[Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse
Andy Blunden
ablunden@mira.net
Mon Sep 15 07:47:14 PDT 2014
"Project" is a key concept for me. It means "an activity" if you're an
Activity Theorist. It is meant to be a very general term.
By "scientific project" I mean it is part of a larger project called
"Science."
It is not up to you or me to define "science", this is a project which
has been going on for about 400 years in its modern form and more than
2000 years since it first got started. It has its own system of
concepts, including its various, contested self-definitions. These are
objective, inasmuch as your question has to be answered by studying the
concepts by means of which science organises itself.
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote:
> Andy,
>
> Out of curiosity, what do you mean by a "scientific project?" Do you
> mean a systematic process of observing and analyzing various data to
> come to some kind of understanding of how things work, do you mean
> somehow be able to understand what is believed to be most likely a
> true representation of how things work, both, or something else? Maybe
> I am not clear as I am thinking aloud, I am hung up with what do you
> mean part. Is it the process, representation, both or something else?
>
> Lisa YL
>
> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational
> Psychology and Counseling
> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey
> Education Complex
> IT Online Program Coordinator University
> of Tennessee
> http://itonline.utk.edu/
> Knoxville, TN 37996
> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone:
> 865-974-7712
>
> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:24 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>
> David,
> CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science it must
> strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are
> meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which they
> are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a system of
> concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental
> finding, but still not agree on the significance of that claim. We
> CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over facts;
> all of this is possible only to the extent that we share concepts.
> "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal as it
> is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is ill-conceived to
> think that this is a means of consolidating a current of research
> like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological, I don't
> think that makes any difference.
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>
>
> David H Kirshner wrote:
>
> Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it seems
> inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing
> efforts to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from
> efforts to solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de
> novo. In tandem, is ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a
> psychological or philosophical discourse.
>
> I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of CHAT
> would not be better served by embedding theoretical discussion
> in analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be
> to make CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application
> (though that would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical
> obligation might transmute (some) questions of theory into
> questions of methodology. In that way, CHAT could become
> differentiated into distinct psychological schools, each
> constrained by methodological strictures that also support a
> more homogeneous theoretical environment. At the same time, a
> wide-open CHAT community could look across these various
> schools to pursue broader philosophical problematics.
>
> David
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>] On Behalf Of Andy
> Blunden
> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM
> To: Huw Lloyd
> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>
> Ah! I see!
> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in
> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally
> contain both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem
> with anyone saying that anything is mediated by anything else,
> where it is appropriate. My problem is that the specific
> insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions
> provides an especially productive unit of analysis for science
> is lost if mediation in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT
> literature with artefact-mediation to the point that
> artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that if you
> were to make the point you were referring to you used some
> expression other than "mediation."
>
> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do
> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or
> thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my
> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or whatever
> - but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are
> products of the history and culture into which I was born. I
> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history
> produce them. So every action I take is essentially
> cultural-historical as well as personal. Also, because
> artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the
> same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much
> as miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting
> the same material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my
> actions. How can they do that? Because they too mediate their
> actions with the same set of universal artefacts! So all human
> action is opened to cultural and historical analysis which is
> as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, eh?
>
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>
>
> Huw Lloyd wrote:
>
>
> If you want to study how action changes then you need to
> study the history and production of the action. Under
> such circumstances, assertions that concepts cannot
> mediate (the production of) actions become more obviously
> false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the
> action away from its genetic base then it may seem correct
> to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action.
>
> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are
> an elegant way to demonstrate this.
>
> Best,
> Huw
>
>
>
>
> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
>
> he, he, Huw!
> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the
> very
> problems that need to be remedied by clarification!
> and I really
> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally
> being used to
> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not
> equal to
> separation.
> I really don't know what you are referring to with
> product and
> history. Perhaps you could explain?
> Andy
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>
>
> Huw Lloyd wrote:
>
> I agree about precision, but not with a call for
> "clarity". Reduction to clarity is a projection or
> reification of the
> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails
> typologies or
> other simplistic devices which prevent the
> conception and
> perception of genetic relations. Actually in
> cases such as
> these we are interested in (clarifying) the
> entanglements
> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be
> equally
> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that
> one needs to
> obfuscate (see darkly) too.
>
> I think it is this "need for simplification" which
> leads me to
> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why
> separate
> the act from its production and history?
> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity
> from
> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the
> problem.
>
> Best,
> Huw
>
> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>> wrote:
>
> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in
> the CHAT
> tradition
> specifically, as opposed to the English
> language in general,
> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of
> course, every
> action
> is both mediated and immediate, and in many
> discursive
> contexts,
> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite
> legitimately,
> but with no special significant for the use of
> CHAT. In social
> theory, for example, mediation of activities
> by other
> activities
> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation
> of actions by
> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But
> if the topic is
> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so
> central, that I
> prefer to spell it out and use the term
> "artefact-mediated" rather
> than the vague term "mediated".
>
> I have come across usages like "mediated by
> such-and-such a
> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use
> words to
> mean what
> you like, but I find a formulation like this
> in the context of
> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of
> "mediation" in
> the most general sense in a way which obscures
> the fact that a
> concept is not immediately present in any act of
> communication or
> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate
> actions*.
> Artefacts,
> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a
> concept, can of
> course mediate an act of communication. But
> the point is
> that a
> word is not universally and unproblematically
> a sign for
> any one
> concept. It means different things to
> different people.
> Concepts
> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in
> their
> materiality,
> but particular in their meaning. So when we
> have a concept
> in mind
> when we use a word in communication, the
> communication is
> mediated
> by the word not the concept, and it is a
> mistake not to be
> aware
> of that.
>
> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were
> always used in
> qualified
> way so that its specific meaning is made clear.
>
> Andy
> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his
> comment, too.
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>
>
>
> Greg Thompson wrote:
>
> Does "mediation" only apply to language
> and culture?
>
> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which
> case we
> would need
> to include
> reflexes)
>
> And does it include our socio-contextual
> surround as in
> Bateson's man with
> the stick? (in which case, we would need
> to include
> newborns).
>
> Just wonderin'.
>
> -greg
>
>
> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H
> Kirshner
> <dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>
> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>
> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>
> <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu <mailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>>> wrote:
>
> Thanks for replies.
> I'm recalling several years ago Jim
> Greeno decided
> to stop
> talking about
> situated cognition because the
> pragmatics of
> adjectival
> use implies there
> has to be a contrasting non-situated
> cognition. He now
> speaks of
> situativity theory. It seems, with the
> exception of
> physical reflexes (and
> perhaps pre-conscious infant
> activity), all human
> action
> is mediated (and
> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as
> well). So, it's
> worth noting that
> "mediated action" doesn't specify a
> kind of
> action, but
> rather a
> theoretical assumption about all human
> action; though
> there seems to be
> some variation in interpretation of
> what that
> assumption
> entails.
> David
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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