete, detailed, description. > > Can we keep this thread on imagination? Maybe Imagination in Education > could be a thread? > > Maybe Imagination and Indian Philosophy could be another subject line? > > Following the threads and the way they mutually inform each other in the > course of the discussion would be facilitated, for me at least, by keeping > Imagination as the lead word to be followed by constituent "and" identifier. > As in Imagination and Indian Philosophy. > > Can we self organize to have such a complex discussion using the existing, > to hand, technologies? The topic of imagination seems a fitting one on > which to try out the idea. A great variety of histories appear to lead to > this common discussion point, but they are almost mutually interpretable ( > I know zero about Indian philosophy + what I am reading here. > > I do know that the when Varela, Rosch, and others at Berkeley ignited the > embodied cognition movement, it was Eastern religions that they drew upon. > > mike > On imagination. What is the precise reference for the concrete-concrete > form of imagination? I found the discussion about distinguishing fantasy as > a form of imagination very helpful. > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 5:05 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >> Annalisa >> >> What I would like to see is an analysis of imagination or >> representation from the point of view of each of the six systems of Indian >> philosophy: Nyaya; Vaisheeshika; Sankhya; Yoga; Karma Mimansa; and Vedanta. >> It is said that knowledge is true only when it is acceptable in the light >> of each of these six systems. I had thoughts about doing such an analysis >> in the past, but realized it would be quite! nontrivial. Are you applying >> (smile)! >> >> Ed >> >>> On Dec 7, 2015, at 12:05 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> Greetings, >>> >>> I would like to offer a few ideas to the mix in this discussion about >> imagination vs. representation. >>> >>> Representation as a word has posed a problem in understanding modes of >> thought and cognition, and most of all, and I realize I am preaching to the >> choir, it tends to commodify the thought as an object as-if coming off a >> conveyor belt, a finished product in isolation. And as Mike points out, >> there is no conveyance of affect in this thought factory of >> representations, nor cultural-historical influences. >>> >>> The usage of "representation" also has tended to give legs to the >> mind-brain, which hasn't been helpful in our understanding (I'm sorry to >> mix my metaphors, but I think it makes a great picture). The brain becomes >> the CPU of the body. >>> >>> I'd also like to offer a few concepts that derive from Vedic theory of >> mind, and these are the vritti, and the samskara. >>> >>> Vritti translates roughly from Sanskrit as "thought-modification." I >> find this concept incredibly powerful for many reasons. >>> >>> First, it bypasses all Cartesian artifacts and constructs in how we >> think about mind. >>> >>> Second, it copes nicely with the problem that Ed and Mike are discussing >> text vs image. >>> >>> Third, it seems to have intuited neurological activity in the brain and >> body, thus uniting mind with movement, embodied thinking, affective >> thought, etc. >>> >>> And there are likely other benefits that I've not yet considered. >>> >>> So what is a vritti? >>> >>> In the Vedic paradigm, as I understand it, the mind is very subtle >> material, like light is subtle, and thus it interacts with the gross body >> while both are interacting with the world. Considering the mind as material >> means that it is not separate from the body, it is just more subtle and >> therefore we are talking about degrees of physicality rather than mind >> being an entity that exists somewhere else and a body is connected to that >> mind through the pineal gland, etc, which to this day I've never been able >> to get my head around. ;) >>> >>> The second concept that is useful is samskara, which is an impression in >> the mind. We can be born with samskaras, but also activities and thoughts >> can create samskaras. Some can be deeper and more fixed, or transient and >> shallow, or anywhere along those two continuums. >>> >>> Further, the notion of samskara as impression can be useful when >> considering obsessive thinking, plasticity, and various forms of learning. >> I don't think samskara need be fixed to the mind, perhaps also to the body, >> but I'm not sure. >>> >>> Considering samskara, it might be useful to think of the way sand can >> have impressions made upon it by the wind or the tide or... a child's >> shovel and pail. >>> >>> When the child creates a sandcastle with the tools of the shovel and >> pail, at that very point the sandcastle becomes is recognizable, it is >> considered a vritti (and the word crowns the deed). Likewise when the child >> takes the very same sand destroying the castle and then creates a starfish >> and it becomes recognizable as such, then it is another vritti. The >> important takeaway here is that the material *does not change*, but the >> shape *does*. That's why it is a "thought-modification." >>> >>> Clay as material could be another useful metaphor, in that sense. The >> potter at the wheel takes a lump of clay and makes a vase and then >> transforms the vase into a bowl, and finally a plate. Analogously, these >> would be three vrittis. >>> >>> However, the reason the vritti need not be visual is that its material >> is "mind" itself (consider mind "as-if sand" or "as-if clay"), with mind >> itself processing all perceptual information. With the same "sand" it >> creates the thought-shapes for sound, touch, smell, and taste, not only >> sight. But these are combined, not isolated as individual percepts in any >> kind of units. >>> >>> This also gets away from the traps of right-brain/left-brain theory, as >> come to think of it. >>> >>> Memory and doubt are also aspects of mind, and this might be where the >> affect comes in, because of the recognition of language, emotional content >> from the past, meaning, etc, all these various mental processes become part >> of the vritti. >>> >>> I'd also like to offer that Kant's notion of givenness also helps in >> this conception, because it is the appearances of external objects we >> perceive and feel that as-if shape the vritti as well as memory, doubt, >> recognition, and so forth. In this sense there is a kind of overlap of the >> external world onto the mind. But the reverse can be true as well. That is, >> the mind can "as-if" overlap onto the world. I'd say this is imagination. >> It could also be fantasy, but that seems to have a different affective >> stance than imagination. Imagination still possesses that self-awareness >> that it is imagined. Fantasy seems to not have that in its extreme >> manifestation, thereby taking what is imagined in place of the external >> world. >>> >>> I'm not sure what the technical term is for the moment of neural >> activity when we see the brain light up in a particular pattern in the >> brain (and likely body, but we lack the means to detect this as we do with >> an fMRI scan of the brain), but it does have a particular shape when there >> is, say, more visual stimulation than aural. The "material" of that thought >> is an electrical impulse, which is subtle, like light. >>> >>> So I think these terms are very insightful, and they can help free us >> from Cartesian conceptions and that's why I like them so much. They also do >> not conflict with Vygotsky's work, as far as I can tell. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >> >> >> > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 7 17:42:21 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 17:42:21 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> Message-ID: Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity given that we started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I indicated in my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life through my teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas drawn from psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and activity-centered research practices. But here I am. So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my understanding. I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the description of the flow from imagination to representation, but glad to encounter a dozen! Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the abstractions can be seen, seem hard to come by. My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by identifying different threads of the topic they constitute was offered with that goal in mind. The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is about it. I learned that from the Russians who write about imagination. Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6? etc? To the extent that these different traditions lead people to the same kinds of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the conclusions are tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, sometimes, in good teaching. mike mike On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > Larry and Mike > > Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to both of you > in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a conversation > that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably good, but it is > a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little larger than what > I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that I need to, one > might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that bear on the, > perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up. > > Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will reread it). I > found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a large grain size > (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look at things). A > few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms and are offered > in the hope that they might be useful. > > 1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; however, > looking at how words are used (a philosophy of language, so to speak) often > does a better job of opening things up. > > 2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did not make your > list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to mention > Avicenna. > > 3. I have the impression you are using the term ?stable? as a > somewhat replacement of Vygotsky?s concrete; I like that as ?concrete' > seems to have very different meanings for different people. I will try to > use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in my replies > tooters. > > 4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of Hellen Keller. I > wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a thin gap is > because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a suspicion that > he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I am fairly sure > Keller was. > > 5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than too thin > although the metaphor of filling still seems reasonable > > 6. In a way you don?t seem to quite come out and say it (or I > missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is not necessarily > creative and I would add that it is quite everyday. > > > Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as they occur. > > Ed > > > On Dec 6, 2015, at 4:41 PM, Lplarry wrote: > > > > Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and re(present) our > notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a metaphor not > error. > > Ed, > > To continue with your reflection if image has some relation to how > others use text. > > Actually I don?t think image has some relation to how others use text. I > twas speculating as whether there is some commonality between how Mike is > using using image and how others are using text. I said this because I > struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary in mathematics > and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to problems that > presently catch my attention. > > > Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In other words > can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The physical > gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of letters on the > page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or the visual > marks making a circle-like shape. > > I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size is too large. > That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I now realize > was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to view > imagination. I don?t mean your perspective is lacking; it just seems to > result in different questions than I would/do ask. > > > These different physical forms are not the foundational bedrock, they > are the material. > > If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on parchment but as > having a deeper process, > > Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual perceptions > but rather having a deeper process. > > My initial reaction is ?Why are you saying this?" If I ever thought the > contrary, I can?t remember. This is just common sense. The interesting > thing about what you say is that you seem to using ?imagine? in a non > visual fashion which was largely my initial point. > > > All the senses share in this process and engage with physically > experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is that unifying > process that includes all the senses but is not itself the senses. > > I would say that all senses can participate in this process. Also > physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too strong although > physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints of a sort on > imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I don?t > physically experience a platonic circle. > > > To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the collated > pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a dialogue, to > imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly have a > unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the vital animating > process lived (into). > > Here is where my example wasn?t helpful. I did not mean one ?sees' the > marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks is too large a > grain size) on the board as having certain properties consistent with those > of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a sort of sense. > The teacher?s language seems to prove the imaging and the moving to new > stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people don?t make the > leaps. > > > This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy of the visual > sense. > > Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none of the sensory > modes > > > The relation of this image process to the language process is also > multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. > > This doesn?t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, doesn?t follow > for me. > > Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable perspective. It is just > one that, to a degree, I either don?t share or seems to be the wrong grain > size. > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: "Ed Wall" > > Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > Mike > > > > My wondering has more to do with your focus on the visual and my > examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be about the visual. > However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well drawn) is a > ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at least, it never > was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. In fact, > assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I can imagine it > (smile). > > On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term ?image? in the > way some use the word ?text.? That is, to take into account both external > and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of what you say > resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am finding that > peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky. > > > > Ed > > > >> On Dec 6, 2015, at 2:35 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent. > >> > >> "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of Zinchenko's > >> experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual system that > >> prevented stabilized images from disappearing. He stabilized the image > >> (here reified as a projection on the retina) but changed its color, thus > >> defeating the retina's tendency to go grey. In those conditions, eye > >> movements continue to trace the spatial coordinates of the image as if > it > >> were continuing to "feel it." > >> > >> These are very special circumstances, to be sure, but for they make it > >> clear that what is called an image is a process (according to Suvorov, > of > >> stepping away from the world and then stepping back into it, but then he > >> was blind and deaf). > >> > >> What we designate as "the image" is some form of materialized > stabilization > >> of the flow of into-image-making. Some structure in the flow of the > always > >> new. From just the blink of an eye to our image of the statue of > liberty. > >> > >> This is an old idea but it fits with my intuition. I first encountered > it > >> reading Dewey who refers to "the poet" on the topic of experience. > >> > >> > >> > >> *Yet all experience is an arch wherehrough / Gleams that untraveled > world > >> whose margin fades / Forever and forever when I move. * > >> > >> *Tennyson, Ulysses* > >> > >> > >> If you are interested, we could try to synch re/reading of some core > common > >> articles/chapters. This entire area of concern is of recent vintage for > me > >> and my ignorance is particularly keenly felt. > >> > >> mike > >> > >> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:02 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >> > >>> Mike > >>> > >>> As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the privileging of > >>> the ?image? in discussions of imagination. Additionally, although it > has > >>> been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don?t think it was > of the > >>> Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw on would > disagree > >>> with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics. > >>> I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems useful! - > and > >>> I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a huge emphasis > in > >>> mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking less about > the > >>> ?imaginal? than you or Larry. That doesn?t mean that what you and > Larry are > >>> talking about might not usefully factor in especially your point about > >>> joint, mediated, activity. > >>> > >>> Ed > >>> > >>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 11:11 AM, mike cole wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et al > >>>> > >>>> I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic beginnings builds > off > >>> of > >>>> the already highly functional sensory system. Assume vision as the > >>> sensory > >>>> system in question. We know that in an important sense, the "simple" > act > >>> of > >>>> seeing what you might call a common object, for example your car in > the > >>>> driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves temporal and > >>>> spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement that must > be > >>>> resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the process of image > >>>> formation ceases to function. > >>>> > >>>> The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for that > simplified > >>>> account. In thinking about imagination I turn to Zaporozhets, > Zinchenko > >>> and > >>>> non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of enactive > >>>> perception/cognition. It is also consistent with joint, mediated, > >>> activity > >>>> as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go. > >>>> > >>>> I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic function and > the > >>>> human possibility for symbolic communication is co-incident and > >>>> co-constitutive of distinctly human imagination. > >>>> > >>>> in brief > >>>> mike > >>>> > >>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Ed, mike, Michael, > >>>>> I will push my question to an earlier time period. > >>>>> Age 2 months. > >>>>> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own activity . > >>>>> Question > >>>>> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving into > the > >>>>> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? > >>>>> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? > >>>>> > >>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > >>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM > >>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy > >>>>> > >>>>> Larry > >>>>> > >>>>> I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or > >>>>> exclusive. > >>>>> > >>>>> I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense if > >>> I > >>>>> understand Vygotsky correctly. > >>>>> > >>>>> I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps I > >>>>> wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the > >>> tendency to > >>>>> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow > >>> extra-concrete. > >>>>> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical > >>> context > >>>>> and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain things > >>> are > >>>>> ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that is?). > >>>>> > >>>>> I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of > >>>>> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. > >>>>> > >>>>> Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean when > >>>>> you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, > >>> perhaps, > >>>>> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy > >>>>> > >>>>> Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy in > >>>>> your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final question. > An > >>>>> approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other > >>>>> possibilities (smile). > >>>>> > >>>>> Ed > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Ed, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> The title imagination (or) fantasy > >>>>>> Is different from > >>>>>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. > >>>>>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a > distanciation?) > >>>>> and return to the mathematical concrete. > >>>>>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the > >>>>> physical to the mathematical? > >>>>>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in historical > >>>>> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical > (concrete) > >>>>> which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical > >>>>> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within the > >>>>> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? > >>>>>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. > >>>>>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which > originates > >>> as > >>>>> concrete. > >>>>>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. > >>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does > one > >>>>> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the actual > >>> can > >>>>> be mapped onto the physical with systems? > >>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? > >>>>>> Larry > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > >>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM > >>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy > >>>>>> > >>>>>> All > >>>>>> > >>>>>> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of > imagination > >>>>> that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or > >>>>> ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements > >>>>> although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing > so I > >>>>> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and > Creativity > >>> in > >>>>> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for > imagination > >>> that > >>>>> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an > >>>>> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a > pass > >>> in > >>>>> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, > >>>>> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a > given > >>>>> concrete toward a new concrete.? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion > >>>>> on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am > >>>>> wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being > >>> asked > >>>>> to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the > >>>>> elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if > somebody > >>> is > >>>>> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my > >>> wondering > >>>>> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there > is no > >>>>> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to > speak, > >>> in > >>>>> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering > about > >>> and > >>>>> then a question. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to > see > >>>>> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. > In a > >>>>> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is > not > >>> a > >>>>> fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a > fraction.? > >>>>> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and > then > >>>>> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another > >>>>> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through > >>>>> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) > >>> seems to > >>>>> be very hard for people to do. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws > >>>>> something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then > draws a > >>>>> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, > "This > >>> is > >>>>> its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her > hand > >>> at > >>>>> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None > of > >>> this > >>>>> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step > >>> here > >>>>> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. > (Hmm > >>> , I > >>>>> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the > >>> mathematical > >>>>> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a > winged > >>>>> horse]. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with > >>>>> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky > >>> have > >>>>> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? > >>> There > >>>>> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in > >>> your > >>>>> take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Ed Wall > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From ewall@umich.edu Mon Dec 7 18:04:06 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 20:04:06 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> Message-ID: <05AB59E5-018D-4FF2-92BE-06619D1F95B8@umich.edu> Mike I assume you have read Sartre on imagination; i.e. The Imagination. This gives what he considers a phenomenological take on imagination. However, I would consider a much more revealing take to be that of Edward Casey in Imaging (I am hoping that book you referenced will supplement that of Casey). The connection to Kant, by the way, critically preceded that of Mzerleau-Ponty and Sartre and that is why I was surprised to not see him mentioned. I agree that we all seem to be coming out in, more or less, the same place. Only the questions seem to differ. Ed > On Dec 7, 2015, at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity given that we > started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I indicated in > my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life through my > teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas drawn from > psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and activity-centered > research practices. But here I am. > > So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my understanding. > > I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the description of the > flow from imagination to representation, but glad to encounter a dozen! > Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the abstractions can > be seen, seem hard to come by. > > My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by > identifying different threads of the topic they constitute was offered with > that goal in mind. > > The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is about it. I > learned that from the Russians who write about imagination. > > Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6? > > etc? > > To the extent that these different traditions lead people to the same kinds > of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the conclusions are > tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, sometimes, in > good teaching. > > mike > > mike > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >> Larry and Mike >> >> Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to both of you >> in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a conversation >> that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably good, but it is >> a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little larger than what >> I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that I need to, one >> might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that bear on the, >> perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up. >> >> Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will reread it). I >> found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a large grain size >> (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look at things). A >> few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms and are offered >> in the hope that they might be useful. >> >> 1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; however, >> looking at how words are used (a philosophy of language, so to speak) often >> does a better job of opening things up. >> >> 2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did not make your >> list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to mention >> Avicenna. >> >> 3. I have the impression you are using the term ?stable? as a >> somewhat replacement of Vygotsky?s concrete; I like that as ?concrete' >> seems to have very different meanings for different people. I will try to >> use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in my replies >> tooters. >> >> 4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of Hellen Keller. I >> wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a thin gap is >> because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a suspicion that >> he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I am fairly sure >> Keller was. >> >> 5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than too thin >> although the metaphor of filling still seems reasonable >> >> 6. In a way you don?t seem to quite come out and say it (or I >> missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is not necessarily >> creative and I would add that it is quite everyday. >> >> >> Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as they occur. >> >> Ed >> >>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 4:41 PM, Lplarry wrote: >>> >>> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and re(present) our >> notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a metaphor not >> error. >>> Ed, >>> To continue with your reflection if image has some relation to how >> others use text. >> >> Actually I don?t think image has some relation to how others use text. I >> twas speculating as whether there is some commonality between how Mike is >> using using image and how others are using text. I said this because I >> struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary in mathematics >> and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to problems that >> presently catch my attention. >> >>> Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In other words >> can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The physical >> gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of letters on the >> page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or the visual >> marks making a circle-like shape. >> >> I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size is too large. >> That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I now realize >> was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to view >> imagination. I don?t mean your perspective is lacking; it just seems to >> result in different questions than I would/do ask. >> >>> These different physical forms are not the foundational bedrock, they >> are the material. >>> If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on parchment but as >> having a deeper process, >>> Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual perceptions >> but rather having a deeper process. >> >> My initial reaction is ?Why are you saying this?" If I ever thought the >> contrary, I can?t remember. This is just common sense. The interesting >> thing about what you say is that you seem to using ?imagine? in a non >> visual fashion which was largely my initial point. >> >>> All the senses share in this process and engage with physically >> experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is that unifying >> process that includes all the senses but is not itself the senses. >> >> I would say that all senses can participate in this process. Also >> physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too strong although >> physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints of a sort on >> imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I don?t >> physically experience a platonic circle. >> >>> To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the collated >> pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a dialogue, to >> imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly have a >> unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the vital animating >> process lived (into). >> >> Here is where my example wasn?t helpful. I did not mean one ?sees' the >> marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks is too large a >> grain size) on the board as having certain properties consistent with those >> of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a sort of sense. >> The teacher?s language seems to prove the imaging and the moving to new >> stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people don?t make the >> leaps. >> >>> This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy of the visual >> sense. >> >> Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none of the sensory >> modes >> >>> The relation of this image process to the language process is also >> multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. >> >> This doesn?t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, doesn?t follow >> for me. >> >> Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable perspective. It is just >> one that, to a degree, I either don?t share or seems to be the wrong grain >> size. >> >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: "Ed Wall" >>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>> >>> Mike >>> >>> My wondering has more to do with your focus on the visual and my >> examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be about the visual. >> However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well drawn) is a >> ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at least, it never >> was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. In fact, >> assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I can imagine it >> (smile). >>> On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term ?image? in the >> way some use the word ?text.? That is, to take into account both external >> and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of what you say >> resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am finding that >> peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky. >>> >>> Ed >>> >>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 2:35 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent. >>>> >>>> "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of Zinchenko's >>>> experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual system that >>>> prevented stabilized images from disappearing. He stabilized the image >>>> (here reified as a projection on the retina) but changed its color, thus >>>> defeating the retina's tendency to go grey. In those conditions, eye >>>> movements continue to trace the spatial coordinates of the image as if >> it >>>> were continuing to "feel it." >>>> >>>> These are very special circumstances, to be sure, but for they make it >>>> clear that what is called an image is a process (according to Suvorov, >> of >>>> stepping away from the world and then stepping back into it, but then he >>>> was blind and deaf). >>>> >>>> What we designate as "the image" is some form of materialized >> stabilization >>>> of the flow of into-image-making. Some structure in the flow of the >> always >>>> new. From just the blink of an eye to our image of the statue of >> liberty. >>>> >>>> This is an old idea but it fits with my intuition. I first encountered >> it >>>> reading Dewey who refers to "the poet" on the topic of experience. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *Yet all experience is an arch wherehrough / Gleams that untraveled >> world >>>> whose margin fades / Forever and forever when I move. * >>>> >>>> *Tennyson, Ulysses* >>>> >>>> >>>> If you are interested, we could try to synch re/reading of some core >> common >>>> articles/chapters. This entire area of concern is of recent vintage for >> me >>>> and my ignorance is particularly keenly felt. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:02 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>>> >>>>> Mike >>>>> >>>>> As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the privileging of >>>>> the ?image? in discussions of imagination. Additionally, although it >> has >>>>> been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don?t think it was >> of the >>>>> Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw on would >> disagree >>>>> with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics. >>>>> I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems useful! - >> and >>>>> I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a huge emphasis >> in >>>>> mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking less about >> the >>>>> ?imaginal? than you or Larry. That doesn?t mean that what you and >> Larry are >>>>> talking about might not usefully factor in especially your point about >>>>> joint, mediated, activity. >>>>> >>>>> Ed >>>>> >>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 11:11 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et al >>>>>> >>>>>> I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic beginnings builds >> off >>>>> of >>>>>> the already highly functional sensory system. Assume vision as the >>>>> sensory >>>>>> system in question. We know that in an important sense, the "simple" >> act >>>>> of >>>>>> seeing what you might call a common object, for example your car in >> the >>>>>> driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves temporal and >>>>>> spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement that must >> be >>>>>> resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the process of image >>>>>> formation ceases to function. >>>>>> >>>>>> The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for that >> simplified >>>>>> account. In thinking about imagination I turn to Zaporozhets, >> Zinchenko >>>>> and >>>>>> non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of enactive >>>>>> perception/cognition. It is also consistent with joint, mediated, >>>>> activity >>>>>> as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go. >>>>>> >>>>>> I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic function and >> the >>>>>> human possibility for symbolic communication is co-incident and >>>>>> co-constitutive of distinctly human imagination. >>>>>> >>>>>> in brief >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Ed, mike, Michael, >>>>>>> I will push my question to an earlier time period. >>>>>>> Age 2 months. >>>>>>> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own activity . >>>>>>> Question >>>>>>> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving into >> the >>>>>>> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? >>>>>>> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" >>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM >>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or >>>>>>> exclusive. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense if >>>>> I >>>>>>> understand Vygotsky correctly. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps I >>>>>>> wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the >>>>> tendency to >>>>>>> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow >>>>> extra-concrete. >>>>>>> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical >>>>> context >>>>>>> and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain things >>>>> are >>>>>>> ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that is?). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of >>>>>>> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean when >>>>>>> you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, >>>>> perhaps, >>>>>>> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy in >>>>>>> your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final question. >> An >>>>>>> approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other >>>>>>> possibilities (smile). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ed, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The title imagination (or) fantasy >>>>>>>> Is different from >>>>>>>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. >>>>>>>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a >> distanciation?) >>>>>>> and return to the mathematical concrete. >>>>>>>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the >>>>>>> physical to the mathematical? >>>>>>>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in historical >>>>>>> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical >> (concrete) >>>>>>> which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical >>>>>>> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within the >>>>>>> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? >>>>>>>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. >>>>>>>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which >> originates >>>>> as >>>>>>> concrete. >>>>>>>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. >>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does >> one >>>>>>> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the actual >>>>> can >>>>>>> be mapped onto the physical with systems? >>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? >>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" >>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM >>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> All >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of >> imagination >>>>>>> that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or >>>>>>> ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements >>>>>>> although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing >> so I >>>>>>> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and >> Creativity >>>>> in >>>>>>> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for >> imagination >>>>> that >>>>>>> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an >>>>>>> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a >> pass >>>>> in >>>>>>> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, >>>>>>> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a >> given >>>>>>> concrete toward a new concrete.? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion >>>>>>> on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am >>>>>>> wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being >>>>> asked >>>>>>> to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the >>>>>>> elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if >> somebody >>>>> is >>>>>>> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my >>>>> wondering >>>>>>> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there >> is no >>>>>>> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to >> speak, >>>>> in >>>>>>> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering >> about >>>>> and >>>>>>> then a question. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to >> see >>>>>>> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. >> In a >>>>>>> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is >> not >>>>> a >>>>>>> fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a >> fraction.? >>>>>>> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and >> then >>>>>>> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another >>>>>>> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through >>>>>>> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) >>>>> seems to >>>>>>> be very hard for people to do. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws >>>>>>> something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then >> draws a >>>>>>> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, >> "This >>>>> is >>>>>>> its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her >> hand >>>>> at >>>>>>> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None >> of >>>>> this >>>>>>> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step >>>>> here >>>>>>> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. >> (Hmm >>>>> , I >>>>>>> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the >>>>> mathematical >>>>>>> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a >> winged >>>>>>> horse]. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with >>>>>>> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky >>>>> have >>>>>>> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? >>>>> There >>>>>>> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in >>>>> your >>>>>>> take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ed Wall >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Dec 7 18:05:57 2015 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 02:05:57 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com> <95C126D7-CAC2-4AA2-B72E-8827AAF9FCB1@umich.edu> Message-ID: Nothing to worry about. It has the ring of celestial humour. :) Best, Huw On 8 December 2015 at 01:27, mike cole wrote: > Ed and Huw. > > The best English descriptions of Davydovian math education is in the work > of Jean Schmitau. She has articles in a couple of places, one in MCA. She > has fuller accounts that are, I believe, referenced there. Otherwise, > Galina Zuckerman, whose English is terrific, is the person I would turn to > in search of concrete, detailed, description. > > Can we keep this thread on imagination? Maybe Imagination in Education > could be a thread? > > Maybe Imagination and Indian Philosophy could be another subject line? > > Following the threads and the way they mutually inform each other in the > course of the discussion would be facilitated, for me at least, by keeping > Imagination as the lead word to be followed by constituent "and" > identifier. > As in Imagination and Indian Philosophy. > > Can we self organize to have such a complex discussion using the existing, > to hand, technologies? The topic of imagination seems a fitting one on > which to try out the idea. A great variety of histories appear to lead to > this common discussion point, but they are almost mutually interpretable ( > I know zero about Indian philosophy + what I am reading here. > > I do know that the when Varela, Rosch, and others at Berkeley ignited the > embodied cognition movement, it was Eastern religions that they drew upon. > > mike > On imagination. What is the precise reference for the concrete-concrete > form of imagination? I found the discussion about distinguishing fantasy as > a form of imagination very helpful. > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 5:05 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > Annalisa > > > > What I would like to see is an analysis of imagination or > > representation from the point of view of each of the six systems of > Indian > > philosophy: Nyaya; Vaisheeshika; Sankhya; Yoga; Karma Mimansa; and > Vedanta. > > It is said that knowledge is true only when it is acceptable in the light > > of each of these six systems. I had thoughts about doing such an analysis > > in the past, but realized it would be quite! nontrivial. Are you applying > > (smile)! > > > > Ed > > > > > On Dec 7, 2015, at 12:05 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > > > > Greetings, > > > > > > I would like to offer a few ideas to the mix in this discussion about > > imagination vs. representation. > > > > > > Representation as a word has posed a problem in understanding modes of > > thought and cognition, and most of all, and I realize I am preaching to > the > > choir, it tends to commodify the thought as an object as-if coming off a > > conveyor belt, a finished product in isolation. And as Mike points out, > > there is no conveyance of affect in this thought factory of > > representations, nor cultural-historical influences. > > > > > > The usage of "representation" also has tended to give legs to the > > mind-brain, which hasn't been helpful in our understanding (I'm sorry to > > mix my metaphors, but I think it makes a great picture). The brain > becomes > > the CPU of the body. > > > > > > I'd also like to offer a few concepts that derive from Vedic theory of > > mind, and these are the vritti, and the samskara. > > > > > > Vritti translates roughly from Sanskrit as "thought-modification." I > > find this concept incredibly powerful for many reasons. > > > > > > First, it bypasses all Cartesian artifacts and constructs in how we > > think about mind. > > > > > > Second, it copes nicely with the problem that Ed and Mike are > discussing > > text vs image. > > > > > > Third, it seems to have intuited neurological activity in the brain and > > body, thus uniting mind with movement, embodied thinking, affective > > thought, etc. > > > > > > And there are likely other benefits that I've not yet considered. > > > > > > So what is a vritti? > > > > > > In the Vedic paradigm, as I understand it, the mind is very subtle > > material, like light is subtle, and thus it interacts with the gross body > > while both are interacting with the world. Considering the mind as > material > > means that it is not separate from the body, it is just more subtle and > > therefore we are talking about degrees of physicality rather than mind > > being an entity that exists somewhere else and a body is connected to > that > > mind through the pineal gland, etc, which to this day I've never been > able > > to get my head around. ;) > > > > > > The second concept that is useful is samskara, which is an impression > in > > the mind. We can be born with samskaras, but also activities and thoughts > > can create samskaras. Some can be deeper and more fixed, or transient and > > shallow, or anywhere along those two continuums. > > > > > > Further, the notion of samskara as impression can be useful when > > considering obsessive thinking, plasticity, and various forms of > learning. > > I don't think samskara need be fixed to the mind, perhaps also to the > body, > > but I'm not sure. > > > > > > Considering samskara, it might be useful to think of the way sand can > > have impressions made upon it by the wind or the tide or... a child's > > shovel and pail. > > > > > > When the child creates a sandcastle with the tools of the shovel and > > pail, at that very point the sandcastle becomes is recognizable, it is > > considered a vritti (and the word crowns the deed). Likewise when the > child > > takes the very same sand destroying the castle and then creates a > starfish > > and it becomes recognizable as such, then it is another vritti. The > > important takeaway here is that the material *does not change*, but the > > shape *does*. That's why it is a "thought-modification." > > > > > > Clay as material could be another useful metaphor, in that sense. The > > potter at the wheel takes a lump of clay and makes a vase and then > > transforms the vase into a bowl, and finally a plate. Analogously, these > > would be three vrittis. > > > > > > However, the reason the vritti need not be visual is that its material > > is "mind" itself (consider mind "as-if sand" or "as-if clay"), with mind > > itself processing all perceptual information. With the same "sand" it > > creates the thought-shapes for sound, touch, smell, and taste, not only > > sight. But these are combined, not isolated as individual percepts in any > > kind of units. > > > > > > This also gets away from the traps of right-brain/left-brain theory, as > > come to think of it. > > > > > > Memory and doubt are also aspects of mind, and this might be where the > > affect comes in, because of the recognition of language, emotional > content > > from the past, meaning, etc, all these various mental processes become > part > > of the vritti. > > > > > > I'd also like to offer that Kant's notion of givenness also helps in > > this conception, because it is the appearances of external objects we > > perceive and feel that as-if shape the vritti as well as memory, doubt, > > recognition, and so forth. In this sense there is a kind of overlap of > the > > external world onto the mind. But the reverse can be true as well. That > is, > > the mind can "as-if" overlap onto the world. I'd say this is imagination. > > It could also be fantasy, but that seems to have a different affective > > stance than imagination. Imagination still possesses that self-awareness > > that it is imagined. Fantasy seems to not have that in its extreme > > manifestation, thereby taking what is imagined in place of the external > > world. > > > > > > I'm not sure what the technical term is for the moment of neural > > activity when we see the brain light up in a particular pattern in the > > brain (and likely body, but we lack the means to detect this as we do > with > > an fMRI scan of the brain), but it does have a particular shape when > there > > is, say, more visual stimulation than aural. The "material" of that > thought > > is an electrical impulse, which is subtle, like light. > > > > > > So I think these terms are very insightful, and they can help free us > > from Cartesian conceptions and that's why I like them so much. They also > do > > not conflict with Vygotsky's work, as far as I can tell. > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 7 18:22:19 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 02:22:19 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: <95C126D7-CAC2-4AA2-B72E-8827AAF9FCB1@umich.edu> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com> , <95C126D7-CAC2-4AA2-B72E-8827AAF9FCB1@umich.edu> Message-ID: Hi Ed, I have never heard this before that in order to be considered true knowledge all six philosophies must agree. I would be curious to know where this comes from. Of course, my studies derive from traditionally taught Vedanta, specifically Advaita, which means non-dual. If it is dual, then I really couldn't comment, because I'd have a lot of questions on how the world all stays together and doesn't fly apart. It seems a little preposterous to me to think all Indian schools would have to agree, and would be like making the same assertion for all forms of Western philosophy. So I'm a little skeptical; no offense, I hope, is taken. On reflection, if we were to consider the same for science, it would also be an unattainable feat. I don't think anyone ever agrees completely in that sense either. There is always room for inquiry, after all. Thank goodness, since that's what minds are for. Another thing to consider is that proponents of Advaita do not consider it a philosophy, but this word is something assigned from the outside the tradition, much like "Hinduism" is a word assigned from outside. Advaita is considered a means of knowledge for the self, and that is all, it's not a religion, nor a philosophy, just a teaching. I realize that these notions are far afield of this thread; I only bring Advaita up here in reference to discussion regarding imagination, to offer one theory of mind and how it works. What I like about it is how lightweight it is, and it doesn't seem to raise conflicts when I consider how my own mind works. It is interesting to think about the differences in a mind before and after knowledge takes place. The material is the same, but what changes? Is there a little person inside with a checklist, functioning like a pilot before takeoff? I'll share that I have been considering how Western philosophy reflects Vedic thought, but it is something of a project I won't layout here. There is some connection with Schopenhauer, but I'm not clear about it at this point. However, to partially answer your question, the way Advaita considers knowledge to be knowledge, which is explained in commentaries by Adi Shankara (I cannot comment on the other Indian traditions), the thought in the mind must be true to the object of knowledge in order to be considered knowledge, if there is a discrepancy, then it is not knowledge. There can be partial knowledge, but then this means there is still ignorance present. It seems to me that if it were the other way around, then that would be the product of an imagination in terms of the architect's vision of a building. But even in that case, how could one know if the building matched his thought? only he could. We can verify if someone knows something in the world however, if we have access to the object of knowledge ourselves, and the person is being honest in his or her testimony concerning the object. Interestingly, there are two forms of ignorance. Complete ignorance of the object, and then taking an object to be something else, which is harder to deal with, because we might think we know what we know, when we really do not. (I didn't mean to sound like Donald Rumsfeld there, honest!) This form of ignorance is the most difficult to deal with. Further, ignorance is seen as a covering rather than as an absence. Even though we can say absence of knowledge means ignorance is there, this is in reference to the mind, not the perceived world. This was a very difficult concept for me to grasp, as a Westerner. In this sense, knowledge is not seen as acquired, but as ignorance removed. Hence, "guru" means "one who removes ignorance." For all you teachers out there! :) Knowledge, then, is located in the world. I should also add that object knowledge is not considered hard and fast, as if there is a real world out there and a real thought in here (points to head), but that it is a process, using a means of knowledge, and always being determined (in the present moment), for the reason that change is always the case and nothing in the world in time and space is static and unchanging. I'll say more on imagination in a different post. Kind regards, Annalisa _______ From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 7 18:24:23 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 02:24:23 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com> <95C126D7-CAC2-4AA2-B72E-8827AAF9FCB1@umich.edu>, Message-ID: Sorry Mike, I just saw your post, and I will relabel the subject from here on out. I am happy to oblige. Kind regards, Annalisa From ablunden@mira.net Mon Dec 7 18:43:37 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 08 Dec 2015 13:43:37 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Soviet Psychology Overview Article In-Reply-To: References: <5665af9d.8700620a.2f8b6.fffffe6e@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <566643D9.5030602@mira.net> I found this paper extremely interesting. It's rather confronting opening, saying that Soviet Psychology had "failed," is really crediting the world-conquering ambition of Vygotsky's vision expressed in the "Crisis of Psychology" text, towards forming not a "Marxist psychology" (i.e. yet another school) but "general psychology" - that is, he aimed to reorganise psychology internationally. I think we take for granted now, that psychology is fragmented into myriad schools, but in those times, the interwar years, this fragmentation of psychology was emblematic of the world crisis manifested in the rise of fascism and stalinism and the evident termination of progress in Europe. It was a central problem for all theory! At that time, it was still expected that Psychology would develop like the natural sciences. So I accept the author's characterisation, together with the claim that Vygotsky's vision is gradually being fulfilled and his school has made a crucial contribution to the eventual achievement of an international psychology. The paper is very optimistic in that respect. I like the perspective for International psychology - the merging of universal, cultural and indigenous currents of research. Very interesting. Also the view that Psychology will develop along too distinct paths - the reductive neurophysiological and the humanistic - with Luria in a founding role in both! This seems a valid description, and emphasises the importance of promoting understanding of Luria's life. I have made a very modest effort to trace how Hegel's efforts in philosophy to create what could be conceived of as a cultural psychology took about 80 years before manifesting in Vygotsky's ideas. And it seems there is a second phase of that journey being described in this paper. A grand vision cannot directly translate into a global research program. It has to arise bit by bit. The characterisation of the internationalisation process as spread of mainstream Psychology + interest in cultural variation. I don't know about this one. I did find a couple of criticisms of Vygotsky odd, mainly that Vygotsky did not give a prominent place to *collaboration* in his psychology (while Piaget did) because he "took collaboration for granted" - I think this is an error. "Collaboration" is one of the ways Vygotsky's ideas connected up with people in the West. The author's ideas about how research is transmitted, or taken up, are interesting too. That theories are appropriated piecemeal and put to work in the research project which is doing the appropriation. The three reasons why Vygotsky's school "failed" to win over to an international psychology: (1) stalinist repression (2) lack of attention to experimental research and the careful documenting of their protocol - seem reasonable, though I think the ideological gap and the uniqueness in time and place of the conditions of the revolutionary ferment which gave birth the CHAT ought to be mentioned too. The author instead refers to "overemphasis on theory". Wonderfully comprehensive review of the development of international psychology! Thanks for that Mike (and for your contributions as document in the chapter!) Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 8/12/2015 4:45 AM, mike cole wrote: > Yes, Huw. I found that odd too. Perhaps it is the date? I also posted it > on a Russian site. It will be interesting to see what they have to say. > > Yes, Larry, that is an amazing archive. I did not have time to peruse it. > > mike > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 8:10 AM, Lplarry wrote: > >> Mike, >> The entire edited volume seems a treasure trove of tracing the formation >> and dissemination of knowledge(s) moving through time. A profound work of >> scholarship. >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: "Huw Lloyd" >> Sent: ?2015-?12-?07 7:40 AM >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Soviet Psychology Overview Article >> >> It seems completely nuts to describe the soviet research program as a >> failure. They demonstrated far more success than any other endeavour in >> scientific psychology that I have studied. Most psychology projects can't >> even establish a coherent theory, let alone apply it. They are forever >> wading around in hypotheses and impressions, or focusing upon incoherent >> slices of phenomena without regard to its origins. >> >> "Psychology today is undergoing a transformation. It is becoming an >> international science, which aspires to uncover universal laws of human >> behavior and cognition as well as to account for their cultural variation. >> How can we understand the transformation of concepts, ideas, and approaches >> involved in this process? In this chapter, I examine a historical precedent >> for the globalization of psychology. In the 1920s?1930s, a group of Soviet >> researchers led by L.S. Vygotsky proposed a new kind of scientific >> psychology that would be international in scope. It was revolutionary in >> its assumption that the study of mind and behavior, in phylo- and >> ontogenesis, >> had to be grounded in the study of the cultural and material conditions in >> which people live. Although this research program as such largely failed, >> the Soviet psychologists contributed much of value, and their ideas were >> taken up?and transformed?by Western psychologists. These ideas form the >> basis of the genuinely international psychology that is only just emerging >> today, and to which the ?cultural-historical? psychology of the Soviets was >> a precursor." >> >> http://www.edition-open-access.de/studies/1/30/index.html#2 >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> On 6 December 2015 at 19:45, mike cole wrote: >> >>> This morning I stumbled over the attached historical overview of Soviet >>> Psychology in relation to international psychology that I thought would >> be >>> of interest to MCA-o-philes. >>> >>> http://www.edition-open-sources.org/studies/1/30/index.html >>> >>> fyi >>> mike >>> >>> -- >>> >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>> > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Dec 7 18:45:17 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 08 Dec 2015 13:45:17 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <05AB59E5-018D-4FF2-92BE-06619D1F95B8@umich.edu> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> <05AB59E5-018D-4FF2-92BE-06619D1F95B8@umich.edu> Message-ID: <5666443D.5010601@mira.net> Hegel also gave a central place to imagination in perception. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 8/12/2015 1:04 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > Mike > > I assume you have read Sartre on imagination; i.e. The Imagination. This gives what he considers a phenomenological take on imagination. However, I would consider a much more revealing take to be that of Edward Casey in Imaging (I am hoping that book you referenced will supplement that of Casey). The connection to Kant, by the way, critically preceded that of Mzerleau-Ponty and Sartre and that is why I was surprised to not see him mentioned. > > I agree that we all seem to be coming out in, more or less, the same place. Only the questions seem to differ. > > Ed > >> On Dec 7, 2015, at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity given that we >> started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I indicated in >> my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life through my >> teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas drawn from >> psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and activity-centered >> research practices. But here I am. >> >> So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my understanding. >> >> I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the description of the >> flow from imagination to representation, but glad to encounter a dozen! >> Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the abstractions can >> be seen, seem hard to come by. >> >> My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by >> identifying different threads of the topic they constitute was offered with >> that goal in mind. >> >> The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is about it. I >> learned that from the Russians who write about imagination. >> >> Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6? >> >> etc? >> >> To the extent that these different traditions lead people to the same kinds >> of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the conclusions are >> tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, sometimes, in >> good teaching. >> >> mike >> >> mike >> >> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >> >>> Larry and Mike >>> >>> Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to both of you >>> in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a conversation >>> that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably good, but it is >>> a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little larger than what >>> I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that I need to, one >>> might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that bear on the, >>> perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up. >>> >>> Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will reread it). I >>> found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a large grain size >>> (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look at things). A >>> few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms and are offered >>> in the hope that they might be useful. >>> >>> 1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; however, >>> looking at how words are used (a philosophy of language, so to speak) often >>> does a better job of opening things up. >>> >>> 2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did not make your >>> list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to mention >>> Avicenna. >>> >>> 3. I have the impression you are using the term ?stable? as a >>> somewhat replacement of Vygotsky?s concrete; I like that as ?concrete' >>> seems to have very different meanings for different people. I will try to >>> use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in my replies >>> tooters. >>> >>> 4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of Hellen Keller. I >>> wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a thin gap is >>> because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a suspicion that >>> he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I am fairly sure >>> Keller was. >>> >>> 5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than too thin >>> although the metaphor of filling still seems reasonable >>> >>> 6. In a way you don?t seem to quite come out and say it (or I >>> missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is not necessarily >>> creative and I would add that it is quite everyday. >>> >>> >>> Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as they occur. >>> >>> Ed >>> >>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 4:41 PM, Lplarry wrote: >>>> >>>> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and re(present) our >>> notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a metaphor not >>> error. >>>> Ed, >>>> To continue with your reflection if image has some relation to how >>> others use text. >>> >>> Actually I don?t think image has some relation to how others use text. I >>> twas speculating as whether there is some commonality between how Mike is >>> using using image and how others are using text. I said this because I >>> struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary in mathematics >>> and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to problems that >>> presently catch my attention. >>> >>>> Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In other words >>> can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The physical >>> gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of letters on the >>> page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or the visual >>> marks making a circle-like shape. >>> >>> I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size is too large. >>> That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I now realize >>> was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to view >>> imagination. I don?t mean your perspective is lacking; it just seems to >>> result in different questions than I would/do ask. >>> >>>> These different physical forms are not the foundational bedrock, they >>> are the material. >>>> If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on parchment but as >>> having a deeper process, >>>> Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual perceptions >>> but rather having a deeper process. >>> >>> My initial reaction is ?Why are you saying this?" If I ever thought the >>> contrary, I can?t remember. This is just common sense. The interesting >>> thing about what you say is that you seem to using ?imagine? in a non >>> visual fashion which was largely my initial point. >>> >>>> All the senses share in this process and engage with physically >>> experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is that unifying >>> process that includes all the senses but is not itself the senses. >>> >>> I would say that all senses can participate in this process. Also >>> physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too strong although >>> physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints of a sort on >>> imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I don?t >>> physically experience a platonic circle. >>> >>>> To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the collated >>> pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a dialogue, to >>> imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly have a >>> unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the vital animating >>> process lived (into). >>> >>> Here is where my example wasn?t helpful. I did not mean one ?sees' the >>> marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks is too large a >>> grain size) on the board as having certain properties consistent with those >>> of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a sort of sense. >>> The teacher?s language seems to prove the imaging and the moving to new >>> stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people don?t make the >>> leaps. >>> >>>> This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy of the visual >>> sense. >>> >>> Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none of the sensory >>> modes >>> >>>> The relation of this image process to the language process is also >>> multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. >>> >>> This doesn?t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, doesn?t follow >>> for me. >>> >>> Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable perspective. It is just >>> one that, to a degree, I either don?t share or seems to be the wrong grain >>> size. >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: "Ed Wall" >>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM >>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>> >>>> Mike >>>> >>>> My wondering has more to do with your focus on the visual and my >>> examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be about the visual. >>> However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well drawn) is a >>> ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at least, it never >>> was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. In fact, >>> assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I can imagine it >>> (smile). >>>> On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term ?image? in the >>> way some use the word ?text.? That is, to take into account both external >>> and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of what you say >>> resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am finding that >>> peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky. >>>> Ed >>>> >>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 2:35 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>> If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent. >>>>> >>>>> "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of Zinchenko's >>>>> experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual system that >>>>> prevented stabilized images from disappearing. He stabilized the image >>>>> (here reified as a projection on the retina) but changed its color, thus >>>>> defeating the retina's tendency to go grey. In those conditions, eye >>>>> movements continue to trace the spatial coordinates of the image as if >>> it >>>>> were continuing to "feel it." >>>>> >>>>> These are very special circumstances, to be sure, but for they make it >>>>> clear that what is called an image is a process (according to Suvorov, >>> of >>>>> stepping away from the world and then stepping back into it, but then he >>>>> was blind and deaf). >>>>> >>>>> What we designate as "the image" is some form of materialized >>> stabilization >>>>> of the flow of into-image-making. Some structure in the flow of the >>> always >>>>> new. From just the blink of an eye to our image of the statue of >>> liberty. >>>>> This is an old idea but it fits with my intuition. I first encountered >>> it >>>>> reading Dewey who refers to "the poet" on the topic of experience. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *Yet all experience is an arch wherehrough / Gleams that untraveled >>> world >>>>> whose margin fades / Forever and forever when I move. * >>>>> >>>>> *Tennyson, Ulysses* >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If you are interested, we could try to synch re/reading of some core >>> common >>>>> articles/chapters. This entire area of concern is of recent vintage for >>> me >>>>> and my ignorance is particularly keenly felt. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:02 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> >>>>>> As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the privileging of >>>>>> the ?image? in discussions of imagination. Additionally, although it >>> has >>>>>> been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don?t think it was >>> of the >>>>>> Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw on would >>> disagree >>>>>> with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics. >>>>>> I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems useful! - >>> and >>>>>> I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a huge emphasis >>> in >>>>>> mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking less about >>> the >>>>>> ?imaginal? than you or Larry. That doesn?t mean that what you and >>> Larry are >>>>>> talking about might not usefully factor in especially your point about >>>>>> joint, mediated, activity. >>>>>> >>>>>> Ed >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 11:11 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et al >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic beginnings builds >>> off >>>>>> of >>>>>>> the already highly functional sensory system. Assume vision as the >>>>>> sensory >>>>>>> system in question. We know that in an important sense, the "simple" >>> act >>>>>> of >>>>>>> seeing what you might call a common object, for example your car in >>> the >>>>>>> driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves temporal and >>>>>>> spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement that must >>> be >>>>>>> resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the process of image >>>>>>> formation ceases to function. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for that >>> simplified >>>>>>> account. In thinking about imagination I turn to Zaporozhets, >>> Zinchenko >>>>>> and >>>>>>> non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of enactive >>>>>>> perception/cognition. It is also consistent with joint, mediated, >>>>>> activity >>>>>>> as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic function and >>> the >>>>>>> human possibility for symbolic communication is co-incident and >>>>>>> co-constitutive of distinctly human imagination. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> in brief >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ed, mike, Michael, >>>>>>>> I will push my question to an earlier time period. >>>>>>>> Age 2 months. >>>>>>>> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own activity . >>>>>>>> Question >>>>>>>> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving into >>> the >>>>>>>> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? >>>>>>>> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" >>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM >>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or >>>>>>>> exclusive. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense if >>>>>> I >>>>>>>> understand Vygotsky correctly. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps I >>>>>>>> wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the >>>>>> tendency to >>>>>>>> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow >>>>>> extra-concrete. >>>>>>>> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical >>>>>> context >>>>>>>> and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain things >>>>>> are >>>>>>>> ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that is?). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of >>>>>>>> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean when >>>>>>>> you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, >>>>>> perhaps, >>>>>>>> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy in >>>>>>>> your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final question. >>> An >>>>>>>> approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other >>>>>>>> possibilities (smile). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ed, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The title imagination (or) fantasy >>>>>>>>> Is different from >>>>>>>>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. >>>>>>>>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a >>> distanciation?) >>>>>>>> and return to the mathematical concrete. >>>>>>>>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from the >>>>>>>> physical to the mathematical? >>>>>>>>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in historical >>>>>>>> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical >>> (concrete) >>>>>>>> which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical >>>>>>>> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within the >>>>>>>> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? >>>>>>>>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. >>>>>>>>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which >>> originates >>>>>> as >>>>>>>> concrete. >>>>>>>>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. >>>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. Does >>> one >>>>>>>> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the actual >>>>>> can >>>>>>>> be mapped onto the physical with systems? >>>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? >>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" >>>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM >>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> All >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of >>> imagination >>>>>>>> that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? or >>>>>>>> ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different statements >>>>>>>> although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing >>> so I >>>>>>>> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and >>> Creativity >>>>>> in >>>>>>>> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for >>> imagination >>>>>> that >>>>>>>> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an >>>>>>>> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a >>> pass >>>>>> in >>>>>>>> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of view, >>>>>>>> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a >>> given >>>>>>>> concrete toward a new concrete.? >>>>>>>>> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous discussion >>>>>>>> on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am >>>>>>>> wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are being >>>>>> asked >>>>>>>> to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the >>>>>>>> elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if >>> somebody >>>>>> is >>>>>>>> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my >>>>>> wondering >>>>>>>> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there >>> is no >>>>>>>> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to >>> speak, >>>>>> in >>>>>>>> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering >>> about >>>>>> and >>>>>>>> then a question. >>>>>>>>> My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to >>> see >>>>>>>> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. >>> In a >>>>>>>> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is >>> not >>>>>> a >>>>>>>> fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a >>> fraction.? >>>>>>>> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and >>> then >>>>>>>> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another >>>>>>>> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through >>>>>>>> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) >>>>>> seems to >>>>>>>> be very hard for people to do. >>>>>>>>> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws >>>>>>>> something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then >>> draws a >>>>>>>> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, >>> "This >>>>>> is >>>>>>>> its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her >>> hand >>>>>> at >>>>>>>> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None >>> of >>>>>> this >>>>>>>> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each step >>>>>> here >>>>>>>> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. >>> (Hmm >>>>>> , I >>>>>>>> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the >>>>>> mathematical >>>>>>>> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) >>>>>>>>> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a >>> winged >>>>>>>> horse]. >>>>>>>>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with >>>>>>>> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would Vygotsky >>>>>> have >>>>>>>> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something else? >>>>>> There >>>>>>>> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested in >>>>>> your >>>>>>>> take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. >>>>>>>>> Ed Wall >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > From ewall@umich.edu Mon Dec 7 18:55:47 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 20:55:47 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy (Vedanta) In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com> <95C126D7-CAC2-4AA2-B72E-8827AAF9FCB1@umich.edu> Message-ID: Annalisa I added the above at, more less, Mike?s request; however, you might feel that it doesn?t fit. What I think I said was "knowledge is true only when it is acceptable in the light of each of these six systems.? I don?t take that to mean they all agree in some absolute fashion. Perhaps the recent discussion might be an example: A number of people including yourself have expressed opinions that differ in certain respects, but point toward something. Further, as far as Western philosophy goes two major traditions: analytical philosophy and continental philosophy do have, as Tugendhat has argued, more places of commonality than is often admitted. Science is a little more complicated because of the culture of falsification; however, acceptance (and scale complicates things) is often taken as an indication of a truth of sorts. Anyway, I agree that philosophy is a Western word and knowledge is a complicated word which I try not to use except in quotes (smile). Ed > On Dec 7, 2015, at 8:22 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Ed, > > I have never heard this before that in order to be considered true knowledge all six philosophies must agree. I would be curious to know where this comes from. > > Of course, my studies derive from traditionally taught Vedanta, specifically Advaita, which means non-dual. If it is dual, then I really couldn't comment, because I'd have a lot of questions on how the world all stays together and doesn't fly apart. > > It seems a little preposterous to me to think all Indian schools would have to agree, and would be like making the same assertion for all forms of Western philosophy. So I'm a little skeptical; no offense, I hope, is taken. On reflection, if we were to consider the same for science, it would also be an unattainable feat. I don't think anyone ever agrees completely in that sense either. > > There is always room for inquiry, after all. Thank goodness, since that's what minds are for. > > Another thing to consider is that proponents of Advaita do not consider it a philosophy, but this word is something assigned from the outside the tradition, much like "Hinduism" is a word assigned from outside. Advaita is considered a means of knowledge for the self, and that is all, it's not a religion, nor a philosophy, just a teaching. I realize that these notions are far afield of this thread; I only bring Advaita up here in reference to discussion regarding imagination, to offer one theory of mind and how it works. > > What I like about it is how lightweight it is, and it doesn't seem to raise conflicts when I consider how my own mind works. > > It is interesting to think about the differences in a mind before and after knowledge takes place. The material is the same, but what changes? Is there a little person inside with a checklist, functioning like a pilot before takeoff? > > I'll share that I have been considering how Western philosophy reflects Vedic thought, but it is something of a project I won't layout here. There is some connection with Schopenhauer, but I'm not clear about it at this point. > > However, to partially answer your question, the way Advaita considers knowledge to be knowledge, which is explained in commentaries by Adi Shankara (I cannot comment on the other Indian traditions), the thought in the mind must be true to the object of knowledge in order to be considered knowledge, if there is a discrepancy, then it is not knowledge. There can be partial knowledge, but then this means there is still ignorance present. > > It seems to me that if it were the other way around, then that would be the product of an imagination in terms of the architect's vision of a building. But even in that case, how could one know if the building matched his thought? only he could. > > We can verify if someone knows something in the world however, if we have access to the object of knowledge ourselves, and the person is being honest in his or her testimony concerning the object. > > Interestingly, there are two forms of ignorance. Complete ignorance of the object, and then taking an object to be something else, which is harder to deal with, because we might think we know what we know, when we really do not. (I didn't mean to sound like Donald Rumsfeld there, honest!) This form of ignorance is the most difficult to deal with. > > Further, ignorance is seen as a covering rather than as an absence. Even though we can say absence of knowledge means ignorance is there, this is in reference to the mind, not the perceived world. This was a very difficult concept for me to grasp, as a Westerner. In this sense, knowledge is not seen as acquired, but as ignorance removed. Hence, "guru" means "one who removes ignorance." For all you teachers out there! :) > > Knowledge, then, is located in the world. > > I should also add that object knowledge is not considered hard and fast, as if there is a real world out there and a real thought in here (points to head), but that it is a process, using a means of knowledge, and always being determined (in the present moment), for the reason that change is always the case and nothing in the world in time and space is static and unchanging. > > I'll say more on imagination in a different post. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > _______ From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 7 19:08:18 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 03:08:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy (Vedanta) In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com> <95C126D7-CAC2-4AA2-B72E-8827AAF9FCB1@umich.edu> , Message-ID: Hi Henry, I think that fantasy vs imagination need not be too complex. One thing about the Vygotsky quote, is that an imagination need not develop into anything. I can say "imagine a red balloon." Then, "Now change it to blue." is there anything concrete about that? But in order to have an imagination of a red balloon, one has to know what a balloon is, and what red is, and then what blue is. And I suppose one would have to know English too to understand me when I say, "imagine this." All this derives from the apparent world we have already perceived in our personal histories, cultures, etc. They have *developed* through our experiences and perceptions. I have not heard of the term, "mara" so I can't comment. I know that there is a word for deluded, or infatuation, which is "moha." Then there is "maayaa," which refers to the veiling power of the universe, how things can seem to be something else, like a mirage, or an optical illusion, or the setting sun, but this is in terms of the world, not in terms of a persons who perceive the world, since we can both witness an mirage and witness the same illusion. One could say this veiling power is the same for quantum physics, where it seems to be turtles all the way down! But getting back to imagination as a part of the creative process, fantasy it seems to me is also that, a creative process. But the only way to determine the difference between fantasy and imagination can be considered from two vantage points. From the thinker herself, and from the perspective of another person interacting with the thinker, or someone not the thinker who has access to the object of imagination independently, if that is possible. But then both could be subject to the fantasy as well, I suppose! That's why I was saying the thinker would have to have self-awareness of his or her imagination, *that* it is an imagination, whereas the thinker who fantasizes would lack that self-awareness. Of course I do not mean this as a binary option, but relatively. For an imagination to happen, there has to be already there concepts as "material" for the imagination, and these come from the world. We can't imagine something we do not know, our of a vacuum. Consider our dreams. Consider a horse with a single horn. This can be imagined because I know what a horse is, and I know what a horn is. But if I really believe that there are unicorns, even to the point that I see them in the world, then I would be fantasizing and hallucinating. In that case, I would lack self-awareness to know this is purely my imagination. Horses with one horn are an overlapping of two things, which then make up one thing. The "concretizing" of this could be weaving a tapestry with a unicorn and even making up a myth about unicorns with songs and value systems, but this still doesn't make them real. But they certainly are wonderful imaginary beasts! Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 7 19:29:22 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 03:29:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy (Vedanta) In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com> <95C126D7-CAC2-4AA2-B72E-8827AAF9FCB1@umich.edu> , Message-ID: Hi Ed, It just occurred to me that you might mean the 6 means of knowledge (pramana). I can't know for sure, but there are 6 means of knowledge discussed when discussing how knowledge takes place. First means is perception. Second is inference. Third is presumption. Fourth is comparison. Fifth is non-apprehension, or absence. Sixth is testimony. So I thought maybe this might be what you meant? It occurs to me just now that in all 6 examples I might offer that there is a kind of overlapping going on, along with an imagination. In each example, however, I think overlap happens a little bit differently. Kind regards, Annalisa From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 7 19:40:30 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 19:40:30 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Soviet Psychology Overview Article In-Reply-To: <566643D9.5030602@mira.net> References: <5665af9d.8700620a.2f8b6.fffffe6e@mx.google.com> <566643D9.5030602@mira.net> Message-ID: When cultural psychology reappeared on the American radar in the early 1980's, Andy, many argued that it was a "branch of psychology." I argued that in order for it to be fulfilled it would have to become Psychology, so it would never happen because entrenched structures of the disciplines would never allow one of its parts to become the the organizing whole. This applies within existing structure of Psychology and among the humane and biological sciences and arts would have to be re-configured. Maybe I was wrong. But I cannot see it happening in my life time. Time will tell. mike mike On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 6:43 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I found this paper extremely interesting. > It's rather confronting opening, saying that Soviet Psychology had > "failed," is really crediting the world-conquering ambition of Vygotsky's > vision expressed in the "Crisis of Psychology" text, towards forming not a > "Marxist psychology" (i.e. yet another school) but "general psychology" - > that is, he aimed to reorganise psychology internationally. I think we take > for granted now, that psychology is fragmented into myriad schools, but in > those times, the interwar years, this fragmentation of psychology was > emblematic of the world crisis manifested in the rise of fascism and > stalinism and the evident termination of progress in Europe. It was a > central problem for all theory! At that time, it was still expected that > Psychology would develop like the natural sciences. So I accept the > author's characterisation, together with the claim that Vygotsky's vision > is gradually being fulfilled and his school has made a crucial contribution > to the eventual achievement of an international psychology. The paper is > very optimistic in that respect. > I like the perspective for International psychology - the merging of > universal, cultural and indigenous currents of research. Very interesting. > Also the view that Psychology will develop along too distinct paths - the > reductive neurophysiological and the humanistic - with Luria in a founding > role in both! This seems a valid description, and emphasises the importance > of promoting understanding of Luria's life. > I have made a very modest effort to trace how Hegel's efforts in > philosophy to create what could be conceived of as a cultural psychology > took about 80 years before manifesting in Vygotsky's ideas. And it seems > there is a second phase of that journey being described in this paper. A > grand vision cannot directly translate into a global research program. It > has to arise bit by bit. > The characterisation of the internationalisation process as spread of > mainstream Psychology + interest in cultural variation. I don't know about > this one. > I did find a couple of criticisms of Vygotsky odd, mainly that Vygotsky > did not give a prominent place to *collaboration* in his psychology (while > Piaget did) because he "took collaboration for granted" - I think this is > an error. "Collaboration" is one of the ways Vygotsky's ideas connected up > with people in the West. > The author's ideas about how research is transmitted, or taken up, are > interesting too. That theories are appropriated piecemeal and put to work > in the research project which is doing the appropriation. > The three reasons why Vygotsky's school "failed" to win over to an > international psychology: (1) stalinist repression (2) lack of attention to > experimental research and the careful documenting of their protocol - seem > reasonable, though I think the ideological gap and the uniqueness in time > and place of the conditions of the revolutionary ferment which gave birth > the CHAT ought to be mentioned too. The author instead refers to > "overemphasis on theory". > Wonderfully comprehensive review of the development of international > psychology! > Thanks for that Mike (and for your contributions as document in the > chapter!) > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 8/12/2015 4:45 AM, mike cole wrote: > >> Yes, Huw. I found that odd too. Perhaps it is the date? I also posted it >> on a Russian site. It will be interesting to see what they have to say. >> >> Yes, Larry, that is an amazing archive. I did not have time to peruse it. >> >> mike >> >> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 8:10 AM, Lplarry wrote: >> >> Mike, >>> The entire edited volume seems a treasure trove of tracing the formation >>> and dissemination of knowledge(s) moving through time. A profound work of >>> scholarship. >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: "Huw Lloyd" >>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?07 7:40 AM >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Soviet Psychology Overview Article >>> >>> It seems completely nuts to describe the soviet research program as a >>> failure. They demonstrated far more success than any other endeavour in >>> scientific psychology that I have studied. Most psychology projects >>> can't >>> even establish a coherent theory, let alone apply it. They are forever >>> wading around in hypotheses and impressions, or focusing upon incoherent >>> slices of phenomena without regard to its origins. >>> >>> "Psychology today is undergoing a transformation. It is becoming an >>> international science, which aspires to uncover universal laws of human >>> behavior and cognition as well as to account for their cultural >>> variation. >>> How can we understand the transformation of concepts, ideas, and >>> approaches >>> involved in this process? In this chapter, I examine a historical >>> precedent >>> for the globalization of psychology. In the 1920s?1930s, a group of >>> Soviet >>> researchers led by L.S. Vygotsky proposed a new kind of scientific >>> psychology that would be international in scope. It was revolutionary in >>> its assumption that the study of mind and behavior, in phylo- and >>> ontogenesis, >>> had to be grounded in the study of the cultural and material conditions >>> in >>> which people live. Although this research program as such largely failed, >>> the Soviet psychologists contributed much of value, and their ideas were >>> taken up?and transformed?by Western psychologists. These ideas form the >>> basis of the genuinely international psychology that is only just >>> emerging >>> today, and to which the ?cultural-historical? psychology of the Soviets >>> was >>> a precursor." >>> >>> http://www.edition-open-access.de/studies/1/30/index.html#2 >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 6 December 2015 at 19:45, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> This morning I stumbled over the attached historical overview of Soviet >>>> Psychology in relation to international psychology that I thought would >>>> >>> be >>> >>>> of interest to MCA-o-philes. >>>> >>>> http://www.edition-open-sources.org/studies/1/30/index.html >>>> >>>> fyi >>>> mike >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>>> >>>> >> >> > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 7 19:42:19 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 19:42:19 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <05AB59E5-018D-4FF2-92BE-06619D1F95B8@umich.edu> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> <05AB59E5-018D-4FF2-92BE-06619D1F95B8@umich.edu> Message-ID: It make sense for the questions to differ, Ed, or at least the way they are posed. Finding a common foundation will take a lot of communication (which will require a lot of imagination!). mike On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 6:04 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > Mike > > I assume you have read Sartre on imagination; i.e. The Imagination. > This gives what he considers a phenomenological take on imagination. > However, I would consider a much more revealing take to be that of Edward > Casey in Imaging (I am hoping that book you referenced will supplement that > of Casey). The connection to Kant, by the way, critically preceded that of > Mzerleau-Ponty and Sartre and that is why I was surprised to not see him > mentioned. > > I agree that we all seem to be coming out in, more or less, the same > place. Only the questions seem to differ. > > Ed > > > On Dec 7, 2015, at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity given that we > > started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I indicated > in > > my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life through my > > teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas drawn from > > psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and activity-centered > > research practices. But here I am. > > > > So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my > understanding. > > > > I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the description of the > > flow from imagination to representation, but glad to encounter a dozen! > > Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the abstractions > can > > be seen, seem hard to come by. > > > > My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by > > identifying different threads of the topic they constitute was offered > with > > that goal in mind. > > > > The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is about it. I > > learned that from the Russians who write about imagination. > > > > Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6? > > > > etc? > > > > To the extent that these different traditions lead people to the same > kinds > > of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the conclusions are > > tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, sometimes, in > > good teaching. > > > > mike > > > > mike > > > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > >> Larry and Mike > >> > >> Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to both of > you > >> in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a > conversation > >> that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably good, but it > is > >> a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little larger than > what > >> I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that I need to, > one > >> might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that bear on the, > >> perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up. > >> > >> Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will reread it). I > >> found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a large grain > size > >> (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look at things). > A > >> few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms and are > offered > >> in the hope that they might be useful. > >> > >> 1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; however, > >> looking at how words are used (a philosophy of language, so to speak) > often > >> does a better job of opening things up. > >> > >> 2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did not make > your > >> list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to mention > >> Avicenna. > >> > >> 3. I have the impression you are using the term ?stable? as a > >> somewhat replacement of Vygotsky?s concrete; I like that as ?concrete' > >> seems to have very different meanings for different people. I will try > to > >> use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in my replies > >> tooters. > >> > >> 4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of Hellen Keller. > I > >> wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a thin gap is > >> because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a suspicion > that > >> he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I am fairly > sure > >> Keller was. > >> > >> 5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than too thin > >> although the metaphor of filling still seems reasonable > >> > >> 6. In a way you don?t seem to quite come out and say it (or I > >> missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is not necessarily > >> creative and I would add that it is quite everyday. > >> > >> > >> Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as they occur. > >> > >> Ed > >> > >>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 4:41 PM, Lplarry wrote: > >>> > >>> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and re(present) our > >> notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a metaphor not > >> error. > >>> Ed, > >>> To continue with your reflection if image has some relation to how > >> others use text. > >> > >> Actually I don?t think image has some relation to how others use text. I > >> twas speculating as whether there is some commonality between how Mike > is > >> using using image and how others are using text. I said this because I > >> struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary in > mathematics > >> and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to problems > that > >> presently catch my attention. > >> > >>> Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In other words > >> can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The physical > >> gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of letters on > the > >> page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or the visual > >> marks making a circle-like shape. > >> > >> I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size is too > large. > >> That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I now realize > >> was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to view > >> imagination. I don?t mean your perspective is lacking; it just seems to > >> result in different questions than I would/do ask. > >> > >>> These different physical forms are not the foundational bedrock, they > >> are the material. > >>> If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on parchment but as > >> having a deeper process, > >>> Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual perceptions > >> but rather having a deeper process. > >> > >> My initial reaction is ?Why are you saying this?" If I ever thought the > >> contrary, I can?t remember. This is just common sense. The interesting > >> thing about what you say is that you seem to using ?imagine? in a non > >> visual fashion which was largely my initial point. > >> > >>> All the senses share in this process and engage with physically > >> experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is that unifying > >> process that includes all the senses but is not itself the senses. > >> > >> I would say that all senses can participate in this process. Also > >> physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too strong although > >> physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints of a sort on > >> imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I don?t > >> physically experience a platonic circle. > >> > >>> To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the collated > >> pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a dialogue, > to > >> imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly have a > >> unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the vital animating > >> process lived (into). > >> > >> Here is where my example wasn?t helpful. I did not mean one ?sees' the > >> marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks is too > large a > >> grain size) on the board as having certain properties consistent with > those > >> of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a sort of > sense. > >> The teacher?s language seems to prove the imaging and the moving to new > >> stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people don?t make > the > >> leaps. > >> > >>> This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy of the visual > >> sense. > >> > >> Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none of the > sensory > >> modes > >> > >>> The relation of this image process to the language process is also > >> multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. > >> > >> This doesn?t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, doesn?t > follow > >> for me. > >> > >> Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable perspective. It is > just > >> one that, to a degree, I either don?t share or seems to be the wrong > grain > >> size. > >> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: "Ed Wall" > >>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM > >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>> > >>> Mike > >>> > >>> My wondering has more to do with your focus on the visual and my > >> examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be about the > visual. > >> However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well drawn) is a > >> ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at least, it > never > >> was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. In fact, > >> assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I can imagine > it > >> (smile). > >>> On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term ?image? in the > >> way some use the word ?text.? That is, to take into account both > external > >> and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of what you say > >> resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am finding that > >> peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky. > >>> > >>> Ed > >>> > >>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 2:35 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>>> > >>>> If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent. > >>>> > >>>> "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of > Zinchenko's > >>>> experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual system > that > >>>> prevented stabilized images from disappearing. He stabilized the image > >>>> (here reified as a projection on the retina) but changed its color, > thus > >>>> defeating the retina's tendency to go grey. In those conditions, eye > >>>> movements continue to trace the spatial coordinates of the image as if > >> it > >>>> were continuing to "feel it." > >>>> > >>>> These are very special circumstances, to be sure, but for they make it > >>>> clear that what is called an image is a process (according to Suvorov, > >> of > >>>> stepping away from the world and then stepping back into it, but then > he > >>>> was blind and deaf). > >>>> > >>>> What we designate as "the image" is some form of materialized > >> stabilization > >>>> of the flow of into-image-making. Some structure in the flow of the > >> always > >>>> new. From just the blink of an eye to our image of the statue of > >> liberty. > >>>> > >>>> This is an old idea but it fits with my intuition. I first encountered > >> it > >>>> reading Dewey who refers to "the poet" on the topic of experience. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> *Yet all experience is an arch wherehrough / Gleams that untraveled > >> world > >>>> whose margin fades / Forever and forever when I move. * > >>>> > >>>> *Tennyson, Ulysses* > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> If you are interested, we could try to synch re/reading of some core > >> common > >>>> articles/chapters. This entire area of concern is of recent vintage > for > >> me > >>>> and my ignorance is particularly keenly felt. > >>>> > >>>> mike > >>>> > >>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:02 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Mike > >>>>> > >>>>> As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the privileging of > >>>>> the ?image? in discussions of imagination. Additionally, although it > >> has > >>>>> been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don?t think it was > >> of the > >>>>> Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw on would > >> disagree > >>>>> with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics. > >>>>> I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems useful! - > >> and > >>>>> I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a huge > emphasis > >> in > >>>>> mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking less about > >> the > >>>>> ?imaginal? than you or Larry. That doesn?t mean that what you and > >> Larry are > >>>>> talking about might not usefully factor in especially your point > about > >>>>> joint, mediated, activity. > >>>>> > >>>>> Ed > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 11:11 AM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et al > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic beginnings builds > >> off > >>>>> of > >>>>>> the already highly functional sensory system. Assume vision as the > >>>>> sensory > >>>>>> system in question. We know that in an important sense, the "simple" > >> act > >>>>> of > >>>>>> seeing what you might call a common object, for example your car in > >> the > >>>>>> driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves temporal and > >>>>>> spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement that must > >> be > >>>>>> resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the process of > image > >>>>>> formation ceases to function. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for that > >> simplified > >>>>>> account. In thinking about imagination I turn to Zaporozhets, > >> Zinchenko > >>>>> and > >>>>>> non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of enactive > >>>>>> perception/cognition. It is also consistent with joint, mediated, > >>>>> activity > >>>>>> as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic function > and > >> the > >>>>>> human possibility for symbolic communication is co-incident and > >>>>>> co-constitutive of distinctly human imagination. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> in brief > >>>>>> mike > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry > wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Ed, mike, Michael, > >>>>>>> I will push my question to an earlier time period. > >>>>>>> Age 2 months. > >>>>>>> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own > activity . > >>>>>>> Question > >>>>>>> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving into > >> the > >>>>>>> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? > >>>>>>> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > >>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM > >>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Larry > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or > >>>>>>> exclusive. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense > if > >>>>> I > >>>>>>> understand Vygotsky correctly. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps I > >>>>>>> wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the > >>>>> tendency to > >>>>>>> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow > >>>>> extra-concrete. > >>>>>>> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical > >>>>> context > >>>>>>> and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain > things > >>>>> are > >>>>>>> ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that is?). > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of > >>>>>>> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean when > >>>>>>> you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, > >>>>> perhaps, > >>>>>>> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy in > >>>>>>> your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final > question. > >> An > >>>>>>> approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other > >>>>>>> possibilities (smile). > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Ed > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry > wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Ed, > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> The title imagination (or) fantasy > >>>>>>>> Is different from > >>>>>>>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. > >>>>>>>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a > >> distanciation?) > >>>>>>> and return to the mathematical concrete. > >>>>>>>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from > the > >>>>>>> physical to the mathematical? > >>>>>>>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in > historical > >>>>>>> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical > >> (concrete) > >>>>>>> which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical > >>>>>>> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within > the > >>>>>>> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? > >>>>>>>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. > >>>>>>>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which > >> originates > >>>>> as > >>>>>>> concrete. > >>>>>>>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. > >>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. > Does > >> one > >>>>>>> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the > actual > >>>>> can > >>>>>>> be mapped onto the physical with systems? > >>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? > >>>>>>>> Larry > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > >>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM > >>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> All > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of > >> imagination > >>>>>>> that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? ?let,? > or > >>>>>>> ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different > statements > >>>>>>> although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In doing > >> so I > >>>>>>> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and > >> Creativity > >>>>> in > >>>>>>> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for > >> imagination > >>>>> that > >>>>>>> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only an > >>>>>>> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a > >> pass > >>>>> in > >>>>>>> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of > view, > >>>>>>> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a > >> given > >>>>>>> concrete toward a new concrete.? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous > discussion > >>>>>>> on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I am > >>>>>>> wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are > being > >>>>> asked > >>>>>>> to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the > >>>>>>> elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if > >> somebody > >>>>> is > >>>>>>> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my > >>>>> wondering > >>>>>>> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there > >> is no > >>>>>>> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to > >> speak, > >>>>> in > >>>>>>> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering > >> about > >>>>> and > >>>>>>> then a question. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to > >> see > >>>>>>> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such thing. > >> In a > >>>>>>> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two is > >> not > >>>>> a > >>>>>>> fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a > >> fraction.? > >>>>>>> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true and > >> then > >>>>>>> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another > >>>>>>> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through > >>>>>>> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) > >>>>> seems to > >>>>>>> be very hard for people to do. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and draws > >>>>>>> something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then > >> draws a > >>>>>>> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, > >> "This > >>>>> is > >>>>>>> its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her > >> hand > >>>>> at > >>>>>>> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? None > >> of > >>>>> this > >>>>>>> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each > step > >>>>> here > >>>>>>> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. > >> (Hmm > >>>>> , I > >>>>>>> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the > >>>>> mathematical > >>>>>>> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a > >> winged > >>>>>>> horse]. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with > >>>>>>> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would > Vygotsky > >>>>> have > >>>>>>> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something > else? > >>>>> There > >>>>>>> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m interested > in > >>>>> your > >>>>>>> take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Ed Wall > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> > >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 7 19:44:02 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 19:44:02 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> <05AB59E5-018D-4FF2-92BE-06619D1F95B8@umich.edu> Message-ID: So maybe Sartre would be a useful common reading source, Ed. http://blog.exre.org/wp-content/uploads/Sartre_The_Imaginary__A_Phenomenological_Psychology_of_the_Imagination.pdf On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > It make sense for the questions to differ, Ed, or at least the way they > are posed. Finding a common foundation will take a lot of communication > (which will require a lot of imagination!). > mike > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 6:04 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >> Mike >> >> I assume you have read Sartre on imagination; i.e. The Imagination. >> This gives what he considers a phenomenological take on imagination. >> However, I would consider a much more revealing take to be that of Edward >> Casey in Imaging (I am hoping that book you referenced will supplement that >> of Casey). The connection to Kant, by the way, critically preceded that of >> Mzerleau-Ponty and Sartre and that is why I was surprised to not see him >> mentioned. >> >> I agree that we all seem to be coming out in, more or less, the >> same place. Only the questions seem to differ. >> >> Ed >> >> > On Dec 7, 2015, at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: >> > >> > Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity given that we >> > started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I indicated >> in >> > my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life through my >> > teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas drawn from >> > psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and activity-centered >> > research practices. But here I am. >> > >> > So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my >> understanding. >> > >> > I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the description of >> the >> > flow from imagination to representation, but glad to encounter a dozen! >> > Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the abstractions >> can >> > be seen, seem hard to come by. >> > >> > My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by >> > identifying different threads of the topic they constitute was offered >> with >> > that goal in mind. >> > >> > The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is about it. I >> > learned that from the Russians who write about imagination. >> > >> > Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6? >> > >> > etc? >> > >> > To the extent that these different traditions lead people to the same >> kinds >> > of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the conclusions are >> > tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, sometimes, in >> > good teaching. >> > >> > mike >> > >> > mike >> > >> > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >> > >> >> Larry and Mike >> >> >> >> Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to both of >> you >> >> in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a >> conversation >> >> that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably good, but >> it is >> >> a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little larger than >> what >> >> I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that I need to, >> one >> >> might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that bear on the, >> >> perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up. >> >> >> >> Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will reread it). I >> >> found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a large grain >> size >> >> (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look at >> things). A >> >> few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms and are >> offered >> >> in the hope that they might be useful. >> >> >> >> 1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; however, >> >> looking at how words are used (a philosophy of language, so to speak) >> often >> >> does a better job of opening things up. >> >> >> >> 2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did not make >> your >> >> list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to mention >> >> Avicenna. >> >> >> >> 3. I have the impression you are using the term ?stable? as a >> >> somewhat replacement of Vygotsky?s concrete; I like that as ?concrete' >> >> seems to have very different meanings for different people. I will try >> to >> >> use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in my replies >> >> tooters. >> >> >> >> 4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of Hellen >> Keller. I >> >> wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a thin gap is >> >> because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a suspicion >> that >> >> he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I am fairly >> sure >> >> Keller was. >> >> >> >> 5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than too thin >> >> although the metaphor of filling still seems reasonable >> >> >> >> 6. In a way you don?t seem to quite come out and say it (or I >> >> missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is not necessarily >> >> creative and I would add that it is quite everyday. >> >> >> >> >> >> Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as they occur. >> >> >> >> Ed >> >> >> >>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 4:41 PM, Lplarry wrote: >> >>> >> >>> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and re(present) our >> >> notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a metaphor >> not >> >> error. >> >>> Ed, >> >>> To continue with your reflection if image has some relation to how >> >> others use text. >> >> >> >> Actually I don?t think image has some relation to how others use text. >> I >> >> twas speculating as whether there is some commonality between how Mike >> is >> >> using using image and how others are using text. I said this because I >> >> struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary in >> mathematics >> >> and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to problems >> that >> >> presently catch my attention. >> >> >> >>> Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In other words >> >> can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The physical >> >> gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of letters on >> the >> >> page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or the visual >> >> marks making a circle-like shape. >> >> >> >> I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size is too >> large. >> >> That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I now >> realize >> >> was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to view >> >> imagination. I don?t mean your perspective is lacking; it just seems to >> >> result in different questions than I would/do ask. >> >> >> >>> These different physical forms are not the foundational bedrock, they >> >> are the material. >> >>> If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on parchment but as >> >> having a deeper process, >> >>> Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual perceptions >> >> but rather having a deeper process. >> >> >> >> My initial reaction is ?Why are you saying this?" If I ever thought the >> >> contrary, I can?t remember. This is just common sense. The interesting >> >> thing about what you say is that you seem to using ?imagine? in a non >> >> visual fashion which was largely my initial point. >> >> >> >>> All the senses share in this process and engage with physically >> >> experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is that >> unifying >> >> process that includes all the senses but is not itself the senses. >> >> >> >> I would say that all senses can participate in this process. Also >> >> physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too strong although >> >> physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints of a sort on >> >> imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I don?t >> >> physically experience a platonic circle. >> >> >> >>> To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the collated >> >> pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a dialogue, >> to >> >> imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly have a >> >> unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the vital animating >> >> process lived (into). >> >> >> >> Here is where my example wasn?t helpful. I did not mean one ?sees' the >> >> marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks is too >> large a >> >> grain size) on the board as having certain properties consistent with >> those >> >> of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a sort of >> sense. >> >> The teacher?s language seems to prove the imaging and the moving to new >> >> stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people don?t make >> the >> >> leaps. >> >> >> >>> This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy of the >> visual >> >> sense. >> >> >> >> Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none of the >> sensory >> >> modes >> >> >> >>> The relation of this image process to the language process is also >> >> multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. >> >> >> >> This doesn?t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, doesn?t >> follow >> >> for me. >> >> >> >> Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable perspective. It is >> just >> >> one that, to a degree, I either don?t share or seems to be the wrong >> grain >> >> size. >> >> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> -----Original Message----- >> >>> From: "Ed Wall" >> >>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM >> >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >> >>> >> >>> Mike >> >>> >> >>> My wondering has more to do with your focus on the visual and >> my >> >> examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be about the >> visual. >> >> However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well drawn) is >> a >> >> ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at least, it >> never >> >> was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. In fact, >> >> assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I can >> imagine it >> >> (smile). >> >>> On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term ?image? in >> the >> >> way some use the word ?text.? That is, to take into account both >> external >> >> and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of what you >> say >> >> resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am finding that >> >> peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky. >> >>> >> >>> Ed >> >>> >> >>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 2:35 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent. >> >>>> >> >>>> "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of >> Zinchenko's >> >>>> experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual system >> that >> >>>> prevented stabilized images from disappearing. He stabilized the >> image >> >>>> (here reified as a projection on the retina) but changed its color, >> thus >> >>>> defeating the retina's tendency to go grey. In those conditions, eye >> >>>> movements continue to trace the spatial coordinates of the image as >> if >> >> it >> >>>> were continuing to "feel it." >> >>>> >> >>>> These are very special circumstances, to be sure, but for they make >> it >> >>>> clear that what is called an image is a process (according to >> Suvorov, >> >> of >> >>>> stepping away from the world and then stepping back into it, but >> then he >> >>>> was blind and deaf). >> >>>> >> >>>> What we designate as "the image" is some form of materialized >> >> stabilization >> >>>> of the flow of into-image-making. Some structure in the flow of the >> >> always >> >>>> new. From just the blink of an eye to our image of the statue of >> >> liberty. >> >>>> >> >>>> This is an old idea but it fits with my intuition. I first >> encountered >> >> it >> >>>> reading Dewey who refers to "the poet" on the topic of experience. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> *Yet all experience is an arch wherehrough / Gleams that untraveled >> >> world >> >>>> whose margin fades / Forever and forever when I move. * >> >>>> >> >>>> *Tennyson, Ulysses* >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> If you are interested, we could try to synch re/reading of some core >> >> common >> >>>> articles/chapters. This entire area of concern is of recent vintage >> for >> >> me >> >>>> and my ignorance is particularly keenly felt. >> >>>> >> >>>> mike >> >>>> >> >>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:02 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>>> Mike >> >>>>> >> >>>>> As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the privileging >> of >> >>>>> the ?image? in discussions of imagination. Additionally, although it >> >> has >> >>>>> been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don?t think it was >> >> of the >> >>>>> Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw on would >> >> disagree >> >>>>> with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics. >> >>>>> I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems useful! - >> >> and >> >>>>> I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a huge >> emphasis >> >> in >> >>>>> mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking less about >> >> the >> >>>>> ?imaginal? than you or Larry. That doesn?t mean that what you and >> >> Larry are >> >>>>> talking about might not usefully factor in especially your point >> about >> >>>>> joint, mediated, activity. >> >>>>> >> >>>>> Ed >> >>>>> >> >>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 11:11 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et al >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic beginnings >> builds >> >> off >> >>>>> of >> >>>>>> the already highly functional sensory system. Assume vision as the >> >>>>> sensory >> >>>>>> system in question. We know that in an important sense, the >> "simple" >> >> act >> >>>>> of >> >>>>>> seeing what you might call a common object, for example your car in >> >> the >> >>>>>> driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves temporal >> and >> >>>>>> spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement that >> must >> >> be >> >>>>>> resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the process of >> image >> >>>>>> formation ceases to function. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for that >> >> simplified >> >>>>>> account. In thinking about imagination I turn to Zaporozhets, >> >> Zinchenko >> >>>>> and >> >>>>>> non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of enactive >> >>>>>> perception/cognition. It is also consistent with joint, mediated, >> >>>>> activity >> >>>>>> as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic function >> and >> >> the >> >>>>>> human possibility for symbolic communication is co-incident and >> >>>>>> co-constitutive of distinctly human imagination. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> in brief >> >>>>>> mike >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry >> wrote: >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Ed, mike, Michael, >> >>>>>>> I will push my question to an earlier time period. >> >>>>>>> Age 2 months. >> >>>>>>> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own >> activity . >> >>>>>>> Question >> >>>>>>> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving >> into >> >> the >> >>>>>>> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? >> >>>>>>> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >> >>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" >> >>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM >> >>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Larry >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or >> >>>>>>> exclusive. >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense >> if >> >>>>> I >> >>>>>>> understand Vygotsky correctly. >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps I >> >>>>>>> wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the >> >>>>> tendency to >> >>>>>>> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow >> >>>>> extra-concrete. >> >>>>>>> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical >> >>>>> context >> >>>>>>> and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain >> things >> >>>>> are >> >>>>>>> ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that >> is?). >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of >> >>>>>>> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean >> when >> >>>>>>> you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, >> >>>>> perhaps, >> >>>>>>> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy >> in >> >>>>>>> your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final >> question. >> >> An >> >>>>>>> approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other >> >>>>>>> possibilities (smile). >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Ed >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry >> wrote: >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Ed, >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> The title imagination (or) fantasy >> >>>>>>>> Is different from >> >>>>>>>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. >> >>>>>>>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a >> >> distanciation?) >> >>>>>>> and return to the mathematical concrete. >> >>>>>>>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from >> the >> >>>>>>> physical to the mathematical? >> >>>>>>>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in >> historical >> >>>>>>> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical >> >> (concrete) >> >>>>>>> which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical >> >>>>>>> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within >> the >> >>>>>>> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? >> >>>>>>>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. >> >>>>>>>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which >> >> originates >> >>>>> as >> >>>>>>> concrete. >> >>>>>>>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. >> >>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. >> Does >> >> one >> >>>>>>> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the >> actual >> >>>>> can >> >>>>>>> be mapped onto the physical with systems? >> >>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? >> >>>>>>>> Larry >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >> >>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" >> >>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM >> >>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> All >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of >> >> imagination >> >>>>>>> that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? >> ?let,? or >> >>>>>>> ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different >> statements >> >>>>>>> although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In >> doing >> >> so I >> >>>>>>> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and >> >> Creativity >> >>>>> in >> >>>>>>> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for >> >> imagination >> >>>>> that >> >>>>>>> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only >> an >> >>>>>>> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a >> >> pass >> >>>>> in >> >>>>>>> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of >> view, >> >>>>>>> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a >> >> given >> >>>>>>> concrete toward a new concrete.? >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous >> discussion >> >>>>>>> on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I >> am >> >>>>>>> wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are >> being >> >>>>> asked >> >>>>>>> to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the >> >>>>>>> elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if >> >> somebody >> >>>>> is >> >>>>>>> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my >> >>>>> wondering >> >>>>>>> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there >> >> is no >> >>>>>>> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to >> >> speak, >> >>>>> in >> >>>>>>> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering >> >> about >> >>>>> and >> >>>>>>> then a question. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to >> >> see >> >>>>>>> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such >> thing. >> >> In a >> >>>>>>> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two >> is >> >> not >> >>>>> a >> >>>>>>> fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a >> >> fraction.? >> >>>>>>> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true >> and >> >> then >> >>>>>>> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another >> >>>>>>> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through >> >>>>>>> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) >> >>>>> seems to >> >>>>>>> be very hard for people to do. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and >> draws >> >>>>>>> something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then >> >> draws a >> >>>>>>> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, >> >> "This >> >>>>> is >> >>>>>>> its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her >> >> hand >> >>>>> at >> >>>>>>> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? >> None >> >> of >> >>>>> this >> >>>>>>> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each >> step >> >>>>> here >> >>>>>>> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. >> >> (Hmm >> >>>>> , I >> >>>>>>> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the >> >>>>> mathematical >> >>>>>>> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a >> >> winged >> >>>>>>> horse]. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with >> >>>>>>> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would >> Vygotsky >> >>>>> have >> >>>>>>> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something >> else? >> >>>>> There >> >>>>>>> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m >> interested in >> >>>>> your >> >>>>>>> take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Ed Wall >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> -- >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with >> an >> >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> -- >> >>>> >> >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >> >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> >>> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > >> > >> > -- >> > >> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> >> >> > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 7 20:06:08 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 04:06:08 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu>, Message-ID: Hi Mike, Just as a reference point among many, my own interest in imagination has to do with creative process and design. I offered two Vedic concepts of mind, samskara and vritti, because they seem relevant, in terms of a way to discuss how thinking takes place in the mind that isn't Cartesian in nature. Admittedly, I am a little confused about how you are using the word "representation" do you mean this in the distributed cognition sense of thinking with things? or did you mean it in terms of Markman & Dietrich (2000) and what they call the "classical view of representation"? Of do you mean representation in terms of art, with signifying something as something else? I had thought you meant the so-called "classical view of representation," which I consider "Cartesian." Sorry if I mistook that. There is agreement here that if different starts end up in the same place, something must be true about that! Kind regards, Annalisa From ablunden@mira.net Mon Dec 7 20:09:00 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 08 Dec 2015 15:09:00 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Soviet Psychology Overview Article In-Reply-To: References: <5665af9d.8700620a.2f8b6.fffffe6e@mx.google.com> <566643D9.5030602@mira.net> Message-ID: <566657DC.5030804@mira.net> Well, you were certainly speaking in the spirit of Vygotsky in saying that CHAT would have to be accepted as "Psychology" in order to fully develop and achieve its potential. You are also undoubtedly correct in seeing disciplinary boundaries and entrenched hegemonies as insuperable barriers to this project. Your decision to set up camp in "Communications" was probably a wise one. It is a looong process. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 8/12/2015 2:40 PM, mike cole wrote: > When cultural psychology reappeared on the American radar > in the early 1980's, Andy, many argued that it was a > "branch of psychology." I argued that in order for it to > be fulfilled it would have to become Psychology, so it > would never happen because entrenched structures of the > disciplines would never allow one of its parts to become > the the organizing whole. This applies within existing > structure of Psychology and among the humane and > biological sciences and arts would have to be re-configured. > > Maybe I was wrong. But I cannot see it happening in my > life time. Time will tell. > mike > mike > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 6:43 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > I found this paper extremely interesting. > It's rather confronting opening, saying that Soviet > Psychology had "failed," is really crediting the > world-conquering ambition of Vygotsky's vision > expressed in the "Crisis of Psychology" text, towards > forming not a "Marxist psychology" (i.e. yet another > school) but "general psychology" - that is, he aimed > to reorganise psychology internationally. I think we > take for granted now, that psychology is fragmented > into myriad schools, but in those times, the interwar > years, this fragmentation of psychology was emblematic > of the world crisis manifested in the rise of fascism > and stalinism and the evident termination of progress > in Europe. It was a central problem for all theory! At > that time, it was still expected that Psychology would > develop like the natural sciences. So I accept the > author's characterisation, together with the claim > that Vygotsky's vision is gradually being fulfilled > and his school has made a crucial contribution to the > eventual achievement of an international psychology. > The paper is very optimistic in that respect. > I like the perspective for International psychology - > the merging of universal, cultural and indigenous > currents of research. Very interesting. Also the view > that Psychology will develop along too distinct paths > - the reductive neurophysiological and the humanistic > - with Luria in a founding role in both! This seems a > valid description, and emphasises the importance of > promoting understanding of Luria's life. > I have made a very modest effort to trace how Hegel's > efforts in philosophy to create what could be > conceived of as a cultural psychology took about 80 > years before manifesting in Vygotsky's ideas. And it > seems there is a second phase of that journey being > described in this paper. A grand vision cannot > directly translate into a global research program. It > has to arise bit by bit. > The characterisation of the internationalisation > process as spread of mainstream Psychology + interest > in cultural variation. I don't know about this one. > I did find a couple of criticisms of Vygotsky odd, > mainly that Vygotsky did not give a prominent place to > *collaboration* in his psychology (while Piaget did) > because he "took collaboration for granted" - I think > this is an error. "Collaboration" is one of the ways > Vygotsky's ideas connected up with people in the West. > The author's ideas about how research is transmitted, > or taken up, are interesting too. That theories are > appropriated piecemeal and put to work in the research > project which is doing the appropriation. > The three reasons why Vygotsky's school "failed" to > win over to an international psychology: (1) stalinist > repression (2) lack of attention to experimental > research and the careful documenting of their protocol > - seem reasonable, though I think the ideological gap > and the uniqueness in time and place of the conditions > of the revolutionary ferment which gave birth the CHAT > ought to be mentioned too. The author instead refers > to "overemphasis on theory". > Wonderfully comprehensive review of the development of > international psychology! > Thanks for that Mike (and for your contributions as > document in the chapter!) > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 8/12/2015 4:45 AM, mike cole wrote: > > Yes, Huw. I found that odd too. Perhaps it is the > date? I also posted it > on a Russian site. It will be interesting to see > what they have to say. > > Yes, Larry, that is an amazing archive. I did not > have time to peruse it. > > mike > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 8:10 AM, Lplarry > > wrote: > > Mike, > The entire edited volume seems a treasure > trove of tracing the formation > and dissemination of knowledge(s) moving > through time. A profound work of > scholarship. > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Huw Lloyd" > > Sent: ?2015-?12-?07 7:40 AM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Soviet Psychology > Overview Article > > It seems completely nuts to describe the > soviet research program as a > failure. They demonstrated far more success > than any other endeavour in > scientific psychology that I have studied. > Most psychology projects can't > even establish a coherent theory, let alone > apply it. They are forever > wading around in hypotheses and impressions, > or focusing upon incoherent > slices of phenomena without regard to its origins. > > "Psychology today is undergoing a > transformation. It is becoming an > international science, which aspires to > uncover universal laws of human > behavior and cognition as well as to account > for their cultural variation. > How can we understand the transformation of > concepts, ideas, and approaches > involved in this process? In this chapter, I > examine a historical precedent > for the globalization of psychology. In the > 1920s?1930s, a group of Soviet > researchers led by L.S. Vygotsky proposed a > new kind of scientific > psychology that would be international in > scope. It was revolutionary in > its assumption that the study of mind and > behavior, in phylo- and > ontogenesis, > had to be grounded in the study of the > cultural and material conditions in > which people live. Although this research > program as such largely failed, > the Soviet psychologists contributed much of > value, and their ideas were > taken up?and transformed?by Western > psychologists. These ideas form the > basis of the genuinely international > psychology that is only just emerging > today, and to which the ?cultural-historical? > psychology of the Soviets was > a precursor." > > http://www.edition-open-access.de/studies/1/30/index.html#2 > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > On 6 December 2015 at 19:45, mike cole > > wrote: > > This morning I stumbled over the attached > historical overview of Soviet > Psychology in relation to international > psychology that I thought would > > be > > of interest to MCA-o-philes. > > http://www.edition-open-sources.org/studies/1/30/index.html > > fyi > mike > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as > a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural > science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 7 20:29:55 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 04:29:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com> <95C126D7-CAC2-4AA2-B72E-8827AAF9FCB1@umich.edu>, Message-ID: In comment to Mike's comment on Varela, Rosch and Berkeley ignitions, I'd love to have a reading list on that history of events, if that's possible? One cultural aspect to this conversation I think is worth noting is the idea that there is even a West and an East. I am attempting to get my hands on a chapter by Graeber called "There never was a West: Or, democracy emerges form the spaces between." Considering gaps and overlaps, this title is quite compelling! If I can imagine a point of view, need I be Western to "get it"? Or Western not to get it? Or can I learn this point of view despite that? How is that different from reading the texts of someone who has been deceased for 80 years, versus another who has been deceased for 100 years, or 500 years, or several thousands of years? Just imagining differences and similarities! :) Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 7 20:34:37 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 04:34:37 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Soviet Psychology Overview Article In-Reply-To: References: <5665af9d.8700620a.2f8b6.fffffe6e@mx.google.com> <566643D9.5030602@mira.net>, Message-ID: Hi, I would love to see Cultural Psychology become the trunk rather than the branch, to an extent it is then only called Psychology. There is such a thing as wet water too. Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 7 20:47:00 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 04:47:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Hegel's imagination Message-ID: Hi Andy, Would you post a link reference to texts where Hegel discusses imagination? Thanks, Annalisa From ablunden@mira.net Mon Dec 7 20:53:03 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 08 Dec 2015 15:53:03 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suspirit.htm#SU455 Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 8/12/2015 3:47 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Andy, > > > Would you post a link reference to texts where Hegel discusses imagination? > > > Thanks, > > > Annalisa > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 7 21:09:36 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 05:09:36 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination In-Reply-To: <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> References: , <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> Message-ID: Marvelous! Thanks, Andy! Kind regards, Annalisa From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Dec 7 22:34:23 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 22:34:23 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> <05AB59E5-018D-4FF2-92BE-06619D1F95B8@umich.edu> Message-ID: <56667a0d.460c620a.547ae.6766@mx.google.com> Mike, To add a fragment on Kant which indicates how he struggled with these themes. The mind does not derive its laws from, but prescribes them to nature. AND The mind does not receive but postulates, the fundamental conditions of moral experience (god, freedom, immortality) Kant remarks that these 3 postulates, necessary to the (meaning) of moral experience, lay not within but OUTSIDE knowledge. He therefore asserted: (I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith) This fragment has the felt (Sens) of the imaginal moving to the reprsentational and knowledge loosing its imaginal process. Of course many rejoinders to this marking of knowledge and faith but does offer one moment in the movement of the imaginal. -----Original Message----- From: "mike cole" Sent: ?2015-?12-?07 7:50 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination So maybe Sartre would be a useful common reading source, Ed. http://blog.exre.org/wp-content/uploads/Sartre_The_Imaginary__A_Phenomenological_Psychology_of_the_Imagination.pdf On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > It make sense for the questions to differ, Ed, or at least the way they > are posed. Finding a common foundation will take a lot of communication > (which will require a lot of imagination!). > mike > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 6:04 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >> Mike >> >> I assume you have read Sartre on imagination; i.e. The Imagination. >> This gives what he considers a phenomenological take on imagination. >> However, I would consider a much more revealing take to be that of Edward >> Casey in Imaging (I am hoping that book you referenced will supplement that >> of Casey). The connection to Kant, by the way, critically preceded that of >> Mzerleau-Ponty and Sartre and that is why I was surprised to not see him >> mentioned. >> >> I agree that we all seem to be coming out in, more or less, the >> same place. Only the questions seem to differ. >> >> Ed >> >> > On Dec 7, 2015, at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: >> > >> > Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity given that we >> > started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I indicated >> in >> > my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life through my >> > teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas drawn from >> > psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and activity-centered >> > research practices. But here I am. >> > >> > So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my >> understanding. >> > >> > I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the description of >> the >> > flow from imagination to representation, but glad to encounter a dozen! >> > Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the abstractions >> can >> > be seen, seem hard to come by. >> > >> > My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by >> > identifying different threads of the topic they constitute was offered >> with >> > that goal in mind. >> > >> > The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is about it. I >> > learned that from the Russians who write about imagination. >> > >> > Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6? >> > >> > etc? >> > >> > To the extent that these different traditions lead people to the same >> kinds >> > of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the conclusions are >> > tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, sometimes, in >> > good teaching. >> > >> > mike >> > >> > mike >> > >> > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >> > >> >> Larry and Mike >> >> >> >> Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to both of >> you >> >> in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a >> conversation >> >> that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably good, but >> it is >> >> a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little larger than >> what >> >> I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that I need to, >> one >> >> might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that bear on the, >> >> perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up. >> >> >> >> Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will reread it). I >> >> found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a large grain >> size >> >> (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look at >> things). A >> >> few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms and are >> offered >> >> in the hope that they might be useful. >> >> >> >> 1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; however, >> >> looking at how words are used (a philosophy of language, so to speak) >> often >> >> does a better job of opening things up. >> >> >> >> 2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did not make >> your >> >> list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to mention >> >> Avicenna. >> >> >> >> 3. I have the impression you are using the term ?stable? as a >> >> somewhat replacement of Vygotsky?s concrete; I like that as ?concrete' >> >> seems to have very different meanings for different people. I will try >> to >> >> use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in my replies >> >> tooters. >> >> >> >> 4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of Hellen >> Keller. I >> >> wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a thin gap is >> >> because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a suspicion >> that >> >> he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I am fairly >> sure >> >> Keller was. >> >> >> >> 5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than too thin >> >> although the metaphor of filling still seems reasonable >> >> >> >> 6. In a way you don?t seem to quite come out and say it (or I >> >> missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is not necessarily >> >> creative and I would add that it is quite everyday. >> >> >> >> >> >> Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as they occur. >> >> >> >> Ed >> >> >> >>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 4:41 PM, Lplarry wrote: >> >>> >> >>> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and re(present) our >> >> notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a metaphor >> not >> >> error. >> >>> Ed, >> >>> To continue with your reflection if image has some relation to how >> >> others use text. >> >> >> >> Actually I don?t think image has some relation to how others use text. >> I >> >> twas speculating as whether there is some commonality between how Mike >> is >> >> using using image and how others are using text. I said this because I >> >> struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary in >> mathematics >> >> and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to problems >> that >> >> presently catch my attention. >> >> >> >>> Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In other words >> >> can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The physical >> >> gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of letters on >> the >> >> page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or the visual >> >> marks making a circle-like shape. >> >> >> >> I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size is too >> large. >> >> That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I now >> realize >> >> was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to view >> >> imagination. I don?t mean your perspective is lacking; it just seems to >> >> result in different questions than I would/do ask. >> >> >> >>> These different physical forms are not the foundational bedrock, they >> >> are the material. >> >>> If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on parchment but as >> >> having a deeper process, >> >>> Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual perceptions >> >> but rather having a deeper process. >> >> >> >> My initial reaction is ?Why are you saying this?" If I ever thought the >> >> contrary, I can?t remember. This is just common sense. The interesting >> >> thing about what you say is that you seem to using ?imagine? in a non >> >> visual fashion which was largely my initial point. >> >> >> >>> All the senses share in this process and engage with physically >> >> experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is that >> unifying >> >> process that includes all the senses but is not itself the senses. >> >> >> >> I would say that all senses can participate in this process. Also >> >> physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too strong although >> >> physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints of a sort on >> >> imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I don?t >> >> physically experience a platonic circle. >> >> >> >>> To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the collated >> >> pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a dialogue, >> to >> >> imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly have a >> >> unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the vital animating >> >> process lived (into). >> >> >> >> Here is where my example wasn?t helpful. I did not mean one ?sees' the >> >> marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks is too >> large a >> >> grain size) on the board as having certain properties consistent with >> those >> >> of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a sort of >> sense. >> >> The teacher?s language seems to prove the imaging and the moving to new >> >> stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people don?t make >> the >> >> leaps. >> >> >> >>> This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy of the >> visual >> >> sense. >> >> >> >> Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none of the >> sensory >> >> modes >> >> >> >>> The relation of this image process to the language process is also >> >> multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. >> >> >> >> This doesn?t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, doesn?t >> follow >> >> for me. >> >> >> >> Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable perspective. It is >> just >> >> one that, to a degree, I either don?t share or seems to be the wrong >> grain >> >> size. >> >> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> -----Original Message----- >> >>> From: "Ed Wall" >> >>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM >> >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >> >>> >> >>> Mike >> >>> >> >>> My wondering has more to do with your focus on the visual and >> my >> >> examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be about the >> visual. >> >> However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well drawn) is >> a >> >> ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at least, it >> never >> >> was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. In fact, >> >> assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I can >> imagine it >> >> (smile). >> >>> On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term ?image? in >> the >> >> way some use the word ?text.? That is, to take into account both >> external >> >> and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of what you >> say >> >> resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am finding that >> >> peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky. >> >>> >> >>> Ed >> >>> >> >>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 2:35 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent. >> >>>> >> >>>> "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of >> Zinchenko's >> >>>> experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual system >> that >> >>>> prevented stabilized images from disappearing. He stabilized the >> image >> >>>> (here reified as a projection on the retina) but changed its color, >> thus >> >>>> defeating the retina's tendency to go grey. In those conditions, eye >> >>>> movements continue to trace the spatial coordinates of the image as >> if >> >> it >> >>>> were continuing to "feel it." >> >>>> >> >>>> These are very special circumstances, to be sure, but for they make >> it >> >>>> clear that what is called an image is a process (according to >> Suvorov, >> >> of >> >>>> stepping away from the world and then stepping back into it, but >> then he >> >>>> was blind and deaf). >> >>>> >> >>>> What we designate as "the image" is some form of materialized >> >> stabilization >> >>>> of the flow of into-image-making. Some structure in the flow of the >> >> always >> >>>> new. From just the blink of an eye to our image of the statue of >> >> liberty. >> >>>> >> >>>> This is an old idea but it fits with my intuition. I first >> encountered >> >> it >> >>>> reading Dewey who refers to "the poet" on the topic of experience. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> *Yet all experience is an arch wherehrough / Gleams that untraveled >> >> world >> >>>> whose margin fades / Forever and forever when I move. * >> >>>> >> >>>> *Tennyson, Ulysses* >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> If you are interested, we could try to synch re/reading of some core >> >> common >> >>>> articles/chapters. This entire area of concern is of recent vintage >> for >> >> me >> >>>> and my ignorance is particularly keenly felt. >> >>>> >> >>>> mike >> >>>> >> >>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:02 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>>> Mike >> >>>>> >> >>>>> As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the privileging >> of >> >>>>> the ?image? in discussions of imagination. Additionally, although it >> >> has >> >>>>> been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don?t think it was >> >> of the >> >>>>> Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw on would >> >> disagree >> >>>>> with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics. >> >>>>> I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems useful! - >> >> and >> >>>>> I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a huge >> emphasis >> >> in >> >>>>> mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking less about >> >> the >> >>>>> ?imaginal? than you or Larry. That doesn?t mean that what you and >> >> Larry are >> >>>>> talking about might not usefully factor in especially your point >> about >> >>>>> joint, mediated, activity. >> >>>>> >> >>>>> Ed >> >>>>> >> >>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 11:11 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et al >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic beginnings >> builds >> >> off >> >>>>> of >> >>>>>> the already highly functional sensory system. Assume vision as the >> >>>>> sensory >> >>>>>> system in question. We know that in an important sense, the >> "simple" >> >> act >> >>>>> of >> >>>>>> seeing what you might call a common object, for example your car in >> >> the >> >>>>>> driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves temporal >> and >> >>>>>> spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement that >> must >> >> be >> >>>>>> resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the process of >> image >> >>>>>> formation ceases to function. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for that >> >> simplified >> >>>>>> account. In thinking about imagination I turn to Zaporozhets, >> >> Zinchenko >> >>>>> and >> >>>>>> non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of enactive >> >>>>>> perception/cognition. It is also consistent with joint, mediated, >> >>>>> activity >> >>>>>> as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic function >> and >> >> the >> >>>>>> human possibility for symbolic communication is co-incident and >> >>>>>> co-constitutive of distinctly human imagination. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> in brief >> >>>>>> mike >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry >> wrote: >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Ed, mike, Michael, >> >>>>>>> I will push my question to an earlier time period. >> >>>>>>> Age 2 months. >> >>>>>>> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own >> activity . >> >>>>>>> Question >> >>>>>>> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving >> into >> >> the >> >>>>>>> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? >> >>>>>>> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >> >>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" >> >>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM >> >>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Larry >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or >> >>>>>>> exclusive. >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense >> if >> >>>>> I >> >>>>>>> understand Vygotsky correctly. >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps I >> >>>>>>> wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the >> >>>>> tendency to >> >>>>>>> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow >> >>>>> extra-concrete. >> >>>>>>> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical >> >>>>> context >> >>>>>>> and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain >> things >> >>>>> are >> >>>>>>> ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that >> is?). >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of >> >>>>>>> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean >> when >> >>>>>>> you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, >> >>>>> perhaps, >> >>>>>>> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy >> in >> >>>>>>> your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final >> question. >> >> An >> >>>>>>> approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other >> >>>>>>> possibilities (smile). >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Ed >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry >> wrote: >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Ed, >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> The title imagination (or) fantasy >> >>>>>>>> Is different from >> >>>>>>>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. >> >>>>>>>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a >> >> distanciation?) >> >>>>>>> and return to the mathematical concrete. >> >>>>>>>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from >> the >> >>>>>>> physical to the mathematical? >> >>>>>>>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in >> historical >> >>>>>>> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical >> >> (concrete) >> >>>>>>> which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical >> >>>>>>> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within >> the >> >>>>>>> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? >> >>>>>>>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. >> >>>>>>>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which >> >> originates >> >>>>> as >> >>>>>>> concrete. >> >>>>>>>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. >> >>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. >> Does >> >> one >> >>>>>>> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the >> actual >> >>>>> can >> >>>>>>> be mapped onto the physical with systems? >> >>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? >> >>>>>>>> Larry >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >> >>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" >> >>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM >> >>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Cultu [The entire original message is not included.] From rlecusay@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 8 05:39:52 2015 From: rlecusay@ucsd.edu (robert lecusay) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 14:39:52 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NEW SWEDISH MA IN PEREZHIVANIE In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311039A3802@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311039A3802@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: Thank you, Jay, for letting folks know about the program. All, don't hesitate to contact me if you have any questions about the program - robert.lecusay@ju.se Take care, Robert On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 9:44 AM, Rod Parker-Rees < R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > Many thanks for passing this on, Jay. > > We have been struggling to set up an international masters programme but > the fees we have to charge make it difficult to get the numbers we need. > This will be very attractive to some of our students as EU citizens pay no > tuition fees in Sweden. > > All the best, > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Jay Lemke > Sent: 07 December 2015 03:51 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] NEW SWEDISH MA IN PEREZHIVANIE > > Hi to all. Not been active on xmca for quite a while, and will take a bit > to catch up. If that's even possible! > > Meanwhile, I forward greetings from recent LCHC alum Robert Lecusay, now > working with Monica Nilsson and others in Sweden on early childhood > development, emotion, perezhivanie at very early ages, etc. > > They are also offering a new MA (in English) focused on the Swedish > approach to early childhood (daycare and education combined), with an > emphasis on play, ZPDs, emotion and learning, etc. > > Here is a link, and I will forward a brochure (1MB) separately. > > > https://ju.se/en/study-at-ju/our-programmes/master/educare-the-swedish-preschool-model.html > > > Robert's current email is: > > robert.lecusay@ju.se > > Jay Lemke > LCHC/Department of Communication > University of California - San Diego > www.jaylemke.com > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > From pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu Tue Dec 8 06:30:33 2015 From: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu (Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 09:30:33 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination In-Reply-To: <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> References: <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, What an amazing excerpt! From this one passage alone I can see the strong influence that Hegel had upon Piaget. Thanks for bringing this section of The Subjective Spirit to attention. It's chock-full of interesting thoughts. Peter On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 11:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suspirit.htm#SU455 > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 8/12/2015 3:47 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Hi Andy, >> >> >> Would you post a link reference to texts where Hegel discusses >> imagination? >> >> >> Thanks, >> >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> > -- Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. Director, Office of Institutional Research Fordham University Thebaud Hall-202 Bronx, NY 10458 Phone: (718) 817-2243 Fax: (718) 817-3817 email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu From ablunden@mira.net Tue Dec 8 06:52:09 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 09 Dec 2015 01:52:09 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination In-Reply-To: References: <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> Message-ID: <5666EE99.5020302@mira.net> Do you have any evidence that Piaget studied Hegel? andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 9/12/2015 1:30 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote: > Andy, > > What an amazing excerpt! From this one passage alone I > can see the strong influence that Hegel had upon Piaget. > > Thanks for bringing this section of The Subjective Spirit > to attention. It's chock-full of interesting thoughts. > > Peter > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 11:53 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suspirit.htm#SU455 > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 8/12/2015 3:47 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Andy, > > > Would you post a link reference to texts where > Hegel discusses imagination? > > > Thanks, > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > -- > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > Director, > Office of Institutional Research > > Fordham University > Thebaud Hall-202 > Bronx, NY 10458 > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Tue Dec 8 07:00:47 2015 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 17:00:47 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination In-Reply-To: <5666EE99.5020302@mira.net> References: <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> <5666EE99.5020302@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy I think probably not directly, because Juane Pascuel-Leone said that Piaget refused to listen to Marxists who told him to put in a final stage called dialectrical operations. So, if he did read Hegel, he would not have taken him seriously. Perhaps the answer to that lies in the index of his later books. I hope that helps. Carol On 8 December 2015 at 16:52, Andy Blunden wrote: > Do you have any evidence that Piaget studied Hegel? > andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 9/12/2015 1:30 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote: > >> Andy, >> >> What an amazing excerpt! From this one passage alone I can see the >> strong influence that Hegel had upon Piaget. >> >> Thanks for bringing this section of The Subjective Spirit to attention. >> It's chock-full of interesting thoughts. >> >> Peter >> >> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 11:53 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> >> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suspirit.htm#SU455 >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 8/12/2015 3:47 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> Hi Andy, >> >> >> Would you post a link reference to texts where >> Hegel discusses imagination? >> >> >> Thanks, >> >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >> Director, >> Office of Institutional Research < >> http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp >> > >> Fordham University >> Thebaud Hall-202 >> Bronx, NY 10458 >> >> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >> > > -- Carol A Macdonald PhD (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa alternative email address: tmacdoca@unisa.ac.za *Behind every gifted woman there is often a remarkable cat.* From glassman.13@osu.edu Tue Dec 8 07:07:47 2015 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 15:07:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination In-Reply-To: <5666EE99.5020302@mira.net> References: <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> <5666EE99.5020302@mira.net> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C2FD6C@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> I believe there may be some evidence in Michael Chapman's Constructive Evolution. Chapman certainly makes an argument that Hegel was an influence on Piaget. Michael -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2015 9:52 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination Do you have any evidence that Piaget studied Hegel? andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 9/12/2015 1:30 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote: > Andy, > > What an amazing excerpt! From this one passage alone I can see the > strong influence that Hegel had upon Piaget. > > Thanks for bringing this section of The Subjective Spirit to > attention. It's chock-full of interesting thoughts. > > Peter > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 11:53 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suspirit.htm#SU455 > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 8/12/2015 3:47 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Andy, > > > Would you post a link reference to texts where > Hegel discusses imagination? > > > Thanks, > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > -- > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > Director, > Office of Institutional Research > tutio/index.asp> > Fordham University > Thebaud Hall-202 > Bronx, NY 10458 > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Dec 8 07:22:01 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 07:22:01 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination In-Reply-To: References: <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> Message-ID: <5666f5b9.1741620a.7ae0.ffffc298@mx.google.com> Peter as we become aware of the movement of the imaginal (and in particular the movement to imagine the imaginal as representational) Piaget was also profoundly in debt to Kant. Dewey, stepping back from Hegel reflected on how Hegel imagined the workings of reason (through) history. Reason is (operative) AS contributing to more stable and understandable (structures). In dewey's own words outlining hegel's historical imaginal: (in intellectual and practical effect the IDEA of process ABOVE that of fixed origins and fixed ends, and PRESENTED the social and moral ORDER as well as the intellectual AS a (scene) of becoming ....) Becoming aware of the movement of the imaginal including towards impressive systematic, structural reason that becomes points of departure for representational presentations. I hope these fragments honour the movement of the representational including the structural, ordered, and systematic. I am suggesting they do (reveal) the movement of the imaginal. However, I notice how the imaginal does not come to rest in the images and ideas of models, structure, order, and systems of representation. There is a restless quality that sees this movement as a seeing (through) by stepping back from the structures, orders, and models. Acknowledging the necessity of structures and systems as the way the imaginal is (revealed) through time. However, not residing in these necessary structures and systems which reveal the way/movement of the imaginal. -----Original Message----- From: "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" Sent: ?2015-?12-?08 6:32 AM To: "ablunden@mira.net" ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination Andy, What an amazing excerpt! From this one passage alone I can see the strong influence that Hegel had upon Piaget. Thanks for bringing this section of The Subjective Spirit to attention. It's chock-full of interesting thoughts. Peter On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 11:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suspirit.htm#SU455 > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 8/12/2015 3:47 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Hi Andy, >> >> >> Would you post a link reference to texts where Hegel discusses >> imagination? >> >> >> Thanks, >> >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> > -- Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. Director, Office of Institutional Research Fordham University Thebaud Hall-202 Bronx, NY 10458 Phone: (718) 817-2243 Fax: (718) 817-3817 email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu From j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca Tue Dec 8 07:33:09 2015 From: j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca (Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 15:33:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C2FD6C@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> References: <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> <5666EE99.5020302@mira.net> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9C2FD6C@CIO-KRC-D1MBX04.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <63440A38-A544-426D-8B21-3B01085641BD@mail.ubc.ca> Piaget is also mentioned in Wozniak's (1975) article in Human Development, A dialectical paradigm from psychological research, although differentiated from Vygotsky. Best - Jen On 2015-12-08, at 7:07 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > I believe there may be some evidence in Michael Chapman's Constructive Evolution. Chapman certainly makes an argument that Hegel was an influence on Piaget. > > Michael > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2015 9:52 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination > > Do you have any evidence that Piaget studied Hegel? > andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 9/12/2015 1:30 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote: >> Andy, >> >> What an amazing excerpt! From this one passage alone I can see the >> strong influence that Hegel had upon Piaget. >> >> Thanks for bringing this section of The Subjective Spirit to >> attention. It's chock-full of interesting thoughts. >> >> Peter >> >> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 11:53 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suspirit.htm#SU455 >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 8/12/2015 3:47 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> Hi Andy, >> >> >> Would you post a link reference to texts where >> Hegel discusses imagination? >> >> >> Thanks, >> >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >> Director, >> Office of Institutional Research >> > tutio/index.asp> >> Fordham University >> Thebaud Hall-202 >> Bronx, NY 10458 >> >> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >> > > From pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu Tue Dec 8 07:36:14 2015 From: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu (Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 10:36:14 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination In-Reply-To: <5666EE99.5020302@mira.net> References: <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> <5666EE99.5020302@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, No, it's merely an hypothesis--although I must admit I never bothered to check whether Piaget ever made any direct references to Hegel. The basis for my hypothesis are several of Piaget's earliest essays in The Essential Piaget (Howard Gruber & Jacques Von?che, Eds.), which are all about *The Idea*. Those essays are what led me (years ago) to infer that he was fascinated with Hegel. Piaget's later writings, which weave dialectical logic into his theory of development, only added further weight to that hypothesis. Apparently, I'm not the only one to see an affinity between Piaget and Hegel: Piaget's dialectical approach to development has been examined by several philosophers, such as James Lawler and Marx Wartofsky. The general critique of Piaget's application of dialectical logic by these authors is that it doesn't stick closely enough to Hegel's formulation, leading Piaget into inconsistencies. Peter On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Do you have any evidence that Piaget studied Hegel? > andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 9/12/2015 1:30 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote: > >> Andy, >> >> What an amazing excerpt! From this one passage alone I can see the >> strong influence that Hegel had upon Piaget. >> >> Thanks for bringing this section of The Subjective Spirit to attention. >> It's chock-full of interesting thoughts. >> >> Peter >> >> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 11:53 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> >> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suspirit.htm#SU455 >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 8/12/2015 3:47 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> Hi Andy, >> >> >> Would you post a link reference to texts where >> Hegel discusses imagination? >> >> >> Thanks, >> >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >> Director, >> Office of Institutional Research < >> http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp >> > >> Fordham University >> Thebaud Hall-202 >> Bronx, NY 10458 >> >> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >> > > -- Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. Director, Office of Institutional Research Fordham University Thebaud Hall-202 Bronx, NY 10458 Phone: (718) 817-2243 Fax: (718) 817-3817 email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu From pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu Tue Dec 8 08:23:34 2015 From: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu (Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 11:23:34 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination In-Reply-To: <5666f5b9.1741620a.7ae0.ffffc298@mx.google.com> References: <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> <5666f5b9.1741620a.7ae0.ffffc298@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Larry, My feeble mind is having difficulty wrapping itself around the intricate ideas you've expressed here. Please forgive me for focusing on just one of these issues in an effort to achieve some clarity. What I find particularly stimulating in this discussion about imagination is the relation between the movement of thought and the movement of speech. LSV describes this as the relation between the *psychological subject and predicate* and the *linguistic subject and predicate*. As I understand it, the movement from subject to predicate that is shared by both thought and conversation is the movement from *topic* to *comment*. Although this movement presumably exists at every stage in the development of verbal thinking (word; phrase; sentence; narrative), my own research concentrates on the transition from thinking in sentences to thinking in narratives. One of the more interesting empirical findings I'm trying to understand and explain is the transition (in children's *private speech* conversations) from *fantasy* narratives to *problem-solving* narratives. That's why I was particularly struck by the following passage from Hegel: *Ordinary social conversation mostly rambles on from one idea to another in a very external and contingent manner. It is only when the conversation has a definite aim that it acquires a firmer coherence.* Insofar as everyday conversation requires speakers to take their listeners' perspective(s) into account (and listeners to takes the speaker's perspective into account), the role of imagination is crucial. It is critical to perspective-taking. What part the movement from topic to comment plays in the process of imagining another person's perspective is complicated and intriguing. But one that I believe can be examined empirically. Peter On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 10:22 AM, Lplarry wrote: > Peter as we become aware of the movement of the imaginal (and in > particular the movement to imagine the imaginal as representational) > Piaget was also profoundly in debt to Kant. > > Dewey, stepping back from Hegel reflected on how Hegel imagined the > workings of reason (through) history. Reason is (operative) AS contributing > to more stable and understandable (structures). > In dewey's own words outlining hegel's historical imaginal: > > (in intellectual and practical effect the IDEA of process ABOVE that of > fixed origins and fixed ends, and PRESENTED the social and moral ORDER as > well as the intellectual AS a (scene) of becoming ....) > > Becoming aware of the movement of the imaginal including towards > impressive systematic, structural reason that becomes points of departure > for representational presentations. > > I hope these fragments honour the movement of the representational > including the structural, ordered, and systematic. I am suggesting they do > (reveal) the movement of the imaginal. However, I notice how the imaginal > does not come to rest in the images and ideas of models, structure, order, > and systems of representation. > There is a restless quality that sees this movement as a seeing (through) > by stepping back from the structures, orders, and models. > Acknowledging the necessity of structures and systems as the way the > imaginal is (revealed) through time. > However, not residing in these necessary structures and systems which > reveal the way/movement of the imaginal. > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?08 6:32 AM > To: "ablunden@mira.net" ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination > > Andy, > > What an amazing excerpt! From this one passage alone I can see the strong > influence that Hegel had upon Piaget. > > Thanks for bringing this section of The Subjective Spirit to attention. > It's chock-full of interesting thoughts. > > Peter > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 11:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suspirit.htm#SU455 > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 8/12/2015 3:47 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > >> Hi Andy, > >> > >> > >> Would you post a link reference to texts where Hegel discusses > >> imagination? > >> > >> > >> Thanks, > >> > >> > >> Annalisa > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > -- > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > Director, > Office of Institutional Research > < > http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp > > > Fordham University > Thebaud Hall-202 > Bronx, NY 10458 > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > -- Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. Director, Office of Institutional Research Fordham University Thebaud Hall-202 Bronx, NY 10458 Phone: (718) 817-2243 Fax: (718) 817-3817 email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu From ewall@umich.edu Tue Dec 8 09:26:19 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 11:26:19 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy (Vedanta) In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com> <95C126D7-CAC2-4AA2-B72E-8827AAF9FCB1@umich.edu> Message-ID: <406DF374-A324-41C7-B11E-E735404CFD74@umich.edu> Annalisa I was referring to the darshans. Ed > On Dec 7, 2015, at 9:29 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Ed, > > It just occurred to me that you might mean the 6 means of knowledge (pramana). > > I can't know for sure, but there are 6 means of knowledge discussed when discussing how knowledge takes place. > > First means is perception. > Second is inference. > Third is presumption. > Fourth is comparison. > Fifth is non-apprehension, or absence. > Sixth is testimony. > > So I thought maybe this might be what you meant? > > It occurs to me just now that in all 6 examples I might offer that there is a kind of overlapping going on, along with an imagination. In each example, however, I think overlap happens a little bit differently. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Dec 8 09:36:14 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 10:36:14 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy (Vedanta) In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com> <95C126D7-CAC2-4AA2-B72E-8827AAF9FCB1@umich.edu> Message-ID: <448EE397-366D-4936-B4A5-FDFA2DD3F087@gmail.com> Annalisa, Thank you for responding! I meant ?maya?, which you spell as ?maayaa?, but perhaps ?moha? is better, given the way you define it. Which shows what little I know about Indian philosophies. Still, your analysis is in the same spirit, I think, as what I was getting at regarding imagination and fantasy: Both individuals and groups can engage in fantasy to the point that they get delusional, and the consequences can be catastrophic. Imagination allows us to see things from the perspective of others, fantasy, in the extreme, does not. This is a rule of thumb that I try to apply to my own life, not always successfully. In any case, the posts on this mulitfaceted thread are great, yours included. Of course, I would be deluding myself if I think I understood it all, dishonest if I said I did. But I would be delusional to say it doesn?t matter. I liked your example: ?See this red balloon, now think of a blue one.? That I can do. Groking all of the posts on this thread has been a struggle, but worth the effort. It?s part of my ontological development, late blooming. By the way, I think the balloon example IS concrete, connecting the material red balloon to a real cognitive event of imagining a blue balloon. A simple, but non-trivial, example of being able to grok the thinking of others. All of the discussion in this thread on the teaching of math attests to the concrete-to-concrete raised at the beginning. Henry > On Dec 7, 2015, at 8:08 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > Hi Henry, > > I think that fantasy vs imagination need not be too complex. > > One thing about the Vygotsky quote, is that an imagination need not develop into anything. I can say "imagine a red balloon." Then, "Now change it to blue." is there anything concrete about that? > > But in order to have an imagination of a red balloon, one has to know what a balloon is, and what red is, and then what blue is. And I suppose one would have to know English too to understand me when I say, "imagine this." All this derives from the apparent world we have already perceived in our personal histories, cultures, etc. They have *developed* through our experiences and perceptions. > > I have not heard of the term, "mara" so I can't comment. I know that there is a word for deluded, or infatuation, which is "moha." > > Then there is "maayaa," which refers to the veiling power of the universe, how things can seem to be something else, like a mirage, or an optical illusion, or the setting sun, but this is in terms of the world, not in terms of a persons who perceive the world, since we can both witness an mirage and witness the same illusion. One could say this veiling power is the same for quantum physics, where it seems to be turtles all the way down! > > But getting back to imagination as a part of the creative process, fantasy it seems to me is also that, a creative process. But the only way to determine the difference between fantasy and imagination can be considered from two vantage points. From the thinker herself, and from the perspective of another person interacting with the thinker, or someone not the thinker who has access to the object of imagination independently, if that is possible. > > But then both could be subject to the fantasy as well, I suppose! > > That's why I was saying the thinker would have to have self-awareness of his or her imagination, *that* it is an imagination, whereas the thinker who fantasizes would lack that self-awareness. Of course I do not mean this as a binary option, but relatively. > > For an imagination to happen, there has to be already there concepts as "material" for the imagination, and these come from the world. We can't imagine something we do not know, our of a vacuum. Consider our dreams. > > Consider a horse with a single horn. This can be imagined because I know what a horse is, and I know what a horn is. But if I really believe that there are unicorns, even to the point that I see them in the world, then I would be fantasizing and hallucinating. In that case, I would lack self-awareness to know this is purely my imagination. > > Horses with one horn are an overlapping of two things, which then make up one thing. The "concretizing" of this could be weaving a tapestry with a unicorn and even making up a myth about unicorns with songs and value systems, but this still doesn't make them real. > > But they certainly are wonderful imaginary beasts! > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > From ewall@umich.edu Tue Dec 8 09:39:52 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 11:39:52 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> <05AB59E5-018D-4FF2-92BE-06619D1F95B8@umich.edu> Message-ID: <1BD78C04-64EA-4C74-BDDB-4723D6312EAF@umich.edu> Mike There are, perhaps, some shortcomings in portions of Sartre work on imagination to which Casey supplies some useful modifications. Also it is a bit long. Take a look at Edward Casey?s web site: . Many of those articles on imagination seem downloadable and besides possibly whetting one?s appetite for Sartre might be interesting in themselves. Perhaps you could pick one that most interests you and provides, from your vantage, a useful common, and modestly short reading source. I would, of course, recommend Casey?s book, but isn?t freely available. Ed > On Dec 7, 2015, at 9:44 PM, mike cole wrote: > > So maybe Sartre would be a useful common reading source, Ed. > > http://blog.exre.org/wp-content/uploads/Sartre_The_Imaginary__A_Phenomenological_Psychology_of_the_Imagination.pdf > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> It make sense for the questions to differ, Ed, or at least the way they >> are posed. Finding a common foundation will take a lot of communication >> (which will require a lot of imagination!). >> mike >> >> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 6:04 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >> >>> Mike >>> >>> I assume you have read Sartre on imagination; i.e. The Imagination. >>> This gives what he considers a phenomenological take on imagination. >>> However, I would consider a much more revealing take to be that of Edward >>> Casey in Imaging (I am hoping that book you referenced will supplement that >>> of Casey). The connection to Kant, by the way, critically preceded that of >>> Mzerleau-Ponty and Sartre and that is why I was surprised to not see him >>> mentioned. >>> >>> I agree that we all seem to be coming out in, more or less, the >>> same place. Only the questions seem to differ. >>> >>> Ed >>> >>>> On Dec 7, 2015, at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity given that we >>>> started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I indicated >>> in >>>> my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life through my >>>> teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas drawn from >>>> psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and activity-centered >>>> research practices. But here I am. >>>> >>>> So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my >>> understanding. >>>> >>>> I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the description of >>> the >>>> flow from imagination to representation, but glad to encounter a dozen! >>>> Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the abstractions >>> can >>>> be seen, seem hard to come by. >>>> >>>> My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by >>>> identifying different threads of the topic they constitute was offered >>> with >>>> that goal in mind. >>>> >>>> The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is about it. I >>>> learned that from the Russians who write about imagination. >>>> >>>> Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6? >>>> >>>> etc? >>>> >>>> To the extent that these different traditions lead people to the same >>> kinds >>>> of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the conclusions are >>>> tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, sometimes, in >>>> good teaching. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>>> >>>>> Larry and Mike >>>>> >>>>> Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to both of >>> you >>>>> in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a >>> conversation >>>>> that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably good, but >>> it is >>>>> a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little larger than >>> what >>>>> I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that I need to, >>> one >>>>> might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that bear on the, >>>>> perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up. >>>>> >>>>> Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will reread it). I >>>>> found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a large grain >>> size >>>>> (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look at >>> things). A >>>>> few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms and are >>> offered >>>>> in the hope that they might be useful. >>>>> >>>>> 1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; however, >>>>> looking at how words are used (a philosophy of language, so to speak) >>> often >>>>> does a better job of opening things up. >>>>> >>>>> 2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did not make >>> your >>>>> list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to mention >>>>> Avicenna. >>>>> >>>>> 3. I have the impression you are using the term ?stable? as a >>>>> somewhat replacement of Vygotsky?s concrete; I like that as ?concrete' >>>>> seems to have very different meanings for different people. I will try >>> to >>>>> use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in my replies >>>>> tooters. >>>>> >>>>> 4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of Hellen >>> Keller. I >>>>> wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a thin gap is >>>>> because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a suspicion >>> that >>>>> he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I am fairly >>> sure >>>>> Keller was. >>>>> >>>>> 5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than too thin >>>>> although the metaphor of filling still seems reasonable >>>>> >>>>> 6. In a way you don?t seem to quite come out and say it (or I >>>>> missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is not necessarily >>>>> creative and I would add that it is quite everyday. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as they occur. >>>>> >>>>> Ed >>>>> >>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 4:41 PM, Lplarry wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and re(present) our >>>>> notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a metaphor >>> not >>>>> error. >>>>>> Ed, >>>>>> To continue with your reflection if image has some relation to how >>>>> others use text. >>>>> >>>>> Actually I don?t think image has some relation to how others use text. >>> I >>>>> twas speculating as whether there is some commonality between how Mike >>> is >>>>> using using image and how others are using text. I said this because I >>>>> struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary in >>> mathematics >>>>> and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to problems >>> that >>>>> presently catch my attention. >>>>> >>>>>> Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In other words >>>>> can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The physical >>>>> gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of letters on >>> the >>>>> page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or the visual >>>>> marks making a circle-like shape. >>>>> >>>>> I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size is too >>> large. >>>>> That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I now >>> realize >>>>> was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to view >>>>> imagination. I don?t mean your perspective is lacking; it just seems to >>>>> result in different questions than I would/do ask. >>>>> >>>>>> These different physical forms are not the foundational bedrock, they >>>>> are the material. >>>>>> If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on parchment but as >>>>> having a deeper process, >>>>>> Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual perceptions >>>>> but rather having a deeper process. >>>>> >>>>> My initial reaction is ?Why are you saying this?" If I ever thought the >>>>> contrary, I can?t remember. This is just common sense. The interesting >>>>> thing about what you say is that you seem to using ?imagine? in a non >>>>> visual fashion which was largely my initial point. >>>>> >>>>>> All the senses share in this process and engage with physically >>>>> experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is that >>> unifying >>>>> process that includes all the senses but is not itself the senses. >>>>> >>>>> I would say that all senses can participate in this process. Also >>>>> physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too strong although >>>>> physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints of a sort on >>>>> imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I don?t >>>>> physically experience a platonic circle. >>>>> >>>>>> To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the collated >>>>> pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a dialogue, >>> to >>>>> imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly have a >>>>> unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the vital animating >>>>> process lived (into). >>>>> >>>>> Here is where my example wasn?t helpful. I did not mean one ?sees' the >>>>> marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks is too >>> large a >>>>> grain size) on the board as having certain properties consistent with >>> those >>>>> of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a sort of >>> sense. >>>>> The teacher?s language seems to prove the imaging and the moving to new >>>>> stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people don?t make >>> the >>>>> leaps. >>>>> >>>>>> This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy of the >>> visual >>>>> sense. >>>>> >>>>> Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none of the >>> sensory >>>>> modes >>>>> >>>>>> The relation of this image process to the language process is also >>>>> multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. >>>>> >>>>> This doesn?t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, doesn?t >>> follow >>>>> for me. >>>>> >>>>> Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable perspective. It is >>> just >>>>> one that, to a degree, I either don?t share or seems to be the wrong >>> grain >>>>> size. >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" >>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM >>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>> >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> >>>>>> My wondering has more to do with your focus on the visual and >>> my >>>>> examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be about the >>> visual. >>>>> However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well drawn) is >>> a >>>>> ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at least, it >>> never >>>>> was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. In fact, >>>>> assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I can >>> imagine it >>>>> (smile). >>>>>> On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term ?image? in >>> the >>>>> way some use the word ?text.? That is, to take into account both >>> external >>>>> and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of what you >>> say >>>>> resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am finding that >>>>> peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky. >>>>>> >>>>>> Ed >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 2:35 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of >>> Zinchenko's >>>>>>> experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual system >>> that >>>>>>> prevented stabilized images from disappearing. He stabilized the >>> image >>>>>>> (here reified as a projection on the retina) but changed its color, >>> thus >>>>>>> defeating the retina's tendency to go grey. In those conditions, eye >>>>>>> movements continue to trace the spatial coordinates of the image as >>> if >>>>> it >>>>>>> were continuing to "feel it." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> These are very special circumstances, to be sure, but for they make >>> it >>>>>>> clear that what is called an image is a process (according to >>> Suvorov, >>>>> of >>>>>>> stepping away from the world and then stepping back into it, but >>> then he >>>>>>> was blind and deaf). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What we designate as "the image" is some form of materialized >>>>> stabilization >>>>>>> of the flow of into-image-making. Some structure in the flow of the >>>>> always >>>>>>> new. From just the blink of an eye to our image of the statue of >>>>> liberty. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is an old idea but it fits with my intuition. I first >>> encountered >>>>> it >>>>>>> reading Dewey who refers to "the poet" on the topic of experience. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *Yet all experience is an arch wherehrough / Gleams that untraveled >>>>> world >>>>>>> whose margin fades / Forever and forever when I move. * >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *Tennyson, Ulysses* >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If you are interested, we could try to synch re/reading of some core >>>>> common >>>>>>> articles/chapters. This entire area of concern is of recent vintage >>> for >>>>> me >>>>>>> and my ignorance is particularly keenly felt. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:02 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the privileging >>> of >>>>>>>> the ?image? in discussions of imagination. Additionally, although it >>>>> has >>>>>>>> been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don?t think it was >>>>> of the >>>>>>>> Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw on would >>>>> disagree >>>>>>>> with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics. >>>>>>>> I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems useful! - >>>>> and >>>>>>>> I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a huge >>> emphasis >>>>> in >>>>>>>> mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking less about >>>>> the >>>>>>>> ?imaginal? than you or Larry. That doesn?t mean that what you and >>>>> Larry are >>>>>>>> talking about might not usefully factor in especially your point >>> about >>>>>>>> joint, mediated, activity. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 11:11 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et al >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic beginnings >>> builds >>>>> off >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> the already highly functional sensory system. Assume vision as the >>>>>>>> sensory >>>>>>>>> system in question. We know that in an important sense, the >>> "simple" >>>>> act >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> seeing what you might call a common object, for example your car in >>>>> the >>>>>>>>> driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves temporal >>> and >>>>>>>>> spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement that >>> must >>>>> be >>>>>>>>> resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the process of >>> image >>>>>>>>> formation ceases to function. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for that >>>>> simplified >>>>>>>>> account. In thinking about imagination I turn to Zaporozhets, >>>>> Zinchenko >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of enactive >>>>>>>>> perception/cognition. It is also consistent with joint, mediated, >>>>>>>> activity >>>>>>>>> as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic function >>> and >>>>> the >>>>>>>>> human possibility for symbolic communication is co-incident and >>>>>>>>> co-constitutive of distinctly human imagination. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> in brief >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry >>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ed, mike, Michael, >>>>>>>>>> I will push my question to an earlier time period. >>>>>>>>>> Age 2 months. >>>>>>>>>> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own >>> activity . >>>>>>>>>> Question >>>>>>>>>> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving >>> into >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? >>>>>>>>>> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" >>>>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM >>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or >>>>>>>>>> exclusive. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense >>> if >>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>> understand Vygotsky correctly. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps I >>>>>>>>>> wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the >>>>>>>> tendency to >>>>>>>>>> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow >>>>>>>> extra-concrete. >>>>>>>>>> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural historical >>>>>>>> context >>>>>>>>>> and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain >>> things >>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>> ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that >>> is?). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of >>>>>>>>>> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean >>> when >>>>>>>>>> you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, >>>>>>>> perhaps, >>>>>>>>>> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy >>> in >>>>>>>>>> your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final >>> question. >>>>> An >>>>>>>>>> approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other >>>>>>>>>> possibilities (smile). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry >>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ed, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The title imagination (or) fantasy >>>>>>>>>>> Is different from >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. >>>>>>>>>>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a >>>>> distanciation?) >>>>>>>>>> and return to the mathematical concrete. >>>>>>>>>>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from >>> the >>>>>>>>>> physical to the mathematical? >>>>>>>>>>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in >>> historical >>>>>>>>>> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical >>>>> (concrete) >>>>>>>>>> which exists prior to the human understanding and the mathematical >>>>>>>>>> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within >>> the >>>>>>>>>> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? >>>>>>>>>>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. >>>>>>>>>>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which >>>>> originates >>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>> concrete. >>>>>>>>>>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. >>>>>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. >>> Does >>>>> one >>>>>>>>>> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the >>> actual >>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>> be mapped onto the physical with systems? >>>>>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? >>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM >>>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> All >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of >>>>> imagination >>>>>>>>>> that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? >>> ?let,? or >>>>>>>>>> ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different >>> statements >>>>>>>>>> although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In >>> doing >>>>> so I >>>>>>>>>> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and >>>>> Creativity >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for >>>>> imagination >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only >>> an >>>>>>>>>> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, only a >>>>> pass >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of >>> view, >>>>>>>>>> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a >>>>> given >>>>>>>>>> concrete toward a new concrete.? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous >>> discussion >>>>>>>>>> on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I >>> am >>>>>>>>>> wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are >>> being >>>>>>>> asked >>>>>>>>>> to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join the >>>>>>>>>> elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if >>>>> somebody >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my >>>>>>>> wondering >>>>>>>>>> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. there >>>>> is no >>>>>>>>>> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to >>>>> speak, >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering >>>>> about >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> then a question. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that to >>>>> see >>>>>>>>>> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such >>> thing. >>>>> In a >>>>>>>>>> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two >>> is >>>>> not >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>> fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a >>>>> fraction.? >>>>>>>>>> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true >>> and >>>>> then >>>>>>>>>> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps another >>>>>>>>>> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete through >>>>>>>>>> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through contradiction) >>>>>>>> seems to >>>>>>>>>> be very hard for people to do. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and >>> draws >>>>>>>>>> something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then >>>>> draws a >>>>>>>>>> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, >>>>> "This >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>> its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving her >>>>> hand >>>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>>> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? >>> None >>>>> of >>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each >>> step >>>>>>>> here >>>>>>>>>> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the concrete. >>>>> (Hmm >>>>>>>> , I >>>>>>>>>> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the >>>>>>>> mathematical >>>>>>>>>> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a >>>>> winged >>>>>>>>>> horse]. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with >>>>>>>>>> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would >>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something >>> else? >>>>>>>> There >>>>>>>>>> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m >>> interested in >>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>>> take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ed Wall >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with >>> an >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> >> >> > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Dec 8 11:53:14 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 11:53:14 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination In-Reply-To: References: <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> <5666f5b9.1741620a.7ae0.ffffc298@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <56673551.0f2c620a.66578.ffffe64b@mx.google.com> Peter, I will try to follow your request to focus on the transition in children's private speech conversations from fantasy narratives to problem solving narratives. Also the transition from thinking in sentences to thinking in narratives as including the movement from topic to comment as implicated in perspective taking (as an imaginal process). The focus on the quality of conversation that develops (coherence) which is acquired under certain conditions and not others. The criteria for coherence manifested when the conversation has a definite aim. Peter, the assumption I am making is that the imaginal is not one aspect or part of coming to coherence. I am questioning if the imaginal is underlying the entirety of your project. The imaginal not yoked to definite aims which direct and lead the imaginal into coherence. Rather definite aims as having force have their source in the imaginal. This in no way negates your questions and project but I suggest situates your project within images of moving from topic to comment and images of types of conversations leading to coherence. Peter, I am implying we are both exploring (texts) and reading into shared activities can be imagined as text-like. This may be going too far afield but I am suggesting that understanding moving from topic to comment is a type of reading process. Understanding conversations with definite aims is a type of reading process. Seeing activity as purposeful actions coming to awareness by stepping back and reading this process. I am suggesting that underlying this awareness are images and these images travel over long durations. We are now imagining images with historically deep roots. Peter I would suggest you are painting a picture, or laying out a scene with roots that are implicated in historical consciousness. These images do not extend beyond time. These images generate narratives as our human nature but the source is the images weaving into our conversations. Focused conversations with definite aims may lead to coherence and may be. Necessary But the imaginal is not a mere hand maiden to this generative process. I would suggest that this movement of historical consciousness is reflective, is a text, and is imaginal. Kant, Hegel, are examples of this movement. CHAT extends this type of aimed or directed conversation into lines of coherence. I am suggesting there is always a remainder beyond the margins of coherence. We develop genealogical narratives. Foucault focused on the radical breaks in different genealogical narratives. I imagine there is a coherence within this genealogical movement. It is critical to understand the way I am using the concept of the imaginal supports your question how children come to shift from sentence level to narrative structures. I am only adding these questions make sense within cultural historical formations which emerge within the historical imaginal. I am hoping this shift of focus opens a place for realizing the emotional costs involved in the move from imaginal to representative models of psychology -----Original Message----- From: "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" Sent: ?2015-?12-?08 8:25 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination Larry, My feeble mind is having difficulty wrapping itself around the intricate ideas you've expressed here. Please forgive me for focusing on just one of these issues in an effort to achieve some clarity. What I find particularly stimulating in this discussion about imagination is the relation between the movement of thought and the movement of speech. LSV describes this as the relation between the *psychological subject and predicate* and the *linguistic subject and predicate*. As I understand it, the movement from subject to predicate that is shared by both thought and conversation is the movement from *topic* to *comment*. Although this movement presumably exists at every stage in the development of verbal thinking (word; phrase; sentence; narrative), my own research concentrates on the transition from thinking in sentences to thinking in narratives. One of the more interesting empirical findings I'm trying to understand and explain is the transition (in children's *private speech* conversations) from *fantasy* narratives to *problem-solving* narratives. That's why I was particularly struck by the following passage from Hegel: *Ordinary social conversation mostly rambles on from one idea to another in a very external and contingent manner. It is only when the conversation has a definite aim that it acquires a firmer coherence.* Insofar as everyday conversation requires speakers to take their listeners' perspective(s) into account (and listeners to takes the speaker's perspective into account), the role of imagination is crucial. It is critical to perspective-taking. What part the movement from topic to comment plays in the process of imagining another person's perspective is complicated and intriguing. But one that I believe can be examined empirically. Peter On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 10:22 AM, Lplarry wrote: > Peter as we become aware of the movement of the imaginal (and in > particular the movement to imagine the imaginal as representational) > Piaget was also profoundly in debt to Kant. > > Dewey, stepping back from Hegel reflected on how Hegel imagined the > workings of reason (through) history. Reason is (operative) AS contributing > to more stable and understandable (structures). > In dewey's own words outlining hegel's historical imaginal: > > (in intellectual and practical effect the IDEA of process ABOVE that of > fixed origins and fixed ends, and PRESENTED the social and moral ORDER as > well as the intellectual AS a (scene) of becoming ....) > > Becoming aware of the movement of the imaginal including towards > impressive systematic, structural reason that becomes points of departure > for representational presentations. > > I hope these fragments honour the movement of the representational > including the structural, ordered, and systematic. I am suggesting they do > (reveal) the movement of the imaginal. However, I notice how the imaginal > does not come to rest in the images and ideas of models, structure, order, > and systems of representation. > There is a restless quality that sees this movement as a seeing (through) > by stepping back from the structures, orders, and models. > Acknowledging the necessity of structures and systems as the way the > imaginal is (revealed) through time. > However, not residing in these necessary structures and systems which > reveal the way/movement of the imaginal. > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Peter Feigenbaum [Staff]" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?08 6:32 AM > To: "ablunden@mira.net" ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination > > Andy, > > What an amazing excerpt! From this one passage alone I can see the strong > influence that Hegel had upon Piaget. > > Thanks for bringing this section of The Subjective Spirit to attention. > It's chock-full of interesting thoughts. > > Peter > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 11:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > > https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suspirit.htm#SU455 > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > On 8/12/2015 3:47 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > >> Hi Andy, > >> > >> > >> Would you post a link reference to texts where Hegel discusses > >> imagination? > >> > >> > >> Thanks, > >> > >> > >> Annalisa > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > -- > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > Director, > Office of Institutional Research > < > http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp > > > Fordham University > Thebaud Hall-202 > Bronx, NY 10458 > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > -- Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. Director, Office of Institutional Research Fordham University Thebaud Hall-202 Bronx, NY 10458 Phone: (718) 817-2243 Fax: (718) 817-3817 email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Dec 8 12:19:22 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 20:19:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy (Vedanta) In-Reply-To: <406DF374-A324-41C7-B11E-E735404CFD74@umich.edu> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com> <95C126D7-CAC2-4AA2-B72E-8827AAF9FCB1@umich.edu> , <406DF374-A324-41C7-B11E-E735404CFD74@umich.edu> Message-ID: Hi Ed, I'm sorry, I don't know what you mean by darshans. I've not heard the word used in the way you are using it. It's OK. I'm not trying to present myself as an expert or as a representative of "the East." I am only trying to employ some ideas as a means to getting out of the straightjacket of Cartesian, dualist thinking, that's all. My suggestions are not the only way to do that, of course, just one I'm exploring. I'm also exploring how these ideas coincide with "Western" philosophy, another grab bag of ideas with various cultural flavors and perspectives. I just thought it would be odd that I examine all Indian "philosophies" in order to make my comparisons. Sorry if I seemed reactive. Perhaps what is getting confused here is the difference between "is" and "ought"? Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Dec 8 12:59:54 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 20:59:54 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy (Vedanta) In-Reply-To: <448EE397-366D-4936-B4A5-FDFA2DD3F087@gmail.com> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com> <95C126D7-CAC2-4AA2-B72E-8827AAF9FCB1@umich.edu> , <448EE397-366D-4936-B4A5-FDFA2DD3F087@gmail.com> Message-ID: Hi Henry and others, OK, m?y? it is. I wrote maayaa, because of the inability to write the diacritical marks. It's too clumsy to do so, as I don't have that keyboard feature installed or turned on or whatever, so I had to pull out my character viewer to write it correctly here. M?y? is has to do with the appearance of the world to us, and how its illusions are apparent to everyone and their apparent power, so the illusion is posit in the world, not in the mind of an individual. It refers to the apparent reality we find ourselves in which is called "mithya" (dependent reality). M?y? has to do with power, how it invokes our wonder, like magic does. Moha has to do with a person who is deluded, so that would pertain to a state of mind of an individual. It isn't meant to be humiliating, just factual. M?y? and moha are not juxtaposed concepts used together. That's just a coincidence, as I was attempting to figure out what you might have meant by "mara." They both start with "m" and have to do with illusion, though. Certainly fantasy can be included in that state of mind I'd think, but fantasy isn't the only way one can be deluded. I'd say trying to understand something doesn't make one deluded, that's just being ignorant about something. I can see how easily it is taken that being ignorant is confused with being deluded, and how it might get associated with humilation, or how it can be mistaken that way. I figure if ignorance and delusion were identical then everyone on the planet must be deluded, since no one knows everything there is to know. And actually that fact is what makes us human. And even gives us something to talk about on well established listservs! Getting back to fantasy: we can have fantasies and enjoy them, but not act upon them, or at least if we do we can do so harmlessly. Child's play is this way, isn't it? I also consider when I'm in a movie theater and the moment my mind is drawn into the story of the movie, I believe that this is a form of fantasy, also harmless, as the drama unfolds upon the screen. I don't have a sense I am imagining the story, because it feels real to me, even if I am imagining it as real. The self-awareness of imagination is gone when I'm watching the movie, so I feel that experience is a form of fantasy. Maybe this is why we love movies? I'm not sure how I see my suggestion to imagine a balloon and change its colors as concrete. (And I'm amused to juxtapose the words balloon and concrete!) This doesn't happen in the real world were I to show a balloon and then change it's color. So I'm missing something there. I'd like to ask if fantasy vs imagination has to do with how they inform our activity or our motivation to act? If there is something to unwind there? In other words, we can have imaginations and we can have fantasies, and then we can act on those states of mind. Do the activities become problematic based upon how "real" we take our states of mind to be? Or is it something else? For example, is a revolutionary (not necessarily political, but incidental, or accidental) someone with a convincing imagination? or a pied piper of fantasy? It seems like it depends. Donald Trump certainly is deluded. And there seems something fantastical in the way he imports himself. We want to have a better world, but need we be revolutionaries to effect actual change? It's odd that we don't have a different word for a person who inspires change. How about "evolutionaries" (ha! my spell check just changed that made-up word into "revolutionaries"! so even my laptop is against me!) I agree that the XMCA multi-threads are fascinating to read as they twist and turn and I'm grateful to learn what others have to say about imagination and fantasy. Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Dec 8 13:12:25 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 21:12:25 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Kant's Imagination Message-ID: Hi esteemed others, I would like to follow the practice Mike asked of us to separate topics out to new fibers as they arise, and Kant came up in a few different threads. Since I'm keen to understand more about Kant through reading and considering the discourse of all the eloquent members here, I am taking the initiative to start a new thread. Would anyone like to explain (in easy language) why Kant is relevant to our discussion on imagination (and perhaps fantasy)? I hope this post doesn't receive an audience of crickets, or even a long list of links to read tomes and tomes of philosophical treatise. I just hope to have a conversation about it. Anyone? Kind regards, Annalisa From ewall@umich.edu Tue Dec 8 13:46:14 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 15:46:14 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy (Vedanta) In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664a066.8549620a.77025.3db9@mx.google.com> <95C126D7-CAC2-4AA2-B72E-8827AAF9FCB1@umich.edu> <406DF374-A324-41C7-B11E-E735404CFD74@umich.edu> Message-ID: Annalisa Language can be ambiguous. I though the term darshan might be helpful. To quote from the Internet: Darshan. In Indian philosophy the term designates the distinctive way in which each philosophical system looks at things, including its exposition of sacred scriptures and authoritative knowledge. The six principal Hindu darshans are Samkhya, Yoga, Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Mimamsa, and Vedanta This, of course, obscures by re-introducing the category of philosophy that you had concerns about; however, I have always thought of these, in part, as modes of analysis. In the West, we have, in a sense, something similar (e.g. analytical philosophy, continental philosophy, psychology, marxism, science, critical theory, cultural historical and the list goes on - although this list could be debated), but, in my opinion, not as well developed. Perhaps more interestingly, people on this list seem to be viewing things in very different ways (Mike?s request for appropriate subject lines underlies this) although such viewing seems to be leading to a sort of commonality. I don?t mean agreement by this, but, perhaps, more of a recognition of or acceptance of something (in a sense, we are pointing in the same direction). There is an old ?proverb? about a number of blind wise people and an elephant. In a way, and this is my opinion, we seem to each be reaching so as to grab hold of imagination and, perhaps, due to the vantage point (or fulcrum) we take, we find something somewhat different, but, more importantly somewhat the same. One might say, the ?knowledge' of imagination in play is acceptable to each of us. Speaking, for myself, I always try to do an analysis on two or so levels and it would be fascinating to do an non-Western analysis on six (smile). Ed > On Dec 8, 2015, at 2:19 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > Hi Ed, > > I'm sorry, I don't know what you mean by darshans. I've not heard the word used in the way you are using it. > > It's OK. I'm not trying to present myself as an expert or as a representative of "the East." I am only trying to employ some ideas as a means to getting out of the straightjacket of Cartesian, dualist thinking, that's all. > > My suggestions are not the only way to do that, of course, just one I'm exploring. > > I'm also exploring how these ideas coincide with "Western" philosophy, another grab bag of ideas with various cultural flavors and perspectives. > > I just thought it would be odd that I examine all Indian "philosophies" in order to make my comparisons. Sorry if I seemed reactive. > > Perhaps what is getting confused here is the difference between "is" and "ought"? > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa From A.Bakker4@uu.nl Tue Dec 8 13:48:27 2015 From: A.Bakker4@uu.nl (Bakker, A. (Arthur)) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 21:48:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination In-Reply-To: References: <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> <5666EE99.5020302@mira.net>, Message-ID: Andy, Peter, I just read an interesting book by Kitchener (1986) on Piaget: Kitchener, R. F. (1986). Piaget's theory of knowledge: Genetic epistemology & scientific reason. Yale University Press. There is a passage on dialectical thinking in Piaget's work, and there is an Hegelian influence, but Kitchener claims that Piaget never read Hegel. I brought the book back to the library, so I cannot check the page numbers (cannot find it in google books). However in the Cambridge Companion to Piaget, Hegel is mentioned a few times (e.g. p. 163 ff by Campbell) so Best, Arthur Dr Arthur Bakker | Freudenthal Institute | Faculty of Science and Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences| Utrecht University | Princetonplein 5, kamer 465 |PO Box 85170, 3508 AD Utrecht | tel. 030 253 5641 | a.bakker4@uu.nl | sampling (ESM 2015), inquiry (ZDM 2015). scaffolding (ZDM 2015) ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+a.bakker4=uu.nl@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+a.bakker4=uu.nl@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] [pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu] Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2015 4:36 PM To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination Andy, No, it's merely an hypothesis--although I must admit I never bothered to check whether Piaget ever made any direct references to Hegel. The basis for my hypothesis are several of Piaget's earliest essays in The Essential Piaget (Howard Gruber & Jacques Von?che, Eds.), which are all about *The Idea*. Those essays are what led me (years ago) to infer that he was fascinated with Hegel. Piaget's later writings, which weave dialectical logic into his theory of development, only added further weight to that hypothesis. Apparently, I'm not the only one to see an affinity between Piaget and Hegel: Piaget's dialectical approach to development has been examined by several philosophers, such as James Lawler and Marx Wartofsky. The general critique of Piaget's application of dialectical logic by these authors is that it doesn't stick closely enough to Hegel's formulation, leading Piaget into inconsistencies. Peter On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Do you have any evidence that Piaget studied Hegel? > andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 9/12/2015 1:30 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote: > >> Andy, >> >> What an amazing excerpt! From this one passage alone I can see the >> strong influence that Hegel had upon Piaget. >> >> Thanks for bringing this section of The Subjective Spirit to attention. >> It's chock-full of interesting thoughts. >> >> Peter >> >> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 11:53 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> >> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suspirit.htm#SU455 >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> On 8/12/2015 3:47 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> Hi Andy, >> >> >> Would you post a link reference to texts where >> Hegel discusses imagination? >> >> >> Thanks, >> >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >> Director, >> Office of Institutional Research < >> http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp >> > >> Fordham University >> Thebaud Hall-202 >> Bronx, NY 10458 >> >> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >> > > -- Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. Director, Office of Institutional Research Fordham University Thebaud Hall-202 Bronx, NY 10458 Phone: (718) 817-2243 Fax: (718) 817-3817 email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu From ablunden@mira.net Tue Dec 8 15:08:00 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 09 Dec 2015 10:08:00 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination In-Reply-To: References: <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> <5666EE99.5020302@mira.net>, Message-ID: <566762D0.6000907@mira.net> I have a recollection of discussions in the late 70s/early 80s where a number of Marxists (whose knowledge of Hegel was derivative of Engels in any case) fervently argued that Piaget was "compatible" with Marxism and that he was an "unconscious" dialectician. I am inclined to believe that Piaget never read Hegel, as you say Arthur, but a lot of people perceived a likeness. In my own reading of Piaget, which is extremely limited - but I did read his Genetic Epistemology, for example - is that he has not read Hegel or appropriated anything from him. But like Kuhn, the nature of the ideas he introduced made many people think of Hegel - the concern with sophisticated logic, transformational change between stages, for example. But quite apart from general resemblances with how change and development is conceived, the passage I sent the link to was from the Subjective Spirit. This is a work which has been very little discussed outside of "professional" Hegel scholarship until very recent times. If Piaget read Hegel that would not suggest that he knew anything about Hegel's ideas about Imagination. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 9/12/2015 8:48 AM, Bakker, A. (Arthur) wrote: > Andy, Peter, > > I just read an interesting book by Kitchener (1986) on Piaget: > > Kitchener, R. F. (1986). Piaget's theory of knowledge: Genetic epistemology & scientific reason. Yale University Press. > > There is a passage on dialectical thinking in Piaget's work, and there is an Hegelian influence, but Kitchener claims that Piaget never read Hegel. > I brought the book back to the library, so I cannot check the page numbers (cannot find it in google books). > However in the Cambridge Companion to Piaget, Hegel is mentioned a few times (e.g. p. 163 ff by Campbell) so > > Best, > > Arthur > > Dr Arthur Bakker | Freudenthal Institute | Faculty of Science and Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences| Utrecht University | Princetonplein 5, kamer 465 |PO Box 85170, 3508 AD Utrecht | tel. 030 253 5641 | a.bakker4@uu.nl | sampling (ESM 2015), inquiry (ZDM 2015). scaffolding (ZDM 2015) > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.bakker4=uu.nl@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+a.bakker4=uu.nl@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] [pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu] > Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2015 4:36 PM > To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination > > Andy, > > No, it's merely an hypothesis--although I must admit I never bothered to > check whether Piaget ever made any direct references to Hegel. The basis > for my hypothesis are several of Piaget's earliest essays in The Essential > Piaget (Howard Gruber & Jacques Von?che, Eds.), which are all about *The > Idea*. Those essays are what led me (years ago) to infer that he was > fascinated with Hegel. Piaget's later writings, which weave dialectical > logic into his theory of development, only added further weight to that > hypothesis. > > Apparently, I'm not the only one to see an affinity between Piaget and > Hegel: Piaget's dialectical approach to development has been examined > by several philosophers, such as James Lawler and Marx Wartofsky. The > general critique of Piaget's application of dialectical logic by these > authors is that it doesn't stick closely enough to Hegel's formulation, > leading Piaget into inconsistencies. > > Peter > > > > > On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Do you have any evidence that Piaget studied Hegel? >> andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 9/12/2015 1:30 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote: >> >>> Andy, >>> >>> What an amazing excerpt! From this one passage alone I can see the >>> strong influence that Hegel had upon Piaget. >>> >>> Thanks for bringing this section of The Subjective Spirit to attention. >>> It's chock-full of interesting thoughts. >>> >>> Peter >>> >>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 11:53 PM, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suspirit.htm#SU455 >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 8/12/2015 3:47 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> Hi Andy, >>> >>> >>> Would you post a link reference to texts where >>> Hegel discusses imagination? >>> >>> >>> Thanks, >>> >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>> Director, >>> Office of Institutional Research < >>> http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp >>> Fordham University >>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>> >>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>> >> > > -- > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > Director, > Office of Institutional Research > > Fordham University > Thebaud Hall-202 > Bronx, NY 10458 > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > > From ewall@umich.edu Tue Dec 8 15:18:23 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 17:18:23 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Kant's Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Annalisa There is much that could be said, but I will leave that for others and briefly quote Casey quoting/paraphrasing Kant: Kant reinforced imagination?s mediatory role by distinguishing between two kinds of imagining: a reproductive type, which is intimately connected with memory and perceptual apprehension, and a productive type which is contiguous with conceptual thinking. Thus imagination stands precisely midway between sensibility and understanding. Kant says, ?The two extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must stand in necessary connection with each other through the mediation of this transcendental function of imagination.? There is, I note, something further which I, personally, need to think about as Casey continues The ?transcendental function? referred to in this passage is effected by means of the transcendental schema, a product of productive imagination and the explicit basis for imagination?s mediatory role. Whatever quibbles one has with all this, most ?modern? Western philosophers who have taken on imagination at some point acknowledged Kant?s view of imagination (that doesn?t mean they agreed with it). In other words, Kant?s views regarding imagination were enormously influential in the West. I should note that Aristotle had similar views. Ed > On Dec 8, 2015, at 3:12 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi esteemed others, > > > I would like to follow the practice Mike asked of us to separate topics out to new fibers as they arise, and Kant came up in a few different threads. Since I'm keen to understand more about Kant through reading and considering the discourse of all the eloquent members here, I am taking the initiative to start a new thread. > > > Would anyone like to explain (in easy language) why Kant is relevant to our discussion on imagination (and perhaps fantasy)? > > > I hope this post doesn't receive an audience of crickets, or even a long list of links to read tomes and tomes of philosophical treatise. I just hope to have a conversation about it. > > > Anyone? > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Dec 8 15:23:18 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 15:23:18 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Kant's Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <56676689.9448620a.49d70.00ef@mx.google.com> The key imaginary at work in kant's project was to validate the existence of (transcendental categories). These are phenomena that exist prior to experience and history and these categories determine the forms of our understanding. Piaget shared this imaginary. -----Original Message----- From: "Annalisa Aguilar" Sent: ?2015-?12-?08 1:13 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Kant's Imagination Hi esteemed others, I would like to follow the practice Mike asked of us to separate topics out to new fibers as they arise, and Kant came up in a few different threads. Since I'm keen to understand more about Kant through reading and considering the discourse of all the eloquent members here, I am taking the initiative to start a new thread. Would anyone like to explain (in easy language) why Kant is relevant to our discussion on imagination (and perhaps fantasy)? I hope this post doesn't receive an audience of crickets, or even a long list of links to read tomes and tomes of philosophical treatise. I just hope to have a conversation about it. Anyone? Kind regards, Annalisa From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Dec 8 16:29:46 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 16:29:46 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Kant's Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <566775fd.1950620a.3ea17.0ab3@mx.google.com> This may or may not add clarity. Stephen H Watson wrote this about Kant in a chapter he named [Abysses] ?Kant had proceeded some 600 pages into the first ?Critique? before he had reached the problem of abysses. He had faithfully followed out the the Enlightenment?s search for foundations, its peculiar form of the {recherche de la verite} as it was called. He had deployed the schemata of the Enlightenment?s beliefs. Transcendental arguments, always, at least in Kant, were regressive. ?If knowledge is to be possible? ? it postulated a complete [picture] of knowledge as well as possibility. And, no one doubted it ? let alone Kant, for whom Newton, Galileo, and Euclid provided the texts for an archive of pure reason. The systems, the {principiae} were introjected: the schemata for synthesis ? the bringing of the manifold of sensation into a unity, the necessary unity of knowledge, of concepts, of judgement, and thereby, of objects. And , consistently, self-critically, and the anathema to all neo-Kantianism, Kant?s {Dialectic} would not allow these ground to go themselves ungrounded. Reason seeks the conditions of the conditions, a higher unity that might ground the certainty of the understanding. The search for grounds, for justification, for legitimation, for necessity is not tangenital to what had gone before: it is necessary. A final grounding is requisite that might satisfy the search, providing a complete determination or ground for logical and ontological possibility such that it might be affirmed, finally and ultimately, that ?everything that exists is completely determined. Being thus could be claimed to be fully rational, that is, both orderly and intelligible. It was Kant?s insight [trope perhaps] to have recognized that this project, the project of all {metaphysics rationalis} was part and parcel theological. In short the project of rationality was {onto-theo-logical}. Because all particularity [manifoldness] would be a limit to this onto-theo-logical project, the search for the conditions of the conditions would be the highest being. {ens summon}. With this ultimate grounding Kant would find completeness. Transcendental logic [as a logic of truth] would have been vindicated. Objectivity would have finally been assured in accordance with a necessity that had driven the search after truth since Plato?s dialectic. {Natural} was Kant?s word for it, and it would bring Hegel?s response that this approach still exhibited an indefensible psychology. This search also contained a certain delirium, an illusion that transcendental ideas could receive ?experience?. This project was a ?focus imaginarius?. This may be too detailed but gives a flavour of the dream underpinning the movement of the imaginal to the representational. Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Ed Wall Sent: Tuesday, December 8, 2015 3:20 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Kant's Imagination Annalisa There is much that could be said, but I will leave that for others and briefly quote Casey quoting/paraphrasing Kant: Kant reinforced imagination?s mediatory role by distinguishing between two kinds of imagining: a reproductive type, which is intimately connected with memory and perceptual apprehension, and a productive type which is contiguous with conceptual thinking. Thus imagination stands precisely midway between sensibility and understanding. Kant says, ?The two extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must stand in necessary connection with each other through the mediation of this transcendental function of imagination.? There is, I note, something further which I, personally, need to think about as Casey continues The ?transcendental function? referred to in this passage is effected by means of the transcendental schema, a product of productive imagination and the explicit basis for imagination?s mediatory role. Whatever quibbles one has with all this, most ?modern? Western philosophers who have taken on imagination at some point acknowledged Kant?s view of imagination (that doesn?t mean they agreed with it). In other words, Kant?s views regarding imagination were enormously influential in the West. I should note that Aristotle had similar views. Ed > On Dec 8, 2015, at 3:12 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi esteemed others, > > > I would like to follow the practice Mike asked of us to separate topics out to new fibers as they arise, and Kant came up in a few different threads. Since I'm keen to understand more about Kant through reading and considering the discourse of all the eloquent members here, I am taking the initiative to start a new thread. > > > Would anyone like to explain (in easy language) why Kant is relevant to our discussion on imagination (and perhaps fantasy)? > > > I hope this post doesn't receive an audience of crickets, or even a long list of links to read tomes and tomes of philosophical treatise. I just hope to have a conversation about it. > > > Anyone? > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 8 17:39:13 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 17:39:13 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Kant's Imagination In-Reply-To: <566775fd.1950620a.3ea17.0ab3@mx.google.com> References: <566775fd.1950620a.3ea17.0ab3@mx.google.com> Message-ID: That seems like a lot of tying together, Larry. Crudely, the Enlightenment grail of certain, rational, grounded knowledge used the strong sense of representation as constituent of the grail. Look what I stumbled over by checking the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/search/search?query=imagination+ Be careful when you go to that site. The clue is the little plus at the end of the instruction.That plus is entries on "imagination in xxxxx". Seems like a great resources for this conversation. mike On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 4:29 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > This may or may not add clarity. Stephen H Watson wrote this about Kant in > a chapter he named [Abysses] > ?Kant had proceeded some 600 pages into the first ?Critique? before he had > reached the problem of abysses. He had faithfully followed out the the > Enlightenment?s search for foundations, its peculiar form of the {recherche > de la verite} as it was called. He had deployed the schemata of the > Enlightenment?s beliefs. Transcendental arguments, always, at least in > Kant, were regressive. ?If knowledge is to be possible? ? it postulated a > complete [picture] of knowledge as well as possibility. And, no one doubted > it ? let alone Kant, for whom Newton, Galileo, and Euclid provided the > texts for an archive of pure reason. The systems, the {principiae} were > introjected: the schemata for synthesis ? the bringing of the manifold of > sensation into a unity, the necessary unity of knowledge, of concepts, of > judgement, and thereby, of objects. And , consistently, self-critically, > and the anathema to all neo-Kantianism, Kant?s {Dialectic} would not allow > these ground to go themselves ungrounded. Reason seeks the conditions of > the conditions, a higher unity that might ground the certainty of the > understanding. The search for grounds, for justification, for legitimation, > for necessity is not tangenital to what had gone before: it is necessary. A > final grounding is requisite that might satisfy the search, providing a > complete determination or ground for logical and ontological possibility > such that it might be affirmed, finally and ultimately, that ?everything > that exists is completely determined. Being thus could be claimed to be > fully rational, that is, both orderly and intelligible. > It was Kant?s insight [trope perhaps] to have recognized that this > project, the project of all {metaphysics rationalis} was part and parcel > theological. In short the project of rationality was {onto-theo-logical}. > Because all particularity [manifoldness] would be a limit to this > onto-theo-logical project, the search for the conditions of the conditions > would be the highest being. {ens summon}. With this ultimate grounding Kant > would find completeness. Transcendental logic [as a logic of truth] would > have been vindicated. Objectivity would have finally been assured in > accordance with a necessity that had driven the search after truth since > Plato?s dialectic. {Natural} was Kant?s word for it, and it would bring > Hegel?s response that this approach still exhibited an indefensible > psychology. This search also contained a certain delirium, an illusion that > transcendental ideas could receive ?experience?. This project was a ?focus > imaginarius?. > > > This may be too detailed but gives a flavour of the dream underpinning the > movement of the imaginal to the representational. > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > > From: Ed Wall > Sent: Tuesday, December 8, 2015 3:20 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Kant's Imagination > > > Annalisa > > There is much that could be said, but I will leave that for others > and briefly quote Casey quoting/paraphrasing Kant: > > Kant reinforced imagination?s mediatory role by distinguishing between two > kinds of imagining: a reproductive type, which is intimately connected with > memory and perceptual apprehension, and a productive type which is > contiguous with conceptual thinking. Thus imagination stands precisely > midway between sensibility and understanding. Kant says, ?The two extremes, > namely sensibility and understanding, must stand in necessary connection > with each other through the mediation of this transcendental function of > imagination.? > > There is, I note, something further which I, personally, need to think > about as Casey continues The ?transcendental function? referred to in this > passage is effected by means of the transcendental schema, a product of > productive imagination and the explicit basis for imagination?s mediatory > role. > > Whatever quibbles one has with all this, most ?modern? Western > philosophers who have taken on imagination at some point acknowledged > Kant?s view of imagination (that doesn?t mean they agreed with it). In > other words, Kant?s views regarding imagination were enormously influential > in the West. > > I should note that Aristotle had similar views. > > Ed > > > On Dec 8, 2015, at 3:12 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > Hi esteemed others, > > > > > > I would like to follow the practice Mike asked of us to separate topics > out to new fibers as they arise, and Kant came up in a few different > threads. Since I'm keen to understand more about Kant through reading and > considering the discourse of all the eloquent members here, I am taking the > initiative to start a new thread. > > > > > > Would anyone like to explain (in easy language) why Kant is relevant to > our discussion on imagination (and perhaps fantasy)? > > > > > > I hope this post doesn't receive an audience of crickets, or even a long > list of links to read tomes and tomes of philosophical treatise. I just > hope to have a conversation about it. > > > > > > Anyone? > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 8 19:41:04 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 19:41:04 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination Message-ID: Attached is a copy of Ribot's book on imagination. It draws from Kant on the one hand and influenced Russian cultural-historical psychologists on the other. The notion of productive imagination and its implied opposite, unproductive imagination, seems worthy of deeper inquiry. mike -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Ribot.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 693586 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20151208/aaba10b7/attachment-0001.pdf From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 8 19:59:39 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 19:59:39 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <1BD78C04-64EA-4C74-BDDB-4723D6312EAF@umich.edu> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> <05AB59E5-018D-4FF2-92BE-06619D1F95B8@umich.edu> <1BD78C04-64EA-4C74-BDDB-4723D6312EAF@umich.edu> Message-ID: The Casey site looks amazing and of course very relevant, Ed. Thanks. When I first read Sartre many years ago, I was totally unprepared to take in what he was saying. I had not way to "digest it." Reading into the electronic copy I sent around yesterday, I could see that it is inappropriate for me to refer to what I do as phenomenology. It is just a kind of intuitive reflection on my experiences and thoughts. No Husserl, no Sartre. Just unschooled introspection that I seek to verify through acquiring evidence that there is more than total idiosyncrasy to what my musings. I feel as if I need to download all the sources of inquiry we have unearthed in the last few days and retreat to a place with no communication with the world for a few weeks just to take them, in. !! mike On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:39 AM, Ed Wall wrote: > Mike > > There are, perhaps, some shortcomings in portions of Sartre work on > imagination to which Casey supplies some useful modifications. Also it is a > bit long. Take a look at Edward Casey?s web site: < > http://edwardscasey.com/?page_id=13>. Many of those articles on > imagination seem downloadable and besides possibly whetting one?s appetite > for Sartre might be interesting in themselves. Perhaps you could pick one > that most interests you and provides, from your vantage, a useful common, > and modestly short reading source. I would, of course, recommend Casey?s > book, but isn?t freely available. > > Ed > > > On Dec 7, 2015, at 9:44 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > So maybe Sartre would be a useful common reading source, Ed. > > > > > http://blog.exre.org/wp-content/uploads/Sartre_The_Imaginary__A_Phenomenological_Psychology_of_the_Imagination.pdf > > > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > >> It make sense for the questions to differ, Ed, or at least the way they > >> are posed. Finding a common foundation will take a lot of communication > >> (which will require a lot of imagination!). > >> mike > >> > >> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 6:04 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >> > >>> Mike > >>> > >>> I assume you have read Sartre on imagination; i.e. The Imagination. > >>> This gives what he considers a phenomenological take on imagination. > >>> However, I would consider a much more revealing take to be that of > Edward > >>> Casey in Imaging (I am hoping that book you referenced will supplement > that > >>> of Casey). The connection to Kant, by the way, critically preceded > that of > >>> Mzerleau-Ponty and Sartre and that is why I was surprised to not see > him > >>> mentioned. > >>> > >>> I agree that we all seem to be coming out in, more or less, the > >>> same place. Only the questions seem to differ. > >>> > >>> Ed > >>> > >>>> On Dec 7, 2015, at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity given that we > >>>> started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I > indicated > >>> in > >>>> my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life through my > >>>> teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas drawn from > >>>> psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and activity-centered > >>>> research practices. But here I am. > >>>> > >>>> So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my > >>> understanding. > >>>> > >>>> I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the description of > >>> the > >>>> flow from imagination to representation, but glad to encounter a > dozen! > >>>> Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the > abstractions > >>> can > >>>> be seen, seem hard to come by. > >>>> > >>>> My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by > >>>> identifying different threads of the topic they constitute was offered > >>> with > >>>> that goal in mind. > >>>> > >>>> The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is about it. > I > >>>> learned that from the Russians who write about imagination. > >>>> > >>>> Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6? > >>>> > >>>> etc? > >>>> > >>>> To the extent that these different traditions lead people to the same > >>> kinds > >>>> of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the conclusions are > >>>> tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, sometimes, > in > >>>> good teaching. > >>>> > >>>> mike > >>>> > >>>> mike > >>>> > >>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Larry and Mike > >>>>> > >>>>> Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to both of > >>> you > >>>>> in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a > >>> conversation > >>>>> that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably good, but > >>> it is > >>>>> a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little larger > than > >>> what > >>>>> I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that I need > to, > >>> one > >>>>> might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that bear on > the, > >>>>> perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up. > >>>>> > >>>>> Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will reread it). I > >>>>> found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a large > grain > >>> size > >>>>> (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look at > >>> things). A > >>>>> few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms and are > >>> offered > >>>>> in the hope that they might be useful. > >>>>> > >>>>> 1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; however, > >>>>> looking at how words are used (a philosophy of language, so to speak) > >>> often > >>>>> does a better job of opening things up. > >>>>> > >>>>> 2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did not make > >>> your > >>>>> list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to mention > >>>>> Avicenna. > >>>>> > >>>>> 3. I have the impression you are using the term ?stable? as a > >>>>> somewhat replacement of Vygotsky?s concrete; I like that as > ?concrete' > >>>>> seems to have very different meanings for different people. I will > try > >>> to > >>>>> use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in my > replies > >>>>> tooters. > >>>>> > >>>>> 4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of Hellen > >>> Keller. I > >>>>> wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a thin gap > is > >>>>> because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a suspicion > >>> that > >>>>> he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I am fairly > >>> sure > >>>>> Keller was. > >>>>> > >>>>> 5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than too thin > >>>>> although the metaphor of filling still seems reasonable > >>>>> > >>>>> 6. In a way you don?t seem to quite come out and say it (or I > >>>>> missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is not necessarily > >>>>> creative and I would add that it is quite everyday. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as they occur. > >>>>> > >>>>> Ed > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 4:41 PM, Lplarry wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and re(present) > our > >>>>> notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a metaphor > >>> not > >>>>> error. > >>>>>> Ed, > >>>>>> To continue with your reflection if image has some relation to how > >>>>> others use text. > >>>>> > >>>>> Actually I don?t think image has some relation to how others use > text. > >>> I > >>>>> twas speculating as whether there is some commonality between how > Mike > >>> is > >>>>> using using image and how others are using text. I said this because > I > >>>>> struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary in > >>> mathematics > >>>>> and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to problems > >>> that > >>>>> presently catch my attention. > >>>>> > >>>>>> Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In other > words > >>>>> can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The physical > >>>>> gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of letters > on > >>> the > >>>>> page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or the > visual > >>>>> marks making a circle-like shape. > >>>>> > >>>>> I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size is too > >>> large. > >>>>> That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I now > >>> realize > >>>>> was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to view > >>>>> imagination. I don?t mean your perspective is lacking; it just seems > to > >>>>> result in different questions than I would/do ask. > >>>>> > >>>>>> These different physical forms are not the foundational bedrock, > they > >>>>> are the material. > >>>>>> If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on parchment but as > >>>>> having a deeper process, > >>>>>> Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual > perceptions > >>>>> but rather having a deeper process. > >>>>> > >>>>> My initial reaction is ?Why are you saying this?" If I ever thought > the > >>>>> contrary, I can?t remember. This is just common sense. The > interesting > >>>>> thing about what you say is that you seem to using ?imagine? in a > non > >>>>> visual fashion which was largely my initial point. > >>>>> > >>>>>> All the senses share in this process and engage with physically > >>>>> experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is that > >>> unifying > >>>>> process that includes all the senses but is not itself the senses. > >>>>> > >>>>> I would say that all senses can participate in this process. Also > >>>>> physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too strong although > >>>>> physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints of a sort > on > >>>>> imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I don?t > >>>>> physically experience a platonic circle. > >>>>> > >>>>>> To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the collated > >>>>> pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a > dialogue, > >>> to > >>>>> imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly have a > >>>>> unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the vital animating > >>>>> process lived (into). > >>>>> > >>>>> Here is where my example wasn?t helpful. I did not mean one ?sees' > the > >>>>> marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks is too > >>> large a > >>>>> grain size) on the board as having certain properties consistent with > >>> those > >>>>> of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a sort of > >>> sense. > >>>>> The teacher?s language seems to prove the imaging and the moving to > new > >>>>> stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people don?t > make > >>> the > >>>>> leaps. > >>>>> > >>>>>> This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy of the > >>> visual > >>>>> sense. > >>>>> > >>>>> Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none of the > >>> sensory > >>>>> modes > >>>>> > >>>>>> The relation of this image process to the language process is also > >>>>> multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. > >>>>> > >>>>> This doesn?t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, doesn?t > >>> follow > >>>>> for me. > >>>>> > >>>>> Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable perspective. It is > >>> just > >>>>> one that, to a degree, I either don?t share or seems to be the wrong > >>> grain > >>>>> size. > >>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > >>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM > >>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Mike > >>>>>> > >>>>>> My wondering has more to do with your focus on the visual and > >>> my > >>>>> examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be about the > >>> visual. > >>>>> However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well drawn) > is > >>> a > >>>>> ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at least, it > >>> never > >>>>> was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. In > fact, > >>>>> assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I can > >>> imagine it > >>>>> (smile). > >>>>>> On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term ?image? in > >>> the > >>>>> way some use the word ?text.? That is, to take into account both > >>> external > >>>>> and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of what you > >>> say > >>>>> resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am finding that > >>>>> peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Ed > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 2:35 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of > >>> Zinchenko's > >>>>>>> experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual system > >>> that > >>>>>>> prevented stabilized images from disappearing. He stabilized the > >>> image > >>>>>>> (here reified as a projection on the retina) but changed its color, > >>> thus > >>>>>>> defeating the retina's tendency to go grey. In those conditions, > eye > >>>>>>> movements continue to trace the spatial coordinates of the image as > >>> if > >>>>> it > >>>>>>> were continuing to "feel it." > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> These are very special circumstances, to be sure, but for they make > >>> it > >>>>>>> clear that what is called an image is a process (according to > >>> Suvorov, > >>>>> of > >>>>>>> stepping away from the world and then stepping back into it, but > >>> then he > >>>>>>> was blind and deaf). > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> What we designate as "the image" is some form of materialized > >>>>> stabilization > >>>>>>> of the flow of into-image-making. Some structure in the flow of the > >>>>> always > >>>>>>> new. From just the blink of an eye to our image of the statue of > >>>>> liberty. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> This is an old idea but it fits with my intuition. I first > >>> encountered > >>>>> it > >>>>>>> reading Dewey who refers to "the poet" on the topic of experience. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> *Yet all experience is an arch wherehrough / Gleams that untraveled > >>>>> world > >>>>>>> whose margin fades / Forever and forever when I move. * > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> *Tennyson, Ulysses* > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> If you are interested, we could try to synch re/reading of some > core > >>>>> common > >>>>>>> articles/chapters. This entire area of concern is of recent vintage > >>> for > >>>>> me > >>>>>>> and my ignorance is particularly keenly felt. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:02 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Mike > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the privileging > >>> of > >>>>>>>> the ?image? in discussions of imagination. Additionally, although > it > >>>>> has > >>>>>>>> been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don?t think it > was > >>>>> of the > >>>>>>>> Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw on would > >>>>> disagree > >>>>>>>> with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics. > >>>>>>>> I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems useful! - > >>>>> and > >>>>>>>> I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a huge > >>> emphasis > >>>>> in > >>>>>>>> mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking less > about > >>>>> the > >>>>>>>> ?imaginal? than you or Larry. That doesn?t mean that what you and > >>>>> Larry are > >>>>>>>> talking about might not usefully factor in especially your point > >>> about > >>>>>>>> joint, mediated, activity. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Ed > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 11:11 AM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et al > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic beginnings > >>> builds > >>>>> off > >>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> the already highly functional sensory system. Assume vision as > the > >>>>>>>> sensory > >>>>>>>>> system in question. We know that in an important sense, the > >>> "simple" > >>>>> act > >>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> seeing what you might call a common object, for example your car > in > >>>>> the > >>>>>>>>> driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves temporal > >>> and > >>>>>>>>> spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement that > >>> must > >>>>> be > >>>>>>>>> resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the process of > >>> image > >>>>>>>>> formation ceases to function. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for that > >>>>> simplified > >>>>>>>>> account. In thinking about imagination I turn to Zaporozhets, > >>>>> Zinchenko > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>> non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of enactive > >>>>>>>>> perception/cognition. It is also consistent with joint, mediated, > >>>>>>>> activity > >>>>>>>>> as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic function > >>> and > >>>>> the > >>>>>>>>> human possibility for symbolic communication is co-incident and > >>>>>>>>> co-constitutive of distinctly human imagination. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> in brief > >>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry > >>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Ed, mike, Michael, > >>>>>>>>>> I will push my question to an earlier time period. > >>>>>>>>>> Age 2 months. > >>>>>>>>>> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own > >>> activity . > >>>>>>>>>> Question > >>>>>>>>>> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving > >>> into > >>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? > >>>>>>>>>> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > >>>>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM > >>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Larry > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or > >>>>>>>>>> exclusive. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense > >>> if > >>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>>> understand Vygotsky correctly. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps > I > >>>>>>>>>> wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the > >>>>>>>> tendency to > >>>>>>>>>> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow > >>>>>>>> extra-concrete. > >>>>>>>>>> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural > historical > >>>>>>>> context > >>>>>>>>>> and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain > >>> things > >>>>>>>> are > >>>>>>>>>> ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that > >>> is?). > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of > >>>>>>>>>> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean > >>> when > >>>>>>>>>> you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, > >>>>>>>> perhaps, > >>>>>>>>>> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy > >>> in > >>>>>>>>>> your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final > >>> question. > >>>>> An > >>>>>>>>>> approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other > >>>>>>>>>> possibilities (smile). > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Ed > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry > >>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Ed, > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> The title imagination (or) fantasy > >>>>>>>>>>> Is different from > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. > >>>>>>>>>>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a > >>>>> distanciation?) > >>>>>>>>>> and return to the mathematical concrete. > >>>>>>>>>>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from > >>> the > >>>>>>>>>> physical to the mathematical? > >>>>>>>>>>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in > >>> historical > >>>>>>>>>> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical > >>>>> (concrete) > >>>>>>>>>> which exists prior to the human understanding and the > mathematical > >>>>>>>>>> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within > >>> the > >>>>>>>>>> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? > >>>>>>>>>>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. > >>>>>>>>>>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which > >>>>> originates > >>>>>>>> as > >>>>>>>>>> concrete. > >>>>>>>>>>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. > >>>>>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. > >>> Does > >>>>> one > >>>>>>>>>> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the > >>> actual > >>>>>>>> can > >>>>>>>>>> be mapped onto the physical with systems? > >>>>>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? > >>>>>>>>>>> Larry > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM > >>>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> All > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of > >>>>> imagination > >>>>>>>>>> that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? > >>> ?let,? or > >>>>>>>>>> ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different > >>> statements > >>>>>>>>>> although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In > >>> doing > >>>>> so I > >>>>>>>>>> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and > >>>>> Creativity > >>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for > >>>>> imagination > >>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only > >>> an > >>>>>>>>>> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, > only a > >>>>> pass > >>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of > >>> view, > >>>>>>>>>> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a > >>>>> given > >>>>>>>>>> concrete toward a new concrete.? > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous > >>> discussion > >>>>>>>>>> on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I > >>> am > >>>>>>>>>> wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are > >>> being > >>>>>>>> asked > >>>>>>>>>> to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join > the > >>>>>>>>>> elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if > >>>>> somebody > >>>>>>>> is > >>>>>>>>>> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my > >>>>>>>> wondering > >>>>>>>>>> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. > there > >>>>> is no > >>>>>>>>>> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to > >>>>> speak, > >>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering > >>>>> about > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>> then a question. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that > to > >>>>> see > >>>>>>>>>> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such > >>> thing. > >>>>> In a > >>>>>>>>>> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two > >>> is > >>>>> not > >>>>>>>> a > >>>>>>>>>> fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a > >>>>> fraction.? > >>>>>>>>>> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true > >>> and > >>>>> then > >>>>>>>>>> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps > another > >>>>>>>>>> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete > through > >>>>>>>>>> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through > contradiction) > >>>>>>>> seems to > >>>>>>>>>> be very hard for people to do. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and > >>> draws > >>>>>>>>>> something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then > >>>>> draws a > >>>>>>>>>> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, > >>>>> "This > >>>>>>>> is > >>>>>>>>>> its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving > her > >>>>> hand > >>>>>>>> at > >>>>>>>>>> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? > >>> None > >>>>> of > >>>>>>>> this > >>>>>>>>>> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each > >>> step > >>>>>>>> here > >>>>>>>>>> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the > concrete. > >>>>> (Hmm > >>>>>>>> , I > >>>>>>>>>> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the > >>>>>>>> mathematical > >>>>>>>>>> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a > >>>>> winged > >>>>>>>>>> horse]. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with > >>>>>>>>>> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would > >>> Vygotsky > >>>>>>>> have > >>>>>>>>>> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something > >>> else? > >>>>>>>> There > >>>>>>>>>> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m > >>> interested in > >>>>>>>> your > >>>>>>>>>> take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Ed Wall > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with > >>> an > >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with > an > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Dec 8 21:12:25 2015 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2015 05:12:25 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> <05AB59E5-018D-4FF2-92BE-06619D1F95B8@umich.edu> <1BD78C04-64EA-4C74-BDDB-4723D6312EAF@umich.edu> Message-ID: Perhaps the challenge will get easier if you keep piling up the references, Mike. :) So, I have persevered with reading, skipping and scanning Lovejoy's "The Great Chain of Being" and have come away with a few pages of notes, and some edification (22nd printing, 2001, Harvard University Press). With respect to the valorisation of imagination, Lovejoy identifies Schleirmacher as an early proponent of the merits of the development of imagination (although one could say that this is implicit in the platonic ideas which concern the book as a whole). (p. 309) With respect to the origins of the idea of a cell (urbild), he identifies Robinet as a rather eclectic proponent of the idea (p. 279), which again is derived from the history of the ideas of absolute perfection (of god), the principle of plentitude and the principle of continuity. He also attributes to Robinet that "fundamental reality in nature for him is not matter but l'avtivite". (p. 281) On a more down to regular strain on the imagination, regarding my assertion early of cognate terms (imagination, orientation etc), my reckoning is that orientation determines the scope and nature of interpretation. Not so long ago, I noticed some apparently new developments in our eldest child's formulations (4y6). We were talking about how to make papier mache objects, which took me back to making a papier mache 'pig' with the help of a balloon. In response to this he volunteered that the balloon would have to be burst with a pencil once it had been covered. I think it was the day before this that he pronounced that the ugly duckling's egg must have been laid by a swan. It seemed to me that that these articulations indicated that he was using a relatively new idea which was helping him to imaginatively understand these situations (an idea of process). I am fairly sure that these solutions were not supplied beforehand. Best, Huw On 9 December 2015 at 03:59, mike cole wrote: > The Casey site looks amazing and of course very relevant, Ed. Thanks. > > When I first read Sartre many years ago, I was totally unprepared to take > in what he was saying. I had not way to "digest it." > > Reading into the electronic copy I sent around yesterday, I could see that > it is inappropriate for me to refer to what I do as phenomenology. It is > just a kind of intuitive reflection > on my experiences and thoughts. No Husserl, no Sartre. Just unschooled > introspection that I seek to verify through acquiring evidence that there > is more than total idiosyncrasy to what my musings. > > I feel as if I need to download all the sources of inquiry we have > unearthed in the last few days and retreat to a place with no communication > with the world for a few weeks just to take them, in. !! > mike > > On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:39 AM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > Mike > > > > There are, perhaps, some shortcomings in portions of Sartre work > on > > imagination to which Casey supplies some useful modifications. Also it > is a > > bit long. Take a look at Edward Casey?s web site: < > > http://edwardscasey.com/?page_id=13>. Many of those articles on > > imagination seem downloadable and besides possibly whetting one?s > appetite > > for Sartre might be interesting in themselves. Perhaps you could pick one > > that most interests you and provides, from your vantage, a useful common, > > and modestly short reading source. I would, of course, recommend Casey?s > > book, but isn?t freely available. > > > > Ed > > > > > On Dec 7, 2015, at 9:44 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > So maybe Sartre would be a useful common reading source, Ed. > > > > > > > > > http://blog.exre.org/wp-content/uploads/Sartre_The_Imaginary__A_Phenomenological_Psychology_of_the_Imagination.pdf > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > >> It make sense for the questions to differ, Ed, or at least the way > they > > >> are posed. Finding a common foundation will take a lot of > communication > > >> (which will require a lot of imagination!). > > >> mike > > >> > > >> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 6:04 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > >> > > >>> Mike > > >>> > > >>> I assume you have read Sartre on imagination; i.e. The > Imagination. > > >>> This gives what he considers a phenomenological take on imagination. > > >>> However, I would consider a much more revealing take to be that of > > Edward > > >>> Casey in Imaging (I am hoping that book you referenced will > supplement > > that > > >>> of Casey). The connection to Kant, by the way, critically preceded > > that of > > >>> Mzerleau-Ponty and Sartre and that is why I was surprised to not see > > him > > >>> mentioned. > > >>> > > >>> I agree that we all seem to be coming out in, more or less, the > > >>> same place. Only the questions seem to differ. > > >>> > > >>> Ed > > >>> > > >>>> On Dec 7, 2015, at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>> Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity given that > we > > >>>> started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I > > indicated > > >>> in > > >>>> my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life through > my > > >>>> teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas drawn > from > > >>>> psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and > activity-centered > > >>>> research practices. But here I am. > > >>>> > > >>>> So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my > > >>> understanding. > > >>>> > > >>>> I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the description > of > > >>> the > > >>>> flow from imagination to representation, but glad to encounter a > > dozen! > > >>>> Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the > > abstractions > > >>> can > > >>>> be seen, seem hard to come by. > > >>>> > > >>>> My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by > > >>>> identifying different threads of the topic they constitute was > offered > > >>> with > > >>>> that goal in mind. > > >>>> > > >>>> The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is about > it. > > I > > >>>> learned that from the Russians who write about imagination. > > >>>> > > >>>> Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6? > > >>>> > > >>>> etc? > > >>>> > > >>>> To the extent that these different traditions lead people to the > same > > >>> kinds > > >>>> of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the conclusions > are > > >>>> tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, > sometimes, > > in > > >>>> good teaching. > > >>>> > > >>>> mike > > >>>> > > >>>> mike > > >>>> > > >>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>> Larry and Mike > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to both > of > > >>> you > > >>>>> in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a > > >>> conversation > > >>>>> that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably good, > but > > >>> it is > > >>>>> a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little larger > > than > > >>> what > > >>>>> I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that I need > > to, > > >>> one > > >>>>> might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that bear on > > the, > > >>>>> perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will reread > it). I > > >>>>> found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a large > > grain > > >>> size > > >>>>> (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look at > > >>> things). A > > >>>>> few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms and are > > >>> offered > > >>>>> in the hope that they might be useful. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> 1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; however, > > >>>>> looking at how words are used (a philosophy of language, so to > speak) > > >>> often > > >>>>> does a better job of opening things up. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> 2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did not make > > >>> your > > >>>>> list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to mention > > >>>>> Avicenna. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> 3. I have the impression you are using the term ?stable? as a > > >>>>> somewhat replacement of Vygotsky?s concrete; I like that as > > ?concrete' > > >>>>> seems to have very different meanings for different people. I will > > try > > >>> to > > >>>>> use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in my > > replies > > >>>>> tooters. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> 4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of Hellen > > >>> Keller. I > > >>>>> wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a thin gap > > is > > >>>>> because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a > suspicion > > >>> that > > >>>>> he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I am > fairly > > >>> sure > > >>>>> Keller was. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> 5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than too thin > > >>>>> although the metaphor of filling still seems reasonable > > >>>>> > > >>>>> 6. In a way you don?t seem to quite come out and say it (or I > > >>>>> missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is not > necessarily > > >>>>> creative and I would add that it is quite everyday. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as they > occur. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Ed > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 4:41 PM, Lplarry > wrote: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and re(present) > > our > > >>>>> notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a > metaphor > > >>> not > > >>>>> error. > > >>>>>> Ed, > > >>>>>> To continue with your reflection if image has some relation to how > > >>>>> others use text. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Actually I don?t think image has some relation to how others use > > text. > > >>> I > > >>>>> twas speculating as whether there is some commonality between how > > Mike > > >>> is > > >>>>> using using image and how others are using text. I said this > because > > I > > >>>>> struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary in > > >>> mathematics > > >>>>> and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to > problems > > >>> that > > >>>>> presently catch my attention. > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In other > > words > > >>>>> can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The > physical > > >>>>> gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of letters > > on > > >>> the > > >>>>> page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or the > > visual > > >>>>> marks making a circle-like shape. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size is too > > >>> large. > > >>>>> That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I now > > >>> realize > > >>>>> was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to view > > >>>>> imagination. I don?t mean your perspective is lacking; it just > seems > > to > > >>>>> result in different questions than I would/do ask. > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> These different physical forms are not the foundational bedrock, > > they > > >>>>> are the material. > > >>>>>> If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on parchment but > as > > >>>>> having a deeper process, > > >>>>>> Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual > > perceptions > > >>>>> but rather having a deeper process. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> My initial reaction is ?Why are you saying this?" If I ever thought > > the > > >>>>> contrary, I can?t remember. This is just common sense. The > > interesting > > >>>>> thing about what you say is that you seem to using ?imagine? in a > > non > > >>>>> visual fashion which was largely my initial point. > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> All the senses share in this process and engage with physically > > >>>>> experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is that > > >>> unifying > > >>>>> process that includes all the senses but is not itself the senses. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> I would say that all senses can participate in this process. Also > > >>>>> physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too strong > although > > >>>>> physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints of a > sort > > on > > >>>>> imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I don?t > > >>>>> physically experience a platonic circle. > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the > collated > > >>>>> pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a > > dialogue, > > >>> to > > >>>>> imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly have a > > >>>>> unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the vital > animating > > >>>>> process lived (into). > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Here is where my example wasn?t helpful. I did not mean one ?sees' > > the > > >>>>> marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks is too > > >>> large a > > >>>>> grain size) on the board as having certain properties consistent > with > > >>> those > > >>>>> of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a sort > of > > >>> sense. > > >>>>> The teacher?s language seems to prove the imaging and the moving to > > new > > >>>>> stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people don?t > > make > > >>> the > > >>>>> leaps. > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy of the > > >>> visual > > >>>>> sense. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none of the > > >>> sensory > > >>>>> modes > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> The relation of this image process to the language process is also > > >>>>> multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> This doesn?t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, doesn?t > > >>> follow > > >>>>> for me. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable perspective. It > is > > >>> just > > >>>>> one that, to a degree, I either don?t share or seems to be the > wrong > > >>> grain > > >>>>> size. > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > > >>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > > >>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM > > >>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Mike > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> My wondering has more to do with your focus on the visual > and > > >>> my > > >>>>> examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be about the > > >>> visual. > > >>>>> However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well drawn) > > is > > >>> a > > >>>>> ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at least, > it > > >>> never > > >>>>> was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. In > > fact, > > >>>>> assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I can > > >>> imagine it > > >>>>> (smile). > > >>>>>> On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term ?image? in > > >>> the > > >>>>> way some use the word ?text.? That is, to take into account both > > >>> external > > >>>>> and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of what > you > > >>> say > > >>>>> resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am finding > that > > >>>>> peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Ed > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 2:35 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of > > >>> Zinchenko's > > >>>>>>> experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual > system > > >>> that > > >>>>>>> prevented stabilized images from disappearing. He stabilized the > > >>> image > > >>>>>>> (here reified as a projection on the retina) but changed its > color, > > >>> thus > > >>>>>>> defeating the retina's tendency to go grey. In those conditions, > > eye > > >>>>>>> movements continue to trace the spatial coordinates of the image > as > > >>> if > > >>>>> it > > >>>>>>> were continuing to "feel it." > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> These are very special circumstances, to be sure, but for they > make > > >>> it > > >>>>>>> clear that what is called an image is a process (according to > > >>> Suvorov, > > >>>>> of > > >>>>>>> stepping away from the world and then stepping back into it, but > > >>> then he > > >>>>>>> was blind and deaf). > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> What we designate as "the image" is some form of materialized > > >>>>> stabilization > > >>>>>>> of the flow of into-image-making. Some structure in the flow of > the > > >>>>> always > > >>>>>>> new. From just the blink of an eye to our image of the statue of > > >>>>> liberty. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> This is an old idea but it fits with my intuition. I first > > >>> encountered > > >>>>> it > > >>>>>>> reading Dewey who refers to "the poet" on the topic of > experience. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> *Yet all experience is an arch wherehrough / Gleams that > untraveled > > >>>>> world > > >>>>>>> whose margin fades / Forever and forever when I move. * > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> *Tennyson, Ulysses* > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> If you are interested, we could try to synch re/reading of some > > core > > >>>>> common > > >>>>>>> articles/chapters. This entire area of concern is of recent > vintage > > >>> for > > >>>>> me > > >>>>>>> and my ignorance is particularly keenly felt. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:02 PM, Ed Wall > wrote: > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> Mike > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the > privileging > > >>> of > > >>>>>>>> the ?image? in discussions of imagination. Additionally, > although > > it > > >>>>> has > > >>>>>>>> been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don?t think it > > was > > >>>>> of the > > >>>>>>>> Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw on would > > >>>>> disagree > > >>>>>>>> with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics. > > >>>>>>>> I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems > useful! - > > >>>>> and > > >>>>>>>> I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a huge > > >>> emphasis > > >>>>> in > > >>>>>>>> mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking less > > about > > >>>>> the > > >>>>>>>> ?imaginal? than you or Larry. That doesn?t mean that what you > and > > >>>>> Larry are > > >>>>>>>> talking about might not usefully factor in especially your point > > >>> about > > >>>>>>>> joint, mediated, activity. > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> Ed > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 11:11 AM, mike cole > wrote: > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et al > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic beginnings > > >>> builds > > >>>>> off > > >>>>>>>> of > > >>>>>>>>> the already highly functional sensory system. Assume vision as > > the > > >>>>>>>> sensory > > >>>>>>>>> system in question. We know that in an important sense, the > > >>> "simple" > > >>>>> act > > >>>>>>>> of > > >>>>>>>>> seeing what you might call a common object, for example your > car > > in > > >>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>> driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves > temporal > > >>> and > > >>>>>>>>> spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement that > > >>> must > > >>>>> be > > >>>>>>>>> resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the process of > > >>> image > > >>>>>>>>> formation ceases to function. > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for that > > >>>>> simplified > > >>>>>>>>> account. In thinking about imagination I turn to Zaporozhets, > > >>>>> Zinchenko > > >>>>>>>> and > > >>>>>>>>> non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of enactive > > >>>>>>>>> perception/cognition. It is also consistent with joint, > mediated, > > >>>>>>>> activity > > >>>>>>>>> as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go. > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic > function > > >>> and > > >>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>> human possibility for symbolic communication is co-incident and > > >>>>>>>>> co-constitutive of distinctly human imagination. > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> in brief > > >>>>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry > > >>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Ed, mike, Michael, > > >>>>>>>>>> I will push my question to an earlier time period. > > >>>>>>>>>> Age 2 months. > > >>>>>>>>>> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own > > >>> activity . > > >>>>>>>>>> Question > > >>>>>>>>>> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving > > >>> into > > >>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? > > >>>>>>>>>> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic > origin? > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > > >>>>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > > >>>>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM > > >>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Larry > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive > or > > >>>>>>>>>> exclusive. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make > sense > > >>> if > > >>>>>>>> I > > >>>>>>>>>> understand Vygotsky correctly. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? > perhaps > > I > > >>>>>>>>>> wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood > the > > >>>>>>>> tendency to > > >>>>>>>>>> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow > > >>>>>>>> extra-concrete. > > >>>>>>>>>> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural > > historical > > >>>>>>>> context > > >>>>>>>>>> and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain > > >>> things > > >>>>>>>> are > > >>>>>>>>>> ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that > > >>> is?). > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development > of > > >>>>>>>>>> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean > > >>> when > > >>>>>>>>>> you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My > answer, > > >>>>>>>> perhaps, > > >>>>>>>>>> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or > fantasy > > >>> in > > >>>>>>>>>> your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final > > >>> question. > > >>>>> An > > >>>>>>>>>> approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other > > >>>>>>>>>> possibilities (smile). > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Ed > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry > > >>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> Ed, > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> The title imagination (or) fantasy > > >>>>>>>>>>> Is different from > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. > > >>>>>>>>>>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a > > >>>>> distanciation?) > > >>>>>>>>>> and return to the mathematical concrete. > > >>>>>>>>>>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer > from > > >>> the > > >>>>>>>>>> physical to the mathematical? > > >>>>>>>>>>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in > > >>> historical > > >>>>>>>>>> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical > > >>>>> (concrete) > > >>>>>>>>>> which exists prior to the human understanding and the > > mathematical > > >>>>>>>>>> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging > within > > >>> the > > >>>>>>>>>> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? > > >>>>>>>>>>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. > > >>>>>>>>>>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which > > >>>>> originates > > >>>>>>>> as > > >>>>>>>>>> concrete. > > >>>>>>>>>>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. > > >>>>>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and > fantasy. > > >>> Does > > >>>>> one > > >>>>>>>>>> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the > > >>> actual > > >>>>>>>> can > > >>>>>>>>>> be mapped onto the physical with systems? > > >>>>>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? > > >>>>>>>>>>> Larry > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > > >>>>>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > > >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM > > >>>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> All > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of > > >>>>> imagination > > >>>>>>>>>> that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? > > >>> ?let,? or > > >>>>>>>>>> ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different > > >>> statements > > >>>>>>>>>> although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In > > >>> doing > > >>>>> so I > > >>>>>>>>>> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and > > >>>>> Creativity > > >>>>>>>> in > > >>>>>>>>>> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for > > >>>>> imagination > > >>>>>>>> that > > >>>>>>>>>> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is > only > > >>> an > > >>>>>>>>>> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, > > only a > > >>>>> pass > > >>>>>>>> in > > >>>>>>>>>> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of > > >>> view, > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed > from a > > >>>>> given > > >>>>>>>>>> concrete toward a new concrete.? > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous > > >>> discussion > > >>>>>>>>>> on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in > that I > > >>> am > > >>>>>>>>>> wondering whether part of what is going on is that children > are > > >>> being > > >>>>>>>> asked > > >>>>>>>>>> to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join > > the > > >>>>>>>>>> elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if > > >>>>> somebody > > >>>>>>>> is > > >>>>>>>>>> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for > my > > >>>>>>>> wondering > > >>>>>>>>>> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. > > there > > >>>>> is no > > >>>>>>>>>> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so > to > > >>>>> speak, > > >>>>>>>> in > > >>>>>>>>>> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am > wondering > > >>>>> about > > >>>>>>>> and > > >>>>>>>>>> then a question. > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> My first example: It is possible that we would all agree > that > > to > > >>>>> see > > >>>>>>>>>> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such > > >>> thing. > > >>>>> In a > > >>>>>>>>>> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of > two > > >>> is > > >>>>> not > > >>>>>>>> a > > >>>>>>>>>> fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a > > >>>>> fraction.? > > >>>>>>>>>> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is > true > > >>> and > > >>>>> then > > >>>>>>>>>> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps > > another > > >>>>>>>>>> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete > > through > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through > > contradiction) > > >>>>>>>> seems to > > >>>>>>>>>> be very hard for people to do. > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and > > >>> draws > > >>>>>>>>>> something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She > then > > >>>>> draws a > > >>>>>>>>>> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and > says, > > >>>>> "This > > >>>>>>>> is > > >>>>>>>>>> its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving > > her > > >>>>> hand > > >>>>>>>> at > > >>>>>>>>>> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? > > >>> None > > >>>>> of > > >>>>>>>> this > > >>>>>>>>>> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. > Each > > >>> step > > >>>>>>>> here > > >>>>>>>>>> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the > > concrete. > > >>>>> (Hmm > > >>>>>>>> , I > > >>>>>>>>>> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the > > >>>>>>>> mathematical > > >>>>>>>>>> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of > a > > >>>>> winged > > >>>>>>>>>> horse]. > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination > with > > >>>>>>>>>> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would > > >>> Vygotsky > > >>>>>>>> have > > >>>>>>>>>> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or > something > > >>> else? > > >>>>>>>> There > > >>>>>>>>>> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m > > >>> interested in > > >>>>>>>> your > > >>>>>>>>>> take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> Ed Wall > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> -- > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science > with > > >>> an > > >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> -- > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with > > an > > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> -- > > >>>> > > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > > >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > >> -- > > >> > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Dec 8 21:19:23 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2015 21:19:23 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Kant's Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5667b9dd.1408620a.6c91c.4524@mx.google.com> This may or may not add clarity. Stephen H Watson wrote this about Kant in a chapter he named [Abysses] ?Kant had proceeded some 600 pages into the first ?Critique? before he had reached the problem of abysses. He had faithfully followed out the the Enlightenment?s search for foundations, its peculiar form of the {recherche de la verite} as it was called. He had deployed the schemata of the Enlightenment?s beliefs. Transcendental arguments, always, at least in Kant, were regressive. ?If knowledge is to be possible? ? it postulated a complete [picture] of knowledge as well as possibility. And, no one doubted it ? let alone Kant, for whom Newton, Galileo, and Euclid provided the texts for an archive of pure reason. The systems, the {principiae} were introjected: the schemata for synthesis ? the bringing of the manifold of sensation into a unity, the necessary unity of knowledge, of concepts, of judgement, and thereby, of objects. And , consistently, self-critically, and the anathema to all neo-Kantianism, Kant?s {Dialectic} would not allow these ground to go themselves ungrounded. Reason seeks the conditions of the conditions, a higher unity that might ground the certainty of the understanding. The search for grounds, for justification, for legitimation, for necessity is not tangenital to what had gone before: it is necessary. A final grounding is requisite that might satisfy the search, providing a complete determination or ground for logical and ontological possibility such that it might be affirmed, finally and ultimately, that ?everything that exists is completely determined. Being thus could be claimed to be fully rational, that is, both orderly and intelligible. It was Kant?s insight [trope perhaps] to have recognized that this project, the project of all {metaphysics rationalis} was part and parcel theological. In short the project of rationality was {onto-theo-logical}. Because all particularity [manifoldness] would be a limit to this onto-theo-logical project, the search for the conditions of the conditions would be the highest being. {ens summon}. With this ultimate grounding Kant would find completeness. Transcendental logic [as a logic of truth] would have been vindicated. Objectivity would have finally been assured in accordance with a necessity that had driven the search after truth since Plato?s dialectic. {Natural} was Kant?s word for it, and it would bring Hegel?s response that this approach still exhibited an indefensible psychology. This search also contained a certain delirium, an illusion that transcendental ideas could receive ?experience?. This project was a ?focus imaginarius?. This may be too detailed but gives a flavour of the dream underpinning the movement of the imaginal to the representational. Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Ed Wall Sent: Tuesday, December 8, 2015 3:20 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Kant's Imagination Annalisa There is much that could be said, but I will leave that for others and briefly quote Casey quoting/paraphrasing Kant: Kant reinforced imagination?s mediatory role by distinguishing between two kinds of imagining: a reproductive type, which is intimately connected with memory and perceptual apprehension, and a productive type which is contiguous with conceptual thinking. Thus imagination stands precisely midway between sensibility and understanding. Kant says, ?The two extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must stand in necessary connection with each other through the mediation of this transcendental function of imagination.? There is, I note, something further which I, personally, need to think about as Casey continues The ?transcendental function? referred to in this passage is effected by means of the transcendental schema, a product of productive imagination and the explicit basis for imagination?s mediatory role. Whatever quibbles one has with all this, most ?modern? Western philosophers who have taken on imagination at some point acknowledged Kant?s view of imagination (that doesn?t mean they agreed with it). In other words, Kant?s views regarding imagination were enormously influential in the West. I should note that Aristotle had similar views. Ed > On Dec 8, 2015, at 3:12 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi esteemed others, > > > I would like to follow the practice Mike asked of us to separate topics out to new fibers as they arise, and Kant came up in a few different threads. Since I'm keen to understand more about Kant through reading and considering the discourse of all the eloquent members here, I am taking the initiative to start a new thread. > > > Would anyone like to explain (in easy language) why Kant is relevant to our discussion on imagination (and perhaps fantasy)? > > > I hope this post doesn't receive an audience of crickets, or even a long list of links to read tomes and tomes of philosophical treatise. I just hope to have a conversation about it. > > > Anyone? > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa From rakahu@utu.fi Wed Dec 9 00:29:43 2015 From: rakahu@utu.fi (Rauno Huttunen) Date: Wed, 09 Dec 2015 08:29:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination - Piaget did read Hegel In-Reply-To: <566762D0.6000907@mira.net> References: <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> <5666EE99.5020302@mira.net> <566762D0.6000907@mira.net> Message-ID: <1dafea0da33b4b579ee8a337ddcc7526@EX13-07.utu.fi> Hello, There are biographical documents that proof that Piaget indeed read Hegel. Following sitation is from Webster R. Callaway?s book Jean Piaget: A Most Outrageous Deception, p. 4: "Piaget?s autobiography shows that he became enchanted with Hegel?s Absolute as an adolescent and proceeded immediately to build his entire philosophy and essentially all his psychology around Him. Literally everthing could be explained by iyts relationship to Him. He 'recalled one evening of profound revelation'. 'The Identification of God with life was an idea that stirred me almost to ecstacy because it enabled me to see in biology the explanation of all things and the mind itself' (Piaget, 1976b, 119)." I read this fragment from Google Books, so I don't know what is reference Piaget 1976b. But if this sitation is valid, it shows that Piaget was really enchanted byt Hegel's idea mystic related to the notion of Absolut. https://books.google.fi/books?id=j3bTqBYYtBYC&pg=PA4&lpg=PA4&dq=piaget+on+hegel&source=bl&ots=O9TUcpovhX&sig=YEle0SsI0dym_CBZIamX4XpaUlk&hl=fi&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjTjtqKqc7JAhVDBSwKHdHmDSUQ6AEISDAF#v=onepage&q=piaget%20on%20hegel&f=false Rauno Huttunen University of Turku Finland L?hett?j?: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] k?ytt?j?n Andy Blunden [ablunden@mira.net] puolesta L?hetetty: 9. joulukuuta 2015 1:08 Vastaanottaja: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Aihe: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination I have a recollection of discussions in the late 70s/early 80s where a number of Marxists (whose knowledge of Hegel was derivative of Engels in any case) fervently argued that Piaget was "compatible" with Marxism and that he was an "unconscious" dialectician. I am inclined to believe that Piaget never read Hegel, as you say Arthur, but a lot of people perceived a likeness. In my own reading of Piaget, which is extremely limited - but I did read his Genetic Epistemology, for example - is that he has not read Hegel or appropriated anything from him. But like Kuhn, the nature of the ideas he introduced made many people think of Hegel - the concern with sophisticated logic, transformational change between stages, for example. But quite apart from general resemblances with how change and development is conceived, the passage I sent the link to was from the Subjective Spirit. This is a work which has been very little discussed outside of "professional" Hegel scholarship until very recent times. If Piaget read Hegel that would not suggest that he knew anything about Hegel's ideas about Imagination. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 9/12/2015 8:48 AM, Bakker, A. (Arthur) wrote: > Andy, Peter, > > I just read an interesting book by Kitchener (1986) on Piaget: > > Kitchener, R. F. (1986). Piaget's theory of knowledge: Genetic epistemology & scientific reason. Yale University Press. > > There is a passage on dialectical thinking in Piaget's work, and there is an Hegelian influence, but Kitchener claims that Piaget never read Hegel. > I brought the book back to the library, so I cannot check the page numbers (cannot find it in google books). > However in the Cambridge Companion to Piaget, Hegel is mentioned a few times (e.g. p. 163 ff by Campbell) so > > Best, > > Arthur > > Dr Arthur Bakker | Freudenthal Institute | Faculty of Science and Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences| Utrecht University | Princetonplein 5, kamer 465 |PO Box 85170, 3508 AD Utrecht | tel. 030 253 5641 | a.bakker4@uu.nl | sampling (ESM 2015), inquiry (ZDM 2015). scaffolding (ZDM 2015) > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+a.bakker4=uu.nl@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+a.bakker4=uu.nl@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] [pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu] > Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2015 4:36 PM > To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination > > Andy, > > No, it's merely an hypothesis--although I must admit I never bothered to > check whether Piaget ever made any direct references to Hegel. The basis > for my hypothesis are several of Piaget's earliest essays in The Essential > Piaget (Howard Gruber & Jacques Von?che, Eds.), which are all about *The > Idea*. Those essays are what led me (years ago) to infer that he was > fascinated with Hegel. Piaget's later writings, which weave dialectical > logic into his theory of development, only added further weight to that > hypothesis. > > Apparently, I'm not the only one to see an affinity between Piaget and > Hegel: Piaget's dialectical approach to development has been examined > by several philosophers, such as James Lawler and Marx Wartofsky. The > general critique of Piaget's application of dialectical logic by these > authors is that it doesn't stick closely enough to Hegel's formulation, > leading Piaget into inconsistencies. > > Peter > > > > > On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Do you have any evidence that Piaget studied Hegel? >> andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 9/12/2015 1:30 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote: >> >>> Andy, >>> >>> What an amazing excerpt! From this one passage alone I can see the >>> strong influence that Hegel had upon Piaget. >>> >>> Thanks for bringing this section of The Subjective Spirit to attention. >>> It's chock-full of interesting thoughts. >>> >>> Peter >>> >>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 11:53 PM, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suspirit.htm#SU455 >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> On 8/12/2015 3:47 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> Hi Andy, >>> >>> >>> Would you post a link reference to texts where >>> Hegel discusses imagination? >>> >>> >>> Thanks, >>> >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>> Director, >>> Office of Institutional Research < >>> http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp >>> Fordham University >>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>> >>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>> >> > > -- > Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. > Director, > Office of Institutional Research > > Fordham University > Thebaud Hall-202 > Bronx, NY 10458 > > Phone: (718) 817-2243 > Fax: (718) 817-3817 > email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu > > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Dec 9 01:05:48 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 09 Dec 2015 20:05:48 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination - Piaget did read Hegel In-Reply-To: <1dafea0da33b4b579ee8a337ddcc7526@EX13-07.utu.fi> References: <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> <5666EE99.5020302@mira.net> <566762D0.6000907@mira.net> <1dafea0da33b4b579ee8a337ddcc7526@EX13-07.utu.fi> Message-ID: <5667EEEC.2090804@mira.net> Well, that settles the matter, doesn't it! Thank you Rauno. :) It sounds as if he embraced Leibniz as well. But it is a very "general" appropriation. isn't it? Still, in my view, highly unlikely that Hegel's ideas about imagination made their way to Piaget. https://books.google.fi/books?id=j3bTqBYYtBYC&pg=PA4&dq=Jean+Piaget:+A+Most+Outrageous+Deception+Hegel&hl=fi&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwibqOyFtc7JAhUkK6YKHUBeB4IQ6AEIGjAA#v=onepage&q=Jean%20Piaget%3A%20A%20Most%20Outrageous%20Deception%20Hegel&f=false ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 9/12/2015 7:29 PM, Rauno Huttunen wrote: > Hello, > > There are biographical documents that proof that Piaget indeed read Hegel. Following sitation is from Webster R. Callaway?s book Jean Piaget: A Most Outrageous Deception, p. 4: > > "Piaget?s autobiography shows that he became enchanted with Hegel?s Absolute as an adolescent and proceeded immediately to build his entire philosophy and essentially all his psychology around Him. Literally everthing could be explained by iyts relationship to Him. He 'recalled one evening of profound revelation'. 'The Identification of God with life was an idea that stirred me almost to ecstacy because it enabled me to see in biology the explanation of all things and the mind itself' (Piaget, 1976b, 119)." > > I read this fragment from Google Books, so I don't know what is reference Piaget 1976b. But if this sitation is valid, it shows that Piaget was really enchanted byt Hegel's idea mystic related to the notion of Absolut. > > https://books.google.fi/books?id=j3bTqBYYtBYC&pg=PA4&lpg=PA4&dq=piaget+on+hegel&source=bl&ots=O9TUcpovhX&sig=YEle0SsI0dym_CBZIamX4XpaUlk&hl=fi&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjTjtqKqc7JAhVDBSwKHdHmDSUQ6AEISDAF#v=onepage&q=piaget%20on%20hegel&f=false > > Rauno Huttunen > University of Turku > Finland > > > > > > > L?hett?j?: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] k?ytt?j?n Andy Blunden [ablunden@mira.net] puolesta > L?hetetty: 9. joulukuuta 2015 1:08 > Vastaanottaja: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Aihe: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination > > I have a recollection of discussions in the late 70s/early > 80s where a number of Marxists (whose knowledge of Hegel was > derivative of Engels in any case) fervently argued that > Piaget was "compatible" with Marxism and that he was an > "unconscious" dialectician. I am inclined to believe that > Piaget never read Hegel, as you say Arthur, but a lot of > people perceived a likeness. In my own reading of Piaget, > which is extremely limited - but I did read his Genetic > Epistemology, for example - is that he has not read Hegel or > appropriated anything from him. But like Kuhn, the nature of > the ideas he introduced made many people think of Hegel - > the concern with sophisticated logic, transformational > change between stages, for example. > > But quite apart from general resemblances with how change > and development is conceived, the passage I sent the link to > was from the Subjective Spirit. This is a work which has > been very little discussed outside of "professional" Hegel > scholarship until very recent times. If Piaget read Hegel > that would not suggest that he knew anything about Hegel's > ideas about Imagination. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 9/12/2015 8:48 AM, Bakker, A. (Arthur) wrote: >> Andy, Peter, >> >> I just read an interesting book by Kitchener (1986) on Piaget: >> >> Kitchener, R. F. (1986). Piaget's theory of knowledge: Genetic epistemology & scientific reason. Yale University Press. >> >> There is a passage on dialectical thinking in Piaget's work, and there is an Hegelian influence, but Kitchener claims that Piaget never read Hegel. >> I brought the book back to the library, so I cannot check the page numbers (cannot find it in google books). >> However in the Cambridge Companion to Piaget, Hegel is mentioned a few times (e.g. p. 163 ff by Campbell) so >> >> Best, >> >> Arthur >> >> Dr Arthur Bakker | Freudenthal Institute | Faculty of Science and Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences| Utrecht University | Princetonplein 5, kamer 465 |PO Box 85170, 3508 AD Utrecht | tel. 030 253 5641 | a.bakker4@uu.nl | sampling (ESM 2015), inquiry (ZDM 2015). scaffolding (ZDM 2015) >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.bakker4=uu.nl@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+a.bakker4=uu.nl@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] [pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu] >> Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2015 4:36 PM >> To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination >> >> Andy, >> >> No, it's merely an hypothesis--although I must admit I never bothered to >> check whether Piaget ever made any direct references to Hegel. The basis >> for my hypothesis are several of Piaget's earliest essays in The Essential >> Piaget (Howard Gruber & Jacques Von?che, Eds.), which are all about *The >> Idea*. Those essays are what led me (years ago) to infer that he was >> fascinated with Hegel. Piaget's later writings, which weave dialectical >> logic into his theory of development, only added further weight to that >> hypothesis. >> >> Apparently, I'm not the only one to see an affinity between Piaget and >> Hegel: Piaget's dialectical approach to development has been examined >> by several philosophers, such as James Lawler and Marx Wartofsky. The >> general critique of Piaget's application of dialectical logic by these >> authors is that it doesn't stick closely enough to Hegel's formulation, >> leading Piaget into inconsistencies. >> >> Peter >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> Do you have any evidence that Piaget studied Hegel? >>> andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> On 9/12/2015 1:30 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote: >>> >>>> Andy, >>>> >>>> What an amazing excerpt! From this one passage alone I can see the >>>> strong influence that Hegel had upon Piaget. >>>> >>>> Thanks for bringing this section of The Subjective Spirit to attention. >>>> It's chock-full of interesting thoughts. >>>> >>>> Peter >>>> >>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 11:53 PM, Andy Blunden >>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suspirit.htm#SU455 >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 8/12/2015 3:47 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Andy, >>>> >>>> >>>> Would you post a link reference to texts where >>>> Hegel discusses imagination? >>>> >>>> >>>> Thanks, >>>> >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>> Director, >>>> Office of Institutional Research < >>>> http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp >>>> Fordham University >>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>> >>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>> >> -- >> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >> Director, >> Office of Institutional Research >> >> Fordham University >> Thebaud Hall-202 >> Bronx, NY 10458 >> >> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >> >> > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Dec 9 07:22:19 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2015 07:22:19 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination - Piaget did read Hegel In-Reply-To: <5667EEEC.2090804@mira.net> References: <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> <5666EE99.5020302@mira.net> <566762D0.6000907@mira.net> <1dafea0da33b4b579ee8a337ddcc7526@EX13-07.utu.fi> <5667EEEC.2090804@mira.net> Message-ID: <56684752.170e620a.3cf2a.ffffb675@mx.google.com> Andy, this (general) image flooded Piaget with an ecstasy in (realizing) all manifestations return to the (One). This experience was the yearning, the desire and in this orientation or approach knowledge and epistemology are founded foundationally on what may be referred to as an ontology.. The hallmark is the desire for an approach that is (certain) across all situations. My point is these yearnings are orientations towards certainty and foundations that can give and become a life project. Piaget also embraced Kant (transcendental ideas) I imagine our human urge for foundations is (general) but I am suggesting imaginal. The response as (foundings) is also general. -----Original Message----- From: "Andy Blunden" Sent: ?2015-?12-?09 1:07 AM To: "Rauno Huttunen" ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination - Piaget did read Hegel Well, that settles the matter, doesn't it! Thank you Rauno. :) It sounds as if he embraced Leibniz as well. But it is a very "general" appropriation. isn't it? Still, in my view, highly unlikely that Hegel's ideas about imagination made their way to Piaget. https://books.google.fi/books?id=j3bTqBYYtBYC&pg=PA4&dq=Jean+Piaget:+A+Most+Outrageous+Deception+Hegel&hl=fi&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwibqOyFtc7JAhUkK6YKHUBeB4IQ6AEIGjAA#v=onepage&q=Jean%20Piaget%3A%20A%20Most%20Outrageous%20Deception%20Hegel&f=false ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 9/12/2015 7:29 PM, Rauno Huttunen wrote: > Hello, > > There are biographical documents that proof that Piaget indeed read Hegel. Following sitation is from Webster R. Callaway?s book Jean Piaget: A Most Outrageous Deception, p. 4: > > "Piaget?s autobiography shows that he became enchanted with Hegel?s Absolute as an adolescent and proceeded immediately to build his entire philosophy and essentially all his psychology around Him. Literally everthing could be explained by iyts relationship to Him. He 'recalled one evening of profound revelation'. 'The Identification of God with life was an idea that stirred me almost to ecstacy because it enabled me to see in biology the explanation of all things and the mind itself' (Piaget, 1976b, 119)." > > I read this fragment from Google Books, so I don't know what is reference Piaget 1976b. But if this sitation is valid, it shows that Piaget was really enchanted byt Hegel's idea mystic related to the notion of Absolut. > > https://books.google.fi/books?id=j3bTqBYYtBYC&pg=PA4&lpg=PA4&dq=piaget+on+hegel&source=bl&ots=O9TUcpovhX&sig=YEle0SsI0dym_CBZIamX4XpaUlk&hl=fi&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjTjtqKqc7JAhVDBSwKHdHmDSUQ6AEISDAF#v=onepage&q=piaget%20on%20hegel&f=false > > Rauno Huttunen > University of Turku > Finland > > > > > > > L?hett?j?: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] k?ytt?j?n Andy Blunden [ablunden@mira.net] puolesta > L?hetetty: 9. joulukuuta 2015 1:08 > Vastaanottaja: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Aihe: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination > > I have a recollection of discussions in the late 70s/early > 80s where a number of Marxists (whose knowledge of Hegel was > derivative of Engels in any case) fervently argued that > Piaget was "compatible" with Marxism and that he was an > "unconscious" dialectician. I am inclined to believe that > Piaget never read Hegel, as you say Arthur, but a lot of > people perceived a likeness. In my own reading of Piaget, > which is extremely limited - but I did read his Genetic > Epistemology, for example - is that he has not read Hegel or > appropriated anything from him. But like Kuhn, the nature of > the ideas he introduced made many people think of Hegel - > the concern with sophisticated logic, transformational > change between stages, for example. > > But quite apart from general resemblances with how change > and development is conceived, the passage I sent the link to > was from the Subjective Spirit. This is a work which has > been very little discussed outside of "professional" Hegel > scholarship until very recent times. If Piaget read Hegel > that would not suggest that he knew anything about Hegel's > ideas about Imagination. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 9/12/2015 8:48 AM, Bakker, A. (Arthur) wrote: >> Andy, Peter, >> >> I just read an interesting book by Kitchener (1986) on Piaget: >> >> Kitchener, R. F. (1986). Piaget's theory of knowledge: Genetic epistemology & scientific reason. Yale University Press. >> >> There is a passage on dialectical thinking in Piaget's work, and there is an Hegelian influence, but Kitchener claims that Piaget never read Hegel. >> I brought the book back to the library, so I cannot check the page numbers (cannot find it in google books). >> However in the Cambridge Companion to Piaget, Hegel is mentioned a few times (e.g. p. 163 ff by Campbell) so >> >> Best, >> >> Arthur >> >> Dr Arthur Bakker | Freudenthal Institute | Faculty of Science and Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences| Utrecht University | Princetonplein 5, kamer 465 |PO Box 85170, 3508 AD Utrecht | tel. 030 253 5641 | a.bakker4@uu.nl | sampling (ESM 2015), inquiry (ZDM 2015). scaffolding (ZDM 2015) >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.bakker4=uu.nl@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+a.bakker4=uu.nl@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] [pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu] >> Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2015 4:36 PM >> To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination >> >> Andy, >> >> No, it's merely an hypothesis--although I must admit I never bothered to >> check whether Piaget ever made any direct references to Hegel. The basis >> for my hypothesis are several of Piaget's earliest essays in The Essential >> Piaget (Howard Gruber & Jacques Von?che, Eds.), which are all about *The >> Idea*. Those essays are what led me (years ago) to infer that he was >> fascinated with Hegel. Piaget's later writings, which weave dialectical >> logic into his theory of development, only added further weight to that >> hypothesis. >> >> Apparently, I'm not the only one to see an affinity between Piaget and >> Hegel: Piaget's dialectical approach to development has been examined >> by several philosophers, such as James Lawler and Marx Wartofsky. The >> general critique of Piaget's application of dialectical logic by these >> authors is that it doesn't stick closely enough to Hegel's formulation, >> leading Piaget into inconsistencies. >> >> Peter >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> Do you have any evidence that Piaget studied Hegel? >>> andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> On 9/12/2015 1:30 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote: >>> >>>> Andy, >>>> >>>> What an amazing excerpt! From this one passage alone I can see the >>>> strong influence that Hegel had upon Piaget. >>>> >>>> Thanks for bringing this section of The Subjective Spirit to attention. >>>> It's chock-full of interesting thoughts. >>>> >>>> Peter >>>> >>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 11:53 PM, Andy Blunden >>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suspirit.htm#SU455 >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 8/12/2015 3:47 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Andy, >>>> >>>> >>>> Would you post a link reference to texts where >>>> Hegel discusses imagination? >>>> >>>> >>>> Thanks, >>>> >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>> Director, >>>> Office of Institutional Research < >>>> http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp >>>> Fordham University >>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>> >>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>> >> -- >> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >> Director, >> Office of Institutional Research >> >> Fordham University >> Thebaud Hall-202 >> Bronx, NY 10458 >> >> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >> >> > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Dec 9 09:34:44 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2015 09:34:44 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination Message-ID: All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes you see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something that isn't even visible. N. McLean, *A River Runs Through it* -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Dec 9 11:38:21 2015 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2015 19:38:21 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination - Piaget did read Hegel In-Reply-To: <1dafea0da33b4b579ee8a337ddcc7526@EX13-07.utu.fi> References: <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> <5666EE99.5020302@mira.net> <566762D0.6000907@mira.net> <1dafea0da33b4b579ee8a337ddcc7526@EX13-07.utu.fi> Message-ID: <70DBFD78-3CA8-4D09-8C37-22075DD91803@uniandes.edu.co> According to this, how shall I say?, interesting book, Piaget was not merely influenced by Hegel: "Piaget... is completely committed to his metaphysical [Hegelian] doctrines, but is well aware that they are not acceptable to the academic community in their unadulterated form. Herculean efforts were made to maintain his views, even if undercover, while he presented a fraudulent view for general consumption. His boldest, most presumptuous deception was to present his metaphysical doctrine dressed up in scientific garb." (p. 6) This is certainly a fresh interpretation of Piaget! Martin On Dec 9, 2015, at 3:29 AM, Rauno Huttunen wrote: > Hello, > > There are biographical documents that proof that Piaget indeed read Hegel. Following sitation is from Webster R. Callaway?s book Jean Piaget: A Most Outrageous Deception, p. 4: > > "Piaget?s autobiography shows that he became enchanted with Hegel?s Absolute as an adolescent and proceeded immediately to build his entire philosophy and essentially all his psychology around Him. Literally everthing could be explained by iyts relationship to Him. He 'recalled one evening of profound revelation'. 'The Identification of God with life was an idea that stirred me almost to ecstacy because it enabled me to see in biology the explanation of all things and the mind itself' (Piaget, 1976b, 119)." > > I read this fragment from Google Books, so I don't know what is reference Piaget 1976b. But if this sitation is valid, it shows that Piaget was really enchanted byt Hegel's idea mystic related to the notion of Absolut. > > https://books.google.fi/books?id=j3bTqBYYtBYC&pg=PA4&lpg=PA4&dq=piaget+on+hegel&source=bl&ots=O9TUcpovhX&sig=YEle0SsI0dym_CBZIamX4XpaUlk&hl=fi&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjTjtqKqc7JAhVDBSwKHdHmDSUQ6AEISDAF#v=onepage&q=piaget%20on%20hegel&f=false > > Rauno Huttunen > University of Turku > Finland > > > > > > > L?hett?j?: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] k?ytt?j?n Andy Blunden [ablunden@mira.net] puolesta > L?hetetty: 9. joulukuuta 2015 1:08 > Vastaanottaja: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Aihe: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination > > I have a recollection of discussions in the late 70s/early > 80s where a number of Marxists (whose knowledge of Hegel was > derivative of Engels in any case) fervently argued that > Piaget was "compatible" with Marxism and that he was an > "unconscious" dialectician. I am inclined to believe that > Piaget never read Hegel, as you say Arthur, but a lot of > people perceived a likeness. In my own reading of Piaget, > which is extremely limited - but I did read his Genetic > Epistemology, for example - is that he has not read Hegel or > appropriated anything from him. But like Kuhn, the nature of > the ideas he introduced made many people think of Hegel - > the concern with sophisticated logic, transformational > change between stages, for example. > > But quite apart from general resemblances with how change > and development is conceived, the passage I sent the link to > was from the Subjective Spirit. This is a work which has > been very little discussed outside of "professional" Hegel > scholarship until very recent times. If Piaget read Hegel > that would not suggest that he knew anything about Hegel's > ideas about Imagination. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 9/12/2015 8:48 AM, Bakker, A. (Arthur) wrote: >> Andy, Peter, >> >> I just read an interesting book by Kitchener (1986) on Piaget: >> >> Kitchener, R. F. (1986). Piaget's theory of knowledge: Genetic epistemology & scientific reason. Yale University Press. >> >> There is a passage on dialectical thinking in Piaget's work, and there is an Hegelian influence, but Kitchener claims that Piaget never read Hegel. >> I brought the book back to the library, so I cannot check the page numbers (cannot find it in google books). >> However in the Cambridge Companion to Piaget, Hegel is mentioned a few times (e.g. p. 163 ff by Campbell) so >> >> Best, >> >> Arthur >> >> Dr Arthur Bakker | Freudenthal Institute | Faculty of Science and Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences| Utrecht University | Princetonplein 5, kamer 465 |PO Box 85170, 3508 AD Utrecht | tel. 030 253 5641 | a.bakker4@uu.nl | sampling (ESM 2015), inquiry (ZDM 2015). scaffolding (ZDM 2015) >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.bakker4=uu.nl@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+a.bakker4=uu.nl@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] [pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu] >> Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2015 4:36 PM >> To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination >> >> Andy, >> >> No, it's merely an hypothesis--although I must admit I never bothered to >> check whether Piaget ever made any direct references to Hegel. The basis >> for my hypothesis are several of Piaget's earliest essays in The Essential >> Piaget (Howard Gruber & Jacques Von?che, Eds.), which are all about *The >> Idea*. Those essays are what led me (years ago) to infer that he was >> fascinated with Hegel. Piaget's later writings, which weave dialectical >> logic into his theory of development, only added further weight to that >> hypothesis. >> >> Apparently, I'm not the only one to see an affinity between Piaget and >> Hegel: Piaget's dialectical approach to development has been examined >> by several philosophers, such as James Lawler and Marx Wartofsky. The >> general critique of Piaget's application of dialectical logic by these >> authors is that it doesn't stick closely enough to Hegel's formulation, >> leading Piaget into inconsistencies. >> >> Peter >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> Do you have any evidence that Piaget studied Hegel? >>> andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> On 9/12/2015 1:30 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote: >>> >>>> Andy, >>>> >>>> What an amazing excerpt! From this one passage alone I can see the >>>> strong influence that Hegel had upon Piaget. >>>> >>>> Thanks for bringing this section of The Subjective Spirit to attention. >>>> It's chock-full of interesting thoughts. >>>> >>>> Peter >>>> >>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 11:53 PM, Andy Blunden >>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suspirit.htm#SU455 >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 8/12/2015 3:47 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Andy, >>>> >>>> >>>> Would you post a link reference to texts where >>>> Hegel discusses imagination? >>>> >>>> >>>> Thanks, >>>> >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>> Director, >>>> Office of Institutional Research < >>>> http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp >>>> Fordham University >>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>> >>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>> >>> >> >> -- >> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >> Director, >> Office of Institutional Research >> >> Fordham University >> Thebaud Hall-202 >> Bronx, NY 10458 >> >> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >> >> > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Dec 9 12:17:25 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2015 12:17:25 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination - Piaget did read Hegel In-Reply-To: <70DBFD78-3CA8-4D09-8C37-22075DD91803@uniandes.edu.co> References: <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> <5666EE99.5020302@mira.net> <566762D0.6000907@mira.net> <1dafea0da33b4b579ee8a337ddcc7526@EX13-07.utu.fi> <70DBFD78-3CA8-4D09-8C37-22075DD91803@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <56688c5a.c944620a.bafea.ffffd559@mx.google.com> Martin, Is this possibly not merely Piaget's personal story of having a crisis or ecstasy at a point in his biography (an overwhelming experience) and some factor that gave sustenance at this time. This type of overwhelming experience generating an (attitude) or orientation and using (ideas) and (images) to make sense of the experience. >From here complex models may be elaborated. One example is William James in 1870 experiencing a deep psychic wound that projected him into his life work. He had the courage to explore this event in his book (varieties of religious experience). . I sense many philosophers are working (out) these types of profound experience which they have undergone. Their theories are not neutral and call upon cultural historical (templates). -----Original Message----- From: "Martin John Packer" Sent: ?2015-?12-?09 11:40 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination - Piaget did read Hegel According to this, how shall I say?, interesting book, Piaget was not merely influenced by Hegel: "Piaget... is completely committed to his metaphysical [Hegelian] doctrines, but is well aware that they are not acceptable to the academic community in their unadulterated form. Herculean efforts were made to maintain his views, even if undercover, while he presented a fraudulent view for general consumption. His boldest, most presumptuous deception was to present his metaphysical doctrine dressed up in scientific garb." (p. 6) This is certainly a fresh interpretation of Piaget! Martin On Dec 9, 2015, at 3:29 AM, Rauno Huttunen wrote: > Hello, > > There are biographical documents that proof that Piaget indeed read Hegel. Following sitation is from Webster R. Callaway?s book Jean Piaget: A Most Outrageous Deception, p. 4: > > "Piaget?s autobiography shows that he became enchanted with Hegel?s Absolute as an adolescent and proceeded immediately to build his entire philosophy and essentially all his psychology around Him. Literally everthing could be explained by iyts relationship to Him. He 'recalled one evening of profound revelation'. 'The Identification of God with life was an idea that stirred me almost to ecstacy because it enabled me to see in biology the explanation of all things and the mind itself' (Piaget, 1976b, 119)." > > I read this fragment from Google Books, so I don't know what is reference Piaget 1976b. But if this sitation is valid, it shows that Piaget was really enchanted byt Hegel's idea mystic related to the notion of Absolut. > > https://books.google.fi/books?id=j3bTqBYYtBYC&pg=PA4&lpg=PA4&dq=piaget+on+hegel&source=bl&ots=O9TUcpovhX&sig=YEle0SsI0dym_CBZIamX4XpaUlk&hl=fi&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjTjtqKqc7JAhVDBSwKHdHmDSUQ6AEISDAF#v=onepage&q=piaget%20on%20hegel&f=false > > Rauno Huttunen > University of Turku > Finland > > > > > > > L?hett?j?: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] k?ytt?j?n Andy Blunden [ablunden@mira.net] puolesta > L?hetetty: 9. joulukuuta 2015 1:08 > Vastaanottaja: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Aihe: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination > > I have a recollection of discussions in the late 70s/early > 80s where a number of Marxists (whose knowledge of Hegel was > derivative of Engels in any case) fervently argued that > Piaget was "compatible" with Marxism and that he was an > "unconscious" dialectician. I am inclined to believe that > Piaget never read Hegel, as you say Arthur, but a lot of > people perceived a likeness. In my own reading of Piaget, > which is extremely limited - but I did read his Genetic > Epistemology, for example - is that he has not read Hegel or > appropriated anything from him. But like Kuhn, the nature of > the ideas he introduced made many people think of Hegel - > the concern with sophisticated logic, transformational > change between stages, for example. > > But quite apart from general resemblances with how change > and development is conceived, the passage I sent the link to > was from the Subjective Spirit. This is a work which has > been very little discussed outside of "professional" Hegel > scholarship until very recent times. If Piaget read Hegel > that would not suggest that he knew anything about Hegel's > ideas about Imagination. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > On 9/12/2015 8:48 AM, Bakker, A. (Arthur) wrote: >> Andy, Peter, >> >> I just read an interesting book by Kitchener (1986) on Piaget: >> >> Kitchener, R. F. (1986). Piaget's theory of knowledge: Genetic epistemology & scientific reason. Yale University Press. >> >> There is a passage on dialectical thinking in Piaget's work, and there is an Hegelian influence, but Kitchener claims that Piaget never read Hegel. >> I brought the book back to the library, so I cannot check the page numbers (cannot find it in google books). >> However in the Cambridge Companion to Piaget, Hegel is mentioned a few times (e.g. p. 163 ff by Campbell) so >> >> Best, >> >> Arthur >> >> Dr Arthur Bakker | Freudenthal Institute | Faculty of Science and Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences| Utrecht University | Princetonplein 5, kamer 465 |PO Box 85170, 3508 AD Utrecht | tel. 030 253 5641 | a.bakker4@uu.nl | sampling (ESM 2015), inquiry (ZDM 2015). scaffolding (ZDM 2015) >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.bakker4=uu.nl@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+a.bakker4=uu.nl@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] [pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu] >> Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2015 4:36 PM >> To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination >> >> Andy, >> >> No, it's merely an hypothesis--although I must admit I never bothered to >> check whether Piaget ever made any direct references to Hegel. The basis >> for my hypothesis are several of Piaget's earliest essays in The Essential >> Piaget (Howard Gruber & Jacques Von?che, Eds.), which are all about *The >> Idea*. Those essays are what led me (years ago) to infer that he was >> fascinated with Hegel. Piaget's later writings, which weave dialectical >> logic into his theory of development, only added further weight to that >> hypothesis. >> >> Apparently, I'm not the only one to see an affinity between Piaget and >> Hegel: Piaget's dialectical approach to development has been examined >> by several philosophers, such as James Lawler and Marx Wartofsky. The >> general critique of Piaget's application of dialectical logic by these >> authors is that it doesn't stick closely enough to Hegel's formulation, >> leading Piaget into inconsistencies. >> >> Peter >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> Do you have any evidence that Piaget studied Hegel? >>> andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> On 9/12/2015 1:30 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote: >>> >>>> Andy, >>>> >>>> What an amazing excerpt! From this one passage alone I can see the >>>> strong influence that Hegel had upon Piaget. >>>> >>>> Thanks for bringing this section of The Subjective Spirit to attention. >>>> It's chock-full of interesting thoughts. >>>> >>>> Peter >>>> >>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 11:53 PM, Andy Blunden >>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suspirit.htm#SU455 >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> On 8/12/2015 3:47 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Andy, >>>> >>>> >>>> Would you post a link reference to texts where >>>> Hegel discusses imagination? >>>> >>>> >>>> Thanks, >>>> >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>> Director, >>>> Office of Institutional Research < >>>> http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp >>>> Fordham University >>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>> >>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>> >>> >> >> -- >> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >> Director, >> Office of Institutional Research >> >> Fordham University >> Thebaud Hall-202 >> Bronx, NY 10458 >> >> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >> >> > > From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Dec 9 12:52:39 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2015 20:52:39 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagining a new economic structure Message-ID: Hi esteemed XMCArs, Apparently, Varoufakis has given a TED talk in Geneva, which is coming to your browser soon. In the meantime, here is the text to the talk at his blog: http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2015/12/09/the-economic-case-for-authentic-democracy-ted-global-geneva-8th-december-2015/ Most of all, and perhaps I'm naive and too idealistic, but I found this the most coherent idea anyone has proposed in the economic-political sphere, lately anyway: At the level of the enterprise, imagine a capital market where you accumulate capital as you work, and which follows you as you move from one company to another - with each company owned solely by those who work in it at the time. Then everyone's income comes only from capital, from profits, and the very concept of the wage disappears, as each worker receives her profit share plus any benefits from a state that tops up incomes from taxes on aggregate profits. No more separation of those who work but not own from those who own but do not work in the company - no more tug of war between labour and capital - no more gaping gap between those who save and those who invest -no more Towering Twin Peaks. Turning to the global political economy, imagine that all national currencies have a free-floating exchange rate with one common, digital currency, let's call it the KOSMOS, to be issued by the International Monetary Fund and the G20 on behalf of humanity. Imagine further that all trade is denominated in KOSMOS with each country paying, automatically, into a common global investment fund a sum of KOSMOS proportional to their trade deficit or surplus - money to be used to invest into green technologies in the part of the world where investment funds are scarce. This is not a new idea - it is a high tech version of what John Maynard Keynes had proposed in 1944 at the Bretton Woods conference. Except that now we have the technology to implement it in the context of a democratised global political-economic sphere. It might be interesting to observe how this imagination takes flight, if it does, and how it *becomes* concrete?. I thought there might be more than a few on this list who might take interest in this development. Kind regards, Annalisa From ewall@umich.edu Wed Dec 9 14:20:48 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2015 16:20:48 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Practicing Imagination Message-ID: <55697D25-F7BC-4C9C-A90E-69DF6FE0F3D1@umich.edu> Just received a book written by Robert McKim in 1980 titled Experiences in Visual Thinking. It has a section on Imagining that begins as follows: The following six chapters are devoted to strengthening the organ of inner vision, the mind?s eye. The mind?s eye, spontaneously active in dreaming, can also be consciously directed. Unlike the sensory eye, which is bound to the here-and-now, the mind?s eye can travel in space and time, to the there-and-then, can entertain fantasy, can form, probe, and manipulate structures and abstract ideas, can obtain insight into realities that have not yet been seen, and can foresee future consequences of present plans. Ed From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Dec 9 14:43:13 2015 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2015 22:43:13 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination - Piaget did read Hegel In-Reply-To: <56688c5a.c944620a.bafea.ffffd559@mx.google.com> References: <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> <5666EE99.5020302@mira.net> <566762D0.6000907@mira.net> <1dafea0da33b4b579ee8a337ddcc7526@EX13-07.utu.fi> <70DBFD78-3CA8-4D09-8C37-22075DD91803@uniandes.edu.co> <56688c5a.c944620a.bafea.ffffd559@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <06AE59AD-B1BC-4A15-9C2A-03585075A31F@uniandes.edu.co> Larry, The book does indeed mention some of Piaget's personal stories, but its goal seems to be to identify a hidden and even occult aim behind Piaget's entire body of work. For example, the author concludes that "There can be no doubt that he [Piaget] is a serious devotee of the bewitching magical arts, and that they are an important part of his professional strategy" (p. 264). To me, it doesn't seem a very convincing analysis of the impact on Piaget of Hegel, or any other serious thinker. Martin On Dec 9, 2015, at 3:17 PM, Lplarry wrote: > Martin, > Is this possibly not merely Piaget's personal story of having a crisis or ecstasy at a point in his biography (an overwhelming experience) and some factor that gave sustenance at this time. This type of overwhelming experience generating an (attitude) or orientation and using (ideas) and (images) to make sense of the experience. >> From here complex models may be elaborated. > One example is William James in 1870 experiencing a deep psychic wound that projected him into his life work. > He had the courage to explore this event in his book (varieties of religious experience). > . > I sense many philosophers are working (out) these types of profound experience which they have undergone. Their theories are not neutral and call upon cultural historical (templates). > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Martin John Packer" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?09 11:40 AM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination - Piaget did read Hegel > > According to this, how shall I say?, interesting book, Piaget was not merely influenced by Hegel: > > "Piaget... is completely committed to his metaphysical [Hegelian] doctrines, but is well aware that they are not acceptable to the academic community in their unadulterated form. Herculean efforts were made to maintain his views, even if undercover, while he presented a fraudulent view for general consumption. His boldest, most presumptuous deception was to present his metaphysical doctrine dressed up in scientific garb." (p. 6) > > This is certainly a fresh interpretation of Piaget! > > Martin > > On Dec 9, 2015, at 3:29 AM, Rauno Huttunen wrote: > >> Hello, >> >> There are biographical documents that proof that Piaget indeed read Hegel. Following sitation is from Webster R. Callaway?s book Jean Piaget: A Most Outrageous Deception, p. 4: >> >> "Piaget?s autobiography shows that he became enchanted with Hegel?s Absolute as an adolescent and proceeded immediately to build his entire philosophy and essentially all his psychology around Him. Literally everthing could be explained by iyts relationship to Him. He 'recalled one evening of profound revelation'. 'The Identification of God with life was an idea that stirred me almost to ecstacy because it enabled me to see in biology the explanation of all things and the mind itself' (Piaget, 1976b, 119)." >> >> I read this fragment from Google Books, so I don't know what is reference Piaget 1976b. But if this sitation is valid, it shows that Piaget was really enchanted byt Hegel's idea mystic related to the notion of Absolut. >> >> https://books.google.fi/books?id=j3bTqBYYtBYC&pg=PA4&lpg=PA4&dq=piaget+on+hegel&source=bl&ots=O9TUcpovhX&sig=YEle0SsI0dym_CBZIamX4XpaUlk&hl=fi&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjTjtqKqc7JAhVDBSwKHdHmDSUQ6AEISDAF#v=onepage&q=piaget%20on%20hegel&f=false >> >> Rauno Huttunen >> University of Turku >> Finland >> >> >> >> >> >> >> L?hett?j?: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] k?ytt?j?n Andy Blunden [ablunden@mira.net] puolesta >> L?hetetty: 9. joulukuuta 2015 1:08 >> Vastaanottaja: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Aihe: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination >> >> I have a recollection of discussions in the late 70s/early >> 80s where a number of Marxists (whose knowledge of Hegel was >> derivative of Engels in any case) fervently argued that >> Piaget was "compatible" with Marxism and that he was an >> "unconscious" dialectician. I am inclined to believe that >> Piaget never read Hegel, as you say Arthur, but a lot of >> people perceived a likeness. In my own reading of Piaget, >> which is extremely limited - but I did read his Genetic >> Epistemology, for example - is that he has not read Hegel or >> appropriated anything from him. But like Kuhn, the nature of >> the ideas he introduced made many people think of Hegel - >> the concern with sophisticated logic, transformational >> change between stages, for example. >> >> But quite apart from general resemblances with how change >> and development is conceived, the passage I sent the link to >> was from the Subjective Spirit. This is a work which has >> been very little discussed outside of "professional" Hegel >> scholarship until very recent times. If Piaget read Hegel >> that would not suggest that he knew anything about Hegel's >> ideas about Imagination. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> On 9/12/2015 8:48 AM, Bakker, A. (Arthur) wrote: >>> Andy, Peter, >>> >>> I just read an interesting book by Kitchener (1986) on Piaget: >>> >>> Kitchener, R. F. (1986). Piaget's theory of knowledge: Genetic epistemology & scientific reason. Yale University Press. >>> >>> There is a passage on dialectical thinking in Piaget's work, and there is an Hegelian influence, but Kitchener claims that Piaget never read Hegel. >>> I brought the book back to the library, so I cannot check the page numbers (cannot find it in google books). >>> However in the Cambridge Companion to Piaget, Hegel is mentioned a few times (e.g. p. 163 ff by Campbell) so >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Arthur >>> >>> Dr Arthur Bakker | Freudenthal Institute | Faculty of Science and Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences| Utrecht University | Princetonplein 5, kamer 465 |PO Box 85170, 3508 AD Utrecht | tel. 030 253 5641 | a.bakker4@uu.nl | sampling (ESM 2015), inquiry (ZDM 2015). scaffolding (ZDM 2015) >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.bakker4=uu.nl@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+a.bakker4=uu.nl@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] [pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu] >>> Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2015 4:36 PM >>> To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination >>> >>> Andy, >>> >>> No, it's merely an hypothesis--although I must admit I never bothered to >>> check whether Piaget ever made any direct references to Hegel. The basis >>> for my hypothesis are several of Piaget's earliest essays in The Essential >>> Piaget (Howard Gruber & Jacques Von?che, Eds.), which are all about *The >>> Idea*. Those essays are what led me (years ago) to infer that he was >>> fascinated with Hegel. Piaget's later writings, which weave dialectical >>> logic into his theory of development, only added further weight to that >>> hypothesis. >>> >>> Apparently, I'm not the only one to see an affinity between Piaget and >>> Hegel: Piaget's dialectical approach to development has been examined >>> by several philosophers, such as James Lawler and Marx Wartofsky. The >>> general critique of Piaget's application of dialectical logic by these >>> authors is that it doesn't stick closely enough to Hegel's formulation, >>> leading Piaget into inconsistencies. >>> >>> Peter >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> Do you have any evidence that Piaget studied Hegel? >>>> andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> On 9/12/2015 1:30 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote: >>>> >>>>> Andy, >>>>> >>>>> What an amazing excerpt! From this one passage alone I can see the >>>>> strong influence that Hegel had upon Piaget. >>>>> >>>>> Thanks for bringing this section of The Subjective Spirit to attention. >>>>> It's chock-full of interesting thoughts. >>>>> >>>>> Peter >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 11:53 PM, Andy Blunden >>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suspirit.htm#SU455 >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> On 8/12/2015 3:47 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Andy, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Would you post a link reference to texts where >>>>> Hegel discusses imagination? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Thanks, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>>> Director, >>>>> Office of Institutional Research < >>>>> http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp >>>>> Fordham University >>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>>> >>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>> Director, >>> Office of Institutional Research >>> >>> Fordham University >>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>> >>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>> >>> >> >> > > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Dec 9 15:35:50 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2015 10:35:50 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination - Piaget did read Hegel In-Reply-To: <06AE59AD-B1BC-4A15-9C2A-03585075A31F@uniandes.edu.co> References: <5666622F.6050301@mira.net> <5666EE99.5020302@mira.net> <566762D0.6000907@mira.net> <1dafea0da33b4b579ee8a337ddcc7526@EX13-07.utu.fi> <70DBFD78-3CA8-4D09-8C37-22075DD91803@uniandes.edu.co> <56688c5a.c944620a.bafea.ffffd559@mx.google.com> <06AE59AD-B1BC-4A15-9C2A-03585075A31F@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <5668BAD6.4060301@mira.net> Interesting, isn't it, that the one who actually read Hegel and apparently found Hegel inspiring (Piaget) was the one who thought conceptual schemas were built into our biology, while the one who never read Hegel (Vygotsky) really grasped Hegel's essential contribution, that concepts are socially constructed forms of activity. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 10/12/2015 9:43 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Larry, > > The book does indeed mention some of Piaget's personal stories, but its goal seems to be to identify a hidden and even occult aim behind Piaget's entire body of work. For example, the author concludes that "There can be no doubt that he [Piaget] is a serious devotee of the bewitching magical arts, and that they are an important part of his professional strategy" (p. 264). > > To me, it doesn't seem a very convincing analysis of the impact on Piaget of Hegel, or any other serious thinker. > > Martin > > On Dec 9, 2015, at 3:17 PM, Lplarry wrote: > >> Martin, >> Is this possibly not merely Piaget's personal story of having a crisis or ecstasy at a point in his biography (an overwhelming experience) and some factor that gave sustenance at this time. This type of overwhelming experience generating an (attitude) or orientation and using (ideas) and (images) to make sense of the experience. >>> From here complex models may be elaborated. >> One example is William James in 1870 experiencing a deep psychic wound that projected him into his life work. >> He had the courage to explore this event in his book (varieties of religious experience). >> . >> I sense many philosophers are working (out) these types of profound experience which they have undergone. Their theories are not neutral and call upon cultural historical (templates). >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: "Martin John Packer" >> Sent: ?2015-?12-?09 11:40 AM >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination - Piaget did read Hegel >> >> According to this, how shall I say?, interesting book, Piaget was not merely influenced by Hegel: >> >> "Piaget... is completely committed to his metaphysical [Hegelian] doctrines, but is well aware that they are not acceptable to the academic community in their unadulterated form. Herculean efforts were made to maintain his views, even if undercover, while he presented a fraudulent view for general consumption. His boldest, most presumptuous deception was to present his metaphysical doctrine dressed up in scientific garb." (p. 6) >> >> This is certainly a fresh interpretation of Piaget! >> >> Martin >> >> On Dec 9, 2015, at 3:29 AM, Rauno Huttunen wrote: >> >>> Hello, >>> >>> There are biographical documents that proof that Piaget indeed read Hegel. Following sitation is from Webster R. Callaway?s book Jean Piaget: A Most Outrageous Deception, p. 4: >>> >>> "Piaget?s autobiography shows that he became enchanted with Hegel?s Absolute as an adolescent and proceeded immediately to build his entire philosophy and essentially all his psychology around Him. Literally everthing could be explained by iyts relationship to Him. He 'recalled one evening of profound revelation'. 'The Identification of God with life was an idea that stirred me almost to ecstacy because it enabled me to see in biology the explanation of all things and the mind itself' (Piaget, 1976b, 119)." >>> >>> I read this fragment from Google Books, so I don't know what is reference Piaget 1976b. But if this sitation is valid, it shows that Piaget was really enchanted byt Hegel's idea mystic related to the notion of Absolut. >>> >>> https://books.google.fi/books?id=j3bTqBYYtBYC&pg=PA4&lpg=PA4&dq=piaget+on+hegel&source=bl&ots=O9TUcpovhX&sig=YEle0SsI0dym_CBZIamX4XpaUlk&hl=fi&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjTjtqKqc7JAhVDBSwKHdHmDSUQ6AEISDAF#v=onepage&q=piaget%20on%20hegel&f=false >>> >>> Rauno Huttunen >>> University of Turku >>> Finland >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> L?hett?j?: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] k?ytt?j?n Andy Blunden [ablunden@mira.net] puolesta >>> L?hetetty: 9. joulukuuta 2015 1:08 >>> Vastaanottaja: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Aihe: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination >>> >>> I have a recollection of discussions in the late 70s/early >>> 80s where a number of Marxists (whose knowledge of Hegel was >>> derivative of Engels in any case) fervently argued that >>> Piaget was "compatible" with Marxism and that he was an >>> "unconscious" dialectician. I am inclined to believe that >>> Piaget never read Hegel, as you say Arthur, but a lot of >>> people perceived a likeness. In my own reading of Piaget, >>> which is extremely limited - but I did read his Genetic >>> Epistemology, for example - is that he has not read Hegel or >>> appropriated anything from him. But like Kuhn, the nature of >>> the ideas he introduced made many people think of Hegel - >>> the concern with sophisticated logic, transformational >>> change between stages, for example. >>> >>> But quite apart from general resemblances with how change >>> and development is conceived, the passage I sent the link to >>> was from the Subjective Spirit. This is a work which has >>> been very little discussed outside of "professional" Hegel >>> scholarship until very recent times. If Piaget read Hegel >>> that would not suggest that he knew anything about Hegel's >>> ideas about Imagination. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> On 9/12/2015 8:48 AM, Bakker, A. (Arthur) wrote: >>>> Andy, Peter, >>>> >>>> I just read an interesting book by Kitchener (1986) on Piaget: >>>> >>>> Kitchener, R. F. (1986). Piaget's theory of knowledge: Genetic epistemology & scientific reason. Yale University Press. >>>> >>>> There is a passage on dialectical thinking in Piaget's work, and there is an Hegelian influence, but Kitchener claims that Piaget never read Hegel. >>>> I brought the book back to the library, so I cannot check the page numbers (cannot find it in google books). >>>> However in the Cambridge Companion to Piaget, Hegel is mentioned a few times (e.g. p. 163 ff by Campbell) so >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Arthur >>>> >>>> Dr Arthur Bakker | Freudenthal Institute | Faculty of Science and Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences| Utrecht University | Princetonplein 5, kamer 465 |PO Box 85170, 3508 AD Utrecht | tel. 030 253 5641 | a.bakker4@uu.nl | sampling (ESM 2015), inquiry (ZDM 2015). scaffolding (ZDM 2015) >>>> >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+a.bakker4=uu.nl@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+a.bakker4=uu.nl@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] [pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu] >>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2015 4:36 PM >>>> To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hegel's imagination >>>> >>>> Andy, >>>> >>>> No, it's merely an hypothesis--although I must admit I never bothered to >>>> check whether Piaget ever made any direct references to Hegel. The basis >>>> for my hypothesis are several of Piaget's earliest essays in The Essential >>>> Piaget (Howard Gruber & Jacques Von?che, Eds.), which are all about *The >>>> Idea*. Those essays are what led me (years ago) to infer that he was >>>> fascinated with Hegel. Piaget's later writings, which weave dialectical >>>> logic into his theory of development, only added further weight to that >>>> hypothesis. >>>> >>>> Apparently, I'm not the only one to see an affinity between Piaget and >>>> Hegel: Piaget's dialectical approach to development has been examined >>>> by several philosophers, such as James Lawler and Marx Wartofsky. The >>>> general critique of Piaget's application of dialectical logic by these >>>> authors is that it doesn't stick closely enough to Hegel's formulation, >>>> leading Piaget into inconsistencies. >>>> >>>> Peter >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:52 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>>> Do you have any evidence that Piaget studied Hegel? >>>>> andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> On 9/12/2015 1:30 AM, Peter Feigenbaum [Staff] wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Andy, >>>>>> >>>>>> What an amazing excerpt! From this one passage alone I can see the >>>>>> strong influence that Hegel had upon Piaget. >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks for bringing this section of The Subjective Spirit to attention. >>>>>> It's chock-full of interesting thoughts. >>>>>> >>>>>> Peter >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 11:53 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suspirit.htm#SU455 >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> On 8/12/2015 3:47 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Andy, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Would you post a link reference to texts where >>>>>> Hegel discusses imagination? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>>>> Director, >>>>>> Office of Institutional Research < >>>>>> http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office_of_the_provos/office_of_institutio/index.asp >>>>>> Fordham University >>>>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>>>> >>>>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>>>> >>>> -- >>>> Peter Feigenbaum, Ph.D. >>>> Director, >>>> Office of Institutional Research >>>> >>>> Fordham University >>>> Thebaud Hall-202 >>>> Bronx, NY 10458 >>>> >>>> Phone: (718) 817-2243 >>>> Fax: (718) 817-3817 >>>> email: pfeigenbaum@fordham.edu >>>> >>>> >>> >> > > From boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Wed Dec 9 15:54:01 2015 From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu (Robert Lake) Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2015 18:54:01 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Call for Proposals for Keywords in Social Studies Education Book In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Of possible interest to many of us. Robert Lake ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: "Ming Fang He" Date: Dec 9, 2015 6:20 PM Subject: Call for Proposals for Keywords in Social Studies Education Book To: Cc: *Please see the attached CFP for a co-edited book project. We welcome your proposals for responding to a "keyword" in social studies education. * *This book aims to unpack and unsettle the dynamic, contested workings behind keywords often employed in the social studies. We would like to see what could happen if we unsettle words taken for granted (such as ?region?) and words which may need to be resettled (such as ?terrorism?). Our goal is to feature unique and differing perspectives from a wide variety of scholars in the field of social studies and/or social education to help researchers, pre-service teachers, and experienced educators re- examine the shared conceptual terminology in our fields. New takes on old keywords can open up an array of compelling questions for us to employ in social studies education. How may we be able to revitalize moments of social studies education when thematic elements related to ?consumption? and ?citizenship? are renewed, challenged, or actualized in innovative ways? The chapter for each keyword should work to develop practices of reading the concept in motion for diverse possibilities in social studies education, identifying connections of inquiry attuned to the rhythms of a field that is always on the move.* *Submission of 600-800 keyword entry proposals are due on January 22, 2016. For questions, please email us at: socialstudieskeywords@gmail.com * *_________________________________* *Mark E. Helmsing* *Secondary Social Studies Education Program Coordinator* *Assistant Professor, Department of Secondary Education* *McWhinnie Hall 210* *University of Wyoming* *1000 E. University Ave.* *Dept. 3374* *Laramie, WY 82071* *Office: 1-307-766-3250 <1-307-766-3250>* *http://www.uwyo.edu/seced/faculty-staff/mark-helmsing.html * ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Mark Helmsing Ming Fang He, Ph.D Vice President, AERA Division B/Curriculum Studies (2014-2017) Professor of Curriculum Studies Department of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading College of Education, Georgia Southern University Post Office Box 8144, Statesboro, GA 30460-8144 Telephone: (912) 478-1546 Fax: (912) 478-5382 An American Educational Research Association List If you need assistance with this list, please send an email to listadmin@aera.net. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Call for Chapter Proposals 120815.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 101729 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20151209/be09cf0f/attachment.pdf From boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Wed Dec 9 15:54:01 2015 From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu (Robert Lake) Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2015 18:54:01 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Call for Proposals for Keywords in Social Studies Education Book In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Of possible interest to many of us. Robert Lake ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: "Ming Fang He" Date: Dec 9, 2015 6:20 PM Subject: Call for Proposals for Keywords in Social Studies Education Book To: Cc: *Please see the attached CFP for a co-edited book project. We welcome your proposals for responding to a "keyword" in social studies education. * *This book aims to unpack and unsettle the dynamic, contested workings behind keywords often employed in the social studies. We would like to see what could happen if we unsettle words taken for granted (such as ?region?) and words which may need to be resettled (such as ?terrorism?). Our goal is to feature unique and differing perspectives from a wide variety of scholars in the field of social studies and/or social education to help researchers, pre-service teachers, and experienced educators re- examine the shared conceptual terminology in our fields. New takes on old keywords can open up an array of compelling questions for us to employ in social studies education. How may we be able to revitalize moments of social studies education when thematic elements related to ?consumption? and ?citizenship? are renewed, challenged, or actualized in innovative ways? The chapter for each keyword should work to develop practices of reading the concept in motion for diverse possibilities in social studies education, identifying connections of inquiry attuned to the rhythms of a field that is always on the move.* *Submission of 600-800 keyword entry proposals are due on January 22, 2016. For questions, please email us at: socialstudieskeywords@gmail.com * *_________________________________* *Mark E. Helmsing* *Secondary Social Studies Education Program Coordinator* *Assistant Professor, Department of Secondary Education* *McWhinnie Hall 210* *University of Wyoming* *1000 E. University Ave.* *Dept. 3374* *Laramie, WY 82071* *Office: 1-307-766-3250 <1-307-766-3250>* *http://www.uwyo.edu/seced/faculty-staff/mark-helmsing.html * ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Mark Helmsing Ming Fang He, Ph.D Vice President, AERA Division B/Curriculum Studies (2014-2017) Professor of Curriculum Studies Department of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading College of Education, Georgia Southern University Post Office Box 8144, Statesboro, GA 30460-8144 Telephone: (912) 478-1546 Fax: (912) 478-5382 An American Educational Research Association List If you need assistance with this list, please send an email to listadmin@aera.net. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Call for Chapter Proposals 120815.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 101729 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20151209/be09cf0f/attachment-0001.pdf From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Dec 9 16:14:18 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2015 16:14:18 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Kant's Imagination In-Reply-To: <8213AF51-7C8B-43CE-9B52-FAC3FB8B29F9@umich.edu> References: <566775fd.1950620a.3ea17.0ab3@mx.google.com> <5667b636.6ae3420a.71325.43a5@mx.google.com> <16E7372C-D528-458F-A156-0E12D04E6408@umich.edu> <56686b30.c300620a.eaaef.ffffc377@mx.google.com> <8213AF51-7C8B-43CE-9B52-FAC3FB8B29F9@umich.edu> Message-ID: <5668c3df.e8c2420a.3e2d4.013e@mx.google.com> We had a conversation which shifted offline and this is returning our conversation (online). Kant seems a pivotal figure (notice the double meaning) as we reflect on the location of the imaginal (and the location of reason) -----Original Message----- From: "Ed Wall" Sent: ?2015-?12-?09 11:39 AM To: "Larry Purss" Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Kant's Imagination Mike and Larry In that case I would suggest this slightly abbreviated version for which the subject line is appropriate. Ed On Dec 9, 2015, at 11:58 AM, mike cole wrote: Can't we take this to the whole group? The productive/unproductive distinction is important to the discussion. mike On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 9:55 AM, Lplarry wrote: Ed, I am going to try to follow your lead and stay with this categorization of 2types of imagination. (reproductive imagination) and (productive imagination) which is intimately connected with conceptual thinking. The question this opens for myself is what (attitude) is on display with this way of understanding the imaginal as mediating the productive (conceptual) AND the reproductive. (perceptual apprehension and memory). The reproductive lines up with (sensibility) and the productive lines up with (understanding). If these categories are expressing a particular (attitude) then I am suggesting the way Kant imaginally composed his categories expresses a relation to the character (and value) of productive forces (an attitude) Ed, I am proposing this line of thought (itself) has been productive and from this root stock many branches have developed exploring our (conceptual) nature. In no way am I denying the fertility of this conceptual approach towards productive forces. This line of composing the categories I am proposing generates rejoinders that explore THIS process as a particular approach to composing lifeworlds. I will offer one example of rejoinders that stays close to the (attitude) of Kant . Clarence Irving Lewis is one of the classical pragmatists who composed a (conceptual) pragmatism. My intent is to show the movement in the rejoinders to Kant not to choose a side. Lewis wrote: The traditional example of the a priori par excellence is the laws of logic. These cannot be derived from experience since they must FIRST be taken for granted in order to prove them. They make EXPLICIT our (general) modes of classification. And they impose upon experience no real limitation. in other words our categories and classifications are (general) modes expressing our (attitudes) towards what is given. I will pause here. I hope I have tried to start from within your example. I am suggesting our categorical imperatives and our structures reveal (attitudes). I am suggesting the image of the imaginal mediating the productive (conceptual) and the reproductive (sensibility) IS generative of further elaboration. This image also as Lewis says makes explicit (reveals) our general modes of classification as attitudinal initiatives. This topic (imaginal) and commentary are generating reflective thought and meaningful action. Let's see where CHAT takes us. Larry -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Dec 9 20:44:06 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2015 04:44:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Kant's Imagination In-Reply-To: <5668c3df.e8c2420a.3e2d4.013e@mx.google.com> References: <566775fd.1950620a.3ea17.0ab3@mx.google.com> <5667b636.6ae3420a.71325.43a5@mx.google.com> <16E7372C-D528-458F-A156-0E12D04E6408@umich.edu> <56686b30.c300620a.eaaef.ffffc377@mx.google.com> <8213AF51-7C8B-43CE-9B52-FAC3FB8B29F9@umich.edu>, <5668c3df.e8c2420a.3e2d4.013e@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Hi everyone, Particularly when it comes to Kant, I'm very much a novice, and many of my thoughts below are likely incomplete, but I hope not ill-informed. Keeping that in mind, here's my contribution. Thanks in advance for reading it. I've been digesting quite slowly a paper by Gaeber about radical alterity (see: http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau5.2.003). Kant is mentioned a few times in it. To set up this discussion, Graeber claims that the word "ontology" has morphed from speaking about "being," its classical meaning in philosophy, to something else, namely, "way of being" or "manner of being." Kant wouldn't have gone along with this. Graeber claims something happens when we get away from talking about Being to talking about "way of being." I think I agree with him. Here is a quote to help kick things off (p18-19): ----- [What happens, then, to the older philosophical conceptions?lets call them Ontology1, Epistemology1, and Semiotics1, so as to distinguish them from the new OT [Ontological Turn] usages, which we can refer to as Ontology2 and Epistemology2?under this new dispensation? Well, if Epistemology2 really just refers, as Henare, Holbraad, and Wastel (2006: 9) claim, to ?systematic formulations of knowledge,? then it follows that all branches of philosophy, including Ontology1, Epistemology1, and Semiotics1, are simply different forms of Epistemology2?and therefore, precisely what OT thinkers propose to move away from. In which case, would not Ontology2 have to refer (just by process of elimination) to tacit assumptions about the nature of being ?in itself ? and the forms of action and modes of experience these make possible (or, possibly, too, to the anthropologists? explicit theories about such tacit assumptions)? This would appear to be the case. But that raises another problem: What, in that case, would ?in itself? mean? Consider here the following definition, which I must emphasize comes from someone I consider to be an unusually subtle and philosophically sophisticated OT thinker: ?Ontology?the investigation and theorization of diverse experiences and understandings of the nature of being itself ? (Scott 2013: 859) Let?s unpack this. So: ontology begins as a mode of academic theory-making, a form of discourse, but its object is not discourse (since that, presumably would be Epistemology2) but ?experiences and understandings of the nature of being itself.? ?Understanding? sounds a lot like knowledge, but let?s say for the sake of argument that we are speaking of the tacit understandings underlying certain forms of ?experience.? Arguably this might escape the charge of Epistemology2. But that leads to the question: How exactly is it possible to have an experience of ?the nature of being itself ?? One can certainly have experience of specific manifestations of being (toothpicks, oceans, bad music coming from a party upstairs . . . ). But normally that?s just called ?experience.? Perhaps a mystical experience, such as might have been had by Jalal al-din al-Rumi or Meister Eckhart, might qualify as an experience of ?the nature of being itself ?? But presumably, this is not the sort of thing the author is talking about either. It only really makes sense if ?being itself ? is simply whatever ?understandings? people might be said to have of it. In which case all ?itself ? is really doing here is pointing to that familiar anthropological object, the tacit assumptions about the nature of time, space, action, personhood, and so on, that underlie what used to be called a particular cultural universe?just, now constructed as an ?as if,? the sort of Ontology1 one imagines the people one is studying would construct, were they the sort of people who spent their time engaging in speculative philosophy.] Papers cited above are: Henare, Amira, Martin Holbaard, and Sari Wastell. 2007*. ?Introduction: Thinking through things.? In Thinking through things: Theorizing artefacts ethnographically, edited by Amira Henare, Martin Holbraad & Sari Wastell, 1?31, London: Routledge. Scott, Michael. 2013. ?The anthropology of ontology (religious science?).? Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute N.S. (19): 859?72. *I believe the citation for Henare et al as 2006 in the above quote is a typo. ----- Graeber says also that to confuse Kant's conceptual categories with cultural categories is a mistake. Kant was attempting to find categories that come before experience, not derived from it (hence a priori, right?) What I wonder, now that we are sitting here in the 21st century, if what this really means is *context*? That we must have a framework there first, a stage upon which to act. For Kant, this is made up by the categories: the opposition of unity and plurality; the notion of cause and effect; the notion of time as a relation of past, present, and future, etc. These are frameworks, or contexts. But (again, sitting in the 21st century) these categories are material, aren't they? (Consider Lakoff and Johnson's metaphorical reasoning, J.J. Gibson's theory of affordances, and Hutchins's distributed cognition, right about now). >From Graeber (p22), "Kant rejected the very possibility of Ontology1, as he did not believe we could say anything about the nature of things in themselves." This on its face I take to mean that Being is the final and underlying basis of beingness, and there's no way to get beneath Being, but that is my novice reading of Kant in light of my studies of Advaita. I suppose Sartre would say that what is beneath Being is Nothingness, and we can all leap into the void with abandon! How French! :) I say there is nothing there, period, but Being. Being is the final turtle, for the reason you can't take it away so that no thing is there. There is always something there, even if we are talking space. Kant, as I understand, was trying to remedy the error that arises in Descartes's "I think, therefore I am," which is dualistic, yes? Descartes claims that being arises from thought, rather than the other way around, which would be "I am, therefore I think." "I think, therefore I am" seems to say that consciousness arises not from being, but from mind, like the hum of the machine. If thought causes being, who is there (first, or "a priori") when Descartes utters his sentence? If thought causes being, then who is there in the infant when its brain/body is not yet developed? Is the baby not a person? And when I sleep, am I no longer a person? In both cases self-awareness (thinking about myself) is not there, but being is. If being is the basis, this makes more sense: I am there before I think that I am. If thought were the basis of being, then I could imagine all kinds of things and become them, a lion, an eagle, even a unicorn, and we would all see far more variation in the human being than we do now, if thought were so powerful in creating being, or should I say beings? I'm sure people would have sprouted wings or gills by now over the millions of years we've been around. It's true, there is a lot of variation in people, but there is a lot more we share than we don't. This brings it back around to the topic of imagination (so thanks for your patience and diligence to have read this far). Our imaginations allow *expression of being* and the creation of infinite experiences and invention of many kinds of tools, but our imaginations do not constitute being, Being constitutes our imaginations. I hope that isn't a controversial thing to say and that the Spanish Inquisition doesn't come to surprise me tonight and drag me from in my bed! But if Descartes were right, then they'd never ever find me! Because I'd be asleep and not there! :) Continuing in my novice understanding here, Kant's innovation was the transcendental method, which I learned from the Graeber paper many anthropologists use to understand their subjects in the field. Kant's innovation is to assert that there are perspectives, right? And to be able to imagine what has to be there first for something to exist as it is (or as we find it)? Is that right? Or am I mistaken? It's not a bad as a method, but it can create what Graeber calls a "moral or political apartheid," if taken too far, that is, as an ideology rather than a method. [Does this have anything to do with "is-ought" ?] Additionally, Kant is the first to coin the term "ontotheology" to try to make the connection between transcendental and ordinary being, which is basically to come up with a theory of everything. Nice try Kant. So Kant is not to asserting that beingness as I experience it is identical to the beingness that you experience, but that there is a Beingness that pervades mine and yours that both you and I cannot know, and because this Beingness affects me and you, it is therefore transcendent, because it affects us, but we don't affect it. I can see how this pertains to imagination, because we cannot find an object, point to it and say, "that is Being, the Final Turtle" though we could say "that is an example of beingness." We must imagine Being, somehow. So here I am finally making a connection that may be of some contribution, also derived from the same Graeber paper: There are two kinds of imagination that Graeber calls "immanent" imagination, and a "transcendent" one (pg 17, footnote #18). My sense is that immanent imagination seems to be the one Mike is thinking about, is this so? It seems to me making this distinction between imaginations is important. Considering these two "categories" of imagination, immanent imagination is about the ways of interacting with the here-and-now, as in the immanent world, all the objects flying about me in my stream of experience. Transcendental imagination has to do with entirely abstract objects, whether we are talking about God; points, lines and planes of geometry; the infinite digits of pi; the sun as the center of our solar system; or even the ends of the universe. Here is my a-ha moment: Perhaps "overlap" is what happens when dealing with immanent imagination, and perhaps "gap" is what happens when dealing with transcendental imagination? I say this because that which is transcendental, whatever it is, is the part of reality we cannot know. There is a certain gap there to our knowledge. I also feel this ties into Vygotsky's unit for analysis, and the concept of the water molecule, but I'm not clear on that just yet. Just how it has to do with the particular and the general; it seems to parallel the immanent and the transcendent. There is another book I read sometime ago, "Heidegger on Ontotheology" by Iain Thomson. As some may already know, Heidegger critiques the ontos and the theos (metaphysics) in Western Philosophy (in his "Being and Time") and its apparent progression through history. Somehow this seems relevant too, given that Heidegger is connected to Kant via Husserl (recall Kant coined the term ontotheology) and also that Sartre came to his own existentialism through reading Being and Time. I think that Heidegger believed that because we lost our way of understanding Being, if we examine Being of the Pre-Socratics, which I think he considered as humankind's "true Being" any fool would see we needed to return to, as our original state (and apparently, this is where Heidegger foolishly lost his way, by thinking National Socialism was the way of return). Anyway, I wonder if this historical construct of "Western" thought as linearly drawn (as a lineage) is a fallacy itself, because we know the victors always do the rewrite. So it's not about finding or delineating a lineage, but instead marveling at the multiplicity of Being (which gets to the power of M?y?, that I'd written about in another thread). This also gets me thinking about evolution, and how (for a time) we got so fixated (remember the Missing Link?) on a lineage there too (perhaps because of all the begets in Genesis); that we don't recognize how arbitrary and anarchic evolution can be. And that's just talking about how our *material bodies* have evolved in particular environments over time. For me, this gives an entirely different meaning to "the fittest survive," because it's not a contest, it's fitness, or better, appropriateness for a given scenario at a given time. Altruism and collaboration could be the better vehicle for evolution above any to-the-death-competition in that same scenario. Certainly the maximal fitness of altruism is the case for cultures, since there can't be a culture of one. Perhaps this is true even for imaginations! Kind regards, Annalisa From ablunden@mira.net Wed Dec 9 21:25:00 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2015 16:25:00 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Kant's Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <566775fd.1950620a.3ea17.0ab3@mx.google.com> <5667b636.6ae3420a.71325.43a5@mx.google.com> <16E7372C-D528-458F-A156-0E12D04E6408@umich.edu> <56686b30.c300620a.eaaef.ffffc377@mx.google.com> <8213AF51-7C8B-43CE-9B52-FAC3FB8B29F9@umich.edu>, <5668c3df.e8c2420a.3e2d4.013e@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <56690CAC.2090805@mira.net> I think what you have gleaned from Gaeber is correct Annalisa. The way the words epistemology and ontology are used nowadays is quit different from the classical meanings - a similar shift to what took place when "culture" started to be used in the plural - "cultures." The point that what Being is in itself, i.e., prior to its apprehension by a human being, is a meaningless question was precisely Kant's point. Hegel took that further in saying that Being was in itself precisely Nothing. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 10/12/2015 3:44 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi everyone, > > Particularly when it comes to Kant, I'm very much a novice, and many of my thoughts below are likely incomplete, but I hope not ill-informed. Keeping that in mind, here's my contribution. Thanks in advance for reading it. > > I've been digesting quite slowly a paper by Gaeber about radical alterity (see: http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau5.2.003). Kant is mentioned a few times in it. > > To set up this discussion, Graeber claims that the word "ontology" has morphed from speaking about "being," its classical meaning in philosophy, to something else, namely, "way of being" or "manner of being." Kant wouldn't have gone along with this. Graeber claims something happens when we get away from talking about Being to talking about "way of being." I think I agree with him. Here is a quote to help kick things off (p18-19): > > ----- > > [What happens, then, to the older philosophical conceptions?lets call them Ontology1, Epistemology1, and Semiotics1, so as to distinguish them from the new OT [Ontological Turn] usages, which we can refer to as Ontology2 and Epistemology2?under this new dispensation? Well, if Epistemology2 really just refers, as Henare, Holbraad, and Wastel (2006: 9) claim, to ?systematic formulations of knowledge,? then it follows that all branches of philosophy, including Ontology1, Epistemology1, and Semiotics1, are simply different forms of Epistemology2?and therefore, precisely what OT thinkers propose to move away from. In which case, would not Ontology2 have to refer (just by process of elimination) to tacit assumptions about the nature of being ?in itself ? and the forms of action and modes of experience these make possible (or, possibly, too, to the anthropologists? explicit theories about such tacit assumptions)? > > This would appear to be the case. But that raises another problem: What, in that case, would ?in itself? mean? Consider here the following definition, which I must emphasize comes from someone I consider to be an unusually subtle and philosophically sophisticated OT thinker: ?Ontology?the investigation and theorization of diverse experiences and understandings of the nature of being itself ? (Scott 2013: 859) > > Let?s unpack this. So: ontology begins as a mode of academic theory-making, a form of discourse, but its object is not discourse (since that, presumably would be Epistemology2) but ?experiences and understandings of the nature of being itself.? ?Understanding? sounds a lot like knowledge, but let?s say for the sake of argument that we are speaking of the tacit understandings underlying certain forms of ?experience.? Arguably this might escape the charge of Epistemology2. But that leads to the question: How exactly is it possible to have an experience of ?the nature of being itself ?? One can certainly have experience of specific manifestations of being (toothpicks, oceans, bad music coming from a party upstairs . . . ). But normally that?s just called ?experience.? Perhaps a mystical experience, such as might have been had by Jalal al-din al-Rumi or Meister Eckhart, might qualify as an experience of ?the nature of being itself ?? But presumably, this is not the sort of thing > the author is talking about either. It only really makes sense if ?being itself ? is simply whatever ?understandings? people might be said to have of it. In which case all ?itself ? is really doing here is pointing to that familiar anthropological object, the tacit assumptions about the nature of time, space, action, personhood, and so on, that underlie what used to be called a particular cultural universe?just, now constructed as an ?as if,? the sort of Ontology1 one imagines the people one is studying would construct, were they the sort of people who spent their time engaging in speculative philosophy.] > > Papers cited above are: > > Henare, Amira, Martin Holbaard, and Sari Wastell. 2007*. ?Introduction: Thinking through > things.? In Thinking through things: Theorizing artefacts ethnographically, edited by > Amira Henare, Martin Holbraad & Sari Wastell, 1?31, London: Routledge. > > Scott, Michael. 2013. ?The anthropology of ontology (religious science?).? Journal of the > Royal Anthropological Institute N.S. (19): 859?72. > > *I believe the citation for Henare et al as 2006 in the above quote is a typo. > > ----- > > Graeber says also that to confuse Kant's conceptual categories with cultural categories is a mistake. Kant was attempting to find categories that come before experience, not derived from it (hence a priori, right?) What I wonder, now that we are sitting here in the 21st century, if what this really means is *context*? That we must have a framework there first, a stage upon which to act. For Kant, this is made up by the categories: the opposition of unity and plurality; the notion of cause and effect; the notion of time as a relation of past, present, and future, etc. These are frameworks, or contexts. But (again, sitting in the 21st century) these categories are material, aren't they? (Consider Lakoff and Johnson's metaphorical reasoning, J.J. Gibson's theory of affordances, and Hutchins's distributed cognition, right about now). > > >From Graeber (p22), "Kant rejected the very possibility of Ontology1, as he did not believe we could say anything about the nature of things in themselves." This on its face I take to mean that Being is the final and underlying basis of beingness, and there's no way to get beneath Being, but that is my novice reading of Kant in light of my studies of Advaita. I suppose Sartre would say that what is beneath Being is Nothingness, and we can all leap into the void with abandon! How French! :) > > I say there is nothing there, period, but Being. Being is the final turtle, for the reason you can't take it away so that no thing is there. There is always something there, even if we are talking space. > > Kant, as I understand, was trying to remedy the error that arises in Descartes's "I think, therefore I am," which is dualistic, yes? Descartes claims that being arises from thought, rather than the other way around, which would be "I am, therefore I think." > > "I think, therefore I am" seems to say that consciousness arises not from being, but from mind, like the hum of the machine. > > If thought causes being, who is there (first, or "a priori") when Descartes utters his sentence? If thought causes being, then who is there in the infant when its brain/body is not yet developed? Is the baby not a person? And when I sleep, am I no longer a person? In both cases self-awareness (thinking about myself) is not there, but being is. > > If being is the basis, this makes more sense: I am there before I think that I am. If thought were the basis of being, then I could imagine all kinds of things and become them, a lion, an eagle, even a unicorn, and we would all see far more variation in the human being than we do now, if thought were so powerful in creating being, or should I say beings? I'm sure people would have sprouted wings or gills by now over the millions of years we've been around. > > It's true, there is a lot of variation in people, but there is a lot more we share than we don't. This brings it back around to the topic of imagination (so thanks for your patience and diligence to have read this far). Our imaginations allow *expression of being* and the creation of infinite experiences and invention of many kinds of tools, but our imaginations do not constitute being, Being constitutes our imaginations. I hope that isn't a controversial thing to say and that the Spanish Inquisition doesn't come to surprise me tonight and drag me from in my bed! But if Descartes were right, then they'd never ever find me! Because I'd be asleep and not there! :) > > Continuing in my novice understanding here, Kant's innovation was the transcendental method, which I learned from the Graeber paper many anthropologists use to understand their subjects in the field. Kant's innovation is to assert that there are perspectives, right? And to be able to imagine what has to be there first for something to exist as it is (or as we find it)? Is that right? Or am I mistaken? It's not a bad as a method, but it can create what Graeber calls a "moral or political apartheid," if taken too far, that is, as an ideology rather than a method. > > [Does this have anything to do with "is-ought" ?] > > Additionally, Kant is the first to coin the term "ontotheology" to try to make the connection between transcendental and ordinary being, which is basically to come up with a theory of everything. Nice try Kant. > > So Kant is not to asserting that beingness as I experience it is identical to the beingness that you experience, but that there is a Beingness that pervades mine and yours that both you and I cannot know, and because this Beingness affects me and you, it is therefore transcendent, because it affects us, but we don't affect it. > > I can see how this pertains to imagination, because we cannot find an object, point to it and say, "that is Being, the Final Turtle" though we could say "that is an example of beingness." We must imagine Being, somehow. > > So here I am finally making a connection that may be of some contribution, also derived from the same Graeber paper: There are two kinds of imagination that Graeber calls "immanent" imagination, and a "transcendent" one (pg 17, footnote #18). > > My sense is that immanent imagination seems to be the one Mike is thinking about, is this so? > > It seems to me making this distinction between imaginations is important. Considering these two "categories" of imagination, immanent imagination is about the ways of interacting with the here-and-now, as in the immanent world, all the objects flying about me in my stream of experience. Transcendental imagination has to do with entirely abstract objects, whether we are talking about God; points, lines and planes of geometry; the infinite digits of pi; the sun as the center of our solar system; or even the ends of the universe. > > Here is my a-ha moment: Perhaps "overlap" is what happens when dealing with immanent imagination, and perhaps "gap" is what happens when dealing with transcendental imagination? I say this because that which is transcendental, whatever it is, is the part of reality we cannot know. There is a certain gap there to our knowledge. > > I also feel this ties into Vygotsky's unit for analysis, and the concept of the water molecule, but I'm not clear on that just yet. Just how it has to do with the particular and the general; it seems to parallel the immanent and the transcendent. > > There is another book I read sometime ago, "Heidegger on Ontotheology" by Iain Thomson. As some may already know, Heidegger critiques the ontos and the theos (metaphysics) in Western Philosophy (in his "Being and Time") and its apparent progression through history. Somehow this seems relevant too, given that Heidegger is connected to Kant via Husserl (recall Kant coined the term ontotheology) and also that Sartre came to his own existentialism through reading Being and Time. > > I think that Heidegger believed that because we lost our way of understanding Being, if we examine Being of the Pre-Socratics, which I think he considered as humankind's "true Being" any fool would see we needed to return to, as our original state (and apparently, this is where Heidegger foolishly lost his way, by thinking National Socialism was the way of return). > > Anyway, I wonder if this historical construct of "Western" thought as linearly drawn (as a lineage) is a fallacy itself, because we know the victors always do the rewrite. So it's not about finding or delineating a lineage, but instead marveling at the multiplicity of Being (which gets to the power of M?y?, that I'd written about in another thread). > > This also gets me thinking about evolution, and how (for a time) we got so fixated (remember the Missing Link?) on a lineage there too (perhaps because of all the begets in Genesis); that we don't recognize how arbitrary and anarchic evolution can be. And that's just talking about how our *material bodies* have evolved in particular environments over time. > > For me, this gives an entirely different meaning to "the fittest survive," because it's not a contest, it's fitness, or better, appropriateness for a given scenario at a given time. Altruism and collaboration could be the better vehicle for evolution above any to-the-death-competition in that same scenario. > > Certainly the maximal fitness of altruism is the case for cultures, since there can't be a culture of one. > > Perhaps this is true even for imaginations! > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Dec 9 21:29:36 2015 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2015 22:29:36 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Language and Communication Special Issue on Semiosis, Temporality, and Self-fashioning Message-ID: Just a heads up that you can currently download the "in press" articles for a special issue of Language and Communication that I co-edited with Benjamin Smith at the following link: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/aip/02715309 The theme of the issue is: semiosis, temporality, and self-fashioning (or as John Haviland referred to it more simply: "language, time, and self"). It was our attempt to take up the issues of language and self across what Jay Lemke has termed "the scales of time." Articles of particular interest for their concern with the language and the "ontogenetic" or "developmental" timescale are: Benjamin Smith on the development of masculinity through Aymara boys playing marbles; John Haviland on the generational differences in self-hood among Z signers; and Katherine Clonan-Roy, Stanton Wortham, and Briana Nichols on the development of racializing stereotypes among Latino adolescents. My article in it deals with the constitution of selves across interactional time - including an example of "learning" across the timescale of an interaction. You might also find some of the other articles that deal with the historical timescale interesting. Michele Koven's article is particularly interesting as it begins with a focus on the interactional scale but then "jumps" scale - or rather, documents how speakers jump scale - to the ontogenetic and historical timescales. Folks may also find these articles on the "historical" timescale to be of interest: Jonathan Rosa on raciolinguistic ideological imaginings of the social tense of Latinos in the U.S. and Shunsuke Nozawa on Japanese life-writing. I'm not sure what happens when they assemble the articles and make it official, so I wanted to send this out before that happens so that folks could download any articles of interest before they get locked down. Cheers, -greg -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Dec 10 08:46:44 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2015 08:46:44 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Erikson faculty openings In-Reply-To: <82BFE20CC25A3E4E9BAFD1E78A4E963D25DDE1@ERI-EXMBX-10.erikson.edu> References: <82BFE20CC25A3E4E9BAFD1E78A4E963D25DDE1@ERI-EXMBX-10.erikson.edu> Message-ID: 3 jobs in early childhood Ed Mike ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *McNamee, Gillian* Date: Tuesday, 8 December 2015 Subject: Erikson faculty openings To: "mike cole (mcole@ucsd.edu)" *Director, Teacher Education* *Erikson Institute* *451 N. LaSalle* *Chicago, IL 60654* *312-893-7135 t* *312-755-0928 f* *gmcnamee@erikson.edu * -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Faculty Search Ad 11 3 15.docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 341747 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20151210/737517bb/attachment.bin From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Dec 10 09:55:55 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2015 17:55:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Kant's Imagination In-Reply-To: <56690CAC.2090805@mira.net> References: <566775fd.1950620a.3ea17.0ab3@mx.google.com> <5667b636.6ae3420a.71325.43a5@mx.google.com> <16E7372C-D528-458F-A156-0E12D04E6408@umich.edu> <56686b30.c300620a.eaaef.ffffc377@mx.google.com> <8213AF51-7C8B-43CE-9B52-FAC3FB8B29F9@umich.edu>, <5668c3df.e8c2420a.3e2d4.013e@mx.google.com> , <56690CAC.2090805@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi Andy and others, How could Hegel know there is nothing there? Who is there being the one who is saying I know nothing is there (as the Final Turtle)? There is a big difference between saying I know I can't know and I know nothing is there. One is a stance of humility, one not, because if one says one knows, that's taking a transcendental POV that is impossible to do, which is different than imagining a transcendental POV. What I'd like to explore however, is not to try to persuade anyone what Being is, since I know I can't know what it is, but what are the ethical implications that derive from saying nothing is there and knowing it's impossible to know. I do know that Hegel had contentions with Kant, but I haven't looked at that as of yet. Also, I still need to read the Hegel's imagination thread. I hope to do that today. Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Dec 10 10:29:07 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2015 18:29:07 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Orangutan's discovery that nothing is there! Message-ID: http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2015/dec/09/orangutan-magic-trick-funny-video Something to (not) show the transmission of humor between species? Kind regards, Annalisa From ewall@umich.edu Thu Dec 10 10:54:53 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2015 12:54:53 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Rationalism and Imagination Message-ID: Mike You wrote, reflecting on something Larry had written, about seeing how "the connection between rationalism and the way that imagining gets drained of its affectiveness in the process of becoming something stable enough to call a representation. In musing about this, I thought of perhaps some examples that might or might not illustrate what you are pointing at and would be interested in your reaction: 1. I grew up with radio and as a boy would listen spellbound to stories and adventure programs. As I think back about it, this probably required more than a bit of imagination. As time passed, my family finally got a television. After my first viewing of a TV program that purported to be identical in content with one of those radio programs I so loved, I, underwhelmed, never again watched that program as seeing the characters ? finally? ?rationally' interpreted was unpleasant (and I really didn?t imagine them on radio as having some sort of fixed image). I have had the same experience, by the way, when seeing a movie that follows closely a book I have read. Somehow, one might say, my imagination was stifled by fixedness of those visual representations. I, to this day, still find TV, for the most part, stifling in regards to imagination. 2. A number of years ago I came across a web summary of book in somewhat diary form written by a mathematician writing about the education of his son - I have tried again and gain to locate that book (I seem to remember the mathematician was either French or Polish) so if by some chance anybody has run across the same let me know! One passage in particular stood out. The mathematician was talking about his son struggling with some sort of mathematics problem. He noted that he took the time to sit down with his son and show him how to solve the problem. The mathematician continues in his diary that he then reflected on how, in this early intervention, he had ruined the pleasure of doing mathematics - perhaps forever - for his son. [As a side note, as part of a research team of mathematics educators we often traded mathematics problems around - abilities were varied from those with, one might say, little mathematics to those who were well known research mathematicians. - so the problems were doable by most. A rule, which I follow to this day, is you don?t spoil a problem for another by telling them the solution. Research mathematicians are very bad about this - mainly because they get excited - and I remember scolding one (smile)!] Ed From ewall@umich.edu Thu Dec 10 11:08:47 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2015 13:08:47 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Kant's Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <566775fd.1950620a.3ea17.0ab3@mx.google.com> <5667b636.6ae3420a.71325.43a5@mx.google.com> <16E7372C-D528-458F-A156-0E12D04E6408@umich.edu> <56686b30.c300620a.eaaef.ffffc377@mx.google.com> <8213AF51-7C8B-43CE-9B52-FAC3FB8B29F9@umich.edu> <5668c3df.e8c2420a.3e2d4.013e@mx.google.com> <56690CAC.2090805@mira.net> Message-ID: Annalisa Hegel supplies, perhaps, some answers to some of your questions in his Science of Logic. Chapter 1 titled Being begins with some fairly readable ?definitions? of what he means by Being and Nothing and, perhaps, more importantly Becoming (no tomes only a few pages). I think Andy gave you the URL. Ed > On Dec 10, 2015, at 11:55 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Andy and others, > > How could Hegel know there is nothing there? > > Who is there being the one who is saying I know nothing is there (as the Final Turtle)? > > There is a big difference between saying I know I can't know and I know nothing is there. > > One is a stance of humility, one not, because if one says one knows, that's taking a transcendental POV that is impossible to do, which is different than imagining a transcendental POV. > > What I'd like to explore however, is not to try to persuade anyone what Being is, since I know I can't know what it is, but what are the ethical implications that derive from saying nothing is there and knowing it's impossible to know. > > I do know that Hegel had contentions with Kant, but I haven't looked at that as of yet. > > Also, I still need to read the Hegel's imagination thread. I hope to do that today. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Thu Dec 10 15:10:18 2015 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2015 23:10:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Orangutan's discovery that nothing is there! In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Very sweet, and perhaps bitter-sweet too given the confines. http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/endangered_species/great_apes/orangutans/ Nevertheless I think our cousin there could show Donald Trump a thing or two about humanity. Best, Huw On 10 December 2015 at 18:29, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2015/dec/09/orangutan-magic-trick-funny-video > > > Something to (not) show the transmission of humor between species? > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Dec 10 15:29:01 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2015 23:29:01 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Orangutan's discovery that nothing is there! In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: Hi Huw, Yes, you're right. There is a context that isn't taken into account, how the baby Orangutan is there behind the glass in the first place. But despite being in that situation, what is remarkable is witnessing the intelligence there. I'm not sure that Donald Trump is rehabilitatable, as we know he's out of his tree, and has been for sometime. Kind regards, Annalisa From ablunden@mira.net Thu Dec 10 15:52:17 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2015 10:52:17 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Kant's Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <566775fd.1950620a.3ea17.0ab3@mx.google.com> <5667b636.6ae3420a.71325.43a5@mx.google.com> <16E7372C-D528-458F-A156-0E12D04E6408@umich.edu> <56686b30.c300620a.eaaef.ffffc377@mx.google.com> <8213AF51-7C8B-43CE-9B52-FAC3FB8B29F9@umich.edu>, <5668c3df.e8c2420a.3e2d4.013e@mx.google.com> , <56690CAC.2090805@mira.net> Message-ID: <566A1031.1050803@mira.net> You're taking Kant's point of view, Annalisa. But remember, Being is a *logical* category, and Hegel's Logic has to be understood as a logic. Here's a couple of links if you want to follow this up. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phprefac.htm https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlintro.htm Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 11/12/2015 4:55 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Andy and others, > > How could Hegel know there is nothing there? > > Who is there being the one who is saying I know nothing is there (as the Final Turtle)? > > There is a big difference between saying I know I can't know and I know nothing is there. > > One is a stance of humility, one not, because if one says one knows, that's taking a transcendental POV that is impossible to do, which is different than imagining a transcendental POV. > > What I'd like to explore however, is not to try to persuade anyone what Being is, since I know I can't know what it is, but what are the ethical implications that derive from saying nothing is there and knowing it's impossible to know. > > I do know that Hegel had contentions with Kant, but I haven't looked at that as of yet. > > Also, I still need to read the Hegel's imagination thread. I hope to do that today. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Thu Dec 10 17:03:11 2015 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2015 01:03:11 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Ed, Re your unknown book. I would expect that there are web sites dedicated to that sort of thing by now. Its not my cup of tea but I thought I'd put the idea here anyway: How many 'chain-emails' would have to be forwarded before your book was found, would that be an index of its obscurity? Would this be an interesting contrast between google search and facebook search? Best, Huw On 10 December 2015 at 18:54, Ed Wall wrote: > Mike > > You wrote, reflecting on something Larry had written, about seeing > how "the connection between rationalism and the way that imagining gets > drained of its affectiveness in the process of becoming something stable > enough to call a representation. In musing about this, I thought of perhaps > some examples that might or might not illustrate what you are pointing at > and would be interested in your reaction: > > 1. I grew up with radio and as a boy would listen spellbound to stories > and adventure programs. As I think back about it, this probably required > more than a bit of imagination. As time passed, my family finally got a > television. After my first viewing of a TV program that purported to be > identical in content with one of those radio programs I so loved, I, > underwhelmed, never again watched that program as seeing the characters ? > finally? ?rationally' interpreted was unpleasant (and I really didn?t > imagine them on radio as having some sort of fixed image). I have had the > same experience, by the way, when seeing a movie that follows closely a > book I have read. Somehow, one might say, my imagination was stifled by > fixedness of those visual representations. I, to this day, still find TV, > for the most part, stifling in regards to imagination. > > 2. A number of years ago I came across a web summary of book in somewhat > diary form written by a mathematician writing about the education of his > son - I have tried again and gain to locate that book (I seem to remember > the mathematician was either French or Polish) so if by some chance anybody > has run across the same let me know! One passage in particular stood out. > The mathematician was talking about his son struggling with some sort of > mathematics problem. He noted that he took the time to sit down with his > son and show him how to solve the problem. The mathematician continues in > his diary that he then reflected on how, in this early intervention, he had > ruined the pleasure of doing mathematics - perhaps forever - for his son. > [As a side note, as part of a research team of mathematics educators we > often traded mathematics problems around - abilities were varied from those > with, one might say, little mathematics to those who were well known > research mathematicians. - so the problems were doable by most. A rule, > which I follow to this day, is you don?t spoil a problem for another by > telling them the solution. Research mathematicians are very bad about this > - mainly because they get excited - and I remember scolding one (smile)!] > > Ed > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Dec 10 17:22:05 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2015 17:22:05 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <566a24e9.1444620a.ac08f.fffffe76@mx.google.com> Ed The aspect of your hearing the story first on radio and then comparing to less [moving] experiences when seeing the narrative unfold. Is there a quality of {condensing} of experience. Vygotsky?s metaphor of [precipitation] as the condensing into droplets. This seems a quality that {moves} the person and I wonder if a similar quality {moves} cultural narratives. It cam apply to any of the 5 senses and other types of sense. Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Huw Lloyd Sent: Thursday, December 10, 2015 5:04 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination Hi Ed, Re your unknown book. I would expect that there are web sites dedicated to that sort of thing by now. Its not my cup of tea but I thought I'd put the idea here anyway: How many 'chain-emails' would have to be forwarded before your book was found, would that be an index of its obscurity? Would this be an interesting contrast between google search and facebook search? Best, Huw On 10 December 2015 at 18:54, Ed Wall wrote: > Mike > > You wrote, reflecting on something Larry had written, about seeing > how "the connection between rationalism and the way that imagining gets > drained of its affectiveness in the process of becoming something stable > enough to call a representation. In musing about this, I thought of perhaps > some examples that might or might not illustrate what you are pointing at > and would be interested in your reaction: > > 1. I grew up with radio and as a boy would listen spellbound to stories > and adventure programs. As I think back about it, this probably required > more than a bit of imagination. As time passed, my family finally got a > television. After my first viewing of a TV program that purported to be > identical in content with one of those radio programs I so loved, I, > underwhelmed, never again watched that program as seeing the characters ? > finally? ?rationally' interpreted was unpleasant (and I really didn?t > imagine them on radio as having some sort of fixed image). I have had the > same experience, by the way, when seeing a movie that follows closely a > book I have read. Somehow, one might say, my imagination was stifled by > fixedness of those visual representations. I, to this day, still find TV, > for the most part, stifling in regards to imagination. > > 2. A number of years ago I came across a web summary of book in somewhat > diary form written by a mathematician writing about the education of his > son - I have tried again and gain to locate that book (I seem to remember > the mathematician was either French or Polish) so if by some chance anybody > has run across the same let me know! One passage in particular stood out. > The mathematician was talking about his son struggling with some sort of > mathematics problem. He noted that he took the time to sit down with his > son and show him how to solve the problem. The mathematician continues in > his diary that he then reflected on how, in this early intervention, he had > ruined the pleasure of doing mathematics - perhaps forever - for his son. > [As a side note, as part of a research team of mathematics educators we > often traded mathematics problems around - abilities were varied from those > with, one might say, little mathematics to those who were well known > research mathematicians. - so the problems were doable by most. A rule, > which I follow to this day, is you don?t spoil a problem for another by > telling them the solution. Research mathematicians are very bad about this > - mainly because they get excited - and I remember scolding one (smile)!] > > Ed > > > From ewall@umich.edu Thu Dec 10 17:22:27 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2015 19:22:27 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <0720C8F5-F561-4A90-96C0-8F6C85467A04@umich.edu> Huw Thanks for the pointers. I have sporadically done as you mention over the last ten or so years without much success; perhaps it is time to try again. Ed > On Dec 10, 2015, at 7:03 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > Hi Ed, > > Re your unknown book. I would expect that there are web sites dedicated to > that sort of thing by now. > > Its not my cup of tea but I thought I'd put the idea here anyway: > > How many 'chain-emails' would have to be forwarded before your book was > found, would that be an index of its obscurity? Would this be an > interesting contrast between google search and facebook search? > > Best, > Huw > > > On 10 December 2015 at 18:54, Ed Wall wrote: > >> Mike >> >> You wrote, reflecting on something Larry had written, about seeing >> how "the connection between rationalism and the way that imagining gets >> drained of its affectiveness in the process of becoming something stable >> enough to call a representation. In musing about this, I thought of perhaps >> some examples that might or might not illustrate what you are pointing at >> and would be interested in your reaction: >> >> 1. I grew up with radio and as a boy would listen spellbound to stories >> and adventure programs. As I think back about it, this probably required >> more than a bit of imagination. As time passed, my family finally got a >> television. After my first viewing of a TV program that purported to be >> identical in content with one of those radio programs I so loved, I, >> underwhelmed, never again watched that program as seeing the characters ? >> finally? ?rationally' interpreted was unpleasant (and I really didn?t >> imagine them on radio as having some sort of fixed image). I have had the >> same experience, by the way, when seeing a movie that follows closely a >> book I have read. Somehow, one might say, my imagination was stifled by >> fixedness of those visual representations. I, to this day, still find TV, >> for the most part, stifling in regards to imagination. >> >> 2. A number of years ago I came across a web summary of book in somewhat >> diary form written by a mathematician writing about the education of his >> son - I have tried again and gain to locate that book (I seem to remember >> the mathematician was either French or Polish) so if by some chance anybody >> has run across the same let me know! One passage in particular stood out. >> The mathematician was talking about his son struggling with some sort of >> mathematics problem. He noted that he took the time to sit down with his >> son and show him how to solve the problem. The mathematician continues in >> his diary that he then reflected on how, in this early intervention, he had >> ruined the pleasure of doing mathematics - perhaps forever - for his son. >> [As a side note, as part of a research team of mathematics educators we >> often traded mathematics problems around - abilities were varied from those >> with, one might say, little mathematics to those who were well known >> research mathematicians. - so the problems were doable by most. A rule, >> which I follow to this day, is you don?t spoil a problem for another by >> telling them the solution. Research mathematicians are very bad about this >> - mainly because they get excited - and I remember scolding one (smile)!] >> >> Ed >> >> >> From ewall@umich.edu Thu Dec 10 17:34:12 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2015 19:34:12 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination In-Reply-To: <566a24e9.1444620a.ac08f.fffffe76@mx.google.com> References: <566a24e9.1444620a.ac08f.fffffe76@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Larry I may misunderstand what you are saying, but it wasn?t the same story on the radio although it was a series with the same name. Also the experiences weren?t less or more moving. It was that I was faced with a ?stable? representation - i.e. visual images of characters and situations - that precluded the imagination I had brought to the radio. My inclination is say that this has little to do with the condensing of experience and much to do with Mike?s insight. Ed > On Dec 10, 2015, at 7:22 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > Ed > The aspect of your hearing the story first on radio and then comparing to less [moving] experiences when seeing the narrative unfold. > Is there a quality of {condensing} of experience. Vygotsky?s metaphor of [precipitation] as the condensing into droplets. > This seems a quality that {moves} the person and I wonder if a similar quality {moves} cultural narratives. > It cam apply to any of the 5 senses and other types of sense. > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > > From: Huw Lloyd > Sent: Thursday, December 10, 2015 5:04 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination > > > Hi Ed, > > Re your unknown book. I would expect that there are web sites dedicated to > that sort of thing by now. > > Its not my cup of tea but I thought I'd put the idea here anyway: > > How many 'chain-emails' would have to be forwarded before your book was > found, would that be an index of its obscurity? Would this be an > interesting contrast between google search and facebook search? > > Best, > Huw > > > On 10 December 2015 at 18:54, Ed Wall wrote: > >> Mike >> >> You wrote, reflecting on something Larry had written, about seeing >> how "the connection between rationalism and the way that imagining gets >> drained of its affectiveness in the process of becoming something stable >> enough to call a representation. In musing about this, I thought of perhaps >> some examples that might or might not illustrate what you are pointing at >> and would be interested in your reaction: >> >> 1. I grew up with radio and as a boy would listen spellbound to stories >> and adventure programs. As I think back about it, this probably required >> more than a bit of imagination. As time passed, my family finally got a >> television. After my first viewing of a TV program that purported to be >> identical in content with one of those radio programs I so loved, I, >> underwhelmed, never again watched that program as seeing the characters ? >> finally? ?rationally' interpreted was unpleasant (and I really didn?t >> imagine them on radio as having some sort of fixed image). I have had the >> same experience, by the way, when seeing a movie that follows closely a >> book I have read. Somehow, one might say, my imagination was stifled by >> fixedness of those visual representations. I, to this day, still find TV, >> for the most part, stifling in regards to imagination. >> >> 2. A number of years ago I came across a web summary of book in somewhat >> diary form written by a mathematician writing about the education of his >> son - I have tried again and gain to locate that book (I seem to remember >> the mathematician was either French or Polish) so if by some chance anybody >> has run across the same let me know! One passage in particular stood out. >> The mathematician was talking about his son struggling with some sort of >> mathematics problem. He noted that he took the time to sit down with his >> son and show him how to solve the problem. The mathematician continues in >> his diary that he then reflected on how, in this early intervention, he had >> ruined the pleasure of doing mathematics - perhaps forever - for his son. >> [As a side note, as part of a research team of mathematics educators we >> often traded mathematics problems around - abilities were varied from those >> with, one might say, little mathematics to those who were well known >> research mathematicians. - so the problems were doable by most. A rule, >> which I follow to this day, is you don?t spoil a problem for another by >> telling them the solution. Research mathematicians are very bad about this >> - mainly because they get excited - and I remember scolding one (smile)!] >> >> Ed >> >> >> > > From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Dec 10 18:05:33 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2015 02:05:33 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Kant's Imagination In-Reply-To: <566A1031.1050803@mira.net> References: <566775fd.1950620a.3ea17.0ab3@mx.google.com> <5667b636.6ae3420a.71325.43a5@mx.google.com> <16E7372C-D528-458F-A156-0E12D04E6408@umich.edu> <56686b30.c300620a.eaaef.ffffc377@mx.google.com> <8213AF51-7C8B-43CE-9B52-FAC3FB8B29F9@umich.edu>, <5668c3df.e8c2420a.3e2d4.013e@mx.google.com> , <56690CAC.2090805@mira.net> , <566A1031.1050803@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi Andy, I'll take a look at Hegel, but I see already, if Being is a logical category, then that is of the mind, because categories are of the mind. This appears to be a reversion to Descartes. If "is" means "equals," then I'd have to disagree. If Being is a member of a category, that means there are multiple Beings, which is different than saying that Being takes multiple forms. If we say beingness is a category, I could make sense of that. Everything we experience in the world in time and space has beingness or "is-ness" and even things we don't experience per se, so perhaps it's better to say any "object in the world." I don't think Being itself can be categorized, because Being is not of the mind. I'm not saying he did or didn't, but if Kant said that, I'd have to disagree with him. So we get back to how Hegel can know what Being is. To call it a category is still not knowing what it is. If calling something a category is done because it is cognitively necessary, just to be able to talk about it, then it's just a handle or container, and it isn't true knowledge of what Being is. That assignment would have more to do cognitive processing, as language, metaphor, or what have you, but not knowledge. Still doesn't tell us what Being is, the reason being, it's not possible to know: Being is not of the mind: I am therefore I think. As I see it, the mind arises from Being, just like any other object in the world. The mind is not privileged as existing outside of Being. I'll take a look at Hegel, but I'm already skeptical, and that's why. Kind regards, Annalisa From ablunden@mira.net Thu Dec 10 18:16:54 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2015 13:16:54 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Kant's Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <566775fd.1950620a.3ea17.0ab3@mx.google.com> <5667b636.6ae3420a.71325.43a5@mx.google.com> <16E7372C-D528-458F-A156-0E12D04E6408@umich.edu> <56686b30.c300620a.eaaef.ffffc377@mx.google.com> <8213AF51-7C8B-43CE-9B52-FAC3FB8B29F9@umich.edu>, <5668c3df.e8c2420a.3e2d4.013e@mx.google.com> , <56690CAC.2090805@mira.net> , <566A1031.1050803@mira.net> Message-ID: <566A3216.6000305@mira.net> Annalisa, I'd really like to give you a brief explanation rather than sending you a couple of links, but it is really quite impossible to grasp the starting point of Hegel's philosophy in this kind of exchange. You need to set aside a couple of days, ideally find a couple of friends to join you, and calmly and patiently works through, let's say, this one: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlbegin.htm You may know what "San Diego is a city" means, but what does "San Diego is" mean? The same as "xmca is" or "Annalisa is" or "A unicorn is" - that's Being. Hegel is responding to the question "With what must Philosophy Begin?" Follow his argument. And I *will not* respond to further questions about this until at the very least you have studied the above chapter. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 11/12/2015 1:05 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Andy, > > > I'll take a look at Hegel, but I see already, if Being is > a logical category, then that is of the mind, because > categories are of the mind. This appears to be a reversion > to Descartes. > > > If "is" means "equals," then I'd have to disagree. If > Being is a member of a category, that means there are > multiple Beings, which is different than saying that Being > takes multiple forms. > > > If we say beingness is a category, I could make sense of > that. Everything we experience in the world in time and > space has beingness or "is-ness" and even things we don't > experience per se, so perhaps it's better to say any > "object in the world." > > > I don't think Being itself can be categorized, because > Being is not of the mind. I'm not saying he did or > didn't, butif Kant said that, I'd have to disagree with him. > > > So we get back to how Hegel can know what Being is. To > call it a category is still not knowing what it is. If > calling something a category is done because it > is cognitively necessary, just to be able to talk about > it, then it's just a handle or container, and it isn't > true knowledge of what Being is. That assignment would > have more to do cognitive processing, as language, > metaphor, or what have you, but not knowledge. > > > Still doesn't tell us what Being is, the reason being, > it's not possible to know: Being is not of the mind: I am > therefore I think. As I see it, the mind arises from > Being, just like any other object in the world. The mind > is not privileged as existing outside of Being. > > > I'll take a look at Hegel, but I'm already skeptical, and > that's why. > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Dec 10 18:40:11 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2015 02:40:11 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Kant's Imagination In-Reply-To: <566A3216.6000305@mira.net> References: <566775fd.1950620a.3ea17.0ab3@mx.google.com> <5667b636.6ae3420a.71325.43a5@mx.google.com> <16E7372C-D528-458F-A156-0E12D04E6408@umich.edu> <56686b30.c300620a.eaaef.ffffc377@mx.google.com> <8213AF51-7C8B-43CE-9B52-FAC3FB8B29F9@umich.edu>, <5668c3df.e8c2420a.3e2d4.013e@mx.google.com> , <56690CAC.2090805@mira.net> , <566A1031.1050803@mira.net> , <566A3216.6000305@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi Andy, Thanks for your reply. Just to be clear, I didn't say I wouldn't look at Hegel. I'm not sure why it would be required to read it with friends, but I'll just read it and see where I get, shall I? Right now I'm reading something else, and when I finish that I plan to read Hegel. I understand why you don't want to discuss this until I've read the text. You've been so handy with the links to lengthy texts in the past, so I appreciate your message, so I've got no bad feeling here about that. That's why I won't reply to your list of things that exist, though I can see where this is going if a category called Being misrepresents itself as Being rather than beingness. I don't debate this for its own sake (believe it or not), but that I recognize an ethical problem with a category called Being, which I believe is a legitimate criticism. Kind regards, Annalisa From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Dec 10 22:21:29 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2015 22:21:29 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <566a24e9.1444620a.ac08f.fffffe76@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <566a6b7b.e405430a.4a789.ffffe6eb@mx.google.com> Ed, I'll focus then on the question of a stable image and its relation to how one feels as this image is (representated). I wonder how this relates to mike's example that he had a stable representation of the concept (kraut) which he had emotionally formed and was attached to as a youth reading war stories. (which he loved and was immersed in). These meaningful experiences formed his stable images and other alternative images of (kraut) became unavailable as this image had such stability (and emotionality). I want to return to the article sent by mike on December 5 by A V Suvorov focusing on representation in deak-blind children On page 17 he focuses on two principles. * the holistic principle that first is the image as a whole (that becomes lived into.) *the principle of emotionality. The image must be intrinsically interesting and motivating. On page 16 Sukorov adds that (games) must develop out of our communicative situation. The teacher just begins the play and the children are taking part before they know it. In other words the image of the game is forming before a conscious decision to join the game. The child by living into the game is living into the image. -----Original Message----- From: "Ed Wall" Sent: ?2015-?12-?10 5:35 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination Larry I may misunderstand what you are saying, but it wasn?t the same story on the radio although it was a series with the same name. Also the experiences weren?t less or more moving. It was that I was faced with a ?stable? representation - i.e. visual images of characters and situations - that precluded the imagination I had brought to the radio. My inclination is say that this has little to do with the condensing of experience and much to do with Mike?s insight. Ed > On Dec 10, 2015, at 7:22 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > Ed > The aspect of your hearing the story first on radio and then comparing to less [moving] experiences when seeing the narrative unfold. > Is there a quality of {condensing} of experience. Vygotsky?s metaphor of [precipitation] as the condensing into droplets. > This seems a quality that {moves} the person and I wonder if a similar quality {moves} cultural narratives. > It cam apply to any of the 5 senses and other types of sense. > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > > From: Huw Lloyd > Sent: Thursday, December 10, 2015 5:04 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination > > > Hi Ed, > > Re your unknown book. I would expect that there are web sites dedicated to > that sort of thing by now. > > Its not my cup of tea but I thought I'd put the idea here anyway: > > How many 'chain-emails' would have to be forwarded before your book was > found, would that be an index of its obscurity? Would this be an > interesting contrast between google search and facebook search? > > Best, > Huw > > > On 10 December 2015 at 18:54, Ed Wall wrote: > >> Mike >> >> You wrote, reflecting on something Larry had written, about seeing >> how "the connection between rationalism and the way that imagining gets >> drained of its affectiveness in the process of becoming something stable >> enough to call a representation. In musing about this, I thought of perhaps >> some examples that might or might not illustrate what you are pointing at >> and would be interested in your reaction: >> >> 1. I grew up with radio and as a boy would listen spellbound to stories >> and adventure programs. As I think back about it, this probably required >> more than a bit of imagination. As time passed, my family finally got a >> television. After my first viewing of a TV program that purported to be >> identical in content with one of those radio programs I so loved, I, >> underwhelmed, never again watched that program as seeing the characters ? >> finally? ?rationally' interpreted was unpleasant (and I really didn?t >> imagine them on radio as having some sort of fixed image). I have had the >> same experience, by the way, when seeing a movie that follows closely a >> book I have read. Somehow, one might say, my imagination was stifled by >> fixedness of those visual representations. I, to this day, still find TV, >> for the most part, stifling in regards to imagination. >> >> 2. A number of years ago I came across a web summary of book in somewhat >> diary form written by a mathematician writing about the education of his >> son - I have tried again and gain to locate that book (I seem to remember >> the mathematician was either French or Polish) so if by some chance anybody >> has run across the same let me know! One passage in particular stood out. >> The mathematician was talking about his son struggling with some sort of >> mathematics problem. He noted that he took the time to sit down with his >> son and show him how to solve the problem. The mathematician continues in >> his diary that he then reflected on how, in this early intervention, he had >> ruined the pleasure of doing mathematics - perhaps forever - for his son. >> [As a side note, as part of a research team of mathematics educators we >> often traded mathematics problems around - abilities were varied from those >> with, one might say, little mathematics to those who were well known >> research mathematicians. - so the problems were doable by most. A rule, >> which I follow to this day, is you don?t spoil a problem for another by >> telling them the solution. Research mathematicians are very bad about this >> - mainly because they get excited - and I remember scolding one (smile)!] >> >> Ed >> >> >> > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Dec 10 22:42:53 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2015 22:42:53 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination In-Reply-To: <566a6b7b.e405430a.4a789.ffffe6eb@mx.google.com> References: <566a24e9.1444620a.ac08f.fffffe76@mx.google.com> <566a6b7b.e405430a.4a789.ffffe6eb@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <566a707a.db0f620a.1f34d.6063@mx.google.com> I want to add one insight (and value) that is captured by suvorov on page 19 when he writes; Without play, study will always remain something alien and autonomous to the playful (mainstream) of mental development. Suvorov adds: In THIS sense play may be considered a dominant activity in any period of a child's development. -----Original Message----- From: "Lplarry" Sent: ?2015-?12-?10 10:21 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination Ed, I'll focus then on the question of a stable image and its relation to how one feels as this image is (representated). I wonder how this relates to mike's example that he had a stable representation of the concept (kraut) which he had emotionally formed and was attached to as a youth reading war stories. (which he loved and was immersed in). These meaningful experiences formed his stable images and other alternative images of (kraut) became unavailable as this image had such stability (and emotionality). I want to return to the article sent by mike on December 5 by A V Suvorov focusing on representation in deak-blind children On page 17 he focuses on two principles. * the holistic principle that first is the image as a whole (that becomes lived into.) *the principle of emotionality. The image must be intrinsically interesting and motivating. On page 16 Sukorov adds that (games) must develop out of our communicative situation. The teacher just begins the play and the children are taking part before they know it. In other words the image of the game is forming before a conscious decision to join the game. The child by living into the game is living into the image. From: Ed Wall Sent: ?2015-?12-?10 5:35 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination Larry I may misunderstand what you are saying, but it wasn?t the same story on the radio although it was a series with the same name. Also the experiences weren?t less or more moving. It was that I was faced with a ?stable? representation - i.e. visual images of characters and situations - that precluded the imagination I had brought to the radio. My inclination is say that this has little to do with the condensing of experience and much to do with Mike?s insight. Ed > On Dec 10, 2015, at 7:22 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > Ed > The aspect of your hearing the story first on radio and then comparing to less [moving] experiences when seeing the narrative unfold. > Is there a quality of {condensing} of experience. Vygotsky?s metaphor of [precipitation] as the condensing into droplets. > This seems a quality that {moves} the person and I wonder if a similar quality {moves} cultural narratives. > It cam apply to any of the 5 senses and other types of sense. > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > > > > From: Huw Lloyd > Sent: Thursday, December 10, 2015 5:04 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination > > > Hi Ed, > > Re your unknown book. I would expect that there are web sites dedicated to > that sort of thing by now. > > Its not my cup of tea but I thought I'd put the idea here anyway: > > How many 'chain-emails' would have to be forwarded before your book was > found, would that be an index of its obscurity? Would this be an > interesting contrast between google search and facebook search? > > Best, > Huw > > > On 10 December 2015 at 18:54, Ed Wall wrote: > >> Mike >> >> You wrote, reflecting on something Larry had written, about seeing >> how "the connection between rationalism and the way that imagining gets >> drained of its affectiveness in the process of becoming something stable >> enough to call a representation. In musing about this, I thought of perhaps >> some examples that might or might not illustrate what you are pointing at >> and would be interested in your reaction: >> >> 1. I grew up with radio and as a boy would listen spellbound to stories >> and adventure programs. As I think back about it, this probably required >> more than a bit of imagination. As time passed, my family finally got a >> television. After my first viewing of a TV program that purported to be >> identical in content with one of those radio programs I so loved, I, >> underwhelmed, never again watched that program as seeing the characters ? >> finally? ?rationally' interpreted was unpleasant (and I really didn?t >> imagine them on radio as having some sort of fixed image). I have had the >> same experience, by the way, when seeing a movie that follows closely a >> book I have read. Somehow, one might say, my imagination was stifled by >> fixedness of those visual representations. I, to this day, still find TV, >> for the most part, stifling in regards to imagination. >> >> 2. A number of years ago I came across a web summary of book in somewhat >> diary form written by a mathematician writing about the education of his >> son - I have tried again and gain to locate that book (I seem to remember >> the mathematician was either French or Polish) so if by some chance anybody >> has run across the same let me know! One passage in particular stood out. >> The mathematician was talking about his son struggling with some sort of >> mathematics problem. He noted that he took the time to sit down with his >> son and show him how to solve the problem. The mathematician continues in >> his diary that he then reflected on how, in this early intervention, he had >> ruined the pleasure of doing mathematics - perhaps forever - for his son. >> [As a side note, as part of a research team of mathematics educators we >> often traded mathematics problems around - abilities were varied from those >> with, one might say, little mathematics to those who were well known >> research mathematicians. - so the problems were doable by most. A rule, >> which I follow to this day, is you don?t spoil a problem for another by >> telling them the solution. Research mathematicians are very bad about this >> - mainly because they get excited - and I remember scolding one (smile)!] >> >> Ed >> >> >> > > From rakahu@utu.fi Fri Dec 11 01:21:39 2015 From: rakahu@utu.fi (Rauno Huttunen) Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2015 09:21:39 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Kant's Imagination In-Reply-To: <566A3216.6000305@mira.net> References: <566775fd.1950620a.3ea17.0ab3@mx.google.com> <5667b636.6ae3420a.71325.43a5@mx.google.com> <16E7372C-D528-458F-A156-0E12D04E6408@umich.edu> <56686b30.c300620a.eaaef.ffffc377@mx.google.com> <8213AF51-7C8B-43CE-9B52-FAC3FB8B29F9@umich.edu> <5668c3df.e8c2420a.3e2d4.013e@mx.google.com> <56690CAC.2090805@mira.net> <566A1031.1050803@mira.net> <566A3216.6000305@mira.net> Message-ID: <23ba8f870ead4c2f9628a291d97f1d83@EX13-07.utu.fi> Hello, Encyclopaedia Logic is more suitabe for beginners: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ol/encycind.htm Rauno Huttunen ________________________________________ L?hett?j?: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] k?ytt?j?n Andy Blunden [ablunden@mira.net] puolesta L?hetetty: 11. joulukuuta 2015 4:16 Vastaanottaja: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Aihe: [Xmca-l] Re: Kant's Imagination Annalisa, I'd really like to give you a brief explanation rather than sending you a couple of links, but it is really quite impossible to grasp the starting point of Hegel's philosophy in this kind of exchange. You need to set aside a couple of days, ideally find a couple of friends to join you, and calmly and patiently works through, let's say, this one: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlbegin.htm You may know what "San Diego is a city" means, but what does "San Diego is" mean? The same as "xmca is" or "Annalisa is" or "A unicorn is" - that's Being. Hegel is responding to the question "With what must Philosophy Begin?" Follow his argument. And I *will not* respond to further questions about this until at the very least you have studied the above chapter. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 11/12/2015 1:05 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Andy, > > > I'll take a look at Hegel, but I see already, if Being is > a logical category, then that is of the mind, because > categories are of the mind. This appears to be a reversion > to Descartes. > > > If "is" means "equals," then I'd have to disagree. If > Being is a member of a category, that means there are > multiple Beings, which is different than saying that Being > takes multiple forms. > > > If we say beingness is a category, I could make sense of > that. Everything we experience in the world in time and > space has beingness or "is-ness" and even things we don't > experience per se, so perhaps it's better to say any > "object in the world." > > > I don't think Being itself can be categorized, because > Being is not of the mind. I'm not saying he did or > didn't, butif Kant said that, I'd have to disagree with him. > > > So we get back to how Hegel can know what Being is. To > call it a category is still not knowing what it is. If > calling something a category is done because it > is cognitively necessary, just to be able to talk about > it, then it's just a handle or container, and it isn't > true knowledge of what Being is. That assignment would > have more to do cognitive processing, as language, > metaphor, or what have you, but not knowledge. > > > Still doesn't tell us what Being is, the reason being, > it's not possible to know: Being is not of the mind: I am > therefore I think. As I see it, the mind arises from > Being, just like any other object in the world. The mind > is not privileged as existing outside of Being. > > > I'll take a look at Hegel, but I'm already skeptical, and > that's why. > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > From ewall@umich.edu Fri Dec 11 09:24:06 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2015 11:24:06 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination In-Reply-To: <566a6b7b.e405430a.4a789.ffffe6eb@mx.google.com> References: <566a24e9.1444620a.ac08f.fffffe76@mx.google.com> <566a6b7b.e405430a.4a789.ffffe6eb@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <065ED5BB-278B-4028-A493-245D81342155@umich.edu> Larry I took Mike to mean in the sentence I quoted that forming a stable representation via a sort of rationalism could be problematic; i.e. >>> "the connection between rationalism and the way that imagining gets >>> drained of its affectiveness in the process of becoming something stable >>> enough to call a representation? and I was musing as to whether my ?stories? were indicative of what he was pointing at (I have read the article by the way); i.e. a draining of affectation in the process of becoming something stable. You seem to be going off in other directions. Perhaps you could take a moment to, so to speak, connect the dots. Ed > On Dec 11, 2015, at 12:21 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > Ed, > I'll focus then on the question of a stable image and its relation to how one feels as this image is (representated). > I wonder how this relates to mike's example that he had a stable representation of the concept (kraut) which he had emotionally formed and was attached to as a youth reading war stories. (which he loved and was immersed in). These meaningful experiences formed his stable images and other alternative images of (kraut) became unavailable as this image had such stability (and emotionality). > I want to return to the article sent by mike on December 5 by A V Suvorov focusing on representation in deak-blind children > On page 17 he focuses on two principles. > * the holistic principle that first is the image as a whole (that becomes lived into.) > *the principle of emotionality. The image must be intrinsically interesting and motivating. > > On page 16 Sukorov adds that (games) must develop out of our communicative situation. The teacher just begins the play and the children are taking part before they know it. In other words the image of the game is forming before a conscious decision to join the game. > The child by living into the game is living into the image. > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Ed Wall" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?10 5:35 PM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination > > Larry > > I may misunderstand what you are saying, but it wasn?t the same story on the radio although it was a series with the same name. Also the experiences weren?t less or more moving. It was that I was faced with a ?stable? representation - i.e. visual images of characters and situations - that precluded the imagination I had brought to the radio. My inclination is say that this has little to do with the condensing of experience and much to do with Mike?s insight. > > Ed > >> On Dec 10, 2015, at 7:22 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >> >> Ed >> The aspect of your hearing the story first on radio and then comparing to less [moving] experiences when seeing the narrative unfold. >> Is there a quality of {condensing} of experience. Vygotsky?s metaphor of [precipitation] as the condensing into droplets. >> This seems a quality that {moves} the person and I wonder if a similar quality {moves} cultural narratives. >> It cam apply to any of the 5 senses and other types of sense. >> >> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >> >> >> >> From: Huw Lloyd >> Sent: Thursday, December 10, 2015 5:04 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination >> >> >> Hi Ed, >> >> Re your unknown book. I would expect that there are web sites dedicated to >> that sort of thing by now. >> >> Its not my cup of tea but I thought I'd put the idea here anyway: >> >> How many 'chain-emails' would have to be forwarded before your book was >> found, would that be an index of its obscurity? Would this be an >> interesting contrast between google search and facebook search? >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> On 10 December 2015 at 18:54, Ed Wall wrote: >> >>> Mike >>> >>> You wrote, reflecting on something Larry had written, about seeing >>> how "the connection between rationalism and the way that imagining gets >>> drained of its affectiveness in the process of becoming something stable >>> enough to call a representation. In musing about this, I thought of perhaps >>> some examples that might or might not illustrate what you are pointing at >>> and would be interested in your reaction: >>> >>> 1. I grew up with radio and as a boy would listen spellbound to stories >>> and adventure programs. As I think back about it, this probably required >>> more than a bit of imagination. As time passed, my family finally got a >>> television. After my first viewing of a TV program that purported to be >>> identical in content with one of those radio programs I so loved, I, >>> underwhelmed, never again watched that program as seeing the characters ? >>> finally? ?rationally' interpreted was unpleasant (and I really didn?t >>> imagine them on radio as having some sort of fixed image). I have had the >>> same experience, by the way, when seeing a movie that follows closely a >>> book I have read. Somehow, one might say, my imagination was stifled by >>> fixedness of those visual representations. I, to this day, still find TV, >>> for the most part, stifling in regards to imagination. >>> >>> 2. A number of years ago I came across a web summary of book in somewhat >>> diary form written by a mathematician writing about the education of his >>> son - I have tried again and gain to locate that book (I seem to remember >>> the mathematician was either French or Polish) so if by some chance anybody >>> has run across the same let me know! One passage in particular stood out. >>> The mathematician was talking about his son struggling with some sort of >>> mathematics problem. He noted that he took the time to sit down with his >>> son and show him how to solve the problem. The mathematician continues in >>> his diary that he then reflected on how, in this early intervention, he had >>> ruined the pleasure of doing mathematics - perhaps forever - for his son. >>> [As a side note, as part of a research team of mathematics educators we >>> often traded mathematics problems around - abilities were varied from those >>> with, one might say, little mathematics to those who were well known >>> research mathematicians. - so the problems were doable by most. A rule, >>> which I follow to this day, is you don?t spoil a problem for another by >>> telling them the solution. Research mathematicians are very bad about this >>> - mainly because they get excited - and I remember scolding one (smile)!] >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Dec 11 21:21:32 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2015 21:21:32 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination In-Reply-To: <065ED5BB-278B-4028-A493-245D81342155@umich.edu> References: <566a24e9.1444620a.ac08f.fffffe76@mx.google.com> <566a6b7b.e405430a.4a789.ffffe6eb@mx.google.com> <065ED5BB-278B-4028-A493-245D81342155@umich.edu> Message-ID: <566baef9.074f620a.94db6.ffffd7c1@mx.google.com> Ed, I am not sure if my (connections) are relevant to your question if stable representations drains our imaging of affectiveness in the process of becoming understood as (representations). My focus is exploring more the cultural historical movement of the imaginal becoming understood as representational. I am suggesting that this movement has profound implications for how we come to understand ourselves and how we understand our (self). The desire to make (present) the fundamental order of knowledge imaged as (presenting) a fundamental unity or ground underlying our knowledge. There is a presumption which involves (reference) as an (idea).. The idea is that there exists an ideal object of desire. This desire is the search for certainty, first principles. The Kantian (thing in itself). This (thing in itself) as an ideal includes transcendental conditions which means this (thing-in-itself) is presumed to stand outside (or independent of) the linguistic categories. Understanding and interpretation are presumed to (re-present) or mediate the thing which has the status of (thing-in-itself). Knowledge imaged this way assumes that through (self-evident) transcendental first principles the ORDER that exists primordially is revealed (presented) as self-evident order and then (re-presented) in our cultural historical narratives. Ed I would suggest this relation to knowledge assumes this (self) HAS knowledge and as a possession I (have) there is a different affective relation to re-presented knowledge. Now my interest is in the movement of this way of reflecting on knowledge. Are there more intimate ways of understanding our desire for certainty that embrace no self-evident (thing-in-itself). This is one possibleway to understand (nothingness) as (no-thing-ness). I am asking if this movement of how we imagine representation profoundly shifts not only our relation to knowledge but shifts our relation to (ourselves) and our relation to what we imagine as our (self). At the heart of this movement is the continuing desire for (absolute) knowledge. I am proposing this desire is a deep part of our inheritance. I am not saying universal or (natural) but this desire does traverse the onto- theological, the romantic, the modern notions of psychology and is a yearning for grounded bedrock foundations. I understand this imaginal movement as the (sharing) of voices. Dilthey understood creating connections (the notion of zusammenhang) in the phrase (life exists everywhere only as zusammenhang). This contrasts with the desire for presenting (self-evident) order which exists a priori and only brought into language as self-evident presentations being re-presented through our transcendental categories. I experience the imaginal in this movement whatever side one represents. -----Original Message----- From: "Ed Wall" Sent: ?2015-?12-?11 9:28 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination Larry I took Mike to mean in the sentence I quoted that forming a stable representation via a sort of rationalism could be problematic; i.e. >>> "the connection between rationalism and the way that imagining gets >>> drained of its affectiveness in the process of becoming something stable >>> enough to call a representation? and I was musing as to whether my ?stories? were indicative of what he was pointing at (I have read the article by the way); i.e. a draining of affectation in the process of becoming something stable. You seem to be going off in other directions. Perhaps you could take a moment to, so to speak, connect the dots. Ed > On Dec 11, 2015, at 12:21 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > Ed, > I'll focus then on the question of a stable image and its relation to how one feels as this image is (representated). > I wonder how this relates to mike's example that he had a stable representation of the concept (kraut) which he had emotionally formed and was attached to as a youth reading war stories. (which he loved and was immersed in). These meaningful experiences formed his stable images and other alternative images of (kraut) became unavailable as this image had such stability (and emotionality). > I want to return to the article sent by mike on December 5 by A V Suvorov focusing on representation in deak-blind children > On page 17 he focuses on two principles. > * the holistic principle that first is the image as a whole (that becomes lived into.) > *the principle of emotionality. The image must be intrinsically interesting and motivating. > > On page 16 Sukorov adds that (games) must develop out of our communicative situation. The teacher just begins the play and the children are taking part before they know it. In other words the image of the game is forming before a conscious decision to join the game. > The child by living into the game is living into the image. > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Ed Wall" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?10 5:35 PM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination > > Larry > > I may misunderstand what you are saying, but it wasn?t the same story on the radio although it was a series with the same name. Also the experiences weren?t less or more moving. It was that I was faced with a ?stable? representation - i.e. visual images of characters and situations - that precluded the imagination I had brought to the radio. My inclination is say that this has little to do with the condensing of experience and much to do with Mike?s insight. > > Ed > >> On Dec 10, 2015, at 7:22 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >> >> Ed >> The aspect of your hearing the story first on radio and then comparing to less [moving] experiences when seeing the narrative unfold. >> Is there a quality of {condensing} of experience. Vygotsky?s metaphor of [precipitation] as the condensing into droplets. >> This seems a quality that {moves} the person and I wonder if a similar quality {moves} cultural narratives. >> It cam apply to any of the 5 senses and other types of sense. >> >> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >> >> >> >> From: Huw Lloyd >> Sent: Thursday, December 10, 2015 5:04 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination >> >> >> Hi Ed, >> >> Re your unknown book. I would expect that there are web sites dedicated to >> that sort of thing by now. >> >> Its not my cup of tea but I thought I'd put the idea here anyway: >> >> How many 'chain-emails' would have to be forwarded before your book was >> found, would that be an index of its obscurity? Would this be an >> interesting contrast between google search and facebook search? >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> On 10 December 2015 at 18:54, Ed Wall wrote: >> >>> Mike >>> >>> You wrote, reflecting on something Larry had written, about seeing >>> how "the connection between rationalism and the way that imagining gets >>> drained of its affectiveness in the process of becoming something stable >>> enough to call a representation. In musing about this, I thought of perhaps >>> some examples that might or might not illustrate what you are pointing at >>> and would be interested in your reaction: >>> >>> 1. I grew up with radio and as a boy would listen spellbound to stories >>> and adventure programs. As I think back about it, this probably required >>> more than a bit of imagination. As time passed, my family finally got a >>> television. After my first viewing of a TV program that purported to be >>> identical in content with one of those radio programs I so loved, I, >>> underwhelmed, never again watched that program as seeing the characters ? >>> finally? ?rationally' interpreted was unpleasant (and I really didn?t >>> imagine them on radio as having some sort of fixed image). I have had the >>> same experience, by the way, when seeing a movie that follows closely a >>> book I have read. Somehow, one might say, my imagination was stifled by >>> fixedness of those visual representations. I, to this day, still find TV, >>> for the most part, stifling in regards to imagination. >>> >>> 2. A number of years ago I came across a web summary of book in somewhat >>> diary form written by a mathematician writing about the education of his >>> son - I have tried again and gain to locate that book (I seem to remember >>> the mathematician was either French or Polish) so if by some chance anybody >>> has run across the same let me know! One passage in particular stood out. >>> The mathematician was talking about his son struggling with some sort of >>> mathematics problem. He noted that he took the time to sit down with his >>> son and show him how to solve the problem. The mathematician continues in >>> his diary that he then reflected on how, in this early intervention, he had >>> ruined the pleasure of doing mathematics - perhaps forever - for his son. >>> [As a side note, as part of a research team of mathematics educators we >>> often traded mathematics problems around - abilities were varied from those >>> with, one might say, little mathematics to those who were well known >>> research mathematicians. - so the problems were doable by most. A rule, >>> which I follow to this day, is you don?t spoil a problem for another by >>> telling them the solution. Research mathematicians are very bad about this >>> - mainly because they get excited - and I remember scolding one (smile)!] >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > From annalisa@unm.edu Fri Dec 11 22:54:09 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sat, 12 Dec 2015 06:54:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination In-Reply-To: <065ED5BB-278B-4028-A493-245D81342155@umich.edu> References: <566a24e9.1444620a.ac08f.fffffe76@mx.google.com> <566a6b7b.e405430a.4a789.ffffe6eb@mx.google.com>, <065ED5BB-278B-4028-A493-245D81342155@umich.edu> Message-ID: Hi Ed (and others), Might I offer a possible explanation of your experience of the radio vs tv series as informed by Antonio Damasio? In the experience of imagining the images (hence imagining?) while listening to the radio version, at the moment we imagine, affective content is activated. It is activated first. What makes stories engaging is their emotional content. During the act of listening to a story, we must surrender our belief or skepticism and place ourselves into a point of view. It could be in the location of the narrator, or of a character, or as a witness of the entire story, a distant observer. These POVs can be constant or changing based upon your own emotional identity toward a character or a situation. You may identify with the protagonist or have aversion for the antagonist for example. What "becomes" from these experiences resembles/represents lived experience as it is experienced in the story world, as it unfolds, as jumpstarted by the affect. Such affective content is not removed, but assists in the creation of an imagination. All this results as a lived experience within a lived experience, which can be stepped into and out of as the imagination wills. This is facile to do while listening to a story. This affective content, according to Damasio is what orients an individual to make proper decisions for oneself. In other words, affect is an essential component of reasoning about (and imagining) something. This necessity for affect to result as effective reasoning is something that Descartes got wrong, and Damasio discusses this in his book, Descartes's Error. Today we know this value of affect because of Damasio's discovery while caring for a patient who suffered injury to the part of the brain responsible for registering affect. The patient could not, as a consequence of this injury, make appropriate decisions for himself, and thus endangered himself. His loss of affect caused him not to consider his own safety and well being. In other words, to understand how to orient ourselves to the world, we sense and then we reason about that sense in order to make a decision how to orient ourselves in the world. Moment to moment requires a new draw of affect and a new reasoning about that affect and a new decision to orient accordingly. There is an evolutionary logic to this order because of the way we must respond to danger (and survive). We require a system to feel and sense before we can actually can reason about that sense, because there may not be enough time to reason, and so we must just act "with the gut". This is the purpose of the Limbic system, but only recently have we understood its connection to reasoning. The consequence of living though this process, however, is that the affect can be so elusive and lightening fast in its processing that we may not realize that it is what motivates our reason. And so it seems affect and reason function separately, especially reason as functioning independently from affect. For example, consider intuition and hunches. We may feel compelled to act on something (or not) without really knowing why. Hence we come to learn "trust your intuition." Further, the dismissal of affect through reason likely also has an evolutionary purpose. There are times we must sometimes arrange our thoughts despite feeling overpowered by a veil of emotion. So it seems as if emotions get in the way more than they inform, and are therefore "unreasonable." This is something of half the illusion of the duck-rabbit, and what is best to be emphasized depending upon the circumstance at hand. Regardless, these dynamic experiences are much like the way the tin man, the lion, and the scarecrow inform Dorothy, as a congress of voices provide different kinds of expertise in counsel about what to do next. I think that what happens in "the West" is that we have been told particular stories about rational thought and imagination and expressing emotion, what is appropriate, what is effective, and what completes an experience as an experience. This can be informed (or dictated) by gender, status, role, basically any formulation of culture that shapes us, and may not actually map to how we physiologically provide content to our lived experience, causing a split or dissonance and therefore discomfort, or flatness. Coming back around to your experience of the same series on television, I'd offer one reason it may have felt less engaging is not so much that the images are readymade constructed images, but also that your POV is dictated by edits of television. You are no longer free to create your own view points to the story and move between them as your imagination may have carried you while you listened to the radio version. Because of that fixed and dictated POV, it is not as fluid to maintain active affective content particular to your own personal directory of experiences, resulting in a more flattened (disaffected!) existence while listening/living to the story. There were images constructed, but they could not be populated by your affect, because affect has to arrive first to ignite the process. The story has to grab us! As younger generations come to learn the affective codes of a new medium, I suspect that affect starts to "begin again" to populate the content. But until that time, the images and POVs remain flat and pseudo-meaningless, and therefore less engaging. This may explain why records and stereo systems have so much meaning to baby-boomers, while digital songs on an iPod have different meaning to millennials, despite both being a means to hear music. Kind regards, Annalisa From ewall@umich.edu Sat Dec 12 09:05:11 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sat, 12 Dec 2015 11:05:11 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination In-Reply-To: <566baef9.074f620a.94db6.ffffd7c1@mx.google.com> References: <566a24e9.1444620a.ac08f.fffffe76@mx.google.com> <566a6b7b.e405430a.4a789.ffffe6eb@mx.google.com> <065ED5BB-278B-4028-A493-245D81342155@umich.edu> <566baef9.074f620a.94db6.ffffd7c1@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <69E39F27-7DEC-4C2F-922C-4EDE68A1DCF5@umich.edu> Larry I also am not sure if your connections are relevant to my questions. So let me pose a new one. You say "imagine representation.? Could you clarify, somewhat phenomenologically, what you mean by that. Perhaps, as I have tried to do, tell a story that captures your words. Ed > On Dec 11, 2015, at 11:21 PM, Lplarry wrote: > > Ed, I am not sure if my (connections) are relevant to your question if stable representations drains our imaging of affectiveness in the process of becoming understood as (representations). > My focus is exploring more the cultural historical movement of the imaginal becoming understood as representational. > I am suggesting that this movement has profound implications for how we come to understand ourselves and how we understand our (self). > The desire to make (present) the fundamental order of knowledge imaged as (presenting) a fundamental unity or ground underlying our knowledge. There is a presumption which involves (reference) as an (idea).. > The idea is that there exists an ideal object of desire. This desire is the search for certainty, first principles. The Kantian (thing in itself). > This (thing in itself) as an ideal includes transcendental conditions which means this (thing-in-itself) is presumed to stand outside (or independent of) the linguistic categories. > Understanding and interpretation are presumed to (re-present) or mediate the thing which has the status of (thing-in-itself). > Knowledge imaged this way assumes that through (self-evident) transcendental first principles the ORDER that exists primordially is revealed (presented) as self-evident order and then (re-presented) in our cultural historical narratives. > Ed I would suggest this relation to knowledge assumes this (self) HAS knowledge and as a possession I (have) there is a different affective relation to re-presented knowledge. > Now my interest is in the movement of this way of reflecting on knowledge. > Are there more intimate ways of understanding our desire for certainty that embrace no self-evident (thing-in-itself). This is one possibleway to understand (nothingness) as (no-thing-ness). > I am asking if this movement of how we imagine representation profoundly shifts not only our relation to knowledge but shifts our relation to (ourselves) and our relation to what we imagine as our (self). > At the heart of this movement is the continuing desire for (absolute) knowledge. > I am proposing this desire is a deep part of our inheritance. > I am not saying universal or (natural) but this desire does traverse the onto- theological, the romantic, the modern notions of psychology and is a yearning for grounded bedrock foundations. > I understand this imaginal movement as the (sharing) of voices. > Dilthey understood creating connections (the notion of zusammenhang) in the phrase > (life exists everywhere only as zusammenhang). > > This contrasts with the desire for presenting (self-evident) order which exists a priori and only brought into language as self-evident presentations being re-presented through our transcendental categories. > I experience the imaginal in this movement whatever side one represents. > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Ed Wall" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?11 9:28 AM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination > > Larry > > I took Mike to mean in the sentence I quoted that forming a stable representation via a sort of rationalism could be problematic; i.e. > >>>> "the connection between rationalism and the way that imagining gets >>>> drained of its affectiveness in the process of becoming something stable >>>> enough to call a representation? > > and I was musing as to whether my ?stories? were indicative of what he was pointing at (I have read the article by the way); i.e. a draining of affectation in the process of becoming something stable. You seem to be going off in other directions. Perhaps you could take a moment to, so to speak, connect the dots. > > Ed > > >> On Dec 11, 2015, at 12:21 AM, Lplarry wrote: >> >> Ed, >> I'll focus then on the question of a stable image and its relation to how one feels as this image is (representated). >> I wonder how this relates to mike's example that he had a stable representation of the concept (kraut) which he had emotionally formed and was attached to as a youth reading war stories. (which he loved and was immersed in). These meaningful experiences formed his stable images and other alternative images of (kraut) became unavailable as this image had such stability (and emotionality). >> I want to return to the article sent by mike on December 5 by A V Suvorov focusing on representation in deak-blind children >> On page 17 he focuses on two principles. >> * the holistic principle that first is the image as a whole (that becomes lived into.) >> *the principle of emotionality. The image must be intrinsically interesting and motivating. >> >> On page 16 Sukorov adds that (games) must develop out of our communicative situation. The teacher just begins the play and the children are taking part before they know it. In other words the image of the game is forming before a conscious decision to join the game. >> The child by living into the game is living into the image. >> >> >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: "Ed Wall" >> Sent: ?2015-?12-?10 5:35 PM >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination >> >> Larry >> >> I may misunderstand what you are saying, but it wasn?t the same story on the radio although it was a series with the same name. Also the experiences weren?t less or more moving. It was that I was faced with a ?stable? representation - i.e. visual images of characters and situations - that precluded the imagination I had brought to the radio. My inclination is say that this has little to do with the condensing of experience and much to do with Mike?s insight. >> >> Ed >> >>> On Dec 10, 2015, at 7:22 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >>> >>> Ed >>> The aspect of your hearing the story first on radio and then comparing to less [moving] experiences when seeing the narrative unfold. >>> Is there a quality of {condensing} of experience. Vygotsky?s metaphor of [precipitation] as the condensing into droplets. >>> This seems a quality that {moves} the person and I wonder if a similar quality {moves} cultural narratives. >>> It cam apply to any of the 5 senses and other types of sense. >>> >>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>> >>> >>> >>> From: Huw Lloyd >>> Sent: Thursday, December 10, 2015 5:04 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination >>> >>> >>> Hi Ed, >>> >>> Re your unknown book. I would expect that there are web sites dedicated to >>> that sort of thing by now. >>> >>> Its not my cup of tea but I thought I'd put the idea here anyway: >>> >>> How many 'chain-emails' would have to be forwarded before your book was >>> found, would that be an index of its obscurity? Would this be an >>> interesting contrast between google search and facebook search? >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> On 10 December 2015 at 18:54, Ed Wall wrote: >>> >>>> Mike >>>> >>>> You wrote, reflecting on something Larry had written, about seeing >>>> how "the connection between rationalism and the way that imagining gets >>>> drained of its affectiveness in the process of becoming something stable >>>> enough to call a representation. In musing about this, I thought of perhaps >>>> some examples that might or might not illustrate what you are pointing at >>>> and would be interested in your reaction: >>>> >>>> 1. I grew up with radio and as a boy would listen spellbound to stories >>>> and adventure programs. As I think back about it, this probably required >>>> more than a bit of imagination. As time passed, my family finally got a >>>> television. After my first viewing of a TV program that purported to be >>>> identical in content with one of those radio programs I so loved, I, >>>> underwhelmed, never again watched that program as seeing the characters ? >>>> finally? ?rationally' interpreted was unpleasant (and I really didn?t >>>> imagine them on radio as having some sort of fixed image). I have had the >>>> same experience, by the way, when seeing a movie that follows closely a >>>> book I have read. Somehow, one might say, my imagination was stifled by >>>> fixedness of those visual representations. I, to this day, still find TV, >>>> for the most part, stifling in regards to imagination. >>>> >>>> 2. A number of years ago I came across a web summary of book in somewhat >>>> diary form written by a mathematician writing about the education of his >>>> son - I have tried again and gain to locate that book (I seem to remember >>>> the mathematician was either French or Polish) so if by some chance anybody >>>> has run across the same let me know! One passage in particular stood out. >>>> The mathematician was talking about his son struggling with some sort of >>>> mathematics problem. He noted that he took the time to sit down with his >>>> son and show him how to solve the problem. The mathematician continues in >>>> his diary that he then reflected on how, in this early intervention, he had >>>> ruined the pleasure of doing mathematics - perhaps forever - for his son. >>>> [As a side note, as part of a research team of mathematics educators we >>>> often traded mathematics problems around - abilities were varied from those >>>> with, one might say, little mathematics to those who were well known >>>> research mathematicians. - so the problems were doable by most. A rule, >>>> which I follow to this day, is you don?t spoil a problem for another by >>>> telling them the solution. Research mathematicians are very bad about this >>>> - mainly because they get excited - and I remember scolding one (smile)!] >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Dec 12 10:51:56 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sat, 12 Dec 2015 10:51:56 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination In-Reply-To: <69E39F27-7DEC-4C2F-922C-4EDE68A1DCF5@umich.edu> References: <566a24e9.1444620a.ac08f.fffffe76@mx.google.com> <566a6b7b.e405430a.4a789.ffffe6eb@mx.google.com> <065ED5BB-278B-4028-A493-245D81342155@umich.edu> <566baef9.074f620a.94db6.ffffd7c1@mx.google.com> <69E39F27-7DEC-4C2F-922C-4EDE68A1DCF5@umich.edu> Message-ID: <566c6cd1.cc07620a.8608b.ffff88c5@mx.google.com> Ed, I will try to say how I approach this topic of living into an image and my way of [stepping back]. I question my own experience of being a self-defining subject as the center from which radiates by involvement in the world. I [play with] the category of [embodiment]. This notion of [playing with] and where to locate embodied experience. I have been thrown into a world [not merely worldview] that influenced me to grow up imagining I am embodied within the parameters of my own physical body. I would say that in this way of experiencing embodiment I am thoroughly a modern person locating my [self] my [subjectivity] within my own body. This is my phenomenological image of myself as a [self-defining] self. I am modern. However, I have throughout my life carried a doubt or skepticism [since age 16] that this modern version or image of a self-defining self [which is the picture I do carry and which does embody my ongoing phenomenological sense of who I am] is not an actual [fact] because I suspect this is rather an image of an [encapsulated] self. However, to say this self-defining self is an [image] is not to discredit its [truth]. This is where the notion of [vo-obraz-zhenie] expresses that this self-identifying self [as an image] IS lived into. I am [imaging] I am vo-obraz-zhenie. This Russian term is usually translated as [perception] and [ideation]. I am suggesting the category of vo-obraz-zhenie can also be translated as [embodied] as an alternative translation. Ed, I hope this gives a felt sense that I phenomenologically am thoroughly modern and I do experience my [self] as a self-identifying self. What I am doing is questioning the source of this particular sense [and meaning] of being embodied. This way of categorizing the self withdraws felt sense and felt meaning from the embodied world and re-locates this sense and meaning within the biological body. In a way analogous to the way in the 1600?s a small minority of scholars where withdrawing from a sense of the world being embodied in external ORDER [and being re-PLACED with locating the sense of self within this cognitively imaged ORDER] I am imagining a small minority of persons re-experiencing the sense of being embodied not within the encapsulated self-identifying self but enacting this sense and meaning of the world being embodied and my [self] existing within this external embodied ORDER. Not a return to the previous sense of ORDER that was theological but a re-figuring [once again] of the place of embodied enchantment through vo-obraz-zhenie. This is an ideal of seeing through the self-identifying-self image not as false but as encapsulated. I, phenomenologically am on this quest to [see through] and [hear through] and [feel through] to the source in living into images. This notion of image includes narrative, text, meaningful action, projects. I would say it is an immanent critique. Honouring Kant as bringing to form this movement for his time and place but I am suggesting this imaging is a restless movement of [moving through]. I am moving through phenomenologically the notion of being a self-identifying self related to objective things. I would say this is an image. Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Ed Wall Sent: Saturday, December 12, 2015 9:06 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination Larry I also am not sure if your connections are relevant to my questions. So let me pose a new one. You say "imagine representation.? Could you clarify, somewhat phenomenologically, what you mean by that. Perhaps, as I have tried to do, tell a story that captures your words. Ed > On Dec 11, 2015, at 11:21 PM, Lplarry wrote: > > Ed, I am not sure if my (connections) are relevant to your question if stable representations drains our imaging of affectiveness in the process of becoming understood as (representations). > My focus is exploring more the cultural historical movement of the imaginal becoming understood as representational. > I am suggesting that this movement has profound implications for how we come to understand ourselves and how we understand our (self). > The desire to make (present) the fundamental order of knowledge imaged as (presenting) a fundamental unity or ground underlying our knowledge. There is a presumption which involves (reference) as an (idea).. > The idea is that there exists an ideal object of desire. This desire is the search for certainty, first principles. The Kantian (thing in itself). > This (thing in itself) as an ideal includes transcendental conditions which means this (thing-in-itself) is presumed to stand outside (or independent of) the linguistic categories. > Understanding and interpretation are presumed to (re-present) or mediate the thing which has the status of (thing-in-itself). > Knowledge imaged this way assumes that through (self-evident) transcendental first principles the ORDER that exists primordially is revealed (presented) as self-evident order and then (re-presented) in our cultural historical narratives. > Ed I would suggest this relation to knowledge assumes this (self) HAS knowledge and as a possession I (have) there is a different affective relation to re-presented knowledge. > Now my interest is in the movement of this way of reflecting on knowledge. > Are there more intimate ways of understanding our desire for certainty that embrace no self-evident (thing-in-itself). This is one possibleway to understand (nothingness) as (no-thing-ness). > I am asking if this movement of how we imagine representation profoundly shifts not only our relation to knowledge but shifts our relation to (ourselves) and our relation to what we imagine as our (self). > At the heart of this movement is the continuing desire for (absolute) knowledge. > I am proposing this desire is a deep part of our inheritance. > I am not saying universal or (natural) but this desire does traverse the onto- theological, the romantic, the modern notions of psychology and is a yearning for grounded bedrock foundations. > I understand this imaginal movement as the (sharing) of voices. > Dilthey understood creating connections (the notion of zusammenhang) in the phrase > (life exists everywhere only as zusammenhang). > > This contrasts with the desire for presenting (self-evident) order which exists a priori and only brought into language as self-evident presentations being re-presented through our transcendental categories. > I experience the imaginal in this movement whatever side one represents. > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Ed Wall" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?11 9:28 AM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination > > Larry > > I took Mike to mean in the sentence I quoted that forming a stable representation via a sort of rationalism could be problematic; i.e. > >>>> "the connection between rationalism and the way that imagining gets >>>> drained of its affectiveness in the process of becoming something stable >>>> enough to call a representation? > > and I was musing as to whether my ?stories? were indicative of what he was pointing at (I have read the article by the way); i.e. a draining of affectation in the process of becoming something stable. You seem to be going off in other directions. Perhaps you could take a moment to, so to speak, connect the dots. > > Ed > > >> On Dec 11, 2015, at 12:21 AM, Lplarry wrote: >> >> Ed, >> I'll focus then on the question of a stable image and its relation to how one feels as this image is (representated). >> I wonder how this relates to mike's example that he had a stable representation of the concept (kraut) which he had emotionally formed and was attached to as a youth reading war stories. (which he loved and was immersed in). These meaningful experiences formed his stable images and other alternative images of (kraut) became unavailable as this image had such stability (and emotionality). >> I want to return to the article sent by mike on December 5 by A V Suvorov focusing on representation in deak-blind children >> On page 17 he focuses on two principles. >> * the holistic principle that first is the image as a whole (that becomes lived into.) >> *the principle of emotionality. The image must be intrinsically interesting and motivating. >> >> On page 16 Sukorov adds that (games) must develop out of our communicative situation. The teacher just begins the play and the children are taking part before they know it. In other words the image of the game is forming before a conscious decision to join the game. >> The child by living into the game is living into the image. >> >> >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: "Ed Wall" >> Sent: ?2015-?12-?10 5:35 PM >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination >> >> Larry >> >> I may misunderstand what you are saying, but it wasn?t the same story on the radio although it was a series with the same name. Also the experiences weren?t less or more moving. It was that I was faced with a ?stable? representation - i.e. visual images of characters and situations - that precluded the imagination I had brought to the radio. My inclination is say that this has little to do with the condensing of experience and much to do with Mike?s insight. >> >> Ed >> >>> On Dec 10, 2015, at 7:22 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >>> >>> Ed >>> The aspect of your hearing the story first on radio and then comparing to less [moving] experiences when seeing the narrative unfold. >>> Is there a quality of {condensing} of experience. Vygotsky?s metaphor of [precipitation] as the condensing into droplets. >>> This seems a quality that {moves} the person and I wonder if a similar quality {moves} cultural narratives. >>> It cam apply to any of the 5 senses and other types of sense. >>> >>> Sent from Mail for Windows 10 >>> >>> >>> >>> From: Huw Lloyd >>> Sent: Thursday, December 10, 2015 5:04 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination >>> >>> >>> Hi Ed, >>> >>> Re your unknown book. I would expect that there are web sites dedicated to >>> that sort of thing by now. >>> >>> Its not my cup of tea but I thought I'd put the idea here anyway: >>> >>> How many 'chain-emails' would have to be forwarded before your book was >>> found, would that be an index of its obscurity? Would this be an >>> interesting contrast between google search and facebook search? >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> On 10 December 2015 at 18:54, Ed Wall wrote: >>> >>>> Mike >>>> >>>> You wrote, reflecting on something Larry had written, about seeing >>>> how "the connection between rationalism and the way that imagining gets >>>> drained of its affectiveness in the process of becoming something stable >>>> enough to call a representation. In musing about this, I thought of perhaps >>>> some examples that might or might not illustrate what you are pointing at >>>> and would be interested in your reaction: >>>> >>>> 1. I grew up with radio and as a boy would listen spellbound to stories >>>> and adventure programs. As I think back about it, this probably required >>>> more than a bit of imagination. As time passed, my family finally got a >>>> television. After my first viewing of a TV program that purported to be >>>> identical in content with one of those radio programs I so loved, I, >>>> underwhelmed, never again watched that program as seeing the characters ? >>>> finally? ?rationally' interpreted was unpleasant (and I really didn?t >>>> imagine them on radio as having some sort of fixed image). I have had the >>>> same experience, by the way, when seeing a movie that follows closely a >>>> book I have read. Somehow, one might say, my imagination was stifled by >>>> fixedness of those visual representations. I, to this day, still find TV, >>>> for the most part, stifling in regards to imagination. >>>> >>>> 2. A number of years ago I came across a web summary of book in somewhat >>>> diary form written by a mathematician writing about the education of his >>>> son - I have tried again and gain to locate that book (I seem to remember >>>> the mathematician was either French or Polish) so if by some chance anybody >>>> has run across the same let me know! One passage in particular stood out. >>>> The mathematician was talking about his son struggling with some sort of >>>> mathematics problem. He noted that he took the time to sit down with his >>>> son and show him how to solve the problem. The mathematician continues in >>>> his diary that he then reflected on how, in this early intervention, he had >>>> ruined the pleasure of doing mathematics - perhaps forever - for his son. >>>> [As a side note, as part of a research team of mathematics educators we >>>> often traded mathematics problems around - abilities were varied from those >>>> with, one might say, little mathematics to those who were well known >>>> research mathematicians. - so the problems were doable by most. A rule, >>>> which I follow to this day, is you don?t spoil a problem for another by >>>> telling them the solution. Research mathematicians are very bad about this >>>> - mainly because they get excited - and I remember scolding one (smile)!] >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> > > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Sat Dec 12 11:03:56 2015 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Sat, 12 Dec 2015 21:03:56 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Women's right to elect and to stand for election in general elections Message-ID: Please. When and where in human history. I know. The first is different than the second, stand for. And also, there is the differentiation between local and general elections. But the question is there: When and where did women obtain the full right to elect and to stand for election? Best, Ulvi P.S. Claimed to be in first in my native country, Turkey! Nowadays unbelievable!! That in 1934, for both to stand for and in general elections. It is true. But is it the first in world history, as is taught today in primary education in Turkey? Hint: No, it isn't. Then, in Britain, in Germany, in US, in France, in Russia, when? From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Dec 12 12:45:05 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 13 Dec 2015 05:45:05 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Women's right to elect and to stand for election in general elections In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Ulvi: The arc of history does not simply bend only very very slowly towards justice; it's more of a zig-zag than a curve. In 1718, Swedish women could vote and be elected, so long as they were taxpayers. But of course most women could not own property unless their menfolk dropped dead first, and only property holders paid taxes, so essentially this was the world's first suffrage for widows. In the 1870s, New Zealand became the first "self-governing colony" where women could both vote and hold office in elections, but since New Zealand didn't actually become a country until 1907 this was essentially a sandbox democracy (like the oxymoron "self governing colony". I think it's worth noting that the complexity of human progress is also reflected on the other side of the barricades: in my own country, the movement for women's suffrage in the late nineteenth century had a strongly racist wing (the argument was that WHITE women would allo white men to overcome the revolutionary reconstruction that was happening after black suffrage became law in the South, because women were more conservative than men). Note that even in Turkey, the Kurdish areas have always had women's suffrage in direct measure to their autonomy from Ankara--today, the Kurdish ruled republics in Northern Syria and Northern Iraq are probably the only place in the whole middle east where women can truly vote and be elected, and there are actually quotas that ensure that this happens. These areas exist mostly because the Kurds who run them (PKK sympatheizers now influenced more by feminism and anarchism than by Marxism!) were forced out of Turkey during Erdogan's genocidal campaign against Kurds. And now, a question for YOU. I am reading about Basil Bernstein's theories of the intersection of class and pedagogy, and it turns out that quite a bit of this has to do with MUSIC education. Do you know anything about this? David Kellogg Macquarie University On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 4:03 AM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > Please. > > When and where in human history. > > I know. > > The first is different than the second, stand for. > > And also, there is the differentiation between local and general elections. > > But the question is there: When and where did women obtain the full right > to elect and to stand for election? > > Best, > Ulvi > > P.S. Claimed to be in first in my native country, Turkey! Nowadays > unbelievable!! That in 1934, for both to stand for and in general > elections. It is true. But is it the first in world history, as is taught > today in primary education in Turkey? Hint: No, it isn't. > Then, in Britain, in Germany, in US, in France, in Russia, when? > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Dec 12 13:05:10 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 13 Dec 2015 06:05:10 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Women's right to elect and to stand for election in general elections In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Sorry Ulvi: A correction: White women didn't vote in New Zealand until 1893, and Maori women were only allowed to vote for four symbolic "Maori" seats in the national assembly. (Incredibly, indigenous people were not allowed to vote here in Australia until 1962, and for census purposes were counted as animals; in Tasmania in the nineteenth century there were bounties for shooting them.) What DID happen in the 1870s was the first really national right of women to vote and hold office...the Paris Commune. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 4:03 AM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > Please. > > When and where in human history. > > I know. > > The first is different than the second, stand for. > > And also, there is the differentiation between local and general elections. > > But the question is there: When and where did women obtain the full right > to elect and to stand for election? > > Best, > Ulvi > > P.S. Claimed to be in first in my native country, Turkey! Nowadays > unbelievable!! That in 1934, for both to stand for and in general > elections. It is true. But is it the first in world history, as is taught > today in primary education in Turkey? Hint: No, it isn't. > Then, in Britain, in Germany, in US, in France, in Russia, when? > From ewall@umich.edu Sat Dec 12 15:06:15 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sat, 12 Dec 2015 17:06:15 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <566a24e9.1444620a.ac08f.fffffe76@mx.google.com> <566a6b7b.e405430a.4a789.ffffe6eb@mx.google.com> <065ED5BB-278B-4028-A493-245D81342155@umich.edu> Message-ID: <9AF9DF23-B6EF-4A09-A0EA-AE3C3D6D9BC4@umich.edu> Annalisa What you say is reasonable and I can ?see? why you told the following story of my radio adventures > Coming back around to your experience of the same series on television, I'd offer one reason it may have felt less engaging is not so much that the images are readymade constructed images, but also that your POV is dictated by edits of television. You are no longer free to create your own view points to the story and move between them as your imagination may have carried you while you listened to the radio version. Because of that fixed and dictated POV, it is not as fluid to maintain active affective content particular to your own personal directory of experiences, resulting in a more flattened (disaffected!) existence while listening/living to the story. There were images constructed, but they could not be populated by your affect, because affect has to arrive first to ignite the process. The story has to grab us! There is, perhaps, a sort of difficulty. I, of course, must have had points of view (although I?m not entirely convinced they were as large part of my story as they are of yours). However, it was not that the TV series was all that much different that the radio series in plot or characters and I am fairly sure if I had taken the time to watch I may have well been ?grabbed? at moments. It was, as I had tried to illustrate (and reinforce with the second story), that the TV visualization created a stabilization that drained imagination. I was, form that day on, unable to imagine the series without the ?seeing? the TV version. So your story raises a few questions. Are you saying that the imagination cannot be drained of effect since ?affect has to arrive first to ignite the process.? Perhaps you are saying that my stories are not an instance of Mike? point? Perhaps you are saying that my storytelling is delirium (smile) and I am simply factually mistaken. As an teacher I, of course, try to create possibilities that ?grab? students. However, I have often seen a degree of established affect drain away in the face of a ?rationalized? move toward stability. There is certainly a change of point of view in such instances; however, it may, at times, be a product. Ed > On Dec 12, 2015, at 12:54 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Ed (and others), > > Might I offer a possible explanation of your experience of the radio vs tv series as informed by Antonio Damasio? > > In the experience of imagining the images (hence imagining?) while listening to the radio version, at the moment we imagine, affective content is activated. It is activated first. What makes stories engaging is their emotional content. During the act of listening to a story, we must surrender our belief or skepticism and place ourselves into a point of view. It could be in the location of the narrator, or of a character, or as a witness of the entire story, a distant observer. These POVs can be constant or changing based upon your own emotional identity toward a character or a situation. You may identify with the protagonist or have aversion for the antagonist for example. What "becomes" from these experiences resembles/represents lived experience as it is experienced in the story world, as it unfolds, as jumpstarted by the affect. Such affective content is not removed, but assists in the creation of an imagination. All this results as a lived experience within a lived experience, which can be stepped into and out of as the imagination wills. This is facile to do while listening to a story. > > This affective content, according to Damasio is what orients an individual to make proper decisions for oneself. In other words, affect is an essential component of reasoning about (and imagining) something. This necessity for affect to result as effective reasoning is something that Descartes got wrong, and Damasio discusses this in his book, Descartes's Error. > > Today we know this value of affect because of Damasio's discovery while caring for a patient who suffered injury to the part of the brain responsible for registering affect. The patient could not, as a consequence of this injury, make appropriate decisions for himself, and thus endangered himself. His loss of affect caused him not to consider his own safety and well being. In other words, to understand how to orient ourselves to the world, we sense and then we reason about that sense in order to make a decision how to orient ourselves in the world. Moment to moment requires a new draw of affect and a new reasoning about that affect and a new decision to orient accordingly. > > There is an evolutionary logic to this order because of the way we must respond to danger (and survive). We require a system to feel and sense before we can actually can reason about that sense, because there may not be enough time to reason, and so we must just act "with the gut". This is the purpose of the Limbic system, but only recently have we understood its connection to reasoning. > > The consequence of living though this process, however, is that the affect can be so elusive and lightening fast in its processing that we may not realize that it is what motivates our reason. And so it seems affect and reason function separately, especially reason as functioning independently from affect. > > For example, consider intuition and hunches. We may feel compelled to act on something (or not) without really knowing why. Hence we come to learn "trust your intuition." > > Further, the dismissal of affect through reason likely also has an evolutionary purpose. There are times we must sometimes arrange our thoughts despite feeling overpowered by a veil of emotion. So it seems as if emotions get in the way more than they inform, and are therefore "unreasonable." > > This is something of half the illusion of the duck-rabbit, and what is best to be emphasized depending upon the circumstance at hand. > > Regardless, these dynamic experiences are much like the way the tin man, the lion, and the scarecrow inform Dorothy, as a congress of voices provide different kinds of expertise in counsel about what to do next. > > I think that what happens in "the West" is that we have been told particular stories about rational thought and imagination and expressing emotion, what is appropriate, what is effective, and what completes an experience as an experience. This can be informed (or dictated) by gender, status, role, basically any formulation of culture that shapes us, and may not actually map to how we physiologically provide content to our lived experience, causing a split or dissonance and therefore discomfort, or flatness. > > Coming back around to your experience of the same series on television, I'd offer one reason it may have felt less engaging is not so much that the images are readymade constructed images, but also that your POV is dictated by edits of television. You are no longer free to create your own view points to the story and move between them as your imagination may have carried you while you listened to the radio version. Because of that fixed and dictated POV, it is not as fluid to maintain active affective content particular to your own personal directory of experiences, resulting in a more flattened (disaffected!) existence while listening/living to the story. There were images constructed, but they could not be populated by your affect, because affect has to arrive first to ignite the process. The story has to grab us! > > As younger generations come to learn the affective codes of a new medium, I suspect that affect starts to "begin again" to populate the content. But until that time, the images and POVs remain flat and pseudo-meaningless, and therefore less engaging. This may explain why records and stereo systems have so much meaning to baby-boomers, while digital songs on an iPod have different meaning to millennials, despite both being a means to hear music. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Sat Dec 12 17:26:18 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 13 Dec 2015 01:26:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination In-Reply-To: <9AF9DF23-B6EF-4A09-A0EA-AE3C3D6D9BC4@umich.edu> References: <566a24e9.1444620a.ac08f.fffffe76@mx.google.com> <566a6b7b.e405430a.4a789.ffffe6eb@mx.google.com> <065ED5BB-278B-4028-A493-245D81342155@umich.edu> , <9AF9DF23-B6EF-4A09-A0EA-AE3C3D6D9BC4@umich.edu> Message-ID: Hi Ed (and others), Thanks for your thoughtful reply. First I'd like to say that what I wrote I wrote without a totally clear picture in mind, or at least a picture that I articulated effectively. If you can imagine that! When I wrote of your TV experience, I wrote about it in reference to the radio experience, in juxtaposition with that experience. I think point of view (POV) is something that functions so elusively, that we aren't aways aware of this being constructed. Making art, whether writing a poem, painting a painting, making a sculpture, playing music, etc. there is a constructed reader/viewer/listener/experiencer being made by the artist through the piece, and conveyed through the medium. The artist might be doing this consciously or unconsciously, but they do it. Consider looking at Guernica without a POV. What is happening with more modern technology is a kind of telling of stories that dictate experiences as such. So if one has different experiences that do not compare to the story, one must surrender to the story or one is alienated, just by the pervasiveness of the medium and the message therein. Consider what it must be like for LGBT to experience a flood of stories and songs about heterosexual romance. If you can, then you have taken, temporarily, a POV, even if it's in your imagination. If you can't place yourself, then consider what a friend told me, that it's like hearing bad Christmas music all the time, wherever you go. This ability to take a POV creates human empathy and sensitivity because affect populates this POV. The affect is the answer to "What is that like?" In old-time radio, there was more apparent freedom available to the listener, as you said the imagination has more leeway to construct images about what the listener experiences. Even in theater there is this experience because the world is represented on the stage, and sets do not simulate the world as the world actually is, so for the theatergoer, the imagination and the flexibility of POV is still possible. One can focus on one character or another. In television and film this seems to be less flexible. I'm not saying that it is not possible to have imaginative experiences in film or television, just that POVs are more deliberately constructed in comparison to the storytelling wizard sharing time with a group around a fire and telling stories of old, or in your case, your radio program. When I watched Star Trek TV episodes, I myself had a "reverse" experience from yours. After, I read (somewhat campy) stories published in a book series and I couldn't get William Shatner's and Leonard Nimoy's personages and voices out of my head, or any of the other characters that might pop up. It was an uncomfortable experience, and I could never really get into the stories. I don't even remember what they were, I just remember this experience, I was probably 13 at the time. But I think it's because the associations are so strongly mapped, there's no space for an imagination to happen (Until we all become post-modern I suppose). My assertion is that POV is the only way we can experience a story, and it's our way into the story: we can feel affect for the characters or situations, that's how they grab us and engage us, they make us care about something. I am the one listening and thus positioning myself to the story, that is one freedom I still possess. I can even say, "I don't buy that story," or "I have a better one," and so on. I don't think taking a POV is all that conscious unless one is actually focusing upon this idea. ANd even in that case, one might ruin the experience of a film by deconstructing what the director did, or how the editor edited, or the screenwriter wrote lines, etc. Which I suppose is still taking a POV, but more as a distant observer than getting involved in the actual story. I might offer that the less aware we are of the POV that we take, the more likely we are to feel an affect more deeply. It might be why we call art art. I don't think I am saying your stories are or are not an instance of Mike's point. If I am (or am not), it's not planned. I was only responding to your experience of what happened and am offering a possible explanation. You can certainly disagree with me. I don't think storytelling is a delirium at all. I think we live and die by the stories we hear and share and experience through hearing and telling. Would you say more about what you mean when you asked, "Are you saying imagination cannot be drained of effect since 'affect has to arrive first to ignite the process'?" What does it mean to say imagination is drained of effect? Do you mean is imagination killed if affect is missing? Though I still would like to hear your reply, I'm going to say that I hope we agree that imagination is an expression of freedom. If there is conscious and deliberate attempts to invoke a specific "picture-making" through cultural meaning for a specifically contained response (I can't call that an imagination because there is propaganda, manipulation or deception involved), this approach, in my opinion, is not far from brainwashing, or some means for justification for group identities, what have you. The end result are adults with limited ability to be creative or imagine anything on their own. Such an imagination is a muscle with a very constrained reach and one can experience pain if asked to imagine something far beyond common experienced. This may be why conservatives or fundamentalists are so reactive if anyone strays from the flock or behaves spontaneously. In such society, one would likely be considered deluded. We had a marvelous presentation by researcher who visited us in the lab yesterday. She is studying the use of tablets (iPads) in preschools. One finding she made is that during interaction with the iPad (either alone or in a small cohort of others) children try to "break" the apps that they interact with, or they use it in ways that were not a part of the design. I see this as an attempt for kids to create their own POV and not settle for the POV as "dictated" or set out by the app designers. The broom is the pivot for the imagined horse only because the child is free to imagine it. That is my opinion of what is going on. Artists do this all the time, it's part of problem-finding and discovery as an art-making process. Then I went to a different level, in considering tech with a particular generational cohort. This is what I was trying to say about new generations (as kids) coming to new tech who will have the experience where affect "begins again." It's not like that for their parents using the same new tech, who developed as children with different tech. For the parents there is an overlap of the old tech and accompanying behaviors assigned to the new one, so the approach possesses a kind of baggage, like learning a new language. Of course these are huge generalizations that can be easily picked apart. I'm just trying to describe an idea I have about it. In my imagination, in response to your comment about drained affect in the face of a rationalized move, it feels like you are describing a killjoy. Kind regards, From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Dec 12 18:37:50 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sat, 12 Dec 2015 18:37:50 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Connecting and stability Message-ID: <566cda19.cf40620a.79833.ffffcf75@mx.google.com> We have been discussing the little word (is) which speaks everywhere in our language. Aristotle's (Peri hermeneias) offers an interesting understanding of this word. Aristotle claims verbs are substantial and have significance but not in itself. Verbs have substance and significance because the person who expresses the verb (fixes the attention) of the hearer. For Aristotle verbs do not bear any existential import (especially the verb - to be -). (to be) (being) (is) indicate nothing by themselves. What these words do (imply) is copulation, (a possible or potential CONNECTION WITH the world). Here we come back to the notion of (embodiment) in the world. Dilthey's notion of life as connection with the world. From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Dec 13 15:59:09 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 13 Dec 2015 23:59:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Connecting and stability In-Reply-To: <566cda19.cf40620a.79833.ffffcf75@mx.google.com> References: <566cda19.cf40620a.79833.ffffcf75@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Hi Larry and others, Is, as a verb is not like other verbs, which have to do with action. I'm not a linguist, but off the top, I don't think there is a verb that doesn't have to do with action other than "to be." At least in English. We use "becoming" to signify change, but the infinitive "to be" is a pointer to Existence. We don't say I become an eater, or I become a sleeper, or I become a writer, even though that has some truth to it (i'm not born a writer), it's not how we speak. I am an eater, I am a sleeper, I am a writer. Become is its own verb, isn't it? "to become," is a marriage of the word Be and Come. If Become where the word for Be, then that would make the game here really different. But Be comes before Become, linguistically and existentially! :) So with that in mind, Is is more of a signifier of existence and the noun that accompanies Is takes the particular shape that reflects Is-ness. Like the pot depends upon clay for its existence. If you remove the clay from the pot, the pot no longer exists. If you smash the pot, the clay remains, thus the pot depends upon clay to exist. I depend upon Being to exist. Of course I've been thinking also about unicorns! I believe I can explain why this definition of Being works even in the imaginary sense. (Which is to say Being is not a category of the mind in the absolute sense of Being, that all there is to Being is a cognitive category, therefore there is nothing to Being but a logical or categorical container in speech and thought, which is the same as saying Being arises from Mind, "I think, therefore I am"). Getting back to unicorns! We can say that the is-ness of the horse and the is-ness of the horn combine in the imagination, and thus unicorn is. Thus the material of the unicorn, which does not exist in the world we live in, is identical to the material of the imagination, which is the material of the Mind. But this does not stop at the Mind. Because the material of the unicorn is no different than the material of the memory of what I ate for dinner last night, or imagining walking on the boardwalk right now while I'm sitting in front of this screen. Just like other imaginations, for imaginary objects, the Is-ness is as-if borrowed from horse-ness and horn-ness, which do exist in the world. It is not possible to create an imagination of things we do not know about. Imaginations (and dreams) are always of the things we have known before, even if it is superficial knowledge. So the existence of unicorns depends upon the material of all imaginary objects, the material of the mind. This still supports the notion that Being comes before Mind. And that Mind is dependent upon Being, not the other way around. Also, Being is not something limited to sentient creatures, but is unlimited, the entire world sits in existence. That is why we can experience the existence of inanimate or insentient objects: the mountain is, the sky is, the ocean is, and since mind is in the world, the unicorn is. The problem is that we can't know what that Being is that makes existence possible for everything else. It's not knowable. And this has nothing to do with believing in a God or not believing, but that there is a limit to what we as humans can know, and that Being, that which pervades all beingness, all names and forms, responsible for the existence all that is here, is one of those things we will never be able to know explicitly. If we were to assert that Being is a product (a category) of Mind, then we are back to Decartes's dualism. When you say that "in the end" there is a final division (of two) and "that's just the way it is", then we can justify hierarchies, we can justify slavery, we can justify class, and so on. "Slavery is just the way it is." "Inequality is just the way it is." I just can't accept that. If we say really that all that is here is Existence, but the multiplicity of objects we experience are just different forms and manifestations of Existence(Being), then we can find the commonality among us despite differences, we can justify our feelings of oneness with Nature, Love for another, Compassion for strangers, etc. I prefer the latter over the former: Difference in this case becomes incidental and ornamental, while similarities are fundamental. So I think there is a fundamental ethical reason to see Being before Mind from this standpoint. Kind regards, Annalisa P.S. I've pulled out On the Soul by Aristotle from my shelf, because I am curious about his take on the Soul, because it is quite apparent that he does not see Soul as limited to Mind, like Hegel did. The Soul for Aristotle is the life-force, or sentiency. In Vedic thought there is the concept of Prana, which is also identical to life-force, something entering from the outside of the gross body, Prana is an aspect of the subtle body, but what gives life to the gross body and which leaves at death. This not analogously different from electricity passing through a lightbulb and when the electricity is there, the light shines, when it is absent the bulb is dark. The electricity is like the subtle body, the bulb the gross body. From Peg.Griffin@att.net Sun Dec 13 16:03:12 2015 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Sun, 13 Dec 2015 19:03:12 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> <05AB59E5-018D-4FF2-92BE-06619D1F95B8@umich.edu> <1BD78C04-64EA-4C74-BDDB-4723D6312EAF@umich.edu> Message-ID: <000c01d13602$d3281930$79784b90$@att.net> This 2015 Nobel Laureate for Literature lecture strikes me as pertinent to this imagination discussion. She is an amazing woman and here addresses issues familiar maybe tanatalizing for this list, I think. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2015/alexievich-lecture_en.html It begins this way: " I do not stand alone at this podium ... There are voices around me, hundreds of voices. They have always been with me, since childhood. I grew up in the countryside...} Peg -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd Sent: Wednesday, December 09, 2015 12:12 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination Perhaps the challenge will get easier if you keep piling up the references, Mike. :) So, I have persevered with reading, skipping and scanning Lovejoy's "The Great Chain of Being" and have come away with a few pages of notes, and some edification (22nd printing, 2001, Harvard University Press). With respect to the valorisation of imagination, Lovejoy identifies Schleirmacher as an early proponent of the merits of the development of imagination (although one could say that this is implicit in the platonic ideas which concern the book as a whole). (p. 309) With respect to the origins of the idea of a cell (urbild), he identifies Robinet as a rather eclectic proponent of the idea (p. 279), which again is derived from the history of the ideas of absolute perfection (of god), the principle of plentitude and the principle of continuity. He also attributes to Robinet that "fundamental reality in nature for him is not matter but l'avtivite". (p. 281) On a more down to regular strain on the imagination, regarding my assertion early of cognate terms (imagination, orientation etc), my reckoning is that orientation determines the scope and nature of interpretation. Not so long ago, I noticed some apparently new developments in our eldest child's formulations (4y6). We were talking about how to make papier mache objects, which took me back to making a papier mache 'pig' with the help of a balloon. In response to this he volunteered that the balloon would have to be burst with a pencil once it had been covered. I think it was the day before this that he pronounced that the ugly duckling's egg must have been laid by a swan. It seemed to me that that these articulations indicated that he was using a relatively new idea which was helping him to imaginatively understand these situations (an idea of process). I am fairly sure that these solutions were not supplied beforehand. Best, Huw On 9 December 2015 at 03:59, mike cole wrote: > The Casey site looks amazing and of course very relevant, Ed. Thanks. > > When I first read Sartre many years ago, I was totally unprepared to > take in what he was saying. I had not way to "digest it." > > Reading into the electronic copy I sent around yesterday, I could see > that it is inappropriate for me to refer to what I do as > phenomenology. It is just a kind of intuitive reflection on my > experiences and thoughts. No Husserl, no Sartre. Just unschooled > introspection that I seek to verify through acquiring evidence that > there is more than total idiosyncrasy to what my musings. > > I feel as if I need to download all the sources of inquiry we have > unearthed in the last few days and retreat to a place with no > communication with the world for a few weeks just to take them, in. !! > mike > > On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:39 AM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > Mike > > > > There are, perhaps, some shortcomings in portions of Sartre > > work > on > > imagination to which Casey supplies some useful modifications. Also > > it > is a > > bit long. Take a look at Edward Casey?s web site: < > > http://edwardscasey.com/?page_id=13>. Many of those articles on > > imagination seem downloadable and besides possibly whetting one?s > appetite > > for Sartre might be interesting in themselves. Perhaps you could > > pick one that most interests you and provides, from your vantage, a > > useful common, and modestly short reading source. I would, of > > course, recommend Casey?s book, but isn?t freely available. > > > > Ed > > > > > On Dec 7, 2015, at 9:44 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > So maybe Sartre would be a useful common reading source, Ed. > > > > > > > > > http://blog.exre.org/wp-content/uploads/Sartre_The_Imaginary__A_Phenom > enological_Psychology_of_the_Imagination.pdf > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > >> It make sense for the questions to differ, Ed, or at least the > > >> way > they > > >> are posed. Finding a common foundation will take a lot of > communication > > >> (which will require a lot of imagination!). > > >> mike > > >> > > >> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 6:04 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > >> > > >>> Mike > > >>> > > >>> I assume you have read Sartre on imagination; i.e. The > Imagination. > > >>> This gives what he considers a phenomenological take on imagination. > > >>> However, I would consider a much more revealing take to be that > > >>> of > > Edward > > >>> Casey in Imaging (I am hoping that book you referenced will > supplement > > that > > >>> of Casey). The connection to Kant, by the way, critically > > >>> preceded > > that of > > >>> Mzerleau-Ponty and Sartre and that is why I was surprised to not > > >>> see > > him > > >>> mentioned. > > >>> > > >>> I agree that we all seem to be coming out in, more or less, > > >>> the same place. Only the questions seem to differ. > > >>> > > >>> Ed > > >>> > > >>>> On Dec 7, 2015, at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>> Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity given > > >>>> that > we > > >>>> started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I > > indicated > > >>> in > > >>>> my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life > > >>>> through > my > > >>>> teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas > > >>>> drawn > from > > >>>> psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and > activity-centered > > >>>> research practices. But here I am. > > >>>> > > >>>> So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my > > >>> understanding. > > >>>> > > >>>> I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the > > >>>> description > of > > >>> the > > >>>> flow from imagination to representation, but glad to encounter > > >>>> a > > dozen! > > >>>> Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the > > abstractions > > >>> can > > >>>> be seen, seem hard to come by. > > >>>> > > >>>> My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by > > >>>> identifying different threads of the topic they constitute was > offered > > >>> with > > >>>> that goal in mind. > > >>>> > > >>>> The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is > > >>>> about > it. > > I > > >>>> learned that from the Russians who write about imagination. > > >>>> > > >>>> Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6? > > >>>> > > >>>> etc? > > >>>> > > >>>> To the extent that these different traditions lead people to > > >>>> the > same > > >>> kinds > > >>>> of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the > > >>>> conclusions > are > > >>>> tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, > sometimes, > > in > > >>>> good teaching. > > >>>> > > >>>> mike > > >>>> > > >>>> mike > > >>>> > > >>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>> Larry and Mike > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to > > >>>>> both > of > > >>> you > > >>>>> in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a > > >>> conversation > > >>>>> that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably > > >>>>> good, > but > > >>> it is > > >>>>> a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little > > >>>>> larger > > than > > >>> what > > >>>>> I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that I > > >>>>> need > > to, > > >>> one > > >>>>> might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that bear > > >>>>> on > > the, > > >>>>> perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will reread > it). I > > >>>>> found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a > > >>>>> large > > grain > > >>> size > > >>>>> (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look at > > >>> things). A > > >>>>> few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms > > >>>>> and are > > >>> offered > > >>>>> in the hope that they might be useful. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> 1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; > > >>>>> however, looking at how words are used (a philosophy of > > >>>>> language, so to > speak) > > >>> often > > >>>>> does a better job of opening things up. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> 2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did not > > >>>>> make > > >>> your > > >>>>> list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to > > >>>>> mention Avicenna. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> 3. I have the impression you are using the term ?stable? > > >>>>> as a somewhat replacement of Vygotsky?s concrete; I like that > > >>>>> as > > ?concrete' > > >>>>> seems to have very different meanings for different people. I > > >>>>> will > > try > > >>> to > > >>>>> use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in my > > replies > > >>>>> tooters. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> 4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of Hellen > > >>> Keller. I > > >>>>> wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a > > >>>>> thin gap > > is > > >>>>> because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a > suspicion > > >>> that > > >>>>> he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I am > fairly > > >>> sure > > >>>>> Keller was. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> 5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than too > > >>>>> thin although the metaphor of filling still seems reasonable > > >>>>> > > >>>>> 6. In a way you don?t seem to quite come out and say it > > >>>>> (or I missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is > > >>>>> not > necessarily > > >>>>> creative and I would add that it is quite everyday. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as they > occur. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Ed > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 4:41 PM, Lplarry > wrote: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and > > >>>>>> re(present) > > our > > >>>>> notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a > metaphor > > >>> not > > >>>>> error. > > >>>>>> Ed, > > >>>>>> To continue with your reflection if image has some relation > > >>>>>> to how > > >>>>> others use text. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Actually I don?t think image has some relation to how others > > >>>>> use > > text. > > >>> I > > >>>>> twas speculating as whether there is some commonality between > > >>>>> how > > Mike > > >>> is > > >>>>> using using image and how others are using text. I said this > because > > I > > >>>>> struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary in > > >>> mathematics > > >>>>> and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to > problems > > >>> that > > >>>>> presently catch my attention. > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In > > >>>>>> other > > words > > >>>>> can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The > physical > > >>>>> gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of > > >>>>> letters > > on > > >>> the > > >>>>> page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or > > >>>>> the > > visual > > >>>>> marks making a circle-like shape. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size > > >>>>> is too > > >>> large. > > >>>>> That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I > > >>>>> now > > >>> realize > > >>>>> was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to > > >>>>> view imagination. I don?t mean your perspective is lacking; it > > >>>>> just > seems > > to > > >>>>> result in different questions than I would/do ask. > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> These different physical forms are not the foundational > > >>>>>> bedrock, > > they > > >>>>> are the material. > > >>>>>> If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on parchment > > >>>>>> but > as > > >>>>> having a deeper process, > > >>>>>> Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual > > perceptions > > >>>>> but rather having a deeper process. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> My initial reaction is ?Why are you saying this?" If I ever > > >>>>> thought > > the > > >>>>> contrary, I can?t remember. This is just common sense. The > > interesting > > >>>>> thing about what you say is that you seem to using ?imagine? > > >>>>> in a > > non > > >>>>> visual fashion which was largely my initial point. > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> All the senses share in this process and engage with > > >>>>>> physically > > >>>>> experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is > > >>>>> that > > >>> unifying > > >>>>> process that includes all the senses but is not itself the senses. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> I would say that all senses can participate in this process. > > >>>>> Also physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too > > >>>>> strong > although > > >>>>> physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints of > > >>>>> a > sort > > on > > >>>>> imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I > > >>>>> don?t physically experience a platonic circle. > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the > collated > > >>>>> pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a > > dialogue, > > >>> to > > >>>>> imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly > > >>>>> have a unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the > > >>>>> vital > animating > > >>>>> process lived (into). > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Here is where my example wasn?t helpful. I did not mean one ?sees' > > the > > >>>>> marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks > > >>>>> is too > > >>> large a > > >>>>> grain size) on the board as having certain properties > > >>>>> consistent > with > > >>> those > > >>>>> of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a > > >>>>> sort > of > > >>> sense. > > >>>>> The teacher?s language seems to prove the imaging and the > > >>>>> moving to > > new > > >>>>> stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people > > >>>>> don?t > > make > > >>> the > > >>>>> leaps. > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy of > > >>>>>> the > > >>> visual > > >>>>> sense. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none of > > >>>>> the > > >>> sensory > > >>>>> modes > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> The relation of this image process to the language process is > > >>>>>> also > > >>>>> multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> This doesn?t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, > > >>>>> doesn?t > > >>> follow > > >>>>> for me. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable > > >>>>> perspective. It > is > > >>> just > > >>>>> one that, to a degree, I either don?t share or seems to be the > wrong > > >>> grain > > >>>>> size. > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > > >>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > > >>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM > > >>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Mike > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> My wondering has more to do with your focus on the > > >>>>>> visual > and > > >>> my > > >>>>> examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be > > >>>>> about the > > >>> visual. > > >>>>> However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well > > >>>>> drawn) > > is > > >>> a > > >>>>> ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at > > >>>>> least, > it > > >>> never > > >>>>> was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. > > >>>>> In > > fact, > > >>>>> assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I > > >>>>> can > > >>> imagine it > > >>>>> (smile). > > >>>>>> On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term > > >>>>>> ?image? in > > >>> the > > >>>>> way some use the word ?text.? That is, to take into account > > >>>>> both > > >>> external > > >>>>> and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of > > >>>>> what > you > > >>> say > > >>>>> resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am > > >>>>> finding > that > > >>>>> peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Ed > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 2:35 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of > > >>> Zinchenko's > > >>>>>>> experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual > system > > >>> that > > >>>>>>> prevented stabilized images from disappearing. He stabilized > > >>>>>>> the > > >>> image > > >>>>>>> (here reified as a projection on the retina) but changed its > color, > > >>> thus > > >>>>>>> defeating the retina's tendency to go grey. In those > > >>>>>>> conditions, > > eye > > >>>>>>> movements continue to trace the spatial coordinates of the > > >>>>>>> image > as > > >>> if > > >>>>> it > > >>>>>>> were continuing to "feel it." > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> These are very special circumstances, to be sure, but for > > >>>>>>> they > make > > >>> it > > >>>>>>> clear that what is called an image is a process (according > > >>>>>>> to > > >>> Suvorov, > > >>>>> of > > >>>>>>> stepping away from the world and then stepping back into it, > > >>>>>>> but > > >>> then he > > >>>>>>> was blind and deaf). > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> What we designate as "the image" is some form of > > >>>>>>> materialized > > >>>>> stabilization > > >>>>>>> of the flow of into-image-making. Some structure in the flow > > >>>>>>> of > the > > >>>>> always > > >>>>>>> new. From just the blink of an eye to our image of the > > >>>>>>> statue of > > >>>>> liberty. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> This is an old idea but it fits with my intuition. I first > > >>> encountered > > >>>>> it > > >>>>>>> reading Dewey who refers to "the poet" on the topic of > experience. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> *Yet all experience is an arch wherehrough / Gleams that > untraveled > > >>>>> world > > >>>>>>> whose margin fades / Forever and forever when I move. * > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> *Tennyson, Ulysses* > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> If you are interested, we could try to synch re/reading of > > >>>>>>> some > > core > > >>>>> common > > >>>>>>> articles/chapters. This entire area of concern is of recent > vintage > > >>> for > > >>>>> me > > >>>>>>> and my ignorance is particularly keenly felt. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:02 PM, Ed Wall > wrote: > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> Mike > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the > privileging > > >>> of > > >>>>>>>> the ?image? in discussions of imagination. Additionally, > although > > it > > >>>>> has > > >>>>>>>> been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don?t > > >>>>>>>> think it > > was > > >>>>> of the > > >>>>>>>> Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw on > > >>>>>>>> would > > >>>>> disagree > > >>>>>>>> with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics. > > >>>>>>>> I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems > useful! - > > >>>>> and > > >>>>>>>> I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a > > >>>>>>>> huge > > >>> emphasis > > >>>>> in > > >>>>>>>> mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking > > >>>>>>>> less > > about > > >>>>> the > > >>>>>>>> ?imaginal? than you or Larry. That doesn?t mean that what > > >>>>>>>> you > and > > >>>>> Larry are > > >>>>>>>> talking about might not usefully factor in especially your > > >>>>>>>> point > > >>> about > > >>>>>>>> joint, mediated, activity. > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> Ed > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 11:11 AM, mike cole > wrote: > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et > > >>>>>>>>> al > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic > > >>>>>>>>> beginnings > > >>> builds > > >>>>> off > > >>>>>>>> of > > >>>>>>>>> the already highly functional sensory system. Assume > > >>>>>>>>> vision as > > the > > >>>>>>>> sensory > > >>>>>>>>> system in question. We know that in an important sense, > > >>>>>>>>> the > > >>> "simple" > > >>>>> act > > >>>>>>>> of > > >>>>>>>>> seeing what you might call a common object, for example > > >>>>>>>>> your > car > > in > > >>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>> driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves > temporal > > >>> and > > >>>>>>>>> spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement > > >>>>>>>>> that > > >>> must > > >>>>> be > > >>>>>>>>> resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the > > >>>>>>>>> process of > > >>> image > > >>>>>>>>> formation ceases to function. > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for > > >>>>>>>>> that > > >>>>> simplified > > >>>>>>>>> account. In thinking about imagination I turn to > > >>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets, > > >>>>> Zinchenko > > >>>>>>>> and > > >>>>>>>>> non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of > > >>>>>>>>> enactive perception/cognition. It is also consistent with > > >>>>>>>>> joint, > mediated, > > >>>>>>>> activity > > >>>>>>>>> as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go. > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic > function > > >>> and > > >>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>> human possibility for symbolic communication is > > >>>>>>>>> co-incident and co-constitutive of distinctly human imagination. > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> in brief > > >>>>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Ed, mike, Michael, > > >>>>>>>>>> I will push my question to an earlier time period. > > >>>>>>>>>> Age 2 months. > > >>>>>>>>>> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces > > >>>>>>>>>> her.own > > >>> activity . > > >>>>>>>>>> Question > > >>>>>>>>>> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, > > >>>>>>>>>> moving > > >>> into > > >>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? > > >>>>>>>>>> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic > origin? > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > > >>>>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > > >>>>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM > > >>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Larry > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be > > >>>>>>>>>> inclusive > or > > >>>>>>>>>> exclusive. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to > > >>>>>>>>>> make > sense > > >>> if > > >>>>>>>> I > > >>>>>>>>>> understand Vygotsky correctly. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? > perhaps > > I > > >>>>>>>>>> wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely > > >>>>>>>>>> understood > the > > >>>>>>>> tendency to > > >>>>>>>>>> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow > > >>>>>>>> extra-concrete. > > >>>>>>>>>> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural > > historical > > >>>>>>>> context > > >>>>>>>>>> and at a certain stage of development people act as if > > >>>>>>>>>> certain > > >>> things > > >>>>>>>> are > > >>>>>>>>>> ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever > > >>>>>>>>>> that > > >>> is?). > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> I?m not quite sure where you are going with the > > >>>>>>>>>> development > of > > >>>>>>>>>> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you > > >>>>>>>>>> mean > > >>> when > > >>>>>>>>>> you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My > answer, > > >>>>>>>> perhaps, > > >>>>>>>>>> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or > fantasy > > >>> in > > >>>>>>>>>> your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your > > >>>>>>>>>> final > > >>> question. > > >>>>> An > > >>>>>>>>>> approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine > > >>>>>>>>>> other possibilities (smile). > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Ed > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> Ed, > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> The title imagination (or) fantasy Is different from > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. > > >>>>>>>>>>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a > > >>>>> distanciation?) > > >>>>>>>>>> and return to the mathematical concrete. > > >>>>>>>>>>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this > > >>>>>>>>>>> transfer > from > > >>> the > > >>>>>>>>>> physical to the mathematical? > > >>>>>>>>>>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged > > >>>>>>>>>>> in > > >>> historical > > >>>>>>>>>> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the > > >>>>>>>>>> physical > > >>>>> (concrete) > > >>>>>>>>>> which exists prior to the human understanding and the > > mathematical > > >>>>>>>>>> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging > within > > >>> the > > >>>>>>>>>> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? > > >>>>>>>>>>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. > > >>>>>>>>>>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical > > >>>>>>>>>>> which > > >>>>> originates > > >>>>>>>> as > > >>>>>>>>>> concrete. > > >>>>>>>>>>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. > > >>>>>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and > fantasy. > > >>> Does > > >>>>> one > > >>>>>>>>>> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other > > >>>>>>>>>> implies the > > >>> actual > > >>>>>>>> can > > >>>>>>>>>> be mapped onto the physical with systems? > > >>>>>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? > > >>>>>>>>>>> Larry > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > > >>>>>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > > >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM > > >>>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> All > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of > > >>>>> imagination > > >>>>>>>>>> that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? > > >>> ?let,? or > > >>>>>>>>>> ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different > > >>> statements > > >>>>>>>>>> although, under certain circumstances, might be the > > >>>>>>>>>> same.? In > > >>> doing > > >>>>> so I > > >>>>>>>>>> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination > > >>>>>>>>>> and > > >>>>> Creativity > > >>>>>>>> in > > >>>>>>>>>> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic > > >>>>>>>>>> for > > >>>>> imagination > > >>>>>>>> that > > >>>>>>>>>> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract > > >>>>>>>>>> is > only > > >>> an > > >>>>>>>>>> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of > > >>>>>>>>>> development, > > only a > > >>>>> pass > > >>>>>>>> in > > >>>>>>>>>> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our > > >>>>>>>>>> point of > > >>> view, > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed > from a > > >>>>> given > > >>>>>>>>>> concrete toward a new concrete.? > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous > > >>> discussion > > >>>>>>>>>> on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in > that I > > >>> am > > >>>>>>>>>> wondering whether part of what is going on is that > > >>>>>>>>>> children > are > > >>> being > > >>>>>>>> asked > > >>>>>>>>>> to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this > > >>>>>>>>>> join > > the > > >>>>>>>>>> elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious > > >>>>>>>>>> (if > > >>>>> somebody > > >>>>>>>> is > > >>>>>>>>>> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason > > >>>>>>>>>> for > my > > >>>>>>>> wondering > > >>>>>>>>>> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. > > there > > >>>>> is no > > >>>>>>>>>> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get > > >>>>>>>>>> stuck, so > to > > >>>>> speak, > > >>>>>>>> in > > >>>>>>>>>> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am > wondering > > >>>>> about > > >>>>>>>> and > > >>>>>>>>>> then a question. > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> My first example: It is possible that we would all > > >>>>>>>>>>> agree > that > > to > > >>>>> see > > >>>>>>>>>> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no > > >>>>>>>>>> such > > >>> thing. > > >>>>> In a > > >>>>>>>>>> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root > > >>>>>>>>>> of > two > > >>> is > > >>>>> not > > >>>>>>>> a > > >>>>>>>>>> fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two > > >>>>>>>>>> is a > > >>>>> fraction.? > > >>>>>>>>>> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it > > >>>>>>>>>> is > true > > >>> and > > >>>>> then > > >>>>>>>>>> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is > > >>>>>>>>>> perhaps > > another > > >>>>>>>>>> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete > > through > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through > > contradiction) > > >>>>>>>> seems to > > >>>>>>>>>> be very hard for people to do. > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > >>> draws > > >>>>>>>>>> something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? > > >>>>>>>>>> She > then > > >>>>> draws a > > >>>>>>>>>> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object > > >>>>>>>>>> and > says, > > >>>>> "This > > >>>>>>>> is > > >>>>>>>>>> its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle > > >>>>>>>>>> (waving > > her > > >>>>> hand > > >>>>>>>> at > > >>>>>>>>>> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? > > >>> None > > >>>>> of > > >>>>>>>> this > > >>>>>>>>>> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. > Each > > >>> step > > >>>>>>>> here > > >>>>>>>>>> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the > > concrete. > > >>>>> (Hmm > > >>>>>>>> , I > > >>>>>>>>>> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to > > >>>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>> mathematical > > >>>>>>>>>> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the > > >>>>>>>>>>> consequences of > a > > >>>>> winged > > >>>>>>>>>> horse]. > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify > > >>>>>>>>>>> imagination > with > > >>>>>>>>>> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what > > >>>>>>>>>> would > > >>> Vygotsky > > >>>>>>>> have > > >>>>>>>>>> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or > something > > >>> else? > > >>>>>>>> There > > >>>>>>>>>> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m > > >>> interested in > > >>>>>>>> your > > >>>>>>>>>> take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> Ed Wall > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> -- > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural > > >>>>>>>>> science > with > > >>> an > > >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> -- > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science > > >>>>>>> with > > an > > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> -- > > >>>> > > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science > > >>>> with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > >> -- > > >> > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with > > >> an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with > > > an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Dec 13 16:29:40 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Sun, 13 Dec 2015 16:29:40 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Connecting and stability In-Reply-To: References: <566cda19.cf40620a.79833.ffffcf75@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <566e0d83.039d420a.37975.ffff8611@mx.google.com> Annalisa, What held my attention was the notion that speech be understood for the quality it gives to the listener of the speech . The meaning resides in how the speaker appeals to the listener to stabilize THIS meaning the speaker is sharing. In other words the meaning resides in the manner the listener or hearer takes up and stabilizes what the speaker is inviting the listener to notice and focus on.. With this notion the intension shifts to the hearer stabilizing what the speaker projects. The verb's meaning resides in how the listener takes up the speaker's use of language which is intended in order for the listener to realize stable meaning. The focus is no longer on self-identifying expression, but shifts to how the speaker intends the listener to grasp meaning as that embodied in the space of shared language. The focus shifts to the listener taking up the others language game and coming to realize shared meaning.. I am indicating a different location where meaning resides. -----Original Message----- From: "Annalisa Aguilar" Sent: ?2015-?12-?13 4:00 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Connecting and stability Hi Larry and others, Is, as a verb is not like other verbs, which have to do with action. I'm not a linguist, but off the top, I don't think there is a verb that doesn't have to do with action other than "to be." At least in English. We use "becoming" to signify change, but the infinitive "to be" is a pointer to Existence. We don't say I become an eater, or I become a sleeper, or I become a writer, even though that has some truth to it (i'm not born a writer), it's not how we speak. I am an eater, I am a sleeper, I am a writer. Become is its own verb, isn't it? "to become," is a marriage of the word Be and Come. If Become where the word for Be, then that would make the game here really different. But Be comes before Become, linguistically and existentially! :) So with that in mind, Is is more of a signifier of existence and the noun that accompanies Is takes the particular shape that reflects Is-ness. Like the pot depends upon clay for its existence. If you remove the clay from the pot, the pot no longer exists. If you smash the pot, the clay remains, thus the pot depends upon clay to exist. I depend upon Being to exist. Of course I've been thinking also about unicorns! I believe I can explain why this definition of Being works even in the imaginary sense. (Which is to say Being is not a category of the mind in the absolute sense of Being, that all there is to Being is a cognitive category, therefore there is nothing to Being but a logical or categorical container in speech and thought, which is the same as saying Being arises from Mind, "I think, therefore I am"). Getting back to unicorns! We can say that the is-ness of the horse and the is-ness of the horn combine in the imagination, and thus unicorn is. Thus the material of the unicorn, which does not exist in the world we live in, is identical to the material of the imagination, which is the material of the Mind. But this does not stop at the Mind. Because the material of the unicorn is no different than the material of the memory of what I ate for dinner last night, or imagining walking on the boardwalk right now while I'm sitting in front of this screen. Just like other imaginations, for imaginary objects, the Is-ness is as-if borrowed from horse-ness and horn-ness, which do exist in the world. It is not possible to create an imagination of things we do not know about. Imaginations (and dreams) are always of the things we have known before, even if it is superficial knowledge. So the existence of unicorns depends upon the material of all imaginary objects, the material of the mind. This still supports the notion that Being comes before Mind. And that Mind is dependent upon Being, not the other way around. Also, Being is not something limited to sentient creatures, but is unlimited, the entire world sits in existence. That is why we can experience the existence of inanimate or insentient objects: the mountain is, the sky is, the ocean is, and since mind is in the world, the unicorn is. The problem is that we can't know what that Being is that makes existence possible for everything else. It's not knowable. And this has nothing to do with believing in a God or not believing, but that there is a limit to what we as humans can know, and that Being, that which pervades all beingness, all names and forms, responsible for the existence all that is here, is one of those things we will never be able to know explicitly. If we were to assert that Being is a product (a category) of Mind, then we are back to Decartes's dualism. When you say that "in the end" there is a final division (of two) and "that's just the way it is", then we can justify hierarchies, we can justify slavery, we can justify class, and so on. "Slavery is just the way it is." "Inequality is just the way it is." I just can't accept that. If we say really that all that is here is Existence, but the multiplicity of objects we experience are just different forms and manifestations of Existence(Being), then we can find the commonality among us despite differences, we can justify our feelings of oneness with Nature, Love for another, Compassion for strangers, etc. I prefer the latter over the former: Difference in this case becomes incidental and ornamental, while similarities are fundamental. So I think there is a fundamental ethical reason to see Being before Mind from this standpoint. Kind regards, Annalisa P.S. I've pulled out On the Soul by Aristotle from my shelf, because I am curious about his take on the Soul, because it is quite apparent that he does not see Soul as limited to Mind, like Hegel did. The Soul for Aristotle is the life-force, or sentiency. In Vedic thought there is the concept of Prana, which is also identical to life-force, something entering from the outside of the gross body, Prana is an aspect of the subtle body, but what gives life to the gross body and which leaves at death. This not analogously different from electricity passing through a lightbulb and when the electricity is there, the light shines, when it is absent the bulb is dark. The electricity is like the subtle body, the bulb the gross body. From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Dec 13 16:59:06 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 13 Dec 2015 16:59:06 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <000c01d13602$d3281930$79784b90$@att.net> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> <05AB59E5-018D-4FF2-92BE-06619D1F95B8@umich.edu> <1BD78C04-64EA-4C74-BDDB-4723D6312EAF@umich.edu> <000c01d13602$d3281930$79784b90$@att.net> Message-ID: Thank you for this, Peg. The little I have read of her work, including the excerpt in the NY Review of Books of her new book, makes her sound amazing. I am fascinated by the processes through which imagination builds into fantasy which seems an endless playground. At the same time, I am more and more impressed with the centrality of imagination in the most mundane of our interactions in the world. It seems to sit at the heart of the process of various psycho-cultural-social contructivisms. Vivian Paley comes to mind very often as I read the interesting places that participants are carrying the discussion. She writes about practices where the two forms of imagination, intersect. Always interesting. mike I know that somewhere in the thread there On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 4:03 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: > This 2015 Nobel Laureate for Literature lecture strikes me as pertinent to > this imagination discussion. She is an amazing woman and here addresses > issues familiar maybe tanatalizing for this list, I think. > > http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2015/alexievich-lecture_en.html > It begins this way: " I do not stand alone at this podium ... There are > voices around me, hundreds of voices. They have always been with me, since > childhood. I grew up in the countryside...} > Peg > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw > Lloyd > Sent: Wednesday, December 09, 2015 12:12 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > Perhaps the challenge will get easier if you keep piling up the > references, Mike. :) > > So, I have persevered with reading, skipping and scanning Lovejoy's "The > Great Chain of Being" and have come away with a few pages of notes, and > some edification (22nd printing, 2001, Harvard University Press). > > With respect to the valorisation of imagination, Lovejoy identifies > Schleirmacher as an early proponent of the merits of the development of > imagination (although one could say that this is implicit in the platonic > ideas which concern the book as a whole). (p. 309) > > With respect to the origins of the idea of a cell (urbild), he identifies > Robinet as a rather eclectic proponent of the idea (p. 279), which again is > derived from the history of the ideas of absolute perfection (of god), the > principle of plentitude and the principle of continuity. He also > attributes to Robinet that "fundamental reality in nature for him is not > matter but l'avtivite". (p. 281) > > On a more down to regular strain on the imagination, regarding my > assertion early of cognate terms (imagination, orientation etc), my > reckoning is that orientation determines the scope and nature of > interpretation. > > Not so long ago, I noticed some apparently new developments in our eldest > child's formulations (4y6). We were talking about how to make papier mache > objects, which took me back to making a papier mache 'pig' with the help of > a balloon. In response to this he volunteered that the balloon would have > to be burst with a pencil once it had been covered. I think it was the day > before this that he pronounced that the ugly duckling's egg must have been > laid by a swan. It seemed to me that that these articulations indicated > that he was using a relatively new idea which was helping him to > imaginatively understand these situations (an idea of process). I am > fairly sure that these solutions were not supplied beforehand. > > Best, > Huw > > > On 9 December 2015 at 03:59, mike cole wrote: > > > The Casey site looks amazing and of course very relevant, Ed. Thanks. > > > > When I first read Sartre many years ago, I was totally unprepared to > > take in what he was saying. I had not way to "digest it." > > > > Reading into the electronic copy I sent around yesterday, I could see > > that it is inappropriate for me to refer to what I do as > > phenomenology. It is just a kind of intuitive reflection on my > > experiences and thoughts. No Husserl, no Sartre. Just unschooled > > introspection that I seek to verify through acquiring evidence that > > there is more than total idiosyncrasy to what my musings. > > > > I feel as if I need to download all the sources of inquiry we have > > unearthed in the last few days and retreat to a place with no > > communication with the world for a few weeks just to take them, in. !! > > mike > > > > On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:39 AM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > > > Mike > > > > > > There are, perhaps, some shortcomings in portions of Sartre > > > work > > on > > > imagination to which Casey supplies some useful modifications. Also > > > it > > is a > > > bit long. Take a look at Edward Casey?s web site: < > > > http://edwardscasey.com/?page_id=13>. Many of those articles on > > > imagination seem downloadable and besides possibly whetting one?s > > appetite > > > for Sartre might be interesting in themselves. Perhaps you could > > > pick one that most interests you and provides, from your vantage, a > > > useful common, and modestly short reading source. I would, of > > > course, recommend Casey?s book, but isn?t freely available. > > > > > > Ed > > > > > > > On Dec 7, 2015, at 9:44 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > So maybe Sartre would be a useful common reading source, Ed. > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://blog.exre.org/wp-content/uploads/Sartre_The_Imaginary__A_Phenom > > enological_Psychology_of_the_Imagination.pdf > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > >> It make sense for the questions to differ, Ed, or at least the > > > >> way > > they > > > >> are posed. Finding a common foundation will take a lot of > > communication > > > >> (which will require a lot of imagination!). > > > >> mike > > > >> > > > >> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 6:04 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > >> > > > >>> Mike > > > >>> > > > >>> I assume you have read Sartre on imagination; i.e. The > > Imagination. > > > >>> This gives what he considers a phenomenological take on > imagination. > > > >>> However, I would consider a much more revealing take to be that > > > >>> of > > > Edward > > > >>> Casey in Imaging (I am hoping that book you referenced will > > supplement > > > that > > > >>> of Casey). The connection to Kant, by the way, critically > > > >>> preceded > > > that of > > > >>> Mzerleau-Ponty and Sartre and that is why I was surprised to not > > > >>> see > > > him > > > >>> mentioned. > > > >>> > > > >>> I agree that we all seem to be coming out in, more or less, > > > >>> the same place. Only the questions seem to differ. > > > >>> > > > >>> Ed > > > >>> > > > >>>> On Dec 7, 2015, at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity given > > > >>>> that > > we > > > >>>> started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I > > > indicated > > > >>> in > > > >>>> my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life > > > >>>> through > > my > > > >>>> teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas > > > >>>> drawn > > from > > > >>>> psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and > > activity-centered > > > >>>> research practices. But here I am. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my > > > >>> understanding. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the > > > >>>> description > > of > > > >>> the > > > >>>> flow from imagination to representation, but glad to encounter > > > >>>> a > > > dozen! > > > >>>> Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the > > > abstractions > > > >>> can > > > >>>> be seen, seem hard to come by. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by > > > >>>> identifying different threads of the topic they constitute was > > offered > > > >>> with > > > >>>> that goal in mind. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is > > > >>>> about > > it. > > > I > > > >>>> learned that from the Russians who write about imagination. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> etc? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> To the extent that these different traditions lead people to > > > >>>> the > > same > > > >>> kinds > > > >>>> of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the > > > >>>> conclusions > > are > > > >>>> tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, > > sometimes, > > > in > > > >>>> good teaching. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> mike > > > >>>> > > > >>>> mike > > > >>>> > > > >>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> Larry and Mike > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to > > > >>>>> both > > of > > > >>> you > > > >>>>> in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a > > > >>> conversation > > > >>>>> that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably > > > >>>>> good, > > but > > > >>> it is > > > >>>>> a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little > > > >>>>> larger > > > than > > > >>> what > > > >>>>> I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that I > > > >>>>> need > > > to, > > > >>> one > > > >>>>> might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that bear > > > >>>>> on > > > the, > > > >>>>> perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will reread > > it). I > > > >>>>> found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a > > > >>>>> large > > > grain > > > >>> size > > > >>>>> (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look at > > > >>> things). A > > > >>>>> few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms > > > >>>>> and are > > > >>> offered > > > >>>>> in the hope that they might be useful. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; > > > >>>>> however, looking at how words are used (a philosophy of > > > >>>>> language, so to > > speak) > > > >>> often > > > >>>>> does a better job of opening things up. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did not > > > >>>>> make > > > >>> your > > > >>>>> list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to > > > >>>>> mention Avicenna. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 3. I have the impression you are using the term ?stable? > > > >>>>> as a somewhat replacement of Vygotsky?s concrete; I like that > > > >>>>> as > > > ?concrete' > > > >>>>> seems to have very different meanings for different people. I > > > >>>>> will > > > try > > > >>> to > > > >>>>> use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in my > > > replies > > > >>>>> tooters. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of Hellen > > > >>> Keller. I > > > >>>>> wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a > > > >>>>> thin gap > > > is > > > >>>>> because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a > > suspicion > > > >>> that > > > >>>>> he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I am > > fairly > > > >>> sure > > > >>>>> Keller was. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than too > > > >>>>> thin although the metaphor of filling still seems reasonable > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 6. In a way you don?t seem to quite come out and say it > > > >>>>> (or I missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is > > > >>>>> not > > necessarily > > > >>>>> creative and I would add that it is quite everyday. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as they > > occur. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Ed > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 4:41 PM, Lplarry > > wrote: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and > > > >>>>>> re(present) > > > our > > > >>>>> notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a > > metaphor > > > >>> not > > > >>>>> error. > > > >>>>>> Ed, > > > >>>>>> To continue with your reflection if image has some relation > > > >>>>>> to how > > > >>>>> others use text. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Actually I don?t think image has some relation to how others > > > >>>>> use > > > text. > > > >>> I > > > >>>>> twas speculating as whether there is some commonality between > > > >>>>> how > > > Mike > > > >>> is > > > >>>>> using using image and how others are using text. I said this > > because > > > I > > > >>>>> struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary in > > > >>> mathematics > > > >>>>> and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to > > problems > > > >>> that > > > >>>>> presently catch my attention. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In > > > >>>>>> other > > > words > > > >>>>> can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The > > physical > > > >>>>> gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of > > > >>>>> letters > > > on > > > >>> the > > > >>>>> page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or > > > >>>>> the > > > visual > > > >>>>> marks making a circle-like shape. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size > > > >>>>> is too > > > >>> large. > > > >>>>> That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I > > > >>>>> now > > > >>> realize > > > >>>>> was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to > > > >>>>> view imagination. I don?t mean your perspective is lacking; it > > > >>>>> just > > seems > > > to > > > >>>>> result in different questions than I would/do ask. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> These different physical forms are not the foundational > > > >>>>>> bedrock, > > > they > > > >>>>> are the material. > > > >>>>>> If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on parchment > > > >>>>>> but > > as > > > >>>>> having a deeper process, > > > >>>>>> Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual > > > perceptions > > > >>>>> but rather having a deeper process. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> My initial reaction is ?Why are you saying this?" If I ever > > > >>>>> thought > > > the > > > >>>>> contrary, I can?t remember. This is just common sense. The > > > interesting > > > >>>>> thing about what you say is that you seem to using ?imagine? > > > >>>>> in a > > > non > > > >>>>> visual fashion which was largely my initial point. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> All the senses share in this process and engage with > > > >>>>>> physically > > > >>>>> experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is > > > >>>>> that > > > >>> unifying > > > >>>>> process that includes all the senses but is not itself the > senses. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> I would say that all senses can participate in this process. > > > >>>>> Also physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too > > > >>>>> strong > > although > > > >>>>> physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints of > > > >>>>> a > > sort > > > on > > > >>>>> imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I > > > >>>>> don?t physically experience a platonic circle. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the > > collated > > > >>>>> pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a > > > dialogue, > > > >>> to > > > >>>>> imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly > > > >>>>> have a unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the > > > >>>>> vital > > animating > > > >>>>> process lived (into). > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Here is where my example wasn?t helpful. I did not mean one > ?sees' > > > the > > > >>>>> marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks > > > >>>>> is too > > > >>> large a > > > >>>>> grain size) on the board as having certain properties > > > >>>>> consistent > > with > > > >>> those > > > >>>>> of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a > > > >>>>> sort > > of > > > >>> sense. > > > >>>>> The teacher?s language seems to prove the imaging and the > > > >>>>> moving to > > > new > > > >>>>> stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people > > > >>>>> don?t > > > make > > > >>> the > > > >>>>> leaps. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy of > > > >>>>>> the > > > >>> visual > > > >>>>> sense. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none of > > > >>>>> the > > > >>> sensory > > > >>>>> modes > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> The relation of this image process to the language process is > > > >>>>>> also > > > >>>>> multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> This doesn?t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, > > > >>>>> doesn?t > > > >>> follow > > > >>>>> for me. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable > > > >>>>> perspective. It > > is > > > >>> just > > > >>>>> one that, to a degree, I either don?t share or seems to be the > > wrong > > > >>> grain > > > >>>>> size. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > > > >>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > > > >>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM > > > >>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Mike > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> My wondering has more to do with your focus on the > > > >>>>>> visual > > and > > > >>> my > > > >>>>> examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be > > > >>>>> about the > > > >>> visual. > > > >>>>> However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well > > > >>>>> drawn) > > > is > > > >>> a > > > >>>>> ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at > > > >>>>> least, > > it > > > >>> never > > > >>>>> was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. > > > >>>>> In > > > fact, > > > >>>>> assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I > > > >>>>> can > > > >>> imagine it > > > >>>>> (smile). > > > >>>>>> On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term > > > >>>>>> ?image? in > > > >>> the > > > >>>>> way some use the word ?text.? That is, to take into account > > > >>>>> both > > > >>> external > > > >>>>> and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of > > > >>>>> what > > you > > > >>> say > > > >>>>> resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am > > > >>>>> finding > > that > > > >>>>> peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Ed > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 2:35 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of > > > >>> Zinchenko's > > > >>>>>>> experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual > > system > > > >>> that > > > >>>>>>> prevented stabilized images from disappearing. He stabilized > > > >>>>>>> the > > > >>> image > > > >>>>>>> (here reified as a projection on the retina) but changed its > > color, > > > >>> thus > > > >>>>>>> defeating the retina's tendency to go grey. In those > > > >>>>>>> conditions, > > > eye > > > >>>>>>> movements continue to trace the spatial coordinates of the > > > >>>>>>> image > > as > > > >>> if > > > >>>>> it > > > >>>>>>> were continuing to "feel it." > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> These are very special circumstances, to be sure, but for > > > >>>>>>> they > > make > > > >>> it > > > >>>>>>> clear that what is called an image is a process (according > > > >>>>>>> to > > > >>> Suvorov, > > > >>>>> of > > > >>>>>>> stepping away from the world and then stepping back into it, > > > >>>>>>> but > > > >>> then he > > > >>>>>>> was blind and deaf). > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> What we designate as "the image" is some form of > > > >>>>>>> materialized > > > >>>>> stabilization > > > >>>>>>> of the flow of into-image-making. Some structure in the flow > > > >>>>>>> of > > the > > > >>>>> always > > > >>>>>>> new. From just the blink of an eye to our image of the > > > >>>>>>> statue of > > > >>>>> liberty. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> This is an old idea but it fits with my intuition. I first > > > >>> encountered > > > >>>>> it > > > >>>>>>> reading Dewey who refers to "the poet" on the topic of > > experience. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> *Yet all experience is an arch wherehrough / Gleams that > > untraveled > > > >>>>> world > > > >>>>>>> whose margin fades / Forever and forever when I move. * > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> *Tennyson, Ulysses* > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> If you are interested, we could try to synch re/reading of > > > >>>>>>> some > > > core > > > >>>>> common > > > >>>>>>> articles/chapters. This entire area of concern is of recent > > vintage > > > >>> for > > > >>>>> me > > > >>>>>>> and my ignorance is particularly keenly felt. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:02 PM, Ed Wall > > wrote: > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> Mike > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the > > privileging > > > >>> of > > > >>>>>>>> the ?image? in discussions of imagination. Additionally, > > although > > > it > > > >>>>> has > > > >>>>>>>> been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don?t > > > >>>>>>>> think it > > > was > > > >>>>> of the > > > >>>>>>>> Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw on > > > >>>>>>>> would > > > >>>>> disagree > > > >>>>>>>> with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics. > > > >>>>>>>> I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems > > useful! - > > > >>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>> I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a > > > >>>>>>>> huge > > > >>> emphasis > > > >>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>> mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking > > > >>>>>>>> less > > > about > > > >>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>> ?imaginal? than you or Larry. That doesn?t mean that what > > > >>>>>>>> you > > and > > > >>>>> Larry are > > > >>>>>>>> talking about might not usefully factor in especially your > > > >>>>>>>> point > > > >>> about > > > >>>>>>>> joint, mediated, activity. > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> Ed > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 11:11 AM, mike cole > > wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et > > > >>>>>>>>> al > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic > > > >>>>>>>>> beginnings > > > >>> builds > > > >>>>> off > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>>> the already highly functional sensory system. Assume > > > >>>>>>>>> vision as > > > the > > > >>>>>>>> sensory > > > >>>>>>>>> system in question. We know that in an important sense, > > > >>>>>>>>> the > > > >>> "simple" > > > >>>>> act > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>>> seeing what you might call a common object, for example > > > >>>>>>>>> your > > car > > > in > > > >>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>> driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves > > temporal > > > >>> and > > > >>>>>>>>> spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement > > > >>>>>>>>> that > > > >>> must > > > >>>>> be > > > >>>>>>>>> resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the > > > >>>>>>>>> process of > > > >>> image > > > >>>>>>>>> formation ceases to function. > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for > > > >>>>>>>>> that > > > >>>>> simplified > > > >>>>>>>>> account. In thinking about imagination I turn to > > > >>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets, > > > >>>>> Zinchenko > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>> non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of > > > >>>>>>>>> enactive perception/cognition. It is also consistent with > > > >>>>>>>>> joint, > > mediated, > > > >>>>>>>> activity > > > >>>>>>>>> as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go. > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic > > function > > > >>> and > > > >>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>> human possibility for symbolic communication is > > > >>>>>>>>> co-incident and co-constitutive of distinctly human > imagination. > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> in brief > > > >>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ed, mike, Michael, > > > >>>>>>>>>> I will push my question to an earlier time period. > > > >>>>>>>>>> Age 2 months. > > > >>>>>>>>>> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces > > > >>>>>>>>>> her.own > > > >>> activity . > > > >>>>>>>>>> Question > > > >>>>>>>>>> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, > > > >>>>>>>>>> moving > > > >>> into > > > >>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? > > > >>>>>>>>>> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic > > origin? > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > > > >>>>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > > > >>>>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM > > > >>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Larry > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be > > > >>>>>>>>>> inclusive > > or > > > >>>>>>>>>> exclusive. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to > > > >>>>>>>>>> make > > sense > > > >>> if > > > >>>>>>>> I > > > >>>>>>>>>> understand Vygotsky correctly. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? > > perhaps > > > I > > > >>>>>>>>>> wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely > > > >>>>>>>>>> understood > > the > > > >>>>>>>> tendency to > > > >>>>>>>>>> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow > > > >>>>>>>> extra-concrete. > > > >>>>>>>>>> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural > > > historical > > > >>>>>>>> context > > > >>>>>>>>>> and at a certain stage of development people act as if > > > >>>>>>>>>> certain > > > >>> things > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > >>>>>>>>>> ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever > > > >>>>>>>>>> that > > > >>> is?). > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I?m not quite sure where you are going with the > > > >>>>>>>>>> development > > of > > > >>>>>>>>>> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you > > > >>>>>>>>>> mean > > > >>> when > > > >>>>>>>>>> you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My > > answer, > > > >>>>>>>> perhaps, > > > >>>>>>>>>> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or > > fantasy > > > >>> in > > > >>>>>>>>>> your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your > > > >>>>>>>>>> final > > > >>> question. > > > >>>>> An > > > >>>>>>>>>> approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine > > > >>>>>>>>>> other possibilities (smile). > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ed > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Ed, > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> The title imagination (or) fantasy Is different from > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a > > > >>>>> distanciation?) > > > >>>>>>>>>> and return to the mathematical concrete. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this > > > >>>>>>>>>>> transfer > > from > > > >>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>> physical to the mathematical? > > > >>>>>>>>>>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged > > > >>>>>>>>>>> in > > > >>> historical > > > >>>>>>>>>> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the > > > >>>>>>>>>> physical > > > >>>>> (concrete) > > > >>>>>>>>>> which exists prior to the human understanding and the > > > mathematical > > > >>>>>>>>>> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging > > within > > > >>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? > > > >>>>>>>>>>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical > > > >>>>>>>>>>> which > > > >>>>> originates > > > >>>>>>>> as > > > >>>>>>>>>> concrete. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and > fantasy. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and > > fantasy. > > > >>> Does > > > >>>>> one > > > >>>>>>>>>> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other > > > >>>>>>>>>> implies the > > > >>> actual > > > >>>>>>>> can > > > >>>>>>>>>> be mapped onto the physical with systems? > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Larry > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > > > >>>>>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM > > > >>>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> All > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of > > > >>>>> imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>> that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? > > > >>> ?let,? or > > > >>>>>>>>>> ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different > > > >>> statements > > > >>>>>>>>>> although, under certain circumstances, might be the > > > >>>>>>>>>> same.? In > > > >>> doing > > > >>>>> so I > > > >>>>>>>>>> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>> Creativity > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>>>> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic > > > >>>>>>>>>> for > > > >>>>> imagination > > > >>>>>>>> that > > > >>>>>>>>>> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract > > > >>>>>>>>>> is > > only > > > >>> an > > > >>>>>>>>>> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of > > > >>>>>>>>>> development, > > > only a > > > >>>>> pass > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>>>> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our > > > >>>>>>>>>> point of > > > >>> view, > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed > > from a > > > >>>>> given > > > >>>>>>>>>> concrete toward a new concrete.? > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous > > > >>> discussion > > > >>>>>>>>>> on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in > > that I > > > >>> am > > > >>>>>>>>>> wondering whether part of what is going on is that > > > >>>>>>>>>> children > > are > > > >>> being > > > >>>>>>>> asked > > > >>>>>>>>>> to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this > > > >>>>>>>>>> join > > > the > > > >>>>>>>>>> elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious > > > >>>>>>>>>> (if > > > >>>>> somebody > > > >>>>>>>> is > > > >>>>>>>>>> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason > > > >>>>>>>>>> for > > my > > > >>>>>>>> wondering > > > >>>>>>>>>> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. > > > there > > > >>>>> is no > > > >>>>>>>>>> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get > > > >>>>>>>>>> stuck, so > > to > > > >>>>> speak, > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>>>> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am > > wondering > > > >>>>> about > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>>> then a question. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> My first example: It is possible that we would all > > > >>>>>>>>>>> agree > > that > > > to > > > >>>>> see > > > >>>>>>>>>> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no > > > >>>>>>>>>> such > > > >>> thing. > > > >>>>> In a > > > >>>>>>>>>> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root > > > >>>>>>>>>> of > > two > > > >>> is > > > >>>>> not > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > >>>>>>>>>> fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two > > > >>>>>>>>>> is a > > > >>>>> fraction.? > > > >>>>>>>>>> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it > > > >>>>>>>>>> is > > true > > > >>> and > > > >>>>> then > > > >>>>>>>>>> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is > > > >>>>>>>>>> perhaps > > > another > > > >>>>>>>>>> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete > > > through > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through > > > contradiction) > > > >>>>>>>> seems to > > > >>>>>>>>>> be very hard for people to do. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>> draws > > > >>>>>>>>>> something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? > > > >>>>>>>>>> She > > then > > > >>>>> draws a > > > >>>>>>>>>> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object > > > >>>>>>>>>> and > > says, > > > >>>>> "This > > > >>>>>>>> is > > > >>>>>>>>>> its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle > > > >>>>>>>>>> (waving > > > her > > > >>>>> hand > > > >>>>>>>> at > > > >>>>>>>>>> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the > center.? > > > >>> None > > > >>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>> this > > > >>>>>>>>>> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. > > Each > > > >>> step > > > >>>>>>>> here > > > >>>>>>>>>> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the > > > concrete. > > > >>>>> (Hmm > > > >>>>>>>> , I > > > >>>>>>>>>> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to > > > >>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>> mathematical > > > >>>>>>>>>> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> consequences of > > a > > > >>>>> winged > > > >>>>>>>>>> horse]. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify > > > >>>>>>>>>>> imagination > > with > > > >>>>>>>>>> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what > > > >>>>>>>>>> would > > > >>> Vygotsky > > > >>>>>>>> have > > > >>>>>>>>>> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or > > something > > > >>> else? > > > >>>>>>>> There > > > >>>>>>>>>> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m > > > >>> interested in > > > >>>>>>>> your > > > >>>>>>>>>> take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Ed Wall > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural > > > >>>>>>>>> science > > with > > > >>> an > > > >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science > > > >>>>>>> with > > > an > > > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> -- > > > >>>> > > > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science > > > >>>> with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> -- > > > >> > > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with > > > >> an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with > > > > an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Dec 13 17:07:30 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 13 Dec 2015 17:07:30 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Connecting and stability In-Reply-To: <566e0d83.039d420a.37975.ffff8611@mx.google.com> References: <566cda19.cf40620a.79833.ffffcf75@mx.google.com> <566e0d83.039d420a.37975.ffff8611@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Two comments on this interesting discussion. 1. Maybe the meaning as communicated is between the words, not in them, the sharedness in the senses they make of this moment of joint mediated activity. 2. An appropriate poem for the occasion with lots to think about and within in it. The Unicorn by Ranier Maira Rilke This is the creature there never has been. They never knew it, and yet, none the less, they loved the way it moved, its suppleness, its neck, its very gaze, mild and serene. Not there, because they loved it, it behaved as though it were. They always left some space. And in that clear unpeopled space they saved it lightly reared its head with scarce a trace of not being there. They fed it, not with corn, but only with the possibility of being. And that was able to confer such strength, its brow put for a horn. One horn. Whitely it stole up to a maid, -- to *be* within the silver mirror and in her. On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 4:29 PM, Lplarry wrote: > Annalisa, > What held my attention was the notion that speech be understood for the > quality it gives to the listener of the speech . > The meaning resides in how the speaker appeals to the listener to > stabilize THIS meaning the speaker is sharing. > In other words the meaning resides in the manner the listener or hearer > takes up and stabilizes what the speaker is inviting the listener to notice > and focus on.. > With this notion the intension shifts to the hearer stabilizing what the > speaker projects. > The verb's meaning resides in how the listener takes up the speaker's use > of language which is intended in order for the listener to realize stable > meaning. > The focus is no longer on self-identifying expression, but shifts to how > the speaker intends the listener to grasp meaning as that embodied in the > space of shared language. > The focus shifts to the listener taking up the others language game and > coming to realize shared meaning.. > I am indicating a different location where meaning resides. > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Annalisa Aguilar" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?13 4:00 PM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Connecting and stability > > Hi Larry and others, > > Is, as a verb is not like other verbs, which have to do with action. I'm > not a linguist, but off the top, I don't think there is a verb that doesn't > have to do with action other than "to be." At least in English. We use > "becoming" to signify change, but the infinitive "to be" is a pointer to > Existence. We don't say I become an eater, or I become a sleeper, or I > become a writer, even though that has some truth to it (i'm not born a > writer), it's not how we speak. I am an eater, I am a sleeper, I am a > writer. Become is its own verb, isn't it? "to become," is a marriage of the > word Be and Come. If Become where the word for Be, then that would make the > game here really different. But Be comes before Become, linguistically and > existentially! :) > > So with that in mind, Is is more of a signifier of existence and the noun > that accompanies Is takes the particular shape that reflects Is-ness. Like > the pot depends upon clay for its existence. If you remove the clay from > the pot, the pot no longer exists. If you smash the pot, the clay remains, > thus the pot depends upon clay to exist. I depend upon Being to exist. > > Of course I've been thinking also about unicorns! I believe I can explain > why this definition of Being works even in the imaginary sense. (Which is > to say Being is not a category of the mind in the absolute sense of Being, > that all there is to Being is a cognitive category, therefore there is > nothing to Being but a logical or categorical container in speech and > thought, which is the same as saying Being arises from Mind, "I think, > therefore I am"). > > Getting back to unicorns! We can say that the is-ness of the horse and the > is-ness of the horn combine in the imagination, and thus unicorn is. Thus > the material of the unicorn, which does not exist in the world we live in, > is identical to the material of the imagination, which is the material of > the Mind. > > But this does not stop at the Mind. Because the material of the unicorn is > no different than the material of the memory of what I ate for dinner last > night, or imagining walking on the boardwalk right now while I'm sitting in > front of this screen. Just like other imaginations, for imaginary objects, > the Is-ness is as-if borrowed from horse-ness and horn-ness, which do exist > in the world. It is not possible to create an imagination of things we do > not know about. Imaginations (and dreams) are always of the things we have > known before, even if it is superficial knowledge. So the existence of > unicorns depends upon the material of all imaginary objects, the material > of the mind. > > This still supports the notion that Being comes before Mind. And that Mind > is dependent upon Being, not the other way around. > > Also, Being is not something limited to sentient creatures, but is > unlimited, the entire world sits in existence. That is why we can > experience the existence of inanimate or insentient objects: the mountain > is, the sky is, the ocean is, and since mind is in the world, the unicorn > is. > > The problem is that we can't know what that Being is that makes existence > possible for everything else. It's not knowable. And this has nothing to do > with believing in a God or not believing, but that there is a limit to what > we as humans can know, and that Being, that which pervades all beingness, > all names and forms, responsible for the existence all that is here, is one > of those things we will never be able to know explicitly. > > If we were to assert that Being is a product (a category) of Mind, then we > are back to Decartes's dualism. When you say that "in the end" there is a > final division (of two) and "that's just the way it is", then we can > justify hierarchies, we can justify slavery, we can justify class, and so > on. "Slavery is just the way it is." "Inequality is just the way it is." I > just can't accept that. If we say really that all that is here is > Existence, but the multiplicity of objects we experience are just different > forms and manifestations of Existence(Being), then we can find the > commonality among us despite differences, we can justify our feelings of > oneness with Nature, Love for another, Compassion for strangers, etc. I > prefer the latter over the former: Difference in this case becomes > incidental and ornamental, while similarities are fundamental. > > So I think there is a fundamental ethical reason to see Being before Mind > from this standpoint. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > P.S. I've pulled out On the Soul by Aristotle from my shelf, because I am > curious about his take on the Soul, because it is quite apparent that he > does not see Soul as limited to Mind, like Hegel did. The Soul for > Aristotle is the life-force, or sentiency. In Vedic thought there is the > concept of Prana, which is also identical to life-force, something entering > from the outside of the gross body, Prana is an aspect of the subtle body, > but what gives life to the gross body and which leaves at death. This not > analogously different from electricity passing through a lightbulb and when > the electricity is there, the light shines, when it is absent the bulb is > dark. The electricity is like the subtle body, the bulb the gross body. > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Dec 13 17:16:03 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 10:16:03 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Connecting and stability In-Reply-To: References: <566cda19.cf40620a.79833.ffffcf75@mx.google.com> Message-ID: In 1706 Isaac Newton created the first color wheel, by taking the colors he observed from his prismatic studies and arranging them carefully in the order they appeared in a circle. In the nineteenth century, the impressionists began to arrange their palettes in the same way (instead of in squares which emphasized shades and tints), but they couldn't really decide if the cardinal points on the chromatic compass were red, blue, and yellow or red, green and yellow. This in turn goes back to a disagreement that Goethe had with Newton on the very nature of color, whether it is an objective property of materials or whether it is an effect produced in the mind: it turns out that modern color printers (with their "millions of colors" produced by only three inks) are largely based on Goethe's theory and not on Newton's. I mention all this because Halliday does more or less the same thing with verbs, or rather with the "processes" that verbs realize. The three cardinal processes, in the first edition of his "introduction to Functional Grammar", were "being", "doing", and "sensing" and we can imagine "to be", "to do" and "to see" as red, blue, and yellow or perhaps orange, green, and blue. So for example a verb like "to have" or "to own" is a relational process, and is a shading or tinting of "to be", and a verb like "play" or "work" is a material process and belongs near "to act" with the doings on the verbal palette, while a verb like "see", "smell", "feel", and by extension "think" is a mental process and belongs somewhere in the vicinity of sensing. In the interstices of these cardinal processes, we find behavioral ones (sleeping, laughing, crying) located somewhere between the material and the mental, existential processes ("there is") between the material and the relational, and above all the verbal processes, between the relational and the mental. But that's the functional picture, not the genetic one. From the newborn child's point of view, there is, as Vygotsky says, an undifferentiated "state" rather than processes, and this is differentiated into feelings on the one hand and doings on the other largely on the basis of instincts like positioning and feeding. The "relational"processes require language to come into being, particularly since, in English anyway, "to be" is a very strange kind of being that actually relates two "be-ers": a carrier and an attribute ("Minsu is tall"), an identifier and an identified ("He is Minsu"), or a token and a value ("Minsu is a boy"). I think that Vygotsky's early work on imagination is essentially wrong, and I include "Imaginary and Creativity in Childhood" in this. The reason is that the distinction between reproductive and combinatorial imagination on which that work rests is associativism which he took over more or less uncritically from Ribot, and only later repudiated. In Ribot, all thinking is essentially a pale shadow of seeing--imagination is nothing but the after-glow of imaging. But not even sensing is reducible to seeing, and certainly not thinking. By the time of Vygotsky's late lectures, he has solved the problem. In his lecture on the development of creativity in childhood (Volume One in the English Collected Works) he points out that the name of a place--just the name--can conjure up a kind of experience, even if we have never even been there, and words in the right order create not only experiences that have never been had but experiences which by their very nature are not haveable by as single human consciousness (e.g. "the French Revolution"). There is no way to get "thinking" out of 'seeing'. We have to recognize that thinking is a mental process that stands somewhere between seeing and saying, in much the same way that green stands somewhere between yellow and blue. Yes, we can produce green by mixing yellow and blue, but that doesn't mean we can reduce it meaningfully to those two colors. I think in the same way it makes no sense to reduce a unicorn to a horse and a horn. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 8:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Larry and others, > > Is, as a verb is not like other verbs, which have to do with action. I'm > not a linguist, but off the top, I don't think there is a verb that doesn't > have to do with action other than "to be." At least in English. We use > "becoming" to signify change, but the infinitive "to be" is a pointer to > Existence. We don't say I become an eater, or I become a sleeper, or I > become a writer, even though that has some truth to it (i'm not born a > writer), it's not how we speak. I am an eater, I am a sleeper, I am a > writer. Become is its own verb, isn't it? "to become," is a marriage of the > word Be and Come. If Become where the word for Be, then that would make the > game here really different. But Be comes before Become, linguistically and > existentially! :) > > So with that in mind, Is is more of a signifier of existence and the noun > that accompanies Is takes the particular shape that reflects Is-ness. Like > the pot depends upon clay for its existence. If you remove the clay from > the pot, the pot no longer exists. If you smash the pot, the clay remains, > thus the pot depends upon clay to exist. I depend upon Being to exist. > > Of course I've been thinking also about unicorns! I believe I can explain > why this definition of Being works even in the imaginary sense. (Which is > to say Being is not a category of the mind in the absolute sense of Being, > that all there is to Being is a cognitive category, therefore there is > nothing to Being but a logical or categorical container in speech and > thought, which is the same as saying Being arises from Mind, "I think, > therefore I am"). > > Getting back to unicorns! We can say that the is-ness of the horse and the > is-ness of the horn combine in the imagination, and thus unicorn is. Thus > the material of the unicorn, which does not exist in the world we live in, > is identical to the material of the imagination, which is the material of > the Mind. > > But this does not stop at the Mind. Because the material of the unicorn is > no different than the material of the memory of what I ate for dinner last > night, or imagining walking on the boardwalk right now while I'm sitting in > front of this screen. Just like other imaginations, for imaginary objects, > the Is-ness is as-if borrowed from horse-ness and horn-ness, which do exist > in the world. It is not possible to create an imagination of things we do > not know about. Imaginations (and dreams) are always of the things we have > known before, even if it is superficial knowledge. So the existence of > unicorns depends upon the material of all imaginary objects, the material > of the mind. > > This still supports the notion that Being comes before Mind. And that Mind > is dependent upon Being, not the other way around. > > Also, Being is not something limited to sentient creatures, but is > unlimited, the entire world sits in existence. That is why we can > experience the existence of inanimate or insentient objects: the mountain > is, the sky is, the ocean is, and since mind is in the world, the unicorn > is. > > The problem is that we can't know what that Being is that makes existence > possible for everything else. It's not knowable. And this has nothing to do > with believing in a God or not believing, but that there is a limit to what > we as humans can know, and that Being, that which pervades all beingness, > all names and forms, responsible for the existence all that is here, is one > of those things we will never be able to know explicitly. > > If we were to assert that Being is a product (a category) of Mind, then we > are back to Decartes's dualism. When you say that "in the end" there is a > final division (of two) and "that's just the way it is", then we can > justify hierarchies, we can justify slavery, we can justify class, and so > on. "Slavery is just the way it is." "Inequality is just the way it is." I > just can't accept that. If we say really that all that is here is > Existence, but the multiplicity of objects we experience are just different > forms and manifestations of Existence(Being), then we can find the > commonality among us despite differences, we can justify our feelings of > oneness with Nature, Love for another, Compassion for strangers, etc. I > prefer the latter over the former: Difference in this case becomes > incidental and ornamental, while similarities are fundamental. > > So I think there is a fundamental ethical reason to see Being before Mind > from this standpoint. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > P.S. I've pulled out On the Soul by Aristotle from my shelf, because I am > curious about his take on the Soul, because it is quite apparent that he > does not see Soul as limited to Mind, like Hegel did. The Soul for > Aristotle is the life-force, or sentiency. In Vedic thought there is the > concept of Prana, which is also identical to life-force, something entering > from the outside of the gross body, Prana is an aspect of the subtle body, > but what gives life to the gross body and which leaves at death. This not > analogously different from electricity passing through a lightbulb and when > the electricity is there, the light shines, when it is absent the bulb is > dark. The electricity is like the subtle body, the bulb the gross body. > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Dec 13 17:22:56 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 13 Dec 2015 17:22:56 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <566a24e9.1444620a.ac08f.fffffe76@mx.google.com> <566a6b7b.e405430a.4a789.ffffe6eb@mx.google.com> <065ED5BB-278B-4028-A493-245D81342155@umich.edu> <9AF9DF23-B6EF-4A09-A0EA-AE3C3D6D9BC4@umich.edu> Message-ID: Perhaps this experimental comparison of remembering TV and radio might be interesting. Ed's earlier post put me in mind of this, but it took a while to dig it out. mike On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 5:26 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Ed (and others), > > Thanks for your thoughtful reply. > > First I'd like to say that what I wrote I wrote without a totally clear > picture in mind, or at least a picture that I articulated effectively. If > you can imagine that! > > When I wrote of your TV experience, I wrote about it in reference to the > radio experience, in juxtaposition with that experience. I think point of > view (POV) is something that functions so elusively, that we aren't aways > aware of this being constructed. > > Making art, whether writing a poem, painting a painting, making a > sculpture, playing music, etc. there is a constructed > reader/viewer/listener/experiencer being made by the artist through the > piece, and conveyed through the medium. The artist might be doing this > consciously or unconsciously, but they do it. Consider looking at Guernica > without a POV. > > What is happening with more modern technology is a kind of telling of > stories that dictate experiences as such. So if one has different > experiences that do not compare to the story, one must surrender to the > story or one is alienated, just by the pervasiveness of the medium and the > message therein. Consider what it must be like for LGBT to experience a > flood of stories and songs about heterosexual romance. If you can, then you > have taken, temporarily, a POV, even if it's in your imagination. If you > can't place yourself, then consider what a friend told me, that it's like > hearing bad Christmas music all the time, wherever you go. This ability to > take a POV creates human empathy and sensitivity because affect populates > this POV. The affect is the answer to "What is that like?" > > In old-time radio, there was more apparent freedom available to the > listener, as you said the imagination has more leeway to construct images > about what the listener experiences. Even in theater there is this > experience because the world is represented on the stage, and sets do not > simulate the world as the world actually is, so for the theatergoer, the > imagination and the flexibility of POV is still possible. One can focus on > one character or another. > > In television and film this seems to be less flexible. I'm not saying that > it is not possible to have imaginative experiences in film or television, > just that POVs are more deliberately constructed in comparison to the > storytelling wizard sharing time with a group around a fire and telling > stories of old, or in your case, your radio program. > > When I watched Star Trek TV episodes, I myself had a "reverse" experience > from yours. After, I read (somewhat campy) stories published in a book > series and I couldn't get William Shatner's and Leonard Nimoy's personages > and voices out of my head, or any of the other characters that might pop > up. It was an uncomfortable experience, and I could never really get into > the stories. I don't even remember what they were, I just remember this > experience, I was probably 13 at the time. But I think it's because the > associations are so strongly mapped, there's no space for an imagination to > happen (Until we all become post-modern I suppose). > > My assertion is that POV is the only way we can experience a story, and > it's our way into the story: we can feel affect for the characters or > situations, that's how they grab us and engage us, they make us care about > something. I am the one listening and thus positioning myself to the story, > that is one freedom I still possess. I can even say, "I don't buy that > story," or "I have a better one," and so on. I don't think taking a POV is > all that conscious unless one is actually focusing upon this idea. ANd even > in that case, one might ruin the experience of a film by deconstructing > what the director did, or how the editor edited, or the screenwriter wrote > lines, etc. Which I suppose is still taking a POV, but more as a distant > observer than getting involved in the actual story. I might offer that the > less aware we are of the POV that we take, the more likely we are to feel > an affect more deeply. It might be why we call art art. > > I don't think I am saying your stories are or are not an instance of > Mike's point. If I am (or am not), it's not planned. I was only responding > to your experience of what happened and am offering a possible explanation. > You can certainly disagree with me. I don't think storytelling is a > delirium at all. I think we live and die by the stories we hear and share > and experience through hearing and telling. > > Would you say more about what you mean when you asked, "Are you saying > imagination cannot be drained of effect since 'affect has to arrive first > to ignite the process'?" What does it mean to say imagination is drained of > effect? Do you mean is imagination killed if affect is missing? > > Though I still would like to hear your reply, I'm going to say that I hope > we agree that imagination is an expression of freedom. > > If there is conscious and deliberate attempts to invoke a specific > "picture-making" through cultural meaning for a specifically contained > response (I can't call that an imagination because there is propaganda, > manipulation or deception involved), this approach, in my opinion, is not > far from brainwashing, or some means for justification for group > identities, what have you. The end result are adults with limited ability > to be creative or imagine anything on their own. Such an imagination is a > muscle with a very constrained reach and one can experience pain if asked > to imagine something far beyond common experienced. This may be why > conservatives or fundamentalists are so reactive if anyone strays from the > flock or behaves spontaneously. In such society, one would likely be > considered deluded. > > We had a marvelous presentation by researcher who visited us in the lab > yesterday. She is studying the use of tablets (iPads) in preschools. One > finding she made is that during interaction with the iPad (either alone or > in a small cohort of others) children try to "break" the apps that they > interact with, or they use it in ways that were not a part of the design. I > see this as an attempt for kids to create their own POV and not settle for > the POV as "dictated" or set out by the app designers. The broom is the > pivot for the imagined horse only because the child is free to imagine it. > That is my opinion of what is going on. Artists do this all the time, it's > part of problem-finding and discovery as an art-making process. > > Then I went to a different level, in considering tech with a particular > generational cohort. This is what I was trying to say about new generations > (as kids) coming to new tech who will have the experience where affect > "begins again." It's not like that for their parents using the same new > tech, who developed as children with different tech. For the parents there > is an overlap of the old tech and accompanying behaviors assigned to the > new one, so the approach possesses a kind of baggage, like learning a new > language. Of course these are huge generalizations that can be easily > picked apart. I'm just trying to describe an idea I have about it. > > In my imagination, in response to your comment about drained affect in the > face of a rationalized move, it feels like you are describing a killjoy. > > Kind regards, > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Greenfield.radio.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 1184121 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20151213/dccfe3e7/attachment-0001.pdf From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Dec 13 19:16:30 2015 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 03:16:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Connecting and stability In-Reply-To: References: <566cda19.cf40620a.79833.ffffcf75@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Thanks for the interesting contribution, David. >From what I recall, Goethe's criticism of Newton's endeavour was that he only undertook half the analysis and failed to gain a relational understanding of the phenomenon as a whole. I never really dug into it that much though. For a parallel to "being", "doing", and "sensing", you could consider Lefebvre's application of "representational", "representations of" and "spatial practice" moments to social spaces. One of the difficulties I think you will have with Lefebvre (The Production of Space), however, is that he is not shy of pointing out that analyses of social space on the basis of language or discourse are inadequate for understanding the production of these spaces. The same can be said for thinking. But perhaps you can take a stream of discourse from a recounting and reliving of lived experience as it is manifest in (say) emotive expression as the expression of a form (outline) for something manifesting a 'primary colour' that is not known to the analysis of discourse, namely action and activity. One could then posit that action within activity was largely responsible for the formation of thought-space that enable the orienting within hearing and the orienting within seeing to yield listening and active looking/perceiving respectively. When it comes to relating thinking as something derived from seeing, I suspect this is considerably biased by personality preference. What many consider to be thinking proper is a commitment to resolve something construed as a mental problem. One has to see, perceive and then decide to stick with it until one begins to perceive the seeds of something else. Best, Huw On 14 December 2015 at 01:16, David Kellogg wrote: > In 1706 Isaac Newton created the first color wheel, by taking the colors he > observed from his prismatic studies and arranging them carefully in the > order they appeared in a circle. In the nineteenth century, the > impressionists began to arrange their palettes in the same way (instead of > in squares which emphasized shades and tints), but they couldn't really > decide if the cardinal points on the chromatic compass were red, blue, and > yellow or red, green and yellow. This in turn goes back to a disagreement > that Goethe had with Newton on the very nature of color, whether it is an > objective property of materials or whether it is an effect produced in the > mind: it turns out that modern color printers (with their "millions of > colors" produced by only three inks) are largely based on Goethe's theory > and not on Newton's. > > I mention all this because Halliday does more or less the same thing with > verbs, or rather with the "processes" that verbs realize. The three > cardinal processes, in the first edition of his "introduction to Functional > Grammar", were "being", "doing", and "sensing" and we can imagine "to be", > "to do" and "to see" as red, blue, and yellow or perhaps orange, green, and > blue. So for example a verb like "to have" or "to own" is a relational > process, and is a shading or tinting of "to be", and a verb like "play" or > "work" is a material process and belongs near "to act" with the doings on > the verbal palette, while a verb like "see", "smell", "feel", and by > extension "think" is a mental process and belongs somewhere in the vicinity > of sensing. In the interstices of these cardinal processes, we find > behavioral ones (sleeping, laughing, crying) located somewhere between the > material and the mental, existential processes ("there is") between the > material and the relational, and above all the verbal processes, between > the relational and the mental. > > But that's the functional picture, not the genetic one. From the newborn > child's point of view, there is, as Vygotsky says, an undifferentiated > "state" rather than processes, and this is differentiated into feelings on > the one hand and doings on the other largely on the basis of instincts like > positioning and feeding. The "relational"processes require language to come > into being, particularly since, in English anyway, "to be" is a very > strange kind of being that actually relates two "be-ers": a carrier and an > attribute ("Minsu is tall"), an identifier and an identified ("He is > Minsu"), or a token and a value ("Minsu is a boy"). > > I think that Vygotsky's early work on imagination is essentially wrong, and > I include "Imaginary and Creativity in Childhood" in this. The reason is > that the distinction between reproductive and combinatorial imagination on > which that work rests is associativism which he took over more or less > uncritically from Ribot, and only later repudiated. In Ribot, all thinking > is essentially a pale shadow of seeing--imagination is nothing but the > after-glow of imaging. But not even sensing is reducible to seeing, and > certainly not thinking. > > By the time of Vygotsky's late lectures, he has solved the problem. In his > lecture on the development of creativity in childhood (Volume One in the > English Collected Works) he points out that the name of a place--just the > name--can conjure up a kind of experience, even if we have never even been > there, and words in the right order create not only experiences that have > never been had but experiences which by their very nature are not haveable > by as single human consciousness (e.g. "the French Revolution"). There is > no way to get "thinking" out of 'seeing'. We have to recognize that > thinking is a mental process that stands somewhere between seeing and > saying, in much the same way that green stands somewhere between yellow and > blue. Yes, we can produce green by mixing yellow and blue, but that doesn't > mean we can reduce it meaningfully to those two colors. I think in the same > way it makes no sense to reduce a unicorn to a horse and a horn. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > > On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 8:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > Hi Larry and others, > > > > Is, as a verb is not like other verbs, which have to do with action. I'm > > not a linguist, but off the top, I don't think there is a verb that > doesn't > > have to do with action other than "to be." At least in English. We use > > "becoming" to signify change, but the infinitive "to be" is a pointer to > > Existence. We don't say I become an eater, or I become a sleeper, or I > > become a writer, even though that has some truth to it (i'm not born a > > writer), it's not how we speak. I am an eater, I am a sleeper, I am a > > writer. Become is its own verb, isn't it? "to become," is a marriage of > the > > word Be and Come. If Become where the word for Be, then that would make > the > > game here really different. But Be comes before Become, linguistically > and > > existentially! :) > > > > So with that in mind, Is is more of a signifier of existence and the noun > > that accompanies Is takes the particular shape that reflects Is-ness. > Like > > the pot depends upon clay for its existence. If you remove the clay from > > the pot, the pot no longer exists. If you smash the pot, the clay > remains, > > thus the pot depends upon clay to exist. I depend upon Being to exist. > > > > Of course I've been thinking also about unicorns! I believe I can explain > > why this definition of Being works even in the imaginary sense. (Which is > > to say Being is not a category of the mind in the absolute sense of > Being, > > that all there is to Being is a cognitive category, therefore there is > > nothing to Being but a logical or categorical container in speech and > > thought, which is the same as saying Being arises from Mind, "I think, > > therefore I am"). > > > > Getting back to unicorns! We can say that the is-ness of the horse and > the > > is-ness of the horn combine in the imagination, and thus unicorn is. Thus > > the material of the unicorn, which does not exist in the world we live > in, > > is identical to the material of the imagination, which is the material of > > the Mind. > > > > But this does not stop at the Mind. Because the material of the unicorn > is > > no different than the material of the memory of what I ate for dinner > last > > night, or imagining walking on the boardwalk right now while I'm sitting > in > > front of this screen. Just like other imaginations, for imaginary > objects, > > the Is-ness is as-if borrowed from horse-ness and horn-ness, which do > exist > > in the world. It is not possible to create an imagination of things we do > > not know about. Imaginations (and dreams) are always of the things we > have > > known before, even if it is superficial knowledge. So the existence of > > unicorns depends upon the material of all imaginary objects, the material > > of the mind. > > > > This still supports the notion that Being comes before Mind. And that > Mind > > is dependent upon Being, not the other way around. > > > > Also, Being is not something limited to sentient creatures, but is > > unlimited, the entire world sits in existence. That is why we can > > experience the existence of inanimate or insentient objects: the mountain > > is, the sky is, the ocean is, and since mind is in the world, the unicorn > > is. > > > > The problem is that we can't know what that Being is that makes existence > > possible for everything else. It's not knowable. And this has nothing to > do > > with believing in a God or not believing, but that there is a limit to > what > > we as humans can know, and that Being, that which pervades all beingness, > > all names and forms, responsible for the existence all that is here, is > one > > of those things we will never be able to know explicitly. > > > > If we were to assert that Being is a product (a category) of Mind, then > we > > are back to Decartes's dualism. When you say that "in the end" there is a > > final division (of two) and "that's just the way it is", then we can > > justify hierarchies, we can justify slavery, we can justify class, and so > > on. "Slavery is just the way it is." "Inequality is just the way it is." > I > > just can't accept that. If we say really that all that is here is > > Existence, but the multiplicity of objects we experience are just > different > > forms and manifestations of Existence(Being), then we can find the > > commonality among us despite differences, we can justify our feelings of > > oneness with Nature, Love for another, Compassion for strangers, etc. I > > prefer the latter over the former: Difference in this case becomes > > incidental and ornamental, while similarities are fundamental. > > > > So I think there is a fundamental ethical reason to see Being before Mind > > from this standpoint. > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > > P.S. I've pulled out On the Soul by Aristotle from my shelf, because I am > > curious about his take on the Soul, because it is quite apparent that he > > does not see Soul as limited to Mind, like Hegel did. The Soul for > > Aristotle is the life-force, or sentiency. In Vedic thought there is the > > concept of Prana, which is also identical to life-force, something > entering > > from the outside of the gross body, Prana is an aspect of the subtle > body, > > but what gives life to the gross body and which leaves at death. This not > > analogously different from electricity passing through a lightbulb and > when > > the electricity is there, the light shines, when it is absent the bulb is > > dark. The electricity is like the subtle body, the bulb the gross body. > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Dec 13 19:32:37 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 03:32:37 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Connecting and stability In-Reply-To: References: <566cda19.cf40620a.79833.ffffcf75@mx.google.com> , Message-ID: Hello everyone, I was considering how when we say things like "I see?" or "I hear you" to connote "I understand." When does: "I see it." "I hear it." "I feel it." "I taste it." "I smell it." actually mean "I understand it." ? We do use those phrases or versions of them to mean that. Which sort of shows my illustration that the world impresses us through our senses and then imprints on our minds. As Vygotsky indicated, "First outside, then inside." Being (external world) is before mind (internal world). Kind regards, Annalisa From ewall@umich.edu Sun Dec 13 19:35:46 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sun, 13 Dec 2015 21:35:46 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> <05AB59E5-018D-4FF2-92BE-06619D1F95B8@umich.edu> <1BD78C04-64EA-4C74-BDDB-4723D6312EAF@umich.edu> Message-ID: <06E52F93-24C1-4489-9992-EAB59C4CE5D0@umich.edu> Mike I think I forgot to reply to this email. I have always thought that some of the jargon around phenomenology was a bit overdone and my impression is that most that now call themselves some sort of phenomenologist have relaxed some. In fact some people argue that is, in practice, impossible to do the kind of phenomenology Husserl espoused. Casey, sort of weaves in a little of the jargon, but all that he puts forth hinges around a reasonably relaxed "intuitive reflection on thoughts and experiences.? Most anything Don Idhe has written is reasonably jargon free and Robert Solowski is reasonably relaxed. There was, so I understand, a Dutch phenomenologist school of whom the Canadian Max van Manen and some of his students are current examples (Wolff-Michael knows him I believe). There are also the ethnomethodologists who have an interesting somewhat ?phenomenological' take in things. In any case, whatever phenomenology is can be a matter of debate although being grounded in personal ?experience is somewhat critical. Ed > On Dec 8, 2015, at 9:59 PM, mike cole wrote: > > The Casey site looks amazing and of course very relevant, Ed. Thanks. > > When I first read Sartre many years ago, I was totally unprepared to take > in what he was saying. I had not way to "digest it." > > Reading into the electronic copy I sent around yesterday, I could see that > it is inappropriate for me to refer to what I do as phenomenology. It is > just a kind of intuitive reflection > on my experiences and thoughts. No Husserl, no Sartre. Just unschooled > introspection that I seek to verify through acquiring evidence that there > is more than total idiosyncrasy to what my musings. > > I feel as if I need to download all the sources of inquiry we have > unearthed in the last few days and retreat to a place with no communication > with the world for a few weeks just to take them, in. !! > mike > > On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:39 AM, Ed Wall wrote: > >> Mike >> >> There are, perhaps, some shortcomings in portions of Sartre work on >> imagination to which Casey supplies some useful modifications. Also it is a >> bit long. Take a look at Edward Casey?s web site: < >> http://edwardscasey.com/?page_id=13>. Many of those articles on >> imagination seem downloadable and besides possibly whetting one?s appetite >> for Sartre might be interesting in themselves. Perhaps you could pick one >> that most interests you and provides, from your vantage, a useful common, >> and modestly short reading source. I would, of course, recommend Casey?s >> book, but isn?t freely available. >> >> Ed >> >>> On Dec 7, 2015, at 9:44 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> So maybe Sartre would be a useful common reading source, Ed. >>> >>> >> http://blog.exre.org/wp-content/uploads/Sartre_The_Imaginary__A_Phenomenological_Psychology_of_the_Imagination.pdf >>> >>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>>> It make sense for the questions to differ, Ed, or at least the way they >>>> are posed. Finding a common foundation will take a lot of communication >>>> (which will require a lot of imagination!). >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 6:04 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>>> >>>>> Mike >>>>> >>>>> I assume you have read Sartre on imagination; i.e. The Imagination. >>>>> This gives what he considers a phenomenological take on imagination. >>>>> However, I would consider a much more revealing take to be that of >> Edward >>>>> Casey in Imaging (I am hoping that book you referenced will supplement >> that >>>>> of Casey). The connection to Kant, by the way, critically preceded >> that of >>>>> Mzerleau-Ponty and Sartre and that is why I was surprised to not see >> him >>>>> mentioned. >>>>> >>>>> I agree that we all seem to be coming out in, more or less, the >>>>> same place. Only the questions seem to differ. >>>>> >>>>> Ed >>>>> >>>>>> On Dec 7, 2015, at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity given that we >>>>>> started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I >> indicated >>>>> in >>>>>> my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life through my >>>>>> teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas drawn from >>>>>> psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and activity-centered >>>>>> research practices. But here I am. >>>>>> >>>>>> So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my >>>>> understanding. >>>>>> >>>>>> I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the description of >>>>> the >>>>>> flow from imagination to representation, but glad to encounter a >> dozen! >>>>>> Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the >> abstractions >>>>> can >>>>>> be seen, seem hard to come by. >>>>>> >>>>>> My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by >>>>>> identifying different threads of the topic they constitute was offered >>>>> with >>>>>> that goal in mind. >>>>>> >>>>>> The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is about it. >> I >>>>>> learned that from the Russians who write about imagination. >>>>>> >>>>>> Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6? >>>>>> >>>>>> etc? >>>>>> >>>>>> To the extent that these different traditions lead people to the same >>>>> kinds >>>>>> of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the conclusions are >>>>>> tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, sometimes, >> in >>>>>> good teaching. >>>>>> >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Larry and Mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to both of >>>>> you >>>>>>> in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a >>>>> conversation >>>>>>> that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably good, but >>>>> it is >>>>>>> a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little larger >> than >>>>> what >>>>>>> I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that I need >> to, >>>>> one >>>>>>> might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that bear on >> the, >>>>>>> perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will reread it). I >>>>>>> found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a large >> grain >>>>> size >>>>>>> (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look at >>>>> things). A >>>>>>> few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms and are >>>>> offered >>>>>>> in the hope that they might be useful. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; however, >>>>>>> looking at how words are used (a philosophy of language, so to speak) >>>>> often >>>>>>> does a better job of opening things up. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did not make >>>>> your >>>>>>> list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to mention >>>>>>> Avicenna. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 3. I have the impression you are using the term ?stable? as a >>>>>>> somewhat replacement of Vygotsky?s concrete; I like that as >> ?concrete' >>>>>>> seems to have very different meanings for different people. I will >> try >>>>> to >>>>>>> use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in my >> replies >>>>>>> tooters. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of Hellen >>>>> Keller. I >>>>>>> wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a thin gap >> is >>>>>>> because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a suspicion >>>>> that >>>>>>> he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I am fairly >>>>> sure >>>>>>> Keller was. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than too thin >>>>>>> although the metaphor of filling still seems reasonable >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 6. In a way you don?t seem to quite come out and say it (or I >>>>>>> missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is not necessarily >>>>>>> creative and I would add that it is quite everyday. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as they occur. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 4:41 PM, Lplarry wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and re(present) >> our >>>>>>> notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a metaphor >>>>> not >>>>>>> error. >>>>>>>> Ed, >>>>>>>> To continue with your reflection if image has some relation to how >>>>>>> others use text. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Actually I don?t think image has some relation to how others use >> text. >>>>> I >>>>>>> twas speculating as whether there is some commonality between how >> Mike >>>>> is >>>>>>> using using image and how others are using text. I said this because >> I >>>>>>> struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary in >>>>> mathematics >>>>>>> and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to problems >>>>> that >>>>>>> presently catch my attention. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In other >> words >>>>>>> can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The physical >>>>>>> gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of letters >> on >>>>> the >>>>>>> page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or the >> visual >>>>>>> marks making a circle-like shape. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size is too >>>>> large. >>>>>>> That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I now >>>>> realize >>>>>>> was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to view >>>>>>> imagination. I don?t mean your perspective is lacking; it just seems >> to >>>>>>> result in different questions than I would/do ask. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> These different physical forms are not the foundational bedrock, >> they >>>>>>> are the material. >>>>>>>> If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on parchment but as >>>>>>> having a deeper process, >>>>>>>> Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual >> perceptions >>>>>>> but rather having a deeper process. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My initial reaction is ?Why are you saying this?" If I ever thought >> the >>>>>>> contrary, I can?t remember. This is just common sense. The >> interesting >>>>>>> thing about what you say is that you seem to using ?imagine? in a >> non >>>>>>> visual fashion which was largely my initial point. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> All the senses share in this process and engage with physically >>>>>>> experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is that >>>>> unifying >>>>>>> process that includes all the senses but is not itself the senses. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I would say that all senses can participate in this process. Also >>>>>>> physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too strong although >>>>>>> physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints of a sort >> on >>>>>>> imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I don?t >>>>>>> physically experience a platonic circle. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the collated >>>>>>> pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a >> dialogue, >>>>> to >>>>>>> imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly have a >>>>>>> unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the vital animating >>>>>>> process lived (into). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Here is where my example wasn?t helpful. I did not mean one ?sees' >> the >>>>>>> marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks is too >>>>> large a >>>>>>> grain size) on the board as having certain properties consistent with >>>>> those >>>>>>> of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a sort of >>>>> sense. >>>>>>> The teacher?s language seems to prove the imaging and the moving to >> new >>>>>>> stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people don?t >> make >>>>> the >>>>>>> leaps. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy of the >>>>> visual >>>>>>> sense. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none of the >>>>> sensory >>>>>>> modes >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The relation of this image process to the language process is also >>>>>>> multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This doesn?t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, doesn?t >>>>> follow >>>>>>> for me. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable perspective. It is >>>>> just >>>>>>> one that, to a degree, I either don?t share or seems to be the wrong >>>>> grain >>>>>>> size. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" >>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM >>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My wondering has more to do with your focus on the visual and >>>>> my >>>>>>> examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be about the >>>>> visual. >>>>>>> However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well drawn) >> is >>>>> a >>>>>>> ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at least, it >>>>> never >>>>>>> was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. In >> fact, >>>>>>> assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I can >>>>> imagine it >>>>>>> (smile). >>>>>>>> On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term ?image? in >>>>> the >>>>>>> way some use the word ?text.? That is, to take into account both >>>>> external >>>>>>> and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of what you >>>>> say >>>>>>> resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am finding that >>>>>>> peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 2:35 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of >>>>> Zinchenko's >>>>>>>>> experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual system >>>>> that >>>>>>>>> prevented stabilized images from disappearing. He stabilized the >>>>> image >>>>>>>>> (here reified as a projection on the retina) but changed its color, >>>>> thus >>>>>>>>> defeating the retina's tendency to go grey. In those conditions, >> eye >>>>>>>>> movements continue to trace the spatial coordinates of the image as >>>>> if >>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>> were continuing to "feel it." >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> These are very special circumstances, to be sure, but for they make >>>>> it >>>>>>>>> clear that what is called an image is a process (according to >>>>> Suvorov, >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> stepping away from the world and then stepping back into it, but >>>>> then he >>>>>>>>> was blind and deaf). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> What we designate as "the image" is some form of materialized >>>>>>> stabilization >>>>>>>>> of the flow of into-image-making. Some structure in the flow of the >>>>>>> always >>>>>>>>> new. From just the blink of an eye to our image of the statue of >>>>>>> liberty. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This is an old idea but it fits with my intuition. I first >>>>> encountered >>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>> reading Dewey who refers to "the poet" on the topic of experience. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *Yet all experience is an arch wherehrough / Gleams that untraveled >>>>>>> world >>>>>>>>> whose margin fades / Forever and forever when I move. * >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *Tennyson, Ulysses* >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> If you are interested, we could try to synch re/reading of some >> core >>>>>>> common >>>>>>>>> articles/chapters. This entire area of concern is of recent vintage >>>>> for >>>>>>> me >>>>>>>>> and my ignorance is particularly keenly felt. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:02 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the privileging >>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> the ?image? in discussions of imagination. Additionally, although >> it >>>>>>> has >>>>>>>>>> been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don?t think it >> was >>>>>>> of the >>>>>>>>>> Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw on would >>>>>>> disagree >>>>>>>>>> with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics. >>>>>>>>>> I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems useful! - >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a huge >>>>> emphasis >>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>> mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking less >> about >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> ?imaginal? than you or Larry. That doesn?t mean that what you and >>>>>>> Larry are >>>>>>>>>> talking about might not usefully factor in especially your point >>>>> about >>>>>>>>>> joint, mediated, activity. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 11:11 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et al >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic beginnings >>>>> builds >>>>>>> off >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> the already highly functional sensory system. Assume vision as >> the >>>>>>>>>> sensory >>>>>>>>>>> system in question. We know that in an important sense, the >>>>> "simple" >>>>>>> act >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> seeing what you might call a common object, for example your car >> in >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves temporal >>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement that >>>>> must >>>>>>> be >>>>>>>>>>> resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the process of >>>>> image >>>>>>>>>>> formation ceases to function. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for that >>>>>>> simplified >>>>>>>>>>> account. In thinking about imagination I turn to Zaporozhets, >>>>>>> Zinchenko >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of enactive >>>>>>>>>>> perception/cognition. It is also consistent with joint, mediated, >>>>>>>>>> activity >>>>>>>>>>> as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic function >>>>> and >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> human possibility for symbolic communication is co-incident and >>>>>>>>>>> co-constitutive of distinctly human imagination. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> in brief >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Ed, mike, Michael, >>>>>>>>>>>> I will push my question to an earlier time period. >>>>>>>>>>>> Age 2 months. >>>>>>>>>>>> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces her.own >>>>> activity . >>>>>>>>>>>> Question >>>>>>>>>>>> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, moving >>>>> into >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? >>>>>>>>>>>> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic origin? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" >>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM >>>>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be inclusive or >>>>>>>>>>>> exclusive. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to make sense >>>>> if >>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>> understand Vygotsky correctly. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? perhaps >> I >>>>>>>>>>>> wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely understood the >>>>>>>>>> tendency to >>>>>>>>>>>> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow >>>>>>>>>> extra-concrete. >>>>>>>>>>>> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural >> historical >>>>>>>>>> context >>>>>>>>>>>> and at a certain stage of development people act as if certain >>>>> things >>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>> ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever that >>>>> is?). >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I?m not quite sure where you are going with the development of >>>>>>>>>>>> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you mean >>>>> when >>>>>>>>>>>> you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My answer, >>>>>>>>>> perhaps, >>>>>>>>>>>> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or fantasy >>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>> your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your final >>>>> question. >>>>>>> An >>>>>>>>>>>> approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine other >>>>>>>>>>>> possibilities (smile). >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Ed >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Ed, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> The title imagination (or) fantasy >>>>>>>>>>>>> Is different from >>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. >>>>>>>>>>>>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a >>>>>>> distanciation?) >>>>>>>>>>>> and return to the mathematical concrete. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this transfer from >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> physical to the mathematical? >>>>>>>>>>>>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged in >>>>> historical >>>>>>>>>>>> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the physical >>>>>>> (concrete) >>>>>>>>>>>> which exists prior to the human understanding and the >> mathematical >>>>>>>>>>>> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging within >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? >>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical which >>>>>>> originates >>>>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>> concrete. >>>>>>>>>>>>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and fantasy. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and fantasy. >>>>> Does >>>>>>> one >>>>>>>>>>>> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other implies the >>>>> actual >>>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>>>> be mapped onto the physical with systems? >>>>>>>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? >>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" >>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM >>>>>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < >> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> All >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of >>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>>>>>>> that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? >>>>> ?let,? or >>>>>>>>>>>> ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different >>>>> statements >>>>>>>>>>>> although, under certain circumstances, might be the same.? In >>>>> doing >>>>>>> so I >>>>>>>>>>>> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination and >>>>>>> Creativity >>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic for >>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract is only >>>>> an >>>>>>>>>>>> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of development, >> only a >>>>>>> pass >>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our point of >>>>> view, >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed from a >>>>>>> given >>>>>>>>>>>> concrete toward a new concrete.? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous >>>>> discussion >>>>>>>>>>>> on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in that I >>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>> wondering whether part of what is going on is that children are >>>>> being >>>>>>>>>> asked >>>>>>>>>>>> to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this join >> the >>>>>>>>>>>> elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious (if >>>>>>> somebody >>>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason for my >>>>>>>>>> wondering >>>>>>>>>>>> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. >> there >>>>>>> is no >>>>>>>>>>>> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get stuck, so to >>>>>>> speak, >>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am wondering >>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> then a question. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> My first example: It is possible that we would all agree that >> to >>>>>>> see >>>>>>>>>>>> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no such >>>>> thing. >>>>>>> In a >>>>>>>>>>>> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root of two >>>>> is >>>>>>> not >>>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>> fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two is a >>>>>>> fraction.? >>>>>>>>>>>> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it is true >>>>> and >>>>>>> then >>>>>>>>>>>> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is perhaps >> another >>>>>>>>>>>> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete >> through >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through >> contradiction) >>>>>>>>>> seems to >>>>>>>>>>>> be very hard for people to do. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard and >>>>> draws >>>>>>>>>>>> something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? She then >>>>>>> draws a >>>>>>>>>>>> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object and says, >>>>>>> "This >>>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>> its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle (waving >> her >>>>>>> hand >>>>>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>>>>> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the center.? >>>>> None >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. Each >>>>> step >>>>>>>>>> here >>>>>>>>>>>> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the >> concrete. >>>>>>> (Hmm >>>>>>>>>> , I >>>>>>>>>>>> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to the >>>>>>>>>> mathematical >>>>>>>>>>>> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the consequences of a >>>>>>> winged >>>>>>>>>>>> horse]. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify imagination with >>>>>>>>>>>> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what would >>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>>>> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or something >>>>> else? >>>>>>>>>> There >>>>>>>>>>>> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m >>>>> interested in >>>>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>>>>> take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Ed Wall >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with >>>>> an >>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with >> an >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> >> >> > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From smago@uga.edu Mon Dec 14 03:11:05 2015 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 11:11:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Connecting and stability In-Reply-To: References: <566cda19.cf40620a.79833.ffffcf75@mx.google.com> <566e0d83.039d420a.37975.ffff8611@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Marty Nystrand (in 1986) wrote about reciprocity between readers and writers, with the idea of them being "in tune" seeming to apply here? -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+smago=uga.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Sunday, December 13, 2015 8:08 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Connecting and stability Two comments on this interesting discussion. 1. Maybe the meaning as communicated is between the words, not in them, the sharedness in the senses they make of this moment of joint mediated activity. 2. An appropriate poem for the occasion with lots to think about and within in it. The Unicorn by Ranier Maira Rilke This is the creature there never has been. They never knew it, and yet, none the less, they loved the way it moved, its suppleness, its neck, its very gaze, mild and serene. Not there, because they loved it, it behaved as though it were. They always left some space. And in that clear unpeopled space they saved it lightly reared its head with scarce a trace of not being there. They fed it, not with corn, but only with the possibility of being. And that was able to confer such strength, its brow put for a horn. One horn. Whitely it stole up to a maid, -- to *be* within the silver mirror and in her. On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 4:29 PM, Lplarry wrote: > Annalisa, > What held my attention was the notion that speech be understood for > the quality it gives to the listener of the speech . > The meaning resides in how the speaker appeals to the listener to > stabilize THIS meaning the speaker is sharing. > In other words the meaning resides in the manner the listener or > hearer takes up and stabilizes what the speaker is inviting the > listener to notice and focus on.. > With this notion the intension shifts to the hearer stabilizing what > the speaker projects. > The verb's meaning resides in how the listener takes up the speaker's > use of language which is intended in order for the listener to realize > stable meaning. > The focus is no longer on self-identifying expression, but shifts to > how the speaker intends the listener to grasp meaning as that embodied > in the space of shared language. > The focus shifts to the listener taking up the others language game > and coming to realize shared meaning.. > I am indicating a different location where meaning resides. > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Annalisa Aguilar" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?13 4:00 PM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Connecting and stability > > Hi Larry and others, > > Is, as a verb is not like other verbs, which have to do with action. > I'm not a linguist, but off the top, I don't think there is a verb > that doesn't have to do with action other than "to be." At least in > English. We use "becoming" to signify change, but the infinitive "to > be" is a pointer to Existence. We don't say I become an eater, or I > become a sleeper, or I become a writer, even though that has some > truth to it (i'm not born a writer), it's not how we speak. I am an > eater, I am a sleeper, I am a writer. Become is its own verb, isn't > it? "to become," is a marriage of the word Be and Come. If Become > where the word for Be, then that would make the game here really > different. But Be comes before Become, linguistically and > existentially! :) > > So with that in mind, Is is more of a signifier of existence and the > noun that accompanies Is takes the particular shape that reflects > Is-ness. Like the pot depends upon clay for its existence. If you > remove the clay from the pot, the pot no longer exists. If you smash > the pot, the clay remains, thus the pot depends upon clay to exist. I depend upon Being to exist. > > Of course I've been thinking also about unicorns! I believe I can > explain why this definition of Being works even in the imaginary > sense. (Which is to say Being is not a category of the mind in the > absolute sense of Being, that all there is to Being is a cognitive > category, therefore there is nothing to Being but a logical or > categorical container in speech and thought, which is the same as > saying Being arises from Mind, "I think, therefore I am"). > > Getting back to unicorns! We can say that the is-ness of the horse and > the is-ness of the horn combine in the imagination, and thus unicorn > is. Thus the material of the unicorn, which does not exist in the > world we live in, is identical to the material of the imagination, > which is the material of the Mind. > > But this does not stop at the Mind. Because the material of the > unicorn is no different than the material of the memory of what I ate > for dinner last night, or imagining walking on the boardwalk right now > while I'm sitting in front of this screen. Just like other > imaginations, for imaginary objects, the Is-ness is as-if borrowed > from horse-ness and horn-ness, which do exist in the world. It is not > possible to create an imagination of things we do not know about. > Imaginations (and dreams) are always of the things we have known > before, even if it is superficial knowledge. So the existence of > unicorns depends upon the material of all imaginary objects, the material of the mind. > > This still supports the notion that Being comes before Mind. And that > Mind is dependent upon Being, not the other way around. > > Also, Being is not something limited to sentient creatures, but is > unlimited, the entire world sits in existence. That is why we can > experience the existence of inanimate or insentient objects: the > mountain is, the sky is, the ocean is, and since mind is in the world, > the unicorn is. > > The problem is that we can't know what that Being is that makes > existence possible for everything else. It's not knowable. And this > has nothing to do with believing in a God or not believing, but that > there is a limit to what we as humans can know, and that Being, that > which pervades all beingness, all names and forms, responsible for the > existence all that is here, is one of those things we will never be able to know explicitly. > > If we were to assert that Being is a product (a category) of Mind, > then we are back to Decartes's dualism. When you say that "in the end" > there is a final division (of two) and "that's just the way it is", > then we can justify hierarchies, we can justify slavery, we can > justify class, and so on. "Slavery is just the way it is." "Inequality > is just the way it is." I just can't accept that. If we say really > that all that is here is Existence, but the multiplicity of objects we > experience are just different forms and manifestations of > Existence(Being), then we can find the commonality among us despite > differences, we can justify our feelings of oneness with Nature, Love > for another, Compassion for strangers, etc. I prefer the latter over > the former: Difference in this case becomes incidental and ornamental, while similarities are fundamental. > > So I think there is a fundamental ethical reason to see Being before > Mind from this standpoint. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > P.S. I've pulled out On the Soul by Aristotle from my shelf, because I > am curious about his take on the Soul, because it is quite apparent > that he does not see Soul as limited to Mind, like Hegel did. The Soul > for Aristotle is the life-force, or sentiency. In Vedic thought there > is the concept of Prana, which is also identical to life-force, > something entering from the outside of the gross body, Prana is an > aspect of the subtle body, but what gives life to the gross body and > which leaves at death. This not analogously different from electricity > passing through a lightbulb and when the electricity is there, the > light shines, when it is absent the bulb is dark. The electricity is like the subtle body, the bulb the gross body. > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From ewall@umich.edu Mon Dec 14 11:22:49 2015 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 13:22:49 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Rationalism and Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <566a24e9.1444620a.ac08f.fffffe76@mx.google.com> <566a6b7b.e405430a.4a789.ffffe6eb@mx.google.com> <065ED5BB-278B-4028-A493-245D81342155@umich.edu> <9AF9DF23-B6EF-4A09-A0EA-AE3C3D6D9BC4@umich.edu> Message-ID: <6B7F9505-A05B-4B5D-9600-DCE1183259DF@umich.edu> Annalisa I am going to have to absent myself for awhile from this interesting conversation, but before I leave a few comments. Thinking about our previous email exchange I though I had better note that my understand of what you were pointing toward with your use of POV was a way of being with. I admit to a growing discomfort with the priority giving seeing through such a term (perhaps I?ve read too much Foucault - smile) and, to a degree, find that such language tends to obscure listening (I am talking about something beyond mere ?hearing' here as I assume ?imaging? is something beyond mere ?seeing?). So I was incorrect to acquiescence to a POV in my listening to the radio programs as I saw nothing; however, I was in the mode, one might say, of being with such audio. Thus the more I move through your use of POV, the more uncomfortable I become and your reference to it possibly functioning elusively I find a matter of concern and a situation for which I am not able to imagine what I consider to be a satisfactory story. This is not to say that I don?t think you do not have a reasonable POV (smile). In any case it is important to note that I did not say, I hope, that I was freer to construct images about what I experienced. In fact, and it was quite awhile ago, I don?t remember constructing any particular images (Oh, I identified by names and quality of voices, one might say, men and women, and I understood the meanings of certain descriptive words; however images of those words, voices, or names did not form images in my mind) until I saw the TV program and this stabilized my imagination in ways that I was unable to shake lose. I could, in a sense, no longer just listen; just be with. However, you do tell a story which I greatly appreciate and it seems to be the sort of thing pointed at by Mike?s comment. I would appreciate it if you could take a moment or two to identify the POVs for me - I won?t be able to reply for awhile - so I can get a better idea of what you consider a POV to be. Time and space seem to be involved interesting ways. This is not, by the way, a should! (smile). Ed > On Dec 12, 2015, at 7:26 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > Hi Ed (and others), > > Thanks for your thoughtful reply. > > First I'd like to say that what I wrote I wrote without a totally clear picture in mind, or at least a picture that I articulated effectively. If you can imagine that! > > When I wrote of your TV experience, I wrote about it in reference to the radio experience, in juxtaposition with that experience. I think point of view (POV) is something that functions so elusively, that we aren't aways aware of this being constructed. > > Making art, whether writing a poem, painting a painting, making a sculpture, playing music, etc. there is a constructed reader/viewer/listener/experiencer being made by the artist through the piece, and conveyed through the medium. The artist might be doing this consciously or unconsciously, but they do it. Consider looking at Guernica without a POV. > > What is happening with more modern technology is a kind of telling of stories that dictate experiences as such. So if one has different experiences that do not compare to the story, one must surrender to the story or one is alienated, just by the pervasiveness of the medium and the message therein. Consider what it must be like for LGBT to experience a flood of stories and songs about heterosexual romance. If you can, then you have taken, temporarily, a POV, even if it's in your imagination. If you can't place yourself, then consider what a friend told me, that it's like hearing bad Christmas music all the time, wherever you go. This ability to take a POV creates human empathy and sensitivity because affect populates this POV. The affect is the answer to "What is that like?" > > In old-time radio, there was more apparent freedom available to the listener, as you said the imagination has more leeway to construct images about what the listener experiences. Even in theater there is this experience because the world is represented on the stage, and sets do not simulate the world as the world actually is, so for the theatergoer, the imagination and the flexibility of POV is still possible. One can focus on one character or another. > > In television and film this seems to be less flexible. I'm not saying that it is not possible to have imaginative experiences in film or television, just that POVs are more deliberately constructed in comparison to the storytelling wizard sharing time with a group around a fire and telling stories of old, or in your case, your radio program. > > When I watched Star Trek TV episodes, I myself had a "reverse" experience from yours. After, I read (somewhat campy) stories published in a book series and I couldn't get William Shatner's and Leonard Nimoy's personages and voices out of my head, or any of the other characters that might pop up. It was an uncomfortable experience, and I could never really get into the stories. I don't even remember what they were, I just remember this experience, I was probably 13 at the time. But I think it's because the associations are so strongly mapped, there's no space for an imagination to happen (Until we all become post-modern I suppose). > > My assertion is that POV is the only way we can experience a story, and it's our way into the story: we can feel affect for the characters or situations, that's how they grab us and engage us, they make us care about something. I am the one listening and thus positioning myself to the story, that is one freedom I still possess. I can even say, "I don't buy that story," or "I have a better one," and so on. I don't think taking a POV is all that conscious unless one is actually focusing upon this idea. ANd even in that case, one might ruin the experience of a film by deconstructing what the director did, or how the editor edited, or the screenwriter wrote lines, etc. Which I suppose is still taking a POV, but more as a distant observer than getting involved in the actual story. I might offer that the less aware we are of the POV that we take, the more likely we are to feel an affect more deeply. It might be why we call art art. > > I don't think I am saying your stories are or are not an instance of Mike's point. If I am (or am not), it's not planned. I was only responding to your experience of what happened and am offering a possible explanation. You can certainly disagree with me. I don't think storytelling is a delirium at all. I think we live and die by the stories we hear and share and experience through hearing and telling. > > Would you say more about what you mean when you asked, "Are you saying imagination cannot be drained of effect since 'affect has to arrive first to ignite the process'?" What does it mean to say imagination is drained of effect? Do you mean is imagination killed if affect is missing? > > Though I still would like to hear your reply, I'm going to say that I hope we agree that imagination is an expression of freedom. > > If there is conscious and deliberate attempts to invoke a specific "picture-making" through cultural meaning for a specifically contained response (I can't call that an imagination because there is propaganda, manipulation or deception involved), this approach, in my opinion, is not far from brainwashing, or some means for justification for group identities, what have you. The end result are adults with limited ability to be creative or imagine anything on their own. Such an imagination is a muscle with a very constrained reach and one can experience pain if asked to imagine something far beyond common experienced. This may be why conservatives or fundamentalists are so reactive if anyone strays from the flock or behaves spontaneously. In such society, one would likely be considered deluded. > > We had a marvelous presentation by researcher who visited us in the lab yesterday. She is studying the use of tablets (iPads) in preschools. One finding she made is that during interaction with the iPad (either alone or in a small cohort of others) children try to "break" the apps that they interact with, or they use it in ways that were not a part of the design. I see this as an attempt for kids to create their own POV and not settle for the POV as "dictated" or set out by the app designers. The broom is the pivot for the imagined horse only because the child is free to imagine it. That is my opinion of what is going on. Artists do this all the time, it's part of problem-finding and discovery as an art-making process. > > Then I went to a different level, in considering tech with a particular generational cohort. This is what I was trying to say about new generations (as kids) coming to new tech who will have the experience where affect "begins again." It's not like that for their parents using the same new tech, who developed as children with different tech. For the parents there is an overlap of the old tech and accompanying behaviors assigned to the new one, so the approach possesses a kind of baggage, like learning a new language. Of course these are huge generalizations that can be easily picked apart. I'm just trying to describe an idea I have about it. > > In my imagination, in response to your comment about drained affect in the face of a rationalized move, it feels like you are describing a killjoy. > > Kind regards, From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Dec 14 11:51:52 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 04:51:52 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Connecting and stability In-Reply-To: References: <566cda19.cf40620a.79833.ffffcf75@mx.google.com> Message-ID: When people (including Vygotsky) think about language, they often think of it as a pile of words. This is a true, but it's only true in the sense that a building is a heap of bricks. As soon as we have to actually build a building (as Lefebvre knew) we find that there are intermediate structures that are actually much more important.For the purpose of situating action in language, I think we can consider just two levels of intermediate structure. Roofs, floors and walls are externally shaped; they are shaped like the great outdoors itself; that is, they are structured the way they are structured because of their function, which is to interface with the environment. That's why a floor or a ceiling or a wall looks like a two dimensional map of the building, and that's why western houses look vaguely like castles while traditional eastern houses look more like umbrellas. Rooms, stairs and halls are internally shaped; they are shaped by other units within the building itself; that is, they are structured the way they are structured because of their function, which is to interface with the inhabitants. That's why a bedroom looks a little like a bed, and a kitchen a little like a kitchen table; a toilet looks a little like...well, like a toilet, actually; each one is a kind of squaring out of a human need. Language is like this too: some structures are externally shaped, e.g. titles and reference lists, introductions and "topic sentences", and what we Hallidayans call "Theme" at the level of the clause. A prepositional phrase like that last one "at the level of the clause" is a little like a minor clause itself: it has a preposition instead of a verb but it certainly has an object and an implicit subject. Other structures are internally shaped: e.g. a nominal group like "other structures" is an expanded noun in sort of the same way that a bedroom is an expanded bed, and a verb group like "are internally shaped" is an expanded verb ("shape") in much the same way that a stairwell is an expanded step. So I think when Huw argues that action can be embedded in language, he's absolutely half right. Language is the only symbolic system we have that has to be able to put the whole of human experience into words (D. H. Lawrence said this about the novel, but when we read "Why the Novel Matters" carefully it turns out that, as usual, he is confusing human experience with his own body). So there are certainly ways of putting actions into words. But the reverse absolutely does not apply: we cannot reduce words into actions of the body, any more than we can reduce a building to a heap of bricks. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 12:16 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Thanks for the interesting contribution, David. > > >From what I recall, Goethe's criticism of Newton's endeavour was that he > only undertook half the analysis and failed to gain a relational > understanding of the phenomenon as a whole. I never really dug into it > that much though. > > For a parallel to "being", "doing", and "sensing", you could consider > Lefebvre's application of "representational", "representations of" > and "spatial practice" moments to social spaces. One of the difficulties I > think you will have with Lefebvre (The Production of Space), however, is > that he is not shy of pointing out that analyses of social space on the > basis of language or discourse are inadequate for understanding the > production of these spaces. The same can be said for thinking. > > But perhaps you can take a stream of discourse from a recounting and > reliving of lived experience as it is manifest in (say) emotive expression > as the expression of a form (outline) for something manifesting a 'primary > colour' that is not known to the analysis of discourse, namely action and > activity. One could then posit that action within activity was largely > responsible for the formation of thought-space that enable the orienting > within hearing and the orienting within seeing to yield listening and > active looking/perceiving respectively. > > When it comes to relating thinking as something derived from seeing, I > suspect this is considerably biased by personality preference. What many > consider to be thinking proper is a commitment to resolve something > construed as a mental problem. One has to see, perceive and then decide to > stick with it until one begins to perceive the seeds of something else. > > Best, > Huw > > > On 14 December 2015 at 01:16, David Kellogg wrote: > > > In 1706 Isaac Newton created the first color wheel, by taking the colors > he > > observed from his prismatic studies and arranging them carefully in the > > order they appeared in a circle. In the nineteenth century, the > > impressionists began to arrange their palettes in the same way (instead > of > > in squares which emphasized shades and tints), but they couldn't really > > decide if the cardinal points on the chromatic compass were red, blue, > and > > yellow or red, green and yellow. This in turn goes back to a disagreement > > that Goethe had with Newton on the very nature of color, whether it is an > > objective property of materials or whether it is an effect produced in > the > > mind: it turns out that modern color printers (with their "millions of > > colors" produced by only three inks) are largely based on Goethe's theory > > and not on Newton's. > > > > I mention all this because Halliday does more or less the same thing with > > verbs, or rather with the "processes" that verbs realize. The three > > cardinal processes, in the first edition of his "introduction to > Functional > > Grammar", were "being", "doing", and "sensing" and we can imagine "to > be", > > "to do" and "to see" as red, blue, and yellow or perhaps orange, green, > and > > blue. So for example a verb like "to have" or "to own" is a relational > > process, and is a shading or tinting of "to be", and a verb like "play" > or > > "work" is a material process and belongs near "to act" with the doings on > > the verbal palette, while a verb like "see", "smell", "feel", and by > > extension "think" is a mental process and belongs somewhere in the > vicinity > > of sensing. In the interstices of these cardinal processes, we find > > behavioral ones (sleeping, laughing, crying) located somewhere between > the > > material and the mental, existential processes ("there is") between the > > material and the relational, and above all the verbal processes, between > > the relational and the mental. > > > > But that's the functional picture, not the genetic one. From the newborn > > child's point of view, there is, as Vygotsky says, an undifferentiated > > "state" rather than processes, and this is differentiated into feelings > on > > the one hand and doings on the other largely on the basis of instincts > like > > positioning and feeding. The "relational"processes require language to > come > > into being, particularly since, in English anyway, "to be" is a very > > strange kind of being that actually relates two "be-ers": a carrier and > an > > attribute ("Minsu is tall"), an identifier and an identified ("He is > > Minsu"), or a token and a value ("Minsu is a boy"). > > > > I think that Vygotsky's early work on imagination is essentially wrong, > and > > I include "Imaginary and Creativity in Childhood" in this. The reason is > > that the distinction between reproductive and combinatorial imagination > on > > which that work rests is associativism which he took over more or less > > uncritically from Ribot, and only later repudiated. In Ribot, all > thinking > > is essentially a pale shadow of seeing--imagination is nothing but the > > after-glow of imaging. But not even sensing is reducible to seeing, and > > certainly not thinking. > > > > By the time of Vygotsky's late lectures, he has solved the problem. In > his > > lecture on the development of creativity in childhood (Volume One in the > > English Collected Works) he points out that the name of a place--just the > > name--can conjure up a kind of experience, even if we have never even > been > > there, and words in the right order create not only experiences that have > > never been had but experiences which by their very nature are not > haveable > > by as single human consciousness (e.g. "the French Revolution"). There is > > no way to get "thinking" out of 'seeing'. We have to recognize that > > thinking is a mental process that stands somewhere between seeing and > > saying, in much the same way that green stands somewhere between yellow > and > > blue. Yes, we can produce green by mixing yellow and blue, but that > doesn't > > mean we can reduce it meaningfully to those two colors. I think in the > same > > way it makes no sense to reduce a unicorn to a horse and a horn. > > > > David Kellogg > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 8:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: > > > > > Hi Larry and others, > > > > > > Is, as a verb is not like other verbs, which have to do with action. > I'm > > > not a linguist, but off the top, I don't think there is a verb that > > doesn't > > > have to do with action other than "to be." At least in English. We use > > > "becoming" to signify change, but the infinitive "to be" is a pointer > to > > > Existence. We don't say I become an eater, or I become a sleeper, or I > > > become a writer, even though that has some truth to it (i'm not born a > > > writer), it's not how we speak. I am an eater, I am a sleeper, I am a > > > writer. Become is its own verb, isn't it? "to become," is a marriage of > > the > > > word Be and Come. If Become where the word for Be, then that would make > > the > > > game here really different. But Be comes before Become, linguistically > > and > > > existentially! :) > > > > > > So with that in mind, Is is more of a signifier of existence and the > noun > > > that accompanies Is takes the particular shape that reflects Is-ness. > > Like > > > the pot depends upon clay for its existence. If you remove the clay > from > > > the pot, the pot no longer exists. If you smash the pot, the clay > > remains, > > > thus the pot depends upon clay to exist. I depend upon Being to exist. > > > > > > Of course I've been thinking also about unicorns! I believe I can > explain > > > why this definition of Being works even in the imaginary sense. (Which > is > > > to say Being is not a category of the mind in the absolute sense of > > Being, > > > that all there is to Being is a cognitive category, therefore there is > > > nothing to Being but a logical or categorical container in speech and > > > thought, which is the same as saying Being arises from Mind, "I think, > > > therefore I am"). > > > > > > Getting back to unicorns! We can say that the is-ness of the horse and > > the > > > is-ness of the horn combine in the imagination, and thus unicorn is. > Thus > > > the material of the unicorn, which does not exist in the world we live > > in, > > > is identical to the material of the imagination, which is the material > of > > > the Mind. > > > > > > But this does not stop at the Mind. Because the material of the unicorn > > is > > > no different than the material of the memory of what I ate for dinner > > last > > > night, or imagining walking on the boardwalk right now while I'm > sitting > > in > > > front of this screen. Just like other imaginations, for imaginary > > objects, > > > the Is-ness is as-if borrowed from horse-ness and horn-ness, which do > > exist > > > in the world. It is not possible to create an imagination of things we > do > > > not know about. Imaginations (and dreams) are always of the things we > > have > > > known before, even if it is superficial knowledge. So the existence of > > > unicorns depends upon the material of all imaginary objects, the > material > > > of the mind. > > > > > > This still supports the notion that Being comes before Mind. And that > > Mind > > > is dependent upon Being, not the other way around. > > > > > > Also, Being is not something limited to sentient creatures, but is > > > unlimited, the entire world sits in existence. That is why we can > > > experience the existence of inanimate or insentient objects: the > mountain > > > is, the sky is, the ocean is, and since mind is in the world, the > unicorn > > > is. > > > > > > The problem is that we can't know what that Being is that makes > existence > > > possible for everything else. It's not knowable. And this has nothing > to > > do > > > with believing in a God or not believing, but that there is a limit to > > what > > > we as humans can know, and that Being, that which pervades all > beingness, > > > all names and forms, responsible for the existence all that is here, is > > one > > > of those things we will never be able to know explicitly. > > > > > > If we were to assert that Being is a product (a category) of Mind, then > > we > > > are back to Decartes's dualism. When you say that "in the end" there > is a > > > final division (of two) and "that's just the way it is", then we can > > > justify hierarchies, we can justify slavery, we can justify class, and > so > > > on. "Slavery is just the way it is." "Inequality is just the way it > is." > > I > > > just can't accept that. If we say really that all that is here is > > > Existence, but the multiplicity of objects we experience are just > > different > > > forms and manifestations of Existence(Being), then we can find the > > > commonality among us despite differences, we can justify our feelings > of > > > oneness with Nature, Love for another, Compassion for strangers, etc. I > > > prefer the latter over the former: Difference in this case becomes > > > incidental and ornamental, while similarities are fundamental. > > > > > > So I think there is a fundamental ethical reason to see Being before > Mind > > > from this standpoint. > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > P.S. I've pulled out On the Soul by Aristotle from my shelf, because I > am > > > curious about his take on the Soul, because it is quite apparent that > he > > > does not see Soul as limited to Mind, like Hegel did. The Soul for > > > Aristotle is the life-force, or sentiency. In Vedic thought there is > the > > > concept of Prana, which is also identical to life-force, something > > entering > > > from the outside of the gross body, Prana is an aspect of the subtle > > body, > > > but what gives life to the gross body and which leaves at death. This > not > > > analogously different from electricity passing through a lightbulb and > > when > > > the electricity is there, the light shines, when it is absent the bulb > is > > > dark. The electricity is like the subtle body, the bulb the gross body. > > > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Dec 14 12:48:42 2015 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 20:48:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Connecting and stability In-Reply-To: References: <566cda19.cf40620a.79833.ffffcf75@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Millie, our dog, says that I'm right and your wrong, David. At least, that's what I think she says. Best, Huw On 14 December 2015 at 19:51, David Kellogg wrote: > When people (including Vygotsky) think about language, they often think of > it as a pile of words. This is a true, but it's only true in the sense that > a building is a heap of bricks. As soon as we have to actually build a > building (as Lefebvre knew) we find that there are intermediate structures > that are actually much more important.For the purpose of situating action > in language, I think we can consider just two levels of intermediate > structure. > > Roofs, floors and walls are externally shaped; they are shaped like the > great outdoors itself; that is, they are structured the way they are > structured because of their function, which is to interface with the > environment. That's why a floor or a ceiling or a wall looks like a two > dimensional map of the building, and that's why western houses look vaguely > like castles while traditional eastern houses look more like umbrellas. > > Rooms, stairs and halls are internally shaped; they are shaped by other > units within the building itself; that is, they are structured the way they > are structured because of their function, which is to interface with the > inhabitants. That's why a bedroom looks a little like a bed, and a kitchen > a little like a kitchen table; a toilet looks a little like...well, like a > toilet, actually; each one is a kind of squaring out of a human need. > > Language is like this too: some structures are externally shaped, e.g. > titles and reference lists, introductions and "topic sentences", and what > we Hallidayans call "Theme" at the level of the clause. A prepositional > phrase like that last one "at the level of the clause" is a little like a > minor clause itself: it has a preposition instead of a verb but it > certainly has an object and an implicit subject. Other structures are > internally shaped: e.g. a nominal group like "other structures" is an > expanded noun in sort of the same way that a bedroom is an expanded bed, > and a verb group like "are internally shaped" is an expanded verb ("shape") > in much the same way that a stairwell is an expanded step. > > So I think when Huw argues that action can be embedded in language, he's > absolutely half right. Language is the only symbolic system we have that > has to be able to put the whole of human experience into words (D. H. > Lawrence said this about the novel, but when we read "Why the Novel > Matters" carefully it turns out that, as usual, he is confusing human > experience with his own body). So there are certainly ways of putting > actions into words. But the reverse absolutely does not apply: we cannot > reduce words into actions of the body, any more than we can reduce a > building to a heap of bricks. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 12:16 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > Thanks for the interesting contribution, David. > > > > >From what I recall, Goethe's criticism of Newton's endeavour was that he > > only undertook half the analysis and failed to gain a relational > > understanding of the phenomenon as a whole. I never really dug into it > > that much though. > > > > For a parallel to "being", "doing", and "sensing", you could consider > > Lefebvre's application of "representational", "representations of" > > and "spatial practice" moments to social spaces. One of the > difficulties I > > think you will have with Lefebvre (The Production of Space), however, is > > that he is not shy of pointing out that analyses of social space on the > > basis of language or discourse are inadequate for understanding the > > production of these spaces. The same can be said for thinking. > > > > But perhaps you can take a stream of discourse from a recounting and > > reliving of lived experience as it is manifest in (say) emotive > expression > > as the expression of a form (outline) for something manifesting a > 'primary > > colour' that is not known to the analysis of discourse, namely action and > > activity. One could then posit that action within activity was largely > > responsible for the formation of thought-space that enable the orienting > > within hearing and the orienting within seeing to yield listening and > > active looking/perceiving respectively. > > > > When it comes to relating thinking as something derived from seeing, I > > suspect this is considerably biased by personality preference. What many > > consider to be thinking proper is a commitment to resolve something > > construed as a mental problem. One has to see, perceive and then decide > to > > stick with it until one begins to perceive the seeds of something else. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > On 14 December 2015 at 01:16, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > > > In 1706 Isaac Newton created the first color wheel, by taking the > colors > > he > > > observed from his prismatic studies and arranging them carefully in the > > > order they appeared in a circle. In the nineteenth century, the > > > impressionists began to arrange their palettes in the same way (instead > > of > > > in squares which emphasized shades and tints), but they couldn't really > > > decide if the cardinal points on the chromatic compass were red, blue, > > and > > > yellow or red, green and yellow. This in turn goes back to a > disagreement > > > that Goethe had with Newton on the very nature of color, whether it is > an > > > objective property of materials or whether it is an effect produced in > > the > > > mind: it turns out that modern color printers (with their "millions of > > > colors" produced by only three inks) are largely based on Goethe's > theory > > > and not on Newton's. > > > > > > I mention all this because Halliday does more or less the same thing > with > > > verbs, or rather with the "processes" that verbs realize. The three > > > cardinal processes, in the first edition of his "introduction to > > Functional > > > Grammar", were "being", "doing", and "sensing" and we can imagine "to > > be", > > > "to do" and "to see" as red, blue, and yellow or perhaps orange, green, > > and > > > blue. So for example a verb like "to have" or "to own" is a relational > > > process, and is a shading or tinting of "to be", and a verb like "play" > > or > > > "work" is a material process and belongs near "to act" with the doings > on > > > the verbal palette, while a verb like "see", "smell", "feel", and by > > > extension "think" is a mental process and belongs somewhere in the > > vicinity > > > of sensing. In the interstices of these cardinal processes, we find > > > behavioral ones (sleeping, laughing, crying) located somewhere between > > the > > > material and the mental, existential processes ("there is") between the > > > material and the relational, and above all the verbal processes, > between > > > the relational and the mental. > > > > > > But that's the functional picture, not the genetic one. From the > newborn > > > child's point of view, there is, as Vygotsky says, an undifferentiated > > > "state" rather than processes, and this is differentiated into feelings > > on > > > the one hand and doings on the other largely on the basis of instincts > > like > > > positioning and feeding. The "relational"processes require language to > > come > > > into being, particularly since, in English anyway, "to be" is a very > > > strange kind of being that actually relates two "be-ers": a carrier and > > an > > > attribute ("Minsu is tall"), an identifier and an identified ("He is > > > Minsu"), or a token and a value ("Minsu is a boy"). > > > > > > I think that Vygotsky's early work on imagination is essentially wrong, > > and > > > I include "Imaginary and Creativity in Childhood" in this. The reason > is > > > that the distinction between reproductive and combinatorial imagination > > on > > > which that work rests is associativism which he took over more or less > > > uncritically from Ribot, and only later repudiated. In Ribot, all > > thinking > > > is essentially a pale shadow of seeing--imagination is nothing but the > > > after-glow of imaging. But not even sensing is reducible to seeing, and > > > certainly not thinking. > > > > > > By the time of Vygotsky's late lectures, he has solved the problem. In > > his > > > lecture on the development of creativity in childhood (Volume One in > the > > > English Collected Works) he points out that the name of a place--just > the > > > name--can conjure up a kind of experience, even if we have never even > > been > > > there, and words in the right order create not only experiences that > have > > > never been had but experiences which by their very nature are not > > haveable > > > by as single human consciousness (e.g. "the French Revolution"). There > is > > > no way to get "thinking" out of 'seeing'. We have to recognize that > > > thinking is a mental process that stands somewhere between seeing and > > > saying, in much the same way that green stands somewhere between yellow > > and > > > blue. Yes, we can produce green by mixing yellow and blue, but that > > doesn't > > > mean we can reduce it meaningfully to those two colors. I think in the > > same > > > way it makes no sense to reduce a unicorn to a horse and a horn. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Macquarie University > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 8:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Hi Larry and others, > > > > > > > > Is, as a verb is not like other verbs, which have to do with action. > > I'm > > > > not a linguist, but off the top, I don't think there is a verb that > > > doesn't > > > > have to do with action other than "to be." At least in English. We > use > > > > "becoming" to signify change, but the infinitive "to be" is a pointer > > to > > > > Existence. We don't say I become an eater, or I become a sleeper, or > I > > > > become a writer, even though that has some truth to it (i'm not born > a > > > > writer), it's not how we speak. I am an eater, I am a sleeper, I am a > > > > writer. Become is its own verb, isn't it? "to become," is a marriage > of > > > the > > > > word Be and Come. If Become where the word for Be, then that would > make > > > the > > > > game here really different. But Be comes before Become, > linguistically > > > and > > > > existentially! :) > > > > > > > > So with that in mind, Is is more of a signifier of existence and the > > noun > > > > that accompanies Is takes the particular shape that reflects Is-ness. > > > Like > > > > the pot depends upon clay for its existence. If you remove the clay > > from > > > > the pot, the pot no longer exists. If you smash the pot, the clay > > > remains, > > > > thus the pot depends upon clay to exist. I depend upon Being to > exist. > > > > > > > > Of course I've been thinking also about unicorns! I believe I can > > explain > > > > why this definition of Being works even in the imaginary sense. > (Which > > is > > > > to say Being is not a category of the mind in the absolute sense of > > > Being, > > > > that all there is to Being is a cognitive category, therefore there > is > > > > nothing to Being but a logical or categorical container in speech and > > > > thought, which is the same as saying Being arises from Mind, "I > think, > > > > therefore I am"). > > > > > > > > Getting back to unicorns! We can say that the is-ness of the horse > and > > > the > > > > is-ness of the horn combine in the imagination, and thus unicorn is. > > Thus > > > > the material of the unicorn, which does not exist in the world we > live > > > in, > > > > is identical to the material of the imagination, which is the > material > > of > > > > the Mind. > > > > > > > > But this does not stop at the Mind. Because the material of the > unicorn > > > is > > > > no different than the material of the memory of what I ate for dinner > > > last > > > > night, or imagining walking on the boardwalk right now while I'm > > sitting > > > in > > > > front of this screen. Just like other imaginations, for imaginary > > > objects, > > > > the Is-ness is as-if borrowed from horse-ness and horn-ness, which do > > > exist > > > > in the world. It is not possible to create an imagination of things > we > > do > > > > not know about. Imaginations (and dreams) are always of the things we > > > have > > > > known before, even if it is superficial knowledge. So the existence > of > > > > unicorns depends upon the material of all imaginary objects, the > > material > > > > of the mind. > > > > > > > > This still supports the notion that Being comes before Mind. And that > > > Mind > > > > is dependent upon Being, not the other way around. > > > > > > > > Also, Being is not something limited to sentient creatures, but is > > > > unlimited, the entire world sits in existence. That is why we can > > > > experience the existence of inanimate or insentient objects: the > > mountain > > > > is, the sky is, the ocean is, and since mind is in the world, the > > unicorn > > > > is. > > > > > > > > The problem is that we can't know what that Being is that makes > > existence > > > > possible for everything else. It's not knowable. And this has nothing > > to > > > do > > > > with believing in a God or not believing, but that there is a limit > to > > > what > > > > we as humans can know, and that Being, that which pervades all > > beingness, > > > > all names and forms, responsible for the existence all that is here, > is > > > one > > > > of those things we will never be able to know explicitly. > > > > > > > > If we were to assert that Being is a product (a category) of Mind, > then > > > we > > > > are back to Decartes's dualism. When you say that "in the end" there > > is a > > > > final division (of two) and "that's just the way it is", then we can > > > > justify hierarchies, we can justify slavery, we can justify class, > and > > so > > > > on. "Slavery is just the way it is." "Inequality is just the way it > > is." > > > I > > > > just can't accept that. If we say really that all that is here is > > > > Existence, but the multiplicity of objects we experience are just > > > different > > > > forms and manifestations of Existence(Being), then we can find the > > > > commonality among us despite differences, we can justify our feelings > > of > > > > oneness with Nature, Love for another, Compassion for strangers, > etc. I > > > > prefer the latter over the former: Difference in this case becomes > > > > incidental and ornamental, while similarities are fundamental. > > > > > > > > So I think there is a fundamental ethical reason to see Being before > > Mind > > > > from this standpoint. > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > P.S. I've pulled out On the Soul by Aristotle from my shelf, because > I > > am > > > > curious about his take on the Soul, because it is quite apparent that > > he > > > > does not see Soul as limited to Mind, like Hegel did. The Soul for > > > > Aristotle is the life-force, or sentiency. In Vedic thought there is > > the > > > > concept of Prana, which is also identical to life-force, something > > > entering > > > > from the outside of the gross body, Prana is an aspect of the subtle > > > body, > > > > but what gives life to the gross body and which leaves at death. This > > not > > > > analogously different from electricity passing through a lightbulb > and > > > when > > > > the electricity is there, the light shines, when it is absent the > bulb > > is > > > > dark. The electricity is like the subtle body, the bulb the gross > body. > > > > > > > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 14 14:21:03 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 22:21:03 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Connecting and stability In-Reply-To: References: <566cda19.cf40620a.79833.ffffcf75@mx.google.com> <566e0d83.039d420a.37975.ffff8611@mx.google.com>, Message-ID: Hi Mike (and others), In response to #1: As I have developed in my understanding, learning about Vygotsky, as a student, and thinking about being, as a human, meaning for me is constructed from the words, but in a particular way. Not as a structure, like a building is built one brick at a time, but in a different way. Just like space pervades the house, the house appears to create the space, because of the walls the house possesses. So... words appear to create meaning, but really don't, it's an appearance. The house sits in space no matter what the house is like. To explain this analogy a little better: meaning is there latent, like space, and activated by the words as they are spoken and received, but always from a point of view to someone, how can I not speak from a point of view, even if I speak to myself? So meaning emerges out of the words and out of what the words imply, that is, what they point to ("space" between the words and I don't mean space as in the spacebar! or between the lines, so you need not try to do that either!) Together, along with an environment, speakers and listeners, and other contexts, words ignite a particular neurological/body construct that creates human meaning as-if on the fly, being unpacked by cues given by history, culture, language, etc. with an appearance that the meaning is in my head or felt in my body (or both). Otherwise, how might it be possible to transmit feeling through words, as done through a poem? Even if that poem is about unicorns? In repose to #2 (original poem pasted in below): I note that Rilke creates the unicorn by describing the parts of the horse. The space is and in its is-ness the unicorn appears as if from nothing, or as if from overlapping parts of the horse plus a horn. It is both overlap and gap. Immanent and transcendent. I love the picture of people feeding its (the unicorn) existence with being. Then, the reflection as-if bringing the image of the unicorn together in the mirror, an image, a reflection of purity, as a purely imagined being in the mind of the maiden. Purity, as in, not soiled by the world (ungrounded). But! what isn't in the poem? The history of the unicorn is interesting too! Apparently the unicorn was thought to originate from the Indus Valley. And not as mythology by the Greeks, but as natural history! The Greeks believed in unicorns!!! Ha! The beast was considered an intemperate beast that could only be tamed by a virgin maiden. Leonardo wrote: "The unicorn, through its intemperance and not knowing how to control itself, for the love it bears to fair maidens forgets its ferocity and wildness; and laying aside all fear it will go up to a seated damsel and go to sleep in her lap, and thus the hunters take it." And here's a quite interesting factoid: the six tapestries in France called "Dame ? la licorne" at Muse? Cluny are said to represent the five senses. Is it possible that the unicorn is the very symbol of the imagination itself? being untamable except only through gentleness, being made of parts but occupying a space of being and existing in the mind, not of the world? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unicorn Kind regards, Annalisa ---- The Unicorn by Ranier Maira Rilke This is the creature there never has been. They never knew it, and yet, none the less, they loved the way it moved, its suppleness, its neck, its very gaze, mild and serene. Not there, because they loved it, it behaved as though it were. They always left some space. And in that clear unpeopled space they saved it lightly reared its head with scarce a trace of not being there. They fed it, not with corn, but only with the possibility of being. And that was able to confer such strength, its brow put for a horn. One horn. Whitely it stole up to a maid, -- to *be* within the silver mirror and in her. From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 14 14:42:56 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 22:42:56 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Connecting and stability In-Reply-To: <566e0d83.039d420a.37975.ffff8611@mx.google.com> References: <566cda19.cf40620a.79833.ffffcf75@mx.google.com> , <566e0d83.039d420a.37975.ffff8611@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Hi Larry, I feel a connection to what you are saying, and it feels similar to my description about the Vedic concept of vritti, but your description is particular to communication of meaning through language between two people, the speaker and the listener. Once the vritti takes shape as something recognizable, it is as-if real in the mind, activating meaning, but this is not relegated to language. In the way a cluster of circles might create an image of a flower, or a dart board depending upon their arrangement, these become recognizable images. Or a drawing of the duck-rabbit will be shift between one or the other in the mind, based upon the word. The word and the image as provided by the vritti are informed by prior knowledge of a flower, a dart board, a duck or a rabbit, that were derived (in history) through the senses in some way. Meaning can never be completely 1:1 identical from speaker to listener, as it depends upon the common experiences and concepts and how similar these concepts are between the speaker and the listener. Meaning (to me) doesn't travel from here to there, but is reflective. This can have an appearance of traveling. My meaning doesn't leave me as I write words that travel to you through the internet and meaning is constructed for you as you read them. Understanding happens when the message is received as the message was intended. :) Copy that? Kind regards, Annalisa From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Dec 14 18:47:54 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 18:47:54 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] The Place of REFUGE as expressing particular qualities Message-ID: <566f7f5c.6892420a.cf792.ffff944e@mx.google.com> I want to introduce a friend, Ana Ines Heras,? who lives in Buenos Aires. She has translated an article into English which captures what she calls an approach to generating meaning in places she calls communities of destiny We have been exploring third spaces and Ana?s focus on particular qualities of places that she calls ?places of refuge? extends this conversation. Refuge is the idea/concept? I am hoping to bring to awareness and stabilize. On page 3 she introduces Moises Rodrigues who works in Brazil and has facilitated state designed and implemented health policy aimed at supporting witnesses and victims of torture dealing with trauma and stress. Ana takes this framework and applies it to understand the situation of thousands of children living in extreme conditions of marginalization in Buenos Aires. Under certain circumstances this framework is connected to a living community which is seen both as ?reference? and as support system. The community becomes a ?place? exhibiting particular qualities. A place that ?simultaneously? becomes embodied as a place to come to rest AND a place to plan action. What I find significant is Ana?s approach that takes Moises Rodrigues ideas, categories, and practice within mental health settings and transitions these ideas, categories, and practices to Buenos Aires and a network of community organizations. These organizations self-identify as a collective of people. These self-identified collectives believe and share a ?faith that it is possible to CREATE spaces where all different subjectivities are protected and supported in places OF refuge. ?This collective considers their shared actions as a social orientation. However, refuge is not the end goal but is more like a stepping stone that is necessary in order to navigate to what Ana metaphorically calls the ?open see?. ?This is where I want to pause at this connection of [refuge] and [open see]. I want to stabilize this connection of refuge to open see. Ana?s approach [and her framework] is to create refuge as holding places which become a necessary step to be able to navigate to the open see as a shared journey within communities of destiny. The children learn how it feels to inhabit and embody *a* space as place. THIS place where one may feel protected enough, cared for enough, and in turn can protect and care for others IN ORDER TO build a [possibility] of something yet to come. THIS is the place of the imaginal that does possess certain qualities of place. A question we have been exploring on this site is where does meaning exist? I would answer that meaning exists where life is experienced as embodied and enacted. Two other concepts that share a family resemblance with this concept are ?incarnated? and ?animated?. When we say the voices of the dead ?live? within places of refuge and communities of destiny we are invoking [animated] notions of meaning located in particular cultural historical places. This introduction of Ana is highlighting her approach captured in the phrase [give place a chance]. Ana?s work embodies this potential and possibility of place as refuge Ana gave permission for me to post this article so I am sending her work out for reflection Larry Sent from Mail for Windows 10 -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: DECEMBER 12 2015 HERAS ANA INES a-city-in-flames-and-a-community-of-destiny1.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 678405 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20151214/ea468d67/attachment-0001.pdf From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Dec 14 19:42:33 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 19:42:33 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Connecting and stability In-Reply-To: References: <566cda19.cf40620a.79833.ffffcf75@mx.google.com> , <566e0d83.039d420a.37975.ffff8611@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <566f8c29.1444620a.ac08f.ffff8ab2@mx.google.com> Annalisa, Your summary comment: Understanding happens when the message is received as the message was intended. :) Is the relation I am putting in question. Is focusing on the subject or the author authoring intending meaning from within an interior space the only way to understand the formation of meaning? I am focusing more on the speaker or author projecting a possible ?connecting? gesture that is oriented toward the listener. However, whether that connecting ?approach? is taken up and ?stabilized? resides in the capacity of the listener who is hearing the ?invitation?. This shift in focus is locating the generation of meaning in this stabilizing of shared joint activity in how the speaker is ?heard?. Mike suggests meaning takes place in the space between the words not within the words. The question I have is if this space between the words engendered within joint activity is meaningful to the degree the listener engenders stabilizing understandings of what is projected into the space by the speaker as necessarily fluid and open ended [a gap]. The listener is either open to a degree to the transitory connecting moves which are not yet become meaningful until stabilized by the listener AS understanding. [or not] >From this POV :) meaning has not occurred until the connecting move as open ended gesture of the speaker has been mediated by the listener and become stabilized as understanding. The relation of ?vittri? taking shape as something not recognizable becoming recognizable AS-IF real may be imagined in a similar way. What was connected but not recognizable ?forms? AS-IF stabilizing into things recognizable. This process is not relegated to language but may be partaking in the same imaginal stabilizing phenomena as language connecting activity. The focus on ?a priori? [a cluster of circles imaged as flowers] are the connecting phenomena. However, the circles could also have been imagined as something else besides flowers until the moment the circles stabilized into flowers. Then there is the impression the flowers preceded the circles becoming flowers. However the flowers may have been just one possible ?a priori? Annalisa, My question is if the quality that I am pointing out that occurs in listening [as stabilizing] may be the same underlying process that occurs when three circles become ?flowers? [which could before being stabilized have been multiple other possible images]. Once the moment of stabilizing the image AS flowers does occur, then all the other open ended possibilities of the three circles no longer seem possible and the meaning that was actually projected within an historical ontological and transitory ?place? becomes stabilized into a naturalized assumption of stability emerging from the intended mind of the author or from the naturalized causes occuring within the ?naturalized? world. [two sides of the same coin.] I am out on a limb here and may have lost the trunk or roots, but this is a reflective movement of connection and stability. Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Annalisa Aguilar Sent: Monday, December 14, 2015 2:44 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Connecting and stability Hi Larry, I feel a connection to what you are saying, and it feels similar to my description about the Vedic concept of vritti, but your description is particular to communication of meaning through language between two people, the speaker and the listener. Once the vritti takes shape as something recognizable, it is as-if real in the mind, activating meaning, but this is not relegated to language. In the way a cluster of circles might create an image of a flower, or a dart board depending upon their arrangement, these become recognizable images. Or a drawing of the duck-rabbit will be shift between one or the other in the mind, based upon the word. The word and the image as provided by the vritti are informed by prior knowledge of a flower, a dart board, a duck or a rabbit, that were derived (in history) through the senses in some way. Meaning can never be completely 1:1 identical from speaker to listener, as it depends upon the common experiences and concepts and how similar these concepts are between the speaker and the listener. Meaning (to me) doesn't travel from here to there, but is reflective. This can have an appearance of traveling. My meaning doesn't leave me as I write words that travel to you through the internet and meaning is constructed for you as you read them. Understanding happens when the message is received as the message was intended. :) Copy that? Kind regards, Annalisa From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Dec 14 20:10:29 2015 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 04:10:29 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <000c01d13602$d3281930$79784b90$@att.net> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> <05AB59E5-018D-4FF2-92BE-06619D1F95B8@umich.edu> <1BD78C04-64EA-4C74-BDDB-4723D6312EAF@umich.edu> <000c01d13602$d3281930$79784b90$@att.net> Message-ID: Svetlana Alexievich's nobel prize address seems to me considerably related to an accounting of the symbolic (life influence). This does not in itself suggest to me something of the immediacy of conscious imagination. Symbolic values (e.g. finding a relationship with suffering) is something that would require considerable work. The many voices reinforce that interpretation. Many voices in sustaining particular symbols (akin perhaps to religious orthodoxy) but also many voices required to compose the fabric of her literature (which clearly would required considerable imaginative work too). So if imagination is involved in the content of a response to suffering, it seems to me more active in the construction of such a necessity (that establishes the symbol) in response to autonomous images of loss 'flooding the imagination'. Here's a link from the ny books. http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2015/10/12/svetlana-alexievich-truth-many-voices/ On 14 December 2015 at 00:03, Peg Griffin wrote: > This 2015 Nobel Laureate for Literature lecture strikes me as pertinent to > this imagination discussion. She is an amazing woman and here addresses > issues familiar maybe tanatalizing for this list, I think. > > http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2015/alexievich-lecture_en.html > It begins this way: " I do not stand alone at this podium ... There are > voices around me, hundreds of voices. They have always been with me, since > childhood. I grew up in the countryside...} > Peg > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw > Lloyd > Sent: Wednesday, December 09, 2015 12:12 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > Perhaps the challenge will get easier if you keep piling up the > references, Mike. :) > > So, I have persevered with reading, skipping and scanning Lovejoy's "The > Great Chain of Being" and have come away with a few pages of notes, and > some edification (22nd printing, 2001, Harvard University Press). > > With respect to the valorisation of imagination, Lovejoy identifies > Schleirmacher as an early proponent of the merits of the development of > imagination (although one could say that this is implicit in the platonic > ideas which concern the book as a whole). (p. 309) > > With respect to the origins of the idea of a cell (urbild), he identifies > Robinet as a rather eclectic proponent of the idea (p. 279), which again is > derived from the history of the ideas of absolute perfection (of god), the > principle of plentitude and the principle of continuity. He also > attributes to Robinet that "fundamental reality in nature for him is not > matter but l'avtivite". (p. 281) > > On a more down to regular strain on the imagination, regarding my > assertion early of cognate terms (imagination, orientation etc), my > reckoning is that orientation determines the scope and nature of > interpretation. > > Not so long ago, I noticed some apparently new developments in our eldest > child's formulations (4y6). We were talking about how to make papier mache > objects, which took me back to making a papier mache 'pig' with the help of > a balloon. In response to this he volunteered that the balloon would have > to be burst with a pencil once it had been covered. I think it was the day > before this that he pronounced that the ugly duckling's egg must have been > laid by a swan. It seemed to me that that these articulations indicated > that he was using a relatively new idea which was helping him to > imaginatively understand these situations (an idea of process). I am > fairly sure that these solutions were not supplied beforehand. > > Best, > Huw > > > On 9 December 2015 at 03:59, mike cole wrote: > > > The Casey site looks amazing and of course very relevant, Ed. Thanks. > > > > When I first read Sartre many years ago, I was totally unprepared to > > take in what he was saying. I had not way to "digest it." > > > > Reading into the electronic copy I sent around yesterday, I could see > > that it is inappropriate for me to refer to what I do as > > phenomenology. It is just a kind of intuitive reflection on my > > experiences and thoughts. No Husserl, no Sartre. Just unschooled > > introspection that I seek to verify through acquiring evidence that > > there is more than total idiosyncrasy to what my musings. > > > > I feel as if I need to download all the sources of inquiry we have > > unearthed in the last few days and retreat to a place with no > > communication with the world for a few weeks just to take them, in. !! > > mike > > > > On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:39 AM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > > > Mike > > > > > > There are, perhaps, some shortcomings in portions of Sartre > > > work > > on > > > imagination to which Casey supplies some useful modifications. Also > > > it > > is a > > > bit long. Take a look at Edward Casey?s web site: < > > > http://edwardscasey.com/?page_id=13>. Many of those articles on > > > imagination seem downloadable and besides possibly whetting one?s > > appetite > > > for Sartre might be interesting in themselves. Perhaps you could > > > pick one that most interests you and provides, from your vantage, a > > > useful common, and modestly short reading source. I would, of > > > course, recommend Casey?s book, but isn?t freely available. > > > > > > Ed > > > > > > > On Dec 7, 2015, at 9:44 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > So maybe Sartre would be a useful common reading source, Ed. > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://blog.exre.org/wp-content/uploads/Sartre_The_Imaginary__A_Phenom > > enological_Psychology_of_the_Imagination.pdf > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > >> It make sense for the questions to differ, Ed, or at least the > > > >> way > > they > > > >> are posed. Finding a common foundation will take a lot of > > communication > > > >> (which will require a lot of imagination!). > > > >> mike > > > >> > > > >> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 6:04 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > >> > > > >>> Mike > > > >>> > > > >>> I assume you have read Sartre on imagination; i.e. The > > Imagination. > > > >>> This gives what he considers a phenomenological take on > imagination. > > > >>> However, I would consider a much more revealing take to be that > > > >>> of > > > Edward > > > >>> Casey in Imaging (I am hoping that book you referenced will > > supplement > > > that > > > >>> of Casey). The connection to Kant, by the way, critically > > > >>> preceded > > > that of > > > >>> Mzerleau-Ponty and Sartre and that is why I was surprised to not > > > >>> see > > > him > > > >>> mentioned. > > > >>> > > > >>> I agree that we all seem to be coming out in, more or less, > > > >>> the same place. Only the questions seem to differ. > > > >>> > > > >>> Ed > > > >>> > > > >>>> On Dec 7, 2015, at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity given > > > >>>> that > > we > > > >>>> started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I > > > indicated > > > >>> in > > > >>>> my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life > > > >>>> through > > my > > > >>>> teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas > > > >>>> drawn > > from > > > >>>> psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and > > activity-centered > > > >>>> research practices. But here I am. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my > > > >>> understanding. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the > > > >>>> description > > of > > > >>> the > > > >>>> flow from imagination to representation, but glad to encounter > > > >>>> a > > > dozen! > > > >>>> Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the > > > abstractions > > > >>> can > > > >>>> be seen, seem hard to come by. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by > > > >>>> identifying different threads of the topic they constitute was > > offered > > > >>> with > > > >>>> that goal in mind. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is > > > >>>> about > > it. > > > I > > > >>>> learned that from the Russians who write about imagination. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> etc? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> To the extent that these different traditions lead people to > > > >>>> the > > same > > > >>> kinds > > > >>>> of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the > > > >>>> conclusions > > are > > > >>>> tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, > > sometimes, > > > in > > > >>>> good teaching. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> mike > > > >>>> > > > >>>> mike > > > >>>> > > > >>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> Larry and Mike > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to > > > >>>>> both > > of > > > >>> you > > > >>>>> in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a > > > >>> conversation > > > >>>>> that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably > > > >>>>> good, > > but > > > >>> it is > > > >>>>> a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little > > > >>>>> larger > > > than > > > >>> what > > > >>>>> I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that I > > > >>>>> need > > > to, > > > >>> one > > > >>>>> might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that bear > > > >>>>> on > > > the, > > > >>>>> perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will reread > > it). I > > > >>>>> found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a > > > >>>>> large > > > grain > > > >>> size > > > >>>>> (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look at > > > >>> things). A > > > >>>>> few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms > > > >>>>> and are > > > >>> offered > > > >>>>> in the hope that they might be useful. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; > > > >>>>> however, looking at how words are used (a philosophy of > > > >>>>> language, so to > > speak) > > > >>> often > > > >>>>> does a better job of opening things up. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did not > > > >>>>> make > > > >>> your > > > >>>>> list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to > > > >>>>> mention Avicenna. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 3. I have the impression you are using the term ?stable? > > > >>>>> as a somewhat replacement of Vygotsky?s concrete; I like that > > > >>>>> as > > > ?concrete' > > > >>>>> seems to have very different meanings for different people. I > > > >>>>> will > > > try > > > >>> to > > > >>>>> use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in my > > > replies > > > >>>>> tooters. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of Hellen > > > >>> Keller. I > > > >>>>> wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a > > > >>>>> thin gap > > > is > > > >>>>> because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a > > suspicion > > > >>> that > > > >>>>> he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I am > > fairly > > > >>> sure > > > >>>>> Keller was. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than too > > > >>>>> thin although the metaphor of filling still seems reasonable > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 6. In a way you don?t seem to quite come out and say it > > > >>>>> (or I missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is > > > >>>>> not > > necessarily > > > >>>>> creative and I would add that it is quite everyday. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as they > > occur. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Ed > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 4:41 PM, Lplarry > > wrote: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and > > > >>>>>> re(present) > > > our > > > >>>>> notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a > > metaphor > > > >>> not > > > >>>>> error. > > > >>>>>> Ed, > > > >>>>>> To continue with your reflection if image has some relation > > > >>>>>> to how > > > >>>>> others use text. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Actually I don?t think image has some relation to how others > > > >>>>> use > > > text. > > > >>> I > > > >>>>> twas speculating as whether there is some commonality between > > > >>>>> how > > > Mike > > > >>> is > > > >>>>> using using image and how others are using text. I said this > > because > > > I > > > >>>>> struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary in > > > >>> mathematics > > > >>>>> and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to > > problems > > > >>> that > > > >>>>> presently catch my attention. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In > > > >>>>>> other > > > words > > > >>>>> can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The > > physical > > > >>>>> gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of > > > >>>>> letters > > > on > > > >>> the > > > >>>>> page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or > > > >>>>> the > > > visual > > > >>>>> marks making a circle-like shape. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size > > > >>>>> is too > > > >>> large. > > > >>>>> That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I > > > >>>>> now > > > >>> realize > > > >>>>> was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to > > > >>>>> view imagination. I don?t mean your perspective is lacking; it > > > >>>>> just > > seems > > > to > > > >>>>> result in different questions than I would/do ask. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> These different physical forms are not the foundational > > > >>>>>> bedrock, > > > they > > > >>>>> are the material. > > > >>>>>> If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on parchment > > > >>>>>> but > > as > > > >>>>> having a deeper process, > > > >>>>>> Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual > > > perceptions > > > >>>>> but rather having a deeper process. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> My initial reaction is ?Why are you saying this?" If I ever > > > >>>>> thought > > > the > > > >>>>> contrary, I can?t remember. This is just common sense. The > > > interesting > > > >>>>> thing about what you say is that you seem to using ?imagine? > > > >>>>> in a > > > non > > > >>>>> visual fashion which was largely my initial point. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> All the senses share in this process and engage with > > > >>>>>> physically > > > >>>>> experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is > > > >>>>> that > > > >>> unifying > > > >>>>> process that includes all the senses but is not itself the > senses. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> I would say that all senses can participate in this process. > > > >>>>> Also physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too > > > >>>>> strong > > although > > > >>>>> physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints of > > > >>>>> a > > sort > > > on > > > >>>>> imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I > > > >>>>> don?t physically experience a platonic circle. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the > > collated > > > >>>>> pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a > > > dialogue, > > > >>> to > > > >>>>> imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly > > > >>>>> have a unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the > > > >>>>> vital > > animating > > > >>>>> process lived (into). > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Here is where my example wasn?t helpful. I did not mean one > ?sees' > > > the > > > >>>>> marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks > > > >>>>> is too > > > >>> large a > > > >>>>> grain size) on the board as having certain properties > > > >>>>> consistent > > with > > > >>> those > > > >>>>> of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a > > > >>>>> sort > > of > > > >>> sense. > > > >>>>> The teacher?s language seems to prove the imaging and the > > > >>>>> moving to > > > new > > > >>>>> stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people > > > >>>>> don?t > > > make > > > >>> the > > > >>>>> leaps. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy of > > > >>>>>> the > > > >>> visual > > > >>>>> sense. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none of > > > >>>>> the > > > >>> sensory > > > >>>>> modes > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> The relation of this image process to the language process is > > > >>>>>> also > > > >>>>> multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> This doesn?t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, > > > >>>>> doesn?t > > > >>> follow > > > >>>>> for me. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable > > > >>>>> perspective. It > > is > > > >>> just > > > >>>>> one that, to a degree, I either don?t share or seems to be the > > wrong > > > >>> grain > > > >>>>> size. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > > > >>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > > > >>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM > > > >>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Mike > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> My wondering has more to do with your focus on the > > > >>>>>> visual > > and > > > >>> my > > > >>>>> examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be > > > >>>>> about the > > > >>> visual. > > > >>>>> However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well > > > >>>>> drawn) > > > is > > > >>> a > > > >>>>> ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at > > > >>>>> least, > > it > > > >>> never > > > >>>>> was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. > > > >>>>> In > > > fact, > > > >>>>> assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I > > > >>>>> can > > > >>> imagine it > > > >>>>> (smile). > > > >>>>>> On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term > > > >>>>>> ?image? in > > > >>> the > > > >>>>> way some use the word ?text.? That is, to take into account > > > >>>>> both > > > >>> external > > > >>>>> and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of > > > >>>>> what > > you > > > >>> say > > > >>>>> resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am > > > >>>>> finding > > that > > > >>>>> peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Ed > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 2:35 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of > > > >>> Zinchenko's > > > >>>>>>> experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual > > system > > > >>> that > > > >>>>>>> prevented stabilized images from disappearing. He stabilized > > > >>>>>>> the > > > >>> image > > > >>>>>>> (here reified as a projection on the retina) but changed its > > color, > > > >>> thus > > > >>>>>>> defeating the retina's tendency to go grey. In those > > > >>>>>>> conditions, > > > eye > > > >>>>>>> movements continue to trace the spatial coordinates of the > > > >>>>>>> image > > as > > > >>> if > > > >>>>> it > > > >>>>>>> were continuing to "feel it." > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> These are very special circumstances, to be sure, but for > > > >>>>>>> they > > make > > > >>> it > > > >>>>>>> clear that what is called an image is a process (according > > > >>>>>>> to > > > >>> Suvorov, > > > >>>>> of > > > >>>>>>> stepping away from the world and then stepping back into it, > > > >>>>>>> but > > > >>> then he > > > >>>>>>> was blind and deaf). > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> What we designate as "the image" is some form of > > > >>>>>>> materialized > > > >>>>> stabilization > > > >>>>>>> of the flow of into-image-making. Some structure in the flow > > > >>>>>>> of > > the > > > >>>>> always > > > >>>>>>> new. From just the blink of an eye to our image of the > > > >>>>>>> statue of > > > >>>>> liberty. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> This is an old idea but it fits with my intuition. I first > > > >>> encountered > > > >>>>> it > > > >>>>>>> reading Dewey who refers to "the poet" on the topic of > > experience. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> *Yet all experience is an arch wherehrough / Gleams that > > untraveled > > > >>>>> world > > > >>>>>>> whose margin fades / Forever and forever when I move. * > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> *Tennyson, Ulysses* > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> If you are interested, we could try to synch re/reading of > > > >>>>>>> some > > > core > > > >>>>> common > > > >>>>>>> articles/chapters. This entire area of concern is of recent > > vintage > > > >>> for > > > >>>>> me > > > >>>>>>> and my ignorance is particularly keenly felt. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:02 PM, Ed Wall > > wrote: > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> Mike > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the > > privileging > > > >>> of > > > >>>>>>>> the ?image? in discussions of imagination. Additionally, > > although > > > it > > > >>>>> has > > > >>>>>>>> been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don?t > > > >>>>>>>> think it > > > was > > > >>>>> of the > > > >>>>>>>> Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw on > > > >>>>>>>> would > > > >>>>> disagree > > > >>>>>>>> with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics. > > > >>>>>>>> I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems > > useful! - > > > >>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>> I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a > > > >>>>>>>> huge > > > >>> emphasis > > > >>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>> mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking > > > >>>>>>>> less > > > about > > > >>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>> ?imaginal? than you or Larry. That doesn?t mean that what > > > >>>>>>>> you > > and > > > >>>>> Larry are > > > >>>>>>>> talking about might not usefully factor in especially your > > > >>>>>>>> point > > > >>> about > > > >>>>>>>> joint, mediated, activity. > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> Ed > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 11:11 AM, mike cole > > wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry et > > > >>>>>>>>> al > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic > > > >>>>>>>>> beginnings > > > >>> builds > > > >>>>> off > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>>> the already highly functional sensory system. Assume > > > >>>>>>>>> vision as > > > the > > > >>>>>>>> sensory > > > >>>>>>>>> system in question. We know that in an important sense, > > > >>>>>>>>> the > > > >>> "simple" > > > >>>>> act > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>>> seeing what you might call a common object, for example > > > >>>>>>>>> your > > car > > > in > > > >>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>> driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves > > temporal > > > >>> and > > > >>>>>>>>> spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye movement > > > >>>>>>>>> that > > > >>> must > > > >>>>> be > > > >>>>>>>>> resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the > > > >>>>>>>>> process of > > > >>> image > > > >>>>>>>>> formation ceases to function. > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for > > > >>>>>>>>> that > > > >>>>> simplified > > > >>>>>>>>> account. In thinking about imagination I turn to > > > >>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets, > > > >>>>> Zinchenko > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>> non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of > > > >>>>>>>>> enactive perception/cognition. It is also consistent with > > > >>>>>>>>> joint, > > mediated, > > > >>>>>>>> activity > > > >>>>>>>>> as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go. > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic > > function > > > >>> and > > > >>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>> human possibility for symbolic communication is > > > >>>>>>>>> co-incident and co-constitutive of distinctly human > imagination. > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> in brief > > > >>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ed, mike, Michael, > > > >>>>>>>>>> I will push my question to an earlier time period. > > > >>>>>>>>>> Age 2 months. > > > >>>>>>>>>> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces > > > >>>>>>>>>> her.own > > > >>> activity . > > > >>>>>>>>>> Question > > > >>>>>>>>>> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, > > > >>>>>>>>>> moving > > > >>> into > > > >>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? > > > >>>>>>>>>> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic > > origin? > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > > > >>>>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > > > >>>>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM > > > >>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Larry > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be > > > >>>>>>>>>> inclusive > > or > > > >>>>>>>>>> exclusive. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to > > > >>>>>>>>>> make > > sense > > > >>> if > > > >>>>>>>> I > > > >>>>>>>>>> understand Vygotsky correctly. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? > > perhaps > > > I > > > >>>>>>>>>> wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely > > > >>>>>>>>>> understood > > the > > > >>>>>>>> tendency to > > > >>>>>>>>>> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as somehow > > > >>>>>>>> extra-concrete. > > > >>>>>>>>>> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural > > > historical > > > >>>>>>>> context > > > >>>>>>>>>> and at a certain stage of development people act as if > > > >>>>>>>>>> certain > > > >>> things > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > >>>>>>>>>> ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' (whatever > > > >>>>>>>>>> that > > > >>> is?). > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I?m not quite sure where you are going with the > > > >>>>>>>>>> development > > of > > > >>>>>>>>>> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what you > > > >>>>>>>>>> mean > > > >>> when > > > >>>>>>>>>> you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. My > > answer, > > > >>>>>>>> perhaps, > > > >>>>>>>>>> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or > > fantasy > > > >>> in > > > >>>>>>>>>> your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your > > > >>>>>>>>>> final > > > >>> question. > > > >>>>> An > > > >>>>>>>>>> approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can imagine > > > >>>>>>>>>> other possibilities (smile). > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ed > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Ed, > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> The title imagination (or) fantasy Is different from > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a > > > >>>>> distanciation?) > > > >>>>>>>>>> and return to the mathematical concrete. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this > > > >>>>>>>>>>> transfer > > from > > > >>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>> physical to the mathematical? > > > >>>>>>>>>>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged > > > >>>>>>>>>>> in > > > >>> historical > > > >>>>>>>>>> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the > > > >>>>>>>>>> physical > > > >>>>> (concrete) > > > >>>>>>>>>> which exists prior to the human understanding and the > > > mathematical > > > >>>>>>>>>> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system emerging > > within > > > >>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? > > > >>>>>>>>>>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical > > > >>>>>>>>>>> which > > > >>>>> originates > > > >>>>>>>> as > > > >>>>>>>>>> concrete. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and > fantasy. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and > > fantasy. > > > >>> Does > > > >>>>> one > > > >>>>>>>>>> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other > > > >>>>>>>>>> implies the > > > >>> actual > > > >>>>>>>> can > > > >>>>>>>>>> be mapped onto the physical with systems? > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Larry > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > > > >>>>>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM > > > >>>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> All > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind of > > > >>>>> imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>> that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? > > > >>> ?let,? or > > > >>>>>>>>>> ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very different > > > >>> statements > > > >>>>>>>>>> although, under certain circumstances, might be the > > > >>>>>>>>>> same.? In > > > >>> doing > > > >>>>> so I > > > >>>>>>>>>> came across something written by Vygotsky in Imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>> Creativity > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>>>> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic > > > >>>>>>>>>> for > > > >>>>> imagination > > > >>>>>>>> that > > > >>>>>>>>>> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the abstract > > > >>>>>>>>>> is > > only > > > >>> an > > > >>>>>>>>>> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of > > > >>>>>>>>>> development, > > > only a > > > >>>>> pass > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>>>> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our > > > >>>>>>>>>> point of > > > >>> view, > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination is a transforming, creative activity directed > > from a > > > >>>>> given > > > >>>>>>>>>> concrete toward a new concrete.? > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> I find this quote very interesting in view of a previous > > > >>> discussion > > > >>>>>>>>>> on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum in > > that I > > > >>> am > > > >>>>>>>>>> wondering whether part of what is going on is that > > > >>>>>>>>>> children > > are > > > >>> being > > > >>>>>>>> asked > > > >>>>>>>>>> to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of this > > > >>>>>>>>>> join > > > the > > > >>>>>>>>>> elementary school that are possibly a little more obvious > > > >>>>>>>>>> (if > > > >>>>> somebody > > > >>>>>>>> is > > > >>>>>>>>>> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one reason > > > >>>>>>>>>> for > > my > > > >>>>>>>> wondering > > > >>>>>>>>>> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. > > > there > > > >>>>> is no > > > >>>>>>>>>> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get > > > >>>>>>>>>> stuck, so > > to > > > >>>>> speak, > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>>>> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am > > wondering > > > >>>>> about > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>>> then a question. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> My first example: It is possible that we would all > > > >>>>>>>>>>> agree > > that > > > to > > > >>>>> see > > > >>>>>>>>>> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no > > > >>>>>>>>>> such > > > >>> thing. > > > >>>>> In a > > > >>>>>>>>>> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square root > > > >>>>>>>>>> of > > two > > > >>> is > > > >>>>> not > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > >>>>>>>>>> fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of two > > > >>>>>>>>>> is a > > > >>>>> fraction.? > > > >>>>>>>>>> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it > > > >>>>>>>>>> is > > true > > > >>> and > > > >>>>> then > > > >>>>>>>>>> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is > > > >>>>>>>>>> perhaps > > > another > > > >>>>>>>>>> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to concrete > > > through > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through > > > contradiction) > > > >>>>>>>> seems to > > > >>>>>>>>>> be very hard for people to do. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> My second example: The teacher goes up to the blackboard > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>> draws > > > >>>>>>>>>> something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? > > > >>>>>>>>>> She > > then > > > >>>>> draws a > > > >>>>>>>>>> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object > > > >>>>>>>>>> and > > says, > > > >>>>> "This > > > >>>>>>>> is > > > >>>>>>>>>> its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle > > > >>>>>>>>>> (waving > > > her > > > >>>>> hand > > > >>>>>>>> at > > > >>>>>>>>>> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the > center.? > > > >>> None > > > >>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>> this > > > >>>>>>>>>> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. > > Each > > > >>> step > > > >>>>>>>> here > > > >>>>>>>>>> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to the > > > concrete. > > > >>>>> (Hmm > > > >>>>>>>> , I > > > >>>>>>>>>> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete to > > > >>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>> mathematical > > > >>>>>>>>>> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> consequences of > > a > > > >>>>> winged > > > >>>>>>>>>> horse]. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify > > > >>>>>>>>>>> imagination > > with > > > >>>>>>>>>> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what > > > >>>>>>>>>> would > > > >>> Vygotsky > > > >>>>>>>> have > > > >>>>>>>>>> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or > > something > > > >>> else? > > > >>>>>>>> There > > > >>>>>>>>>> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m > > > >>> interested in > > > >>>>>>>> your > > > >>>>>>>>>> take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Ed Wall > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural > > > >>>>>>>>> science > > with > > > >>> an > > > >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science > > > >>>>>>> with > > > an > > > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> -- > > > >>>> > > > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science > > > >>>> with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> -- > > > >> > > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with > > > >> an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with > > > > an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Dec 14 20:57:52 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 20:57:52 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> <05AB59E5-018D-4FF2-92BE-06619D1F95B8@umich.edu> <1BD78C04-64EA-4C74-BDDB-4723D6312EAF@umich.edu> <000c01d13602$d3281930$79784b90$@att.net> Message-ID: <566f9de4.0512620a.4ae9b.04b2@mx.google.com> Huw, This relation or connection between the symbolic (mediated) and the more immediate imagination (maybe not always conscious?) seems to me the question at the heart of our reflections. Your example (finding a relationship with suffering) as requiring considerable work. Where does this desire and commitment to do (or be called) to the work of opening to suffering and opening to the voices of suffering. I keep returning to the question why did Svetlana open to the suffering she witnesses with love rather than hate or despair. Why does she offer testimony. Is she a saint? Is she immersed in a tradition as a historical ontology (forming the type or kind of person she becomes and living into the symbols. Is her work a self-identifying autonomous work? Is it because she senses she is participating in a community of destiny? Always to suffer. Her self reflection is to identify her character and qualities as being of Russian (stock). Is it because her people have free will to choose love or power and they chose power? The key seems to be her relation to humanity as always at the core suffering. Most turn away from this suffering but she is (listening). That is her commitment.to hear the voices. What dies is not dead if the voices continue to speak And we hear. Now to understand all this intellectually is to miss her meaning (her felt meaning dwelling within the suffering). Is this not listening to the images? THIS that is not revealed to cognitive notions of seeing. THIS is symbolic work I agree. But why respond with love to suffering? Rather than fear and despair. I believe it requires an understanding that is imaginal and symbolic and sees through the myth of self-identifying self as the place of meaning. This does have something to do with the imaginal and the symbolic. Larry -----Original Message----- From: "Huw Lloyd" Sent: ?2015-?12-?14 8:13 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination Svetlana Alexievich's nobel prize address seems to me considerably related to an accounting of the symbolic (life influence). This does not in itself suggest to me something of the immediacy of conscious imagination. Symbolic values (e.g. finding a relationship with suffering) is something that would require considerable work. The many voices reinforce that interpretation. Many voices in sustaining particular symbols (akin perhaps to religious orthodoxy) but also many voices required to compose the fabric of her literature (which clearly would required considerable imaginative work too). So if imagination is involved in the content of a response to suffering, it seems to me more active in the construction of such a necessity (that establishes the symbol) in response to autonomous images of loss 'flooding the imagination'. Here's a link from the ny books. http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2015/10/12/svetlana-alexievich-truth-many-voices/ On 14 December 2015 at 00:03, Peg Griffin wrote: > This 2015 Nobel Laureate for Literature lecture strikes me as pertinent to > this imagination discussion. She is an amazing woman and here addresses > issues familiar maybe tanatalizing for this list, I think. > > http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2015/alexievich-lecture_en.html > It begins this way: " I do not stand alone at this podium ... There are > voices around me, hundreds of voices. They have always been with me, since > childhood. I grew up in the countryside...} > Peg > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw > Lloyd > Sent: Wednesday, December 09, 2015 12:12 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > Perhaps the challenge will get easier if you keep piling up the > references, Mike. :) > > So, I have persevered with reading, skipping and scanning Lovejoy's "The > Great Chain of Being" and have come away with a few pages of notes, and > some edification (22nd printing, 2001, Harvard University Press). > > With respect to the valorisation of imagination, Lovejoy identifies > Schleirmacher as an early proponent of the merits of the development of > imagination (although one could say that this is implicit in the platonic > ideas which concern the book as a whole). (p. 309) > > With respect to the origins of the idea of a cell (urbild), he identifies > Robinet as a rather eclectic proponent of the idea (p. 279), which again is > derived from the history of the ideas of absolute perfection (of god), the > principle of plentitude and the principle of continuity. He also > attributes to Robinet that "fundamental reality in nature for him is not > matter but l'avtivite". (p. 281) > > On a more down to regular strain on the imagination, regarding my > assertion early of cognate terms (imagination, orientation etc), my > reckoning is that orientation determines the scope and nature of > interpretation. > > Not so long ago, I noticed some apparently new developments in our eldest > child's formulations (4y6). We were talking about how to make papier mache > objects, which took me back to making a papier mache 'pig' with the help of > a balloon. In response to this he volunteered that the balloon would have > to be burst with a pencil once it had been covered. I think it was the day > before this that he pronounced that the ugly duckling's egg must have been > laid by a swan. It seemed to me that that these articulations indicated > that he was using a relatively new idea which was helping him to > imaginatively understand these situations (an idea of process). I am > fairly sure that these solutions were not supplied beforehand. > > Best, > Huw > > > On 9 December 2015 at 03:59, mike cole wrote: > > > The Casey site looks amazing and of course very relevant, Ed. Thanks. > > > > When I first read Sartre many years ago, I was totally unprepared to > > take in what he was saying. I had not way to "digest it." > > > > Reading into the electronic copy I sent around yesterday, I could see > > that it is inappropriate for me to refer to what I do as > > phenomenology. It is just a kind of intuitive reflection on my > > experiences and thoughts. No Husserl, no Sartre. Just unschooled > > introspection that I seek to verify through acquiring evidence that > > there is more than total idiosyncrasy to what my musings. > > > > I feel as if I need to download all the sources of inquiry we have > > unearthed in the last few days and retreat to a place with no > > communication with the world for a few weeks just to take them, in. !! > > mike > > > > On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:39 AM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > > > Mike > > > > > > There are, perhaps, some shortcomings in portions of Sartre > > > work > > on > > > imagination to which Casey supplies some useful modifications. Also > > > it > > is a > > > bit long. Take a look at Edward Casey?s web site: < > > > http://edwardscasey.com/?page_id=13>. Many of those articles on > > > imagination seem downloadable and besides possibly whetting one?s > > appetite > > > for Sartre might be interesting in themselves. Perhaps you could > > > pick one that most interests you and provides, from your vantage, a > > > useful common, and modestly short reading source. I would, of > > > course, recommend Casey?s book, but isn?t freely available. > > > > > > Ed > > > > > > > On Dec 7, 2015, at 9:44 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > So maybe Sartre would be a useful common reading source, Ed. > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://blog.exre.org/wp-content/uploads/Sartre_The_Imaginary__A_Phenom > > enological_Psychology_of_the_Imagination.pdf > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > >> It make sense for the questions to differ, Ed, or at least the > > > >> way > > they > > > >> are posed. Finding a common foundation will take a lot of > > communication > > > >> (which will require a lot of imagination!). > > > >> mike > > > >> > > > >> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 6:04 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > >> > > > >>> Mike > > > >>> > > > >>> I assume you have read Sartre on imagination; i.e. The > > Imagination. > > > >>> This gives what he considers a phenomenological take on > imagination. > > > >>> However, I would consider a much more revealing take to be that > > > >>> of > > > Edward > > > >>> Casey in Imaging (I am hoping that book you referenced will > > supplement > > > that > > > >>> of Casey). The connection to Kant, by the way, critically > > > >>> preceded > > > that of > > > >>> Mzerleau-Ponty and Sartre and that is why I was surprised to not > > > >>> see > > > him > > > >>> mentioned. > > > >>> > > > >>> I agree that we all seem to be coming out in, more or less, > > > >>> the same place. Only the questions seem to differ. > > > >>> > > > >>> Ed > > > >>> > > > >>>> On Dec 7, 2015, at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity given > > > >>>> that > > we > > > >>>> started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I > > > indicated > > > >>> in > > > >>>> my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life > > > >>>> through > > my > > > >>>> teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas > > > >>>> drawn > > from > > > >>>> psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and > > activity-centered > > > >>>> research practices. But here I am. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my > > > >>> understanding. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the > > > >>>> description > > of > > > >>> the > > > >>>> flow from imagination to representation, but glad to encounter > > > >>>> a > > > dozen! > > > >>>> Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the > > > abstractions > > > >>> can > > > >>>> be seen, seem hard to come by. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by > > > >>>> identifying different threads of the topic they constitute was > > offered > > > >>> with > > > >>>> that goal in mind. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is > > > >>>> about > > it. > > > I > > > >>>> learned that from the Russians who write about imagination. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> etc? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> To the extent that these different traditions lead people to > > > >>>> the > > same > > > >>> kinds > > > >>>> of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the > > > >>>> conclusions > > are > > > >>>> tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, > > sometimes, > > > in > > > >>>> good teaching. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> mike > > > >>>> > > > >>>> mike > > > >>>> > > > >>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> Larry and Mike > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to > > > >>>>> both > > of > > > >>> you > > > >>>>> in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a > > > >>> conversation > > > >>>>> that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably > > > >>>>> good, > > but > > > >>> it is > > > >>>>> a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little > > > >>>>> larger > > > than > > > >>> what > > > >>>>> I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that I > > > >>>>> need > > > to, > > > >>> one > > > >>>>> might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that bear > > > >>>>> on > > > the, > > > >>>>> perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will reread > > it). I > > > >>>>> found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a > > > >>>>> large > > > grain > > > >>> size > > > >>>>> (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look at > > > >>> things). A > > > >>>>> few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms > > > >>>>> and are > > > >>> offered > > > >>>>> in the hope that they might be useful. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; > > > >>>>> however, looking at how words are used (a philosophy of > > > >>>>> language, so to > > speak) > > > >>> often > > > >>>>> does a better job of opening things up. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did not > > > >>>>> make > > > >>> your > > > >>>>> list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to > > > >>>>> mention Avicenna. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 3. I have the impression you are using the term ?stable? > > > >>>>> as a somewhat replacement of Vygotsky?s concrete; I like that > > > >>>>> as > > > ?concrete' > > > >>>>> seems to have very different meanings for different people. I > > > >>>>> will > > > try > > > >>> to > > > >>>>> use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in my > > > replies > > > >>>>> tooters. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of Hellen > > > >>> Keller. I > > > >>>>> wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a > > > >>>>> thin gap > > > is > > > >>>>> because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a > > suspicion > > > >>> that > > > >>>>> he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I am > > fairly > > > >>> sure > > > >>>>> Keller was. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than too > > > >>>>> thin although the metaphor of filling still seems reasonable > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 6. In a way you don?t seem to quite come out and say it > > > >>>>> (or I missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is > > > >>>>> not > > necessarily > > > >>>>> creative and I would add that it is quite everyday. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as they > > occur. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Ed > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 4:41 PM, Lplarry > > wrote: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and > > > >>>>>> re(present) > > > our > > > >>>>> notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a > > metaphor > > > >>> not > > > >>>>> error. > > > >>>>>> Ed, > > > >>>>>> To continue with your reflection if image has some relation > > > >>>>>> to how > > > >>>>> others use text. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Actually I don?t think image has some relation to how others > > > >>>>> use > > > text. > > > >>> I > > > >>>>> twas speculating as whether there is some commonality between > > > >>>>> how > > > Mike > > > >>> is > > > >>>>> using using image and how others are using text. I said this > > because > > > I > > > >>>>> struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary in > > > >>> mathematics > > > >>>>> and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to > > problems > > > >>> that > > > >>>>> presently catch my attention. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In > > > >>>>>> other > > > words > > > >>>>> can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The > > physical > > > >>>>> gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of > > > >>>>> letters > > > on > > > >>> the > > > >>>>> page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or > > > >>>>> the > > > visual > > > >>>>> marks making a circle-like shape. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size > > > >>>>> is too > > > >>> large. > > > >>>>> That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I > > > >>>>> now > > > >>> realize > > > >>>>> was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to > > > >>>>> view imagination. I don?t mean your perspective is lacking; it > > > >>>>> just > > seems > > > to > > > >>>>> result in different questions than I would/do ask. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> These different physical forms are not the foundational > > > >>>>>> bedrock, > > > they > > > >>>>> are the material. > > > >>>>>> If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on parchment > > > >>>>>> but > > as > > > >>>>> having a deeper process, > > > >>>>>> Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual > > > perceptions > > > >>>>> but rather having a deeper process. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> My initial reaction is ?Why are you saying this?" If I ever > > > >>>>> thought > > > the > > > >>>>> contrary, I can?t remember. This is just common sense. The > > > interesting > > > >>>>> thing about what you say is that you seem to using ?imagine? > > > >>>>> in a > > > non > > > >>>>> visual fashion which was largely my initial point. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> All the senses share in this process and engage with > > > >>>>>> physically > > > >>>>> experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is > > > >>>>> that > > > >>> unifying > > > >>>>> process that includes all the senses but is not itself the > senses. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> I would say that all senses can participate in this process. > > > >>>>> Also physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too > > > >>>>> strong > > although > > > >>>>> physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints of > > > >>>>> a > > sort > > > on > > > >>>>> imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I > > > >>>>> don?t physically experience a platonic circle. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the > > collated > > > >>>>> pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a > > > dialogue, > > > >>> to > > > >>>>> imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly > > > >>>>> have a unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the > > > >>>>> vital > > animating > > > >>>>> process lived (into). > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Here is where my example wasn?t helpful. I did not mean one > ?sees' > > > the > > > >>>>> marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks > > > >>>>> is too > > > >>> large a > > > >>>>> grain size) on the board as having certain properties > > > >>>>> consistent > > with > > > >>> those > > > >>>>> of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a > > > >>>>> sort > > of > > > >>> sense. > > > >>>>> The teacher?s language seems to prove the imaging and the > > > >>>>> moving to > > > new > > > >>>>> stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people > > > >>>>> don?t > > > make > > > >>> the > > > >>>>> leaps. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy of > > > >>>>>> the > > > >>> visual > > > >>>>> sense. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none of > > > >>>>> the > > > >>> sensory > > > >>>>> modes > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> The relation of this image process to the language process is > > > >>>>>> also > > > >>>>> multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> This doesn?t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, > > > >>>>> doesn?t > > > >>> follow > > > >>>>> for me. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable > > > >>>>> perspective. It > > is > > > >>> just > > > >>>>> one that, to a degree, I either don?t share or seems to be the > > wrong > > > >>> grain > > > >>>>> size. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > > > >>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > > > >>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM > > > >>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Mike > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> My wondering has more to do with your focus on the > > > >>>>>> visual > > and > > > >>> my > > > >>>>> examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be > > > >>>>> about the > > > >>> visual. > > > >>>>> However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well > > > >>>>> drawn) > > > is > > > >>> a > > > >>>>> ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at > > > >>>>> least, > > it > > > >>> never > > > >>>>> was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. > > > >>>>> In > > > fact, > > > >>>>> assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I > > > >>>>> can > > > >>> imagine it > > > >>>>> (smile). > > > >>>>>> On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term > > > >>>>>> ?image? in > > > >>> the > > > >>>>> way some use the word ?text.? That is, to take into account > > > >>>>> both > > > >>> external > > > >>>>> and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of > > > >>>>> what > > you > > > >>> say > > > >>>>> resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am > > > >>>>> finding > > that > > > >>>>> peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Ed > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 2:35 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of > > > >>> Zinchenko's > > > >>>>>>> experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual > > system > > > >>> that > > > >>>>>>> prevented stabilized images from disappearin [The entire original message is not included.] From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Dec 14 22:51:30 2015 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 23:51:30 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Place of REFUGE as expressing particular qualities In-Reply-To: <566f7f5c.6892420a.cf792.ffff944e@mx.google.com> References: <566f7f5c.6892420a.cf792.ffff944e@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <34A93690-3DA4-44B5-83DB-69B83F3034B1@gmail.com> Larry, I have read quickly through Ana?s article and imagined ?concrete? connections with Mike?s work with the 5th Dimension and any ?Zine project with young people. As well, with the work of Alfredo Jornet and Rolf Steier on gesture and boundary objects in a museum design project. (The Matter of Space: Bodily Performances and the Emergence of Boundary Objects During Multidisciplinary Design Meetings) Does that make sense to you? Henry > On Dec 14, 2015, at 7:47 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > I want to introduce a friend, Ana Ines Heras, who lives in Buenos Aires. > She has translated an article into English which captures what she calls an approach to generating meaning in places she calls communities of destiny > We have been exploring third spaces and Ana?s focus on particular qualities of places that she calls ?places of refuge? extends this conversation. > Refuge is the idea/concept I am hoping to bring to awareness and stabilize. > On page 3 she introduces Moises Rodrigues who works in Brazil and has facilitated state designed and implemented health policy aimed at supporting witnesses and victims of torture dealing with trauma and stress. > Ana takes this framework and applies it to understand the situation of thousands of children living in extreme conditions of marginalization in Buenos Aires. > Under certain circumstances this framework is connected to a living community which is seen both as ?reference? and as support system. The community becomes a ?place? exhibiting particular qualities. > A place that ?simultaneously? becomes embodied as a place to come to rest AND a place to plan action. > What I find significant is Ana?s approach that takes Moises Rodrigues ideas, categories, and practice within mental health settings and transitions these ideas, categories, and practices to Buenos Aires and a network of community organizations. These organizations self-identify as a collective of people. These self-identified collectives believe and share a faith that it is possible to CREATE spaces where all different subjectivities are protected and supported in places OF refuge. This collective considers their shared actions as a social orientation. > > However, refuge is not the end goal but is more like a stepping stone that is necessary in order to navigate to what Ana metaphorically calls the ?open see?. This is where I want to pause at this connection of [refuge] and [open see]. I want to stabilize this connection of refuge to open see. > Ana?s approach [and her framework] is to create refuge as holding places which become a necessary step to be able to navigate to the open see as a shared journey within communities of destiny. > The children learn how it feels to inhabit and embody *a* space as place. THIS place where one may feel protected enough, cared for enough, and in turn can protect and care for others IN ORDER TO build a [possibility] of something yet to come. THIS is the place of the imaginal that does possess certain qualities of place. > > A question we have been exploring on this site is where does meaning exist? I would answer that meaning exists where life is experienced as embodied and enacted. Two other concepts that share a family resemblance with this concept are incarnated? and ?animated?. > When we say the voices of the dead ?live? within places of refuge and communities of destiny we are invoking [animated] notions of meaning located in particular cultural historical places. > This introduction of Ana is highlighting her approach captured in the phrase [give place a chance]. Ana?s work embodies this potential and possibility of place as refuge > > Ana gave permission for me to post this article so I am sending her work out for reflection > Larry > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Dec 15 05:23:06 2015 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 13:23:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <566f9de4.0512620a.4ae9b.04b2@mx.google.com> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> <05AB59E5-018D-4FF2-92BE-06619D1F95B8@umich.edu> <1BD78C04-64EA-4C74-BDDB-4723D6312EAF@umich.edu> <000c01d13602$d3281930$79784b90$@att.net> <566f9de4.0512620a.4ae9b.04b2@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Hi Larry, I haven't read her work but from the links it is clear that she identifies with numerous memories. Memories that power does not find agreeable, and so the rhetoric of power cannot be accepted on face-value. Responding with love to suffering is a means of avoiding falling into fear (of seeing beyond 'short sighted' fear). "the voices of tired village women who gathered on benches near their cottages drew us like magnets", "I think I've known what love is since childhood", "Why are love and death so close?" Best, Huw On 15 December 2015 at 04:57, Lplarry wrote: > Huw, > This relation or connection between the symbolic (mediated) and the more > immediate imagination (maybe not always conscious?) seems to me the > question at the heart of our reflections. > Your example (finding a relationship with suffering) as requiring > considerable work. > > Where does this desire and commitment to do (or be called) to the work of > opening to suffering and opening to the voices of suffering. > I keep returning to the question why did Svetlana open to the suffering > she witnesses with love rather than hate or despair. > Why does she offer testimony. > Is she a saint? > Is she immersed in a tradition as a historical ontology (forming the type > or kind of person she becomes and living into the symbols. > Is her work a self-identifying autonomous work? > Is it because she senses she is participating in a community of destiny? > Always to suffer. > Her self reflection is to identify her character and qualities as being of > Russian (stock). > Is it because her people have free will to choose love or power and they > chose power? > > The key seems to be her relation to humanity as always at the core > suffering. Most turn away from this suffering but she is (listening). > That is her commitment.to hear the voices. What dies is not dead if the > voices continue to speak And we hear. > Now to understand all this intellectually is to miss her meaning (her felt > meaning dwelling within the suffering). > Is this not listening to the images? > THIS that is not revealed to cognitive notions of seeing. > THIS is symbolic work I agree. > But why respond with love to suffering? Rather than fear and despair. > I believe it requires an understanding that is imaginal and symbolic and > sees through the myth of self-identifying self as the place of meaning. > This does have something to do with the imaginal and the symbolic. > Larry > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Huw Lloyd" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?14 8:13 PM > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > Svetlana Alexievich's nobel prize address seems to me considerably related > to an accounting of the symbolic (life influence). This does not in itself > suggest to me something of the immediacy of conscious imagination. > Symbolic values (e.g. finding a relationship with suffering) is something > that would require considerable work. The many voices reinforce that > interpretation. Many voices in sustaining particular symbols (akin perhaps > to religious orthodoxy) but also many voices required to compose the fabric > of her literature (which clearly would required considerable imaginative > work too). So if imagination is involved in the content of a response to > suffering, it seems to me more active in the construction of such a > necessity (that establishes the symbol) in response to autonomous images of > loss 'flooding the imagination'. > > Here's a link from the ny books. > > > http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2015/10/12/svetlana-alexievich-truth-many-voices/ > > > > On 14 December 2015 at 00:03, Peg Griffin wrote: > > > This 2015 Nobel Laureate for Literature lecture strikes me as pertinent > to > > this imagination discussion. She is an amazing woman and here addresses > > issues familiar maybe tanatalizing for this list, I think. > > > > > http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2015/alexievich-lecture_en.html > > It begins this way: " I do not stand alone at this podium ... There are > > voices around me, hundreds of voices. They have always been with me, > since > > childhood. I grew up in the countryside...} > > Peg > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw > > Lloyd > > Sent: Wednesday, December 09, 2015 12:12 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > Perhaps the challenge will get easier if you keep piling up the > > references, Mike. :) > > > > So, I have persevered with reading, skipping and scanning Lovejoy's "The > > Great Chain of Being" and have come away with a few pages of notes, and > > some edification (22nd printing, 2001, Harvard University Press). > > > > With respect to the valorisation of imagination, Lovejoy identifies > > Schleirmacher as an early proponent of the merits of the development of > > imagination (although one could say that this is implicit in the platonic > > ideas which concern the book as a whole). (p. 309) > > > > With respect to the origins of the idea of a cell (urbild), he identifies > > Robinet as a rather eclectic proponent of the idea (p. 279), which again > is > > derived from the history of the ideas of absolute perfection (of god), > the > > principle of plentitude and the principle of continuity. He also > > attributes to Robinet that "fundamental reality in nature for him is not > > matter but l'avtivite". (p. 281) > > > > On a more down to regular strain on the imagination, regarding my > > assertion early of cognate terms (imagination, orientation etc), my > > reckoning is that orientation determines the scope and nature of > > interpretation. > > > > Not so long ago, I noticed some apparently new developments in our eldest > > child's formulations (4y6). We were talking about how to make papier > mache > > objects, which took me back to making a papier mache 'pig' with the help > of > > a balloon. In response to this he volunteered that the balloon would > have > > to be burst with a pencil once it had been covered. I think it was the > day > > before this that he pronounced that the ugly duckling's egg must have > been > > laid by a swan. It seemed to me that that these articulations indicated > > that he was using a relatively new idea which was helping him to > > imaginatively understand these situations (an idea of process). I am > > fairly sure that these solutions were not supplied beforehand. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > On 9 December 2015 at 03:59, mike cole wrote: > > > > > The Casey site looks amazing and of course very relevant, Ed. Thanks. > > > > > > When I first read Sartre many years ago, I was totally unprepared to > > > take in what he was saying. I had not way to "digest it." > > > > > > Reading into the electronic copy I sent around yesterday, I could see > > > that it is inappropriate for me to refer to what I do as > > > phenomenology. It is just a kind of intuitive reflection on my > > > experiences and thoughts. No Husserl, no Sartre. Just unschooled > > > introspection that I seek to verify through acquiring evidence that > > > there is more than total idiosyncrasy to what my musings. > > > > > > I feel as if I need to download all the sources of inquiry we have > > > unearthed in the last few days and retreat to a place with no > > > communication with the world for a few weeks just to take them, in. !! > > > mike > > > > > > On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:39 AM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > > > > > Mike > > > > > > > > There are, perhaps, some shortcomings in portions of Sartre > > > > work > > > on > > > > imagination to which Casey supplies some useful modifications. Also > > > > it > > > is a > > > > bit long. Take a look at Edward Casey?s web site: < > > > > http://edwardscasey.com/?page_id=13>. Many of those articles on > > > > imagination seem downloadable and besides possibly whetting one?s > > > appetite > > > > for Sartre might be interesting in themselves. Perhaps you could > > > > pick one that most interests you and provides, from your vantage, a > > > > useful common, and modestly short reading source. I would, of > > > > course, recommend Casey?s book, but isn?t freely available. > > > > > > > > Ed > > > > > > > > > On Dec 7, 2015, at 9:44 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > > So maybe Sartre would be a useful common reading source, Ed. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://blog.exre.org/wp-content/uploads/Sartre_The_Imaginary__A_Phenom > > > enological_Psychology_of_the_Imagination.pdf > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > >> It make sense for the questions to differ, Ed, or at least the > > > > >> way > > > they > > > > >> are posed. Finding a common foundation will take a lot of > > > communication > > > > >> (which will require a lot of imagination!). > > > > >> mike > > > > >> > > > > >> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 6:04 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>> Mike > > > > >>> > > > > >>> I assume you have read Sartre on imagination; i.e. The > > > Imagination. > > > > >>> This gives what he considers a phenomenological take on > > imagination. > > > > >>> However, I would consider a much more revealing take to be that > > > > >>> of > > > > Edward > > > > >>> Casey in Imaging (I am hoping that book you referenced will > > > supplement > > > > that > > > > >>> of Casey). The connection to Kant, by the way, critically > > > > >>> preceded > > > > that of > > > > >>> Mzerleau-Ponty and Sartre and that is why I was surprised to not > > > > >>> see > > > > him > > > > >>> mentioned. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> I agree that we all seem to be coming out in, more or less, > > > > >>> the same place. Only the questions seem to differ. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Ed > > > > >>> > > > > >>>> On Dec 7, 2015, at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity given > > > > >>>> that > > > we > > > > >>>> started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I > > > > indicated > > > > >>> in > > > > >>>> my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life > > > > >>>> through > > > my > > > > >>>> teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas > > > > >>>> drawn > > > from > > > > >>>> psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and > > > activity-centered > > > > >>>> research practices. But here I am. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my > > > > >>> understanding. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the > > > > >>>> description > > > of > > > > >>> the > > > > >>>> flow from imagination to representation, but glad to encounter > > > > >>>> a > > > > dozen! > > > > >>>> Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the > > > > abstractions > > > > >>> can > > > > >>>> be seen, seem hard to come by. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by > > > > >>>> identifying different threads of the topic they constitute was > > > offered > > > > >>> with > > > > >>>> that goal in mind. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is > > > > >>>> about > > > it. > > > > I > > > > >>>> learned that from the Russians who write about imagination. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6? > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> etc? > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> To the extent that these different traditions lead people to > > > > >>>> the > > > same > > > > >>> kinds > > > > >>>> of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the > > > > >>>> conclusions > > > are > > > > >>>> tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, > > > sometimes, > > > > in > > > > >>>> good teaching. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> mike > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> mike > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall > wrote: > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> Larry and Mike > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to > > > > >>>>> both > > > of > > > > >>> you > > > > >>>>> in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a > > > > >>> conversation > > > > >>>>> that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably > > > > >>>>> good, > > > but > > > > >>> it is > > > > >>>>> a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little > > > > >>>>> larger > > > > than > > > > >>> what > > > > >>>>> I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that I > > > > >>>>> need > > > > to, > > > > >>> one > > > > >>>>> might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that bear > > > > >>>>> on > > > > the, > > > > >>>>> perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will reread > > > it). I > > > > >>>>> found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a > > > > >>>>> large > > > > grain > > > > >>> size > > > > >>>>> (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look at > > > > >>> things). A > > > > >>>>> few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms > > > > >>>>> and are > > > > >>> offered > > > > >>>>> in the hope that they might be useful. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> 1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; > > > > >>>>> however, looking at how words are used (a philosophy of > > > > >>>>> language, so to > > > speak) > > > > >>> often > > > > >>>>> does a better job of opening things up. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> 2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did not > > > > >>>>> make > > > > >>> your > > > > >>>>> list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to > > > > >>>>> mention Avicenna. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> 3. I have the impression you are using the term ?stable? > > > > >>>>> as a somewhat replacement of Vygotsky?s concrete; I like that > > > > >>>>> as > > > > ?concrete' > > > > >>>>> seems to have very different meanings for different people. I > > > > >>>>> will > > > > try > > > > >>> to > > > > >>>>> use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in my > > > > replies > > > > >>>>> tooters. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> 4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of Hellen > > > > >>> Keller. I > > > > >>>>> wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a > > > > >>>>> thin gap > > > > is > > > > >>>>> because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a > > > suspicion > > > > >>> that > > > > >>>>> he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I am > > > fairly > > > > >>> sure > > > > >>>>> Keller was. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> 5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than too > > > > >>>>> thin although the metaphor of filling still seems reasonable > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> 6. In a way you don?t seem to quite come out and say it > > > > >>>>> (or I missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is > > > > >>>>> not > > > necessarily > > > > >>>>> creative and I would add that it is quite everyday. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as they > > > occur. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Ed > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 4:41 PM, Lplarry > > > wrote: > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and > > > > >>>>>> re(present) > > > > our > > > > >>>>> notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a > > > metaphor > > > > >>> not > > > > >>>>> error. > > > > >>>>>> Ed, > > > > >>>>>> To continue with your reflection if image has some relation > > > > >>>>>> to how > > > > >>>>> others use text. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Actually I don?t think image has some relation to how others > > > > >>>>> use > > > > text. > > > > >>> I > > > > >>>>> twas speculating as whether there is some commonality between > > > > >>>>> how > > > > Mike > > > > >>> is > > > > >>>>> using using image and how others are using text. I said this > > > because > > > > I > > > > >>>>> struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary in > > > > >>> mathematics > > > > >>>>> and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to > > > problems > > > > >>> that > > > > >>>>> presently catch my attention. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In > > > > >>>>>> other > > > > words > > > > >>>>> can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The > > > physical > > > > >>>>> gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of > > > > >>>>> letters > > > > on > > > > >>> the > > > > >>>>> page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or > > > > >>>>> the > > > > visual > > > > >>>>> marks making a circle-like shape. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size > > > > >>>>> is too > > > > >>> large. > > > > >>>>> That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I > > > > >>>>> now > > > > >>> realize > > > > >>>>> was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to > > > > >>>>> view imagination. I don?t mean your perspective is lacking; it > > > > >>>>> just > > > seems > > > > to > > > > >>>>> result in different questions than I would/do ask. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> These different physical forms are not the foundational > > > > >>>>>> bedrock, > > > > they > > > > >>>>> are the material. > > > > >>>>>> If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on parchment > > > > >>>>>> but > > > as > > > > >>>>> having a deeper process, > > > > >>>>>> Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual > > > > perceptions > > > > >>>>> but rather having a deeper process. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> My initial reaction is ?Why are you saying this?" If I ever > > > > >>>>> thought > > > > the > > > > >>>>> contrary, I can?t remember. This is just common sense. The > > > > interesting > > > > >>>>> thing about what you say is that you seem to using ?imagine? > > > > >>>>> in a > > > > non > > > > >>>>> visual fashion which was largely my initial point. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> All the senses share in this process and engage with > > > > >>>>>> physically > > > > >>>>> experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is > > > > >>>>> that > > > > >>> unifying > > > > >>>>> process that includes all the senses but is not itself the > > senses. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> I would say that all senses can participate in this process. > > > > >>>>> Also physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too > > > > >>>>> strong > > > although > > > > >>>>> physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints of > > > > >>>>> a > > > sort > > > > on > > > > >>>>> imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I > > > > >>>>> don?t physically experience a platonic circle. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the > > > collated > > > > >>>>> pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a > > > > dialogue, > > > > >>> to > > > > >>>>> imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly > > > > >>>>> have a unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the > > > > >>>>> vital > > > animating > > > > >>>>> process lived (into). > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Here is where my example wasn?t helpful. I did not mean one > > ?sees' > > > > the > > > > >>>>> marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks > > > > >>>>> is too > > > > >>> large a > > > > >>>>> grain size) on the board as having certain properties > > > > >>>>> consistent > > > with > > > > >>> those > > > > >>>>> of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a > > > > >>>>> sort > > > of > > > > >>> sense. > > > > >>>>> The teacher?s language seems to prove the imaging and the > > > > >>>>> moving to > > > > new > > > > >>>>> stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people > > > > >>>>> don?t > > > > make > > > > >>> the > > > > >>>>> leaps. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy of > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > >>> visual > > > > >>>>> sense. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none of > > > > >>>>> the > > > > >>> sensory > > > > >>>>> modes > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> The relation of this image process to the language process is > > > > >>>>>> also > > > > >>>>> multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> This doesn?t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, > > > > >>>>> doesn?t > > > > >>> follow > > > > >>>>> for me. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable > > > > >>>>> perspective. It > > > is > > > > >>> just > > > > >>>>> one that, to a degree, I either don?t share or seems to be the > > > wrong > > > > >>> grain > > > > >>>>> size. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > > > > >>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > > > > >>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM > > > > >>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Mike > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> My wondering has more to do with your focus on the > > > > >>>>>> visual > > > and > > > > >>> my > > > > >>>>> examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be > > > > >>>>> about the > > > > >>> visual. > > > > >>>>> However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well > > > > >>>>> drawn) > > > > is > > > > >>> a > > > > >>>>> ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at > > > > >>>>> least, > > > it > > > > >>> never > > > > >>>>> was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. > > > > >>>>> In > > > > fact, > > > > >>>>> assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I > > > > >>>>> can > > > > >>> imagine it > > > > >>>>> (smile). > > > > >>>>>> On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term > > > > >>>>>> ?image? in > > > > >>> the > > > > >>>>> way some use the word ?text.? That is, to take into account > > > > >>>>> both > > > > >>> external > > > > >>>>> and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of > > > > >>>>> what > > > you > > > > >>> say > > > > >>>>> resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am > > > > >>>>> finding > > > that > > > > >>>>> peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky. > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Ed > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 2:35 PM, mike cole > wrote: > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think of > > > > >>> Zinchenko's > > > > >>>>>>> experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the visual > > > system > > > > >>> that > > > > >>>>>>> prevented stabilized images from disappearin > > > [The entire original message is not included.] > From Peg.Griffin@att.net Tue Dec 15 09:55:08 2015 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 12:55:08 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> <05AB59E5-018D-4FF2-92BE-06619D1F95B8@umich.edu> <1BD78C04-64EA-4C74-BDDB-4723D6312EAF@umich.edu> <000c01d13602$d3281930$79784b90$@att. net> Message-ID: <005f01d13761$bd7b8800$38729800$@att.net> I like two things most about the lecture: 1. Svetlana Alexievich imagines the polyphony of voices as she writes/in order to write. Some folks claim her work is not literature (creative) and is merely journalism. Indeed she does cherish her tape-recorders! But she finds/composes/conducts/performs the polyphony and I imagine that is all in some leaky category near the "mundane" arena (journalistic writing). 2. Her collection of work suggests "endless" ground if sometimes a bit complicated to be called a playground. The lecture illustrates close to an endless cultural-historical ground punctuated in socio-historical event figures. To me it seems to be a sort of phenomenologal account of her imagining process. I'd love to get a hint of the two forms of imagination in Paley's practices you are thinking of, Mike. Is it, for example, in her paired practices for story-telling and story-acting focused on in the Ball State video? Back to reading and grading (some happy and some not)... Peg -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Sunday, December 13, 2015 7:59 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination Thank you for this, Peg. The little I have read of her work, including the excerpt in the NY Review of Books of her new book, makes her sound amazing. I am fascinated by the processes through which imagination builds into fantasy which seems an endless playground. At the same time, I am more and more impressed with the centrality of imagination in the most mundane of our interactions in the world. It seems to sit at the heart of the process of various psycho-cultural-social contructivisms. Vivian Paley comes to mind very often as I read the interesting places that participants are carrying the discussion. She writes about practices where the two forms of imagination, intersect. Always interesting. mike I know that somewhere in the thread there On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 4:03 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: > This 2015 Nobel Laureate for Literature lecture strikes me as > pertinent to this imagination discussion. She is an amazing woman and > here addresses issues familiar maybe tanatalizing for this list, I think. > > http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2015/alexi > evich-lecture_en.html It begins this way: " I do not stand alone at > this podium ... There are voices around me, hundreds of voices. They > have always been with me, since childhood. I grew up in the > countryside...} Peg > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw > Lloyd > Sent: Wednesday, December 09, 2015 12:12 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > Perhaps the challenge will get easier if you keep piling up the > references, Mike. :) > > So, I have persevered with reading, skipping and scanning Lovejoy's > "The Great Chain of Being" and have come away with a few pages of > notes, and some edification (22nd printing, 2001, Harvard University Press). > > With respect to the valorisation of imagination, Lovejoy identifies > Schleirmacher as an early proponent of the merits of the development > of imagination (although one could say that this is implicit in the > platonic ideas which concern the book as a whole). (p. 309) > > With respect to the origins of the idea of a cell (urbild), he > identifies Robinet as a rather eclectic proponent of the idea (p. > 279), which again is derived from the history of the ideas of absolute > perfection (of god), the principle of plentitude and the principle of > continuity. He also attributes to Robinet that "fundamental reality > in nature for him is not matter but l'avtivite". (p. 281) > > On a more down to regular strain on the imagination, regarding my > assertion early of cognate terms (imagination, orientation etc), my > reckoning is that orientation determines the scope and nature of > interpretation. > > Not so long ago, I noticed some apparently new developments in our > eldest child's formulations (4y6). We were talking about how to make > papier mache objects, which took me back to making a papier mache > 'pig' with the help of a balloon. In response to this he volunteered > that the balloon would have to be burst with a pencil once it had been > covered. I think it was the day before this that he pronounced that > the ugly duckling's egg must have been laid by a swan. It seemed to > me that that these articulations indicated that he was using a > relatively new idea which was helping him to imaginatively understand > these situations (an idea of process). I am fairly sure that these solutions were not supplied beforehand. > > Best, > Huw > > > On 9 December 2015 at 03:59, mike cole wrote: > > > The Casey site looks amazing and of course very relevant, Ed. Thanks. > > > > When I first read Sartre many years ago, I was totally unprepared to > > take in what he was saying. I had not way to "digest it." > > > > Reading into the electronic copy I sent around yesterday, I could > > see that it is inappropriate for me to refer to what I do as > > phenomenology. It is just a kind of intuitive reflection on my > > experiences and thoughts. No Husserl, no Sartre. Just unschooled > > introspection that I seek to verify through acquiring evidence that > > there is more than total idiosyncrasy to what my musings. > > > > I feel as if I need to download all the sources of inquiry we have > > unearthed in the last few days and retreat to a place with no > > communication with the world for a few weeks just to take them, in. !! > > mike > > > > On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:39 AM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > > > Mike > > > > > > There are, perhaps, some shortcomings in portions of Sartre > > > work > > on > > > imagination to which Casey supplies some useful modifications. > > > Also it > > is a > > > bit long. Take a look at Edward Casey?s web site: < > > > http://edwardscasey.com/?page_id=13>. Many of those articles on > > > imagination seem downloadable and besides possibly whetting one?s > > appetite > > > for Sartre might be interesting in themselves. Perhaps you could > > > pick one that most interests you and provides, from your vantage, > > > a useful common, and modestly short reading source. I would, of > > > course, recommend Casey?s book, but isn?t freely available. > > > > > > Ed > > > > > > > On Dec 7, 2015, at 9:44 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > So maybe Sartre would be a useful common reading source, Ed. > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://blog.exre.org/wp-content/uploads/Sartre_The_Imaginary__A_Phen > > om enological_Psychology_of_the_Imagination.pdf > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > >> It make sense for the questions to differ, Ed, or at least the > > > >> way > > they > > > >> are posed. Finding a common foundation will take a lot of > > communication > > > >> (which will require a lot of imagination!). > > > >> mike > > > >> > > > >> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 6:04 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > >> > > > >>> Mike > > > >>> > > > >>> I assume you have read Sartre on imagination; i.e. The > > Imagination. > > > >>> This gives what he considers a phenomenological take on > imagination. > > > >>> However, I would consider a much more revealing take to be > > > >>> that of > > > Edward > > > >>> Casey in Imaging (I am hoping that book you referenced will > > supplement > > > that > > > >>> of Casey). The connection to Kant, by the way, critically > > > >>> preceded > > > that of > > > >>> Mzerleau-Ponty and Sartre and that is why I was surprised to > > > >>> not see > > > him > > > >>> mentioned. > > > >>> > > > >>> I agree that we all seem to be coming out in, more or > > > >>> less, the same place. Only the questions seem to differ. > > > >>> > > > >>> Ed > > > >>> > > > >>>> On Dec 7, 2015, at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity > > > >>>> given that > > we > > > >>>> started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I > > > indicated > > > >>> in > > > >>>> my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life > > > >>>> through > > my > > > >>>> teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas > > > >>>> drawn > > from > > > >>>> psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and > > activity-centered > > > >>>> research practices. But here I am. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my > > > >>> understanding. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the > > > >>>> description > > of > > > >>> the > > > >>>> flow from imagination to representation, but glad to > > > >>>> encounter a > > > dozen! > > > >>>> Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the > > > abstractions > > > >>> can > > > >>>> be seen, seem hard to come by. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by > > > >>>> identifying different threads of the topic they constitute > > > >>>> was > > offered > > > >>> with > > > >>>> that goal in mind. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is > > > >>>> about > > it. > > > I > > > >>>> learned that from the Russians who write about imagination. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> etc? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> To the extent that these different traditions lead people to > > > >>>> the > > same > > > >>> kinds > > > >>>> of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the > > > >>>> conclusions > > are > > > >>>> tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, > > sometimes, > > > in > > > >>>> good teaching. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> mike > > > >>>> > > > >>>> mike > > > >>>> > > > >>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> Larry and Mike > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to > > > >>>>> both > > of > > > >>> you > > > >>>>> in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a > > > >>> conversation > > > >>>>> that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably > > > >>>>> good, > > but > > > >>> it is > > > >>>>> a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little > > > >>>>> larger > > > than > > > >>> what > > > >>>>> I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that > > > >>>>> I need > > > to, > > > >>> one > > > >>>>> might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that > > > >>>>> bear on > > > the, > > > >>>>> perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will > > > >>>>> reread > > it). I > > > >>>>> found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a > > > >>>>> large > > > grain > > > >>> size > > > >>>>> (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look > > > >>>>> at > > > >>> things). A > > > >>>>> few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms > > > >>>>> and are > > > >>> offered > > > >>>>> in the hope that they might be useful. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; > > > >>>>> however, looking at how words are used (a philosophy of > > > >>>>> language, so to > > speak) > > > >>> often > > > >>>>> does a better job of opening things up. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did > > > >>>>> not make > > > >>> your > > > >>>>> list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to > > > >>>>> mention Avicenna. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 3. I have the impression you are using the term ?stable? > > > >>>>> as a somewhat replacement of Vygotsky?s concrete; I like > > > >>>>> that as > > > ?concrete' > > > >>>>> seems to have very different meanings for different people. > > > >>>>> I will > > > try > > > >>> to > > > >>>>> use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in > > > >>>>> my > > > replies > > > >>>>> tooters. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of > > > >>>>> Hellen > > > >>> Keller. I > > > >>>>> wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a > > > >>>>> thin gap > > > is > > > >>>>> because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a > > suspicion > > > >>> that > > > >>>>> he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I > > > >>>>> am > > fairly > > > >>> sure > > > >>>>> Keller was. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than > > > >>>>> too thin although the metaphor of filling still seems > > > >>>>> reasonable > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 6. In a way you don?t seem to quite come out and say it > > > >>>>> (or I missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is > > > >>>>> not > > necessarily > > > >>>>> creative and I would add that it is quite everyday. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as > > > >>>>> they > > occur. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Ed > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 4:41 PM, Lplarry > > wrote: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and > > > >>>>>> re(present) > > > our > > > >>>>> notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a > > metaphor > > > >>> not > > > >>>>> error. > > > >>>>>> Ed, > > > >>>>>> To continue with your reflection if image has some relation > > > >>>>>> to how > > > >>>>> others use text. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Actually I don?t think image has some relation to how others > > > >>>>> use > > > text. > > > >>> I > > > >>>>> twas speculating as whether there is some commonality > > > >>>>> between how > > > Mike > > > >>> is > > > >>>>> using using image and how others are using text. I said this > > because > > > I > > > >>>>> struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary > > > >>>>> in > > > >>> mathematics > > > >>>>> and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to > > problems > > > >>> that > > > >>>>> presently catch my attention. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In > > > >>>>>> other > > > words > > > >>>>> can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The > > physical > > > >>>>> gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of > > > >>>>> letters > > > on > > > >>> the > > > >>>>> page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or > > > >>>>> the > > > visual > > > >>>>> marks making a circle-like shape. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size > > > >>>>> is too > > > >>> large. > > > >>>>> That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I > > > >>>>> now > > > >>> realize > > > >>>>> was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to > > > >>>>> view imagination. I don?t mean your perspective is lacking; > > > >>>>> it just > > seems > > > to > > > >>>>> result in different questions than I would/do ask. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> These different physical forms are not the foundational > > > >>>>>> bedrock, > > > they > > > >>>>> are the material. > > > >>>>>> If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on > > > >>>>>> parchment but > > as > > > >>>>> having a deeper process, > > > >>>>>> Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual > > > perceptions > > > >>>>> but rather having a deeper process. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> My initial reaction is ?Why are you saying this?" If I ever > > > >>>>> thought > > > the > > > >>>>> contrary, I can?t remember. This is just common sense. The > > > interesting > > > >>>>> thing about what you say is that you seem to using ?imagine? > > > >>>>> in a > > > non > > > >>>>> visual fashion which was largely my initial point. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> All the senses share in this process and engage with > > > >>>>>> physically > > > >>>>> experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is > > > >>>>> that > > > >>> unifying > > > >>>>> process that includes all the senses but is not itself the > senses. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> I would say that all senses can participate in this process. > > > >>>>> Also physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too > > > >>>>> strong > > although > > > >>>>> physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints > > > >>>>> of a > > sort > > > on > > > >>>>> imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I > > > >>>>> don?t physically experience a platonic circle. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the > > collated > > > >>>>> pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a > > > dialogue, > > > >>> to > > > >>>>> imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly > > > >>>>> have a unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the > > > >>>>> vital > > animating > > > >>>>> process lived (into). > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Here is where my example wasn?t helpful. I did not mean one > ?sees' > > > the > > > >>>>> marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks > > > >>>>> is too > > > >>> large a > > > >>>>> grain size) on the board as having certain properties > > > >>>>> consistent > > with > > > >>> those > > > >>>>> of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a > > > >>>>> sort > > of > > > >>> sense. > > > >>>>> The teacher?s language seems to prove the imaging and the > > > >>>>> moving to > > > new > > > >>>>> stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people > > > >>>>> don?t > > > make > > > >>> the > > > >>>>> leaps. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy > > > >>>>>> of the > > > >>> visual > > > >>>>> sense. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none > > > >>>>> of the > > > >>> sensory > > > >>>>> modes > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> The relation of this image process to the language process > > > >>>>>> is also > > > >>>>> multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> This doesn?t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, > > > >>>>> doesn?t > > > >>> follow > > > >>>>> for me. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable > > > >>>>> perspective. It > > is > > > >>> just > > > >>>>> one that, to a degree, I either don?t share or seems to be > > > >>>>> the > > wrong > > > >>> grain > > > >>>>> size. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > > > >>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > > > >>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM > > > >>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Mike > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> My wondering has more to do with your focus on the > > > >>>>>> visual > > and > > > >>> my > > > >>>>> examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be > > > >>>>> about the > > > >>> visual. > > > >>>>> However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well > > > >>>>> drawn) > > > is > > > >>> a > > > >>>>> ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at > > > >>>>> least, > > it > > > >>> never > > > >>>>> was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. > > > >>>>> In > > > fact, > > > >>>>> assuming that it is static seems strange although I guess I > > > >>>>> can > > > >>> imagine it > > > >>>>> (smile). > > > >>>>>> On the other hand, perhaps, you are using the term > > > >>>>>> ?image? in > > > >>> the > > > >>>>> way some use the word ?text.? That is, to take into account > > > >>>>> both > > > >>> external > > > >>>>> and the , so called, internal senses. In that case, much of > > > >>>>> what > > you > > > >>> say > > > >>>>> resonates with what I have been thinking. However, I am > > > >>>>> finding > > that > > > >>>>> peeling way the visual from what you write is tricky. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Ed > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 2:35 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> If I read you correctly Ed, my language belies my intent. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> "An image" is not a static thing, it is a process. Think > > > >>>>>>> of > > > >>> Zinchenko's > > > >>>>>>> experiments with fixed images in which he tricked the > > > >>>>>>> visual > > system > > > >>> that > > > >>>>>>> prevented stabilized images from disappearing. He > > > >>>>>>> stabilized the > > > >>> image > > > >>>>>>> (here reified as a projection on the retina) but changed > > > >>>>>>> its > > color, > > > >>> thus > > > >>>>>>> defeating the retina's tendency to go grey. In those > > > >>>>>>> conditions, > > > eye > > > >>>>>>> movements continue to trace the spatial coordinates of the > > > >>>>>>> image > > as > > > >>> if > > > >>>>> it > > > >>>>>>> were continuing to "feel it." > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> These are very special circumstances, to be sure, but for > > > >>>>>>> they > > make > > > >>> it > > > >>>>>>> clear that what is called an image is a process (according > > > >>>>>>> to > > > >>> Suvorov, > > > >>>>> of > > > >>>>>>> stepping away from the world and then stepping back into > > > >>>>>>> it, but > > > >>> then he > > > >>>>>>> was blind and deaf). > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> What we designate as "the image" is some form of > > > >>>>>>> materialized > > > >>>>> stabilization > > > >>>>>>> of the flow of into-image-making. Some structure in the > > > >>>>>>> flow of > > the > > > >>>>> always > > > >>>>>>> new. From just the blink of an eye to our image of the > > > >>>>>>> statue of > > > >>>>> liberty. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> This is an old idea but it fits with my intuition. I first > > > >>> encountered > > > >>>>> it > > > >>>>>>> reading Dewey who refers to "the poet" on the topic of > > experience. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> *Yet all experience is an arch wherehrough / Gleams that > > untraveled > > > >>>>> world > > > >>>>>>> whose margin fades / Forever and forever when I move. * > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> *Tennyson, Ulysses* > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> If you are interested, we could try to synch re/reading of > > > >>>>>>> some > > > core > > > >>>>> common > > > >>>>>>> articles/chapters. This entire area of concern is of > > > >>>>>>> recent > > vintage > > > >>> for > > > >>>>> me > > > >>>>>>> and my ignorance is particularly keenly felt. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 12:02 PM, Ed Wall > > wrote: > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> Mike > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> As I indicated to Larry, I wonder somewhat about the > > privileging > > > >>> of > > > >>>>>>>> the ?image? in discussions of imagination. Additionally, > > although > > > it > > > >>>>> has > > > >>>>>>>> been awhile since I delved into enactivism (and I don?t > > > >>>>>>>> think it > > > was > > > >>>>> of the > > > >>>>>>>> Russian kind) some of the theorists they seemed to draw > > > >>>>>>>> on would > > > >>>>> disagree > > > >>>>>>>> with such a focus; this also seems to apply to semiotics. > > > >>>>>>>> I did order the book after an Amazon perusal - it seems > > useful! - > > > >>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>> I have yet to read your paper slowly. However, despite a > > > >>>>>>>> huge > > > >>> emphasis > > > >>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>> mathematics education on visualization, I may be thinking > > > >>>>>>>> less > > > about > > > >>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>> ?imaginal? than you or Larry. That doesn?t mean that what > > > >>>>>>>> you > > and > > > >>>>> Larry are > > > >>>>>>>> talking about might not usefully factor in especially > > > >>>>>>>> your point > > > >>> about > > > >>>>>>>> joint, mediated, activity. > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> Ed > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 11:11 AM, mike cole > > wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Thanks for having IMAGINATION in the subject line Larry > > > >>>>>>>>> et al > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> I'll venture that into-image-make in its embryonic > > > >>>>>>>>> beginnings > > > >>> builds > > > >>>>> off > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>>> the already highly functional sensory system. Assume > > > >>>>>>>>> vision as > > > the > > > >>>>>>>> sensory > > > >>>>>>>>> system in question. We know that in an important sense, > > > >>>>>>>>> the > > > >>> "simple" > > > >>>>> act > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>>> seeing what you might call a common object, for example > > > >>>>>>>>> your > > car > > > in > > > >>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>> driveway, or for an infant, the mother's face, involves > > temporal > > > >>> and > > > >>>>>>>>> spatial discontinuities arising from saccadic eye > > > >>>>>>>>> movement that > > > >>> must > > > >>>>> be > > > >>>>>>>>> resolved by the nervous system or vision ceases, the > > > >>>>>>>>> process of > > > >>> image > > > >>>>>>>>> formation ceases to function. > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> The Peleprat/Cole paper provides more substantiation for > > > >>>>>>>>> that > > > >>>>> simplified > > > >>>>>>>>> account. In thinking about imagination I turn to > > > >>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets, > > > >>>>> Zinchenko > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>> non-Russians who I think of as promoting the idea of > > > >>>>>>>>> enactive perception/cognition. It is also consistent > > > >>>>>>>>> with joint, > > mediated, > > > >>>>>>>> activity > > > >>>>>>>>> as the germ cell of human ontogeny. Or so the story might go. > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> I currently have my bet on the emergence of the semiotic > > function > > > >>> and > > > >>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>> human possibility for symbolic communication is > > > >>>>>>>>> co-incident and co-constitutive of distinctly human > imagination. > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> in brief > > > >>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Lplarry > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ed, mike, Michael, > > > >>>>>>>>>> I will push my question to an earlier time period. > > > >>>>>>>>>> Age 2 months. > > > >>>>>>>>>> The baby (perceives) mom's activity and introduces > > > >>>>>>>>>> her.own > > > >>> activity . > > > >>>>>>>>>> Question > > > >>>>>>>>>> With this mutual activity is the baby forming an image, > > > >>>>>>>>>> moving > > > >>> into > > > >>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>> image and becoming an (imaging) human as het nature? > > > >>>>>>>>>> Will say more but where does (image) have its embryonic > > origin? > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > > > >>>>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > > > >>>>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?05 4:48 PM > > > >>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination or Fantasy > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Larry > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I wan?t looking at the title, but, yes, ?or? can be > > > >>>>>>>>>> inclusive > > or > > > >>>>>>>>>> exclusive. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I don?t think of it as a detour; that doesn?t seem to > > > >>>>>>>>>> make > > sense > > > >>> if > > > >>>>>>>> I > > > >>>>>>>>>> understand Vygotsky correctly. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I, personally, don?t equate ?physical' and ?concrete?;? > > perhaps > > > I > > > >>>>>>>>>> wasn?t clear. In any case, I?ve never completely > > > >>>>>>>>>> understood > > the > > > >>>>>>>> tendency to > > > >>>>>>>>>> think of the physical (i.e. a thing in itself) as > > > >>>>>>>>>> somehow > > > >>>>>>>> extra-concrete. > > > >>>>>>>>>> The best I can do is imagine that in a certain cultural > > > historical > > > >>>>>>>> context > > > >>>>>>>>>> and at a certain stage of development people act as if > > > >>>>>>>>>> certain > > > >>> things > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > >>>>>>>>>> ?concrete.? This includes the 'physical world' > > > >>>>>>>>>> (whatever that > > > >>> is?). > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I?m not quite sure where you are going with the > > > >>>>>>>>>> development > > of > > > >>>>>>>>>> systems and concrete-like or even cultural historical. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Fantasy is a complicated word so I don?t know what > > > >>>>>>>>>> you mean > > > >>> when > > > >>>>>>>>>> you allude to ?assume that or let? involving fantasy. > > > >>>>>>>>>> My > > answer, > > > >>>>>>>> perhaps, > > > >>>>>>>>>> would be neither is necessarily imaginal or fantasy > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Since I have no clear idea what you mean by system or > > fantasy > > > >>> in > > > >>>>>>>>>> your email, I can?t give a reasonable answer to your > > > >>>>>>>>>> final > > > >>> question. > > > >>>>> An > > > >>>>>>>>>> approximate answer might be ?no?; however, I can > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagine other possibilities (smile). > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ed > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 4, 2015, at 4:04 PM, Lplarry > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Ed, > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> The title imagination (or) fantasy Is different from > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination (equates) with fantasy. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> To move from the physical concrete though a detour (a > > > >>>>> distanciation?) > > > >>>>>>>>>> and return to the mathematical concrete. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Is the same word (concrete) shift meaning in this > > > >>>>>>>>>>> transfer > > from > > > >>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>> physical to the mathematical? > > > >>>>>>>>>>> If mathematics is actually a (system) that has emerged > > > >>>>>>>>>>> in > > > >>> historical > > > >>>>>>>>>> consciousness then is it reasonable to say that the > > > >>>>>>>>>> physical > > > >>>>> (concrete) > > > >>>>>>>>>> which exists prior to the human understanding and the > > > mathematical > > > >>>>>>>>>> (concrete) which is a cultural historical system > > > >>>>>>>>>> emerging > > within > > > >>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>> imaginal are both (concrete) in identical ways? > > > >>>>>>>>>>> It seems that systems (develop) and become concrete-like. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Is this the same meaning of concrete as the physical > > > >>>>>>>>>>> which > > > >>>>> originates > > > >>>>>>>> as > > > >>>>>>>>>> concrete. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> To (assume that or to let) involves the imaginal and > fantasy. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between the imaginal and > > fantasy. > > > >>> Does > > > >>>>> one > > > >>>>>>>>>> imply it does not (actually) exist while the other > > > >>>>>>>>>> implies the > > > >>> actual > > > >>>>>>>> can > > > >>>>>>>>>> be mapped onto the physical with systems? > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Is there a clear demarcation between systems and fantasy? > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Larry > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message----- > > > >>>>>>>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?04 11:05 AM > > > >>>>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination or Fantasy > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> All > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> For various reasons I have been thinking about a kind > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>> imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>> that might be subsumed under statements like ?assume that,? > > > >>> ?let,? or > > > >>>>>>>>>> ?Imagine that? (and these may be, in fact, very > > > >>>>>>>>>> different > > > >>> statements > > > >>>>>>>>>> although, under certain circumstances, might be the > > > >>>>>>>>>> same.? In > > > >>> doing > > > >>>>> so I > > > >>>>>>>>>> came across something written by Vygotsky in > > > >>>>>>>>>> Imagination and > > > >>>>> Creativity > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>>>> the Adolescent (ed Rieber) p163: ?It is characteristic > > > >>>>>>>>>> for > > > >>>>> imagination > > > >>>>>>>> that > > > >>>>>>>>>> it does not stop at this path, that for it, the > > > >>>>>>>>>> abstract is > > only > > > >>> an > > > >>>>>>>>>> intermediate link, only a stage on the path of > > > >>>>>>>>>> development, > > > only a > > > >>>>> pass > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>>>> the process of its movement to the concrete. From our > > > >>>>>>>>>> point of > > > >>> view, > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination is a transforming, creative activity > > > >>>>>>>>>> directed > > from a > > > >>>>> given > > > >>>>>>>>>> concrete toward a new concrete.? > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> I find this quote very interesting in view of a > > > >>>>>>>>>>> previous > > > >>> discussion > > > >>>>>>>>>> on the list regarding Davydov?s mathematics curriculum > > > >>>>>>>>>> in > > that I > > > >>> am > > > >>>>>>>>>> wondering whether part of what is going on is that > > > >>>>>>>>>> children > > are > > > >>> being > > > >>>>>>>> asked > > > >>>>>>>>>> to ?imagine." I have other mathematical examples of > > > >>>>>>>>>> this join > > > the > > > >>>>>>>>>> elementary school that are possibly a little more > > > >>>>>>>>>> obvious (if > > > >>>>> somebody > > > >>>>>>>> is > > > >>>>>>>>>> interested I can give them off list). Anyway, one > > > >>>>>>>>>> reason for > > my > > > >>>>>>>> wondering > > > >>>>>>>>>> is that for so many people mathematics is not concrete; i.e. > > > there > > > >>>>> is no > > > >>>>>>>>>> stepping from concrete to concrete; the sort of get > > > >>>>>>>>>> stuck, so > > to > > > >>>>> speak, > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>>>> the abstract. So let me give two examples of what I am > > wondering > > > >>>>> about > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>>> then a question. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> My first example: It is possible that we would all > > > >>>>>>>>>>> agree > > that > > > to > > > >>>>> see > > > >>>>>>>>>> a winged horse is imagine a winged horse as there is no > > > >>>>>>>>>> such > > > >>> thing. > > > >>>>> In a > > > >>>>>>>>>> somewhat like manner, a simple proof that the square > > > >>>>>>>>>> root of > > two > > > >>> is > > > >>>>> not > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > >>>>>>>>>> fraction begins with ?Assume that the square root of > > > >>>>>>>>>> two is a > > > >>>>> fraction.? > > > >>>>>>>>>> This is not so thus, in sense, one must imagine that it > > > >>>>>>>>>> is > > true > > > >>> and > > > >>>>> then > > > >>>>>>>>>> look at the consequences (the square root of -1 is > > > >>>>>>>>>> perhaps > > > another > > > >>>>>>>>>> example). This seems to be a case of concrete to > > > >>>>>>>>>> concrete > > > through > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination and this type of proof (a proof through > > > contradiction) > > > >>>>>>>> seems to > > > >>>>>>>>>> be very hard for people to do. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> My second example: The teacher goes up to the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> blackboard and > > > >>> draws > > > >>>>>>>>>> something rather circular and says ?This is a circle.? > > > >>>>>>>>>> She > > then > > > >>>>> draws a > > > >>>>>>>>>> point somewhat towards the center of the planar object > > > >>>>>>>>>> and > > says, > > > >>>>> "This > > > >>>>>>>> is > > > >>>>>>>>>> its center.? She then says ?Every point on this circle > > > >>>>>>>>>> (waving > > > her > > > >>>>> hand > > > >>>>>>>> at > > > >>>>>>>>>> the object on the blackboard) is equidistant from the > center.? > > > >>> None > > > >>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>> this > > > >>>>>>>>>> is true, but somehow we are meant to behave as if it were. > > Each > > > >>> step > > > >>>>>>>> here > > > >>>>>>>>>> seems to go through imagination from the concrete to > > > >>>>>>>>>> the > > > concrete. > > > >>>>> (Hmm > > > >>>>>>>> , I > > > >>>>>>>>>> see that I am really saying from the physical concrete > > > >>>>>>>>>> to the > > > >>>>>>>> mathematical > > > >>>>>>>>>> concrete. Perhaps Vygotsky wouldn?t allow this?) > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> [I note by the way Poul Anderson took on the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> consequences of > > a > > > >>>>> winged > > > >>>>>>>>>> horse]. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> So my question, as Vygotsky seems to identify > > > >>>>>>>>>>> imagination > > with > > > >>>>>>>>>> fantasy (this may be a fault of the translation), what > > > >>>>>>>>>> would > > > >>> Vygotsky > > > >>>>>>>> have > > > >>>>>>>>>> called my examples? A case of sheer conceivability or > > something > > > >>> else? > > > >>>>>>>> There > > > >>>>>>>>>> is, I note, good reason to call it imagination, but I?m > > > >>> interested in > > > >>>>>>>> your > > > >>>>>>>>>> take on what Vygotsky?s take might be. > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Ed Wall > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural > > > >>>>>>>>> science > > with > > > >>> an > > > >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural > > > >>>>>>> science with > > > an > > > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> -- > > > >>>> > > > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science > > > >>>> with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> -- > > > >> > > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science > > > >> with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science > > > > with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Dec 15 11:02:36 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 11:02:36 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <005f01d13761$bd7b8800$38729800$@att.net> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> <05AB59E5-018D-4FF2-92BE-06619D1F95B8@umich.edu> <1BD78C04-64EA-4C74-BDDB-4723D6312EAF@umich.edu> <000c01d13602$d3281930$79784b90$@att. net> <005f01d13761$bd7b8800$38729800$@att.net> Message-ID: <567063e5.d748620a.63c0f.7371@mx.google.com> Peg, If imagination is understood as what happens as we compose and stabilize our connections then I want to follow your lead and lean into (listen to) your connections. You liked first: Svetlana having an image of polyphonic voices. She stabilizes this image and enters its (space) in order to write. She finds/composes/conducts/performs this imaginal polyphony. We can impose a category such as literature or the ordinary/mundane but whatever category we imagine there is a quality and a character that moves her listeners/readers. This points to the imaginal manifesting within the ordinary/mundane which is how I understand Dewey's article (understanding experience). I believe your connections exploring the imaginal do move towards stabilizing our understanding the imaginal. This brings us to your second understanding. While we are composing connections AND moving towards stabilizing our images (through acts such as writing), work such as Svetlana'sindicates the reality of an "endless" ground. Can we label this endless ground a type of playground? Yes, a very complicated (place) and sometimes we struggle to notice the play quality within this imaginal endless ground. However, I believe it is valid to name this place of endless ground a complex playground. An endless cultural historical playground that brings into view "event" figures within the endless ground. The notion of semiology is that signs designate objects in the world existing outside the sign systems. (my understanding). The notion of hermeneutics is that signs (indicating objects) and interpretations as endless ground all the way down are different approaches. Some say semiology and hermeneutics as approaches image each other and one cannot exist without the other. I am listening to the sound of "endless" ground manifesting imaginally as supporting this connection of semiological and hermeneutical approaches meeting in this imaginal endless ground? I also understand my reply as an "event" of transitory stabilization within this complex playground. This is taking place within the ordinary/mundane as an extraordinary place. My listening may be a misunderstanding but this implies in the future we may possibly arrive at shared understanding. Larry -----Original Message----- From: "Peg Griffin" Sent: ?2015-?12-?15 9:57 AM To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination I like two things most about the lecture: 1. Svetlana Alexievich imagines the polyphony of voices as she writes/in order to write. Some folks claim her work is not literature (creative) and is merely journalism. Indeed she does cherish her tape-recorders! But she finds/composes/conducts/performs the polyphony and I imagine that is all in some leaky category near the "mundane" arena (journalistic writing). 2. Her collection of work suggests "endless" ground if sometimes a bit complicated to be called a playground. The lecture illustrates close to an endless cultural-historical ground punctuated in socio-historical event figures. To me it seems to be a sort of phenomenologal account of her imagining process. I'd love to get a hint of the two forms of imagination in Paley's practices you are thinking of, Mike. Is it, for example, in her paired practices for story-telling and story-acting focused on in the Ball State video? Back to reading and grading (some happy and some not)... Peg -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Sunday, December 13, 2015 7:59 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination Thank you for this, Peg. The little I have read of her work, including the excerpt in the NY Review of Books of her new book, makes her sound amazing. I am fascinated by the processes through which imagination builds into fantasy which seems an endless playground. At the same time, I am more and more impressed with the centrality of imagination in the most mundane of our interactions in the world. It seems to sit at the heart of the process of various psycho-cultural-social contructivisms. Vivian Paley comes to mind very often as I read the interesting places that participants are carrying the discussion. She writes about practices where the two forms of imagination, intersect. Always interesting. mike I know that somewhere in the thread there On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 4:03 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: > This 2015 Nobel Laureate for Literature lecture strikes me as > pertinent to this imagination discussion. She is an amazing woman and > here addresses issues familiar maybe tanatalizing for this list, I think. > > http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2015/alexi > evich-lecture_en.html It begins this way: " I do not stand alone at > this podium ... There are voices around me, hundreds of voices. They > have always been with me, since childhood. I grew up in the > countryside...} Peg > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw > Lloyd > Sent: Wednesday, December 09, 2015 12:12 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > Perhaps the challenge will get easier if you keep piling up the > references, Mike. :) > > So, I have persevered with reading, skipping and scanning Lovejoy's > "The Great Chain of Being" and have come away with a few pages of > notes, and some edification (22nd printing, 2001, Harvard University Press). > > With respect to the valorisation of imagination, Lovejoy identifies > Schleirmacher as an early proponent of the merits of the development > of imagination (although one could say that this is implicit in the > platonic ideas which concern the book as a whole). (p. 309) > > With respect to the origins of the idea of a cell (urbild), he > identifies Robinet as a rather eclectic proponent of the idea (p. > 279), which again is derived from the history of the ideas of absolute > perfection (of god), the principle of plentitude and the principle of > continuity. He also attributes to Robinet that "fundamental reality > in nature for him is not matter but l'avtivite". (p. 281) > > On a more down to regular strain on the imagination, regarding my > assertion early of cognate terms (imagination, orientation etc), my > reckoning is that orientation determines the scope and nature of > interpretation. > > Not so long ago, I noticed some apparently new developments in our > eldest child's formulations (4y6). We were talking about how to make > papier mache objects, which took me back to making a papier mache > 'pig' with the help of a balloon. In response to this he volunteered > that the balloon would have to be burst with a pencil once it had been > covered. I think it was the day before this that he pronounced that > the ugly duckling's egg must have been laid by a swan. It seemed to > me that that these articulations indicated that he was using a > relatively new idea which was helping him to imaginatively understand > these situations (an idea of process). I am fairly sure that these solutions were not supplied beforehand. > > Best, > Huw > > > On 9 December 2015 at 03:59, mike cole wrote: > > > The Casey site looks amazing and of course very relevant, Ed. Thanks. > > > > When I first read Sartre many years ago, I was totally unprepared to > > take in what he was saying. I had not way to "digest it." > > > > Reading into the electronic copy I sent around yesterday, I could > > see that it is inappropriate for me to refer to what I do as > > phenomenology. It is just a kind of intuitive reflection on my > > experiences and thoughts. No Husserl, no Sartre. Just unschooled > > introspection that I seek to verify through acquiring evidence that > > there is more than total idiosyncrasy to what my musings. > > > > I feel as if I need to download all the sources of inquiry we have > > unearthed in the last few days and retreat to a place with no > > communication with the world for a few weeks just to take them, in. !! > > mike > > > > On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:39 AM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > > > Mike > > > > > > There are, perhaps, some shortcomings in portions of Sartre > > > work > > on > > > imagination to which Casey supplies some useful modifications. > > > Also it > > is a > > > bit long. Take a look at Edward Casey?s web site: < > > > http://edwardscasey.com/?page_id=13>. Many of those articles on > > > imagination seem downloadable and besides possibly whetting one?s > > appetite > > > for Sartre might be interesting in themselves. Perhaps you could > > > pick one that most interests you and provides, from your vantage, > > > a useful common, and modestly short reading source. I would, of > > > course, recommend Casey?s book, but isn?t freely available. > > > > > > Ed > > > > > > > On Dec 7, 2015, at 9:44 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > So maybe Sartre would be a useful common reading source, Ed. > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://blog.exre.org/wp-content/uploads/Sartre_The_Imaginary__A_Phen > > om enological_Psychology_of_the_Imagination.pdf > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > >> It make sense for the questions to differ, Ed, or at least the > > > >> way > > they > > > >> are posed. Finding a common foundation will take a lot of > > communication > > > >> (which will require a lot of imagination!). > > > >> mike > > > >> > > > >> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 6:04 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > >> > > > >>> Mike > > > >>> > > > >>> I assume you have read Sartre on imagination; i.e. The > > Imagination. > > > >>> This gives what he considers a phenomenological take on > imagination. > > > >>> However, I would consider a much more revealing take to be > > > >>> that of > > > Edward > > > >>> Casey in Imaging (I am hoping that book you referenced will > > supplement > > > that > > > >>> of Casey). The connection to Kant, by the way, critically > > > >>> preceded > > > that of > > > >>> Mzerleau-Ponty and Sartre and that is why I was surprised to > > > >>> not see > > > him > > > >>> mentioned. > > > >>> > > > >>> I agree that we all seem to be coming out in, more or > > > >>> less, the same place. Only the questions seem to differ. > > > >>> > > > >>> Ed > > > >>> > > > >>>> On Dec 7, 2015, at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity > > > >>>> given that > > we > > > >>>> started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I > > > indicated > > > >>> in > > > >>>> my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life > > > >>>> through > > my > > > >>>> teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas > > > >>>> drawn > > from > > > >>>> psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and > > activity-centered > > > >>>> research practices. But here I am. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my > > > >>> understanding. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the > > > >>>> description > > of > > > >>> the > > > >>>> flow from imagination to representation, but glad to > > > >>>> encounter a > > > dozen! > > > >>>> Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the > > > abstractions > > > >>> can > > > >>>> be seen, seem hard to come by. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by > > > >>>> identifying different threads of the topic they constitute > > > >>>> was > > offered > > > >>> with > > > >>>> that goal in mind. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is > > > >>>> about > > it. > > > I > > > >>>> learned that from the Russians who write about imagination. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> etc? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> To the extent that these different traditions lead people to > > > >>>> the > > same > > > >>> kinds > > > >>>> of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the > > > >>>> conclusions > > are > > > >>>> tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, > > sometimes, > > > in > > > >>>> good teaching. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> mike > > > >>>> > > > >>>> mike > > > >>>> > > > >>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> Larry and Mike > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to > > > >>>>> both > > of > > > >>> you > > > >>>>> in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a > > > >>> conversation > > > >>>>> that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably > > > >>>>> good, > > but > > > >>> it is > > > >>>>> a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little > > > >>>>> larger > > > than > > > >>> what > > > >>>>> I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that > > > >>>>> I need > > > to, > > > >>> one > > > >>>>> might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that > > > >>>>> bear on > > > the, > > > >>>>> perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will > > > >>>>> reread > > it). I > > > >>>>> found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a > > > >>>>> large > > > grain > > > >>> size > > > >>>>> (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look > > > >>>>> at > > > >>> things). A > > > >>>>> few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms > > > >>>>> and are > > > >>> offered > > > >>>>> in the hope that they might be useful. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; > > > >>>>> however, looking at how words are used (a philosophy of > > > >>>>> language, so to > > speak) > > > >>> often > > > >>>>> does a better job of opening things up. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did > > > >>>>> not make > > > >>> your > > > >>>>> list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to > > > >>>>> mention Avicenna. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 3. I have the impression you are using the term ?stable? > > > >>>>> as a somewhat replacement of Vygotsky?s concrete; I like > > > >>>>> that as > > > ?concrete' > > > >>>>> seems to have very different meanings for different people. > > > >>>>> I will > > > try > > > >>> to > > > >>>>> use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in > > > >>>>> my > > > replies > > > >>>>> tooters. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of > > > >>>>> Hellen > > > >>> Keller. I > > > >>>>> wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a > > > >>>>> thin gap > > > is > > > >>>>> because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a > > suspicion > > > >>> that > > > >>>>> he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I > > > >>>>> am > > fairly > > > >>> sure > > > >>>>> Keller was. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than > > > >>>>> too thin although the metaphor of filling still seems > > > >>>>> reasonable > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> 6. In a way you don?t seem to quite come out and say it > > > >>>>> (or I missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is > > > >>>>> not > > necessarily > > > >>>>> creative and I would add that it is quite everyday. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as > > > >>>>> they > > occur. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Ed > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 4:41 PM, Lplarry > > wrote: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and > > > >>>>>> re(present) > > > our > > > >>>>> notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a > > metaphor > > > >>> not > > > >>>>> error. > > > >>>>>> Ed, > > > >>>>>> To continue with your reflection if image has some relation > > > >>>>>> to how > > > >>>>> others use text. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Actually I don?t think image has some relation to how others > > > >>>>> use > > > text. > > > >>> I > > > >>>>> twas speculating as whether there is some commonality > > > >>>>> between how > > > Mike > > > >>> is > > > >>>>> using using image and how others are using text. I said this > > because > > > I > > > >>>>> struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary > > > >>>>> in > > > >>> mathematics > > > >>>>> and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to > > problems > > > >>> that > > > >>>>> presently catch my attention. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In > > > >>>>>> other > > > words > > > >>>>> can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The > > physical > > > >>>>> gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of > > > >>>>> letters > > > on > > > >>> the > > > >>>>> page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or > > > >>>>> the > > > visual > > > >>>>> marks making a circle-like shape. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size > > > >>>>> is too > > > >>> large. > > > >>>>> That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I > > > >>>>> now > > > >>> realize > > > >>>>> was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to > > > >>>>> view imagination. I don?t mean your perspective is lacking; > > > >>>>> it just > > seems > > > to > > > >>>>> result in different questions than I would/do ask. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> These different physical forms are not the foundational > > > >>>>>> bedrock, > > > they > > > >>>>> are the material. > > > >>>>>> If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on > > > >>>>>> parchment but > > as > > > >>>>> having a deeper process, > > > >>>>>> Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual > > > perceptions > > > >>>>> but rather having a deeper process. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> My initial reaction is ?Why are you saying this?" If I ever > > > >>>>> thought > > > the > > > >>>>> contrary, I can?t remember. This is just common sense. The > > > interesting > > > >>>>> thing about what you say is that you seem to using ?imagine? > > > >>>>> in a > > > non > > > >>>>> visual fashion which was largely my initial point. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> All the senses share in this process and engage with > > > >>>>>> physically > > > >>>>> experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is > > > >>>>> that > > > >>> unifying > > > >>>>> process that includes all the senses but is not itself the > senses. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> I would say that all senses can participate in this process. > > > >>>>> Also physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too > > > >>>>> strong > > although > > > >>>>> physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints > > > >>>>> of a > > sort > > > on > > > >>>>> imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I > > > >>>>> don?t physically experience a platonic circle. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the > > collated > > > >>>>> pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a > > > dialogue, > > > >>> to > > > >>>>> imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly > > > >>>>> have a unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the > > > >>>>> vital > > animating > > > >>>>> process lived (into). > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Here is where my example wasn?t helpful. I did not mean one > ?sees' > > > the > > > >>>>> marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks > > > >>>>> is too > > > >>> large a > > > >>>>> grain size) on the board as having certain properties > > > >>>>> consistent > > with > > > >>> those > > > >>>>> of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a > > > >>>>> sort > > of > > > >>> sense. > > > >>>>> The teacher?s language seems to prove the imaging and the > > > >>>>> moving to > > > new > > > >>>>> stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people > > > >>>>> don?t > > > make > > > >>> the > > > >>>>> leaps. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy > > > >>>>>> of the > > > >>> visual > > > >>>>> sense. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none > > > >>>>> of the > > > >>> sensory > > > >>>>> modes > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> The relation of this image process to the language process > > > >>>>>> is also > > > >>>>> multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> This doesn?t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, > > > >>>>> doesn?t > > > >>> follow > > > >>>>> for me. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable > > > >>>>> perspective. It > > is > > > >>> just > > > >>>>> one that, to a degree, I either don?t share or seems to be > > > >>>>> the > > wrong > > > >>> grain > > > >>>>> size. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > > > >>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > > > >>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM > > > >>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Mike > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> My wondering has more to do with your focus on the > > > >>>>>> visual > > and > > > >>> my > > > >>>>> examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be > > > >>>>> about the > > > >>> visual. > > > >>>>> However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well > > > >>>>> drawn) > > > is > > > >>> a > > > >>>>> ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at > > > >>>>> least, > > it > > > >>> never > > > >>>>> was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. > > > >>>>> In > > > fact, > > > >>>>> assuming that it is static seems strange although I gues [The entire original message is not included.] From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 15 11:27:31 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 11:27:31 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <567063e5.d748620a.63c0f.7371@mx.google.com> References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> <05AB59E5-018D-4FF2-92BE-06619D1F95B8@umich.edu> <1BD78C04-64EA-4C74-BDDB-4723D6312EAF@umich.edu> <005f01d13761$bd7b8800$38729800$@att.net> <567063e5.d748620a.63c0f.7371@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Just to go back to the text a little. It is true that she opens with feelings of love for the human voice in the middle of horrible circumstances. "I love the lone human voice. It is my greatest love and passion." But she ends a creature of Belorussia, Ukraine, and Russian culture.... "But in this day and age it is difficult to talk of about love." mike On Tue, Dec 15, 2015 at 11:02 AM, Lplarry wrote: > Peg, > If imagination is understood as what happens as we compose and stabilize > our connections then I want to follow your lead and lean into (listen to) > your connections. > You liked first: > Svetlana having an image of polyphonic voices. She stabilizes this image > and enters its (space) in order to write. > She finds/composes/conducts/performs this imaginal polyphony. > We can impose a category such as literature or the ordinary/mundane but > whatever category we imagine there is a quality and a character that moves > her listeners/readers. > This points to the imaginal manifesting within the ordinary/mundane which > is how I understand Dewey's article (understanding experience). > I believe your connections exploring the imaginal do move towards > stabilizing our understanding the imaginal. > This brings us to your second understanding. While we are composing > connections AND moving towards stabilizing our images (through acts such as > writing), work such as Svetlana'sindicates the reality of an "endless" > ground. > Can we label this endless ground a type of playground? Yes, a very > complicated (place) and sometimes we struggle to notice the play quality > within this imaginal endless ground. > However, I believe it is valid to name this place of endless ground a > complex playground. > An endless cultural historical playground that brings into view "event" > figures within the endless ground. > > The notion of semiology is that signs designate objects in the world > existing outside the sign systems. (my understanding). > The notion of hermeneutics is that signs (indicating objects) and > interpretations as endless ground all the way down are different approaches. > Some say semiology and hermeneutics as approaches image each other and one > cannot exist without the other. > I am listening to the sound of "endless" ground manifesting imaginally as > supporting this connection of semiological and hermeneutical approaches > meeting in this imaginal endless ground? > > I also understand my reply as an "event" of transitory stabilization > within this complex playground. > This is taking place within the ordinary/mundane as an extraordinary place. > My listening may be a misunderstanding but this implies in the future we > may possibly arrive at shared understanding. > Larry > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Peg Griffin" > Sent: ?2015-?12-?15 9:57 AM > To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > I like two things most about the lecture: > 1. Svetlana Alexievich imagines the polyphony of voices as she writes/in > order to write. Some folks claim her work is not literature (creative) and > is merely journalism. Indeed she does cherish her tape-recorders! But she > finds/composes/conducts/performs the polyphony and I imagine that is all in > some leaky category near the "mundane" arena (journalistic writing). > 2. Her collection of work suggests "endless" ground if sometimes a bit > complicated to be called a playground. The lecture illustrates close to an > endless cultural-historical ground punctuated in socio-historical event > figures. To me it seems to be a sort of phenomenologal account of her > imagining process. > > I'd love to get a hint of the two forms of imagination in Paley's > practices you are thinking of, Mike. Is it, for example, in her paired > practices for story-telling and story-acting focused on in the Ball State > video? > > Back to reading and grading (some happy and some not)... > Peg > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike > cole > Sent: Sunday, December 13, 2015 7:59 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > Thank you for this, Peg. The little I have read of her work, including the > excerpt in the NY Review of Books of her new book, makes her sound amazing. > > I am fascinated by the processes through which imagination builds into > fantasy which seems an endless playground. At the same time, I am more and > more impressed with the centrality of imagination in the most mundane of > our interactions in the world. It seems to sit at the heart of the process > of various psycho-cultural-social contructivisms. > > Vivian Paley comes to mind very often as I read the interesting places > that participants are carrying the discussion. She writes about practices > where the two forms of imagination, intersect. Always interesting. > > mike > > I know that somewhere in the thread there > > On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 4:03 PM, Peg Griffin wrote: > > > This 2015 Nobel Laureate for Literature lecture strikes me as > > pertinent to this imagination discussion. She is an amazing woman and > > here addresses issues familiar maybe tanatalizing for this list, I think. > > > > http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2015/alexi > > evich-lecture_en.html It begins this way: " I do not stand alone at > > this podium ... There are voices around me, hundreds of voices. They > > have always been with me, since childhood. I grew up in the > > countryside...} Peg > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw > > Lloyd > > Sent: Wednesday, December 09, 2015 12:12 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > Perhaps the challenge will get easier if you keep piling up the > > references, Mike. :) > > > > So, I have persevered with reading, skipping and scanning Lovejoy's > > "The Great Chain of Being" and have come away with a few pages of > > notes, and some edification (22nd printing, 2001, Harvard University > Press). > > > > With respect to the valorisation of imagination, Lovejoy identifies > > Schleirmacher as an early proponent of the merits of the development > > of imagination (although one could say that this is implicit in the > > platonic ideas which concern the book as a whole). (p. 309) > > > > With respect to the origins of the idea of a cell (urbild), he > > identifies Robinet as a rather eclectic proponent of the idea (p. > > 279), which again is derived from the history of the ideas of absolute > > perfection (of god), the principle of plentitude and the principle of > > continuity. He also attributes to Robinet that "fundamental reality > > in nature for him is not matter but l'avtivite". (p. 281) > > > > On a more down to regular strain on the imagination, regarding my > > assertion early of cognate terms (imagination, orientation etc), my > > reckoning is that orientation determines the scope and nature of > > interpretation. > > > > Not so long ago, I noticed some apparently new developments in our > > eldest child's formulations (4y6). We were talking about how to make > > papier mache objects, which took me back to making a papier mache > > 'pig' with the help of a balloon. In response to this he volunteered > > that the balloon would have to be burst with a pencil once it had been > > covered. I think it was the day before this that he pronounced that > > the ugly duckling's egg must have been laid by a swan. It seemed to > > me that that these articulations indicated that he was using a > > relatively new idea which was helping him to imaginatively understand > > these situations (an idea of process). I am fairly sure that these > solutions were not supplied beforehand. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > On 9 December 2015 at 03:59, mike cole wrote: > > > > > The Casey site looks amazing and of course very relevant, Ed. Thanks. > > > > > > When I first read Sartre many years ago, I was totally unprepared to > > > take in what he was saying. I had not way to "digest it." > > > > > > Reading into the electronic copy I sent around yesterday, I could > > > see that it is inappropriate for me to refer to what I do as > > > phenomenology. It is just a kind of intuitive reflection on my > > > experiences and thoughts. No Husserl, no Sartre. Just unschooled > > > introspection that I seek to verify through acquiring evidence that > > > there is more than total idiosyncrasy to what my musings. > > > > > > I feel as if I need to download all the sources of inquiry we have > > > unearthed in the last few days and retreat to a place with no > > > communication with the world for a few weeks just to take them, in. !! > > > mike > > > > > > On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:39 AM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > > > > > Mike > > > > > > > > There are, perhaps, some shortcomings in portions of Sartre > > > > work > > > on > > > > imagination to which Casey supplies some useful modifications. > > > > Also it > > > is a > > > > bit long. Take a look at Edward Casey?s web site: < > > > > http://edwardscasey.com/?page_id=13>. Many of those articles on > > > > imagination seem downloadable and besides possibly whetting one?s > > > appetite > > > > for Sartre might be interesting in themselves. Perhaps you could > > > > pick one that most interests you and provides, from your vantage, > > > > a useful common, and modestly short reading source. I would, of > > > > course, recommend Casey?s book, but isn?t freely available. > > > > > > > > Ed > > > > > > > > > On Dec 7, 2015, at 9:44 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > > So maybe Sartre would be a useful common reading source, Ed. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://blog.exre.org/wp-content/uploads/Sartre_The_Imaginary__A_Phen > > > om enological_Psychology_of_the_Imagination.pdf > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > >> It make sense for the questions to differ, Ed, or at least the > > > > >> way > > > they > > > > >> are posed. Finding a common foundation will take a lot of > > > communication > > > > >> (which will require a lot of imagination!). > > > > >> mike > > > > >> > > > > >> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 6:04 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>> Mike > > > > >>> > > > > >>> I assume you have read Sartre on imagination; i.e. The > > > Imagination. > > > > >>> This gives what he considers a phenomenological take on > > imagination. > > > > >>> However, I would consider a much more revealing take to be > > > > >>> that of > > > > Edward > > > > >>> Casey in Imaging (I am hoping that book you referenced will > > > supplement > > > > that > > > > >>> of Casey). The connection to Kant, by the way, critically > > > > >>> preceded > > > > that of > > > > >>> Mzerleau-Ponty and Sartre and that is why I was surprised to > > > > >>> not see > > > > him > > > > >>> mentioned. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> I agree that we all seem to be coming out in, more or > > > > >>> less, the same place. Only the questions seem to differ. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Ed > > > > >>> > > > > >>>> On Dec 7, 2015, at 7:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity > > > > >>>> given that > > > we > > > > >>>> started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I > > > > indicated > > > > >>> in > > > > >>>> my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life > > > > >>>> through > > > my > > > > >>>> teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas > > > > >>>> drawn > > > from > > > > >>>> psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and > > > activity-centered > > > > >>>> research practices. But here I am. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my > > > > >>> understanding. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the > > > > >>>> description > > > of > > > > >>> the > > > > >>>> flow from imagination to representation, but glad to > > > > >>>> encounter a > > > > dozen! > > > > >>>> Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the > > > > abstractions > > > > >>> can > > > > >>>> be seen, seem hard to come by. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by > > > > >>>> identifying different threads of the topic they constitute > > > > >>>> was > > > offered > > > > >>> with > > > > >>>> that goal in mind. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is > > > > >>>> about > > > it. > > > > I > > > > >>>> learned that from the Russians who write about imagination. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6? > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> etc? > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> To the extent that these different traditions lead people to > > > > >>>> the > > > same > > > > >>> kinds > > > > >>>> of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the > > > > >>>> conclusions > > > are > > > > >>>> tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, > > > sometimes, > > > > in > > > > >>>> good teaching. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> mike > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> mike > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall > wrote: > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> Larry and Mike > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to > > > > >>>>> both > > > of > > > > >>> you > > > > >>>>> in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a > > > > >>> conversation > > > > >>>>> that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably > > > > >>>>> good, > > > but > > > > >>> it is > > > > >>>>> a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little > > > > >>>>> larger > > > > than > > > > >>> what > > > > >>>>> I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that > > > > >>>>> I need > > > > to, > > > > >>> one > > > > >>>>> might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that > > > > >>>>> bear on > > > > the, > > > > >>>>> perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will > > > > >>>>> reread > > > it). I > > > > >>>>> found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a > > > > >>>>> large > > > > grain > > > > >>> size > > > > >>>>> (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look > > > > >>>>> at > > > > >>> things). A > > > > >>>>> few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms > > > > >>>>> and are > > > > >>> offered > > > > >>>>> in the hope that they might be useful. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> 1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; > > > > >>>>> however, looking at how words are used (a philosophy of > > > > >>>>> language, so to > > > speak) > > > > >>> often > > > > >>>>> does a better job of opening things up. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> 2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did > > > > >>>>> not make > > > > >>> your > > > > >>>>> list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to > > > > >>>>> mention Avicenna. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> 3. I have the impression you are using the term ?stable? > > > > >>>>> as a somewhat replacement of Vygotsky?s concrete; I like > > > > >>>>> that as > > > > ?concrete' > > > > >>>>> seems to have very different meanings for different people. > > > > >>>>> I will > > > > try > > > > >>> to > > > > >>>>> use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in > > > > >>>>> my > > > > replies > > > > >>>>> tooters. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> 4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of > > > > >>>>> Hellen > > > > >>> Keller. I > > > > >>>>> wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a > > > > >>>>> thin gap > > > > is > > > > >>>>> because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a > > > suspicion > > > > >>> that > > > > >>>>> he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I > > > > >>>>> am > > > fairly > > > > >>> sure > > > > >>>>> Keller was. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> 5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than > > > > >>>>> too thin although the metaphor of filling still seems > > > > >>>>> reasonable > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> 6. In a way you don?t seem to quite come out and say it > > > > >>>>> (or I missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is > > > > >>>>> not > > > necessarily > > > > >>>>> creative and I would add that it is quite everyday. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as > > > > >>>>> they > > > occur. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Ed > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 4:41 PM, Lplarry > > > wrote: > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and > > > > >>>>>> re(present) > > > > our > > > > >>>>> notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a > > > metaphor > > > > >>> not > > > > >>>>> error. > > > > >>>>>> Ed, > > > > >>>>>> To continue with your reflection if image has some relation > > > > >>>>>> to how > > > > >>>>> others use text. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Actually I don?t think image has some relation to how others > > > > >>>>> use > > > > text. > > > > >>> I > > > > >>>>> twas speculating as whether there is some commonality > > > > >>>>> between how > > > > Mike > > > > >>> is > > > > >>>>> using using image and how others are using text. I said this > > > because > > > > I > > > > >>>>> struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary > > > > >>>>> in > > > > >>> mathematics > > > > >>>>> and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to > > > problems > > > > >>> that > > > > >>>>> presently catch my attention. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In > > > > >>>>>> other > > > > words > > > > >>>>> can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The > > > physical > > > > >>>>> gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of > > > > >>>>> letters > > > > on > > > > >>> the > > > > >>>>> page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or > > > > >>>>> the > > > > visual > > > > >>>>> marks making a circle-like shape. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size > > > > >>>>> is too > > > > >>> large. > > > > >>>>> That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I > > > > >>>>> now > > > > >>> realize > > > > >>>>> was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to > > > > >>>>> view imagination. I don?t mean your perspective is lacking; > > > > >>>>> it just > > > seems > > > > to > > > > >>>>> result in different questions than I would/do ask. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> These different physical forms are not the foundational > > > > >>>>>> bedrock, > > > > they > > > > >>>>> are the material. > > > > >>>>>> If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on > > > > >>>>>> parchment but > > > as > > > > >>>>> having a deeper process, > > > > >>>>>> Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual > > > > perceptions > > > > >>>>> but rather having a deeper process. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> My initial reaction is ?Why are you saying this?" If I ever > > > > >>>>> thought > > > > the > > > > >>>>> contrary, I can?t remember. This is just common sense. The > > > > interesting > > > > >>>>> thing about what you say is that you seem to using ?imagine? > > > > >>>>> in a > > > > non > > > > >>>>> visual fashion which was largely my initial point. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> All the senses share in this process and engage with > > > > >>>>>> physically > > > > >>>>> experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is > > > > >>>>> that > > > > >>> unifying > > > > >>>>> process that includes all the senses but is not itself the > > senses. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> I would say that all senses can participate in this process. > > > > >>>>> Also physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too > > > > >>>>> strong > > > although > > > > >>>>> physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints > > > > >>>>> of a > > > sort > > > > on > > > > >>>>> imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I > > > > >>>>> don?t physically experience a platonic circle. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the > > > collated > > > > >>>>> pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a > > > > dialogue, > > > > >>> to > > > > >>>>> imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly > > > > >>>>> have a unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the > > > > >>>>> vital > > > animating > > > > >>>>> process lived (into). > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Here is where my example wasn?t helpful. I did not mean one > > ?sees' > > > > the > > > > >>>>> marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks > > > > >>>>> is too > > > > >>> large a > > > > >>>>> grain size) on the board as having certain properties > > > > >>>>> consistent > > > with > > > > >>> those > > > > >>>>> of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a > > > > >>>>> sort > > > of > > > > >>> sense. > > > > >>>>> The teacher?s language seems to prove the imaging and the > > > > >>>>> moving to > > > > new > > > > >>>>> stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people > > > > >>>>> don?t > > > > make > > > > >>> the > > > > >>>>> leaps. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy > > > > >>>>>> of the > > > > >>> visual > > > > >>>>> sense. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none > > > > >>>>> of the > > > > >>> sensory > > > > >>>>> modes > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> The relation of this image process to the language process > > > > >>>>>> is also > > > > >>>>> multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> This doesn?t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, > > > > >>>>> doesn?t > > > > >>> follow > > > > >>>>> for me. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable > > > > >>>>> perspective. It > > > is > > > > >>> just > > > > >>>>> one that, to a degree, I either don?t share or seems to be > > > > >>>>> the > > > wrong > > > > >>> grain > > > > >>>>> size. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > > > > >>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > > > > >>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM > > > > >>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Mike > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> My wondering has more to do with your focus on the > > > > >>>>>> visual > > > and > > > > >>> my > > > > >>>>> examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be > > > > >>>>> about the > > > > >>> visual. > > > > >>>>> However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well > > > > >>>>> drawn) > > > > is > > > > >>> a > > > > >>>>> ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at > > > > >>>>> least, > > > it > > > > >>> never > > > > >>>>> was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. > > > > >>>>> In > > > > fact, > > > > >>>>> assuming that it is static seems strange although I gues > > > [The entire original message is not included.] > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Dec 15 13:25:39 2015 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 21:25:39 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> <05AB59E5-018D-4FF2-92BE-06619D1F95B8@umich.edu> <1BD78C04-64EA-4C74-BDDB-4723D6312EAF@umich.edu> <005f01d13761$bd7b8800$38729800$@att.net> <567063e5.d748620a.63c0f.7371@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Here's the English text to the Dostoevsky's quote with regard to infinity (from http://www.gutenberg.org/files/8117/8117-h/8117-h.htm): "And on condition, too," Shatov put in wrathfully, "that you take a different tone. Do you hear? I demand when I ought to entreat. Do you understand what it means to demand when one ought to entreat?" "I understand that in that way you lift yourself above all ordinary considerations for the sake of loftier aims," said Nikolay Vsyevolodovitch with a faint smile. "I see with regret, too, that you're feverish." "I beg you to treat me with respect, I insist on it!" shouted Shatov, "not my personality?I don't care a hang for that, but something else, just for this once. While I am talking... we are two beings, and have come together in infinity... for the last time in the world. Drop your tone, and speak like a human being! Speak, if only for once in your life with the voice of a man. I say it not for my sake but for yours. Do you understand that you ought to forgive me that blow in the face if only because I gave you the opportunity of realising your immense power. ... Again you smile your disdainful, worldly smile! Oh, when will you understand me! Have done with being a snob! Understand that I insist on that. I insist on it, else I won't speak, I'm not going to for anything!" Best, Huw On 15 December 2015 at 19:27, mike cole wrote: > Just to go back to the text a little. It is true that she opens with > feelings of love for the human voice in the middle of horrible > circumstances. "I love the lone human voice. It is my greatest love and > passion." > > But she ends a creature of Belorussia, Ukraine, and Russian culture.... > > "But in this day and age it is difficult to talk of about love." > > mike > > On Tue, Dec 15, 2015 at 11:02 AM, Lplarry wrote: > > > Peg, > > If imagination is understood as what happens as we compose and stabilize > > our connections then I want to follow your lead and lean into (listen to) > > your connections. > > You liked first: > > Svetlana having an image of polyphonic voices. She stabilizes this image > > and enters its (space) in order to write. > > She finds/composes/conducts/performs this imaginal polyphony. > > We can impose a category such as literature or the ordinary/mundane but > > whatever category we imagine there is a quality and a character that > moves > > her listeners/readers. > > This points to the imaginal manifesting within the ordinary/mundane which > > is how I understand Dewey's article (understanding experience). > > I believe your connections exploring the imaginal do move towards > > stabilizing our understanding the imaginal. > > This brings us to your second understanding. While we are composing > > connections AND moving towards stabilizing our images (through acts such > as > > writing), work such as Svetlana'sindicates the reality of an "endless" > > ground. > > Can we label this endless ground a type of playground? Yes, a very > > complicated (place) and sometimes we struggle to notice the play quality > > within this imaginal endless ground. > > However, I believe it is valid to name this place of endless ground a > > complex playground. > > An endless cultural historical playground that brings into view "event" > > figures within the endless ground. > > > > The notion of semiology is that signs designate objects in the world > > existing outside the sign systems. (my understanding). > > The notion of hermeneutics is that signs (indicating objects) and > > interpretations as endless ground all the way down are different > approaches. > > Some say semiology and hermeneutics as approaches image each other and > one > > cannot exist without the other. > > I am listening to the sound of "endless" ground manifesting imaginally as > > supporting this connection of semiological and hermeneutical approaches > > meeting in this imaginal endless ground? > > > > I also understand my reply as an "event" of transitory stabilization > > within this complex playground. > > This is taking place within the ordinary/mundane as an extraordinary > place. > > My listening may be a misunderstanding but this implies in the future we > > may possibly arrive at shared understanding. > > Larry > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: "Peg Griffin" > > Sent: ?2015-?12-?15 9:57 AM > > To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > I like two things most about the lecture: > > 1. Svetlana Alexievich imagines the polyphony of voices as she writes/in > > order to write. Some folks claim her work is not literature (creative) > and > > is merely journalism. Indeed she does cherish her tape-recorders! But > she > > finds/composes/conducts/performs the polyphony and I imagine that is all > in > > some leaky category near the "mundane" arena (journalistic writing). > > 2. Her collection of work suggests "endless" ground if sometimes a bit > > complicated to be called a playground. The lecture illustrates close to > an > > endless cultural-historical ground punctuated in socio-historical event > > figures. To me it seems to be a sort of phenomenologal account of her > > imagining process. > > > > I'd love to get a hint of the two forms of imagination in Paley's > > practices you are thinking of, Mike. Is it, for example, in her paired > > practices for story-telling and story-acting focused on in the Ball State > > video? > > > > Back to reading and grading (some happy and some not)... > > Peg > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike > > cole > > Sent: Sunday, December 13, 2015 7:59 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > Thank you for this, Peg. The little I have read of her work, including > the > > excerpt in the NY Review of Books of her new book, makes her sound > amazing. > > > > I am fascinated by the processes through which imagination builds into > > fantasy which seems an endless playground. At the same time, I am more > and > > more impressed with the centrality of imagination in the most mundane of > > our interactions in the world. It seems to sit at the heart of the > process > > of various psycho-cultural-social contructivisms. > > > > Vivian Paley comes to mind very often as I read the interesting places > > that participants are carrying the discussion. She writes about practices > > where the two forms of imagination, intersect. Always interesting. > > > > mike > > > > I know that somewhere in the thread there > > > > On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 4:03 PM, Peg Griffin > wrote: > > > > > This 2015 Nobel Laureate for Literature lecture strikes me as > > > pertinent to this imagination discussion. She is an amazing woman and > > > here addresses issues familiar maybe tanatalizing for this list, I > think. > > > > > > http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2015/alexi > > > evich-lecture_en.html It begins this way: " I do not stand alone at > > > this podium ... There are voices around me, hundreds of voices. They > > > have always been with me, since childhood. I grew up in the > > > countryside...} Peg > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw > > > Lloyd > > > Sent: Wednesday, December 09, 2015 12:12 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > > Perhaps the challenge will get easier if you keep piling up the > > > references, Mike. :) > > > > > > So, I have persevered with reading, skipping and scanning Lovejoy's > > > "The Great Chain of Being" and have come away with a few pages of > > > notes, and some edification (22nd printing, 2001, Harvard University > > Press). > > > > > > With respect to the valorisation of imagination, Lovejoy identifies > > > Schleirmacher as an early proponent of the merits of the development > > > of imagination (although one could say that this is implicit in the > > > platonic ideas which concern the book as a whole). (p. 309) > > > > > > With respect to the origins of the idea of a cell (urbild), he > > > identifies Robinet as a rather eclectic proponent of the idea (p. > > > 279), which again is derived from the history of the ideas of absolute > > > perfection (of god), the principle of plentitude and the principle of > > > continuity. He also attributes to Robinet that "fundamental reality > > > in nature for him is not matter but l'avtivite". (p. 281) > > > > > > On a more down to regular strain on the imagination, regarding my > > > assertion early of cognate terms (imagination, orientation etc), my > > > reckoning is that orientation determines the scope and nature of > > > interpretation. > > > > > > Not so long ago, I noticed some apparently new developments in our > > > eldest child's formulations (4y6). We were talking about how to make > > > papier mache objects, which took me back to making a papier mache > > > 'pig' with the help of a balloon. In response to this he volunteered > > > that the balloon would have to be burst with a pencil once it had been > > > covered. I think it was the day before this that he pronounced that > > > the ugly duckling's egg must have been laid by a swan. It seemed to > > > me that that these articulations indicated that he was using a > > > relatively new idea which was helping him to imaginatively understand > > > these situations (an idea of process). I am fairly sure that these > > solutions were not supplied beforehand. > > > > > > Best, > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > On 9 December 2015 at 03:59, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > The Casey site looks amazing and of course very relevant, Ed. Thanks. > > > > > > > > When I first read Sartre many years ago, I was totally unprepared to > > > > take in what he was saying. I had not way to "digest it." > > > > > > > > Reading into the electronic copy I sent around yesterday, I could > > > > see that it is inappropriate for me to refer to what I do as > > > > phenomenology. It is just a kind of intuitive reflection on my > > > > experiences and thoughts. No Husserl, no Sartre. Just unschooled > > > > introspection that I seek to verify through acquiring evidence that > > > > there is more than total idiosyncrasy to what my musings. > > > > > > > > I feel as if I need to download all the sources of inquiry we have > > > > unearthed in the last few days and retreat to a place with no > > > > communication with the world for a few weeks just to take them, in. > !! > > > > mike > > > > > > > > On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:39 AM, Ed Wall wrote: > > > > > > > > > Mike > > > > > > > > > > There are, perhaps, some shortcomings in portions of Sartre > > > > > work > > > > on > > > > > imagination to which Casey supplies some useful modifications. > > > > > Also it > > > > is a > > > > > bit long. Take a look at Edward Casey?s web site: < > > > > > http://edwardscasey.com/?page_id=13>. Many of those articles on > > > > > imagination seem downloadable and besides possibly whetting one?s > > > > appetite > > > > > for Sartre might be interesting in themselves. Perhaps you could > > > > > pick one that most interests you and provides, from your vantage, > > > > > a useful common, and modestly short reading source. I would, of > > > > > course, recommend Casey?s book, but isn?t freely available. > > > > > > > > > > Ed > > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 7, 2015, at 9:44 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > So maybe Sartre would be a useful common reading source, Ed. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://blog.exre.org/wp-content/uploads/Sartre_The_Imaginary__A_Phen > > > > om enological_Psychology_of_the_Imagination.pdf > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 7:42 PM, mike cole > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > >> It make sense for the questions to differ, Ed, or at least the > > > > > >> way > > > > they > > > > > >> are posed. Finding a common foundation will take a lot of > > > > communication > > > > > >> (which will require a lot of imagination!). > > > > > >> mike > > > > > >> > > > > > >> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 6:04 PM, Ed Wall > wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >>> Mike > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> I assume you have read Sartre on imagination; i.e. The > > > > Imagination. > > > > > >>> This gives what he considers a phenomenological take on > > > imagination. > > > > > >>> However, I would consider a much more revealing take to be > > > > > >>> that of > > > > > Edward > > > > > >>> Casey in Imaging (I am hoping that book you referenced will > > > > supplement > > > > > that > > > > > >>> of Casey). The connection to Kant, by the way, critically > > > > > >>> preceded > > > > > that of > > > > > >>> Mzerleau-Ponty and Sartre and that is why I was surprised to > > > > > >>> not see > > > > > him > > > > > >>> mentioned. > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> I agree that we all seem to be coming out in, more or > > > > > >>> less, the same place. Only the questions seem to differ. > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> Ed > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>>> On Dec 7, 2015, at 7:42 PM, mike cole > wrote: > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity > > > > > >>>> given that > > > > we > > > > > >>>> started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I > > > > > indicated > > > > > >>> in > > > > > >>>> my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life > > > > > >>>> through > > > > my > > > > > >>>> teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas > > > > > >>>> drawn > > > > from > > > > > >>>> psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and > > > > activity-centered > > > > > >>>> research practices. But here I am. > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my > > > > > >>> understanding. > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the > > > > > >>>> description > > > > of > > > > > >>> the > > > > > >>>> flow from imagination to representation, but glad to > > > > > >>>> encounter a > > > > > dozen! > > > > > >>>> Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the > > > > > abstractions > > > > > >>> can > > > > > >>>> be seen, seem hard to come by. > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by > > > > > >>>> identifying different threads of the topic they constitute > > > > > >>>> was > > > > offered > > > > > >>> with > > > > > >>>> that goal in mind. > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is > > > > > >>>> about > > > > it. > > > > > I > > > > > >>>> learned that from the Russians who write about imagination. > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6? > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> etc? > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> To the extent that these different traditions lead people to > > > > > >>>> the > > > > same > > > > > >>> kinds > > > > > >>>> of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the > > > > > >>>> conclusions > > > > are > > > > > >>>> tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, > > > > sometimes, > > > > > in > > > > > >>>> good teaching. > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> mike > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> mike > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall > > wrote: > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> Larry and Mike > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to > > > > > >>>>> both > > > > of > > > > > >>> you > > > > > >>>>> in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a > > > > > >>> conversation > > > > > >>>>> that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably > > > > > >>>>> good, > > > > but > > > > > >>> it is > > > > > >>>>> a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little > > > > > >>>>> larger > > > > > than > > > > > >>> what > > > > > >>>>> I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that > > > > > >>>>> I need > > > > > to, > > > > > >>> one > > > > > >>>>> might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that > > > > > >>>>> bear on > > > > > the, > > > > > >>>>> perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will > > > > > >>>>> reread > > > > it). I > > > > > >>>>> found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a > > > > > >>>>> large > > > > > grain > > > > > >>> size > > > > > >>>>> (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look > > > > > >>>>> at > > > > > >>> things). A > > > > > >>>>> few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms > > > > > >>>>> and are > > > > > >>> offered > > > > > >>>>> in the hope that they might be useful. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> 1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; > > > > > >>>>> however, looking at how words are used (a philosophy of > > > > > >>>>> language, so to > > > > speak) > > > > > >>> often > > > > > >>>>> does a better job of opening things up. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> 2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did > > > > > >>>>> not make > > > > > >>> your > > > > > >>>>> list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to > > > > > >>>>> mention Avicenna. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> 3. I have the impression you are using the term ?stable? > > > > > >>>>> as a somewhat replacement of Vygotsky?s concrete; I like > > > > > >>>>> that as > > > > > ?concrete' > > > > > >>>>> seems to have very different meanings for different people. > > > > > >>>>> I will > > > > > try > > > > > >>> to > > > > > >>>>> use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in > > > > > >>>>> my > > > > > replies > > > > > >>>>> tooters. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> 4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of > > > > > >>>>> Hellen > > > > > >>> Keller. I > > > > > >>>>> wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a > > > > > >>>>> thin gap > > > > > is > > > > > >>>>> because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a > > > > suspicion > > > > > >>> that > > > > > >>>>> he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I > > > > > >>>>> am > > > > fairly > > > > > >>> sure > > > > > >>>>> Keller was. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> 5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than > > > > > >>>>> too thin although the metaphor of filling still seems > > > > > >>>>> reasonable > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> 6. In a way you don?t seem to quite come out and say it > > > > > >>>>> (or I missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is > > > > > >>>>> not > > > > necessarily > > > > > >>>>> creative and I would add that it is quite everyday. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as > > > > > >>>>> they > > > > occur. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> Ed > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 4:41 PM, Lplarry > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and > > > > > >>>>>> re(present) > > > > > our > > > > > >>>>> notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a > > > > metaphor > > > > > >>> not > > > > > >>>>> error. > > > > > >>>>>> Ed, > > > > > >>>>>> To continue with your reflection if image has some relation > > > > > >>>>>> to how > > > > > >>>>> others use text. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> Actually I don?t think image has some relation to how others > > > > > >>>>> use > > > > > text. > > > > > >>> I > > > > > >>>>> twas speculating as whether there is some commonality > > > > > >>>>> between how > > > > > Mike > > > > > >>> is > > > > > >>>>> using using image and how others are using text. I said this > > > > because > > > > > I > > > > > >>>>> struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary > > > > > >>>>> in > > > > > >>> mathematics > > > > > >>>>> and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to > > > > problems > > > > > >>> that > > > > > >>>>> presently catch my attention. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In > > > > > >>>>>> other > > > > > words > > > > > >>>>> can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The > > > > physical > > > > > >>>>> gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of > > > > > >>>>> letters > > > > > on > > > > > >>> the > > > > > >>>>> page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or > > > > > >>>>> the > > > > > visual > > > > > >>>>> marks making a circle-like shape. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size > > > > > >>>>> is too > > > > > >>> large. > > > > > >>>>> That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I > > > > > >>>>> now > > > > > >>> realize > > > > > >>>>> was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to > > > > > >>>>> view imagination. I don?t mean your perspective is lacking; > > > > > >>>>> it just > > > > seems > > > > > to > > > > > >>>>> result in different questions than I would/do ask. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> These different physical forms are not the foundational > > > > > >>>>>> bedrock, > > > > > they > > > > > >>>>> are the material. > > > > > >>>>>> If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on > > > > > >>>>>> parchment but > > > > as > > > > > >>>>> having a deeper process, > > > > > >>>>>> Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual > > > > > perceptions > > > > > >>>>> but rather having a deeper process. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> My initial reaction is ?Why are you saying this?" If I ever > > > > > >>>>> thought > > > > > the > > > > > >>>>> contrary, I can?t remember. This is just common sense. The > > > > > interesting > > > > > >>>>> thing about what you say is that you seem to using ?imagine? > > > > > >>>>> in a > > > > > non > > > > > >>>>> visual fashion which was largely my initial point. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> All the senses share in this process and engage with > > > > > >>>>>> physically > > > > > >>>>> experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is > > > > > >>>>> that > > > > > >>> unifying > > > > > >>>>> process that includes all the senses but is not itself the > > > senses. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> I would say that all senses can participate in this process. > > > > > >>>>> Also physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too > > > > > >>>>> strong > > > > although > > > > > >>>>> physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints > > > > > >>>>> of a > > > > sort > > > > > on > > > > > >>>>> imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I > > > > > >>>>> don?t physically experience a platonic circle. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the > > > > collated > > > > > >>>>> pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a > > > > > dialogue, > > > > > >>> to > > > > > >>>>> imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly > > > > > >>>>> have a unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the > > > > > >>>>> vital > > > > animating > > > > > >>>>> process lived (into). > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> Here is where my example wasn?t helpful. I did not mean one > > > ?sees' > > > > > the > > > > > >>>>> marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks > > > > > >>>>> is too > > > > > >>> large a > > > > > >>>>> grain size) on the board as having certain properties > > > > > >>>>> consistent > > > > with > > > > > >>> those > > > > > >>>>> of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a > > > > > >>>>> sort > > > > of > > > > > >>> sense. > > > > > >>>>> The teacher?s language seems to prove the imaging and the > > > > > >>>>> moving to > > > > > new > > > > > >>>>> stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people > > > > > >>>>> don?t > > > > > make > > > > > >>> the > > > > > >>>>> leaps. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy > > > > > >>>>>> of the > > > > > >>> visual > > > > > >>>>> sense. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none > > > > > >>>>> of the > > > > > >>> sensory > > > > > >>>>> modes > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> The relation of this image process to the language process > > > > > >>>>>> is also > > > > > >>>>> multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> This doesn?t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, > > > > > >>>>> doesn?t > > > > > >>> follow > > > > > >>>>> for me. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable > > > > > >>>>> perspective. It > > > > is > > > > > >>> just > > > > > >>>>> one that, to a degree, I either don?t share or seems to be > > > > > >>>>> the > > > > wrong > > > > > >>> grain > > > > > >>>>> size. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > > > > > >>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" > > > > > >>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM > > > > > >>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Mike > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> My wondering has more to do with your focus on the > > > > > >>>>>> visual > > > > and > > > > > >>> my > > > > > >>>>> examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be > > > > > >>>>> about the > > > > > >>> visual. > > > > > >>>>> However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well > > > > > >>>>> drawn) > > > > > is > > > > > >>> a > > > > > >>>>> ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at > > > > > >>>>> least, > > > > it > > > > > >>> never > > > > > >>>>> was for me. I have no problems with an image being a process. > > > > > >>>>> In > > > > > fact, > > > > > >>>>> assuming that it is static seems strange although I gues > > > > > > [The entire original message is not included.] > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Dec 15 16:04:14 2015 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2015 00:04:14 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <6AFA675C-6B2F-4C1A-8629-5435AFA2272E@umich.edu> <56620e01.ca09620a.9562a.ffffd8ea@mx.google.com> <4BD5DD15-EDD2-4767-A427-35E515411BA9@umich.edu> <56646571.a5de420a.224f.2df9@mx.google.com> <5664b99a.1712620a.e92d.47fc@mx.google.com> <4F831442-F211-4C53-90E9-22BBA38D6CF6@umich.edu> <05AB59E5-018D-4FF2-92BE-06619D1F95B8@umich.edu> <1BD78C04-64EA-4C74-BDDB-4723D6312EAF@umich.edu> <005f01d13761$bd7b8800$38729800$@att.net> <567063e5.d748620a.63c0f.7371@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Taking this one step further to try to identify where imagination is taking place, it seems to me that it occurs in relation to particular goals, or questions. E.g. "How do I, in my identification with the Russian spirit respond to this catastrophe? What do these other Russians do, how does the human spirit and the romantic, Russian socialist spirit respond? I respond in a way that describes and relates what they account for and the spirited responses they describe." Note that I am excluding the cultural symbolic orientation itself from the imagination as an active process, treating it as a created and constructed orientation that has an 'automatic' shaping of imaginative contents in relation to goals. An interesting point for me here is the notion that an orientation could be considered the substance of culture, which would be one means of distinguishing between social and cultural, implying that some basic needs could be considered as part of the remit of culture. Do you have any references or papers with respect to your mentioning Paley, Mike? Best, Huw On 15 December 2015 at 21:25, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Here's the English text to the Dostoevsky's quote with regard to infinity > (from http://www.gutenberg.org/files/8117/8117-h/8117-h.htm): > > "And on condition, too," Shatov put in wrathfully, "that you take a > different tone. Do you hear? I demand when I ought to entreat. Do you > understand what it means to demand when one ought to entreat?" > > "I understand that in that way you lift yourself above all ordinary > considerations for the sake of loftier aims," said Nikolay Vsyevolodovitch > with a faint smile. "I see with regret, too, that you're feverish." > > "I beg you to treat me with respect, I insist on it!" shouted Shatov, "not > my personality?I don't care a hang for that, but something else, just for > this once. While I am talking... we are two beings, and have come together > in infinity... for the last time in the world. Drop your tone, and speak > like a human being! Speak, if only for once in your life with the voice of > a man. I say it not for my sake but for yours. Do you understand that you > ought to forgive me that blow in the face if only because I gave you the > opportunity of realising your immense power. ... Again you smile your > disdainful, worldly smile! Oh, when will you understand me! Have done with > being a snob! Understand that I insist on that. I insist on it, else I > won't speak, I'm not going to for anything!" > > Best, > Huw > > > On 15 December 2015 at 19:27, mike cole wrote: > >> Just to go back to the text a little. It is true that she opens with >> feelings of love for the human voice in the middle of horrible >> circumstances. "I love the lone human voice. It is my greatest love and >> passion." >> >> But she ends a creature of Belorussia, Ukraine, and Russian culture.... >> >> "But in this day and age it is difficult to talk of about love." >> >> mike >> >> On Tue, Dec 15, 2015 at 11:02 AM, Lplarry wrote: >> >> > Peg, >> > If imagination is understood as what happens as we compose and >> stabilize >> > our connections then I want to follow your lead and lean into (listen >> to) >> > your connections. >> > You liked first: >> > Svetlana having an image of polyphonic voices. She stabilizes this image >> > and enters its (space) in order to write. >> > She finds/composes/conducts/performs this imaginal polyphony. >> > We can impose a category such as literature or the ordinary/mundane but >> > whatever category we imagine there is a quality and a character that >> moves >> > her listeners/readers. >> > This points to the imaginal manifesting within the ordinary/mundane >> which >> > is how I understand Dewey's article (understanding experience). >> > I believe your connections exploring the imaginal do move towards >> > stabilizing our understanding the imaginal. >> > This brings us to your second understanding. While we are composing >> > connections AND moving towards stabilizing our images (through acts >> such as >> > writing), work such as Svetlana'sindicates the reality of an "endless" >> > ground. >> > Can we label this endless ground a type of playground? Yes, a very >> > complicated (place) and sometimes we struggle to notice the play quality >> > within this imaginal endless ground. >> > However, I believe it is valid to name this place of endless ground a >> > complex playground. >> > An endless cultural historical playground that brings into view "event" >> > figures within the endless ground. >> > >> > The notion of semiology is that signs designate objects in the world >> > existing outside the sign systems. (my understanding). >> > The notion of hermeneutics is that signs (indicating objects) and >> > interpretations as endless ground all the way down are different >> approaches. >> > Some say semiology and hermeneutics as approaches image each other and >> one >> > cannot exist without the other. >> > I am listening to the sound of "endless" ground manifesting imaginally >> as >> > supporting this connection of semiological and hermeneutical approaches >> > meeting in this imaginal endless ground? >> > >> > I also understand my reply as an "event" of transitory stabilization >> > within this complex playground. >> > This is taking place within the ordinary/mundane as an extraordinary >> place. >> > My listening may be a misunderstanding but this implies in the future we >> > may possibly arrive at shared understanding. >> > Larry >> > >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: "Peg Griffin" >> > Sent: ?2015-?12-?15 9:57 AM >> > To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >> > >> > I like two things most about the lecture: >> > 1. Svetlana Alexievich imagines the polyphony of voices as she writes/in >> > order to write. Some folks claim her work is not literature (creative) >> and >> > is merely journalism. Indeed she does cherish her tape-recorders! But >> she >> > finds/composes/conducts/performs the polyphony and I imagine that is >> all in >> > some leaky category near the "mundane" arena (journalistic writing). >> > 2. Her collection of work suggests "endless" ground if sometimes a bit >> > complicated to be called a playground. The lecture illustrates close >> to an >> > endless cultural-historical ground punctuated in socio-historical event >> > figures. To me it seems to be a sort of phenomenologal account of her >> > imagining process. >> > >> > I'd love to get a hint of the two forms of imagination in Paley's >> > practices you are thinking of, Mike. Is it, for example, in her paired >> > practices for story-telling and story-acting focused on in the Ball >> State >> > video? >> > >> > Back to reading and grading (some happy and some not)... >> > Peg >> > >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> > xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike >> > cole >> > Sent: Sunday, December 13, 2015 7:59 PM >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >> > >> > Thank you for this, Peg. The little I have read of her work, including >> the >> > excerpt in the NY Review of Books of her new book, makes her sound >> amazing. >> > >> > I am fascinated by the processes through which imagination builds into >> > fantasy which seems an endless playground. At the same time, I am more >> and >> > more impressed with the centrality of imagination in the most mundane of >> > our interactions in the world. It seems to sit at the heart of the >> process >> > of various psycho-cultural-social contructivisms. >> > >> > Vivian Paley comes to mind very often as I read the interesting places >> > that participants are carrying the discussion. She writes about >> practices >> > where the two forms of imagination, intersect. Always interesting. >> > >> > mike >> > >> > I know that somewhere in the thread there >> > >> > On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 4:03 PM, Peg Griffin >> wrote: >> > >> > > This 2015 Nobel Laureate for Literature lecture strikes me as >> > > pertinent to this imagination discussion. She is an amazing woman and >> > > here addresses issues familiar maybe tanatalizing for this list, I >> think. >> > > >> > > >> http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2015/alexi >> > > evich-lecture_en.html It begins this way: " I do not stand alone at >> > > this podium ... There are voices around me, hundreds of voices. They >> > > have always been with me, since childhood. I grew up in the >> > > countryside...} Peg >> > > >> > > -----Original Message----- >> > > From: xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> > > xmca-l-bounces+peg.griffin=att.net@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw >> > > Lloyd >> > > Sent: Wednesday, December 09, 2015 12:12 AM >> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >> > > >> > > Perhaps the challenge will get easier if you keep piling up the >> > > references, Mike. :) >> > > >> > > So, I have persevered with reading, skipping and scanning Lovejoy's >> > > "The Great Chain of Being" and have come away with a few pages of >> > > notes, and some edification (22nd printing, 2001, Harvard University >> > Press). >> > > >> > > With respect to the valorisation of imagination, Lovejoy identifies >> > > Schleirmacher as an early proponent of the merits of the development >> > > of imagination (although one could say that this is implicit in the >> > > platonic ideas which concern the book as a whole). (p. 309) >> > > >> > > With respect to the origins of the idea of a cell (urbild), he >> > > identifies Robinet as a rather eclectic proponent of the idea (p. >> > > 279), which again is derived from the history of the ideas of absolute >> > > perfection (of god), the principle of plentitude and the principle of >> > > continuity. He also attributes to Robinet that "fundamental reality >> > > in nature for him is not matter but l'avtivite". (p. 281) >> > > >> > > On a more down to regular strain on the imagination, regarding my >> > > assertion early of cognate terms (imagination, orientation etc), my >> > > reckoning is that orientation determines the scope and nature of >> > > interpretation. >> > > >> > > Not so long ago, I noticed some apparently new developments in our >> > > eldest child's formulations (4y6). We were talking about how to make >> > > papier mache objects, which took me back to making a papier mache >> > > 'pig' with the help of a balloon. In response to this he volunteered >> > > that the balloon would have to be burst with a pencil once it had been >> > > covered. I think it was the day before this that he pronounced that >> > > the ugly duckling's egg must have been laid by a swan. It seemed to >> > > me that that these articulations indicated that he was using a >> > > relatively new idea which was helping him to imaginatively understand >> > > these situations (an idea of process). I am fairly sure that these >> > solutions were not supplied beforehand. >> > > >> > > Best, >> > > Huw >> > > >> > > >> > > On 9 December 2015 at 03:59, mike cole wrote: >> > > >> > > > The Casey site looks amazing and of course very relevant, Ed. >> Thanks. >> > > > >> > > > When I first read Sartre many years ago, I was totally unprepared to >> > > > take in what he was saying. I had not way to "digest it." >> > > > >> > > > Reading into the electronic copy I sent around yesterday, I could >> > > > see that it is inappropriate for me to refer to what I do as >> > > > phenomenology. It is just a kind of intuitive reflection on my >> > > > experiences and thoughts. No Husserl, no Sartre. Just unschooled >> > > > introspection that I seek to verify through acquiring evidence that >> > > > there is more than total idiosyncrasy to what my musings. >> > > > >> > > > I feel as if I need to download all the sources of inquiry we have >> > > > unearthed in the last few days and retreat to a place with no >> > > > communication with the world for a few weeks just to take them, in. >> !! >> > > > mike >> > > > >> > > > On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 9:39 AM, Ed Wall wrote: >> > > > >> > > > > Mike >> > > > > >> > > > > There are, perhaps, some shortcomings in portions of Sartre >> > > > > work >> > > > on >> > > > > imagination to which Casey supplies some useful modifications. >> > > > > Also it >> > > > is a >> > > > > bit long. Take a look at Edward Casey?s web site: < >> > > > > http://edwardscasey.com/?page_id=13>. Many of those articles on >> > > > > imagination seem downloadable and besides possibly whetting one?s >> > > > appetite >> > > > > for Sartre might be interesting in themselves. Perhaps you could >> > > > > pick one that most interests you and provides, from your vantage, >> > > > > a useful common, and modestly short reading source. I would, of >> > > > > course, recommend Casey?s book, but isn?t freely available. >> > > > > >> > > > > Ed >> > > > > >> > > > > > On Dec 7, 2015, at 9:44 PM, mike cole wrote: >> > > > > > >> > > > > > So maybe Sartre would be a useful common reading source, Ed. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> http://blog.exre.org/wp-content/uploads/Sartre_The_Imaginary__A_Phen >> > > > om enological_Psychology_of_the_Imagination.pdf >> > > > > > >> > > > > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 7:42 PM, mike cole >> wrote: >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> It make sense for the questions to differ, Ed, or at least the >> > > > > >> way >> > > > they >> > > > > >> are posed. Finding a common foundation will take a lot of >> > > > communication >> > > > > >> (which will require a lot of imagination!). >> > > > > >> mike >> > > > > >> >> > > > > >> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 6:04 PM, Ed Wall >> wrote: >> > > > > >> >> > > > > >>> Mike >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> I assume you have read Sartre on imagination; i.e. The >> > > > Imagination. >> > > > > >>> This gives what he considers a phenomenological take on >> > > imagination. >> > > > > >>> However, I would consider a much more revealing take to be >> > > > > >>> that of >> > > > > Edward >> > > > > >>> Casey in Imaging (I am hoping that book you referenced will >> > > > supplement >> > > > > that >> > > > > >>> of Casey). The connection to Kant, by the way, critically >> > > > > >>> preceded >> > > > > that of >> > > > > >>> Mzerleau-Ponty and Sartre and that is why I was surprised to >> > > > > >>> not see >> > > > > him >> > > > > >>> mentioned. >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> I agree that we all seem to be coming out in, more or >> > > > > >>> less, the same place. Only the questions seem to differ. >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> Ed >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>>> On Dec 7, 2015, at 7:42 PM, mike cole >> wrote: >> > > > > >>>> >> > > > > >>>> Seems to me that we have achieved pretty close proximity >> > > > > >>>> given that >> > > > we >> > > > > >>>> started from such different places. Part of the problem, as I >> > > > > indicated >> > > > > >>> in >> > > > > >>>> my prior note, is that I came to this problem late in life >> > > > > >>>> through >> > > > my >> > > > > >>>> teaching. It took a long time for my research/theory ideas >> > > > > >>>> drawn >> > > > from >> > > > > >>>> psychology and apprenticeships in anthropology and >> > > > activity-centered >> > > > > >>>> research practices. But here I am. >> > > > > >>>> >> > > > > >>>> So, happy to be wrong so long as I can see how it broadens my >> > > > > >>> understanding. >> > > > > >>>> >> > > > > >>>> I am not sure how to be more phenomenological than the >> > > > > >>>> description >> > > > of >> > > > > >>> the >> > > > > >>>> flow from imagination to representation, but glad to >> > > > > >>>> encounter a >> > > > > dozen! >> > > > > >>>> Affect and cognition are so entangled that sites where the >> > > > > abstractions >> > > > > >>> can >> > > > > >>>> be seen, seem hard to come by. >> > > > > >>>> >> > > > > >>>> My proposal to take advantage of the structure offered by >> > > > > >>>> identifying different threads of the topic they constitute >> > > > > >>>> was >> > > > offered >> > > > > >>> with >> > > > > >>>> that goal in mind. >> > > > > >>>> >> > > > > >>>> The connection to Kant I know about, and Ribot, but that is >> > > > > >>>> about >> > > > it. >> > > > > I >> > > > > >>>> learned that from the Russians who write about imagination. >> > > > > >>>> >> > > > > >>>> Seems like there is an Indian tradition, or 6? >> > > > > >>>> >> > > > > >>>> etc? >> > > > > >>>> >> > > > > >>>> To the extent that these different traditions lead people to >> > > > > >>>> the >> > > > same >> > > > > >>> kinds >> > > > > >>>> of conclusions seems interesting. Especially when the >> > > > > >>>> conclusions >> > > > are >> > > > > >>>> tightly bound to daily practice, as they are, for example, >> > > > sometimes, >> > > > > in >> > > > > >>>> good teaching. >> > > > > >>>> >> > > > > >>>> mike >> > > > > >>>> >> > > > > >>>> mike >> > > > > >>>> >> > > > > >>>> On Mon, Dec 7, 2015 at 4:57 PM, Ed Wall >> > wrote: >> > > > > >>>> >> > > > > >>>>> Larry and Mike >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>> Since you seem to agree with one another I will reply to >> > > > > >>>>> both >> > > > of >> > > > > >>> you >> > > > > >>>>> in this email. First I note that I seeme to be involved in a >> > > > > >>> conversation >> > > > > >>>>> that diverges a bit from where I started. This is probably >> > > > > >>>>> good, >> > > > but >> > > > > >>> it is >> > > > > >>>>> a conversation that seems at a grain size that is a little >> > > > > >>>>> larger >> > > > > than >> > > > > >>> what >> > > > > >>>>> I can find immediately useful. That said, I often find that >> > > > > >>>>> I need >> > > > > to, >> > > > > >>> one >> > > > > >>>>> might say, assimilate a bit so as to find resonances that >> > > > > >>>>> bear on >> > > > > the, >> > > > > >>>>> perhaps, pragmatic problem I tend to take up. >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>> Mike, I have read your article (and I am sure I will >> > > > > >>>>> reread >> > > > it). I >> > > > > >>>>> found it interesting although again it seems to occur at a >> > > > > >>>>> large >> > > > > grain >> > > > > >>> size >> > > > > >>>>> (I tend to be a bit more phenomenological in the way I look >> > > > > >>>>> at >> > > > > >>> things). A >> > > > > >>>>> few comments from my perspective; these are not! criticisms >> > > > > >>>>> and are >> > > > > >>> offered >> > > > > >>>>> in the hope that they might be useful. >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>> 1. Dictionary definitions are a good place to start; >> > > > > >>>>> however, looking at how words are used (a philosophy of >> > > > > >>>>> language, so to >> > > > speak) >> > > > > >>> often >> > > > > >>>>> does a better job of opening things up. >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>> 2. I was surprised to find that Kant or Schelling did >> > > > > >>>>> not make >> > > > > >>> your >> > > > > >>>>> list of those influential in thinking about imaging; not to >> > > > > >>>>> mention Avicenna. >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>> 3. I have the impression you are using the term >> ?stable? >> > > > > >>>>> as a somewhat replacement of Vygotsky?s concrete; I like >> > > > > >>>>> that as >> > > > > ?concrete' >> > > > > >>>>> seems to have very different meanings for different people. >> > > > > >>>>> I will >> > > > > try >> > > > > >>> to >> > > > > >>>>> use it (and I may misuse it out of yet misunderstanding) in >> > > > > >>>>> my >> > > > > replies >> > > > > >>>>> tooters. >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>> 4. When I read the blind/deaf section I thought of >> > > > > >>>>> Hellen >> > > > > >>> Keller. I >> > > > > >>>>> wonder if the only reason Suvorov considered such having a >> > > > > >>>>> thin gap >> > > > > is >> > > > > >>>>> because he was too focused on seeing and hearing. I have a >> > > > suspicion >> > > > > >>> that >> > > > > >>>>> he was quite imaginative in the way I think about it and I >> > > > > >>>>> am >> > > > fairly >> > > > > >>> sure >> > > > > >>>>> Keller was. >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>> 5. I tend to think of the gap as too wide rather than >> > > > > >>>>> too thin although the metaphor of filling still seems >> > > > > >>>>> reasonable >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>> 6. In a way you don?t seem to quite come out and say it >> > > > > >>>>> (or I missed you doing so), but I agree that imagination is >> > > > > >>>>> not >> > > > necessarily >> > > > > >>>>> creative and I would add that it is quite everyday. >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>> Larry, I will try to answer your comments or questions as >> > > > > >>>>> they >> > > > occur. >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>> Ed >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>>> On Dec 6, 2015, at 4:41 PM, Lplarry > > >> > > > wrote: >> > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > >>>>>> Mike, I would be willing to re(turn) to re(read) and >> > > > > >>>>>> re(present) >> > > > > our >> > > > > >>>>> notions as we sail under Dewey's arches to the (open see) a >> > > > metaphor >> > > > > >>> not >> > > > > >>>>> error. >> > > > > >>>>>> Ed, >> > > > > >>>>>> To continue with your reflection if image has some relation >> > > > > >>>>>> to how >> > > > > >>>>> others use text. >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>> Actually I don?t think image has some relation to how others >> > > > > >>>>> use >> > > > > text. >> > > > > >>> I >> > > > > >>>>> twas speculating as whether there is some commonality >> > > > > >>>>> between how >> > > > > Mike >> > > > > >>> is >> > > > > >>>>> using using image and how others are using text. I said this >> > > > because >> > > > > I >> > > > > >>>>> struggle against the tendency to make being vision primary >> > > > > >>>>> in >> > > > > >>> mathematics >> > > > > >>>>> and otherwise what Mike has written has little relevance to >> > > > problems >> > > > > >>> that >> > > > > >>>>> presently catch my attention. >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>>> Can we imagine human shared movement (itself) as text? In >> > > > > >>>>>> other >> > > > > words >> > > > > >>>>> can we (read) mutual shared movements as choreography. The >> > > > physical >> > > > > >>>>> gestures as the material having a quality like the shape of >> > > > > >>>>> letters >> > > > > on >> > > > > >>> the >> > > > > >>>>> page, or the acoustic resonance of the voice on the ear, or >> > > > > >>>>> the >> > > > > visual >> > > > > >>>>> marks making a circle-like shape. >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>> I have no great problem with any of this, but the grain size >> > > > > >>>>> is too >> > > > > >>> large. >> > > > > >>>>> That is why I tried to give you a particular example which I >> > > > > >>>>> now >> > > > > >>> realize >> > > > > >>>>> was not necessarily a good one because of how you appear to >> > > > > >>>>> view imagination. I don?t mean your perspective is lacking; >> > > > > >>>>> it just >> > > > seems >> > > > > to >> > > > > >>>>> result in different questions than I would/do ask. >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>>> These different physical forms are not the foundational >> > > > > >>>>>> bedrock, >> > > > > they >> > > > > >>>>> are the material. >> > > > > >>>>>> If we can imagine (texts) as not just scratches on >> > > > > >>>>>> parchment but >> > > > as >> > > > > >>>>> having a deeper process, >> > > > > >>>>>> Is it also possible to imagine (images) as not just visual >> > > > > perceptions >> > > > > >>>>> but rather having a deeper process. >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>> My initial reaction is ?Why are you saying this?" If I ever >> > > > > >>>>> thought >> > > > > the >> > > > > >>>>> contrary, I can?t remember. This is just common sense. The >> > > > > interesting >> > > > > >>>>> thing about what you say is that you seem to using >> ?imagine? >> > > > > >>>>> in a >> > > > > non >> > > > > >>>>> visual fashion which was largely my initial point. >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>>> All the senses share in this process and engage with >> > > > > >>>>>> physically >> > > > > >>>>> experienced phenomena but what is being gestured toward is >> > > > > >>>>> that >> > > > > >>> unifying >> > > > > >>>>> process that includes all the senses but is not itself the >> > > senses. >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>> I would say that all senses can participate in this process. >> > > > > >>>>> Also physically experienced phenomena sounds a little too >> > > > > >>>>> strong >> > > > although >> > > > > >>>>> physically experienced phenomena seem to place constraints >> > > > > >>>>> of a >> > > > sort >> > > > > on >> > > > > >>>>> imaging. There is also, re Mike, the idea of stability as I >> > > > > >>>>> don?t physically experience a platonic circle. >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>>> To imagine the marks on paper as a (circle) to imagine the >> > > > collated >> > > > > >>>>> pages of a book as a (text) to imagine vocal acoustics as a >> > > > > dialogue, >> > > > > >>> to >> > > > > >>>>> imagine mutual shared actions as an (activity) may possibly >> > > > > >>>>> have a unifying basis in the image which is (created) as the >> > > > > >>>>> vital >> > > > animating >> > > > > >>>>> process lived (into). >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>> Here is where my example wasn?t helpful. I did not mean one >> > > ?sees' >> > > > > the >> > > > > >>>>> marks on the paper as a circle. One imagines the oval (marks >> > > > > >>>>> is too >> > > > > >>> large a >> > > > > >>>>> grain size) on the board as having certain properties >> > > > > >>>>> consistent >> > > > with >> > > > > >>> those >> > > > > >>>>> of a platonic circle. This is why marking the center makes a >> > > > > >>>>> sort >> > > > of >> > > > > >>> sense. >> > > > > >>>>> The teacher?s language seems to prove the imaging and the >> > > > > >>>>> moving to >> > > > > new >> > > > > >>>>> stabilities. My experience is that a large number of people >> > > > > >>>>> don?t >> > > > > make >> > > > > >>> the >> > > > > >>>>> leaps. >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>>> This imaging is multimodal and not reduced to the primacy >> > > > > >>>>>> of the >> > > > > >>> visual >> > > > > >>>>> sense. >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>> Imagine may or may not be multimodal. It may reference none >> > > > > >>>>> of the >> > > > > >>> sensory >> > > > > >>>>> modes >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>>> The relation of this image process to the language process >> > > > > >>>>>> is also >> > > > > >>>>> multimodal and I suspect reciprocal. >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>> This doesn?t seem to follow or, given my earlier comments, >> > > > > >>>>> doesn?t >> > > > > >>> follow >> > > > > >>>>> for me. >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>> Larry, all of you said here is not an unreasonable >> > > > > >>>>> perspective. It >> > > > is >> > > > > >>> just >> > > > > >>>>> one that, to a degree, I either don?t share or seems to be >> > > > > >>>>> the >> > > > wrong >> > > > > >>> grain >> > > > > >>>>> size. >> > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >> > > > > >>>>>> From: "Ed Wall" >> > > > > >>>>>> Sent: ?2015-?12-?06 1:14 PM >> > > > > >>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >> > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > >>>>>> Mike >> > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > >>>>>> My wondering has more to do with your focus on the >> > > > > >>>>>> visual >> > > > and >> > > > > >>> my >> > > > > >>>>> examples may not of helped since it seemed. perhaps to be >> > > > > >>>>> about the >> > > > > >>> visual. >> > > > > >>>>> However, imaging that some poorly drawn thingy (or even well >> > > > > >>>>> drawn) >> > > > > is >> > > > > >>> a >> > > > > >>>>> ?concrete? platonic circle doesn?t seem to be visual or, at >> > > > > >>>>> least, >> > > > it >> > > > > >>> never >> > > > > >>>>> was for me. I have no problems with an image being a >> process. >> > > > > >>>>> In >> > > > > fact, >> > > > > >>>>> assuming that it is static seems strange although I gues >> > >> > >> > [The entire original message is not included.] >> > >> >> >> >> -- >> >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch >> > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Dec 15 19:57:32 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 19:57:32 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Place of REFUGE as expressing particular qualities In-Reply-To: <34A93690-3DA4-44B5-83DB-69B83F3034B1@gmail.com> References: <566f7f5c.6892420a.cf792.ffff944e@mx.google.com> <34A93690-3DA4-44B5-83DB-69B83F3034B1@gmail.com> Message-ID: <5670e13d.4b0e620a.cf34f.4461@mx.google.com> Henry, What I see as similar is the exploration of place as intimately related to the formation of identity. We have been exploring qualities of the imaginal and I am suggesting the imaginal may be, like identity, intimately connected to particular places. In Buenos Aires the place is the community school. This place is bricks and mortar as building material but this does not explain this schools meaning to the self-identified community of destiny. This school is a place of significant meaning which emerges because of the sense of refuge generated within this self-organizing place. Henry, I want to raise up this word -refuge- as place based. Ana's article describes the source of this words meaning emerging from a mental health model in Brazil. The key shift is the connections Ana makes between the quality of this mental health model of refuge and the quality informing the educational place of refuge.in Buenos Aires. Why I am sharing her work is the quality of place this self organizing community has generated. The bricks and mortar building houses a place of safety, a place of refuge, a developing consciousness of belonging to a community of destiny. What are the qualities that transferred from a mental health model of refuge to an educational model of refuge? * this place emerges as manifested from a framework of what is possible. * aimed at supporting marginalized and traumatized persons living in extreme conditions. * in this place children, youth, and adults can re-construct their lives. *struggle is connected to community AS reference *struggle is also connected to educational place as support system. * the place does not exist a priori, but becomes a place of refuge by our shared acts. * this place is a place to come to rest. I consider this a key quality of refuge. *this place also opens a space to plan future action. *a self-identified collective of people who dare to dream and think it is possible to create spaces *all different and unique subjectivities are protected and supported. *educational places of refuge can be co-ordinated as a network * to start these places is to start a journey of learning and community building as the focus of the community. *destiny is a core image and can be constructed across time and across individuals within places. * action occurs within society at large, and this is the arena where place of refuge is justified as a struggle for human rights. * the critical understanding that refuge is not a withdrawal from society at large but remains an open space. No predetermined story line is determined, only an approach. *The purpose of place as refuge is to create something anew and not be static within refuge.. This is imaged as destiny not given but imagined. *one can always be open to learn something else, become a companion to someone else. *one learns how it feels to INHABIT a place. *this place can be conceptualized as a space where one can feel protected enough, cared for enough, and protect and care for others. *from a place of refuge one can imagine a possibility of something new yet to come. Henry, what is significant is that this image of place as refuge now exists. It may be a fragile place, but Ana is documenting how hope is an actual place and is a particular approach. To listen, really listen, to the suffering of the other within actual communities. The shift from mental health models to educational models as places approaching the open see of the not yet, but possible. I have stayed close to the 5 pages shared in order to highlight the quality of certain places to respond to and address the traumatized and marginalized people living on the streets of Buenos Aires. In this particular narrative is something general indicating the need for places where we can come to rest. -----Original Message----- From: "HENRY SHONERD" Sent: ?2015-?12-?14 10:53 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Cc: "Ana In?s Heras" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Place of REFUGE as expressing particular qualities Larry, I have read quickly through Ana?s article and imagined ?concrete? connections with Mike?s work with the 5th Dimension and any ?Zine project with young people. As well, with the work of Alfredo Jornet and Rolf Steier on gesture and boundary objects in a museum design project. (The Matter of Space: Bodily Performances and the Emergence of Boundary Objects During Multidisciplinary Design Meetings) Does that make sense to you? Henry > On Dec 14, 2015, at 7:47 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > I want to introduce a friend, Ana Ines Heras, who lives in Buenos Aires. > She has translated an article into English which captures what she calls an approach to generating meaning in places she calls communities of destiny > We have been exploring third spaces and Ana?s focus on particular qualities of places that she calls ?places of refuge? extends this conversation. > Refuge is the idea/concept I am hoping to bring to awareness and stabilize. > On page 3 she introduces Moises Rodrigues who works in Brazil and has facilitated state designed and implemented health policy aimed at supporting witnesses and victims of torture dealing with trauma and stress. > Ana takes this framework and applies it to understand the situation of thousands of children living in extreme conditions of marginalization in Buenos Aires. > Under certain circumstances this framework is connected to a living community which is seen both as ?reference? and as support system. The community becomes a ?place? exhibiting particular qualities. > A place that ?simultaneously? becomes embodied as a place to come to rest AND a place to plan action. > What I find significant is Ana?s approach that takes Moises Rodrigues ideas, categories, and practice within mental health settings and transitions these ideas, categories, and practices to Buenos Aires and a network of community organizations. These organizations self-identify as a collective of people. These self-identified collectives believe and share a faith that it is possible to CREATE spaces where all different subjectivities are protected and supported in places OF refuge. This collective considers their shared actions as a social orientation. > > However, refuge is not the end goal but is more like a stepping stone that is necessary in order to navigate to what Ana metaphorically calls the ?open see?. This is where I want to pause at this connection of [refuge] and [open see]. I want to stabilize this connection of refuge to open see. > Ana?s approach [and her framework] is to create refuge as holding places which become a necessary step to be able to navigate to the open see as a shared journey within communities of destiny. > The children learn how it feels to inhabit and embody *a* space as place. THIS place where one may feel protected enough, cared for enough, and in turn can protect and care for others IN ORDER TO build a [possibility] of something yet to come. THIS is the place of the imaginal that does possess certain qualities of place. > > A question we have been exploring on this site is where does meaning exist? I would answer that meaning exists where life is experienced as embodied and enacted. Two other concepts that share a family resemblance with this concept are incarnated? and ?animated?. > When we say the voices of the dead ?live? within places of refuge and communities of destiny we are invoking [animated] notions of meaning located in particular cultural historical places. > This introduction of Ana is highlighting her approach captured in the phrase [give place a chance]. Ana?s work embodies this potential and possibility of place as refuge > > Ana gave permission for me to post this article so I am sending her work out for reflection > Larry > > > Sent from Mail for Windows 10 > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Dec 16 09:57:12 2015 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2015 09:57:12 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call for Papers - Journal of Electronic Science and Technology Special Issue on Cognition and Language In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Weiyima Date: Tue, Dec 15, 2015 at 10:09 PM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Call for Papers - Journal of Electronic Science and Technology Special Issue on Cognition and Language To: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org ________________________________ Weiyi Ma, Ph.D. Associate Investigator, ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders Department of Cognitive Science, Faculty of Human Sciences Macquarie University Sydney, NSW 2109 Australia Office: Hearing Hub 3.523 Phone: 61-02-9850-2993 *weiyi.ma@mq.edu.au * http://www.ccd.edu.au/people/profile.php?memberID=1062 _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: logo.png Type: image/png Size: 10377 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20151216/8a056247/attachment.png -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Call for Papers.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 377184 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20151216/8a056247/attachment.pdf From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Dec 16 16:30:09 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 00:30:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Connecting and stability In-Reply-To: <566f8c29.1444620a.ac08f.ffff8ab2@mx.google.com> References: <566cda19.cf40620a.79833.ffffcf75@mx.google.com> , <566e0d83.039d420a.37975.ffff8611@mx.google.com> , <566f8c29.1444620a.ac08f.ffff8ab2@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Hi Larry, Thanks for your reply. Well, it seems that reduction is something that people do when expansion might be a better path (for understanding). I did not intend for "Understanding happens when the message is received as the message was intended," to be the summary of my email. It was a commentary on understanding as a result. The process of communication arising from the said and the unsaid and the context in which the message is delivered and received was the focus of my email. Understanding is merely the consequence that both parties hope to find in common, at least this is my experience myself when talking to people. Reduction is a habit of mind, it might be either biologically or culturally based (likely both), when the mind grasps the object as an object. On the one hand it can be a trick of attention to focus upon objects (biology), and on the other, it could be culturally significant, tapping into previous impressions already present. It's likely both are happening, in fact, I think it's always both. In these cases, there is always the possibility of jumping to conclusions. Descartes for one jumped to conclusions. But he seemed smarter than that, so I wonder if he had some other agenda, like performing the distraction of a magician. Reduction can also have to do with the status of the speaker and the status of the listener. I think we can agree that these influences shape attention and the way messages are sent and received. But that's just a side comment on how reduction occurs inadvertently. So to reply to your question is the speaker's intention the only possible formation of meaning? No. But it is a powerful suggestion. For example if I yell "Fire!" in a crowded theater, and people see no fire, chances are they will be skeptical and attend to perceive a fire, before deciding to run out. If I ran in with charcoal on my face and I'm choking and coughing and urgently yell the same word, they will, I hope, be more persuaded to leave the theater without seeing the fire itself. They are always free to respond as they like, which includes finding meaning as they like. If I yell the word "Fire!" during a walk at the beach while wading knee deep in the ocean and point to the horizon, it simply will not register to people passing by what I'm talking about, or, they might think I'm talking about the sunset. The vritti (that's v-r-i-t-t-i, pronounced "vrt-tee") is shaped by all these inputs. Understanding happens when my vritti matches the receiver's. But first, how is it possible to know they match? It isn't. This is just to identify (in the realm of this conversation) concepts of knowledge and understanding. How it happens is a different topic. Second, understanding can only be relative (through relating in the here and now) and not absolute (there and then). Also, understanding may not be agreement, which might be what happens at the beach when people hear me yell "Fire!" One of the problems that happens with minority voices, is they are not allowed to author their intended meanings in their given contexts without the huge filter of the abstract being assigned to their intended meanings, which then misconstrues meaning and prevents understanding. Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar, for example. Believe it or not. I think what I'm saying here is listening is hard work. But understanding is always rewarding, even if there is disagreement. It may be that you use the word "stabilize" as I mean "understanding." I'm not sure. I'm in agreement with Mike that meaning takes place in contexts, if that is what Mike means. Also, that meaning is not embedded in the word itself like a fortune (meaning) in a fortune cookie (word), or the way a computer will read code in a program. Meaning is a constant stream of dynamic processes simultaneously happening in the present moment between actors in a context of some kind. I do not think even words have to be present for meaning to take place. So meaning need not depend on words. But I think meaning is something like the vritti taking shape in the mind, perhaps it is a kind of impression, or recognition. I intuit meaning is the moment of recognition of the object of thought that meaning is there, but this need not be verbal, nor word-based. I can't say if recognition and meaning are identical. I don't think so, but I'm not sure. I'd have to think about that! For example what is happening when we have a sense of meaning when we hear instrumental music? There are no words there. We certainly can't reduce the note of "C" to mean apple pie, and the note of "F" to mean a cup of coffee, and whenever the piano player puts those two notes together it means it's time for coffee and pie! [😊] I don't think we are disagreeing about mediated listening and stabilization as understanding (if that is what you are saying). However, it is the job of the speaker if one wants to be understood to try to interact in the "language" of meaning of the listener, if possible. A few weeks ago, I watched a special on Johnny Carson. At the end of his life he went to Africa and learned Swahili. Apparently he was delighted at being able to do an adhoc comedy with the Africans he met there, who were delighted by his jokes. I sort of doubt the Africans would know what an institution Carson was in American television, even if it was explained to them. But they loved his jokes (spoken in Swahili). How is that possible? Considering the circles: they could have been imagined as anything, I was just pointing to that to illustrate that the vritti transforms into a shape that is reflective of something. Samskaras (impressions) can certainly affect vrittis. So yes, the entire cluster of circles could have been in an "in-between" state, until they shifted into the shape of a flower, and associated as such, and yes the flower impression would definitely have to be a possible "a priori" because we wouldn't call it a flower without knowing a flower (what it looks like, not just what it is called). And yes, the cluster could have been anything other than a flower. But the difference of the shift between the cluster of circles where they are now a flower and then a dartboard illustrates the transformation of the vritti from one form to another. This was the point of my illustration. I feel to say that stabilizing is identical to recognition or to understanding might be reductive, because thought is fluid, like the sandcastle on the beach isn't fixed, but when the tide rolls in, the sand doesn't really disappear it just takes a new shape, in the case of the beach, resolving into the beach. Perhaps another good metaphor is the giant penlight billboard that lights up and changes from one image to another. We recognize the words and the images, nothing changes about the arrangement of the pinlights on the billboard. All that changes is the configuration of light and how the pinlights light up. It's always the same number of pinlights on the screen. Have you ever noticed that it's not possible to have two thoughts at the same time? We can have multiple perceptions, but we can only attend to one thought at a time. So the material of the mind is in constant shaping of itself and being influenced through perceptions, into a vritti here and another vritti here, using the same material of the mind. If I am understanding you, the poignancy of your question is, if it becomes impossible for spontaneity to occur in the listener once an impression has been made a priori. I think that depends upon the flexibility of the listener to be spontaneous, and if the listener considers the speaker as saying something worth a listen. In the case of people who have been rigorously conditioned to think a certain way, for whatever reason that might be, it probably does become difficult to listen outside of one's comfort zone. But I don't think that that has to be the case. I always have hope, because I believe everyone is in the end a free person on some level to choose to listen or not. I certainly hope you feel listened to Larry! [😊] Kind regards, Annalisa -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: OutlookEmoji-&#X1f60a.png Type: image/png Size: 488 bytes Desc: OutlookEmoji-&#X1f60a.png Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20151217/319363b5/attachment.png From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Dec 16 21:58:43 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 05:58:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] =?windows-1252?q?_Imagination=85_EFF_Presents=3A_Pwning_Tomorrow?= Message-ID: Hello! This entered into my email consciousness today, and I thought imagineers of this list might be intrigued how some of today's writers are imagining the future in regards to the Internet, where we live on this list, after all? https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/12/eff-publishes-pwning-tomorrow-speculative-fiction-anthology Seems to be relevant. The EFF requests a donation, but the digital download is available free. Below is the introduction, by David Maass of the EFF: Introduction to "Pwning Tomorrow" Let?s start with the end. The final work in this collection, Free Fall, is a novella by paranormal romance writer Carolyn Jewel. It?s a thriller in which a litigator (who happens to be a witch) partners up with her infosec expert witness (who happens to be a demon) for a passionate encounter, bookended by battles against a tyrannical dark force. A hacker and a lawyer with supernatural powers pairing up to fight the good fight? That?s a pretty fitting metaphor for the work we?ve done at EFF these last 25 years. Carolyn Jewel also happens to be the lead plaintiff in Jewel v. NSA, our years-long lawsuit to end warrantless, mass surveillance of our electronic communications. Long before Edward Snowden got the entire world paying attention, Carolyn?like so many other writers?knew what was going on and stood up against it. Today, the PEN American Center, the largest association of writers in the world, is also a plaintiff in a lawsuit against the NSA. Writers understand the threats to our freedom in the digital age, and they help the rest of us understand it. This is especially true of those who write speculative fiction. In an essay for Locus, Cory Doctorow once explained that science fiction writers give us the ?narrative vocabularies by which futures can be debated, discussed, adopted, or discarded.? Over the decades, this vocabulary has become so very rich; where would we be without terms like ?Orwellian? and ?Kafkaesque? to describe government dystopias, without ?pre-crime? and ?Skynet? to describe emerging technology? The fantasy genre has also contributed to the digital rights lexicon with concepts like ?Eye of Sauron? and ?trolls.? Imagination is among the most powerful weapons in the battle for Internet freedom. When new policies are introduced, we try to imagine how they will impact civil liberties years, even decades from now. We use our creativity to generate campaigns to fight back and utilize our ingenuity to design technological countermeasures. Creativity gives us an edge in our fight against the well-funded institutions that are devising new ways to invade our privacy and chill our speech every fiscal year. In the Internet freedom community, a love of genre fiction often goes hand in hand with a commitment to civil liberties, whether it?s Citizen Lab?s habit of naming malware investigations after James Bond films, Access Now?s rebranding of the nefarious Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act as the ?Darth Vader? bill, or Public Knowledge Senior Vice President Harold Feld?s epic explainers that compare the politics of the unlicensed spectrum to ?Game of Thrones.? Walk through EFF?s offices and you?ll see sci-fi everywhere you look: Babylon 5 DVDs in our general counsel?s office, mechanical tribbles on a technologist?s? table, Van Gogh?s TARDIS Starry Night on our international rights director?s wall. That?s why we thought a story collection would be a great way to help celebrate our 25th anniversary, with two-dozen superstar writers speculating on the next 25 years and beyond. In this book, you?ll find a variety of stories. Some are brand new, like Madeline Ashby?s ?Be Seeing You,? a story of a bodyguard whose employers insist on watching the world through her digital eyes, and some are older classics, such as Lewis Shiner?s 1985 adventure ?Stompin? at the Savoy,? featuring mutants, state secrets, and a robotic Santa Claus. We have stories that play with concepts of intellectual property, such as Charlie Jane Anders? ?I?ve Got the Music in Me,? a satire on overreaching anti-piracy legislation and Annalee Newitz?s ?Unclaimed,? a hardboiled mystery about orphan works. Meanwhile, Paul Ford?s ?Nanolaw with Daughter,? parodies how legal threats are increasingly becoming an automated process. The Internet of Things provided inspiration for ?Business as Usual,? Pat Cadigan?s story of an interface designer?s relationship with a smart refrigerator. Other authors imagined what will happen when corporate marketing becomes even more pervasive and controlling, such as in Raam Namez? ?Water,? and Rudy Rucker and Eileen Gunn?s collaboration, ?Hive Mind Man.? In ?The Smartest Mob,? David Brin explores the positive possibilities of crowdsourcing news and public safety, while Paolo Bacigalupi?s ?The Gambler,? goes the other way, examining how mainstream media pits tabloid sensationalism against investigative reporting. Several stories play with how digital augmentation will affect our concepts of ourselves, including Neil Gaiman?s ?Changes,? Lauren Beukes? ?Slipping,? and Kameron Hurley?s ?The Light Brigade.? Hannu Rajaniemi?s ?His Master?s Voice? even has a cyborg dog and cat rescuing their owner, who was imprisoned for playing around with forbidden biotechnology. The authors yank today?s technologies forward with a surreal or unexpected twist. Charles Human?s ?Dance Dance Revolution? wonders what would happen if drone warfare were paired with the dance rhythm arcade game. Cory Doctorow spoofs Google?s ?Don?t be evil? motto in ?Scroogled.? Sarah Lotz and Louis Greenberg (who collaborate under the pseudonym S.L. Grey) imagine how voices from beyond the grave would communicate via social media. Charles Yu?s story?the name of which is too long to reprint here?parodies how office technology can spiral out of control. Then there are stories about hackers, such as Bruce Sterling?s ?The Brain Dump? about hacker culture in Ukraine, and, of course, Carolyn Jewel?s novella. Consider this your NSFW warning: Carolyn?s Free Fall is steamy. But that?s all the more reason to include it in this collection: in authoritarian regimes, graphic and unconventional depictions of romance are often among the first to be banned, along with any fiction that challenges the status quo. It?s worth noting that we don?t just love this stuff, some of us actually create it, too: two of the authors in this collection were once part of EFF?s team. Before founding io9.com and becoming tech culture editor at Ars Technica, Annalee Newitz analyzed policy and interfaced with the media at EFF. Cory Doctorow, who worked as EFF?s European Affairs Coordinator for four years, recently returned to help with our Apollo 1201 Project to defeat anti-circumvention measures?also known as digital rights management, or DRM. (Cory even invoked 2001: A Space Odyssey in the press release.) We would like to thank all of these authors for not only allowing us to publish their stories, but for making them available under Creative Commons licenses, so the collection can be shared among the likeminded and curious. We are especially grateful to Cory for his help reaching out to all these authors. In addition, we are thankful for Nick Harkaway?s feedback and encouragement, for Tessellate Media?s advice and assistance in e-publishing, O?Reilly Media, and Troy Mott?s assistance with formatting. Most of all, we thank our supporters for their continued dedication to our causes. We hope you are as inspired by these authors as we are. Please share it far and wide. ? Dave Maass, EFF Investigative Researcher, 2015 From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Thu Dec 17 03:01:38 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 06:01:38 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?q?Fwd=3A_BSA_Bourdieu_Study_Group=E2=80=99s_Inaugural_Bi?= =?utf-8?q?ennial_Conference_2016_-_Call_for_Papers?= Message-ID: Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: BSA Events Team Date: 12/17/2015 5:21 AM (GMT-05:00) To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com Subject: BSA Bourdieu Study Group?s Inaugural Biennial Conference 2016 - Call for Papers CALL FOR PAPERS???The contemporary relevance of the work of Pierre Bourdieu?BSA Bourdieu Study Group?s Inaugural Biennial Conference 2016?Organised in association with the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol?4-6 July, 2016, University of Bristol???Pierre Bourdieu has been one of the most influential sociologists of the second half of the 20th Century. His work, which has been translated into more than 24 languages, has had a significant impact on contemporary sociology internationally. Bourdieu?s importance shows no signs of decreasing as newer generations of sociologists unpack and expand his theoretical framework to a wide range ofpresent-day sociological issues and case studies. Nonetheless, previous arguments repeatedly seem to resurface on whether Bourdieu?s ideas ? developed over 50 years ago in a different era and the specific context of France ? are empirically persuasive today.?From its establishment in 2012, the British Sociological Association?s (BSA) Bourdieu Study Group has sought to critically examine and extend the application of Bourdieusian social theory in contemporary research. This conference aims tofurther this endeavour by bringing together international researchers from different areas of inquiry and stages of career who are using Bourdieu. Through doing so, this three day event will highlight and pull together the various complementary ways in which Bourdieu?s intellectual heritage is being developed internationally.??Keynote Speakers/Panellists:?Dr Will Atkinson (University of Bristol), Professor Gill Crozier (University of Roehampton), Professor David James ?(Cardiff University), Dr Joseph Ibrahim (Leeds Beckett University), Dr Lisa McKenzie (London School of Economics), ?Professor Tariq Modood ?(University of Bristol), ?Professor Diane Reay (Cambridge University), ?Professor Derek Robbins (University of East London), ?Dr Nicola Rollock (Institute of Education), ?Professor Mike Savage ?(London School of Economics) Professor Franz Schultheis (University of St. Gallen)?Workshop Coordinators and Discussants:Dr Will Atkinson, Dr Michael Benson, ?Professor Harriet Bradley, Dr Ciaran Burke Professor Gill Crozier, Dr Sam Friedman, Professor David James, Dr Joseph Ibrahim, Dr Nicola Ingram, Dr Daniel Laurison, Dr Lisa McKenzie, Professor Diane Reay, Professor Derek Robbins, Professor Franz Schultheis, Dr Derron Wallace All delegates will be able to attend two workshops and have eight to choose from:??Workshop 1: Bourdieu?s epistemology and ?the principle of reflexivity?Workshop 2: Bourdieu?s philosophy of action: habitus?Workshop 3: The social space: fields?Workshop 4: How to interpret a multiple correspondence analysis?Workshop 5: Bourdieu and public sociology Workshop 6: Taste, culture, and distinction Workshop 7: Bourdieu and visual ethnographyWorkshop 8: Using Bourdieu in educational research??????Call for papers?We welcome symposiums and individual papers relating to the below theoretical, methodological, and empirical themes of Bourdieu, including:????? The Continuing Importance of Bourdieu ? why is he relevant/necessary????? Bourdieu and Politics/Social justice and Equality/Public Sociology???? Bourdieu and Methodology???? Bourdieu and Education???? Bourdieu, ?Race?, Ethnicity and? Migration???? Bourdieu ?and ?Gender????? Bourdieu: ??Place and? Space????? Bourdieu: Culture, Taste and Distinction???? Transformation of Habitus/Habitus Fluidity?A maximum of 75 papers will be accepted for presentation in parallel sessions and aMaximum of 20 posters abstracts will be accepted.??Steps to follow to participate:??1) Submission of abstracts: Wednesday 30th December ?2015??Please submit you abstracts through the BSA website:http://portal.britsoc.co.uk/public/abstract/abstracts.aspx?The committee will make a selection of participants based on the quality and relevance of the submitted abstracts. Abstracts? ?length should be no more than 250 words and should include a title and 3 keywords. Please provide a short biography (50-100 words) in the section marked research. Ensure that you choose a mode of presentation, either oral or poster and select a preferred stream.?2) Announcement of selected abstracts: February 2016??3) Online registration opens for accepted papers: February 2016??4) Registration for accepted papers closes: March 4th 2016 5) Registration opens for all delegates: March 7th 2016???Useful Information??The organisers cannot pay for participants? travel and accommodation. The following will be provided for all participants: Refreshments and lunch during the conference; an evening meal on the first and second night of the conference.?Cancellations received up to and including 30 March 2016 will incur an administration fee of?50.??Cancellations received after 30 March 2016 will not be eligible for a refund on any fees-related registration.?The Bourdieu Study Group cannot be held responsible for unforeseen circumstances that change the advertised programme.?Important information??Registration??Registration price will be released soon. Prices will be in line with other large-scale academic conferences. There will be no single day rate, as delegates are expected to attend the whole three days of the event.?There are a limited number of attendance only spaces. Registration for these places will be open soon at: ?http://portal.britsoc.co.uk/public/event/events.aspx ?Please note, that registering early will not secure you a presentation place, but that once the attendee only places are fully booked, places will only be open for accepted abstracts. Should you want to attend the event even if your abstract is unsuccessful, you are advised to book as soon as possible.??For academic queries contact: BSA Bourdieu Study Group: ?bourdieu2011@gmail.com?For further info contact: ?events@britsoc.org.uk or (0191) 383 0839.?For more info about the BSA Bourdieu Study Group: ?http://www.britsoc.co.uk/studygroups/bourdieu.aspx, Facebook: ?https://www.facebook.com/bsabourdieu Twitter: @BSABourdieuSG and join our mailing list: ?BSA- BOURDIEU-STUDY-GROUP@JISCMAIL.AC.UK ______________________________________________________________________ This email has been scanned by TSG Cloud Based Mail Security. For more information please visit http://www.tsg.com/product/anti-virus-anti-spam ______________________________________________________________________ From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Thu Dec 17 03:15:15 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 06:15:15 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?b?RndkOiBOWVRpbWVzLmNvbTogVGhlIOKAmEJlbmVmaXRz4oCZIG9m?= =?utf-8?q?_Black_Physics_Students?= Message-ID: This article as inspiring as it maybe fails to answer chief justice roberts' question. ?Middle class black America and "Hip hop" and it's practitioners do not offer an opposing metaphysical understanding of the universe that would make their participation in a physics class diverse. ?Unless you are a five percenter (sub group of the hip hop community who believe that humans are gods and only 5 percent of them are conscious of their true nature...includes people like ll cool j; jay-z; Kanye west) of the community who shares a marginalize view.? I am in agreement with roberts as it pertains to the black american. ?Liberal black America's fight for equality of opportunity, recognition, and distribution makes justice roberts' question a fundamental one which they must attack head on! Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" Date: 12/17/2015 5:51 AM (GMT-05:00) To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" Subject: NYTimes.com: The ?Benefits? of Black Physics Students From The New York Times: The ?Benefits? of Black Physics Students Black students? responsibility in the classroom is not to serve as ?seasoning? to the academic soup. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/17/opinion/the-benefits-of-black-physics-students.html?mwrsm=Email Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Dec 17 05:56:33 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 05:56:33 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] contrasting matching and marking acts Message-ID: <5672beae.d111620a.b25a8.ffffc53e@mx.google.com> We have been discussing the imaginal and I want to focus on what I notice as a recurring theme. Fonagey studied the intimate dance of care giver and infant within primary inter-subjectivity. He documented how if the care giver matched the babies response [copying, mirroring, identity] that this was mechanical, pathological, and profoundly distressing to the infant. The care giver was unable to read the intimate dance or bond of love. In contrast when the care giver marks the baby?s movements by modulating his/her responses and through attention and focus to responding with marked affect by intensifying or softening or in other ways changing the rhythm, then the baby is met and held within primary inter-subjectivity. Now my conjecture is this example of the difference between matching and marking movements has far reaching and general applications within ongoing human conduct. I will give one more example from hermeneutics and the way translation may be envisioned as a marking phenomena. Manfred Frank recalled the contribution of August Boeckh to hermeneutics, who wrote: To record an individual expression and re-produce it in the act of reading [in other words re-create it] does not then signify [and this is decisive] articulating the same linguistic sequence again and indeed with like meaning, but rather undertaking another articulation of the same linguistic sequence. For August Boeckh, ?one can never produce the same thing again? In other words, marking not matching is foundational to human conduct across the life span. This is why listening, really listening, is performing marking acts [of semblance] as mutually shared modulation and is animated or embodied. In contrast to re-present as a mechanical act of identity is matching. This is where I insert this conceptual contrast of marking and matching into the notion of refuge which Ana Heras is actualizing in her work. Refuge is a place where marking acts of mutual modulation create places of hope in response to suffering and despair. Actual brick and mortar {material and imaginal] places. Places where the not yet becomes possible from this place of care giving. A spiral understanding. Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu Dec 17 14:41:09 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2015 07:41:09 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?RndkOiBOWVRpbWVzLmNvbTogVGhlIOKAmEJlbmVmaXRz4oCZ?= =?utf-8?q?_of_Black_Physics_Students?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Paul: What black students bring to physics class is...more black students. Both synchronically (because they bring their boyfriends and girlfriends and comrades and make it easier for black perfect strangers to stick it out) and diachronically (because they grow up to be black physics professors and the next thing you know you've got a whole row of black kids right in front of the lecturn). Somewhere in the back of their minds, that's what's really bothering their honorships. The USA has never had any problems with Nazi physicists--when we ran out of real Nazis (like Werner Von Braun) we just grew our own (Edward Teller). Even Russians can fit in (Sagdeev). But too many black physicists, and it becomes very difficult to carry out atrocities like Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Shortly after apartheid fell my father went to South Africa to watch a comet hit Jupiter. The main black radio station had him on for an interview; they thought some of their listeners would dig it (they did). Maybe some day that will happen in really backward places, like in the USA. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Thu, Dec 17, 2015 at 8:15 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > This article as inspiring as it maybe fails to answer chief justice > roberts' question. Middle class black America and "Hip hop" and it's > practitioners do not offer an opposing metaphysical understanding of the > universe that would make their participation in a physics class diverse. > Unless you are a five percenter (sub group of the hip hop community who > believe that humans are gods and only 5 percent of them are conscious of > their true nature...includes people like ll cool j; jay-z; Kanye west) of > the community who shares a marginalize view. > I am in agreement with roberts as it pertains to the black american. > Liberal black America's fight for equality of opportunity, recognition, and > distribution makes justice roberts' question a fundamental one which they > must attack head on! > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > -------- Original message -------- > From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > Date: 12/17/2015 5:51 AM (GMT-05:00) > To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > Subject: NYTimes.com: The ?Benefits? of Black Physics Students > > From The New York Times: > > The ?Benefits? of Black Physics Students > > Black students? responsibility in the classroom is not to serve as > ?seasoning? to the academic soup. > > > http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/17/opinion/the-benefits-of-black-physics-students.html?mwrsm=Email > > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Dec 17 14:46:21 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 22:46:21 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?windows-1252?q?Imagination=85_EFF_Presents=3A_Pwning_Tomorr?= =?windows-1252?q?ow?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hello esteemed xmcars! Mike asked that I chose one of these EFF stories from this small fleet of stories "Pwning Tomorrow" for us to discuss how imagination is working. I'm picking this particular one below, which also previously appeared in a book of sci-fi/futurists called "Gigantic Worlds." http://giganticbooks.com/ I chose it because it's not racy (it's safe for work), and... it's short! So perhaps in keeping with the general rope of imagination, consider, while reading it, the gaps and overlaps? Or any other topic that has recently come up regarding imagination. Of course there will not be a test afterwards and nothing will be graded. Just enjoy! Kind regards, Annalisa It is an epistolary story that seems apropos for this list in more ways than one. It is called: RE: RE: RE: RE: RE: MICROWAVE IN THE BREAK ROOM DOING WEIRD THINGS TO FABRIC OF SPACE-TIME by Charles Yu ? 2015 Creative Commons (Donate to EFF or download the rest of the anthology here: https://supporters.eff.org/donate/pwning-tomorrow) --- The story begins? FROM: JASPER (FACILITIES) TUES 8/12/13 12:17 P.M. TO: STAFF-ALL-NYC RE: MICROWAVE IN THE BREAK ROOM Hey everyone, sorry for the email blast, but please stop using the lower microwave in the kitchen. Someone nuked a burrito in there on high for what I am assuming had to be at least 20+ minutes because it?s barely recognizable as a burrito. Beans look seriously crazy after having been heated for that long. In fact, it?s barely recognizable as a known form of matter?it?s continuing to disintegrate. Or something worse. We?re trying to figure out if it?s possible to clean it, but at this point it seems like the inside of the microwave might need to be scrubbed on like a subatomic level, which is probably not going to be cost-effective?I know a lot of you love that microwave because it?s so powerful, but just to give you a heads-up, it might make sense to just toss it and get a new one. We?ll keep you posted. Thanks for your attention to the matter and please use the upper microwave until further notice. And whatever you do, please DO NOT use the lower one. Cheers, Jasper FROM: JASPER (FACILITIES) TUES 8/12/13 12:24 P.M. TO: STAFF-ALL-NYC RE: RE: MICROWAVE IN THE BREAK ROOM Okay well I?m sorry to say someone must have either missed my first email or thought I was kidding because, and I can?t believe someone would do this, but someone put their cup of noodles in the lower microwave, on top of the bean-crust substrate, and pressed start and yeah, I think you all know what I?m going to say next: the Styrofoam and the substrate must have interacted in such a way as to destabilize the local microstructure of reality there. Before anyone thinks I?m using circumstantial evidence to make a serious accusation, I would note that there is now a ring of empty non-reality inside the microwave, that just happens to be of the exact circumference of the bottom of a standard Nissin ramen cup. I?m not totally sure what?s going to happen now, but we called building management and they?re sending someone to take a look. I can?t believe I have to say this again, but PLEASE ONLY USE the upper microwave until we figure out what is going on with the broken one. And not to single anyone out, but if you?re making noodles (Brett, Allison, you others know who you are), use the hot water thing from the coffee machine. I thought we?d settled that weeks ago. It cooks the noodles better anyway. Cheers, Jasper FROM: JASPER (FACILITIES) TUES 8/12/13 12:44 P.M. TO: STAFF-ALL-NYC RE: RE: RE: MICROWAVE IN THE BREAK ROOM Since my last update things have gotten a little weird. The ring of brokendown manifold or whatever has continued to do things that would probably be interesting to a cosmologist, but for those of us trying to get our jobs done it?s going to be an inconvenience, possibly through the end of the day. I might be garbling this a little, so anyone pipe up and correct me if I?m wrong, but I?m told that the styrofoam-bean ring underwent a continuous topological deformation, which was fine, until it wasn?t so continuous anymore. Part of the ring tore and glued itself somewhere else in the universe, and so we?ve got that to deal with on top of everything else. Anyway, stay tuned. Ice cream social at 3:30 is canceled, for obvious reasons. Cheers, Jasper FROM: JASPER (FACILITIES) TUES 8/12/13 2:30 P.M. TO: STAFF-ALL-NYC; STAFF-ALL-HARTFORD RE: RE: RE: RE: MICROWAVE IN THE BREAK ROOM Ugh. So that banging you were all hearing was me and the team from building management here in New York, and also some old friends of ours who have gotten much closer in the last ninety minutes or so. The last time I emailed, we were just learning about the tearing and reattaching of the noodle-cup/bean ring to another location in our little reality here. Well, as you may have heard, that location was the third stall in the fifth floor men?s room in Hartford office. It?s an almost incalculably improbably coincidence, which would be cool to marvel over and ponder and debate, except that it?s causing some non-trivial problems with the HVAC systems of both buildings, and other tenants (in both locations!) are complaining. If we don?t get this fixed soon, we might have to answer to the landlord, the NYFD and the HFD, and there is also, I am advised, about a 30% probability that due to this spatial reconfiguration we have set in motion a chain of events that will lead to the imminent collapse of the entire cosmos. The upside is that I?m using cosmos in the narrow sense there, i.e., just our universe and not any others, and also cool is the fact that we effectively have a very, very, very good interoffice mail system between Hartford and NYC now. Anyway, that banging you heard was us trying to put some scaffolding up to stabilize the structure of the portal between the formerly-separatednow-connected-regions?we apparently didn?t have the right materials or tools to do such a thing, so it didn?t work. Our next step is to send someone very small into the portal (probably me), to see if we can learn anything about it. That?s supposed to happen in the next 20 minutes, and I?ll do my best to update you all, but honestly I am not sure ?20 minutes? has any real meaning anymore, given the aforementioned complete breakdown in space and time as we knew it. Cheers, Jasper FROM: JASPER (FACILITIES) THURS 8/14/13 2:30 P.M. TO: STAFF-ALL-NYC; STAFF-ALL-HARTFORD RE: RE: RE: RE: RE: MICROWAVE IN THE BREAK ROOM Well, that didn?t work. We appear to have jumped 2 days in the future. Trying to go back now. Cheers, Jasper FROM: JASPER (FACILITIES) TUES 8/12/13 12:17 P.M. TO: STAFF-ALL-NYC RE: MICROWAVE IN THE BREAK ROOM Apparently the best we could do was to go back to the original point in space-time where it all started. None of you except for me (since I was in the portal) have any clue what I?m talking about, so no worries, but I?m writing this anyway to create what I hope will be a record, either on a computer server somewhere, or if not then at least in some abstract information 112 space, of a transmission documenting what just happened (especially if it turns out we?re in a loop). If anyone out there has residual knowledge for some reason, maybe we could meet up by the water cooler and just chat about what just happened?it?d be great to verify that I?m not going crazy. For everyone else, please, if you see anyone with a burrito headed toward the break room, take it from them. I know that sounds really weird, but you have to trust me on this. Take the burrito and do whatever you need to do?eat it, shred it, I don?t care. Just DO NOT nuke it in the lower microwave. BTW, ice cream social at 3:30. Cheers, Jasper ---end Charles Yu is the author of three books, including the novel How to Live Safely in a Science Fictional Universe and his latest story collection, Sorry Please Thank You. He lives in southern California with his wife and their two kids, and is currently writing for the upcoming HBO series, Westworld. From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Thu Dec 17 15:10:38 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 18:10:38 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?RndkOiBOWVRpbWVzLmNvbTogVGhlIOKAmEJlbmVmaXRz4oCZ?= =?utf-8?q?_of_Black_Physics_Students?= Message-ID: David, "But too many black physicists, and it becomes very difficult to carry out atrocities like Hiroshima and Nagasaki." I to was under the impression that bcuz of our experiences as african people we are immune to allowing or carrying out atrocities like Hiroshima and nagasaki. ?However, duvalier, amin, and other african leaders have proven me wrong. ?I heard a wonderful talk by Vijay Prashad (Watch "Days of Revolt: The Militarism of U.S. Diplomacy" on YouTubehttps://youtu.be/rFNjoy0kSV0) regarding how the leaders of the BRIC nations gave carte blanche to Barack Obama to invade libya because they assumed as a black man he was different from the other white American leaders who preceded him. ?They were wrong! Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: David Kellogg Date: 12/17/2015 5:41 PM (GMT-05:00) To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: The ?Benefits? of Black Physics Students Paul: What black students bring to physics class is...more black students. Both synchronically (because they bring their boyfriends and girlfriends and comrades and make it easier for black perfect strangers to stick it out) and diachronically (because they grow up to be black physics professors and the next thing you know you've got a whole row of black kids right in front of the lecturn). Somewhere in the back of their minds, that's what's really bothering their honorships. The USA has never had any problems with Nazi physicists--when we ran out of real Nazis (like Werner Von Braun) we just grew our own (Edward Teller). Even Russians can fit in (Sagdeev). But too many black physicists, and it becomes very difficult to carry out atrocities like Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Shortly after apartheid fell my father went to South Africa to watch a comet hit Jupiter. The main black radio station had him on for an interview; they thought some of their listeners would dig it (they did). Maybe some day that will happen in really backward places, like in the USA. David Kellogg Macquarie University On Thu, Dec 17, 2015 at 8:15 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > This article as inspiring as it maybe fails to answer chief justice > roberts' question.? Middle class black America and "Hip hop" and it's > practitioners do not offer an opposing metaphysical understanding of the > universe that would make their participation in a physics class diverse. > Unless you are a five percenter (sub group of the hip hop community who > believe that humans are gods and only 5 percent of them are conscious of > their true nature...includes people like ll cool j; jay-z; Kanye west) of > the community who shares a marginalize view. > I am in agreement with roberts as it pertains to the black american. > Liberal black America's fight for equality of opportunity, recognition, and > distribution makes justice roberts' question a fundamental one which they > must attack head on! > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > -------- Original message -------- > From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > Date: 12/17/2015? 5:51 AM? (GMT-05:00) > To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > Subject: NYTimes.com: The ?Benefits? of Black Physics Students > > From The New York Times: > > The ?Benefits? of Black Physics Students > > Black students? responsibility in the classroom is not to serve as > ?seasoning? to the academic soup. > > > http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/17/opinion/the-benefits-of-black-physics-students.html?mwrsm=Email > > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Thu Dec 17 16:57:07 2015 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2015 00:57:07 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?RndkOiBOWVRpbWVzLmNvbTogVGhlIOKAmEJlbmVmaXRz4oCZ?= =?utf-8?q?_of_Black_Physics_Students?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Prashad says "swayed by the personality difference" -- nothing overt about racial ethnicity per se.. Best, Huw On 17 December 2015 at 23:10, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > > David, > "But too many black > physicists, and it becomes very difficult to carry out atrocities like > Hiroshima and Nagasaki." > > I to was under the impression that bcuz of our experiences as african > people we are immune to allowing or carrying out atrocities like Hiroshima > and nagasaki. However, duvalier, amin, and other african leaders have > proven me wrong. I heard a wonderful talk by Vijay Prashad (Watch "Days of > Revolt: The Militarism of U.S. Diplomacy" on YouTubehttps:// > youtu.be/rFNjoy0kSV0) regarding how the leaders of the BRIC nations gave > carte blanche to Barack Obama to invade libya because they assumed as a > black man he was different from the other white American leaders who > preceded him. They were wrong! > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > -------- Original message -------- > From: David Kellogg > Date: 12/17/2015 5:41 PM (GMT-05:00) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: > Fwd: NYTimes.com: The ?Benefits? of Black Physics Students > > Paul: > > What black students bring to physics class is...more black students. Both > synchronically (because they bring their boyfriends and girlfriends and > comrades and make it easier for black perfect strangers to stick it out) > and diachronically (because they grow up to be black physics professors and > the next thing you know you've got a whole row of black kids right in front > of the lecturn). > > Somewhere in the back of their minds, that's what's really bothering their > honorships. The USA has never had any problems with Nazi physicists--when > we ran out of real Nazis (like Werner Von Braun) we just grew our own > (Edward Teller). Even Russians can fit in (Sagdeev). But too many black > physicists, and it becomes very difficult to carry out atrocities like > Hiroshima and Nagasaki. > > Shortly after apartheid fell my father went to South Africa to watch a > comet hit Jupiter. The main black radio station had him on for an > interview; they thought some of their listeners would dig it (they > did). Maybe some day that will happen in really backward places, like > in the USA. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Thu, Dec 17, 2015 at 8:15 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > > > > > This article as inspiring as it maybe fails to answer chief justice > > roberts' question. Middle class black America and "Hip hop" and it's > > practitioners do not offer an opposing metaphysical understanding of the > > universe that would make their participation in a physics class diverse. > > Unless you are a five percenter (sub group of the hip hop community who > > believe that humans are gods and only 5 percent of them are conscious of > > their true nature...includes people like ll cool j; jay-z; Kanye west) of > > the community who shares a marginalize view. > > I am in agreement with roberts as it pertains to the black american. > > Liberal black America's fight for equality of opportunity, recognition, > and > > distribution makes justice roberts' question a fundamental one which they > > must attack head on! > > > > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > > > -------- Original message -------- > > From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > > Date: 12/17/2015 5:51 AM (GMT-05:00) > > To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > > Subject: NYTimes.com: The ?Benefits? of Black Physics Students > > > > From The New York Times: > > > > The ?Benefits? of Black Physics Students > > > > Black students? responsibility in the classroom is not to serve as > > ?seasoning? to the academic soup. > > > > > > > http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/17/opinion/the-benefits-of-black-physics-students.html?mwrsm=Email > > > > > > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Thu Dec 17 17:50:53 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 20:50:53 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?b?RndkOiBOWVRpbWVzLmNvbTogVGhlIOKAmEJlbmVmaXRz4oCZ?= =?utf-8?q?_of_Black_Physics_Students?= Message-ID: I read racial/ethnicity into that statement... Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: Huw Lloyd Date: 12/17/2015 7:57 PM (GMT-05:00) To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: The ?Benefits? of Black Physics Students Prashad says "swayed by the personality difference" -- nothing overt about racial ethnicity per se.. Best, Huw On 17 December 2015 at 23:10, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > > David, > "But too many black > physicists, and it becomes very difficult to carry out atrocities like > Hiroshima and Nagasaki." > > I to was under the impression that bcuz of our experiences as african > people we are immune to allowing or carrying out atrocities like Hiroshima > and nagasaki.? However, duvalier, amin, and other african leaders have > proven me wrong.? I heard a wonderful talk by Vijay Prashad (Watch "Days of > Revolt: The Militarism of U.S. Diplomacy" on YouTubehttps:// > youtu.be/rFNjoy0kSV0) regarding how the leaders of the BRIC nations gave > carte blanche to Barack Obama to invade libya because they assumed as a > black man he was different from the other white American leaders who > preceded him.? They were wrong! > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > -------- Original message -------- > From: David Kellogg > Date: 12/17/2015? 5:41 PM? (GMT-05:00) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >???????? Fwd: NYTimes.com: The ?Benefits? of Black Physics Students > > Paul: > > What black students bring to physics class is...more black students. Both > synchronically (because they bring their boyfriends and girlfriends and > comrades and make it easier for black perfect strangers to stick it out) > and diachronically (because they grow up to be black physics professors and > the next thing you know you've got a whole row of black kids right in front > of the lecturn). > > Somewhere in the back of their minds, that's what's really bothering their > honorships. The USA has never had any problems with Nazi physicists--when > we ran out of real Nazis (like Werner Von Braun) we just grew our own > (Edward Teller). Even Russians can fit in (Sagdeev). But too many black > physicists, and it becomes very difficult to carry out atrocities like > Hiroshima and Nagasaki. > > Shortly after apartheid fell my father went to South Africa to watch a > comet hit Jupiter. The main black radio station had him on for an > interview; they thought some of their listeners would dig it (they > did). Maybe some day that will happen in really backward places, like > in the USA. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > On Thu, Dec 17, 2015 at 8:15 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > > > > > This article as inspiring as it maybe fails to answer chief justice > > roberts' question.? Middle class black America and "Hip hop" and it's > > practitioners do not offer an opposing metaphysical understanding of the > > universe that would make their participation in a physics class diverse. > > Unless you are a five percenter (sub group of the hip hop community who > > believe that humans are gods and only 5 percent of them are conscious of > > their true nature...includes people like ll cool j; jay-z; Kanye west) of > > the community who shares a marginalize view. > > I am in agreement with roberts as it pertains to the black american. > > Liberal black America's fight for equality of opportunity, recognition, > and > > distribution makes justice roberts' question a fundamental one which they > > must attack head on! > > > > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > > > > -------- Original message -------- > > From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > > Date: 12/17/2015? 5:51 AM? (GMT-05:00) > > To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > > Subject: NYTimes.com: The ?Benefits? of Black Physics Students > > > > From The New York Times: > > > > The ?Benefits? of Black Physics Students > > > > Black students? responsibility in the classroom is not to serve as > > ?seasoning? to the academic soup. > > > > > > > http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/17/opinion/the-benefits-of-black-physics-students.html?mwrsm=Email > > > > > > > > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone > From annalisa@unm.edu Sat Dec 19 09:35:33 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sat, 19 Dec 2015 17:35:33 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination: Greek Drama (as radio) with accompanying historical critique Message-ID: Hello esteemed xmcars, After reading the paper Mike posted about radio vs. television and their effect upon imagination, I thought this might be a worthy topic to follow on its heels. Today, I learned of a dramatization of the Greek Bailout this past summer on the BBC Radio 4. It is audio only and beckons to the radio format of past times, with narrator and sound effects and English speakers with foreign accents! See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b06s1s5x Believe it or not I learned about it from Varoufakis on his blog, and he has a critique of this dramatization here: http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2015/12/19/a-greek-drama-the-bbcs-radio-play-10-factual-corrections/ What I find intriguing is not so much the production value of this "historical artifact," but instead why does it exist exactly? There is somewhere a need in the UK, apparently to shape how Britons (and English speakers) think about the event. Why? One obscurity I muddle through while listening is how does one dramatize a massive complex of political economic processes, where multiple causes have been distanced from their multiple effects to such a degree that one would have to be Varoufakis himself to understand them completely! Then I think about the (over) usage of "the Greek Drama" or "the Greek Tragedy" as a cognitive cultural-historical container to present to the "agora" of the Internet. Then, what does it mean for Varoufakis to offer a critique THAT? What would it be like for us to possess a text handed down through the ages from Antigone that is a critique of Sophocles on his play about her father, Oedipus? It's a strange m?bius strip. Mighty strange. Kind egads, Annalisa From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Dec 21 19:55:00 2015 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 21 Dec 2015 19:55:00 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination: Greek Drama (as radio) with accompanyinghistorical critique In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5678c999.c64c620a.3e01a.ffffadcc@mx.google.com> Annalisa, Here is an interesting article on Greek drama and why its motifs and themes continue to be relevant today. The central theme is the exploration of what the author refers to as two distinct moral orders [or stabilities]. Oikos order and polis order. Athena had the wisdom to undrstand the centrality of oikos order to the polis. Hestia is the goddess of the oikos order and her symbol is the ?hearth?. The question if the oikos order is necessary for the polis order? This continues to be a relevant question. Oikos in English is ?eco? [ecology, economy] Larry Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Annalisa Aguilar Sent: Saturday, December 19, 2015 9:36 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination: Greek Drama (as radio) with accompanyinghistorical critique Hello esteemed xmcars, After reading the paper Mike posted about radio vs. television and their effect upon imagination, I thought this might be a worthy topic to follow on its heels. Today, I learned of a dramatization of the Greek Bailout this past summer on the BBC Radio 4. It is audio only and beckons to the radio format of past times, with narrator and sound effects and English speakers with foreign accents! See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b06s1s5x Believe it or not I learned about it from Varoufakis on his blog, and he has a critique of this dramatization here: http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2015/12/19/a-greek-drama-the-bbcs-radio-play-10-factual-corrections/ What I find intriguing is not so much the production value of this "historical artifact," but instead why does it exist exactly? There is somewhere a need in the UK, apparently to shape how Britons (and English speakers) think about the event. Why? One obscurity I muddle through while listening is how does one dramatize a massive complex of political economic processes, where multiple causes have been distanced from their multiple effects to such a degree that one would have to be Varoufakis himself to understand them completely! Then I think about the (over) usage of "the Greek Drama" or "the Greek Tragedy" as a cognitive cultural-historical container to present to the "agora" of the Internet. Then, what does it mean for Varoufakis to offer a critique THAT? What would it be like for us to possess a text handed down through the ages from Antigone that is a critique of Sophocles on his play about her father, Oedipus? It's a strange m?bius strip. Mighty strange. Kind egads, Annalisa -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: DECEMBER 21 2015 SHIELDS JAMES MARK Oikos and Polis in Greek Drama.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 183860 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20151221/0efbbcf6/attachment-0001.pdf From l.woods@iicedu.org Wed Dec 23 15:54:10 2015 From: l.woods@iicedu.org (L inda Woods) Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2015 23:54:10 +0000 (GMT) Subject: [Xmca-l] Ireland International Conference on Education (IICE-2016): Call for Submissions! Message-ID: <147927088.125180.b45ba933-be54-4246-ad5f-8d26cb02ee68.open-xchange@email.1and1.co.uk> Apologies for cross-postings. Kindly email this call for papers to your colleagues, faculty members and postgraduate students. Call for Papers, Extended Abstracts, Posters, Tutorials and Workshops! ******************************************************************* Ireland International Conference on Education (IICE-2016) April 25-28, 2016 Clayton Hotel Ballsbridge Dublin, Ireland http://www.iicedu.org ******************************************************************* The IICE is an international refereed conference dedicated to the advancement of the theory and practices in education. The IICE promotes collaborative excellence between academicians and professionals from Education. The aim of IICE is to provide an opportunity for academicians and professionals from various educational fields with cross-disciplinary interests to bridge the knowledge gap, promote research esteem and the evolution of pedagogy. The IICE 2016 invites research papers that encompass conceptual analysis, design implementation and performance evaluation. All the accepted papers will appear in the proceedings and modified version of selected papers will be published in special issues peer reviewed journals. The topics in IICE-2016 include but are not confined to the following areas: *Academic Advising and Counselling *Art Education *Adult Education *APD/Listening and Acoustics in Education Environment *Business Education *Counsellor Education *Curriculum, Research and Development *Competitive Skills *Continuing Education *Distance Education *Early Childhood Education *Educational Administration *Educational Foundations *Educational Psychology *Educational Technology *Education Policy and Leadership *Elementary Education *E-Learning *E-Manufacturing *ESL/TESL *E-Society *Geographical Education *Geographic information systems *Health Education *Higher Education *History *Home Education *Human Computer Interaction *Human Resource Development *Indigenous Education *ICT Education *Internet technologies *Imaginative Education *Kinesiology & Leisure Science *K12 *Language Education *Mathematics Education *Mobile Applications *Multi-Virtual Environment *Music Education *Pedagogy *Physical Education (PE) *Reading Education *Writing Education *Religion and Education Studies *Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) *Rural Education *Science Education *Secondary Education *Second life Educators *Social Studies Education *Special Education *Student Affairs *Teacher Education *Cross-disciplinary areas of Education *Ubiquitous Computing *Virtual Reality *Wireless applications *Other Areas of Education - You can submit your research paper at http://www.iicedu.org/Paper%20Submission.html or email it to papers-2016april@iicedu.org Important Dates: * Abstract and Extended Abstract (Work in Progress) Submission Date: January 10, 2016 * Notification of Abstract and Extended Abstract (Work in Progress) Acceptance/Rejection: January 20, 2016 * Research Paper, Student Paper, Case Study, Report Submission Date: January 22, 2016 * Notification of Research Paper, Student Paper, Case Study, Report Acceptance / Rejection: February 05, 2016 * Proposal for Workshops Submission Date: January 10, 2016 * Notification of Workshop Acceptance / Rejection: January 15, 2016 * Posters Proposal Submission Date: January 10, 2016 * Notification of Posters Acceptance / Rejection: January 15, 2016 * Camera Ready Paper Due: February 28, 2016 * Early Bird Registration (Authors and Participants): November 20, 2015 - March 05, 2016 * Late Bird Registration Deadline (Authors only): March 06, 2016 - March 30, 2016 * Late Bird Registration Deadline (Participants only): March 16, 2016 - April 14, 2016 * Conference Dates: April 25-28, 2016 For further information please visit http://www.iicedu.org From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 28 13:01:00 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 28 Dec 2015 21:01:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination: Greek Drama (as radio) with accompanyinghistorical critique In-Reply-To: <5678c999.c64c620a.3e01a.ffffadcc@mx.google.com> References: , <5678c999.c64c620a.3e01a.ffffadcc@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Hi Larry, This is a great little paper, I have finally read it, thanks for sending it. You know, it fits in nicely with my personal inquiry, not only concerning Greece and the European Union, but the relationships between the general and the specific, the abstract and the concrete, even the gap and the overlap! What seems "left out" in the Shields paper is discussion concerning the individual as the entity that travels these two "worlds" the oikos and the polis, the private and the public spheres respectively. It's there, just not explicit. In these stories, some individuals appear to be automatons, following a code of ethics mechanically, who consequently "lose the spirit" and become meaningless, while others are quite conscious of self-sacrifice necessary to protect that which is meaningful. Shields doesn't really touch on this angle directly. Consquently, I could not help but recognize Oedipus as an individual with no oikos to guide him. As an ungrounded figure in the polis, his rendition of polis reminds me of corporatized or privatized governments, which possess no private spheres to speak of (or to speak in). This absence of oikos space in Oedipus's individual development generates what becomes abominable, equivalencies to incest and regicide/patricide, which then blinds the leader from what was right in front of him all along. A strange kind of loop. Creon, on the other hand, takes the polis as literally his oikos, to be protected in the same manner as oikos. By Creon's concept of polis overlapping (as projection) over true oikos, it becomes totalitarian, rather than as polis as being the gap between many oikoi (oikos - plural) to be filled in by spontaneous civic interaction (of the polis) It seems that political figures who gravitate toward the totalitarian tragically suffer from this lack "seeing" of oikos, as it is, as oikos is meant to function. It's easy to see why Freud became fixated upon Greek mythology as a (poetic) language of the mind. I wasn't really intending to make a direct comparison of Varoufakis to Antigone, but it seems to work easily enough: Antigone travelled outside the polis to bury her dead traitorous brother, and Varoufakis has left Greek government (and Brussels) to tour Europe in the appeal for a European Democracy, could be translated as his moral outrage to bury the corrupt body of oligarchy (traitorous brothers of Varoufakis, as fellow Greeks) against the odds, to protect oikos. There is far more to it than that, because not only does Varoufakis understand the oikos he also understands the ecos, being an Keynesian economist! Does Varoufakis know he risks to be sacrificed to Athena in the process? I suspect, as Antigone did, he does. (Which I suspect Larry, was a connection you made!) I would like to offer as another layer to this emerging reading stream, a chapter by David Graeber I've been thinking about. That chapter is "Manners, deference, and private property (or Elements for a General Theory of Hierarchy)" from his book, "Possibilities: Hierarchy, Desire, and Rebellion "(2007). His observation of anthropological concepts of joking relations and avoidance relations and their presence in "western" history seems to resonate with these concepts of oikos and polis. Particularly if one can see joking relations as an ecological method of protest against hierarchies with no "soul," or, as Graeber puts it, as a solvent to hierarchies that have become too rigid or abstract. Could be something important to this stone soup? Kind regards, Annalisa -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Graeber_Manners deference and private property or elements for a general theory of hierachy_2007.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 859634 bytes Desc: Graeber_Manners deference and private property or elements for a general theory of hierachy_2007.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20151228/d1fa139c/attachment-0001.pdf From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Mon Dec 28 18:16:27 2015 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Tue, 29 Dec 2015 02:16:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination: Greek Drama (as radio) with accompanyinghistorical critique In-Reply-To: References: , <5678c999.c64c620a.3e01a.ffffadcc@mx.google.com>, Message-ID: sounds like the dozens, or signifying - joking partners. phillip From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 28 20:21:48 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 29 Dec 2015 04:21:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination: Greek Drama (as radio) with accompanying historical critique In-Reply-To: References: , <5678c999.c64c620a.3e01a.ffffadcc@mx.google.com>, , Message-ID: Hi Phillip, I looked up dozens on Wikipedia. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Dozens) Of course, joking relations are not singular to AA communities, as per Lefever, etc. as it said on this wikipage. Unless they just mean this particular game (then, OK). It's an activity that many cultures all over the world do, and even throughout history, but yeah the dozens certainly is an example of that. Graeber calls it the "taking good and giving bad." Interesting how neatly insulting one's mother fits into that specification. Any form of "playful aggression" qualifies, which would include, for example, a custom discussed in the chapter, from Medieval Europe called charivari (anglicized as "shivaree"). Villagers would participate a loud parade of rowdy music and singing to mock something they disapproved. Say, a widow or widower who married too soon, or to protest wifebeaters or adulterers. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charivari). Charivari derives either from Roman word, "caribaria" translating to "headache." or Greek "kerebaria" translating to "head-heavy." Could be our version of head-banging? :) Graeber maps avoidance relations as the inversion of joking relations. The two are superimposed systems of social meaning-making. Avoidance relations creates divisions and distance, resulting in hierarchies (how might this fit in with alienation and individualism as produced by capitalism?). Not sure if this is original to Graeber, or something understood in anthropology in general, but it seems to make a lot of sense. In the chapter I uploaded, Graeber also brings up Bakhtin and his own study of Rabelais. That was interesting too. Maybe to other xmcars reading Bakhtin might find something to add? You know, the whole experience of carnival, and other festivals of the people (like May Day and Maypole dances), which actually everyone participated in, not just commoners (unless one was a Puritan, or course). The action of knocking the crown off the Carnival King was "a more universal attack, one directed against the very principle of hierarchy itself." Makes me consider why coup d'etats cannot "work" if they simply replace one hierarchy for another, whereas direct democracies function through joking relations, communities of the common people tearing down hierarchies through civic activity and festivals (and voting!) It also explains reasons for protests in the street, which are like charivari. We have this recent construct, "Arab Spring." Spring is the time of regeneration: May Day was the pagan festival of fertility. The Greek referendum was occasionally referred to as the "Greek Spring" even though this was in July. What springs from the word "spring", can also be cleansing water, or a jack-in-the-box. Interesting metaphors abound and surprise! Seems the Dozens is another way of cutting one's head down to size, in case someone gets to full of oneself. Similar functions, but on an individual level. Anyway, thanks! Kind regards, Annalisa From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Dec 29 15:45:11 2015 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 29 Dec 2015 18:45:11 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Link to an Article from Journal of Developing Societies Message-ID: Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note? 4, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: Article Notifications Date: 12/29/2015 5:43 PM (GMT-05:00) To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com Subject: Link to an Article from Journal of Developing Societies The following article from "Journal of Developing Societies" may be of interest to you: The African-Americanization of the Black Diaspora in Globalization or the Contemporary Capitalist World-system From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Dec 30 09:57:12 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2015 17:57:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Link to an Article from Journal of Developing Societies In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: By chance?.hazlink? === The following article from "Journal of Developing Societies" may be of interest to you: The African-Americanization of the Black Diaspora in Globalization or the Contemporary Capitalist World-system From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Dec 30 10:22:28 2015 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2015 18:22:28 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Three Hau books coming in 2016 Message-ID: Hello fellow and esteemed XMCArs, Just a heads up that some fascinating books are coming out of Hau this year! Here's info (and links) for three intriguing tomes... First up, for all those feminists among us, you know who you are: _Before and After Gender: Sexual Mythologies of Everyday Life_ http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/B/bo23679117.html By Marilyn Strathern Written in the early 1970s amidst widespread debate over the causes of gender inequality, Marilyn Strathern?s Before and After Gender was intended as a widely accessible analysis of gender as a powerful cultural code and sex as a defining mythology. But when her publisher unexpectedly folded, the manuscript went into storage, where it has remained for more than four decades. This book finally brings it to light, giving the long-lost feminist work?accompanied here by an afterword from Judith Butler?an overdue spot in feminist history. Strathern incisively engages some of the leading feminist thinkers of the time, including Shulamith Firestone, Simone de Beauvoir, Ann Oakley, and Kate Millett. Building with characteristic precision toward a bold conclusion in which she argues that we underestimate the materializing grammars of sex and gender at our own peril, she offers a powerful challenge to the intransigent mythologies of sex that still plague contemporary society. The result is a sweeping display of Strathern?s vivid critical thought and an important contribution to feminist studies that has gone unpublished for far too long. ------ Next, for the ludologists and imagineers: _Why We Play: An Anthropological Study_ http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/W/bo23679551.html By Roberte Hamayon Whether it?s childhood make-believe, the theater, sports, or even market speculation, play is one of humanity?s seemingly purest activities: a form of entertainment and leisure and a chance to explore the world and its possibilities in an imagined environment or construct. But as Roberte Hamayon shows in this book, play has implications that go even further than that. Exploring play?s many dimensions, she offers an insightful look at why play has become so ubiquitous across human cultures. Hamayon begins by zeroing in on Mongolia and Siberia, where communities host national holiday games similar to the Olympics. Within these events Hamayon explores the performance of ethical values and local identity, and then she draws her analysis into larger ideas examinations of the spectrum of play activities as they can exist in any culture. She explores facets of play such as learning, interaction, emotion, strategy, luck, and belief, and she emphasizes the crucial ambiguity between fiction and reality that is at the heart of play as a phenomenon. Revealing how consistent and coherent play is, she ultimately shows it as a unique modality of action that serves an invaluable role in the human experience. ----- And third, there might be something here for all those linguists out there: _Language in Culture: The Semiotics of Interaction_ http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/L/bo23679295.html by Michael Silverstein This book offers a rich assortment of some of Michael Silverstein?s most important lectures at the University of Chicago over the past forty years, all of which converge on theoretical issues involved in the semiotic, cognitive, and sociopolitical study of language and communication. Together they provide an overdue home to an impressive body of thought that has otherwise only been available via unofficial distribution?in hand-written notes, audio recordings, and other media?by longtime fans and students. Developing and employing semiotic concepts, these lectures concentrate on two central and inverse problems. The first is to understand how interpersonal communication is carried in and by the medium of language. The second is to understand how language is a defining factor in conceptual representations and mental knowledge. Exploring the diversity of sources of knowledge and the many forms of language they can be coded into, Silverstein details the modes of semiosis of which language is composed, in particular those that express cultural knowledge and conceptualization. A sophisticated study of language as a form of interaction, these lectures offer one of the most important contributions to linguistics and anthropological semiotics since Ferdinand de Saussure. ---- While these are not specifically CHAT, they seem to resonate with previous discussions on the list, and hence may be of relevance? Other upcoming books (and even ones available now) may be perused here: http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/publisher/pu3432000_3432001.html Hau is a marvelous upcoming publisher. Lots of great stuff...Stay tuned! Kind regards, Annalisa From anamshane@gmail.com Wed Dec 30 10:44:30 2015 From: anamshane@gmail.com (Dr. Ana Marjanovic-Shane) Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2015 13:44:30 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Happy New 2016 Message-ID: Happy New 2016 Year I wish you a lot of happiness, joy, health, success, fun, good books, films, shows, music to listen and to dance to, many travels and meeting new and exciting people; I wish for the peace in the world, goodheartedness, incredible science, technical, medical and ecological advances; and, of course, I wish you to have all your wishes fulfilled. But, most of all, I wish us to have a lot of good time together. Ana ________________________________ Ana Marjanovic-Shane anamshane@gmail.com (m) 267-334-2905 From r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk Wed Dec 30 10:50:33 2015 From: r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk (R.J.S.Parsons) Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2015 18:50:33 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Link to an Article from Journal of Developing Societies In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <56842779.7070700@open.ac.uk> http://jds.sagepub.com/content/31/4/467.abstract But it's paywalled. Rob On 30/12/2015 17:57, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > By chance?.hazlink? > > === > > The following article from "Journal of Developing Societies" may be of interest to you: > > The African-Americanization of the Black Diaspora in Globalization or the Contemporary Capitalist World-system > > > > -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu Dec 31 16:00:48 2015 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 1 Jan 2016 09:00:48 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Yasnitsky and Van der Veer: Mythbusters! Message-ID: Or not. So, you thought you knew your Vygotsky, did you? Here are seven facts you've always believed about Vygotsky that are...well, more or less right, actually, according to Yasnitsky and Van der Veer's "Revisionist Revolution in Vygotsky Studies", due to come out on Routledge in the new year. 1. Stalinist science was highly centralized, clique ridden, ritualistic, deliberately esoteric and impractical, parochial, and given to cults and personality. Sounds familiar? Now, lest you think that I am making an unfair comparison between Stalinist Russia and today's relatively benign and bucolic academic atmosphere, note that Anton's revolutionary revisionist point in this first section is precisely that: the present day reputation of Vygotsky is based on a very centralized, monolithic interpretation of his work, drive-by citations and padded reference lists,an almost complete disjunction between high theory and more or less banal practice, a geographical focus in just a few centres in Russia and the West, and a foundational myth of a doomed Moses, who saw the promised land from the mountaintop and knew he would never set foot there. Is the comparison unfair? Not at all. If anything, the problem is that it is too obvious to count as revision, much less as revolution. There is, however, another problem, or rather two other problems. The first is that myths are not entirely fiction--it is not a myth but a medical fact that L.S. Vygotsky died of tuberculosis in June of 1934, and it is not really much more far fetched to say that he died without ever knowing that in eight decades he would be translated into the Korean language and widely read by school teachers in South Korea. The second is that mythbusters are themselves mythic figures; that is, they take certain historical facts and construct narratives around them, in this case the narrative that the previous narrative was constructed around incorrect facts or that it was constructed around correct facts which have been grossly misinterpreted in some way. So.... 2. There never was a Troika or a Pyatorka: instead, the "Vygotsky School" was a loose network of scholars who came and went, joined and drifted away, spread across three cities (Moscow, Leningrad, and Kharkov, although the loyalty of the Kharkov centre is in doubt). This section, based on Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work, is--unlike the first section, which manages to be both sensationalistic and naive--both nuanced and closely argued. But of course for that very reason it tends to undermine the claims of the first part of the book. And at the same time, it ignores the most obvious evidence that there really WAS something like a Pyatorka--the fact that Vygotsky's own letters referto the Pyatorka, and the fact that the Pyatorka held meetings, internal conferences, etc, None of this contradicts Anton's main thesis, which was that the "Troika" and the "Pyatorka" were convenient constructs (exoteric as opposed to esoteric ways of understanding) for thinking about the history of the Vygotsky school even while it was happening. But it also doesn't answer the question I have always had about the use of the term "Troika". For Trotskyists (and, as Anton points out, there is clear evidence that Vygotsky has strong pro-Trotsky sympathies), the term Troika has very bad connotations: it referred to a bureaucratic bloc between Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev to oust Trotsky from power in the year following Lenin's death. . 3. Thinking and Speech", far from being Vygotsky's magnum opus, is an unfinished and highly uneven work, cobbled together from materials which really fit rather poorly, during the months immediately before...and after...Vygotsky's death. I think anybody who really knows the chronology of the composition of Thinking and Speech will not find this controversial; the facts are well known, and only serve to throw the coherence and power of the work into greater relief (and also, incidentally, to undermine the popular idea--which Yasnitsky and Van der Veer DO subscribe to--that there are three very different Vygotskies believing three very different foundational ideas at work in the years 1926-1934). So of course this is not really revisionist and revolutionary enough for Yasnitsky and Van der Veer. Beyond this, they try to claim that the works that Vygotsky thought were important are NOT the works that we read today, and the works we read today are NOT the works that Vygotsky held dear. They found their argument on Vygotsky's own lists, compiled at three times during his life, of his own works. The problem is that two of these lists are part of job applications, and anybody who has ever done a job application knows very well that you list things that your potential employer will find impressive, and these are usually quite far from being the works that you yourself value. Sure enough, by this standard, Vygotsky's most important work is his first one: "Educational Psychology", which is surely his most uneven and least visionary, closely followed by "Imagination and Creativity", which was, as the authors quite correctly point out, a work of popular science (and includes references to textbook writers and agony aunts who wrote for the Soviet papers). Weakest of all are Yasnitsky's claims about the History of the Development of the Higher Mental Functions and Tool and Sign, to wit, that the former was a fabrication by the Soviet editors cobbled together from two unrelated texts and the Russian version of the latter the result of a benign forgery by Luria and the popular medical writer Elkhonon Goldberg. First of all, there is strong evidence INSIDE the text of HDHMF that it was conceived and written as a single work: there is a conclusion which goes back to the beginning, which remarks on the order in which it was conceived and how it differs from the order it was written, and how the chapters fit together. More importantly, the first part DOES lay out the problem, the approach and the research method followed in the "special studies" of the second part, just as Thinking and Speech was to do years later. is is really weak stuff: they Secondly, as Yasnitsky himself admits, the wonderful story of benign forgery (actually back translation, not a rare occurence in recovering historic manuscripts) does not actually explain what it is supposed to explain, which is the recurrence of several paragraphs, not word for word, but very nearly so. Yasnitsky explains this by adding a kind of Ptolemaic epicycle: there were TWO translators, and the editor didn't bother to read what he was editing, so there was some redundancy. The only authority for this story, which seems so much less probable than the alternative explanation that this is simply another instance of Vygotsky's tendency t repeat himself more or less verbatim in places, is Elkhonon Goldberg ("The Wisdom Paradox: How Aging Actually Benefits Your Brain", and other must readings in psychoneurology for aging jet-setters), and an anonymous blogger (neither source seems very well disposed to their erstwhile professor, Luria). Of course, the mere fact that a story is highly improbable and that the sources are somewhat jaundiced do not mean that it is not true; but in a work devoted to mythbusting, it should mean that it is...well, possibly mythical. 4. Vygotsky died with an unfinished book on consciousness clearly in mind. This much too should be have been already very clear to any careful reader of Thinking and Speech. But this is in fact the most exciting part of the book, and the only part of the book which really does offer completely new evidence (it is also the only part of the book which was not written by Yasnitsky or by Van der Veer). You may disagree with a lot of what Zavershneva has to say about Vygotsky's supposed Nietszcheanism and his rejection of "word meaning" as a unit of consciousness in favor of "sense" (which is, after all, a type of word meaning). You may question, as I did, whether "perizhevianie" is really intended as a substitute, and if so up to what point it is a substitute for word meaning. Above all, you may wonder what the relationship between THIS unwritten work and the other unfinished works that Vygotsky left us might be ("Teaching on the Emotions" is mentioned, but there is hardly any mention at all of "Child Development"). But this is the part of the book where you are most likely to learn something. It's also the part of the book where we see the most Vygotsky inedit--unpublished Vygotsky. 5. Vygotsky has been poorly translated, and he didn't write either of the English language books for which he is famous. The facts are depressingly clear: the 1962 version of "Thought and Language" is something like half of the original, with all the Marx and Lenin (and also the "redundancies", which for Yasnitsky are the proof of the inauthenticity of Tool and Sign) cut away by editors. "Mind in Society" was not a book that Vygotsky ever wrote but instead (like much of Aristotle, like all of the New Testament, like the Quran and like de Saussure's "Cours", a compilation put together by students and students of students (e.g. Mike). I think what the revolutionary revisionists ignore is the dialectic of that process: "Mind in Society" was designed to, and did in fact, overcome the significant omissions of Hanfmann and Vakar's translation: they saw that they could bring back some of Vygotsky's Marxist roots, and that is exactly what they did. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer acknowledge that this book, whether by Vygotsky or not, was the book that started the Vygotsky "boom"; the real question we have to ask is--what can we actually accomplish with the energy that "Mind and Society" unlocked? What happens when the rubble of the boom stops bouncing? Previously, our "revolutionary revisionists" suggested archival work,authoritative editions, and so on, and of course that is certainly very much to be desired. But it also ignores the exoteric nature of the boom and does nothing to overcome the gap between theory and practice noted in point 1) above. 6. The results of Luria's Central Asian expeditions were suppressed in order not to inflame resentment among the USSR's national minorities. This too is extremely well known to people who read Luria's own preface, as well as those who followed the horrible story of the quasi-official denunciation of Vygotsky and Luria (see point 7 below). And it turns out to be...well, more or less true, although Laman and Yasnitsky manage to cloak the truth in anachronistic phrases like "affirmative action" and "political correctness" which only show how very little they understand the concrete realities that Luria and Vygotsky actually faced. The really objectionable part of this section of the book, though, is the accusation that Vygotsky is a vulgar Marxist who believed that the change in the relations of production, without any education, was enough to create concepts in the minds of Uzbeks. There is no evidence for this in any of Vygotsky's or Luria's texts, and plenty of evidence to the contrary. (Luria repeatedly refers to the effect of schooling). Note that Lamdan and Yasnitsky do not raise a number of key issues: a) Vygotsky at one point in HDHMF, Chapter Two, criticizes those who take experiments out of the laboratory and do anthropological fieldwork with them and calls this method absolutely unjustified. Does this explain why he did not personally take part? b) In fact, Luria's experiments were quite similar to what people like Rivers had done in New Guinea--they were not at all unprecedented; they were in fact part of a recognized and continuing tradition in cross-cultural psychology (c.f. Glick and Cole, and also recent work on chimps and children in Africa). This ethnographic tradition WAS politically suspect, and for good reason. Is this why Luria refers to it sparingly, and why Koffka is rather unsympathetic to Luria's (largely foregone) conclusions? 7. Vygotsky's work was never officially denounced by Stalin himself, but instead was subject to an informal ban, which did not prevent him from being favorably cited in the twenty years between his death and the first publications in Russia. Well, this isn't exactly myth-busting. Stalin was not particularly well-read; his most critical comment on Vygotsky would have been something along the lines of "Who?" But this really is both sensationalistic and naive: it is sensationalistic (and anachronistic) to imagine that Vygotsky's work was famous enough at his death to deserve the kind of explicit suppression that, say, Trotsky, Bukharin, Radek, or even Vavilov suffered. It is naive to imagine that the two almost fact-free articles published against Vygotsky in the years after his death were somehow not part of an orchestrated campaign against his work (which began WELL before he died--why is there no discussion of the 1931 decree on pedology in Leningrad, something that Vygotsky himself mentions in Thinking and Speech Chapter Six?) As Kozulin remarks in a remarkably well-tempered preface, this is a dangerous book--not so much to the reader, but to the writers. The danger is that that Yasnitsky and Van der Veer run the risk of busting a gut rather than busting myths, making revolutionary revisionism out of their firm grasp of the obvious embroidered with material that is anything but obvious. When that happens, we get something that is neither a gorgon nor a minotaur but more like Lady Bracknell in "The Importance of Being Earnest": something like a monster without being a myth. David Kellogg Macquarie University , and even (in designed to undo some of those cuts. Like Aristotle, Jesus Christ, and Muhammad, Vygotsky didn't write or at least didn't edit the books that made him famous. The problem of course is that Vygotsky didn't know that he was Vygotsky; he thought he was just "me". and de Saussure, Vygotsky did not So you thought you knew L.S. Vygotsky! Well From ablunden@mira.net Thu Dec 31 16:35:20 2015 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 01 Jan 2016 11:35:20 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Yasnitsky and Van der Veer: Mythbusters! In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5685C9C8.1060302@mira.net> Thanks, David! :) All makes sense to me. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ On 1/01/2016 11:00 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Or not. So, you thought you knew your Vygotsky, did you? Here are seven > facts you've always believed about Vygotsky that are...well, more or less > right, actually, according to Yasnitsky and Van der Veer's "Revisionist > Revolution in Vygotsky Studies", due to come out on Routledge in the new > year. > > 1. Stalinist science was highly centralized, clique ridden, ritualistic, > deliberately esoteric and impractical, parochial, and given to cults and > personality. Sounds familiar? Now, lest you think that I am making an > unfair comparison between Stalinist Russia and today's relatively benign > and bucolic academic atmosphere, note that Anton's revolutionary > revisionist point in this first section is precisely that: the present day > reputation of Vygotsky is based on a very centralized, monolithic > interpretation of his work, drive-by citations and padded reference > lists,an almost complete disjunction between high theory and more or less > banal practice, a geographical focus in just a few centres in Russia and > the West, and a foundational myth of a doomed Moses, who saw the promised > land from the mountaintop and knew he would never set foot there. Is the > comparison unfair? Not at all. If anything, the problem is that it is too > obvious to count as revision, much less as revolution. > > There is, however, another problem, or rather two other problems. The first > is that myths are not entirely fiction--it is not a myth but a medical fact > that L.S. Vygotsky died of tuberculosis in June of 1934, and it is not > really much more far fetched to say that he died without ever knowing that > in eight decades he would be translated into the Korean language and widely > read by school teachers in South Korea. The second is that mythbusters are > themselves mythic figures; that is, they take certain historical facts and > construct narratives around them, in this case the narrative that the > previous narrative was constructed around incorrect facts or that it was > constructed around correct facts which have been grossly misinterpreted in > some way. So.... > > 2. There never was a Troika or a Pyatorka: instead, the "Vygotsky School" > was a loose network of scholars who came and went, joined and drifted away, > spread across three cities (Moscow, Leningrad, and Kharkov, although the > loyalty of the Kharkov centre is in doubt). This section, based on > Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work, is--unlike the first section, which manages to be > both sensationalistic and naive--both nuanced and closely argued. But of > course for that very reason it tends to undermine the claims of the first > part of the book. And at the same time, it ignores the most obvious > evidence that there really WAS something like a Pyatorka--the fact that > Vygotsky's own letters referto the Pyatorka, and the fact that the Pyatorka > held meetings, internal conferences, etc, None of this contradicts Anton's > main thesis, which was that the "Troika" and the "Pyatorka" were convenient > constructs (exoteric as opposed to esoteric ways of understanding) for > thinking about the history of the Vygotsky school even while it was > happening. But it also doesn't answer the question I have always had about > the use of the term "Troika". For Trotskyists (and, as Anton points out, > there is clear evidence that Vygotsky has strong pro-Trotsky sympathies), > the term Troika has very bad connotations: it referred to a bureaucratic > bloc between Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev to oust Trotsky from power in the > year following Lenin's death. . > > 3. Thinking and Speech", far from being Vygotsky's magnum opus, is an > unfinished and highly uneven work, cobbled together from materials which > really fit rather poorly, during the months immediately before...and > after...Vygotsky's death. I think anybody who really knows the chronology > of the composition of Thinking and Speech will not find this controversial; > the facts are well known, and only serve to throw the coherence and power > of the work into greater relief (and also, incidentally, to undermine the > popular idea--which Yasnitsky and Van der Veer DO subscribe to--that there > are three very different Vygotskies believing three very different > foundational ideas at work in the years 1926-1934). > > So of course this is not really revisionist and revolutionary enough for > Yasnitsky and Van der Veer. Beyond this, they try to claim that the works > that Vygotsky thought were important are NOT the works that we read today, > and the works we read today are NOT the works that Vygotsky held dear. They > found their argument on Vygotsky's own lists, compiled at three times > during his life, of his own works. The problem is that two of these lists > are part of job applications, and anybody who has ever done a job > application knows very well that you list things that your potential > employer will find impressive, and these are usually quite far from being > the works that you yourself value. Sure enough, by this standard, > Vygotsky's most important work is his first one: "Educational Psychology", > which is surely his most uneven and least visionary, closely followed by > "Imagination and Creativity", which was, as the authors quite correctly > point out, a work of popular science (and includes references to textbook > writers and agony aunts who wrote for the Soviet papers). > > Weakest of all are Yasnitsky's claims about the History of the Development > of the Higher Mental Functions and Tool and Sign, to wit, that the former > was a fabrication by the Soviet editors cobbled together from two unrelated > texts and the Russian version of the latter the result of a benign forgery > by Luria and the popular medical writer Elkhonon Goldberg. > > First of all, there is strong evidence INSIDE the text of HDHMF that it was > conceived and written as a single work: there is a conclusion which goes > back to the beginning, which remarks on the order in which it was conceived > and how it differs from the order it was written, and how the chapters fit > together. More importantly, the first part DOES lay out the problem, the > approach and the research method followed in the "special studies" of the > second part, just as Thinking and Speech was to do years later. is is > really weak stuff: they > > Secondly, as Yasnitsky himself admits, the wonderful story of benign > forgery (actually back translation, not a rare occurence in recovering > historic manuscripts) does not actually explain what it is supposed to > explain, which is the recurrence of several paragraphs, not word for word, > but very nearly so. Yasnitsky explains this by adding a kind of Ptolemaic > epicycle: there were TWO translators, and the editor didn't bother to read > what he was editing, so there was some redundancy. The only authority for > this story, which seems so much less probable than the alternative > explanation that this is simply another instance of Vygotsky's tendency t > repeat himself more or less verbatim in places, is Elkhonon Goldberg ("The > Wisdom Paradox: How Aging Actually Benefits Your Brain", and other must > readings in psychoneurology for aging jet-setters), and an anonymous > blogger (neither source seems very well disposed to their erstwhile > professor, Luria). Of course, the mere fact that a story is highly > improbable and that the sources are somewhat jaundiced do not mean that it > is not true; but in a work devoted to mythbusting, it should mean that it > is...well, possibly mythical. > > 4. Vygotsky died with an unfinished book on consciousness clearly in mind. > This much too should be have been already very clear to any careful reader > of Thinking and Speech. But this is in fact the most exciting part of the > book, and the only part of the book which really does offer completely new > evidence (it is also the only part of the book which was not written by > Yasnitsky or by Van der Veer). You may disagree with a lot of what > Zavershneva has to say about Vygotsky's supposed Nietszcheanism and his > rejection of "word meaning" as a unit of consciousness in favor of "sense" > (which is, after all, a type of word meaning). You may question, as I did, > whether "perizhevianie" is really intended as a substitute, and if so up to > what point it is a substitute for word meaning. Above all, you may wonder > what the relationship between THIS unwritten work and the other unfinished > works that Vygotsky left us might be ("Teaching on the Emotions" is > mentioned, but there is hardly any mention at all of "Child Development"). > But this is the part of the book where you are most likely to learn > something. It's also the part of the book where we see the most Vygotsky > inedit--unpublished Vygotsky. > > 5. Vygotsky has been poorly translated, and he didn't write either of the > English language books for which he is famous. The facts are depressingly > clear: the 1962 version of "Thought and Language" is something like half of > the original, with all the Marx and Lenin (and also the "redundancies", > which for Yasnitsky are the proof of the inauthenticity of Tool and Sign) > cut away by editors. "Mind in Society" was not a book that Vygotsky ever > wrote but instead (like much of Aristotle, like all of the New Testament, > like the Quran and like de Saussure's "Cours", a compilation put together > by students and students of students (e.g. Mike). I think what the > revolutionary revisionists ignore is the dialectic of that process: "Mind > in Society" was designed to, and did in fact, overcome the significant > omissions of Hanfmann and Vakar's translation: they saw that they could > bring back some of Vygotsky's Marxist roots, and that is exactly what they > did. Yasnitsky and Van der Veer acknowledge that this book, whether by > Vygotsky or not, was the book that started the Vygotsky "boom"; the real > question we have to ask is--what can we actually accomplish with the energy > that "Mind and Society" unlocked? What happens when the rubble of the boom > stops bouncing? Previously, our "revolutionary revisionists" suggested > archival work,authoritative editions, and so on, and of course that is > certainly very much to be desired. But it also ignores the exoteric nature > of the boom and does nothing to overcome the gap between theory and > practice noted in point 1) above. > > 6. The results of Luria's Central Asian expeditions were suppressed in > order not to inflame resentment among the USSR's national minorities. This > too is extremely well known to people who read Luria's own preface, as well > as those who followed the horrible story of the quasi-official denunciation > of Vygotsky and Luria (see point 7 below). And it turns out to be...well, > more or less true, although Laman and Yasnitsky manage to cloak the truth > in anachronistic phrases like "affirmative action" and "political > correctness" which only show how very little they understand the concrete > realities that Luria and Vygotsky actually faced. The really objectionable > part of this section of the book, though, is the accusation that Vygotsky > is a vulgar Marxist who believed that the change in the relations of > production, without any education, was enough to create concepts in the > minds of Uzbeks. There is no evidence for this in any of Vygotsky's or > Luria's texts, and plenty of evidence to the contrary. (Luria repeatedly > refers to the effect of schooling). Note that Lamdan and Yasnitsky do not > raise a number of key issues: > > a) Vygotsky at one point in HDHMF, Chapter Two, criticizes those who take > experiments out of the laboratory and do anthropological fieldwork with > them and calls this method absolutely unjustified. Does this explain why he > did not personally take part? > > b) In fact, Luria's experiments were quite similar to what people like > Rivers had done in New Guinea--they were not at all unprecedented; they > were in fact part of a recognized and continuing tradition in > cross-cultural psychology (c.f. Glick and Cole, and also recent work on > chimps and children in Africa). This ethnographic tradition WAS politically > suspect, and for good reason. Is this why Luria refers to it sparingly, and > why Koffka is rather unsympathetic to Luria's (largely foregone) > conclusions? > > 7. Vygotsky's work was never officially denounced by Stalin himself, but > instead was subject to an informal ban, which did not prevent him from > being favorably cited in the twenty years between his death and the first > publications in Russia. Well, this isn't exactly myth-busting. Stalin was > not particularly well-read; his most critical comment on Vygotsky would > have been something along the lines of "Who?" But this really is both > sensationalistic and naive: it is sensationalistic (and anachronistic) to > imagine that Vygotsky's work was famous enough at his death to deserve the > kind of explicit suppression that, say, Trotsky, Bukharin, Radek, or even > Vavilov suffered. It is naive to imagine that the two almost fact-free > articles published against Vygotsky in the years after his death were > somehow not part of an orchestrated campaign against his work (which began > WELL before he died--why is there no discussion of the 1931 decree on > pedology in Leningrad, something that Vygotsky himself mentions in Thinking > and Speech Chapter Six?) > > As Kozulin remarks in a remarkably well-tempered preface, this is a > dangerous book--not so much to the reader, but to the writers. The danger > is that that Yasnitsky and Van der Veer run the risk of busting a gut > rather than busting myths, making revolutionary revisionism out of their > firm grasp of the obvious embroidered with material that is anything but > obvious. When that happens, we get something that is neither a gorgon nor a > minotaur but more like Lady Bracknell in "The Importance of Being Earnest": > something like a monster without being a myth. > > David Kellogg > Macquarie University > > > > , and even (in designed to undo some of those cuts. Like Aristotle, Jesus > Christ, and Muhammad, Vygotsky didn't write or at least didn't edit the > books that made him famous. The problem of course is that Vygotsky didn't > know that he was Vygotsky; he thought he was just "me". and de Saussure, > Vygotsky did not > > > > So you thought you knew L.S. Vygotsky! Well >