[Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse
Lisa Yamagata-Lynch
lisayl@utk.edu
Mon Sep 15 08:31:46 PDT 2014
I agree, I have an American Psychological background from Japan, and moved
away from it once I crossed to America after college. I have been away from
it for so long that it is perhaps not my place to think this, but in my
observation American Psychology has predominantly become a field about
procedures and moved away from philosophical concepts that I thought it
originally branched out form.
Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational Psychology
and Counseling
http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey
Education Complex
IT Online Program Coordinator University of
Tennessee
http://itonline.utk.edu/
Knoxville, TN 37996
https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: 865-974-7712
On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:22 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> Well, Lisa, I think that is a project which requires a lot of what David
> would call "philosophical" discussion. :)
> The Psychology of Concepts, as it is know to American psychology, i.e.,
> the "mainstream" do endless laboratory tests and questionnaires and surveys
> and so far as I can see have still haven't figured out what a concept is.
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>
>
> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote:
>
>> Well I am guilty for being fixated about thinking and talking about
>> methods and how to better understand how we can make a trustworthy leap
>> from understanding the world to understanding concepts. Again just talking
>> aloud.
>>
>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational Psychology
>> and Counseling
>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey
>> Education Complex
>> IT Online Program Coordinator University of
>> Tennessee
>> http://itonline.utk.edu/
>> Knoxville, TN 37996
>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone:
>> 865-974-7712
>>
>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>>
>> I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and we all have
>> our specific research interests.
>> But when we publish, most of us have something to report.
>> I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more of my share of
>> time arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest.
>> Andy
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> ------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>
>>
>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote:
>>
>> Why is it that we came to what David stated as:
>>
>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over
>> facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical
>> elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost
>> completely detached from empirical specifics.
>>
>>
>>
>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational
>> Psychology and Counseling
>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532
>> Bailey Education Complex
>> IT Online Program Coordinator
>> University of Tennessee
>> http://itonline.utk.edu/
>> Knoxville, TN 37996
>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone:
>> 865-974-7712 <tel:865-974-7712>
>>
>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner
>> <dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu
>> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>> wrote:
>>
>> Andy,
>>
>> I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific
>> project,
>> though it might initially have been conceived as such.
>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over
>> facts."
>> We are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations,
>> distinctions, and qualifications almost completely
>> detached from
>> empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even
>> at the
>> level of theory, we're not all playing the same game.
>>
>> I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that
>> claims be
>> framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the
>> significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical
>> setting
>> theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In
>> this case,
>> there is a possibility that disagreements lead to
>> separation of
>> research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical agreement
>> as a
>> consequence.
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>]
>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM
>> To: David H Kirshner
>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse
>>
>> David,
>> CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science it must
>> strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are
>> meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which
>> they
>> are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a
>> system of
>> concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental
>> finding, but still not agree on the significance of that
>> claim. We
>> CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over
>> facts;
>> all of this is possible only to the extent that we share
>> concepts.
>> "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal
>> as it
>> is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is
>> ill-conceived to
>> think that this is a means of consolidating a current of
>> research
>> like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological,
>> I don't
>> think that makes any difference.
>> Andy
>> ------------------------------
>> ------------------------------------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>
>>
>> David H Kirshner wrote:
>> > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it
>> seems
>> inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing
>> efforts
>> to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from efforts to
>> solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In
>> tandem, is
>> ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or
>> philosophical
>> discourse.
>> >
>> > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of
>> CHAT
>> would not be better served by embedding theoretical
>> discussion in
>> analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be
>> to make
>> CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application
>> (though that
>> would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation
>> might
>> transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of
>> methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated
>> into
>> distinct psychological schools, each constrained by
>> methodological
>> strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical
>> environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community
>> could
>> look across these various schools to pursue broader
>> philosophical
>> problematics.
>> >
>> > David
>> >
>> > -----Original Message-----
>> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>>
>> > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>>] On Behalf Of Andy
>> Blunden
>> > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM
>> > To: Huw Lloyd
>> > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct
>> perception
>> >
>> > Ah! I see!
>> > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in
>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally
>> contain
>> both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem
>> with anyone
>> saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is
>> appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of
>> Vygotsky,
>> that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially
>> productive unit of analysis for science is lost if
>> mediation in
>> the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with
>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is
>> lost.
>> Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point
>> you were
>> referring to you used some expression other than "mediation."
>> >
>> > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I
>> can do
>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or
>> thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my
>> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or
>> whatever -
>> but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are
>> products of the history and culture into which I was born.
>> I can
>> choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce
>> them. So every action I take is essentially
>> cultural-historical as
>> well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material
>> objects,
>> their physical form is the same for everyone, it is
>> universal. So
>> communication as much as miscommunication takes place through
>> everyone interpreting the same material objects,
>> artefacts, that I
>> am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too
>> mediate their actions with the same set of universal
>> artefacts! So
>> all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis
>> which is as objective as any branch of natural science.
>> Wonderful, eh?
>> >
>> > Andy
>> >
>> ------------------------------
>> ----------------------------------------
>> > --
>> > *Andy Blunden*
>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> >
>> >
>> > Huw Lloyd wrote:
>> >
>> >> If you want to study how action changes then you need
>> to study the
>> >> history and production of the action. Under such
>> circumstances,
>> >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production
>> of) actions
>> >> become more obviously false. If one has simplified,
>> through
>> >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then
>> it may seem
>> >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action.
>> >>
>> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume)
>> are an elegant
>> >> way to demonstrate this.
>> >>
>> >> Best,
>> >> Huw
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden
>> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
>> >> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> he, he, Huw!
>> >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are
>> the very
>> >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification!
>> and I
>> really
>> >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally
>> being
>> used to
>> >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is
>> not equal to
>> >> separation.
>> >> I really don't know what you are referring to with
>> product and
>> >> history. Perhaps you could explain?
>> >> Andy
>> >> ------------------------------
>> ------------------------------------------
>> >> *Andy Blunden*
>> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> >> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Huw Lloyd wrote:
>> >>
>> >> I agree about precision, but not with a call
>> for "clarity".
>> >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or
>> reification of the
>> >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails
>> typologies or
>> >> other simplistic devices which prevent the
>> conception and
>> >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in
>> cases such as
>> >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the
>> entanglements
>> >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would
>> be equally
>> >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one
>> needs to
>> >> obfuscate (see darkly) too.
>> >>
>> >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which
>> leads me to
>> >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example,
>> why separate
>> >> the act from its production and history?
>> >> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple
>> clarity from
>> >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the
>> problem.
>> >>
>> >> Best,
>> >> Huw
>> >>
>> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden
>> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
>> >> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
>> >> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>>>
>>
>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that
>> in the CHAT
>> >> tradition
>> >> specifically, as opposed to the English
>> language in
>> general,
>> >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of
>> course, every
>> >> action
>> >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many
>> discursive
>> >> contexts,
>> >> "mediation" is a concept which may be
>> evoked quite
>> >> legitimately,
>> >> but with no special significant for the use of
>> CHAT. In social
>> >> theory, for example, mediation of
>> activities by other
>> >> activities
>> >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as
>> mediation of
>> actions by
>> >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology.
>> But if
>> the topic is
>> >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so
>> central, that I
>> >> prefer to spell it out and use the term
>> >> "artefact-mediated" rather
>> >> than the vague term "mediated".
>> >>
>> >> I have come across usages like "mediated by
>> such-and-such a
>> >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can
>> use words to
>> >> mean what
>> >> you like, but I find a formulation like
>> this in the
>> context of
>> >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the
>> idea of
>> >> "mediation" in
>> >> the most general sense in a way which
>> obscures the
>> fact that a
>> >> concept is not immediately present in any
>> act of
>> >> communication or
>> >> any other act, and therefore *cannot
>> mediate actions*.
>> >> Artefacts,
>> >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a
>> concept, can of
>> >> course mediate an act of communication. But the
>> point is
>> >> that a
>> >> word is not universally and unproblematically a
>> sign for
>> >> any one
>> >> concept. It means different things to
>> different people.
>> >> Concepts
>> >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal
>> in their
>> >> materiality,
>> >> but particular in their meaning. So when we
>> have a
>> concept
>> >> in mind
>> >> when we use a word in communication, the
>> communication is
>> >> mediated
>> >> by the word not the concept, and it is a
>> mistake
>> not to be
>> >> aware
>> >> of that.
>> >>
>> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were
>> always used in
>> >> qualified
>> >> way so that its specific meaning is made clear.
>> >>
>> >> Andy
>> >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his
>> comment, too.
>> >>
>> >> ------------------------------
>> ------------------------------------------
>> >> *Andy Blunden*
>> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> >> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> >> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Greg Thompson wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and
>> culture?
>> >>
>> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in
>> which case we
>> >> would need
>> >> to include
>> >> reflexes)
>> >>
>> >> And does it include our socio-contextual
>> surround as in
>> >> Bateson's man with
>> >> the stick? (in which case, we would
>> need to include
>> >> newborns).
>> >>
>> >> Just wonderin'.
>> >>
>> >> -greg
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David
>> H Kirshner
>> >> <dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>
>> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>
>> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>
>> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>>
>> >> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>
>> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>
>> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>
>> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>>>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Thanks for replies.
>> >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim
>> Greeno
>> decided
>> >> to stop
>> >> talking about
>> >> situated cognition because the
>> pragmatics of
>> >> adjectival
>> >> use implies there
>> >> has to be a contrasting non-situated
>> cognition. He now
>> >> speaks of
>> >> situativity theory. It seems, with the
>> exception of
>> >> physical reflexes (and
>> >> perhaps pre-conscious infant
>> activity), all
>> human
>> >> action
>> >> is mediated (and
>> >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as
>> well). So, it's
>> >> worth noting that
>> >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a
>> kind of
>> >> action, but
>> >> rather a
>> >> theoretical assumption about all human
>> action; though
>> >> there seems to be
>> >> some variation in interpretation of
>> what that
>> >> assumption
>> >> entails.
>> >> David
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
More information about the xmca-l
mailing list