[Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Greg Thompson
greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
Mon Sep 15 20:00:58 PDT 2014
comes from Hegel,
but, imho, resonates with Merleau-Ponty.
I'm just sayin'.
-greg
On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 6:22 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> What I was saying about sensation comes form Hegel, Greg, continuing
> Paul's comment about Kant.
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>
>
> Greg Thompson wrote:
>
>> Andy,
>> Were you able to read Larry's rather long email on Merleau-Ponty? esp.
>> his criticism of the "sensation fallacy"?
>> I ask b.c. it seems to resonate well with your ideas about sensation
>> having no meaning if it isn't mediated. Do you see connections?
>> I'm partly wondering b.c. I have heard others mention connections between
>> M-P and Vygotsky before but have never been able to see those connections
>> before...
>> -greg
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 7:34 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:
>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>>
>> Carol Macdonald wrote:
>>
>> Hi Andy,
>>
>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down,
>> but at the same time purports to account for "everything".
>> But are there really only universal artefacts? There must be
>> at least the possibility of
>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this;
>> - as yet potential understanding
>> - a total lack of understanding.
>>
>> That's the whole point, Carol! a given material artefact has a
>> certain *material* form which is universal, but it is subject to
>> interpretation, that is, meaning is ascribed to it by a person,
>> and different people at different times will ascribe different
>> meanings to it. But the meaning of the word "material" is what is
>> outside of consciousness and independent of activity. The
>> independent existence of the material world is what makes science
>> possible.
>>
>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated
>> sensation - so if we are hungry, we need to eat; but the
>> eating is mediated. We need to take in fluid, but everything
>> apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of course we
>> serve water in culturally mediated ways.)
>> I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands
>> your schema Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns.
>>
>> By "unmediated sensation" I presume you mean that aspect of a
>> sensation which is unmediated. All sensations are both immediate
>> and mediated. This is what I take to be the core meaning of
>> "dual-stimulation." Were you to be subject to an unmediated
>> sensation (maybe soon after you were born) then it would have no
>> meaning for you and would therefore be no sensation at all. But if
>> it has a meaning, that is because of the mediation of the
>> sensation by aspects of your consciousness.
>>
>> Here of course the mediation being talked of is not
>> artefact-mediation. :)
>>
>> Andy
>>
>>
>> Carol
>>
>>
>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
>>
>> Ah! I see!
>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in
>> nature
>> or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain
>> both
>> immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem with anyone
>> saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is
>> appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of
>> Vygotsky,
>> that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially
>> productive unit of analysis for science is lost if
>> mediation in
>> the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with
>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is
>> lost.
>> Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point
>> you were
>> referring to you used some expression other than "mediation."
>>
>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do
>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or
>> thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my
>> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or
>> whatever -
>> but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are
>> products of the history and culture into which I was born.
>> I can
>> choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce
>> them. So every action I take is essentially
>> cultural-historical as
>> well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material
>> objects,
>> their physical form is the same for everyone, it is
>> universal. So
>> communication as much as miscommunication takes place through
>> everyone interpreting the same material objects,
>> artefacts, that I
>> am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too
>> mediate their actions with the same set of universal
>> artefacts! So
>> all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis
>> which is as objective as any branch of natural science.
>> Wonderful, eh?
>>
>> Andy
>> ------------------------------
>> ------------------------------------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>
>>
>> Huw Lloyd wrote:
>>
>> If you want to study how action changes then you need
>> to study
>> the history and production of the action. Under such
>> circumstances, assertions that concepts cannot mediate
>> (the
>> production of) actions become more obviously false.
>> If one
>> has simplified, through "clarity", the action away
>> from its
>> genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a
>> concept
>> cannot mediate an action.
>>
>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume)
>> are an
>> elegant way to demonstrate this.
>>
>> Best,
>> Huw
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden
>> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>> wrote:
>>
>> he, he, Huw!
>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are
>> the very
>> problems that need to be remedied by
>> clarification! and I
>> really
>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally
>> being
>> used to
>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is
>> not equal to
>> separation.
>> I really don't know what you are referring to with
>> product and
>> history. Perhaps you could explain?
>> Andy
>> ------------------------------
>> ------------------------------------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>
>>
>> Huw Lloyd wrote:
>>
>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for
>> "clarity". Reduction to clarity is a projection or
>> reification of the
>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails
>> typologies or
>> other simplistic devices which prevent the
>> conception and
>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in
>> cases
>> such as
>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the
>> entanglements
>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would
>> be equally
>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state
>> that one
>> needs to
>> obfuscate (see darkly) too.
>>
>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which
>> leads me to
>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why
>> separate
>> the act from its production and history?
>> Of
>> course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity
>> from
>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the
>> problem.
>>
>> Best,
>> Huw
>>
>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden
>> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
>>
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>>> wrote:
>>
>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that
>> in the CHAT
>> tradition
>> specifically, as opposed to the English
>> language
>> in general,
>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of
>> course, every
>> action
>> is both mediated and immediate, and in
>> many discursive
>> contexts,
>> "mediation" is a concept which may be
>> evoked quite
>> legitimately,
>> but with no special significant for the use of
>> CHAT. In social
>> theory, for example, mediation of
>> activities by other
>> activities
>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as
>> mediation of
>> actions by
>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology.
>> But if
>> the topic is
>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so
>> central, that I
>> prefer to spell it out and use the term
>> "artefact-mediated" rather
>> than the vague term "mediated".
>>
>> I have come across usages like "mediated by
>> such-and-such a
>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use
>> words to
>> mean what
>> you like, but I find a formulation like
>> this in
>> the context of
>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the
>> idea of
>> "mediation" in
>> the most general sense in a way which
>> obscures the
>> fact that a
>> concept is not immediately present in any
>> act of
>> communication or
>> any other act, and therefore *cannot
>> mediate actions*.
>> Artefacts,
>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a
>> concept, can of
>> course mediate an act of communication.
>> But the
>> point is
>> that a
>> word is not universally and
>> unproblematically a
>> sign for
>> any one
>> concept. It means different things to
>> different
>> people.
>> Concepts
>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal
>> in their
>> materiality,
>> but particular in their meaning. So when
>> we have a
>> concept
>> in mind
>> when we use a word in communication, the
>> communication is
>> mediated
>> by the word not the concept, and it is a
>> mistake
>> not to be
>> aware
>> of that.
>>
>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were
>> always
>> used in
>> qualified
>> way so that its specific meaning is made
>> clear.
>>
>> Andy
>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his
>> comment, too.
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>
>>
>>
>> Greg Thompson wrote:
>>
>> Does "mediation" only apply to
>> language and
>> culture?
>>
>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in
>> which case we
>> would need
>> to include
>> reflexes)
>>
>> And does it include our socio-contextual
>> surround as in
>> Bateson's man with
>> the stick? (in which case, we would
>> need to
>> include
>> newborns).
>>
>> Just wonderin'.
>>
>> -greg
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David
>> H Kirshner
>> <dkirsh@lsu.edu
>> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu
>> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>
>> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>
>> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>>
>> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>
>> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>
>> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>
>> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>>>> wrote:
>>
>> Thanks for replies.
>> I'm recalling several years ago
>> Jim Greeno
>> decided
>> to stop
>> talking about
>> situated cognition because the
>> pragmatics of
>> adjectival
>> use implies there
>> has to be a contrasting non-situated
>> cognition. He now
>> speaks of
>> situativity theory. It seems, with the
>> exception of
>> physical reflexes (and
>> perhaps pre-conscious infant
>> activity),
>> all human
>> action
>> is mediated (and
>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as
>> well). So, it's
>> worth noting that
>> "mediated action" doesn't specify
>> a kind of
>> action, but
>> rather a
>> theoretical assumption about all human
>> action; though
>> there seems to be
>> some variation in interpretation
>> of what that
>> assumption
>> entails.
>> David
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin)
>> Developmental psycholinguist
>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow:
>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>> Assistant Professor
>> Department of Anthropology
>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
>> Brigham Young University
>> Provo, UT 84602
>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>>
>
>
--
Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Anthropology
882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
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