From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Sep 1 00:30:26 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 1 Sep 2014 16:30:26 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Halliday and Vygotsky Message-ID: Martin-- I think, if you've read "Learning to Mean", you've got the essentials (although there is a whole volume of Halliday's Collected Works, with a huge CD of the complete Nigel Transcripts that supports this now). And you've certainly got the esssential compability between Halliday and Vygotsky that is lacking when I read Langacker. Firstly, development. Halliday uses real data, from real people. The latest work is entirely corpus based. As you can see from Langacker's articles, he makes up his data. To me, this means he is all explanation and no description. Secondly, what develops is free choice. For Halliday, a system is essentially paradigmatic, like Vygotsky's description of thinking in Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech. A grammatical choice like tense or polarity is in essence a crossroads; it's a place where you can turn left or right (and sometimes go straight, but for the choices to be manageable to a human mind, they need to be fairly few). Langacker doesn't see this: his way of handling complexity is not to give us systems within systems but instead to give us superhuman powers of access and activation (essentially, superhuman powers of empathy). But as Vygotsky says in HDHMF, the concept of the development of higher mental functions, the concept of cultural behavior, and the concept of the development of self control are essentially one and the same concept. Thirdly, both Halliday and Vygotsky are Marxists, and they both insist on a dialectical concept of development. I don't see this in Langacker at all--instead, I see rather Piagetian remarks, like "Experientially, each of us occupies the very centre of our universe, from which we apprehend the world around us." Halliday is always interrogating function about structure, and history about function. Langacker is mosly interrogating made up examples. I don't want to say that there are NO differences to be reconciled between Halliday and Vygotsky. The most obvious difference, though, is the least useful: Halliday talks of metafunctions that are made up of grammatical systems, while Vygotsky wants us to accept that psychological systems are made up of functions. I think this difference is actually uninteresting, because when Vygotsky uses the word "function" he's talking about choices (i.e. Halliday's systems) and when Vygotsky uses the term "system" he's talking about interfunctional relations (i.e. Halliday's metafunctions). A more substantial difference is that Halliday sees the grammatical system as being revolutionized during child development, while the semantics are basically stable. Vygotsky sees speech as revolutionizing thinking as well. Finally, I think Halliday would reject the idea that Vygotsky argues in Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech--that thinking (that is, the ideational metafunction, the representative function of speech) happens somehow on an inner plane, which is then projected onto a plane of "inner speech (that is, Rheme and New in the textual metafunction) and then realized as "outer speech" (Halliday's interpersonal metafunction). For Hallliday, ideation, textualization, and interpersonalization exist in thinking as well as in speech and at every point along the way; they must be variously represented whenever we speak, and however we do it, and at clause level they are mapped onto each other (as transitivity, information structure, and mood). But the very fact that Halliday, unlike Langacker, separates clause structure into these three metafunctions, and that these three metafunctions (the ideational, the textual, and the interpersonal) correspond very precisely to "Thinking", "and" and "Speech" tells you quite a bit about the latent affinities between Halliday and Vygotsky, there to be brought out.. In practical terms, Halliday's sociology is not just Marxist but Bernsteinian: if we really do not accept that language has a potentially liberating effect, then we have to accept that it is also has a potentially crippling effect. Interestingly, this was Stalin's position against Marr and Vygotsky: language is not part of the superstructure, it is part of the base. My own view is that both are right--language viewed from economic activity is superstructure, but language viewed from ontogenesis is base. So if we do not accept that that parent language has an effect on a child's code and therefore on his or herl classpirations (pardon my portmanteau), then we can conclude only either a) we already live in a classless society (Leontiev), or b) language is more afterthought than aperitif (Piaget). David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Sep 1 09:07:53 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Mon, 1 Sep 2014 10:07:53 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Halliday and Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5E12EFFC-75E8-473E-8260-8D6E8DDC2A97@gmail.com> David, Let me start by saying I feel like an imposter taking part in this dialog at all, so new to XMCA and so short on deep knowledge of Vygotsky (though I've tried for many years to get there!) and totally lacking in a knowledge of Halliday, so many years since I have read from his work. Sorry about that. However, I am glad that I weighed in a few days back by introducing Langacker into the conversation and totally appreciate you would respond. I am sure that your contrast between Halliday and Langacker are well taken, however I think that, for me, the important contrast is not between Langacker and Halliday, but between Langacker and Halliday, on the one side, and Chomsky on the other. This is important for the historical development of linguistics as a discipline, in the U.S. at least, in the same way that William James, and Charles Peirce before James, represented a leap in the development of psychology and philosophy on this side of the waters. I understand that European traditions in philosophy and psychology, more influenced by Marxist thinking, are markedly different from those in the U.S., and that may have something to do with your analysis. However, I think Langacker has much to offer to the XMCA dialog. I am thinking that Langacker is a complement to Halliday, not an adversary. Langacker and Halliday are semioticians, as was Vygotsky. Chomsky, who has made his reputation by attacking structural linguistics and behavioralism, sees language as an autonomous cognitive module and grammar as autonomous from meaning; with Fodor he sees syntax and meaning as "blind" to one another. Langacker sees externally realized language form as a subset of meaning and language as rooted in all cognitive functioning; in other words, he sees (language-based) semantic space as a subset of symbolic space. Though Langacker doesn't focus on language development, what little he says makes it clearly the result of a dynamic interplay between real language use in context and the developing grammar of the child. Grammar as structure is a reification of the dynamics of mental processing, just as nouns are reifications of verbs. There's a simplicity in his grammatical analysis that I think is of use in understanding the connection between language and thinking: Words stand for things, processes and relations. This is in line with what we have all learned about "parts of speech", but Langacker, by construing parts of speech this way, makes grammatical analysis meaningful/semantic, not formalistic. For Langacker, language and meaning are both in the head of the language user and "out there" in the world. I think I get why you find Langacker's comment on each of us "experientially occupying the center of the universe" as Piagetian: egocentric thinking. But, as per Langacker, language reveals our ability to construe "the universe" non-egocentrically. His work in subjectification and objectification is interesting on this score. You are certainly right that Langacker "makes up" his examples of language, but they are good examples and that's how specialists in grammar work. I agree with you that "thick description" has got to be done to understand language, but that's not an argument against introspection. His work is in Cognitive Grammar, not the broader discipline of cognitive linguistics. Halliday, I believe, is seen as a scholar of functional linguistics, which is very much compatible with cognitive linguistics. One of the hard problems of cognitive linguistics and Cognitive Grammar is to take on discourse. The work of Bruner on narrative as a foundation for cultural psychology appears to have taken hold in XMCA circles. (An excellent article by Andy Blunden (2010), Narrative and Metaphors tells me so.) I was hoping that Langacker might find favor there too. (Or, I should say here, since I am gratefully part of the circle!) I'll end by repeating my sense of inadequacy in making the case for Langacker. The article by Merja and her colleagues in Helsinki is evidence that Langacker is of use to others in the CHAT, others that are NOT impostors! Henry On Sep 1, 2014, at 1:30 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Martin-- > > I think, if you've read "Learning to Mean", you've got the essentials > (although there is a whole volume of Halliday's Collected Works, with > a huge CD of the complete Nigel Transcripts that supports this now). > And you've certainly got the esssential compability between Halliday > and Vygotsky that is lacking when I read Langacker. > > Firstly, development. Halliday uses real data, from real people. The > latest work is entirely corpus based. As you can see from Langacker's > articles, he makes up his data. To me, this means he is all > explanation and no description. > > Secondly, what develops is free choice. For Halliday, a system is > essentially paradigmatic, like Vygotsky's description of thinking in > Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech. A grammatical choice like tense > or polarity is in essence a crossroads; it's a place where you can > turn left or right (and sometimes go straight, but for the choices to > be manageable to a human mind, they need to be fairly few). Langacker > doesn't see this: his way of handling complexity is not to give us > systems within systems but instead to give us superhuman powers of > access and activation (essentially, superhuman powers of empathy). But > as Vygotsky says in HDHMF, the concept of the development of higher > mental functions, the concept of cultural behavior, and the concept of > the development of self control are essentially one and the same > concept. > > Thirdly, both Halliday and Vygotsky are Marxists, and they both insist > on a dialectical concept of development. I don't see this in Langacker > at all--instead, I see rather Piagetian remarks, like "Experientially, > each of us occupies the very centre of our universe, from which we > apprehend the world around us." Halliday is always interrogating > function about structure, and history about function. Langacker is > mosly interrogating made up examples. > > I don't want to say that there are NO differences to be reconciled > between Halliday and Vygotsky. The most obvious difference, though, is > the least useful: Halliday talks of metafunctions that are made up of > grammatical systems, while Vygotsky wants us to accept that > psychological systems are made up of functions. I think this > difference is actually uninteresting, because when Vygotsky uses the > word "function" he's talking about choices (i.e. Halliday's systems) > and when Vygotsky uses the term "system" he's talking about > interfunctional relations (i.e. Halliday's metafunctions). > > A more substantial difference is that Halliday sees the grammatical > system as being revolutionized during child development, while the > semantics are basically stable. Vygotsky sees speech as > revolutionizing thinking as well. > > Finally, I think Halliday would reject the idea that Vygotsky argues > in Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech--that thinking (that is, the > ideational metafunction, the representative function of speech) > happens somehow on an inner plane, which is then projected onto a > plane of "inner speech (that is, Rheme and New in the textual > metafunction) and then realized as "outer speech" (Halliday's > interpersonal metafunction). > > For Hallliday, ideation, textualization, and interpersonalization > exist in thinking as well as in speech and at every point along the > way; they must be variously represented whenever we speak, and however > we do it, and at clause level they are mapped onto each other (as > transitivity, information structure, and mood). But the very fact that > Halliday, unlike Langacker, separates clause structure into these > three metafunctions, and that these three metafunctions (the > ideational, the textual, and the interpersonal) correspond very > precisely to "Thinking", "and" and "Speech" tells you quite a bit > about the latent affinities between Halliday and Vygotsky, there to be > brought out.. > > In practical terms, Halliday's sociology is not just Marxist but > Bernsteinian: if we really do not accept that language has a > potentially liberating effect, then we have to accept that it is also > has a potentially crippling effect. Interestingly, this was Stalin's > position against Marr and Vygotsky: language is not part of the > superstructure, it is part of the base. > > My own view is that both are right--language viewed from economic > activity is superstructure, but language viewed from ontogenesis is > base. So if we do not accept that that parent language has an effect > on a child's code and therefore on his or herl classpirations (pardon > my portmanteau), then we can conclude only either a) we already live > in a classless society (Leontiev), or b) language is more afterthought > than aperitif (Piaget). > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies From djwdoc@yahoo.com Mon Sep 1 10:22:06 2014 From: djwdoc@yahoo.com (Douglas Williams) Date: Mon, 1 Sep 2014 10:22:06 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Halliday and Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <5E12EFFC-75E8-473E-8260-8D6E8DDC2A97@gmail.com> References: <5E12EFFC-75E8-473E-8260-8D6E8DDC2A97@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1409592126.56991.YahooMailNeo@web164701.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> Hi-- I'm a little out of practice at this (if you're new, Henry, I think I would be "decayed"), and I know nothing of Halliday, so I will admit to even greater inadequacy. But I took an interest in Cognitive Linguistics awhile back, and Chomsky too. For what it's worth, I think you're on the right track. For Chomsky, grammar and language are so infinitely complex that they can only exist in the presence of a black box, an innate sense of grammar, that, like a cryptographic key, provides the basis for beginning interpretation. Humans are not just physiologically adapted to language activity, but are atomic linguistic beings: in a fundamental way, language is beyond culture and experience. It is a theory of dico, ergo sum. For Langacker, grammar and language begins with the embodied nature of our perception--up, down, on, under, here, there--but it doesn't end there; this physiological sense of size, perspective, and experience in our world provides the cryptographic key for associating sounds with activity and experience. I can't claim to have any profound insights into Langacker, though I struggled through (or scanned for comprehension) Foundations of Cognitive Grammar volumes 1 and 2, and it's been a long time since I looked at them, but I think the parallel is to language emerging from mimetic representation, first from observation and experience, and then internalized as the basis for shared mimetic representations associated with sounds, along the lines of Merlin Donald--and of course CHAT: Meaning emerges from interaction with objects, sounds and a community in action--and this experience of language, enriched with meanings derived from the practical experiences of others,and logic beyond the experience of the child, rapidly becomes the medium of self-expression and analytical action. The Cognitive Metaphor part of Cognitive Linguistics is an extension of that idea: Language has built into it what Marx might call the dead labor of generations in creating shorthand narratives of experience and action, both in a strictly embodied sense within the physical constraints of our world (up is hard, down is easy; "it's all downhill from here") and in more complex interpersonal and societal interactions. The implicit educational idea in this is surely what drew together film director Sergei Eisenstein and Zaporozhets, Leontiev, Luria and Vygotsky in the late 1920s and early 1930s, to better understand how montage and the language of cinema worked, and to understand ways of using cinema to teach; to make, in short, the tools and activities of culture available not just for use, but for design--or perhaps better, since tools always find uses beyond the imagination of their designers, to create more affordances to enrich the creative potential of people in society. Regards, Doug Williams Pilgrim on the Road to Nowhere ________________________________ From: Henry G. Shonerd III To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Monday, September 1, 2014 9:07 AM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Halliday and Vygotsky David, Let me start by saying I feel like an imposter taking part in this dialog at all, so new to XMCA and so short on deep knowledge of Vygotsky (though I've tried for many years to get there!) and totally lacking in a knowledge of Halliday, so many years since I have read from his work. Sorry about that. However, I am glad that I weighed in a few days back by introducing Langacker into the conversation and totally appreciate you would respond. I am sure that your contrast between Halliday and Langacker are well taken, however I think that, for me, the important contrast is not between Langacker and Halliday, but between Langacker and Halliday, on the one side, and Chomsky on the other. This is important for the historical development of linguistics as a discipline, in the U.S. at least, in the same way that William James, and Charles Peirce before James, represented a leap in the development of psychology and philosophy on this side of the waters. I understand that European traditions in philosophy and psychology, more influenced by Marxist thinking, are markedly different from those in the U.S., and that may have something to do with your analysis. However, I think Langacker has much to offer to the XMCA dialog. I am thinking that Langacker is a complement to Halliday, not an adversary. Langacker and Halliday are semioticians, as was Vygotsky. Chomsky, who has made his reputation by attacking structural linguistics and behavioralism, sees language as an autonomous cognitive module and grammar as autonomous from meaning; with Fodor he sees syntax and meaning as "blind" to one another. Langacker sees externally realized language form as a subset of meaning and language as rooted in all cognitive functioning; in other words, he sees (language-based) semantic space as a subset of symbolic space. Though Langacker doesn't focus on language development, what little he says makes it clearly the result of a dynamic interplay between real language use in context and the developing grammar of the child. Grammar as structure is a reification of the dynamics of mental processing, just as nouns are reifications of verbs. There's a simplicity in his grammatical analysis that I think is of use in understanding the connection between language and thinking: Words stand for things, processes and relations. This is in line with what we have all learned about "parts of speech", but Langacker, by construing parts of speech this way, makes grammatical analysis meaningful/semantic, not formalistic. For Langacker, language and meaning are both in the head of the language user and "out there" in the world. I think I get why you find Langacker's comment on each of us "experientially occupying the center of the universe" as Piagetian: egocentric thinking. But, as per Langacker, language reveals our ability to construe "the universe" non-egocentrically. His work in subjectification and objectification is interesting on this score. You are certainly right that Langacker "makes up" his examples of language, but they are good examples and that's how specialists in grammar work. I agree with you that "thick description" has got to be done to understand language, but that's not an argument against introspection. His work is in Cognitive Grammar, not the broader discipline of cognitive linguistics. Halliday, I believe, is seen as a scholar of functional linguistics, which is very much compatible with cognitive linguistics. One of the hard problems of cognitive linguistics and Cognitive Grammar is to take on discourse. The work of Bruner on narrative as a foundation for cultural psychology appears to have taken hold in XMCA circles. (An excellent article by Andy Blunden (2010), Narrative and Metaphors tells me so.) I was hoping that Langacker might find favor there too. (Or, I should say here, since I am gratefully part of the circle!) I'll end by repeating my sense of inadequacy in making the case for Langacker. The article by Merja and her colleagues in Helsinki is evidence that Langacker is of use to others in the CHAT, others that are NOT impostors! Henry On Sep 1, 2014, at 1:30 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Martin-- > > I think, if you've read "Learning to Mean", you've got the essentials > (although there is a whole volume of Halliday's Collected Works, with > a huge CD of the complete Nigel Transcripts that supports this now). > And you've certainly got the esssential compability between Halliday > and Vygotsky that is lacking when I read Langacker. > > Firstly, development. Halliday uses real data, from real people. The > latest work is entirely corpus based. As you can see from Langacker's > articles, he makes up his data. To me, this means he is all > explanation and no description. > > Secondly, what develops is free choice. For Halliday, a system is > essentially paradigmatic, like Vygotsky's description of thinking in > Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech. A grammatical choice like tense > or polarity is in essence a crossroads; it's a place where you can > turn left or right (and sometimes go straight, but for the choices to > be manageable to a human mind, they need to be fairly few). Langacker > doesn't see this: his way of handling complexity is not to give us > systems within systems but instead to give us superhuman powers of > access and activation (essentially, superhuman powers of empathy). But > as Vygotsky says in HDHMF, the concept of the development of higher > mental functions, the concept of cultural behavior, and the concept of > the development of self control are essentially one and the same > concept. > > Thirdly, both Halliday and Vygotsky are Marxists, and they both insist > on a dialectical concept of development. I don't see this in Langacker > at all--instead, I see rather Piagetian remarks, like "Experientially, > each of us occupies the very centre of our universe, from which we > apprehend the world around us." Halliday is always interrogating > function about structure, and history about function. Langacker is > mosly interrogating made up examples. > > I don't want to say that there are NO differences to be reconciled > between Halliday and Vygotsky. The most obvious difference, though, is > the least useful: Halliday talks of metafunctions that are made up of > grammatical systems, while Vygotsky wants us to accept that > psychological systems are made up of functions. I think this > difference is actually uninteresting, because when Vygotsky uses the > word "function" he's talking about choices (i.e. Halliday's systems) > and when Vygotsky uses the term "system" he's talking about > interfunctional relations (i.e. Halliday's metafunctions). > > A more substantial difference is that Halliday sees the grammatical > system as being revolutionized during child development, while the > semantics are basically stable. Vygotsky sees speech as > revolutionizing thinking as well. > > Finally, I think Halliday would reject the idea that Vygotsky argues > in Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech--that thinking (that is, the > ideational metafunction, the representative function of speech) > happens somehow on an inner plane, which is then projected onto a > plane of "inner speech (that is, Rheme and New in the textual > metafunction) and then realized as "outer speech" (Halliday's > interpersonal metafunction). > > For Hallliday, ideation, textualization, and interpersonalization > exist in thinking as well as in speech and at every point along the > way; they must be variously represented whenever we speak, and however > we do it, and at clause level they are mapped onto each other (as > transitivity, information structure, and mood). But the very fact that > Halliday, unlike Langacker, separates clause structure into these > three metafunctions, and that these three metafunctions (the > ideational, the textual, and the interpersonal) correspond very > precisely to "Thinking", "and" and "Speech" tells you quite a bit > about the latent affinities between Halliday and Vygotsky, there to be > brought out.. > > In practical terms, Halliday's sociology is not just Marxist but > Bernsteinian: if we really do not accept that language has a > potentially liberating effect, then we have to accept that it is also > has a potentially crippling effect. Interestingly, this was Stalin's > position against Marr and Vygotsky: language is not part of the > superstructure, it is part of the base. > > My own view is that both are right--language viewed from economic > activity is superstructure, but language viewed from ontogenesis is > base. So if we do not accept that that parent language has an effect > on a child's code and therefore on his or herl classpirations (pardon > my portmanteau), then we can conclude only either a) we already live > in a classless society (Leontiev), or b) language is more afterthought > than aperitif (Piaget). > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies From lchcmike@gmail.com Mon Sep 1 10:56:47 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Mon, 1 Sep 2014 10:56:47 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Halliday and Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <5E12EFFC-75E8-473E-8260-8D6E8DDC2A97@gmail.com> References: <5E12EFFC-75E8-473E-8260-8D6E8DDC2A97@gmail.com> Message-ID: We are students, here, Henry. An imposter would someone who poses as a guru who hands down THE WORD, not one who seeks to understand. I believe that among many important distinctions David introduced, the emphasis on development, on change over time, is an important differentiator among scholarly traditions under discussion. We imagine we see many affinities, locally, among (for example) the DCOG approach of Ed Hutchins and his colleagues and LCHC folks. But was also see our different emphases on development as a difference that makes a difference -- a topic of ongoing discussion and exploration. There are many such in David's recent posts. mike On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 9:07 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > David, > Let me start by saying I feel like an imposter taking part in this dialog > at all, so new to XMCA and so short on deep knowledge of Vygotsky (though > I've tried for many years to get there!) and totally lacking in a knowledge > of Halliday, so many years since I have read from his work. Sorry about > that. However, I am glad that I weighed in a few days back by introducing > Langacker into the conversation and totally appreciate you would respond. > > I am sure that your contrast between Halliday and Langacker are well > taken, however I think that, for me, the important contrast is not between > Langacker and Halliday, but between Langacker and Halliday, on the one > side, and Chomsky on the other. This is important for the historical > development of linguistics as a discipline, in the U.S. at least, in the > same way that William James, and Charles Peirce before James, represented a > leap in the development of psychology and philosophy on this side of the > waters. I understand that European traditions in philosophy and psychology, > more influenced by Marxist thinking, are markedly different from those in > the U.S., and that may have something to do with your analysis. However, I > think Langacker has much to offer to the XMCA dialog. I am thinking that > Langacker is a complement to Halliday, not an adversary. > > Langacker and Halliday are semioticians, as was Vygotsky. Chomsky, who has > made his reputation by attacking structural linguistics and behavioralism, > sees language as an autonomous cognitive module and grammar as autonomous > from meaning; with Fodor he sees syntax and meaning as "blind" to one > another. Langacker sees externally realized language form as a subset of > meaning and language as rooted in all cognitive functioning; in other > words, he sees (language-based) semantic space as a subset of symbolic > space. Though Langacker doesn't focus on language development, what little > he says makes it clearly the result of a dynamic interplay between real > language use in context and the developing grammar of the child. Grammar as > structure is a reification of the dynamics of mental processing, just as > nouns are reifications of verbs. There's a simplicity in his grammatical > analysis that I think is of use in understanding the connection between > language and thinking: Words stand for things, processes and relations. > This is in line with what we have all learned about "parts of speech", but > Langacker, by construing parts of speech this way, makes grammatical > analysis meaningful/semantic, not formalistic. For Langacker, language and > meaning are both in the head of the language user and "out there" in the > world. I think I get why you find Langacker's comment on each of us > "experientially occupying the center of the universe" as Piagetian: > egocentric thinking. But, as per Langacker, language reveals our ability to > construe "the universe" non-egocentrically. His work in subjectification > and objectification is interesting on this score. You are certainly right > that Langacker "makes up" his examples of language, but they are good > examples and that's how specialists in grammar work. I agree with you that > "thick description" has got to be done to understand language, but that's > not an argument against introspection. His work is in Cognitive Grammar, > not the broader discipline of cognitive linguistics. Halliday, I believe, > is seen as a scholar of functional linguistics, which is very much > compatible with cognitive linguistics. One of the hard problems of > cognitive linguistics and Cognitive Grammar is to take on discourse. The > work of Bruner on narrative as a foundation for cultural psychology appears > to have taken hold in XMCA circles. (An excellent article by Andy Blunden > (2010), Narrative and Metaphors tells me so.) I was hoping that Langacker > might find favor there too. (Or, I should say here, since I am gratefully > part of the circle!) > > I'll end by repeating my sense of inadequacy in making the case for > Langacker. The article by Merja and her colleagues in Helsinki is evidence > that Langacker is of use to others in the CHAT, others that are NOT > impostors! > Henry > > On Sep 1, 2014, at 1:30 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > Martin-- > > > > I think, if you've read "Learning to Mean", you've got the essentials > > (although there is a whole volume of Halliday's Collected Works, with > > a huge CD of the complete Nigel Transcripts that supports this now). > > And you've certainly got the esssential compability between Halliday > > and Vygotsky that is lacking when I read Langacker. > > > > Firstly, development. Halliday uses real data, from real people. The > > latest work is entirely corpus based. As you can see from Langacker's > > articles, he makes up his data. To me, this means he is all > > explanation and no description. > > > > Secondly, what develops is free choice. For Halliday, a system is > > essentially paradigmatic, like Vygotsky's description of thinking in > > Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech. A grammatical choice like tense > > or polarity is in essence a crossroads; it's a place where you can > > turn left or right (and sometimes go straight, but for the choices to > > be manageable to a human mind, they need to be fairly few). Langacker > > doesn't see this: his way of handling complexity is not to give us > > systems within systems but instead to give us superhuman powers of > > access and activation (essentially, superhuman powers of empathy). But > > as Vygotsky says in HDHMF, the concept of the development of higher > > mental functions, the concept of cultural behavior, and the concept of > > the development of self control are essentially one and the same > > concept. > > > > Thirdly, both Halliday and Vygotsky are Marxists, and they both insist > > on a dialectical concept of development. I don't see this in Langacker > > at all--instead, I see rather Piagetian remarks, like "Experientially, > > each of us occupies the very centre of our universe, from which we > > apprehend the world around us." Halliday is always interrogating > > function about structure, and history about function. Langacker is > > mosly interrogating made up examples. > > > > I don't want to say that there are NO differences to be reconciled > > between Halliday and Vygotsky. The most obvious difference, though, is > > the least useful: Halliday talks of metafunctions that are made up of > > grammatical systems, while Vygotsky wants us to accept that > > psychological systems are made up of functions. I think this > > difference is actually uninteresting, because when Vygotsky uses the > > word "function" he's talking about choices (i.e. Halliday's systems) > > and when Vygotsky uses the term "system" he's talking about > > interfunctional relations (i.e. Halliday's metafunctions). > > > > A more substantial difference is that Halliday sees the grammatical > > system as being revolutionized during child development, while the > > semantics are basically stable. Vygotsky sees speech as > > revolutionizing thinking as well. > > > > Finally, I think Halliday would reject the idea that Vygotsky argues > > in Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech--that thinking (that is, the > > ideational metafunction, the representative function of speech) > > happens somehow on an inner plane, which is then projected onto a > > plane of "inner speech (that is, Rheme and New in the textual > > metafunction) and then realized as "outer speech" (Halliday's > > interpersonal metafunction). > > > > For Hallliday, ideation, textualization, and interpersonalization > > exist in thinking as well as in speech and at every point along the > > way; they must be variously represented whenever we speak, and however > > we do it, and at clause level they are mapped onto each other (as > > transitivity, information structure, and mood). But the very fact that > > Halliday, unlike Langacker, separates clause structure into these > > three metafunctions, and that these three metafunctions (the > > ideational, the textual, and the interpersonal) correspond very > > precisely to "Thinking", "and" and "Speech" tells you quite a bit > > about the latent affinities between Halliday and Vygotsky, there to be > > brought out.. > > > > In practical terms, Halliday's sociology is not just Marxist but > > Bernsteinian: if we really do not accept that language has a > > potentially liberating effect, then we have to accept that it is also > > has a potentially crippling effect. Interestingly, this was Stalin's > > position against Marr and Vygotsky: language is not part of the > > superstructure, it is part of the base. > > > > My own view is that both are right--language viewed from economic > > activity is superstructure, but language viewed from ontogenesis is > > base. So if we do not accept that that parent language has an effect > > on a child's code and therefore on his or herl classpirations (pardon > > my portmanteau), then we can conclude only either a) we already live > > in a classless society (Leontiev), or b) language is more afterthought > > than aperitif (Piaget). > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Sep 1 15:01:32 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 1 Sep 2014 23:01:32 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Halliday and Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: <5E12EFFC-75E8-473E-8260-8D6E8DDC2A97@gmail.com> Message-ID: Surely any respectable guru should be handing down the the deed rather than the word? :) On 1 September 2014 18:56, mike cole wrote: > We are students, here, Henry. An imposter would someone who poses as a guru > who hands down THE WORD, not one who seeks to understand. > > I believe that among many important distinctions David introduced, the > emphasis on development, on change over time, is an important > differentiator among scholarly traditions under discussion. We imagine we > see many affinities, locally, among (for example) the DCOG approach of Ed > Hutchins and his colleagues and LCHC folks. But was also see our different > emphases on development as a difference that makes a difference -- a topic > of ongoing discussion and exploration. > > There are many such in David's recent posts. > mike > > > > > On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 9:07 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: > > > David, > > Let me start by saying I feel like an imposter taking part in this dialog > > at all, so new to XMCA and so short on deep knowledge of Vygotsky (though > > I've tried for many years to get there!) and totally lacking in a > knowledge > > of Halliday, so many years since I have read from his work. Sorry about > > that. However, I am glad that I weighed in a few days back by introducing > > Langacker into the conversation and totally appreciate you would respond. > > > > I am sure that your contrast between Halliday and Langacker are well > > taken, however I think that, for me, the important contrast is not > between > > Langacker and Halliday, but between Langacker and Halliday, on the one > > side, and Chomsky on the other. This is important for the historical > > development of linguistics as a discipline, in the U.S. at least, in the > > same way that William James, and Charles Peirce before James, > represented a > > leap in the development of psychology and philosophy on this side of the > > waters. I understand that European traditions in philosophy and > psychology, > > more influenced by Marxist thinking, are markedly different from those in > > the U.S., and that may have something to do with your analysis. However, > I > > think Langacker has much to offer to the XMCA dialog. I am thinking that > > Langacker is a complement to Halliday, not an adversary. > > > > Langacker and Halliday are semioticians, as was Vygotsky. Chomsky, who > has > > made his reputation by attacking structural linguistics and > behavioralism, > > sees language as an autonomous cognitive module and grammar as autonomous > > from meaning; with Fodor he sees syntax and meaning as "blind" to one > > another. Langacker sees externally realized language form as a subset of > > meaning and language as rooted in all cognitive functioning; in other > > words, he sees (language-based) semantic space as a subset of symbolic > > space. Though Langacker doesn't focus on language development, what > little > > he says makes it clearly the result of a dynamic interplay between real > > language use in context and the developing grammar of the child. Grammar > as > > structure is a reification of the dynamics of mental processing, just as > > nouns are reifications of verbs. There's a simplicity in his grammatical > > analysis that I think is of use in understanding the connection between > > language and thinking: Words stand for things, processes and relations. > > This is in line with what we have all learned about "parts of speech", > but > > Langacker, by construing parts of speech this way, makes grammatical > > analysis meaningful/semantic, not formalistic. For Langacker, language > and > > meaning are both in the head of the language user and "out there" in the > > world. I think I get why you find Langacker's comment on each of us > > "experientially occupying the center of the universe" as Piagetian: > > egocentric thinking. But, as per Langacker, language reveals our ability > to > > construe "the universe" non-egocentrically. His work in subjectification > > and objectification is interesting on this score. You are certainly right > > that Langacker "makes up" his examples of language, but they are good > > examples and that's how specialists in grammar work. I agree with you > that > > "thick description" has got to be done to understand language, but that's > > not an argument against introspection. His work is in Cognitive Grammar, > > not the broader discipline of cognitive linguistics. Halliday, I believe, > > is seen as a scholar of functional linguistics, which is very much > > compatible with cognitive linguistics. One of the hard problems of > > cognitive linguistics and Cognitive Grammar is to take on discourse. The > > work of Bruner on narrative as a foundation for cultural psychology > appears > > to have taken hold in XMCA circles. (An excellent article by Andy Blunden > > (2010), Narrative and Metaphors tells me so.) I was hoping that Langacker > > might find favor there too. (Or, I should say here, since I am gratefully > > part of the circle!) > > > > I'll end by repeating my sense of inadequacy in making the case for > > Langacker. The article by Merja and her colleagues in Helsinki is > evidence > > that Langacker is of use to others in the CHAT, others that are NOT > > impostors! > > Henry > > > > On Sep 1, 2014, at 1:30 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > Martin-- > > > > > > I think, if you've read "Learning to Mean", you've got the essentials > > > (although there is a whole volume of Halliday's Collected Works, with > > > a huge CD of the complete Nigel Transcripts that supports this now). > > > And you've certainly got the esssential compability between Halliday > > > and Vygotsky that is lacking when I read Langacker. > > > > > > Firstly, development. Halliday uses real data, from real people. The > > > latest work is entirely corpus based. As you can see from Langacker's > > > articles, he makes up his data. To me, this means he is all > > > explanation and no description. > > > > > > Secondly, what develops is free choice. For Halliday, a system is > > > essentially paradigmatic, like Vygotsky's description of thinking in > > > Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech. A grammatical choice like tense > > > or polarity is in essence a crossroads; it's a place where you can > > > turn left or right (and sometimes go straight, but for the choices to > > > be manageable to a human mind, they need to be fairly few). Langacker > > > doesn't see this: his way of handling complexity is not to give us > > > systems within systems but instead to give us superhuman powers of > > > access and activation (essentially, superhuman powers of empathy). But > > > as Vygotsky says in HDHMF, the concept of the development of higher > > > mental functions, the concept of cultural behavior, and the concept of > > > the development of self control are essentially one and the same > > > concept. > > > > > > Thirdly, both Halliday and Vygotsky are Marxists, and they both insist > > > on a dialectical concept of development. I don't see this in Langacker > > > at all--instead, I see rather Piagetian remarks, like "Experientially, > > > each of us occupies the very centre of our universe, from which we > > > apprehend the world around us." Halliday is always interrogating > > > function about structure, and history about function. Langacker is > > > mosly interrogating made up examples. > > > > > > I don't want to say that there are NO differences to be reconciled > > > between Halliday and Vygotsky. The most obvious difference, though, is > > > the least useful: Halliday talks of metafunctions that are made up of > > > grammatical systems, while Vygotsky wants us to accept that > > > psychological systems are made up of functions. I think this > > > difference is actually uninteresting, because when Vygotsky uses the > > > word "function" he's talking about choices (i.e. Halliday's systems) > > > and when Vygotsky uses the term "system" he's talking about > > > interfunctional relations (i.e. Halliday's metafunctions). > > > > > > A more substantial difference is that Halliday sees the grammatical > > > system as being revolutionized during child development, while the > > > semantics are basically stable. Vygotsky sees speech as > > > revolutionizing thinking as well. > > > > > > Finally, I think Halliday would reject the idea that Vygotsky argues > > > in Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech--that thinking (that is, the > > > ideational metafunction, the representative function of speech) > > > happens somehow on an inner plane, which is then projected onto a > > > plane of "inner speech (that is, Rheme and New in the textual > > > metafunction) and then realized as "outer speech" (Halliday's > > > interpersonal metafunction). > > > > > > For Hallliday, ideation, textualization, and interpersonalization > > > exist in thinking as well as in speech and at every point along the > > > way; they must be variously represented whenever we speak, and however > > > we do it, and at clause level they are mapped onto each other (as > > > transitivity, information structure, and mood). But the very fact that > > > Halliday, unlike Langacker, separates clause structure into these > > > three metafunctions, and that these three metafunctions (the > > > ideational, the textual, and the interpersonal) correspond very > > > precisely to "Thinking", "and" and "Speech" tells you quite a bit > > > about the latent affinities between Halliday and Vygotsky, there to be > > > brought out.. > > > > > > In practical terms, Halliday's sociology is not just Marxist but > > > Bernsteinian: if we really do not accept that language has a > > > potentially liberating effect, then we have to accept that it is also > > > has a potentially crippling effect. Interestingly, this was Stalin's > > > position against Marr and Vygotsky: language is not part of the > > > superstructure, it is part of the base. > > > > > > My own view is that both are right--language viewed from economic > > > activity is superstructure, but language viewed from ontogenesis is > > > base. So if we do not accept that that parent language has an effect > > > on a child's code and therefore on his or herl classpirations (pardon > > > my portmanteau), then we can conclude only either a) we already live > > > in a classless society (Leontiev), or b) language is more afterthought > > > than aperitif (Piaget). > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Sep 1 15:37:45 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 1 Sep 2014 23:37:45 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Highlander Center in Tennessee In-Reply-To: References: <53F9E94F.4060506@mira.net> <5400424D.4070208@mira.net> <2A41C980-4AC3-4E4C-A9EB-452B0A35750F@gmail.com> <54026EB2.8000801@mira.net> Message-ID: Thanks for bringing the Highlander Center topic up, Andy. In addition to thinking about Peg's comment, one of things that struck me was the accord with Lefebvre's ideas in the production of space, i.e. new social relations calling for a new space. Best, Huw On 31 August 2014 15:58, mike cole wrote: > Good luck, all. > Mike > > On Saturday, August 30, 2014, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Helena Worthen and Greg Thompson have responded off-line, in addition to > > Robert Lake and you who proposed it, Mike. And Helena wants to involve > > someone on the Highlander faculty. When does a collaborative review > article > > become a broth with too many cooks? Pretty soon I think. > > I will send a message to this group off-line to see if we can get a plan. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > mike cole wrote: > > > >> I have heard no news of deadlines about an article of the sort I thought > >> Andy was suggesting. And it appears that at least Andy and Robert are > >> interested, and perhaps Henry? And? > >> > >> No centralized organization seems appropriate here. Those interested can > >> recognize themselves from the discussion and let the editors what > emerges. > >> > >> The theme(s) is/are clearly generative of interest. > >> mike > >> > >> > >> On Sat, Aug 30, 2014 at 2:27 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > hshonerd@gmail.com > >> > > >> wrote: > >> > >> > >> > >>> Hi Robert and Andy, > >>> Taking a biographical perspective on a smaller scale, it's interesting > >>> that an Australian Vygotskian/Hegellian/dialectic scholar would find so > >>> interesting the civil rights work of a courageous Black woman, that a > >>> white > >>> professor who gets impetus for writing while in movement (as he > explains > >>> in > >>> his letter to Vera) would have a thorough knowledge of her work, and > >>> that a > >>> Black scholar (Lisa Delpit), should be associated with the "dark side" > in > >>> literacy for minorities. How pun-ishingly ironic, maybe at the heart of > >>> the > >>> dialectic? Does it make sense to see such "entanglements" as consonant > >>> with > >>> a fractal model of history and culture, fractal formations at any scale > >>> being "self similar" and complex. Surely dialect thinking and fractal > >>> thinking are blendable, just as science and art are blendable. I am > >>> thinking about Fauconnier and Turner (on blending), Cantor (on > fractals) > >>> and articles by Andy on metaphor and narrative, romantic science and > the > >>> interaction of conceptual and pre-conceptual thinking. One more > personal > >>> anecdote ties in. Two weekends ago my wife and I had lunch with Vera > and > >>> Ruben in Santa Fe. She talked about the creative "leap". In her 1985 > >>> Notebooks of the Mind, Vera talks about "the joining of rapid bursts of > >>> thought with a regime of disciplined work". And finally, Anna Stetsenko > >>> in > >>> the the letters to Vera (Constructing a Community of Thought), argues > >>> that > >>> "Creativity?is an ineluctable feature of all and every person in their > >>> even > >>> utmost mundane activities and pursuits of everyday life." Vera and > >>> Vygotsky > >>> bring us creativity at all scales. Typically, "going to scale" means > >>> growth. Cancer is a growth. Destructive. Creativity is generative, > >>> nurturing. In all of this I find hope, which was got me into the xmca > >>> dialog in the first place. > >>> Henry > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Aug 29, 2014, at 7:43 AM, Robert Lake > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> ?Hi ? > >>>> ?Andy, > >>>> I am so glad you are intrigued by Septima's role in the formation of > >>>> > >>>> > >>> SNCC . > >>> > >>> > >>>> She was often overlooked in the chauvinist culture of the times (both > >>>> > >>>> > >>> white > >>> > >>> > >>>> and black) and that is why began researching her life. Most people see > >>>> recognize Rosa Parks and Ella Baker's role and later those who were > >>>> credited for the "Freedom School curriculum? > >>>> ?". If you look at Clark's life and the manner and content of what she > >>>> taught on John's Island and other parts of South Carolina, ? > >>>> ?you can easily recognize that her work was seminal in the formation > of > >>>> > >>>> > >>> the > >>> > >>> > >>>> Freedom School Curriculum. > >>>> > >>>> I have tried to get permission to reprint Septima's autobiography from > >>>> > >>>> > >>> her > >>> > >>> > >>>> family, but I have been unsuccessful. The book by Cynthia Brown > *Ready > >>>> from Within *has a lot of primary source interviews. Catherine Mellon > >>>> Charon's book, *Septima Clark: Freedom's Teacher *is richly detailed > >>>> > >>>> > >>> with > >>> > >>> > >>>> many interviews of her friends and documents from primary sources > from > >>>> > >>>> > >>> the > >>> > >>> > >>>> University of Wisconsin Highlander collection. > >>>> > >>>> Here is a link to a recorded interview with Septima that may be useful > >>>> to > >>>> you. I enjoyed hearing her voice at least. > >>>> > >>>> http://docsouth.unc.edu/sohp/G-0017/menu.html > >>>> > >>>> *Robert* > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> ? > >>>> > >>>> On Aug 29, 2014 5:05 AM, "Andy Blunden" wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> So you are placing Septima Clark right up there in importance, > Robert. > >>>>> I am part way through a "chronicle" of Highlander, called > "Highlander. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> No > >>> > >>> > >>>> Ordinary school, 1932-1962". It is very useful for me, so I can get > >>>>> everything in sequence. So here I discovered that Septima Clark was > in > >>>>> charge of the discussions with the students who later joined SNCC. So > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> she > >>> > >>> > >>>> is coming into focus for me. I have just ordered two books on her, > >>>>> including the one you recommended. Unfortuantely, an autobiography > she > >>>>> wrote in 1962 seems to be out of print and entirely unavailable now. > >>>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>> ------------ > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Robert Lake wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> Hi Andy, > >>>>>> Yes I do. Start with this . > >>>>>> http://highlandercenter.org/about-us/history/ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> And this biography of Myles Horton > >>>>>> > >>>>>> http://www.amazon.com/The-Long-Haul-An-Autobiography/dp/0807737003 > >>>>>> and the biography of Septima Clark. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> http://www.amazon.com/Freedoms-Teacher-Life-Septima- > >>>>>> Clark/dp/0807872229/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid= > >>>>>> 1408889271&sr=1-2&keywords=septima+clark >>>>>> Freedoms-Teacher-Life-Septima-Clark/dp/0807872229/ref=sr_1_ > >>>>>> 2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1408889271&sr=1-2&keywords=septima+clark> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I have written a piece on her as well and will send it this > afternoon. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I think the book We Make the Road by Walking: A dialogue between > Myles > >>>>>> Horton and Paulo Freire > >>>>>> is one of the best books on both these leaders. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> More Later, > >>>>>> Robert Lake > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I will send more this afternoon. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 9:31 AM, Andy Blunden >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> >>> > >>> > >>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Does anyone on this list know about the Highlander Center, what > >>>>>> used to be called the Highlander Folk School? > >>>>>> The people there are very helpful, but they're also rushed off > >>>>>> their feet (like everyone, I guess) and if there were any other > >>>>>> sources of information about it, that would be helpful. I'm > >>>>>> particularly interested if anyone is familiar with what they were > >>>>>> doing in the 1950s and 60s. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> -- ------------------------------ > >>>>>> ------------------------------ > >>>>>> ------------ > >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> *Robert Lake Ed.D. > >>>>>> *Associate Professor > >>>>>> Social Foundations of Education > >>>>>> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > >>>>>> Georgia Southern University > >>>>>> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group > >>>>>> P. O. Box 8144 > >>>>>> Phone: (912) 478-0355 > >>>>>> Fax: (912) 478-5382 > >>>>>> Statesboro, GA 30460 > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Sep 1 15:42:29 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 2 Sep 2014 07:42:29 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Halliday and Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: <5E12EFFC-75E8-473E-8260-8D6E8DDC2A97@gmail.com> Message-ID: Of course, BOTH Huw and Mike are right. A "respectable" guru is really another name for a fellow student (cue Brahms's "Academic Overture" and another round of Weizenbier). But what gets handed down, at least according to Vygotsky, is neither word nor deed (the original Goethe reference, after all, is Mephistophelian!). It's the stern injunction that when you get handed a deed, that's just the beginning. That said, I enjoyed both Langacker articles a lot, and I particularly liked reading the account of ellipsis, since I work with a lot of elliptical data (children who ride parasitically on the clause grammar of the teacher). I also appreciated the obvious continuity to Chafe, whose work on intonation and the encoding of time I highly prize. Finally, I congratulate anyone who managed to read to the end of my last screed--and of course I apologize for the error: what I meant to say was that if we really DO accept that language has a potentially liberating effect on classpirations (either ensuring class mobility or placing us "in but not of" class society) then we have to accept its potentially crippling effect as well. Let me just say a word about adversarial polemics and what I think is the underlying issue, that is, intellectual insecurity. When I was new to the list, now more than a decade ago, I was a little irked by Mike's pastoral role; it seemed to me that whenever the rumpus appeared about to get interesting, Mike would intervene with a "Now, calm down, children!", and the excitement would dissipate. I think I once pointed out to him that Vygotsky himself was a pretty strident polemicist. I have now, in the course of translating Vygotsky, read him a little more carefully, and I realize that although Vygotsky never actually agrees with anybody (not even himself), he also never entirely disagrees with anybody either; indeed he is apt to find very positive and very useful things in the most unlikely places: Bergson, James, Husserl, Herbart, and even (though he is a militant Spinozist) Descartes. Vygotsky just doesn't ever have the intellectual insecurity required for unmitigated contempt. All of which is preamble to something I never thought I would write this side of the grave: Andy is really not altogether wrong in his defense of Descartes, and Chomsky too, although insufferably formalist, idealist, yea, explicitly Cartesian, has something to offer us. In particular, it was Chomsky who made the case that communication is not, in the course of a normal adult day, the main function of language: the preponderance of inner speech over externalized speech must be something like the preponderance of oral speech over writing, and we will only really have a scientific linguistics when we learn to take inner speech as the model just as modern linguists now take oral speech as the model. Oral speech, you see, is a deed, and as Vygotsky says, a deed is only a commencement. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 2 September 2014 07:01, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Surely any respectable guru should be handing down the the deed rather than > the word? :) > > > > > > On 1 September 2014 18:56, mike cole wrote: > >> We are students, here, Henry. An imposter would someone who poses as a guru >> who hands down THE WORD, not one who seeks to understand. >> >> I believe that among many important distinctions David introduced, the >> emphasis on development, on change over time, is an important >> differentiator among scholarly traditions under discussion. We imagine we >> see many affinities, locally, among (for example) the DCOG approach of Ed >> Hutchins and his colleagues and LCHC folks. But was also see our different >> emphases on development as a difference that makes a difference -- a topic >> of ongoing discussion and exploration. >> >> There are many such in David's recent posts. >> mike >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 9:07 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III >> wrote: >> >> > David, >> > Let me start by saying I feel like an imposter taking part in this dialog >> > at all, so new to XMCA and so short on deep knowledge of Vygotsky (though >> > I've tried for many years to get there!) and totally lacking in a >> knowledge >> > of Halliday, so many years since I have read from his work. Sorry about >> > that. However, I am glad that I weighed in a few days back by introducing >> > Langacker into the conversation and totally appreciate you would respond. >> > >> > I am sure that your contrast between Halliday and Langacker are well >> > taken, however I think that, for me, the important contrast is not >> between >> > Langacker and Halliday, but between Langacker and Halliday, on the one >> > side, and Chomsky on the other. This is important for the historical >> > development of linguistics as a discipline, in the U.S. at least, in the >> > same way that William James, and Charles Peirce before James, >> represented a >> > leap in the development of psychology and philosophy on this side of the >> > waters. I understand that European traditions in philosophy and >> psychology, >> > more influenced by Marxist thinking, are markedly different from those in >> > the U.S., and that may have something to do with your analysis. However, >> I >> > think Langacker has much to offer to the XMCA dialog. I am thinking that >> > Langacker is a complement to Halliday, not an adversary. >> > >> > Langacker and Halliday are semioticians, as was Vygotsky. Chomsky, who >> has >> > made his reputation by attacking structural linguistics and >> behavioralism, >> > sees language as an autonomous cognitive module and grammar as autonomous >> > from meaning; with Fodor he sees syntax and meaning as "blind" to one >> > another. Langacker sees externally realized language form as a subset of >> > meaning and language as rooted in all cognitive functioning; in other >> > words, he sees (language-based) semantic space as a subset of symbolic >> > space. Though Langacker doesn't focus on language development, what >> little >> > he says makes it clearly the result of a dynamic interplay between real >> > language use in context and the developing grammar of the child. Grammar >> as >> > structure is a reification of the dynamics of mental processing, just as >> > nouns are reifications of verbs. There's a simplicity in his grammatical >> > analysis that I think is of use in understanding the connection between >> > language and thinking: Words stand for things, processes and relations. >> > This is in line with what we have all learned about "parts of speech", >> but >> > Langacker, by construing parts of speech this way, makes grammatical >> > analysis meaningful/semantic, not formalistic. For Langacker, language >> and >> > meaning are both in the head of the language user and "out there" in the >> > world. I think I get why you find Langacker's comment on each of us >> > "experientially occupying the center of the universe" as Piagetian: >> > egocentric thinking. But, as per Langacker, language reveals our ability >> to >> > construe "the universe" non-egocentrically. His work in subjectification >> > and objectification is interesting on this score. You are certainly right >> > that Langacker "makes up" his examples of language, but they are good >> > examples and that's how specialists in grammar work. I agree with you >> that >> > "thick description" has got to be done to understand language, but that's >> > not an argument against introspection. His work is in Cognitive Grammar, >> > not the broader discipline of cognitive linguistics. Halliday, I believe, >> > is seen as a scholar of functional linguistics, which is very much >> > compatible with cognitive linguistics. One of the hard problems of >> > cognitive linguistics and Cognitive Grammar is to take on discourse. The >> > work of Bruner on narrative as a foundation for cultural psychology >> appears >> > to have taken hold in XMCA circles. (An excellent article by Andy Blunden >> > (2010), Narrative and Metaphors tells me so.) I was hoping that Langacker >> > might find favor there too. (Or, I should say here, since I am gratefully >> > part of the circle!) >> > >> > I'll end by repeating my sense of inadequacy in making the case for >> > Langacker. The article by Merja and her colleagues in Helsinki is >> evidence >> > that Langacker is of use to others in the CHAT, others that are NOT >> > impostors! >> > Henry >> > >> > On Sep 1, 2014, at 1:30 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >> > >> > > Martin-- >> > > >> > > I think, if you've read "Learning to Mean", you've got the essentials >> > > (although there is a whole volume of Halliday's Collected Works, with >> > > a huge CD of the complete Nigel Transcripts that supports this now). >> > > And you've certainly got the esssential compability between Halliday >> > > and Vygotsky that is lacking when I read Langacker. >> > > >> > > Firstly, development. Halliday uses real data, from real people. The >> > > latest work is entirely corpus based. As you can see from Langacker's >> > > articles, he makes up his data. To me, this means he is all >> > > explanation and no description. >> > > >> > > Secondly, what develops is free choice. For Halliday, a system is >> > > essentially paradigmatic, like Vygotsky's description of thinking in >> > > Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech. A grammatical choice like tense >> > > or polarity is in essence a crossroads; it's a place where you can >> > > turn left or right (and sometimes go straight, but for the choices to >> > > be manageable to a human mind, they need to be fairly few). Langacker >> > > doesn't see this: his way of handling complexity is not to give us >> > > systems within systems but instead to give us superhuman powers of >> > > access and activation (essentially, superhuman powers of empathy). But >> > > as Vygotsky says in HDHMF, the concept of the development of higher >> > > mental functions, the concept of cultural behavior, and the concept of >> > > the development of self control are essentially one and the same >> > > concept. >> > > >> > > Thirdly, both Halliday and Vygotsky are Marxists, and they both insist >> > > on a dialectical concept of development. I don't see this in Langacker >> > > at all--instead, I see rather Piagetian remarks, like "Experientially, >> > > each of us occupies the very centre of our universe, from which we >> > > apprehend the world around us." Halliday is always interrogating >> > > function about structure, and history about function. Langacker is >> > > mosly interrogating made up examples. >> > > >> > > I don't want to say that there are NO differences to be reconciled >> > > between Halliday and Vygotsky. The most obvious difference, though, is >> > > the least useful: Halliday talks of metafunctions that are made up of >> > > grammatical systems, while Vygotsky wants us to accept that >> > > psychological systems are made up of functions. I think this >> > > difference is actually uninteresting, because when Vygotsky uses the >> > > word "function" he's talking about choices (i.e. Halliday's systems) >> > > and when Vygotsky uses the term "system" he's talking about >> > > interfunctional relations (i.e. Halliday's metafunctions). >> > > >> > > A more substantial difference is that Halliday sees the grammatical >> > > system as being revolutionized during child development, while the >> > > semantics are basically stable. Vygotsky sees speech as >> > > revolutionizing thinking as well. >> > > >> > > Finally, I think Halliday would reject the idea that Vygotsky argues >> > > in Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech--that thinking (that is, the >> > > ideational metafunction, the representative function of speech) >> > > happens somehow on an inner plane, which is then projected onto a >> > > plane of "inner speech (that is, Rheme and New in the textual >> > > metafunction) and then realized as "outer speech" (Halliday's >> > > interpersonal metafunction). >> > > >> > > For Hallliday, ideation, textualization, and interpersonalization >> > > exist in thinking as well as in speech and at every point along the >> > > way; they must be variously represented whenever we speak, and however >> > > we do it, and at clause level they are mapped onto each other (as >> > > transitivity, information structure, and mood). But the very fact that >> > > Halliday, unlike Langacker, separates clause structure into these >> > > three metafunctions, and that these three metafunctions (the >> > > ideational, the textual, and the interpersonal) correspond very >> > > precisely to "Thinking", "and" and "Speech" tells you quite a bit >> > > about the latent affinities between Halliday and Vygotsky, there to be >> > > brought out.. >> > > >> > > In practical terms, Halliday's sociology is not just Marxist but >> > > Bernsteinian: if we really do not accept that language has a >> > > potentially liberating effect, then we have to accept that it is also >> > > has a potentially crippling effect. Interestingly, this was Stalin's >> > > position against Marr and Vygotsky: language is not part of the >> > > superstructure, it is part of the base. >> > > >> > > My own view is that both are right--language viewed from economic >> > > activity is superstructure, but language viewed from ontogenesis is >> > > base. So if we do not accept that that parent language has an effect >> > > on a child's code and therefore on his or herl classpirations (pardon >> > > my portmanteau), then we can conclude only either a) we already live >> > > in a classless society (Leontiev), or b) language is more afterthought >> > > than aperitif (Piaget). >> > > >> > > David Kellogg >> > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> > >> > >> From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 1 17:44:12 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 02 Sep 2014 10:44:12 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Highlander Center in Tennessee In-Reply-To: References: <53F9E94F.4060506@mira.net> <5400424D.4070208@mira.net> <2A41C980-4AC3-4E4C-A9EB-452B0A35750F@gmail.com> <54026EB2.8000801@mira.net> Message-ID: <540512DC.7010104@mira.net> Actually, Horton says that after a long time searching and travelling and studying looking for a method or a way to do education for social change, he eventually realised what he had to do - "The thing to do was just find a place, move in and start and let it grow." He was lucky to catch the eye of an elderly woman farmer who gave him a farmhouse in Grundy County, Tennessee, so that was his beginning and the next 30 years. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Huw Lloyd wrote: > Thanks for bringing the Highlander Center topic up, Andy. > > In addition to thinking about Peg's comment, one of things that struck me > was the accord with Lefebvre's ideas in the production of space, i.e. new > social relations calling for a new space. > > Best, > Huw > > > On 31 August 2014 15:58, mike cole wrote: > > >> Good luck, all. >> Mike >> >> On Saturday, August 30, 2014, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> Helena Worthen and Greg Thompson have responded off-line, in addition to >>> Robert Lake and you who proposed it, Mike. And Helena wants to involve >>> someone on the Highlander faculty. When does a collaborative review >>> >> article >> >>> become a broth with too many cooks? Pretty soon I think. >>> I will send a message to this group off-line to see if we can get a plan. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> mike cole wrote: >>> >>> >>>> I have heard no news of deadlines about an article of the sort I thought >>>> Andy was suggesting. And it appears that at least Andy and Robert are >>>> interested, and perhaps Henry? And? >>>> >>>> No centralized organization seems appropriate here. Those interested can >>>> recognize themselves from the discussion and let the editors what >>>> >> emerges. >> >>>> The theme(s) is/are clearly generative of interest. >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, Aug 30, 2014 at 2:27 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < >>>> >> hshonerd@gmail.com >> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Hi Robert and Andy, >>>>> Taking a biographical perspective on a smaller scale, it's interesting >>>>> that an Australian Vygotskian/Hegellian/dialectic scholar would find so >>>>> interesting the civil rights work of a courageous Black woman, that a >>>>> white >>>>> professor who gets impetus for writing while in movement (as he >>>>> >> explains >> >>>>> in >>>>> his letter to Vera) would have a thorough knowledge of her work, and >>>>> that a >>>>> Black scholar (Lisa Delpit), should be associated with the "dark side" >>>>> >> in >> >>>>> literacy for minorities. How pun-ishingly ironic, maybe at the heart of >>>>> the >>>>> dialectic? Does it make sense to see such "entanglements" as consonant >>>>> with >>>>> a fractal model of history and culture, fractal formations at any scale >>>>> being "self similar" and complex. Surely dialect thinking and fractal >>>>> thinking are blendable, just as science and art are blendable. I am >>>>> thinking about Fauconnier and Turner (on blending), Cantor (on >>>>> >> fractals) >> >>>>> and articles by Andy on metaphor and narrative, romantic science and >>>>> >> the >> >>>>> interaction of conceptual and pre-conceptual thinking. One more >>>>> >> personal >> >>>>> anecdote ties in. Two weekends ago my wife and I had lunch with Vera >>>>> >> and >> >>>>> Ruben in Santa Fe. She talked about the creative "leap". In her 1985 >>>>> Notebooks of the Mind, Vera talks about "the joining of rapid bursts of >>>>> thought with a regime of disciplined work". And finally, Anna Stetsenko >>>>> in >>>>> the the letters to Vera (Constructing a Community of Thought), argues >>>>> that >>>>> "Creativity?is an ineluctable feature of all and every person in their >>>>> even >>>>> utmost mundane activities and pursuits of everyday life." Vera and >>>>> Vygotsky >>>>> bring us creativity at all scales. Typically, "going to scale" means >>>>> growth. Cancer is a growth. Destructive. Creativity is generative, >>>>> nurturing. In all of this I find hope, which was got me into the xmca >>>>> dialog in the first place. >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Aug 29, 2014, at 7:43 AM, Robert Lake >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> ?Hi ? >>>>>> ?Andy, >>>>>> I am so glad you are intrigued by Septima's role in the formation of >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> SNCC . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> She was often overlooked in the chauvinist culture of the times (both >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> white >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> and black) and that is why began researching her life. Most people see >>>>>> recognize Rosa Parks and Ella Baker's role and later those who were >>>>>> credited for the "Freedom School curriculum? >>>>>> ?". If you look at Clark's life and the manner and content of what she >>>>>> taught on John's Island and other parts of South Carolina, ? >>>>>> ?you can easily recognize that her work was seminal in the formation >>>>>> >> of >> >>>>>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Freedom School Curriculum. >>>>>> >>>>>> I have tried to get permission to reprint Septima's autobiography from >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> her >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> family, but I have been unsuccessful. The book by Cynthia Brown >>>>>> >> *Ready >> >>>>>> from Within *has a lot of primary source interviews. Catherine Mellon >>>>>> Charon's book, *Septima Clark: Freedom's Teacher *is richly detailed >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> with >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> many interviews of her friends and documents from primary sources >>>>>> >> from >> >>>>>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> University of Wisconsin Highlander collection. >>>>>> >>>>>> Here is a link to a recorded interview with Septima that may be useful >>>>>> to >>>>>> you. I enjoyed hearing her voice at least. >>>>>> >>>>>> http://docsouth.unc.edu/sohp/G-0017/menu.html >>>>>> >>>>>> *Robert* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ? >>>>>> >>>>>> On Aug 29, 2014 5:05 AM, "Andy Blunden" wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> So you are placing Septima Clark right up there in importance, >>>>>>> >> Robert. >> >>>>>>> I am part way through a "chronicle" of Highlander, called >>>>>>> >> "Highlander. >> >>>>>>> >>>>>> No >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Ordinary school, 1932-1962". It is very useful for me, so I can get >>>>>> >>>>>>> everything in sequence. So here I discovered that Septima Clark was >>>>>>> >> in >> >>>>>>> charge of the discussions with the students who later joined SNCC. So >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> she >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> is coming into focus for me. I have just ordered two books on her, >>>>>> >>>>>>> including the one you recommended. Unfortuantely, an autobiography >>>>>>> >> she >> >>>>>>> wrote in 1962 seems to be out of print and entirely unavailable now. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Robert Lake wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hi Andy, >>>>>>>> Yes I do. Start with this . >>>>>>>> http://highlandercenter.org/about-us/history/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And this biography of Myles Horton >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://www.amazon.com/The-Long-Haul-An-Autobiography/dp/0807737003 >>>>>>>> and the biography of Septima Clark. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://www.amazon.com/Freedoms-Teacher-Life-Septima- >>>>>>>> Clark/dp/0807872229/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid= >>>>>>>> 1408889271&sr=1-2&keywords=septima+clark >>>>>>> Freedoms-Teacher-Life-Septima-Clark/dp/0807872229/ref=sr_1_ >>>>>>>> 2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1408889271&sr=1-2&keywords=septima+clark> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I have written a piece on her as well and will send it this >>>>>>>> >> afternoon. >> >>>>>>>> I think the book We Make the Road by Walking: A dialogue between >>>>>>>> >> Myles >> >>>>>>>> Horton and Paulo Freire >>>>>>>> is one of the best books on both these leaders. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> More Later, >>>>>>>> Robert Lake >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I will send more this afternoon. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 9:31 AM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>>> Does anyone on this list know about the Highlander Center, what >>>>>>>> used to be called the Highlander Folk School? >>>>>>>> The people there are very helpful, but they're also rushed off >>>>>>>> their feet (like everyone, I guess) and if there were any other >>>>>>>> sources of information about it, that would be helpful. I'm >>>>>>>> particularly interested if anyone is familiar with what they were >>>>>>>> doing in the 1950s and 60s. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> -- ------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> *Robert Lake Ed.D. >>>>>>>> *Associate Professor >>>>>>>> Social Foundations of Education >>>>>>>> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading >>>>>>>> Georgia Southern University >>>>>>>> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group >>>>>>>> P. O. Box 8144 >>>>>>>> Phone: (912) 478-0355 >>>>>>>> Fax: (912) 478-5382 >>>>>>>> Statesboro, GA 30460 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Mon Sep 1 18:53:11 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Mon, 1 Sep 2014 18:53:11 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Highlander Center in Tennessee In-Reply-To: <540512DC.7010104@mira.net> References: <53F9E94F.4060506@mira.net> <5400424D.4070208@mira.net> <2A41C980-4AC3-4E4C-A9EB-452B0A35750F@gmail.com> <54026EB2.8000801@mira.net> <540512DC.7010104@mira.net> Message-ID: Sounds right to my experience. mike On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 5:44 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Actually, Horton says that after a long time searching and travelling and > studying looking for a method or a way to do education for social change, > he eventually realised what he had to do - "The thing to do was just find a > place, move in and start and let it grow." He was lucky to catch the eye of > an elderly woman farmer who gave him a farmhouse in Grundy County, > Tennessee, so that was his beginning and the next 30 years. > > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> Thanks for bringing the Highlander Center topic up, Andy. >> >> In addition to thinking about Peg's comment, one of things that struck me >> was the accord with Lefebvre's ideas in the production of space, i.e. new >> social relations calling for a new space. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> On 31 August 2014 15:58, mike cole wrote: >> >> >> >>> Good luck, all. >>> Mike >>> >>> On Saturday, August 30, 2014, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Helena Worthen and Greg Thompson have responded off-line, in addition to >>>> Robert Lake and you who proposed it, Mike. And Helena wants to involve >>>> someone on the Highlander faculty. When does a collaborative review >>>> >>>> >>> article >>> >>> >>>> become a broth with too many cooks? Pretty soon I think. >>>> I will send a message to this group off-line to see if we can get a >>>> plan. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> ------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> I have heard no news of deadlines about an article of the sort I >>>>> thought >>>>> Andy was suggesting. And it appears that at least Andy and Robert are >>>>> interested, and perhaps Henry? And? >>>>> >>>>> No centralized organization seems appropriate here. Those interested >>>>> can >>>>> recognize themselves from the discussion and let the editors what >>>>> >>>>> >>>> emerges. >>> >>> >>>> The theme(s) is/are clearly generative of interest. >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Aug 30, 2014 at 2:27 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < >>>>> >>>>> >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>> >>> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Hi Robert and Andy, >>>>>> Taking a biographical perspective on a smaller scale, it's interesting >>>>>> that an Australian Vygotskian/Hegellian/dialectic scholar would find >>>>>> so >>>>>> interesting the civil rights work of a courageous Black woman, that a >>>>>> white >>>>>> professor who gets impetus for writing while in movement (as he >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> explains >>> >>> >>>> in >>>>>> his letter to Vera) would have a thorough knowledge of her work, and >>>>>> that a >>>>>> Black scholar (Lisa Delpit), should be associated with the "dark side" >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> in >>> >>> >>>> literacy for minorities. How pun-ishingly ironic, maybe at the heart of >>>>>> the >>>>>> dialectic? Does it make sense to see such "entanglements" as consonant >>>>>> with >>>>>> a fractal model of history and culture, fractal formations at any >>>>>> scale >>>>>> being "self similar" and complex. Surely dialect thinking and fractal >>>>>> thinking are blendable, just as science and art are blendable. I am >>>>>> thinking about Fauconnier and Turner (on blending), Cantor (on >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> fractals) >>> >>> >>>> and articles by Andy on metaphor and narrative, romantic science and >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> the >>> >>> >>>> interaction of conceptual and pre-conceptual thinking. One more >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> personal >>> >>> >>>> anecdote ties in. Two weekends ago my wife and I had lunch with Vera >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> and >>> >>> >>>> Ruben in Santa Fe. She talked about the creative "leap". In her 1985 >>>>>> Notebooks of the Mind, Vera talks about "the joining of rapid bursts >>>>>> of >>>>>> thought with a regime of disciplined work". And finally, Anna >>>>>> Stetsenko >>>>>> in >>>>>> the the letters to Vera (Constructing a Community of Thought), argues >>>>>> that >>>>>> "Creativity?is an ineluctable feature of all and every person in their >>>>>> even >>>>>> utmost mundane activities and pursuits of everyday life." Vera and >>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>> bring us creativity at all scales. Typically, "going to scale" means >>>>>> growth. Cancer is a growth. Destructive. Creativity is generative, >>>>>> nurturing. In all of this I find hope, which was got me into the xmca >>>>>> dialog in the first place. >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Aug 29, 2014, at 7:43 AM, Robert Lake >>>>> > >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> ?Hi ? >>>>>>> ?Andy, >>>>>>> I am so glad you are intrigued by Septima's role in the formation of >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> SNCC . >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> She was often overlooked in the chauvinist culture of the times (both >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> white >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> and black) and that is why began researching her life. Most people >>>>>>> see >>>>>>> recognize Rosa Parks and Ella Baker's role and later those who were >>>>>>> credited for the "Freedom School curriculum? >>>>>>> ?". If you look at Clark's life and the manner and content of what >>>>>>> she >>>>>>> taught on John's Island and other parts of South Carolina, ? >>>>>>> ?you can easily recognize that her work was seminal in the formation >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> of >>> >>> >>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Freedom School Curriculum. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I have tried to get permission to reprint Septima's autobiography >>>>>>> from >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> her >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> family, but I have been unsuccessful. The book by Cynthia Brown >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> *Ready >>> >>> >>>> from Within *has a lot of primary source interviews. Catherine Mellon >>>>>>> Charon's book, *Septima Clark: Freedom's Teacher *is richly detailed >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> with >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> many interviews of her friends and documents from primary sources >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> from >>> >>> >>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> University of Wisconsin Highlander collection. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Here is a link to a recorded interview with Septima that may be >>>>>>> useful >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> you. I enjoyed hearing her voice at least. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://docsouth.unc.edu/sohp/G-0017/menu.html >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *Robert* >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Aug 29, 2014 5:05 AM, "Andy Blunden" wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So you are placing Septima Clark right up there in importance, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Robert. >>> >>> >>>> I am part way through a "chronicle" of Highlander, called >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> "Highlander. >>> >>> >>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> No >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Ordinary school, 1932-1962". It is very useful for me, so I can get >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> everything in sequence. So here I discovered that Septima Clark was >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> in >>> >>> >>>> charge of the discussions with the students who later joined SNCC. So >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> she >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> is coming into focus for me. I have just ordered two books on her, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> including the one you recommended. Unfortuantely, an autobiography >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> she >>> >>> >>>> wrote in 1962 seems to be out of print and entirely unavailable now. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Robert Lake wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hi Andy, >>>>>>>>> Yes I do. Start with this . >>>>>>>>> http://highlandercenter.org/about-us/history/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> And this biography of Myles Horton >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://www.amazon.com/The-Long-Haul-An-Autobiography/dp/0807737003 >>>>>>>>> and the biography of Septima Clark. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://www.amazon.com/Freedoms-Teacher-Life-Septima- >>>>>>>>> Clark/dp/0807872229/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid= >>>>>>>>> 1408889271&sr=1-2&keywords=septima+clark >>>>>>>> Freedoms-Teacher-Life-Septima-Clark/dp/0807872229/ref=sr_1_ >>>>>>>>> 2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1408889271&sr=1-2&keywords=septima+clark> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I have written a piece on her as well and will send it this >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> afternoon. >>> >>> >>>> I think the book We Make the Road by Walking: A dialogue between >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Myles >>> >>> >>>> Horton and Paulo Freire >>>>>>>>> is one of the best books on both these leaders. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> More Later, >>>>>>>>> Robert Lake >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I will send more this afternoon. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 9:31 AM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Does anyone on this list know about the Highlander Center, what >>>>>>>>> used to be called the Highlander Folk School? >>>>>>>>> The people there are very helpful, but they're also rushed off >>>>>>>>> their feet (like everyone, I guess) and if there were any other >>>>>>>>> sources of information about it, that would be helpful. I'm >>>>>>>>> particularly interested if anyone is familiar with what they >>>>>>>>> were >>>>>>>>> doing in the 1950s and 60s. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> -- ------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> *Robert Lake Ed.D. >>>>>>>>> *Associate Professor >>>>>>>>> Social Foundations of Education >>>>>>>>> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading >>>>>>>>> Georgia Southern University >>>>>>>>> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group >>>>>>>>> P. O. Box 8144 >>>>>>>>> Phone: (912) 478-0355 >>>>>>>>> Fax: (912) 478-5382 >>>>>>>>> Statesboro, GA 30460 >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> > > From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Mon Sep 1 19:53:50 2014 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Mon, 1 Sep 2014 20:53:50 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Highlander Center in Tennessee In-Reply-To: <2A41C980-4AC3-4E4C-A9EB-452B0A35750F@gmail.com> References: <53F9E94F.4060506@mira.net> <5400424D.4070208@mira.net> , <2A41C980-4AC3-4E4C-A9EB-452B0A35750F@gmail.com> Message-ID: Henry, not noted that Lisa Delpit is associated with the "dark side" in literacy for minorities. i'd like to suggest that those proponents of explicit teacher to children of minorities (in which i also include white children in poverty) have misread Delpit. yes, she supports of explicit teaching to all students the culture of power. this is very much a foucaultian project, as well as a Freire project. i add here a quote from the Lisa Delpit entry in wikipedia: "In one of her most heavily cited works, The Silenced Dialogue,[9] Delpit argues the focus on process-oriented as opposed to skills-oriented writing instruction reduces the chances for black children to gain access to the tools required for accessing the "culture of power", which she describes as follows: (1) Issues of power as being enacted in classrooms; (2) Codes or rules established for participation in power, lending credence to the existence of a "culture of power"; (3) Rules of the culture of power being a reflection of the rules adhered to in the culture of those who have power; (4) Understanding explicitly the rules of a culture of power as fundamental to acquisition of the power of that culture; and (5)Tendency of those within the culture of power to be least aware or willing to admit that a culture of power exists. Delpit explores stances taken by teachers towards black children within the classroom and emphasizes how essential it is for teachers, both black and white, to communicate effectively and positively with black students if they are to achieve academic success. She concludes the skills/process debate is fallacious because it subscribes to the view that black and poor children can be categorically organized. Rather, she asserts the need for equipping black students to communicate across cultures. She believes teachers can play a major role as they give a voice to people and to children of color.[9]" it is true that in one of her original works - teacher other people's children - she advocated the reading program distar - which is highly directive and controlling of both students and teachers - , but i've not read anything like that since. she did believe that whole language as an instructional method supported middle class children who already had acquired the 'rules' of literacy as practiced by middle class families - something that Shirley Brice Heath also demonstrated in "Ways with words". i write this hoping that with additional readings of Delpit you might reconsider her theoretical positions regarding the education of minority children. phillip Phillip White, PhD Urban Community Teacher Education Program Site Coordinator Montview Elementary, Aurora, CO phillip.white@ucdenver.edu or pawhite@aps.k12.co.us ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Henry G. Shonerd III [hshonerd@gmail.com] Sent: Saturday, August 30, 2014 3:27 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Highlander Center in Tennessee Hi Robert and Andy, Taking a biographical perspective on a smaller scale, it's interesting that an Australian Vygotskian/Hegellian/dialectic scholar would find so interesting the civil rights work of a courageous Black woman, that a white professor who gets impetus for writing while in movement (as he explains in his letter to Vera) would have a thorough knowledge of her work, and that a Black scholar (Lisa Delpit), should be associated with the "dark side" in literacy for minorities. How pun-ishingly ironic, maybe at the heart of the dialectic? Does it make sense to see such "entanglements" as consonant with a fractal model of history and culture, fractal formations at any scale being "self similar" and complex. Surely dialect thinking and fractal thinking are blendable, just as science and art are blendable. I am thinking about Fauconnier and Turner (on blending), Cantor (on fractals) and articles by Andy on metaphor and narrative, romantic science and the interaction of conceptual and pre-conceptual thinking. One more personal anecdote ties in. Two weekends ago my wife and I had lunch with Vera and Ruben in Santa Fe. She talked about the creative "leap". In her 1985 Notebooks of the Mind, Vera talks about "the joining of rapid bursts of thought with a regime of disciplined work". And finally, Anna Stetsenko in the the letters to Vera (Constructing a Community of Thought), argues that "Creativity?is an ineluctable feature of all and every person in their even utmost mundane activities and pursuits of everyday life." Vera and Vygotsky bring us creativity at all scales. Typically, "going to scale" means growth. Cancer is a growth. Destructive. Creativity is generative, nurturing. In all of this I find hope, which was got me into the xmca dialog in the first place. Henry From ewall@umich.edu Mon Sep 1 20:36:46 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 1 Sep 2014 22:36:46 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Highlander Center in Tennessee In-Reply-To: <540512DC.7010104@mira.net> References: <53F9E94F.4060506@mira.net> <5400424D.4070208@mira.net> <2A41C980-4AC3-4E4C-A9EB-452B0A35750F@gmail.com> <54026EB2.8000801@mira.net> <540512DC.7010104@mira.net> Message-ID: I didn't realize the Highlander School was in Grundy county near Monteagle. I attended high school on 'Monteagle Mountain' about 10 miles from Monteagle; graduated in '60. Never heard anything about Highlander School , but people on the mountain tended to keep to themselves for a variety of reasons. The University of the South is about 20 miles from Monteagle and about 40 miles or so the other way is a large military installation staffed in the '50s or so by aeronautical types the US grabbed from Germany after World War II. All this makes the Warren, Grundy, and Franklin County area somewhat unique and Monteagle was, at that time, somewhat isolated because the main road up the mountain winds a lot (there is an interstate now that, although straight, isn't much better). Given that Highland School was near Monteagle the later move to Knoxville makes a kind of sense. Ed Wall On Sep 1, 2014, at 7:44 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Actually, Horton says that after a long time searching and travelling and studying looking for a method or a way to do education for social change, he eventually realised what he had to do - "The thing to do was just find a place, move in and start and let it grow." He was lucky to catch the eye of an elderly woman farmer who gave him a farmhouse in Grundy County, Tennessee, so that was his beginning and the next 30 years. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: >> Thanks for bringing the Highlander Center topic up, Andy. >> >> In addition to thinking about Peg's comment, one of things that struck me >> was the accord with Lefebvre's ideas in the production of space, i.e. new >> social relations calling for a new space. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> On 31 August 2014 15:58, mike cole wrote: >> >> >>> Good luck, all. >>> Mike >>> >>> On Saturday, August 30, 2014, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Helena Worthen and Greg Thompson have responded off-line, in addition to >>>> Robert Lake and you who proposed it, Mike. And Helena wants to involve >>>> someone on the Highlander faculty. When does a collaborative review >>>> >>> article >>> >>>> become a broth with too many cooks? Pretty soon I think. >>>> I will send a message to this group off-line to see if we can get a plan. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> I have heard no news of deadlines about an article of the sort I thought >>>>> Andy was suggesting. And it appears that at least Andy and Robert are >>>>> interested, and perhaps Henry? And? >>>>> >>>>> No centralized organization seems appropriate here. Those interested can >>>>> recognize themselves from the discussion and let the editors what >>>>> >>> emerges. >>> >>>>> The theme(s) is/are clearly generative of interest. >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Aug 30, 2014 at 2:27 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < >>>>> >>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Hi Robert and Andy, >>>>>> Taking a biographical perspective on a smaller scale, it's interesting >>>>>> that an Australian Vygotskian/Hegellian/dialectic scholar would find so >>>>>> interesting the civil rights work of a courageous Black woman, that a >>>>>> white >>>>>> professor who gets impetus for writing while in movement (as he >>>>>> >>> explains >>> >>>>>> in >>>>>> his letter to Vera) would have a thorough knowledge of her work, and >>>>>> that a >>>>>> Black scholar (Lisa Delpit), should be associated with the "dark side" >>>>>> >>> in >>> >>>>>> literacy for minorities. How pun-ishingly ironic, maybe at the heart of >>>>>> the >>>>>> dialectic? Does it make sense to see such "entanglements" as consonant >>>>>> with >>>>>> a fractal model of history and culture, fractal formations at any scale >>>>>> being "self similar" and complex. Surely dialect thinking and fractal >>>>>> thinking are blendable, just as science and art are blendable. I am >>>>>> thinking about Fauconnier and Turner (on blending), Cantor (on >>>>>> >>> fractals) >>> >>>>>> and articles by Andy on metaphor and narrative, romantic science and >>>>>> >>> the >>> >>>>>> interaction of conceptual and pre-conceptual thinking. One more >>>>>> >>> personal >>> >>>>>> anecdote ties in. Two weekends ago my wife and I had lunch with Vera >>>>>> >>> and >>> >>>>>> Ruben in Santa Fe. She talked about the creative "leap". In her 1985 >>>>>> Notebooks of the Mind, Vera talks about "the joining of rapid bursts of >>>>>> thought with a regime of disciplined work". And finally, Anna Stetsenko >>>>>> in >>>>>> the the letters to Vera (Constructing a Community of Thought), argues >>>>>> that >>>>>> "Creativity?is an ineluctable feature of all and every person in their >>>>>> even >>>>>> utmost mundane activities and pursuits of everyday life." Vera and >>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>> bring us creativity at all scales. Typically, "going to scale" means >>>>>> growth. Cancer is a growth. Destructive. Creativity is generative, >>>>>> nurturing. In all of this I find hope, which was got me into the xmca >>>>>> dialog in the first place. >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Aug 29, 2014, at 7:43 AM, Robert Lake >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> ?Hi ? >>>>>>> ?Andy, >>>>>>> I am so glad you are intrigued by Septima's role in the formation of >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> SNCC . >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> She was often overlooked in the chauvinist culture of the times (both >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> white >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> and black) and that is why began researching her life. Most people see >>>>>>> recognize Rosa Parks and Ella Baker's role and later those who were >>>>>>> credited for the "Freedom School curriculum? >>>>>>> ?". If you look at Clark's life and the manner and content of what she >>>>>>> taught on John's Island and other parts of South Carolina, ? >>>>>>> ?you can easily recognize that her work was seminal in the formation >>>>>>> >>> of >>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Freedom School Curriculum. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I have tried to get permission to reprint Septima's autobiography from >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> her >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> family, but I have been unsuccessful. The book by Cynthia Brown >>>>>>> >>> *Ready >>> >>>>>>> from Within *has a lot of primary source interviews. Catherine Mellon >>>>>>> Charon's book, *Septima Clark: Freedom's Teacher *is richly detailed >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> with >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> many interviews of her friends and documents from primary sources >>>>>>> >>> from >>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> University of Wisconsin Highlander collection. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Here is a link to a recorded interview with Septima that may be useful >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> you. I enjoyed hearing her voice at least. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://docsouth.unc.edu/sohp/G-0017/menu.html >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *Robert* >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Aug 29, 2014 5:05 AM, "Andy Blunden" wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So you are placing Septima Clark right up there in importance, >>>>>>>> >>> Robert. >>> >>>>>>>> I am part way through a "chronicle" of Highlander, called >>>>>>>> >>> "Highlander. >>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> No >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Ordinary school, 1932-1962". It is very useful for me, so I can get >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> everything in sequence. So here I discovered that Septima Clark was >>>>>>>> >>> in >>> >>>>>>>> charge of the discussions with the students who later joined SNCC. So >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> she >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> is coming into focus for me. I have just ordered two books on her, >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> including the one you recommended. Unfortuantely, an autobiography >>>>>>>> >>> she >>> >>>>>>>> wrote in 1962 seems to be out of print and entirely unavailable now. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Robert Lake wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hi Andy, >>>>>>>>> Yes I do. Start with this . >>>>>>>>> http://highlandercenter.org/about-us/history/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> And this biography of Myles Horton >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://www.amazon.com/The-Long-Haul-An-Autobiography/dp/0807737003 >>>>>>>>> and the biography of Septima Clark. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://www.amazon.com/Freedoms-Teacher-Life-Septima- >>>>>>>>> Clark/dp/0807872229/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid= >>>>>>>>> 1408889271&sr=1-2&keywords=septima+clark >>>>>>>> Freedoms-Teacher-Life-Septima-Clark/dp/0807872229/ref=sr_1_ >>>>>>>>> 2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1408889271&sr=1-2&keywords=septima+clark> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I have written a piece on her as well and will send it this >>>>>>>>> >>> afternoon. >>> >>>>>>>>> I think the book We Make the Road by Walking: A dialogue between >>>>>>>>> >>> Myles >>> >>>>>>>>> Horton and Paulo Freire >>>>>>>>> is one of the best books on both these leaders. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> More Later, >>>>>>>>> Robert Lake >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I will send more this afternoon. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 9:31 AM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Does anyone on this list know about the Highlander Center, what >>>>>>>>> used to be called the Highlander Folk School? >>>>>>>>> The people there are very helpful, but they're also rushed off >>>>>>>>> their feet (like everyone, I guess) and if there were any other >>>>>>>>> sources of information about it, that would be helpful. I'm >>>>>>>>> particularly interested if anyone is familiar with what they were >>>>>>>>> doing in the 1950s and 60s. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> -- ------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> *Robert Lake Ed.D. >>>>>>>>> *Associate Professor >>>>>>>>> Social Foundations of Education >>>>>>>>> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading >>>>>>>>> Georgia Southern University >>>>>>>>> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group >>>>>>>>> P. O. Box 8144 >>>>>>>>> Phone: (912) 478-0355 >>>>>>>>> Fax: (912) 478-5382 >>>>>>>>> Statesboro, GA 30460 >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >> >> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Sep 1 21:17:57 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Mon, 1 Sep 2014 22:17:57 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Highlander Center in Tennessee In-Reply-To: References: <53F9E94F.4060506@mira.net> <5400424D.4070208@mira.net> , <2A41C980-4AC3-4E4C-A9EB-452B0A35750F@gmail.com> Message-ID: <6EB7259F-9BDF-4044-87E2-727D5E6631C0@gmail.com> Phillip, Thank you very much for laying out Delpit's analysis. Other People's Children (1995), is the only thing I have read by her. I was uncomfortable about the Distar stuff, but she makes the same points you enumerate in one of the chapters, so I was confused. Not least because in my own learning of second languages I have used programmed materials. What I think is that such materials CAN help the learner, but that it can't be all there is. I got good at Spanish and other languages through massive immersion, natural language use, which the "drills" supported. And it can't be test driven. When you get discourse fluent, you KNOW you are fluent and your native-speaking interlocutors tell you so. That's what all learners need, or so I think. Math benefits from a thorough facility with the addition and multiplication "facts", but that facility supports all of the problem solving, reasoning, and communication about math that makes one "good at math". Fear of math ranks higher than fear of death I hear. I took differential calculus three time before I got the limit theorem. Bad teaching. Therein lies another narrative of power: STEM! That's not a minority issue, but it sure helps in understanding Delpit's complaint. Henry On Sep 1, 2014, at 8:53 PM, "White, Phillip" wrote: > Henry, not noted that Lisa Delpit is associated with the "dark side" in literacy for minorities. > > i'd like to suggest that those proponents of explicit teacher to children of minorities (in which i also include white children in poverty) have misread Delpit. yes, she supports of explicit teaching to all students the culture of power. this is very much a foucaultian project, as well as a Freire project. i add here a quote from the Lisa Delpit entry in wikipedia: > > "In one of her most heavily cited works, The Silenced Dialogue,[9] Delpit argues the focus on process-oriented as opposed to skills-oriented writing instruction reduces the chances for black children to gain access to the tools required for accessing the "culture of power", which she describes as follows: (1) Issues of power as being enacted in classrooms; (2) Codes or rules established for participation in power, lending credence to the existence of a "culture of power"; (3) Rules of the culture of power being a reflection of the rules adhered to in the culture of those who have power; (4) Understanding explicitly the rules of a culture of power as fundamental to acquisition of the power of that culture; and (5)Tendency of those within the culture of power to be least aware or willing to admit that a culture of power exists. Delpit explores stances taken by teachers towards black children within the classroom and emphasizes how essential it is for teachers, both black and white, to communicate effectively and positively with black students if they are to achieve academic success. She concludes the skills/process debate is fallacious because it subscribes to the view that black and poor children can be categorically organized. Rather, she asserts the need for equipping black students to communicate across cultures. She believes teachers can play a major role as they give a voice to people and to children of color.[9]" > > it is true that in one of her original works - teacher other people's children - she advocated the reading program distar - which is highly directive and controlling of both students and teachers - , but i've not read anything like that since. she did believe that whole language as an instructional method supported middle class children who already had acquired the 'rules' of literacy as practiced by middle class families - something that Shirley Brice Heath also demonstrated in "Ways with words". > > i write this hoping that with additional readings of Delpit you might reconsider her theoretical positions regarding the education of minority children. > > phillip > > > Phillip White, PhD > Urban Community Teacher Education Program > Site Coordinator > Montview Elementary, Aurora, CO > phillip.white@ucdenver.edu > or > pawhite@aps.k12.co.us > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Henry G. Shonerd III [hshonerd@gmail.com] > Sent: Saturday, August 30, 2014 3:27 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Highlander Center in Tennessee > > Hi Robert and Andy, > Taking a biographical perspective on a smaller scale, it's interesting that an Australian Vygotskian/Hegellian/dialectic scholar would find so interesting the civil rights work of a courageous Black woman, that a white professor who gets impetus for writing while in movement (as he explains in his letter to Vera) would have a thorough knowledge of her work, and that a Black scholar (Lisa Delpit), should be associated with the "dark side" in literacy for minorities. How pun-ishingly ironic, maybe at the heart of the dialectic? Does it make sense to see such "entanglements" as consonant with a fractal model of history and culture, fractal formations at any scale being "self similar" and complex. Surely dialect thinking and fractal thinking are blendable, just as science and art are blendable. I am thinking about Fauconnier and Turner (on blending), Cantor (on fractals) and articles by Andy on metaphor and narrative, romantic science and the interaction of conceptual and pre-conceptual thinking. One more personal anecdote ties in. Two weekends ago my wife and I had lunch with Vera and Ruben in Santa Fe. She talked about the creative "leap". In her 1985 Notebooks of the Mind, Vera talks about "the joining of rapid bursts of thought with a regime of disciplined work". And finally, Anna Stetsenko in the the letters to Vera (Constructing a Community of Thought), argues that "Creativity?is an ineluctable feature of all and every person in their even utmost mundane activities and pursuits of everyday life." Vera and Vygotsky bring us creativity at all scales. Typically, "going to scale" means growth. Cancer is a growth. Destructive. Creativity is generative, nurturing. In all of this I find hope, which was got me into the xmca dialog in the first place. > Henry > From lchcmike@gmail.com Wed Sep 3 09:50:43 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Wed, 3 Sep 2014 09:50:43 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Relevant MCA job Message-ID: https://csucareers.calstate.edu/Detail.aspx?pid=41952 From lchcmike@gmail.com Wed Sep 3 12:16:29 2014 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Wed, 3 Sep 2014 12:16:29 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Assistant Professor in Developmental Psychology, UC San Diego In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: David Barner Date: Wed, Sep 3, 2014 at 12:14 PM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Assistant Professor in Developmental Psychology, UC San Diego To: cogdevsoc DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO. The Psychology Department (http://psy.ucsd.edu/) within the Division of Social Sciences at UC, San Diego is committed to academic excellence and diversity within the faculty, staff and student body. The Department invites applications for a tenure track Assistant Professor position in Developmental Psychology. Candidates must have a Ph.D. and have a record of publishable research in any area of developmental psychology, including cognitive, perceptual, and social development. The preferred candidate will have demonstrated strong leadership or a commitment to support diversity, equity, and inclusion in an academic setting. Salary: Salary is commensurate with qualifications and based on University of California pay scales. Closing Date: Review of applications will begin November 1, 2014 and will continue until the position is filled. To Apply: Candidates should submit cover letter, curriculum vitae, research statement, teaching statement, reprints, names of three to five referees, and a personal statement that summarizes their past or potential contributions to diversity (see http://facultyequity.ucsd.edu/Faculty-Applicant-C2D-Info.asp for further information) electronically via UCSD's Academic Personnel On-Line RECRUIT at https://apol-recruit.ucsd.edu/apply/JPF00642. Please apply to the following job posting: Assistant Professor (10-837) - Developmental Psychology. AA-EOE: The University of California is an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action Employer. All qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, age or protected veteran status. -- David Barner, Ph.D. Associate Professor Departments of Psychology & Linguistics University of California, San Diego 5336 McGill Hall, 9500 Gilman Drive La Jolla, CA 92093-0109 t: 858-246-0874 f: 858-534-7190 http://www.ladlab.com _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org From Rick.Heiden@pb.com Thu Sep 4 05:40:06 2014 From: Rick.Heiden@pb.com (Rick Heiden) Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2014 12:40:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Intrinsic motivation? In-Reply-To: <85B4E3A8-77FE-403B-8F0A-44B7F11B5B64@umich.edu> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9025498@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <53E0F32D.5020204@mira.net> <53E17CD1.2080700@mira.net> <60ba2a3dc15442788114f3bd6dec035d@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <85B4E3A8-77FE-403B-8F0A-44B7F11B5B64@umich.edu> Message-ID: Please take me off the list. Rick This email message may contain confidential, proprietary and/or privileged information. It is intended only for the use of the intended recipient(s). If you have received it in error, please immediately advise the sender by reply email and then delete this email message. Any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the information contained in this email message to or by anyone other than the intended recipient is strictly prohibited. Any views expressed in this message are those of the individual sender, except where the sender specifically states them to be the views of Pitney Bowes. Thank you. On 8/6/14, 10:36 AM, "Ed Wall" wrote: >Robert > > I'm glad you brought this up. I've read what Andy had written (I >just checked and there seems to be more or perhaps a different format or >perhaps I've just forgotten) and have also studied Hegel's Science of >Logic in a bit of depth. I've also read the first in Jackson's series and >was uncertain whether this was an help or improvement (Dewey seems to >have lectured on this piece by Hegel by the way); however, I admit to >possible bias because of these other readings. Thus I've always wondered >how helpful other people found the series and why. > >Ed Wall > >On Aug 6, 2014, at 9:17 AM, Robert Lake >wrote: > >> Hi Peter, >> Speaking of Philip Jackson, I called him >> a couple of months ago to make sure I was >> clear on his particular reading of Dewey's work. In passing, >> I mentioned how pleased I was to see his work on Hegel >> in* Teacher's College Record.*(Speaking of Thinking: >> A Beginner's Guide to Hegel's *Science of Logic*, Parts I-5). >> He said that series of articles represented ten years of >> research and that I was the only person that >> ever mentioned anything about this work >> to him. That is sad. >> Robert >> >> >> >> On Wed, Aug 6, 2014 at 6:34 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: >> >>> I read After Virtue in grad school, assigned by Philip Jackson (and it >>>was >>> Lortie, not Jackson, who made the apprenticeship of observation a >>>common >>> term among teacher educators--someone posted earlier on this question. >>>In >>> case anyone's interested, I've got a forthcoming study of >>>apprenticeship of >>> observation that complicates Lortie's conclusions based on interviews >>>from >>> a different era, and would be happy to send the pdf to anyone who's >>> interested). >>> >>> Anyhow, on MacIntyre: I remember discussing at the time that the book >>> seemed like a rough draft that really would have benefitted from a >>>thorough >>> revision to cut out the meandering and make a more pointed argument. >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: Tuesday, August 05, 2014 8:55 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Intrinsic motivation? >>> >>> Relevant references to MacIntyre's "After Virtue" are on pp. 7-8 of >>> "Collaborative Projects. An Interdisciplinary Study," which I know you >>>have >>> a copy of, Greg. He uses the expressions "internal reward" and >>>"external >>> reward." >>> Andy >>> >>>------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>> And one more thing Andy (I realize given the hour down-under, you are >>>> probably slumbering - hopefully not dogmatically...), could you sell >>>> us on why we should look at MacIntyre on extrinsic and intrinsic >>>> motivation. >>>> Your suggestion that Cristina read MacIntyre on extrinsic and >>>> intrinsic motivation was less than convincing to me if only b.c. I >>>> know nothing about it! >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Aug 5, 2014 at 12:00 PM, Greg Thompson >>>> > wrote: >>>> >>>> Andy, >>>> I'm a bit baffled by your response to Cristina. It seems fair >>>> enough to try to recover Descartes as not necessarily a bad guy. >>>> But I didn't take that to be Cristina's point. >>>> It seems to me that she was arguing against Cartesian dualism - a >>>> particular way in which we Westerners (and we aren't the only ones >>>> who do this) divide up the world into various kinds binaries - >>>> subject/object, mind/body, nature/culture, emotion/reason, and so >>>>on. >>>> Are you advocating that these should be the governing categories >>>> of the human sciences? >>>> If so, then "real human language" will work just fine. >>>> If not, then the "real human language" called English will pose >>>> some significant problems for imagining things other than they are. >>>> Confused. >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Aug 5, 2014 at 9:07 AM, Andy Blunden >>> > wrote: >>>> >>>> Cristina, >>>> There is far too much in your message to deal with on an email >>>> list. What I usually do in such cases is simply pick a bit I >>>> think I can respond to and ignore the rest. OK? >>>> >>>> I think *real human languages* - as opposed to made up >>>> languages like Esperanto or the kind of mixture of neologs, >>>> hyphenated words and other gobbydegook fashionable in some >>>> academic circles - can be underestimated. Sure, one must use >>>> specialised jargon sometimes, to communicate to a specialised >>>> collaborator in a shared discipline, but generally that is >>>> because the jargon has itself a long track record. Don't try >>>> and make up words and concepts, at least, take a year or two >>>> about it if you have to. >>>> >>>> Secondly, Descartes was no fool. He was the person that first >>>> treated consciousness as an object of science, and the many of >>>> those belonging to the dualist tradition he was part of wound >>>> up being burnt at the stake for suggesting that the world was >>>> not necessarily identical to how it seemed. So I'd say, better >>>> to suffer association with Descartes than make up words and >>>> expressions. The Fascist campaign launched against him in the >>>> 1930s was not meant to help us. He deserves respect. >>>> >>>> For example, my development is not the same the development >>>> some project makes. And no amount of playing with words can >>>> eliminate that without degenerating into nonsense. I must >>>> correct something I said which was wrong in my earlier post >>>> though. I said that the relation between projects was the >>>> crucial thing in personality development. Not completely true. >>>> As Jean Lave has shown so well, the relation between a person >>>> and a project they are committed to is equally important, >>>> their role, so to speak. Take these two together. >>>> >>>> Motives instead of motivation is good. More definite. But I >>>> don't agree at all that Leontyev resolves this problem. For a >>>> start his dichotomy between 'objective' motives, i.e., those >>>> endorsed by the hegemonic power in the given social formation, >>>> and 'subjective', usually unacknowledged, motives, is in my >>>> view a product of the times he lived in, and not useful for >>>> us. The question is: how does the person form a *concept* of >>>> the object? It is the object-concept which is the crucial >>>> thing in talking abut motives. Over and above the relation >>>> between the worker's project of providing for his family (or >>>> whatever) and the employer's project of expanding the >>>> proportion of the social labour subsumed under his/her >>>> capital. The relation between these two projects doubtless >>>> seems to the boss to be the difference between the worker's >>>> subjective, secret, self-interest, and his own "objective" >>>> motive. But his point of view is not necessarily ours. >>>> >>>> Have a read of Alasdair MacIntyre on extrinsic and intrinsic >>>> motives, too. >>>> >>>> That's more than enough. >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> >>> >>>------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Maria Cristina Migliore wrote: >>>> >>>> Greg and Andy, >>>> >>>> Thank you for your comments. >>>> >>>> >>>> Greg, I absolutely agree with you about the difficulties >>>> of overcoming our >>>> western language and thoughts, so influenced by the >>>> Cartesian dualism. >>>> Andy, I hope to be able to show a bit how I connect >>>> activities in what >>>> follow. >>>> >>>> >>>> About my attempts to overcome a dualistic language: I tend >>>> to prefer to >>>> talk about a) single development (as suggest by Cole and >>>> Wertsh) instead of >>>> individual and activity (or context or project) >>>> development; b) dimensions >>>> of a phenomenon instead of levels of a phenomenon >>>> (micro-meso-macro); c) >>>> motives instead of motivation. >>>> >>>> >>>> However it happens that I need to swing between ?my? new >>>> language and the >>>> ?standard? one, because I am living in a still Cartesian >>>> world and I need >>>> to be understood by people (and even myself!) who are (am) >>>> made of this >>>> Cartesian world. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >>> >>> > > ________________________________ From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Sep 4 17:17:58 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2014 18:17:58 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Halliday and Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: <5E12EFFC-75E8-473E-8260-8D6E8DDC2A97@gmail.com> Message-ID: Hi All, I would like to respond to some the comments by David on September 1 to help in determining just how compatible Langacker and Halliday are, but first address references to Chomsky. David states, "...it was Chomsky who made the case that communication > > is not, in the course of a normal adult day, the main function of > language: the preponderance of inner speech over externalized speech?" In his 2008 Cognitive Grammar (p. 459), Langacker agrees with Chomsky, then expands on the idea with something Vygotsky and Bakhtin could have said: ""It is generally accepted that the conversational use of language is primary. It is not the most frequent: the award fort sheer prevalence goes to the silent verbal thought we engage in a at most every moment of our waking lives?In no small measure, our verbal thought takes the form of imagined dialog if only with ourselves." It is with Chomsky, the "insufferable formalist" as per David, that Langacker takes issue. Langacker, after some years as an expert and purveyor of (Chomsky's) generative grammar, found THAT enterprise anything but generative and began, with others, work in Cognitive Grammar, whose fundamental claim is that grammar is SYMBOLIC, hence meaningful, even at its most schematic. I think it would be fair to say that Langacker, and others, embarked on the kind of "Romantic Science" Andy Blunden describes in his article Is Science a Humanity? (on his website, sorry I don't have a date), unshackled by premature formalisms motivated by the desire for discreteness and predictability in a phenomenon (language) that is, to say the least, rich and messy. As far as the compatibility of Langacker and Halliday, here is what Langacker had to say when he read David's comments: I am not at all qualified to enter into any detailed consideration of how my work relates to Vygotsky. Nor do I care to enter into any competition with Halliday as to which approach is the best fit. I appreciate your defense of my approach in this regard and do not find any fault with it. Let me offer just a few brief comments. Much of my work in recent years, but little yet accessible in publications, is devoted to topics and idea that bring CG into closer alignment with Halliday and addess perceived gaps in previous formulations?notions like semantic functions and systems, and the continuum between grammar and discourse. I should note that these are not changes in the CG framework, but merely the elaboration of aspects of it that were previously in the background. I should also note that those who criticize CG seldom have very much exposure to it, and there is a strong tendency to translate the selective nature of what has been presented thus far into rigid limitations in principle. I can only say, stay tuned. Corpus work is essential for many purposes, but not for others, and requiring it as a precondition for serious scholarship (a notable tendency these days) is simplistic to say the least. In any case, I admit to these and many other limitations, and appreciate that my work is at least being discussed in these broader contexts. I hope you will take this not as airing dirty laundry, but to encourage openness to new ideas, ideas very much in the spirit of Vygotsky, Bakhtin and Halliday, and particularly the work of Vera John-Steiner in her book Creative Collaboration (2000). Her book is infused with research on complementarity and dialog in the creative work of artists and scientists on the edge of what the human mind can accomplish. I was very heartened that David enjoyed the two articles by Langacker, though for myself, I find them tough going for the density of thought, evidence that others in the XMCA circle might, let me say would, be better at the hard work of blending Halliday and Langacker. Of course, that is exactly the work that Langacker is committed to, but he is not part of the XMCA circle. Thirty years ago, when I did my dissertation on second language acquisition, I could find nothing of use in Chomsky on how language (L1 or L2) develops and found Langacker's Cognitive Grammar of great use to me. Vygotsky, through Vera, was the other major theoretical base for my work. Thirty years on, after a career in teacher education at a liberal arts college that did not require publications, I am taking up the work again, having found that that blending of Vygtosky and Cognitive Grammar has not been part of the work of XMCA, the foremost dialog of thinkers on Vygotsky. By the way, I didn't know that Vygotsky was a "militant Spinozist", but was very glad to hear it. I have a love for Spinoza, whose life narrative seems so much like Vygotsky's in ways that matter to me. Thanks to David for making my day. Stay tuned. Henry On Sep 1, 2014, at 4:42 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Of course, BOTH Huw and Mike are right. A "respectable" guru is really > another name for a fellow student (cue Brahms's "Academic Overture" > and another round of Weizenbier). But what gets handed down, at least > according to Vygotsky, is neither word nor deed (the original Goethe > reference, after all, is Mephistophelian!). It's the stern injunction > that when you get handed a deed, that's just the beginning. > > That said, I enjoyed both Langacker articles a lot, and I particularly > liked reading the account of ellipsis, since I work with a lot of > elliptical data (children who ride parasitically on the clause grammar > of the teacher). I also appreciated the obvious continuity to Chafe, > whose work on intonation and the encoding of time I highly prize. > Finally, I congratulate anyone who managed to read to the end of my > last screed--and of course I apologize for the error: what I meant to > say was that if we really DO accept that language has a potentially > liberating effect on classpirations (either ensuring class mobility or > placing us "in but not of" class society) then we have to accept its > potentially crippling effect as well. > > Let me just say a word about adversarial polemics and what I think is > the underlying issue, that is, intellectual insecurity. When I was new > to the list, now more than a decade ago, I was a little irked by > Mike's pastoral role; it seemed to me that whenever the rumpus > appeared about to get interesting, Mike would intervene with a "Now, > calm down, children!", and the excitement would dissipate. I think I > once pointed out to him that Vygotsky himself was a pretty strident > polemicist. I have now, in the course of translating Vygotsky, read > him a little more carefully, and I realize that although Vygotsky > never actually agrees with anybody (not even himself), he also never > entirely disagrees with anybody either; indeed he is apt to find very > positive and very useful things in the most unlikely places: Bergson, > James, Husserl, Herbart, and even (though he is a militant Spinozist) > Descartes. Vygotsky just doesn't ever have the intellectual insecurity > required for unmitigated contempt. > > All of which is preamble to something I never thought I would write > this side of the grave: Andy is really not altogether wrong in his > defense of Descartes, and Chomsky too, although insufferably > formalist, idealist, yea, explicitly Cartesian, has something to offer > us. In particular, it was Chomsky who made the case that communication > is not, in the course of a normal adult day, the main function of > language: the preponderance of inner speech over externalized speech > must be something like the preponderance of oral speech over writing, > and we will only really have a scientific linguistics when we learn to > take inner speech as the model just as modern linguists now take oral > speech as the model. Oral speech, you see, is a deed, and as Vygotsky > says, a deed is only a commencement. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > On 2 September 2014 07:01, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> Surely any respectable guru should be handing down the the deed rather than >> the word? :) >> >> >> >> >> >> On 1 September 2014 18:56, mike cole wrote: >> >>> We are students, here, Henry. An imposter would someone who poses as a guru >>> who hands down THE WORD, not one who seeks to understand. >>> >>> I believe that among many important distinctions David introduced, the >>> emphasis on development, on change over time, is an important >>> differentiator among scholarly traditions under discussion. We imagine we >>> see many affinities, locally, among (for example) the DCOG approach of Ed >>> Hutchins and his colleagues and LCHC folks. But was also see our different >>> emphases on development as a difference that makes a difference -- a topic >>> of ongoing discussion and exploration. >>> >>> There are many such in David's recent posts. >>> mike >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 9:07 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III >>> wrote: >>> >>>> David, >>>> Let me start by saying I feel like an imposter taking part in this dialog >>>> at all, so new to XMCA and so short on deep knowledge of Vygotsky (though >>>> I've tried for many years to get there!) and totally lacking in a >>> knowledge >>>> of Halliday, so many years since I have read from his work. Sorry about >>>> that. However, I am glad that I weighed in a few days back by introducing >>>> Langacker into the conversation and totally appreciate you would respond. >>>> >>>> I am sure that your contrast between Halliday and Langacker are well >>>> taken, however I think that, for me, the important contrast is not >>> between >>>> Langacker and Halliday, but between Langacker and Halliday, on the one >>>> side, and Chomsky on the other. This is important for the historical >>>> development of linguistics as a discipline, in the U.S. at least, in the >>>> same way that William James, and Charles Peirce before James, >>> represented a >>>> leap in the development of psychology and philosophy on this side of the >>>> waters. I understand that European traditions in philosophy and >>> psychology, >>>> more influenced by Marxist thinking, are markedly different from those in >>>> the U.S., and that may have something to do with your analysis. However, >>> I >>>> think Langacker has much to offer to the XMCA dialog. I am thinking that >>>> Langacker is a complement to Halliday, not an adversary. >>>> >>>> Langacker and Halliday are semioticians, as was Vygotsky. Chomsky, who >>> has >>>> made his reputation by attacking structural linguistics and >>> behavioralism, >>>> sees language as an autonomous cognitive module and grammar as autonomous >>>> from meaning; with Fodor he sees syntax and meaning as "blind" to one >>>> another. Langacker sees externally realized language form as a subset of >>>> meaning and language as rooted in all cognitive functioning; in other >>>> words, he sees (language-based) semantic space as a subset of symbolic >>>> space. Though Langacker doesn't focus on language development, what >>> little >>>> he says makes it clearly the result of a dynamic interplay between real >>>> language use in context and the developing grammar of the child. Grammar >>> as >>>> structure is a reification of the dynamics of mental processing, just as >>>> nouns are reifications of verbs. There's a simplicity in his grammatical >>>> analysis that I think is of use in understanding the connection between >>>> language and thinking: Words stand for things, processes and relations. >>>> This is in line with what we have all learned about "parts of speech", >>> but >>>> Langacker, by construing parts of speech this way, makes grammatical >>>> analysis meaningful/semantic, not formalistic. For Langacker, language >>> and >>>> meaning are both in the head of the language user and "out there" in the >>>> world. I think I get why you find Langacker's comment on each of us >>>> "experientially occupying the center of the universe" as Piagetian: >>>> egocentric thinking. But, as per Langacker, language reveals our ability >>> to >>>> construe "the universe" non-egocentrically. His work in subjectification >>>> and objectification is interesting on this score. You are certainly right >>>> that Langacker "makes up" his examples of language, but they are good >>>> examples and that's how specialists in grammar work. I agree with you >>> that >>>> "thick description" has got to be done to understand language, but that's >>>> not an argument against introspection. His work is in Cognitive Grammar, >>>> not the broader discipline of cognitive linguistics. Halliday, I believe, >>>> is seen as a scholar of functional linguistics, which is very much >>>> compatible with cognitive linguistics. One of the hard problems of >>>> cognitive linguistics and Cognitive Grammar is to take on discourse. The >>>> work of Bruner on narrative as a foundation for cultural psychology >>> appears >>>> to have taken hold in XMCA circles. (An excellent article by Andy Blunden >>>> (2010), Narrative and Metaphors tells me so.) I was hoping that Langacker >>>> might find favor there too. (Or, I should say here, since I am gratefully >>>> part of the circle!) >>>> >>>> I'll end by repeating my sense of inadequacy in making the case for >>>> Langacker. The article by Merja and her colleagues in Helsinki is >>> evidence >>>> that Langacker is of use to others in the CHAT, others that are NOT >>>> impostors! >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> On Sep 1, 2014, at 1:30 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>>> Martin-- >>>>> >>>>> I think, if you've read "Learning to Mean", you've got the essentials >>>>> (although there is a whole volume of Halliday's Collected Works, with >>>>> a huge CD of the complete Nigel Transcripts that supports this now). >>>>> And you've certainly got the esssential compability between Halliday >>>>> and Vygotsky that is lacking when I read Langacker. >>>>> >>>>> Firstly, development. Halliday uses real data, from real people. The >>>>> latest work is entirely corpus based. As you can see from Langacker's >>>>> articles, he makes up his data. To me, this means he is all >>>>> explanation and no description. >>>>> >>>>> Secondly, what develops is free choice. For Halliday, a system is >>>>> essentially paradigmatic, like Vygotsky's description of thinking in >>>>> Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech. A grammatical choice like tense >>>>> or polarity is in essence a crossroads; it's a place where you can >>>>> turn left or right (and sometimes go straight, but for the choices to >>>>> be manageable to a human mind, they need to be fairly few). Langacker >>>>> doesn't see this: his way of handling complexity is not to give us >>>>> systems within systems but instead to give us superhuman powers of >>>>> access and activation (essentially, superhuman powers of empathy). But >>>>> as Vygotsky says in HDHMF, the concept of the development of higher >>>>> mental functions, the concept of cultural behavior, and the concept of >>>>> the development of self control are essentially one and the same >>>>> concept. >>>>> >>>>> Thirdly, both Halliday and Vygotsky are Marxists, and they both insist >>>>> on a dialectical concept of development. I don't see this in Langacker >>>>> at all--instead, I see rather Piagetian remarks, like "Experientially, >>>>> each of us occupies the very centre of our universe, from which we >>>>> apprehend the world around us." Halliday is always interrogating >>>>> function about structure, and history about function. Langacker is >>>>> mosly interrogating made up examples. >>>>> >>>>> I don't want to say that there are NO differences to be reconciled >>>>> between Halliday and Vygotsky. The most obvious difference, though, is >>>>> the least useful: Halliday talks of metafunctions that are made up of >>>>> grammatical systems, while Vygotsky wants us to accept that >>>>> psychological systems are made up of functions. I think this >>>>> difference is actually uninteresting, because when Vygotsky uses the >>>>> word "function" he's talking about choices (i.e. Halliday's systems) >>>>> and when Vygotsky uses the term "system" he's talking about >>>>> interfunctional relations (i.e. Halliday's metafunctions). >>>>> >>>>> A more substantial difference is that Halliday sees the grammatical >>>>> system as being revolutionized during child development, while the >>>>> semantics are basically stable. Vygotsky sees speech as >>>>> revolutionizing thinking as well. >>>>> >>>>> Finally, I think Halliday would reject the idea that Vygotsky argues >>>>> in Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech--that thinking (that is, the >>>>> ideational metafunction, the representative function of speech) >>>>> happens somehow on an inner plane, which is then projected onto a >>>>> plane of "inner speech (that is, Rheme and New in the textual >>>>> metafunction) and then realized as "outer speech" (Halliday's >>>>> interpersonal metafunction). >>>>> >>>>> For Hallliday, ideation, textualization, and interpersonalization >>>>> exist in thinking as well as in speech and at every point along the >>>>> way; they must be variously represented whenever we speak, and however >>>>> we do it, and at clause level they are mapped onto each other (as >>>>> transitivity, information structure, and mood). But the very fact that >>>>> Halliday, unlike Langacker, separates clause structure into these >>>>> three metafunctions, and that these three metafunctions (the >>>>> ideational, the textual, and the interpersonal) correspond very >>>>> precisely to "Thinking", "and" and "Speech" tells you quite a bit >>>>> about the latent affinities between Halliday and Vygotsky, there to be >>>>> brought out.. >>>>> >>>>> In practical terms, Halliday's sociology is not just Marxist but >>>>> Bernsteinian: if we really do not accept that language has a >>>>> potentially liberating effect, then we have to accept that it is also >>>>> has a potentially crippling effect. Interestingly, this was Stalin's >>>>> position against Marr and Vygotsky: language is not part of the >>>>> superstructure, it is part of the base. >>>>> >>>>> My own view is that both are right--language viewed from economic >>>>> activity is superstructure, but language viewed from ontogenesis is >>>>> base. So if we do not accept that that parent language has an effect >>>>> on a child's code and therefore on his or herl classpirations (pardon >>>>> my portmanteau), then we can conclude only either a) we already live >>>>> in a classless society (Leontiev), or b) language is more afterthought >>>>> than aperitif (Piaget). >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> >>> From bjones@ucsd.edu Fri Sep 5 12:16:25 2014 From: bjones@ucsd.edu (Bruce Jones) Date: Fri, 05 Sep 2014 12:16:25 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Unsubscribing Message-ID: <540A0C09.2030209@ucsd.edu> Just a note to remind folks that, if you wish to unsubscribe from the xmca mailing list, please send a note to that effect to me - bjones@ucsd.edu Or to xmca-l-owner@mailman.ucsd.edu Sending mail to the xmca mailing list goes to everyone on the list, but not to me. Thanks -- Bruce Jones Sys Admin, LCHC bjones@ucsd.edu -- Plan for the worst imaginable. That way all you'll be disappointed in are the inadequacies of your imagination. -- From sugagaki@gmail.com Fri Sep 5 12:22:17 2014 From: sugagaki@gmail.com (Bruce Jones) Date: Fri, 5 Sep 2014 12:22:17 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Test from outside account - DELETE ME Message-ID: Test. -- Bruce Jones Sys Admin, LCHC bjones@ucsd.edu From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Sep 5 17:16:37 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 6 Sep 2014 09:16:37 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Halliday and Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: <5E12EFFC-75E8-473E-8260-8D6E8DDC2A97@gmail.com> Message-ID: Thanks for that, Henry. I hope Langacker wasn't as peeved as he sounded: I don't think I ever suggested that corpora were a prerequisite for serious scholarship. The problem is that unserious scholars like myself have to work with real people and real data or we can't hold down our jobs, and in fact when I read Langacker it does seem to me to make a difference. The obvious example is elision. Langacker uses examples like: "Ann came with and Bob without a date." My examples look more like this: T: Today is Tory's birthday. Let's buy a present for Tory. For example, I like a big white dog. What do I like? S: White dog. T: Big or small? S: Big white dog. You can see that this kind of elision is much better understood as Halliday understands it--that is, as a cohesive device which works interpersonally. "Big" is understood by omitting it, but that omission is ambiguous to the teacher (for good reasons--it's very unlikely that the child omits the indefinite article because it is understood, for example). So she insists on re-inserting it. On Vygotsky's Spinozism, which is somewhat controversial on this list. I'm busy editing our first volume of Vygotsky's lectures on pedology, and I have to write summarizing notes. Usually I just cheat and split each section into four sections, because Koreans often form study groups of around four people, and this makes it a little easier to "read and report". Most of Vygotsky's writings have the structure of a river anyway: you break into it and try to dam it at your peril, and any attempt to impose some kind of PPT order on the raging torrent of ideas is obviously arbitrary and will not last. But these lecturese are a little different: Vygotsky is being pedagogical, and he orders his material pretty rigorously. One of the things Vygotsky likes to do is to present "four basic laws" with "corollaries". I assumed that this was part of his training as a lawyer at Petrograd University (and of course he does like to use words that have legal connotations--so for example, the word he uses for "action" is not "activity" but something like "act" in the sense of a legal deed). But the corollaries seem to me to be straight from Spinoza's "Ethics", a book which really haunts every paragraph of the "Teaching on Emotions". David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 5 September 2014 09:17, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > Hi All, > I would like to respond to some the comments by David on September 1 to help in determining just how compatible Langacker and Halliday are, but first address references to Chomsky. > > David states, "...it was Chomsky who made the case that communication >> >> is not, in the course of a normal adult day, the main function of >> language: the preponderance of inner speech over externalized speech?" > > In his 2008 Cognitive Grammar (p. 459), Langacker agrees with Chomsky, then expands on the idea with something Vygotsky and Bakhtin could have said: > ""It is generally accepted that the conversational use of language is primary. It is not the most frequent: the award fort sheer prevalence goes to the silent verbal thought we engage in a at most every moment of our waking lives?In no small measure, our verbal thought takes the form of imagined dialog if only with ourselves." > > It is with Chomsky, the "insufferable formalist" as per David, that Langacker takes issue. Langacker, after some years as an expert and purveyor of (Chomsky's) generative grammar, found THAT enterprise anything but generative and began, with others, work in Cognitive Grammar, whose fundamental claim is that grammar is SYMBOLIC, hence meaningful, even at its most schematic. I think it would be fair to say that Langacker, and others, embarked on the kind of "Romantic Science" Andy Blunden describes in his article Is Science a Humanity? (on his website, sorry I don't have a date), unshackled by premature formalisms motivated by the desire for discreteness and predictability in a phenomenon (language) that is, to say the least, rich and messy. > > As far as the compatibility of Langacker and Halliday, here is what Langacker had to say when he read David's comments: > > I am not at all qualified to enter into any detailed consideration of how my work relates to Vygotsky. Nor do I care to enter into any competition with Halliday as to which approach is the best fit. I appreciate your defense of my approach in this regard and do not find any fault with it. Let me offer just a few brief comments. > > Much of my work in recent years, but little yet accessible in publications, is devoted to topics and idea that bring CG into closer alignment with Halliday and addess perceived gaps in previous formulations?notions like semantic functions and systems, and the continuum between grammar and discourse. I should note that these are not changes in the CG framework, but merely the elaboration of aspects of it that were previously in the background. > > I should also note that those who criticize CG seldom have very much exposure to it, and there is a strong tendency to translate the selective nature of what has been presented thus far into rigid limitations in principle. I can only say, stay tuned. > > Corpus work is essential for many purposes, but not for others, and requiring it as a precondition for serious scholarship (a notable tendency these days) is simplistic to say the least. > > In any case, I admit to these and many other limitations, and appreciate that my work is at least being discussed in these broader contexts. > > I hope you will take this not as airing dirty laundry, but to encourage openness to new ideas, ideas very much in the spirit of Vygotsky, Bakhtin and Halliday, and particularly the work of Vera John-Steiner in her book Creative Collaboration (2000). Her book is infused with research on complementarity and dialog in the creative work of artists and scientists on the edge of what the human mind can accomplish. > > I was very heartened that David enjoyed the two articles by Langacker, though for myself, I find them tough going for the density of thought, evidence that others in the XMCA circle might, let me say would, be better at the hard work of blending Halliday and Langacker. Of course, that is exactly the work that Langacker is committed to, but he is not part of the XMCA circle. Thirty years ago, when I did my dissertation on second language acquisition, I could find nothing of use in Chomsky on how language (L1 or L2) develops and found Langacker's Cognitive Grammar of great use to me. Vygotsky, through Vera, was the other major theoretical base for my work. Thirty years on, after a career in teacher education at a liberal arts college that did not require publications, I am taking up the work again, having found that that blending of Vygtosky and Cognitive Grammar has not been part of the work of XMCA, the foremost dialog of thinkers on Vygotsky. > > By the way, I didn't know that Vygotsky was a "militant Spinozist", but was very glad to hear it. I have a love for Spinoza, whose life narrative seems so much like Vygotsky's in ways that matter to me. Thanks to David for making my day. > > Stay tuned. > Henry > > > > > > > > On Sep 1, 2014, at 4:42 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Of course, BOTH Huw and Mike are right. A "respectable" guru is really >> another name for a fellow student (cue Brahms's "Academic Overture" >> and another round of Weizenbier). But what gets handed down, at least >> according to Vygotsky, is neither word nor deed (the original Goethe >> reference, after all, is Mephistophelian!). It's the stern injunction >> that when you get handed a deed, that's just the beginning. >> >> That said, I enjoyed both Langacker articles a lot, and I particularly >> liked reading the account of ellipsis, since I work with a lot of >> elliptical data (children who ride parasitically on the clause grammar >> of the teacher). I also appreciated the obvious continuity to Chafe, >> whose work on intonation and the encoding of time I highly prize. >> Finally, I congratulate anyone who managed to read to the end of my >> last screed--and of course I apologize for the error: what I meant to >> say was that if we really DO accept that language has a potentially >> liberating effect on classpirations (either ensuring class mobility or >> placing us "in but not of" class society) then we have to accept its >> potentially crippling effect as well. >> >> Let me just say a word about adversarial polemics and what I think is >> the underlying issue, that is, intellectual insecurity. When I was new >> to the list, now more than a decade ago, I was a little irked by >> Mike's pastoral role; it seemed to me that whenever the rumpus >> appeared about to get interesting, Mike would intervene with a "Now, >> calm down, children!", and the excitement would dissipate. I think I >> once pointed out to him that Vygotsky himself was a pretty strident >> polemicist. I have now, in the course of translating Vygotsky, read >> him a little more carefully, and I realize that although Vygotsky >> never actually agrees with anybody (not even himself), he also never >> entirely disagrees with anybody either; indeed he is apt to find very >> positive and very useful things in the most unlikely places: Bergson, >> James, Husserl, Herbart, and even (though he is a militant Spinozist) >> Descartes. Vygotsky just doesn't ever have the intellectual insecurity >> required for unmitigated contempt. >> >> All of which is preamble to something I never thought I would write >> this side of the grave: Andy is really not altogether wrong in his >> defense of Descartes, and Chomsky too, although insufferably >> formalist, idealist, yea, explicitly Cartesian, has something to offer >> us. In particular, it was Chomsky who made the case that communication >> is not, in the course of a normal adult day, the main function of >> language: the preponderance of inner speech over externalized speech >> must be something like the preponderance of oral speech over writing, >> and we will only really have a scientific linguistics when we learn to >> take inner speech as the model just as modern linguists now take oral >> speech as the model. Oral speech, you see, is a deed, and as Vygotsky >> says, a deed is only a commencement. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> On 2 September 2014 07:01, Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> Surely any respectable guru should be handing down the the deed rather than >>> the word? :) >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 1 September 2014 18:56, mike cole wrote: >>> >>>> We are students, here, Henry. An imposter would someone who poses as a guru >>>> who hands down THE WORD, not one who seeks to understand. >>>> >>>> I believe that among many important distinctions David introduced, the >>>> emphasis on development, on change over time, is an important >>>> differentiator among scholarly traditions under discussion. We imagine we >>>> see many affinities, locally, among (for example) the DCOG approach of Ed >>>> Hutchins and his colleagues and LCHC folks. But was also see our different >>>> emphases on development as a difference that makes a difference -- a topic >>>> of ongoing discussion and exploration. >>>> >>>> There are many such in David's recent posts. >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 9:07 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> David, >>>>> Let me start by saying I feel like an imposter taking part in this dialog >>>>> at all, so new to XMCA and so short on deep knowledge of Vygotsky (though >>>>> I've tried for many years to get there!) and totally lacking in a >>>> knowledge >>>>> of Halliday, so many years since I have read from his work. Sorry about >>>>> that. However, I am glad that I weighed in a few days back by introducing >>>>> Langacker into the conversation and totally appreciate you would respond. >>>>> >>>>> I am sure that your contrast between Halliday and Langacker are well >>>>> taken, however I think that, for me, the important contrast is not >>>> between >>>>> Langacker and Halliday, but between Langacker and Halliday, on the one >>>>> side, and Chomsky on the other. This is important for the historical >>>>> development of linguistics as a discipline, in the U.S. at least, in the >>>>> same way that William James, and Charles Peirce before James, >>>> represented a >>>>> leap in the development of psychology and philosophy on this side of the >>>>> waters. I understand that European traditions in philosophy and >>>> psychology, >>>>> more influenced by Marxist thinking, are markedly different from those in >>>>> the U.S., and that may have something to do with your analysis. However, >>>> I >>>>> think Langacker has much to offer to the XMCA dialog. I am thinking that >>>>> Langacker is a complement to Halliday, not an adversary. >>>>> >>>>> Langacker and Halliday are semioticians, as was Vygotsky. Chomsky, who >>>> has >>>>> made his reputation by attacking structural linguistics and >>>> behavioralism, >>>>> sees language as an autonomous cognitive module and grammar as autonomous >>>>> from meaning; with Fodor he sees syntax and meaning as "blind" to one >>>>> another. Langacker sees externally realized language form as a subset of >>>>> meaning and language as rooted in all cognitive functioning; in other >>>>> words, he sees (language-based) semantic space as a subset of symbolic >>>>> space. Though Langacker doesn't focus on language development, what >>>> little >>>>> he says makes it clearly the result of a dynamic interplay between real >>>>> language use in context and the developing grammar of the child. Grammar >>>> as >>>>> structure is a reification of the dynamics of mental processing, just as >>>>> nouns are reifications of verbs. There's a simplicity in his grammatical >>>>> analysis that I think is of use in understanding the connection between >>>>> language and thinking: Words stand for things, processes and relations. >>>>> This is in line with what we have all learned about "parts of speech", >>>> but >>>>> Langacker, by construing parts of speech this way, makes grammatical >>>>> analysis meaningful/semantic, not formalistic. For Langacker, language >>>> and >>>>> meaning are both in the head of the language user and "out there" in the >>>>> world. I think I get why you find Langacker's comment on each of us >>>>> "experientially occupying the center of the universe" as Piagetian: >>>>> egocentric thinking. But, as per Langacker, language reveals our ability >>>> to >>>>> construe "the universe" non-egocentrically. His work in subjectification >>>>> and objectification is interesting on this score. You are certainly right >>>>> that Langacker "makes up" his examples of language, but they are good >>>>> examples and that's how specialists in grammar work. I agree with you >>>> that >>>>> "thick description" has got to be done to understand language, but that's >>>>> not an argument against introspection. His work is in Cognitive Grammar, >>>>> not the broader discipline of cognitive linguistics. Halliday, I believe, >>>>> is seen as a scholar of functional linguistics, which is very much >>>>> compatible with cognitive linguistics. One of the hard problems of >>>>> cognitive linguistics and Cognitive Grammar is to take on discourse. The >>>>> work of Bruner on narrative as a foundation for cultural psychology >>>> appears >>>>> to have taken hold in XMCA circles. (An excellent article by Andy Blunden >>>>> (2010), Narrative and Metaphors tells me so.) I was hoping that Langacker >>>>> might find favor there too. (Or, I should say here, since I am gratefully >>>>> part of the circle!) >>>>> >>>>> I'll end by repeating my sense of inadequacy in making the case for >>>>> Langacker. The article by Merja and her colleagues in Helsinki is >>>> evidence >>>>> that Langacker is of use to others in the CHAT, others that are NOT >>>>> impostors! >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> On Sep 1, 2014, at 1:30 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Martin-- >>>>>> >>>>>> I think, if you've read "Learning to Mean", you've got the essentials >>>>>> (although there is a whole volume of Halliday's Collected Works, with >>>>>> a huge CD of the complete Nigel Transcripts that supports this now). >>>>>> And you've certainly got the esssential compability between Halliday >>>>>> and Vygotsky that is lacking when I read Langacker. >>>>>> >>>>>> Firstly, development. Halliday uses real data, from real people. The >>>>>> latest work is entirely corpus based. As you can see from Langacker's >>>>>> articles, he makes up his data. To me, this means he is all >>>>>> explanation and no description. >>>>>> >>>>>> Secondly, what develops is free choice. For Halliday, a system is >>>>>> essentially paradigmatic, like Vygotsky's description of thinking in >>>>>> Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech. A grammatical choice like tense >>>>>> or polarity is in essence a crossroads; it's a place where you can >>>>>> turn left or right (and sometimes go straight, but for the choices to >>>>>> be manageable to a human mind, they need to be fairly few). Langacker >>>>>> doesn't see this: his way of handling complexity is not to give us >>>>>> systems within systems but instead to give us superhuman powers of >>>>>> access and activation (essentially, superhuman powers of empathy). But >>>>>> as Vygotsky says in HDHMF, the concept of the development of higher >>>>>> mental functions, the concept of cultural behavior, and the concept of >>>>>> the development of self control are essentially one and the same >>>>>> concept. >>>>>> >>>>>> Thirdly, both Halliday and Vygotsky are Marxists, and they both insist >>>>>> on a dialectical concept of development. I don't see this in Langacker >>>>>> at all--instead, I see rather Piagetian remarks, like "Experientially, >>>>>> each of us occupies the very centre of our universe, from which we >>>>>> apprehend the world around us." Halliday is always interrogating >>>>>> function about structure, and history about function. Langacker is >>>>>> mosly interrogating made up examples. >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't want to say that there are NO differences to be reconciled >>>>>> between Halliday and Vygotsky. The most obvious difference, though, is >>>>>> the least useful: Halliday talks of metafunctions that are made up of >>>>>> grammatical systems, while Vygotsky wants us to accept that >>>>>> psychological systems are made up of functions. I think this >>>>>> difference is actually uninteresting, because when Vygotsky uses the >>>>>> word "function" he's talking about choices (i.e. Halliday's systems) >>>>>> and when Vygotsky uses the term "system" he's talking about >>>>>> interfunctional relations (i.e. Halliday's metafunctions). >>>>>> >>>>>> A more substantial difference is that Halliday sees the grammatical >>>>>> system as being revolutionized during child development, while the >>>>>> semantics are basically stable. Vygotsky sees speech as >>>>>> revolutionizing thinking as well. >>>>>> >>>>>> Finally, I think Halliday would reject the idea that Vygotsky argues >>>>>> in Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech--that thinking (that is, the >>>>>> ideational metafunction, the representative function of speech) >>>>>> happens somehow on an inner plane, which is then projected onto a >>>>>> plane of "inner speech (that is, Rheme and New in the textual >>>>>> metafunction) and then realized as "outer speech" (Halliday's >>>>>> interpersonal metafunction). >>>>>> >>>>>> For Hallliday, ideation, textualization, and interpersonalization >>>>>> exist in thinking as well as in speech and at every point along the >>>>>> way; they must be variously represented whenever we speak, and however >>>>>> we do it, and at clause level they are mapped onto each other (as >>>>>> transitivity, information structure, and mood). But the very fact that >>>>>> Halliday, unlike Langacker, separates clause structure into these >>>>>> three metafunctions, and that these three metafunctions (the >>>>>> ideational, the textual, and the interpersonal) correspond very >>>>>> precisely to "Thinking", "and" and "Speech" tells you quite a bit >>>>>> about the latent affinities between Halliday and Vygotsky, there to be >>>>>> brought out.. >>>>>> >>>>>> In practical terms, Halliday's sociology is not just Marxist but >>>>>> Bernsteinian: if we really do not accept that language has a >>>>>> potentially liberating effect, then we have to accept that it is also >>>>>> has a potentially crippling effect. Interestingly, this was Stalin's >>>>>> position against Marr and Vygotsky: language is not part of the >>>>>> superstructure, it is part of the base. >>>>>> >>>>>> My own view is that both are right--language viewed from economic >>>>>> activity is superstructure, but language viewed from ontogenesis is >>>>>> base. So if we do not accept that that parent language has an effect >>>>>> on a child's code and therefore on his or herl classpirations (pardon >>>>>> my portmanteau), then we can conclude only either a) we already live >>>>>> in a classless society (Leontiev), or b) language is more afterthought >>>>>> than aperitif (Piaget). >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Sep 5 17:42:17 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 5 Sep 2014 17:42:17 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Spinoza on xmca Message-ID: Hi David and Henry-- David-- I was intrigued by your comment that Spinoza is a controversial topic on xmca. I googled Spinoza on the main web page and came up with 4K plus hits (!!). My own impression is that few on this list, me included, have engaged in serious study of Spinoza let alone the imprint of Spinoza on Vygotsky. What is the nature of the controversy? What is at stake? The topic is of particular interest to me at present because I have been part of discussions with people who are focused on Vygotsky's use of perezhivanie in his later work, where the relation of emotion and cognition is a central concern and Spinoza is clearly relevant. Henry and anyone interested in chasing down what has been written about various topics in xmca chatter, take advantage of the nice google search at lchc.ucsd.edu. mike (who enmeshed in the sense/meaning distinction in all of its multilingual confusifications at present) From djwdoc@yahoo.com Fri Sep 5 20:04:02 2014 From: djwdoc@yahoo.com (Douglas Williams) Date: Fri, 5 Sep 2014 20:04:02 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Halliday and Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: <5E12EFFC-75E8-473E-8260-8D6E8DDC2A97@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1409972642.95866.YahooMailNeo@web164702.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> Hi-- Given my work, which is less concerned with theory than action dominated by deadlines, and which tends more toward serial communications than polyphonic, I probably miss half of what's going on. But this is a fun topic. I did finally catch up with the fact that there were two Langacker papers in play, and that I could read them. I found what I was looking for in them, related to the foundation of a shared ontology as the prerequisite to communication. That shared ontology is both cultural and environmental, but without it being shared--in the sense of people familiar with each other's experience and activity--the encryption key that makes communication possible would not be there. Elliptic Coordination P.11 ____________ With certain qualifications, I take it as already being in place for both the speaker and the hearer. It is important not to embrace the simplistic notion that the speaker merely encodes, going from meaning to sounds, while the hearer merely decodes, going from sounds to meaning. The CG position is rather that both interlocutors engage in coding, the process by which a set of linguistic units are activated as the conventional basis for apprehending (or participating in) a usage event, comprising an expression?s full contextual understanding paired with its finegrained phonetic manifestation. The activated units constitute the expression?s linguistic structure. In the ideal case?at best only approximated in actual practice?the interlocutors wind up activating the same symbolic units, agreeing on both the expression used and how it relates to the target conception. When they use an expression successfully, their scope of awareness and focus of attention with respect to the target are momentarily aligned. Viewed in global terms, the interlocutors proceed in tandem through the target, each expression serving to access, and if need be to augment or modify, certain portions of it. The ease and success of this intersubjective journey depend on how extensively their conceptual substrates overlap to begin with. And since the substrate includes the ongoing discourse and its current state, the overlap is generally quite substantial even in regard to the target. It is not a matter of the speaker starting with a full target conception and the listener with none at all: at a given point in the discourse both interlocutors know what has been said and have some idea of what is likely to come. The speaker, at least, must entertain some version of the target before expressing it. How far in advance the projection is made is highly variable, 6 and it is subject to modification as the discourse proceeds. In any case, the hearer also makes this projection and can often anticipate much if not all of what is coming. The content conveyed is commonly already known to both interlocutors. Typically they alternate in the speaker and hearer roles. Moreover, each simulates the other?s role, the hearer imagining what the speaker might say, and the speaker estimating how the hearer will apprehend it. So whoever takes the initiative at a given moment, discourse is an intersubjective process of co-construction. ______________ In short, communication depends on Bruner's card trick: Shared culture and experience. yuo dkinf probd bjy udndrdstnd whtd I'dn wridtying her even thoguty i am ndibt wruidyuing uindglish, bdducase we ghav a shr87rd sedse ofy landgyuae and readug xeopreruebce. And to illustrate the idea further, I offer a parallel yet linked idea, from David Auerbach, "The Stupidity of Computers, in Machine Politics, issue 13. It is darn hard for human-computer interactions to be meaningful,because simply processing things does not create a shared meaningful context. Computers are not in our world. Computers have no context of embodied experience in a shared environment, which makes human embodied and sociocultural experience (filled with hot, messy emotive and other embodied perspectives) very difficult to emulate through computers, no matter how much computing power you throw at it. I think that is rather a proof of Spinoza's point--that mind and body cannot be divided--and that is something that I think Langacker, Vygotsky, and Spinoza all share--though perhaps the language in which each express it--a language derived from the subcultures in which each operates--perhaps obscures the commonality. The Stupidity of Computers The Stupidity of Computers Computers are near-omnipotent cauldrons of processing power, but they re also stupid. They are the undisputed chess champions of the world, but they can... View on nplusonemag.com Preview by Yahoo Regards, Doug ________________________________ From: David Kellogg To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Friday, September 5, 2014 5:16 PM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Halliday and Vygotsky Thanks for that, Henry. I hope Langacker wasn't as peeved as he sounded: I don't think I ever suggested that corpora were a prerequisite for serious scholarship. The problem is that unserious scholars like myself have to work with real people and real data or we can't hold down our jobs, and in fact when I read Langacker it does seem to me to make a difference. The obvious example is elision. Langacker uses examples like: "Ann came with and Bob without a date." My examples look more like this: T: Today is Tory's birthday. Let's buy a present for Tory. For example, I like a big white dog. What do I like? S: White dog. T: Big or small? S: Big white dog. You can see that this kind of elision is much better understood as Halliday understands it--that is, as a cohesive device which works interpersonally. "Big" is understood by omitting it, but that omission is ambiguous to the teacher (for good reasons--it's very unlikely that the child omits the indefinite article because it is understood, for example). So she insists on re-inserting it. On Vygotsky's Spinozism, which is somewhat controversial on this list. I'm busy editing our first volume of Vygotsky's lectures on pedology, and I have to write summarizing notes. Usually I just cheat and split each section into four sections, because Koreans often form study groups of around four people, and this makes it a little easier to "read and report". Most of Vygotsky's writings have the structure of a river anyway: you break into it and try to dam it at your peril, and any attempt to impose some kind of PPT order on the raging torrent of ideas is obviously arbitrary and will not last. But these lecturese are a little different: Vygotsky is being pedagogical, and he orders his material pretty rigorously. One of the things Vygotsky likes to do is to present "four basic laws" with "corollaries". I assumed that this was part of his training as a lawyer at Petrograd University (and of course he does like to use words that have legal connotations--so for example, the word he uses for "action" is not "activity" but something like "act" in the sense of a legal deed). But the corollaries seem to me to be straight from Spinoza's "Ethics", a book which really haunts every paragraph of the "Teaching on Emotions". David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 5 September 2014 09:17, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > Hi All, > I would like to respond to some the comments by David on September 1 to help in determining just how compatible Langacker and Halliday are, but first address references to Chomsky. > > David states, "...it was Chomsky who made the case that communication >> >> is not, in the course of a normal adult day, the main function of >> language: the preponderance of inner speech over externalized speech?" > > In his 2008 Cognitive Grammar (p. 459), Langacker agrees with Chomsky, then expands on the idea with something Vygotsky and Bakhtin could have said: > ""It is generally accepted that the conversational use of language is primary. It is not the most frequent: the award fort sheer prevalence goes to the silent verbal thought we engage in a at most every moment of our waking lives?In no small measure, our verbal thought takes the form of imagined dialog if only with ourselves." > > It is with Chomsky, the "insufferable formalist" as per David, that Langacker takes issue. Langacker, after some years as an expert and purveyor of (Chomsky's) generative grammar, found THAT enterprise anything but generative and began, with others, work in Cognitive Grammar, whose fundamental claim is that grammar is SYMBOLIC, hence meaningful, even at its most schematic. I think it would be fair to say that Langacker, and others, embarked on the kind of "Romantic Science" Andy Blunden describes in his article Is Science a Humanity? (on his website, sorry I don't have a date), unshackled by premature formalisms motivated by the desire for discreteness and predictability in a phenomenon (language) that is, to say the least, rich and messy. > > As far as the compatibility of Langacker and Halliday, here is what Langacker had to say when he read David's comments: > > I am not at all qualified to enter into any detailed consideration of how my work relates to Vygotsky. Nor do I care to enter into any competition with Halliday as to which approach is the best fit. I appreciate your defense of my approach in this regard and do not find any fault with it. Let me offer just a few brief comments. > > Much of my work in recent years, but little yet accessible in publications, is devoted to topics and idea that bring CG into closer alignment with Halliday and addess perceived gaps in previous formulations?notions like semantic functions and systems, and the continuum between grammar and discourse. I should note that these are not changes in the CG framework, but merely the elaboration of aspects of it that were previously in the background. > > I should also note that those who criticize CG seldom have very much exposure to it, and there is a strong tendency to translate the selective nature of what has been presented thus far into rigid limitations in principle. I can only say, stay tuned. > > Corpus work is essential for many purposes, but not for others, and requiring it as a precondition for serious scholarship (a notable tendency these days) is simplistic to say the least. > > In any case, I admit to these and many other limitations, and appreciate that my work is at least being discussed in these broader contexts. > > I hope you will take this not as airing dirty laundry, but to encourage openness to new ideas, ideas very much in the spirit of Vygotsky, Bakhtin and Halliday, and particularly the work of Vera John-Steiner in her book Creative Collaboration (2000). Her book is infused with research on complementarity and dialog in the creative work of artists and scientists on the edge of what the human mind can accomplish. > > I was very heartened that David enjoyed the two articles by Langacker, though for myself, I find them tough going for the density of thought, evidence that others in the XMCA circle might, let me say would, be better at the hard work of blending Halliday and Langacker. Of course, that is exactly the work that Langacker is committed to, but he is not part of the XMCA circle. Thirty years ago, when I did my dissertation on second language acquisition, I could find nothing of use in Chomsky on how language (L1 or L2) develops and found Langacker's Cognitive Grammar of great use to me. Vygotsky, through Vera, was the other major theoretical base for my work. Thirty years on, after a career in teacher education at a liberal arts college that did not require publications, I am taking up the work again, having found that that blending of Vygtosky and Cognitive Grammar has not been part of the work of XMCA, the foremost dialog of thinkers on Vygotsky. > > By the way, I didn't know that Vygotsky was a "militant Spinozist", but was very glad to hear it. I have a love for Spinoza, whose life narrative seems so much like Vygotsky's in ways that matter to me. Thanks to David for making my day. > > Stay tuned. > Henry > > > > > > > > On Sep 1, 2014, at 4:42 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Of course, BOTH Huw and Mike are right. A "respectable" guru is really >> another name for a fellow student (cue Brahms's "Academic Overture" >> and another round of Weizenbier). But what gets handed down, at least >> according to Vygotsky, is neither word nor deed (the original Goethe >> reference, after all, is Mephistophelian!). It's the stern injunction >> that when you get handed a deed, that's just the beginning. >> >> That said, I enjoyed both Langacker articles a lot, and I particularly >> liked reading the account of ellipsis, since I work with a lot of >> elliptical data (children who ride parasitically on the clause grammar >> of the teacher). I also appreciated the obvious continuity to Chafe, >> whose work on intonation and the encoding of time I highly prize. >> Finally, I congratulate anyone who managed to read to the end of my >> last screed--and of course I apologize for the error: what I meant to >> say was that if we really DO accept that language has a potentially >> liberating effect on classpirations (either ensuring class mobility or >> placing us "in but not of" class society) then we have to accept its >> potentially crippling effect as well. >> >> Let me just say a word about adversarial polemics and what I think is >> the underlying issue, that is, intellectual insecurity. When I was new >> to the list, now more than a decade ago, I was a little irked by >> Mike's pastoral role; it seemed to me that whenever the rumpus >> appeared about to get interesting, Mike would intervene with a "Now, >> calm down, children!", and the excitement would dissipate. I think I >> once pointed out to him that Vygotsky himself was a pretty strident >> polemicist. I have now, in the course of translating Vygotsky, read >> him a little more carefully, and I realize that although Vygotsky >> never actually agrees with anybody (not even himself), he also never >> entirely disagrees with anybody either; indeed he is apt to find very >> positive and very useful things in the most unlikely places: Bergson, >> James, Husserl, Herbart, and even (though he is a militant Spinozist) >> Descartes. Vygotsky just doesn't ever have the intellectual insecurity >> required for unmitigated contempt. >> >> All of which is preamble to something I never thought I would write >> this side of the grave: Andy is really not altogether wrong in his >> defense of Descartes, and Chomsky too, although insufferably >> formalist, idealist, yea, explicitly Cartesian, has something to offer >> us. In particular, it was Chomsky who made the case that communication >> is not, in the course of a normal adult day, the main function of >> language: the preponderance of inner speech over externalized speech >> must be something like the preponderance of oral speech over writing, >> and we will only really have a scientific linguistics when we learn to >> take inner speech as the model just as modern linguists now take oral >> speech as the model. Oral speech, you see, is a deed, and as Vygotsky >> says, a deed is only a commencement. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> On 2 September 2014 07:01, Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> Surely any respectable guru should be handing down the the deed rather than >>> the word? :) >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 1 September 2014 18:56, mike cole wrote: >>> >>>> We are students, here, Henry. An imposter would someone who poses as a guru >>>> who hands down THE WORD, not one who seeks to understand. >>>> >>>> I believe that among many important distinctions David introduced, the >>>> emphasis on development, on change over time, is an important >>>> differentiator among scholarly traditions under discussion. We imagine we >>>> see many affinities, locally, among (for example) the DCOG approach of Ed >>>> Hutchins and his colleagues and LCHC folks. But was also see our different >>>> emphases on development as a difference that makes a difference -- a topic >>>> of ongoing discussion and exploration. >>>> >>>> There are many such in David's recent posts. >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 9:07 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> David, >>>>> Let me start by saying I feel like an imposter taking part in this dialog >>>>> at all, so new to XMCA and so short on deep knowledge of Vygotsky (though >>>>> I've tried for many years to get there!) and totally lacking in a >>>> knowledge >>>>> of Halliday, so many years since I have read from his work. Sorry about >>>>> that. However, I am glad that I weighed in a few days back by introducing >>>>> Langacker into the conversation and totally appreciate you would respond. >>>>> >>>>> I am sure that your contrast between Halliday and Langacker are well >>>>> taken, however I think that, for me, the important contrast is not >>>> between >>>>> Langacker and Halliday, but between Langacker and Halliday, on the one >>>>> side, and Chomsky on the other. This is important for the historical >>>>> development of linguistics as a discipline, in the U.S. at least, in the >>>>> same way that William James, and Charles Peirce before James, >>>> represented a >>>>> leap in the development of psychology and philosophy on this side of the >>>>> waters. I understand that European traditions in philosophy and >>>> psychology, >>>>> more influenced by Marxist thinking, are markedly different from those in >>>>> the U.S., and that may have something to do with your analysis. However, >>>> I >>>>> think Langacker has much to offer to the XMCA dialog. I am thinking that >>>>> Langacker is a complement to Halliday, not an adversary. >>>>> >>>>> Langacker and Halliday are semioticians, as was Vygotsky. Chomsky, who >>>> has >>>>> made his reputation by attacking structural linguistics and >>>> behavioralism, >>>>> sees language as an autonomous cognitive module and grammar as autonomous >>>>> from meaning; with Fodor he sees syntax and meaning as "blind" to one >>>>> another. Langacker sees externally realized language form as a subset of >>>>> meaning and language as rooted in all cognitive functioning; in other >>>>> words, he sees (language-based) semantic space as a subset of symbolic >>>>> space. Though Langacker doesn't focus on language development, what >>>> little >>>>> he says makes it clearly the result of a dynamic interplay between real >>>>> language use in context and the developing grammar of the child. Grammar >>>> as >>>>> structure is a reification of the dynamics of mental processing, just as >>>>> nouns are reifications of verbs. There's a simplicity in his grammatical >>>>> analysis that I think is of use in understanding the connection between >>>>> language and thinking: Words stand for things, processes and relations. >>>>> This is in line with what we have all learned about "parts of speech", >>>> but >>>>> Langacker, by construing parts of speech this way, makes grammatical >>>>> analysis meaningful/semantic, not formalistic. For Langacker, language >>>> and >>>>> meaning are both in the head of the language user and "out there" in the >>>>> world. I think I get why you find Langacker's comment on each of us >>>>> "experientially occupying the center of the universe" as Piagetian: >>>>> egocentric thinking. But, as per Langacker, language reveals our ability >>>> to >>>>> construe "the universe" non-egocentrically. His work in subjectification >>>>> and objectification is interesting on this score. You are certainly right >>>>> that Langacker "makes up" his examples of language, but they are good >>>>> examples and that's how specialists in grammar work. I agree with you >>>> that >>>>> "thick description" has got to be done to understand language, but that's >>>>> not an argument against introspection. His work is in Cognitive Grammar, >>>>> not the broader discipline of cognitive linguistics. Halliday, I believe, >>>>> is seen as a scholar of functional linguistics, which is very much >>>>> compatible with cognitive linguistics. One of the hard problems of >>>>> cognitive linguistics and Cognitive Grammar is to take on discourse. The >>>>> work of Bruner on narrative as a foundation for cultural psychology >>>> appears >>>>> to have taken hold in XMCA circles. (An excellent article by Andy Blunden >>>>> (2010), Narrative and Metaphors tells me so.) I was hoping that Langacker >>>>> might find favor there too. (Or, I should say here, since I am gratefully >>>>> part of the circle!) >>>>> >>>>> I'll end by repeating my sense of inadequacy in making the case for >>>>> Langacker. The article by Merja and her colleagues in Helsinki is >>>> evidence >>>>> that Langacker is of use to others in the CHAT, others that are NOT >>>>> impostors! >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> On Sep 1, 2014, at 1:30 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Martin-- >>>>>> >>>>>> I think, if you've read "Learning to Mean", you've got the essentials >>>>>> (although there is a whole volume of Halliday's Collected Works, with >>>>>> a huge CD of the complete Nigel Transcripts that supports this now). >>>>>> And you've certainly got the esssential compability between Halliday >>>>>> and Vygotsky that is lacking when I read Langacker. >>>>>> >>>>>> Firstly, development. Halliday uses real data, from real people. The >>>>>> latest work is entirely corpus based. As you can see from Langacker's >>>>>> articles, he makes up his data. To me, this means he is all >>>>>> explanation and no description. >>>>>> >>>>>> Secondly, what develops is free choice. For Halliday, a system is >>>>>> essentially paradigmatic, like Vygotsky's description of thinking in >>>>>> Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech. A grammatical choice like tense >>>>>> or polarity is in essence a crossroads; it's a place where you can >>>>>> turn left or right (and sometimes go straight, but for the choices to >>>>>> be manageable to a human mind, they need to be fairly few). Langacker >>>>>> doesn't see this: his way of handling complexity is not to give us >>>>>> systems within systems but instead to give us superhuman powers of >>>>>> access and activation (essentially, superhuman powers of empathy). But >>>>>> as Vygotsky says in HDHMF, the concept of the development of higher >>>>>> mental functions, the concept of cultural behavior, and the concept of >>>>>> the development of self control are essentially one and the same >>>>>> concept. >>>>>> >>>>>> Thirdly, both Halliday and Vygotsky are Marxists, and they both insist >>>>>> on a dialectical concept of development. I don't see this in Langacker >>>>>> at all--instead, I see rather Piagetian remarks, like "Experientially, >>>>>> each of us occupies the very centre of our universe, from which we >>>>>> apprehend the world around us." Halliday is always interrogating >>>>>> function about structure, and history about function. Langacker is >>>>>> mosly interrogating made up examples. >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't want to say that there are NO differences to be reconciled >>>>>> between Halliday and Vygotsky. The most obvious difference, though, is >>>>>> the least useful: Halliday talks of metafunctions that are made up of >>>>>> grammatical systems, while Vygotsky wants us to accept that >>>>>> psychological systems are made up of functions. I think this >>>>>> difference is actually uninteresting, because when Vygotsky uses the >>>>>> word "function" he's talking about choices (i.e. Halliday's systems) >>>>>> and when Vygotsky uses the term "system" he's talking about >>>>>> interfunctional relations (i.e. Halliday's metafunctions). >>>>>> >>>>>> A more substantial difference is that Halliday sees the grammatical >>>>>> system as being revolutionized during child development, while the >>>>>> semantics are basically stable. Vygotsky sees speech as >>>>>> revolutionizing thinking as well. >>>>>> >>>>>> Finally, I think Halliday would reject the idea that Vygotsky argues >>>>>> in Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech--that thinking (that is, the >>>>>> ideational metafunction, the representative function of speech) >>>>>> happens somehow on an inner plane, which is then projected onto a >>>>>> plane of "inner speech (that is, Rheme and New in the textual >>>>>> metafunction) and then realized as "outer speech" (Halliday's >>>>>> interpersonal metafunction). >>>>>> >>>>>> For Hallliday, ideation, textualization, and interpersonalization >>>>>> exist in thinking as well as in speech and at every point along the >>>>>> way; they must be variously represented whenever we speak, and however >>>>>> we do it, and at clause level they are mapped onto each other (as >>>>>> transitivity, information structure, and mood). But the very fact that >>>>>> Halliday, unlike Langacker, separates clause structure into these >>>>>> three metafunctions, and that these three metafunctions (the >>>>>> ideational, the textual, and the interpersonal) correspond very >>>>>> precisely to "Thinking", "and" and "Speech" tells you quite a bit >>>>>> about the latent affinities between Halliday and Vygotsky, there to be >>>>>> brought out.. >>>>>> >>>>>> In practical terms, Halliday's sociology is not just Marxist but >>>>>> Bernsteinian: if we really do not accept that language has a >>>>>> potentially liberating effect, then we have to accept that it is also >>>>>> has a potentially crippling effect. Interestingly, this was Stalin's >>>>>> position against Marr and Vygotsky: language is not part of the >>>>>> superstructure, it is part of the base. >>>>>> >>>>>> My own view is that both are right--language viewed from economic >>>>>> activity is superstructure, but language viewed from ontogenesis is >>>>>> base. So if we do not accept that that parent language has an effect >>>>>> on a child's code and therefore on his or herl classpirations (pardon >>>>>> my portmanteau), then we can conclude only either a) we already live >>>>>> in a classless society (Leontiev), or b) language is more afterthought >>>>>> than aperitif (Piaget). >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat Sep 6 12:11:23 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Sat, 6 Sep 2014 13:11:23 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Halliday and Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: <5E12EFFC-75E8-473E-8260-8D6E8DDC2A97@gmail.com> Message-ID: <27FE3729-6645-4ED6-88BC-8EBCF5A81683@gmail.com> Hi David, Thank you for your thoughtful and generous reply to my email. In the spirit of this wonderful dialog, and to scaffold my thinking as I take another turn, I'll go paragraph by paragraph: Thanks for that, Henry. I hope Langacker wasn't as peeved as he sounded: I don't think I ever suggested that corpora were a prerequisite for serious scholarship. The problem is that unserious scholars like myself have to work with real people and real data or we can't hold down our jobs, and in fact when I read Langacker it does seem to me to make a difference. David: I have promised to blind copy Langacker any of my emails to you Vygotskians where his work was the focus, so that he could address any misconstuals of that work on my part. He has a wonderful, dry sense of humor, so I assume he's chuckling now, in no small part due to your willingness to engage in this dialog. You can imagine the hits he has taken for his seminal work. I think he really wants this dialog, or he wouldn't be doing the work he is bringing together CG and all of the discourse scholars, especially Halliday. No need to pull punches in honest and committed effort to do this work. If I understand you, and I hope I do, you find that Langacker actually has something to offer us teacher scholars. When he says, "Stay tuned", I think he means that he has much more to offer than what he has already done. The obvious example is elision. Langacker uses examples like: "Ann came with and Bob without a date." My examples look more like this: T: Today is Tory's birthday. Let's buy a present for Tory. For example, I like a big white dog. What do I like? S: White dog. T: Big or small? S: Big white dog. You can see that this kind of elision is much better understood as Halliday understands it--that is, as a cohesive device which works interpersonally. "Big" is understood by omitting it, but that omission is ambiguous to the teacher (for good reasons--it's very unlikely that the child omits the indefinite article because it is understood, for example). So she insists on re-inserting it. David: This is actual corpus, right? Not something you invented. I suspect this would work as a good example for the application of CG to not only real world language but to language development, both first and second. Let me quote from one of the articles by Langacker that I sent out to XMCA (which I attach again): First, not every statement is informative. A great deal of language use pertains to matters that both interlocutors already know. Situations of this sort lend themselves to co- construction, as in (3), which is made-up but hopefully not too implausible. So it is not just the speaker who entertains the target conception. The hearer does so also?independently, through anticipation of what the speaker is going to say, through simulation during the speech event, or through apprehension, at its conclusion. A: Remember when we tried to wash the cat? B: Yeah, it cried and squirmed ? A: ... and tried to scratch us. B: Then it got its revenge ? A and B: ... by spraying all over the sofa. Your example is between a native-English-speaking teacher and a Korean student, while Langacker's example (which I assume is real corpus), but in both cases the interaction is not "informative", since the teacher already knows the answer to his question and just wants to scaffold the appropriate use of English by the student. I don't know the age of the student, nor the possibilities for transfer from Korean to English, but that would go into the analysis too. Overwhelming, but exciting. On Vygotsky's Spinozism, which is somewhat controversial on this list. I'm busy editing our first volume of Vygotsky's lectures on pedology, and I have to write summarizing notes. Usually I just cheat and split each section into four sections, because Koreans often form study groups of around four people, and this makes it a little easier to "read and report". Most of Vygotsky's writings have the structure of a river anyway: you break into it and try to dam it at your peril, and any attempt to impose some kind of PPT order on the raging torrent of ideas is obviously arbitrary and will not last. But these lecturese are a little different: Vygotsky is being pedagogical, and he orders his material pretty rigorously. David: I am interested in XMCA perspectives on Spinoza, but you have made my day with "Vygotsky the river". Somewhere (I read it in Vera's Notebooks), he has been called the "Mozart of Psychology". Got to love these metaphors. I have always been embarrassed by my difficulty in reading Vygotsky. Vera told me a few years back to read Vygotsky on scientific thinking. Damn! I couldn't get it straight. So, I have been corresponding with Andy Blunden for over a year asking him to straighten me out. That has helped a lot, though I have a long way to go. But the point is, I needed a scaffolder like Andy to help me out. I couldn't do it directly with Vygotsky. (ZPD at work). I look forward to any volumes that will help me out, especially your editing of Vygotsky on pedology. One of the things Vygotsky likes to do is to present "four basic laws" with "corollaries". I assumed that this was part of his training as a lawyer at Petrograd University (and of course he does like to use words that have legal connotations--so for example, the word he uses for "action" is not "activity" but something like "act" in the sense of a legal deed). But the corollaries seem to me to be straight from Spinoza's "Ethics", a book which really haunts every paragraph of the "Teaching on Emotions". David: Cool detective work, what historians do. It must affect your teaching in small and large ways. In a previous paragraph, you characterize yourself as an "unserious scholar". You're trying to pull yourself down to my level, but it just won't do. I get THAT role and you have to live with the responsibilities of being a real scholar. I'm older and get to decide. Otherwise, this dialog will get uncomfortable for me. Henry On Sep 5, 2014, at 6:16 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Thanks for that, Henry. I hope Langacker wasn't as peeved as he > sounded: I don't think I ever suggested that corpora were a > prerequisite for serious scholarship. The problem is that unserious > scholars like myself have to work with real people and real data or we > can't hold down our jobs, and in fact when I read Langacker it does > seem to me to make a difference. > > The obvious example is elision. Langacker uses examples like: > > "Ann came with and Bob without a date." > > My examples look more like this: > > T: Today is Tory's birthday. Let's buy a present for Tory. For > example, I like a big white dog. What do I like? > S: White dog. > T: Big or small? > S: Big white dog. > > You can see that this kind of elision is much better understood as > Halliday understands it--that is, as a cohesive device which works > interpersonally. "Big" is understood by omitting it, but that omission > is ambiguous to the teacher (for good reasons--it's very unlikely that > the child omits the indefinite article because it is understood, for > example). So she insists on re-inserting it. > > On Vygotsky's Spinozism, which is somewhat controversial on this list. > I'm busy editing our first volume of Vygotsky's lectures on pedology, > and I have to write summarizing notes. Usually I just cheat and split > each section into four sections, because Koreans often form study > groups of around four people, and this makes it a little easier to > "read and report". Most of Vygotsky's writings have the structure of a > river anyway: you break into it and try to dam it at your peril, and > any attempt to impose some kind of PPT order on the raging torrent of > ideas is obviously arbitrary and will not last. But these lecturese > are a little different: Vygotsky is being pedagogical, and he orders > his material pretty rigorously. > > One of the things Vygotsky likes to do is to present "four basic laws" > with "corollaries". I assumed that this was part of his training as a > lawyer at Petrograd University (and of course he does like to use > words that have legal connotations--so for example, the word he uses > for "action" is not "activity" but something like "act" in the sense > of a legal deed). But the corollaries seem to me to be straight from > Spinoza's "Ethics", a book which really haunts every paragraph of the > "Teaching on Emotions". > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > On 5 September 2014 09:17, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: >> Hi All, >> I would like to respond to some the comments by David on September 1 to help in determining just how compatible Langacker and Halliday are, but first address references to Chomsky. >> >> David states, "...it was Chomsky who made the case that communication >>> >>> is not, in the course of a normal adult day, the main function of >>> language: the preponderance of inner speech over externalized speech?" >> >> In his 2008 Cognitive Grammar (p. 459), Langacker agrees with Chomsky, then expands on the idea with something Vygotsky and Bakhtin could have said: >> ""It is generally accepted that the conversational use of language is primary. It is not the most frequent: the award fort sheer prevalence goes to the silent verbal thought we engage in a at most every moment of our waking lives?In no small measure, our verbal thought takes the form of imagined dialog if only with ourselves." >> >> It is with Chomsky, the "insufferable formalist" as per David, that Langacker takes issue. Langacker, after some years as an expert and purveyor of (Chomsky's) generative grammar, found THAT enterprise anything but generative and began, with others, work in Cognitive Grammar, whose fundamental claim is that grammar is SYMBOLIC, hence meaningful, even at its most schematic. I think it would be fair to say that Langacker, and others, embarked on the kind of "Romantic Science" Andy Blunden describes in his article Is Science a Humanity? (on his website, sorry I don't have a date), unshackled by premature formalisms motivated by the desire for discreteness and predictability in a phenomenon (language) that is, to say the least, rich and messy. >> >> As far as the compatibility of Langacker and Halliday, here is what Langacker had to say when he read David's comments: >> >> I am not at all qualified to enter into any detailed consideration of how my work relates to Vygotsky. Nor do I care to enter into any competition with Halliday as to which approach is the best fit. I appreciate your defense of my approach in this regard and do not find any fault with it. Let me offer just a few brief comments. >> >> Much of my work in recent years, but little yet accessible in publications, is devoted to topics and idea that bring CG into closer alignment with Halliday and addess perceived gaps in previous formulations?notions like semantic functions and systems, and the continuum between grammar and discourse. I should note that these are not changes in the CG framework, but merely the elaboration of aspects of it that were previously in the background. >> >> I should also note that those who criticize CG seldom have very much exposure to it, and there is a strong tendency to translate the selective nature of what has been presented thus far into rigid limitations in principle. I can only say, stay tuned. >> >> Corpus work is essential for many purposes, but not for others, and requiring it as a precondition for serious scholarship (a notable tendency these days) is simplistic to say the least. >> >> In any case, I admit to these and many other limitations, and appreciate that my work is at least being discussed in these broader contexts. >> >> I hope you will take this not as airing dirty laundry, but to encourage openness to new ideas, ideas very much in the spirit of Vygotsky, Bakhtin and Halliday, and particularly the work of Vera John-Steiner in her book Creative Collaboration (2000). Her book is infused with research on complementarity and dialog in the creative work of artists and scientists on the edge of what the human mind can accomplish. >> >> I was very heartened that David enjoyed the two articles by Langacker, though for myself, I find them tough going for the density of thought, evidence that others in the XMCA circle might, let me say would, be better at the hard work of blending Halliday and Langacker. Of course, that is exactly the work that Langacker is committed to, but he is not part of the XMCA circle. Thirty years ago, when I did my dissertation on second language acquisition, I could find nothing of use in Chomsky on how language (L1 or L2) develops and found Langacker's Cognitive Grammar of great use to me. Vygotsky, through Vera, was the other major theoretical base for my work. Thirty years on, after a career in teacher education at a liberal arts college that did not require publications, I am taking up the work again, having found that that blending of Vygtosky and Cognitive Grammar has not been part of the work of XMCA, the foremost dialog of thinkers on Vygotsky. >> >> By the way, I didn't know that Vygotsky was a "militant Spinozist", but was very glad to hear it. I have a love for Spinoza, whose life narrative seems so much like Vygotsky's in ways that matter to me. Thanks to David for making my day. >> >> Stay tuned. >> Henry >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Sep 1, 2014, at 4:42 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Of course, BOTH Huw and Mike are right. A "respectable" guru is really >>> another name for a fellow student (cue Brahms's "Academic Overture" >>> and another round of Weizenbier). But what gets handed down, at least >>> according to Vygotsky, is neither word nor deed (the original Goethe >>> reference, after all, is Mephistophelian!). It's the stern injunction >>> that when you get handed a deed, that's just the beginning. >>> >>> That said, I enjoyed both Langacker articles a lot, and I particularly >>> liked reading the account of ellipsis, since I work with a lot of >>> elliptical data (children who ride parasitically on the clause grammar >>> of the teacher). I also appreciated the obvious continuity to Chafe, >>> whose work on intonation and the encoding of time I highly prize. >>> Finally, I congratulate anyone who managed to read to the end of my >>> last screed--and of course I apologize for the error: what I meant to >>> say was that if we really DO accept that language has a potentially >>> liberating effect on classpirations (either ensuring class mobility or >>> placing us "in but not of" class society) then we have to accept its >>> potentially crippling effect as well. >>> >>> Let me just say a word about adversarial polemics and what I think is >>> the underlying issue, that is, intellectual insecurity. When I was new >>> to the list, now more than a decade ago, I was a little irked by >>> Mike's pastoral role; it seemed to me that whenever the rumpus >>> appeared about to get interesting, Mike would intervene with a "Now, >>> calm down, children!", and the excitement would dissipate. I think I >>> once pointed out to him that Vygotsky himself was a pretty strident >>> polemicist. I have now, in the course of translating Vygotsky, read >>> him a little more carefully, and I realize that although Vygotsky >>> never actually agrees with anybody (not even himself), he also never >>> entirely disagrees with anybody either; indeed he is apt to find very >>> positive and very useful things in the most unlikely places: Bergson, >>> James, Husserl, Herbart, and even (though he is a militant Spinozist) >>> Descartes. Vygotsky just doesn't ever have the intellectual insecurity >>> required for unmitigated contempt. >>> >>> All of which is preamble to something I never thought I would write >>> this side of the grave: Andy is really not altogether wrong in his >>> defense of Descartes, and Chomsky too, although insufferably >>> formalist, idealist, yea, explicitly Cartesian, has something to offer >>> us. In particular, it was Chomsky who made the case that communication >>> is not, in the course of a normal adult day, the main function of >>> language: the preponderance of inner speech over externalized speech >>> must be something like the preponderance of oral speech over writing, >>> and we will only really have a scientific linguistics when we learn to >>> take inner speech as the model just as modern linguists now take oral >>> speech as the model. Oral speech, you see, is a deed, and as Vygotsky >>> says, a deed is only a commencement. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> >>> On 2 September 2014 07:01, Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>> Surely any respectable guru should be handing down the the deed rather than >>>> the word? :) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 1 September 2014 18:56, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>>> We are students, here, Henry. An imposter would someone who poses as a guru >>>>> who hands down THE WORD, not one who seeks to understand. >>>>> >>>>> I believe that among many important distinctions David introduced, the >>>>> emphasis on development, on change over time, is an important >>>>> differentiator among scholarly traditions under discussion. We imagine we >>>>> see many affinities, locally, among (for example) the DCOG approach of Ed >>>>> Hutchins and his colleagues and LCHC folks. But was also see our different >>>>> emphases on development as a difference that makes a difference -- a topic >>>>> of ongoing discussion and exploration. >>>>> >>>>> There are many such in David's recent posts. >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 9:07 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> David, >>>>>> Let me start by saying I feel like an imposter taking part in this dialog >>>>>> at all, so new to XMCA and so short on deep knowledge of Vygotsky (though >>>>>> I've tried for many years to get there!) and totally lacking in a >>>>> knowledge >>>>>> of Halliday, so many years since I have read from his work. Sorry about >>>>>> that. However, I am glad that I weighed in a few days back by introducing >>>>>> Langacker into the conversation and totally appreciate you would respond. >>>>>> >>>>>> I am sure that your contrast between Halliday and Langacker are well >>>>>> taken, however I think that, for me, the important contrast is not >>>>> between >>>>>> Langacker and Halliday, but between Langacker and Halliday, on the one >>>>>> side, and Chomsky on the other. This is important for the historical >>>>>> development of linguistics as a discipline, in the U.S. at least, in the >>>>>> same way that William James, and Charles Peirce before James, >>>>> represented a >>>>>> leap in the development of psychology and philosophy on this side of the >>>>>> waters. I understand that European traditions in philosophy and >>>>> psychology, >>>>>> more influenced by Marxist thinking, are markedly different from those in >>>>>> the U.S., and that may have something to do with your analysis. However, >>>>> I >>>>>> think Langacker has much to offer to the XMCA dialog. I am thinking that >>>>>> Langacker is a complement to Halliday, not an adversary. >>>>>> >>>>>> Langacker and Halliday are semioticians, as was Vygotsky. Chomsky, who >>>>> has >>>>>> made his reputation by attacking structural linguistics and >>>>> behavioralism, >>>>>> sees language as an autonomous cognitive module and grammar as autonomous >>>>>> from meaning; with Fodor he sees syntax and meaning as "blind" to one >>>>>> another. Langacker sees externally realized language form as a subset of >>>>>> meaning and language as rooted in all cognitive functioning; in other >>>>>> words, he sees (language-based) semantic space as a subset of symbolic >>>>>> space. Though Langacker doesn't focus on language development, what >>>>> little >>>>>> he says makes it clearly the result of a dynamic interplay between real >>>>>> language use in context and the developing grammar of the child. Grammar >>>>> as >>>>>> structure is a reification of the dynamics of mental processing, just as >>>>>> nouns are reifications of verbs. There's a simplicity in his grammatical >>>>>> analysis that I think is of use in understanding the connection between >>>>>> language and thinking: Words stand for things, processes and relations. >>>>>> This is in line with what we have all learned about "parts of speech", >>>>> but >>>>>> Langacker, by construing parts of speech this way, makes grammatical >>>>>> analysis meaningful/semantic, not formalistic. For Langacker, language >>>>> and >>>>>> meaning are both in the head of the language user and "out there" in the >>>>>> world. I think I get why you find Langacker's comment on each of us >>>>>> "experientially occupying the center of the universe" as Piagetian: >>>>>> egocentric thinking. But, as per Langacker, language reveals our ability >>>>> to >>>>>> construe "the universe" non-egocentrically. His work in subjectification >>>>>> and objectification is interesting on this score. You are certainly right >>>>>> that Langacker "makes up" his examples of language, but they are good >>>>>> examples and that's how specialists in grammar work. I agree with you >>>>> that >>>>>> "thick description" has got to be done to understand language, but that's >>>>>> not an argument against introspection. His work is in Cognitive Grammar, >>>>>> not the broader discipline of cognitive linguistics. Halliday, I believe, >>>>>> is seen as a scholar of functional linguistics, which is very much >>>>>> compatible with cognitive linguistics. One of the hard problems of >>>>>> cognitive linguistics and Cognitive Grammar is to take on discourse. The >>>>>> work of Bruner on narrative as a foundation for cultural psychology >>>>> appears >>>>>> to have taken hold in XMCA circles. (An excellent article by Andy Blunden >>>>>> (2010), Narrative and Metaphors tells me so.) I was hoping that Langacker >>>>>> might find favor there too. (Or, I should say here, since I am gratefully >>>>>> part of the circle!) >>>>>> >>>>>> I'll end by repeating my sense of inadequacy in making the case for >>>>>> Langacker. The article by Merja and her colleagues in Helsinki is >>>>> evidence >>>>>> that Langacker is of use to others in the CHAT, others that are NOT >>>>>> impostors! >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sep 1, 2014, at 1:30 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin-- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think, if you've read "Learning to Mean", you've got the essentials >>>>>>> (although there is a whole volume of Halliday's Collected Works, with >>>>>>> a huge CD of the complete Nigel Transcripts that supports this now). >>>>>>> And you've certainly got the esssential compability between Halliday >>>>>>> and Vygotsky that is lacking when I read Langacker. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Firstly, development. Halliday uses real data, from real people. The >>>>>>> latest work is entirely corpus based. As you can see from Langacker's >>>>>>> articles, he makes up his data. To me, this means he is all >>>>>>> explanation and no description. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Secondly, what develops is free choice. For Halliday, a system is >>>>>>> essentially paradigmatic, like Vygotsky's description of thinking in >>>>>>> Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech. A grammatical choice like tense >>>>>>> or polarity is in essence a crossroads; it's a place where you can >>>>>>> turn left or right (and sometimes go straight, but for the choices to >>>>>>> be manageable to a human mind, they need to be fairly few). Langacker >>>>>>> doesn't see this: his way of handling complexity is not to give us >>>>>>> systems within systems but instead to give us superhuman powers of >>>>>>> access and activation (essentially, superhuman powers of empathy). But >>>>>>> as Vygotsky says in HDHMF, the concept of the development of higher >>>>>>> mental functions, the concept of cultural behavior, and the concept of >>>>>>> the development of self control are essentially one and the same >>>>>>> concept. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thirdly, both Halliday and Vygotsky are Marxists, and they both insist >>>>>>> on a dialectical concept of development. I don't see this in Langacker >>>>>>> at all--instead, I see rather Piagetian remarks, like "Experientially, >>>>>>> each of us occupies the very centre of our universe, from which we >>>>>>> apprehend the world around us." Halliday is always interrogating >>>>>>> function about structure, and history about function. Langacker is >>>>>>> mosly interrogating made up examples. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don't want to say that there are NO differences to be reconciled >>>>>>> between Halliday and Vygotsky. The most obvious difference, though, is >>>>>>> the least useful: Halliday talks of metafunctions that are made up of >>>>>>> grammatical systems, while Vygotsky wants us to accept that >>>>>>> psychological systems are made up of functions. I think this >>>>>>> difference is actually uninteresting, because when Vygotsky uses the >>>>>>> word "function" he's talking about choices (i.e. Halliday's systems) >>>>>>> and when Vygotsky uses the term "system" he's talking about >>>>>>> interfunctional relations (i.e. Halliday's metafunctions). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> A more substantial difference is that Halliday sees the grammatical >>>>>>> system as being revolutionized during child development, while the >>>>>>> semantics are basically stable. Vygotsky sees speech as >>>>>>> revolutionizing thinking as well. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Finally, I think Halliday would reject the idea that Vygotsky argues >>>>>>> in Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech--that thinking (that is, the >>>>>>> ideational metafunction, the representative function of speech) >>>>>>> happens somehow on an inner plane, which is then projected onto a >>>>>>> plane of "inner speech (that is, Rheme and New in the textual >>>>>>> metafunction) and then realized as "outer speech" (Halliday's >>>>>>> interpersonal metafunction). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For Hallliday, ideation, textualization, and interpersonalization >>>>>>> exist in thinking as well as in speech and at every point along the >>>>>>> way; they must be variously represented whenever we speak, and however >>>>>>> we do it, and at clause level they are mapped onto each other (as >>>>>>> transitivity, information structure, and mood). But the very fact that >>>>>>> Halliday, unlike Langacker, separates clause structure into these >>>>>>> three metafunctions, and that these three metafunctions (the >>>>>>> ideational, the textual, and the interpersonal) correspond very >>>>>>> precisely to "Thinking", "and" and "Speech" tells you quite a bit >>>>>>> about the latent affinities between Halliday and Vygotsky, there to be >>>>>>> brought out.. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In practical terms, Halliday's sociology is not just Marxist but >>>>>>> Bernsteinian: if we really do not accept that language has a >>>>>>> potentially liberating effect, then we have to accept that it is also >>>>>>> has a potentially crippling effect. Interestingly, this was Stalin's >>>>>>> position against Marr and Vygotsky: language is not part of the >>>>>>> superstructure, it is part of the base. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My own view is that both are right--language viewed from economic >>>>>>> activity is superstructure, but language viewed from ontogenesis is >>>>>>> base. So if we do not accept that that parent language has an effect >>>>>>> on a child's code and therefore on his or herl classpirations (pardon >>>>>>> my portmanteau), then we can conclude only either a) we already live >>>>>>> in a classless society (Leontiev), or b) language is more afterthought >>>>>>> than aperitif (Piaget). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat Sep 6 12:33:04 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Sat, 6 Sep 2014 13:33:04 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <8D2C4DB1-CFE1-4A1D-8683-CE5A8551B35C@gmail.com> Hi Mike, All I can say now is that Spinoza is famously quoted as having said, "The more clearly you understand yourself and your emotions, the more you become a lover of what is." This quote happens to appear in the introduction to a very popular self help book, Loving What Is, by Byron Katie (2002). I bought the book , obviously, because I thought I needed help. It did, but it also introduced me to Spinoza. And that has been a deeper "help". So, from a personal perspective, I can totally understand how Spinoza and periizhvanie would be connected. For all of you ESL teachers out there, who doesn't remember Krashen on the "affective filter" and I have been seeing a lot on character and education lately. Oh yes, and how failing is important to eventual success. Teasing out issues in the education of non-mainstreamers, and recognizing how the current system is toxic for everyone, I think Spinoza's analysis and the narrative of his life are powerful. Vygotsky hits me the same way. Cantor, the mathematician, and Pierce, the philosopher/logician/semiotician, also constantly come up for me. They were ridiculed by the received cognoscenti of the time, so much so that the suffered mental breakdowns. But they pushed on to develop tools in math and semiotics that seem to me are complementary with Vygotsky. Again I get to take the role of unserious scholar here, so think of my thoughts as gaming on line and don't take the game too seriously. Henry On Sep 5, 2014, at 6:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > Hi David and Henry-- > > David-- I was intrigued by your comment that Spinoza is a controversial > topic on xmca. I googled Spinoza on the main web page and came up with 4K > plus hits (!!). My own impression is that few on this list, me included, > have engaged in serious study of Spinoza let alone the imprint of Spinoza > on Vygotsky. > > What is the nature of the controversy? What is at stake? The topic is of > particular interest to me at present because I have been part of > discussions with people who are focused on Vygotsky's use of perezhivanie > in his later work, where the relation of emotion and cognition is a central > concern and Spinoza is clearly relevant. > > Henry and anyone interested in chasing down what has been written about > various topics in xmca chatter, take advantage of the nice google search at > lchc.ucsd.edu. > > mike > > (who enmeshed in the sense/meaning distinction in all of its multilingual > confusifications at present) From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Sep 6 12:51:05 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 6 Sep 2014 12:51:05 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca In-Reply-To: <8D2C4DB1-CFE1-4A1D-8683-CE5A8551B35C@gmail.com> References: <8D2C4DB1-CFE1-4A1D-8683-CE5A8551B35C@gmail.com> Message-ID: Hi Henry-- There goes my pile of books that need to be read before bed time! Spinoza goes up there right next to Dead Souls. However, David having already claimed the mantle of unserious scholar, and you having made the same claim, I am afraid that I have to make precisely the same claim on the unrefutable grounds that no one pays me any longer for what I do so I get to be as unserious as i can seriously be! mike On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 12:33 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > Hi Mike, > All I can say now is that Spinoza is famously quoted as having said, "The > more clearly you understand yourself and your emotions, the more you become > a lover of what is." This quote happens to appear in the introduction to a > very popular self help book, Loving What Is, by Byron Katie (2002). I > bought the book , obviously, because I thought I needed help. It did, but > it also introduced me to Spinoza. And that has been a deeper "help". So, > from a personal perspective, I can totally understand how Spinoza and > periizhvanie would be connected. For all of you ESL teachers out there, who > doesn't remember Krashen on the "affective filter" and I have been seeing a > lot on character and education lately. Oh yes, and how failing is important > to eventual success. Teasing out issues in the education of > non-mainstreamers, and recognizing how the current system is toxic for > everyone, I think Spinoza's analysis and the narrative of his life are > powerful. Vygotsky hits me the same way. Cantor, the mathematician, and > Pierce, the philosopher/logician/semiotician, also constantly come up for > me. They were ridiculed by the received cognoscenti of the time, so much so > that the suffered mental breakdowns. But they pushed on to develop tools in > math and semiotics that seem to me are complementary with Vygotsky. Again I > get to take the role of unserious scholar here, so think of my thoughts as > gaming on line and don't take the game too seriously. > Henry > > On Sep 5, 2014, at 6:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Hi David and Henry-- > > > > David-- I was intrigued by your comment that Spinoza is a controversial > > topic on xmca. I googled Spinoza on the main web page and came up with 4K > > plus hits (!!). My own impression is that few on this list, me included, > > have engaged in serious study of Spinoza let alone the imprint of Spinoza > > on Vygotsky. > > > > What is the nature of the controversy? What is at stake? The topic is of > > particular interest to me at present because I have been part of > > discussions with people who are focused on Vygotsky's use of perezhivanie > > in his later work, where the relation of emotion and cognition is a > central > > concern and Spinoza is clearly relevant. > > > > Henry and anyone interested in chasing down what has been written about > > various topics in xmca chatter, take advantage of the nice google search > at > > lchc.ucsd.edu. > > > > mike > > > > (who enmeshed in the sense/meaning distinction in all of its multilingual > > confusifications at present) > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat Sep 6 13:48:32 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Sat, 6 Sep 2014 14:48:32 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca In-Reply-To: References: <8D2C4DB1-CFE1-4A1D-8683-CE5A8551B35C@gmail.com> Message-ID: Mike and David, This is seriously getting to be a club that I, like Groucho, won't join, if it takes me as a member. I think all of this seriously evokes Andy's contention, in his notes for the upcoming presentation at the ISCAR conference (which XMCA has gotten) that, "Adults can grasp true concepts, and can change society, and a social theory has to treat adults as adults, and this is what the projects approach allows us to do. " If "adult" means the same as "serious", you can see why I have my doubts about joining the Unserious Scholar Club. On the other hand, if I can have some fun, as in the laughing warrior (forget gender stereotypes here, and dare me to talk about Jihad), then that's what I'm talking about. Incidentally, I loved Andy's notes. I could so relate it to CG. The emergent character of project realization he talks about applies very well to discourse, as you can see in the articles by Langacker I have sent out. Discourse IS a project and its outcome is typically not entirely clear in the minds of the interactants as they negotiate its waters. XMCA, of which this email is a "turn", is a prototypical "work in progress", as Andy puts it, since we clearly don't know where this will all end up. But I hope it can be fun along the way. Henry On Sep 6, 2014, at 1:51 PM, mike cole wrote: > Hi Henry-- There goes my pile of books that need to be read before bed time! > Spinoza goes up there right next to Dead Souls. > > However, David having already claimed the mantle of unserious scholar, and > you having made the same claim, I am afraid that I have to make precisely > the same claim on the unrefutable grounds that no one pays me any longer > for what I do so I get to be as unserious as i can seriously be! > mike > > > On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 12:33 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: > >> Hi Mike, >> All I can say now is that Spinoza is famously quoted as having said, "The >> more clearly you understand yourself and your emotions, the more you become >> a lover of what is." This quote happens to appear in the introduction to a >> very popular self help book, Loving What Is, by Byron Katie (2002). I >> bought the book , obviously, because I thought I needed help. It did, but >> it also introduced me to Spinoza. And that has been a deeper "help". So, >> from a personal perspective, I can totally understand how Spinoza and >> periizhvanie would be connected. For all of you ESL teachers out there, who >> doesn't remember Krashen on the "affective filter" and I have been seeing a >> lot on character and education lately. Oh yes, and how failing is important >> to eventual success. Teasing out issues in the education of >> non-mainstreamers, and recognizing how the current system is toxic for >> everyone, I think Spinoza's analysis and the narrative of his life are >> powerful. Vygotsky hits me the same way. Cantor, the mathematician, and >> Pierce, the philosopher/logician/semiotician, also constantly come up for >> me. They were ridiculed by the received cognoscenti of the time, so much so >> that the suffered mental breakdowns. But they pushed on to develop tools in >> math and semiotics that seem to me are complementary with Vygotsky. Again I >> get to take the role of unserious scholar here, so think of my thoughts as >> gaming on line and don't take the game too seriously. >> Henry >> >> On Sep 5, 2014, at 6:42 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >>> Hi David and Henry-- >>> >>> David-- I was intrigued by your comment that Spinoza is a controversial >>> topic on xmca. I googled Spinoza on the main web page and came up with 4K >>> plus hits (!!). My own impression is that few on this list, me included, >>> have engaged in serious study of Spinoza let alone the imprint of Spinoza >>> on Vygotsky. >>> >>> What is the nature of the controversy? What is at stake? The topic is of >>> particular interest to me at present because I have been part of >>> discussions with people who are focused on Vygotsky's use of perezhivanie >>> in his later work, where the relation of emotion and cognition is a >> central >>> concern and Spinoza is clearly relevant. >>> >>> Henry and anyone interested in chasing down what has been written about >>> various topics in xmca chatter, take advantage of the nice google search >> at >>> lchc.ucsd.edu. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> (who enmeshed in the sense/meaning distinction in all of its multilingual >>> confusifications at present) >> >> From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Sep 6 14:35:08 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 7 Sep 2014 06:35:08 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca In-Reply-To: References: <8D2C4DB1-CFE1-4A1D-8683-CE5A8551B35C@gmail.com> Message-ID: Probably the world's oldest naturalistic novel (in the sense of an anti-Romance) is not Don Quixote, but an outrageously pornographic philosophical treatise called Jin Ping Mei (after its three main heroines). It was published sometime in the late Ming Dynasty, i.e. before 1644, and nobody really knows who the author is, but he signs himself "the unserious scholar of Lanling" (nobody really knows were Lanling was, but people think it was someplace in Shandong Province, not that far from here). Not the sort of thing that Spinoza would have written. But the Ethics is concerned with the same sort of thing that "the unserious scholar of Lanling" wrote: the vanity of worldliness, the fatuousness of ambition, and of course the moral good of pleasure. More importantly, Spinoza wrote the three words that really (in my opinion) began the Enlightenment ("Deus Sive Natura"), words that could have been the epigraph to Jin Ping Mei, since it too is concerned with the truths of nature and the naturalness (as opposed to the unknowable nature) of truth. I think that the reason why Spinoza is controversial on this list has to do with his solution of the mind-body problem. Andy has always considered Spinoza's response inadequate by virtue of its extremism; a kind of "cutting of the Gordian knot" rather than a trying to unravel it. Descartes says minds are spirit stuff and bodies are another matter, and never the twain to the meet, and Spinoza's answer is just to say that everything in the world is made of sentient meat--some of it may be more sentient (or perhaps we need to say POTENTIALLY more sentient) and some of it less so, but everything has to at least potentially have both ideality and materiality or it can't really partake of reality to begin with (or anyway we cannot partake of its reallity). This solution, it seems to me, makes good sense, and I think it also made perfect sense to Vygotsky, and it's part of a long tradition of anti-Aristotelian thinking that goes back at least as far as Jean Buridan. Vygotsky is quite interested in Buridan, and not just his famous donkey (in HDHMF Vygotsky shows that he knows perfectly well that the donkey was made up not by Buridan but by his Aristotelian enemies). One reason is that Buridan appears to have been one of the first who suggested that, contrary to what Aristotle thought (and contrary to what English grammar suggests), the laws of nature were perfectly determinate in the present and the future as well as in the past (Aristotle considered the past fully determined but the present and the future intrinsically indeterminate, because of free will). The donkey was apparently an attempt by the Aristotelians to prove Buridan wrong: since humans do not starve to death in a Buridan situation, free will must exist, and therefore we really do live in two different worlds: a fully determined past and an essentially unknowable non-past. Spinoza, like Buridan, did believe that in any one situation there was, from a strictly rationalist point of view, only one right course of action (as in a game of chess, which as Von Neumann pointed out, is not really a game at all but simply an unsolved calculation). This was as true of moral and economic problems as it was of mathematical ones. And Spinoza, like Buridan, argued that if the the right course of action was unclear, the thing to do was to suspend judgment and keep calculating until it became clear--and this is actually where Vygotsky gets his epigraph for "Psychology of Art" ("No one has hitherto laid down the limits to the powers of the body..."). Halliday insists on rendering grammatical choice as a set of bifurcations or trifurcations--Buridan decisions which, taken one by one, are manageable, and only in the their cumulative, synoptic result seem inhumanely complex. And I think that one reason he insists on this is that he insists on knowing not only how the whole system works, but also how it could have come about, and above all why. For example, when I first read: "Ann came with a date and Bill without one". I couldn't help thinking that Ann and Bill came together--poor Ann thinking that Bill was her date and Bill, the lout, on the lookout for a new one. The reason I can't help thinking such "unserious scholar of Lanling" thoughts is that I, like Halliday, usually start from the point of view that an utterance like this has to have some point--there has to be some reason why "came" is elided. By eliding "came", the hearer is left with the strong feeling that something is missing on Bill's side of the equation. Such dramas do happen in real life, and have done so since at least the Ming dynasty, but they don't really seem to make it into grammar books. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies PS: Henry--I am an ELT person just like you (and I am within a decade of retirement age, despite my unserious demeanour). So I understood the reference to Krashen. But for most people on the list the name Krashen either means nothing at all, or refers to an admirable defendent of bilingual education in the state of California and not a rather hidebound and rigid second language acquisition theorist whose theory of language is straight Chomsky and whose theory of learning and acquisition is straight Piaget. The data I gave was data recorded by one of my graduates on her cell phone during the first moments of her class. Most of my grads, including this one, are non-native speakers of English. dk On 7 September 2014 04:51, mike cole wrote: > Hi Henry-- There goes my pile of books that need to be read before bed time! > Spinoza goes up there right next to Dead Souls. > > However, David having already claimed the mantle of unserious scholar, and > you having made the same claim, I am afraid that I have to make precisely > the same claim on the unrefutable grounds that no one pays me any longer > for what I do so I get to be as unserious as i can seriously be! > mike > > > On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 12:33 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: > >> Hi Mike, >> All I can say now is that Spinoza is famously quoted as having said, "The >> more clearly you understand yourself and your emotions, the more you become >> a lover of what is." This quote happens to appear in the introduction to a >> very popular self help book, Loving What Is, by Byron Katie (2002). I >> bought the book , obviously, because I thought I needed help. It did, but >> it also introduced me to Spinoza. And that has been a deeper "help". So, >> from a personal perspective, I can totally understand how Spinoza and >> periizhvanie would be connected. For all of you ESL teachers out there, who >> doesn't remember Krashen on the "affective filter" and I have been seeing a >> lot on character and education lately. Oh yes, and how failing is important >> to eventual success. Teasing out issues in the education of >> non-mainstreamers, and recognizing how the current system is toxic for >> everyone, I think Spinoza's analysis and the narrative of his life are >> powerful. Vygotsky hits me the same way. Cantor, the mathematician, and >> Pierce, the philosopher/logician/semiotician, also constantly come up for >> me. They were ridiculed by the received cognoscenti of the time, so much so >> that the suffered mental breakdowns. But they pushed on to develop tools in >> math and semiotics that seem to me are complementary with Vygotsky. Again I >> get to take the role of unserious scholar here, so think of my thoughts as >> gaming on line and don't take the game too seriously. >> Henry >> >> On Sep 5, 2014, at 6:42 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> > Hi David and Henry-- >> > >> > David-- I was intrigued by your comment that Spinoza is a controversial >> > topic on xmca. I googled Spinoza on the main web page and came up with 4K >> > plus hits (!!). My own impression is that few on this list, me included, >> > have engaged in serious study of Spinoza let alone the imprint of Spinoza >> > on Vygotsky. >> > >> > What is the nature of the controversy? What is at stake? The topic is of >> > particular interest to me at present because I have been part of >> > discussions with people who are focused on Vygotsky's use of perezhivanie >> > in his later work, where the relation of emotion and cognition is a >> central >> > concern and Spinoza is clearly relevant. >> > >> > Henry and anyone interested in chasing down what has been written about >> > various topics in xmca chatter, take advantage of the nice google search >> at >> > lchc.ucsd.edu. >> > >> > mike >> > >> > (who enmeshed in the sense/meaning distinction in all of its multilingual >> > confusifications at present) >> >> From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat Sep 6 15:18:30 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Sat, 6 Sep 2014 16:18:30 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Khan and the Btottmans Message-ID: <4DFC3582-CB1D-4005-99D2-31B744E11096@gmail.com> Hi Gang, I ask total forgiveness for occupying the XMCA waves, but the articles by the Brottmans (Return of the Freakshow) and Muqtedar Khan (Shura and Democracy) evoked connections for me. In addition to the consultative and consensual elements of Shura, I wonder what Muqtedar has in mind when he says, "There is more in Islam that shura when it comes to reflecting over the nature of good governance and best polities. But we shall reserve that discussion for another occasion." I wonder if Jihad would be part of that discussion, especially the jihad within, the struggle we all have with ourselves, as individuals and as "cultures". Regarding the article by Mikita and David, what great metaphors: Carnival and Freakshow! Totally generative and in line with my on-going screed (David's term) to blend Cognitive Grammar (of which an essential focus is metaphor) and Vygotsky. In addition, an essential CG term Langacker uses in analyzing discourse is "On Stage" (OS), so in line with carnivals and freak shows that it takes the breath away. (I sent you the article, but I am attaching it again. Every teacher believes in repetition. THIS copy includes my highlighting, as sort of a study guide. I know, I'm insufferable.) Langacker defines OS as, "?the profiled event. It constitutes the objective situation, which serves as the object of description." Keep in mind that the "object(s) of description" are conceptualizations in the minds of the participants in a discourse, which find external expression (canonically or prototypically through speaking or signing) in the discourse itself. The goal of discourse is generally that the conceptualizations in the minds of the interlocutors be "coordinated" in real time. It's a dynamic process, a work in progress. I am comforted by the Brottmans' observation that "we are all freaks together". Who doesn't belong to this club-in-the-making, this work in progress? The Laughing Warrior (Maybe you're one too!) From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat Sep 6 18:54:02 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Sat, 6 Sep 2014 19:54:02 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca In-Reply-To: References: <8D2C4DB1-CFE1-4A1D-8683-CE5A8551B35C@gmail.com> Message-ID: <8FC4A581-87AB-4127-824A-663C92536031@gmail.com> David, Buridan's Donkey is all of us when the social discourse is so entirely dominated by consumerism. Behavioral economists are on to the paradox of choice in a consumer society with so many options, forced on us by institutional arrangements (Andy's concepts) that profile selling and profit making, rather than living a life of quality. In fact selling and making a profit are our quality of life. What a sad life for us little people. No wonder the U.S. is so low compared to the rest of the world in measurements of happiness, as scientific as most measurement Andy's description of the "asbestos project" (which deserves the kind of status that Buridan's Ass got), overreaching bosses have finally met their match. And Shakespeare is replete with overreaching pride. If this isn't empirical confirmation for Spinoza, with his views on the vanity of worldliness and the fatuousness of ambition, what is? I'm with Andy: Why can't adults just be adults? Now here's where I remember one of my maxims: all criticism is projection. So, we're all freaks. But some of us take themselves so seriously. I am thinking of guys like Stalin and Hitler. It's too bad they didn't get better talk therapy. On being a monist, what is to be done? If we're going material, we have to consider Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy in measuring a quantum world, hence to whatever the brain is doing when thinking takes place. That doesn't mean that the quantum construal of the world is any "truer" than a Newtonian one, but it's a construal that one has to take into consideration when we engage the world. I think a dynamic systems approach to the development of cognition and action (Thelen and Smith, 1993 and 1994) blends well with a quantum world. In such a world, there is no blueprint for cognition or action available to the homunculus. There is only us human organisms engaged in a dialog with our environment, one largely created by humans, cultural. So, to engage the world, to have a life of meaning, I have no choice but to collaborate with others in good projects. From projects come narratives. A narrative of mental illness profiles the struggle with oneself: William James fought off depression on his way to a meaningful life. Baruch Spinoza's narrative profiles struggles with others in accomplishing his work. Cantor and Peirce got the double whammy, a synergy of insanity and bullying. Thanks to them, though not JUST to them, we are having this dialog. They are part of the dialog. I actually hear them talking to me. Just kidding! Maybe. So, how did these guys do it? How else but by engaging in the life of the mind: "?a world of extraordinary richness, extending far beyond the physical reality it is grounded in." (Langacker, 2008, p. 4)? Science is truly a humanity, and from a CG perspective, and Vygotsky's I think, this monist project will always be a work in progress. Spinoza's vision is optimistic, even joyful, but not easy. Joy in motion. The dance of life. Okay, I'm insufferable. Henry P.S. David, I have heard your assertion that the enlightenment started with Spinoza from a Univ of New Mexico prof (Michael Nutkiewicz), a Spinoza scholar. In fact, it was his talk that made me love Spinoza.According to Michael, Spinoza just did it with the language of the middle ages, which you found evidence of with his use of "deeds" among other things. Also, David, I agree with everything you say about Krashen. In my dissertation he and Chomsky were all the rage, so I HAD to point out why I didn't take from them. On Sep 6, 2014, at 3:35 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Probably the world's oldest naturalistic novel (in the sense of an > anti-Romance) is not Don Quixote, but an outrageously pornographic > philosophical treatise called Jin Ping Mei (after its three main > heroines). It was published sometime in the late Ming Dynasty, i.e. > before 1644, and nobody really knows who the author is, but he signs > himself "the unserious scholar of Lanling" (nobody really knows were > Lanling was, but people think it was someplace in Shandong Province, > not that far from here). > > Not the sort of thing that Spinoza would have written. But the Ethics > is concerned with the same sort of thing that "the unserious scholar > of Lanling" wrote: the vanity of worldliness, the fatuousness of > ambition, and of course the moral good of pleasure. More importantly, > Spinoza wrote the three words that really (in my opinion) began the > Enlightenment ("Deus Sive Natura"), words that could have been the > epigraph to Jin Ping Mei, since it too is concerned with the truths of > nature and the naturalness (as opposed to the unknowable nature) of > truth. > > I think that the reason why Spinoza is controversial on this list has > to do with his solution of the mind-body problem. Andy has always > considered Spinoza's response inadequate by virtue of its extremism; a > kind of "cutting of the Gordian knot" rather than a trying to unravel > it. Descartes says minds are spirit stuff and bodies are another > matter, and never the twain to the meet, and Spinoza's answer is just > to say that everything in the world is made of sentient meat--some of > it may be more sentient (or perhaps we need to say POTENTIALLY more > sentient) and some of it less so, but everything has to at least > potentially have both ideality and materiality or it can't really > partake of reality to begin with (or anyway we cannot partake of its > reallity). This solution, it seems to me, makes good sense, and I > think it also made perfect sense to Vygotsky, and it's part of a long > tradition of anti-Aristotelian thinking that goes back at least as far > as Jean Buridan. > > Vygotsky is quite interested in Buridan, and not just his famous > donkey (in HDHMF Vygotsky shows that he knows perfectly well that the > donkey was made up not by Buridan but by his Aristotelian enemies). > One reason is that Buridan appears to have been one of the first who > suggested that, contrary to what Aristotle thought (and contrary to > what English grammar suggests), the laws of nature were perfectly > determinate in the present and the future as well as in the past > (Aristotle considered the past fully determined but the present and > the future intrinsically indeterminate, because of free will). The > donkey was apparently an attempt by the Aristotelians to prove Buridan > wrong: since humans do not starve to death in a Buridan situation, > free will must exist, and therefore we really do live in two different > worlds: a fully determined past and an essentially unknowable > non-past. > > Spinoza, like Buridan, did believe that in any one situation there > was, from a strictly rationalist point of view, only one right course > of action (as in a game of chess, which as Von Neumann pointed out, is > not really a game at all but simply an unsolved calculation). This was > as true of moral and economic problems as it was of mathematical ones. > And Spinoza, like Buridan, argued that if the the right course of > action was unclear, the thing to do was to suspend judgment and keep > calculating until it became clear--and this is actually where Vygotsky > gets his epigraph for "Psychology of Art" ("No one has hitherto laid > down the limits to the powers of the body..."). > > Halliday insists on rendering grammatical choice as a set of > bifurcations or trifurcations--Buridan decisions which, taken one by > one, are manageable, and only in the their cumulative, synoptic result > seem inhumanely complex. And I think that one reason he insists on > this is that he insists on knowing not only how the whole system > works, but also how it could have come about, and above all why. > > For example, when I first read: > > "Ann came with a date and Bill without one". > > I couldn't help thinking that Ann and Bill came together--poor Ann > thinking that Bill was her date and Bill, the lout, on the lookout for > a new one. The reason I can't help thinking such "unserious scholar of > Lanling" thoughts is tha I, like Halliday, usually start from the > point of view that an utterance like this has to have some > point--there has to be some reason why "came" is elided. By eliding > "came", the hearer is left with the strong feeling that something is > missing on Bill's side of the equation. Such dramas do happen in real > life, and have done so since at least the Ming dynasty, but they don't > really seem to make it into grammar books. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > PS: Henry--I am an ELT person just like you (and I am within a decade > of retirement age, despite my unserious demeanour). So I understood > the reference to Krashen. But for most people on the list the name > Krashen either means nothing at all, or refers to an admirable > defendent of bilingual education in the state of California and not a > rather hidebound and rigid second language acquisition theorist whose > theory of language is straight Chomsky and whose theory of learning > and acquisition is straight Piaget. > > The data I gave was data recorded by one of my graduates on her cell > phone during the first moments of her class. Most of my grads, > including this one, are non-native speakers of English. > > > dk > > > On 7 September 2014 04:51, mike cole wrote: >> Hi Henry-- There goes my pile of books that need to be read before bed time! >> Spinoza goes up there right next to Dead Souls. >> >> However, David having already claimed the mantle of unserious scholar, and >> you having made the same claim, I am afraid that I have to make precisely >> the same claim on the unrefutable grounds that no one pays me any longer >> for what I do so I get to be as unserious as i can seriously be! >> mike >> >> >> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 12:33 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III >> wrote: >> >>> Hi Mike, >>> All I can say now is that Spinoza is famously quoted as having said, "The >>> more clearly you understand yourself and your emotions, the more you become >>> a lover of what is." This quote happens to appear in the introduction to a >>> very popular self help book, Loving What Is, by Byron Katie (2002). I >>> bought the book , obviously, because I thought I needed help. It did, but >>> it also introduced me to Spinoza. And that has been a deeper "help". So, >>> from a personal perspective, I can totally understand how Spinoza and >>> periizhvanie would be connected. For all of you ESL teachers out there, who >>> doesn't remember Krashen on the "affective filter" and I have been seeing a >>> lot on character and education lately. Oh yes, and how failing is important >>> to eventual success. Teasing out issues in the education of >>> non-mainstreamers, and recognizing how the current system is toxic for >>> everyone, I think Spinoza's analysis and the narrative of his life are >>> powerful. Vygotsky hits me the same way. Cantor, the mathematician, and >>> Pierce, the philosopher/logician/semiotician, also constantly come up for >>> me. They were ridiculed by the received cognoscenti of the time, so much so >>> that the suffered mental breakdowns. But they pushed on to develop tools in >>> math and semiotics that seem to me are complementary with Vygotsky. Again I >>> get to take the role of unserious scholar here, so think of my thoughts as >>> gaming on line and don't take the game too seriously. >>> Henry >>> >>> On Sep 5, 2014, at 6:42 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>>> Hi David and Henry-- >>>> >>>> David-- I was intrigued by your comment that Spinoza is a controversial >>>> topic on xmca. I googled Spinoza on the main web page and came up with 4K >>>> plus hits (!!). My own impression is that few on this list, me included, >>>> have engaged in serious study of Spinoza let alone the imprint of Spinoza >>>> on Vygotsky. >>>> >>>> What is the nature of the controversy? What is at stake? The topic is of >>>> particular interest to me at present because I have been part of >>>> discussions with people who are focused on Vygotsky's use of perezhivanie >>>> in his later work, where the relation of emotion and cognition is a >>> central >>>> concern and Spinoza is clearly relevant. >>>> >>>> Henry and anyone interested in chasing down what has been written about >>>> various topics in xmca chatter, take advantage of the nice google search >>> at >>>> lchc.ucsd.edu. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> (who enmeshed in the sense/meaning distinction in all of its multilingual >>>> confusifications at present) >>> >>> From ewall@umich.edu Sun Sep 7 18:32:04 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sun, 7 Sep 2014 20:32:04 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [Sysfling] Exploring Functional-Cognitive Space References: Message-ID: <19334E22-8384-4472-B0ED-3B071C3324F3@umich.edu> From the SFL list. Perhaps of some interest in view of the ongoing discussion. Unfortunately, I haven't read the comparisons (the book is a bit pricey). Ed Wall Begin forwarded message: > From: "Thompson, Geoff" > Subject: [Sysfling] Exploring Functional-Cognitive Space > Date: September 7, 2014 6:58:16 AM CDT > To: "sys-func@listserv.uts.edu.au" , sysfling > > Message forwarded on behalf of Chris and Francisco - this volume is well worth checking out. > > Geoff > > ******************************** > List members might be interested to know of the following recent publication, which discusses and compares a wide range of functional and/or cognitive/constructionist approaches to language, including SFL: > > Butler, Christopher S. and Francisco Gonz?lvez-Garc?a. 2014. Exploring Functional-Cognitive Space. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. > > Details are available at https://benjamins.com/#catalog/books/slcs.157/main > > Chris Butler and Francisco Gonz?lvez Garcia > > ******************************** > > > > ************ > Geoff Thompson > > Honorary Senior Fellow > School of English, University of Liverpool > Liverpool L69 7ZR, UK > > Visiting Professor, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou > Guest Professor, University of Science and Technology Beijing > > tel: (0)151 794 2928 > fax: (0) 151 794 2739 > email: geoff9@liv.ac.uk > _______________________________________________ > Sysfling mailing list > Sysfling@cardiff.ac.uk > https://mailman.cf.ac.uk/mailman/listinfo/sysfling From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Sep 8 11:16:15 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2014 11:16:15 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky Message-ID: Check it out! mike http://webpages.charter.net/schmolze1/vygotsky/vygotsky.html -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From ewall@umich.edu Mon Sep 8 12:25:17 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2014 14:25:17 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> Thanks for this, Mike. The piece about Vygotsky and Bhaktin in regard to the ZPD is quite interesting. I'd be interested to hear comments from the list. Ed On Sep 8, 2014, at 1:16 PM, mike cole wrote: > Check it out! > mike > > http://webpages.charter.net/schmolze1/vygotsky/vygotsky.html > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Sep 8 13:44:52 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2014 13:44:52 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Assistant Professor in Linguistics and Human Development In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Melissa Koenig Date: Mon, Sep 8, 2014 at 1:09 PM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Assistant Professor in Linguistics and Human Development To: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org Please see below on behalf of Gris Arellano at UCSD. The Department of Linguistics (http://ling.ucsd.edu) and the Human Development Program (http://hdp.ucsd.edu) within the Division of Social Sciences at the University of California, San Diego invite applications for a tenure-track faculty position in Language Evolution and/or Development at the level of Assistant Professor, beginning July 1, 2015. The successful candidate will contribute to teaching in Linguistics and the Human Development Program. Both units are committed to academic excellence and diversity within the faculty, staff and student body. Qualifications: The ideal candidate will have research and teaching strengths in language emergence and evolution and/or language development. Additional expertise preferred in some combination of the following areas: computational modeling, experimental methods, linguistic typology, language variation, models of human learning and cultural transmission. Candidates should have a Ph.D. in Linguistics or a related field by the start of the appointment on July 1, 2015. Candidates should demonstrate evidence of research productivity, undergraduate and graduate teaching ability, and extramural funding potential. Candidates are encouraged to highlight how their research complements existing research on language and human development at UC San Diego. The preferred candidate will have experience or a willingness to participate in teaching, mentoring, research or service towards building an equitable and diverse scholarly environment. In compliance with the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, individuals offered employment by the University of California will be required to verify identity and authorization to work in the United States. Please submit full application, including letters of recommendation by December 1, 2014. Applications should be submitted to the UC San Diego on-line application collection system, AP-On-Line Recruit, at: https://apol-recruit.ucsd.edu/apply/. Applications must include a letter of application, a curriculum vitae, research and teaching statements and two representative publications. A separate statement describing past experience in activities that promote diversity, equity, and inclusion and/or plans to make future contributions is also required. For further information about contributions to diversity statements, see http://facultyequity.ucsd.edu/Faculty-Applicant-C2D-Info.asp and http://diversity.ucsd.edu. Candidates should also arrange for three letters of recommendation to be submitted via the on-line application system. Salary is commensurate with qualifications and based on University of California pay scales. AA-EOE: The University of California is an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action Employer. All qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, age or protected veteran status. LEARN MORE More information about this recruitment: http://ling.ucsd.edu Gris Arellano Management Services Officer | Department of Linguistics and Human Development Program | UC San Diego | MC 0108 T *(**:* 858.534.3602 | F *7**:* 858.534.7223 | E:: garellano@ucsd.edu -- Melissa Koenig Associate Professor Institute of Child Development University of Minnesota Minneapolis, MN 55455 (o) 612-625-6251 Lab: http://www.cehd.umn.edu/icd/research/elel/default.html _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Sep 8 16:18:36 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2014 16:18:36 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> Message-ID: The comparison of the different forms of dialogicality IS interesting, Ed, at least to me. At present I fear that the leading Bakhtinians among us have moved on to other forums, so not sure who will be reading or is interested. I regretted their acceptance of the scaffolding metaphor. I really believe it is misleading in important ways, as easily as it comes to mind (including my own). But its one of those topics that while it has been around for a long time (early 1980's at least, not long after Wood, Bruner, et al started using the term), gets no traction. mike On Mon, Sep 8, 2014 at 12:25 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > Thanks for this, Mike. The piece about Vygotsky and Bhaktin in regard to > the ZPD is quite interesting. I'd be interested to hear comments from the > list. > > Ed > > On Sep 8, 2014, at 1:16 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Check it out! > > mike > > > > http://webpages.charter.net/schmolze1/vygotsky/vygotsky.html > > > > -- > > > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more > or > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > > Gray, 2001] > > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From dkirsh@lsu.edu Mon Sep 8 19:13:09 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2014 02:13:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Netflix is in In-Reply-To: <540e5b5d4c1d7_23fe0a5eebea013056fb@c58218f1-ae8f-4d6c-bf13-202990029e8b.mail> References: <540e5b5d4c1d7_23fe0a5eebea013056fb@c58218f1-ae8f-4d6c-bf13-202990029e8b.mail> Message-ID: <49b087f4db434a87a649d334e4f448a2@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> I hope my forwarding this protest action to XMCA is not considered an intrusion. This effort to maintain an unfettered internet system affects us directly. David From: Evan Greer from FFTF [mailto:info@list.fightforthefuture.org] Sent: Monday, September 08, 2014 8:44 PM To: David H Kirshner Subject: Netflix is in Hey, No time to write. There are 30 hours left until the Internet Slowdown protest for net neutrality, and all of us here at FFTF are working round the clock to make this huge. Everything you need is right here: https://battleforthenet.com/sept10th Just this morning, Netflix announced that they?re joining the slowdown and will be showing a prominent message sitewide on September 10th. That?s huge. We?re going to reach millions and millions of people who have never heard the words ?net neutrality? before. So many of you have already joined and have been helping spread the word, and we can?t thank you enough. Here?s the thing. It?s not enough for this protest to be huge. It has to be massive. Comcast, Verizon, AT&T, and Time Warner are spending more than $1 million per week lobbying to make sure that the FCC protects their interests even though the public?s voice couldn't be clearer. It?s possible to drown out the influence of those lobbying dollars -- we?ve proven that before -- but only if everyone starts scrambling right now to get even more people and sites on board. Will you forward this email to everyone you know right now? Another way to help is to text everyone in your address book this link: https://battleforthenet.com/sept10th We need to get the slowdown trending and viral on social media starting TONIGHT. Use these links to share on social media. Retweet this awesome gif or make your own and tweet to #InternetSlowdown. Click here to share on Facebook Click here to share on Twitter Click here to share on Tumblr Click here to share on Google+ The battle for the net is raging and we?re gaining ground every day, but the outcome is still very much uncertain. What each of us does right now will matter for generations to come. Yours for the future of the free web, -Evan, Tiffiniy, Holmes, Kevin, Vasjen, Jeff, and Jessica at Fight for the Future P.S. Just a reminder that EVERYONE can participate in the protest on September 10th. If you have a website, go here to get the code. If not, click here, and change your profile picture.It?s easy! [http://action.fightforthefuture.org/beacon.gif?t=dXNlcmlkPTU1MjY5MzMzLGVtYWlsaWQ9OTAzMg==] Want more awesome more often? * Like us on Facebook * Follow us on Twitter * Keep us fighting, chip in what you can. If you would like to unsubscribe and stop receiving these emails click here. From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Sep 9 11:07:23 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 09 Sep 2014 14:07:23 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?q?Watch_=22University_of_Illinois_Urged_to_Reinstate_Pro?= =?utf-8?q?fess=E2=80=A6=22_on_YouTube?= Message-ID: <2eoo2qo0atxarq9bvssi2gma.1410286043686@email.android.com> University of Illinois Urged to Reinstate Profess?: http://youtu.be/OrdQn6g4o1Y Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info? From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Sep 9 14:31:56 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2014 21:31:56 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Vygotsky, bernstein and halliday Message-ID: <431A2CEB-4335-4285-8441-8F490D6F0549@uniandes.edu.co> Anyone have a copy of this? Martin Vygotsky, bernstein and halliday: Towards a unified theory of L1 and L2 learning Language, Culture and Curriculum Volume 4, Issue 1, 1991 DOI: 10.1080/07908319109525092 Joseph Foley From tom.richardson3@googlemail.com Tue Sep 9 14:51:48 2014 From: tom.richardson3@googlemail.com (Tom Richardson) Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2014 22:51:48 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?q?Watch_=22University_of_Illinois_Urged_to_Reinstate_?= =?utf-8?q?Profess=E2=80=A6=22_on_YouTube?= In-Reply-To: <2eoo2qo0atxarq9bvssi2gma.1410286043686@email.android.com> References: <2eoo2qo0atxarq9bvssi2gma.1410286043686@email.android.com> Message-ID: Hi Paul I have signed the petition if that is what the link is about - I haven't clicked on it before writing this Best wishes Tom On 9 September 2014 19:07, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > University of Illinois Urged to Reinstate Profess?: > http://youtu.be/OrdQn6g4o1Y > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Sep 9 16:26:21 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 09 Sep 2014 19:26:21 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?q?Watch_=22University_of_Illinois_Urged_to_Reinstate_?= =?utf-8?q?Profess=E2=80=A6=22_on_YouTube?= Message-ID: Sounds good tom... Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Tom Richardson
Date:09/09/2014 5:51 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Watch "University of Illinois Urged to Reinstate Profess?" on YouTube
Hi Paul I have signed the petition if that is what the link is about - I haven't clicked on it before writing this Best wishes Tom On 9 September 2014 19:07, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > University of Illinois Urged to Reinstate Profess?: > http://youtu.be/OrdQn6g4o1Y > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Sep 9 21:00:49 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2014 22:00:49 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> Message-ID: What's wrong with the scaffolding metaphor? Henry On Sep 8, 2014, at 5:18 PM, mike cole wrote: > The comparison of the different forms of dialogicality IS interesting, Ed, > at least to me. At present I fear that the leading Bakhtinians among us > have moved on to other forums, so not sure who will be reading or is > interested. > > I regretted their acceptance of the scaffolding metaphor. I really believe > it is misleading in important ways, as easily as it comes to mind > (including my own). But its one of those topics that while it has been > around for a long time (early 1980's at least, not long after Wood, Bruner, > et al started using the term), gets no traction. > mike > > On Mon, Sep 8, 2014 at 12:25 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >> Thanks for this, Mike. The piece about Vygotsky and Bhaktin in regard to >> the ZPD is quite interesting. I'd be interested to hear comments from the >> list. >> >> Ed >> >> On Sep 8, 2014, at 1:16 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >>> Check it out! >>> mike >>> >>> http://webpages.charter.net/schmolze1/vygotsky/vygotsky.html >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more >> or >>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>> Gray, 2001] >> >> >> > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue Sep 9 21:29:36 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2014 13:29:36 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> Message-ID: Henry: Scaffolding is mechanical. Scaffolding is external. Scaffolding is essentially the shaping of behavior. If the scaffold is made of language, what is the building itself made of? All of these criticisms are developed in our own field to be found in: Kinginger, C. (2002). Defining the zone of proximal development in US foreign language education. Applied Linguistics, 23 (2) pp. 240-261. Mike, though, was critiquing the "scaffolding" metaphor almost as soon as it came out: Griffin, P. and Cole, M. (1984). Current activity for the future: The Zo-ped. In Rogoff and Wertsch, (Eds). Children's Learning in the Zone of Proximal Development, San Francisco: Jossey Bass, pp. 45-65. I think, however, the most damning critique of scaffolding is to be found in B. F. Skinner's description of how to teach pigeons to play ping-pong. Here's how my old professor Keith Johnson describes it: "How to teach a pigeon to play table tennis, in five easy lessons. "Lesson 1. First stand your pigeon behind a ping-pon ball. Whenever it approaches the ball (by chance at first), give it some food. Soon your pigeon will have been conditioned to approach the ball. "Lesson 2. Now only give the pigeon food when it actually touches the ball. "Lesson 3. When the pigeon has learned to touch the ball, start to reward it only when it pushes the ball forward. "Lesson 4. Continue training int eh same way until the pigeon can knock the ball over a net. "Lesson 5. Your pigeon is now ready to confront an opponent (another pigeon). You now only reward them when they push the ball past their opponent. The championship can commence!" Johnson, K. (1994). An Introduction to Foreign Language Learning and Teaching. Harlow: Pearson Longman, p. 48. If you need one, here's a much better metaphor--although it is still mechanical and external. It's from Otto Neurath, who when he was minister of museums in revolutionary Vienna tried--and failed--to replace the signs with "Isotype", a set of non-linguistic icons. Escaping over the English channel in an overloaded lifeboat, he reflected on the fact that we have to use language to "figure out" language itself: "We are like sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea, never able to dismantle it in dry dock and to reconstruct it there out of the best materials." David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 10 September 2014 13:00, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > What's wrong with the scaffolding metaphor? > Henry > > On Sep 8, 2014, at 5:18 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> The comparison of the different forms of dialogicality IS interesting, Ed, >> at least to me. At present I fear that the leading Bakhtinians among us >> have moved on to other forums, so not sure who will be reading or is >> interested. >> >> I regretted their acceptance of the scaffolding metaphor. I really believe >> it is misleading in important ways, as easily as it comes to mind >> (including my own). But its one of those topics that while it has been >> around for a long time (early 1980's at least, not long after Wood, Bruner, >> et al started using the term), gets no traction. >> mike >> >> On Mon, Sep 8, 2014 at 12:25 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >> >>> Thanks for this, Mike. The piece about Vygotsky and Bhaktin in regard to >>> the ZPD is quite interesting. I'd be interested to hear comments from the >>> list. >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> On Sep 8, 2014, at 1:16 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>>> Check it out! >>>> mike >>>> >>>> http://webpages.charter.net/schmolze1/vygotsky/vygotsky.html >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more >>> or >>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>>> Gray, 2001] >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> >> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or >> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >> Gray, 2001] > From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Sep 9 22:01:58 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2014 23:01:58 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> Message-ID: Hi David, Thank you! I have been using the term "scaffolding" for years with student teachers. I like the idea of it being temporary, with a "turn-over and then upping the ante. All of this is Bruner, I guess, which is also why I liked the term. . Scaffolding does have the sense of being physical, but aren't all metaphors "embodied"? "Shaping" as metaphor, on the other hand, isn't so much supporting learning as it is directing it. What I like about the ZPD is that its goal is learner autonomy, so the temporary nature of scaffolding seems appropriate. "Shaping" isn't about autonomy at all. Those poor pigeons! Henry On Sep 9, 2014, at 10:29 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Henry: > > Scaffolding is mechanical. Scaffolding is external. Scaffolding is > essentially the shaping of behavior. If the scaffold is made of > language, what is the building itself made of? > > All of these criticisms are developed in our own field to be found in: > > Kinginger, C. (2002). Defining the zone of proximal development in US > foreign language education. Applied Linguistics, 23 (2) pp. 240-261. > > Mike, though, was critiquing the "scaffolding" metaphor almost as soon > as it came out: > > Griffin, P. and Cole, M. (1984). Current activity for the future: The > Zo-ped. In Rogoff and Wertsch, (Eds). Children's Learning in the Zone > of Proximal Development, San Francisco: Jossey Bass, pp. 45-65. > > I think, however, the most damning critique of scaffolding is to be > found in B. F. Skinner's description of how to teach pigeons to play > ping-pong. Here's how my old professor Keith Johnson describes it: > > "How to teach a pigeon to play table tennis, in five easy lessons. > > "Lesson 1. First stand your pigeon behind a ping-pon ball. Whenever it > approaches the ball (by chance at first), give it some food. Soon your > pigeon will have been conditioned to approach the ball. > > "Lesson 2. Now only give the pigeon food when it actually touches the ball. > > "Lesson 3. When the pigeon has learned to touch the ball, start to > reward it only when it pushes the ball forward. > > "Lesson 4. Continue training int eh same way until the pigeon can > knock the ball over a net. > > "Lesson 5. Your pigeon is now ready to confront an opponent (another > pigeon). You now only reward them when they push the ball past their > opponent. The championship can commence!" > > Johnson, K. (1994). An Introduction to Foreign Language Learning and > Teaching. Harlow: Pearson Longman, p. 48. > > If you need one, here's a much better metaphor--although it is still > mechanical and external. It's from Otto Neurath, who when he was > minister of museums in revolutionary Vienna tried--and failed--to > replace the signs with "Isotype", a set of non-linguistic icons. > Escaping over the English channel in an overloaded lifeboat, he > reflected on the fact that we have to use language to "figure out" > language itself: > > "We are like sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea, > never able to dismantle it in dry dock and to reconstruct it there out > of the best materials." > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 10 September 2014 13:00, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: >> What's wrong with the scaffolding metaphor? >> Henry >> >> On Sep 8, 2014, at 5:18 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >>> The comparison of the different forms of dialogicality IS interesting, Ed, >>> at least to me. At present I fear that the leading Bakhtinians among us >>> have moved on to other forums, so not sure who will be reading or is >>> interested. >>> >>> I regretted their acceptance of the scaffolding metaphor. I really believe >>> it is misleading in important ways, as easily as it comes to mind >>> (including my own). But its one of those topics that while it has been >>> around for a long time (early 1980's at least, not long after Wood, Bruner, >>> et al started using the term), gets no traction. >>> mike >>> >>> On Mon, Sep 8, 2014 at 12:25 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>> >>>> Thanks for this, Mike. The piece about Vygotsky and Bhaktin in regard to >>>> the ZPD is quite interesting. I'd be interested to hear comments from the >>>> list. >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> On Sep 8, 2014, at 1:16 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>>> Check it out! >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> http://webpages.charter.net/schmolze1/vygotsky/vygotsky.html >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >>>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more >>>> or >>>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>>>> Gray, 2001] >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or >>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>> Gray, 2001] >> From s.franklin08@btinternet.com Wed Sep 10 01:42:39 2014 From: s.franklin08@btinternet.com (Shirley Franklin) Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2014 09:42:39 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky, bernstein and halliday In-Reply-To: <431A2CEB-4335-4285-8441-8F490D6F0549@uniandes.edu.co> References: <431A2CEB-4335-4285-8441-8F490D6F0549@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <5CBAADBB-663F-4007-974E-837EEECE5BDD@btinternet.com> I would also like a copy please. Shirley Sent from my iPhone > On 9 Sep 2014, at 22:31, Martin John Packer wrote: > > Anyone have a copy of this? > > Martin > > Vygotsky, bernstein and halliday: Towards a unified theory of L1 and L2 learning > Language, Culture and Curriculum > Volume 4, Issue 1, 1991 > > DOI: > 10.1080/07908319109525092 > Joseph Foley > > > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Wed Sep 10 02:09:06 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2014 11:09:06 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky, bernstein and halliday In-Reply-To: <5CBAADBB-663F-4007-974E-837EEECE5BDD@btinternet.com> References: <431A2CEB-4335-4285-8441-8F490D6F0549@uniandes.edu.co> <5CBAADBB-663F-4007-974E-837EEECE5BDD@btinternet.com> Message-ID: I would also like a copy, without having to pay $35 for the article. Thanks Carol PS Why don't they (T&F) open source papers so far back? On 10 September 2014 10:42, Shirley Franklin wrote: > I would also like a copy please. > Shirley > > Sent from my iPhone > > > On 9 Sep 2014, at 22:31, Martin John Packer > wrote: > > > > Anyone have a copy of this? > > > > Martin > > > > Vygotsky, bernstein and halliday: Towards a unified theory of L1 and L2 > learning > > Language, Culture and Curriculum > > Volume 4, Issue 1< > http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rlcc20/4/1>, 1991 > > > > DOI: > > 10.1080/07908319109525092 > > Joseph Foley > > > > > > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk Wed Sep 10 02:40:43 2014 From: r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk (rjsp2) Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2014 10:40:43 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> Message-ID: <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> Hi everyone I have disliked the term scaffolding for some time, not so much because of the philosophy behind it as because of its connotations as a word. The people I teach using it don't go into it in such depth, but I think the connotations influence what they think they should be doing. At one level scaffolding works perfectly well as a concept: you put something in place in order to aid a particular activity, then you take it away when the activity is complete. But my impression is that that is not what people see. What they see is something with massive physical presence, heavy, immovable (the whole point of scaffolding on a building, of course, is that it is intended to be rigid), which looms over, enfolds the activity, and which is very difficult to dismantle. So they tend to think of it as something they build, but not something they dismantle. I find teaching the concept works much better if I start by saying that the key to the idea is the withdrawal of support. Then they get the message. (Scaffolding is one of a small collection I am building up of unhelpfully named concepts. It started with reflecting on Argyris's very useful but hopelessly named concept of single and double loop learning. Whatever good double loop learning does is not achieved by going round in a circle twice, as most of my students think before I enlighten them.) Rob On 10/09/2014 06:01, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > Hi David, > Thank you! I have been using the term "scaffolding" for years with student teachers. I like the idea of it being temporary, with a "turn-over and then upping the ante. All of this is Bruner, I guess, which is also why I liked the term. . Scaffolding does have the sense of being physical, but aren't all metaphors "embodied"? "Shaping" as metaphor, on the other hand, isn't so much supporting learning as it is directing it. What I like about the ZPD is that its goal is learner autonomy, so the temporary nature of scaffolding seems appropriate. "Shaping" isn't about autonomy at all. Those poor pigeons! > Henry > > On Sep 9, 2014, at 10:29 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Henry: >> >> Scaffolding is mechanical. Scaffolding is external. Scaffolding is >> essentially the shaping of behavior. If the scaffold is made of >> language, what is the building itself made of? >> >> All of these criticisms are developed in our own field to be found in: >> >> Kinginger, C. (2002). Defining the zone of proximal development in US >> foreign language education. Applied Linguistics, 23 (2) pp. 240-261. >> >> Mike, though, was critiquing the "scaffolding" metaphor almost as soon >> as it came out: >> >> Griffin, P. and Cole, M. (1984). Current activity for the future: The >> Zo-ped. In Rogoff and Wertsch, (Eds). Children's Learning in the Zone >> of Proximal Development, San Francisco: Jossey Bass, pp. 45-65. >> >> I think, however, the most damning critique of scaffolding is to be >> found in B. F. Skinner's description of how to teach pigeons to play >> ping-pong. Here's how my old professor Keith Johnson describes it: >> >> "How to teach a pigeon to play table tennis, in five easy lessons. >> >> "Lesson 1. First stand your pigeon behind a ping-pon ball. Whenever it >> approaches the ball (by chance at first), give it some food. Soon your >> pigeon will have been conditioned to approach the ball. >> >> "Lesson 2. Now only give the pigeon food when it actually touches the ball. >> >> "Lesson 3. When the pigeon has learned to touch the ball, start to >> reward it only when it pushes the ball forward. >> >> "Lesson 4. Continue training int eh same way until the pigeon can >> knock the ball over a net. >> >> "Lesson 5. Your pigeon is now ready to confront an opponent (another >> pigeon). You now only reward them when they push the ball past their >> opponent. The championship can commence!" >> >> Johnson, K. (1994). An Introduction to Foreign Language Learning and >> Teaching. Harlow: Pearson Longman, p. 48. >> >> If you need one, here's a much better metaphor--although it is still >> mechanical and external. It's from Otto Neurath, who when he was >> minister of museums in revolutionary Vienna tried--and failed--to >> replace the signs with "Isotype", a set of non-linguistic icons. >> Escaping over the English channel in an overloaded lifeboat, he >> reflected on the fact that we have to use language to "figure out" >> language itself: >> >> "We are like sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea, >> never able to dismantle it in dry dock and to reconstruct it there out >> of the best materials." >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> On 10 September 2014 13:00, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: >>> What's wrong with the scaffolding metaphor? >>> Henry >>> >>> On Sep 8, 2014, at 5:18 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>>> The comparison of the different forms of dialogicality IS interesting, Ed, >>>> at least to me. At present I fear that the leading Bakhtinians among us >>>> have moved on to other forums, so not sure who will be reading or is >>>> interested. >>>> >>>> I regretted their acceptance of the scaffolding metaphor. I really believe >>>> it is misleading in important ways, as easily as it comes to mind >>>> (including my own). But its one of those topics that while it has been >>>> around for a long time (early 1980's at least, not long after Wood, Bruner, >>>> et al started using the term), gets no traction. >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Mon, Sep 8, 2014 at 12:25 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>>> >>>>> Thanks for this, Mike. The piece about Vygotsky and Bhaktin in regard to >>>>> the ZPD is quite interesting. I'd be interested to hear comments from the >>>>> list. >>>>> >>>>> Ed >>>>> >>>>> On Sep 8, 2014, at 1:16 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Check it out! >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> http://webpages.charter.net/schmolze1/vygotsky/vygotsky.html >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >>>>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more >>>>> or >>>>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>>>>> Gray, 2001] >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or >>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>>> Gray, 2001] > -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. From smago@uga.edu Wed Sep 10 03:36:40 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2014 10:36:40 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Call for Chapter Proposals In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: THIS IS A FORWARDED MESSAGE. PLEASE READ ITS CONTENTS CAREFULLY AND REPLY TO THE ORIGINAL SENDER RATHER THAN TO ME From: Russell, Donna L [mailto:russelldl@missouri.edu] Sent: Tuesday, September 09, 2014 7:25 PM To: Peter Smagorinsky Cc: Russell, Donna L Subject: Call for Chapter Proposals Hello Dr. Smagorinsky, I was hoping you would consider posting the attached call for chapter proposals to your SIG list. The book, Handbook of Research of Gaming Trends in P-12 Education, is designed to be a comprehensive discussion of future trends in this multidisciplinary field. I am a CHAT researcher and hoped that the cultural historical perspective on critical topics, e.g. Play and telepresence, would be represented in this Handbook. Please let me know if you have questions. Thank you. Donna Donna Russell, Ph.D. Assistant Clinical Professor School of Information Science and Learning Technologies College of Education University of Missouri at Columbia russelldl@missouri.edu cell: 314.210.6996. Donna Russell, Ph.D. Author: Inquiry into Mediated Action: Understanding Collaborative Online Professional Development Editor of Cases of Collaborative Virtual Learning Environments: Processes and Interactions Lead Editor of Web-Based Engineering Education: Critical Design and Effective Tools Past Program Chair of the Problem-Based Education committee of the American Educational Researchers Association International Editorial Review Board member for the International Journal of Information and Communication Technologies Education Reviewer for: Educational Technologies Research and Design British Journal of Educational Technology Interdisciplinary Journal of Problem-Based Learning International Journal of Educational Technology and Society Journal of Engineering Education Journal of Online Learning and Teaching "No problem can be solved at the same level of consciousness as when it was created. " Albert Einstein. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Extended_Call for Chapter Proposal_EducationalGaming2.docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 29235 bytes Desc: Extended_Call for Chapter Proposal_EducationalGaming2.docx Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140910/f019b60c/attachment.bin From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Wed Sep 10 03:37:39 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2014 11:37:39 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> Message-ID: Scaffolding lacks the recognition of motive. Huw On 10 September 2014 10:40, rjsp2 wrote: > Hi everyone > > I have disliked the term scaffolding for some time, not so much because > of the philosophy behind it as because of its connotations as a word. > The people I teach using it don't go into it in such depth, but I think > the connotations influence what they think they should be doing. At one > level scaffolding works perfectly well as a concept: you put something > in place in order to aid a particular activity, then you take it away > when the activity is complete. > > But my impression is that that is not what people see. What they see is > something with massive physical presence, heavy, immovable (the whole > point of scaffolding on a building, of course, is that it is intended to > be rigid), which looms over, enfolds the activity, and which is very > difficult to dismantle. So they tend to think of it as something they > build, but not something they dismantle. I find teaching the concept > works much better if I start by saying that the key to the idea is the > withdrawal of support. Then they get the message. > > (Scaffolding is one of a small collection I am building up of > unhelpfully named concepts. It started with reflecting on Argyris's very > useful but hopelessly named concept of single and double loop learning. > Whatever good double loop learning does is not achieved by going round > in a circle twice, as most of my students think before I enlighten them.) > > Rob > > > On 10/09/2014 06:01, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > >> Hi David, >> Thank you! I have been using the term "scaffolding" for years with >> student teachers. I like the idea of it being temporary, with a "turn-over >> and then upping the ante. All of this is Bruner, I guess, which is also why >> I liked the term. . Scaffolding does have the sense of being physical, but >> aren't all metaphors "embodied"? "Shaping" as metaphor, on the other hand, >> isn't so much supporting learning as it is directing it. What I like about >> the ZPD is that its goal is learner autonomy, so the temporary nature of >> scaffolding seems appropriate. "Shaping" isn't about autonomy at all. Those >> poor pigeons! >> Henry >> >> On Sep 9, 2014, at 10:29 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> Henry: >>> >>> Scaffolding is mechanical. Scaffolding is external. Scaffolding is >>> essentially the shaping of behavior. If the scaffold is made of >>> language, what is the building itself made of? >>> >>> All of these criticisms are developed in our own field to be found in: >>> >>> Kinginger, C. (2002). Defining the zone of proximal development in US >>> foreign language education. Applied Linguistics, 23 (2) pp. 240-261. >>> >>> Mike, though, was critiquing the "scaffolding" metaphor almost as soon >>> as it came out: >>> >>> Griffin, P. and Cole, M. (1984). Current activity for the future: The >>> Zo-ped. In Rogoff and Wertsch, (Eds). Children's Learning in the Zone >>> of Proximal Development, San Francisco: Jossey Bass, pp. 45-65. >>> >>> I think, however, the most damning critique of scaffolding is to be >>> found in B. F. Skinner's description of how to teach pigeons to play >>> ping-pong. Here's how my old professor Keith Johnson describes it: >>> >>> "How to teach a pigeon to play table tennis, in five easy lessons. >>> >>> "Lesson 1. First stand your pigeon behind a ping-pon ball. Whenever it >>> approaches the ball (by chance at first), give it some food. Soon your >>> pigeon will have been conditioned to approach the ball. >>> >>> "Lesson 2. Now only give the pigeon food when it actually touches the >>> ball. >>> >>> "Lesson 3. When the pigeon has learned to touch the ball, start to >>> reward it only when it pushes the ball forward. >>> >>> "Lesson 4. Continue training int eh same way until the pigeon can >>> knock the ball over a net. >>> >>> "Lesson 5. Your pigeon is now ready to confront an opponent (another >>> pigeon). You now only reward them when they push the ball past their >>> opponent. The championship can commence!" >>> >>> Johnson, K. (1994). An Introduction to Foreign Language Learning and >>> Teaching. Harlow: Pearson Longman, p. 48. >>> >>> If you need one, here's a much better metaphor--although it is still >>> mechanical and external. It's from Otto Neurath, who when he was >>> minister of museums in revolutionary Vienna tried--and failed--to >>> replace the signs with "Isotype", a set of non-linguistic icons. >>> Escaping over the English channel in an overloaded lifeboat, he >>> reflected on the fact that we have to use language to "figure out" >>> language itself: >>> >>> "We are like sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea, >>> never able to dismantle it in dry dock and to reconstruct it there out >>> of the best materials." >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> On 10 September 2014 13:00, Henry G. Shonerd III >>> wrote: >>> >>>> What's wrong with the scaffolding metaphor? >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> On Sep 8, 2014, at 5:18 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> The comparison of the different forms of dialogicality IS interesting, >>>>> Ed, >>>>> at least to me. At present I fear that the leading Bakhtinians among us >>>>> have moved on to other forums, so not sure who will be reading or is >>>>> interested. >>>>> >>>>> I regretted their acceptance of the scaffolding metaphor. I really >>>>> believe >>>>> it is misleading in important ways, as easily as it comes to mind >>>>> (including my own). But its one of those topics that while it has been >>>>> around for a long time (early 1980's at least, not long after Wood, >>>>> Bruner, >>>>> et al started using the term), gets no traction. >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Sep 8, 2014 at 12:25 PM, Ed Wall wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Thanks for this, Mike. The piece about Vygotsky and Bhaktin in regard >>>>>> to >>>>>> the ZPD is quite interesting. I'd be interested to hear comments >>>>>> from the >>>>>> list. >>>>>> >>>>>> Ed >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sep 8, 2014, at 1:16 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Check it out! >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://webpages.charter.net/schmolze1/vygotsky/vygotsky.html >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction >>>>>>> and re- >>>>>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but >>>>>>> more >>>>>>> >>>>>> or >>>>>> >>>>>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> Gray, 2001] >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and >>>>> re- >>>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but >>>>> more or >>>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>>>> Gray, 2001] >>>>> >>>> >> > -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an > exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC > 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial > Conduct Authority. > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Sep 10 06:00:22 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2014 13:00:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?q?Vygotsky=2C_bernstein_and_halliday?= In-Reply-To: References: <431A2CEB-4335-4285-8441-8F490D6F0549@uniandes.edu.co> <5CBAADBB-663F-4007-974E-837EEECE5BDD@btinternet.com>, Message-ID: <7dfa67872ed74f25bebc79a4143f3bb5@gmail.com> Carol, I also would like a copy. The discussion of the metaphor of *scaffolding* which seems to have intuitive appeal but is questioned is also a comment on the power of *metaphor* for forming [and transforming] *modes* of consciousness. Scaffolding as a metaphor *indicates/gestures* towards the relation of passing on already formed ideas, concepts, names which the listener is to receive and appropriate. It is a *construction* metaphor. The *building* as David says is already *assumed* to be *designed* The relation of the *literal* to the *metaphorical* seems important to consider in this metaphor and more generally in the transformative power of metaphor Is the boundary and contrast between *metaphorical* and *literal* clear or fuzzy? The boundary between *is* *as* *as if* seems to be fluid and yet deeply implicated in our understandings and explanations For example the metaphors *scaffolding* *boundaries* *permeability* fluid* *construction* *constituted* *modes* are examples of metaphors used. What do we *mean* by *modes* of consciousness. How *real* are *modes*?? James Ma in his 2014 article he recently posted [ The Synergy of Peirce and Vygotsky AS an Analytical Approach to the Multimodality of Semiotic Mediation* seems to have potential for relating what he refers to as Vygotsky?s *deductive* focus and Peirce?s *abductive* approach. to approach the relation of the metaphorical and literal and their *fuzzy boundaries* within *fuzzy logic* may be contrasted *clear and distinct* nominalistic notions. James Ma explores the notion of *multimodality* [pluralistic modes] such as words AND images Peirce also developed a concept *interpretive MUSINGS* that I would like leads to follow up. The centrality of Peirce?s notion of *musings* and its relation to *metaphoricity* and to *abduction* and to *multimodality* I am curious to explore further. For that I may need *scaffolding* and *building blocks* to constitute [or be constituted by] within multiple pluralistic polythematic *arrangements* and *orders* Larry Sent from Windows Mail From: Carol Macdonald Sent: ?Wednesday?, ?September? ?10?, ?2014 ?2?:?09? ?AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity c I would also like a copy, without having to pay $35 for the article. Thanks Carol= PS Why don't they (T&F) open source papers so far back? On 10 September 2014 10:42, Shirley Franklin s.franklin08@btinternet.com* wrote: > I would also like a copy please. > Shirley > > Sent from my iPhone > > > On 9 Sep 2014, at 22:31, Martin John Packer > wrote: > > > > Anyone have a copy of this? > > > > Martin > > > > Vygotsky, bernstein and halliday: Towards a unified theory of L1 and L2 > learning > > Language, Culture and Curriculum > > Volume 4, Issue 1< > http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rlcc20/4/1>, 1991 > > > > DOI: > > 10.1080/07908319109525092 > > Joseph Foley > > > > > > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Wed Sep 10 08:58:00 2014 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2014 09:58:00 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> , <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> Message-ID: like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at the same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian Cambourne's "conditions for learning" that lead to student engagement, as well as how it relates to student engagement (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of responsibility" and Lave & Wenger's "community of practice" - in combination these works (along with critical race theory and queer theory, identity theory, Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished listing here) provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student learning, than "motive" in CHAT. for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic haiku - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. phillip ? ? Phillip White, PhD Urban Community Teacher Education Program Site Coordinator Montview Elementary, Aurora, CO phillip.white@ucdenver.edu or pawhite@aps.k12.co.us -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: GradualReleaseResponsibilityJan08.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 101774 bytes Desc: GradualReleaseResponsibilityJan08.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140910/4d1d8e32/attachment-0003.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: lave(1996)_teaching.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 2012811 bytes Desc: lave(1996)_teaching.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140910/4d1d8e32/attachment-0004.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: MarzanoHighlyEngagedClassroom.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 388186 bytes Desc: MarzanoHighlyEngagedClassroom.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140910/4d1d8e32/attachment-0005.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Cambourne Conditions.doc Type: application/msword Size: 49152 bytes Desc: Cambourne Conditions.doc Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140910/4d1d8e32/attachment-0001.doc From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Sep 10 10:17:00 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2014 11:17:00 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky, bernstein and halliday In-Reply-To: <7dfa67872ed74f25bebc79a4143f3bb5@gmail.com> References: <431A2CEB-4335-4285-8441-8F490D6F0549@uniandes.edu.co> <5CBAADBB-663F-4007-974E-837EEECE5BDD@btinternet.com>, <7dfa67872ed74f25bebc79a4143f3bb5@gmail.com> Message-ID: <9BC7517E-E789-49FA-A52A-0FF57E5ED31E@gmail.com> Hi Larry, Your "musings" set of my own. I have got to read Peirce more deeply. I have read that he is the first pragmatist, and that shows in the Vygotsky genealogy available to XMCA. Like Vygotsky and Cantor (think fractals and dynamic systems), Peirce, I think, will have a greater impact as a "distant teacher" than he did when he lived. (Hope for ALL teachers!) Regarding fuzzy logic, I am attaching a paper by Eleanor Rosch conjecturing on the applicability of fuzzy logic to categories, concepts, and logical deduction. All us Vygotskians are steeped in "concept", which includes logical deduction. Categories (think prototype) and fuzzy logic, I gather, are complementary in that that categories have graded structure but fuzzy logic assigns the probability (0 to 1) of inclusion in a category, a subtle but important difference. Prototype theory and metaphor are the sparks, I think, that got cognitive linguistics and Cognitive Grammar rolling back in the early 80s. Great stuff! Henry P.S. I leave it to someone smarter than me an answer to your question about the metaphorical and the literal. Maybe Rosch has an answer. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Slow Lettuce.doc Type: application/msword Size: 121344 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140910/ad81d451/attachment.doc -------------- next part -------------- On Sep 10, 2014, at 7:00 AM, lpscholar2@gmail.com wrote: > Carol, I also would like a copy. > > > > > The discussion of the metaphor of *scaffolding* which seems to have intuitive appeal but is questioned is also a comment on the power of *metaphor* for forming [and transforming] *modes* of consciousness. > > > > > Scaffolding as a metaphor *indicates/gestures* towards the relation of passing on already formed ideas, concepts, names which the listener is to receive and appropriate. It is a *construction* metaphor. The *building* as David says is already *assumed* to be *designed* > > > The relation of the *literal* to the *metaphorical* seems important to consider in this metaphor and more generally in the transformative power of metaphor > > Is the boundary and contrast between *metaphorical* and *literal* clear or fuzzy? > > > > > The boundary between *is* *as* *as if* seems to be fluid and yet deeply implicated in our understandings and explanations > > For example the metaphors *scaffolding* *boundaries* *permeability* fluid* *construction* *constituted* *modes* are examples of metaphors used. What do we *mean* by *modes* of consciousness. How *real* are *modes*?? > > > > > James Ma in his 2014 article he recently posted [ The Synergy of Peirce and Vygotsky AS an Analytical Approach to the Multimodality of Semiotic Mediation* seems to have potential for relating what he refers to as Vygotsky?s *deductive* focus and Peirce?s *abductive* approach. > > > to approach the relation of the metaphorical and literal and their *fuzzy boundaries* within *fuzzy logic* may be contrasted *clear and distinct* nominalistic notions. > > > James Ma explores the notion of *multimodality* [pluralistic modes] such as words AND images > > > Peirce also developed a concept *interpretive MUSINGS* that I would like leads to follow up. > > The centrality of Peirce?s notion of *musings* and its relation to *metaphoricity* and to *abduction* and to *multimodality* I am curious to explore further. > > For that I may need *scaffolding* and *building blocks* to constitute [or be constituted by] within multiple pluralistic polythematic *arrangements* and *orders* > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > Sent from Windows Mail > > > > > > From: Carol Macdonald > Sent: ?Wednesday?, ?September? ?10?, ?2014 ?2?:?09? ?AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > c > > > > I would also like a copy, without having to pay $35 for the article. > > Thanks > Carol= > > PS Why don't they (T&F) open source papers so far back? > > On 10 September 2014 10:42, Shirley Franklin s.franklin08@btinternet.com* > wrote: > >> I would also like a copy please. >> Shirley >> >> Sent from my iPhone >> >>> On 9 Sep 2014, at 22:31, Martin John Packer >> wrote: >>> >>> Anyone have a copy of this? >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> Vygotsky, bernstein and halliday: Towards a unified theory of L1 and L2 >> learning >>> Language, Culture and Curriculum >>> Volume 4, Issue 1< >> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rlcc20/4/1>, 1991 >>> >>> DOI: >>> 10.1080/07908319109525092 >>> Joseph Foley >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Sep 10 11:02:16 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2014 12:02:16 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> , <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> Message-ID: <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not Vygotskian enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the XMCA mainstream. I am reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct instruction a few weeks back wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples Children (1995) is cited as supporting DISTAR, prototypical direct instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on the "Silenced Dialog". I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to the XMCA chat. I am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with her (she was SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never responded, maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy doing other things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to join one more listserve. But I am wondering what she might have transpired if she joined in. I am thinking distributed cognition (Hutchins) and cognitive pluralism (a term I know from Vera's book, Creative Collaboration). The attachments that Phillip sent seem to find direct instruction complementary with more dialogic approaches to instruction, as per the turn-over principle of Bruner. Henry On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" wrote: > like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at the same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian Cambourne's "conditions for learning" that lead to student engagement, as well as how it relates to student engagement (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of responsibility" and Lave & Wenger's "community of practice" - in combination these works (along with critical race theory and queer theory, identity theory, Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished listing here) provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student learning, than "motive" in CHAT. > > for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic haiku - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). > > i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. > > > phillip > ? > ? > > Phillip White, PhD > Urban Community Teacher Education Program > Site Coordinator > Montview Elementary, Aurora, CO > phillip.white@ucdenver.edu > or > pawhite@aps.k12.co.us From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Sep 10 14:27:50 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2014 14:27:50 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> Message-ID: The paper Peg and I wrote which takes up scaffolding along with other metaphors can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Mike current activity for the future is the title. mike On Wed, Sep 10, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not Vygotskian > enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the XMCA mainstream. I am > reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct instruction a few weeks back > wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples Children (1995) is cited as supporting > DISTAR, prototypical direct instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on > the "Silenced Dialog". I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to > the XMCA chat. I am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with > her (she was SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never > responded, maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy doing > other things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to join one more > listserve. But I am wondering what she might have transpired if she joined > in. I am thinking distributed cognition (Hutchins) and cognitive pluralism > (a term I know from Vera's book, Creative Collaboration). The attachments > that Phillip sent seem to find direct instruction complementary with more > dialogic approaches to instruction, as per the turn-over principle of > Bruner. > Henry > > On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" > wrote: > > > like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at the > same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian Cambourne's > "conditions for learning" that lead to student engagement, as well as how > it relates to student engagement (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of > responsibility" and Lave & Wenger's "community of practice" - in > combination these works (along with critical race theory and queer theory, > identity theory, Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished > listing here) provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student > learning, than "motive" in CHAT. > > > > for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic haiku > - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, > relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). > > > > i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. > > > > > > phillip > > ? > > ? > > > > Phillip White, PhD > > Urban Community Teacher Education Program > > Site Coordinator > > Montview Elementary, Aurora, CO > > phillip.white@ucdenver.edu > > or > > pawhite@aps.k12.co.us Conditions.doc> > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Sep 10 17:36:43 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2014 09:36:43 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Vygotsky, bernstein and halliday In-Reply-To: <9BC7517E-E789-49FA-A52A-0FF57E5ED31E@gmail.com> References: <431A2CEB-4335-4285-8441-8F490D6F0549@uniandes.edu.co> <5CBAADBB-663F-4007-974E-837EEECE5BDD@btinternet.com> <7dfa67872ed74f25bebc79a4143f3bb5@gmail.com> <9BC7517E-E789-49FA-A52A-0FF57E5ED31E@gmail.com> Message-ID: The article is listed on Joseph Foley's academia.edu page, but when you click on it you receive a note that says it's not been uploaded (Taylor and Francis are quite strict about copyright, although they will usually let you upload an uncorrected proof on sharing sites). There is a button you can click to ask the author for a personal copy, though. One of the puzzling things about Chapter Seven of Thinking and Speech is that Vygotsky tells us that thought is not made up of seperable units. If so, in what sense can verbal thinking be said to be verbal? One way to solve this problem is to say that somehow the separable units get "added" at the stage of inner speech. But in fact Chapter Seven makes it very clear that this only true of the New in speech; as far as the Given, the "semantics" of speech (presumably the addition of word significations) lies somewhere between the plane of inner speech and external speech. Halliday solves this problem. There are three semantic metafunctions, and only one of them, the ideational (that is, the logical and the experiential), is truly compontential in its structure. The other two metafunctions, the interpersonal and the textual, are respectively "field-like" (with a positive pole and a negative pole) and "wave-like" (sometimes quite literally so, since textuality has to do with organizing the transition from Theme to New information, something realized through the intensity of sound waves in speech). David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 11 September 2014 02:17, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > Hi Larry, > Your "musings" set of my own. I have got to read Peirce more deeply. I have read that he is the first pragmatist, and that shows in the Vygotsky genealogy available to XMCA. Like Vygotsky and Cantor (think fractals and dynamic systems), Peirce, I think, will have a greater impact as a "distant teacher" than he did when he lived. (Hope for ALL teachers!) Regarding fuzzy logic, I am attaching a paper by Eleanor Rosch conjecturing on the applicability of fuzzy logic to categories, concepts, and logical deduction. All us Vygotskians are steeped in "concept", which includes logical deduction. Categories (think prototype) and fuzzy logic, I gather, are complementary in that that categories have graded structure but fuzzy logic assigns the probability (0 to 1) of inclusion in a category, a subtle but important difference. Prototype theory and metaphor are the sparks, I think, that got cognitive linguistics and Cognitive Grammar rolling back in the early 80s. Great stuff! > Henry > P.S. I leave it to someone smarter than me an answer to your question about the metaphorical and the literal. Maybe Rosch has an answer. > > > > > > On Sep 10, 2014, at 7:00 AM, lpscholar2@gmail.com wrote: > >> Carol, I also would like a copy. >> >> >> >> >> The discussion of the metaphor of *scaffolding* which seems to have intuitive appeal but is questioned is also a comment on the power of *metaphor* for forming [and transforming] *modes* of consciousness. >> >> >> >> >> Scaffolding as a metaphor *indicates/gestures* towards the relation of passing on already formed ideas, concepts, names which the listener is to receive and appropriate. It is a *construction* metaphor. The *building* as David says is already *assumed* to be *designed* >> >> >> The relation of the *literal* to the *metaphorical* seems important to consider in this metaphor and more generally in the transformative power of metaphor >> >> Is the boundary and contrast between *metaphorical* and *literal* clear or fuzzy? >> >> >> >> >> The boundary between *is* *as* *as if* seems to be fluid and yet deeply implicated in our understandings and explanations >> >> For example the metaphors *scaffolding* *boundaries* *permeability* fluid* *construction* *constituted* *modes* are examples of metaphors used. What do we *mean* by *modes* of consciousness. How *real* are *modes*?? >> >> >> >> >> James Ma in his 2014 article he recently posted [ The Synergy of Peirce and Vygotsky AS an Analytical Approach to the Multimodality of Semiotic Mediation* seems to have potential for relating what he refers to as Vygotsky?s *deductive* focus and Peirce?s *abductive* approach. >> >> >> to approach the relation of the metaphorical and literal and their *fuzzy boundaries* within *fuzzy logic* may be contrasted *clear and distinct* nominalistic notions. >> >> >> James Ma explores the notion of *multimodality* [pluralistic modes] such as words AND images >> >> >> Peirce also developed a concept *interpretive MUSINGS* that I would like leads to follow up. >> >> The centrality of Peirce?s notion of *musings* and its relation to *metaphoricity* and to *abduction* and to *multimodality* I am curious to explore further. >> >> For that I may need *scaffolding* and *building blocks* to constitute [or be constituted by] within multiple pluralistic polythematic *arrangements* and *orders* >> >> >> Larry >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Sent from Windows Mail >> >> >> >> >> >> From: Carol Macdonald >> Sent: ?Wednesday?, ?September? ?10?, ?2014 ?2?:?09? ?AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >> c >> >> >> >> I would also like a copy, without having to pay $35 for the article. >> >> Thanks >> Carol= >> >> PS Why don't they (T&F) open source papers so far back? >> >> On 10 September 2014 10:42, Shirley Franklin s.franklin08@btinternet.com* >> wrote: >> >>> I would also like a copy please. >>> Shirley >>> >>> Sent from my iPhone >>> >>>> On 9 Sep 2014, at 22:31, Martin John Packer >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Anyone have a copy of this? >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> Vygotsky, bernstein and halliday: Towards a unified theory of L1 and L2 >>> learning >>>> Language, Culture and Curriculum >>>> Volume 4, Issue 1< >>> http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rlcc20/4/1>, 1991 >>>> >>>> DOI: >>>> 10.1080/07908319109525092 >>>> Joseph Foley >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> Developmental psycholinguist >> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > From Kevin.Oconnor@colorado.edu Thu Sep 11 12:31:11 2014 From: Kevin.Oconnor@colorado.edu (Kevin O'Connor) Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2014 13:31:11 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] 6 faculty positions at University of Colorado Boulder Message-ID: <36B9AE17-B73B-4DB4-A0D4-3AB84FF47BB1@colorado.edu> The School of Education at the University of Colorado Boulder announces six tenure track faculty positions for the 2015-2016 academic year: Bilingual Education Special Education or Bilingual Special Education Elementary Literacy Education Democracy and Education Anthropology of Education and Qualitative Research Methodology Quantitative Research Methodology All positions are open rank. The School intends to fill at least three positions at the Associate or full Professor level based on the competitiveness of applicants; remaining positions will be filled at the Assistant Professor level. Please see attached for descriptions of the positions and application and contact information. Best, Kevin -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: _finalChronicleAd.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 137925 bytes Desc: _finalChronicleAd.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140911/24822dcb/attachment.pdf -------------- next part -------------- An embedded and charset-unspecified text was scrubbed... Name: ATT00001.txt Url: https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140911/24822dcb/attachment.txt From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Sep 11 14:07:55 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2014 14:07:55 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 6 faculty positions at University of Colorado Boulder In-Reply-To: <36B9AE17-B73B-4DB4-A0D4-3AB84FF47BB1@colorado.edu> References: <36B9AE17-B73B-4DB4-A0D4-3AB84FF47BB1@colorado.edu> Message-ID: Guess you folks in Colorado will not have much time for XMCA discussion with all that recruiting going on! mike On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 12:31 PM, Kevin O'Connor wrote: > The School of Education at the University of Colorado Boulder announces > six tenure track faculty positions for the 2015-2016 academic year: > > Bilingual Education > Special Education or Bilingual Special Education > Elementary Literacy Education > Democracy and Education > Anthropology of Education and Qualitative Research Methodology > Quantitative Research Methodology > > All positions are open rank. The School intends to fill at least three > positions at the Associate or full Professor level based on the > competitiveness of applicants; remaining positions will be filled at the > Assistant Professor level. > > Please see attached for descriptions of the positions and application and > contact information. > > Best, > Kevin > > > > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Sep 11 14:07:55 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2014 14:07:55 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 6 faculty positions at University of Colorado Boulder In-Reply-To: <36B9AE17-B73B-4DB4-A0D4-3AB84FF47BB1@colorado.edu> References: <36B9AE17-B73B-4DB4-A0D4-3AB84FF47BB1@colorado.edu> Message-ID: Guess you folks in Colorado will not have much time for XMCA discussion with all that recruiting going on! mike On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 12:31 PM, Kevin O'Connor wrote: > The School of Education at the University of Colorado Boulder announces > six tenure track faculty positions for the 2015-2016 academic year: > > Bilingual Education > Special Education or Bilingual Special Education > Elementary Literacy Education > Democracy and Education > Anthropology of Education and Qualitative Research Methodology > Quantitative Research Methodology > > All positions are open rank. The School intends to fill at least three > positions at the Associate or full Professor level based on the > competitiveness of applicants; remaining positions will be filled at the > Assistant Professor level. > > Please see attached for descriptions of the positions and application and > contact information. > > Best, > Kevin > > > > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Sep 11 15:54:40 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2014 22:54:40 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 6 faculty positions at University of Colorado Boulder In-Reply-To: <36B9AE17-B73B-4DB4-A0D4-3AB84FF47BB1@colorado.edu> References: <36B9AE17-B73B-4DB4-A0D4-3AB84FF47BB1@colorado.edu> Message-ID: Did Alferd Packer (not a relative of mine, i swear) get loose again and eat half the school of ed? Martin On Sep 11, 2014, at 2:31 PM, Kevin O'Connor wrote: > The School of Education at the University of Colorado Boulder announces six tenure track faculty positions for the 2015-2016 academic year: > > Bilingual Education > Special Education or Bilingual Special Education > Elementary Literacy Education > Democracy and Education > Anthropology of Education and Qualitative Research Methodology > Quantitative Research Methodology > > All positions are open rank. The School intends to fill at least three positions at the Associate or full Professor level based on the competitiveness of applicants; remaining positions will be filled at the Assistant Professor level. > > Please see attached for descriptions of the positions and application and contact information. > > Best, > Kevin > > > > > <_finalChronicleAd.pdf> From Kevin.Oconnor@colorado.edu Thu Sep 11 18:45:35 2014 From: Kevin.Oconnor@colorado.edu (Kevin O'Connor) Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2014 19:45:35 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 6 faculty positions at University of Colorado Boulder In-Reply-To: References: <36B9AE17-B73B-4DB4-A0D4-3AB84FF47BB1@colorado.edu> Message-ID: Alferd Packer, of course, being a famous Colorado cannibal: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alferd_Packer There?s a cafeteria named after him on campus. On Sep 11, 2014, at 4:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Did Alferd Packer (not a relative of mine, i swear) get loose again and eat half the school of ed? > > Martin > > On Sep 11, 2014, at 2:31 PM, Kevin O'Connor wrote: > >> The School of Education at the University of Colorado Boulder announces six tenure track faculty positions for the 2015-2016 academic year: >> >> Bilingual Education >> Special Education or Bilingual Special Education >> Elementary Literacy Education >> Democracy and Education >> Anthropology of Education and Qualitative Research Methodology >> Quantitative Research Methodology >> >> All positions are open rank. The School intends to fill at least three positions at the Associate or full Professor level based on the competitiveness of applicants; remaining positions will be filled at the Assistant Professor level. >> >> Please see attached for descriptions of the positions and application and contact information. >> >> Best, >> Kevin >> >> >> >> >> <_finalChronicleAd.pdf> > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Sep 11 19:14:14 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2014 20:14:14 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 6 faculty positions at University of Colorado Boulder In-Reply-To: References: <36B9AE17-B73B-4DB4-A0D4-3AB84FF47BB1@colorado.edu> Message-ID: <7179CDA2-7F1B-48D9-AF61-68DC905E62B6@gmail.com> Before I found the wikipedia article, I thought Packer must have been the provost or some other administrator. Same difference, as people used to say. Metaphors we live by. On Sep 11, 2014, at 7:45 PM, "Kevin O'Connor" wrote: > Alferd Packer, of course, being a famous Colorado cannibal: > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alferd_Packer > > There?s a cafeteria named after him on campus. > > > On Sep 11, 2014, at 4:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >> Did Alferd Packer (not a relative of mine, i swear) get loose again and eat half the school of ed? >> >> Martin >> >> On Sep 11, 2014, at 2:31 PM, Kevin O'Connor wrote: >> >>> The School of Education at the University of Colorado Boulder announces six tenure track faculty positions for the 2015-2016 academic year: >>> >>> Bilingual Education >>> Special Education or Bilingual Special Education >>> Elementary Literacy Education >>> Democracy and Education >>> Anthropology of Education and Qualitative Research Methodology >>> Quantitative Research Methodology >>> >>> All positions are open rank. The School intends to fill at least three positions at the Associate or full Professor level based on the competitiveness of applicants; remaining positions will be filled at the Assistant Professor level. >>> >>> Please see attached for descriptions of the positions and application and contact information. >>> >>> Best, >>> Kevin >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> <_finalChronicleAd.pdf> >> >> > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Sep 11 19:20:31 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Fri, 12 Sep 2014 02:20:31 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: 6 faculty positions at University of Colorado Boulder In-Reply-To: References: <36B9AE17-B73B-4DB4-A0D4-3AB84FF47BB1@colorado.edu> Message-ID: Yes, I visited it and proposed that since I shared his name I might deserve a discount. Martin On Sep 11, 2014, at 8:45 PM, Kevin O'Connor wrote: > Alferd Packer, of course, being a famous Colorado cannibal: > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alferd_Packer > > There?s a cafeteria named after him on campus. > > > On Sep 11, 2014, at 4:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >> Did Alferd Packer (not a relative of mine, i swear) get loose again and eat half the school of ed? >> >> Martin >> >> On Sep 11, 2014, at 2:31 PM, Kevin O'Connor wrote: >> >>> The School of Education at the University of Colorado Boulder announces six tenure track faculty positions for the 2015-2016 academic year: >>> >>> Bilingual Education >>> Special Education or Bilingual Special Education >>> Elementary Literacy Education >>> Democracy and Education >>> Anthropology of Education and Qualitative Research Methodology >>> Quantitative Research Methodology >>> >>> All positions are open rank. The School intends to fill at least three positions at the Associate or full Professor level based on the competitiveness of applicants; remaining positions will be filled at the Assistant Professor level. >>> >>> Please see attached for descriptions of the positions and application and contact information. >>> >>> Best, >>> Kevin >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> <_finalChronicleAd.pdf> >> >> > > From smago@uga.edu Fri Sep 12 07:22:15 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Fri, 12 Sep 2014 14:22:15 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] JoLLE Conference: Call for proposals Message-ID: Please consider submitting a proposal to this terrific conference. Best,Peter Peter Smagorinsky Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia 315 Aderhold Hall Athens, GA 30602 Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga [cid:image001.jpg@01CEA4AC.71367E90] Personal twitter account: @psmagorinsky -------------- next part -------------- -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image001.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 2929 bytes Desc: image001.jpg Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140912/60f1a7b3/attachment.jpg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: CALL FOR PROPOSALS.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 90950 bytes Desc: CALL FOR PROPOSALS.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140912/60f1a7b3/attachment.pdf From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Sep 12 10:20:58 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Fri, 12 Sep 2014 17:20:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] minecraft In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <01E9BE13-A4AB-418B-B63A-BB5D4CF4A806@uniandes.edu.co> Does anyone know of a attempt to design a Minecraft simulation for developmental psychology? Martin From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Sep 12 14:22:29 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 12 Sep 2014 14:22:29 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: announcement attached Re: Assistant/Associate Prof. position in Learning Sciences/Science Education In-Reply-To: <2412CB06-B50F-43CE-B831-90048473E0F2@berkeley.edu> References: <5F6006E7-E6D4-4A88-983C-8C107B936F15@berkeley.edu> <2412CB06-B50F-43CE-B831-90048473E0F2@berkeley.edu> Message-ID: ?H? i All, I?m chairing a search committee at UC Berkeley for an Assistant/Associate Professor in the learning sciences with an emphasis on science education. I?ve attached the position description. Would you kindly pass this announcement on to potential candidates? Of course, if appropriate, please consider applying. Thanks! Geoff Geoffrey Saxe Professor, Graduate School of Education University of California, Berkeley Berkeley, CA 94720-1670 (510) 643-6627 saxe@berkeley.edu Website: http://gse.berkeley.edu/people/geoffrey-b-saxe Recent book: *Cultural Development of Mathematical Ideas: Papua New Guinea Studies *(Cambridge University Press). Cognitive Development Society Best Authored Book Award 2013; Eleanor E. Maccoby Book Award from the American Psychological Association 2015 Website: http://www.culturecognition.com/ Recent design research: *Learning Mathematics through Representations: A number-line based curriculum unit on integers and fractions* Website: http://www.culturecognition.com/lmr/ -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: UC Berkeley ScienceEd_ad_long.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 91774 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140912/eaf5502b/attachment.pdf From lstone@skymail.csus.edu Fri Sep 12 15:41:58 2014 From: lstone@skymail.csus.edu (Stone, Lynda) Date: Fri, 12 Sep 2014 22:41:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> Message-ID: <7740D810-586B-49AC-8A69-FCE513CAE91C@csus.edu> Hi All! I just wanted to share that I use Peg and Mike's paper in all of my cognitive development classes for both undergraduate and graduate students. It has been extremely helpful---my students, I'm thrilled to say, develop more complex understandings of what the zoped involves. And when I combine this article with Activity Theory--- the leading activity not only makes sense to them but also allows them to see how the intersubjective processes through which knowledge is constructed are influenced by multiple aspects of a context--including motives. They even change their views about "context" and come to understand it as a dynamic phenomenon--- okay, I share this to say that this article is particularly helpful because by reading it my students see how culture and cognition (another paper of Mike's) are constructed in the zoped. These understandings are so different from the scaffolding metaphor and most all of my students have been taught that scaffolding is equivalent to the zoped. Hope this sharing is useful--- -lynda On Sep 10, 2014, at 2:27 PM, mike cole wrote: The paper Peg and I wrote which takes up scaffolding along with other metaphors can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Mike current activity for the future is the title. mike On Wed, Sep 10, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not Vygotskian enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the XMCA mainstream. I am reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct instruction a few weeks back wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples Children (1995) is cited as supporting DISTAR, prototypical direct instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on the "Silenced Dialog". I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to the XMCA chat. I am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with her (she was SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never responded, maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy doing other things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to join one more listserve. But I am wondering what she might have transpired if she joined in. I am thinking distributed cognition (Hutchins) and cognitive pluralism (a term I know from Vera's book, Creative Collaboration). The attachments that Phillip sent seem to find direct instruction complementary with more dialogic approaches to instruction, as per the turn-over principle of Bruner. Henry On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" > wrote: like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at the same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian Cambourne's "conditions for learning" that lead to student engagement, as well as how it relates to student engagement (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of responsibility" and Lave & Wenger's "community of practice" - in combination these works (along with critical race theory and queer theory, identity theory, Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished listing here) provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student learning, than "motive" in CHAT. for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic haiku - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. phillip ? ? Phillip White, PhD Urban Community Teacher Education Program Site Coordinator Montview Elementary, Aurora, CO phillip.white@ucdenver.edu or pawhite@aps.k12.co.us -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Sep 12 17:19:13 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 12 Sep 2014 17:19:13 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [commfac] Fwd: FW: URGENT : Post-Doc position minimum 6 monthes at NICE-SOPHIA ANTIPOLIS In-Reply-To: References: <451557293.21597740.1410471207580.JavaMail.zimbra@enst.fr> <1424698027.21597773.1410471275360.JavaMail.zimbra@enst.fr> Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Morana Alac Date: Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 10:52 PM Subject: [commfac] Fwd: FW: URGENT : Post-Doc position minimum 6 monthes at NICE-SOPHIA ANTIPOLIS To: CommFac , CommGrad , "Martha L." < mlampland@ucsd.edu> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Buscher, Monika Date: Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 10:00 PM Subject: FW: URGENT : Post-Doc position minimum 6 monthes at NICE-SOPHIA ANTIPOLIS To: soc-postgrads , Alexander Boden < alexander.boden@fit.fraunhofer.de>, Morana Alac , Imagination Lancaster , Luigina Ciolfi < L.Ciolfi@shu.ac.uk> Hi There a super chance for a post doc in Nice for someone interested in Digital Society research. They had a candidate but he or she got a job and dropped out. Please forward as appropriate. The deadline is 15th September or so. Contact Caroline Rizza Best Monika SUBMISSION THEME: Digital Society TITLE: Use information, hide the trace: CItizen's Privacy in RFID and IoT contexts. Exploratory study for the socio-technical viability of the ?silence of the chips? concept CODE NAME: CIPRIoT PERSONS IN CHARGE OF THE PROJECT: Caroline Rizza and Laura Draetta ATTACHMENT SCHOOL OF THE PERSONS IN CHARGE OF THE PROJECT: Telecom ParisTech POST-DOC / VISITING SCIENTIST HOSTING TEAM(S): T?l?com ParisTech, D?partement SES, Antenne DEIXIS-Sophia (Sophia Antipolis), France: Laura Draetta and Caroline Rizza KEYWORDS: RFID, IoT, socio-technical viability assessment, Privacy, Responsible Research and Innovation, STS, Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), digital footprint, silence-of-the-chips ABSTRACT: The CIPRIoT project proposes to assess the socio-technical sustainability of the concept of ?silence of the chips?- as defined and used for RFID tags in the Internet of Things (IoT) perspective - which technocratic positions would prefer to forget for the benefit of a juridical modification of the privacy concept. It combines a statistical lexical analysis - to map the public and scientific debate - with a study on practices and uses in situation (use-case: IoT for smart home) through STS? and ethnographic? approaches. Positioned in the field of responsible research and innovation, its results will be consolidated in order to draft policy recommendations and industrial guidelines embedding ?privacy (or ethics) by design? perspectives, with the final objective of supporting and promoting an industrial responsible innovation in the RFID and IoT contexts. thank you for your help, Best wishes, Caroline -- Dr. Monika B?scher Director mobilities.lab Centre for Mobilities Research Department of Sociology Bowland North, B14 Lancaster University LA1 4YD http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/centres/cemore/profiles/monika-buscher email: m.buscher(at)lancaster.ac.uk mobile: 07890 847166 Twitter: @mbuscher, @mobslab, @BridgeLancaster Bridge project: http://www.bridgeproject.eu/en Catalyst project: http://www.catalystproject.org.uk -- On 11/09/2014 22:34, "Caroline Rizza" wrote: > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From eg100@hermes.cam.ac.uk Sat Sep 13 02:12:30 2014 From: eg100@hermes.cam.ac.uk (Esther Goody) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 10:12:30 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <7740D810-586B-49AC-8A69-FCE513CAE91C@csus.edu> References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk><4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> <7740D810-586B-49AC-8A69-FCE513CAE91C@csus.edu> Message-ID: Hmmmm, Re scaffolding = zone of proximal development: Is it?/Are they? I thought zone of proximal development was in one's head .............. While scaffolding, a la Brunner, by definition involves at least two people. [Of course text-actor could be seen as scaffolding. But this leads away from activity. I hope Vygotsky would not have got mired in text-actor stuff ] I am currently obsessed by the way dialogue - real exchanges between real people - seems to account for aspects of cognition. So it is important to keep role of actors central. Comments? Esther Goody -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda Sent: 12 September 2014 23:42 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky Hi All! I just wanted to share that I use Peg and Mike's paper in all of my cognitive development classes for both undergraduate and graduate students. It has been extremely helpful---my students, I'm thrilled to say, develop more complex understandings of what the zoped involves. And when I combine this article with Activity Theory--- the leading activity not only makes sense to them but also allows them to see how the intersubjective processes through which knowledge is constructed are influenced by multiple aspects of a context--including motives. They even change their views about "context" and come to understand it as a dynamic phenomenon--- okay, I share this to say that this article is particularly helpful because by reading it my students see how culture and cognition (another paper of Mike's) are constructed in the zoped. These understandings are so different from the scaffolding metaphor and most all of my students have been taught that scaffolding is equivalent to the zoped. Hope this sharing is useful--- -lynda On Sep 10, 2014, at 2:27 PM, mike cole wrote: The paper Peg and I wrote which takes up scaffolding along with other metaphors can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Mike current activity for the future is the title. mike On Wed, Sep 10, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not Vygotskian enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the XMCA mainstream. I am reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct instruction a few weeks back wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples Children (1995) is cited as supporting DISTAR, prototypical direct instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on the "Silenced Dialog". I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to the XMCA chat. I am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with her (she was SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never responded, maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy doing other things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to join one more listserve. But I am wondering what she might have transpired if she joined in. I am thinking distributed cognition (Hutchins) and cognitive pluralism (a term I know from Vera's book, Creative Collaboration). The attachments that Phillip sent seem to find direct instruction complementary with more dialogic approaches to instruction, as per the turn-over principle of Bruner. Henry On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" > wrote: like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at the same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian Cambourne's "conditions for learning" that lead to student engagement, as well as how it relates to student engagement (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of responsibility" and Lave & Wenger's "community of practice" - in combination these works (along with critical race theory and queer theory, identity theory, Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished listing here) provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student learning, than "motive" in CHAT. for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic haiku - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. phillip ? ? Phillip White, PhD Urban Community Teacher Education Program Site Coordinator Montview Elementary, Aurora, CO phillip.white@ucdenver.edu or pawhite@aps.k12.co.us -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu ----- No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2014.0.4765 / Virus Database: 4015/8201 - Release Date: 09/12/14 From carolmacdon@gmail.com Sat Sep 13 04:51:14 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 13:51:14 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> <7740D810-586B-49AC-8A69-FCE513CAE91C@csus.edu> Message-ID: Esther The zone of proximal development is constructed in mediated activity. That's my tuppence worth. Carol On 13 September 2014 11:12, Esther Goody wrote: > Hmmmm, > Re scaffolding = zone of proximal development: > Is it?/Are they? > > I thought zone of proximal development was in one's head .............. > While scaffolding, a la Brunner, by definition involves at least two > people. > > [Of course text-actor could be seen as scaffolding. But this leads away > from activity. I hope Vygotsky would not have got mired in text-actor stuff > ] > > I am currently obsessed by the way dialogue - real exchanges between real > people - seems to account for aspects of cognition. > So it is important to keep role of actors central. > > Comments? > Esther Goody > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda > Sent: 12 September 2014 23:42 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky > > Hi All! > > I just wanted to share that I use Peg and Mike's paper in all of my > cognitive > development classes for both undergraduate and graduate students. It has > been > extremely helpful---my students, I'm thrilled to say, develop more complex > understandings of what > the zoped involves. And when I combine this article with Activity > Theory--- > the leading activity not only makes sense to them but also allows them to > see how the intersubjective processes through which knowledge is > constructed > are influenced by multiple aspects of a context--including motives. They > even change their > views about "context" and come to understand it as a dynamic phenomenon--- > okay, I share this to say that this article is particularly helpful > because by reading it my students > see how culture and cognition (another paper of Mike's) are constructed in > the zoped. These understandings are so different from the scaffolding > metaphor and most all of my students > have been taught that scaffolding is equivalent to the zoped. > > Hope this sharing is useful--- > > -lynda > > > > > On Sep 10, 2014, at 2:27 PM, mike cole wrote: > > The paper Peg and I wrote which takes up scaffolding along with other > metaphors can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Mike current activity > for the future is the title. > > mike > > On Wed, Sep 10, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > > wrote: > > I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not Vygotskian > enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the XMCA mainstream. I am > reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct instruction a few weeks back > wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples Children (1995) is cited as supporting > DISTAR, prototypical direct instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on > the "Silenced Dialog". I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to > the XMCA chat. I am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with > her (she was SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never > responded, maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy doing > other things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to join one more > listserve. But I am wondering what she might have transpired if she joined > in. I am thinking distributed cognition (Hutchins) and cognitive pluralism > (a term I know from Vera's book, Creative Collaboration). The attachments > that Phillip sent seem to find direct instruction complementary with more > dialogic approaches to instruction, as per the turn-over principle of > Bruner. > Henry > > On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" > > wrote: > > like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at the > same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian Cambourne's > "conditions for learning" that lead to student engagement, as well as how > it relates to student engagement (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of > responsibility" and Lave & Wenger's "community of practice" - in > combination these works (along with critical race theory and queer theory, > identity theory, Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished > listing here) provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student > learning, than "motive" in CHAT. > > for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic haiku > - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, > relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). > > i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. > > > phillip > ? > ? > > Phillip White, PhD > Urban Community Teacher Education Program > Site Coordinator > Montview Elementary, Aurora, CO > phillip.white@ucdenver.edu > or > pawhite@aps.k12.co.us > Conditions.doc> > > > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] > > > > > > > > > Lynda Stone, Ph.D. > Professor > Dept. Child Development > CSU Sacramento > CSUS/UC-Links Program Director > lstone@csus.edu > > > > > > ----- > No virus found in this message. > Checked by AVG - www.avg.com > Version: 2014.0.4765 / Virus Database: 4015/8201 - Release Date: 09/12/14 > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat Sep 13 06:53:13 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 07:53:13 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> <7740D810-586B-49AC-8A69-FCE513CAE91C@csus.edu> Message-ID: <2B52789B-53FF-4200-96C5-B1DADABADC79@gmail.com> And the mediated activity is "on stage", a real drama? My one pence. Henry On Sep 13, 2014, at 5:51 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > Esther > > The zone of proximal development is constructed in mediated activity. > > That's my tuppence worth. > > Carol > > On 13 September 2014 11:12, Esther Goody wrote: > >> Hmmmm, >> Re scaffolding = zone of proximal development: >> Is it?/Are they? >> >> I thought zone of proximal development was in one's head .............. >> While scaffolding, a la Brunner, by definition involves at least two >> people. >> >> [Of course text-actor could be seen as scaffolding. But this leads away >> from activity. I hope Vygotsky would not have got mired in text-actor stuff >> ] >> >> I am currently obsessed by the way dialogue - real exchanges between real >> people - seems to account for aspects of cognition. >> So it is important to keep role of actors central. >> >> Comments? >> Esther Goody >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda >> Sent: 12 September 2014 23:42 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky >> >> Hi All! >> >> I just wanted to share that I use Peg and Mike's paper in all of my >> cognitive >> development classes for both undergraduate and graduate students. It has >> been >> extremely helpful---my students, I'm thrilled to say, develop more complex >> understandings of what >> the zoped involves. And when I combine this article with Activity >> Theory--- >> the leading activity not only makes sense to them but also allows them to >> see how the intersubjective processes through which knowledge is >> constructed >> are influenced by multiple aspects of a context--including motives. They >> even change their >> views about "context" and come to understand it as a dynamic phenomenon--- >> okay, I share this to say that this article is particularly helpful >> because by reading it my students >> see how culture and cognition (another paper of Mike's) are constructed in >> the zoped. These understandings are so different from the scaffolding >> metaphor and most all of my students >> have been taught that scaffolding is equivalent to the zoped. >> >> Hope this sharing is useful--- >> >> -lynda >> >> >> >> >> On Sep 10, 2014, at 2:27 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> The paper Peg and I wrote which takes up scaffolding along with other >> metaphors can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Mike current activity >> for the future is the title. >> >> mike >> >> On Wed, Sep 10, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > > >> wrote: >> >> I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not Vygotskian >> enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the XMCA mainstream. I am >> reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct instruction a few weeks back >> wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples Children (1995) is cited as supporting >> DISTAR, prototypical direct instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on >> the "Silenced Dialog". I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to >> the XMCA chat. I am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with >> her (she was SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never >> responded, maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy doing >> other things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to join one more >> listserve. But I am wondering what she might have transpired if she joined >> in. I am thinking distributed cognition (Hutchins) and cognitive pluralism >> (a term I know from Vera's book, Creative Collaboration). The attachments >> that Phillip sent seem to find direct instruction complementary with more >> dialogic approaches to instruction, as per the turn-over principle of >> Bruner. >> Henry >> >> On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" > > >> wrote: >> >> like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at the >> same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian Cambourne's >> "conditions for learning" that lead to student engagement, as well as how >> it relates to student engagement (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of >> responsibility" and Lave & Wenger's "community of practice" - in >> combination these works (along with critical race theory and queer theory, >> identity theory, Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished >> listing here) provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student >> learning, than "motive" in CHAT. >> >> for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic haiku >> - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, >> relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). >> >> i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. >> >> >> phillip >> ? >> ? >> >> Phillip White, PhD >> Urban Community Teacher Education Program >> Site Coordinator >> Montview Elementary, Aurora, CO >> phillip.white@ucdenver.edu >> or >> pawhite@aps.k12.co.us >> > Conditions.doc> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or >> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >> Gray, 2001] >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Lynda Stone, Ph.D. >> Professor >> Dept. Child Development >> CSU Sacramento >> CSUS/UC-Links Program Director >> lstone@csus.edu >> >> >> >> >> >> ----- >> No virus found in this message. >> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com >> Version: 2014.0.4765 / Virus Database: 4015/8201 - Release Date: 09/12/14 >> >> >> > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From lstone@skymail.csus.edu Sat Sep 13 07:14:59 2014 From: lstone@skymail.csus.edu (Stone, Lynda) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 14:14:59 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> <7740D810-586B-49AC-8A69-FCE513CAE91C@csus.edu> Message-ID: <0CCEAB76-F4A7-4A27-AB95-99F4DDF08F7F@csus.edu> Ester, That's my view also---but I've found that this metaphor has led folks to think, and I quote, justified "direct instruction" in addition to my students thinking that Vygostky came up with the idea, these are seniors and entering Master students in a child development program so it's their prior instruction--- Well I guess I added to your "tuppence" a bit-- lynda On Sep 13, 2014, at 4:51 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: Esther The zone of proximal development is constructed in mediated activity. That's my tuppence worth. Carol On 13 September 2014 11:12, Esther Goody > wrote: Hmmmm, Re scaffolding = zone of proximal development: Is it?/Are they? I thought zone of proximal development was in one's head .............. While scaffolding, a la Brunner, by definition involves at least two people. [Of course text-actor could be seen as scaffolding. But this leads away from activity. I hope Vygotsky would not have got mired in text-actor stuff ] I am currently obsessed by the way dialogue - real exchanges between real people - seems to account for aspects of cognition. So it is important to keep role of actors central. Comments? Esther Goody -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda Sent: 12 September 2014 23:42 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky Hi All! I just wanted to share that I use Peg and Mike's paper in all of my cognitive development classes for both undergraduate and graduate students. It has been extremely helpful---my students, I'm thrilled to say, develop more complex understandings of what the zoped involves. And when I combine this article with Activity Theory--- the leading activity not only makes sense to them but also allows them to see how the intersubjective processes through which knowledge is constructed are influenced by multiple aspects of a context--including motives. They even change their views about "context" and come to understand it as a dynamic phenomenon--- okay, I share this to say that this article is particularly helpful because by reading it my students see how culture and cognition (another paper of Mike's) are constructed in the zoped. These understandings are so different from the scaffolding metaphor and most all of my students have been taught that scaffolding is equivalent to the zoped. Hope this sharing is useful--- -lynda On Sep 10, 2014, at 2:27 PM, mike cole wrote: The paper Peg and I wrote which takes up scaffolding along with other metaphors can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Mike current activity for the future is the title. mike On Wed, Sep 10, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not Vygotskian enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the XMCA mainstream. I am reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct instruction a few weeks back wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples Children (1995) is cited as supporting DISTAR, prototypical direct instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on the "Silenced Dialog". I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to the XMCA chat. I am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with her (she was SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never responded, maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy doing other things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to join one more listserve. But I am wondering what she might have transpired if she joined in. I am thinking distributed cognition (Hutchins) and cognitive pluralism (a term I know from Vera's book, Creative Collaboration). The attachments that Phillip sent seem to find direct instruction complementary with more dialogic approaches to instruction, as per the turn-over principle of Bruner. Henry On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" > wrote: like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at the same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian Cambourne's "conditions for learning" that lead to student engagement, as well as how it relates to student engagement (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of responsibility" and Lave & Wenger's "community of practice" - in combination these works (along with critical race theory and queer theory, identity theory, Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished listing here) provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student learning, than "motive" in CHAT. for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic haiku - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. phillip ? ? Phillip White, PhD Urban Community Teacher Education Program Site Coordinator Montview Elementary, Aurora, CO phillip.white@ucdenver.edu or pawhite@aps.k12.co.us -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu ----- No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2014.0.4765 / Virus Database: 4015/8201 - Release Date: 09/12/14 -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Sat Sep 13 07:18:48 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 14:18:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <2B52789B-53FF-4200-96C5-B1DADABADC79@gmail.com> References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> <7740D810-586B-49AC-8A69-FCE513CAE91C@csus.edu> <2B52789B-53FF-4200-96C5-B1DADABADC79@gmail.com> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022242D6@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> I see Vygotsky's references to the stage as a reminder that mediated action takes place in social contexts which actively (and often quite deliberately) shape how participants FEEL about how they and others act. We don't understand something until we know how 'the audience' can be expected to react to it and eventually the audience is internalised as a 'super ego' or cultural awareness of 'what will people think?'. I have just been reading John Shotter's writing on 'withness thinking' and thought this passage from a piece he wrote with John Newson in 1982 touched on this idea of acting 'on stage' before a critical audience: ?Just as the child comes to appreciate the 'suckability' of a proffered teat or the 'graspability' of a cup handle, so she also apprehends in an equally direct manner, we suggest, the moral force underlying a serious maternal prohibition, and begins to distinguish between a deliberately harmful insult to her person and one which is merely a humorous form of play. She perceives these social barrier reefs and high seas, the harbours, havens, and horizons directly in people's stony silences and fixed expressions, in their nods, winks, grimaces, gestures, stances, and smiles?. (Shotter, J. and Newson, J. (1982) An ecological approach to cognitive development: implicate orders, joint action, and intentionality. In G. Butterworth and P. Light (eds.) Social cognition: studies in the development of understanding, Sussex: Harvester: 32-52. p.38). It may be no coincidence that Shotter was himself engaged in producing stage plays! All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Henry G. Shonerd III Sent: 13 September 2014 14:53 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky And the mediated activity is "on stage", a real drama? My one pence. Henry On Sep 13, 2014, at 5:51 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > Esther > > The zone of proximal development is constructed in mediated activity. > > That's my tuppence worth. > > Carol > > On 13 September 2014 11:12, Esther Goody wrote: > >> Hmmmm, >> Re scaffolding = zone of proximal development: >> Is it?/Are they? >> >> I thought zone of proximal development was in one's head .............. >> While scaffolding, a la Brunner, by definition involves at least two >> people. >> >> [Of course text-actor could be seen as scaffolding. But this leads >> away from activity. I hope Vygotsky would not have got mired in >> text-actor stuff ] >> >> I am currently obsessed by the way dialogue - real exchanges between >> real people - seems to account for aspects of cognition. >> So it is important to keep role of actors central. >> >> Comments? >> Esther Goody >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda >> Sent: 12 September 2014 23:42 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky >> >> Hi All! >> >> I just wanted to share that I use Peg and Mike's paper in all of my >> cognitive development classes for both undergraduate and graduate >> students. It has been extremely helpful---my students, I'm thrilled >> to say, develop more complex understandings of what the zoped >> involves. And when I combine this article with Activity >> Theory--- >> the leading activity not only makes sense to them but also allows >> them to see how the intersubjective processes through which knowledge >> is constructed are influenced by multiple aspects of a >> context--including motives. They even change their views about >> "context" and come to understand it as a dynamic phenomenon--- okay, >> I share this to say that this article is particularly helpful because >> by reading it my students see how culture and cognition (another >> paper of Mike's) are constructed in the zoped. These understandings >> are so different from the scaffolding metaphor and most all of my >> students have been taught that scaffolding is equivalent to the >> zoped. >> >> Hope this sharing is useful--- >> >> -lynda >> >> >> >> >> On Sep 10, 2014, at 2:27 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> The paper Peg and I wrote which takes up scaffolding along with other >> metaphors can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Mike current activity >> for the future is the title. >> >> mike >> >> On Wed, Sep 10, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III >> > >> wrote: >> >> I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not Vygotskian >> enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the XMCA >> mainstream. I am reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct >> instruction a few weeks back wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples >> Children (1995) is cited as supporting DISTAR, prototypical direct >> instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on the "Silenced Dialog". >> I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to the XMCA chat. I >> am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with her (she was >> SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never responded, >> maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy doing other >> things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to join one more >> listserve. But I am wondering what she might have transpired if she >> joined in. I am thinking distributed cognition (Hutchins) and >> cognitive pluralism (a term I know from Vera's book, Creative >> Collaboration). The attachments that Phillip sent seem to find direct >> instruction complementary with more dialogic approaches to instruction, as per the turn-over principle of Bruner. >> Henry >> >> On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" >> > >> wrote: >> >> like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at >> the same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian >> Cambourne's "conditions for learning" that lead to student >> engagement, as well as how it relates to student engagement >> (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of responsibility" and Lave & >> Wenger's "community of practice" - in combination these works >> (along with critical race theory and queer theory, identity theory, >> Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished listing here) >> provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student learning, than "motive" in CHAT. >> >> for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic >> haiku >> - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, >> relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). >> >> i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. >> >> >> phillip >> >> >> >> Phillip White, PhD >> Urban Community Teacher Education Program Site Coordinator Montview >> Elementary, Aurora, CO >> phillip.white@ucdenver.edu >> or >> pawhite@aps.k12.co.us >> > anoHighlyEngagedClassroom.pdf>> Conditions.doc> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and >> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently >> but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, >> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Lynda Stone, Ph.D. >> Professor >> Dept. Child Development >> CSU Sacramento >> CSUS/UC-Links Program Director >> lstone@csus.edu >> >> >> >> >> >> ----- >> No virus found in this message. >> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com >> Version: 2014.0.4765 / Virus Database: 4015/8201 - Release Date: >> 09/12/14 >> >> >> > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat Sep 13 07:37:50 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 08:37:50 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022242D6@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> <7740D810-586B-49AC-8A69-FCE513CAE91C@csus.edu> <2B52789B-53FF-4200-96C5-B1DADABADC79@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022242D6@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <93B7CAE2-788A-40B1-A942-0EACF9192F8B@gmail.com> Good teaching/learning often seems like improvised comedy, where every proffer from the lesson plan gets a good drubbing from the students before the students are willing to take it seriously. I used to have a book, Teaching as Performance, but haven't been able to find it lately. Henry On Sep 13, 2014, at 8:18 AM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > I see Vygotsky's references to the stage as a reminder that mediated action takes place in social contexts which actively (and often quite deliberately) shape how participants FEEL about how they and others act. We don't understand something until we know how 'the audience' can be expected to react to it and eventually the audience is internalised as a 'super ego' or cultural awareness of 'what will people think?'. I have just been reading John Shotter's writing on 'withness thinking' and thought this passage from a piece he wrote with John Newson in 1982 touched on this idea of acting 'on stage' before a critical audience: > > ?Just as the child comes to appreciate the 'suckability' of a proffered teat or the 'graspability' of a cup handle, so she also apprehends in an equally direct manner, we suggest, the moral force underlying a serious maternal prohibition, and begins to distinguish between a deliberately harmful insult to her person and one which is merely a humorous form of play. She perceives these social barrier reefs and high seas, the harbours, havens, and horizons directly in people's stony silences and fixed expressions, in their nods, winks, grimaces, gestures, stances, and smiles?. (Shotter, J. and Newson, J. (1982) An ecological approach to cognitive development: implicate orders, joint action, and intentionality. In G. Butterworth and P. Light (eds.) Social cognition: studies in the development of understanding, Sussex: Harvester: 32-52. p.38). > > It may be no coincidence that Shotter was himself engaged in producing stage plays! > > All the best, > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Henry G. Shonerd III > Sent: 13 September 2014 14:53 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky > > And the mediated activity is "on stage", a real drama? My one pence. > Henry > > > On Sep 13, 2014, at 5:51 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > >> Esther >> >> The zone of proximal development is constructed in mediated activity. >> >> That's my tuppence worth. >> >> Carol >> >> On 13 September 2014 11:12, Esther Goody wrote: >> >>> Hmmmm, >>> Re scaffolding = zone of proximal development: >>> Is it?/Are they? >>> >>> I thought zone of proximal development was in one's head .............. >>> While scaffolding, a la Brunner, by definition involves at least two >>> people. >>> >>> [Of course text-actor could be seen as scaffolding. But this leads >>> away from activity. I hope Vygotsky would not have got mired in >>> text-actor stuff ] >>> >>> I am currently obsessed by the way dialogue - real exchanges between >>> real people - seems to account for aspects of cognition. >>> So it is important to keep role of actors central. >>> >>> Comments? >>> Esther Goody >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda >>> Sent: 12 September 2014 23:42 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky >>> >>> Hi All! >>> >>> I just wanted to share that I use Peg and Mike's paper in all of my >>> cognitive development classes for both undergraduate and graduate >>> students. It has been extremely helpful---my students, I'm thrilled >>> to say, develop more complex understandings of what the zoped >>> involves. And when I combine this article with Activity >>> Theory--- >>> the leading activity not only makes sense to them but also allows >>> them to see how the intersubjective processes through which knowledge >>> is constructed are influenced by multiple aspects of a >>> context--including motives. They even change their views about >>> "context" and come to understand it as a dynamic phenomenon--- okay, >>> I share this to say that this article is particularly helpful because >>> by reading it my students see how culture and cognition (another >>> paper of Mike's) are constructed in the zoped. These understandings >>> are so different from the scaffolding metaphor and most all of my >>> students have been taught that scaffolding is equivalent to the >>> zoped. >>> >>> Hope this sharing is useful--- >>> >>> -lynda >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sep 10, 2014, at 2:27 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> The paper Peg and I wrote which takes up scaffolding along with other >>> metaphors can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Mike current activity >>> for the future is the title. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Wed, Sep 10, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III >>> > >>> wrote: >>> >>> I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not Vygotskian >>> enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the XMCA >>> mainstream. I am reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct >>> instruction a few weeks back wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples >>> Children (1995) is cited as supporting DISTAR, prototypical direct >>> instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on the "Silenced Dialog". >>> I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to the XMCA chat. I >>> am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with her (she was >>> SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never responded, >>> maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy doing other >>> things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to join one more >>> listserve. But I am wondering what she might have transpired if she >>> joined in. I am thinking distributed cognition (Hutchins) and >>> cognitive pluralism (a term I know from Vera's book, Creative >>> Collaboration). The attachments that Phillip sent seem to find direct >>> instruction complementary with more dialogic approaches to instruction, as per the turn-over principle of Bruner. >>> Henry >>> >>> On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" >>> > >>> wrote: >>> >>> like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at >>> the same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian >>> Cambourne's "conditions for learning" that lead to student >>> engagement, as well as how it relates to student engagement >>> (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of responsibility" and Lave & >>> Wenger's "community of practice" - in combination these works >>> (along with critical race theory and queer theory, identity theory, >>> Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished listing here) >>> provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student learning, than "motive" in CHAT. >>> >>> for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic >>> haiku >>> - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, >>> relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). >>> >>> i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. >>> >>> >>> phillip >>> >>> >>> >>> Phillip White, PhD >>> Urban Community Teacher Education Program Site Coordinator Montview >>> Elementary, Aurora, CO >>> phillip.white@ucdenver.edu >>> or >>> pawhite@aps.k12.co.us >>> >> anoHighlyEngagedClassroom.pdf>>> Conditions.doc> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and >>> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently >>> but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, >>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Lynda Stone, Ph.D. >>> Professor >>> Dept. Child Development >>> CSU Sacramento >>> CSUS/UC-Links Program Director >>> lstone@csus.edu >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ----- >>> No virus found in this message. >>> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com >>> Version: 2014.0.4765 / Virus Database: 4015/8201 - Release Date: >>> 09/12/14 >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> Developmental psycholinguist >> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > From dkirsh@lsu.edu Sat Sep 13 07:40:43 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 14:40:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <0CCEAB76-F4A7-4A27-AB95-99F4DDF08F7F@csus.edu> References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> <7740D810-586B-49AC-8A69-FCE513CAE91C@csus.edu> <0CCEAB76-F4A7-4A27-AB95-99F4DDF08F7F@csus.edu> Message-ID: Aside from physical reflexes, are there any actions that are unmediated? David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda Sent: Saturday, September 13, 2014 9:15 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky Ester, That's my view also---but I've found that this metaphor has led folks to think, and I quote, justified "direct instruction" in addition to my students thinking that Vygostky came up with the idea, these are seniors and entering Master students in a child development program so it's their prior instruction--- Well I guess I added to your "tuppence" a bit-- lynda On Sep 13, 2014, at 4:51 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: Esther The zone of proximal development is constructed in mediated activity. That's my tuppence worth. Carol On 13 September 2014 11:12, Esther Goody > wrote: Hmmmm, Re scaffolding = zone of proximal development: Is it?/Are they? I thought zone of proximal development was in one's head .............. While scaffolding, a la Brunner, by definition involves at least two people. [Of course text-actor could be seen as scaffolding. But this leads away from activity. I hope Vygotsky would not have got mired in text-actor stuff ] I am currently obsessed by the way dialogue - real exchanges between real people - seems to account for aspects of cognition. So it is important to keep role of actors central. Comments? Esther Goody -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda Sent: 12 September 2014 23:42 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky Hi All! I just wanted to share that I use Peg and Mike's paper in all of my cognitive development classes for both undergraduate and graduate students. It has been extremely helpful---my students, I'm thrilled to say, develop more complex understandings of what the zoped involves. And when I combine this article with Activity Theory--- the leading activity not only makes sense to them but also allows them to see how the intersubjective processes through which knowledge is constructed are influenced by multiple aspects of a context--including motives. They even change their views about "context" and come to understand it as a dynamic phenomenon--- okay, I share this to say that this article is particularly helpful because by reading it my students see how culture and cognition (another paper of Mike's) are constructed in the zoped. These understandings are so different from the scaffolding metaphor and most all of my students have been taught that scaffolding is equivalent to the zoped. Hope this sharing is useful--- -lynda On Sep 10, 2014, at 2:27 PM, mike cole wrote: The paper Peg and I wrote which takes up scaffolding along with other metaphors can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Mike current activity for the future is the title. mike On Wed, Sep 10, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not Vygotskian enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the XMCA mainstream. I am reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct instruction a few weeks back wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples Children (1995) is cited as supporting DISTAR, prototypical direct instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on the "Silenced Dialog". I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to the XMCA chat. I am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with her (she was SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never responded, maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy doing other things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to join one more listserve. But I am wondering what she might have transpired if she joined in. I am thinking distributed cognition (Hutchins) and cognitive pluralism (a term I know from Vera's book, Creative Collaboration). The attachments that Phillip sent seem to find direct instruction complementary with more dialogic approaches to instruction, as per the turn-over principle of Bruner. Henry On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" > wrote: like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at the same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian Cambourne's "conditions for learning" that lead to student engagement, as well as how it relates to student engagement (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of responsibility" and Lave & Wenger's "community of practice" - in combination these works (along with critical race theory and queer theory, identity theory, Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished listing here) provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student learning, than "motive" in CHAT. for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic haiku - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. phillip Phillip White, PhD Urban Community Teacher Education Program Site Coordinator Montview Elementary, Aurora, CO phillip.white@ucdenver.edu or pawhite@aps.k12.co.us -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu ----- No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2014.0.4765 / Virus Database: 4015/8201 - Release Date: 09/12/14 -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu From lstone@skymail.csus.edu Sat Sep 13 07:52:29 2014 From: lstone@skymail.csus.edu (Stone, Lynda) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 14:52:29 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> <7740D810-586B-49AC-8A69-FCE513CAE91C@csus.edu> <0CCEAB76-F4A7-4A27-AB95-99F4DDF08F7F@csus.edu> Message-ID: <5B164B28-4482-4ECD-8DD3-15A245F354C1@csus.edu> David-- how can actions be unmediated if there are "voices of the mind" (i.e., culture) with us at all times? lynda On Sep 13, 2014, at 7:40 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: Aside from physical reflexes, are there any actions that are unmediated? David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda Sent: Saturday, September 13, 2014 9:15 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky Ester, That's my view also---but I've found that this metaphor has led folks to think, and I quote, justified "direct instruction" in addition to my students thinking that Vygostky came up with the idea, these are seniors and entering Master students in a child development program so it's their prior instruction--- Well I guess I added to your "tuppence" a bit-- lynda On Sep 13, 2014, at 4:51 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: Esther The zone of proximal development is constructed in mediated activity. That's my tuppence worth. Carol On 13 September 2014 11:12, Esther Goody > wrote: Hmmmm, Re scaffolding = zone of proximal development: Is it?/Are they? I thought zone of proximal development was in one's head .............. While scaffolding, a la Brunner, by definition involves at least two people. [Of course text-actor could be seen as scaffolding. But this leads away from activity. I hope Vygotsky would not have got mired in text-actor stuff ] I am currently obsessed by the way dialogue - real exchanges between real people - seems to account for aspects of cognition. So it is important to keep role of actors central. Comments? Esther Goody -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda Sent: 12 September 2014 23:42 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky Hi All! I just wanted to share that I use Peg and Mike's paper in all of my cognitive development classes for both undergraduate and graduate students. It has been extremely helpful---my students, I'm thrilled to say, develop more complex understandings of what the zoped involves. And when I combine this article with Activity Theory--- the leading activity not only makes sense to them but also allows them to see how the intersubjective processes through which knowledge is constructed are influenced by multiple aspects of a context--including motives. They even change their views about "context" and come to understand it as a dynamic phenomenon--- okay, I share this to say that this article is particularly helpful because by reading it my students see how culture and cognition (another paper of Mike's) are constructed in the zoped. These understandings are so different from the scaffolding metaphor and most all of my students have been taught that scaffolding is equivalent to the zoped. Hope this sharing is useful--- -lynda On Sep 10, 2014, at 2:27 PM, mike cole wrote: The paper Peg and I wrote which takes up scaffolding along with other metaphors can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Mike current activity for the future is the title. mike On Wed, Sep 10, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not Vygotskian enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the XMCA mainstream. I am reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct instruction a few weeks back wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples Children (1995) is cited as supporting DISTAR, prototypical direct instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on the "Silenced Dialog". I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to the XMCA chat. I am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with her (she was SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never responded, maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy doing other things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to join one more listserve. But I am wondering what she might have transpired if she joined in. I am thinking distributed cognition (Hutchins) and cognitive pluralism (a term I know from Vera's book, Creative Collaboration). The attachments that Phillip sent seem to find direct instruction complementary with more dialogic approaches to instruction, as per the turn-over principle of Bruner. Henry On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" > wrote: like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at the same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian Cambourne's "conditions for learning" that lead to student engagement, as well as how it relates to student engagement (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of responsibility" and Lave & Wenger's "community of practice" - in combination these works (along with critical race theory and queer theory, identity theory, Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished listing here) provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student learning, than "motive" in CHAT. for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic haiku - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. phillip Phillip White, PhD Urban Community Teacher Education Program Site Coordinator Montview Elementary, Aurora, CO phillip.white@ucdenver.edu or pawhite@aps.k12.co.us -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu ----- No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2014.0.4765 / Virus Database: 4015/8201 - Release Date: 09/12/14 -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu From lstone@skymail.csus.edu Sat Sep 13 07:55:39 2014 From: lstone@skymail.csus.edu (Stone, Lynda) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 14:55:39 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <2B52789B-53FF-4200-96C5-B1DADABADC79@gmail.com> References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> <7740D810-586B-49AC-8A69-FCE513CAE91C@csus.edu> <2B52789B-53FF-4200-96C5-B1DADABADC79@gmail.com> Message-ID: Henry, this is such an interesting way of talking about mediated activity-- so like Goffman's work-- lynda On Sep 13, 2014, at 6:53 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: And the mediated activity is "on stage", a real drama? My one pence. Henry On Sep 13, 2014, at 5:51 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: Esther The zone of proximal development is constructed in mediated activity. That's my tuppence worth. Carol On 13 September 2014 11:12, Esther Goody > wrote: Hmmmm, Re scaffolding = zone of proximal development: Is it?/Are they? I thought zone of proximal development was in one's head .............. While scaffolding, a la Brunner, by definition involves at least two people. [Of course text-actor could be seen as scaffolding. But this leads away from activity. I hope Vygotsky would not have got mired in text-actor stuff ] I am currently obsessed by the way dialogue - real exchanges between real people - seems to account for aspects of cognition. So it is important to keep role of actors central. Comments? Esther Goody -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda Sent: 12 September 2014 23:42 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky Hi All! I just wanted to share that I use Peg and Mike's paper in all of my cognitive development classes for both undergraduate and graduate students. It has been extremely helpful---my students, I'm thrilled to say, develop more complex understandings of what the zoped involves. And when I combine this article with Activity Theory--- the leading activity not only makes sense to them but also allows them to see how the intersubjective processes through which knowledge is constructed are influenced by multiple aspects of a context--including motives. They even change their views about "context" and come to understand it as a dynamic phenomenon--- okay, I share this to say that this article is particularly helpful because by reading it my students see how culture and cognition (another paper of Mike's) are constructed in the zoped. These understandings are so different from the scaffolding metaphor and most all of my students have been taught that scaffolding is equivalent to the zoped. Hope this sharing is useful--- -lynda On Sep 10, 2014, at 2:27 PM, mike cole wrote: The paper Peg and I wrote which takes up scaffolding along with other metaphors can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Mike current activity for the future is the title. mike On Wed, Sep 10, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not Vygotskian enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the XMCA mainstream. I am reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct instruction a few weeks back wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples Children (1995) is cited as supporting DISTAR, prototypical direct instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on the "Silenced Dialog". I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to the XMCA chat. I am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with her (she was SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never responded, maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy doing other things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to join one more listserve. But I am wondering what she might have transpired if she joined in. I am thinking distributed cognition (Hutchins) and cognitive pluralism (a term I know from Vera's book, Creative Collaboration). The attachments that Phillip sent seem to find direct instruction complementary with more dialogic approaches to instruction, as per the turn-over principle of Bruner. Henry On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" > wrote: like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at the same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian Cambourne's "conditions for learning" that lead to student engagement, as well as how it relates to student engagement (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of responsibility" and Lave & Wenger's "community of practice" - in combination these works (along with critical race theory and queer theory, identity theory, Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished listing here) provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student learning, than "motive" in CHAT. for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic haiku - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. phillip ? ? Phillip White, PhD Urban Community Teacher Education Program Site Coordinator Montview Elementary, Aurora, CO phillip.white@ucdenver.edu or pawhite@aps.k12.co.us -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu ----- No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2014.0.4765 / Virus Database: 4015/8201 - Release Date: 09/12/14 -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu From glassman.13@osu.edu Sat Sep 13 07:59:19 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 14:59:19 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <5B164B28-4482-4ECD-8DD3-15A245F354C1@csus.edu> References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> <7740D810-586B-49AC-8A69-FCE513CAE91C@csus.edu> <0CCEAB76-F4A7-4A27-AB95-99F4DDF08F7F@csus.edu> , <5B164B28-4482-4ECD-8DD3-15A245F354C1@csus.edu> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034682@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> I think I have trouble with this. Aren't mediated actions something we developed over time to help us in our communications with each other, and organizing those communications? Doesn't that mean that there must be some human actions that pre-date mediating capabilities. Did we just completely jettison them? Or do we just use mediation to claim they don't exist. I read recently that the reason some dogs are very social and very close to you is at least partly because they are observing you. They are trying to gauge when you are paying attention and when you are not - so that they become very good at stealing food, but also knowing when you need their warmth. Having had two very different dogs of the same breed in succession I think I can attest to this. There is no mediation in the relationship, at least for the dog. Don't humans have the same thing. Aren't there humans who can watch somebody closely and see their unmediated actions and determine how they should act in the moment - really good at stealing but also knowing when you need warmth? Don't we call them politicians? Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Stone, Lynda [lstone@skymail.csus.edu] Sent: Saturday, September 13, 2014 10:52 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky David-- how can actions be unmediated if there are "voices of the mind" (i.e., culture) with us at all times? lynda On Sep 13, 2014, at 7:40 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: Aside from physical reflexes, are there any actions that are unmediated? David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda Sent: Saturday, September 13, 2014 9:15 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky Ester, That's my view also---but I've found that this metaphor has led folks to think, and I quote, justified "direct instruction" in addition to my students thinking that Vygostky came up with the idea, these are seniors and entering Master students in a child development program so it's their prior instruction--- Well I guess I added to your "tuppence" a bit-- lynda On Sep 13, 2014, at 4:51 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: Esther The zone of proximal development is constructed in mediated activity. That's my tuppence worth. Carol On 13 September 2014 11:12, Esther Goody > wrote: Hmmmm, Re scaffolding = zone of proximal development: Is it?/Are they? I thought zone of proximal development was in one's head .............. While scaffolding, a la Brunner, by definition involves at least two people. [Of course text-actor could be seen as scaffolding. But this leads away from activity. I hope Vygotsky would not have got mired in text-actor stuff ] I am currently obsessed by the way dialogue - real exchanges between real people - seems to account for aspects of cognition. So it is important to keep role of actors central. Comments? Esther Goody -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda Sent: 12 September 2014 23:42 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky Hi All! I just wanted to share that I use Peg and Mike's paper in all of my cognitive development classes for both undergraduate and graduate students. It has been extremely helpful---my students, I'm thrilled to say, develop more complex understandings of what the zoped involves. And when I combine this article with Activity Theory--- the leading activity not only makes sense to them but also allows them to see how the intersubjective processes through which knowledge is constructed are influenced by multiple aspects of a context--including motives. They even change their views about "context" and come to understand it as a dynamic phenomenon--- okay, I share this to say that this article is particularly helpful because by reading it my students see how culture and cognition (another paper of Mike's) are constructed in the zoped. These understandings are so different from the scaffolding metaphor and most all of my students have been taught that scaffolding is equivalent to the zoped. Hope this sharing is useful--- -lynda On Sep 10, 2014, at 2:27 PM, mike cole wrote: The paper Peg and I wrote which takes up scaffolding along with other metaphors can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Mike current activity for the future is the title. mike On Wed, Sep 10, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not Vygotskian enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the XMCA mainstream. I am reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct instruction a few weeks back wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples Children (1995) is cited as supporting DISTAR, prototypical direct instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on the "Silenced Dialog". I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to the XMCA chat. I am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with her (she was SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never responded, maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy doing other things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to join one more listserve. But I am wondering what she might have transpired if she joined in. I am thinking distributed cognition (Hutchins) and cognitive pluralism (a term I know from Vera's book, Creative Collaboration). The attachments that Phillip sent seem to find direct instruction complementary with more dialogic approaches to instruction, as per the turn-over principle of Bruner. Henry On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" > wrote: like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at the same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian Cambourne's "conditions for learning" that lead to student engagement, as well as how it relates to student engagement (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of responsibility" and Lave & Wenger's "community of practice" - in combination these works (along with critical race theory and queer theory, identity theory, Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished listing here) provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student learning, than "motive" in CHAT. for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic haiku - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. phillip Phillip White, PhD Urban Community Teacher Education Program Site Coordinator Montview Elementary, Aurora, CO phillip.white@ucdenver.edu or pawhite@aps.k12.co.us -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu ----- No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2014.0.4765 / Virus Database: 4015/8201 - Release Date: 09/12/14 -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu From lstone@skymail.csus.edu Sat Sep 13 08:16:48 2014 From: lstone@skymail.csus.edu (Stone, Lynda) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 15:16:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022242D6@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> <7740D810-586B-49AC-8A69-FCE513CAE91C@csus.edu> <2B52789B-53FF-4200-96C5-B1DADABADC79@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022242D6@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: Rod, I have to share--- your statement, "social contexts which actively (and often quite deliberately) shape how participants FEEL about how they and others act"-- is related to one of my most current publications, co-written with Greg Thompson, "Classroom mood and the dance of stance: The role of affective and epistemic stancetaking int the development of a classroom mood" - We argue just what you are claiming---social contexts shape feelings and draw you into social life in particular ways--Of course, the construction of a context interweaves emotion, cognition, identity production with moral aspects of each context, but so difficult to capture in the same analysis, or at least, I have found it so-- -lynda On Sep 13, 2014, at 7:18 AM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: I see Vygotsky's references to the stage as a reminder that mediated action takes place in social contexts which actively (and often quite deliberately) shape how participants FEEL about how they and others act. We don't understand something until we know how 'the audience' can be expected to react to it and eventually the audience is internalised as a 'super ego' or cultural awareness of 'what will people think?'. I have just been reading John Shotter's writing on 'withness thinking' and thought this passage from a piece he wrote with John Newson in 1982 touched on this idea of acting 'on stage' before a critical audience: ?Just as the child comes to appreciate the 'suckability' of a proffered teat or the 'graspability' of a cup handle, so she also apprehends in an equally direct manner, we suggest, the moral force underlying a serious maternal prohibition, and begins to distinguish between a deliberately harmful insult to her person and one which is merely a humorous form of play. She perceives these social barrier reefs and high seas, the harbours, havens, and horizons directly in people's stony silences and fixed expressions, in their nods, winks, grimaces, gestures, stances, and smiles?. (Shotter, J. and Newson, J. (1982) An ecological approach to cognitive development: implicate orders, joint action, and intentionality. In G. Butterworth and P. Light (eds.) Social cognition: studies in the development of understanding, Sussex: Harvester: 32-52. p.38). It may be no coincidence that Shotter was himself engaged in producing stage plays! All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Henry G. Shonerd III Sent: 13 September 2014 14:53 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky And the mediated activity is "on stage", a real drama? My one pence. Henry On Sep 13, 2014, at 5:51 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: Esther The zone of proximal development is constructed in mediated activity. That's my tuppence worth. Carol On 13 September 2014 11:12, Esther Goody > wrote: Hmmmm, Re scaffolding = zone of proximal development: Is it?/Are they? I thought zone of proximal development was in one's head .............. While scaffolding, a la Brunner, by definition involves at least two people. [Of course text-actor could be seen as scaffolding. But this leads away from activity. I hope Vygotsky would not have got mired in text-actor stuff ] I am currently obsessed by the way dialogue - real exchanges between real people - seems to account for aspects of cognition. So it is important to keep role of actors central. Comments? Esther Goody -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda Sent: 12 September 2014 23:42 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky Hi All! I just wanted to share that I use Peg and Mike's paper in all of my cognitive development classes for both undergraduate and graduate students. It has been extremely helpful---my students, I'm thrilled to say, develop more complex understandings of what the zoped involves. And when I combine this article with Activity Theory--- the leading activity not only makes sense to them but also allows them to see how the intersubjective processes through which knowledge is constructed are influenced by multiple aspects of a context--including motives. They even change their views about "context" and come to understand it as a dynamic phenomenon--- okay, I share this to say that this article is particularly helpful because by reading it my students see how culture and cognition (another paper of Mike's) are constructed in the zoped. These understandings are so different from the scaffolding metaphor and most all of my students have been taught that scaffolding is equivalent to the zoped. Hope this sharing is useful--- -lynda On Sep 10, 2014, at 2:27 PM, mike cole wrote: The paper Peg and I wrote which takes up scaffolding along with other metaphors can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Mike current activity for the future is the title. mike On Wed, Sep 10, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not Vygotskian enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the XMCA mainstream. I am reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct instruction a few weeks back wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples Children (1995) is cited as supporting DISTAR, prototypical direct instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on the "Silenced Dialog". I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to the XMCA chat. I am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with her (she was SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never responded, maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy doing other things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to join one more listserve. But I am wondering what she might have transpired if she joined in. I am thinking distributed cognition (Hutchins) and cognitive pluralism (a term I know from Vera's book, Creative Collaboration). The attachments that Phillip sent seem to find direct instruction complementary with more dialogic approaches to instruction, as per the turn-over principle of Bruner. Henry On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" > wrote: like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at the same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian Cambourne's "conditions for learning" that lead to student engagement, as well as how it relates to student engagement (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of responsibility" and Lave & Wenger's "community of practice" - in combination these works (along with critical race theory and queer theory, identity theory, Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished listing here) provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student learning, than "motive" in CHAT. for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic haiku - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. phillip Phillip White, PhD Urban Community Teacher Education Program Site Coordinator Montview Elementary, Aurora, CO phillip.white@ucdenver.edu or pawhite@aps.k12.co.us -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu ----- No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2014.0.4765 / Virus Database: 4015/8201 - Release Date: 09/12/14 -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu From lstone@skymail.csus.edu Sat Sep 13 08:26:47 2014 From: lstone@skymail.csus.edu (Stone, Lynda) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 15:26:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034682@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> <7740D810-586B-49AC-8A69-FCE513CAE91C@csus.edu> <0CCEAB76-F4A7-4A27-AB95-99F4DDF08F7F@csus.edu> , <5B164B28-4482-4ECD-8DD3-15A245F354C1@csus.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034682@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: huh---interesting--not sure about this but, nativist do describe how we enter the world very nicely---we are hard wired to engage in intersubjective processes from the get go, and I believe this means we come prepared for mediated activity-- But, as to the pre-dating of this hard-wired capacity, I simply don't know when this may have occurred in our development--perhaps other do- -lynda On Sep 13, 2014, at 7:59 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: I think I have trouble with this. Aren't mediated actions something we developed over time to help us in our communications with each other, and organizing those communications? Doesn't that mean that there must be some human actions that pre-date mediating capabilities. Did we just completely jettison them? Or do we just use mediation to claim they don't exist. I read recently that the reason some dogs are very social and very close to you is at least partly because they are observing you. They are trying to gauge when you are paying attention and when you are not - so that they become very good at stealing food, but also knowing when you need their warmth. Having had two very different dogs of the same breed in succession I think I can attest to this. There is no mediation in the relationship, at least for the dog. Don't humans have the same thing. Aren't there humans who can watch somebody closely and see their unmediated actions and determine how they should act in the moment - really good at stealing but also knowing when you need warmth? Don't we call them politicians? Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Stone, Lynda [lstone@skymail.csus.edu] Sent: Saturday, September 13, 2014 10:52 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky David-- how can actions be unmediated if there are "voices of the mind" (i.e., culture) with us at all times? lynda On Sep 13, 2014, at 7:40 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: Aside from physical reflexes, are there any actions that are unmediated? David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda Sent: Saturday, September 13, 2014 9:15 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky Ester, That's my view also---but I've found that this metaphor has led folks to think, and I quote, justified "direct instruction" in addition to my students thinking that Vygostky came up with the idea, these are seniors and entering Master students in a child development program so it's their prior instruction--- Well I guess I added to your "tuppence" a bit-- lynda On Sep 13, 2014, at 4:51 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: Esther The zone of proximal development is constructed in mediated activity. That's my tuppence worth. Carol On 13 September 2014 11:12, Esther Goody > wrote: Hmmmm, Re scaffolding = zone of proximal development: Is it?/Are they? I thought zone of proximal development was in one's head .............. While scaffolding, a la Brunner, by definition involves at least two people. [Of course text-actor could be seen as scaffolding. But this leads away from activity. I hope Vygotsky would not have got mired in text-actor stuff ] I am currently obsessed by the way dialogue - real exchanges between real people - seems to account for aspects of cognition. So it is important to keep role of actors central. Comments? Esther Goody -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda Sent: 12 September 2014 23:42 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky Hi All! I just wanted to share that I use Peg and Mike's paper in all of my cognitive development classes for both undergraduate and graduate students. It has been extremely helpful---my students, I'm thrilled to say, develop more complex understandings of what the zoped involves. And when I combine this article with Activity Theory--- the leading activity not only makes sense to them but also allows them to see how the intersubjective processes through which knowledge is constructed are influenced by multiple aspects of a context--including motives. They even change their views about "context" and come to understand it as a dynamic phenomenon--- okay, I share this to say that this article is particularly helpful because by reading it my students see how culture and cognition (another paper of Mike's) are constructed in the zoped. These understandings are so different from the scaffolding metaphor and most all of my students have been taught that scaffolding is equivalent to the zoped. Hope this sharing is useful--- -lynda On Sep 10, 2014, at 2:27 PM, mike cole wrote: The paper Peg and I wrote which takes up scaffolding along with other metaphors can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Mike current activity for the future is the title. mike On Wed, Sep 10, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not Vygotskian enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the XMCA mainstream. I am reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct instruction a few weeks back wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples Children (1995) is cited as supporting DISTAR, prototypical direct instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on the "Silenced Dialog". I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to the XMCA chat. I am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with her (she was SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never responded, maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy doing other things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to join one more listserve. But I am wondering what she might have transpired if she joined in. I am thinking distributed cognition (Hutchins) and cognitive pluralism (a term I know from Vera's book, Creative Collaboration). The attachments that Phillip sent seem to find direct instruction complementary with more dialogic approaches to instruction, as per the turn-over principle of Bruner. Henry On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" > wrote: like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at the same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian Cambourne's "conditions for learning" that lead to student engagement, as well as how it relates to student engagement (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of responsibility" and Lave & Wenger's "community of practice" - in combination these works (along with critical race theory and queer theory, identity theory, Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished listing here) provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student learning, than "motive" in CHAT. for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic haiku - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. phillip Phillip White, PhD Urban Community Teacher Education Program Site Coordinator Montview Elementary, Aurora, CO phillip.white@ucdenver.edu or pawhite@aps.k12.co.us -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu ----- No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2014.0.4765 / Virus Database: 4015/8201 - Release Date: 09/12/14 -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Sat Sep 13 09:01:56 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 16:01:56 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034682@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> <7740D810-586B-49AC-8A69-FCE513CAE91C@csus.edu> <0CCEAB76-F4A7-4A27-AB95-99F4DDF08F7F@csus.edu> , <5B164B28-4482-4ECD-8DD3-15A245F354C1@csus.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034682@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222436E@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Isn't it likely that any pre-mediated (immediate) actions which our species once had will now have become mediated by the fact that we act in the knowledge that our actions are seen and evaluated by others? Eating, for example, is a 'natural' action but we may easily become self conscious about being seen to eat (in Japan, I believe it is not unusual for women in particular to cover their mouths with a napkin to preserve their modesty while eating and my grandmother was very sniffy about people eating - or laughing, for that matter - in the street). And is it not conceivable that the behaviour of dogs who live with humans might be mediated by the behaviour of humans? There is plenty of evidence that human reared chimpanzees, parrots and other animals develop ways of relating to the world which are not seen in their wild-reared co-specifics. I am not sure we do have unmediated actions once we have tasted the fruit of the tree of knowledge and been expelled from the Eden of immediate experience - can anyone tell me where I read an account of a man hailing a taxi and converting the gesture into a showy adjustment of his hat when the taxi drove past (not wanting to give anyone who might be watching the impression that he had failed to hail the cab)? Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Glassman, Michael Sent: 13 September 2014 15:59 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky I think I have trouble with this. Aren't mediated actions something we developed over time to help us in our communications with each other, and organizing those communications? Doesn't that mean that there must be some human actions that pre-date mediating capabilities. Did we just completely jettison them? Or do we just use mediation to claim they don't exist. I read recently that the reason some dogs are very social and very close to you is at least partly because they are observing you. They are trying to gauge when you are paying attention and when you are not - so that they become very good at stealing food, but also knowing when you need their warmth. Having had two very different dogs of the same breed in succession I think I can attest to this. There is no mediation in the relationship, at least for the dog. Don't humans have the same thing. Aren't there humans who can watch somebody closely and see their unmediated actions and determine how they should act in the moment - really good at stealing but also knowing when you need warmth? Don't we call them politicians? Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Stone, Lynda [lstone@skymail.csus.edu] Sent: Saturday, September 13, 2014 10:52 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky David-- how can actions be unmediated if there are "voices of the mind" (i.e., culture) with us at all times? lynda On Sep 13, 2014, at 7:40 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: Aside from physical reflexes, are there any actions that are unmediated? David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda Sent: Saturday, September 13, 2014 9:15 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky Ester, That's my view also---but I've found that this metaphor has led folks to think, and I quote, justified "direct instruction" in addition to my students thinking that Vygostky came up with the idea, these are seniors and entering Master students in a child development program so it's their prior instruction--- Well I guess I added to your "tuppence" a bit-- lynda On Sep 13, 2014, at 4:51 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: Esther The zone of proximal development is constructed in mediated activity. That's my tuppence worth. Carol On 13 September 2014 11:12, Esther Goody > wrote: Hmmmm, Re scaffolding = zone of proximal development: Is it?/Are they? I thought zone of proximal development was in one's head .............. While scaffolding, a la Brunner, by definition involves at least two people. [Of course text-actor could be seen as scaffolding. But this leads away from activity. I hope Vygotsky would not have got mired in text-actor stuff ] I am currently obsessed by the way dialogue - real exchanges between real people - seems to account for aspects of cognition. So it is important to keep role of actors central. Comments? Esther Goody -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda Sent: 12 September 2014 23:42 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky Hi All! I just wanted to share that I use Peg and Mike's paper in all of my cognitive development classes for both undergraduate and graduate students. It has been extremely helpful---my students, I'm thrilled to say, develop more complex understandings of what the zoped involves. And when I combine this article with Activity Theory--- the leading activity not only makes sense to them but also allows them to see how the intersubjective processes through which knowledge is constructed are influenced by multiple aspects of a context--including motives. They even change their views about "context" and come to understand it as a dynamic phenomenon--- okay, I share this to say that this article is particularly helpful because by reading it my students see how culture and cognition (another paper of Mike's) are constructed in the zoped. These understandings are so different from the scaffolding metaphor and most all of my students have been taught that scaffolding is equivalent to the zoped. Hope this sharing is useful--- -lynda On Sep 10, 2014, at 2:27 PM, mike cole wrote: The paper Peg and I wrote which takes up scaffolding along with other metaphors can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Mike current activity for the future is the title. mike On Wed, Sep 10, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not Vygotskian enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the XMCA mainstream. I am reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct instruction a few weeks back wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples Children (1995) is cited as supporting DISTAR, prototypical direct instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on the "Silenced Dialog". I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to the XMCA chat. I am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with her (she was SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never responded, maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy doing other things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to join one more listserve. But I am wondering what she might have transpired if she joined in. I am thinking distributed cognition (Hutchins) and cognitive pluralism (a term I know from Vera's book, Creative Collaboration). The attachments that Phillip sent seem to find direct instruction complementary with more dialogic approaches to instruction, as per the turn-over principle of Bruner. Henry On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" > wrote: like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at the same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian Cambourne's "conditions for learning" that lead to student engagement, as well as how it relates to student engagement (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of responsibility" and Lave & Wenger's "community of practice" - in combination these works (along with critical race theory and queer theory, identity theory, Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished listing here) provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student learning, than "motive" in CHAT. for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic haiku - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. phillip Phillip White, PhD Urban Community Teacher Education Program Site Coordinator Montview Elementary, Aurora, CO phillip.white@ucdenver.edu or pawhite@aps.k12.co.us -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu ----- No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2014.0.4765 / Virus Database: 4015/8201 - Release Date: 09/12/14 -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu Lynda Stone, Ph.D. Professor Dept. Child Development CSU Sacramento CSUS/UC-Links Program Director lstone@csus.edu ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Sep 13 09:35:08 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 09:35:08 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> <7740D810-586B-49AC-8A69-FCE513CAE91C@csus.edu> Message-ID: There are several commentaries on Esther's note that take us into the territory of mediation, direct perception of moral feelings, and other very relevant places. But its not clear that they help a lot with Esther's questions. To repeat myself, and David Kellog, the link below leads to a not very long article that discusses the notion of a zone of proximal development with respect to both the scaffolding metaphor, "next step" approaches to the organization of instruction, and related ideas. Does this piece in any way address your question(s), Esther? If people want to get into the other related issues by all means go for it. But could we give the topics subject headers and try to get clear about the issues involved before moving on? I know its difficult (I find it to be for sure) but otherwise we end up in a kind of chaining that often leaves me more confused than when we started!) mike PS-- Esther -- In a prior message you asked for my email, I believe, and i wrote to what I thought to be yours at hermes. But no answer. So, for current reference mcole@ucsd.edu will reach me just fine. On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:12 AM, Esther Goody wrote: > Hmmmm, > Re scaffolding = zone of proximal development: > Is it?/Are they? > > I thought zone of proximal development was in one's head .............. > While scaffolding, a la Brunner, by definition involves at least two > people. > > [Of course text-actor could be seen as scaffolding. But this leads away > from activity. I hope Vygotsky would not have got mired in text-actor stuff > ] > > I am currently obsessed by the way dialogue - real exchanges between real > people - seems to account for aspects of cognition. > So it is important to keep role of actors central. > > Comments? > Esther Goody > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda > Sent: 12 September 2014 23:42 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky > > Hi All! > > I just wanted to share that I use Peg and Mike's paper in all of my > cognitive > development classes for both undergraduate and graduate students. It has > been > extremely helpful---my students, I'm thrilled to say, develop more complex > understandings of what > the zoped involves. And when I combine this article with Activity > Theory--- > the leading activity not only makes sense to them but also allows them to > see how the intersubjective processes through which knowledge is > constructed > are influenced by multiple aspects of a context--including motives. They > even change their > views about "context" and come to understand it as a dynamic phenomenon--- > okay, I share this to say that this article is particularly helpful > because by reading it my students > see how culture and cognition (another paper of Mike's) are constructed in > the zoped. These understandings are so different from the scaffolding > metaphor and most all of my students > have been taught that scaffolding is equivalent to the zoped. > > Hope this sharing is useful--- > > -lynda > > > > > On Sep 10, 2014, at 2:27 PM, mike cole wrote: > > The paper Peg and I wrote which takes up scaffolding along with other > metaphors can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Mike current activity > for the future is the title. > > mike > > On Wed, Sep 10, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > > wrote: > > I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not Vygotskian > enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the XMCA mainstream. I am > reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct instruction a few weeks back > wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples Children (1995) is cited as supporting > DISTAR, prototypical direct instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on > the "Silenced Dialog". I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to > the XMCA chat. I am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with > her (she was SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never > responded, maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy doing > other things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to join one more > listserve. But I am wondering what she might have transpired if she joined > in. I am thinking distributed cognition (Hutchins) and cognitive pluralism > (a term I know from Vera's book, Creative Collaboration). The attachments > that Phillip sent seem to find direct instruction complementary with more > dialogic approaches to instruction, as per the turn-over principle of > Bruner. > Henry > > On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" > > wrote: > > like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at the > same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian Cambourne's > "conditions for learning" that lead to student engagement, as well as how > it relates to student engagement (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of > responsibility" and Lave & Wenger's "community of practice" - in > combination these works (along with critical race theory and queer theory, > identity theory, Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished > listing here) provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student > learning, than "motive" in CHAT. > > for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic haiku > - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, > relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). > > i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. > > > phillip > ? > ? > > Phillip White, PhD > Urban Community Teacher Education Program > Site Coordinator > Montview Elementary, Aurora, CO > phillip.white@ucdenver.edu > or > pawhite@aps.k12.co.us > Conditions.doc> > > > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] > > > > > > > > > Lynda Stone, Ph.D. > Professor > Dept. Child Development > CSU Sacramento > CSUS/UC-Links Program Director > lstone@csus.edu > > > > > > ----- > No virus found in this message. > Checked by AVG - www.avg.com > Version: 2014.0.4765 / Virus Database: 4015/8201 - Release Date: 09/12/14 > > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Sep 13 09:38:24 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 09:38:24 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022242D6@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> <7740D810-586B-49AC-8A69-FCE513CAE91C@csus.edu> <2B52789B-53FF-4200-96C5-B1DADABADC79@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022242D6@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: Rod-- Your comments not only evoke John Shotter's name again for xmca-ites, but the links to Gibsonian notions of direct perception, extended to include the moral force that accompanies other's behavior. Do you think that the entire essay is something we should read to get a better graps on "withness thinking"? mike On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 7:18 AM, Rod Parker-Rees < R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > I see Vygotsky's references to the stage as a reminder that mediated > action takes place in social contexts which actively (and often quite > deliberately) shape how participants FEEL about how they and others act. We > don't understand something until we know how 'the audience' can be expected > to react to it and eventually the audience is internalised as a 'super ego' > or cultural awareness of 'what will people think?'. I have just been > reading John Shotter's writing on 'withness thinking' and thought this > passage from a piece he wrote with John Newson in 1982 touched on this idea > of acting 'on stage' before a critical audience: > > ?Just as the child comes to appreciate the 'suckability' of a proffered > teat or the 'graspability' of a cup handle, so she also apprehends in an > equally direct manner, we suggest, the moral force underlying a serious > maternal prohibition, and begins to distinguish between a deliberately > harmful insult to her person and one which is merely a humorous form of > play. She perceives these social barrier reefs and high seas, the harbours, > havens, and horizons directly in people's stony silences and fixed > expressions, in their nods, winks, grimaces, gestures, stances, and > smiles?. (Shotter, J. and Newson, J. (1982) An ecological approach to > cognitive development: implicate orders, joint action, and intentionality. > In G. Butterworth and P. Light (eds.) Social cognition: studies in the > development of understanding, Sussex: Harvester: 32-52. p.38). > > It may be no coincidence that Shotter was himself engaged in producing > stage plays! > > All the best, > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Henry G. Shonerd III > Sent: 13 September 2014 14:53 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky > > And the mediated activity is "on stage", a real drama? My one pence. > Henry > > > On Sep 13, 2014, at 5:51 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > > > Esther > > > > The zone of proximal development is constructed in mediated activity. > > > > That's my tuppence worth. > > > > Carol > > > > On 13 September 2014 11:12, Esther Goody wrote: > > > >> Hmmmm, > >> Re scaffolding = zone of proximal development: > >> Is it?/Are they? > >> > >> I thought zone of proximal development was in one's head .............. > >> While scaffolding, a la Brunner, by definition involves at least two > >> people. > >> > >> [Of course text-actor could be seen as scaffolding. But this leads > >> away from activity. I hope Vygotsky would not have got mired in > >> text-actor stuff ] > >> > >> I am currently obsessed by the way dialogue - real exchanges between > >> real people - seems to account for aspects of cognition. > >> So it is important to keep role of actors central. > >> > >> Comments? > >> Esther Goody > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda > >> Sent: 12 September 2014 23:42 > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky > >> > >> Hi All! > >> > >> I just wanted to share that I use Peg and Mike's paper in all of my > >> cognitive development classes for both undergraduate and graduate > >> students. It has been extremely helpful---my students, I'm thrilled > >> to say, develop more complex understandings of what the zoped > >> involves. And when I combine this article with Activity > >> Theory--- > >> the leading activity not only makes sense to them but also allows > >> them to see how the intersubjective processes through which knowledge > >> is constructed are influenced by multiple aspects of a > >> context--including motives. They even change their views about > >> "context" and come to understand it as a dynamic phenomenon--- okay, > >> I share this to say that this article is particularly helpful because > >> by reading it my students see how culture and cognition (another > >> paper of Mike's) are constructed in the zoped. These understandings > >> are so different from the scaffolding metaphor and most all of my > >> students have been taught that scaffolding is equivalent to the > >> zoped. > >> > >> Hope this sharing is useful--- > >> > >> -lynda > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Sep 10, 2014, at 2:27 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> The paper Peg and I wrote which takes up scaffolding along with other > >> metaphors can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Mike current > activity > >> for the future is the title. > >> > >> mike > >> > >> On Wed, Sep 10, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > >> > > >> wrote: > >> > >> I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not Vygotskian > >> enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the XMCA > >> mainstream. I am reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct > >> instruction a few weeks back wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples > >> Children (1995) is cited as supporting DISTAR, prototypical direct > >> instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on the "Silenced Dialog". > >> I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to the XMCA chat. I > >> am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with her (she was > >> SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never responded, > >> maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy doing other > >> things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to join one more > >> listserve. But I am wondering what she might have transpired if she > >> joined in. I am thinking distributed cognition (Hutchins) and > >> cognitive pluralism (a term I know from Vera's book, Creative > >> Collaboration). The attachments that Phillip sent seem to find direct > >> instruction complementary with more dialogic approaches to instruction, > as per the turn-over principle of Bruner. > >> Henry > >> > >> On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" > >> > > >> wrote: > >> > >> like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at > >> the same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian > >> Cambourne's "conditions for learning" that lead to student > >> engagement, as well as how it relates to student engagement > >> (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of responsibility" and Lave & > >> Wenger's "community of practice" - in combination these works > >> (along with critical race theory and queer theory, identity theory, > >> Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished listing here) > >> provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student learning, > than "motive" in CHAT. > >> > >> for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic > >> haiku > >> - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, > >> relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). > >> > >> i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. > >> > >> > >> phillip > >> > >> > >> > >> Phillip White, PhD > >> Urban Community Teacher Education Program Site Coordinator Montview > >> Elementary, Aurora, CO > >> phillip.white@ucdenver.edu > >> or > >> pawhite@aps.k12.co.us > >> >> anoHighlyEngagedClassroom.pdf> >> Conditions.doc> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> > >> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and > >> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently > >> but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > >> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Lynda Stone, Ph.D. > >> Professor > >> Dept. Child Development > >> CSU Sacramento > >> CSUS/UC-Links Program Director > >> lstone@csus.edu > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> ----- > >> No virus found in this message. > >> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com > >> Version: 2014.0.4765 / Virus Database: 4015/8201 - Release Date: > >> 09/12/14 > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Sep 13 09:47:36 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 09:47:36 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034682@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> <7740D810-586B-49AC-8A69-FCE513CAE91C@csus.edu> <0CCEAB76-F4A7-4A27-AB95-99F4DDF08F7F@csus.edu> <5B164B28-4482-4ECD-8DD3-15A245F354C1@csus.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034682@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: David Ki and MichaelG --- Might you suggest an essay or two that would help us to address seriously the questions you raise? For example, I can think of Jim Wertsch's essay on mediation in that companion to Vygotsky or Wolf Michael Roth's article in Theory and Psychology. You may have better text to suggest. Both of those texts we could find a way to make generally available if there was sufficient interest in focusing on the topic. Mike -- for now a blind man with stick and a date to meet some friends colleagues online. On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 7:59 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > I think I have trouble with this. Aren't mediated actions something we > developed over time to help us in our communications with each other, and > organizing those communications? Doesn't that mean that there must be some > human actions that pre-date mediating capabilities. Did we just completely > jettison them? Or do we just use mediation to claim they don't exist. > > I read recently that the reason some dogs are very social and very close > to you is at least partly because they are observing you. They are trying > to gauge when you are paying attention and when you are not - so that they > become very good at stealing food, but also knowing when you need their > warmth. Having had two very different dogs of the same breed in succession > I think I can attest to this. There is no mediation in the relationship, > at least for the dog. Don't humans have the same thing. Aren't there > humans who can watch somebody closely and see their unmediated actions and > determine how they should act in the moment - really good at stealing but > also knowing when you need warmth? Don't we call them politicians? > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf > of Stone, Lynda [lstone@skymail.csus.edu] > Sent: Saturday, September 13, 2014 10:52 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky > > David-- > > how can actions be unmediated if there are "voices of the mind" (i.e., > culture) with us at all times? > > lynda > > On Sep 13, 2014, at 7:40 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: > > Aside from physical reflexes, are there any actions that are unmediated? > David > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda > Sent: Saturday, September 13, 2014 9:15 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky > > Ester, > > That's my view also---but I've found that this metaphor has led folks to > think, and I quote, justified "direct instruction" in addition to my > students thinking that Vygostky came up with the idea, these are seniors > and entering Master students in a child development program so it's their > prior instruction--- > > Well I guess I added to your "tuppence" a bit-- > > lynda > > > On Sep 13, 2014, at 4:51 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > > Esther > > The zone of proximal development is constructed in mediated activity. > > That's my tuppence worth. > > Carol > > On 13 September 2014 11:12, Esther Goody eg100@hermes.cam.ac.uk>> wrote: > > Hmmmm, > Re scaffolding = zone of proximal development: > Is it?/Are they? > > I thought zone of proximal development was in one's head .............. > While scaffolding, a la Brunner, by definition involves at least two > people. > > [Of course text-actor could be seen as scaffolding. But this leads away > from activity. I hope Vygotsky would not have got mired in text-actor stuff > ] > > I am currently obsessed by the way dialogue - real exchanges between real > people - seems to account for aspects of cognition. > So it is important to keep role of actors central. > > Comments? > Esther Goody > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda > Sent: 12 September 2014 23:42 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky > > Hi All! > > I just wanted to share that I use Peg and Mike's paper in all of my > cognitive development classes for both undergraduate and graduate > students. It has been extremely helpful---my students, I'm thrilled to > say, develop more complex understandings of what the zoped involves. And > when I combine this article with Activity > Theory--- > the leading activity not only makes sense to them but also allows them to > see how the intersubjective processes through which knowledge is > constructed are influenced by multiple aspects of a context--including > motives. They even change their views about "context" and come to > understand it as a dynamic phenomenon--- okay, I share this to say that > this article is particularly helpful because by reading it my students see > how culture and cognition (another paper of Mike's) are constructed in the > zoped. These understandings are so different from the scaffolding metaphor > and most all of my students have been taught that scaffolding is equivalent > to the zoped. > > Hope this sharing is useful--- > > -lynda > > > > > On Sep 10, 2014, at 2:27 PM, mike cole wrote: > > The paper Peg and I wrote which takes up scaffolding along with other > metaphors can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Mike current activity > for the future is the title. > > mike > > On Wed, Sep 10, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > > > wrote: > > I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not Vygotskian > enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the XMCA mainstream. I am > reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct instruction a few weeks back > wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples Children (1995) is cited as supporting > DISTAR, prototypical direct instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on > the "Silenced Dialog". I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to > the XMCA chat. I am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with > her (she was SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never > responded, maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy doing > other things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to join one more > listserve. But I am wondering what she might have transpired if she joined > in. I am thinking distributed cognition (Hutchins) and cognitive pluralism > (a term I know from Vera's book, Creative Collaboration). The attachments > that Phillip sent seem to find direct instruction complementary with more > dialogic approaches to instruction, as per the turn-over principle of > Bruner. > Henry > > On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" > > > wrote: > > like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at the > same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian Cambourne's > "conditions for learning" that lead to student engagement, as well as how > it relates to student engagement (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of > responsibility" and Lave & Wenger's "community of practice" - in > combination these works (along with critical race theory and queer theory, > identity theory, Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished > listing here) provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student > learning, than "motive" in CHAT. > > for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic haiku > - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, > relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). > > i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. > > > phillip > > > > Phillip White, PhD > Urban Community Teacher Education Program Site Coordinator Montview > Elementary, Aurora, CO phillip.white@ucdenver.edu phillip.white@ucdenver.edu> > or > pawhite@aps.k12.co.us > > Conditions.doc> > > > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] > > > > > > > > > Lynda Stone, Ph.D. > Professor > Dept. Child Development > CSU Sacramento > CSUS/UC-Links Program Director > lstone@csus.edu > > > > > > ----- > No virus found in this message. > Checked by AVG - www.avg.com > Version: 2014.0.4765 / Virus Database: 4015/8201 - Release Date: 09/12/14 > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > > > > > > Lynda Stone, Ph.D. > Professor > Dept. Child Development > CSU Sacramento > CSUS/UC-Links Program Director > lstone@csus.edu > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Lynda Stone, Ph.D. > Professor > Dept. Child Development > CSU Sacramento > CSUS/UC-Links Program Director > lstone@csus.edu > > > > > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Sat Sep 13 09:59:39 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 16:59:39 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> <7740D810-586B-49AC-8A69-FCE513CAE91C@csus.edu> <2B52789B-53FF-4200-96C5-B1DADABADC79@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022242D6@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022243D1@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> I have been reading as much as I can of John Shotter's work (there is plenty available on his website - http://www.johnshotter.com). I recently came across a collection of papers 'Construction on the edge: withness thinking and embodiment' which presents a good overview of the development of his thinking (2010 - Taos Institute). He also has a 'Short book on withness thinking' which is available at http://pubpages.unh.edu/~jds/ShortbookUSA.pdf. I haven't yet seen his slightly more recent book, 'Getting it: Withness-Thinking and the Dialogical in Practice' but there is quite a bit of overlap between his publications! He is very much influenced by Vygotsky but also Wittgenstein, Bakhtin and Voloshinov, Merleau-Ponty and, more recently, Karen Barad. What appeals to me about the idea of 'withness thinking' is that it acknowledges the very different nature of the kind of knowing that is involved in knowing a person (very different from knowing ABOUT a person). This sort of knowing is grounded in the specificities of particular interactional (or we should say intra-actional, following Barad), embodied activity rather than in the more 'free-floating' systems of language and concepts. This is why some meanings are very difficult to explain once they have been taken out of the context in which they occurred (e.g. a free-wheeling social conversation) - sometimes feeling rather inexplicable or limp once extracted from the flow of interaction. I am also interested because my work is particularly focused on very young children for whom context may be the only frame available for their meaning making (because they have not yet worked out, or rather worked in, the concept systems which inform and mediate adults' use of language). Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: 13 September 2014 17:38 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky Rod-- Your comments not only evoke John Shotter's name again for xmca-ites, but the links to Gibsonian notions of direct perception, extended to include the moral force that accompanies other's behavior. Do you think that the entire essay is something we should read to get a better graps on "withness thinking"? mike On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 7:18 AM, Rod Parker-Rees < R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > I see Vygotsky's references to the stage as a reminder that mediated > action takes place in social contexts which actively (and often quite > deliberately) shape how participants FEEL about how they and others > act. We don't understand something until we know how 'the audience' > can be expected to react to it and eventually the audience is internalised as a 'super ego' > or cultural awareness of 'what will people think?'. I have just been > reading John Shotter's writing on 'withness thinking' and thought this > passage from a piece he wrote with John Newson in 1982 touched on this > idea of acting 'on stage' before a critical audience: > > ?Just as the child comes to appreciate the 'suckability' of a > proffered teat or the 'graspability' of a cup handle, so she also > apprehends in an equally direct manner, we suggest, the moral force > underlying a serious maternal prohibition, and begins to distinguish > between a deliberately harmful insult to her person and one which is > merely a humorous form of play. She perceives these social barrier > reefs and high seas, the harbours, havens, and horizons directly in > people's stony silences and fixed expressions, in their nods, winks, > grimaces, gestures, stances, and smiles?. (Shotter, J. and Newson, J. > (1982) An ecological approach to cognitive development: implicate orders, joint action, and intentionality. > In G. Butterworth and P. Light (eds.) Social cognition: studies in the > development of understanding, Sussex: Harvester: 32-52. p.38). > > It may be no coincidence that Shotter was himself engaged in producing > stage plays! > > All the best, > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Henry G. Shonerd III > Sent: 13 September 2014 14:53 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky > > And the mediated activity is "on stage", a real drama? My one pence. > Henry > > > On Sep 13, 2014, at 5:51 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > > > Esther > > > > The zone of proximal development is constructed in mediated activity. > > > > That's my tuppence worth. > > > > Carol > > > > On 13 September 2014 11:12, Esther Goody wrote: > > > >> Hmmmm, > >> Re scaffolding = zone of proximal development: > >> Is it?/Are they? > >> > >> I thought zone of proximal development was in one's head .............. > >> While scaffolding, a la Brunner, by definition involves at least > >> two people. > >> > >> [Of course text-actor could be seen as scaffolding. But this leads > >> away from activity. I hope Vygotsky would not have got mired in > >> text-actor stuff ] > >> > >> I am currently obsessed by the way dialogue - real exchanges > >> between real people - seems to account for aspects of cognition. > >> So it is important to keep role of actors central. > >> > >> Comments? > >> Esther Goody > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda > >> Sent: 12 September 2014 23:42 > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky > >> > >> Hi All! > >> > >> I just wanted to share that I use Peg and Mike's paper in all of my > >> cognitive development classes for both undergraduate and graduate > >> students. It has been extremely helpful---my students, I'm > >> thrilled to say, develop more complex understandings of what the > >> zoped involves. And when I combine this article with Activity > >> Theory--- > >> the leading activity not only makes sense to them but also allows > >> them to see how the intersubjective processes through which > >> knowledge is constructed are influenced by multiple aspects of a > >> context--including motives. They even change their views about > >> "context" and come to understand it as a dynamic phenomenon--- > >> okay, I share this to say that this article is particularly helpful > >> because by reading it my students see how culture and cognition > >> (another paper of Mike's) are constructed in the zoped. These > >> understandings are so different from the scaffolding metaphor and > >> most all of my students have been taught that scaffolding is > >> equivalent to the zoped. > >> > >> Hope this sharing is useful--- > >> > >> -lynda > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Sep 10, 2014, at 2:27 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> The paper Peg and I wrote which takes up scaffolding along with other > >> metaphors can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Mike current > activity > >> for the future is the title. > >> > >> mike > >> > >> On Wed, Sep 10, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > >> > > >> wrote: > >> > >> I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not > >> Vygotskian enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the > >> XMCA mainstream. I am reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct > >> instruction a few weeks back wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples > >> Children (1995) is cited as supporting DISTAR, prototypical direct > >> instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on the "Silenced Dialog". > >> I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to the XMCA chat. I > >> am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with her (she > >> was SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never > >> responded, maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy > >> doing other things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to > >> join one more listserve. But I am wondering what she might have > >> transpired if she joined in. I am thinking distributed cognition > >> (Hutchins) and cognitive pluralism (a term I know from Vera's book, > >> Creative Collaboration). The attachments that Phillip sent seem to > >> find direct instruction complementary with more dialogic approaches > >> to instruction, > as per the turn-over principle of Bruner. > >> Henry > >> > >> On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" > >> > > >> wrote: > >> > >> like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at > >> the same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian > >> Cambourne's "conditions for learning" that lead to student > >> engagement, as well as how it relates to student engagement > >> (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of responsibility" and Lave & > >> Wenger's "community of practice" - in combination these works > >> (along with critical race theory and queer theory, identity theory, > >> Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished listing here) > >> provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student > >> learning, > than "motive" in CHAT. > >> > >> for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic > >> haiku > >> - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, > >> relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). > >> > >> i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. > >> > >> > >> phillip > >> > >> > >> > >> Phillip White, PhD > >> Urban Community Teacher Education Program Site Coordinator Montview > >> Elementary, Aurora, CO > >> phillip.white@ucdenver.edu > >> or > >> pawhite@aps.k12.co.us > >> >> rz anoHighlyEngagedClassroom.pdf> >> Conditions.doc> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> > >> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction > >> and > >> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently > >> but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > >> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Lynda Stone, Ph.D. > >> Professor > >> Dept. Child Development > >> CSU Sacramento > >> CSUS/UC-Links Program Director > >> lstone@csus.edu > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> ----- > >> No virus found in this message. > >> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com > >> Version: 2014.0.4765 / Virus Database: 4015/8201 - Release Date: > >> 09/12/14 > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely > for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not > the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University > accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to > scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept > responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this > email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services > unless accompanied by an official order form. > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From glassman.13@osu.edu Sat Sep 13 10:19:50 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 17:19:50 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] mediate perception and direct perception Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Mike, David, whoever Tried to find the original message to respond to but this mail program has become too mediated. Here is a short essay by (speaking of) Gibson, I guess related to what I was saying, http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/ecopsyc/perils/folder3/mediated.html I wonder if it challenges Shotters idea. Michael From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Sat Sep 13 10:50:36 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 17:50:36 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Many thanks for this Michael but I would (humbly) want to take issue with Gibson's apparent assumption here, that children attribute meaning or information to words, images etc. as context-independent 'objects'. I was particularly interested in Shotter's emphasis on 'withness thinking' because I had come to the conclusion that babies' first awareness is of their interactions (with people and with whatever they can get hold of in their environment) rather than of people or things as objects. This also fitted well with Vasu Reddy's distinction between the 'third person perspective' adopted in many developmental psychology studies and the 'second person perspective' which is characteristic of social interactions (especially the more playful, 'full-on' kind). Gibson wants to use 'mediated perception' to refer only to representations but I think we also need to acknowledge the role of mediation in giving meaning to attention itself (the sharing of meaning that is afforded by shared attention). I am not convinced that babies simply or directly relate pictures of things (or 'names' of things) with context-free, ideal concepts of those things. I think it is much more likely that the association is with past (inter) actions WITH similar things, interactions which are heavily mediated by the values and meanings which others attach to the infant's actions. We 'soak up' intuitive or not consciously noticed information about other people's responses to our actions and this social information becomes part of the meaning of these actions. Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Glassman, Michael Sent: 13 September 2014 18:20 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] mediate perception and direct perception Mike, David, whoever Tried to find the original message to respond to but this mail program has become too mediated. Here is a short essay by (speaking of) Gibson, I guess related to what I was saying, http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/ecopsyc/perils/folder3/mediated.html I wonder if it challenges Shotters idea. Michael ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Sat Sep 13 11:54:01 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 18:54:01 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] More than cool reason: 'withness thinking' or 'systemic thinking' and 'thinking about systems' Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022244C2@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> On Mike?s suggestion I have attached a fairly recent paper by John Shotter which focuses on the differences between thinking WITH and thinking ABOUT ? with appropriate theatrical references too! Rod ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: SHOTTER JOHN 2012 More than Cool Reason - ? =?utf-8?B?V2l0aG5lc3MtdGhpbmtpbmfigJkgb3 Type: application/pdf Size: 138977 bytes Desc: =?utf-8?B?U0hPVFRFUiBKT0hOIDIwMTIgTW9yZSB0aGFuIENvb2wgUmVhc29uIC0g4oCY?= =?utf-8?B?V2l0aG5lc3MtdGhpbmtpbmfigJkgb3Ig4oCYc3lzdGVtaWMgdGhpbmtpbmc=?= =?utf-8?B?4oCZIGFuZCDigJh0aGlua2luZyBhYm91dCBzeXN0ZW1zJy5wZGY=?= Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140913/2f53e62c/attachment-0001.pdf From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Sep 13 13:26:28 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 14:26:28 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca In-Reply-To: References: <8D2C4DB1-CFE1-4A1D-8683-CE5A8551B35C@gmail.com> Message-ID: I would hope that a certain amount of irreverence would be dear to most people on this list! But seriously Henry, have you come across Bakhtin's work at all? Seems like another that you might want to throw in with the crowd of healthy irreverents. -greg On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 2:48 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > Mike and David, > This is seriously getting to be a club that I, like Groucho, won't join, > if it takes me as a member. I think all of this seriously evokes Andy's > contention, in his notes for the upcoming presentation at the ISCAR > conference (which XMCA has gotten) that, "Adults can grasp true concepts, > and can change society, and a social theory has to treat adults as adults, > and this is what the projects approach allows us to do. " If "adult" means > the same as "serious", you can see why I have my doubts about joining the > Unserious Scholar Club. On the other hand, if I can have some fun, as in > the laughing warrior (forget gender stereotypes here, and dare me to talk > about Jihad), then that's what I'm talking about. Incidentally, I loved > Andy's notes. I could so relate it to CG. The emergent character of project > realization he talks about applies very well to discourse, as you can see > in the articles by Langacker I have sent out. Discourse IS a project and > its outcome is typically not entirely clear in the minds of the > interactants as they negotiate its waters. XMCA, of which this email is a > "turn", is a prototypical "work in progress", as Andy puts it, since we > clearly don't know where this will all end up. But I hope it can be fun > along the way. > Henry > > > > > On Sep 6, 2014, at 1:51 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Hi Henry-- There goes my pile of books that need to be read before bed > time! > > Spinoza goes up there right next to Dead Souls. > > > > However, David having already claimed the mantle of unserious scholar, > and > > you having made the same claim, I am afraid that I have to make precisely > > the same claim on the unrefutable grounds that no one pays me any longer > > for what I do so I get to be as unserious as i can seriously be! > > mike > > > > > > On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 12:33 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > wrote: > > > >> Hi Mike, > >> All I can say now is that Spinoza is famously quoted as having said, > "The > >> more clearly you understand yourself and your emotions, the more you > become > >> a lover of what is." This quote happens to appear in the introduction > to a > >> very popular self help book, Loving What Is, by Byron Katie (2002). I > >> bought the book , obviously, because I thought I needed help. It did, > but > >> it also introduced me to Spinoza. And that has been a deeper "help". So, > >> from a personal perspective, I can totally understand how Spinoza and > >> periizhvanie would be connected. For all of you ESL teachers out there, > who > >> doesn't remember Krashen on the "affective filter" and I have been > seeing a > >> lot on character and education lately. Oh yes, and how failing is > important > >> to eventual success. Teasing out issues in the education of > >> non-mainstreamers, and recognizing how the current system is toxic for > >> everyone, I think Spinoza's analysis and the narrative of his life are > >> powerful. Vygotsky hits me the same way. Cantor, the mathematician, and > >> Pierce, the philosopher/logician/semiotician, also constantly come up > for > >> me. They were ridiculed by the received cognoscenti of the time, so > much so > >> that the suffered mental breakdowns. But they pushed on to develop > tools in > >> math and semiotics that seem to me are complementary with Vygotsky. > Again I > >> get to take the role of unserious scholar here, so think of my thoughts > as > >> gaming on line and don't take the game too seriously. > >> Henry > >> > >> On Sep 5, 2014, at 6:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >>> Hi David and Henry-- > >>> > >>> David-- I was intrigued by your comment that Spinoza is a controversial > >>> topic on xmca. I googled Spinoza on the main web page and came up with > 4K > >>> plus hits (!!). My own impression is that few on this list, me > included, > >>> have engaged in serious study of Spinoza let alone the imprint of > Spinoza > >>> on Vygotsky. > >>> > >>> What is the nature of the controversy? What is at stake? The topic is > of > >>> particular interest to me at present because I have been part of > >>> discussions with people who are focused on Vygotsky's use of > perezhivanie > >>> in his later work, where the relation of emotion and cognition is a > >> central > >>> concern and Spinoza is clearly relevant. > >>> > >>> Henry and anyone interested in chasing down what has been written about > >>> various topics in xmca chatter, take advantage of the nice google > search > >> at > >>> lchc.ucsd.edu. > >>> > >>> mike > >>> > >>> (who enmeshed in the sense/meaning distinction in all of its > multilingual > >>> confusifications at present) > >> > >> > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From dkirsh@lsu.edu Sat Sep 13 13:48:59 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 20:48:59 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Thanks for replies. I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided to stop talking about situated cognition because the pragmatics of adjectival use implies there has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now speaks of situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of physical reflexes (and perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human action is mediated (and perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's worth noting that "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of action, but rather a theoretical assumption about all human action; though there seems to be some variation in interpretation of what that assumption entails. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rod Parker-Rees Sent: Saturday, September 13, 2014 12:51 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Many thanks for this Michael but I would (humbly) want to take issue with Gibson's apparent assumption here, that children attribute meaning or information to words, images etc. as context-independent 'objects'. I was particularly interested in Shotter's emphasis on 'withness thinking' because I had come to the conclusion that babies' first awareness is of their interactions (with people and with whatever they can get hold of in their environment) rather than of people or things as objects. This also fitted well with Vasu Reddy's distinction between the 'third person perspective' adopted in many developmental psychology studies and the 'second person perspective' which is characteristic of social interactions (especially the more playful, 'full-on' kind). Gibson wants to use 'mediated perception' to refer only to representations but I think we also need to acknowledge the role of mediation in giving meaning to attention itself (the sharing of meaning that is afforded by shared attention). I am not convinced that babies simply or directly relate pictures of things (or 'names' of things) with context-free, ideal concepts of those things. I think it is much more likely that the association is with past (inter) actions WITH similar things, interactions which are heavily mediated by the values and meanings which others attach to the infant's actions. We 'soak up' intuitive or not consciously noticed information about other people's responses to our actions and this social information becomes part of the meaning of these actions. Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Glassman, Michael Sent: 13 September 2014 18:20 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] mediate perception and direct perception Mike, David, whoever Tried to find the original message to respond to but this mail program has become too mediated. Here is a short essay by (speaking of) Gibson, I guess related to what I was saying, http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/ecopsyc/perils/folder3/mediated.html I wonder if it challenges Shotters idea. Michael ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Sep 13 15:48:55 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 16:48:55 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we would need to include reflexes) And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in Bateson's man with the stick? (in which case, we would need to include newborns). Just wonderin'. -greg On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > Thanks for replies. > I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided to stop talking about > situated cognition because the pragmatics of adjectival use implies there > has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now speaks of > situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of physical reflexes (and > perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human action is mediated (and > perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's worth noting that > "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of action, but rather a > theoretical assumption about all human action; though there seems to be > some variation in interpretation of what that assumption entails. > David > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rod Parker-Rees > Sent: Saturday, September 13, 2014 12:51 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > Many thanks for this Michael but I would (humbly) want to take issue with > Gibson's apparent assumption here, that children attribute meaning or > information to words, images etc. as context-independent 'objects'. I was > particularly interested in Shotter's emphasis on 'withness thinking' > because I had come to the conclusion that babies' first awareness is of > their interactions (with people and with whatever they can get hold of in > their environment) rather than of people or things as objects. This also > fitted well with Vasu Reddy's distinction between the 'third person > perspective' adopted in many developmental psychology studies and the > 'second person perspective' which is characteristic of social interactions > (especially the more playful, 'full-on' kind). Gibson wants to use > 'mediated perception' to refer only to representations but I think we also > need to acknowledge the role of mediation in giving meaning to attention > itself (the sharing of meaning that is afforded by shared attention). I am > not convinced that babies simply or directly relate pictures of things (or > 'names' of things) with context-free, ideal concepts of those things. I > think it is much more likely that the association is with past (inter) > actions WITH similar things, interactions which are heavily mediated by the > values and meanings which others attach to the infant's actions. We 'soak > up' intuitive or not consciously noticed information about other people's > responses to our actions and this social information becomes part of the > meaning of these actions. > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Glassman, Michael > Sent: 13 September 2014 18:20 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] mediate perception and direct perception > > > Mike, David, whoever > > Tried to find the original message to respond to but this mail program has > become too mediated. > > Here is a short essay by (speaking of) Gibson, I guess related to what I > was saying, > > http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/ecopsyc/perils/folder3/mediated.html > > I wonder if it challenges Shotters idea. > > Michael > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat Sep 13 19:13:18 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 20:13:18 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca In-Reply-To: References: <8D2C4DB1-CFE1-4A1D-8683-CE5A8551B35C@gmail.com> Message-ID: <6322AED9-6172-4B7C-8A08-4F0F1FE673D2@gmail.com> Greg, Thank you for you good words and great question. I knew about Bakhtin, but have been finding him everywhere in the articles and chat of XMCA over the last week. Seriously. Henry On Sep 13, 2014, at 2:26 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > I would hope that a certain amount of irreverence would be dear to most > people on this list! > But seriously Henry, have you come across Bakhtin's work at all? > Seems like another that you might want to throw in with the crowd of > healthy irreverents. > -greg > > > On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 2:48 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: > >> Mike and David, >> This is seriously getting to be a club that I, like Groucho, won't join, >> if it takes me as a member. I think all of this seriously evokes Andy's >> contention, in his notes for the upcoming presentation at the ISCAR >> conference (which XMCA has gotten) that, "Adults can grasp true concepts, >> and can change society, and a social theory has to treat adults as adults, >> and this is what the projects approach allows us to do. " If "adult" means >> the same as "serious", you can see why I have my doubts about joining the >> Unserious Scholar Club. On the other hand, if I can have some fun, as in >> the laughing warrior (forget gender stereotypes here, and dare me to talk >> about Jihad), then that's what I'm talking about. Incidentally, I loved >> Andy's notes. I could so relate it to CG. The emergent character of project >> realization he talks about applies very well to discourse, as you can see >> in the articles by Langacker I have sent out. Discourse IS a project and >> its outcome is typically not entirely clear in the minds of the >> interactants as they negotiate its waters. XMCA, of which this email is a >> "turn", is a prototypical "work in progress", as Andy puts it, since we >> clearly don't know where this will all end up. But I hope it can be fun >> along the way. >> Henry >> >> >> >> >> On Sep 6, 2014, at 1:51 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >>> Hi Henry-- There goes my pile of books that need to be read before bed >> time! >>> Spinoza goes up there right next to Dead Souls. >>> >>> However, David having already claimed the mantle of unserious scholar, >> and >>> you having made the same claim, I am afraid that I have to make precisely >>> the same claim on the unrefutable grounds that no one pays me any longer >>> for what I do so I get to be as unserious as i can seriously be! >>> mike >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 12:33 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < >> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Mike, >>>> All I can say now is that Spinoza is famously quoted as having said, >> "The >>>> more clearly you understand yourself and your emotions, the more you >> become >>>> a lover of what is." This quote happens to appear in the introduction >> to a >>>> very popular self help book, Loving What Is, by Byron Katie (2002). I >>>> bought the book , obviously, because I thought I needed help. It did, >> but >>>> it also introduced me to Spinoza. And that has been a deeper "help". So, >>>> from a personal perspective, I can totally understand how Spinoza and >>>> periizhvanie would be connected. For all of you ESL teachers out there, >> who >>>> doesn't remember Krashen on the "affective filter" and I have been >> seeing a >>>> lot on character and education lately. Oh yes, and how failing is >> important >>>> to eventual success. Teasing out issues in the education of >>>> non-mainstreamers, and recognizing how the current system is toxic for >>>> everyone, I think Spinoza's analysis and the narrative of his life are >>>> powerful. Vygotsky hits me the same way. Cantor, the mathematician, and >>>> Pierce, the philosopher/logician/semiotician, also constantly come up >> for >>>> me. They were ridiculed by the received cognoscenti of the time, so >> much so >>>> that the suffered mental breakdowns. But they pushed on to develop >> tools in >>>> math and semiotics that seem to me are complementary with Vygotsky. >> Again I >>>> get to take the role of unserious scholar here, so think of my thoughts >> as >>>> gaming on line and don't take the game too seriously. >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> On Sep 5, 2014, at 6:42 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi David and Henry-- >>>>> >>>>> David-- I was intrigued by your comment that Spinoza is a controversial >>>>> topic on xmca. I googled Spinoza on the main web page and came up with >> 4K >>>>> plus hits (!!). My own impression is that few on this list, me >> included, >>>>> have engaged in serious study of Spinoza let alone the imprint of >> Spinoza >>>>> on Vygotsky. >>>>> >>>>> What is the nature of the controversy? What is at stake? The topic is >> of >>>>> particular interest to me at present because I have been part of >>>>> discussions with people who are focused on Vygotsky's use of >> perezhivanie >>>>> in his later work, where the relation of emotion and cognition is a >>>> central >>>>> concern and Spinoza is clearly relevant. >>>>> >>>>> Henry and anyone interested in chasing down what has been written about >>>>> various topics in xmca chatter, take advantage of the nice google >> search >>>> at >>>>> lchc.ucsd.edu. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> (who enmeshed in the sense/meaning distinction in all of its >> multilingual >>>>> confusifications at present) >>>> >>>> >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Sep 13 20:49:19 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 20:49:19 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Mediation re-ducks Message-ID: attached is a short essay on mediation by Raymond Williams that might be helpful to this discussion. mike -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, ?Gray, 2001] -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Communication and Mediation - Williams_Part2.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 226398 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140913/ca2cecf1/attachment.pdf From ablunden@mira.net Sat Sep 13 23:02:23 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 14 Sep 2014 16:02:23 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT tradition specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every action is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive contexts, "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite legitimately, but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In social theory, for example, mediation of activities by other activities or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I prefer to spell it out and use the term "artefact-mediated" rather than the vague term "mediated". I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to mean what you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context of CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of "mediation" in the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that a concept is not immediately present in any act of communication or any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. Artefacts, such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of course mediate an act of communication. But the point is that a word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for any one concept. It means different things to different people. Concepts are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their materiality, but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept in mind when we use a word in communication, the communication is mediated by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be aware of that. So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in qualified way so that its specific meaning is made clear. Andy PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Greg Thompson wrote: > Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? > > Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we would need to include > reflexes) > > And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in Bateson's man with > the stick? (in which case, we would need to include newborns). > > Just wonderin'. > > -greg > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > > >> Thanks for replies. >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided to stop talking about >> situated cognition because the pragmatics of adjectival use implies there >> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now speaks of >> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of physical reflexes (and >> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human action is mediated (and >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's worth noting that >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of action, but rather a >> theoretical assumption about all human action; though there seems to be >> some variation in interpretation of what that assumption entails. >> David >> >> > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun Sep 14 07:49:34 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sun, 14 Sep 2014 08:49:34 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca In-Reply-To: <6322AED9-6172-4B7C-8A08-4F0F1FE673D2@gmail.com> References: <8D2C4DB1-CFE1-4A1D-8683-CE5A8551B35C@gmail.com> <6322AED9-6172-4B7C-8A08-4F0F1FE673D2@gmail.com> Message-ID: One reason I mention him is because of resonances with ideas. But I also mention him as a kind of trickster figure as well as a student of the trickster in writing (his dissertation was on Rabelais). I also mention him as a writer who seems authentically engaged with meaningful/emotive aspects of human existence (e.g., Toward a Philosophy of the Act, and Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity). And finally, I mention Bakhtin because I'm still not convinced that the deep treasures of Bakhtin's work has yet been mined out. -greg On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 8:13 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > Greg, > Thank you for you good words and great question. I knew about Bakhtin, but > have been finding him everywhere in the articles and chat of XMCA over the > last week. Seriously. > Henry > > On Sep 13, 2014, at 2:26 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > I would hope that a certain amount of irreverence would be dear to most > > people on this list! > > But seriously Henry, have you come across Bakhtin's work at all? > > Seems like another that you might want to throw in with the crowd of > > healthy irreverents. > > -greg > > > > > > On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 2:48 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III > > > wrote: > > > >> Mike and David, > >> This is seriously getting to be a club that I, like Groucho, won't > join, > >> if it takes me as a member. I think all of this seriously evokes Andy's > >> contention, in his notes for the upcoming presentation at the ISCAR > >> conference (which XMCA has gotten) that, "Adults can grasp true > concepts, > >> and can change society, and a social theory has to treat adults as > adults, > >> and this is what the projects approach allows us to do. " If "adult" > means > >> the same as "serious", you can see why I have my doubts about joining > the > >> Unserious Scholar Club. On the other hand, if I can have some fun, as in > >> the laughing warrior (forget gender stereotypes here, and dare me to > talk > >> about Jihad), then that's what I'm talking about. Incidentally, I loved > >> Andy's notes. I could so relate it to CG. The emergent character of > project > >> realization he talks about applies very well to discourse, as you can > see > >> in the articles by Langacker I have sent out. Discourse IS a project and > >> its outcome is typically not entirely clear in the minds of the > >> interactants as they negotiate its waters. XMCA, of which this email is > a > >> "turn", is a prototypical "work in progress", as Andy puts it, since we > >> clearly don't know where this will all end up. But I hope it can be fun > >> along the way. > >> Henry > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Sep 6, 2014, at 1:51 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >>> Hi Henry-- There goes my pile of books that need to be read before bed > >> time! > >>> Spinoza goes up there right next to Dead Souls. > >>> > >>> However, David having already claimed the mantle of unserious scholar, > >> and > >>> you having made the same claim, I am afraid that I have to make > precisely > >>> the same claim on the unrefutable grounds that no one pays me any > longer > >>> for what I do so I get to be as unserious as i can seriously be! > >>> mike > >>> > >>> > >>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 12:33 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Hi Mike, > >>>> All I can say now is that Spinoza is famously quoted as having said, > >> "The > >>>> more clearly you understand yourself and your emotions, the more you > >> become > >>>> a lover of what is." This quote happens to appear in the introduction > >> to a > >>>> very popular self help book, Loving What Is, by Byron Katie (2002). I > >>>> bought the book , obviously, because I thought I needed help. It did, > >> but > >>>> it also introduced me to Spinoza. And that has been a deeper "help". > So, > >>>> from a personal perspective, I can totally understand how Spinoza and > >>>> periizhvanie would be connected. For all of you ESL teachers out > there, > >> who > >>>> doesn't remember Krashen on the "affective filter" and I have been > >> seeing a > >>>> lot on character and education lately. Oh yes, and how failing is > >> important > >>>> to eventual success. Teasing out issues in the education of > >>>> non-mainstreamers, and recognizing how the current system is toxic for > >>>> everyone, I think Spinoza's analysis and the narrative of his life are > >>>> powerful. Vygotsky hits me the same way. Cantor, the mathematician, > and > >>>> Pierce, the philosopher/logician/semiotician, also constantly come up > >> for > >>>> me. They were ridiculed by the received cognoscenti of the time, so > >> much so > >>>> that the suffered mental breakdowns. But they pushed on to develop > >> tools in > >>>> math and semiotics that seem to me are complementary with Vygotsky. > >> Again I > >>>> get to take the role of unserious scholar here, so think of my > thoughts > >> as > >>>> gaming on line and don't take the game too seriously. > >>>> Henry > >>>> > >>>> On Sep 5, 2014, at 6:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi David and Henry-- > >>>>> > >>>>> David-- I was intrigued by your comment that Spinoza is a > controversial > >>>>> topic on xmca. I googled Spinoza on the main web page and came up > with > >> 4K > >>>>> plus hits (!!). My own impression is that few on this list, me > >> included, > >>>>> have engaged in serious study of Spinoza let alone the imprint of > >> Spinoza > >>>>> on Vygotsky. > >>>>> > >>>>> What is the nature of the controversy? What is at stake? The topic is > >> of > >>>>> particular interest to me at present because I have been part of > >>>>> discussions with people who are focused on Vygotsky's use of > >> perezhivanie > >>>>> in his later work, where the relation of emotion and cognition is a > >>>> central > >>>>> concern and Spinoza is clearly relevant. > >>>>> > >>>>> Henry and anyone interested in chasing down what has been written > about > >>>>> various topics in xmca chatter, take advantage of the nice google > >> search > >>>> at > >>>>> lchc.ucsd.edu. > >>>>> > >>>>> mike > >>>>> > >>>>> (who enmeshed in the sense/meaning distinction in all of its > >> multilingual > >>>>> confusifications at present) > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Sep 14 09:02:29 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 14 Sep 2014 09:02:29 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> Message-ID: My apologies for attaching more than the two pages on "mediation" by Williams last night. Trying to learn to get control of acrobat.The attached etymological discussion is less than two pages long. As a supplement to the Williams, two uses of the term in the OED might also be constructive. All of this supports Andy's suggestions for great specification of what sort of mediation one is referring to. ----------- OED *2.* Thesaurus ? *a.* Agency or action as an intermediary; the state or fact of serving as an intermediate agent, a means of action, or a medium of transmission; instrumentality. *c*1425 Lydgate *Troyyes Bk.* (Augustus A.iv) iv. 162 How I be-stat..Wolde in no maner never occupie By o?er title ?an fre elleccioun, Nat interrupt by mediacioun of procage [*read* brocage] roted vp-on mede. *a*1450 (?1391) Chaucer *Treat. Astrolabe* Introd. 12 By mediacioun of this litel tretys, I purpose to teche the a certein nombre of conclusions. *a*1513 J. Irland *Meroure of Wyssdome* (1965) II. 70 The sone wyrkis nocht his operacioun bot be the mediacioun of the causis particular and inferior. 1560 J. Daus tr. J. Sleidane *Commentaries* f. xxj, His fellowes at home..wrot to Lewis the Frenche kinge, by the mediation of Erarde Marchiaue Byshoppe of Liege. 1615 G. Sandys *Relation of Journey* 168 Not to be touched but by the mediation of a sticke prepared for the purpose. 1646 H. Lawrence *Of Communion & Warre with Angels* 38 The understanding receives things by the mediation, first of the externall sences, then of the fancy. 1648 in S. R. Gardiner *Hamilton Papers* (1880) 205, I intend to corresponde with you by her mediation. 1682 N. Grew *Of Mixture* i. v. ?5 in *Anat. Plants* 232 To mix them by mediation of some third..Body, which may be congruous in part to them both. 1710 J. Norris *Treat. Christian Prudence* iii. 135 By the Will those Motions or Operations (Imperate Acts as they are call'd) which are performed by the mediation of the Body. 1796 E. Burke *Lett. Peace Regic. France* i, in *Wks.* (1808) VIII. 156 To seek for peace..through the mediation of a vigorous war. 1796 R. Kirwan *Elements Mineral.* (ed. 2) II. 269 By the mediation of nickel it will unite to Bismuth. 1860 J. Tyndall *Glaciers of Alps* i. iii. 23 Through his mediation I secured a chamois-hunter. 1902 E. Carpenter *Civilisation* (ed. 7) ii. 70 An immaterial mediation..would simply remove the problem out of the regions of scientific analysis. 1988 A. Brookner *Latecomers* viii. 117 There was also in Yvette a will to overcome that was translated, without the mediation of her mind, into excellent bodily health. (Hide quotations) Thesaurus ? Categories ? *b.* *Psychol.* The interposition of stages or processes between stimulus and result, or intention and realization. Freq. *attrib.* 1912 *Amer. Jrnl. Psychol.* Jan. 102 The occurrence of associations whose mediation does not come into consciousness in any recognizable manner is certainly an interesting and well-attested phenomenon. 1934 H. C. Warren *Dict. Psychol.* 162/1 *Mediation*, the interposition of one or more ideas or acts between an initial stimulus or idea and a given end result whose genesis is under investigation. 1953 C. E. Osgood *Method & Theory Exper. Psychol.* iii. ix. 395 Short circuiting enters into all behavior, and its most important role lies in formation of those representational mediation processes. 1971 A. Paivio *Imagery & Verbal Processes* ix. 320 The experimental and language-habit approach to the investigation of mediation paradigms. 1996 *Appl. Linguistics* *17* 89 One frequently finds oneself repeating the number in one's head or aloud: this verbal mediation is necessary to keep the declarative information alive in working memory. On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 11:02 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT tradition > specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, mediation > refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every action is both mediated > and immediate, and in many discursive contexts, "mediation" is a concept > which may be evoked quite legitimately, but with no special significant for > the use of CHAT. In social theory, for example, mediation of activities by > other activities or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions > by artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is > psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I prefer to > spell it out and use the term "artefact-mediated" rather than the vague > term "mediated". > > I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a concept." Like > Alice in Wonderland one can use words to mean what you like, but I find a > formulation like this in the context of CHAT problematic, because it is > using the idea of "mediation" in the most general sense in a way which > obscures the fact that a concept is not immediately present in any act of > communication or any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. > Artefacts, such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of > course mediate an act of communication. But the point is that a word is not > universally and unproblematically a sign for any one concept. It means > different things to different people. Concepts are not artefacts. Artefacts > are universal in their materiality, but particular in their meaning. So > when we have a concept in mind when we use a word in communication, the > communication is mediated by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake > not to be aware of that. > > So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in qualified way so > that its specific meaning is made clear. > > Andy > PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we would need to include >> reflexes) >> >> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in Bateson's man with >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include newborns). >> >> Just wonderin'. >> >> -greg >> >> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: >> >> >> >>> Thanks for replies. >>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided to stop talking about >>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of adjectival use implies there >>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now speaks of >>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of physical reflexes >>> (and >>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human action is mediated (and >>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's worth noting that >>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of action, but rather a >>> theoretical assumption about all human action; though there seems to be >>> some variation in interpretation of what that assumption entails. >>> David >>> >>> >>> >> >> > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Sep 14 09:03:11 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 14 Sep 2014 09:03:11 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> Message-ID: the attachment re mediation On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 11:02 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT tradition > specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, mediation > refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every action is both mediated > and immediate, and in many discursive contexts, "mediation" is a concept > which may be evoked quite legitimately, but with no special significant for > the use of CHAT. In social theory, for example, mediation of activities by > other activities or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions > by artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is > psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I prefer to > spell it out and use the term "artefact-mediated" rather than the vague > term "mediated". > > I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a concept." Like > Alice in Wonderland one can use words to mean what you like, but I find a > formulation like this in the context of CHAT problematic, because it is > using the idea of "mediation" in the most general sense in a way which > obscures the fact that a concept is not immediately present in any act of > communication or any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. > Artefacts, such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of > course mediate an act of communication. But the point is that a word is not > universally and unproblematically a sign for any one concept. It means > different things to different people. Concepts are not artefacts. Artefacts > are universal in their materiality, but particular in their meaning. So > when we have a concept in mind when we use a word in communication, the > communication is mediated by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake > not to be aware of that. > > So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in qualified way so > that its specific meaning is made clear. > > Andy > PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we would need to include >> reflexes) >> >> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in Bateson's man with >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include newborns). >> >> Just wonderin'. >> >> -greg >> >> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: >> >> >> >>> Thanks for replies. >>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided to stop talking about >>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of adjectival use implies there >>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now speaks of >>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of physical reflexes >>> (and >>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human action is mediated (and >>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's worth noting that >>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of action, but rather a >>> theoretical assumption about all human action; though there seems to be >>> some variation in interpretation of what that assumption entails. >>> David >>> >>> >>> >> >> > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Mediation - Williams.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 227639 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140914/bf4ab36e/attachment.pdf From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Sep 14 10:20:42 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Sun, 14 Sep 2014 17:20:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?q?Nate=27s_new_webpage_on_Vygotsky?= In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022243D1@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> <7740D810-586B-49AC-8A69-FCE513CAE91C@csus.edu> <2B52789B-53FF-4200-96C5-B1DADABADC79@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022242D6@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> , <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022243D1@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <53a57a7bc97349578fa3ac65bc2cd2df@gmail.com> Rod Mike, and others interested in Shotter?s Withness Thinking Mike asks how it may ?links to Gibsonian notions of direct perception, extended to include the moral force that accompanies other's behavior. Do you think that the entire essay is something we should read to get a better graps on "withness thinking"? Rod mentions Shotter?s close reading of Vygotsky who he puts in play with Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty and recently Barard who explore dialogue in practice. I would like to focus on the theme of *direct perception* as explored in Merleau Ponty?s view of perception. My thoughts are from Lawrence Haas who wrote a book on Merleau Ponty?s perspective as a response to what Haas terms the *sensation Fallacy* Haas says the sensation fallacy [that has become a key master concept in psychology and philosophy that allowed Descartes to treat sensations AS the fundamental objective material rooted in *sensory mechanisms* and perceptions are viewed as the unreliable *subjective REPRESENTATIONS of this sensory mechanism. Locke, extending Descarte?s sensory fallacy wrote: ?Though the qualities [sense datum] that affect our Senses are in the things themselves, so united and blended ? Yet ?tis plain the *ideas* they produce in the mind, enter by the senses simple and unmixed ? The coldness and hardness which a man feels in a piece of ice being AS distinct *ideas* in the Mind, as the smell and whiteness of a lily ?. There is nothing can be plainer to a man, than the clear and distinct perception he has of those simple *ideas* which being EACH IN ITSELF uncompounded, contains in it nothing by one uniform appearance, or CONCEPTION in the mind, and is NOT distinguished into different *ideas*? Merleau Ponty focused his theory of perception to refute the sensation fallacy that dominates our modern consciousness. THAT SENSATIONS BRING THE EXTERNAL WORLD *inside** to BECOME *re-presented* AS *ideas*. Merleau Ponty shows how this sensation fallacy [which has become axiomatic in traditional empiricism] is actually a secondary intellectual conceptual construction DERIVED from perceptual experience Locke, Hume, Mill, Russel, Moore, Carnap, all shared this TYPE of re-presentational notion of sensation. Indeed Haas writes, ?whenever one finds a philosopher defining sensation WITH a list of qualities such as cold, hot, white, sour, hard, bitter, red, THIS *understanding* [sensation fallacy] is at work. M-P shows this intellectually derived fallacy corresponds to nothing in our actual perceptual experience. M-p shows even our most rudimentary perceptions ARE RELATIONAL and MEANING-LADEN. The sensation CONSTRUCTED AS ontologically basic IS an ARTIFACT of second-order thinking- an ABSTRACT concept - that has been REIFIED AS ontologically basic. This THEN entails that the accompanying theory of perception AS AN *internal* IDEAL REPRESENTATIION of an *external* world built up out of sense-data [sense-qualia] IS EQUALLY ABSTRACT and ultimately flawed. THIS empiricist theory of perception keeps us blind to the very character of perceptual experience. M-P draws on Gestalt psychology to show ALL perception is COMPLEX AND RELATIONAL. M-P shows many dimensions that refute the sensation fallacy and representational notions of perception. A CENTRAL DIMENSION IS THAT ALL perception is charged with significance. [with a sense - [SENS AS both sense and direction] The contemporary term is *intentional* They bear [carry] meaning WITHIN [and because of ] the complex gestalt between figure and context. SENS refers to perceptions AS CHARGED WITH A SENSE OF OPEN POSSIBILITIES. I have the sense that I could *see* these possibilities IF I moved my orientation [focus] in THAT DIRECTION. M-P emphasizes that besides this *spatial* dimension of [sens/direction] there are DISPOSITIONAL AND TEMPORAL AND AFFECTIVE perceptions that carry *significance* Our most basic perceptions ARE not atom-like qualia but meaning-laden Gestalten. THESE GESTALTEN OPEN UP THE WORLD towards possible actions activities, and affective RESPONSES WITH the world. The fact is that any given perspective RADIATES the [sens] of other perspectives in EXCESS OR BEYOND the immediate perspective focused on. This [sens/ intentionality] recognizes [senses] that with THIS PERCEPTION I am opening onto the world that *transcends* me. This opening beyond me M-P calls the dimension of EXCESS. Perception goes beyond me and my *ideas* On easpect of THIS transcendence is that PERCEPTION IS a field of contact WITH OTHERS and with otherness. Sometimes this *withness* CONSTRAINS my explorations, sometimes this contact with others draws me out of myself. I open onto other perceivers, perceiving me, touching me, constraining me and *touching* the things I perceive. Below the *intellectual CONCEPT OF pure sense-qualia IS knowledge of *existences* In perceptual experience I EMERGE from my individual life through opening to life WITH others and otherness. In perceptual experience I open to a PLURALITY of thinking subjects This perceptual experience is NOT *merely in my mind or brain [the sensation fallacy] We KNOW from experience of existences. We might withdraw into our reified *ideas* or *conceptual* sense-qualia. However perceptual experience is our *deliverance* from this narcissistic withdrawal. Perceptions always express EXCESS and POINT or GESTURE beyond themselves and points to MORE. If I follow up my sens/intentionality WITH re-focusing on the periphery of my perception I turn my head to focus on it THERE. however, AGAIN, THERE WILL BE excess SPILLING OPUT beyond THIS NEW PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE. This is *true* in both spatial and temporal dimensions. The sens/intentionality of the *lamp* as excess points gestures to the lamp that was here before I looked and the lamp that will be here later [in the future] Our basic perception therefore is not a collection of sense-data given as distinct snapshots. In fact, as I focus, time has been passingand it is already later. Perception IS LIVED AS ENGAGEMENT with others and otherness. [with what IS BEYOND ME] Perception as temporal and spatial engagement WITH THE WORLD is our ongoing OPENING onto the world. Rod, Mike, This was a way to explore the notion of *immediate* and *mediated* engagement WITH OTHERS. M-P attempted to articulate a new perceptual ontology BEYOND the fallacy OF SENSATION as REPRESENTATION IN THE MIND OF EXTERNAL REALITY. It is one aspect of the complexity of *contaxt* and may add to the exploration of *withness* thinking. M-P was one of Shotter?s inspiring sources of his understanding. Larry Sent from Windows Mail From: Rod Parker-Rees Sent: ?Saturday?, ?September? ?13?, ?2014 ?9?:?59? ?AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity I have been reading as much as I can of John Shotter's work (there is plenty available on his website - http://www.johnshotter.com). I recently came across a collection of papers 'Construction on the edge: withness thinking and embodiment' which presents a good overview of the development of his thinking (2010 - Taos Institute). He also has a 'Short book on withness thinking' which is available at http://pubpages.unh.edu/~jds/ShortbookUSA.pdf. I haven't yet seen his slightly more recent book, 'Getting it: Withness-Thinking and the Dialogical in Practice' but there is quite a bit of overlap between his publications! He is very much influenced by Vygotsky but also Wittgenstein, Bakhtin and Voloshinov, Merleau-Ponty and, more recently, Karen Barad. What appeals to me about the idea of 'withness thinking' is that it acknowledges the very different nature of the kind of knowing that is involved in knowing a person (very different from knowing ABOUT a person). This sort of knowing is grounded in the specificities of particular interactional (or we should say intra-actional, following Barad), embodied activity rather than in the more 'free-floating' systems of language and concepts. This is why some meanings are very difficult to explain once they have been taken out of the context in which they occurred (e.g. a free-wheeling social conversation) - sometimes feeling rather inexplicable or limp once extracted from the flow of interaction. I am also interested because my work is particularly focused on very young children for whom context may be the only frame available for their meaning making (because they have not yet worked out, or rather worked in, the concept systems which inform and mediate adults' use of language). Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: 13 September 2014 17:38 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky Rod-- Your comments not only evoke John Shotter's name again for xmca-ites, but the links to Gibsonian notions of direct perception, extended to include the moral force that accompanies other's behavior. Do you think that the entire essay is something we should read to get a better graps on "withness thinking"? mike On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 7:18 AM, Rod Parker-Rees < R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > I see Vygotsky's references to the stage as a reminder that mediated > action takes place in social contexts which actively (and often quite > deliberately) shape how participants FEEL about how they and others > act. We don't understand something until we know how 'the audience' > can be expected to react to it and eventually the audience is internalised as a 'super ego' > or cultural awareness of 'what will people think?'. I have just been > reading John Shotter's writing on 'withness thinking' and thought this > passage from a piece he wrote with John Newson in 1982 touched on this > idea of acting 'on stage' before a critical audience: > > ?Just as the child comes to appreciate the 'suckability' of a > proffered teat or the 'graspability' of a cup handle, so she also > apprehends in an equally direct manner, we suggest, the moral force > underlying a serious maternal prohibition, and begins to distinguish > between a deliberately harmful insult to her person and one which is > merely a humorous form of play. She perceives these social barrier > reefs and high seas, the harbours, havens, and horizons directly in > people's stony silences and fixed expressions, in their nods, winks, > grimaces, gestures, stances, and smiles?. (Shotter, J. and Newson, J. > (1982) An ecological approach to cognitive development: implicate orders, joint action, and intentionality. > In G. Butterworth and P. Light (eds.) Social cognition: studies in the > development of understanding, Sussex: Harvester: 32-52. p.38). > > It may be no coincidence that Shotter was himself engaged in producing > stage plays! > > All the best, > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Henry G. Shonerd III > Sent: 13 September 2014 14:53 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky > > And the mediated activity is "on stage", a real drama? My one pence. > Henry > > > On Sep 13, 2014, at 5:51 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > > > Esther > > > > The zone of proximal development is constructed in mediated activity. > > > > That's my tuppence worth. > > > > Carol > > > > On 13 September 2014 11:12, Esther Goody wrote: > > > >> Hmmmm, > >> Re scaffolding = zone of proximal development: > >> Is it?/Are they? > >> > >> I thought zone of proximal development was in one's head .............. > >> While scaffolding, a la Brunner, by definition involves at least > >> two people. > >> > >> [Of course text-actor could be seen as scaffolding. But this leads > >> away from activity. I hope Vygotsky would not have got mired in > >> text-actor stuff ] > >> > >> I am currently obsessed by the way dialogue - real exchanges > >> between real people - seems to account for aspects of cognition. > >> So it is important to keep role of actors central. > >> > >> Comments? > >> Esther Goody > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda > >> Sent: 12 September 2014 23:42 > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky > >> > >> Hi All! > >> > >> I just wanted to share that I use Peg and Mike's paper in all of my > >> cognitive development classes for both undergraduate and graduate > >> students. It has been extremely helpful---my students, I'm > >> thrilled to say, develop more complex understandings of what the > >> zoped involves. And when I combine this article with Activity > >> Theory--- > >> the leading activity not only makes sense to them but also allows > >> them to see how the intersubjective processes through which > >> knowledge is constructed are influenced by multiple aspects of a > >> context--including motives. They even change their views about > >> "context" and come to understand it as a dynamic phenomenon--- > >> okay, I share this to say that this article is particularly helpful > >> because by reading it my students see how culture and cognition > >> (another paper of Mike's) are constructed in the zoped. These > >> understandings are so different from the scaffolding metaphor and > >> most all of my students have been taught that scaffolding is > >> equivalent to the zoped. > >> > >> Hope this sharing is useful--- > >> > >> -lynda > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Sep 10, 2014, at 2:27 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> The paper Peg and I wrote which takes up scaffolding along with other > >> metaphors can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Mike current > activity > >> for the future is the title. > >> > >> mike > >> > >> On Wed, Sep 10, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > >> > > >> wrote: > >> > >> I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not > >> Vygotskian enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the > >> XMCA mainstream. I am reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct > >> instruction a few weeks back wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples > >> Children (1995) is cited as supporting DISTAR, prototypical direct > >> instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on the "Silenced Dialog". > >> I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to the XMCA chat. I > >> am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with her (she > >> was SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never > >> responded, maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy > >> doing other things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to > >> join one more listserve. But I am wondering what she might have > >> transpired if she joined in. I am thinking distributed cognition > >> (Hutchins) and cognitive pluralism (a term I know from Vera's book, > >> Creative Collaboration). The attachments that Phillip sent seem to > >> find direct instruction complementary with more dialogic approaches > >> to instruction, > as per the turn-over principle of Bruner. > >> Henry > >> > >> On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" > >> > > >> wrote: > >> > >> like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at > >> the same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian > >> Cambourne's "conditions for learning" that lead to student > >> engagement, as well as how it relates to student engagement > >> (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of responsibility" and Lave & > >> Wenger's "community of practice" - in combination these works > >> (along with critical race theory and queer theory, identity theory, > >> Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished listing here) > >> provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student > >> learning, > than "motive" in CHAT. > >> > >> for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic > >> haiku > >> - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, > >> relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). > >> > >> i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. > >> > >> > >> phillip > >> > >> > >> > >> Phillip White, PhD > >> Urban Community Teacher Education Program Site Coordinator Montview > >> Elementary, Aurora, CO > >> phillip.white@ucdenver.edu > >> or > >> pawhite@aps.k12.co.us > >> >> rz anoHighlyEngagedClassroom.pdf> >> Conditions.doc> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> > >> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction > >> and > >> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently > >> but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > >> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Lynda Stone, Ph.D. > >> Professor > >> Dept. Child Development > >> CSU Sacramento > >> CSUS/UC-Links Program Director > >> lstone@csus.edu > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> ----- > >> No virus found in this message. > >> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com > >> Version: 2014.0.4765 / Virus Database: 4015/8201 - Release Date: > >> 09/12/14 > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely > for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not > the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University > accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to > scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept > responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this > email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services > unless accompanied by an official order form. > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Sep 14 12:34:36 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 14 Sep 2014 12:34:36 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Post Doctoral Fellowship Opportunity -- Please distribute In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Beth Warren Date: Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 12:29 PM Subject: Post Doctoral Fellowship Opportunity -- Please distribute To: Cc: Beth Warren Dear Friends and Colleagues, I am pleased to share with you the attached announcement of a Postdoctoral Fellowship opportunity sponsored by the Education Research Collaborative at TERC in Cambridge, MA. We invite applications for a two-year residential research fellowship. The fellowship program is focused broadly on transformative research on teaching and learning that intentionally seeks to expand formal and/or informal educational opportunities for children, youth and adults from historically under-represented communities. We are particularly interested in work focused in the sciences, technology, engineering, or mathematics (STEM), or cross-disciplinary studies (e.g., spanning the sciences, mathematics, arts, humanities, social sciences). A major component of the fellowship program is to foster a scholarly learning community in which Postdoctoral Fellows develop their research and writing in a supportive environment, work directly with a mentor or mentor team, and share their emerging work with the broader TERC community. They also have opportunities to collaborate with ongoing R&D projects and develop grant proposal and manuscript writing skills. Many thanks in advance for distributing this announcement widely among your students and within your professional networks. All my best, Beth Beth Warren co-Director Ch?che Konnen Center TERC 2067 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02140 Beth_Warren@terc.edu 617 873 9739 (tel) -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: ERC Post Doc Fellowship 2015-17.pdf Type: application/octet-stream Size: 59297 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140914/dd9362ec/attachment.obj From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Sep 14 17:14:01 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 01:14:01 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> Message-ID: This is a nice account. Do you know the source title for which which these pages were reprinted, please? Huw On 14 September 2014 17:03, mike cole wrote: > the attachment re mediation > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 11:02 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT tradition > > specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, mediation > > refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every action is both mediated > > and immediate, and in many discursive contexts, "mediation" is a concept > > which may be evoked quite legitimately, but with no special significant > for > > the use of CHAT. In social theory, for example, mediation of activities > by > > other activities or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions > > by artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is > > psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I prefer to > > spell it out and use the term "artefact-mediated" rather than the vague > > term "mediated". > > > > I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a concept." > Like > > Alice in Wonderland one can use words to mean what you like, but I find a > > formulation like this in the context of CHAT problematic, because it is > > using the idea of "mediation" in the most general sense in a way which > > obscures the fact that a concept is not immediately present in any act of > > communication or any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. > > Artefacts, such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of > > course mediate an act of communication. But the point is that a word is > not > > universally and unproblematically a sign for any one concept. It means > > different things to different people. Concepts are not artefacts. > Artefacts > > are universal in their materiality, but particular in their meaning. So > > when we have a concept in mind when we use a word in communication, the > > communication is mediated by the word not the concept, and it is a > mistake > > not to be aware of that. > > > > So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in qualified way so > > that its specific meaning is made clear. > > > > Andy > > PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > > >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? > >> > >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we would need to include > >> reflexes) > >> > >> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in Bateson's man > with > >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include newborns). > >> > >> Just wonderin'. > >> > >> -greg > >> > >> > >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner > wrote: > >> > >> > >> > >>> Thanks for replies. > >>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided to stop talking > about > >>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of adjectival use implies > there > >>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now speaks of > >>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of physical reflexes > >>> (and > >>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human action is mediated > (and > >>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's worth noting that > >>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of action, but rather a > >>> theoretical assumption about all human action; though there seems to be > >>> some variation in interpretation of what that assumption entails. > >>> David > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Sep 14 18:33:58 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 14 Sep 2014 18:33:58 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi Huw-- The entries on communication (blurry) and mediation (ok and the focus of the discussion are from Raymond Williams, *Keywords. *I find that book in general an invaluable resource and particularly apt for the discipline of communication, in which, in my view, mediation plays a central role. mike On Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 5:14 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > This is a nice account. Do you know the source title for which which these > pages were reprinted, please? > > Huw > > On 14 September 2014 17:03, mike cole wrote: > > > the attachment re mediation > > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 11:02 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > > > My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT tradition > > > specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, mediation > > > refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every action is both > mediated > > > and immediate, and in many discursive contexts, "mediation" is a > concept > > > which may be evoked quite legitimately, but with no special significant > > for > > > the use of CHAT. In social theory, for example, mediation of activities > > by > > > other activities or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of > actions > > > by artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is > > > psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I prefer to > > > spell it out and use the term "artefact-mediated" rather than the vague > > > term "mediated". > > > > > > I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a concept." > > Like > > > Alice in Wonderland one can use words to mean what you like, but I > find a > > > formulation like this in the context of CHAT problematic, because it is > > > using the idea of "mediation" in the most general sense in a way which > > > obscures the fact that a concept is not immediately present in any act > of > > > communication or any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. > > > Artefacts, such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can > of > > > course mediate an act of communication. But the point is that a word is > > not > > > universally and unproblematically a sign for any one concept. It means > > > different things to different people. Concepts are not artefacts. > > Artefacts > > > are universal in their materiality, but particular in their meaning. So > > > when we have a concept in mind when we use a word in communication, the > > > communication is mediated by the word not the concept, and it is a > > mistake > > > not to be aware of that. > > > > > > So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in qualified way > so > > > that its specific meaning is made clear. > > > > > > Andy > > > PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > > > > >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? > > >> > > >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we would need to > include > > >> reflexes) > > >> > > >> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in Bateson's man > > with > > >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include newborns). > > >> > > >> Just wonderin'. > > >> > > >> -greg > > >> > > >> > > >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner > > wrote: > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >>> Thanks for replies. > > >>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided to stop talking > > about > > >>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of adjectival use implies > > there > > >>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now speaks of > > >>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of physical reflexes > > >>> (and > > >>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human action is mediated > > (and > > >>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's worth noting > that > > >>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of action, but rather a > > >>> theoretical assumption about all human action; though there seems to > be > > >>> some variation in interpretation of what that assumption entails. > > >>> David > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more > or > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > > Gray, 2001] > > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Sep 14 18:42:12 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 02:42:12 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi Mike, "Keywords" was the original printing, not the re-printing of those pages. I'm assuming citations would be rather extensive making some work to figure out where this passage was reprinted (i.e a book devoted to mediaiton?). Huw On 15 September 2014 02:33, mike cole wrote: > Hi Huw-- > The entries on communication (blurry) and mediation (ok and the focus of > the discussion are from Raymond Williams, *Keywords. *I find that book in > general an invaluable resource and particularly apt for the discipline of > communication, in which, in my view, mediation plays a central role. > mike > > > On Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 5:14 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > This is a nice account. Do you know the source title for which which > these > > pages were reprinted, please? > > > > Huw > > > > On 14 September 2014 17:03, mike cole wrote: > > > > > the attachment re mediation > > > > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 11:02 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > > > > > My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT tradition > > > > specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, > mediation > > > > refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every action is both > > mediated > > > > and immediate, and in many discursive contexts, "mediation" is a > > concept > > > > which may be evoked quite legitimately, but with no special > significant > > > for > > > > the use of CHAT. In social theory, for example, mediation of > activities > > > by > > > > other activities or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of > > actions > > > > by artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is > > > > psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I prefer > to > > > > spell it out and use the term "artefact-mediated" rather than the > vague > > > > term "mediated". > > > > > > > > I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a concept." > > > Like > > > > Alice in Wonderland one can use words to mean what you like, but I > > find a > > > > formulation like this in the context of CHAT problematic, because it > is > > > > using the idea of "mediation" in the most general sense in a way > which > > > > obscures the fact that a concept is not immediately present in any > act > > of > > > > communication or any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate > actions*. > > > > Artefacts, such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, > can > > of > > > > course mediate an act of communication. But the point is that a word > is > > > not > > > > universally and unproblematically a sign for any one concept. It > means > > > > different things to different people. Concepts are not artefacts. > > > Artefacts > > > > are universal in their materiality, but particular in their meaning. > So > > > > when we have a concept in mind when we use a word in communication, > the > > > > communication is mediated by the word not the concept, and it is a > > > mistake > > > > not to be aware of that. > > > > > > > > So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in qualified way > > so > > > > that its specific meaning is made clear. > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > > > > > > >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? > > > >> > > > >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we would need to > > include > > > >> reflexes) > > > >> > > > >> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in Bateson's > man > > > with > > > >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include newborns). > > > >> > > > >> Just wonderin'. > > > >> > > > >> -greg > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner > > > wrote: > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >>> Thanks for replies. > > > >>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided to stop talking > > > about > > > >>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of adjectival use implies > > > there > > > >>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now speaks of > > > >>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of physical > reflexes > > > >>> (and > > > >>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human action is > mediated > > > (and > > > >>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's worth noting > > that > > > >>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of action, but rather a > > > >>> theoretical assumption about all human action; though there seems > to > > be > > > >>> some variation in interpretation of what that assumption entails. > > > >>> David > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and > re- > > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more > > or > > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > > > Gray, 2001] > > > > > > > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Sep 14 18:47:21 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 14 Sep 2014 18:47:21 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> Message-ID: I am unsure,,,, it was done by an undergrad two years ago. The texts match though, I think. mike On Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 6:42 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Hi Mike, > > "Keywords" was the original printing, not the re-printing of those pages. > I'm assuming citations would be rather extensive making some work to > figure out where this passage was reprinted (i.e a book devoted to > mediaiton?). > > Huw > > On 15 September 2014 02:33, mike cole wrote: > > > Hi Huw-- > > The entries on communication (blurry) and mediation (ok and the focus of > > the discussion are from Raymond Williams, *Keywords. *I find that book in > > general an invaluable resource and particularly apt for the discipline of > > communication, in which, in my view, mediation plays a central role. > > mike > > > > > > On Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 5:14 PM, Huw Lloyd > > wrote: > > > > > This is a nice account. Do you know the source title for which which > > these > > > pages were reprinted, please? > > > > > > Huw > > > > > > On 14 September 2014 17:03, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > the attachment re mediation > > > > > > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 11:02 PM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT tradition > > > > > specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, > > mediation > > > > > refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every action is both > > > mediated > > > > > and immediate, and in many discursive contexts, "mediation" is a > > > concept > > > > > which may be evoked quite legitimately, but with no special > > significant > > > > for > > > > > the use of CHAT. In social theory, for example, mediation of > > activities > > > > by > > > > > other activities or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of > > > actions > > > > > by artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is > > > > > psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I prefer > > to > > > > > spell it out and use the term "artefact-mediated" rather than the > > vague > > > > > term "mediated". > > > > > > > > > > I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a > concept." > > > > Like > > > > > Alice in Wonderland one can use words to mean what you like, but I > > > find a > > > > > formulation like this in the context of CHAT problematic, because > it > > is > > > > > using the idea of "mediation" in the most general sense in a way > > which > > > > > obscures the fact that a concept is not immediately present in any > > act > > > of > > > > > communication or any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate > > actions*. > > > > > Artefacts, such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, > > can > > > of > > > > > course mediate an act of communication. But the point is that a > word > > is > > > > not > > > > > universally and unproblematically a sign for any one concept. It > > means > > > > > different things to different people. Concepts are not artefacts. > > > > Artefacts > > > > > are universal in their materiality, but particular in their > meaning. > > So > > > > > when we have a concept in mind when we use a word in communication, > > the > > > > > communication is mediated by the word not the concept, and it is a > > > > mistake > > > > > not to be aware of that. > > > > > > > > > > So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in qualified > way > > > so > > > > > that its specific meaning is made clear. > > > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > > > > > > > > >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? > > > > >> > > > > >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we would need to > > > include > > > > >> reflexes) > > > > >> > > > > >> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in Bateson's > > man > > > > with > > > > >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include newborns). > > > > >> > > > > >> Just wonderin'. > > > > >> > > > > >> -greg > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner > > > > > wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >>> Thanks for replies. > > > > >>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided to stop > talking > > > > about > > > > >>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of adjectival use > implies > > > > there > > > > >>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now speaks of > > > > >>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of physical > > reflexes > > > > >>> (and > > > > >>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human action is > > mediated > > > > (and > > > > >>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's worth > noting > > > that > > > > >>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of action, but rather a > > > > >>> theoretical assumption about all human action; though there seems > > to > > > be > > > > >>> some variation in interpretation of what that assumption entails. > > > > >>> David > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and > > re- > > > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > more > > > or > > > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, > and > > > > Gray, 2001] > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more > or > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > > Gray, 2001] > > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Sep 14 18:52:05 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 02:52:05 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> Message-ID: Ah, ok. Reprinted in a thesis or similar. On 15 September 2014 02:47, mike cole wrote: > I am unsure,,,, it was done by an undergrad two years ago. The texts match > though, I think. > mike > > On Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 6:42 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > Hi Mike, > > > > "Keywords" was the original printing, not the re-printing of those pages. > > I'm assuming citations would be rather extensive making some work to > > figure out where this passage was reprinted (i.e a book devoted to > > mediaiton?). > > > > Huw > > > > On 15 September 2014 02:33, mike cole wrote: > > > > > Hi Huw-- > > > The entries on communication (blurry) and mediation (ok and the focus > of > > > the discussion are from Raymond Williams, *Keywords. *I find that book > in > > > general an invaluable resource and particularly apt for the discipline > of > > > communication, in which, in my view, mediation plays a central role. > > > mike > > > > > > > > > On Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 5:14 PM, Huw Lloyd > > > wrote: > > > > > > > This is a nice account. Do you know the source title for which which > > > these > > > > pages were reprinted, please? > > > > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > On 14 September 2014 17:03, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > the attachment re mediation > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 11:02 PM, Andy Blunden > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT tradition > > > > > > specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, > > > mediation > > > > > > refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every action is both > > > > mediated > > > > > > and immediate, and in many discursive contexts, "mediation" is a > > > > concept > > > > > > which may be evoked quite legitimately, but with no special > > > significant > > > > > for > > > > > > the use of CHAT. In social theory, for example, mediation of > > > activities > > > > > by > > > > > > other activities or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of > > > > actions > > > > > > by artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is > > > > > > psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I > prefer > > > to > > > > > > spell it out and use the term "artefact-mediated" rather than the > > > vague > > > > > > term "mediated". > > > > > > > > > > > > I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a > > concept." > > > > > Like > > > > > > Alice in Wonderland one can use words to mean what you like, but > I > > > > find a > > > > > > formulation like this in the context of CHAT problematic, because > > it > > > is > > > > > > using the idea of "mediation" in the most general sense in a way > > > which > > > > > > obscures the fact that a concept is not immediately present in > any > > > act > > > > of > > > > > > communication or any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate > > > actions*. > > > > > > Artefacts, such as spoken words, which may be signs for a > concept, > > > can > > > > of > > > > > > course mediate an act of communication. But the point is that a > > word > > > is > > > > > not > > > > > > universally and unproblematically a sign for any one concept. It > > > means > > > > > > different things to different people. Concepts are not artefacts. > > > > > Artefacts > > > > > > are universal in their materiality, but particular in their > > meaning. > > > So > > > > > > when we have a concept in mind when we use a word in > communication, > > > the > > > > > > communication is mediated by the word not the concept, and it is > a > > > > > mistake > > > > > > not to be aware of that. > > > > > > > > > > > > So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in qualified > > way > > > > so > > > > > > that its specific meaning is made clear. > > > > > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we would need to > > > > include > > > > > >> reflexes) > > > > > >> > > > > > >> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in > Bateson's > > > man > > > > > with > > > > > >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include newborns). > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Just wonderin'. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> -greg > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner < > dkirsh@lsu.edu > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >>> Thanks for replies. > > > > > >>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided to stop > > talking > > > > > about > > > > > >>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of adjectival use > > implies > > > > > there > > > > > >>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now speaks > of > > > > > >>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of physical > > > reflexes > > > > > >>> (and > > > > > >>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human action is > > > mediated > > > > > (and > > > > > >>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's worth > > noting > > > > that > > > > > >>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of action, but rather > a > > > > > >>> theoretical assumption about all human action; though there > seems > > > to > > > > be > > > > > >>> some variation in interpretation of what that assumption > entails. > > > > > >>> David > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > > > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction > and > > > re- > > > > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > > more > > > > or > > > > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, > > and > > > > > Gray, 2001] > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and > re- > > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more > > or > > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > > > Gray, 2001] > > > > > > > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Sep 14 19:05:32 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 03:05:32 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> Message-ID: I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to obfuscate (see darkly) too. I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate the act from its production and history? Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. Best, Huw On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden wrote: > My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT tradition > specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, mediation > refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every action is both mediated > and immediate, and in many discursive contexts, "mediation" is a concept > which may be evoked quite legitimately, but with no special significant for > the use of CHAT. In social theory, for example, mediation of activities by > other activities or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions > by artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is > psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I prefer to > spell it out and use the term "artefact-mediated" rather than the vague > term "mediated". > > I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a concept." Like > Alice in Wonderland one can use words to mean what you like, but I find a > formulation like this in the context of CHAT problematic, because it is > using the idea of "mediation" in the most general sense in a way which > obscures the fact that a concept is not immediately present in any act of > communication or any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. > Artefacts, such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of > course mediate an act of communication. But the point is that a word is not > universally and unproblematically a sign for any one concept. It means > different things to different people. Concepts are not artefacts. Artefacts > are universal in their materiality, but particular in their meaning. So > when we have a concept in mind when we use a word in communication, the > communication is mediated by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake > not to be aware of that. > > So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in qualified way so > that its specific meaning is made clear. > > Andy > PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we would need to include >> reflexes) >> >> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in Bateson's man with >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include newborns). >> >> Just wonderin'. >> >> -greg >> >> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: >> >> >> >>> Thanks for replies. >>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided to stop talking about >>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of adjectival use implies there >>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now speaks of >>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of physical reflexes >>> (and >>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human action is mediated (and >>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's worth noting that >>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of action, but rather a >>> theoretical assumption about all human action; though there seems to be >>> some variation in interpretation of what that assumption entails. >>> David >>> >>> >>> >> >> > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun Sep 14 19:07:21 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sun, 14 Sep 2014 20:07:21 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034682@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <2C9137BA-2758-423C-A31D-23DC25035122@umich.edu> <54101C9B.40708@open.ac.uk> <4D8912AE-B59B-4F24-B2AC-4ACE8D80D306@gmail.com> <7740D810-586B-49AC-8A69-FCE513CAE91C@csus.edu> <0CCEAB76-F4A7-4A27-AB95-99F4DDF08F7F@csus.edu> <5B164B28-4482-4ECD-8DD3-15A245F354C1@csus.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034682@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Michael, I was shooting for something a little simpler than what Lynda has suggested. By arguing for "mediated" reflexes, I was simply pointing to the fact that (ap?)perception is mediated. We do not immediately perceive the world in all its fullness. Our eyes, nerves, and brains do a ton of the work for us and in ways that are unique to humans. Just ask a bat: http://organizations.utep.edu/portals/1475/nagel_bat.pdf or just about any other animal out there and you'll quickly see that we reflexively inhabit a very peculiarly constructed world. Similarly, the child's world is already mediated for them and so to say that a child is in the world in an unmediated fashion seems unlikely. But how this fits with Andy's idea of artefact-mediation, I'm not sure. Is the human nervous system an artefact (it is very tool-like in the way that it chops up the world for us). Or is the mediation by our senses something different from artefact-mediation? I'll throw that one back to Andy. -greg On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 8:59 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > I think I have trouble with this. Aren't mediated actions something we > developed over time to help us in our communications with each other, and > organizing those communications? Doesn't that mean that there must be some > human actions that pre-date mediating capabilities. Did we just completely > jettison them? Or do we just use mediation to claim they don't exist. > > I read recently that the reason some dogs are very social and very close > to you is at least partly because they are observing you. They are trying > to gauge when you are paying attention and when you are not - so that they > become very good at stealing food, but also knowing when you need their > warmth. Having had two very different dogs of the same breed in succession > I think I can attest to this. There is no mediation in the relationship, > at least for the dog. Don't humans have the same thing. Aren't there > humans who can watch somebody closely and see their unmediated actions and > determine how they should act in the moment - really good at stealing but > also knowing when you need warmth? Don't we call them politicians? > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf > of Stone, Lynda [lstone@skymail.csus.edu] > Sent: Saturday, September 13, 2014 10:52 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky > > David-- > > how can actions be unmediated if there are "voices of the mind" (i.e., > culture) with us at all times? > > lynda > > On Sep 13, 2014, at 7:40 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: > > Aside from physical reflexes, are there any actions that are unmediated? > David > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda > Sent: Saturday, September 13, 2014 9:15 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky > > Ester, > > That's my view also---but I've found that this metaphor has led folks to > think, and I quote, justified "direct instruction" in addition to my > students thinking that Vygostky came up with the idea, these are seniors > and entering Master students in a child development program so it's their > prior instruction--- > > Well I guess I added to your "tuppence" a bit-- > > lynda > > > On Sep 13, 2014, at 4:51 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > > Esther > > The zone of proximal development is constructed in mediated activity. > > That's my tuppence worth. > > Carol > > On 13 September 2014 11:12, Esther Goody eg100@hermes.cam.ac.uk>> wrote: > > Hmmmm, > Re scaffolding = zone of proximal development: > Is it?/Are they? > > I thought zone of proximal development was in one's head .............. > While scaffolding, a la Brunner, by definition involves at least two > people. > > [Of course text-actor could be seen as scaffolding. But this leads away > from activity. I hope Vygotsky would not have got mired in text-actor stuff > ] > > I am currently obsessed by the way dialogue - real exchanges between real > people - seems to account for aspects of cognition. > So it is important to keep role of actors central. > > Comments? > Esther Goody > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Stone, Lynda > Sent: 12 September 2014 23:42 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Nate's new webpage on Vygotsky > > Hi All! > > I just wanted to share that I use Peg and Mike's paper in all of my > cognitive development classes for both undergraduate and graduate > students. It has been extremely helpful---my students, I'm thrilled to > say, develop more complex understandings of what the zoped involves. And > when I combine this article with Activity > Theory--- > the leading activity not only makes sense to them but also allows them to > see how the intersubjective processes through which knowledge is > constructed are influenced by multiple aspects of a context--including > motives. They even change their views about "context" and come to > understand it as a dynamic phenomenon--- okay, I share this to say that > this article is particularly helpful because by reading it my students see > how culture and cognition (another paper of Mike's) are constructed in the > zoped. These understandings are so different from the scaffolding metaphor > and most all of my students have been taught that scaffolding is equivalent > to the zoped. > > Hope this sharing is useful--- > > -lynda > > > > > On Sep 10, 2014, at 2:27 PM, mike cole wrote: > > The paper Peg and I wrote which takes up scaffolding along with other > metaphors can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Mike current activity > for the future is the title. > > mike > > On Wed, Sep 10, 2014 at 11:02 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > > > wrote: > > I appreciate ALL of the attachments! I worry that I am not Vygotskian > enough, and would have thought Marzano was out of the XMCA mainstream. I am > reminded of the XMCA conversation on direct instruction a few weeks back > wherein Lisa Delpit's Other Peoples Children (1995) is cited as supporting > DISTAR, prototypical direct instruction. In the same book, is a chapter on > the "Silenced Dialog". I had a fantasy that Delpit could jump right in to > the XMCA chat. I am embarrassed to say that I tried to get in touch with > her (she was SO nice to me when we met some years ago), but she never > responded, maybe for no other reason than that she is super busy doing > other things. Maybe she got the message, but didn't want to join one more > listserve. But I am wondering what she might have transpired if she joined > in. I am thinking distributed cognition (Hutchins) and cognitive pluralism > (a term I know from Vera's book, Creative Collaboration). The attachments > that Phillip sent seem to find direct instruction complementary with more > dialogic approaches to instruction, as per the turn-over principle of > Bruner. > Henry > > On Sep 10, 2014, at 9:58 AM, "White, Phillip" > > > wrote: > > like Henry, i find the metaphor 'scaffolding' a useful term, and at the > same time i'm also strengthening that metaphor with Brian Cambourne's > "conditions for learning" that lead to student engagement, as well as how > it relates to student engagement (Marzano), Fisher's "gradual release of > responsibility" and Lave & Wenger's "community of practice" - in > combination these works (along with critical race theory and queer theory, > identity theory, Foucault's understanding of power - an impoverished > listing here) provide a far richer, more complex understanding of student > learning, than "motive" in CHAT. > > for me, theory is a mutable impression - much like a calligraphic haiku > - in which theoretical understanding changes over time, context, > relationships and experiences (again, an incomplete list). > > i hope that there aren't too many attachments here. > > > phillip > > > > Phillip White, PhD > Urban Community Teacher Education Program Site Coordinator Montview > Elementary, Aurora, CO phillip.white@ucdenver.edu phillip.white@ucdenver.edu> > or > pawhite@aps.k12.co.us > > Conditions.doc> > > > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] > > > > > > > > > Lynda Stone, Ph.D. > Professor > Dept. Child Development > CSU Sacramento > CSUS/UC-Links Program Director > lstone@csus.edu > > > > > > ----- > No virus found in this message. > Checked by AVG - www.avg.com > Version: 2014.0.4765 / Virus Database: 4015/8201 - Release Date: 09/12/14 > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > > > > > > Lynda Stone, Ph.D. > Professor > Dept. Child Development > CSU Sacramento > CSUS/UC-Links Program Director > lstone@csus.edu > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Lynda Stone, Ph.D. > Professor > Dept. Child Development > CSU Sacramento > CSUS/UC-Links Program Director > lstone@csus.edu > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Sun Sep 14 20:26:32 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 13:26:32 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> Message-ID: <54165C68.7010802@mira.net> he, he, Huw! For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to separation. I really don't know what you are referring to with product and history. Perhaps you could explain? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Huw Lloyd wrote: > I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". Reduction > to clarity is a projection or reification of the need for simplicity. > Simplicity usually entails typologies or other simplistic devices > which prevent the conception and perception of genetic relations. > Actually in cases such as these we are interested in (clarifying) the > entanglements between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally > appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to obfuscate > (see darkly) too. > > I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to > disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate the act > from its production and history? > > Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from modes > of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. > > Best, > Huw > > On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT tradition > specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, > mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every action > is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive contexts, > "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite legitimately, > but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In social > theory, for example, mediation of activities by other activities > or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by > artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is > psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I > prefer to spell it out and use the term "artefact-mediated" rather > than the vague term "mediated". > > I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a > concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to mean what > you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context of > CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of "mediation" in > the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that a > concept is not immediately present in any act of communication or > any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. Artefacts, > such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of > course mediate an act of communication. But the point is that a > word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for any one > concept. It means different things to different people. Concepts > are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their materiality, > but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept in mind > when we use a word in communication, the communication is mediated > by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be aware > of that. > > So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in qualified > way so that its specific meaning is made clear. > > Andy > PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? > > Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we would need > to include > reflexes) > > And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in > Bateson's man with > the stick? (in which case, we would need to include newborns). > > Just wonderin'. > > -greg > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner > > wrote: > > > > Thanks for replies. > I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided to stop > talking about > situated cognition because the pragmatics of adjectival > use implies there > has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now > speaks of > situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of > physical reflexes (and > perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human action > is mediated (and > perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's > worth noting that > "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of action, but > rather a > theoretical assumption about all human action; though > there seems to be > some variation in interpretation of what that assumption > entails. > David > > > > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun Sep 14 20:42:58 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Sun, 14 Sep 2014 21:42:58 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca In-Reply-To: References: <8D2C4DB1-CFE1-4A1D-8683-CE5A8551B35C@gmail.com> <6322AED9-6172-4B7C-8A08-4F0F1FE673D2@gmail.com> Message-ID: <4BDC889C-9B1B-4516-9F11-5549F0EF3003@gmail.com> Hi Greg, I'm convinced you are right. Like I say, Bakhtin just keeps popping up. The trickster? Rebelais? What is that about? Henry On Sep 14, 2014, at 8:49 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > One reason I mention him is because of resonances with ideas. > But I also mention him as a kind of trickster figure as well as a student > of the trickster in writing (his dissertation was on Rabelais). > I also mention him as a writer who seems authentically engaged with > meaningful/emotive aspects of human existence (e.g., Toward a Philosophy of > the Act, and Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity). > And finally, I mention Bakhtin because I'm still not convinced that the > deep treasures of Bakhtin's work has yet been mined out. > -greg > > > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 8:13 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: > >> Greg, >> Thank you for you good words and great question. I knew about Bakhtin, but >> have been finding him everywhere in the articles and chat of XMCA over the >> last week. Seriously. >> Henry >> >> On Sep 13, 2014, at 2:26 PM, Greg Thompson >> wrote: >> >>> I would hope that a certain amount of irreverence would be dear to most >>> people on this list! >>> But seriously Henry, have you come across Bakhtin's work at all? >>> Seems like another that you might want to throw in with the crowd of >>> healthy irreverents. >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 2:48 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III >> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Mike and David, >>>> This is seriously getting to be a club that I, like Groucho, won't >> join, >>>> if it takes me as a member. I think all of this seriously evokes Andy's >>>> contention, in his notes for the upcoming presentation at the ISCAR >>>> conference (which XMCA has gotten) that, "Adults can grasp true >> concepts, >>>> and can change society, and a social theory has to treat adults as >> adults, >>>> and this is what the projects approach allows us to do. " If "adult" >> means >>>> the same as "serious", you can see why I have my doubts about joining >> the >>>> Unserious Scholar Club. On the other hand, if I can have some fun, as in >>>> the laughing warrior (forget gender stereotypes here, and dare me to >> talk >>>> about Jihad), then that's what I'm talking about. Incidentally, I loved >>>> Andy's notes. I could so relate it to CG. The emergent character of >> project >>>> realization he talks about applies very well to discourse, as you can >> see >>>> in the articles by Langacker I have sent out. Discourse IS a project and >>>> its outcome is typically not entirely clear in the minds of the >>>> interactants as they negotiate its waters. XMCA, of which this email is >> a >>>> "turn", is a prototypical "work in progress", as Andy puts it, since we >>>> clearly don't know where this will all end up. But I hope it can be fun >>>> along the way. >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sep 6, 2014, at 1:51 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Henry-- There goes my pile of books that need to be read before bed >>>> time! >>>>> Spinoza goes up there right next to Dead Souls. >>>>> >>>>> However, David having already claimed the mantle of unserious scholar, >>>> and >>>>> you having made the same claim, I am afraid that I have to make >> precisely >>>>> the same claim on the unrefutable grounds that no one pays me any >> longer >>>>> for what I do so I get to be as unserious as i can seriously be! >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 12:33 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>> All I can say now is that Spinoza is famously quoted as having said, >>>> "The >>>>>> more clearly you understand yourself and your emotions, the more you >>>> become >>>>>> a lover of what is." This quote happens to appear in the introduction >>>> to a >>>>>> very popular self help book, Loving What Is, by Byron Katie (2002). I >>>>>> bought the book , obviously, because I thought I needed help. It did, >>>> but >>>>>> it also introduced me to Spinoza. And that has been a deeper "help". >> So, >>>>>> from a personal perspective, I can totally understand how Spinoza and >>>>>> periizhvanie would be connected. For all of you ESL teachers out >> there, >>>> who >>>>>> doesn't remember Krashen on the "affective filter" and I have been >>>> seeing a >>>>>> lot on character and education lately. Oh yes, and how failing is >>>> important >>>>>> to eventual success. Teasing out issues in the education of >>>>>> non-mainstreamers, and recognizing how the current system is toxic for >>>>>> everyone, I think Spinoza's analysis and the narrative of his life are >>>>>> powerful. Vygotsky hits me the same way. Cantor, the mathematician, >> and >>>>>> Pierce, the philosopher/logician/semiotician, also constantly come up >>>> for >>>>>> me. They were ridiculed by the received cognoscenti of the time, so >>>> much so >>>>>> that the suffered mental breakdowns. But they pushed on to develop >>>> tools in >>>>>> math and semiotics that seem to me are complementary with Vygotsky. >>>> Again I >>>>>> get to take the role of unserious scholar here, so think of my >> thoughts >>>> as >>>>>> gaming on line and don't take the game too seriously. >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sep 5, 2014, at 6:42 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi David and Henry-- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David-- I was intrigued by your comment that Spinoza is a >> controversial >>>>>>> topic on xmca. I googled Spinoza on the main web page and came up >> with >>>> 4K >>>>>>> plus hits (!!). My own impression is that few on this list, me >>>> included, >>>>>>> have engaged in serious study of Spinoza let alone the imprint of >>>> Spinoza >>>>>>> on Vygotsky. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What is the nature of the controversy? What is at stake? The topic is >>>> of >>>>>>> particular interest to me at present because I have been part of >>>>>>> discussions with people who are focused on Vygotsky's use of >>>> perezhivanie >>>>>>> in his later work, where the relation of emotion and cognition is a >>>>>> central >>>>>>> concern and Spinoza is clearly relevant. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Henry and anyone interested in chasing down what has been written >> about >>>>>>> various topics in xmca chatter, take advantage of the nice google >>>> search >>>>>> at >>>>>>> lchc.ucsd.edu. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (who enmeshed in the sense/meaning distinction in all of its >>>> multilingual >>>>>>> confusifications at present) >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Mon Sep 15 00:21:25 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 07:21:25 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <54165C68.7010802@mira.net> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> <54165C68.7010802@mira.net> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102224B10@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Clarification is absolutely necessary for communication at a distance as Vygotsky pointed out when he said that experience must be greatly simplified before it can be represented in word mediated concepts but engaged communication is much fuzzier - most of what we know about the people we know (as persons rather than through their publications!) is not easily accessible to conscious elaboration (tacit knowledge). But then again most of what we know about a particular concept may also be tacit knowledge (a vague sense of how others feel about this concept, who might be excited about it, who is likely to know and care about it, who may be outraged by it, who has used or misused it in the past, etc.). There is always a risk that simplification aims to strip away this social sense which hangs around concepts in different ways for each of us. Like pinning a butterfly to a board, it makes things easier to observe but it may remove what makes those things interesting (the body and vitality which Vygotsky argued was brought to scientific concepts by their connection with spontaneous, bodily experienced 'concepts'). Rather than thinking in black and white terms of clarity and obfuscation (chiaroscuro) we should perhaps consider where clarity is useful and where it is more appropriate to accept and value fuzziness. Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: 15 September 2014 04:27 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception he, he, Huw! For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to separation. I really don't know what you are referring to with product and history. Perhaps you could explain? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Huw Lloyd wrote: > I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". Reduction > to clarity is a projection or reification of the need for simplicity. > Simplicity usually entails typologies or other simplistic devices > which prevent the conception and perception of genetic relations. > Actually in cases such as these we are interested in (clarifying) the > entanglements between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally > appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to obfuscate > (see darkly) too. > > I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to > disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate the act > from its production and history? > > Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from modes > of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. > > Best, > Huw > > On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT tradition > specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, > mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every action > is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive contexts, > "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite legitimately, > but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In social > theory, for example, mediation of activities by other activities > or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by > artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is > psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I > prefer to spell it out and use the term "artefact-mediated" rather > than the vague term "mediated". > > I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a > concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to mean what > you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context of > CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of "mediation" in > the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that a > concept is not immediately present in any act of communication or > any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. Artefacts, > such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of > course mediate an act of communication. But the point is that a > word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for any one > concept. It means different things to different people. Concepts > are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their materiality, > but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept in mind > when we use a word in communication, the communication is mediated > by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be aware > of that. > > So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in qualified > way so that its specific meaning is made clear. > > Andy > PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? > > Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we would need > to include > reflexes) > > And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in > Bateson's man with > the stick? (in which case, we would need to include newborns). > > Just wonderin'. > > -greg > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner > > wrote: > > > > Thanks for replies. > I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided to stop > talking about > situated cognition because the pragmatics of adjectival > use implies there > has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now > speaks of > situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of > physical reflexes (and > perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human action > is mediated (and > perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's > worth noting that > "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of action, but > rather a > theoretical assumption about all human action; though > there seems to be > some variation in interpretation of what that assumption > entails. > David > > > > > > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Mon Sep 15 00:44:45 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 07:44:45 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102224B10@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> <54165C68.7010802@mira.net>, <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102224B10@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102224B74@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> I meant also to add that we should not look for clarity in words or texts, rather in communication BETWEEN authors/speakers and readers/listeners. We are constantly being asked to make task specifications, assessment criteria and feedback clearer but this surely depends on a dialogue with students. Every 'clarification' introduces new nooks and crannies where different interpretations can slip in! Rod Sent from my Windows Phone ________________________________ From: Rod Parker-Rees Sent: 15/09/2014 08:22 To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Clarification is absolutely necessary for communication at a distance as Vygotsky pointed out when he said that experience must be greatly simplified before it can be represented in word mediated concepts but engaged communication is much fuzzier - most of what we know about the people we know (as persons rather than through their publications!) is not easily accessible to conscious elaboration (tacit knowledge). But then again most of what we know about a particular concept may also be tacit knowledge (a vague sense of how others feel about this concept, who might be excited about it, who is likely to know and care about it, who may be outraged by it, who has used or misused it in the past, etc.). There is always a risk that simplification aims to strip away this social sense which hangs around concepts in different ways for each of us. Like pinning a butterfly to a board, it makes things easier to observe but it may remove what makes those things interesting (the body and vitality which Vygotsky argued was brought to scientific concepts by their connection with spontaneous, bodily experienced 'concepts'). Rather than thinking in black and white terms of clarity and obfuscation (chiaroscuro) we should perhaps consider where clarity is useful and where it is more appropriate to accept and value fuzziness. Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: 15 September 2014 04:27 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception he, he, Huw! For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to separation. I really don't know what you are referring to with product and history. Perhaps you could explain? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Huw Lloyd wrote: > I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". Reduction > to clarity is a projection or reification of the need for simplicity. > Simplicity usually entails typologies or other simplistic devices > which prevent the conception and perception of genetic relations. > Actually in cases such as these we are interested in (clarifying) the > entanglements between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally > appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to obfuscate > (see darkly) too. > > I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to > disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate the act > from its production and history? > > Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from modes > of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. > > Best, > Huw > > On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT tradition > specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, > mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every action > is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive contexts, > "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite legitimately, > but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In social > theory, for example, mediation of activities by other activities > or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by > artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is > psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I > prefer to spell it out and use the term "artefact-mediated" rather > than the vague term "mediated". > > I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a > concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to mean what > you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context of > CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of "mediation" in > the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that a > concept is not immediately present in any act of communication or > any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. Artefacts, > such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of > course mediate an act of communication. But the point is that a > word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for any one > concept. It means different things to different people. Concepts > are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their materiality, > but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept in mind > when we use a word in communication, the communication is mediated > by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be aware > of that. > > So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in qualified > way so that its specific meaning is made clear. > > Andy > PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? > > Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we would need > to include > reflexes) > > And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in > Bateson's man with > the stick? (in which case, we would need to include newborns). > > Just wonderin'. > > -greg > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner > > wrote: > > > > Thanks for replies. > I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided to stop > talking about > situated cognition because the pragmatics of adjectival > use implies there > has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now > speaks of > situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of > physical reflexes (and > perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human action > is mediated (and > perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's > worth noting that > "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of action, but > rather a > theoretical assumption about all human action; though > there seems to be > some variation in interpretation of what that assumption > entails. > David > > > > > > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From smago@uga.edu Mon Sep 15 03:22:08 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 10:22:08 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: two "hurricanes" in one day In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Those who are interested in mediation via religious/political framing might find this new article interesting: "False Doctrine" and the Stifling Of Indigenous Political Will Four Arrows Fielding Graduate University Home > Vol 5, No 13 (2014) > Four Arrows Abstract I hypothesis that there is a correlation between the failure of Indigenous politics to achieve its goals and the sway of what Thomas Paine refers to as the false doctrine of Christian dogma. Unremitting evangelism and Christian hegemony has led to silencing or compromising authentic grassroots voices of too many Indigenous people. High conversion rates have weakened opportunities for resistance to colonialism and the loss of vital traditional values. (I suggest that a similar problem may relate to the failure of contemporary black politics.) It is important at this critical time for human civilization to reflect carefully on the influence of dominant worldview assumptions as relates both to the tragic problems facing Indigenous Peoples as well as to the broader consequences globally of having dismissed Indigenous understandings about the world. Overcoming the problems of religious hegemony does not require wholesale rejection. It includes possibilities for a complementary relationship between Indigenous spiritual understanding and alternative interpretations of Biblical Gospel that have existed for centuries. Moving to a different location is a simple process, though it often takes courage. One merely decides what to take and what to leave behind. What man makes, whether computers or religions, requires consumers to critically and intuitively consider both positive and negative potential outcomes. We must engage dialectically about likely universal truths and those that we invent about how best to live in flowing balance. All of us, Indigenous as well as those far removed from their Indigenous ancestors, however, can learn to again trust in the laws of Nature on which Indigenous worldviews are based. Keywords Indigenous Peoples; Religious Influences; Christianity, Thomas Paine; Political Will;Civilization Full Text: PDF [Bookmark and Share] [Creative Commons License] This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. ISSN 1920-4175 Critical Education From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Sep 15 04:37:36 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 12:37:36 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <54165C68.7010802@mira.net> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> <54165C68.7010802@mira.net> Message-ID: If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way to demonstrate this. Best, Huw On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden wrote: > he, he, Huw! > For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very problems that > need to be remedied by clarification! and I really don't think obfuscation > is ever helpful, generally being used to obscure the genesis of phenomena. > Distinction is not equal to separation. > I really don't know what you are referring to with product and history. > Perhaps you could explain? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". Reduction to >> clarity is a projection or reification of the need for simplicity. >> Simplicity usually entails typologies or other simplistic devices which >> prevent the conception and perception of genetic relations. Actually in >> cases such as these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally appropriate and >> meaning-prompting to state that one needs to obfuscate (see darkly) too. >> >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to disagree >> with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate the act from its >> production and history? >> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from modes of >> simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT tradition >> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every action >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive contexts, >> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite legitimately, >> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In social >> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other activities >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >> prefer to spell it out and use the term "artefact-mediated" rather >> than the vague term "mediated". >> >> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to mean what >> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context of >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of "mediation" in >> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that a >> concept is not immediately present in any act of communication or >> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. Artefacts, >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of >> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is that a >> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for any one >> concept. It means different things to different people. Concepts >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their materiality, >> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept in mind >> when we use a word in communication, the communication is mediated >> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be aware >> of that. >> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in qualified >> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >> >> Andy >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> Greg Thompson wrote: >> >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we would need >> to include >> reflexes) >> >> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >> Bateson's man with >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include newborns). >> >> Just wonderin'. >> >> -greg >> >> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >> > wrote: >> >> >> Thanks for replies. >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided to stop >> talking about >> situated cognition because the pragmatics of adjectival >> use implies there >> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now >> speaks of >> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >> physical reflexes (and >> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human action >> is mediated (and >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's >> worth noting that >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of action, but >> rather a >> theoretical assumption about all human action; though >> there seems to be >> some variation in interpretation of what that assumption >> entails. >> David >> >> >> >> >> >> > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Mon Sep 15 04:42:11 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 07:42:11 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: two "hurricanes" in one day Message-ID: Myself, tomlin, and showunmi make somewhat of a similar argument in the attached article. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Peter Smagorinsky
Date:09/15/2014 6:22 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity (xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu)"
Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: two "hurricanes" in one day
Those who are interested in mediation via religious/political framing might find this new article interesting: "False Doctrine" and the Stifling Of Indigenous Political Will Four Arrows Fielding Graduate University Home > Vol 5, No 13 (2014) > Four Arrows Abstract I hypothesis that there is a correlation between the failure of Indigenous politics to achieve its goals and the sway of what Thomas Paine refers to as the false doctrine of Christian dogma. Unremitting evangelism and Christian hegemony has led to silencing or compromising authentic grassroots voices of too many Indigenous people. High conversion rates have weakened opportunities for resistance to colonialism and the loss of vital traditional values. (I suggest that a similar problem may relate to the failure of contemporary black politics.) It is important at this critical time for human civilization to reflect carefully on the influence of dominant worldview assumptions as relates both to the tragic problems facing Indigenous Peoples as well as to the broader consequences globally of having dismissed Indigenous understandings about the world. Overcoming the problems of religious hegemony does not require wholesale rejection. It includes possibilities for a complementary relationship between Indigenous spiritual understanding and alternative interpretations of Biblical Gospel that have existed for centuries. Moving to a different location is a simple process, though it often takes courage. One merely decides what to take and what to leave behind. What man makes, whether computers or religions, requires consumers to critically and intuitively consider both positive and negative potential outcomes. We must engage dialectically about likely universal truths and those that we invent about how best to live in flowing balance. All of us, Indigenous as well as those far removed from their Indigenous ancestors, however, can learn to again trust in the laws of Nature on which Indigenous worldviews are based. Keywords Indigenous Peoples; Religious Influences; Christianity, Thomas Paine; Political Will;Civilization Full Text: PDF [Bookmark and Share] [Creative Commons License] This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. ISSN 1920-4175 Critical Education -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 002-article-Mocombe_et_al.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 465462 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140915/fa44c992/attachment-0001.pdf From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 15 05:02:16 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 22:02:16 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> <54165C68.7010802@mira.net> Message-ID: <5416D548.4080406@mira.net> Ah! I see! As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was born. I can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. So every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of universal artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, eh? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Huw Lloyd wrote: > If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the > history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, > assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions > become more obviously false. If one has simplified, through > "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then it may seem > correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. > > The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant > way to demonstrate this. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > he, he, Huw! > For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very > problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really > don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to > obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to > separation. > I really don't know what you are referring to with product and > history. Perhaps you could explain? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". > Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the > need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or > other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and > perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as > these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements > between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally > appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to > obfuscate (see darkly) too. > > I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to > disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate > the act from its production and history? > Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from > modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. > > Best, > Huw > > On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >> wrote: > > My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT > tradition > specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, > mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every > action > is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive > contexts, > "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite > legitimately, > but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In social > theory, for example, mediation of activities by other > activities > or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by > artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is > psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I > prefer to spell it out and use the term > "artefact-mediated" rather > than the vague term "mediated". > > I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a > concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to > mean what > you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context of > CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of > "mediation" in > the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that a > concept is not immediately present in any act of > communication or > any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. > Artefacts, > such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of > course mediate an act of communication. But the point is > that a > word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for > any one > concept. It means different things to different people. > Concepts > are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their > materiality, > but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept > in mind > when we use a word in communication, the communication is > mediated > by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be > aware > of that. > > So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in > qualified > way so that its specific meaning is made clear. > > Andy > PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? > > Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we > would need > to include > reflexes) > > And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in > Bateson's man with > the stick? (in which case, we would need to include > newborns). > > Just wonderin'. > > -greg > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner > > >> wrote: > > > Thanks for replies. > I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided > to stop > talking about > situated cognition because the pragmatics of > adjectival > use implies there > has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now > speaks of > situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of > physical reflexes (and > perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human > action > is mediated (and > perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's > worth noting that > "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of > action, but > rather a > theoretical assumption about all human action; though > there seems to be > some variation in interpretation of what that > assumption > entails. > David > > > > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Sep 15 05:08:56 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 13:08:56 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102224B74@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> <54165C68.7010802@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102224B10@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102224B74@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: That seems reasonable to me, Rod. I think in practice we make temporary simplifications in order to assist in clarification, but that we must hold in mind the complexity of what we're studying. To portray the simplified against its darker background. The need for clarification (as if everything can be simplified without consequence) seems to me to be a false pillar, along with the need for rationalisation of all judgements and the preeminence of the word to describe all circumstances. These are simple-minded pillars. But perhaps they are necessary stage on the path to a less simplified way of knowing. Perhaps the need for clarity in marking criteria is an additional mode by which grading corrupts a taught material (in addition to a dubious motive). When our political "leader" states "we have been absolutely clear ...", he is saying we have absolutely simplified. Best, Huw On 15 September 2014 08:44, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > I meant also to add that we should not look for clarity in words or texts, > rather in communication BETWEEN authors/speakers and readers/listeners. We > are constantly being asked to make task specifications, assessment criteria > and feedback clearer but this surely depends on a dialogue with students. > Every 'clarification' introduces new nooks and crannies where different > interpretations can slip in! > > Rod > > Sent from my Windows Phone > ________________________________ > From: Rod Parker-Rees > Sent: 15/09/2014 08:22 > To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > Clarification is absolutely necessary for communication at a distance as > Vygotsky pointed out when he said that experience must be greatly > simplified before it can be represented in word mediated concepts but > engaged communication is much fuzzier - most of what we know about the > people we know (as persons rather than through their publications!) is not > easily accessible to conscious elaboration (tacit knowledge). But then > again most of what we know about a particular concept may also be tacit > knowledge (a vague sense of how others feel about this concept, who might > be excited about it, who is likely to know and care about it, who may be > outraged by it, who has used or misused it in the past, etc.). There is > always a risk that simplification aims to strip away this social sense > which hangs around concepts in different ways for each of us. Like pinning > a butterfly to a board, it makes things easier to observe but it may remove > what makes those things interesting (the body and vitality which Vygotsky > argued was brought to scientific concepts by their connection with > spontaneous, bodily experienced 'concepts'). > > Rather than thinking in black and white terms of clarity and obfuscation > (chiaroscuro) we should perhaps consider where clarity is useful and where > it is more appropriate to accept and value fuzziness. > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: 15 September 2014 04:27 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > he, he, Huw! > For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very problems that > need to be remedied by clarification! and I really don't think obfuscation > is ever helpful, generally being used to obscure the genesis of phenomena. > Distinction is not equal to separation. > I really don't know what you are referring to with product and history. > Perhaps you could explain? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". Reduction > > to clarity is a projection or reification of the need for simplicity. > > Simplicity usually entails typologies or other simplistic devices > > which prevent the conception and perception of genetic relations. > > Actually in cases such as these we are interested in (clarifying) the > > entanglements between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally > > appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to obfuscate > > (see darkly) too. > > > > I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to > > disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate the act > > from its production and history? > > > > Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from modes > > of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > > My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT tradition > > specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, > > mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every action > > is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive contexts, > > "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite legitimately, > > but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In social > > theory, for example, mediation of activities by other activities > > or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by > > artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is > > psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I > > prefer to spell it out and use the term "artefact-mediated" rather > > than the vague term "mediated". > > > > I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a > > concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to mean what > > you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context of > > CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of "mediation" in > > the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that a > > concept is not immediately present in any act of communication or > > any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. Artefacts, > > such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of > > course mediate an act of communication. But the point is that a > > word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for any one > > concept. It means different things to different people. Concepts > > are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their materiality, > > but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept in mind > > when we use a word in communication, the communication is mediated > > by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be aware > > of that. > > > > So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in qualified > > way so that its specific meaning is made clear. > > > > Andy > > PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > > > Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? > > > > Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we would need > > to include > > reflexes) > > > > And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in > > Bateson's man with > > the stick? (in which case, we would need to include newborns). > > > > Just wonderin'. > > > > -greg > > > > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > Thanks for replies. > > I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided to stop > > talking about > > situated cognition because the pragmatics of adjectival > > use implies there > > has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now > > speaks of > > situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of > > physical reflexes (and > > perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human action > > is mediated (and > > perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's > > worth noting that > > "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of action, but > > rather a > > theoretical assumption about all human action; though > > there seems to be > > some variation in interpretation of what that assumption > > entails. > > David > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Mon Sep 15 05:15:35 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 08:15:35 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Message-ID: Andy, Would it be more appropriate to use heidegger ' s term, "enframing?" ?it is not that our culture produces them...i would say our cultural content "enframes" the material contents. ?I am not an idealist. ?There is an independent reality, the noumenal world, which we experience...it is so happened that our cultures and bodies prevent us from experiencing that world directly. ?Although arthur Schopenhauer appears to suggest that the self or my will belongs to the noumenal world, I would disagree with that! Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Andy Blunden
Date:09/15/2014 8:02 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: Huw Lloyd
Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Ah! I see! As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was born. I can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. So every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of universal artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, eh? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Huw Lloyd wrote: > If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the > history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, > assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions > become more obviously false. If one has simplified, through > "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then it may seem > correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. > > The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant > way to demonstrate this. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > he, he, Huw! > For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very > problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really > don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to > obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to > separation. > I really don't know what you are referring to with product and > history. Perhaps you could explain? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". > Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the > need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or > other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and > perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as > these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements > between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally > appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to > obfuscate (see darkly) too. > > I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to > disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate > the act from its production and history? > Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from > modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. > > Best, > Huw > > On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >> wrote: > > My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT > tradition > specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, > mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every > action > is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive > contexts, > "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite > legitimately, > but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In social > theory, for example, mediation of activities by other > activities > or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by > artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is > psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I > prefer to spell it out and use the term > "artefact-mediated" rather > than the vague term "mediated". > > I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a > concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to > mean what > you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context of > CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of > "mediation" in > the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that a > concept is not immediately present in any act of > communication or > any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. > Artefacts, > such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of > course mediate an act of communication. But the point is > that a > word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for > any one > concept. It means different things to different people. > Concepts > are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their > materiality, > but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept > in mind > when we use a word in communication, the communication is > mediated > by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be > aware > of that. > > So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in > qualified > way so that its specific meaning is made clear. > > Andy > PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? > > Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we > would need > to include > reflexes) > > And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in > Bateson's man with > the stick? (in which case, we would need to include > newborns). > > Just wonderin'. > > -greg > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner > > >> wrote: > > > Thanks for replies. > I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided > to stop > talking about > situated cognition because the pragmatics of > adjectival > use implies there > has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now > speaks of > situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of > physical reflexes (and > perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human > action > is mediated (and > perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's > worth noting that > "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of > action, but > rather a > theoretical assumption about all human action; though > there seems to be > some variation in interpretation of what that > assumption > entails. > David > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 15 05:20:07 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 22:20:07 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5416D977.9060406@mira.net> Fine, but "enframing" is a different concept. If one wants to view a particular problem with spectacles provided by Heidegger, enframing is a good way to go. My point is that if Vygotsky has any value, then ditching his concepts and using some other concepts which we are more comfortable with is something we ought to do knowingly and not unconsciously. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Andy, > > Would it be more appropriate to use heidegger ' s term, "enframing?" > it is not that our culture produces them...i would say our cultural > content "enframes" the material contents. I am not an idealist. > There is an independent reality, the noumenal world, which we > experience...it is so happened that our cultures and bodies prevent us > from experiencing that world directly. Although arthur Schopenhauer > appears to suggest that the self or my will belongs to the noumenal > world, I would disagree with that! > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > -------- Original message -------- > From: Andy Blunden > Date:09/15/2014 8:02 AM (GMT-05:00) > To: Huw Lloyd > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > Ah! I see! > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in > mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and > mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is > mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that > the specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions > provides an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost > if mediation in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with > artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, > I would prefer that if you were to make the point you were referring to > you used some expression other than "mediation." > > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I > like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to > use some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a > word, a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, > without exception, are products of the history and culture into which I > was born. I can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history > produce them. So every action I take is essentially cultural-historical > as well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material objects, their > physical form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So > communication as much as miscommunication takes place through everyone > interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my > actions. How can they do that? Because they too mediate their actions > with the same set of universal artefacts! So all human action is opened > to cultural and historical analysis which is as objective as any branch > of natural science. Wonderful, eh? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the > > history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, > > assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions > > become more obviously false. If one has simplified, through > > "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then it may seem > > correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. > > > > The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant > > way to demonstrate this. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > > he, he, Huw! > > For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very > > problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really > > don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to > > obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to > > separation. > > I really don't know what you are referring to with product and > > history. Perhaps you could explain? > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". > > Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the > > need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or > > other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and > > perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as > > these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements > > between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally > > appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to > > obfuscate (see darkly) too. > > > > I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to > > disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate > > the act from its production and history? > > Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from > > modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > > > My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT > > tradition > > specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, > > mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every > > action > > is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive > > contexts, > > "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite > > legitimately, > > but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In > social > > theory, for example, mediation of activities by other > > activities > > or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by > > artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the > topic is > > psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I > > prefer to spell it out and use the term > > "artefact-mediated" rather > > than the vague term "mediated". > > > > I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a > > concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to > > mean what > > you like, but I find a formulation like this in the > context of > > CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of > > "mediation" in > > the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact > that a > > concept is not immediately present in any act of > > communication or > > any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. > > Artefacts, > > such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, > can of > > course mediate an act of communication. But the point is > > that a > > word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for > > any one > > concept. It means different things to different people. > > Concepts > > are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their > > materiality, > > but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept > > in mind > > when we use a word in communication, the communication is > > mediated > > by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be > > aware > > of that. > > > > So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in > > qualified > > way so that its specific meaning is made clear. > > > > Andy > > PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > > > Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? > > > > Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we > > would need > > to include > > reflexes) > > > > And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in > > Bateson's man with > > the stick? (in which case, we would need to include > > newborns). > > > > Just wonderin'. > > > > -greg > > > > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > > Thanks for replies. > > I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided > > to stop > > talking about > > situated cognition because the pragmatics of > > adjectival > > use implies there > > has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. > He now > > speaks of > > situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of > > physical reflexes (and > > perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human > > action > > is mediated (and > > perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, > it's > > worth noting that > > "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of > > action, but > > rather a > > theoretical assumption about all human action; > though > > there seems to be > > some variation in interpretation of what that > > assumption > > entails. > > David > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Mon Sep 15 05:33:19 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 08:33:19 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Message-ID: Gotcha Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Andy Blunden
Date:09/15/2014 8:20 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Fine, but "enframing" is a different concept. If one wants to view a particular problem with spectacles provided by Heidegger, enframing is a good way to go. My point is that if Vygotsky has any value, then ditching his concepts and using some other concepts which we are more comfortable with is something we ought to do knowingly and not unconsciously. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Andy, > > Would it be more appropriate to use heidegger ' s term, "enframing?" > it is not that our culture produces them...i would say our cultural > content "enframes" the material contents. I am not an idealist. > There is an independent reality, the noumenal world, which we > experience...it is so happened that our cultures and bodies prevent us > from experiencing that world directly. Although arthur Schopenhauer > appears to suggest that the self or my will belongs to the noumenal > world, I would disagree with that! > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > -------- Original message -------- > From: Andy Blunden > Date:09/15/2014 8:02 AM (GMT-05:00) > To: Huw Lloyd > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > Ah! I see! > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in > mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and > mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is > mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that > the specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions > provides an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost > if mediation in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with > artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, > I would prefer that if you were to make the point you were referring to > you used some expression other than "mediation." > > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I > like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to > use some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a > word, a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, > without exception, are products of the history and culture into which I > was born. I can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history > produce them. So every action I take is essentially cultural-historical > as well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material objects, their > physical form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So > communication as much as miscommunication takes place through everyone > interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my > actions. How can they do that? Because they too mediate their actions > with the same set of universal artefacts! So all human action is opened > to cultural and historical analysis which is as objective as any branch > of natural science. Wonderful, eh? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the > > history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, > > assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions > > become more obviously false. If one has simplified, through > > "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then it may seem > > correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. > > > > The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant > > way to demonstrate this. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > > he, he, Huw! > > For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very > > problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really > > don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to > > obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to > > separation. > > I really don't know what you are referring to with product and > > history. Perhaps you could explain? > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". > > Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the > > need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or > > other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and > > perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as > > these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements > > between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally > > appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to > > obfuscate (see darkly) too. > > > > I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to > > disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate > > the act from its production and history? > > Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from > > modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > > > My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT > > tradition > > specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, > > mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every > > action > > is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive > > contexts, > > "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite > > legitimately, > > but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In > social > > theory, for example, mediation of activities by other > > activities > > or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by > > artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the > topic is > > psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I > > prefer to spell it out and use the term > > "artefact-mediated" rather > > than the vague term "mediated". > > > > I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a > > concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to > > mean what > > you like, but I find a formulation like this in the > context of > > CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of > > "mediation" in > > the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact > that a > > concept is not immediately present in any act of > > communication or > > any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. > > Artefacts, > > such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, > can of > > course mediate an act of communication. But the point is > > that a > > word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for > > any one > > concept. It means different things to different people. > > Concepts > > are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their > > materiality, > > but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept > > in mind > > when we use a word in communication, the communication is > > mediated > > by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be > > aware > > of that. > > > > So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in > > qualified > > way so that its specific meaning is made clear. > > > > Andy > > PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > > > Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? > > > > Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we > > would need > > to include > > reflexes) > > > > And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in > > Bateson's man with > > the stick? (in which case, we would need to include > > newborns). > > > > Just wonderin'. > > > > -greg > > > > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > > Thanks for replies. > > I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided > > to stop > > talking about > > situated cognition because the pragmatics of > > adjectival > > use implies there > > has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. > He now > > speaks of > > situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of > > physical reflexes (and > > perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human > > action > > is mediated (and > > perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, > it's > > worth noting that > > "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of > > action, but > > rather a > > theoretical assumption about all human action; > though > > there seems to be > > some variation in interpretation of what that > > assumption > > entails. > > David > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Mon Sep 15 05:39:37 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 14:39:37 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <5416D548.4080406@mira.net> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> <54165C68.7010802@mira.net> <5416D548.4080406@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi Andy, This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; - as yet potential understanding - a total lack of understanding. And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. Carol On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: > Ah! I see! > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in > mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and > mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is > mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that the > specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides > an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation > in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation > to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that if > you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression > other than "mediation." > > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I > like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to use > some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, > a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without > exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was born. I > can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. So > every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as personal. > Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the > same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as > miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same > material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they do > that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of universal > artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical > analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, > eh? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, assertions >> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more >> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action away >> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >> cannot mediate an action. >> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way >> to demonstrate this. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> he, he, Huw! >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >> separation. >> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >> history. Perhaps you could explain? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >> >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > > >> >> wrote: >> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >> tradition >> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >> action >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >> contexts, >> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >> legitimately, >> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In social >> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >> activities >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >> prefer to spell it out and use the term >> "artefact-mediated" rather >> than the vague term "mediated". >> >> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >> mean what >> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context of >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >> "mediation" in >> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that a >> concept is not immediately present in any act of >> communication or >> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >> Artefacts, >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of >> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >> that a >> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >> any one >> concept. It means different things to different people. >> Concepts >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >> materiality, >> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >> in mind >> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >> mediated >> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >> aware >> of that. >> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >> qualified >> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >> >> Andy >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >> ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> Greg Thompson wrote: >> >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >> would need >> to include >> reflexes) >> >> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >> Bateson's man with >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >> newborns). >> >> Just wonderin'. >> >> -greg >> >> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >> >> >> wrote: >> >> Thanks for replies. >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >> to stop >> talking about >> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >> adjectival >> use implies there >> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now >> speaks of >> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >> physical reflexes (and >> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >> action >> is mediated (and >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's >> worth noting that >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >> action, but >> rather a >> theoretical assumption about all human action; though >> there seems to be >> some variation in interpretation of what that >> assumption >> entails. >> David >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Mon Sep 15 06:05:00 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 09:05:00 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Message-ID: Carol, It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. ?I would agree that culture enframes them in a variety of ways. ?However, do they not, as sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated ways we encounter them? Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Hi Andy, This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; - as yet potential understanding - a total lack of understanding. And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. Carol On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: > Ah! I see! > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in > mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and > mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is > mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that the > specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides > an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation > in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation > to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that if > you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression > other than "mediation." > > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I > like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to use > some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, > a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without > exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was born. I > can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. So > every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as personal. > Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the > same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as > miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same > material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they do > that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of universal > artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical > analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, > eh? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, assertions >> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more >> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action away >> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >> cannot mediate an action. >> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way >> to demonstrate this. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> he, he, Huw! >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >> separation. >> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >> history. Perhaps you could explain? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >> >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > > >> >> wrote: >> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >> tradition >> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >> action >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >> contexts, >> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >> legitimately, >> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In social >> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >> activities >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >> prefer to spell it out and use the term >> "artefact-mediated" rather >> than the vague term "mediated". >> >> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >> mean what >> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context of >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >> "mediation" in >> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that a >> concept is not immediately present in any act of >> communication or >> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >> Artefacts, >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of >> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >> that a >> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >> any one >> concept. It means different things to different people. >> Concepts >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >> materiality, >> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >> in mind >> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >> mediated >> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >> aware >> of that. >> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >> qualified >> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >> >> Andy >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >> ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> Greg Thompson wrote: >> >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >> would need >> to include >> reflexes) >> >> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >> Bateson's man with >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >> newborns). >> >> Just wonderin'. >> >> -greg >> >> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >> >> >> wrote: >> >> Thanks for replies. >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >> to stop >> talking about >> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >> adjectival >> use implies there >> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now >> speaks of >> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >> physical reflexes (and >> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >> action >> is mediated (and >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's >> worth noting that >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >> action, but >> rather a >> theoretical assumption about all human action; though >> there seems to be >> some variation in interpretation of what that >> assumption >> entails. >> David >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From wester@uga.edu Mon Sep 15 06:31:10 2014 From: wester@uga.edu (Katherine Wester Neal) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 13:31:10 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <04EAC9D9-D4A8-4740-8D70-3DC3E025F81E@uga.edu> I'm still working through all this and trying to keep up with the discussion, so please bear with me if this is simplistic. I am wary of blanket statements, but I think it is possible to say that all action is mediated through culture. Certainly for adults, I think culture is the medium through which everyone lives their lives. (I am not so sure this is true with children of all ages, but that's a different post.) Perhaps not? Carol's examples really have me thinking this morning about what is or isn't mediated. I think even the sensation of being hungry is mediated; scads of advertising dollars are expended to make us think, at least in the U.S., that we are hungry all the time--not just for food, but also for more stuff. And in nearly every locale in the U.S., even the water is mediated: filtered by local authorities and pumped up with fluoride. That's not always true outside of the U.S., so following the "all action is culturally-mediated" statement, I would say the filtering and the fluoride are culturally-based actions that then themselves mediate how people act to fulfill a basic need. Katie Katie Wester-Neal Doctoral Candidate University of Georgia On Sep 15, 2014, at 9:07 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" wrote: Carol, It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree that culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated ways we encounter them? Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Hi Andy, This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; - as yet potential understanding - a total lack of understanding. And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. Carol > On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: > > Ah! I see! > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in > mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and > mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is > mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that the > specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides > an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation > in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation > to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that if > you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression > other than "mediation." > > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I > like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to use > some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, > a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without > exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was born. I > can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. So > every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as personal. > Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the > same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as > miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same > material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they do > that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of universal > artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical > analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, > eh? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, assertions >> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more >> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action away >> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >> cannot mediate an action. >> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way >> to demonstrate this. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> he, he, Huw! >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >> separation. >> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >> history. Perhaps you could explain? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >> >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > > >> >> wrote: >> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >> tradition >> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >> action >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >> contexts, >> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >> legitimately, >> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In social >> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >> activities >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >> prefer to spell it out and use the term >> "artefact-mediated" rather >> than the vague term "mediated". >> >> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >> mean what >> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context of >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >> "mediation" in >> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that a >> concept is not immediately present in any act of >> communication or >> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >> Artefacts, >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of >> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >> that a >> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >> any one >> concept. It means different things to different people. >> Concepts >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >> materiality, >> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >> in mind >> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >> mediated >> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >> aware >> of that. >> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >> qualified >> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >> >> Andy >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >> ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> Greg Thompson wrote: >> >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >> would need >> to include >> reflexes) >> >> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >> Bateson's man with >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >> newborns). >> >> Just wonderin'. >> >> -greg >> >> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >> >> >> wrote: >> >> Thanks for replies. >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >> to stop >> talking about >> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >> adjectival >> use implies there >> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now >> speaks of >> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >> physical reflexes (and >> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >> action >> is mediated (and >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's >> worth noting that >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >> action, but >> rather a >> theoretical assumption about all human action; though >> there seems to be >> some variation in interpretation of what that >> assumption >> entails. >> David -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 15 06:34:06 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 23:34:06 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> <54165C68.7010802@mira.net> <5416D548.4080406@mira.net> Message-ID: <5416EACE.4040505@mira.net> Carol Macdonald wrote: > Hi Andy, > > This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at > the same time purports to account for "everything". But are there > really only universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of > - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; > - as yet potential understanding > - a total lack of understanding. That's the whole point, Carol! a given material artefact has a certain *material* form which is universal, but it is subject to interpretation, that is, meaning is ascribed to it by a person, and different people at different times will ascribe different meanings to it. But the meaning of the word "material" is what is outside of consciousness and independent of activity. The independent existence of the material world is what makes science possible. > And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so > if we are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need > to take in fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be > mediated. (And of course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) > I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your > schema Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. By "unmediated sensation" I presume you mean that aspect of a sensation which is unmediated. All sensations are both immediate and mediated. This is what I take to be the core meaning of "dual-stimulation." Were you to be subject to an unmediated sensation (maybe soon after you were born) then it would have no meaning for you and would therefore be no sensation at all. But if it has a meaning, that is because of the mediation of the sensation by aspects of your consciousness. Here of course the mediation being talked of is not artefact-mediation. :) Andy > > Carol > > On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > Ah! I see! > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature > or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both > immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem with anyone > saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is > appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of Vygotsky, > that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially > productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation in > the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with > artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. > Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point you were > referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." > > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do > what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or > thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my > actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or whatever - > but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are > products of the history and culture into which I was born. I can > choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce > them. So every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as > well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material objects, > their physical form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So > communication as much as miscommunication takes place through > everyone interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I > am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too > mediate their actions with the same set of universal artefacts! So > all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis > which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, eh? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > If you want to study how action changes then you need to study > the history and production of the action. Under such > circumstances, assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the > production of) actions become more obviously false. If one > has simplified, through "clarity", the action away from its > genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept > cannot mediate an action. > > The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an > elegant way to demonstrate this. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >> wrote: > > he, he, Huw! > For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very > problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I > really > don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being > used to > obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to > separation. > I really don't know what you are referring to with product and > history. Perhaps you could explain? > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > I agree about precision, but not with a call for > "clarity". Reduction to clarity is a projection or > reification of the > need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails > typologies or > other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and > perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases > such as > these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements > between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally > appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one > needs to > obfuscate (see darkly) too. > > I think it is this "need for simplification" which > leads me to > disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why > separate > the act from its production and history? Of > course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from > modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. > > Best, > Huw > > On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > > > > > > >>> wrote: > > My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT > tradition > specifically, as opposed to the English language > in general, > mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of > course, every > action > is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive > contexts, > "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite > legitimately, > but with no special significant for the use of > CHAT. In social > theory, for example, mediation of activities by other > activities > or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of > actions by > artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if > the topic is > psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so > central, that I > prefer to spell it out and use the term > "artefact-mediated" rather > than the vague term "mediated". > > I have come across usages like "mediated by > such-and-such a > concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use > words to > mean what > you like, but I find a formulation like this in > the context of > CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of > "mediation" in > the most general sense in a way which obscures the > fact that a > concept is not immediately present in any act of > communication or > any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. > Artefacts, > such as spoken words, which may be signs for a > concept, can of > course mediate an act of communication. But the > point is > that a > word is not universally and unproblematically a > sign for > any one > concept. It means different things to different > people. > Concepts > are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their > materiality, > but particular in their meaning. So when we have a > concept > in mind > when we use a word in communication, the > communication is > mediated > by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake > not to be > aware > of that. > > So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always > used in > qualified > way so that its specific meaning is made clear. > > Andy > PS. And David Ki is completely right in his > comment, too. > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > Does "mediation" only apply to language and > culture? > > Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we > would need > to include > reflexes) > > And does it include our socio-contextual > surround as in > Bateson's man with > the stick? (in which case, we would need to > include > newborns). > > Just wonderin'. > > -greg > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner > > > > > >>> wrote: > > Thanks for replies. > I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno > decided > to stop > talking about > situated cognition because the pragmatics of > adjectival > use implies there > has to be a contrasting non-situated > cognition. He now > speaks of > situativity theory. It seems, with the > exception of > physical reflexes (and > perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), > all human > action > is mediated (and > perhaps a lot of non-human action, as > well). So, it's > worth noting that > "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of > action, but > rather a > theoretical assumption about all human > action; though > there seems to be > some variation in interpretation of what that > assumption > entails. > David > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 15 06:37:08 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 23:37:08 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <04EAC9D9-D4A8-4740-8D70-3DC3E025F81E@uga.edu> References: <04EAC9D9-D4A8-4740-8D70-3DC3E025F81E@uga.edu> Message-ID: <5416EB84.6080902@mira.net> Sure Kate, "all action is mediated through culture," but that is not only a very general statement which is kind of bound to be true, but what is culture? Is the concept of culture something clearer and more definite and basic that the concept of "action"? How does it help us to know that "culture" is mediating all our actions? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > I'm still working through all this and trying to keep up with the discussion, so please bear with me if this is simplistic. I am wary of blanket statements, but I think it is possible to say that all action is mediated through culture. Certainly for adults, I think culture is the medium through which everyone lives their lives. (I am not so sure this is true with children of all ages, but that's a different post.) Perhaps not? > > Carol's examples really have me thinking this morning about what is or isn't mediated. I think even the sensation of being hungry is mediated; scads of advertising dollars are expended to make us think, at least in the U.S., that we are hungry all the time--not just for food, but also for more stuff. And in nearly every locale in the U.S., even the water is mediated: filtered by local authorities and pumped up with fluoride. That's not always true outside of the U.S., so following the "all action is culturally-mediated" statement, I would say the filtering and the fluoride are culturally-based actions that then themselves mediate how people act to fulfill a basic need. > > Katie > > Katie Wester-Neal > Doctoral Candidate > University of Georgia > > > On Sep 15, 2014, at 9:07 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" wrote: > > Carol, > > It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree that culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated ways we encounter them? > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>
Hi Andy, > > This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the > same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only > universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of > - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; > - as yet potential understanding > - a total lack of understanding. > And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we > are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in > fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of > course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) > I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema > Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. > > Carol > > >> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Ah! I see! >> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in >> mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and >> mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is >> mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that the >> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides >> an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation >> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation >> to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that if >> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression >> other than "mediation." >> >> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I >> like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to use >> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, >> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without >> exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was born. I >> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. So >> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as personal. >> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the >> same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as >> miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same >> material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they do >> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of universal >> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical >> analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, >> eh? >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> >>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >>> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, assertions >>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more >>> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action away >>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >>> cannot mediate an action. >>> >>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way >>> to demonstrate this. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>> >>> he, he, Huw! >>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >>> separation. >>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> ------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> >>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>> >>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >> >> >>> >> wrote: >>> >>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>> tradition >>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>> action >>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>> contexts, >>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>> legitimately, >>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In social >>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>> activities >>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is >>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>> than the vague term "mediated". >>> >>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>> mean what >>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context of >>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>> "mediation" in >>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that a >>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>> communication or >>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>> Artefacts, >>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of >>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>> that a >>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>> any one >>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>> Concepts >>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>> materiality, >>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>> in mind >>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>> mediated >>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>> aware >>> of that. >>> >>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>> qualified >>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>> >>> Andy >>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>> ------------------------------ >>> ------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>> >>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>> >>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>> would need >>> to include >>> reflexes) >>> >>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>> Bateson's man with >>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>> newborns). >>> >>> Just wonderin'. >>> >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>> >>> >> wrote: >>> >>> Thanks for replies. >>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>> to stop >>> talking about >>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>> adjectival >>> use implies there >>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now >>> speaks of >>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>> physical reflexes (and >>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>> action >>> is mediated (and >>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's >>> worth noting that >>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>> action, but >>> rather a >>> theoretical assumption about all human action; though >>> there seems to be >>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>> assumption >>> entails. >>> David >>> > > > From dkirsh@lsu.edu Mon Sep 15 07:08:35 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 14:08:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] CHAT Discourse Message-ID: Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it seems inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing efforts to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from efforts to solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In tandem, is ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or philosophical discourse. I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of CHAT would not be better served by embedding theoretical discussion in analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be to make CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application (though that would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation might transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated into distinct psychological schools, each constrained by methodological strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community could look across these various schools to pursue broader philosophical problematics. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM To: Huw Lloyd Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Ah! I see! As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was born. I can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. So every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of universal artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, eh? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Huw Lloyd wrote: > If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the > history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, > assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions > become more obviously false. If one has simplified, through > "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then it may seem > correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. > > The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant > way to demonstrate this. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > he, he, Huw! > For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very > problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really > don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to > obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to > separation. > I really don't know what you are referring to with product and > history. Perhaps you could explain? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". > Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the > need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or > other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and > perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as > these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements > between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally > appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to > obfuscate (see darkly) too. > > I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to > disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate > the act from its production and history? > Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from > modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. > > Best, > Huw > > On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >> wrote: > > My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT > tradition > specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, > mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every > action > is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive > contexts, > "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite > legitimately, > but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In social > theory, for example, mediation of activities by other > activities > or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by > artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is > psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I > prefer to spell it out and use the term > "artefact-mediated" rather > than the vague term "mediated". > > I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a > concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to > mean what > you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context of > CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of > "mediation" in > the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that a > concept is not immediately present in any act of > communication or > any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. > Artefacts, > such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of > course mediate an act of communication. But the point is > that a > word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for > any one > concept. It means different things to different people. > Concepts > are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their > materiality, > but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept > in mind > when we use a word in communication, the communication is > mediated > by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be > aware > of that. > > So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in > qualified > way so that its specific meaning is made clear. > > Andy > PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? > > Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we > would need > to include > reflexes) > > And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in > Bateson's man with > the stick? (in which case, we would need to include > newborns). > > Just wonderin'. > > -greg > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner > > >> wrote: > > > Thanks for replies. > I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided > to stop > talking about > situated cognition because the pragmatics of > adjectival > use implies there > has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now > speaks of > situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of > physical reflexes (and > perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human > action > is mediated (and > perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's > worth noting that > "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of > action, but > rather a > theoretical assumption about all human action; though > there seems to be > some variation in interpretation of what that > assumption > entails. > David > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 15 07:24:08 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 00:24:08 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> David, CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science it must strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which they are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a system of concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental finding, but still not agree on the significance of that claim. We CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over facts; all of this is possible only to the extent that we share concepts. "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal as it is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is ill-conceived to think that this is a means of consolidating a current of research like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological, I don't think that makes any difference. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David H Kirshner wrote: > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it seems inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing efforts to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from efforts to solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In tandem, is ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or philosophical discourse. > > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of CHAT would not be better served by embedding theoretical discussion in analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be to make CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application (though that would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation might transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated into distinct psychological schools, each constrained by methodological strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community could look across these various schools to pursue broader philosophical problematics. > > David > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM > To: Huw Lloyd > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > Ah! I see! > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." > > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was born. I can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. So every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of universal artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, eh? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions >> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, through >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then it may seem >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. >> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant >> way to demonstrate this. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> he, he, Huw! >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >> separation. >> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >> history. Perhaps you could explain? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >> >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >> the act from its production and history? >> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: >> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >> tradition >> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >> action >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >> contexts, >> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >> legitimately, >> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In social >> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >> activities >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >> prefer to spell it out and use the term >> "artefact-mediated" rather >> than the vague term "mediated". >> >> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >> mean what >> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context of >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >> "mediation" in >> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that a >> concept is not immediately present in any act of >> communication or >> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >> Artefacts, >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of >> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >> that a >> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >> any one >> concept. It means different things to different people. >> Concepts >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >> materiality, >> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >> in mind >> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >> mediated >> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >> aware >> of that. >> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >> qualified >> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >> >> Andy >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> Greg Thompson wrote: >> >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >> would need >> to include >> reflexes) >> >> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >> Bateson's man with >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >> newborns). >> >> Just wonderin'. >> >> -greg >> >> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >> >> >> wrote: >> >> >> Thanks for replies. >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >> to stop >> talking about >> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >> adjectival >> use implies there >> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now >> speaks of >> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >> physical reflexes (and >> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >> action >> is mediated (and >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's >> worth noting that >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >> action, but >> rather a >> theoretical assumption about all human action; though >> there seems to be >> some variation in interpretation of what that >> assumption >> entails. >> David >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > From lisayl@utk.edu Mon Sep 15 07:38:19 2014 From: lisayl@utk.edu (Lisa Yamagata-Lynch) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 10:38:19 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, Out of curiosity, what do you mean by a "scientific project?" Do you mean a systematic process of observing and analyzing various data to come to some kind of understanding of how things work, do you mean somehow be able to understand what is believed to be most likely a true representation of how things work, both, or something else? Maybe I am not clear as I am thinking aloud, I am hung up with what do you mean part. Is it the process, representation, both or something else? Lisa YL Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational Psychology and Counseling http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey Education Complex IT Online Program Coordinator University of Tennessee http://itonline.utk.edu/ Knoxville, TN 37996 https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: 865-974-7712 On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:24 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > David, > CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science it must strive to > produce empirically verifiable claims which are meaningful irrespective of > the conceptual frame into which they are accepted. But as a project it is > characterised by a system of concepts. People can agree on this or that > hard experimental finding, but still not agree on the significance of that > claim. We CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over facts; > all of this is possible only to the extent that we share concepts. > "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal as it is to lay > out some agreed facts, I think it is ill-conceived to think that this is a > means of consolidating a current of research like CHAT. You can call it > philosophical or psychological, I don't think that makes any difference. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > David H Kirshner wrote: > >> Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it seems inherently >> a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing efforts to elaborate >> Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from efforts to solve the problems >> Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In tandem, is ambiguity as to whether >> CHAT is a psychological or philosophical discourse. >> >> I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of CHAT would not >> be better served by embedding theoretical discussion in analysis of >> empirical data. The point, here, would not be to make CHAT more directly >> relevant to domains of application (though that would not be a bad thing). >> Rather, an empirical obligation might transmute (some) questions of theory >> into questions of methodology. In that way, CHAT could become >> differentiated into distinct psychological schools, each constrained by >> methodological strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical >> environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community could look across >> these various schools to pursue broader philosophical problematics. >> >> David >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@ >> mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM >> To: Huw Lloyd >> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >> >> Ah! I see! >> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in >> mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and >> mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is >> mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that the >> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides >> an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation >> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation >> to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that if >> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression >> other than "mediation." >> >> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I >> like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to use >> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, >> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without >> exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was born. I >> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. So >> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as personal. >> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the >> same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as >> miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same >> material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they do >> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of universal >> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical >> analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, >> eh? >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> >>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >>> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, assertions >>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more >>> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action away >>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >>> cannot mediate an action. >>> >>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way >>> to demonstrate this. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>> >>> he, he, Huw! >>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >>> separation. >>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> ------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> >>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>> >>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >> >> >> wrote: >>> >>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>> tradition >>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>> action >>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>> contexts, >>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>> legitimately, >>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>> social >>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>> activities >>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is >>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>> than the vague term "mediated". >>> >>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>> mean what >>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context >>> of >>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>> "mediation" in >>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that >>> a >>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>> communication or >>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>> Artefacts, >>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can >>> of >>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>> that a >>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>> any one >>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>> Concepts >>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>> materiality, >>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>> in mind >>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>> mediated >>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>> aware >>> of that. >>> >>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>> qualified >>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>> >>> Andy >>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>> ------------------------------ >>> ------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>> >>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>> >>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>> would need >>> to include >>> reflexes) >>> >>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>> Bateson's man with >>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>> newborns). >>> >>> Just wonderin'. >>> >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>> >>> >> wrote: >>> >>> Thanks for replies. >>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>> to stop >>> talking about >>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>> adjectival >>> use implies there >>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He >>> now >>> speaks of >>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>> physical reflexes (and >>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>> action >>> is mediated (and >>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's >>> worth noting that >>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>> action, but >>> rather a >>> theoretical assumption about all human action; though >>> there seems to be >>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>> assumption >>> entails. >>> David >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 15 07:47:14 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 00:47:14 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> Message-ID: <5416FBF2.30004@mira.net> "Project" is a key concept for me. It means "an activity" if you're an Activity Theorist. It is meant to be a very general term. By "scientific project" I mean it is part of a larger project called "Science." It is not up to you or me to define "science", this is a project which has been going on for about 400 years in its modern form and more than 2000 years since it first got started. It has its own system of concepts, including its various, contested self-definitions. These are objective, inasmuch as your question has to be answered by studying the concepts by means of which science organises itself. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > Andy, > > Out of curiosity, what do you mean by a "scientific project?" Do you > mean a systematic process of observing and analyzing various data to > come to some kind of understanding of how things work, do you mean > somehow be able to understand what is believed to be most likely a > true representation of how things work, both, or something else? Maybe > I am not clear as I am thinking aloud, I am hung up with what do you > mean part. Is it the process, representation, both or something else? > > Lisa YL > > Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > Psychology and Counseling > http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey > Education Complex > IT Online Program Coordinator University > of Tennessee > http://itonline.utk.edu/ > Knoxville, TN 37996 > https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > 865-974-7712 > > On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:24 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > David, > CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science it must > strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are > meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which they > are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a system of > concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental > finding, but still not agree on the significance of that claim. We > CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over facts; > all of this is possible only to the extent that we share concepts. > "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal as it > is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is ill-conceived to > think that this is a means of consolidating a current of research > like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological, I don't > think that makes any difference. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > David H Kirshner wrote: > > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it seems > inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing > efforts to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from > efforts to solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de > novo. In tandem, is ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a > psychological or philosophical discourse. > > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of CHAT > would not be better served by embedding theoretical discussion > in analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be > to make CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application > (though that would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical > obligation might transmute (some) questions of theory into > questions of methodology. In that way, CHAT could become > differentiated into distinct psychological schools, each > constrained by methodological strictures that also support a > more homogeneous theoretical environment. At the same time, a > wide-open CHAT community could look across these various > schools to pursue broader philosophical problematics. > > David > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] On Behalf Of Andy > Blunden > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM > To: Huw Lloyd > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > Ah! I see! > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in > nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally > contain both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem > with anyone saying that anything is mediated by anything else, > where it is appropriate. My problem is that the specific > insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions > provides an especially productive unit of analysis for science > is lost if mediation in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT > literature with artefact-mediation to the point that > artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that if you > were to make the point you were referring to you used some > expression other than "mediation." > > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do > what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or > thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my > actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or whatever > - but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are > products of the history and culture into which I was born. I > can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history > produce them. So every action I take is essentially > cultural-historical as well as personal. Also, because > artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the > same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much > as miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting > the same material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my > actions. How can they do that? Because they too mediate their > actions with the same set of universal artefacts! So all human > action is opened to cultural and historical analysis which is > as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, eh? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > If you want to study how action changes then you need to > study the history and production of the action. Under > such circumstances, assertions that concepts cannot > mediate (the production of) actions become more obviously > false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the > action away from its genetic base then it may seem correct > to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. > > The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are > an elegant way to demonstrate this. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > he, he, Huw! > For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the > very > problems that need to be remedied by clarification! > and I really > don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally > being used to > obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not > equal to > separation. > I really don't know what you are referring to with > product and > history. Perhaps you could explain? > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > I agree about precision, but not with a call for > "clarity". Reduction to clarity is a projection or > reification of the > need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails > typologies or > other simplistic devices which prevent the > conception and > perception of genetic relations. Actually in > cases such as > these we are interested in (clarifying) the > entanglements > between artefacts and mind. I think It would be > equally > appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that > one needs to > obfuscate (see darkly) too. > > I think it is this "need for simplification" which > leads me to > disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why > separate > the act from its production and history? > Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity > from > modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the > problem. > > Best, > Huw > > On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > > > > >>> wrote: > > My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in > the CHAT > tradition > specifically, as opposed to the English > language in general, > mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of > course, every > action > is both mediated and immediate, and in many > discursive > contexts, > "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite > legitimately, > but with no special significant for the use of > CHAT. In social > theory, for example, mediation of activities > by other > activities > or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation > of actions by > artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But > if the topic is > psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so > central, that I > prefer to spell it out and use the term > "artefact-mediated" rather > than the vague term "mediated". > > I have come across usages like "mediated by > such-and-such a > concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use > words to > mean what > you like, but I find a formulation like this > in the context of > CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of > "mediation" in > the most general sense in a way which obscures > the fact that a > concept is not immediately present in any act of > communication or > any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate > actions*. > Artefacts, > such as spoken words, which may be signs for a > concept, can of > course mediate an act of communication. But > the point is > that a > word is not universally and unproblematically > a sign for > any one > concept. It means different things to > different people. > Concepts > are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in > their > materiality, > but particular in their meaning. So when we > have a concept > in mind > when we use a word in communication, the > communication is > mediated > by the word not the concept, and it is a > mistake not to be > aware > of that. > > So I would prefer it if "mediation" were > always used in > qualified > way so that its specific meaning is made clear. > > Andy > PS. And David Ki is completely right in his > comment, too. > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > Does "mediation" only apply to language > and culture? > > Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which > case we > would need > to include > reflexes) > > And does it include our socio-contextual > surround as in > Bateson's man with > the stick? (in which case, we would need > to include > newborns). > > Just wonderin'. > > -greg > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H > Kirshner > > > > > >>> wrote: > > Thanks for replies. > I'm recalling several years ago Jim > Greeno decided > to stop > talking about > situated cognition because the > pragmatics of > adjectival > use implies there > has to be a contrasting non-situated > cognition. He now > speaks of > situativity theory. It seems, with the > exception of > physical reflexes (and > perhaps pre-conscious infant > activity), all human > action > is mediated (and > perhaps a lot of non-human action, as > well). So, it's > worth noting that > "mediated action" doesn't specify a > kind of > action, but > rather a > theoretical assumption about all human > action; though > there seems to be > some variation in interpretation of > what that > assumption > entails. > David > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From dkirsh@lsu.edu Mon Sep 15 07:56:43 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 14:56:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> Message-ID: <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Andy, I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific project, though it might initially have been conceived as such. Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost completely detached from empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even at the level of theory, we're not all playing the same game. I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that claims be framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical setting theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In this case, there is a possibility that disagreements lead to separation of research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical agreement as a consequence. David -----Original Message----- From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net] Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM To: David H Kirshner Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse David, CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science it must strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which they are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a system of concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental finding, but still not agree on the significance of that claim. We CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over facts; all of this is possible only to the extent that we share concepts. "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal as it is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is ill-conceived to think that this is a means of consolidating a current of research like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological, I don't think that makes any difference. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David H Kirshner wrote: > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it seems inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing efforts to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from efforts to solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In tandem, is ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or philosophical discourse. > > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of CHAT would not be better served by embedding theoretical discussion in analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be to make CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application (though that would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation might transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated into distinct psychological schools, each constrained by methodological strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community could look across these various schools to pursue broader philosophical problematics. > > David > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM > To: Huw Lloyd > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > Ah! I see! > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." > > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was born. I can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. So every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of universal artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, eh? > > Andy > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions >> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, through >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then it may seem >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. >> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant >> way to demonstrate this. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> he, he, Huw! >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >> separation. >> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >> history. Perhaps you could explain? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >> >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >> the act from its production and history? >> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: >> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >> tradition >> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >> action >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >> contexts, >> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >> legitimately, >> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In social >> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >> activities >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >> prefer to spell it out and use the term >> "artefact-mediated" rather >> than the vague term "mediated". >> >> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >> mean what >> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context of >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >> "mediation" in >> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that a >> concept is not immediately present in any act of >> communication or >> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >> Artefacts, >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of >> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >> that a >> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >> any one >> concept. It means different things to different people. >> Concepts >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >> materiality, >> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >> in mind >> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >> mediated >> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >> aware >> of that. >> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >> qualified >> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >> >> Andy >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> Greg Thompson wrote: >> >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >> would need >> to include >> reflexes) >> >> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >> Bateson's man with >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >> newborns). >> >> Just wonderin'. >> >> -greg >> >> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >> >> >> wrote: >> >> >> Thanks for replies. >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >> to stop >> talking about >> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >> adjectival >> use implies there >> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now >> speaks of >> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >> physical reflexes (and >> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >> action >> is mediated (and >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's >> worth noting that >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >> action, but >> rather a >> theoretical assumption about all human action; though >> there seems to be >> some variation in interpretation of what that >> assumption >> entails. >> David >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 15 08:00:00 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 01:00:00 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <5416FEF0.8010706@mira.net> :) I think you exaggerate, David, but I have to agree - the situation is dire if we want to be a science rather than a cocktail party. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David H Kirshner wrote: > Andy, > > I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific project, though it might initially have been conceived as such. > Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost completely detached from empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even at the level of theory, we're not all playing the same game. > > I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that claims be framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical setting theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In this case, there is a possibility that disagreements lead to separation of research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical agreement as a consequence. > > David > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net] > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM > To: David H Kirshner > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse > > David, > CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science it must strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which they are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a system of concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental finding, but still not agree on the significance of that claim. We CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over facts; all of this is possible only to the extent that we share concepts. > "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal as it is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is ill-conceived to think that this is a means of consolidating a current of research like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological, I don't think that makes any difference. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > David H Kirshner wrote: > >> Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it seems inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing efforts to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from efforts to solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In tandem, is ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or philosophical discourse. >> >> I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of CHAT would not be better served by embedding theoretical discussion in analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be to make CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application (though that would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation might transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated into distinct psychological schools, each constrained by methodological strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community could look across these various schools to pursue broader philosophical problematics. >> >> David >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM >> To: Huw Lloyd >> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >> >> Ah! I see! >> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." >> >> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was born. I can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. So every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of universal artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, eh? >> >> Andy >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> >>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >>> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, >>> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions >>> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, through >>> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then it may seem >>> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. >>> >>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant >>> way to demonstrate this. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >>> >>> he, he, Huw! >>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >>> separation. >>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> >>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>> >>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>> the act from its production and history? >>> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >> >> >> wrote: >>> >>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>> tradition >>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>> action >>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>> contexts, >>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>> legitimately, >>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In social >>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>> activities >>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is >>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>> than the vague term "mediated". >>> >>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>> mean what >>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context of >>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>> "mediation" in >>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that a >>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>> communication or >>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>> Artefacts, >>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of >>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>> that a >>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>> any one >>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>> Concepts >>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>> materiality, >>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>> in mind >>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>> mediated >>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>> aware >>> of that. >>> >>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>> qualified >>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>> >>> Andy >>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>> >>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>> >>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>> would need >>> to include >>> reflexes) >>> >>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>> Bateson's man with >>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>> newborns). >>> >>> Just wonderin'. >>> >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>> >>> >> wrote: >>> >>> >>> Thanks for replies. >>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>> to stop >>> talking about >>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>> adjectival >>> use implies there >>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now >>> speaks of >>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>> physical reflexes (and >>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>> action >>> is mediated (and >>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's >>> worth noting that >>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>> action, but >>> rather a >>> theoretical assumption about all human action; though >>> there seems to be >>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>> assumption >>> entails. >>> David >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Mon Sep 15 08:04:23 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 15:04:23 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net>, <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034A62@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Hi David, What do you mean by empirical? Are you using it in the realist sense, adopted by positivists suggesting that there are actual facts out there in the universe we can know and use as pre-determined tools to predict outcomes? Or do you mean it in a more Pragmatic sense in which you judge a problem solving process solely based on whether it provided a solution to your problem? Many times these can be in conflict - what happens when our positive facts don't lead to the intended outcome? Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of David H Kirshner [dkirsh@lsu.edu] Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 10:56 AM To: ablunden@mira.net Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse Andy, I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific project, though it might initially have been conceived as such. Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost completely detached from empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even at the level of theory, we're not all playing the same game. I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that claims be framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical setting theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In this case, there is a possibility that disagreements lead to separation of research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical agreement as a consequence. David -----Original Message----- From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net] Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM To: David H Kirshner Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse David, CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science it must strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which they are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a system of concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental finding, but still not agree on the significance of that claim. We CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over facts; all of this is possible only to the extent that we share concepts. "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal as it is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is ill-conceived to think that this is a means of consolidating a current of research like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological, I don't think that makes any difference. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David H Kirshner wrote: > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it seems inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing efforts to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from efforts to solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In tandem, is ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or philosophical discourse. > > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of CHAT would not be better served by embedding theoretical discussion in analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be to make CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application (though that would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation might transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated into distinct psychological schools, each constrained by methodological strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community could look across these various schools to pursue broader philosophical problematics. > > David > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM > To: Huw Lloyd > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > Ah! I see! > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." > > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was born. I can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. So every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of universal artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, eh? > > Andy > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions >> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, through >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then it may seem >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. >> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant >> way to demonstrate this. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> he, he, Huw! >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >> separation. >> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >> history. Perhaps you could explain? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >> >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >> the act from its production and history? >> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: >> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >> tradition >> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >> action >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >> contexts, >> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >> legitimately, >> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In social >> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >> activities >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >> prefer to spell it out and use the term >> "artefact-mediated" rather >> than the vague term "mediated". >> >> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >> mean what >> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context of >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >> "mediation" in >> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that a >> concept is not immediately present in any act of >> communication or >> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >> Artefacts, >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of >> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >> that a >> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >> any one >> concept. It means different things to different people. >> Concepts >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >> materiality, >> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >> in mind >> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >> mediated >> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >> aware >> of that. >> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >> qualified >> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >> >> Andy >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> Greg Thompson wrote: >> >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >> would need >> to include >> reflexes) >> >> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >> Bateson's man with >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >> newborns). >> >> Just wonderin'. >> >> -greg >> >> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >> >> >> wrote: >> >> >> Thanks for replies. >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >> to stop >> talking about >> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >> adjectival >> use implies there >> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now >> speaks of >> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >> physical reflexes (and >> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >> action >> is mediated (and >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's >> worth noting that >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >> action, but >> rather a >> theoretical assumption about all human action; though >> there seems to be >> some variation in interpretation of what that >> assumption >> entails. >> David >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > From lisayl@utk.edu Mon Sep 15 08:04:10 2014 From: lisayl@utk.edu (Lisa Yamagata-Lynch) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 11:04:10 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: Why is it that we came to what David stated as: Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost completely detached from empirical specifics. Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational Psychology and Counseling http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey Education Complex IT Online Program Coordinator University of Tennessee http://itonline.utk.edu/ Knoxville, TN 37996 https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: 865-974-7712 On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: > Andy, > > I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific project, though > it might initially have been conceived as such. > Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over facts." We are > engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, distinctions, and > qualifications almost completely detached from empirical specifics. And as > your note has revealed, even at the level of theory, we're not all playing > the same game. > > I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that claims be framed > empirically does not imply we will "agree on the significance of that > claim." But perhaps in an empirical setting theoretical issues surface as > methodological issues. In this case, there is a possibility that > disagreements lead to separation of research enterprises, with (greater) > theoretical agreement as a consequence. > > David > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net] > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM > To: David H Kirshner > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse > > David, > CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science it must strive to > produce empirically verifiable claims which are meaningful irrespective of > the conceptual frame into which they are accepted. But as a project it is > characterised by a system of concepts. People can agree on this or that > hard experimental finding, but still not agree on the significance of that > claim. We CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over facts; > all of this is possible only to the extent that we share concepts. > "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal as it is to lay > out some agreed facts, I think it is ill-conceived to think that this is a > means of consolidating a current of research like CHAT. You can call it > philosophical or psychological, I don't think that makes any difference. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > David H Kirshner wrote: > > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it seems > inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing efforts to > elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from efforts to solve the > problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In tandem, is ambiguity as to > whether CHAT is a psychological or philosophical discourse. > > > > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of CHAT would not > be better served by embedding theoretical discussion in analysis of > empirical data. The point, here, would not be to make CHAT more directly > relevant to domains of application (though that would not be a bad thing). > Rather, an empirical obligation might transmute (some) questions of theory > into questions of methodology. In that way, CHAT could become > differentiated into distinct psychological schools, each constrained by > methodological strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical > environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community could look across > these various schools to pursue broader philosophical problematics. > > > > David > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM > > To: Huw Lloyd > > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > > > Ah! I see! > > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in > mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and > mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is > mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that the > specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides > an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation > in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation > to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that if > you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression > other than "mediation." > > > > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I > like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to use > some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, > a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without > exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was born. I > can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. So > every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as personal. > Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the > same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as > miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same > material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they do > that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of universal > artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical > analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, > eh? > > > > Andy > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > >> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the > >> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, > >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions > >> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, through > >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then it may seem > >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. > >> > >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant > >> way to demonstrate this. > >> > >> Best, > >> Huw > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: > >> > >> he, he, Huw! > >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very > >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really > >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to > >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to > >> separation. > >> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and > >> history. Perhaps you could explain? > >> Andy > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> > >> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> > >> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". > >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the > >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or > >> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and > >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as > >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements > >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally > >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to > >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. > >> > >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to > >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate > >> the act from its production and history? > >> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from > >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. > >> > >> Best, > >> Huw > >> > >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >> >> >> wrote: > >> > >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT > >> tradition > >> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, > >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every > >> action > >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive > >> contexts, > >> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite > >> legitimately, > >> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In > social > >> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other > >> activities > >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by > >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic > is > >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I > >> prefer to spell it out and use the term > >> "artefact-mediated" rather > >> than the vague term "mediated". > >> > >> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a > >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to > >> mean what > >> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context > of > >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of > >> "mediation" in > >> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact > that a > >> concept is not immediately present in any act of > >> communication or > >> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. > >> Artefacts, > >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can > of > >> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is > >> that a > >> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for > >> any one > >> concept. It means different things to different people. > >> Concepts > >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their > >> materiality, > >> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept > >> in mind > >> when we use a word in communication, the communication is > >> mediated > >> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be > >> aware > >> of that. > >> > >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in > >> qualified > >> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. > >> > >> Andy > >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > >> > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Greg Thompson wrote: > >> > >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? > >> > >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we > >> would need > >> to include > >> reflexes) > >> > >> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in > >> Bateson's man with > >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include > >> newborns). > >> > >> Just wonderin'. > >> > >> -greg > >> > >> > >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner > >> > >> >> wrote: > >> > >> > >> Thanks for replies. > >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided > >> to stop > >> talking about > >> situated cognition because the pragmatics of > >> adjectival > >> use implies there > >> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He > now > >> speaks of > >> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of > >> physical reflexes (and > >> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human > >> action > >> is mediated (and > >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, > it's > >> worth noting that > >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of > >> action, but > >> rather a > >> theoretical assumption about all human action; > though > >> there seems to be > >> some variation in interpretation of what that > >> assumption > >> entails. > >> David > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 15 08:11:07 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 01:11:07 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and we all have our specific research interests. But when we publish, most of us have something to report. I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more of my share of time arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > Why is it that we came to what David stated as: > > Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over facts." We > are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, distinctions, > and qualifications almost completely detached from empirical specifics. > > > > Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > Psychology and Counseling > http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey > Education Complex > IT Online Program Coordinator University > of Tennessee > http://itonline.utk.edu/ > Knoxville, TN 37996 > https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > 865-974-7712 > > On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner > wrote: > > Andy, > > I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific project, > though it might initially have been conceived as such. > Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over facts." > We are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, > distinctions, and qualifications almost completely detached from > empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even at the > level of theory, we're not all playing the same game. > > I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that claims be > framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the > significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical setting > theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In this case, > there is a possibility that disagreements lead to separation of > research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical agreement as a > consequence. > > David > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net > ] > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM > To: David H Kirshner > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse > > David, > CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science it must > strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are > meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which they > are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a system of > concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental > finding, but still not agree on the significance of that claim. We > CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over facts; > all of this is possible only to the extent that we share concepts. > "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal as it > is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is ill-conceived to > think that this is a means of consolidating a current of research > like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological, I don't > think that makes any difference. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > David H Kirshner wrote: > > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it seems > inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing efforts > to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from efforts to > solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In tandem, is > ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or philosophical > discourse. > > > > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of CHAT > would not be better served by embedding theoretical discussion in > analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be to make > CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application (though that > would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation might > transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of > methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated into > distinct psychological schools, each constrained by methodological > strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical > environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community could > look across these various schools to pursue broader philosophical > problematics. > > > > David > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM > > To: Huw Lloyd > > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > > > Ah! I see! > > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in > nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain > both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem with anyone > saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is > appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of Vygotsky, > that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially > productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation in > the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with > artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. > Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point you were > referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." > > > > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do > what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or > thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my > actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or whatever - > but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are > products of the history and culture into which I was born. I can > choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce > them. So every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as > well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material objects, > their physical form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So > communication as much as miscommunication takes place through > everyone interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I > am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too > mediate their actions with the same set of universal artefacts! So > all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis > which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, eh? > > > > Andy > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > >> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the > >> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, > >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions > >> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, through > >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then it may seem > >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. > >> > >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant > >> way to demonstrate this. > >> > >> Best, > >> Huw > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > >> >> wrote: > >> > >> he, he, Huw! > >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very > >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I > really > >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being > used to > >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to > >> separation. > >> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and > >> history. Perhaps you could explain? > >> Andy > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >> > >> > >> > >> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> > >> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". > >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the > >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails > typologies or > >> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and > >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as > >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements > >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally > >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one > needs to > >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. > >> > >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which > leads me to > >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate > >> the act from its production and history? > >> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple > clarity from > >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. > >> > >> Best, > >> Huw > >> > >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > > >> > > > >> >>> > wrote: > >> > >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT > >> tradition > >> specifically, as opposed to the English language in > general, > >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of > course, every > >> action > >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive > >> contexts, > >> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite > >> legitimately, > >> but with no special significant for the use of > CHAT. In social > >> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other > >> activities > >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of > actions by > >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if > the topic is > >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so > central, that I > >> prefer to spell it out and use the term > >> "artefact-mediated" rather > >> than the vague term "mediated". > >> > >> I have come across usages like "mediated by > such-and-such a > >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to > >> mean what > >> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the > context of > >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of > >> "mediation" in > >> the most general sense in a way which obscures the > fact that a > >> concept is not immediately present in any act of > >> communication or > >> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. > >> Artefacts, > >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a > concept, can of > >> course mediate an act of communication. But the > point is > >> that a > >> word is not universally and unproblematically a > sign for > >> any one > >> concept. It means different things to different people. > >> Concepts > >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their > >> materiality, > >> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a > concept > >> in mind > >> when we use a word in communication, the > communication is > >> mediated > >> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake > not to be > >> aware > >> of that. > >> > >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in > >> qualified > >> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. > >> > >> Andy > >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his > comment, too. > >> > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Greg Thompson wrote: > >> > >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and > culture? > >> > >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we > >> would need > >> to include > >> reflexes) > >> > >> And does it include our socio-contextual > surround as in > >> Bateson's man with > >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include > >> newborns). > >> > >> Just wonderin'. > >> > >> -greg > >> > >> > >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner > >> > > > >> > >>> wrote: > >> > >> > >> Thanks for replies. > >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno > decided > >> to stop > >> talking about > >> situated cognition because the pragmatics of > >> adjectival > >> use implies there > >> has to be a contrasting non-situated > cognition. He now > >> speaks of > >> situativity theory. It seems, with the > exception of > >> physical reflexes (and > >> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all > human > >> action > >> is mediated (and > >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as > well). So, it's > >> worth noting that > >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of > >> action, but > >> rather a > >> theoretical assumption about all human > action; though > >> there seems to be > >> some variation in interpretation of what that > >> assumption > >> entails. > >> David > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > From lisayl@utk.edu Mon Sep 15 08:18:30 2014 From: lisayl@utk.edu (Lisa Yamagata-Lynch) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 11:18:30 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> Message-ID: Well I am guilty for being fixated about thinking and talking about methods and how to better understand how we can make a trustworthy leap from understanding the world to understanding concepts. Again just talking aloud. Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational Psychology and Counseling http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey Education Complex IT Online Program Coordinator University of Tennessee http://itonline.utk.edu/ Knoxville, TN 37996 https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: 865-974-7712 On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and we all have our > specific research interests. > But when we publish, most of us have something to report. > I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more of my share of time > arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > >> Why is it that we came to what David stated as: >> >> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over facts." We are >> engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, distinctions, and >> qualifications almost completely detached from empirical specifics. >> >> >> >> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational Psychology >> and Counseling >> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey >> Education Complex >> IT Online Program Coordinator University of >> Tennessee >> http://itonline.utk.edu/ >> Knoxville, TN 37996 >> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: >> 865-974-7712 >> >> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner > > wrote: >> >> Andy, >> >> I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific project, >> though it might initially have been conceived as such. >> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over facts." >> We are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, >> distinctions, and qualifications almost completely detached from >> empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even at the >> level of theory, we're not all playing the same game. >> >> I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that claims be >> framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the >> significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical setting >> theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In this case, >> there is a possibility that disagreements lead to separation of >> research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical agreement as a >> consequence. >> >> David >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net >> ] >> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM >> To: David H Kirshner >> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse >> >> David, >> CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science it must >> strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are >> meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which they >> are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a system of >> concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental >> finding, but still not agree on the significance of that claim. We >> CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over facts; >> all of this is possible only to the extent that we share concepts. >> "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal as it >> is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is ill-conceived to >> think that this is a means of consolidating a current of research >> like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological, I don't >> think that makes any difference. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> David H Kirshner wrote: >> > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it seems >> inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing efforts >> to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from efforts to >> solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In tandem, is >> ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or philosophical >> discourse. >> > >> > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of CHAT >> would not be better served by embedding theoretical discussion in >> analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be to make >> CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application (though that >> would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation might >> transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of >> methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated into >> distinct psychological schools, each constrained by methodological >> strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical >> environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community could >> look across these various schools to pursue broader philosophical >> problematics. >> > >> > David >> > >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM >> > To: Huw Lloyd >> > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >> > >> > Ah! I see! >> > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in >> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain >> both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem with anyone >> saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is >> appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of Vygotsky, >> that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially >> productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation in >> the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with >> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. >> Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point you were >> referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." >> > >> > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do >> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or >> thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my >> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or whatever - >> but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are >> products of the history and culture into which I was born. I can >> choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce >> them. So every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as >> well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material objects, >> their physical form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So >> communication as much as miscommunication takes place through >> everyone interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I >> am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too >> mediate their actions with the same set of universal artefacts! So >> all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis >> which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, eh? >> > >> > Andy >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ---------- >> > -- >> > *Andy Blunden* >> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> > >> > >> > Huw Lloyd wrote: >> > >> >> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >> >> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, >> >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions >> >> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, through >> >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then it may seem >> >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. >> >> >> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant >> >> way to demonstrate this. >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > >> >> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> he, he, Huw! >> >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >> >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I >> really >> >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being >> used to >> >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >> >> separation. >> >> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >> >> history. Perhaps you could explain? >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------------------ >> >> *Andy Blunden* >> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> >> >> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >> >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >> >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails >> typologies or >> >> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >> >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >> >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >> >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >> >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one >> needs to >> >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >> >> >> >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which >> leads me to >> >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >> >> the act from its production and history? >> >> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple >> clarity from >> >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Huw >> >> >> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >> >> >> > >> >> >> >>> >> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >> >> tradition >> >> specifically, as opposed to the English language in >> general, >> >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of >> course, every >> >> action >> >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >> >> contexts, >> >> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >> >> legitimately, >> >> but with no special significant for the use of >> CHAT. In social >> >> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >> >> activities >> >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of >> actions by >> >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if >> the topic is >> >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so >> central, that I >> >> prefer to spell it out and use the term >> >> "artefact-mediated" rather >> >> than the vague term "mediated". >> >> >> >> I have come across usages like "mediated by >> such-and-such a >> >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >> >> mean what >> >> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the >> context of >> >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >> >> "mediation" in >> >> the most general sense in a way which obscures the >> fact that a >> >> concept is not immediately present in any act of >> >> communication or >> >> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >> >> Artefacts, >> >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a >> concept, can of >> >> course mediate an act of communication. But the >> point is >> >> that a >> >> word is not universally and unproblematically a >> sign for >> >> any one >> >> concept. It means different things to different people. >> >> Concepts >> >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >> >> materiality, >> >> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a >> concept >> >> in mind >> >> when we use a word in communication, the >> communication is >> >> mediated >> >> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake >> not to be >> >> aware >> >> of that. >> >> >> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >> >> qualified >> >> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >> >> >> >> Andy >> >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his >> comment, too. >> >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------------------ >> >> *Andy Blunden* >> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Greg Thompson wrote: >> >> >> >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and >> culture? >> >> >> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >> >> would need >> >> to include >> >> reflexes) >> >> >> >> And does it include our socio-contextual >> surround as in >> >> Bateson's man with >> >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >> >> newborns). >> >> >> >> Just wonderin'. >> >> >> >> -greg >> >> >> >> >> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >> >> >> > >> >> >> >>> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> Thanks for replies. >> >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno >> decided >> >> to stop >> >> talking about >> >> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >> >> adjectival >> >> use implies there >> >> has to be a contrasting non-situated >> cognition. He now >> >> speaks of >> >> situativity theory. It seems, with the >> exception of >> >> physical reflexes (and >> >> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all >> human >> >> action >> >> is mediated (and >> >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as >> well). So, it's >> >> worth noting that >> >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >> >> action, but >> >> rather a >> >> theoretical assumption about all human >> action; though >> >> there seems to be >> >> some variation in interpretation of what that >> >> assumption >> >> entails. >> >> David >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > >> > >> >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 15 08:22:32 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 01:22:32 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> Message-ID: <54170438.60905@mira.net> Well, Lisa, I think that is a project which requires a lot of what David would call "philosophical" discussion. :) The Psychology of Concepts, as it is know to American psychology, i.e., the "mainstream" do endless laboratory tests and questionnaires and surveys and so far as I can see have still haven't figured out what a concept is. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > Well I am guilty for being fixated about thinking and talking about > methods and how to better understand how we can make a trustworthy > leap from understanding the world to understanding concepts. Again > just talking aloud. > > Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > Psychology and Counseling > http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey > Education Complex > IT Online Program Coordinator University > of Tennessee > http://itonline.utk.edu/ > Knoxville, TN 37996 > https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > 865-974-7712 > > On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and we all have > our specific research interests. > But when we publish, most of us have something to report. > I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more of my share of > time arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > > Why is it that we came to what David stated as: > > Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over > facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical > elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost > completely detached from empirical specifics. > > > > Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > Psychology and Counseling > http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 > Bailey Education Complex > IT Online Program Coordinator > University of Tennessee > http://itonline.utk.edu/ > Knoxville, TN 37996 > https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > 865-974-7712 > > On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner > >> wrote: > > Andy, > > I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific > project, > though it might initially have been conceived as such. > Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over > facts." > We are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, > distinctions, and qualifications almost completely > detached from > empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even > at the > level of theory, we're not all playing the same game. > > I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that > claims be > framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the > significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical > setting > theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In > this case, > there is a possibility that disagreements lead to > separation of > research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical agreement > as a > consequence. > > David > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net > > >] > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM > To: David H Kirshner > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse > > David, > CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science it must > strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are > meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which > they > are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a > system of > concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental > finding, but still not agree on the significance of that > claim. We > CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over > facts; > all of this is possible only to the extent that we share > concepts. > "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal > as it > is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is > ill-conceived to > think that this is a means of consolidating a current of > research > like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological, > I don't > think that makes any difference. > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > David H Kirshner wrote: > > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it > seems > inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing > efforts > to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from efforts to > solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In > tandem, is > ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or > philosophical > discourse. > > > > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of > CHAT > would not be better served by embedding theoretical > discussion in > analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be > to make > CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application > (though that > would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation > might > transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of > methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated > into > distinct psychological schools, each constrained by > methodological > strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical > environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community > could > look across these various schools to pursue broader > philosophical > problematics. > > > > David > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >] On Behalf Of Andy > Blunden > > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM > > To: Huw Lloyd > > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct > perception > > > > Ah! I see! > > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in > nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally > contain > both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem > with anyone > saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is > appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of > Vygotsky, > that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially > productive unit of analysis for science is lost if > mediation in > the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with > artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is > lost. > Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point > you were > referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." > > > > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I > can do > what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or > thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my > actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or > whatever - > but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are > products of the history and culture into which I was born. > I can > choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce > them. So every action I take is essentially > cultural-historical as > well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material > objects, > their physical form is the same for everyone, it is > universal. So > communication as much as miscommunication takes place through > everyone interpreting the same material objects, > artefacts, that I > am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too > mediate their actions with the same set of universal > artefacts! So > all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis > which is as objective as any branch of natural science. > Wonderful, eh? > > > > Andy > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > >> If you want to study how action changes then you need > to study the > >> history and production of the action. Under such > circumstances, > >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production > of) actions > >> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, > through > >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then > it may seem > >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. > >> > >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) > are an elegant > >> way to demonstrate this. > >> > >> Best, > >> Huw > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > > > > >> > >>> wrote: > >> > >> he, he, Huw! > >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are > the very > >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! > and I > really > >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally > being > used to > >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is > not equal to > >> separation. > >> I really don't know what you are referring to with > product and > >> history. Perhaps you could explain? > >> Andy > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >> > >> > >> > >> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> > >> I agree about precision, but not with a call > for "clarity". > >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or > reification of the > >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails > typologies or > >> other simplistic devices which prevent the > conception and > >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in > cases such as > >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the > entanglements > >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would > be equally > >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one > needs to > >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. > >> > >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which > leads me to > >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, > why separate > >> the act from its production and history? > >> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple > clarity from > >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the > problem. > >> > >> Best, > >> Huw > >> > >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > > > > >> >> > > > > >> >>>> > > wrote: > >> > >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that > in the CHAT > >> tradition > >> specifically, as opposed to the English > language in > general, > >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of > course, every > >> action > >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many > discursive > >> contexts, > >> "mediation" is a concept which may be > evoked quite > >> legitimately, > >> but with no special significant for the use of > CHAT. In social > >> theory, for example, mediation of > activities by other > >> activities > >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as > mediation of > actions by > >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. > But if > the topic is > >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so > central, that I > >> prefer to spell it out and use the term > >> "artefact-mediated" rather > >> than the vague term "mediated". > >> > >> I have come across usages like "mediated by > such-and-such a > >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can > use words to > >> mean what > >> you like, but I find a formulation like > this in the > context of > >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the > idea of > >> "mediation" in > >> the most general sense in a way which > obscures the > fact that a > >> concept is not immediately present in any > act of > >> communication or > >> any other act, and therefore *cannot > mediate actions*. > >> Artefacts, > >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a > concept, can of > >> course mediate an act of communication. But the > point is > >> that a > >> word is not universally and unproblematically a > sign for > >> any one > >> concept. It means different things to > different people. > >> Concepts > >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal > in their > >> materiality, > >> but particular in their meaning. So when we > have a > concept > >> in mind > >> when we use a word in communication, the > communication is > >> mediated > >> by the word not the concept, and it is a > mistake > not to be > >> aware > >> of that. > >> > >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were > always used in > >> qualified > >> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. > >> > >> Andy > >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his > comment, too. > >> > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Greg Thompson wrote: > >> > >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and > culture? > >> > >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in > which case we > >> would need > >> to include > >> reflexes) > >> > >> And does it include our socio-contextual > surround as in > >> Bateson's man with > >> the stick? (in which case, we would > need to include > >> newborns). > >> > >> Just wonderin'. > >> > >> -greg > >> > >> > >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David > H Kirshner > >> > > > > >> > >> > > > > >>>> wrote: > >> > >> > >> Thanks for replies. > >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim > Greeno > decided > >> to stop > >> talking about > >> situated cognition because the > pragmatics of > >> adjectival > >> use implies there > >> has to be a contrasting non-situated > cognition. He now > >> speaks of > >> situativity theory. It seems, with the > exception of > >> physical reflexes (and > >> perhaps pre-conscious infant > activity), all > human > >> action > >> is mediated (and > >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as > well). So, it's > >> worth noting that > >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a > kind of > >> action, but > >> rather a > >> theoretical assumption about all human > action; though > >> there seems to be > >> some variation in interpretation of > what that > >> assumption > >> entails. > >> David > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > From lisayl@utk.edu Mon Sep 15 08:31:46 2014 From: lisayl@utk.edu (Lisa Yamagata-Lynch) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 11:31:46 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: <54170438.60905@mira.net> References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> Message-ID: I agree, I have an American Psychological background from Japan, and moved away from it once I crossed to America after college. I have been away from it for so long that it is perhaps not my place to think this, but in my observation American Psychology has predominantly become a field about procedures and moved away from philosophical concepts that I thought it originally branched out form. Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational Psychology and Counseling http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey Education Complex IT Online Program Coordinator University of Tennessee http://itonline.utk.edu/ Knoxville, TN 37996 https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: 865-974-7712 On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:22 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Well, Lisa, I think that is a project which requires a lot of what David > would call "philosophical" discussion. :) > The Psychology of Concepts, as it is know to American psychology, i.e., > the "mainstream" do endless laboratory tests and questionnaires and surveys > and so far as I can see have still haven't figured out what a concept is. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > >> Well I am guilty for being fixated about thinking and talking about >> methods and how to better understand how we can make a trustworthy leap >> from understanding the world to understanding concepts. Again just talking >> aloud. >> >> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational Psychology >> and Counseling >> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey >> Education Complex >> IT Online Program Coordinator University of >> Tennessee >> http://itonline.utk.edu/ >> Knoxville, TN 37996 >> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: >> 865-974-7712 >> >> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and we all have >> our specific research interests. >> But when we publish, most of us have something to report. >> I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more of my share of >> time arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: >> >> Why is it that we came to what David stated as: >> >> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over >> facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical >> elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost >> completely detached from empirical specifics. >> >> >> >> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational >> Psychology and Counseling >> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 >> Bailey Education Complex >> IT Online Program Coordinator >> University of Tennessee >> http://itonline.utk.edu/ >> Knoxville, TN 37996 >> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: >> 865-974-7712 >> >> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner >> > >> wrote: >> >> Andy, >> >> I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific >> project, >> though it might initially have been conceived as such. >> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over >> facts." >> We are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, >> distinctions, and qualifications almost completely >> detached from >> empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even >> at the >> level of theory, we're not all playing the same game. >> >> I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that >> claims be >> framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the >> significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical >> setting >> theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In >> this case, >> there is a possibility that disagreements lead to >> separation of >> research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical agreement >> as a >> consequence. >> >> David >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net >> >> >] >> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM >> To: David H Kirshner >> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse >> >> David, >> CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science it must >> strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are >> meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which >> they >> are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a >> system of >> concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental >> finding, but still not agree on the significance of that >> claim. We >> CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over >> facts; >> all of this is possible only to the extent that we share >> concepts. >> "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal >> as it >> is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is >> ill-conceived to >> think that this is a means of consolidating a current of >> research >> like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological, >> I don't >> think that makes any difference. >> Andy >> ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> David H Kirshner wrote: >> > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it >> seems >> inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing >> efforts >> to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from efforts to >> solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In >> tandem, is >> ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or >> philosophical >> discourse. >> > >> > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of >> CHAT >> would not be better served by embedding theoretical >> discussion in >> analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be >> to make >> CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application >> (though that >> would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation >> might >> transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of >> methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated >> into >> distinct psychological schools, each constrained by >> methodological >> strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical >> environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community >> could >> look across these various schools to pursue broader >> philosophical >> problematics. >> > >> > David >> > >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > > >> > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> > >] On Behalf Of Andy >> Blunden >> > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM >> > To: Huw Lloyd >> > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct >> perception >> > >> > Ah! I see! >> > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in >> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally >> contain >> both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem >> with anyone >> saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is >> appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of >> Vygotsky, >> that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially >> productive unit of analysis for science is lost if >> mediation in >> the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with >> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is >> lost. >> Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point >> you were >> referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." >> > >> > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I >> can do >> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or >> thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my >> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or >> whatever - >> but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are >> products of the history and culture into which I was born. >> I can >> choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce >> them. So every action I take is essentially >> cultural-historical as >> well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material >> objects, >> their physical form is the same for everyone, it is >> universal. So >> communication as much as miscommunication takes place through >> everyone interpreting the same material objects, >> artefacts, that I >> am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too >> mediate their actions with the same set of universal >> artefacts! So >> all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis >> which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >> Wonderful, eh? >> > >> > Andy >> > >> ------------------------------ >> ---------------------------------------- >> > -- >> > *Andy Blunden* >> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> > >> > >> > Huw Lloyd wrote: >> > >> >> If you want to study how action changes then you need >> to study the >> >> history and production of the action. Under such >> circumstances, >> >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production >> of) actions >> >> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, >> through >> >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then >> it may seem >> >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. >> >> >> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) >> are an elegant >> >> way to demonstrate this. >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >> >> > >> >> >> >>> wrote: >> >> >> >> he, he, Huw! >> >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are >> the very >> >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! >> and I >> really >> >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally >> being >> used to >> >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is >> not equal to >> >> separation. >> >> I really don't know what you are referring to with >> product and >> >> history. Perhaps you could explain? >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------------------ >> >> *Andy Blunden* >> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> >> >> I agree about precision, but not with a call >> for "clarity". >> >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or >> reification of the >> >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails >> typologies or >> >> other simplistic devices which prevent the >> conception and >> >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in >> cases such as >> >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the >> entanglements >> >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would >> be equally >> >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one >> needs to >> >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >> >> >> >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which >> leads me to >> >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, >> why separate >> >> the act from its production and history? >> >> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple >> clarity from >> >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the >> problem. >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Huw >> >> >> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >> >> > >> >> > > >> >> >> > >> >> > > >>>> >> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that >> in the CHAT >> >> tradition >> >> specifically, as opposed to the English >> language in >> general, >> >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of >> course, every >> >> action >> >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many >> discursive >> >> contexts, >> >> "mediation" is a concept which may be >> evoked quite >> >> legitimately, >> >> but with no special significant for the use of >> CHAT. In social >> >> theory, for example, mediation of >> activities by other >> >> activities >> >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as >> mediation of >> actions by >> >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. >> But if >> the topic is >> >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so >> central, that I >> >> prefer to spell it out and use the term >> >> "artefact-mediated" rather >> >> than the vague term "mediated". >> >> >> >> I have come across usages like "mediated by >> such-and-such a >> >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can >> use words to >> >> mean what >> >> you like, but I find a formulation like >> this in the >> context of >> >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the >> idea of >> >> "mediation" in >> >> the most general sense in a way which >> obscures the >> fact that a >> >> concept is not immediately present in any >> act of >> >> communication or >> >> any other act, and therefore *cannot >> mediate actions*. >> >> Artefacts, >> >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a >> concept, can of >> >> course mediate an act of communication. But the >> point is >> >> that a >> >> word is not universally and unproblematically a >> sign for >> >> any one >> >> concept. It means different things to >> different people. >> >> Concepts >> >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal >> in their >> >> materiality, >> >> but particular in their meaning. So when we >> have a >> concept >> >> in mind >> >> when we use a word in communication, the >> communication is >> >> mediated >> >> by the word not the concept, and it is a >> mistake >> not to be >> >> aware >> >> of that. >> >> >> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were >> always used in >> >> qualified >> >> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >> >> >> >> Andy >> >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his >> comment, too. >> >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------------------ >> >> *Andy Blunden* >> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Greg Thompson wrote: >> >> >> >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and >> culture? >> >> >> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in >> which case we >> >> would need >> >> to include >> >> reflexes) >> >> >> >> And does it include our socio-contextual >> surround as in >> >> Bateson's man with >> >> the stick? (in which case, we would >> need to include >> >> newborns). >> >> >> >> Just wonderin'. >> >> >> >> -greg >> >> >> >> >> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David >> H Kirshner >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> > >> >> >>>> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> Thanks for replies. >> >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim >> Greeno >> decided >> >> to stop >> >> talking about >> >> situated cognition because the >> pragmatics of >> >> adjectival >> >> use implies there >> >> has to be a contrasting non-situated >> cognition. He now >> >> speaks of >> >> situativity theory. It seems, with the >> exception of >> >> physical reflexes (and >> >> perhaps pre-conscious infant >> activity), all >> human >> >> action >> >> is mediated (and >> >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as >> well). So, it's >> >> worth noting that >> >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a >> kind of >> >> action, but >> >> rather a >> >> theoretical assumption about all human >> action; though >> >> there seems to be >> >> some variation in interpretation of >> what that >> >> assumption >> >> entails. >> >> David >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > From dkirsh@lsu.edu Mon Sep 15 08:50:40 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 15:50:40 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: <54170438.60905@mira.net> References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> Message-ID: Does CHAT theory really advance with respect to empirical studies? If so, then why isn't the XMCA discussion a discussion about so-and-so's empirical results and how we should interpret them? Various branches of psychology (e.g., cognitive and developmental) do address concepts, and do conduct empirical research related to concepts. It's true, they rarely enter into full-blooded discussion of what is a concept. But perhaps that's because they're scientists rather than philosophers. They're operating within a framework that is bounded primarily by empirical and methodological expectations and obligations; theory evolves within those boundaries. It's not clear to me that the Vygotskyan research community ever operated in that fashion, and I'm wondering what would happen if it did. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 10:23 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse Well, Lisa, I think that is a project which requires a lot of what David would call "philosophical" discussion. :) The Psychology of Concepts, as it is know to American psychology, i.e., the "mainstream" do endless laboratory tests and questionnaires and surveys and so far as I can see have still haven't figured out what a concept is. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > Well I am guilty for being fixated about thinking and talking about > methods and how to better understand how we can make a trustworthy > leap from understanding the world to understanding concepts. Again > just talking aloud. > > Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > Psychology and Counseling > http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey > Education Complex > IT Online Program Coordinator University > of Tennessee > http://itonline.utk.edu/ > Knoxville, TN 37996 > https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > 865-974-7712 > > On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and we all have > our specific research interests. > But when we publish, most of us have something to report. > I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more of my share of > time arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > > Why is it that we came to what David stated as: > > Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over > facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical > elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost > completely detached from empirical specifics. > > > > Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > Psychology and Counseling > http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 > Bailey Education Complex > IT Online Program Coordinator > University of Tennessee > http://itonline.utk.edu/ > Knoxville, TN 37996 > https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > 865-974-7712 > > On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner > >> wrote: > > Andy, > > I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific > project, > though it might initially have been conceived as such. > Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over > facts." > We are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, > distinctions, and qualifications almost completely > detached from > empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even > at the > level of theory, we're not all playing the same game. > > I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that > claims be > framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the > significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical > setting > theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In > this case, > there is a possibility that disagreements lead to > separation of > research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical agreement > as a > consequence. > > David > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net > > >] > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM > To: David H Kirshner > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse > > David, > CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science it must > strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are > meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which > they > are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a > system of > concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental > finding, but still not agree on the significance of that > claim. We > CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over > facts; > all of this is possible only to the extent that we share > concepts. > "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal > as it > is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is > ill-conceived to > think that this is a means of consolidating a current of > research > like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological, > I don't > think that makes any difference. > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > David H Kirshner wrote: > > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it > seems > inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing > efforts > to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from efforts to > solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In > tandem, is > ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or > philosophical > discourse. > > > > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of > CHAT > would not be better served by embedding theoretical > discussion in > analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be > to make > CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application > (though that > would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation > might > transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of > methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated > into > distinct psychological schools, each constrained by > methodological > strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical > environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community > could > look across these various schools to pursue broader > philosophical > problematics. > > > > David > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >] On Behalf Of Andy > Blunden > > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM > > To: Huw Lloyd > > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct > perception > > > > Ah! I see! > > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in > nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally > contain > both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem > with anyone > saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is > appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of > Vygotsky, > that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially > productive unit of analysis for science is lost if > mediation in > the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with > artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is > lost. > Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point > you were > referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." > > > > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I > can do > what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or > thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my > actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or > whatever - > but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are > products of the history and culture into which I was born. > I can > choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce > them. So every action I take is essentially > cultural-historical as > well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material > objects, > their physical form is the same for everyone, it is > universal. So > communication as much as miscommunication takes place through > everyone interpreting the same material objects, > artefacts, that I > am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too > mediate their actions with the same set of universal > artefacts! So > all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis > which is as objective as any branch of natural science. > Wonderful, eh? > > > > Andy > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > >> If you want to study how action changes then you need > to study the > >> history and production of the action. Under such > circumstances, > >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production > of) actions > >> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, > through > >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then > it may seem > >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. > >> > >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) > are an elegant > >> way to demonstrate this. > >> > >> Best, > >> Huw > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > > > > >> > >>> wrote: > >> > >> he, he, Huw! > >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are > the very > >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! > and I > really > >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally > being > used to > >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is > not equal to > >> separation. > >> I really don't know what you are referring to with > product and > >> history. Perhaps you could explain? > >> Andy > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >> > >> > >> > >> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> > >> I agree about precision, but not with a call > for "clarity". > >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or > reification of the > >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails > typologies or > >> other simplistic devices which prevent the > conception and > >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in > cases such as > >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the > entanglements > >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would > be equally > >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one > needs to > >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. > >> > >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which > leads me to > >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, > why separate > >> the act from its production and history? > >> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple > clarity from > >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the > problem. > >> > >> Best, > >> Huw > >> > >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > > > > >> >> > > > > >> >>>> > > wrote: > >> > >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that > in the CHAT > >> tradition > >> specifically, as opposed to the English > language in > general, > >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of > course, every > >> action > >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many > discursive > >> contexts, > >> "mediation" is a concept which may be > evoked quite > >> legitimately, > >> but with no special significant for the use of > CHAT. In social > >> theory, for example, mediation of > activities by other > >> activities > >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as > mediation of > actions by > >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. > But if > the topic is > >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so > central, that I > >> prefer to spell it out and use the term > >> "artefact-mediated" rather > >> than the vague term "mediated". > >> > >> I have come across usages like "mediated by > such-and-such a > >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can > use words to > >> mean what > >> you like, but I find a formulation like > this in the > context of > >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the > idea of > >> "mediation" in > >> the most general sense in a way which > obscures the > fact that a > >> concept is not immediately present in any > act of > >> communication or > >> any other act, and therefore *cannot > mediate actions*. > >> Artefacts, > >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a > concept, can of > >> course mediate an act of communication. But the > point is > >> that a > >> word is not universally and unproblematically a > sign for > >> any one > >> concept. It means different things to > different people. > >> Concepts > >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal > in their > >> materiality, > >> but particular in their meaning. So when we > have a > concept > >> in mind > >> when we use a word in communication, the > communication is > >> mediated > >> by the word not the concept, and it is a > mistake > not to be > >> aware > >> of that. > >> > >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were > always used in > >> qualified > >> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. > >> > >> Andy > >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his > comment, too. > >> > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Greg Thompson wrote: > >> > >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and > culture? > >> > >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in > which case we > >> would need > >> to include > >> reflexes) > >> > >> And does it include our socio-contextual > surround as in > >> Bateson's man with > >> the stick? (in which case, we would > need to include > >> newborns). > >> > >> Just wonderin'. > >> > >> -greg > >> > >> > >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David > H Kirshner > >> > > > > >> > >> > > > > >>>> wrote: > >> > >> > >> Thanks for replies. > >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim > Greeno > decided > >> to stop > >> talking about > >> situated cognition because the > pragmatics of > >> adjectival > >> use implies there > >> has to be a contrasting non-situated > cognition. He now > >> speaks of > >> situativity theory. It seems, with the > exception of > >> physical reflexes (and > >> perhaps pre-conscious infant > activity), all > human > >> action > >> is mediated (and > >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as > well). So, it's > >> worth noting that > >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a > kind of > >> action, but > >> rather a > >> theoretical assumption about all human > action; though > >> there seems to be > >> some variation in interpretation of > what that > >> assumption > >> entails. > >> David > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Sep 15 09:01:59 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 09:01:59 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> Message-ID: So many message overnight in response to David's initial message. Retrograde that I am proving to be, I will go back to his message and try to respond from that starting point. In this message I will take up only his first paragraph. Later, life permitting, I will take up the second. David wrote: Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it seems inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing efforts to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from efforts to solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In tandem, is ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or philosophical discourse. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hopefully useful comments. 1a. For many scholars who take Vygotsky as a starting point, it is still a huge task to get agreement on what LSV wrote, the order in which he wrote it, and what he meant. 1b. Equally, there is great uncertainty between the continuity and even the compatibility of the ideas of LSV and Alexei Leontiev (ANL). (the acronym, chat, indicates a willingness to consider mediation AND activity, mediated by language AND (strictly speaking) non-linguistic action, as part of a signal paradigm-- despite fulsome evidence of discontinuities and in some places incompatibilities in LSV and ANL's writings). These two statements are true both in the English and Russian speaking communities concerned with this domain of inquiry. I think that together, they help to explain why there is so much discussion about what appear to be theoretical/philosophical issues. 2a. The uncertainties in number 1 above lead to uncertainty on my part about what you mean by "efforts to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully," from "efforts to solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo." -Which problems was LSV trying to solve de novo? -Does "elaborate more fully" mean to work with LSV's ideas as one understands them, find places where they seem inadequate, and offer modified forumulations, accompanied by empirical data, to arrive at a more adequate theoretical framework that is seen (rightly or wrongly) as a development of the theory? I think this path is one that I have chosen. 3. Finally, in all of the writings about CHAT that come to mind as I sit here typing, it is emphasized that it is an interdisciplinary undertaking, reducible neither to psychology or philosophy. This stance has its problems that always bear consideration. I see you have already responded while I have been typing, David, so I will stop here. mike On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 8:31 AM, Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > I agree, I have an American Psychological background from Japan, and moved > away from it once I crossed to America after college. I have been away from > it for so long that it is perhaps not my place to think this, but in my > observation American Psychology has predominantly become a field about > procedures and moved away from philosophical concepts that I thought it > originally branched out form. > > Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational Psychology > and Counseling > http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey > Education Complex > IT Online Program Coordinator University of > Tennessee > http://itonline.utk.edu/ > Knoxville, TN 37996 > https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > 865-974-7712 > > On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:22 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Well, Lisa, I think that is a project which requires a lot of what David > > would call "philosophical" discussion. :) > > The Psychology of Concepts, as it is know to American psychology, i.e., > > the "mainstream" do endless laboratory tests and questionnaires and > surveys > > and so far as I can see have still haven't figured out what a concept is. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > > > >> Well I am guilty for being fixated about thinking and talking about > >> methods and how to better understand how we can make a trustworthy leap > >> from understanding the world to understanding concepts. Again just > talking > >> aloud. > >> > >> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > Psychology > >> and Counseling > >> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey > >> Education Complex > >> IT Online Program Coordinator University of > >> Tennessee > >> http://itonline.utk.edu/ > >> Knoxville, TN 37996 > >> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > >> 865-974-7712 > >> > >> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: > >> > >> I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and we all have > >> our specific research interests. > >> But when we publish, most of us have something to report. > >> I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more of my share of > >> time arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest. > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> ------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> > >> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > >> > >> Why is it that we came to what David stated as: > >> > >> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over > >> facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical > >> elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost > >> completely detached from empirical specifics. > >> > >> > >> > >> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > >> Psychology and Counseling > >> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 > >> Bailey Education Complex > >> IT Online Program Coordinator > >> University of Tennessee > >> http://itonline.utk.edu/ > >> Knoxville, TN 37996 > >> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > >> 865-974-7712 > >> > >> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner > >> >> >> wrote: > >> > >> Andy, > >> > >> I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific > >> project, > >> though it might initially have been conceived as such. > >> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over > >> facts." > >> We are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, > >> distinctions, and qualifications almost completely > >> detached from > >> empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even > >> at the > >> level of theory, we're not all playing the same game. > >> > >> I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that > >> claims be > >> framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the > >> significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical > >> setting > >> theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In > >> this case, > >> there is a possibility that disagreements lead to > >> separation of > >> research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical agreement > >> as a > >> consequence. > >> > >> David > >> > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net > >> > >> >] > >> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM > >> To: David H Kirshner > >> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse > >> > >> David, > >> CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science it > must > >> strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are > >> meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which > >> they > >> are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a > >> system of > >> concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental > >> finding, but still not agree on the significance of that > >> claim. We > >> CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over > >> facts; > >> all of this is possible only to the extent that we share > >> concepts. > >> "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal > >> as it > >> is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is > >> ill-conceived to > >> think that this is a means of consolidating a current of > >> research > >> like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological, > >> I don't > >> think that makes any difference. > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------ > >> ------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> David H Kirshner wrote: > >> > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it > >> seems > >> inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing > >> efforts > >> to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from efforts > to > >> solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In > >> tandem, is > >> ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or > >> philosophical > >> discourse. > >> > > >> > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of > >> CHAT > >> would not be better served by embedding theoretical > >> discussion in > >> analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be > >> to make > >> CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application > >> (though that > >> would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation > >> might > >> transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of > >> methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated > >> into > >> distinct psychological schools, each constrained by > >> methodological > >> strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical > >> environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community > >> could > >> look across these various schools to pursue broader > >> philosophical > >> problematics. > >> > > >> > David > >> > > >> > -----Original Message----- > >> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> > >> >> > > >> > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> > >> >> >] On Behalf Of Andy > >> Blunden > >> > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM > >> > To: Huw Lloyd > >> > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct > >> perception > >> > > >> > Ah! I see! > >> > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in > >> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally > >> contain > >> both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem > >> with anyone > >> saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it > is > >> appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of > >> Vygotsky, > >> that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially > >> productive unit of analysis for science is lost if > >> mediation in > >> the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with > >> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is > >> lost. > >> Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point > >> you were > >> referring to you used some expression other than > "mediation." > >> > > >> > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I > >> can do > >> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or > >> thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my > >> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or > >> whatever - > >> but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are > >> products of the history and culture into which I was born. > >> I can > >> choose which artefact to use, but culture and history > produce > >> them. So every action I take is essentially > >> cultural-historical as > >> well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material > >> objects, > >> their physical form is the same for everyone, it is > >> universal. So > >> communication as much as miscommunication takes place > through > >> everyone interpreting the same material objects, > >> artefacts, that I > >> am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they > too > >> mediate their actions with the same set of universal > >> artefacts! So > >> all human action is opened to cultural and historical > analysis > >> which is as objective as any branch of natural science. > >> Wonderful, eh? > >> > > >> > Andy > >> > > >> ------------------------------ > >> ---------------------------------------- > >> > -- > >> > *Andy Blunden* > >> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> > > >> > > >> > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> > > >> >> If you want to study how action changes then you need > >> to study the > >> >> history and production of the action. Under such > >> circumstances, > >> >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production > >> of) actions > >> >> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, > >> through > >> >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then > >> it may seem > >> >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an > action. > >> >> > >> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) > >> are an elegant > >> >> way to demonstrate this. > >> >> > >> >> Best, > >> >> Huw > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > >> > >> > > >> >> > >> >>> wrote: > >> >> > >> >> he, he, Huw! > >> >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are > >> the very > >> >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! > >> and I > >> really > >> >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally > >> being > >> used to > >> >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is > >> not equal to > >> >> separation. > >> >> I really don't know what you are referring to with > >> product and > >> >> history. Perhaps you could explain? > >> >> Andy > >> >> ------------------------------ > >> ------------------------------------------ > >> >> *Andy Blunden* > >> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> >> > >> >> I agree about precision, but not with a call > >> for "clarity". > >> >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or > >> reification of the > >> >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails > >> typologies or > >> >> other simplistic devices which prevent the > >> conception and > >> >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in > >> cases such as > >> >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the > >> entanglements > >> >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would > >> be equally > >> >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that > one > >> needs to > >> >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. > >> >> > >> >> I think it is this "need for simplification" > which > >> leads me to > >> >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, > >> why separate > >> >> the act from its production and history? > >> >> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple > >> clarity from > >> >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the > >> problem. > >> >> > >> >> Best, > >> >> Huw > >> >> > >> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > >> > >> > > >> >> >> >> >> > >> > >> > > >> >> >> >> >>>> > >> > >> wrote: > >> >> > >> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that > >> in the CHAT > >> >> tradition > >> >> specifically, as opposed to the English > >> language in > >> general, > >> >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of > >> course, every > >> >> action > >> >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many > >> discursive > >> >> contexts, > >> >> "mediation" is a concept which may be > >> evoked quite > >> >> legitimately, > >> >> but with no special significant for the use > of > >> CHAT. In social > >> >> theory, for example, mediation of > >> activities by other > >> >> activities > >> >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as > >> mediation of > >> actions by > >> >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. > >> But if > >> the topic is > >> >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so > >> central, that I > >> >> prefer to spell it out and use the term > >> >> "artefact-mediated" rather > >> >> than the vague term "mediated". > >> >> > >> >> I have come across usages like "mediated by > >> such-and-such a > >> >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can > >> use words to > >> >> mean what > >> >> you like, but I find a formulation like > >> this in the > >> context of > >> >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the > >> idea of > >> >> "mediation" in > >> >> the most general sense in a way which > >> obscures the > >> fact that a > >> >> concept is not immediately present in any > >> act of > >> >> communication or > >> >> any other act, and therefore *cannot > >> mediate actions*. > >> >> Artefacts, > >> >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for > a > >> concept, can of > >> >> course mediate an act of communication. But > the > >> point is > >> >> that a > >> >> word is not universally and > unproblematically a > >> sign for > >> >> any one > >> >> concept. It means different things to > >> different people. > >> >> Concepts > >> >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal > >> in their > >> >> materiality, > >> >> but particular in their meaning. So when we > >> have a > >> concept > >> >> in mind > >> >> when we use a word in communication, the > >> communication is > >> >> mediated > >> >> by the word not the concept, and it is a > >> mistake > >> not to be > >> >> aware > >> >> of that. > >> >> > >> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were > >> always used in > >> >> qualified > >> >> way so that its specific meaning is made > clear. > >> >> > >> >> Andy > >> >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his > >> comment, too. > >> >> > >> >> ------------------------------ > >> ------------------------------------------ > >> >> *Andy Blunden* > >> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> Greg Thompson wrote: > >> >> > >> >> Does "mediation" only apply to language > and > >> culture? > >> >> > >> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in > >> which case we > >> >> would need > >> >> to include > >> >> reflexes) > >> >> > >> >> And does it include our socio-contextual > >> surround as in > >> >> Bateson's man with > >> >> the stick? (in which case, we would > >> need to include > >> >> newborns). > >> >> > >> >> Just wonderin'. > >> >> > >> >> -greg > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David > >> H Kirshner > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> >>>> wrote: > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> Thanks for replies. > >> >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim > >> Greeno > >> decided > >> >> to stop > >> >> talking about > >> >> situated cognition because the > >> pragmatics of > >> >> adjectival > >> >> use implies there > >> >> has to be a contrasting non-situated > >> cognition. He now > >> >> speaks of > >> >> situativity theory. It seems, with > the > >> exception of > >> >> physical reflexes (and > >> >> perhaps pre-conscious infant > >> activity), all > >> human > >> >> action > >> >> is mediated (and > >> >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as > >> well). So, it's > >> >> worth noting that > >> >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a > >> kind of > >> >> action, but > >> >> rather a > >> >> theoretical assumption about all > human > >> action; though > >> >> there seems to be > >> >> some variation in interpretation of > >> what that > >> >> assumption > >> >> entails. > >> >> David > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From jennamcjenna@gmail.com Mon Sep 15 09:03:24 2014 From: jennamcjenna@gmail.com (Jenna McWilliams) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 10:03:24 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> Message-ID: <54170DCC.5040001@gmail.com> This is a great cocktail party! Who's hosting it, anyway, and do they mind that we trashed the kitchen? I wanted to weigh in on a side point that Andy made. He wrote: By "scientific project" I mean it is part of a larger project called "Science." It is not up to you or me to define "science", this is a project which has been going on for about 400 years in its modern form and more than 2000 years since it first got started. It has its own system of concepts, including its various, contested self-definitions. These are objective, inasmuch as your question has to be answered by studying the concepts by means of which science organises itself. I believe it is very much up to you and me to define "science"--to use CHAT, concepts of mediation, critical theories, empirically derived theories or any other tool at our disposal to challenge science's "own system of concepts, including its various, contested self-definitions." In fact, many scholars (lots of whom, for reasons that may be important or not, are not active members of this listserv) have been contesting the larger project called "Science" quite pointedly and effectively for quite a long time. -- Jenna McWilliams Learning Sciences Program, University of Colorado j.mcwilliams@colorado.edu David H Kirshner wrote: > By "scientific project" I mean it is part of a larger project called > "Science." > It is not up to you or me to define "science", this is a project which > has been going on for about 400 years in its modern form and more than > 2000 years since it first got started. It has its own system of > concepts, including its various, contested self-definitions. These are > objective, inasmuch as your question has to be answered by studying > the concepts by means of which science organises itself. From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Sep 15 09:15:24 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 09:15:24 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> Message-ID: Your followup comment is closely related to the second part of your initiating message, David. So i will respond in line. Firstly, I think it would be helpful to distinguish between MCA and xmca. The idea behind xmca was to provide a discussion forum for articles that appear in MCA so that instead of authors having to wait 2+ years for feedback on their ideas (which rarely comes, even then!), we could discuss the published work and learn from it in a timely manner. By an large, that effort has, in my opinion, failed. Thanks to the recent decision to have the editors pick out articles for discussion which include the author(s) in the discussion, this situation has been somewhat mitigated. But only somewhat. xma discussions have all the characteristics of Vygotskian chaining, as a rule. Secondly, when I take down a bundle of recent MCA issues and look at the titles, they at least sound like they are about empirical matters ranging across a wide variety of content areas. Are you saying that these articles are not really empirical? Or that they are not really helping us to develop better methods to deal with perceived problems of social value? Again, this raises the question of "MCA or xmca". Lastly, perhaps it would be helpful if those of us who believe that empirical work guided by CHAT ideas of some value has been produced in, say, the past two decades, would post brief summiaries of that work with references. Maybe its just all verbal sound and fury, signifying the usual! mike On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 8:50 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: > Does CHAT theory really advance with respect to empirical studies? > If so, then why isn't the XMCA discussion a discussion about so-and-so's > empirical results and how we should interpret them? > Various branches of psychology (e.g., cognitive and developmental) do > address concepts, and do conduct empirical research related to concepts. > It's true, they rarely enter into full-blooded discussion of what is a > concept. But perhaps that's because they're scientists rather than > philosophers. They're operating within a framework that is bounded > primarily by empirical and methodological expectations and obligations; > theory evolves within those boundaries. > It's not clear to me that the Vygotskyan research community ever operated > in that fashion, and I'm wondering what would happen if it did. > David > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 10:23 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > > Well, Lisa, I think that is a project which requires a lot of what David > would call "philosophical" discussion. :) The Psychology of Concepts, as it > is know to American psychology, i.e., the "mainstream" do endless > laboratory tests and questionnaires and surveys and so far as I can see > have still haven't figured out what a concept is. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > > Well I am guilty for being fixated about thinking and talking about > > methods and how to better understand how we can make a trustworthy > > leap from understanding the world to understanding concepts. Again > > just talking aloud. > > > > Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > > Psychology and Counseling > > http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey > > Education Complex > > IT Online Program Coordinator University > > of Tennessee > > http://itonline.utk.edu/ > > Knoxville, TN 37996 > > https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > > 865-974-7712 > > > > On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > > I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and we all have > > our specific research interests. > > But when we publish, most of us have something to report. > > I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more of my share of > > time arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > > > > Why is it that we came to what David stated as: > > > > Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over > > facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical > > elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost > > completely detached from empirical specifics. > > > > > > > > Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > > Psychology and Counseling > > http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 > > Bailey Education Complex > > IT Online Program Coordinator > > University of Tennessee > > http://itonline.utk.edu/ > > Knoxville, TN 37996 > > https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > > 865-974-7712 > > > > On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner > > > >> wrote: > > > > Andy, > > > > I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific > > project, > > though it might initially have been conceived as such. > > Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over > > facts." > > We are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, > > distinctions, and qualifications almost completely > > detached from > > empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even > > at the > > level of theory, we're not all playing the same game. > > > > I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that > > claims be > > framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the > > significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical > > setting > > theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In > > this case, > > there is a possibility that disagreements lead to > > separation of > > research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical agreement > > as a > > consequence. > > > > David > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net > > > > >] > > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM > > To: David H Kirshner > > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse > > > > David, > > CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science it > must > > strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are > > meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which > > they > > are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a > > system of > > concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental > > finding, but still not agree on the significance of that > > claim. We > > CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over > > facts; > > all of this is possible only to the extent that we share > > concepts. > > "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal > > as it > > is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is > > ill-conceived to > > think that this is a means of consolidating a current of > > research > > like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological, > > I don't > > think that makes any difference. > > Andy > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > David H Kirshner wrote: > > > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it > > seems > > inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing > > efforts > > to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from efforts > to > > solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In > > tandem, is > > ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or > > philosophical > > discourse. > > > > > > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of > > CHAT > > would not be better served by embedding theoretical > > discussion in > > analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be > > to make > > CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application > > (though that > > would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation > > might > > transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of > > methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated > > into > > distinct psychological schools, each constrained by > > methodological > > strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical > > environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community > > could > > look across these various schools to pursue broader > > philosophical > > problematics. > > > > > > David > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >] On Behalf Of Andy > > Blunden > > > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM > > > To: Huw Lloyd > > > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct > > perception > > > > > > Ah! I see! > > > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in > > nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally > > contain > > both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem > > with anyone > > saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it > is > > appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of > > Vygotsky, > > that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially > > productive unit of analysis for science is lost if > > mediation in > > the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with > > artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is > > lost. > > Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point > > you were > > referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." > > > > > > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I > > can do > > what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or > > thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my > > actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or > > whatever - > > but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are > > products of the history and culture into which I was born. > > I can > > choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce > > them. So every action I take is essentially > > cultural-historical as > > well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material > > objects, > > their physical form is the same for everyone, it is > > universal. So > > communication as much as miscommunication takes place through > > everyone interpreting the same material objects, > > artefacts, that I > > am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they > too > > mediate their actions with the same set of universal > > artefacts! So > > all human action is opened to cultural and historical > analysis > > which is as objective as any branch of natural science. > > Wonderful, eh? > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > -- > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > > >> If you want to study how action changes then you need > > to study the > > >> history and production of the action. Under such > > circumstances, > > >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production > > of) actions > > >> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, > > through > > >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then > > it may seem > > >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. > > >> > > >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) > > are an elegant > > >> way to demonstrate this. > > >> > > >> Best, > > >> Huw > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > > > > > > > >> > > >>> wrote: > > >> > > >> he, he, Huw! > > >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are > > the very > > >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! > > and I > > really > > >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally > > being > > used to > > >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is > > not equal to > > >> separation. > > >> I really don't know what you are referring to with > > product and > > >> history. Perhaps you could explain? > > >> Andy > > >> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> Huw Lloyd wrote: > > >> > > >> I agree about precision, but not with a call > > for "clarity". > > >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or > > reification of the > > >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails > > typologies or > > >> other simplistic devices which prevent the > > conception and > > >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in > > cases such as > > >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the > > entanglements > > >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would > > be equally > > >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that > one > > needs to > > >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. > > >> > > >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which > > leads me to > > >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, > > why separate > > >> the act from its production and history? > > >> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple > > clarity from > > >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the > > problem. > > >> > > >> Best, > > >> Huw > > >> > > >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > > > > > > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > >>>> > > > > wrote: > > >> > > >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that > > in the CHAT > > >> tradition > > >> specifically, as opposed to the English > > language in > > general, > > >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of > > course, every > > >> action > > >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many > > discursive > > >> contexts, > > >> "mediation" is a concept which may be > > evoked quite > > >> legitimately, > > >> but with no special significant for the use of > > CHAT. In social > > >> theory, for example, mediation of > > activities by other > > >> activities > > >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as > > mediation of > > actions by > > >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. > > But if > > the topic is > > >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so > > central, that I > > >> prefer to spell it out and use the term > > >> "artefact-mediated" rather > > >> than the vague term "mediated". > > >> > > >> I have come across usages like "mediated by > > such-and-such a > > >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can > > use words to > > >> mean what > > >> you like, but I find a formulation like > > this in the > > context of > > >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the > > idea of > > >> "mediation" in > > >> the most general sense in a way which > > obscures the > > fact that a > > >> concept is not immediately present in any > > act of > > >> communication or > > >> any other act, and therefore *cannot > > mediate actions*. > > >> Artefacts, > > >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a > > concept, can of > > >> course mediate an act of communication. But > the > > point is > > >> that a > > >> word is not universally and unproblematically > a > > sign for > > >> any one > > >> concept. It means different things to > > different people. > > >> Concepts > > >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal > > in their > > >> materiality, > > >> but particular in their meaning. So when we > > have a > > concept > > >> in mind > > >> when we use a word in communication, the > > communication is > > >> mediated > > >> by the word not the concept, and it is a > > mistake > > not to be > > >> aware > > >> of that. > > >> > > >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were > > always used in > > >> qualified > > >> way so that its specific meaning is made > clear. > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his > > comment, too. > > >> > > >> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> Greg Thompson wrote: > > >> > > >> Does "mediation" only apply to language > and > > culture? > > >> > > >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in > > which case we > > >> would need > > >> to include > > >> reflexes) > > >> > > >> And does it include our socio-contextual > > surround as in > > >> Bateson's man with > > >> the stick? (in which case, we would > > need to include > > >> newborns). > > >> > > >> Just wonderin'. > > >> > > >> -greg > > >> > > >> > > >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David > > H Kirshner > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > >>>> wrote: > > >> > > >> > > >> Thanks for replies. > > >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim > > Greeno > > decided > > >> to stop > > >> talking about > > >> situated cognition because the > > pragmatics of > > >> adjectival > > >> use implies there > > >> has to be a contrasting non-situated > > cognition. He now > > >> speaks of > > >> situativity theory. It seems, with the > > exception of > > >> physical reflexes (and > > >> perhaps pre-conscious infant > > activity), all > > human > > >> action > > >> is mediated (and > > >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as > > well). So, it's > > >> worth noting that > > >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a > > kind of > > >> action, but > > >> rather a > > >> theoretical assumption about all human > > action; though > > >> there seems to be > > >> some variation in interpretation of > > what that > > >> assumption > > >> entails. > > >> David > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Sep 15 09:16:58 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 09:16:58 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: <54170DCC.5040001@gmail.com> References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> <54170DCC.5040001@gmail.com> Message-ID: Who is the "who" in your comment, Jenna? Whose kitchen are you in? ? :-)) mike On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 9:03 AM, Jenna McWilliams wrote: > This is a great cocktail party! Who's hosting it, anyway, and do they mind > that we trashed the kitchen? > > I wanted to weigh in on a side point that Andy made. He wrote: > By "scientific project" I mean it is part of a larger project called > "Science." > It is not up to you or me to define "science", this is a project which has > been going on for about 400 years in its modern form and more than 2000 > years since it first got started. It has its own system of concepts, > including its various, contested self-definitions. These are objective, > inasmuch as your question has to be answered by studying the concepts by > means of which science organises itself. > > I believe it is very much up to you and me to define "science"--to use > CHAT, concepts of mediation, critical theories, empirically derived > theories or any other tool at our disposal to challenge science's "own > system of concepts, including its various, contested self-definitions." In > fact, many scholars (lots of whom, for reasons that may be important or > not, are not active members of this listserv) have been contesting the > larger project called "Science" quite pointedly and effectively for quite a > long time. > > > > > -- > Jenna McWilliams > Learning Sciences Program, University of Colorado > j.mcwilliams@colorado.edu > > > > > David H Kirshner wrote: > >> By "scientific project" I mean it is part of a larger project called >> "Science." >> It is not up to you or me to define "science", this is a project which >> has been going on for about 400 years in its modern form and more than 2000 >> years since it first got started. It has its own system of concepts, >> including its various, contested self-definitions. These are objective, >> inasmuch as your question has to be answered by studying the concepts by >> means of which science organises itself. >> > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Sep 15 09:57:10 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 17:57:10 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: <54170DCC.5040001@gmail.com> References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> <54170DCC.5040001@gmail.com> Message-ID: An overt role of the philosophy is in demarcating the relationship between theory and facts. In simplistic theories (and philosophy) where things are considered separate and distinct from other things, theory is closely coupled to the "distinct" facts. In richer theories (and philosophy) where things are considered related to other things, the theory is less directly bound to these "distinct" facts. In the first case there is little philosophical discussion because it is simple. In the second case, one begins to attend to the structure of the theory and its relation to the structure of the facts, because the structure of the theory begins to take up a guiding role. For me, philosophy is not distinct from science. It is all method (*). But if one's method is curtailed to cause and effect science, then philosophy becomes an other, separate and arbitrary thing. The non-arbitrariness of philosophy is contingent upon facts about the facts. If one chooses to ignore the facts about the facts then one has no basis for discerning a legitimate philosophy. Hence the more richly structured one's theory becomes and the more discerning one becomes in positing facts the more careful one must be about the structure of one's knowledge, hence the value in mutual criticism. Best, Huw * e.g see Davydov's & Radzikhovskii's article, "Vygotsky's theory and the activity oriented approach in psychology". (In Culture, Communication and Cognition: Vygotskian Perspectives). On 15 September 2014 17:03, Jenna McWilliams wrote: > This is a great cocktail party! Who's hosting it, anyway, and do they mind > that we trashed the kitchen? > > I wanted to weigh in on a side point that Andy made. He wrote: > By "scientific project" I mean it is part of a larger project called > "Science." > It is not up to you or me to define "science", this is a project which has > been going on for about 400 years in its modern form and more than 2000 > years since it first got started. It has its own system of concepts, > including its various, contested self-definitions. These are objective, > inasmuch as your question has to be answered by studying the concepts by > means of which science organises itself. > > I believe it is very much up to you and me to define "science"--to use > CHAT, concepts of mediation, critical theories, empirically derived > theories or any other tool at our disposal to challenge science's "own > system of concepts, including its various, contested self-definitions." In > fact, many scholars (lots of whom, for reasons that may be important or > not, are not active members of this listserv) have been contesting the > larger project called "Science" quite pointedly and effectively for quite a > long time. > > > > > -- > Jenna McWilliams > Learning Sciences Program, University of Colorado > j.mcwilliams@colorado.edu > > > > > David H Kirshner wrote: > >> By "scientific project" I mean it is part of a larger project called >> "Science." >> It is not up to you or me to define "science", this is a project which >> has been going on for about 400 years in its modern form and more than 2000 >> years since it first got started. It has its own system of concepts, >> including its various, contested self-definitions. These are objective, >> inasmuch as your question has to be answered by studying the concepts by >> means of which science organises itself. >> > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Mon Sep 15 10:31:23 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 10:31:23 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> Message-ID: <2205B353-0D02-45DD-8DC0-4F307A9B7654@gmail.com> OK -- empirical work "guided by CHAT"? I have used CHAT to design all my teaching and research since I first started drinking the Kool-Aid, as they say. Once you get it into your head, it sort of takes over. I would say that the reason it works for me is because it helps me see the changes that I want to encourage as a teacher, while they are happening. It also helps me avoid big mistakes. A quick example of the latter: I was part of a team of faculty invited to study a conflict at work -- power plant workers who were refusing to wear PPE (personal protective equipment). The manager was stumped: why, in this self-evidently dangerous environment, were these experienced workers refusing his directives? It was obvious to me - and easy to explain to the workers, who had no problem grasping the concept of activity system -- that there were two activity systems in conflict with each other. One was production and one was safety. As long as management was prioritizing production over safety (running the plant hard but not repairing damaged or worn-out parts), the senior workers were choosing to withhold cooperation. Sort of a safety strike. To mediate -- to use another AT term -- the slow shift of the balance of power from the production perspective to the safety perspective, I got our team to incorporate maps of the plant so that during the interviews -- we had decided to interview all the employees -- they would be able to circle any hazardous areas. This raised the question of safety and changed the focus of the project. The maps obviously were "tools" in the Engestrom triangle sense. I presented this at ISCAR in San Diego as part of a panel that stipulated that everyone report on empirical work. 'Helena Worthen hworthen@illinois.edu On Sep 15, 2014, at 9:15 AM, mike cole wrote: > Your followup comment is closely related to the second part of your > initiating message, David. So i will respond in line. > > Firstly, I think it would be helpful to distinguish between MCA and xmca. > The idea behind xmca was to provide a discussion forum for articles that > appear in MCA so that instead of authors having to wait 2+ years for > feedback on their ideas (which rarely comes, even then!), we could discuss > the published work and learn from it in a timely manner. By an large, that > effort has, in my opinion, failed. Thanks to the recent decision to have > the editors pick out articles for discussion which include the author(s) in > the discussion, this situation has been somewhat mitigated. But only > somewhat. xma discussions have all the characteristics of Vygotskian > chaining, as a rule. > > Secondly, when I take down a bundle of recent MCA issues and look at the > titles, they at least sound like they are about empirical matters ranging > across a wide variety of content areas. Are you saying that these articles > are not really empirical? Or that they are not really helping us to develop > better methods to deal with perceived problems of social value? Again, this > raises the question of "MCA or xmca". > > Lastly, perhaps it would be helpful if those of us who believe that > empirical work guided by CHAT ideas of some value has been produced in, > say, the past two decades, would post brief summiaries of that work with > references. > Maybe its just all verbal sound and fury, signifying the usual! > mike > > On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 8:50 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: > >> Does CHAT theory really advance with respect to empirical studies? >> If so, then why isn't the XMCA discussion a discussion about so-and-so's >> empirical results and how we should interpret them? >> Various branches of psychology (e.g., cognitive and developmental) do >> address concepts, and do conduct empirical research related to concepts. >> It's true, they rarely enter into full-blooded discussion of what is a >> concept. But perhaps that's because they're scientists rather than >> philosophers. They're operating within a framework that is bounded >> primarily by empirical and methodological expectations and obligations; >> theory evolves within those boundaries. >> It's not clear to me that the Vygotskyan research community ever operated >> in that fashion, and I'm wondering what would happen if it did. >> David >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 10:23 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse >> >> Well, Lisa, I think that is a project which requires a lot of what David >> would call "philosophical" discussion. :) The Psychology of Concepts, as it >> is know to American psychology, i.e., the "mainstream" do endless >> laboratory tests and questionnaires and surveys and so far as I can see >> have still haven't figured out what a concept is. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: >>> Well I am guilty for being fixated about thinking and talking about >>> methods and how to better understand how we can make a trustworthy >>> leap from understanding the world to understanding concepts. Again >>> just talking aloud. >>> >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational >>> Psychology and Counseling >>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey >>> Education Complex >>> IT Online Program Coordinator University >>> of Tennessee >>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ >>> Knoxville, TN 37996 >>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: >>> 865-974-7712 >>> >>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >>> >>> I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and we all have >>> our specific research interests. >>> But when we publish, most of us have something to report. >>> I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more of my share of >>> time arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest. >>> Andy >>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: >>> >>> Why is it that we came to what David stated as: >>> >>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over >>> facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical >>> elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost >>> completely detached from empirical specifics. >>> >>> >>> >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational >>> Psychology and Counseling >>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 >>> Bailey Education Complex >>> IT Online Program Coordinator >>> University of Tennessee >>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ >>> Knoxville, TN 37996 >>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: >>> 865-974-7712 >>> >>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner >>> >> >> wrote: >>> >>> Andy, >>> >>> I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific >>> project, >>> though it might initially have been conceived as such. >>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over >>> facts." >>> We are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, >>> distinctions, and qualifications almost completely >>> detached from >>> empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even >>> at the >>> level of theory, we're not all playing the same game. >>> >>> I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that >>> claims be >>> framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the >>> significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical >>> setting >>> theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In >>> this case, >>> there is a possibility that disagreements lead to >>> separation of >>> research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical agreement >>> as a >>> consequence. >>> >>> David >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net >>> >>> >] >>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM >>> To: David H Kirshner >>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse >>> >>> David, >>> CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science it >> must >>> strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are >>> meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which >>> they >>> are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a >>> system of >>> concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental >>> finding, but still not agree on the significance of that >>> claim. We >>> CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over >>> facts; >>> all of this is possible only to the extent that we share >>> concepts. >>> "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal >>> as it >>> is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is >>> ill-conceived to >>> think that this is a means of consolidating a current of >>> research >>> like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological, >>> I don't >>> think that makes any difference. >>> Andy >>> >>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> David H Kirshner wrote: >>>> Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it >>> seems >>> inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing >>> efforts >>> to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from efforts >> to >>> solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In >>> tandem, is >>> ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or >>> philosophical >>> discourse. >>>> >>>> I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of >>> CHAT >>> would not be better served by embedding theoretical >>> discussion in >>> analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be >>> to make >>> CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application >>> (though that >>> would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation >>> might >>> transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of >>> methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated >>> into >>> distinct psychological schools, each constrained by >>> methodological >>> strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical >>> environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community >>> could >>> look across these various schools to pursue broader >>> philosophical >>> problematics. >>>> >>>> David >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> >] On Behalf Of Andy >>> Blunden >>>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM >>>> To: Huw Lloyd >>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct >>> perception >>>> >>>> Ah! I see! >>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in >>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally >>> contain >>> both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem >>> with anyone >>> saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it >> is >>> appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of >>> Vygotsky, >>> that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially >>> productive unit of analysis for science is lost if >>> mediation in >>> the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with >>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is >>> lost. >>> Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point >>> you were >>> referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." >>>> >>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I >>> can do >>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or >>> thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my >>> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or >>> whatever - >>> but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are >>> products of the history and culture into which I was born. >>> I can >>> choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce >>> them. So every action I take is essentially >>> cultural-historical as >>> well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material >>> objects, >>> their physical form is the same for everyone, it is >>> universal. So >>> communication as much as miscommunication takes place through >>> everyone interpreting the same material objects, >>> artefacts, that I >>> am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they >> too >>> mediate their actions with the same set of universal >>> artefacts! So >>> all human action is opened to cultural and historical >> analysis >>> which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>> Wonderful, eh? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>> >>> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> -- >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>> >>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need >>> to study the >>>>> history and production of the action. Under such >>> circumstances, >>>>> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production >>> of) actions >>>>> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, >>> through >>>>> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then >>> it may seem >>>>> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. >>>>> >>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) >>> are an elegant >>>>> way to demonstrate this. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>> >>> > >>>>> >>> >>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are >>> the very >>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! >>> and I >>> really >>>>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally >>> being >>> used to >>>>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is >>> not equal to >>>>> separation. >>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with >>> product and >>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call >>> for "clarity". >>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or >>> reification of the >>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails >>> typologies or >>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the >>> conception and >>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in >>> cases such as >>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the >>> entanglements >>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would >>> be equally >>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that >> one >>> needs to >>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>> >>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which >>> leads me to >>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, >>> why separate >>>>> the act from its production and history? >>>>> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple >>> clarity from >>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the >>> problem. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>> >>> > >>>>> >> >> >> >>> >>> > >>>>> >> >> >>>> >>> >>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that >>> in the CHAT >>>>> tradition >>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English >>> language in >>> general, >>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of >>> course, every >>>>> action >>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many >>> discursive >>>>> contexts, >>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be >>> evoked quite >>>>> legitimately, >>>>> but with no special significant for the use of >>> CHAT. In social >>>>> theory, for example, mediation of >>> activities by other >>>>> activities >>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as >>> mediation of >>> actions by >>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. >>> But if >>> the topic is >>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so >>> central, that I >>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>> >>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by >>> such-and-such a >>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can >>> use words to >>>>> mean what >>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like >>> this in the >>> context of >>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the >>> idea of >>>>> "mediation" in >>>>> the most general sense in a way which >>> obscures the >>> fact that a >>>>> concept is not immediately present in any >>> act of >>>>> communication or >>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot >>> mediate actions*. >>>>> Artefacts, >>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a >>> concept, can of >>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But >> the >>> point is >>>>> that a >>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically >> a >>> sign for >>>>> any one >>>>> concept. It means different things to >>> different people. >>>>> Concepts >>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal >>> in their >>>>> materiality, >>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we >>> have a >>> concept >>>>> in mind >>>>> when we use a word in communication, the >>> communication is >>>>> mediated >>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a >>> mistake >>> not to be >>>>> aware >>>>> of that. >>>>> >>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were >>> always used in >>>>> qualified >>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made >> clear. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his >>> comment, too. >>>>> >>>>> >>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language >> and >>> culture? >>>>> >>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in >>> which case we >>>>> would need >>>>> to include >>>>> reflexes) >>>>> >>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual >>> surround as in >>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would >>> need to include >>>>> newborns). >>>>> >>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>> >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David >>> H Kirshner >>>>> >>> > >>> >>> >> >>>>> >>> > >>> >>> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim >>> Greeno >>> decided >>>>> to stop >>>>> talking about >>>>> situated cognition because the >>> pragmatics of >>>>> adjectival >>>>> use implies there >>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated >>> cognition. He now >>>>> speaks of >>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the >>> exception of >>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant >>> activity), all >>> human >>>>> action >>>>> is mediated (and >>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as >>> well). So, it's >>>>> worth noting that >>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a >>> kind of >>>>> action, but >>>>> rather a >>>>> theoretical assumption about all human >>> action; though >>>>> there seems to be >>>>> some variation in interpretation of >>> what that >>>>> assumption >>>>> entails. >>>>> David >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] From helenaworthen@gmail.com Mon Sep 15 11:04:09 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 11:04:09 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> Message-ID: <6E1F94BC-E8A7-41FF-9A50-E221886E2630@gmail.com> In writing my response to Mike's invitation to post brief summaries etc, I realized something that may explain why there is a question about the usefulness of CHAT in doing empirical work (I'm not saying just research, but work - intentionally). That is that in order to engage with non-academics using CHAT, you have to be able to explain to them why you're doing what you're doing. You can't make the fine distinctions that typify conversations on XMCA. This may sound like simplification with resulting loss of meaning, but I don't think that actually is what happens. Instead, the practice into which you pull people brings out the meaning. But while that's going on, you have to be able to explain what's going on in plain English (or whatever language you're working in). I'm not talking about students. if you're teaching CHAT to students, of course you can use the terminology that has become the standard for CHAT. That's part of what you're teaching. They're expected to be able to use it themselves and join the discussion (cocktail party?). I'm talking about adults with whom one is working on a project., who didn't sign up for having to learn a lot of strange-sounding vocabulary. Getting them on board with the project requires letting them in on the theoretical framework that you are operating with, right? So they don't feel blindsided, and so they can have some control over what's happening. And in order to do that, you've got to minimize the terms of art that require too much background. Helena Worthen hworthen@illinois.edu On Sep 15, 2014, at 9:15 AM, mike cole wrote: > > Lastly, perhaps it would be helpful if those of us who believe that > empirical work guided by CHAT ideas of some value has been produced in, > say, the past two decades, would post brief summiaries of that work with > references. > Maybe its just all verbal sound and fury, signifying the usual! > mike > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Sep 15 11:25:39 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 18:25:39 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] OK -- empirical work "guided by CHAT"? In-Reply-To: <2205B353-0D02-45DD-8DC0-4F307A9B7654@gmail.com> References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> <2205B353-0D02-45DD-8DC0-4F307A9B7654@gmail.com> Message-ID: <8F17DBCE-4805-403E-95EA-C58353573AB8@uniandes.edu.co> On Sep 15, 2014, at 12:31 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > OK -- empirical work "guided by CHAT"? And at ICLS in Boulder in June I gave a presentation describing the work of one of my graduate students, Roc?o Gonzalez, who is studying the practices of pedagogy in a preschool where the main aim is to prepare children to be members of the Muisca community. The Muisca are the indigenous people who were living in the area of what is now Bogot? when the Spanish arrived. Their culture has been declared dead, but in fact they are still around. The focus of the research, and the methodology, are guided by the CHAT perspective. Martin From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Sep 15 11:49:50 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 19:49:50 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: <6E1F94BC-E8A7-41FF-9A50-E221886E2630@gmail.com> References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> <6E1F94BC-E8A7-41FF-9A50-E221886E2630@gmail.com> Message-ID: Helena, It seems to me that an important factor in this kind of participation research is that the workers at the coal-face (who are closer to the "truth" of the situation) recognise the appropriateness of your proffered forms of organisation, which has an objective status as a socialised variant of Polanyi's personal knowledge, i.e. as a necessary methodological component in the fullness of activity. Presumably what you're then looking for is an alignment between your proffered explanation (a tension between two ongoing concerns) and the workers recognition of this as a good fit? Huw On 15 September 2014 19:04, Helena Worthen wrote: > In writing my response to Mike's invitation to post brief summaries etc, I > realized something that may explain why there is a question about the > usefulness of CHAT in doing empirical work (I'm not saying just research, > but work - intentionally). That is that in order to engage with > non-academics using CHAT, you have to be able to explain to them why you're > doing what you're doing. You can't make the fine distinctions that typify > conversations on XMCA. This may sound like simplification with resulting > loss of meaning, but I don't think that actually is what happens. Instead, > the practice into which you pull people brings out the meaning. But while > that's going on, you have to be able to explain what's going on in plain > English (or whatever language you're working in). > > I'm not talking about students. if you're teaching CHAT to students, of > course you can use the terminology that has become the standard for CHAT. > That's part of what you're teaching. They're expected to be able to use it > themselves and join the discussion (cocktail party?). I'm talking about > adults with whom one is working on a project., who didn't sign up for > having to learn a lot of strange-sounding vocabulary. Getting them on board > with the project requires letting them in on the theoretical framework that > you are operating with, right? So they don't feel blindsided, and so they > can have some control over what's happening. And in order to do that, > you've got to minimize the terms of art that require too much background. > > Helena Worthen > hworthen@illinois.edu > > On Sep 15, 2014, at 9:15 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > Lastly, perhaps it would be helpful if those of us who believe that > > empirical work guided by CHAT ideas of some value has been produced in, > > say, the past two decades, would post brief summiaries of that work with > > references. > > Maybe its just all verbal sound and fury, signifying the usual! > > mike > > > > > From leaj@temple.edu Mon Sep 15 10:04:57 2014 From: leaj@temple.edu (Lea Jacobson) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 13:04:57 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Unsubscribe Message-ID: Please remove me from this listserv. Thank you, Lea Jacobson From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Sep 15 12:23:51 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 13:23:51 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> <6E1F94BC-E8A7-41FF-9A50-E221886E2630@gmail.com> Message-ID: All, I am loving this dialog, thinking it is, in its "materiality", a tool for both communication and thinking. I humbly observe that, for me, Langacker provides a psycholinguistic analysis of the grammar of language that helps our understanding of both conceptualization and discourse in general, and this dialog in particular. Grammar is a reification of discourse processes, narrative and dialog being prototypical, AND of categorization. Grammar is constantly in a process of disintegration from below and the entrenchment of new (or recycled) language structures from the top. Typical of this is relaxed pronunciation that, over time, changes the phonological structure of language, but the loss of analyzability affects semantic structure inexorably as well. Concepts that used to be psychologically and socially clear, analyzable, over time, lose their focus and specificity, unless they are constantly a focus of dialog (internal and external). Language use is always both conventional and creative. The conventional is well represented by Andy's constant reminders about what "concept", "artifact" and "mediation" are taken to mean by experts (Vygotsky, Hegel,?). Mike has done his part both by explaining and giving examples (things to read). Let me make clear, that "conventional" is not a dirty word, without it we couldn't communicate! The creative (dynamic, chaotic) is well represented as well as CHAT interlocutors negotiate the blending of the "old" (Vygotsky, Hegel) and the inclusion of new perspectives (Shott, Gibson) to the stage. A project is not only a work in progress, but its primary tool, dialog, is working against the clock to keep both coherence and analyzability. This happens in complex dialog (including with oneself) all the time, where people take the time to be clear, but THAT charge is in tension with the need to "get it out", to talk at the speed of thought. Language use, prototypically dialog, whether with oneself or others, is the crucible not only of synagmatic structure (syntax being prototypical) but of paradigmatic structure, the basis for categorization. Where Langacker and other cognitive linguists part ways with generative linguistics (Chomsky, Postal, etc.) is in including imagery, metaphor, narrative and prototype in construing categorization, not just attribute checklists, enriching the "data base". I think this allows for the synergy of conceptual and pre-conceptual modes of thinking. Reading Andy's "Is Science a Humanity" and "Narratives and Metaphors" was a breakthrough for me on this score. Regarding the XMCA project and the XMA project: temporally the XMCA email chat is at the synchronous side of things (face-to-face dialog being prototypically temporally immediate, not to say unmediated), whereas the XMA publications are at the asynchronous side. Speech and writing, but note how technologically (artefactually) complex our understanding of "media" is compared to when Vygotsky was working and writing! In none of the areas, as I understand it, can we say, definitively what Vygotsky thought. But taken together, and thinking of "the project" (with so many projects nested therein) as society-wide, not just in schools, it (the Kool Aid) drives me on. Henry P.S. Not all of this is Langacker. I have taken also from Dan Slobin on the charges of language, from John Lyons on syntagmatic and paradigmatic thinking, from Vera on creativity, complementarity and cognitive pluralism and am darned sure William James and Chafe are there. On Sep 15, 2014, at 12:49 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Helena, > > It seems to me that an important factor in this kind of participation > research is that the workers at the coal-face (who are closer to the > "truth" of the situation) recognise the appropriateness of your proffered > forms of organisation, which has an objective status as a socialised > variant of Polanyi's personal knowledge, i.e. as a necessary methodological > component in the fullness of activity. Presumably what you're then looking > for is an alignment between your proffered explanation (a tension between > two ongoing concerns) and the workers recognition of this as a good fit? > > Huw > > > > On 15 September 2014 19:04, Helena Worthen wrote: > >> In writing my response to Mike's invitation to post brief summaries etc, I >> realized something that may explain why there is a question about the >> usefulness of CHAT in doing empirical work (I'm not saying just research, >> but work - intentionally). That is that in order to engage with >> non-academics using CHAT, you have to be able to explain to them why you're >> doing what you're doing. You can't make the fine distinctions that typify >> conversations on XMCA. This may sound like simplification with resulting >> loss of meaning, but I don't think that actually is what happens. Instead, >> the practice into which you pull people brings out the meaning. But while >> that's going on, you have to be able to explain what's going on in plain >> English (or whatever language you're working in). >> >> I'm not talking about students. if you're teaching CHAT to students, of >> course you can use the terminology that has become the standard for CHAT. >> That's part of what you're teaching. They're expected to be able to use it >> themselves and join the discussion (cocktail party?). I'm talking about >> adults with whom one is working on a project., who didn't sign up for >> having to learn a lot of strange-sounding vocabulary. Getting them on board >> with the project requires letting them in on the theoretical framework that >> you are operating with, right? So they don't feel blindsided, and so they >> can have some control over what's happening. And in order to do that, >> you've got to minimize the terms of art that require too much background. >> >> Helena Worthen >> hworthen@illinois.edu >> >> On Sep 15, 2014, at 9:15 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >>> >>> Lastly, perhaps it would be helpful if those of us who believe that >>> empirical work guided by CHAT ideas of some value has been produced in, >>> say, the past two decades, would post brief summiaries of that work with >>> references. >>> Maybe its just all verbal sound and fury, signifying the usual! >>> mike >>> >> >> >> From wester@uga.edu Mon Sep 15 13:39:46 2014 From: wester@uga.edu (Katherine Wester Neal) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 20:39:46 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> <6E1F94BC-E8A7-41FF-9A50-E221886E2630@gmail.com> , Message-ID: <657CBBDE-C26A-4D6D-8814-390836E56D2C@uga.edu> Agreed, Henry! This discussion is certainly a tool for expanding my thinking, and I have enjoyed the different examples. After looking around at several different theories, I find Vygotsky's work to be immensely useful in empirical work. For my research, the usefulness of Vygotsky lies in, as Wertsch termed it, "the primacy of mediated action," which puts my work more in the sociocultural vein than the CHAT vein. People are acting all the time, so I study their mediated actions to better understand what they are doing, why they are doing it, and what meaning they derive from it. I recently conducted a small study about how a group of middle grades teacher candidates learned to teach in a university-based teacher education program and another small study about how a group of middle grades language arts teacher thought about their learning from their teacher ed program and whether it helped them as they entered their first teaching job. Currently, I'm working on my dissertation study in which I'm following a group of middle grades language arts teacher candidates to explore how they learn to teach reading during their final year in a teacher ed program. I come to this work with the theory that (to paraphrase Andy's post from this morning) everything these teacher candidates do in their field placements is mediated culturally and historically through the artefacts they choose to use as they are teaching and learning. As to Mike's comment about the sound and the fury, I see that as the major problem facing ed research. What does all this research mean, and what good does it do? I don't have an answer to the problem per se, but I find this forum is a step in the right direction--that is, toward amassing a large body of work that advances the importance of culture as the defining factor in all that humans do in the world. I think if more people were drinking that Koolaid, it would be a good thing! On Sep 15, 2014, at 3:33 PM, "Henry G. Shonerd III" wrote: All, I am loving this dialog, thinking it is, in its "materiality", a tool for both communication and thinking. I humbly observe that, for me, Langacker provides a psycholinguistic analysis of the grammar of language that helps our understanding of both conceptualization and discourse in general, and this dialog in particular. Grammar is a reification of discourse processes, narrative and dialog being prototypical, AND of categorization. Grammar is constantly in a process of disintegration from below and the entrenchment of new (or recycled) language structures from the top. Typical of this is relaxed pronunciation that, over time, changes the phonological structure of language, but the loss of analyzability affects semantic structure inexorably as well. Concepts that used to be psychologically and socially clear, analyzable, over time, lose their focus and specificity, unless they are constantly a focus of dialog (internal and external). Language use is always both conventional and creative. The conventional is well represented by Andy's constant reminders about what "concept", "artifact" and "mediation" are taken to mean by experts (Vygotsky, Hegel,?). Mike has done his part both by explaining and giving examples (things to read). Let me make clear, that "conventional" is not a dirty word, without it we couldn't communicate! The creative (dynamic, chaotic) is well represented as well as CHAT interlocutors negotiate the blending of the "old" (Vygotsky, Hegel) and the inclusion of new perspectives (Shott, Gibson) to the stage. A project is not only a work in progress, but its primary tool, dialog, is working against the clock to keep both coherence and analyzability. This happens in complex dialog (including with oneself) all the time, where people take the time to be clear, but THAT charge is in tension with the need to "get it out", to talk at the speed of thought. Language use, prototypically dialog, whether with oneself or others, is the crucible not only of synagmatic structure (syntax being prototypical) but of paradigmatic structure, the basis for categorization. Where Langacker and other cognitive linguists part ways with generative linguistics (Chomsky, Postal, etc.) is in including imagery, metaphor, narrative and prototype in construing categorization, not just attribute checklists, enriching the "data base". I think this allows for the synergy of conceptual and pre-conceptual modes of thinking. Reading Andy's "Is Science a Humanity" and "Narratives and Metaphors" was a breakthrough for me on this score. Regarding the XMCA project and the XMA project: temporally the XMCA email chat is at the synchronous side of things (face-to-face dialog being prototypically temporally immediate, not to say unmediated), whereas the XMA publications are at the asynchronous side. Speech and writing, but note how technologically (artefactually) complex our understanding of "media" is compared to when Vygotsky was working and writing! In none of the areas, as I understand it, can we say, definitively what Vygotsky thought. But taken together, and thinking of "the project" (with so many projects nested therein) as society-wide, not just in schools, it (the Kool Aid) drives me on. Henry P.S. Not all of this is Langacker. I have taken also from Dan Slobin on the charges of language, from John Lyons on syntagmatic and paradigmatic thinking, from Vera on creativity, complementarity and cognitive pluralism and am darned sure William James and Chafe are there. > On Sep 15, 2014, at 12:49 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > Helena, > > It seems to me that an important factor in this kind of participation > research is that the workers at the coal-face (who are closer to the > "truth" of the situation) recognise the appropriateness of your proffered > forms of organisation, which has an objective status as a socialised > variant of Polanyi's personal knowledge, i.e. as a necessary methodological > component in the fullness of activity. Presumably what you're then looking > for is an alignment between your proffered explanation (a tension between > two ongoing concerns) and the workers recognition of this as a good fit? > > Huw > > > >> On 15 September 2014 19:04, Helena Worthen wrote: >> >> In writing my response to Mike's invitation to post brief summaries etc, I >> realized something that may explain why there is a question about the >> usefulness of CHAT in doing empirical work (I'm not saying just research, >> but work - intentionally). That is that in order to engage with >> non-academics using CHAT, you have to be able to explain to them why you're >> doing what you're doing. You can't make the fine distinctions that typify >> conversations on XMCA. This may sound like simplification with resulting >> loss of meaning, but I don't think that actually is what happens. Instead, >> the practice into which you pull people brings out the meaning. But while >> that's going on, you have to be able to explain what's going on in plain >> English (or whatever language you're working in). >> >> I'm not talking about students. if you're teaching CHAT to students, of >> course you can use the terminology that has become the standard for CHAT. >> That's part of what you're teaching. They're expected to be able to use it >> themselves and join the discussion (cocktail party?). I'm talking about >> adults with whom one is working on a project., who didn't sign up for >> having to learn a lot of strange-sounding vocabulary. Getting them on board >> with the project requires letting them in on the theoretical framework that >> you are operating with, right? So they don't feel blindsided, and so they >> can have some control over what's happening. And in order to do that, >> you've got to minimize the terms of art that require too much background. >> >> Helena Worthen >> hworthen@illinois.edu >> >>> On Sep 15, 2014, at 9:15 AM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> >>> Lastly, perhaps it would be helpful if those of us who believe that >>> empirical work guided by CHAT ideas of some value has been produced in, >>> say, the past two decades, would post brief summiaries of that work with >>> references. >>> Maybe its just all verbal sound and fury, signifying the usual! >>> mike From dkirsh@lsu.edu Mon Sep 15 14:26:09 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 21:26:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> Message-ID: Mike, Clearly, as in Katherine Neal's response, and in MCA, CHAT/sociocultural theory informs empirical research. What's less clear is that empirical research informs CHAT/sociocultural theorizing. Not quite sure what to make of that. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 11:15 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse Your followup comment is closely related to the second part of your initiating message, David. So i will respond in line. Firstly, I think it would be helpful to distinguish between MCA and xmca. The idea behind xmca was to provide a discussion forum for articles that appear in MCA so that instead of authors having to wait 2+ years for feedback on their ideas (which rarely comes, even then!), we could discuss the published work and learn from it in a timely manner. By an large, that effort has, in my opinion, failed. Thanks to the recent decision to have the editors pick out articles for discussion which include the author(s) in the discussion, this situation has been somewhat mitigated. But only somewhat. xma discussions have all the characteristics of Vygotskian chaining, as a rule. Secondly, when I take down a bundle of recent MCA issues and look at the titles, they at least sound like they are about empirical matters ranging across a wide variety of content areas. Are you saying that these articles are not really empirical? Or that they are not really helping us to develop better methods to deal with perceived problems of social value? Again, this raises the question of "MCA or xmca". Lastly, perhaps it would be helpful if those of us who believe that empirical work guided by CHAT ideas of some value has been produced in, say, the past two decades, would post brief summiaries of that work with references. Maybe its just all verbal sound and fury, signifying the usual! mike On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 8:50 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: > Does CHAT theory really advance with respect to empirical studies? > If so, then why isn't the XMCA discussion a discussion about > so-and-so's empirical results and how we should interpret them? > Various branches of psychology (e.g., cognitive and developmental) do > address concepts, and do conduct empirical research related to concepts. > It's true, they rarely enter into full-blooded discussion of what is a > concept. But perhaps that's because they're scientists rather than > philosophers. They're operating within a framework that is bounded > primarily by empirical and methodological expectations and > obligations; theory evolves within those boundaries. > It's not clear to me that the Vygotskyan research community ever > operated in that fashion, and I'm wondering what would happen if it did. > David > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 10:23 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > > Well, Lisa, I think that is a project which requires a lot of what > David would call "philosophical" discussion. :) The Psychology of > Concepts, as it is know to American psychology, i.e., the "mainstream" > do endless laboratory tests and questionnaires and surveys and so far > as I can see have still haven't figured out what a concept is. > Andy > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > > Well I am guilty for being fixated about thinking and talking about > > methods and how to better understand how we can make a trustworthy > > leap from understanding the world to understanding concepts. Again > > just talking aloud. > > > > Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > > Psychology and Counseling > > http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey > > Education Complex > > IT Online Program Coordinator University > > of Tennessee > > http://itonline.utk.edu/ > > Knoxville, TN 37996 > > https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > > 865-974-7712 > > > > On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > > I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and we all have > > our specific research interests. > > But when we publish, most of us have something to report. > > I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more of my share of > > time arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest. > > Andy > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > > > > Why is it that we came to what David stated as: > > > > Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over > > facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical > > elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost > > completely detached from empirical specifics. > > > > > > > > Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > > Psychology and Counseling > > http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 > > Bailey Education Complex > > IT Online Program Coordinator > > University of Tennessee > > http://itonline.utk.edu/ > > Knoxville, TN 37996 > > https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > > 865-974-7712 > > > > On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner > > > >> wrote: > > > > Andy, > > > > I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific > > project, > > though it might initially have been conceived as such. > > Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over > > facts." > > We are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, > > distinctions, and qualifications almost completely > > detached from > > empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even > > at the > > level of theory, we're not all playing the same game. > > > > I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that > > claims be > > framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the > > significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical > > setting > > theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In > > this case, > > there is a possibility that disagreements lead to > > separation of > > research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical agreement > > as a > > consequence. > > > > David > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net > > > > >] > > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM > > To: David H Kirshner > > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse > > > > David, > > CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science > > it > must > > strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are > > meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which > > they > > are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a > > system of > > concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental > > finding, but still not agree on the significance of that > > claim. We > > CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over > > facts; > > all of this is possible only to the extent that we share > > concepts. > > "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal > > as it > > is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is > > ill-conceived to > > think that this is a means of consolidating a current of > > research > > like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological, > > I don't > > think that makes any difference. > > Andy > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > David H Kirshner wrote: > > > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it > > seems > > inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing > > efforts > > to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from > > efforts > to > > solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In > > tandem, is > > ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or > > philosophical > > discourse. > > > > > > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of > > CHAT > > would not be better served by embedding theoretical > > discussion in > > analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be > > to make > > CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application > > (though that > > would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation > > might > > transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of > > methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated > > into > > distinct psychological schools, each constrained by > > methodological > > strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical > > environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community > > could > > look across these various schools to pursue broader > > philosophical > > problematics. > > > > > > David > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >] On Behalf Of Andy > > Blunden > > > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM > > > To: Huw Lloyd > > > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct > > perception > > > > > > Ah! I see! > > > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in > > nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally > > contain > > both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem > > with anyone > > saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where > > it > is > > appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of > > Vygotsky, > > that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially > > productive unit of analysis for science is lost if > > mediation in > > the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with > > artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is > > lost. > > Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point > > you were > > referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." > > > > > > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I > > can do > > what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or > > thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my > > actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or > > whatever - > > but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are > > products of the history and culture into which I was born. > > I can > > choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce > > them. So every action I take is essentially > > cultural-historical as > > well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material > > objects, > > their physical form is the same for everyone, it is > > universal. So > > communication as much as miscommunication takes place through > > everyone interpreting the same material objects, > > artefacts, that I > > am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because > > they > too > > mediate their actions with the same set of universal > > artefacts! So > > all human action is opened to cultural and historical > analysis > > which is as objective as any branch of natural science. > > Wonderful, eh? > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > -- > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > > >> If you want to study how action changes then you need > > to study the > > >> history and production of the action. Under such > > circumstances, > > >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production > > of) actions > > >> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, > > through > > >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then > > it may seem > > >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. > > >> > > >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) > > are an elegant > > >> way to demonstrate this. > > >> > > >> Best, > > >> Huw > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > > > > > > > >> > > >>> wrote: > > >> > > >> he, he, Huw! > > >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are > > the very > > >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! > > and I > > really > > >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally > > being > > used to > > >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is > > not equal to > > >> separation. > > >> I really don't know what you are referring to with > > product and > > >> history. Perhaps you could explain? > > >> Andy > > >> > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> Huw Lloyd wrote: > > >> > > >> I agree about precision, but not with a call > > for "clarity". > > >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or > > reification of the > > >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails > > typologies or > > >> other simplistic devices which prevent the > > conception and > > >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in > > cases such as > > >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the > > entanglements > > >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would > > be equally > > >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that > one > > needs to > > >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. > > >> > > >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which > > leads me to > > >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, > > why separate > > >> the act from its production and history? > > >> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple > > clarity from > > >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the > > problem. > > >> > > >> Best, > > >> Huw > > >> > > >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > > > > > > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > >>>> > > > > wrote: > > >> > > >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that > > in the CHAT > > >> tradition > > >> specifically, as opposed to the English > > language in > > general, > > >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of > > course, every > > >> action > > >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many > > discursive > > >> contexts, > > >> "mediation" is a concept which may be > > evoked quite > > >> legitimately, > > >> but with no special significant for the use of > > CHAT. In social > > >> theory, for example, mediation of > > activities by other > > >> activities > > >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as > > mediation of > > actions by > > >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. > > But if > > the topic is > > >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so > > central, that I > > >> prefer to spell it out and use the term > > >> "artefact-mediated" rather > > >> than the vague term "mediated". > > >> > > >> I have come across usages like "mediated by > > such-and-such a > > >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can > > use words to > > >> mean what > > >> you like, but I find a formulation like > > this in the > > context of > > >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the > > idea of > > >> "mediation" in > > >> the most general sense in a way which > > obscures the > > fact that a > > >> concept is not immediately present in any > > act of > > >> communication or > > >> any other act, and therefore *cannot > > mediate actions*. > > >> Artefacts, > > >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a > > concept, can of > > >> course mediate an act of communication. But > the > > point is > > >> that a > > >> word is not universally and unproblematically > a > > sign for > > >> any one > > >> concept. It means different things to > > different people. > > >> Concepts > > >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal > > in their > > >> materiality, > > >> but particular in their meaning. So when we > > have a > > concept > > >> in mind > > >> when we use a word in communication, the > > communication is > > >> mediated > > >> by the word not the concept, and it is a > > mistake > > not to be > > >> aware > > >> of that. > > >> > > >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were > > always used in > > >> qualified > > >> way so that its specific meaning is made > clear. > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his > > comment, too. > > >> > > >> > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> Greg Thompson wrote: > > >> > > >> Does "mediation" only apply to language > and > > culture? > > >> > > >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in > > which case we > > >> would need > > >> to include > > >> reflexes) > > >> > > >> And does it include our socio-contextual > > surround as in > > >> Bateson's man with > > >> the stick? (in which case, we would > > need to include > > >> newborns). > > >> > > >> Just wonderin'. > > >> > > >> -greg > > >> > > >> > > >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David > > H Kirshner > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > >>>> wrote: > > >> > > >> > > >> Thanks for replies. > > >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim > > Greeno > > decided > > >> to stop > > >> talking about > > >> situated cognition because the > > pragmatics of > > >> adjectival > > >> use implies there > > >> has to be a contrasting non-situated > > cognition. He now > > >> speaks of > > >> situativity theory. It seems, with the > > exception of > > >> physical reflexes (and > > >> perhaps pre-conscious infant > > activity), all > > human > > >> action > > >> is mediated (and > > >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as > > well). So, it's > > >> worth noting that > > >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a > > kind of > > >> action, but > > >> rather a > > >> theoretical assumption about all human > > action; though > > >> there seems to be > > >> some variation in interpretation of > > what that > > >> assumption > > >> entails. > > >> David > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Mon Sep 15 16:15:25 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 20:15:25 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Academic Positions in Chile Message-ID: <142480EC-2C6B-4C22-B7E0-80CEF559E0D5@gmail.com> The School of Psychology of the Pontificia Universidad Cat?lica de Chile invites applications for three tenure track full time faculty positions at the Assistant Professor level in the fields of Clinical Psychology; Educational Psychology and/or Developmental Psychology; and Industrial/Organizational Psychology. The positions involve research and teaching. Applicants must demonstrate the potential to develop a line of independent and original research of international relevance. The Assistant Professors are expected to conduct teaching at the graduate and undergraduate level. The language of instruction in these programs is Spanish; therefore, candidates must demonstrate fluency in this language. The positions are tenure-track positions and they are normed by the Reglamento Acad?mico UC (available online or upon request.) The Pontificia Universidad Cat?lica de Chile is a leading Latin American University, consistently ranked among the best universities in the region. Faculty working at the School of Psychology teaches in our undergraduate program, in one of the professional master programs offered by the school, as well as in one of three active doctoral programs of the School: in Psychology, Neurosciences and Psychotherapy. Our faculty develops basic and applied research in diverse areas of psychology and participates in a large number of international collaborations with universities across the globe. More information about the School can be found at http://psicologia.uc.cl Applicants must hold a completed PhD in Psychology or related disciplines (Cognitive Science, Education, Administration, or others in the Social Sciences). To ensure full consideration, please send a letter of application, curriculum vitae, statement of research program and teaching approach (2500 words including both), and a representative publication. The documentation must be sent in PDF format to msepulvm@uc.cl until November 15th, 2014, with the subject " Concurso Academico EPUC". Candidates must specify which of the three positions they are applying for. Additionally, applicants must have three letters of recommendation sent as a PDF to msepulvm@uc.cl indicating in the subject "Concurso Academico EPUC" and the text of the email the name of the applicant. The letters must be signed and sent from the e-mail of the recommender. Applicants to the Clinical Psychology position must hold a professional degree in psychology, which allows the candidate to work in Chile as a licensed professional psychologist. Additionally, applicants to the Clinical Psychology position must be accredited as Psychotherapist and Supervisor by the Comisi?n Nacional de Psic?logos Cl?nicos de Chile. If the degree is not from a Chilean university, the applicant should inquire whether his or her degree might be validated in Chile. For international applicants, the committee may consider a temporary position of one year, with an extension conditional on the attainment of the Chilean license during that period Questions may be made to David Preiss, Director of the School of Psychology, in the e-mail: davidpreiss@uc.cl David Preiss, Ph.D. Director Escuela de Psicolog?a Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile Av Vicu?a Mackenna - 4860 7820436 Macul Santiago, Chile Fono: (562) 3544635 Fax: (562) 3544844 web: https://sites.google.com/site/daviddpreiss/ From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Mon Sep 15 16:15:38 2014 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 17:15:38 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> , Message-ID: greetings, David - in my experience, when xmc a participants discuss a paper from MCA it doesn't appear that there is any discussion uses the research to critique CHAT/sociocultural theorizing. it doesn't seem to be an object of xmca - and i can't think of examples when the MCA paper has been used to clarify particular theoretical points. however, i've no data to back up these two statements - they are instead a reflection of my general impression. in my own research when i've used CHAT/sociocultural theory to explicate the activities i've documented in my research, i have come to not see the value of attempting to identify motives. the field of motivational theory is highly complex what with intrinsic / extrinsic categories, much less all of the other categories. in fact, it seems to me that motivational theories are much like Maslow's theory of needs hierarchy - there's no research that supports it, even though it is taught as a concrete reality. it's much like Perry's initial theory of adult development, or Kohlberg's hierarchy of moral development, not to mention Piaget's stages of development: they have all merely formalized cultural beliefs of western white male heterosexuals and pronounced their understandings as universal. just as problematic for me, i've always found Leontiev's example of the tribal hunt as an example of shared motives. the fact that people are working together on a joint activity does not indicate that they have shared motives, and i've yet to read any research in which the researcher can demonstrate with clear evidence that participants in a shared activity also all have the same motives. on the other hand, i just finished reading "A Pedagogy of Powerful Communication; Youth radio and radio arts in the multilingual classroom", an ethnography of high school students in which community members mediate the students' thinking, emotions and creative productions. the ethnography was written by Dana Walker, published by Peter Lang 2014. it's an interactional ethnography working with sociocultural psychology. she employs as support for the theoretical foundations the works of Gutierrez, Moll, Wertsch, Rogoff, Lave, Wenger, Bakhtin, Cole, Gee, Lemke, Leander, to name but a few of our contemporary xmca-ers. (well, excluding Bakhtin). while Walker does not critique CHAT/sociocultural theory, she does expand the understanding for those interested in how to work towards a pedagogy of powerful communication. well, my two-bits worth and as always quite half-baked. phillip ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David H Kirshner [dkirsh@lsu.edu] Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 3:26 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse Mike, Clearly, as in Katherine Neal's response, and in MCA, CHAT/sociocultural theory informs empirical research. What's less clear is that empirical research informs CHAT/sociocultural theorizing. Not quite sure what to make of that. David greetings, From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Sep 15 16:19:51 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 17:19:51 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <5416EACE.4040505@mira.net> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> <54165C68.7010802@mira.net> <5416D548.4080406@mira.net> <5416EACE.4040505@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, Were you able to read Larry's rather long email on Merleau-Ponty? esp. his criticism of the "sensation fallacy"? I ask b.c. it seems to resonate well with your ideas about sensation having no meaning if it isn't mediated. Do you see connections? I'm partly wondering b.c. I have heard others mention connections between M-P and Vygotsky before but have never been able to see those connections before... -greg On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 7:34 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Carol Macdonald wrote: > >> Hi Andy, >> >> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the >> same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only >> universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of >> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >> - as yet potential understanding >> - a total lack of understanding. >> > That's the whole point, Carol! a given material artefact has a certain > *material* form which is universal, but it is subject to interpretation, > that is, meaning is ascribed to it by a person, and different people at > different times will ascribe different meanings to it. But the meaning of > the word "material" is what is outside of consciousness and independent of > activity. The independent existence of the material world is what makes > science possible. > > And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if >> we are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take >> in fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And >> of course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) >> I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema >> Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >> > By "unmediated sensation" I presume you mean that aspect of a sensation > which is unmediated. All sensations are both immediate and mediated. This > is what I take to be the core meaning of "dual-stimulation." Were you to be > subject to an unmediated sensation (maybe soon after you were born) then it > would have no meaning for you and would therefore be no sensation at all. > But if it has a meaning, that is because of the mediation of the sensation > by aspects of your consciousness. > > Here of course the mediation being talked of is not artefact-mediation. :) > > Andy > >> >> Carol >> >> >> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Ah! I see! >> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature >> or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both >> immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem with anyone >> saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is >> appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of Vygotsky, >> that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially >> productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation in >> the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with >> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. >> Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point you were >> referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." >> >> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do >> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or >> thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my >> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or whatever - >> but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are >> products of the history and culture into which I was born. I can >> choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce >> them. So every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as >> well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material objects, >> their physical form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So >> communication as much as miscommunication takes place through >> everyone interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I >> am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too >> mediate their actions with the same set of universal artefacts! So >> all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis >> which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, eh? >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study >> the history and production of the action. Under such >> circumstances, assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the >> production of) actions become more obviously false. If one >> has simplified, through "clarity", the action away from its >> genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >> cannot mediate an action. >> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an >> elegant way to demonstrate this. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: >> >> he, he, Huw! >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I >> really >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being >> used to >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >> separation. >> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >> history. Perhaps you could explain? >> Andy >> ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> I agree about precision, but not with a call for >> "clarity". Reduction to clarity is a projection or >> reification of the >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails >> typologies or >> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases >> such as >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one >> needs to >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >> >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which >> leads me to >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why >> separate >> the act from its production and history? Of >> course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >> >> > >> >> >> > >>> wrote: >> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >> tradition >> specifically, as opposed to the English language >> in general, >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of >> course, every >> action >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >> contexts, >> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >> legitimately, >> but with no special significant for the use of >> CHAT. In social >> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >> activities >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of >> actions by >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if >> the topic is >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so >> central, that I >> prefer to spell it out and use the term >> "artefact-mediated" rather >> than the vague term "mediated". >> >> I have come across usages like "mediated by >> such-and-such a >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use >> words to >> mean what >> you like, but I find a formulation like this in >> the context of >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >> "mediation" in >> the most general sense in a way which obscures the >> fact that a >> concept is not immediately present in any act of >> communication or >> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >> Artefacts, >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a >> concept, can of >> course mediate an act of communication. But the >> point is >> that a >> word is not universally and unproblematically a >> sign for >> any one >> concept. It means different things to different >> people. >> Concepts >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >> materiality, >> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a >> concept >> in mind >> when we use a word in communication, the >> communication is >> mediated >> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake >> not to be >> aware >> of that. >> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always >> used in >> qualified >> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >> >> Andy >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his >> comment, too. >> ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Greg Thompson wrote: >> >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and >> culture? >> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >> would need >> to include >> reflexes) >> >> And does it include our socio-contextual >> surround as in >> Bateson's man with >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to >> include >> newborns). >> >> Just wonderin'. >> >> -greg >> >> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >> >> > >> >> >>> wrote: >> >> Thanks for replies. >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno >> decided >> to stop >> talking about >> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >> adjectival >> use implies there >> has to be a contrasting non-situated >> cognition. He now >> speaks of >> situativity theory. It seems, with the >> exception of >> physical reflexes (and >> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), >> all human >> action >> is mediated (and >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as >> well). So, it's >> worth noting that >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >> action, but >> rather a >> theoretical assumption about all human >> action; though >> there seems to be >> some variation in interpretation of what that >> assumption >> entails. >> David >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> Developmental psycholinguist >> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of >> Linguistics, Unisa >> >> >> >> > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 15 17:22:50 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 10:22:50 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> <54165C68.7010802@mira.net> <5416D548.4080406@mira.net> <5416EACE.4040505@mira.net> Message-ID: <541782DA.9030505@mira.net> What I was saying about sensation comes form Hegel, Greg, continuing Paul's comment about Kant. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Greg Thompson wrote: > Andy, > Were you able to read Larry's rather long email on Merleau-Ponty? esp. > his criticism of the "sensation fallacy"? > I ask b.c. it seems to resonate well with your ideas about sensation > having no meaning if it isn't mediated. Do you see connections? > I'm partly wondering b.c. I have heard others mention connections > between M-P and Vygotsky before but have never been able to see those > connections before... > -greg > > > On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 7:34 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > Carol Macdonald wrote: > > Hi Andy, > > This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, > but at the same time purports to account for "everything". > But are there really only universal artefacts? There must be > at least the possibility of > - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; > - as yet potential understanding > - a total lack of understanding. > > That's the whole point, Carol! a given material artefact has a > certain *material* form which is universal, but it is subject to > interpretation, that is, meaning is ascribed to it by a person, > and different people at different times will ascribe different > meanings to it. But the meaning of the word "material" is what is > outside of consciousness and independent of activity. The > independent existence of the material world is what makes science > possible. > > And there is still the need to account for unmediated > sensation - so if we are hungry, we need to eat; but the > eating is mediated. We need to take in fluid, but everything > apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of course we > serve water in culturally mediated ways.) > I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands > your schema Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. > > By "unmediated sensation" I presume you mean that aspect of a > sensation which is unmediated. All sensations are both immediate > and mediated. This is what I take to be the core meaning of > "dual-stimulation." Were you to be subject to an unmediated > sensation (maybe soon after you were born) then it would have no > meaning for you and would therefore be no sensation at all. But if > it has a meaning, that is because of the mediation of the > sensation by aspects of your consciousness. > > Here of course the mediation being talked of is not > artefact-mediation. :) > > Andy > > > Carol > > > On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden >> wrote: > > Ah! I see! > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in > nature > or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain > both > immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem with anyone > saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is > appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of > Vygotsky, > that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially > productive unit of analysis for science is lost if > mediation in > the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with > artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is > lost. > Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point > you were > referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." > > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do > what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or > thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my > actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or > whatever - > but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are > products of the history and culture into which I was born. > I can > choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce > them. So every action I take is essentially > cultural-historical as > well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material > objects, > their physical form is the same for everyone, it is > universal. So > communication as much as miscommunication takes place through > everyone interpreting the same material objects, > artefacts, that I > am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too > mediate their actions with the same set of universal > artefacts! So > all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis > which is as objective as any branch of natural science. > Wonderful, eh? > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > If you want to study how action changes then you need > to study > the history and production of the action. Under such > circumstances, assertions that concepts cannot mediate > (the > production of) actions become more obviously false. > If one > has simplified, through "clarity", the action away > from its > genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a > concept > cannot mediate an action. > > The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) > are an > elegant way to demonstrate this. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > > > > > >>> wrote: > > he, he, Huw! > For me, reduction, simplification and typology are > the very > problems that need to be remedied by > clarification! and I > really > don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally > being > used to > obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is > not equal to > separation. > I really don't know what you are referring to with > product and > history. Perhaps you could explain? > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > I agree about precision, but not with a call for > "clarity". Reduction to clarity is a projection or > reification of the > need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails > typologies or > other simplistic devices which prevent the > conception and > perception of genetic relations. Actually in > cases > such as > these we are interested in (clarifying) the > entanglements > between artefacts and mind. I think It would > be equally > appropriate and meaning-prompting to state > that one > needs to > obfuscate (see darkly) too. > > I think it is this "need for simplification" which > leads me to > disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why > separate > the act from its production and history? > Of > course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity > from > modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the > problem. > > Best, > Huw > > On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > > > > >> > > > > > > >>>> wrote: > > My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that > in the CHAT > tradition > specifically, as opposed to the English > language > in general, > mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of > course, every > action > is both mediated and immediate, and in > many discursive > contexts, > "mediation" is a concept which may be > evoked quite > legitimately, > but with no special significant for the use of > CHAT. In social > theory, for example, mediation of > activities by other > activities > or institutions is as ubiquitous as > mediation of > actions by > artefacts is in the domain of psychology. > But if > the topic is > psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so > central, that I > prefer to spell it out and use the term > "artefact-mediated" rather > than the vague term "mediated". > > I have come across usages like "mediated by > such-and-such a > concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use > words to > mean what > you like, but I find a formulation like > this in > the context of > CHAT problematic, because it is using the > idea of > "mediation" in > the most general sense in a way which > obscures the > fact that a > concept is not immediately present in any > act of > communication or > any other act, and therefore *cannot > mediate actions*. > Artefacts, > such as spoken words, which may be signs for a > concept, can of > course mediate an act of communication. > But the > point is > that a > word is not universally and > unproblematically a > sign for > any one > concept. It means different things to > different > people. > Concepts > are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal > in their > materiality, > but particular in their meaning. So when > we have a > concept > in mind > when we use a word in communication, the > communication is > mediated > by the word not the concept, and it is a > mistake > not to be > aware > of that. > > So I would prefer it if "mediation" were > always > used in > qualified > way so that its specific meaning is made > clear. > > Andy > PS. And David Ki is completely right in his > comment, too. > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > Does "mediation" only apply to > language and > culture? > > Or does it include nerve fibers? (in > which case we > would need > to include > reflexes) > > And does it include our socio-contextual > surround as in > Bateson's man with > the stick? (in which case, we would > need to > include > newborns). > > Just wonderin'. > > -greg > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David > H Kirshner > > > > >> > > > > > >>>> wrote: > > Thanks for replies. > I'm recalling several years ago > Jim Greeno > decided > to stop > talking about > situated cognition because the > pragmatics of > adjectival > use implies there > has to be a contrasting non-situated > cognition. He now > speaks of > situativity theory. It seems, with the > exception of > physical reflexes (and > perhaps pre-conscious infant > activity), > all human > action > is mediated (and > perhaps a lot of non-human action, as > well). So, it's > worth noting that > "mediated action" doesn't specify > a kind of > action, but > rather a > theoretical assumption about all human > action; though > there seems to be > some variation in interpretation > of what that > assumption > entails. > David > > > > > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: > Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 15 17:38:59 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 10:38:59 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: <54170DCC.5040001@gmail.com> References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> <54170DCC.5040001@gmail.com> Message-ID: <541786A3.7040806@mira.net> Jenna, my observation has to be read within the rubric of CHAT. Your response participates what I called the "contested self-definition" of the object of science, taking place within science. But was I referring to is that project, in which people write books critiquing each other, work in buildings with names of the sciences on them and attend conferences purporting to be scientific conferences, subjects are taught at school and programs run on TV all describing each other as "science" and thereby constituting "science" a a project. That is, I am talking about something objective, something which one can study and learn about and even write books like "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" about, and observe over time the changing self-definitions of the object of science within. OK? Activities define *their own* objects. Contesting that definition is certainly part of being a scientist, but science, as an activity or institution, is not dependant on what you and I, writing here on xmca in 2014, says it is. The concept of science is immanent in the activity of science, is constituted by it and constitutes it. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Jenna McWilliams wrote: > This is a great cocktail party! Who's hosting it, anyway, and do they > mind that we trashed the kitchen? > > I wanted to weigh in on a side point that Andy made. He wrote: > By "scientific project" I mean it is part of a larger project called > "Science." > It is not up to you or me to define "science", this is a project which > has been going on for about 400 years in its modern form and more than > 2000 years since it first got started. It has its own system of > concepts, including its various, contested self-definitions. These are > objective, inasmuch as your question has to be answered by studying > the concepts by means of which science organises itself. > > I believe it is very much up to you and me to define "science"--to use > CHAT, concepts of mediation, critical theories, empirically derived > theories or any other tool at our disposal to challenge science's "own > system of concepts, including its various, contested > self-definitions." In fact, many scholars (lots of whom, for reasons > that may be important or not, are not active members of this listserv) > have been contesting the larger project called "Science" quite > pointedly and effectively for quite a long time. > > > > > -- > Jenna McWilliams > Learning Sciences Program, University of Colorado > j.mcwilliams@colorado.edu > > > > David H Kirshner wrote: >> By "scientific project" I mean it is part of a larger project called >> "Science." >> It is not up to you or me to define "science", this is a project >> which has been going on for about 400 years in its modern form and >> more than 2000 years since it first got started. It has its own >> system of concepts, including its various, contested >> self-definitions. These are objective, inasmuch as your question has >> to be answered by studying the concepts by means of which science >> organises itself. From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 15 17:58:49 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 10:58:49 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> Message-ID: <54178B49.9070205@mira.net> David, in the recently published book, "Collaborative Projects. An Interdisciplinary Study," authors were invited to submit studies with empirical content (in the sense in which you are using the word) which illustrated the use of the concept of "project" within CHAT. https://www.academia.edu/6756231/Collaborative_Projects._An_Interdisciplinary_Study As you can see from the Table of Contents, more than a dozen different practical studies were contributed, and I am satisfied that the collection functioned to illuminate the philosophical issues about the nature of "an activity," and its ue as a unit of analysis, even though they are only explicitly addressed in the long Introduction. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David H Kirshner wrote: > Mike, > > Clearly, as in Katherine Neal's response, and in MCA, CHAT/sociocultural theory informs empirical research. > What's less clear is that empirical research informs CHAT/sociocultural theorizing. > Not quite sure what to make of that. > > David > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 11:15 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > > Your followup comment is closely related to the second part of your initiating message, David. So i will respond in line. > > Firstly, I think it would be helpful to distinguish between MCA and xmca. > The idea behind xmca was to provide a discussion forum for articles that appear in MCA so that instead of authors having to wait 2+ years for feedback on their ideas (which rarely comes, even then!), we could discuss the published work and learn from it in a timely manner. By an large, that effort has, in my opinion, failed. Thanks to the recent decision to have the editors pick out articles for discussion which include the author(s) in the discussion, this situation has been somewhat mitigated. But only somewhat. xma discussions have all the characteristics of Vygotskian chaining, as a rule. > > Secondly, when I take down a bundle of recent MCA issues and look at the titles, they at least sound like they are about empirical matters ranging across a wide variety of content areas. Are you saying that these articles are not really empirical? Or that they are not really helping us to develop better methods to deal with perceived problems of social value? Again, this raises the question of "MCA or xmca". > > Lastly, perhaps it would be helpful if those of us who believe that empirical work guided by CHAT ideas of some value has been produced in, say, the past two decades, would post brief summiaries of that work with references. > Maybe its just all verbal sound and fury, signifying the usual! > mike > > On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 8:50 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: > > >> Does CHAT theory really advance with respect to empirical studies? >> If so, then why isn't the XMCA discussion a discussion about >> so-and-so's empirical results and how we should interpret them? >> Various branches of psychology (e.g., cognitive and developmental) do >> address concepts, and do conduct empirical research related to concepts. >> It's true, they rarely enter into full-blooded discussion of what is a >> concept. But perhaps that's because they're scientists rather than >> philosophers. They're operating within a framework that is bounded >> primarily by empirical and methodological expectations and >> obligations; theory evolves within those boundaries. >> It's not clear to me that the Vygotskyan research community ever >> operated in that fashion, and I'm wondering what would happen if it did. >> David >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 10:23 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse >> >> Well, Lisa, I think that is a project which requires a lot of what >> David would call "philosophical" discussion. :) The Psychology of >> Concepts, as it is know to American psychology, i.e., the "mainstream" >> do endless laboratory tests and questionnaires and surveys and so far >> as I can see have still haven't figured out what a concept is. >> Andy >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: >> >>> Well I am guilty for being fixated about thinking and talking about >>> methods and how to better understand how we can make a trustworthy >>> leap from understanding the world to understanding concepts. Again >>> just talking aloud. >>> >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational >>> Psychology and Counseling >>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey >>> Education Complex >>> IT Online Program Coordinator University >>> of Tennessee >>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ >>> Knoxville, TN 37996 >>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: >>> 865-974-7712 >>> >>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >>> >>> I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and we all have >>> our specific research interests. >>> But when we publish, most of us have something to report. >>> I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more of my share of >>> time arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest. >>> Andy >>> >>> >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >> >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: >>> >>> Why is it that we came to what David stated as: >>> >>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over >>> facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical >>> elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost >>> completely detached from empirical specifics. >>> >>> >>> >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational >>> Psychology and Counseling >>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 >>> Bailey Education Complex >>> IT Online Program Coordinator >>> University of Tennessee >>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ >>> Knoxville, TN 37996 >>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: >>> 865-974-7712 >>> >>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner >>> >> >> wrote: >>> >>> Andy, >>> >>> I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific >>> project, >>> though it might initially have been conceived as such. >>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over >>> facts." >>> We are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, >>> distinctions, and qualifications almost completely >>> detached from >>> empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even >>> at the >>> level of theory, we're not all playing the same game. >>> >>> I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that >>> claims be >>> framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the >>> significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical >>> setting >>> theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In >>> this case, >>> there is a possibility that disagreements lead to >>> separation of >>> research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical agreement >>> as a >>> consequence. >>> >>> David >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net >>> >>> >] >>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM >>> To: David H Kirshner >>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse >>> >>> David, >>> CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science >>> it >>> >> must >> >>> strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are >>> meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which >>> they >>> are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a >>> system of >>> concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental >>> finding, but still not agree on the significance of that >>> claim. We >>> CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over >>> facts; >>> all of this is possible only to the extent that we share >>> concepts. >>> "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal >>> as it >>> is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is >>> ill-conceived to >>> think that this is a means of consolidating a current of >>> research >>> like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological, >>> I don't >>> think that makes any difference. >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >> >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> David H Kirshner wrote: >>> > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it >>> seems >>> inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing >>> efforts >>> to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from >>> efforts >>> >> to >> >>> solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In >>> tandem, is >>> ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or >>> philosophical >>> discourse. >>> > >>> > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of >>> CHAT >>> would not be better served by embedding theoretical >>> discussion in >>> analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be >>> to make >>> CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application >>> (though that >>> would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation >>> might >>> transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of >>> methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated >>> into >>> distinct psychological schools, each constrained by >>> methodological >>> strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical >>> environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community >>> could >>> look across these various schools to pursue broader >>> philosophical >>> problematics. >>> > >>> > David >>> > >>> > -----Original Message----- >>> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> >] On Behalf Of Andy >>> Blunden >>> > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM >>> > To: Huw Lloyd >>> > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct >>> perception >>> > >>> > Ah! I see! >>> > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in >>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally >>> contain >>> both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem >>> with anyone >>> saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where >>> it >>> >> is >> >>> appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of >>> Vygotsky, >>> that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially >>> productive unit of analysis for science is lost if >>> mediation in >>> the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with >>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is >>> lost. >>> Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point >>> you were >>> referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." >>> > >>> > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I >>> can do >>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or >>> thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my >>> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or >>> whatever - >>> but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are >>> products of the history and culture into which I was born. >>> I can >>> choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce >>> them. So every action I take is essentially >>> cultural-historical as >>> well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material >>> objects, >>> their physical form is the same for everyone, it is >>> universal. So >>> communication as much as miscommunication takes place through >>> everyone interpreting the same material objects, >>> artefacts, that I >>> am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because >>> they >>> >> too >> >>> mediate their actions with the same set of universal >>> artefacts! So >>> all human action is opened to cultural and historical >>> >> analysis >> >>> which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>> Wonderful, eh? >>> > >>> > Andy >>> > >>> >>> >>> >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >>> > -- >>> > *Andy Blunden* >>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> > >>> > >>> > Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> > >>> >> If you want to study how action changes then you need >>> to study the >>> >> history and production of the action. Under such >>> circumstances, >>> >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production >>> of) actions >>> >> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, >>> through >>> >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then >>> it may seem >>> >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. >>> >> >>> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) >>> are an elegant >>> >> way to demonstrate this. >>> >> >>> >> Best, >>> >> Huw >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>> >>> > >>> >> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >> >>> >> he, he, Huw! >>> >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are >>> the very >>> >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! >>> and I >>> really >>> >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally >>> being >>> used to >>> >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is >>> not equal to >>> >> separation. >>> >> I really don't know what you are referring to with >>> product and >>> >> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>> >> Andy >>> >> >>> >>> >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >> >>> >> *Andy Blunden* >>> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> >> >>> >> I agree about precision, but not with a call >>> for "clarity". >>> >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or >>> reification of the >>> >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails >>> typologies or >>> >> other simplistic devices which prevent the >>> conception and >>> >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in >>> cases such as >>> >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the >>> entanglements >>> >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would >>> be equally >>> >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that >>> >> one >> >>> needs to >>> >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>> >> >>> >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which >>> leads me to >>> >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, >>> why separate >>> >> the act from its production and history? >>> >> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple >>> clarity from >>> >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the >>> problem. >>> >> >>> >> Best, >>> >> Huw >>> >> >>> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>> >>> > >>> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> > >>> >> >> >> >>>> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >> >>> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that >>> in the CHAT >>> >> tradition >>> >> specifically, as opposed to the English >>> language in >>> general, >>> >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of >>> course, every >>> >> action >>> >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many >>> discursive >>> >> contexts, >>> >> "mediation" is a concept which may be >>> evoked quite >>> >> legitimately, >>> >> but with no special significant for the use of >>> CHAT. In social >>> >> theory, for example, mediation of >>> activities by other >>> >> activities >>> >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as >>> mediation of >>> actions by >>> >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. >>> But if >>> the topic is >>> >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so >>> central, that I >>> >> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>> >> "artefact-mediated" rather >>> >> than the vague term "mediated". >>> >> >>> >> I have come across usages like "mediated by >>> such-and-such a >>> >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can >>> use words to >>> >> mean what >>> >> you like, but I find a formulation like >>> this in the >>> context of >>> >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the >>> idea of >>> >> "mediation" in >>> >> the most general sense in a way which >>> obscures the >>> fact that a >>> >> concept is not immediately present in any >>> act of >>> >> communication or >>> >> any other act, and therefore *cannot >>> mediate actions*. >>> >> Artefacts, >>> >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a >>> concept, can of >>> >> course mediate an act of communication. But >>> >> the >> >>> point is >>> >> that a >>> >> word is not universally and unproblematically >>> >> a >> >>> sign for >>> >> any one >>> >> concept. It means different things to >>> different people. >>> >> Concepts >>> >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal >>> in their >>> >> materiality, >>> >> but particular in their meaning. So when we >>> have a >>> concept >>> >> in mind >>> >> when we use a word in communication, the >>> communication is >>> >> mediated >>> >> by the word not the concept, and it is a >>> mistake >>> not to be >>> >> aware >>> >> of that. >>> >> >>> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were >>> always used in >>> >> qualified >>> >> way so that its specific meaning is made >>> >> clear. >> >>> >> >>> >> Andy >>> >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his >>> comment, too. >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >> >>> >> *Andy Blunden* >>> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> Greg Thompson wrote: >>> >> >>> >> Does "mediation" only apply to language >>> >> and >> >>> culture? >>> >> >>> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in >>> which case we >>> >> would need >>> >> to include >>> >> reflexes) >>> >> >>> >> And does it include our socio-contextual >>> surround as in >>> >> Bateson's man with >>> >> the stick? (in which case, we would >>> need to include >>> >> newborns). >>> >> >>> >> Just wonderin'. >>> >> >>> >> -greg >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David >>> H Kirshner >>> >> >>> > >>> >>> >> >>> >> >>> > >>> >>> >>>> wrote: >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> Thanks for replies. >>> >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim >>> Greeno >>> decided >>> >> to stop >>> >> talking about >>> >> situated cognition because the >>> pragmatics of >>> >> adjectival >>> >> use implies there >>> >> has to be a contrasting non-situated >>> cognition. He now >>> >> speaks of >>> >> situativity theory. It seems, with the >>> exception of >>> >> physical reflexes (and >>> >> perhaps pre-conscious infant >>> activity), all >>> human >>> >> action >>> >> is mediated (and >>> >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as >>> well). So, it's >>> >> worth noting that >>> >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a >>> kind of >>> >> action, but >>> >> rather a >>> >> theoretical assumption about all human >>> action; though >>> >> there seems to be >>> >> some variation in interpretation of >>> what that >>> >> assumption >>> >> entails. >>> >> David >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> > >>> > >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Sep 15 20:00:58 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 21:00:58 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <541782DA.9030505@mira.net> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034720@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222443F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4a2558fedc274c17a4543eac464c9fd1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54152F6F.4070201@mira.net> <54165C68.7010802@mira.net> <5416D548.4080406@mira.net> <5416EACE.4040505@mira.net> <541782DA.9030505@mira.net> Message-ID: comes from Hegel, but, imho, resonates with Merleau-Ponty. I'm just sayin'. -greg On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 6:22 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > What I was saying about sensation comes form Hegel, Greg, continuing > Paul's comment about Kant. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > >> Andy, >> Were you able to read Larry's rather long email on Merleau-Ponty? esp. >> his criticism of the "sensation fallacy"? >> I ask b.c. it seems to resonate well with your ideas about sensation >> having no meaning if it isn't mediated. Do you see connections? >> I'm partly wondering b.c. I have heard others mention connections between >> M-P and Vygotsky before but have never been able to see those connections >> before... >> -greg >> >> >> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 7:34 AM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Carol Macdonald wrote: >> >> Hi Andy, >> >> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, >> but at the same time purports to account for "everything". >> But are there really only universal artefacts? There must be >> at least the possibility of >> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >> - as yet potential understanding >> - a total lack of understanding. >> >> That's the whole point, Carol! a given material artefact has a >> certain *material* form which is universal, but it is subject to >> interpretation, that is, meaning is ascribed to it by a person, >> and different people at different times will ascribe different >> meanings to it. But the meaning of the word "material" is what is >> outside of consciousness and independent of activity. The >> independent existence of the material world is what makes science >> possible. >> >> And there is still the need to account for unmediated >> sensation - so if we are hungry, we need to eat; but the >> eating is mediated. We need to take in fluid, but everything >> apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of course we >> serve water in culturally mediated ways.) >> I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands >> your schema Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >> >> By "unmediated sensation" I presume you mean that aspect of a >> sensation which is unmediated. All sensations are both immediate >> and mediated. This is what I take to be the core meaning of >> "dual-stimulation." Were you to be subject to an unmediated >> sensation (maybe soon after you were born) then it would have no >> meaning for you and would therefore be no sensation at all. But if >> it has a meaning, that is because of the mediation of the >> sensation by aspects of your consciousness. >> >> Here of course the mediation being talked of is not >> artefact-mediation. :) >> >> Andy >> >> >> Carol >> >> >> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: >> >> Ah! I see! >> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in >> nature >> or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain >> both >> immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem with anyone >> saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where it is >> appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of >> Vygotsky, >> that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially >> productive unit of analysis for science is lost if >> mediation in >> the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with >> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is >> lost. >> Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point >> you were >> referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." >> >> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do >> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or >> thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my >> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or >> whatever - >> but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are >> products of the history and culture into which I was born. >> I can >> choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce >> them. So every action I take is essentially >> cultural-historical as >> well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material >> objects, >> their physical form is the same for everyone, it is >> universal. So >> communication as much as miscommunication takes place through >> everyone interpreting the same material objects, >> artefacts, that I >> am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because they too >> mediate their actions with the same set of universal >> artefacts! So >> all human action is opened to cultural and historical analysis >> which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >> Wonderful, eh? >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> If you want to study how action changes then you need >> to study >> the history and production of the action. Under such >> circumstances, assertions that concepts cannot mediate >> (the >> production of) actions become more obviously false. >> If one >> has simplified, through "clarity", the action away >> from its >> genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a >> concept >> cannot mediate an action. >> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) >> are an >> elegant way to demonstrate this. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >> >> > >> >> > >>> wrote: >> >> he, he, Huw! >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are >> the very >> problems that need to be remedied by >> clarification! and I >> really >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally >> being >> used to >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is >> not equal to >> separation. >> I really don't know what you are referring to with >> product and >> history. Perhaps you could explain? >> Andy >> ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> I agree about precision, but not with a call for >> "clarity". Reduction to clarity is a projection or >> reification of the >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails >> typologies or >> other simplistic devices which prevent the >> conception and >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in >> cases >> such as >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the >> entanglements >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would >> be equally >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state >> that one >> needs to >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >> >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which >> leads me to >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why >> separate >> the act from its production and history? >> Of >> course, if one had the discipline to de-couple clarity >> from >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the >> problem. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >> >> > >> > > >> >> >> > >> >> > >> > >>>> wrote: >> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that >> in the CHAT >> tradition >> specifically, as opposed to the English >> language >> in general, >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of >> course, every >> action >> is both mediated and immediate, and in >> many discursive >> contexts, >> "mediation" is a concept which may be >> evoked quite >> legitimately, >> but with no special significant for the use of >> CHAT. In social >> theory, for example, mediation of >> activities by other >> activities >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as >> mediation of >> actions by >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. >> But if >> the topic is >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so >> central, that I >> prefer to spell it out and use the term >> "artefact-mediated" rather >> than the vague term "mediated". >> >> I have come across usages like "mediated by >> such-and-such a >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use >> words to >> mean what >> you like, but I find a formulation like >> this in >> the context of >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the >> idea of >> "mediation" in >> the most general sense in a way which >> obscures the >> fact that a >> concept is not immediately present in any >> act of >> communication or >> any other act, and therefore *cannot >> mediate actions*. >> Artefacts, >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a >> concept, can of >> course mediate an act of communication. >> But the >> point is >> that a >> word is not universally and >> unproblematically a >> sign for >> any one >> concept. It means different things to >> different >> people. >> Concepts >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal >> in their >> materiality, >> but particular in their meaning. So when >> we have a >> concept >> in mind >> when we use a word in communication, the >> communication is >> mediated >> by the word not the concept, and it is a >> mistake >> not to be >> aware >> of that. >> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were >> always >> used in >> qualified >> way so that its specific meaning is made >> clear. >> >> Andy >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his >> comment, too. >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Greg Thompson wrote: >> >> Does "mediation" only apply to >> language and >> culture? >> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in >> which case we >> would need >> to include >> reflexes) >> >> And does it include our socio-contextual >> surround as in >> Bateson's man with >> the stick? (in which case, we would >> need to >> include >> newborns). >> >> Just wonderin'. >> >> -greg >> >> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David >> H Kirshner >> > > > >> >> >> >> >> > >> >> >>>> wrote: >> >> Thanks for replies. >> I'm recalling several years ago >> Jim Greeno >> decided >> to stop >> talking about >> situated cognition because the >> pragmatics of >> adjectival >> use implies there >> has to be a contrasting non-situated >> cognition. He now >> speaks of >> situativity theory. It seems, with the >> exception of >> physical reflexes (and >> perhaps pre-conscious infant >> activity), >> all human >> action >> is mediated (and >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as >> well). So, it's >> worth noting that >> "mediated action" doesn't specify >> a kind of >> action, but >> rather a >> theoretical assumption about all human >> action; though >> there seems to be >> some variation in interpretation >> of what that >> assumption >> entails. >> David >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> Developmental psycholinguist >> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Sep 15 20:40:49 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 21:40:49 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Some facts about cultural "triple packages" Message-ID: Been enjoying the party, and apropos of David's call for some facts (which I'm in full support of - despite being a theory-wonk), I thought I'd offer this Ted talk that was sent to me by an LCHC colleague: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHUMcxaqm9U Lots of facts in there, and not a little theory. They've got big claims about the facts of their program in inner-city schools and about inequality too (you have to listen to the end to hear about that). What do you think? Anything to it? Anyone have any facts to counter their facts? -greg ?p.s., I'm still listening to it right now. Not sure I'm going to be able to stomach the entire talk... getting a little queasy. Feeling like someone is selling me something that is going to cost me a ton and I'm not going to like. Ugh..?. -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 15 23:17:53 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 16:17:53 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts about cultural "triple packages" In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5417D611.1020706@mira.net> Interesting stuff, Greg. I find the rampant individualism scary though. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Greg Thompson wrote: > Been enjoying the party, and apropos of David's call for some facts (which > I'm in full support of - despite being a theory-wonk), I thought I'd offer > this Ted talk that was sent to me by an LCHC colleague: > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHUMcxaqm9U > > Lots of facts in there, and not a little theory. > > They've got big claims about the facts of their program in inner-city > schools and about inequality too (you have to listen to the end to hear > about that). > > What do you think? > > Anything to it? > > Anyone have any facts to counter their facts? > > -greg > > ?p.s., I'm still listening to it right now. Not sure I'm going to be able > to stomach the entire talk... getting a little queasy. Feeling like someone > is selling me something that is going to cost me a ton and I'm not going to > like. Ugh..?. > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 00:43:10 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 00:43:10 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca In-Reply-To: <4BDC889C-9B1B-4516-9F11-5549F0EF3003@gmail.com> References: <8D2C4DB1-CFE1-4A1D-8683-CE5A8551B35C@gmail.com> <6322AED9-6172-4B7C-8A08-4F0F1FE673D2@gmail.com> <4BDC889C-9B1B-4516-9F11-5549F0EF3003@gmail.com> Message-ID: Bahktin the trickster. In Greek mythology that was Hermes the messenger who brought messages between [mediated] the divine and the human realms. Bahktin definitely overlaps with Hermes [and hermeneutics] Larry On Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 8:42 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > Hi Greg, > I'm convinced you are right. Like I say, Bakhtin just keeps popping up. > The trickster? Rebelais? What is that about? > Henry > > On Sep 14, 2014, at 8:49 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > One reason I mention him is because of resonances with ideas. > > But I also mention him as a kind of trickster figure as well as a student > > of the trickster in writing (his dissertation was on Rabelais). > > I also mention him as a writer who seems authentically engaged with > > meaningful/emotive aspects of human existence (e.g., Toward a Philosophy > of > > the Act, and Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity). > > And finally, I mention Bakhtin because I'm still not convinced that the > > deep treasures of Bakhtin's work has yet been mined out. > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 8:13 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > wrote: > > > >> Greg, > >> Thank you for you good words and great question. I knew about Bakhtin, > but > >> have been finding him everywhere in the articles and chat of XMCA over > the > >> last week. Seriously. > >> Henry > >> > >> On Sep 13, 2014, at 2:26 PM, Greg Thompson > >> wrote: > >> > >>> I would hope that a certain amount of irreverence would be dear to most > >>> people on this list! > >>> But seriously Henry, have you come across Bakhtin's work at all? > >>> Seems like another that you might want to throw in with the crowd of > >>> healthy irreverents. > >>> -greg > >>> > >>> > >>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 2:48 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > hshonerd@gmail.com > >>> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Mike and David, > >>>> This is seriously getting to be a club that I, like Groucho, won't > >> join, > >>>> if it takes me as a member. I think all of this seriously evokes > Andy's > >>>> contention, in his notes for the upcoming presentation at the ISCAR > >>>> conference (which XMCA has gotten) that, "Adults can grasp true > >> concepts, > >>>> and can change society, and a social theory has to treat adults as > >> adults, > >>>> and this is what the projects approach allows us to do. " If "adult" > >> means > >>>> the same as "serious", you can see why I have my doubts about joining > >> the > >>>> Unserious Scholar Club. On the other hand, if I can have some fun, as > in > >>>> the laughing warrior (forget gender stereotypes here, and dare me to > >> talk > >>>> about Jihad), then that's what I'm talking about. Incidentally, I > loved > >>>> Andy's notes. I could so relate it to CG. The emergent character of > >> project > >>>> realization he talks about applies very well to discourse, as you can > >> see > >>>> in the articles by Langacker I have sent out. Discourse IS a project > and > >>>> its outcome is typically not entirely clear in the minds of the > >>>> interactants as they negotiate its waters. XMCA, of which this email > is > >> a > >>>> "turn", is a prototypical "work in progress", as Andy puts it, since > we > >>>> clearly don't know where this will all end up. But I hope it can be > fun > >>>> along the way. > >>>> Henry > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Sep 6, 2014, at 1:51 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi Henry-- There goes my pile of books that need to be read before > bed > >>>> time! > >>>>> Spinoza goes up there right next to Dead Souls. > >>>>> > >>>>> However, David having already claimed the mantle of unserious > scholar, > >>>> and > >>>>> you having made the same claim, I am afraid that I have to make > >> precisely > >>>>> the same claim on the unrefutable grounds that no one pays me any > >> longer > >>>>> for what I do so I get to be as unserious as i can seriously be! > >>>>> mike > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 12:33 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Hi Mike, > >>>>>> All I can say now is that Spinoza is famously quoted as having said, > >>>> "The > >>>>>> more clearly you understand yourself and your emotions, the more you > >>>> become > >>>>>> a lover of what is." This quote happens to appear in the > introduction > >>>> to a > >>>>>> very popular self help book, Loving What Is, by Byron Katie (2002). > I > >>>>>> bought the book , obviously, because I thought I needed help. It > did, > >>>> but > >>>>>> it also introduced me to Spinoza. And that has been a deeper "help". > >> So, > >>>>>> from a personal perspective, I can totally understand how Spinoza > and > >>>>>> periizhvanie would be connected. For all of you ESL teachers out > >> there, > >>>> who > >>>>>> doesn't remember Krashen on the "affective filter" and I have been > >>>> seeing a > >>>>>> lot on character and education lately. Oh yes, and how failing is > >>>> important > >>>>>> to eventual success. Teasing out issues in the education of > >>>>>> non-mainstreamers, and recognizing how the current system is toxic > for > >>>>>> everyone, I think Spinoza's analysis and the narrative of his life > are > >>>>>> powerful. Vygotsky hits me the same way. Cantor, the mathematician, > >> and > >>>>>> Pierce, the philosopher/logician/semiotician, also constantly come > up > >>>> for > >>>>>> me. They were ridiculed by the received cognoscenti of the time, so > >>>> much so > >>>>>> that the suffered mental breakdowns. But they pushed on to develop > >>>> tools in > >>>>>> math and semiotics that seem to me are complementary with Vygotsky. > >>>> Again I > >>>>>> get to take the role of unserious scholar here, so think of my > >> thoughts > >>>> as > >>>>>> gaming on line and don't take the game too seriously. > >>>>>> Henry > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Sep 5, 2014, at 6:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Hi David and Henry-- > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> David-- I was intrigued by your comment that Spinoza is a > >> controversial > >>>>>>> topic on xmca. I googled Spinoza on the main web page and came up > >> with > >>>> 4K > >>>>>>> plus hits (!!). My own impression is that few on this list, me > >>>> included, > >>>>>>> have engaged in serious study of Spinoza let alone the imprint of > >>>> Spinoza > >>>>>>> on Vygotsky. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> What is the nature of the controversy? What is at stake? The topic > is > >>>> of > >>>>>>> particular interest to me at present because I have been part of > >>>>>>> discussions with people who are focused on Vygotsky's use of > >>>> perezhivanie > >>>>>>> in his later work, where the relation of emotion and cognition is a > >>>>>> central > >>>>>>> concern and Spinoza is clearly relevant. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Henry and anyone interested in chasing down what has been written > >> about > >>>>>>> various topics in xmca chatter, take advantage of the nice google > >>>> search > >>>>>> at > >>>>>>> lchc.ucsd.edu. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> (who enmeshed in the sense/meaning distinction in all of its > >>>> multilingual > >>>>>>> confusifications at present) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>> Assistant Professor > >>> Department of Anthropology > >>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>> Brigham Young University > >>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > From dkirsh@lsu.edu Tue Sep 16 01:06:22 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 08:06:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: <54178B49.9070205@mira.net> References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> <54178B49.9070205@mira.net> Message-ID: <50f7f5173d374b5fa9ed51a3b62501f9@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Andy, Thanks for the link to the TOC of your edited volume, which perhaps unintentionally illustrates my point that empirical studies using CHAT/sociocultural theory generally aren't intended as contributions to theory, per se; as you noted, the affordances for theorizing were brought out by you, rather than by the authors as part of their motive for producing the empirical work. I've hung out with cognitive psychologists quite a bit, and there's a very clear demarcation between applied studies which utilize cognitive theory for applicative purposes and pure studies whose sole raison d'?tre is to inform theory. Furthermore, it is a fairly rare occurrence for anyone to attempt to address theory in any other way than through the lens of empirical studies. My own experience of this community includes appreciation of the tight logic of their theorizing, and also of the inventiveness of researchers in generating truly provocative data that they are then forced to contend. But it also includes a sense of frustration with the absence of any critique of or input to theory from outside of the little studies that, one after another, niggle away at the theoretical infrastructure. Excluded, here, are not only philosophical inputs to theory, but even broader methodological constraints regarding the character of good theories. (My own grounding in mathematical theorizing includes a deliciously salient sense of the ?elegance? that makes a theory truly admirable and worthy.) Somehow, it seems noteworthy that CHAT/sociocultural psychology?whatever its virtues?isn?t organized like other branches of psychology (e.g., behavioral, cognitive, developmental) with respect to the role of empirical data in theory construction. Andy, in your response to Jenna, you described science as an objective practice that ?is not dependant on what you and I, writing here on xmca in 2014, says it is.? The question all this raises is whether CHAT/sociocultural psychology actually qualifies as a scientific practice. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:59 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse David, in the recently published book, "Collaborative Projects. An Interdisciplinary Study," authors were invited to submit studies with empirical content (in the sense in which you are using the word) which illustrated the use of the concept of "project" within CHAT. https://www.academia.edu/6756231/Collaborative_Projects._An_Interdisciplinary_Study As you can see from the Table of Contents, more than a dozen different practical studies were contributed, and I am satisfied that the collection functioned to illuminate the philosophical issues about the nature of "an activity," and its ue as a unit of analysis, even though they are only explicitly addressed in the long Introduction. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David H Kirshner wrote: > Mike, > > Clearly, as in Katherine Neal's response, and in MCA, CHAT/sociocultural theory informs empirical research. > What's less clear is that empirical research informs CHAT/sociocultural theorizing. > Not quite sure what to make of that. > > David > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 11:15 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > > Your followup comment is closely related to the second part of your initiating message, David. So i will respond in line. > > Firstly, I think it would be helpful to distinguish between MCA and xmca. > The idea behind xmca was to provide a discussion forum for articles that appear in MCA so that instead of authors having to wait 2+ years for feedback on their ideas (which rarely comes, even then!), we could discuss the published work and learn from it in a timely manner. By an large, that effort has, in my opinion, failed. Thanks to the recent decision to have the editors pick out articles for discussion which include the author(s) in the discussion, this situation has been somewhat mitigated. But only somewhat. xma discussions have all the characteristics of Vygotskian chaining, as a rule. > > Secondly, when I take down a bundle of recent MCA issues and look at the titles, they at least sound like they are about empirical matters ranging across a wide variety of content areas. Are you saying that these articles are not really empirical? Or that they are not really helping us to develop better methods to deal with perceived problems of social value? Again, this raises the question of "MCA or xmca". > > Lastly, perhaps it would be helpful if those of us who believe that empirical work guided by CHAT ideas of some value has been produced in, say, the past two decades, would post brief summiaries of that work with references. > Maybe its just all verbal sound and fury, signifying the usual! > mike > > On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 8:50 AM, David H Kirshner > wrote: > > >> Does CHAT theory really advance with respect to empirical studies? >> If so, then why isn't the XMCA discussion a discussion about >> so-and-so's empirical results and how we should interpret them? >> Various branches of psychology (e.g., cognitive and developmental) do >> address concepts, and do conduct empirical research related to concepts. >> It's true, they rarely enter into full-blooded discussion of what is >> a concept. But perhaps that's because they're scientists rather than >> philosophers. They're operating within a framework that is bounded >> primarily by empirical and methodological expectations and >> obligations; theory evolves within those boundaries. >> It's not clear to me that the Vygotskyan research community ever >> operated in that fashion, and I'm wondering what would happen if it did. >> David >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 10:23 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse >> >> Well, Lisa, I think that is a project which requires a lot of what >> David would call "philosophical" discussion. :) The Psychology of >> Concepts, as it is know to American psychology, i.e., the "mainstream" >> do endless laboratory tests and questionnaires and surveys and so far >> as I can see have still haven't figured out what a concept is. >> Andy >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> - >> -- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: >> >>> Well I am guilty for being fixated about thinking and talking about >>> methods and how to better understand how we can make a trustworthy >>> leap from understanding the world to understanding concepts. Again >>> just talking aloud. >>> >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational >>> Psychology and Counseling >>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey >>> Education Complex >>> IT Online Program Coordinator University >>> of Tennessee >>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ >>> Knoxville, TN 37996 >>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: >>> 865-974-7712 >>> >>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >>> >>> I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and we all have >>> our specific research interests. >>> But when we publish, most of us have something to report. >>> I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more of my share of >>> time arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest. >>> Andy >>> >>> >> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> - >> -- >> >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: >>> >>> Why is it that we came to what David stated as: >>> >>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over >>> facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical >>> elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost >>> completely detached from empirical specifics. >>> >>> >>> >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational >>> Psychology and Counseling >>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 >>> Bailey Education Complex >>> IT Online Program Coordinator >>> University of Tennessee >>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ >>> Knoxville, TN 37996 >>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: >>> 865-974-7712 >>> >>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner >>> > >> >> wrote: >>> >>> Andy, >>> >>> I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific >>> project, >>> though it might initially have been conceived as such. >>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over >>> facts." >>> We are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, >>> distinctions, and qualifications almost completely >>> detached from >>> empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even >>> at the >>> level of theory, we're not all playing the same game. >>> >>> I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that >>> claims be >>> framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the >>> significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical >>> setting >>> theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In >>> this case, >>> there is a possibility that disagreements lead to >>> separation of >>> research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical agreement >>> as a >>> consequence. >>> >>> David >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net >>> >>> >] >>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM >>> To: David H Kirshner >>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse >>> >>> David, >>> CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science >>> it >>> >> must >> >>> strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are >>> meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which >>> they >>> are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a >>> system of >>> concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental >>> finding, but still not agree on the significance of that >>> claim. We >>> CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over >>> facts; >>> all of this is possible only to the extent that we share >>> concepts. >>> "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal >>> as it >>> is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is >>> ill-conceived to >>> think that this is a means of consolidating a current of >>> research >>> like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological, >>> I don't >>> think that makes any difference. >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> >> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> - >> -- >> >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> David H Kirshner wrote: >>> > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it >>> seems >>> inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing >>> efforts >>> to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from >>> efforts >>> >> to >> >>> solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In >>> tandem, is >>> ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or >>> philosophical >>> discourse. >>> > >>> > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of >>> CHAT >>> would not be better served by embedding theoretical >>> discussion in >>> analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be >>> to make >>> CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application >>> (though that >>> would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation >>> might >>> transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of >>> methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated >>> into >>> distinct psychological schools, each constrained by >>> methodological >>> strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical >>> environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community >>> could >>> look across these various schools to pursue broader >>> philosophical >>> problematics. >>> > >>> > David >>> > >>> > -----Original Message----- >>> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> > >>> > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >> >] On Behalf Of Andy >>> Blunden >>> > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM >>> > To: Huw Lloyd >>> > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct >>> perception >>> > >>> > Ah! I see! >>> > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in >>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally >>> contain >>> both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem >>> with anyone >>> saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where >>> it >>> >> is >> >>> appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of >>> Vygotsky, >>> that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially >>> productive unit of analysis for science is lost if >>> mediation in >>> the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with >>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is >>> lost. >>> Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point >>> you were >>> referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." >>> > >>> > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I >>> can do >>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or >>> thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my >>> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or >>> whatever - >>> but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are >>> products of the history and culture into which I was born. >>> I can >>> choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce >>> them. So every action I take is essentially >>> cultural-historical as >>> well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material >>> objects, >>> their physical form is the same for everyone, it is >>> universal. So >>> communication as much as miscommunication takes place through >>> everyone interpreting the same material objects, >>> artefacts, that I >>> am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because >>> they >>> >> too >> >>> mediate their actions with the same set of universal >>> artefacts! So >>> all human action is opened to cultural and historical >>> >> analysis >> >>> which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>> Wonderful, eh? >>> > >>> > Andy >>> > >>> >>> >>> >> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> - >> >>> > -- >>> > *Andy Blunden* >>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> > >>> > >>> > Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> > >>> >> If you want to study how action changes then you need >>> to study the >>> >> history and production of the action. Under such >>> circumstances, >>> >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production >>> of) actions >>> >> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, >>> through >>> >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then >>> it may seem >>> >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. >>> >> >>> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) >>> are an elegant >>> >> way to demonstrate this. >>> >> >>> >> Best, >>> >> Huw >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>> > >>> >> >>> >> > >>> >>>> wrote: >>> >> >>> >> he, he, Huw! >>> >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are >>> the very >>> >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! >>> and I >>> really >>> >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally >>> being >>> used to >>> >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is >>> not equal to >>> >> separation. >>> >> I really don't know what you are referring to with >>> product and >>> >> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>> >> Andy >>> >> >>> >>> >> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> - >> -- >> >>> >> *Andy Blunden* >>> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> >> >>> >> I agree about precision, but not with a call >>> for "clarity". >>> >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or >>> reification of the >>> >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails >>> typologies or >>> >> other simplistic devices which prevent the >>> conception and >>> >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in >>> cases such as >>> >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the >>> entanglements >>> >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would >>> be equally >>> >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that >>> >> one >> >>> needs to >>> >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>> >> >>> >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which >>> leads me to >>> >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, >>> why separate >>> >> the act from its production and history? >>> >> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple >>> clarity from >>> >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the >>> problem. >>> >> >>> >> Best, >>> >> Huw >>> >> >>> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >>> > >>> >> >>> >> >> >> >>>> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >> >>> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that >>> in the CHAT >>> >> tradition >>> >> specifically, as opposed to the English >>> language in >>> general, >>> >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of >>> course, every >>> >> action >>> >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many >>> discursive >>> >> contexts, >>> >> "mediation" is a concept which may be >>> evoked quite >>> >> legitimately, >>> >> but with no special significant for the use of >>> CHAT. In social >>> >> theory, for example, mediation of >>> activities by other >>> >> activities >>> >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as >>> mediation of >>> actions by >>> >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. >>> But if >>> the topic is >>> >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so >>> central, that I >>> >> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>> >> "artefact-mediated" rather >>> >> than the vague term "mediated". >>> >> >>> >> I have come across usages like "mediated by >>> such-and-such a >>> >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can >>> use words to >>> >> mean what >>> >> you like, but I find a formulation like >>> this in the >>> context of >>> >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the >>> idea of >>> >> "mediation" in >>> >> the most general sense in a way which >>> obscures the >>> fact that a >>> >> concept is not immediately present in any >>> act of >>> >> communication or >>> >> any other act, and therefore *cannot >>> mediate actions*. >>> >> Artefacts, >>> >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a >>> concept, can of >>> >> course mediate an act of communication. But >>> >> the >> >>> point is >>> >> that a >>> >> word is not universally and unproblematically >>> >> a >> >>> sign for >>> >> any one >>> >> concept. It means different things to >>> different people. >>> >> Concepts >>> >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal >>> in their >>> >> materiality, >>> >> but particular in their meaning. So when we >>> have a >>> concept >>> >> in mind >>> >> when we use a word in communication, the >>> communication is >>> >> mediated >>> >> by the word not the concept, and it is a >>> mistake >>> not to be >>> >> aware >>> >> of that. >>> >> >>> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were >>> always used in >>> >> qualified >>> >> way so that its specific meaning is made >>> >> clear. >> >>> >> >>> >> Andy >>> >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his >>> comment, too. >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> - >> -- >> >>> >> *Andy Blunden* >>> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> Greg Thompson wrote: >>> >> >>> >> Does "mediation" only apply to language >>> >> and >> >>> culture? >>> >> >>> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in >>> which case we >>> >> would need >>> >> to include >>> >> reflexes) >>> >> >>> >> And does it include our socio-contextual >>> surround as in >>> >> Bateson's man with >>> >> the stick? (in which case, we would >>> need to include >>> >> newborns). >>> >> >>> >> Just wonderin'. >>> >> >>> >> -greg >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David >>> H Kirshner >>> >> > >>> >> >>> > >>> >>> >>> >> > >>> >> >>> > >>> >>>>> wrote: >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> Thanks for replies. >>> >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim >>> Greeno >>> decided >>> >> to stop >>> >> talking about >>> >> situated cognition because the >>> pragmatics of >>> >> adjectival >>> >> use implies there >>> >> has to be a contrasting non-situated >>> cognition. He now >>> >> speaks of >>> >> situativity theory. It seems, with the >>> exception of >>> >> physical reflexes (and >>> >> perhaps pre-conscious infant >>> activity), all >>> human >>> >> action >>> >> is mediated (and >>> >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as >>> well). So, it's >>> >> worth noting that >>> >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a >>> kind of >>> >> action, but >>> >> rather a >>> >> theoretical assumption about all human >>> action; though >>> >> there seems to be >>> >> some variation in interpretation of >>> what that >>> >> assumption >>> >> entails. >>> >> David >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> > >>> > >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > From h2cmng@yahoo.co.uk Tue Sep 16 01:15:10 2014 From: h2cmng@yahoo.co.uk (peter jones) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 09:15:10 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca In-Reply-To: References: <8D2C4DB1-CFE1-4A1D-8683-CE5A8551B35C@gmail.com> <6322AED9-6172-4B7C-8A08-4F0F1FE673D2@gmail.com> <4BDC889C-9B1B-4516-9F11-5549F0EF3003@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1410855310.36603.YahooMailNeo@web171501.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Michel Serres has written on these themes.... Fifty Key Contemporary Thinkers by John Lechte, Routledge, 1994. With the recognition of the interrelation between different sciences and different forms of knowledge, as well as between science and different artistic practices, has come Serres's effort to plot the way that different knowledge domains interpenetrate. Even more: Serres has set himself the task of being a means of communication (a medium) between the sciences and the arts - the Hermes of modern scholarships. With the advent of information science, a new figure for representing science becomes possible: this is the 'model' of communication. Accordingly, we have three elements: a message, a channel for transmitting it, and the noise, or interference, that accompanies the transmission. Noise calls for decipherment; it makes a reading of the message more difficult. And yet without it, there would be no message. There is, in short, no message without resistance. What Serres initially finds intriguing about noise (rather than the message) is that it opens up such a fertile avenue of reflection. Instead of remaining pure noise, the latter becomes a means of transport. Thus in the first volume of the Hermes series noise is analysed as the third, empirical element of the message. Ideally, communication must be separated from noise. Noise is what is not communicated; it is just there as a kind of chaos, as the empirical third element of the message, the accidental part, the part of difference that is excluded. Every formalism (mathematics, for example) is founded on the exclusion of the third element of noise. Every formalism is a way of moving from one region of knowledge to another. To communicate is to move within a class of objects that have the same form. Form has to be extracted from the cacophony of noise; form (communication) is the exclusion of noise, an escape from the domain of the empirical. In his book, The Parasite, Serres recalls that 'parasite' also means noise (in French). A parasite is a noise in a channel. And so when describing the rats' meals in a story from the fables of La Fontaine - the meals of two parasites - Serres also refers to noise: 'The two companions scurry off when they hear a noise at the door. It was only a noise, but it was also a message, a bit of information producing panic: an interruption, a corruption, a rupture of information. Was this noise really a message? Wasn't it, rather, static, a parasite? see also: http://www.frieze.com/issue/article/joyeux-anniversaire/ Peter Jones Lancashire, UK Blogging at "Welcome to the QUAD" http://hodges-model.blogspot.com/ http://twitter.com/h2cm ________________________________ From: Larry Purss To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Tuesday, 16 September 2014, 8:43 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca Bahktin the trickster. In Greek mythology that was Hermes the messenger who brought messages between [mediated] the divine and the human realms. Bahktin definitely overlaps with Hermes [and hermeneutics] Larry On Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 8:42 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > Hi Greg, > I'm convinced you are right. Like I say, Bakhtin just keeps popping up. > The trickster? Rebelais? What is that about? > Henry > > On Sep 14, 2014, at 8:49 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > One reason I mention him is because of resonances with ideas. > > But I also mention him as a kind of trickster figure as well as a student > > of the trickster in writing (his dissertation was on Rabelais). > > I also mention him as a writer who seems authentically engaged with > > meaningful/emotive aspects of human existence (e.g., Toward a Philosophy > of > > the Act, and Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity). > > And finally, I mention Bakhtin because I'm still not convinced that the > > deep treasures of Bakhtin's work has yet been mined out. > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 8:13 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > wrote: > > > >> Greg, > >> Thank you for you good words and great question. I knew about Bakhtin, > but > >> have been finding him everywhere in the articles and chat of XMCA over > the > >> last week. Seriously. > >> Henry > >> > >> On Sep 13, 2014, at 2:26 PM, Greg Thompson > >> wrote: > >> > >>> I would hope that a certain amount of irreverence would be dear to most > >>> people on this list! > >>> But seriously Henry, have you come across Bakhtin's work at all? > >>> Seems like another that you might want to throw in with the crowd of > >>> healthy irreverents. > >>> -greg > >>> > >>> > >>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 2:48 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > hshonerd@gmail.com > >>> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Mike and David, > >>>> This is seriously getting to be a club that I, like Groucho, won't > >> join, > >>>> if it takes me as a member. I think all of this seriously evokes > Andy's > >>>> contention, in his notes for the upcoming presentation at the ISCAR > >>>> conference (which XMCA has gotten) that, "Adults can grasp true > >> concepts, > >>>> and can change society, and a social theory has to treat adults as > >> adults, > >>>> and this is what the projects approach allows us to do. " If "adult" > >> means > >>>> the same as "serious", you can see why I have my doubts about joining > >> the > >>>> Unserious Scholar Club. On the other hand, if I can have some fun, as > in > >>>> the laughing warrior (forget gender stereotypes here, and dare me to > >> talk > >>>> about Jihad), then that's what I'm talking about. Incidentally, I > loved > >>>> Andy's notes. I could so relate it to CG. The emergent character of > >> project > >>>> realization he talks about applies very well to discourse, as you can > >> see > >>>> in the articles by Langacker I have sent out. Discourse IS a project > and > >>>> its outcome is typically not entirely clear in the minds of the > >>>> interactants as they negotiate its waters. XMCA, of which this email > is > >> a > >>>> "turn", is a prototypical "work in progress", as Andy puts it, since > we > >>>> clearly don't know where this will all end up. But I hope it can be > fun > >>>> along the way. > >>>> Henry > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Sep 6, 2014, at 1:51 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi Henry-- There goes my pile of books that need to be read before > bed > >>>> time! > >>>>> Spinoza goes up there right next to Dead Souls. > >>>>> > >>>>> However, David having already claimed the mantle of unserious > scholar, > >>>> and > >>>>> you having made the same claim, I am afraid that I have to make > >> precisely > >>>>> the same claim on the unrefutable grounds that no one pays me any > >> longer > >>>>> for what I do so I get to be as unserious as i can seriously be! > >>>>> mike > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 12:33 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Hi Mike, > >>>>>> All I can say now is that Spinoza is famously quoted as having said, > >>>> "The > >>>>>> more clearly you understand yourself and your emotions, the more you > >>>> become > >>>>>> a lover of what is." This quote happens to appear in the > introduction > >>>> to a > >>>>>> very popular self help book, Loving What Is, by Byron Katie (2002). > I > >>>>>> bought the book , obviously, because I thought I needed help. It > did, > >>>> but > >>>>>> it also introduced me to Spinoza. And that has been a deeper "help". > >> So, > >>>>>> from a personal perspective, I can totally understand how Spinoza > and > >>>>>> periizhvanie would be connected. For all of you ESL teachers out > >> there, > >>>> who > >>>>>> doesn't remember Krashen on the "affective filter" and I have been > >>>> seeing a > >>>>>> lot on character and education lately. Oh yes, and how failing is > >>>> important > >>>>>> to eventual success. Teasing out issues in the education of > >>>>>> non-mainstreamers, and recognizing how the current system is toxic > for > >>>>>> everyone, I think Spinoza's analysis and the narrative of his life > are > >>>>>> powerful. Vygotsky hits me the same way. Cantor, the mathematician, > >> and > >>>>>> Pierce, the philosopher/logician/semiotician, also constantly come > up > >>>> for > >>>>>> me. They were ridiculed by the received cognoscenti of the time, so > >>>> much so > >>>>>> that the suffered mental breakdowns. But they pushed on to develop > >>>> tools in > >>>>>> math and semiotics that seem to me are complementary with Vygotsky. > >>>> Again I > >>>>>> get to take the role of unserious scholar here, so think of my > >> thoughts > >>>> as > >>>>>> gaming on line and don't take the game too seriously. > >>>>>> Henry > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Sep 5, 2014, at 6:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Hi David and Henry-- > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> David-- I was intrigued by your comment that Spinoza is a > >> controversial > >>>>>>> topic on xmca. I googled Spinoza on the main web page and came up > >> with > >>>> 4K > >>>>>>> plus hits (!!). My own impression is that few on this list, me > >>>> included, > >>>>>>> have engaged in serious study of Spinoza let alone the imprint of > >>>> Spinoza > >>>>>>> on Vygotsky. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> What is the nature of the controversy? What is at stake? The topic > is > >>>> of > >>>>>>> particular interest to me at present because I have been part of > >>>>>>> discussions with people who are focused on Vygotsky's use of > >>>> perezhivanie > >>>>>>> in his later work, where the relation of emotion and cognition is a > >>>>>> central > >>>>>>> concern and Spinoza is clearly relevant. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Henry and anyone interested in chasing down what has been written > >> about > >>>>>>> various topics in xmca chatter, take advantage of the nice google > >>>> search > >>>>>> at > >>>>>>> lchc.ucsd.edu. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> (who enmeshed in the sense/meaning distinction in all of its > >>>> multilingual > >>>>>>> confusifications at present) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>> Assistant Professor > >>> Department of Anthropology > >>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>> Brigham Young University > >>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > From rohini.ng@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 02:08:40 2014 From: rohini.ng@gmail.com (Rohini Nag) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 14:38:40 +0530 Subject: [Xmca-l] looking for the collected works of L.S Vygotsky, Volumes as many available(?) Message-ID: Dear X-MCA, Can any of you suggest where might we find *The Collected Works of L.S Vygotsky*, Volumes I, II and III that can be downloadable, or if there is a way to find scanned copies (if) available online? Or anybody have them with you in a file format? Not all volumes (in print) are available here in India, and the one that is, is hugely expensive for our library resources. e-books are unavailable too. Is there a way we can find them? Best, Rohini Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi-110067 India From wester@uga.edu Tue Sep 16 03:59:24 2014 From: wester@uga.edu (Katherine Wester Neal) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 10:59:24 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts about cultural "triple packages" In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <580E931B-34AF-482D-95C1-D8F264E63406@uga.edu> Thanks for sending, Greg. I also found it hard to keep watching. I have read Amy Chua's "tiger mom" book, and this TED talk seems to be a way to validate and extend the parenting ideas that she lays out in the book (which I find to be harsh and a bit mean-spirited). I have many issues with their claims, but I'll just mention two. First, I don't think their generalizations/facts are very useful. They perpetuate the idea, for example, that stereotypes are acceptable, especially if they're "true," which is probably where the comment that they're racist came from. It is also unhelpful to tell white, middle class parents one more time that "other" kids are going to outperform their kids and their kids are falling behind. This sort of scarcity rhetoric hurts kids and parents, in part because it sets up an us/them dichotomy. Second, as Greg said, there's no theory. I am suspect of facts, such as these, without theory because they don't account for how the facts were produced. Katie Katie Wester-Neal Doctoral Candidate University of Georgia On Sep 15, 2014, at 11:41 PM, "Greg Thompson" wrote: Been enjoying the party, and apropos of David's call for some facts (which I'm in full support of - despite being a theory-wonk), I thought I'd offer this Ted talk that was sent to me by an LCHC colleague: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHUMcxaqm9U Lots of facts in there, and not a little theory. They've got big claims about the facts of their program in inner-city schools and about inequality too (you have to listen to the end to hear about that). What do you think? Anything to it? Anyone have any facts to counter their facts? -greg ?p.s., I'm still listening to it right now. Not sure I'm going to be able to stomach the entire talk... getting a little queasy. Feeling like someone is selling me something that is going to cost me a ton and I'm not going to like. Ugh..?. -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk Tue Sep 16 04:12:31 2014 From: r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk (rjsp2) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 12:12:31 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts about cultural "triple packages" In-Reply-To: <580E931B-34AF-482D-95C1-D8F264E63406@uga.edu> References: <580E931B-34AF-482D-95C1-D8F264E63406@uga.edu> Message-ID: <54181B1F.1000000@open.ac.uk> Ye gods. It reminds me of this: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a01QQZyl-_I I gave up feeling guilty about being a laid back parent years ago. Rob On 16/09/2014 11:59, Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > Thanks for sending, Greg. I also found it hard to keep watching. I have read Amy Chua's "tiger mom" book, and this TED talk seems to be a way to validate and extend the parenting ideas that she lays out in the book (which I find to be harsh and a bit mean-spirited). I have many issues with their claims, but I'll just mention two. > > First, I don't think their generalizations/facts are very useful. They perpetuate the idea, for example, that stereotypes are acceptable, especially if they're "true," which is probably where the comment that they're racist came from. It is also unhelpful to tell white, middle class parents one more time that "other" kids are going to outperform their kids and their kids are falling behind. This sort of scarcity rhetoric hurts kids and parents, in part because it sets up an us/them dichotomy. > > Second, as Greg said, there's no theory. I am suspect of facts, such as these, without theory because they don't account for how the facts were produced. > > Katie > > Katie Wester-Neal > Doctoral Candidate > University of Georgia > > > > > > On Sep 15, 2014, at 11:41 PM, "Greg Thompson" wrote: > > Been enjoying the party, and apropos of David's call for some facts (which > I'm in full support of - despite being a theory-wonk), I thought I'd offer > this Ted talk that was sent to me by an LCHC colleague: > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHUMcxaqm9U > > Lots of facts in there, and not a little theory. > > They've got big claims about the facts of their program in inner-city > schools and about inequality too (you have to listen to the end to hear > about that). > > What do you think? > > Anything to it? > > Anyone have any facts to counter their facts? > > -greg > > ?p.s., I'm still listening to it right now. Not sure I'm going to be able > to stomach the entire talk... getting a little queasy. Feeling like someone > is selling me something that is going to cost me a ton and I'm not going to > like. Ugh..?. > > -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. From daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 06:19:06 2014 From: daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com (Daniel Hyman) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 09:19:06 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: looking for the collected works of L.S Vygotsky, Volumes as many available(?) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dear Rohini, Not sure if these leads address your questions directly, but they do speak to what resources (however dear) present themselves online: http://books.google.com/books/about/The_Collected_Works_of_L_S_Vygotsky.html?id=u8UTfKFWb5UC http://www.worldcat.org/title/collected-works-1-problems-of-general-psychology-including-the-volume-thinking-and-speech/oclc/644973380/editions?referer=di&editionsView=true The WorldCat entries might facilitate an interlibrary loan of English Volume 1 (a translation of Russian Volume 2). Hope this helps, Dan On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 5:08 AM, Rohini Nag wrote: > Dear X-MCA, > > Can any of you suggest where might we find *The Collected Works of L.S > Vygotsky*, Volumes I, II and III that can be downloadable, or if there is a > way to find scanned copies (if) available online? Or anybody have them with > you in a file format? > > Not all volumes (in print) are available here in India, and the one that > is, is hugely expensive for our library resources. e-books are unavailable > too. Is there a way we can find them? > > Best, > Rohini > Jawaharlal Nehru University, > New Delhi-110067 > India > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 07:26:16 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 07:26:16 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca In-Reply-To: <1410855310.36603.YahooMailNeo@web171501.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> References: <8D2C4DB1-CFE1-4A1D-8683-CE5A8551B35C@gmail.com> <6322AED9-6172-4B7C-8A08-4F0F1FE673D2@gmail.com> <4BDC889C-9B1B-4516-9F11-5549F0EF3003@gmail.com> <1410855310.36603.YahooMailNeo@web171501.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Peter, I was fascinated with this extension of my quick impusive reflection. In particular this phrase you wrote: Even more: Serres has set himself the task of being a means of communication (a medium) between the sciences and the arts - the Hermes of modern scholarships. What I find so intriquing is the PERSONAL reference [or personifying imaginal configuration] This SENS [sense AND direction] to BE/BECOME *a medium* that is not *subjective* or a *reductio* to the interior individual but rather is a movement of EXCESS. Calling us BEYOND [and in THAT sense transcending our fixation on the reduction [or abstraction] of either the sciences or the arts. Yes *the trickster* as a personifying image [THE medium] by CHOICE [or disposition] . Is Serres project the *even more* of your commen hubris or *channeling*?? THIS opens up what Merleau-Ponty referred to as an *ontological rehabilitation*. THROUGH *expressive cognition* [communication as medium] we share in this EXCESS [contrasted with reductio] Poetic rhetoric AND ratio/analysis BOTH expressed in our *sayings* channeled as personal mediums. Just wondering. Will have to read Serres as continuing in the tradition of the *trickster* Larry On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 1:15 AM, peter jones wrote: > > > Michel Serres has written on these themes.... > > Fifty > Key Contemporary Thinkers by John Lechte, Routledge, 1994. > > With the recognition of the interrelation between different sciences > and different forms of knowledge, as well as between science and different > artistic practices, has come Serres's effort to plot the way that different > knowledge domains interpenetrate. Even more: Serres has set himself the > task of being a means of communication (a medium) between the sciences > and the arts - the Hermes of modern scholarships. With the advent of > information > science, a new figure for representing science becomes possible: this is > the 'model' of communication. Accordingly, we have three elements: a > message, > a channel for transmitting it, and the noise, or interference, that > accompanies > the transmission. Noise calls for decipherment; it makes a reading of the > message more difficult. And yet without it, there would be no message. > There is, in short, no message without resistance. What Serres initially > finds intriguing about noise (rather than the message) is that it opens > up such a fertile avenue of reflection. Instead of remaining pure noise, > the latter becomes a means of transport. Thus in the first volume of the > Hermes series noise is analysed as the third, empirical element of the > message. Ideally, communication must be separated from noise. Noise is > what is not communicated; it is just there as a kind of chaos, as the > empirical > third element of the message, the accidental part, the part of difference > that is excluded. Every formalism (mathematics, for example) is founded > on the exclusion of the third element of noise. Every formalism is a way > of moving from one region of knowledge to another. To communicate is to > move within a class of objects that have the same form. Form has to be > extracted from the cacophony of noise; form (communication) is the > exclusion > of noise, an escape from the domain of the empirical. > > > In his book, The Parasite, Serres recalls that 'parasite' also means > noise (in French). A parasite is a noise in a channel. And so when > describing > the rats' meals in a story from the fables of La Fontaine - the meals of > two parasites - Serres also refers to noise: 'The two companions scurry > off when they hear a noise at the door. It was only a noise, but it was > also a message, a bit of information producing panic: an interruption, > a corruption, a rupture of information. Was this noise really a message? > Wasn't it, rather, static, a parasite? > > see also: > > http://www.frieze.com/issue/article/joyeux-anniversaire/ > > > Peter Jones > Lancashire, UK > Blogging at "Welcome to the QUAD" > http://hodges-model.blogspot.com/ > http://twitter.com/h2cm > > > ________________________________ > From: Larry Purss > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Tuesday, 16 September 2014, 8:43 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca > > > Bahktin the trickster. > In Greek mythology that was Hermes the messenger who brought messages > between [mediated] the divine and the human realms. Bahktin definitely > overlaps with Hermes [and hermeneutics] > Larry > > On Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 8:42 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: > > > Hi Greg, > > I'm convinced you are right. Like I say, Bakhtin just keeps popping up. > > The trickster? Rebelais? What is that about? > > Henry > > > > On Sep 14, 2014, at 8:49 AM, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > > > One reason I mention him is because of resonances with ideas. > > > But I also mention him as a kind of trickster figure as well as a > student > > > of the trickster in writing (his dissertation was on Rabelais). > > > I also mention him as a writer who seems authentically engaged with > > > meaningful/emotive aspects of human existence (e.g., Toward a > Philosophy > > of > > > the Act, and Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity). > > > And finally, I mention Bakhtin because I'm still not convinced that the > > > deep treasures of Bakhtin's work has yet been mined out. > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 8:13 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > wrote: > > > > > >> Greg, > > >> Thank you for you good words and great question. I knew about Bakhtin, > > but > > >> have been finding him everywhere in the articles and chat of XMCA over > > the > > >> last week. Seriously. > > >> Henry > > >> > > >> On Sep 13, 2014, at 2:26 PM, Greg Thompson > > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >>> I would hope that a certain amount of irreverence would be dear to > most > > >>> people on this list! > > >>> But seriously Henry, have you come across Bakhtin's work at all? > > >>> Seems like another that you might want to throw in with the crowd of > > >>> healthy irreverents. > > >>> -greg > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 2:48 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > > hshonerd@gmail.com > > >>> > > >>> wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> Mike and David, > > >>>> This is seriously getting to be a club that I, like Groucho, won't > > >> join, > > >>>> if it takes me as a member. I think all of this seriously evokes > > Andy's > > >>>> contention, in his notes for the upcoming presentation at the ISCAR > > >>>> conference (which XMCA has gotten) that, "Adults can grasp true > > >> concepts, > > >>>> and can change society, and a social theory has to treat adults as > > >> adults, > > >>>> and this is what the projects approach allows us to do. " If "adult" > > >> means > > >>>> the same as "serious", you can see why I have my doubts about > joining > > >> the > > >>>> Unserious Scholar Club. On the other hand, if I can have some fun, > as > > in > > >>>> the laughing warrior (forget gender stereotypes here, and dare me to > > >> talk > > >>>> about Jihad), then that's what I'm talking about. Incidentally, I > > loved > > >>>> Andy's notes. I could so relate it to CG. The emergent character of > > >> project > > >>>> realization he talks about applies very well to discourse, as you > can > > >> see > > >>>> in the articles by Langacker I have sent out. Discourse IS a project > > and > > >>>> its outcome is typically not entirely clear in the minds of the > > >>>> interactants as they negotiate its waters. XMCA, of which this email > > is > > >> a > > >>>> "turn", is a prototypical "work in progress", as Andy puts it, > since > > we > > >>>> clearly don't know where this will all end up. But I hope it can be > > fun > > >>>> along the way. > > >>>> Henry > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> On Sep 6, 2014, at 1:51 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>> Hi Henry-- There goes my pile of books that need to be read before > > bed > > >>>> time! > > >>>>> Spinoza goes up there right next to Dead Souls. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> However, David having already claimed the mantle of unserious > > scholar, > > >>>> and > > >>>>> you having made the same claim, I am afraid that I have to make > > >> precisely > > >>>>> the same claim on the unrefutable grounds that no one pays me any > > >> longer > > >>>>> for what I do so I get to be as unserious as i can seriously be! > > >>>>> mike > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 12:33 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > > >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > >>>>> wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> Hi Mike, > > >>>>>> All I can say now is that Spinoza is famously quoted as having > said, > > >>>> "The > > >>>>>> more clearly you understand yourself and your emotions, the more > you > > >>>> become > > >>>>>> a lover of what is." This quote happens to appear in the > > introduction > > >>>> to a > > >>>>>> very popular self help book, Loving What Is, by Byron Katie > (2002). > > I > > >>>>>> bought the book , obviously, because I thought I needed help. It > > did, > > >>>> but > > >>>>>> it also introduced me to Spinoza. And that has been a deeper > "help". > > >> So, > > >>>>>> from a personal perspective, I can totally understand how Spinoza > > and > > >>>>>> periizhvanie would be connected. For all of you ESL teachers out > > >> there, > > >>>> who > > >>>>>> doesn't remember Krashen on the "affective filter" and I have been > > >>>> seeing a > > >>>>>> lot on character and education lately. Oh yes, and how failing is > > >>>> important > > >>>>>> to eventual success. Teasing out issues in the education of > > >>>>>> non-mainstreamers, and recognizing how the current system is toxic > > for > > >>>>>> everyone, I think Spinoza's analysis and the narrative of his life > > are > > >>>>>> powerful. Vygotsky hits me the same way. Cantor, the > mathematician, > > >> and > > >>>>>> Pierce, the philosopher/logician/semiotician, also constantly come > > up > > >>>> for > > >>>>>> me. They were ridiculed by the received cognoscenti of the time, > so > > >>>> much so > > >>>>>> that the suffered mental breakdowns. But they pushed on to develop > > >>>> tools in > > >>>>>> math and semiotics that seem to me are complementary with > Vygotsky. > > >>>> Again I > > >>>>>> get to take the role of unserious scholar here, so think of my > > >> thoughts > > >>>> as > > >>>>>> gaming on line and don't take the game too seriously. > > >>>>>> Henry > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> On Sep 5, 2014, at 6:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Hi David and Henry-- > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> David-- I was intrigued by your comment that Spinoza is a > > >> controversial > > >>>>>>> topic on xmca. I googled Spinoza on the main web page and came up > > >> with > > >>>> 4K > > >>>>>>> plus hits (!!). My own impression is that few on this list, me > > >>>> included, > > >>>>>>> have engaged in serious study of Spinoza let alone the imprint of > > >>>> Spinoza > > >>>>>>> on Vygotsky. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> What is the nature of the controversy? What is at stake? The > topic > > is > > >>>> of > > >>>>>>> particular interest to me at present because I have been part of > > >>>>>>> discussions with people who are focused on Vygotsky's use of > > >>>> perezhivanie > > >>>>>>> in his later work, where the relation of emotion and cognition > is a > > >>>>>> central > > >>>>>>> concern and Spinoza is clearly relevant. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Henry and anyone interested in chasing down what has been written > > >> about > > >>>>>>> various topics in xmca chatter, take advantage of the nice google > > >>>> search > > >>>>>> at > > >>>>>>> lchc.ucsd.edu. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> (who enmeshed in the sense/meaning distinction in all of its > > >>>> multilingual > > >>>>>>> confusifications at present) > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> -- > > >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >>> Assistant Professor > > >>> Department of Anthropology > > >>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >>> Brigham Young University > > >>> Provo, UT 84602 > > >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > From djwdoc@yahoo.com Tue Sep 16 07:26:50 2014 From: djwdoc@yahoo.com (Douglas Williams) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 07:26:50 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <5416EB84.6080902@mira.net> References: <04EAC9D9-D4A8-4740-8D70-3DC3E025F81E@uga.edu> <5416EB84.6080902@mira.net> Message-ID: <1410877610.85555.YahooMailNeo@web164701.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> Hi-- Isn't "culture" ideas and strategies and identities, through which the chaotic sensual world takes a recognizable form? Even at very early ages, can there be an interaction between an object and a person that is not mediated through the specific culturally-informed objects around a child, and the specific sounds and patterns of human interaction a language affords? And isn't the internalization of culture, as mediated through history, environment, and the human form, a tool for survival? My own interest in these things is (intermittently) serious, in that I am interested in the ways in which societies dream to themselves through narratives. Stories we tell ourselves to guide our actions very often to me seem to be thinking in strings of culturally mediated complexes--like putting on shoes, which involves using the dead labor of centuries, and mixes in with a number of small steps like tying knots, which one observes and repeats, and which (if one forces oneself to be conscious of it, can think about, one can discuss), but which are generally not thought of in the action of performance. At some point, a knot "feels" right, a shoe fits a half-aesthetic purpose, and the foot is protected from the sharp things on the ground. But ground, shoe and foot are infused with history and experience, to such an extent that the physical artifact and the rational purpose of mediating the experience of walking is not nearly as interesting as the historical culture of its expression--indeed, the sociocultural activity in footwear often defeats rather than enhances the pragmatic use of the tool. I think, Andy, that is something you agree with, from what I read. But treating ideas as objects is so basic to human speech, and verbalized experience is so fully between us and unmediated sensation, that I am not sure I grasp how one can clarify the interaction between human and object without also treating as part of the core of that experience the mixture of shared preconcepts and conscious disciplines that typically inform any human activity. Shoes may be nearly a universal human artifact, but I don't see how one can really deal with them in any true sense without addressing culture. As for the science part, I would be interested in seeing more about a CHAT-informed science of mediation of events with culture (mediation in both its transmission and reconciliation purposes, as cultural complexes of social interaction, such as "American Exceptionalism," (not a complex? then what is it?) wend their way through time and events. But then, I have since childhood had a doubtlessly unserious interest in Asimov's Psychohistory idea. I have to wonder, though, given the rather pragmatic concerns of cultural interaction and remediation that certainly was part of the late 1920s, is that concern about culture so far away from Vygotsky? Certainly Eisenstein was interested in precisely a conscious intervention in culture mediated though artifacts of ideas and universal or culturally informed action. Regards, Doug ________________________________ From: Andy Blunden To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 6:37 AM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Sure Kate, "all action is mediated through culture," but that is not only a very general statement which is kind of bound to be true, but what is culture? Is the concept of culture something clearer and more definite and basic that the concept of "action"? How does it help us to know that "culture" is mediating all our actions? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > I'm still working through all this and trying to keep up with the discussion, so please bear with me if this is simplistic. I am wary of blanket statements, but I think it is possible to say that all action is mediated through culture. Certainly for adults, I think culture is the medium through which everyone lives their lives. (I am not so sure this is true with children of all ages, but that's a different post.) Perhaps not? > > Carol's examples really have me thinking this morning about what is or isn't mediated. I think even the sensation of being hungry is mediated; scads of advertising dollars are expended to make us think, at least in the U.S., that we are hungry all the time--not just for food, but also for more stuff. And in nearly every locale in the U.S., even the water is mediated: filtered by local authorities and pumped up with fluoride. That's not always true outside of the U.S., so following the "all action is culturally-mediated" statement, I would say the filtering and the fluoride are culturally-based actions that then themselves mediate how people act to fulfill a basic need. > > Katie > > Katie Wester-Neal > Doctoral Candidate > University of Georgia > > > On Sep 15, 2014, at 9:07 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" wrote: > > Carol, > > It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree that culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated ways we encounter them? > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>
Hi Andy, > > This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the > same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only > universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of > - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; > - as yet potential understanding > - a total lack of understanding. > And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we > are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in > fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of > course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) > I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema > Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. > > Carol > > >> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Ah! I see! >> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in >> mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and >> mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is >> mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that the >> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides >> an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation >> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation >> to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that if >> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression >> other than "mediation." >> >> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I >> like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to use >> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, >> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without >> exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was born. I >> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. So >> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as personal. >> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the >> same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as >> miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same >> material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they do >> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of universal >> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical >> analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, >> eh? >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> >>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >>> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, assertions >>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more >>> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action away >>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >>> cannot mediate an action. >>> >>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way >>> to demonstrate this. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>> >>> he, he, Huw! >>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >>> separation. >>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> ------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> >>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>> >>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >> >> >>> >> wrote: >>> >>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>> tradition >>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>> action >>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>> contexts, >>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>> legitimately, >>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In social >>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>> activities >>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is >>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>> than the vague term "mediated". >>> >>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>> mean what >>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context of >>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>> "mediation" in >>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that a >>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>> communication or >>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>> Artefacts, >>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of >>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>> that a >>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>> any one >>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>> Concepts >>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>> materiality, >>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>> in mind >>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>> mediated >>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>> aware >>> of that. >>> >>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>> qualified >>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>> >>> Andy >>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>> ------------------------------ >>> ------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>> >>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>> >>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>> would need >>> to include >>> reflexes) >>> >>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>> Bateson's man with >>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>> newborns). >>> >>> Just wonderin'. >>> >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>> >>> >> wrote: >>> >>> Thanks for replies. >>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>> to stop >>> talking about >>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>> adjectival >>> use implies there >>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now >>> speaks of >>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>> physical reflexes (and >>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>> action >>> is mediated (and >>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's >>> worth noting that >>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>> action, but >>> rather a >>> theoretical assumption about all human action; though >>> there seems to be >>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>> assumption >>> entails. >>> David >>> > > > From djwdoc@yahoo.com Tue Sep 16 07:26:50 2014 From: djwdoc@yahoo.com (Douglas Williams) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 07:26:50 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <5416EB84.6080902@mira.net> References: <04EAC9D9-D4A8-4740-8D70-3DC3E025F81E@uga.edu> <5416EB84.6080902@mira.net> Message-ID: <1410877610.85555.YahooMailNeo@web164701.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> Hi-- Isn't "culture" ideas and strategies and identities, through which the chaotic sensual world takes a recognizable form? Even at very early ages, can there be an interaction between an object and a person that is not mediated through the specific culturally-informed objects around a child, and the specific sounds and patterns of human interaction a language affords? And isn't the internalization of culture, as mediated through history, environment, and the human form, a tool for survival? My own interest in these things is (intermittently) serious, in that I am interested in the ways in which societies dream to themselves through narratives. Stories we tell ourselves to guide our actions very often to me seem to be thinking in strings of culturally mediated complexes--like putting on shoes, which involves using the dead labor of centuries, and mixes in with a number of small steps like tying knots, which one observes and repeats, and which (if one forces oneself to be conscious of it, can think about, one can discuss), but which are generally not thought of in the action of performance. At some point, a knot "feels" right, a shoe fits a half-aesthetic purpose, and the foot is protected from the sharp things on the ground. But ground, shoe and foot are infused with history and experience, to such an extent that the physical artifact and the rational purpose of mediating the experience of walking is not nearly as interesting as the historical culture of its expression--indeed, the sociocultural activity in footwear often defeats rather than enhances the pragmatic use of the tool. I think, Andy, that is something you agree with, from what I read. But treating ideas as objects is so basic to human speech, and verbalized experience is so fully between us and unmediated sensation, that I am not sure I grasp how one can clarify the interaction between human and object without also treating as part of the core of that experience the mixture of shared preconcepts and conscious disciplines that typically inform any human activity. Shoes may be nearly a universal human artifact, but I don't see how one can really deal with them in any true sense without addressing culture. As for the science part, I would be interested in seeing more about a CHAT-informed science of mediation of events with culture (mediation in both its transmission and reconciliation purposes, as cultural complexes of social interaction, such as "American Exceptionalism," (not a complex? then what is it?) wend their way through time and events. But then, I have since childhood had a doubtlessly unserious interest in Asimov's Psychohistory idea. I have to wonder, though, given the rather pragmatic concerns of cultural interaction and remediation that certainly was part of the late 1920s, is that concern about culture so far away from Vygotsky? Certainly Eisenstein was interested in precisely a conscious intervention in culture mediated though artifacts of ideas and universal or culturally informed action. Regards, Doug ________________________________ From: Andy Blunden To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 6:37 AM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Sure Kate, "all action is mediated through culture," but that is not only a very general statement which is kind of bound to be true, but what is culture? Is the concept of culture something clearer and more definite and basic that the concept of "action"? How does it help us to know that "culture" is mediating all our actions? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > I'm still working through all this and trying to keep up with the discussion, so please bear with me if this is simplistic. I am wary of blanket statements, but I think it is possible to say that all action is mediated through culture. Certainly for adults, I think culture is the medium through which everyone lives their lives. (I am not so sure this is true with children of all ages, but that's a different post.) Perhaps not? > > Carol's examples really have me thinking this morning about what is or isn't mediated. I think even the sensation of being hungry is mediated; scads of advertising dollars are expended to make us think, at least in the U.S., that we are hungry all the time--not just for food, but also for more stuff. And in nearly every locale in the U.S., even the water is mediated: filtered by local authorities and pumped up with fluoride. That's not always true outside of the U.S., so following the "all action is culturally-mediated" statement, I would say the filtering and the fluoride are culturally-based actions that then themselves mediate how people act to fulfill a basic need. > > Katie > > Katie Wester-Neal > Doctoral Candidate > University of Georgia > > > On Sep 15, 2014, at 9:07 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" wrote: > > Carol, > > It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree that culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated ways we encounter them? > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>
Hi Andy, > > This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the > same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only > universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of > - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; > - as yet potential understanding > - a total lack of understanding. > And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we > are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in > fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of > course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) > I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema > Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. > > Carol > > >> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Ah! I see! >> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in >> mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and >> mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is >> mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that the >> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides >> an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if mediation >> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation >> to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that if >> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression >> other than "mediation." >> >> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I >> like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to use >> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, >> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without >> exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was born. I >> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. So >> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as personal. >> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the >> same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as >> miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same >> material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they do >> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of universal >> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical >> analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. Wonderful, >> eh? >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> >>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >>> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, assertions >>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more >>> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action away >>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >>> cannot mediate an action. >>> >>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way >>> to demonstrate this. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>> >>> he, he, Huw! >>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >>> separation. >>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> ------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> >>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>> >>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >> >> >>> >> wrote: >>> >>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>> tradition >>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>> action >>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>> contexts, >>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>> legitimately, >>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In social >>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>> activities >>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic is >>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>> than the vague term "mediated". >>> >>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>> mean what >>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context of >>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>> "mediation" in >>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact that a >>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>> communication or >>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>> Artefacts, >>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can of >>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>> that a >>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>> any one >>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>> Concepts >>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>> materiality, >>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>> in mind >>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>> mediated >>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>> aware >>> of that. >>> >>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>> qualified >>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>> >>> Andy >>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>> ------------------------------ >>> ------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>> >>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>> >>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>> would need >>> to include >>> reflexes) >>> >>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>> Bateson's man with >>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>> newborns). >>> >>> Just wonderin'. >>> >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>> >>> >> wrote: >>> >>> Thanks for replies. >>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>> to stop >>> talking about >>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>> adjectival >>> use implies there >>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He now >>> speaks of >>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>> physical reflexes (and >>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>> action >>> is mediated (and >>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, it's >>> worth noting that >>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>> action, but >>> rather a >>> theoretical assumption about all human action; though >>> there seems to be >>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>> assumption >>> entails. >>> David >>> > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 07:34:30 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 08:34:30 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca In-Reply-To: References: <8D2C4DB1-CFE1-4A1D-8683-CE5A8551B35C@gmail.com> <6322AED9-6172-4B7C-8A08-4F0F1FE673D2@gmail.com> <4BDC889C-9B1B-4516-9F11-5549F0EF3003@gmail.com> Message-ID: <5DAD63A2-6147-4055-BB2C-17B6DCA08276@gmail.com> So this goes way back. I googled hermeneutics/hermes and the first line of my first hit was the following from Heidigger: "By a playful thinking that is more persuasive than the rigor of science." In a Marzano attachment you sent me, humor was associated with student engagement. The same thing applies to even this highfalutin' XMCA dialog, don't you think? On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:43 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Bahktin the trickster. > In Greek mythology that was Hermes the messenger who brought messages > between [mediated] the divine and the human realms. Bahktin definitely > overlaps with Hermes [and hermeneutics] > Larry > > On Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 8:42 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: > >> Hi Greg, >> I'm convinced you are right. Like I say, Bakhtin just keeps popping up. >> The trickster? Rebelais? What is that about? >> Henry >> >> On Sep 14, 2014, at 8:49 AM, Greg Thompson >> wrote: >> >>> One reason I mention him is because of resonances with ideas. >>> But I also mention him as a kind of trickster figure as well as a student >>> of the trickster in writing (his dissertation was on Rabelais). >>> I also mention him as a writer who seems authentically engaged with >>> meaningful/emotive aspects of human existence (e.g., Toward a Philosophy >> of >>> the Act, and Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity). >>> And finally, I mention Bakhtin because I'm still not convinced that the >>> deep treasures of Bakhtin's work has yet been mined out. >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 8:13 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < >> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Greg, >>>> Thank you for you good words and great question. I knew about Bakhtin, >> but >>>> have been finding him everywhere in the articles and chat of XMCA over >> the >>>> last week. Seriously. >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> On Sep 13, 2014, at 2:26 PM, Greg Thompson >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I would hope that a certain amount of irreverence would be dear to most >>>>> people on this list! >>>>> But seriously Henry, have you come across Bakhtin's work at all? >>>>> Seems like another that you might want to throw in with the crowd of >>>>> healthy irreverents. >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 2:48 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < >> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Mike and David, >>>>>> This is seriously getting to be a club that I, like Groucho, won't >>>> join, >>>>>> if it takes me as a member. I think all of this seriously evokes >> Andy's >>>>>> contention, in his notes for the upcoming presentation at the ISCAR >>>>>> conference (which XMCA has gotten) that, "Adults can grasp true >>>> concepts, >>>>>> and can change society, and a social theory has to treat adults as >>>> adults, >>>>>> and this is what the projects approach allows us to do. " If "adult" >>>> means >>>>>> the same as "serious", you can see why I have my doubts about joining >>>> the >>>>>> Unserious Scholar Club. On the other hand, if I can have some fun, as >> in >>>>>> the laughing warrior (forget gender stereotypes here, and dare me to >>>> talk >>>>>> about Jihad), then that's what I'm talking about. Incidentally, I >> loved >>>>>> Andy's notes. I could so relate it to CG. The emergent character of >>>> project >>>>>> realization he talks about applies very well to discourse, as you can >>>> see >>>>>> in the articles by Langacker I have sent out. Discourse IS a project >> and >>>>>> its outcome is typically not entirely clear in the minds of the >>>>>> interactants as they negotiate its waters. XMCA, of which this email >> is >>>> a >>>>>> "turn", is a prototypical "work in progress", as Andy puts it, since >> we >>>>>> clearly don't know where this will all end up. But I hope it can be >> fun >>>>>> along the way. >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sep 6, 2014, at 1:51 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi Henry-- There goes my pile of books that need to be read before >> bed >>>>>> time! >>>>>>> Spinoza goes up there right next to Dead Souls. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> However, David having already claimed the mantle of unserious >> scholar, >>>>>> and >>>>>>> you having made the same claim, I am afraid that I have to make >>>> precisely >>>>>>> the same claim on the unrefutable grounds that no one pays me any >>>> longer >>>>>>> for what I do so I get to be as unserious as i can seriously be! >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 12:33 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < >>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>>>> All I can say now is that Spinoza is famously quoted as having said, >>>>>> "The >>>>>>>> more clearly you understand yourself and your emotions, the more you >>>>>> become >>>>>>>> a lover of what is." This quote happens to appear in the >> introduction >>>>>> to a >>>>>>>> very popular self help book, Loving What Is, by Byron Katie (2002). >> I >>>>>>>> bought the book , obviously, because I thought I needed help. It >> did, >>>>>> but >>>>>>>> it also introduced me to Spinoza. And that has been a deeper "help". >>>> So, >>>>>>>> from a personal perspective, I can totally understand how Spinoza >> and >>>>>>>> periizhvanie would be connected. For all of you ESL teachers out >>>> there, >>>>>> who >>>>>>>> doesn't remember Krashen on the "affective filter" and I have been >>>>>> seeing a >>>>>>>> lot on character and education lately. Oh yes, and how failing is >>>>>> important >>>>>>>> to eventual success. Teasing out issues in the education of >>>>>>>> non-mainstreamers, and recognizing how the current system is toxic >> for >>>>>>>> everyone, I think Spinoza's analysis and the narrative of his life >> are >>>>>>>> powerful. Vygotsky hits me the same way. Cantor, the mathematician, >>>> and >>>>>>>> Pierce, the philosopher/logician/semiotician, also constantly come >> up >>>>>> for >>>>>>>> me. They were ridiculed by the received cognoscenti of the time, so >>>>>> much so >>>>>>>> that the suffered mental breakdowns. But they pushed on to develop >>>>>> tools in >>>>>>>> math and semiotics that seem to me are complementary with Vygotsky. >>>>>> Again I >>>>>>>> get to take the role of unserious scholar here, so think of my >>>> thoughts >>>>>> as >>>>>>>> gaming on line and don't take the game too seriously. >>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sep 5, 2014, at 6:42 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hi David and Henry-- >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David-- I was intrigued by your comment that Spinoza is a >>>> controversial >>>>>>>>> topic on xmca. I googled Spinoza on the main web page and came up >>>> with >>>>>> 4K >>>>>>>>> plus hits (!!). My own impression is that few on this list, me >>>>>> included, >>>>>>>>> have engaged in serious study of Spinoza let alone the imprint of >>>>>> Spinoza >>>>>>>>> on Vygotsky. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> What is the nature of the controversy? What is at stake? The topic >> is >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> particular interest to me at present because I have been part of >>>>>>>>> discussions with people who are focused on Vygotsky's use of >>>>>> perezhivanie >>>>>>>>> in his later work, where the relation of emotion and cognition is a >>>>>>>> central >>>>>>>>> concern and Spinoza is clearly relevant. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Henry and anyone interested in chasing down what has been written >>>> about >>>>>>>>> various topics in xmca chatter, take advantage of the nice google >>>>>> search >>>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>> lchc.ucsd.edu. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (who enmeshed in the sense/meaning distinction in all of its >>>>>> multilingual >>>>>>>>> confusifications at present) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> >> From dkirsh@lsu.edu Tue Sep 16 07:37:18 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 14:37:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> <54178B49.9070205@mira.net> <50f7f5173d374b5fa9ed51a3b62501f9@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <541818DC.8090504@mira.net> Message-ID: <76e8100f253146e5ba8f9f5ba77d2c12@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Andy, I think you've framed the question well, and I agree it would be good to bring it to the list, so I'm posting our brief off-line exchange. David ______________________ Andy said: I think the substantive and interesting question you raise here is: Has CHAT theorizing has advanced over the years as a result of insights of the form of empirical observations, or, as a result of critique of concepts? I don't know if I have enough of an overview of the history of CHAT to answer this. It would be good to keep it on the list because Mike Cole probably could answer authoritatively. My guess is that there have been occasional problems which have arisen and become subjects of wide discussion, particularly in the domain of education, and these have stimulated theoretical advance. But I really don't know. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David H Kirshner wrote: -----Original Message----- From: David H Kirshner Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 9:00 AM To: 'ablunden@mira.net' Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse Hi Andy, Thanks for sending these papers. I look forward to reading them. My point isn't that empirical evidence CAN'T inform theory, but that's not the usual vehicle whereby theory is advanced. You're much more aware of this literature than me. Do you disagree with the generalization that empirical work in CHAT/sociocultural is of an applied nature, notwithstanding occasional cases in which data are used to establish a theoretical position? Note that your observation about the relative lack of sophistication of cognitive theorization of concepts is kind of a celebration of that fact that CHAT/sociocultural theorizing is informed primarily by a theoretical/philosophical discourse, rather than one that is rooted in empirical evidence. So the question isn't a normative one--how should CHAT/sociocultural theory advance--but a description one--how does it advance. I should add that the problem with cognitive theorizing, as I see it, isn't only that it progresses slowly, but that it is fundamentally limited by its starting assumptions. The fundamental constructs of cognitive psychology come from the analogy of the serial digital computer to the human information processing system. I don't think that ever gets challenged within that paradigm. David -----Original Message----- From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net] Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 6:03 AM To: David H Kirshner Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse David, I think I misled you by making it seem as if the book had a dichotomy of theory here and data there. Not so. If you look at Brecht's and Anna's chapters you will see that the chapters had empirical content but were also theory-laden and the data was brought to bear on the theory: On Cognitive Psychology, I am only familiar with the Psychology of Concepts, so my comments are relevant only to that branch. I agree that they have shown a lot of ingenuity in their experimental work and this has led to a relatively rapid progress in its theory. But their theory begins at such a woeful level! If experimental work aims to "test" theory, it is not hard to "test" theory which hardly rises above common sense. https://www.academia.edu/6025821/The_Psychology_of_Concepts And David, you have to give CHAT credit for the fact that it sets its standards very high for theory. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David H Kirshner wrote: > > Andy, > > > > Thanks for the link to the TOC of your edited volume, which perhaps > unintentionally illustrates my point that empirical studies using > CHAT/sociocultural theory generally aren't intended as contributions > to theory, per se; as you noted, the affordances for theorizing were > brought out by you, rather than by the authors as part of their motive > for producing the empirical work. > > > > I've hung out with cognitive psychologists quite a bit, and there's a > very clear demarcation between applied studies which utilize cognitive > theory for applicative purposes and pure studies whose sole raison > d'?tre is to inform theory. Furthermore, it is a fairly rare > occurrence for anyone to attempt to address theory in any other way > than through the lens of empirical studies. > > > > My own experience of this community includes appreciation of the tight > logic of their theorizing, and also of the inventiveness of > researchers in generating truly provocative data that they are then > forced to contend. But it also includes a sense of frustration with > the absence of any critique of or input to theory from outside of the > little studies that, one after another, niggle away at the theoretical > infrastructure. Excluded, here, are not only philosophical inputs to > theory, but even broader methodological constraints regarding the > character of good theories. (My own grounding in mathematical > theorizing includes a deliciously salient sense of the ?elegance? that > makes a theory truly admirable and worthy.) > > > > Somehow, it seems noteworthy that CHAT/sociocultural > psychology?whatever its virtues?isn?t organized like other branches of > psychology (e.g., behavioral, cognitive, developmental) with respect > to the role of empirical data in theory construction. Andy, in your > response to Jenna, you described science as an objective practice that > ?is not dependant on what you and I, writing here on xmca in 2014, > says it is.? The question all this raises is whether > CHAT/sociocultural psychology actually qualifies as a scientific > practice. > > > > David > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:59 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > > > > David, in the recently published book, "Collaborative Projects. An > Interdisciplinary Study," authors were invited to submit studies with > empirical content (in the sense in which you are using the word) which > illustrated the use of the concept of "project" within CHAT. > > > > https://www.academia.edu/6756231/Collaborative_Projects._An_Interdisci > plinary_Study > > > > As you can see from the Table of Contents, more than a dozen different > practical studies were contributed, and I am satisfied that the > collection functioned to illuminate the philosophical issues about the > nature of "an activity," and its ue as a unit of analysis, even though > they are only explicitly addressed in the long Introduction. > > > > Andy > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > David H Kirshner wrote: > > > Mike, > > > > > > Clearly, as in Katherine Neal's response, and in MCA, > CHAT/sociocultural theory informs empirical research. > > > What's less clear is that empirical research informs > CHAT/sociocultural theorizing. > > > Not quite sure what to make of that. > > > > > > David > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > > > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 11:15 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > > > > > > Your followup comment is closely related to the second part of your > initiating message, David. So i will respond in line. > > > > > > Firstly, I think it would be helpful to distinguish between MCA and > xmca. > > > The idea behind xmca was to provide a discussion forum for articles > that appear in MCA so that instead of authors having to wait 2+ years > for feedback on their ideas (which rarely comes, even then!), we could > discuss the published work and learn from it in a timely manner. By an > large, that effort has, in my opinion, failed. Thanks to the recent > decision to have the editors pick out articles for discussion which > include the author(s) in the discussion, this situation has been > somewhat mitigated. But only somewhat. xma discussions have all the > characteristics of Vygotskian chaining, as a rule. > > > > > > Secondly, when I take down a bundle of recent MCA issues and look at > the titles, they at least sound like they are about empirical matters > ranging across a wide variety of content areas. Are you saying that > these articles are not really empirical? Or that they are not really > helping us to develop better methods to deal with perceived problems > of social value? Again, this raises the question of "MCA or xmca". > > > > > > Lastly, perhaps it would be helpful if those of us who believe that > empirical work guided by CHAT ideas of some value has been produced > in, say, the past two decades, would post brief summiaries of that > work with references. > > > Maybe its just all verbal sound and fury, signifying the usual! > > > mike > > > > > > On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 8:50 AM, David H Kirshner > wrote: > > > > > > > > >> Does CHAT theory really advance with respect to empirical studies? > > >> If so, then why isn't the XMCA discussion a discussion about > > >> so-and-so's empirical results and how we should interpret them? > > >> Various branches of psychology (e.g., cognitive and developmental) > >> do > > >> address concepts, and do conduct empirical research related to > concepts. > > >> It's true, they rarely enter into full-blooded discussion of what > >> is > > >> a concept. But perhaps that's because they're scientists rather > >> than > > >> philosophers. They're operating within a framework that is bounded > > >> primarily by empirical and methodological expectations and > > >> obligations; theory evolves within those boundaries. > > >> It's not clear to me that the Vygotskyan research community ever > > >> operated in that fashion, and I'm wondering what would happen if it > did. > > >> David > > >> > > >> > > >> -----Original Message----- > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > > >> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 10:23 AM > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > > >> > > >> Well, Lisa, I think that is a project which requires a lot of what > > >> David would call "philosophical" discussion. :) The Psychology of > > >> Concepts, as it is know to American psychology, i.e., the "mainstream" > > >> do endless laboratory tests and questionnaires and surveys and so > >> far > > >> as I can see have still haven't figured out what a concept is. > > >> Andy > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> -- > > >> - > > >> -- > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > > >> > > >>> Well I am guilty for being fixated about thinking and talking > >>> about > > >>> methods and how to better understand how we can make a trustworthy > > >>> leap from understanding the world to understanding concepts. Again > > >>> just talking aloud. > > >>> > > >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > > >>> Psychology and Counseling > > >>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey > > >>> Education Complex > > >>> IT Online Program Coordinator University > > >>> of Tennessee > > >>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ > > >>> Knoxville, TN 37996 > > >>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > > >>> 865-974-7712 > > >>> > > >>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Andy Blunden > >>> > wrote: > > >>> > > >>> I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and we all > >>> have > > >>> our specific research interests. > > >>> But when we publish, most of us have something to report. > > >>> I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more of my > >>> share of > > >>> time arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest. > > >>> Andy > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> -- > > >> - > > >> -- > > >> > > >>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > > >>> > > >>> Why is it that we came to what David stated as: > > >>> > > >>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over > > >>> facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical > > >>> elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost > > >>> completely detached from empirical specifics. > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > > >>> Psychology and Counseling > > >>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 > > >>> Bailey Education Complex > > >>> IT Online Program Coordinator > > >>> University of Tennessee > > >>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ > > >>> Knoxville, TN 37996 > > >>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > > >>> 865-974-7712 > > >>> > > >>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner > > >>> > > > >>> >> wrote: > > >>> > > >>> Andy, > > >>> > > >>> I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a > >>> scientific > > >>> project, > > >>> though it might initially have been conceived as such. > > >>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue > >>> over > > >>> facts." > > >>> We are engaged in making endless theoretical > >>> elaborations, > > >>> distinctions, and qualifications almost completely > > >>> detached from > > >>> empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, > >>> even > > >>> at the > > >>> level of theory, we're not all playing the same game. > > >>> > > >>> I agree with you that simply creating an obligation > >>> that > > >>> claims be > > >>> framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on > >>> the > > >>> significance of that claim." But perhaps in an > >>> empirical > > >>> setting > > >>> theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. > >>> In > > >>> this case, > > >>> there is a possibility that disagreements lead to > > >>> separation of > > >>> research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical > >>> agreement > > >>> as a > > >>> consequence. > > >>> > > >>> David > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> -----Original Message----- > > >>> From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net > > >>> > > >>> >] > > >>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM > > >>> To: David H Kirshner > > >>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >>> Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse > > >>> > > >>> David, > > >>> CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science > > >>> it > > >>> > > >> must > > >> > > >>> strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which > >>> are > > >>> meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into > >>> which > > >>> they > > >>> are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by > >>> a > > >>> system of > > >>> concepts. People can agree on this or that hard > experimental > > >>> finding, but still not agree on the significance of > >>> that > > >>> claim. We > > >>> CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue > >>> over > > >>> facts; > > >>> all of this is possible only to the extent that we > >>> share > > >>> concepts. > > >>> "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a > >>> goal > > >>> as it > > >>> is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is > > >>> ill-conceived to > > >>> think that this is a means of consolidating a current > >>> of > > >>> research > > >>> like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or > >>> psychological, > > >>> I don't > > >>> think that makes any difference. > > >>> Andy > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> -- > > >> - > > >> -- > > >> > > >>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> David H Kirshner wrote: > > >>> > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact > >>> mediation, it > > >>> seems > > >>> inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to > >>> distinguishing > > >>> efforts > > >>> to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from > > >>> efforts > > >>> > > >> to > > >> > > >>> solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. > >>> In > > >>> tandem, is > > >>> ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or > > >>> philosophical > > >>> discourse. > > >>> > > > >>> > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if > >>> advancement of > > >>> CHAT > > >>> would not be better served by embedding theoretical > > >>> discussion in > > >>> analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not > >>> be > > >>> to make > > >>> CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application > > >>> (though that > > >>> would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical > >>> obligation > > >>> might > > >>> transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of > > >>> methodology. In that way, CHAT could become > >>> differentiated > > >>> into > > >>> distinct psychological schools, each constrained by > > >>> methodological > > >>> strictures that also support a more homogeneous > theoretical > > >>> environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT > >>> community > > >>> could > > >>> look across these various schools to pursue broader > > >>> philosophical > > >>> problematics. > > >>> > > > >>> > David > > >>> > > > >>> > -----Original Message----- > > >>> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >>> > > >>> > >>> > > > >>> > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >>> > > >>> > >>> >] On Behalf Of > >>> Andy > > >>> Blunden > > >>> > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM > > >>> > To: Huw Lloyd > > >>> > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct > > >>> perception > > >>> > > > >>> > Ah! I see! > > >>> > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, > or in > > >>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not > >>> equally > > >>> contain > > >>> both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem > > >>> with anyone > > >>> saying that anything is mediated by anything else, > >>> where > > >>> it > > >>> > > >> is > > >> > > >>> appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight > >>> of > > >>> Vygotsky, > > >>> that artefact-mediation of actions provides an > >>> especially > > >>> productive unit of analysis for science is lost if > > >>> mediation in > > >>> the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with > > >>> artefact-mediation to the point that > >>> artefact-mediation is > > >>> lost. > > >>> Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the > >>> point > > >>> you were > > >>> referring to you used some expression other than > "mediation." > > >>> > > > >>> > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant > >>> insight. I > > >>> can do > > >>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have > >>> dreams or > > >>> thoughts) I have to use some material object to > transmit my > > >>> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or > > >>> whatever - > > >>> but all these artefacts which I use, without > exception, are > > >>> products of the history and culture into which I was born. > > >>> I can > > >>> choose which artefact to use, but culture and history > produce > > >>> them. So every action I take is essentially > > >>> cultural-historical as > > >>> well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material > > >>> objects, > > >>> their physical form is the same for everyone, it is > > >>> universal. So > > >>> communication as much as miscommunication takes place > through > > >>> everyone interpreting the same material objects, > > >>> artefacts, that I > > >>> am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because > > >>> they > > >>> > > >> too > > >> > > >>> mediate their actions with the same set of universal > > >>> artefacts! So > > >>> all human action is opened to cultural and historical > > >>> > > >> analysis > > >> > > >>> which is as objective as any branch of natural science. > > >>> Wonderful, eh? > > >>> > > > >>> > Andy > > >>> > > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> -- > > >> - > > >> > > >>> > -- > > >>> > *Andy Blunden* > > >>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > >>> > > > >>> >> If you want to study how action changes then you > >>> need > > >>> to study the > > >>> >> history and production of the action. Under such > > >>> circumstances, > > >>> >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the > >>> production > > >>> of) actions > > >>> >> become more obviously false. If one has > >>> simplified, > > >>> through > > >>> >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base > >>> then > > >>> it may seem > > >>> >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an > action. > > >>> >> > > >>> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of > >>> volume) > > >>> are an elegant > > >>> >> way to demonstrate this. > > >>> >> > > >>> >> Best, > > >>> >> Huw > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > > >>> > > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > > >>> >>>> wrote: > > >>> >> > > >>> >> he, he, Huw! > > >>> >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are > > >>> the very > > >>> >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! > > >>> and I > > >>> really > > >>> >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally > > >>> being > > >>> used to > > >>> >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is > > >>> not equal to > > >>> >> separation. > > >>> >> I really don't know what you are referring to with > > >>> product and > > >>> >> history. Perhaps you could explain? > > >>> >> Andy > > >>> >> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> -- > > >> - > > >> -- > > >> > > >>> >> *Andy Blunden* > > >>> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: > > >>> >> > > >>> >> I agree about precision, but not with a call > > >>> for "clarity". > > >>> >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or > > >>> reification of the > > >>> >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually > entails > > >>> typologies or > > >>> >> other simplistic devices which prevent the > > >>> conception and > > >>> >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in > > >>> cases such as > > >>> >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the > > >>> entanglements > > >>> >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would > > >>> be equally > > >>> >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that > > >>> > > >> one > > >> > > >>> needs to > > >>> >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. > > >>> >> > > >>> >> I think it is this "need for > simplification" which > > >>> leads me to > > >>> >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, > > >>> why separate > > >>> >> the act from its production and history? > > >>> >> Of course, if one had the discipline to > de-couple > > >>> clarity from > > >>> >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the > > >>> problem. > > >>> >> > > >>> >> Best, > > >>> >> Huw > > >>> >> > > >>> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > > >>> > > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > >>> > >>> >> > > >>> > > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > >>> > >>> >>>> > > >>> > > >>> wrote: > > >>> >> > > >>> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that > > >>> in the CHAT > > >>> >> tradition > > >>> >> specifically, as opposed to the English > > >>> language in > > >>> general, > > >>> >> mediation refers to > *artefact-mediation*. Of > > >>> course, every > > >>> >> action > > >>> >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many > > >>> discursive > > >>> >> contexts, > > >>> >> "mediation" is a concept which may be > > >>> evoked quite > > >>> >> legitimately, > > >>> >> but with no special significant for the > use of > > >>> CHAT. In social > > >>> >> theory, for example, mediation of > > >>> activities by other > > >>> >> activities > > >>> >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as > > >>> mediation of > > >>> actions by > > >>> >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. > > >>> But if > > >>> the topic is > > >>> >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation > is so > > >>> central, that I > > >>> >> prefer to spell it out and use the term > > >>> >> "artefact-mediated" rather > > >>> >> than the vague term "mediated". > > >>> >> > > >>> >> I have come across usages like "mediated by > > >>> such-and-such a > > >>> >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can > > >>> use words to > > >>> >> mean what > > >>> >> you like, but I find a formulation like > > >>> this in the > > >>> context of > > >>> >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the > > >>> idea of > > >>> >> "mediation" in > > >>> >> the most general sense in a way which > > >>> obscures the > > >>> fact that a > > >>> >> concept is not immediately present in any > > >>> act of > > >>> >> communication or > > >>> >> any other act, and therefore *cannot > > >>> mediate actions*. > > >>> >> Artefacts, > > >>> >> such as spoken words, which may be > signs for a > > >>> concept, can of > > >>> >> course mediate an act of communication. But > > >>> > > >> the > > >> > > >>> point is > > >>> >> that a > > >>> >> word is not universally and > unproblematically > > >>> > > >> a > > >> > > >>> sign for > > >>> >> any one > > >>> >> concept. It means different things to > > >>> different people. > > >>> >> Concepts > > >>> >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal > > >>> in their > > >>> >> materiality, > > >>> >> but particular in their meaning. So when we > > >>> have a > > >>> concept > > >>> >> in mind > > >>> >> when we use a word in communication, the > > >>> communication is > > >>> >> mediated > > >>> >> by the word not the concept, and it is a > > >>> mistake > > >>> not to be > > >>> >> aware > > >>> >> of that. > > >>> >> > > >>> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were > > >>> always used in > > >>> >> qualified > > >>> >> way so that its specific meaning is made > > >>> > > >> clear. > > >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> Andy > > >>> >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his > > >>> comment, too. > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> -- > > >> - > > >> -- > > >> > > >>> >> *Andy Blunden* > > >>> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> Greg Thompson wrote: > > >>> >> > > >>> >> Does "mediation" only apply to language > > >>> > > >> and > > >> > > >>> culture? > > >>> >> > > >>> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in > > >>> which case we > > >>> >> would need > > >>> >> to include > > >>> >> reflexes) > > >>> >> > > >>> >> And does it include our > socio-contextual > > >>> surround as in > > >>> >> Bateson's man with > > >>> >> the stick? (in which case, we would > > >>> need to include > > >>> >> newborns). > > >>> >> > > >>> >> Just wonderin'. > > >>> >> > > >>> >> -greg > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David > > >>> H Kirshner > > >>> >> > > > >>> >> > > >>> > > > >>> >>> > > >>> >> > > > >>> >> > > >>> > > > >>> >>>>> wrote: > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> Thanks for replies. > > >>> >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim > > >>> Greeno > > >>> decided > > >>> >> to stop > > >>> >> talking about > > >>> >> situated cognition because the > > >>> pragmatics of > > >>> >> adjectival > > >>> >> use implies there > > >>> >> has to be a contrasting > non-situated > > >>> cognition. He now > > >>> >> speaks of > > >>> >> situativity theory. It seems, > with the > > >>> exception of > > >>> >> physical reflexes (and > > >>> >> perhaps pre-conscious infant > > >>> activity), all > > >>> human > > >>> >> action > > >>> >> is mediated (and > > >>> >> perhaps a lot of non-human > action, as > > >>> well). So, it's > > >>> >> worth noting that > > >>> >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a > > >>> kind of > > >>> >> action, but > > >>> >> rather a > > >>> >> theoretical assumption about > all human > > >>> action; though > > >>> >> there seems to be > > >>> >> some variation in interpretation of > > >>> what that > > >>> >> assumption > > >>> >> entails. > > >>> >> David > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Tue Sep 16 07:48:33 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 00:48:33 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <1410877610.85555.YahooMailNeo@web164701.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> References: <04EAC9D9-D4A8-4740-8D70-3DC3E025F81E@uga.edu> <5416EB84.6080902@mira.net> <1410877610.85555.YahooMailNeo@web164701.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <54184DC1.1050007@mira.net> Douglas, yes, I do agree with that outline of yours about the penetration of culture into the minutiae of daily life, and of course, none of this can be understood other than through the culture. That was not my point. It's the difference between clarity and reduction, I guess. Culture is a very complex entity, about as complex as it gets actually, and it is also something, the definition of which is as contested as it gets. This contrasts with "action", "mediation" and "artefact" which are certainly open to misunderstanding but in a couple of lines it is possible to succinctly define them and in any given event actually specify them unambiguously. The definition of culture I like is "the constellation of artefacts shared by a community," (shared artefacts and community are mutually constitutive) in which "constellation" refers to the complex network of relations between all the artefacts which is established by the active use of the artefacts in activities within the community and constitutes them as artefacts. So actually when I behave like an old curmudgeon and insist on artefact-mediated action as a unit of analysis for CHAT and insist that an artefact is a material object fashioned by and used inhuman activity and actions include the processes of consciousness entailed in their performance, I feel I at least have my feet on the ground when I try to understand some complex cultural phenomenon. I don't think I have excluded anything and I don't think I have simplified anything. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Douglas Williams wrote: > Hi-- > > Isn't "culture" ideas and strategies and identities, through which the > chaotic sensual world takes a recognizable form? Even at very early > ages, can there be an interaction between an object and a person that > is not mediated through the specific culturally-informed objects > around a child, and the specific sounds and patterns of human > interaction a language affords? And isn't the internalization of > culture, as mediated through history, environment, and the human form, > a tool for survival? > > My own interest in these things is (intermittently) serious, in that I > am interested in the ways in which societies dream to themselves > through narratives. Stories we tell ourselves to guide our actions > very often to me seem to be thinking in strings of culturally mediated > complexes--like putting on shoes, which involves using the dead labor > of centuries, and mixes in with a number of small steps like tying > knots, which one observes and repeats, and which (if one forces > oneself to be conscious of it, can think about, one can discuss), but > which are generally not thought of in the action of performance. At > some point, a knot "feels" right, a shoe fits a half-aesthetic > purpose, and the foot is protected from the sharp things on the > ground. But ground, shoe and foot are infused with history and > experience, to such an extent that the physical artifact and the > rational purpose of mediating the experience of walking is not nearly > as interesting as the historical culture of its expression--indeed, > the sociocultural activity in footwear often defeats rather than > enhances the pragmatic use of the tool. I think, Andy, that is > something you agree with, from what I read. But treating ideas as > objects is so basic to human speech, and verbalized experience is so > fully between us and unmediated sensation, that I am not sure I grasp > how one can clarify the interaction between human and object without > also treating as part of the core of that experience the mixture of > shared preconcepts and conscious disciplines that typically inform any > human activity. Shoes may be nearly a universal human artifact, but I > don't see how one can really deal with them in any true sense without > addressing culture. > > As for the science part, I would be interested in seeing more about a > CHAT-informed science of mediation of events with culture (mediation > in both its transmission and reconciliation purposes, as cultural > complexes of social interaction, such as "American Exceptionalism," > (not a complex? then what is it?) wend their way through time and > events. But then, I have since childhood had a doubtlessly unserious > interest in Asimov's Psychohistory idea. I have to wonder, though, > given the rather pragmatic concerns of cultural interaction and > remediation that certainly was part of the late 1920s, is that concern > about culture so far away from Vygotsky? Certainly Eisenstein was > interested in precisely a conscious intervention in culture mediated > though artifacts of ideas and universal or culturally informed action. > > Regards, > Doug > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* Andy Blunden > *To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > *Sent:* Monday, September 15, 2014 6:37 AM > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > Sure Kate, "all action is mediated through culture," but that is not > only a very general statement which is kind of bound to be true, but > what is culture? Is the concept of culture something clearer and more > definite and basic that the concept of "action"? How does it help us to > know that "culture" is mediating all our actions? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 08:03:53 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 08:03:53 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca In-Reply-To: <5DAD63A2-6147-4055-BB2C-17B6DCA08276@gmail.com> References: <8D2C4DB1-CFE1-4A1D-8683-CE5A8551B35C@gmail.com> <6322AED9-6172-4B7C-8A08-4F0F1FE673D2@gmail.com> <4BDC889C-9B1B-4516-9F11-5549F0EF3003@gmail.com> <5DAD63A2-6147-4055-BB2C-17B6DCA08276@gmail.com> Message-ID: Henry, Yes, goes *way back* and also a *return* to the *beginning*. Very *tricky* requiring the awareness of the trickster. Science as a project opening to the EXCESS BEYOND the *sensation fallacy* that Merleau-Ponty refers to AS *ontological rehabilitation* Heidegger and Serres also *playing WITH and WITHIN this SYNERGY [Merleau-Ponty's term] Merleau-Ponty was very engaged with the facticity of *experience* . However he questioned its *reductio* and called us back to EXCESS Larry Larry On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 7:34 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > So this goes way back. I googled hermeneutics/hermes and the first line of > my first hit was the following from Heidigger: "By a playful thinking that > is more persuasive than the rigor of science." In a Marzano attachment you > sent me, humor was associated with student engagement. The same thing > applies to even this highfalutin' XMCA dialog, don't you think? > > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:43 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > Bahktin the trickster. > > In Greek mythology that was Hermes the messenger who brought messages > > between [mediated] the divine and the human realms. Bahktin definitely > > overlaps with Hermes [and hermeneutics] > > Larry > > > > On Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 8:42 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > wrote: > > > >> Hi Greg, > >> I'm convinced you are right. Like I say, Bakhtin just keeps popping up. > >> The trickster? Rebelais? What is that about? > >> Henry > >> > >> On Sep 14, 2014, at 8:49 AM, Greg Thompson > >> wrote: > >> > >>> One reason I mention him is because of resonances with ideas. > >>> But I also mention him as a kind of trickster figure as well as a > student > >>> of the trickster in writing (his dissertation was on Rabelais). > >>> I also mention him as a writer who seems authentically engaged with > >>> meaningful/emotive aspects of human existence (e.g., Toward a > Philosophy > >> of > >>> the Act, and Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity). > >>> And finally, I mention Bakhtin because I'm still not convinced that the > >>> deep treasures of Bakhtin's work has yet been mined out. > >>> -greg > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 8:13 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Greg, > >>>> Thank you for you good words and great question. I knew about Bakhtin, > >> but > >>>> have been finding him everywhere in the articles and chat of XMCA over > >> the > >>>> last week. Seriously. > >>>> Henry > >>>> > >>>> On Sep 13, 2014, at 2:26 PM, Greg Thompson > > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> I would hope that a certain amount of irreverence would be dear to > most > >>>>> people on this list! > >>>>> But seriously Henry, have you come across Bakhtin's work at all? > >>>>> Seems like another that you might want to throw in with the crowd of > >>>>> healthy irreverents. > >>>>> -greg > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 2:48 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>> > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Mike and David, > >>>>>> This is seriously getting to be a club that I, like Groucho, won't > >>>> join, > >>>>>> if it takes me as a member. I think all of this seriously evokes > >> Andy's > >>>>>> contention, in his notes for the upcoming presentation at the ISCAR > >>>>>> conference (which XMCA has gotten) that, "Adults can grasp true > >>>> concepts, > >>>>>> and can change society, and a social theory has to treat adults as > >>>> adults, > >>>>>> and this is what the projects approach allows us to do. " If "adult" > >>>> means > >>>>>> the same as "serious", you can see why I have my doubts about > joining > >>>> the > >>>>>> Unserious Scholar Club. On the other hand, if I can have some fun, > as > >> in > >>>>>> the laughing warrior (forget gender stereotypes here, and dare me to > >>>> talk > >>>>>> about Jihad), then that's what I'm talking about. Incidentally, I > >> loved > >>>>>> Andy's notes. I could so relate it to CG. The emergent character of > >>>> project > >>>>>> realization he talks about applies very well to discourse, as you > can > >>>> see > >>>>>> in the articles by Langacker I have sent out. Discourse IS a project > >> and > >>>>>> its outcome is typically not entirely clear in the minds of the > >>>>>> interactants as they negotiate its waters. XMCA, of which this email > >> is > >>>> a > >>>>>> "turn", is a prototypical "work in progress", as Andy puts it, > since > >> we > >>>>>> clearly don't know where this will all end up. But I hope it can be > >> fun > >>>>>> along the way. > >>>>>> Henry > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Sep 6, 2014, at 1:51 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Hi Henry-- There goes my pile of books that need to be read before > >> bed > >>>>>> time! > >>>>>>> Spinoza goes up there right next to Dead Souls. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> However, David having already claimed the mantle of unserious > >> scholar, > >>>>>> and > >>>>>>> you having made the same claim, I am afraid that I have to make > >>>> precisely > >>>>>>> the same claim on the unrefutable grounds that no one pays me any > >>>> longer > >>>>>>> for what I do so I get to be as unserious as i can seriously be! > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 12:33 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > >>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Hi Mike, > >>>>>>>> All I can say now is that Spinoza is famously quoted as having > said, > >>>>>> "The > >>>>>>>> more clearly you understand yourself and your emotions, the more > you > >>>>>> become > >>>>>>>> a lover of what is." This quote happens to appear in the > >> introduction > >>>>>> to a > >>>>>>>> very popular self help book, Loving What Is, by Byron Katie > (2002). > >> I > >>>>>>>> bought the book , obviously, because I thought I needed help. It > >> did, > >>>>>> but > >>>>>>>> it also introduced me to Spinoza. And that has been a deeper > "help". > >>>> So, > >>>>>>>> from a personal perspective, I can totally understand how Spinoza > >> and > >>>>>>>> periizhvanie would be connected. For all of you ESL teachers out > >>>> there, > >>>>>> who > >>>>>>>> doesn't remember Krashen on the "affective filter" and I have been > >>>>>> seeing a > >>>>>>>> lot on character and education lately. Oh yes, and how failing is > >>>>>> important > >>>>>>>> to eventual success. Teasing out issues in the education of > >>>>>>>> non-mainstreamers, and recognizing how the current system is toxic > >> for > >>>>>>>> everyone, I think Spinoza's analysis and the narrative of his life > >> are > >>>>>>>> powerful. Vygotsky hits me the same way. Cantor, the > mathematician, > >>>> and > >>>>>>>> Pierce, the philosopher/logician/semiotician, also constantly come > >> up > >>>>>> for > >>>>>>>> me. They were ridiculed by the received cognoscenti of the time, > so > >>>>>> much so > >>>>>>>> that the suffered mental breakdowns. But they pushed on to develop > >>>>>> tools in > >>>>>>>> math and semiotics that seem to me are complementary with > Vygotsky. > >>>>>> Again I > >>>>>>>> get to take the role of unserious scholar here, so think of my > >>>> thoughts > >>>>>> as > >>>>>>>> gaming on line and don't take the game too seriously. > >>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Sep 5, 2014, at 6:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Hi David and Henry-- > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> David-- I was intrigued by your comment that Spinoza is a > >>>> controversial > >>>>>>>>> topic on xmca. I googled Spinoza on the main web page and came up > >>>> with > >>>>>> 4K > >>>>>>>>> plus hits (!!). My own impression is that few on this list, me > >>>>>> included, > >>>>>>>>> have engaged in serious study of Spinoza let alone the imprint of > >>>>>> Spinoza > >>>>>>>>> on Vygotsky. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> What is the nature of the controversy? What is at stake? The > topic > >> is > >>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> particular interest to me at present because I have been part of > >>>>>>>>> discussions with people who are focused on Vygotsky's use of > >>>>>> perezhivanie > >>>>>>>>> in his later work, where the relation of emotion and cognition > is a > >>>>>>>> central > >>>>>>>>> concern and Spinoza is clearly relevant. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Henry and anyone interested in chasing down what has been written > >>>> about > >>>>>>>>> various topics in xmca chatter, take advantage of the nice google > >>>>>> search > >>>>>>>> at > >>>>>>>>> lchc.ucsd.edu. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> (who enmeshed in the sense/meaning distinction in all of its > >>>>>> multilingual > >>>>>>>>> confusifications at present) > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>>> Assistant Professor > >>>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>>> Brigham Young University > >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>> Assistant Professor > >>> Department of Anthropology > >>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>> Brigham Young University > >>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > >> > >> > > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 08:13:02 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 17:13:02 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" wrote: > Carol, > > It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are > referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, > which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree that > culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as > sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated > ways we encounter them? > Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. Please explain. However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some of our suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am sure I wasn't the only who could imagine how lovely it would be to have a shower (or bath or wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. Carol > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald < > carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: > mediate perception and direct perception
>
Hi Andy, > > This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the > same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only > universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of > - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; > - as yet potential understanding > - a total lack of understanding. > And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we > are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in > fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of > course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) > I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema > Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. > > Carol > > On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Ah! I see! > > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in > > mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and > > mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is > > mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that > the > > specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides > > an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if > mediation > > in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation > > to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that > if > > you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression > > other than "mediation." > > > > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I > > like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to > use > > some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a > word, > > a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without > > exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was > born. I > > can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. > So > > every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as > personal. > > Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the > > same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as > > miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same > > material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they > do > > that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of > universal > > artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical > > analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. > Wonderful, > > eh? > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > >> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the > >> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, > assertions > >> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more > >> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action > away > >> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept > >> cannot mediate an action. > >> > >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way > >> to demonstrate this. > >> > >> Best, > >> Huw > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >> > >> he, he, Huw! > >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very > >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really > >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to > >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to > >> separation. > >> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and > >> history. Perhaps you could explain? > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> ------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> > >> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> > >> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". > >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the > >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or > >> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and > >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as > >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements > >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally > >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to > >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. > >> > >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to > >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate > >> the act from its production and history? Of course, if > >> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from > >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. > >> > >> Best, > >> Huw > >> > >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >> >> > >> >> wrote: > >> > >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT > >> tradition > >> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, > >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every > >> action > >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive > >> contexts, > >> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite > >> legitimately, > >> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In > social > >> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other > >> activities > >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by > >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic > is > >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I > >> prefer to spell it out and use the term > >> "artefact-mediated" rather > >> than the vague term "mediated". > >> > >> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a > >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to > >> mean what > >> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context > of > >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of > >> "mediation" in > >> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact > that a > >> concept is not immediately present in any act of > >> communication or > >> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. > >> Artefacts, > >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can > of > >> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is > >> that a > >> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for > >> any one > >> concept. It means different things to different people. > >> Concepts > >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their > >> materiality, > >> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept > >> in mind > >> when we use a word in communication, the communication is > >> mediated > >> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be > >> aware > >> of that. > >> > >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in > >> qualified > >> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. > >> > >> Andy > >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > >> ------------------------------ > >> ------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Greg Thompson wrote: > >> > >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? > >> > >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we > >> would need > >> to include > >> reflexes) > >> > >> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in > >> Bateson's man with > >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include > >> newborns). > >> > >> Just wonderin'. > >> > >> -greg > >> > >> > >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner > >> > >> >> wrote: > >> > >> Thanks for replies. > >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided > >> to stop > >> talking about > >> situated cognition because the pragmatics of > >> adjectival > >> use implies there > >> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He > now > >> speaks of > >> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of > >> physical reflexes (and > >> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human > >> action > >> is mediated (and > >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, > it's > >> worth noting that > >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of > >> action, but > >> rather a > >> theoretical assumption about all human action; > though > >> there seems to be > >> some variation in interpretation of what that > >> assumption > >> entails. > >> David > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 08:18:01 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 16:18:01 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: <76e8100f253146e5ba8f9f5ba77d2c12@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> <54178B49.9070205@mira.net> <50f7f5173d374b5fa9ed51a3b62501f9@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <541818DC.8090504@mira.net> <76e8100f253146e5ba8f9f5ba77d2c12@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: David, I suspect you'll find the works of Gal'perin interesting with respect to theoretical and empirical models concerning what constitutes conceptual progress which is applicable to theory more generally, I believe. A caveat to this would be the remarks by Lektorsky in regarding viewpoints of outdatedness. But this "outdatedness" and papers published expemplifying this argumentation and its theoretical and empirical developments (See Zaporozhets with respect to Leontyev) gives examples of what you're also questioning about. The empirical and theoretical distinctions you make regarding theoretical development manifest in Gal'perin's work with respect to trial and error learning and the analysis of situations to discern a suitably correct orientation. Best, Huw Gal'perin, P. Ia (1992) Stage-by-Stage Formation as a Method of Psychological Investigation. Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, 30(4), pp. 60-80 Lektorsky, V. A. (1999) Activity Theory in a New Era. In: Y. Engestr?m, R. Miettinen & R. L.. Punam?ki (Eds.). (1999). *Perspectives on activity theory*. Cambridge University Press. Zaporozhets, A. V. (2002) Problems in the Psychology of Activity. Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, 40(4), pp. 47-52 On 16 September 2014 15:37, David H Kirshner wrote: > Andy, > > I think you've framed the question well, and I agree it would be good to > bring it to the list, so I'm posting our brief off-line exchange. > > David > > ______________________ > Andy said: > > I think the substantive and interesting question you raise here is: > > Has CHAT theorizing has advanced over the years as a result of > insights of the form of empirical observations, or, as a result of > critique of concepts? > > I don't know if I have enough of an overview of the history of CHAT to > answer this. It would be good to keep it on the list because Mike Cole > probably could answer authoritatively. My guess is that there have been > occasional problems which have arisen and become subjects of wide > discussion, particularly in the domain of education, and these have > stimulated theoretical advance. But I really don't know. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > David H Kirshner wrote: > -----Original Message----- > From: David H Kirshner > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 9:00 AM > To: 'ablunden@mira.net' > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > > Hi Andy, > > Thanks for sending these papers. I look forward to reading them. > My point isn't that empirical evidence CAN'T inform theory, but that's not > the usual vehicle whereby theory is advanced. > You're much more aware of this literature than me. Do you disagree with > the generalization that empirical work in CHAT/sociocultural is of an > applied nature, notwithstanding occasional cases in which data are used to > establish a theoretical position? Note that your observation about the > relative lack of sophistication of cognitive theorization of concepts is > kind of a celebration of that fact that CHAT/sociocultural theorizing is > informed primarily by a theoretical/philosophical discourse, rather than > one that is rooted in empirical evidence. So the question isn't a normative > one--how should CHAT/sociocultural theory advance--but a description > one--how does it advance. > > I should add that the problem with cognitive theorizing, as I see it, > isn't only that it progresses slowly, but that it is fundamentally limited > by its starting assumptions. The fundamental constructs of cognitive > psychology come from the analogy of the serial digital computer to the > human information processing system. I don't think that ever gets > challenged within that paradigm. > > David > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net] > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 6:03 AM > To: David H Kirshner > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > > David, > I think I misled you by making it seem as if the book had a dichotomy of > theory here and data there. Not so. If you look at Brecht's and Anna's > chapters you will see that the chapters had empirical content but were also > theory-laden and the data was brought to bear on the theory: > > On Cognitive Psychology, I am only familiar with the Psychology of > Concepts, so my comments are relevant only to that branch. I agree that > they have shown a lot of ingenuity in their experimental work and this has > led to a relatively rapid progress in its theory. But their theory begins > at such a woeful level! If experimental work aims to "test" > theory, it is not hard to "test" theory which hardly rises above common > sense. > > https://www.academia.edu/6025821/The_Psychology_of_Concepts > > And David, you have to give CHAT credit for the fact that it sets its > standards very high for theory. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > David H Kirshner wrote: > > > > Andy, > > > > > > > > Thanks for the link to the TOC of your edited volume, which perhaps > > unintentionally illustrates my point that empirical studies using > > CHAT/sociocultural theory generally aren't intended as contributions > > to theory, per se; as you noted, the affordances for theorizing were > > brought out by you, rather than by the authors as part of their motive > > for producing the empirical work. > > > > > > > > I've hung out with cognitive psychologists quite a bit, and there's a > > very clear demarcation between applied studies which utilize cognitive > > theory for applicative purposes and pure studies whose sole raison > > d'?tre is to inform theory. Furthermore, it is a fairly rare > > occurrence for anyone to attempt to address theory in any other way > > than through the lens of empirical studies. > > > > > > > > My own experience of this community includes appreciation of the tight > > logic of their theorizing, and also of the inventiveness of > > researchers in generating truly provocative data that they are then > > forced to contend. But it also includes a sense of frustration with > > the absence of any critique of or input to theory from outside of the > > little studies that, one after another, niggle away at the theoretical > > infrastructure. Excluded, here, are not only philosophical inputs to > > theory, but even broader methodological constraints regarding the > > character of good theories. (My own grounding in mathematical > > theorizing includes a deliciously salient sense of the ?elegance? that > > makes a theory truly admirable and worthy.) > > > > > > > > Somehow, it seems noteworthy that CHAT/sociocultural > > psychology?whatever its virtues?isn?t organized like other branches of > > psychology (e.g., behavioral, cognitive, developmental) with respect > > to the role of empirical data in theory construction. Andy, in your > > response to Jenna, you described science as an objective practice that > > ?is not dependant on what you and I, writing here on xmca in 2014, > > says it is.? The question all this raises is whether > > CHAT/sociocultural psychology actually qualifies as a scientific > > practice. > > > > > > > > David > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:59 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > > > > > > > > David, in the recently published book, "Collaborative Projects. An > > Interdisciplinary Study," authors were invited to submit studies with > > empirical content (in the sense in which you are using the word) which > > illustrated the use of the concept of "project" within CHAT. > > > > > > > > https://www.academia.edu/6756231/Collaborative_Projects._An_Interdisci > > plinary_Study > > > > > > > > As you can see from the Table of Contents, more than a dozen different > > practical studies were contributed, and I am satisfied that the > > collection functioned to illuminate the philosophical issues about the > > nature of "an activity," and its ue as a unit of analysis, even though > > they are only explicitly addressed in the long Introduction. > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > David H Kirshner wrote: > > > > > Mike, > > > > > > > > > > Clearly, as in Katherine Neal's response, and in MCA, > > CHAT/sociocultural theory informs empirical research. > > > > > What's less clear is that empirical research informs > > CHAT/sociocultural theorizing. > > > > > Not quite sure what to make of that. > > > > > > > > > > David > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > > > > > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 11:15 AM > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > > > > > > > > > > Your followup comment is closely related to the second part of your > > initiating message, David. So i will respond in line. > > > > > > > > > > Firstly, I think it would be helpful to distinguish between MCA and > > xmca. > > > > > The idea behind xmca was to provide a discussion forum for articles > > that appear in MCA so that instead of authors having to wait 2+ years > > for feedback on their ideas (which rarely comes, even then!), we could > > discuss the published work and learn from it in a timely manner. By an > > large, that effort has, in my opinion, failed. Thanks to the recent > > decision to have the editors pick out articles for discussion which > > include the author(s) in the discussion, this situation has been > > somewhat mitigated. But only somewhat. xma discussions have all the > > characteristics of Vygotskian chaining, as a rule. > > > > > > > > > > Secondly, when I take down a bundle of recent MCA issues and look at > > the titles, they at least sound like they are about empirical matters > > ranging across a wide variety of content areas. Are you saying that > > these articles are not really empirical? Or that they are not really > > helping us to develop better methods to deal with perceived problems > > of social value? Again, this raises the question of "MCA or xmca". > > > > > > > > > > Lastly, perhaps it would be helpful if those of us who believe that > > empirical work guided by CHAT ideas of some value has been produced > > in, say, the past two decades, would post brief summiaries of that > > work with references. > > > > > Maybe its just all verbal sound and fury, signifying the usual! > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 8:50 AM, David H Kirshner > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> Does CHAT theory really advance with respect to empirical studies? > > > > >> If so, then why isn't the XMCA discussion a discussion about > > > > >> so-and-so's empirical results and how we should interpret them? > > > > >> Various branches of psychology (e.g., cognitive and developmental) > > >> do > > > > >> address concepts, and do conduct empirical research related to > > concepts. > > > > >> It's true, they rarely enter into full-blooded discussion of what > > >> is > > > > >> a concept. But perhaps that's because they're scientists rather > > >> than > > > > >> philosophers. They're operating within a framework that is bounded > > > > >> primarily by empirical and methodological expectations and > > > > >> obligations; theory evolves within those boundaries. > > > > >> It's not clear to me that the Vygotskyan research community ever > > > > >> operated in that fashion, and I'm wondering what would happen if it > > did. > > > > >> David > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> -----Original Message----- > > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > > > > >> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 10:23 AM > > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > > > > >> > > > > >> Well, Lisa, I think that is a project which requires a lot of what > > > > >> David would call "philosophical" discussion. :) The Psychology of > > > > >> Concepts, as it is know to American psychology, i.e., the "mainstream" > > > > >> do endless laboratory tests and questionnaires and surveys and so > > >> far > > > > >> as I can see have still haven't figured out what a concept is. > > > > >> Andy > > > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >> -- > > > > >> - > > > > >> -- > > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>> Well I am guilty for being fixated about thinking and talking > > >>> about > > > > >>> methods and how to better understand how we can make a trustworthy > > > > >>> leap from understanding the world to understanding concepts. Again > > > > >>> just talking aloud. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > > > > >>> Psychology and Counseling > > > > >>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 > Bailey > > > > >>> Education Complex > > > > >>> IT Online Program Coordinator University > > > > >>> of Tennessee > > > > >>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ > > > > >>> Knoxville, TN 37996 > > > > >>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > > > > >>> 865-974-7712 > > > > >>> > > > > >>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Andy Blunden > > > >>> > wrote: > > > > >>> > > > > >>> I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and we all > > >>> have > > > > >>> our specific research interests. > > > > >>> But when we publish, most of us have something to report. > > > > >>> I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more of my > > >>> share of > > > > >>> time arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest. > > > > >>> Andy > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >> -- > > > > >> - > > > > >> -- > > > > >> > > > > >>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Why is it that we came to what David stated as: > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over > > > > >>> facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical > > > > >>> elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost > > > > >>> completely detached from empirical specifics. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor > Educational > > > > >>> Psychology and Counseling > > > > >>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ > A532 > > > > >>> Bailey Education Complex > > > > >>> IT Online Program Coordinator > > > > >>> University of Tennessee > > > > >>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ > > > > >>> Knoxville, TN 37996 > > > > >>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline > Phone: > > > > >>> 865-974-7712 > > > > >>> > > > > >>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>> >> wrote: > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Andy, > > > > >>> > > > > >>> I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a > > >>> scientific > > > > >>> project, > > > > >>> though it might initially have been conceived as such. > > > > >>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue > > >>> over > > > > >>> facts." > > > > >>> We are engaged in making endless theoretical > > >>> elaborations, > > > > >>> distinctions, and qualifications almost completely > > > > >>> detached from > > > > >>> empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, > > >>> even > > > > >>> at the > > > > >>> level of theory, we're not all playing the same game. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> I agree with you that simply creating an obligation > > >>> that > > > > >>> claims be > > > > >>> framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on > > >>> the > > > > >>> significance of that claim." But perhaps in an > > >>> empirical > > > > >>> setting > > > > >>> theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. > > >>> In > > > > >>> this case, > > > > >>> there is a possibility that disagreements lead to > > > > >>> separation of > > > > >>> research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical > > >>> agreement > > > > >>> as a > > > > >>> consequence. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> David > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> -----Original Message----- > > > > >>> From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net > > > > >>> > > > > >>> >] > > > > >>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM > > > > >>> To: David H Kirshner > > > > >>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > >>> Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse > > > > >>> > > > > >>> David, > > > > >>> CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science > > > > >>> it > > > > >>> > > > > >> must > > > > >> > > > > >>> strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which > > >>> are > > > > >>> meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into > > >>> which > > > > >>> they > > > > >>> are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by > > >>> a > > > > >>> system of > > > > >>> concepts. People can agree on this or that hard > > experimental > > > > >>> finding, but still not agree on the significance of > > >>> that > > > > >>> claim. We > > > > >>> CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue > > >>> over > > > > >>> facts; > > > > >>> all of this is possible only to the extent that we > > >>> share > > > > >>> concepts. > > > > >>> "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a > > >>> goal > > > > >>> as it > > > > >>> is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is > > > > >>> ill-conceived to > > > > >>> think that this is a means of consolidating a current > > >>> of > > > > >>> research > > > > >>> like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or > > >>> psychological, > > > > >>> I don't > > > > >>> think that makes any difference. > > > > >>> Andy > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >> -- > > > > >> - > > > > >> -- > > > > >> > > > > >>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> David H Kirshner wrote: > > > > >>> > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact > > >>> mediation, it > > > > >>> seems > > > > >>> inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to > > >>> distinguishing > > > > >>> efforts > > > > >>> to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from > > > > >>> efforts > > > > >>> > > > > >> to > > > > >> > > > > >>> solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. > > >>> In > > > > >>> tandem, is > > > > >>> ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or > > > > >>> philosophical > > > > >>> discourse. > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if > > >>> advancement of > > > > >>> CHAT > > > > >>> would not be better served by embedding theoretical > > > > >>> discussion in > > > > >>> analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not > > >>> be > > > > >>> to make > > > > >>> CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application > > > > >>> (though that > > > > >>> would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical > > >>> obligation > > > > >>> might > > > > >>> transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of > > > > >>> methodology. In that way, CHAT could become > > >>> differentiated > > > > >>> into > > > > >>> distinct psychological schools, each constrained by > > > > >>> methodological > > > > >>> strictures that also support a more homogeneous > > theoretical > > > > >>> environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT > > >>> community > > > > >>> could > > > > >>> look across these various schools to pursue broader > > > > >>> philosophical > > > > >>> problematics. > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > David > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > -----Original Message----- > > > > >>> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > >>> >] On Behalf Of > > >>> Andy > > > > >>> Blunden > > > > >>> > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM > > > > >>> > To: Huw Lloyd > > > > >>> > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > >>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct > > > > >>> perception > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > Ah! I see! > > > > >>> > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, > > or in > > > > >>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not > > >>> equally > > > > >>> contain > > > > >>> both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem > > > > >>> with anyone > > > > >>> saying that anything is mediated by anything else, > > >>> where > > > > >>> it > > > > >>> > > > > >> is > > > > >> > > > > >>> appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight > > >>> of > > > > >>> Vygotsky, > > > > >>> that artefact-mediation of actions provides an > > >>> especially > > > > >>> productive unit of analysis for science is lost if > > > > >>> mediation in > > > > >>> the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with > > > > >>> artefact-mediation to the point that > > >>> artefact-mediation is > > > > >>> lost. > > > > >>> Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the > > >>> point > > > > >>> you were > > > > >>> referring to you used some expression other than > > "mediation." > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant > > >>> insight. I > > > > >>> can do > > > > >>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have > > >>> dreams or > > > > >>> thoughts) I have to use some material object to > > transmit my > > > > >>> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or > > > > >>> whatever - > > > > >>> but all these artefacts which I use, without > > exception, are > > > > >>> products of the history and culture into which I was > born. > > > > >>> I can > > > > >>> choose which artefact to use, but culture and history > > produce > > > > >>> them. So every action I take is essentially > > > > >>> cultural-historical as > > > > >>> well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material > > > > >>> objects, > > > > >>> their physical form is the same for everyone, it is > > > > >>> universal. So > > > > >>> communication as much as miscommunication takes place > > through > > > > >>> everyone interpreting the same material objects, > > > > >>> artefacts, that I > > > > >>> am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because > > > > >>> they > > > > >>> > > > > >> too > > > > >> > > > > >>> mediate their actions with the same set of universal > > > > >>> artefacts! So > > > > >>> all human action is opened to cultural and historical > > > > >>> > > > > >> analysis > > > > >> > > > > >>> which is as objective as any branch of natural science. > > > > >>> Wonderful, eh? > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > Andy > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >> -- > > > > >> - > > > > >> > > > > >>> > -- > > > > >>> > *Andy Blunden* > > > > >>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> >> If you want to study how action changes then you > > >>> need > > > > >>> to study the > > > > >>> >> history and production of the action. Under such > > > > >>> circumstances, > > > > >>> >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the > > >>> production > > > > >>> of) actions > > > > >>> >> become more obviously false. If one has > > >>> simplified, > > > > >>> through > > > > >>> >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base > > >>> then > > > > >>> it may seem > > > > >>> >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an > > action. > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of > > >>> volume) > > > > >>> are an elegant > > > > >>> >> way to demonstrate this. > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> Best, > > > > >>> >> Huw > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> > >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > > > >>> > >>>> wrote: > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> he, he, Huw! > > > > >>> >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are > > > > >>> the very > > > > >>> >> problems that need to be remedied by > clarification! > > > > >>> and I > > > > >>> really > > > > >>> >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally > > > > >>> being > > > > >>> used to > > > > >>> >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is > > > > >>> not equal to > > > > >>> >> separation. > > > > >>> >> I really don't know what you are referring to with > > > > >>> product and > > > > >>> >> history. Perhaps you could explain? > > > > >>> >> Andy > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >> -- > > > > >> - > > > > >> -- > > > > >> > > > > >>> >> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >>> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> I agree about precision, but not with a call > > > > >>> for "clarity". > > > > >>> >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or > > > > >>> reification of the > > > > >>> >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually > > entails > > > > >>> typologies or > > > > >>> >> other simplistic devices which prevent the > > > > >>> conception and > > > > >>> >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in > > > > >>> cases such as > > > > >>> >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the > > > > >>> entanglements > > > > >>> >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would > > > > >>> be equally > > > > >>> >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state > that > > > > >>> > > > > >> one > > > > >> > > > > >>> needs to > > > > >>> >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> I think it is this "need for > > simplification" which > > > > >>> leads me to > > > > >>> >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, > > > > >>> why separate > > > > >>> >> the act from its production and history? > > > > >>> >> Of course, if one had the discipline to > > de-couple > > > > >>> clarity from > > > > >>> >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the > > > > >>> problem. > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> Best, > > > > >>> >> Huw > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> > >> > > > > >>> >> > > > >>> > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> > >> > > > > >>> >> > > > >>> > > > >>> >>>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that > > > > >>> in the CHAT > > > > >>> >> tradition > > > > >>> >> specifically, as opposed to the English > > > > >>> language in > > > > >>> general, > > > > >>> >> mediation refers to > > *artefact-mediation*. Of > > > > >>> course, every > > > > >>> >> action > > > > >>> >> is both mediated and immediate, and in > many > > > > >>> discursive > > > > >>> >> contexts, > > > > >>> >> "mediation" is a concept which may be > > > > >>> evoked quite > > > > >>> >> legitimately, > > > > >>> >> but with no special significant for the > > use of > > > > >>> CHAT. In social > > > > >>> >> theory, for example, mediation of > > > > >>> activities by other > > > > >>> >> activities > > > > >>> >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as > > > > >>> mediation of > > > > >>> actions by > > > > >>> >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. > > > > >>> But if > > > > >>> the topic is > > > > >>> >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation > > is so > > > > >>> central, that I > > > > >>> >> prefer to spell it out and use the term > > > > >>> >> "artefact-mediated" rather > > > > >>> >> than the vague term "mediated". > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> I have come across usages like "mediated > by > > > > >>> such-and-such a > > > > >>> >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can > > > > >>> use words to > > > > >>> >> mean what > > > > >>> >> you like, but I find a formulation like > > > > >>> this in the > > > > >>> context of > > > > >>> >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the > > > > >>> idea of > > > > >>> >> "mediation" in > > > > >>> >> the most general sense in a way which > > > > >>> obscures the > > > > >>> fact that a > > > > >>> >> concept is not immediately present in any > > > > >>> act of > > > > >>> >> communication or > > > > >>> >> any other act, and therefore *cannot > > > > >>> mediate actions*. > > > > >>> >> Artefacts, > > > > >>> >> such as spoken words, which may be > > signs for a > > > > >>> concept, can of > > > > >>> >> course mediate an act of communication. > But > > > > >>> > > > > >> the > > > > >> > > > > >>> point is > > > > >>> >> that a > > > > >>> >> word is not universally and > > unproblematically > > > > >>> > > > > >> a > > > > >> > > > > >>> sign for > > > > >>> >> any one > > > > >>> >> concept. It means different things to > > > > >>> different people. > > > > >>> >> Concepts > > > > >>> >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal > > > > >>> in their > > > > >>> >> materiality, > > > > >>> >> but particular in their meaning. So when > we > > > > >>> have a > > > > >>> concept > > > > >>> >> in mind > > > > >>> >> when we use a word in communication, the > > > > >>> communication is > > > > >>> >> mediated > > > > >>> >> by the word not the concept, and it is a > > > > >>> mistake > > > > >>> not to be > > > > >>> >> aware > > > > >>> >> of that. > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were > > > > >>> always used in > > > > >>> >> qualified > > > > >>> >> way so that its specific meaning is made > > > > >>> > > > > >> clear. > > > > >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> Andy > > > > >>> >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in > his > > > > >>> comment, too. > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >> -- > > > > >> - > > > > >> -- > > > > >> > > > > >>> >> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >>> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> Greg Thompson wrote: > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> Does "mediation" only apply to > language > > > > >>> > > > > >> and > > > > >> > > > > >>> culture? > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in > > > > >>> which case we > > > > >>> >> would need > > > > >>> >> to include > > > > >>> >> reflexes) > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> And does it include our > > socio-contextual > > > > >>> surround as in > > > > >>> >> Bateson's man with > > > > >>> >> the stick? (in which case, we would > > > > >>> need to include > > > > >>> >> newborns). > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> Just wonderin'. > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> -greg > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David > > > > >>> H Kirshner > > > > >>> >> > > > > > > > >>> > >> > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> > >>> > > > > >>> >> > > > > > > > >>> > >> > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> > >>>>> wrote: > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> Thanks for replies. > > > > >>> >> I'm recalling several years ago > Jim > > > > >>> Greeno > > > > >>> decided > > > > >>> >> to stop > > > > >>> >> talking about > > > > >>> >> situated cognition because the > > > > >>> pragmatics of > > > > >>> >> adjectival > > > > >>> >> use implies there > > > > >>> >> has to be a contrasting > > non-situated > > > > >>> cognition. He now > > > > >>> >> speaks of > > > > >>> >> situativity theory. It seems, > > with the > > > > >>> exception of > > > > >>> >> physical reflexes (and > > > > >>> >> perhaps pre-conscious infant > > > > >>> activity), all > > > > >>> human > > > > >>> >> action > > > > >>> >> is mediated (and > > > > >>> >> perhaps a lot of non-human > > action, as > > > > >>> well). So, it's > > > > >>> >> worth noting that > > > > >>> >> "mediated action" doesn't specify > a > > > > >>> kind of > > > > >>> >> action, but > > > > >>> >> rather a > > > > >>> >> theoretical assumption about > > all human > > > > >>> action; though > > > > >>> >> there seems to be > > > > >>> >> some variation in interpretation > of > > > > >>> what that > > > > >>> >> assumption > > > > >>> >> entails. > > > > >>> >> David > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Sep 16 09:01:10 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 12:01:10 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Message-ID: I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. ?That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world...?does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? ?Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? ? Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
On 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" wrote: > Carol, > > It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are > referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, > which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree that > culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as > sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated > ways we encounter them? > Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. Please explain. However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some of our suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am sure I wasn't the only who could imagine how lovely it would be to have a shower (or bath or wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. Carol > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald < > carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: > mediate perception and direct perception
>
Hi Andy, > > This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the > same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only > universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of > - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; > - as yet potential understanding > - a total lack of understanding. > And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we > are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in > fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of > course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) > I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema > Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. > > Carol > > On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Ah! I see! > > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in > > mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and > > mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is > > mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that > the > > specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides > > an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if > mediation > > in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation > > to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that > if > > you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression > > other than "mediation." > > > > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I > > like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to > use > > some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a > word, > > a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without > > exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was > born. I > > can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. > So > > every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as > personal. > > Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the > > same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as > > miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same > > material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they > do > > that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of > universal > > artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical > > analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. > Wonderful, > > eh? > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > >> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the > >> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, > assertions > >> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more > >> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action > away > >> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept > >> cannot mediate an action. > >> > >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way > >> to demonstrate this. > >> > >> Best, > >> Huw > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >> > >> he, he, Huw! > >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very > >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really > >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to > >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to > >> separation. > >> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and > >> history. Perhaps you could explain? > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> ------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> > >> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> > >> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". > >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the > >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or > >> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and > >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as > >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements > >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally > >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to > >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. > >> > >> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to > >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate > >> the act from its production and history? Of course, if > >> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from > >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. > >> > >> Best, > >> Huw > >> > >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >> >> > >> >> wrote: > >> > >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT > >> tradition > >> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, > >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every > >> action > >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive > >> contexts, > >> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite > >> legitimately, > >> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In > social > >> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other > >> activities > >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by > >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic > is > >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I > >> prefer to spell it out and use the term > >> "artefact-mediated" rather > >> than the vague term "mediated". > >> > >> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a > >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to > >> mean what > >> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context > of > >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of > >> "mediation" in > >> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact > that a > >> concept is not immediately present in any act of > >> communication or > >> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. > >> Artefacts, > >> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can > of > >> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is > >> that a > >> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for > >> any one > >> concept. It means different things to different people. > >> Concepts > >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their > >> materiality, > >> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept > >> in mind > >> when we use a word in communication, the communication is > >> mediated > >> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be > >> aware > >> of that. > >> > >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in > >> qualified > >> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. > >> > >> Andy > >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > >> ------------------------------ > >> ------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Greg Thompson wrote: > >> > >> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? > >> > >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we > >> would need > >> to include > >> reflexes) > >> > >> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in > >> Bateson's man with > >> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include > >> newborns). > >> > >> Just wonderin'. > >> > >> -greg > >> > >> > >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner > >> > >> >> wrote: > >> > >> Thanks for replies. > >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided > >> to stop > >> talking about > >> situated cognition because the pragmatics of > >> adjectival > >> use implies there > >> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He > now > >> speaks of > >> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of > >> physical reflexes (and > >> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human > >> action > >> is mediated (and > >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, > it's > >> worth noting that > >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of > >> action, but > >> rather a > >> theoretical assumption about all human action; > though > >> there seems to be > >> some variation in interpretation of what that > >> assumption > >> entails. > >> David > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Sep 16 09:25:32 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 16:25:32 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>
On 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > wrote: > >> Carol, >> >> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are >> referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, >> which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree that >> culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as >> sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated >> ways we encounter them? >> > > Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. Please > explain. > > However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some of our > suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am sure I wasn't the > only who could imagine how lovely it would be to have a shower (or bath or > wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. > > > Carol > > >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald < >> carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, >> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >> mediate perception and direct perception
>>
Hi Andy, >> >> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the >> same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only >> universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of >> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >> - as yet potential understanding >> - a total lack of understanding. >> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we >> are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in >> fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of >> course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) >> I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema >> Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >> >> Carol >> >> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> Ah! I see! >>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in >>> mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and >>> mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is >>> mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that >> the >>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides >>> an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if >> mediation >>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation >>> to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that >> if >>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression >>> other than "mediation." >>> >>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I >>> like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to >> use >>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a >> word, >>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without >>> exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was >> born. I >>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >> So >>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as >> personal. >>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the >>> same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as >>> miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same >>> material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they >> do >>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of >> universal >>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical >>> analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >> Wonderful, >>> eh? >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> >>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >>>> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, >> assertions >>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more >>>> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action >> away >>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >>>> cannot mediate an action. >>>> >>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way >>>> to demonstrate this. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>> >>>> he, he, Huw! >>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >>>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >>>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >>>> separation. >>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> ------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>> >>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>> >>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>> >>> >>>> >> wrote: >>>> >>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>> tradition >>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>> action >>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>> contexts, >>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>> legitimately, >>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >> social >>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>> activities >>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic >> is >>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>> >>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>> mean what >>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context >> of >>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>> "mediation" in >>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >> that a >>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>> communication or >>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>> Artefacts, >>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can >> of >>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>> that a >>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>> any one >>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>> Concepts >>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>> materiality, >>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>> in mind >>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>> mediated >>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>> aware >>>> of that. >>>> >>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>> qualified >>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>> ------------------------------ >>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>> >>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>> >>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>> would need >>>> to include >>>> reflexes) >>>> >>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>> Bateson's man with >>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>> newborns). >>>> >>>> Just wonderin'. >>>> >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>> >>>> >> wrote: >>>> >>>> Thanks for replies. >>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>> to stop >>>> talking about >>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>> adjectival >>>> use implies there >>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He >> now >>>> speaks of >>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>> physical reflexes (and >>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>> action >>>> is mediated (and >>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >> it's >>>> worth noting that >>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>> action, but >>>> rather a >>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >> though >>>> there seems to be >>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>> assumption >>>> entails. >>>> David >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> Developmental psycholinguist >> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Sep 16 09:54:09 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 09:54:09 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca In-Reply-To: <1410855310.36603.YahooMailNeo@web171501.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> References: <8D2C4DB1-CFE1-4A1D-8683-CE5A8551B35C@gmail.com> <6322AED9-6172-4B7C-8A08-4F0F1FE673D2@gmail.com> <4BDC889C-9B1B-4516-9F11-5549F0EF3003@gmail.com> <1410855310.36603.YahooMailNeo@web171501.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Peter-- I fully agree with the need for what you/Serres/Shannon-Weaver call noise in the process of communication. However, I think it is a cardinal error when he/you(?) write: With the advent of information science, a new figure for representing science becomes possible: this is the 'model' of communication. Accordingly, we have three elements: a message, a channel for transmitting it, and the noise, or interference, that accompanies the transmission. Noise calls for decipherment; it makes a reading of the message more difficult. And yet without it, there would be no message. This form of information science is, overtly, a sender-receiver TRANSMISSION model of communication. It assumes a linear temporal process. Such a reduction is tolerable only under very carefully prescribed constraints. The "third" part is noise, but the unidirectionality remains. A different way of thinking about this is offered by John Shotter in the piece that Rod sent around. He does not use the term, noise, but he does focus our attention on the necessity of uncertainty and co-participation as conditions of thought and action. I am all on board with the need for cross-talk between disciplines as well as theoretical traditions working within the same disciplines or with common concern. I also think that the invocation of parasitism is quite relevant to the way i have been thinking about human development, but communication-as-transmission seems like a mistake. Infected by George H. Mead in steamy san diego mike On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 1:15 AM, peter jones wrote: > > > Michel Serres has written on these themes.... > > Fifty > Key Contemporary Thinkers by John Lechte, Routledge, 1994. > > With the recognition of the interrelation between different sciences > and different forms of knowledge, as well as between science and different > artistic practices, has come Serres's effort to plot the way that different > knowledge domains interpenetrate. Even more: Serres has set himself the > task of being a means of communication (a medium) between the sciences > and the arts - the Hermes of modern scholarships. With the advent of > information > science, a new figure for representing science becomes possible: this is > the 'model' of communication. Accordingly, we have three elements: a > message, > a channel for transmitting it, and the noise, or interference, that > accompanies > the transmission. Noise calls for decipherment; it makes a reading of the > message more difficult. And yet without it, there would be no message. > There is, in short, no message without resistance. What Serres initially > finds intriguing about noise (rather than the message) is that it opens > up such a fertile avenue of reflection. Instead of remaining pure noise, > the latter becomes a means of transport. Thus in the first volume of the > Hermes series noise is analysed as the third, empirical element of the > message. Ideally, communication must be separated from noise. Noise is > what is not communicated; it is just there as a kind of chaos, as the > empirical > third element of the message, the accidental part, the part of difference > that is excluded. Every formalism (mathematics, for example) is founded > on the exclusion of the third element of noise. Every formalism is a way > of moving from one region of knowledge to another. To communicate is to > move within a class of objects that have the same form. Form has to be > extracted from the cacophony of noise; form (communication) is the > exclusion > of noise, an escape from the domain of the empirical. > > > In his book, The Parasite, Serres recalls that 'parasite' also means > noise (in French). A parasite is a noise in a channel. And so when > describing > the rats' meals in a story from the fables of La Fontaine - the meals of > two parasites - Serres also refers to noise: 'The two companions scurry > off when they hear a noise at the door. It was only a noise, but it was > also a message, a bit of information producing panic: an interruption, > a corruption, a rupture of information. Was this noise really a message? > Wasn't it, rather, static, a parasite? > > see also: > > http://www.frieze.com/issue/article/joyeux-anniversaire/ > > > Peter Jones > Lancashire, UK > Blogging at "Welcome to the QUAD" > http://hodges-model.blogspot.com/ > http://twitter.com/h2cm > > > ________________________________ > From: Larry Purss > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Tuesday, 16 September 2014, 8:43 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca > > > Bahktin the trickster. > In Greek mythology that was Hermes the messenger who brought messages > between [mediated] the divine and the human realms. Bahktin definitely > overlaps with Hermes [and hermeneutics] > Larry > > On Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 8:42 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: > > > Hi Greg, > > I'm convinced you are right. Like I say, Bakhtin just keeps popping up. > > The trickster? Rebelais? What is that about? > > Henry > > > > On Sep 14, 2014, at 8:49 AM, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > > > One reason I mention him is because of resonances with ideas. > > > But I also mention him as a kind of trickster figure as well as a > student > > > of the trickster in writing (his dissertation was on Rabelais). > > > I also mention him as a writer who seems authentically engaged with > > > meaningful/emotive aspects of human existence (e.g., Toward a > Philosophy > > of > > > the Act, and Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity). > > > And finally, I mention Bakhtin because I'm still not convinced that the > > > deep treasures of Bakhtin's work has yet been mined out. > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 8:13 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > wrote: > > > > > >> Greg, > > >> Thank you for you good words and great question. I knew about Bakhtin, > > but > > >> have been finding him everywhere in the articles and chat of XMCA over > > the > > >> last week. Seriously. > > >> Henry > > >> > > >> On Sep 13, 2014, at 2:26 PM, Greg Thompson > > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >>> I would hope that a certain amount of irreverence would be dear to > most > > >>> people on this list! > > >>> But seriously Henry, have you come across Bakhtin's work at all? > > >>> Seems like another that you might want to throw in with the crowd of > > >>> healthy irreverents. > > >>> -greg > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 2:48 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > > hshonerd@gmail.com > > >>> > > >>> wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> Mike and David, > > >>>> This is seriously getting to be a club that I, like Groucho, won't > > >> join, > > >>>> if it takes me as a member. I think all of this seriously evokes > > Andy's > > >>>> contention, in his notes for the upcoming presentation at the ISCAR > > >>>> conference (which XMCA has gotten) that, "Adults can grasp true > > >> concepts, > > >>>> and can change society, and a social theory has to treat adults as > > >> adults, > > >>>> and this is what the projects approach allows us to do. " If "adult" > > >> means > > >>>> the same as "serious", you can see why I have my doubts about > joining > > >> the > > >>>> Unserious Scholar Club. On the other hand, if I can have some fun, > as > > in > > >>>> the laughing warrior (forget gender stereotypes here, and dare me to > > >> talk > > >>>> about Jihad), then that's what I'm talking about. Incidentally, I > > loved > > >>>> Andy's notes. I could so relate it to CG. The emergent character of > > >> project > > >>>> realization he talks about applies very well to discourse, as you > can > > >> see > > >>>> in the articles by Langacker I have sent out. Discourse IS a project > > and > > >>>> its outcome is typically not entirely clear in the minds of the > > >>>> interactants as they negotiate its waters. XMCA, of which this email > > is > > >> a > > >>>> "turn", is a prototypical "work in progress", as Andy puts it, > since > > we > > >>>> clearly don't know where this will all end up. But I hope it can be > > fun > > >>>> along the way. > > >>>> Henry > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> On Sep 6, 2014, at 1:51 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>> Hi Henry-- There goes my pile of books that need to be read before > > bed > > >>>> time! > > >>>>> Spinoza goes up there right next to Dead Souls. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> However, David having already claimed the mantle of unserious > > scholar, > > >>>> and > > >>>>> you having made the same claim, I am afraid that I have to make > > >> precisely > > >>>>> the same claim on the unrefutable grounds that no one pays me any > > >> longer > > >>>>> for what I do so I get to be as unserious as i can seriously be! > > >>>>> mike > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 12:33 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > > >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > >>>>> wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> Hi Mike, > > >>>>>> All I can say now is that Spinoza is famously quoted as having > said, > > >>>> "The > > >>>>>> more clearly you understand yourself and your emotions, the more > you > > >>>> become > > >>>>>> a lover of what is." This quote happens to appear in the > > introduction > > >>>> to a > > >>>>>> very popular self help book, Loving What Is, by Byron Katie > (2002). > > I > > >>>>>> bought the book , obviously, because I thought I needed help. It > > did, > > >>>> but > > >>>>>> it also introduced me to Spinoza. And that has been a deeper > "help". > > >> So, > > >>>>>> from a personal perspective, I can totally understand how Spinoza > > and > > >>>>>> periizhvanie would be connected. For all of you ESL teachers out > > >> there, > > >>>> who > > >>>>>> doesn't remember Krashen on the "affective filter" and I have been > > >>>> seeing a > > >>>>>> lot on character and education lately. Oh yes, and how failing is > > >>>> important > > >>>>>> to eventual success. Teasing out issues in the education of > > >>>>>> non-mainstreamers, and recognizing how the current system is toxic > > for > > >>>>>> everyone, I think Spinoza's analysis and the narrative of his life > > are > > >>>>>> powerful. Vygotsky hits me the same way. Cantor, the > mathematician, > > >> and > > >>>>>> Pierce, the philosopher/logician/semiotician, also constantly come > > up > > >>>> for > > >>>>>> me. They were ridiculed by the received cognoscenti of the time, > so > > >>>> much so > > >>>>>> that the suffered mental breakdowns. But they pushed on to develop > > >>>> tools in > > >>>>>> math and semiotics that seem to me are complementary with > Vygotsky. > > >>>> Again I > > >>>>>> get to take the role of unserious scholar here, so think of my > > >> thoughts > > >>>> as > > >>>>>> gaming on line and don't take the game too seriously. > > >>>>>> Henry > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> On Sep 5, 2014, at 6:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Hi David and Henry-- > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> David-- I was intrigued by your comment that Spinoza is a > > >> controversial > > >>>>>>> topic on xmca. I googled Spinoza on the main web page and came up > > >> with > > >>>> 4K > > >>>>>>> plus hits (!!). My own impression is that few on this list, me > > >>>> included, > > >>>>>>> have engaged in serious study of Spinoza let alone the imprint of > > >>>> Spinoza > > >>>>>>> on Vygotsky. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> What is the nature of the controversy? What is at stake? The > topic > > is > > >>>> of > > >>>>>>> particular interest to me at present because I have been part of > > >>>>>>> discussions with people who are focused on Vygotsky's use of > > >>>> perezhivanie > > >>>>>>> in his later work, where the relation of emotion and cognition > is a > > >>>>>> central > > >>>>>>> concern and Spinoza is clearly relevant. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Henry and anyone interested in chasing down what has been written > > >> about > > >>>>>>> various topics in xmca chatter, take advantage of the nice google > > >>>> search > > >>>>>> at > > >>>>>>> lchc.ucsd.edu. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> (who enmeshed in the sense/meaning distinction in all of its > > >>>> multilingual > > >>>>>>> confusifications at present) > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> -- > > >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >>> Assistant Professor > > >>> Department of Anthropology > > >>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >>> Brigham Young University > > >>> Provo, UT 84602 > > >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 10:12:02 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 11:12:02 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts about cultural "triple packages" In-Reply-To: <580E931B-34AF-482D-95C1-D8F264E63406@uga.edu> References: <580E931B-34AF-482D-95C1-D8F264E63406@uga.edu> Message-ID: I am struck by how inauthentic (phony?) Chua and her husband are, even more so than most TED talks. As I listened, I remembered the work by Ogbu on oppositional responses of "involuntary immigrants" (Blacks as slaves, Native Americans and Hispanics caught up in the movement of national borders). I have heard Ogbu has been criticized, but he convinced me. Henry On Sep 16, 2014, at 4:59 AM, Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > Thanks for sending, Greg. I also found it hard to keep watching. I have read Amy Chua's "tiger mom" book, and this TED talk seems to be a way to validate and extend the parenting ideas that she lays out in the book (which I find to be harsh and a bit mean-spirited). I have many issues with their claims, but I'll just mention two. > > First, I don't think their generalizations/facts are very useful. They perpetuate the idea, for example, that stereotypes are acceptable, especially if they're "true," which is probably where the comment that they're racist came from. It is also unhelpful to tell white, middle class parents one more time that "other" kids are going to outperform their kids and their kids are falling behind. This sort of scarcity rhetoric hurts kids and parents, in part because it sets up an us/them dichotomy. > > Second, as Greg said, there's no theory. I am suspect of facts, such as these, without theory because they don't account for how the facts were produced. > > Katie > > Katie Wester-Neal > Doctoral Candidate > University of Georgia > > > > > > On Sep 15, 2014, at 11:41 PM, "Greg Thompson" wrote: > > Been enjoying the party, and apropos of David's call for some facts (which > I'm in full support of - despite being a theory-wonk), I thought I'd offer > this Ted talk that was sent to me by an LCHC colleague: > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHUMcxaqm9U > > Lots of facts in there, and not a little theory. > > They've got big claims about the facts of their program in inner-city > schools and about inequality too (you have to listen to the end to hear > about that). > > What do you think? > > Anything to it? > > Anyone have any facts to counter their facts? > > -greg > > ?p.s., I'm still listening to it right now. Not sure I'm going to be able > to stomach the entire talk... getting a little queasy. Feeling like someone > is selling me something that is going to cost me a ton and I'm not going to > like. Ugh..?. > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Sep 16 10:26:23 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 13:26:23 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Message-ID: Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>
On 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > wrote: > >> Carol, >> >> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are >> referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, >> which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree that >> culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as >> sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated >> ways we encounter them? >> > > Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. Please > explain. > > However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some of our > suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am sure I wasn't the > only who could imagine how lovely it would be to have a shower (or bath or > wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. > > > Carol > > >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald < >> carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, >> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >> mediate perception and direct perception
>>
Hi Andy, >> >> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the >> same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only >> universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of >> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >> - as yet potential understanding >> - a total lack of understanding. >> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we >> are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in >> fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of >> course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) >> I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema >> Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >> >> Carol >> >> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>> Ah! I see! >>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in >>> mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and >>> mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is >>> mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that >> the >>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides >>> an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if >> mediation >>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation >>> to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that >> if >>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression >>> other than "mediation." >>> >>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I >>> like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to >> use >>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a >> word, >>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without >>> exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was >> born. I >>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >> So >>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as >> personal. >>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the >>> same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as >>> miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same >>> material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they >> do >>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of >> universal >>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical >>> analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >> Wonderful, >>> eh? >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> >>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >>>> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, >> assertions >>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more >>>> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action >> away >>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >>>> cannot mediate an action. >>>> >>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way >>>> to demonstrate this. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>> >>>> he, he, Huw! >>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >>>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >>>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >>>> separation. >>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> ------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>> >>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>> >>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>> >>> >>>> >> wrote: >>>> >>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>> tradition >>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>> action >>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>> contexts, >>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>> legitimately, >>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >> social >>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>> activities >>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic >> is >>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>> >>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>> mean what >>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context >> of >>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>> "mediation" in >>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >> that a >>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>> communication or >>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>> Artefacts, >>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can >> of >>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>> that a >>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>> any one >>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>> Concepts >>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>> materiality, >>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>> in mind >>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>> mediated >>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>> aware >>>> of that. >>>> >>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>> qualified >>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>> ------------------------------ >>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>> >>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>> >>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>> would need >>>> to include >>>> reflexes) >>>> >>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>> Bateson's man with >>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>> newborns). >>>> >>>> Just wonderin'. >>>> >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>> >>>> >> wrote: >>>> >>>> Thanks for replies. >>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>> to stop >>>> talking about >>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>> adjectival >>>> use implies there >>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He >> now >>>> speaks of >>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>> physical reflexes (and >>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>> action >>>> is mediated (and >>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >> it's >>>> worth noting that >>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>> action, but >>>> rather a >>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >> though >>>> there seems to be >>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>> assumption >>>> entails. >>>> David >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> Developmental psycholinguist >> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Sep 16 10:45:16 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 13:45:16 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts about cultural "triple packages" Message-ID: <5ludl16dbj40lcf5cs4xnf9w.1410889516950@email.android.com> I am not a psychologist, but is this what is passing off as empirical psychological research? ?On another note, can we get some real psychologists to weigh in on the impact of spanking children on their psychological development. ?This Adrian Peterson thing is getting racial really quickly. ?By the way, my parents would be in prison today based on how I was spanked.... Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: "Henry G. Shonerd III"
Date:09/16/2014 1:12 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts about cultural "triple packages"
I am struck by how inauthentic (phony?) Chua and her husband are, even more so than most TED talks. As I listened, I remembered the work by Ogbu on oppositional responses of "involuntary immigrants" (Blacks as slaves, Native Americans and Hispanics caught up in the movement of national borders). I have heard Ogbu has been criticized, but he convinced me. Henry On Sep 16, 2014, at 4:59 AM, Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > Thanks for sending, Greg. I also found it hard to keep watching. I have read Amy Chua's "tiger mom" book, and this TED talk seems to be a way to validate and extend the parenting ideas that she lays out in the book (which I find to be harsh and a bit mean-spirited). I have many issues with their claims, but I'll just mention two. > > First, I don't think their generalizations/facts are very useful. They perpetuate the idea, for example, that stereotypes are acceptable, especially if they're "true," which is probably where the comment that they're racist came from. It is also unhelpful to tell white, middle class parents one more time that "other" kids are going to outperform their kids and their kids are falling behind. This sort of scarcity rhetoric hurts kids and parents, in part because it sets up an us/them dichotomy. > > Second, as Greg said, there's no theory. I am suspect of facts, such as these, without theory because they don't account for how the facts were produced. > > Katie > > Katie Wester-Neal > Doctoral Candidate > University of Georgia > > > > > > On Sep 15, 2014, at 11:41 PM, "Greg Thompson" wrote: > > Been enjoying the party, and apropos of David's call for some facts (which > I'm in full support of - despite being a theory-wonk), I thought I'd offer > this Ted talk that was sent to me by an LCHC colleague: > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHUMcxaqm9U > > Lots of facts in there, and not a little theory. > > They've got big claims about the facts of their program in inner-city > schools and about inequality too (you have to listen to the end to hear > about that). > > What do you think? > > Anything to it? > > Anyone have any facts to counter their facts? > > -greg > > ?p.s., I'm still listening to it right now. Not sure I'm going to be able > to stomach the entire talk... getting a little queasy. Feeling like someone > is selling me something that is going to cost me a ton and I'm not going to > like. Ugh..?. > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 10:45:51 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 10:45:51 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: <50f7f5173d374b5fa9ed51a3b62501f9@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> <54178B49.9070205@mira.net> <50f7f5173d374b5fa9ed51a3b62501f9@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <6987B572-6449-4D96-9D18-6A8D2BE1AEF5@gmail.com> David - Can you elaborate on this, please? "...the affordances for theorizing were brought out by you, rather than by the authors as part of their motive for producing the empirical work"? On the one hand, I think that the affordances for theorizing (meaning, the opportunities for engaging with theory, right? Or the actions that can be allowed or supported by a particular theory? Or the way the effect of a theoretical framework can be surfaced and explored by empirical work?) ARE brought out by the authors in the book Andy edited. On the other hand, I guess I'd agree that the empirical work itself (meaning the research, the activities) was not motivated by the desire to contribute to theory. However, writing the chapters in which the empirical work is presented was clearly motivated by a desire to contribute to theory. Have I got it wrong? Helena Worthen hworthen@illinois.edu On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:06 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: > Andy, > > > > Thanks for the link to the TOC of your edited volume, which perhaps unintentionally illustrates my point that empirical studies using CHAT/sociocultural theory generally aren't intended as contributions to theory, per se; as you noted, the affordances for theorizing were brought out by you, rather than by the authors as part of their motive for producing the empirical work. > > > > I've hung out with cognitive psychologists quite a bit, and there's a very clear demarcation between applied studies which utilize cognitive theory for applicative purposes and pure studies whose sole raison d'?tre is to inform theory. Furthermore, it is a fairly rare occurrence for anyone to attempt to address theory in any other way than through the lens of empirical studies. > > > > My own experience of this community includes appreciation of the tight logic of their theorizing, and also of the inventiveness of researchers in generating truly provocative data that they are then forced to contend. But it also includes a sense of frustration with the absence of any critique of or input to theory from outside of the little studies that, one after another, niggle away at the theoretical infrastructure. Excluded, here, are not only philosophical inputs to theory, but even broader methodological constraints regarding the character of good theories. (My own grounding in mathematical theorizing includes a deliciously salient sense of the ?elegance? that makes a theory truly admirable and worthy.) > > > > Somehow, it seems noteworthy that CHAT/sociocultural psychology?whatever its virtues?isn?t organized like other branches of psychology (e.g., behavioral, cognitive, developmental) with respect to the role of empirical data in theory construction. Andy, in your response to Jenna, you described science as an objective practice that ?is not dependant on what you and I, writing here on xmca in 2014, says it is.? The question all this raises is whether CHAT/sociocultural psychology actually qualifies as a scientific practice. > > > > David > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:59 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > > > > David, in the recently published book, "Collaborative Projects. An Interdisciplinary Study," authors were invited to submit studies with empirical content (in the sense in which you are using the word) which illustrated the use of the concept of "project" within CHAT. > > > > https://www.academia.edu/6756231/Collaborative_Projects._An_Interdisciplinary_Study > > > > As you can see from the Table of Contents, more than a dozen different practical studies were contributed, and I am satisfied that the collection functioned to illuminate the philosophical issues about the nature of "an activity," and its ue as a unit of analysis, even though they are only explicitly addressed in the long Introduction. > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > David H Kirshner wrote: > >> Mike, > >> > >> Clearly, as in Katherine Neal's response, and in MCA, CHAT/sociocultural theory informs empirical research. > >> What's less clear is that empirical research informs CHAT/sociocultural theorizing. > >> Not quite sure what to make of that. > >> > >> David > >> > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > >> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 11:15 AM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > >> > >> Your followup comment is closely related to the second part of your initiating message, David. So i will respond in line. > >> > >> Firstly, I think it would be helpful to distinguish between MCA and xmca. > >> The idea behind xmca was to provide a discussion forum for articles that appear in MCA so that instead of authors having to wait 2+ years for feedback on their ideas (which rarely comes, even then!), we could discuss the published work and learn from it in a timely manner. By an large, that effort has, in my opinion, failed. Thanks to the recent decision to have the editors pick out articles for discussion which include the author(s) in the discussion, this situation has been somewhat mitigated. But only somewhat. xma discussions have all the characteristics of Vygotskian chaining, as a rule. > >> > >> Secondly, when I take down a bundle of recent MCA issues and look at the titles, they at least sound like they are about empirical matters ranging across a wide variety of content areas. Are you saying that these articles are not really empirical? Or that they are not really helping us to develop better methods to deal with perceived problems of social value? Again, this raises the question of "MCA or xmca". > >> > >> Lastly, perhaps it would be helpful if those of us who believe that empirical work guided by CHAT ideas of some value has been produced in, say, the past two decades, would post brief summiaries of that work with references. > >> Maybe its just all verbal sound and fury, signifying the usual! > >> mike > >> > >> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 8:50 AM, David H Kirshner > wrote: > >> > >> > >>> Does CHAT theory really advance with respect to empirical studies? > >>> If so, then why isn't the XMCA discussion a discussion about > >>> so-and-so's empirical results and how we should interpret them? > >>> Various branches of psychology (e.g., cognitive and developmental) do > >>> address concepts, and do conduct empirical research related to concepts. > >>> It's true, they rarely enter into full-blooded discussion of what is > >>> a concept. But perhaps that's because they're scientists rather than > >>> philosophers. They're operating within a framework that is bounded > >>> primarily by empirical and methodological expectations and > >>> obligations; theory evolves within those boundaries. > >>> It's not clear to me that the Vygotskyan research community ever > >>> operated in that fashion, and I'm wondering what would happen if it did. > >>> David > >>> > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 10:23 AM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > >>> > >>> Well, Lisa, I think that is a project which requires a lot of what > >>> David would call "philosophical" discussion. :) The Psychology of > >>> Concepts, as it is know to American psychology, i.e., the "mainstream" > >>> do endless laboratory tests and questionnaires and surveys and so far > >>> as I can see have still haven't figured out what a concept is. > >>> Andy > >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>> - > >>> -- > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > >>> > >>>> Well I am guilty for being fixated about thinking and talking about > >>>> methods and how to better understand how we can make a trustworthy > >>>> leap from understanding the world to understanding concepts. Again > >>>> just talking aloud. > >>>> > >>>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > >>>> Psychology and Counseling > >>>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey > >>>> Education Complex > >>>> IT Online Program Coordinator University > >>>> of Tennessee > >>>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ > >>>> Knoxville, TN 37996 > >>>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > >>>> 865-974-7712 > >>>> > >>>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Andy Blunden >>>> > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and we all have > >>>> our specific research interests. > >>>> But when we publish, most of us have something to report. > >>>> I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more of my share of > >>>> time arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest. > >>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>> - > >>> -- > >>> > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Why is it that we came to what David stated as: > >>>> > >>>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over > >>>> facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical > >>>> elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost > >>>> completely detached from empirical specifics. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > >>>> Psychology and Counseling > >>>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 > >>>> Bailey Education Complex > >>>> IT Online Program Coordinator > >>>> University of Tennessee > >>>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ > >>>> Knoxville, TN 37996 > >>>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > >>>> 865-974-7712 > >>>> > >>>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner > >>>> > >>>> >> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Andy, > >>>> > >>>> I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific > >>>> project, > >>>> though it might initially have been conceived as such. > >>>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over > >>>> facts." > >>>> We are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, > >>>> distinctions, and qualifications almost completely > >>>> detached from > >>>> empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even > >>>> at the > >>>> level of theory, we're not all playing the same game. > >>>> > >>>> I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that > >>>> claims be > >>>> framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the > >>>> significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical > >>>> setting > >>>> theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In > >>>> this case, > >>>> there is a possibility that disagreements lead to > >>>> separation of > >>>> research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical agreement > >>>> as a > >>>> consequence. > >>>> > >>>> David > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net > >>>> > >>>> >] > >>>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM > >>>> To: David H Kirshner > >>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>> Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse > >>>> > >>>> David, > >>>> CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science > >>>> it > >>>> > >>> must > >>> > >>>> strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are > >>>> meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which > >>>> they > >>>> are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a > >>>> system of > >>>> concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental > >>>> finding, but still not agree on the significance of that > >>>> claim. We > >>>> CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over > >>>> facts; > >>>> all of this is possible only to the extent that we share > >>>> concepts. > >>>> "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal > >>>> as it > >>>> is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is > >>>> ill-conceived to > >>>> think that this is a means of consolidating a current of > >>>> research > >>>> like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological, > >>>> I don't > >>>> think that makes any difference. > >>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>> - > >>> -- > >>> > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> David H Kirshner wrote: > >>>>> Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it > >>>> seems > >>>> inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing > >>>> efforts > >>>> to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from > >>>> efforts > >>>> > >>> to > >>> > >>>> solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In > >>>> tandem, is > >>>> ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or > >>>> philosophical > >>>> discourse. > >>>>> > >>>>> I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of > >>>> CHAT > >>>> would not be better served by embedding theoretical > >>>> discussion in > >>>> analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be > >>>> to make > >>>> CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application > >>>> (though that > >>>> would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation > >>>> might > >>>> transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of > >>>> methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated > >>>> into > >>>> distinct psychological schools, each constrained by > >>>> methodological > >>>> strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical > >>>> environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community > >>>> could > >>>> look across these various schools to pursue broader > >>>> philosophical > >>>> problematics. > >>>>> > >>>>> David > >>>>> > >>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> > >>>> >>>> > > >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> > >>>> >>>> >] On Behalf Of Andy > >>>> Blunden > >>>>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM > >>>>> To: Huw Lloyd > >>>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct > >>>> perception > >>>>> > >>>>> Ah! I see! > >>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in > >>>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally > >>>> contain > >>>> both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem > >>>> with anyone > >>>> saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where > >>>> it > >>>> > >>> is > >>> > >>>> appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of > >>>> Vygotsky, > >>>> that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially > >>>> productive unit of analysis for science is lost if > >>>> mediation in > >>>> the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with > >>>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is > >>>> lost. > >>>> Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point > >>>> you were > >>>> referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." > >>>>> > >>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I > >>>> can do > >>>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or > >>>> thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my > >>>> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or > >>>> whatever - > >>>> but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are > >>>> products of the history and culture into which I was born. > >>>> I can > >>>> choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce > >>>> them. So every action I take is essentially > >>>> cultural-historical as > >>>> well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material > >>>> objects, > >>>> their physical form is the same for everyone, it is > >>>> universal. So > >>>> communication as much as miscommunication takes place through > >>>> everyone interpreting the same material objects, > >>>> artefacts, that I > >>>> am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because > >>>> they > >>>> > >>> too > >>> > >>>> mediate their actions with the same set of universal > >>>> artefacts! So > >>>> all human action is opened to cultural and historical > >>>> > >>> analysis > >>> > >>>> which is as objective as any branch of natural science. > >>>> Wonderful, eh? > >>>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>> - > >>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need > >>>> to study the > >>>>>> history and production of the action. Under such > >>>> circumstances, > >>>>>> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production > >>>> of) actions > >>>>>> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, > >>>> through > >>>>>> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then > >>>> it may seem > >>>>>> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) > >>>> are an elegant > >>>>>> way to demonstrate this. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Best, > >>>>>> Huw > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > >>>> > > >>>> >> > >>>>>> > > >>>> >>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> he, he, Huw! > >>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are > >>>> the very > >>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! > >>>> and I > >>>> really > >>>>>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally > >>>> being > >>>> used to > >>>>>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is > >>>> not equal to > >>>>>> separation. > >>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with > >>>> product and > >>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>> - > >>> -- > >>> > >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call > >>>> for "clarity". > >>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or > >>>> reification of the > >>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails > >>>> typologies or > >>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the > >>>> conception and > >>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in > >>>> cases such as > >>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the > >>>> entanglements > >>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would > >>>> be equally > >>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that > >>>> > >>> one > >>> > >>>> needs to > >>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which > >>>> leads me to > >>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, > >>>> why separate > >>>>>> the act from its production and history? > >>>>>> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple > >>>> clarity from > >>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the > >>>> problem. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Best, > >>>>>> Huw > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > >>>> > > >>>> >> > >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >> > >>>> > > >>>> >> > >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> > >>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that > >>>> in the CHAT > >>>>>> tradition > >>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English > >>>> language in > >>>> general, > >>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of > >>>> course, every > >>>>>> action > >>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many > >>>> discursive > >>>>>> contexts, > >>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be > >>>> evoked quite > >>>>>> legitimately, > >>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of > >>>> CHAT. In social > >>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of > >>>> activities by other > >>>>>> activities > >>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as > >>>> mediation of > >>>> actions by > >>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. > >>>> But if > >>>> the topic is > >>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so > >>>> central, that I > >>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term > >>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather > >>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by > >>>> such-and-such a > >>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can > >>>> use words to > >>>>>> mean what > >>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like > >>>> this in the > >>>> context of > >>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the > >>>> idea of > >>>>>> "mediation" in > >>>>>> the most general sense in a way which > >>>> obscures the > >>>> fact that a > >>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any > >>>> act of > >>>>>> communication or > >>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot > >>>> mediate actions*. > >>>>>> Artefacts, > >>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a > >>>> concept, can of > >>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But > >>>> > >>> the > >>> > >>>> point is > >>>>>> that a > >>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically > >>>> > >>> a > >>> > >>>> sign for > >>>>>> any one > >>>>>> concept. It means different things to > >>>> different people. > >>>>>> Concepts > >>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal > >>>> in their > >>>>>> materiality, > >>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we > >>>> have a > >>>> concept > >>>>>> in mind > >>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the > >>>> communication is > >>>>>> mediated > >>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a > >>>> mistake > >>>> not to be > >>>>>> aware > >>>>>> of that. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were > >>>> always used in > >>>>>> qualified > >>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made > >>>> > >>> clear. > >>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his > >>>> comment, too. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>> - > >>> -- > >>> > >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language > >>>> > >>> and > >>> > >>>> culture? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in > >>>> which case we > >>>>>> would need > >>>>>> to include > >>>>>> reflexes) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual > >>>> surround as in > >>>>>> Bateson's man with > >>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would > >>>> need to include > >>>>>> newborns). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Just wonderin'. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -greg > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David > >>>> H Kirshner > >>>>>> > > >>>> >> > >>>> > > >>>> >>> > >>>>>> > > >>>> >> > >>>> > > >>>> >>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Thanks for replies. > >>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim > >>>> Greeno > >>>> decided > >>>>>> to stop > >>>>>> talking about > >>>>>> situated cognition because the > >>>> pragmatics of > >>>>>> adjectival > >>>>>> use implies there > >>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated > >>>> cognition. He now > >>>>>> speaks of > >>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the > >>>> exception of > >>>>>> physical reflexes (and > >>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant > >>>> activity), all > >>>> human > >>>>>> action > >>>>>> is mediated (and > >>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as > >>>> well). So, it's > >>>>>> worth noting that > >>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a > >>>> kind of > >>>>>> action, but > >>>>>> rather a > >>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human > >>>> action; though > >>>>>> there seems to be > >>>>>> some variation in interpretation of > >>>> what that > >>>>>> assumption > >>>>>> entails. > >>>>>> David > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 10:46:43 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 11:46:43 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca In-Reply-To: References: <8D2C4DB1-CFE1-4A1D-8683-CE5A8551B35C@gmail.com> <6322AED9-6172-4B7C-8A08-4F0F1FE673D2@gmail.com> <4BDC889C-9B1B-4516-9F11-5549F0EF3003@gmail.com> <5DAD63A2-6147-4055-BB2C-17B6DCA08276@gmail.com> Message-ID: Larry, It will take me a while to decode what you have said about Merleau-Ponty, but I was thinking about Noise as a metaphor much like an "ether" that inhabits the universe. Humor inhabits an engaged classroom (Marzano). Everything is, to some extent, tongue in cheek. Regarding sensation, what about chronic pain? How do you take that with a light touch? Kabat-Zinn and Mindfulness advocates have taken that on in collaboration with UMass Hospital: hopeless cases, yet the patients are often actually able to find relief not available through Western medicine. So, even with pain, there are culturally-fashioned tools to deal with it. Also, on Merleau-Ponty, check out: Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement, Sabine C. Koch, Thomas Fuchs, Michela Summa http://books.google.com/books?id=_ShHwxMuU1AC&pg=PA54&lpg=PA54&dq=dual+simulation+luria&source=bl&ots=zttYqIULQv&sig=wD44qQiaJ9Sx3plLi3EgMqEBLIs&hl=en&sa=X&ei=PjwJVPWqDob8yQTTroKABA&ved=0CCcQ6AEwAQ - v=onepage&q=dual simulation luria&f=false Henry On Sep 16, 2014, at 9:03 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Henry, > Yes, goes *way back* and also a *return* to the *beginning*. > > Very *tricky* requiring the awareness of the trickster. > Science as a project opening to the EXCESS BEYOND the *sensation fallacy* > that Merleau-Ponty refers to AS *ontological rehabilitation* > Heidegger and Serres also *playing WITH and WITHIN this SYNERGY > [Merleau-Ponty's term] > Merleau-Ponty was very engaged with the facticity of *experience* . However > he questioned its *reductio* and called us back to EXCESS > > Larry > Larry > > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 7:34 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: > >> So this goes way back. I googled hermeneutics/hermes and the first line of >> my first hit was the following from Heidigger: "By a playful thinking that >> is more persuasive than the rigor of science." In a Marzano attachment you >> sent me, humor was associated with student engagement. The same thing >> applies to even this highfalutin' XMCA dialog, don't you think? >> >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:43 AM, Larry Purss wrote: >> >>> Bahktin the trickster. >>> In Greek mythology that was Hermes the messenger who brought messages >>> between [mediated] the divine and the human realms. Bahktin definitely >>> overlaps with Hermes [and hermeneutics] >>> Larry >>> >>> On Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 8:42 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < >> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Greg, >>>> I'm convinced you are right. Like I say, Bakhtin just keeps popping up. >>>> The trickster? Rebelais? What is that about? >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> On Sep 14, 2014, at 8:49 AM, Greg Thompson >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> One reason I mention him is because of resonances with ideas. >>>>> But I also mention him as a kind of trickster figure as well as a >> student >>>>> of the trickster in writing (his dissertation was on Rabelais). >>>>> I also mention him as a writer who seems authentically engaged with >>>>> meaningful/emotive aspects of human existence (e.g., Toward a >> Philosophy >>>> of >>>>> the Act, and Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity). >>>>> And finally, I mention Bakhtin because I'm still not convinced that the >>>>> deep treasures of Bakhtin's work has yet been mined out. >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 8:13 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Greg, >>>>>> Thank you for you good words and great question. I knew about Bakhtin, >>>> but >>>>>> have been finding him everywhere in the articles and chat of XMCA over >>>> the >>>>>> last week. Seriously. >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sep 13, 2014, at 2:26 PM, Greg Thompson >> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I would hope that a certain amount of irreverence would be dear to >> most >>>>>>> people on this list! >>>>>>> But seriously Henry, have you come across Bakhtin's work at all? >>>>>>> Seems like another that you might want to throw in with the crowd of >>>>>>> healthy irreverents. >>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 2:48 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Mike and David, >>>>>>>> This is seriously getting to be a club that I, like Groucho, won't >>>>>> join, >>>>>>>> if it takes me as a member. I think all of this seriously evokes >>>> Andy's >>>>>>>> contention, in his notes for the upcoming presentation at the ISCAR >>>>>>>> conference (which XMCA has gotten) that, "Adults can grasp true >>>>>> concepts, >>>>>>>> and can change society, and a social theory has to treat adults as >>>>>> adults, >>>>>>>> and this is what the projects approach allows us to do. " If "adult" >>>>>> means >>>>>>>> the same as "serious", you can see why I have my doubts about >> joining >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> Unserious Scholar Club. On the other hand, if I can have some fun, >> as >>>> in >>>>>>>> the laughing warrior (forget gender stereotypes here, and dare me to >>>>>> talk >>>>>>>> about Jihad), then that's what I'm talking about. Incidentally, I >>>> loved >>>>>>>> Andy's notes. I could so relate it to CG. The emergent character of >>>>>> project >>>>>>>> realization he talks about applies very well to discourse, as you >> can >>>>>> see >>>>>>>> in the articles by Langacker I have sent out. Discourse IS a project >>>> and >>>>>>>> its outcome is typically not entirely clear in the minds of the >>>>>>>> interactants as they negotiate its waters. XMCA, of which this email >>>> is >>>>>> a >>>>>>>> "turn", is a prototypical "work in progress", as Andy puts it, >> since >>>> we >>>>>>>> clearly don't know where this will all end up. But I hope it can be >>>> fun >>>>>>>> along the way. >>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sep 6, 2014, at 1:51 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hi Henry-- There goes my pile of books that need to be read before >>>> bed >>>>>>>> time! >>>>>>>>> Spinoza goes up there right next to Dead Souls. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> However, David having already claimed the mantle of unserious >>>> scholar, >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> you having made the same claim, I am afraid that I have to make >>>>>> precisely >>>>>>>>> the same claim on the unrefutable grounds that no one pays me any >>>>>> longer >>>>>>>>> for what I do so I get to be as unserious as i can seriously be! >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 12:33 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>>>>>> All I can say now is that Spinoza is famously quoted as having >> said, >>>>>>>> "The >>>>>>>>>> more clearly you understand yourself and your emotions, the more >> you >>>>>>>> become >>>>>>>>>> a lover of what is." This quote happens to appear in the >>>> introduction >>>>>>>> to a >>>>>>>>>> very popular self help book, Loving What Is, by Byron Katie >> (2002). >>>> I >>>>>>>>>> bought the book , obviously, because I thought I needed help. It >>>> did, >>>>>>>> but >>>>>>>>>> it also introduced me to Spinoza. And that has been a deeper >> "help". >>>>>> So, >>>>>>>>>> from a personal perspective, I can totally understand how Spinoza >>>> and >>>>>>>>>> periizhvanie would be connected. For all of you ESL teachers out >>>>>> there, >>>>>>>> who >>>>>>>>>> doesn't remember Krashen on the "affective filter" and I have been >>>>>>>> seeing a >>>>>>>>>> lot on character and education lately. Oh yes, and how failing is >>>>>>>> important >>>>>>>>>> to eventual success. Teasing out issues in the education of >>>>>>>>>> non-mainstreamers, and recognizing how the current system is toxic >>>> for >>>>>>>>>> everyone, I think Spinoza's analysis and the narrative of his life >>>> are >>>>>>>>>> powerful. Vygotsky hits me the same way. Cantor, the >> mathematician, >>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> Pierce, the philosopher/logician/semiotician, also constantly come >>>> up >>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>> me. They were ridiculed by the received cognoscenti of the time, >> so >>>>>>>> much so >>>>>>>>>> that the suffered mental breakdowns. But they pushed on to develop >>>>>>>> tools in >>>>>>>>>> math and semiotics that seem to me are complementary with >> Vygotsky. >>>>>>>> Again I >>>>>>>>>> get to take the role of unserious scholar here, so think of my >>>>>> thoughts >>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>> gaming on line and don't take the game too seriously. >>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Sep 5, 2014, at 6:42 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Hi David and Henry-- >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> David-- I was intrigued by your comment that Spinoza is a >>>>>> controversial >>>>>>>>>>> topic on xmca. I googled Spinoza on the main web page and came up >>>>>> with >>>>>>>> 4K >>>>>>>>>>> plus hits (!!). My own impression is that few on this list, me >>>>>>>> included, >>>>>>>>>>> have engaged in serious study of Spinoza let alone the imprint of >>>>>>>> Spinoza >>>>>>>>>>> on Vygotsky. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> What is the nature of the controversy? What is at stake? The >> topic >>>> is >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> particular interest to me at present because I have been part of >>>>>>>>>>> discussions with people who are focused on Vygotsky's use of >>>>>>>> perezhivanie >>>>>>>>>>> in his later work, where the relation of emotion and cognition >> is a >>>>>>>>>> central >>>>>>>>>>> concern and Spinoza is clearly relevant. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Henry and anyone interested in chasing down what has been written >>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>>> various topics in xmca chatter, take advantage of the nice google >>>>>>>> search >>>>>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>>>> lchc.ucsd.edu. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> (who enmeshed in the sense/meaning distinction in all of its >>>>>>>> multilingual >>>>>>>>>>> confusifications at present) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Sep 16 11:20:56 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 18:20:56 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <3FEDFA16-BB95-4E61-8E24-630CF88824D3@uniandes.edu.co> Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > >> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >> >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>
On 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >> wrote: >> >>> Carol, >>> >>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are >>> referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, >>> which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree that >>> culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as >>> sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated >>> ways we encounter them? >>> >> >> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. Please >> explain. >> >> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some of our >> suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am sure I wasn't the >> only who could imagine how lovely it would be to have a shower (or bath or >> wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >> >> >> Carol >> >> >>> >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>> President >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>> www.mocombeian.com >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>> >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald < >>> carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, >>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>> mediate perception and direct perception
>>>
Hi Andy, >>> >>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the >>> same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only >>> universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of >>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>> - as yet potential understanding >>> - a total lack of understanding. >>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we >>> are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in >>> fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of >>> course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) >>> I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema >>> Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>> >>> Carol >>> >>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> Ah! I see! >>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in >>>> mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and >>>> mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is >>>> mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>> the >>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides >>>> an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if >>> mediation >>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation >>>> to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that >>> if >>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression >>>> other than "mediation." >>>> >>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I >>>> like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to >>> use >>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a >>> word, >>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without >>>> exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was >>> born. I >>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >>> So >>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as >>> personal. >>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the >>>> same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as >>>> miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same >>>> material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they >>> do >>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of >>> universal >>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical >>>> analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>> Wonderful, >>>> eh? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>> >>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >>>>> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, >>> assertions >>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more >>>>> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action >>> away >>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >>>>> cannot mediate an action. >>>>> >>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way >>>>> to demonstrate this. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >>>>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >>>>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >>>>> separation. >>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> ------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>> >>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>> >>>> >>>>> >> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>> tradition >>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>> action >>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>> contexts, >>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>> legitimately, >>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>> social >>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>> activities >>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic >>> is >>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>> >>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>> mean what >>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context >>> of >>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>> "mediation" in >>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>> that a >>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>> communication or >>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>> Artefacts, >>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can >>> of >>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>> that a >>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>> any one >>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>> Concepts >>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>> materiality, >>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>> in mind >>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>> mediated >>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>> aware >>>>> of that. >>>>> >>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>> qualified >>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>> >>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>> would need >>>>> to include >>>>> reflexes) >>>>> >>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>> newborns). >>>>> >>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>> >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>> >>>>> >> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>> to stop >>>>> talking about >>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>> adjectival >>>>> use implies there >>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He >>> now >>>>> speaks of >>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>> action >>>>> is mediated (and >>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>> it's >>>>> worth noting that >>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>> action, but >>>>> rather a >>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>> though >>>>> there seems to be >>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>> assumption >>>>> entails. >>>>> David >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>> Developmental psycholinguist >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>> >>> >> > > > From rohini.ng@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 11:41:06 2014 From: rohini.ng@gmail.com (Rohini Nag) Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 00:11:06 +0530 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: looking for the collected works of L.S Vygotsky, Volumes as many available(?) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thank you Daniel. Google books does not have the entire preview but this seems workable for now. WorldCat too has the purchasable volumes, but our university library can be approached I guess. R. On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Daniel Hyman wrote: > Dear Rohini, > > Not sure if these leads address your questions directly, but they do speak > to what resources (however dear) present themselves online: > > > http://books.google.com/books/about/The_Collected_Works_of_L_S_Vygotsky.html?id=u8UTfKFWb5UC > > > http://www.worldcat.org/title/collected-works-1-problems-of-general-psychology-including-the-volume-thinking-and-speech/oclc/644973380/editions?referer=di&editionsView=true > > The WorldCat entries might facilitate an interlibrary loan of English > Volume 1 (a translation of Russian Volume 2). > > Hope this helps, > > Dan > > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 5:08 AM, Rohini Nag wrote: > > > Dear X-MCA, > > > > Can any of you suggest where might we find *The Collected Works of L.S > > Vygotsky*, Volumes I, II and III that can be downloadable, or if there > is a > > way to find scanned copies (if) available online? Or anybody have them > with > > you in a file format? > > > > Not all volumes (in print) are available here in India, and the one that > > is, is hugely expensive for our library resources. e-books are > unavailable > > too. Is there a way we can find them? > > > > Best, > > Rohini > > Jawaharlal Nehru University, > > New Delhi-110067 > > India > > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Sep 16 11:42:25 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 14:42:25 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Message-ID: The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the mechanisms for our demise. ?It is one thing to have culture, but its another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. ? Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > >> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >> >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>
On 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >> wrote: >> >>> Carol, >>> >>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are >>> referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, >>> which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree that >>> culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as >>> sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated >>> ways we encounter them? >>> >> >> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. Please >> explain. >> >> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some of our >> suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am sure I wasn't the >> only who could imagine how lovely it would be to have a shower (or bath or >> wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >> >> >> Carol >> >> >>> >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>> President >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>> www.mocombeian.com >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>> >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald < >>> carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, >>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>> mediate perception and direct perception
>>>
Hi Andy, >>> >>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the >>> same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only >>> universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of >>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>> - as yet potential understanding >>> - a total lack of understanding. >>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we >>> are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in >>> fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of >>> course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) >>> I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema >>> Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>> >>> Carol >>> >>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> Ah! I see! >>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in >>>> mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and >>>> mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is >>>> mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>> the >>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides >>>> an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if >>> mediation >>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation >>>> to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that >>> if >>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression >>>> other than "mediation." >>>> >>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I >>>> like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to >>> use >>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a >>> word, >>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without >>>> exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was >>> born. I >>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >>> So >>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as >>> personal. >>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the >>>> same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as >>>> miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same >>>> material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they >>> do >>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of >>> universal >>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical >>>> analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>> Wonderful, >>>> eh? >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>> >>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >>>>> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, >>> assertions >>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more >>>>> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action >>> away >>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >>>>> cannot mediate an action. >>>>> >>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way >>>>> to demonstrate this. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >>>>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >>>>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >>>>> separation. >>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> ------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>> >>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>> >>>> >>>>> >> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>> tradition >>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>> action >>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>> contexts, >>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>> legitimately, >>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>> social >>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>> activities >>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic >>> is >>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>> >>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>> mean what >>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context >>> of >>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>> "mediation" in >>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>> that a >>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>> communication or >>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>> Artefacts, >>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can >>> of >>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>> that a >>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>> any one >>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>> Concepts >>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>> materiality, >>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>> in mind >>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>> mediated >>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>> aware >>>>> of that. >>>>> >>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>> qualified >>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>> >>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>> would need >>>>> to include >>>>> reflexes) >>>>> >>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>> newborns). >>>>> >>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>> >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>> >>>>> >> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>> to stop >>>>> talking about >>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>> adjectival >>>>> use implies there >>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He >>> now >>>>> speaks of >>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>> action >>>>> is mediated (and >>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>> it's >>>>> worth noting that >>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>> action, but >>>>> rather a >>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>> though >>>>> there seems to be >>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>> assumption >>>>> entails. >>>>> David >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>> Developmental psycholinguist >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>> >>> >> > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Sep 16 11:49:12 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 18:49:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault along one of the roads not taken... Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > >> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. >> >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. >> >> Martin >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >>> >>> >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>> President >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>> www.mocombeian.com >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>> >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>
On 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Carol, >>>> >>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are >>>> referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, >>>> which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree that >>>> culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as >>>> sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated >>>> ways we encounter them? >>>> >>> >>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. Please >>> explain. >>> >>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some of our >>> suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am sure I wasn't the >>> only who could imagine how lovely it would be to have a shower (or bath or >>> wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >>> >>> >>> Carol >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald < >>>> carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, >>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>> mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>
Hi Andy, >>>> >>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the >>>> same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only >>>> universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of >>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>>> - as yet potential understanding >>>> - a total lack of understanding. >>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we >>>> are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in >>>> fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of >>>> course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) >>>> I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema >>>> Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>>> >>>> Carol >>>> >>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>>> Ah! I see! >>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in >>>>> mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and >>>>> mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is >>>>> mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>>> the >>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides >>>>> an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if >>>> mediation >>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation >>>>> to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that >>>> if >>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression >>>>> other than "mediation." >>>>> >>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I >>>>> like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to >>>> use >>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a >>>> word, >>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without >>>>> exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was >>>> born. I >>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >>>> So >>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as >>>> personal. >>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the >>>>> same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as >>>>> miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same >>>>> material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they >>>> do >>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of >>>> universal >>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical >>>>> analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>>> Wonderful, >>>>> eh? >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >>>>>> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, >>>> assertions >>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more >>>>>> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action >>>> away >>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >>>>>> cannot mediate an action. >>>>>> >>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way >>>>>> to demonstrate this. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >>>>>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >>>>>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >>>>>> separation. >>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> ------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>>> tradition >>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>>> action >>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>>> contexts, >>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>>> legitimately, >>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>>> social >>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>>> activities >>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic >>>> is >>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>> >>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>>> mean what >>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context >>>> of >>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>>> "mediation" in >>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>>> that a >>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>>> communication or >>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>>> Artefacts, >>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can >>>> of >>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>>> that a >>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>>> any one >>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>>> Concepts >>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>>> materiality, >>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>>> in mind >>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>>> mediated >>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>>> aware >>>>>> of that. >>>>>> >>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>>> qualified >>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>>> >>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>>> would need >>>>>> to include >>>>>> reflexes) >>>>>> >>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>>> newborns). >>>>>> >>>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>>> >>>>>> -greg >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>>> >>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>>> to stop >>>>>> talking about >>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>>> adjectival >>>>>> use implies there >>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He >>>> now >>>>>> speaks of >>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>>> action >>>>>> is mediated (and >>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>>> it's >>>>>> worth noting that >>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>>> action, but >>>>>> rather a >>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>>> though >>>>>> there seems to be >>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>>> assumption >>>>>> entails. >>>>>> David >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 11:55:41 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 19:55:41 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: looking for the collected works of L.S Vygotsky, Volumes as many available(?) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: http://marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/index.htm http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/xmcamail.2013_10.dir/msg00189.html On 16 September 2014 19:41, Rohini Nag wrote: > Thank you Daniel. Google books does not have the entire preview but this > seems workable for now. WorldCat too has the purchasable volumes, but our > university library can be approached I guess. > > R. > > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Daniel Hyman > wrote: > > > Dear Rohini, > > > > Not sure if these leads address your questions directly, but they do > speak > > to what resources (however dear) present themselves online: > > > > > > > http://books.google.com/books/about/The_Collected_Works_of_L_S_Vygotsky.html?id=u8UTfKFWb5UC > > > > > > > http://www.worldcat.org/title/collected-works-1-problems-of-general-psychology-including-the-volume-thinking-and-speech/oclc/644973380/editions?referer=di&editionsView=true > > > > The WorldCat entries might facilitate an interlibrary loan of English > > Volume 1 (a translation of Russian Volume 2). > > > > Hope this helps, > > > > Dan > > > > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 5:08 AM, Rohini Nag wrote: > > > > > Dear X-MCA, > > > > > > Can any of you suggest where might we find *The Collected Works of L.S > > > Vygotsky*, Volumes I, II and III that can be downloadable, or if there > > is a > > > way to find scanned copies (if) available online? Or anybody have them > > with > > > you in a file format? > > > > > > Not all volumes (in print) are available here in India, and the one > that > > > is, is hugely expensive for our library resources. e-books are > > unavailable > > > too. Is there a way we can find them? > > > > > > Best, > > > Rohini > > > Jawaharlal Nehru University, > > > New Delhi-110067 > > > India > > > > > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Tue Sep 16 12:02:55 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 19:02:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we don't believe we can step outside of it? Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault along one of the roads not taken... Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > >> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. >> >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. >> >> Martin >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >>> >>> >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>> President >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>> www.mocombeian.com >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>> >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>
On 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Carol, >>>> >>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are >>>> referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, >>>> which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree that >>>> culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as >>>> sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated >>>> ways we encounter them? >>>> >>> >>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. Please >>> explain. >>> >>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some of our >>> suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am sure I wasn't the >>> only who could imagine how lovely it would be to have a shower (or bath or >>> wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >>> >>> >>> Carol >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald < >>>> carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, >>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>> mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>
Hi Andy, >>>> >>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the >>>> same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only >>>> universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of >>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>>> - as yet potential understanding >>>> - a total lack of understanding. >>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we >>>> are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in >>>> fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of >>>> course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) >>>> I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema >>>> Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>>> >>>> Carol >>>> >>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>>> Ah! I see! >>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in >>>>> mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and >>>>> mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is >>>>> mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>>> the >>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides >>>>> an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if >>>> mediation >>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation >>>>> to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that >>>> if >>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression >>>>> other than "mediation." >>>>> >>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I >>>>> like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to >>>> use >>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a >>>> word, >>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without >>>>> exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was >>>> born. I >>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >>>> So >>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as >>>> personal. >>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the >>>>> same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as >>>>> miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same >>>>> material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they >>>> do >>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of >>>> universal >>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical >>>>> analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>>> Wonderful, >>>>> eh? >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >>>>>> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, >>>> assertions >>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more >>>>>> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action >>>> away >>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >>>>>> cannot mediate an action. >>>>>> >>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way >>>>>> to demonstrate this. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >>>>>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >>>>>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >>>>>> separation. >>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> ------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>>> tradition >>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>>> action >>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>>> contexts, >>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>>> legitimately, >>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>>> social >>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>>> activities >>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic >>>> is >>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>> >>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>>> mean what >>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context >>>> of >>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>>> "mediation" in >>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>>> that a >>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>>> communication or >>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>>> Artefacts, >>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can >>>> of >>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>>> that a >>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>>> any one >>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>>> Concepts >>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>>> materiality, >>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>>> in mind >>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>>> mediated >>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>>> aware >>>>>> of that. >>>>>> >>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>>> qualified >>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>>> >>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>>> would need >>>>>> to include >>>>>> reflexes) >>>>>> >>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>>> newborns). >>>>>> >>>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>>> >>>>>> -greg >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>>> >>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>>> to stop >>>>>> talking about >>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>>> adjectival >>>>>> use implies there >>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He >>>> now >>>>>> speaks of >>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>>> action >>>>>> is mediated (and >>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>>> it's >>>>>> worth noting that >>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>>> action, but >>>>>> rather a >>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>>> though >>>>>> there seems to be >>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>>> assumption >>>>>> entails. >>>>>> David >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Sep 16 12:10:29 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 12:10:29 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: looking for the collected works of L.S Vygotsky, Volumes as many available(?) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: thanks for excavating the files, huw. mike On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 11:55 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > http://marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/index.htm > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/xmcamail.2013_10.dir/msg00189.html > > On 16 September 2014 19:41, Rohini Nag wrote: > > > Thank you Daniel. Google books does not have the entire preview but this > > seems workable for now. WorldCat too has the purchasable volumes, but our > > university library can be approached I guess. > > > > R. > > > > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Daniel Hyman < > daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com> > > wrote: > > > > > Dear Rohini, > > > > > > Not sure if these leads address your questions directly, but they do > > speak > > > to what resources (however dear) present themselves online: > > > > > > > > > > > > http://books.google.com/books/about/The_Collected_Works_of_L_S_Vygotsky.html?id=u8UTfKFWb5UC > > > > > > > > > > > > http://www.worldcat.org/title/collected-works-1-problems-of-general-psychology-including-the-volume-thinking-and-speech/oclc/644973380/editions?referer=di&editionsView=true > > > > > > The WorldCat entries might facilitate an interlibrary loan of English > > > Volume 1 (a translation of Russian Volume 2). > > > > > > Hope this helps, > > > > > > Dan > > > > > > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 5:08 AM, Rohini Nag > wrote: > > > > > > > Dear X-MCA, > > > > > > > > Can any of you suggest where might we find *The Collected Works of > L.S > > > > Vygotsky*, Volumes I, II and III that can be downloadable, or if > there > > > is a > > > > way to find scanned copies (if) available online? Or anybody have > them > > > with > > > > you in a file format? > > > > > > > > Not all volumes (in print) are available here in India, and the one > > that > > > > is, is hugely expensive for our library resources. e-books are > > > unavailable > > > > too. Is there a way we can find them? > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > Rohini > > > > Jawaharlal Nehru University, > > > > New Delhi-110067 > > > > India > > > > > > > > > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Sep 16 12:14:21 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 19:14:21 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> How could we step out of culture, Michael, if it sustains human life? Surely culture is pervasive: no human being lives outside culture. Created to a purpose? Not sure what you mean by that. Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:02 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we don't believe we can step outside of it? > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault along one of the roads not taken... > > Martin > > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > >> The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. >> >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. >> >> Martin >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >>> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. >>> >>> >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>> President >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>> www.mocombeian.com >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>> >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>> >>>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >>>> >>>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>
On 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Carol, >>>>> >>>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are >>>>> referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, >>>>> which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree that >>>>> culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as >>>>> sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated >>>>> ways we encounter them? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. Please >>>> explain. >>>> >>>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some of our >>>> suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am sure I wasn't the >>>> only who could imagine how lovely it would be to have a shower (or bath or >>>> wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >>>> >>>> >>>> Carol >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>> President >>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>> >>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald < >>>>> carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, >>>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>>> mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>>
Hi Andy, >>>>> >>>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the >>>>> same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only >>>>> universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of >>>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>>>> - as yet potential understanding >>>>> - a total lack of understanding. >>>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we >>>>> are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in >>>>> fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of >>>>> course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) >>>>> I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema >>>>> Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>>>> >>>>> Carol >>>>> >>>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Ah! I see! >>>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in >>>>>> mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and >>>>>> mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is >>>>>> mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>>>> the >>>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides >>>>>> an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if >>>>> mediation >>>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation >>>>>> to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that >>>>> if >>>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression >>>>>> other than "mediation." >>>>>> >>>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I >>>>>> like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to >>>>> use >>>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a >>>>> word, >>>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without >>>>>> exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was >>>>> born. I >>>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >>>>> So >>>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as >>>>> personal. >>>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the >>>>>> same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as >>>>>> miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same >>>>>> material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they >>>>> do >>>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of >>>>> universal >>>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical >>>>>> analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>>>> Wonderful, >>>>>> eh? >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >>>>>>> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, >>>>> assertions >>>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more >>>>>>> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action >>>>> away >>>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >>>>>>> cannot mediate an action. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way >>>>>>> to demonstrate this. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >>>>>>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >>>>>>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >>>>>>> separation. >>>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>>>> tradition >>>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>>>> action >>>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>>>> contexts, >>>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>>>> legitimately, >>>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>>>> social >>>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>>>> activities >>>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic >>>>> is >>>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>>>> mean what >>>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context >>>>> of >>>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>>>> "mediation" in >>>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>>>> that a >>>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>>>> communication or >>>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>>>> Artefacts, >>>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can >>>>> of >>>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>>>> that a >>>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>>>> any one >>>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>>>> Concepts >>>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>>>> materiality, >>>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>>>> in mind >>>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>>>> aware >>>>>>> of that. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>>>> qualified >>>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>>>> would need >>>>>>> to include >>>>>>> reflexes) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>>>> newborns). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>>>> to stop >>>>>>> talking about >>>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>>>> adjectival >>>>>>> use implies there >>>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He >>>>> now >>>>>>> speaks of >>>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>>>> action >>>>>>> is mediated (and >>>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>>>> it's >>>>>>> worth noting that >>>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>>>> action, but >>>>>>> rather a >>>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>>>> though >>>>>>> there seems to be >>>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>>>> assumption >>>>>>> entails. >>>>>>> David >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > From rohini.ng@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 12:13:34 2014 From: rohini.ng@gmail.com (Rohini Nag) Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 00:43:34 +0530 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: looking for the collected works of L.S Vygotsky, Volumes as many available(?) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thank you Huw. helped a lot. On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 12:25 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > http://marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/index.htm > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/xmcamail.2013_10.dir/msg00189.html > > On 16 September 2014 19:41, Rohini Nag wrote: > > > Thank you Daniel. Google books does not have the entire preview but this > > seems workable for now. WorldCat too has the purchasable volumes, but our > > university library can be approached I guess. > > > > R. > > > > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Daniel Hyman < > daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com> > > wrote: > > > > > Dear Rohini, > > > > > > Not sure if these leads address your questions directly, but they do > > speak > > > to what resources (however dear) present themselves online: > > > > > > > > > > > > http://books.google.com/books/about/The_Collected_Works_of_L_S_Vygotsky.html?id=u8UTfKFWb5UC > > > > > > > > > > > > http://www.worldcat.org/title/collected-works-1-problems-of-general-psychology-including-the-volume-thinking-and-speech/oclc/644973380/editions?referer=di&editionsView=true > > > > > > The WorldCat entries might facilitate an interlibrary loan of English > > > Volume 1 (a translation of Russian Volume 2). > > > > > > Hope this helps, > > > > > > Dan > > > > > > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 5:08 AM, Rohini Nag > wrote: > > > > > > > Dear X-MCA, > > > > > > > > Can any of you suggest where might we find *The Collected Works of > L.S > > > > Vygotsky*, Volumes I, II and III that can be downloadable, or if > there > > > is a > > > > way to find scanned copies (if) available online? Or anybody have > them > > > with > > > > you in a file format? > > > > > > > > Not all volumes (in print) are available here in India, and the one > > that > > > > is, is hugely expensive for our library resources. e-books are > > > unavailable > > > > too. Is there a way we can find them? > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > Rohini > > > > Jawaharlal Nehru University, > > > > New Delhi-110067 > > > > India > > > > > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Sep 16 12:15:45 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 12:15:45 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: live by the sword, die by the sword, Paul. mike On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 11:42 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded to in > the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the > mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its > another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer >
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM > (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate > perception and direct perception
>
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only > live in the material world but are components of that material world, I > think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live > in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human > biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working > together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous > generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > wrote: > > > Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant > is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the > object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is > different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the > former but never access the object in itself. > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > President > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > www.mocombeian.com > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John > Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM > (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate > perception and direct perception
> >
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am > more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind > creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to > the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material > reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' > that continues to dominate the social sciences today. > > > > Martin > > > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > >> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, > if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and > our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an > unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about > reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a > state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the > material world that is not mediated by culture? > >> > >> > >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > >> President > >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > >> www.mocombeian.com > >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > >> www.paulcmocombe.info > >> > >>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald >
Date:09/16/2014 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00) >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture Activity" >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >
> >>
On 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> > >> wrote: > >> > >>> Carol, > >>> > >>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are > >>> referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and > understandings, > >>> which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree that > >>> culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as > >>> sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the > mediated > >>> ways we encounter them? > >>> > >> > >> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. Please > >> explain. > >> > >> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some of > our > >> suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am sure I wasn't > the > >> only who could imagine how lovely it would be to have a shower (or bath > or > >> wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. > >> > >> > >> Carol > >> > >> > >>> > >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > >>> President > >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > >>> www.mocombeian.com > >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > >>> www.paulcmocombe.info > >>> > >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol > Macdonald < > >>> carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM > (GMT-05:00) > >>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, > Culture, > >>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: > >>> mediate perception and direct perception
> >>>
Hi Andy, > >>> > >>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the > >>> same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really > only > >>> universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of > >>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; > >>> - as yet potential understanding > >>> - a total lack of understanding. > >>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so > if we > >>> are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to > take in > >>> fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And > of > >>> course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) > >>> I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema > >>> Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. > >>> > >>> Carol > >>> > >>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>> > >>>> Ah! I see! > >>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or > in > >>>> mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy > and > >>>> mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything > is > >>>> mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that > >>> the > >>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions > provides > >>>> an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if > >>> mediation > >>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with > artefact-mediation > >>>> to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer > that > >>> if > >>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some > expression > >>>> other than "mediation." > >>>> > >>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I > >>>> like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have > to > >>> use > >>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a > >>> word, > >>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without > >>>> exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was > >>> born. I > >>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce > them. > >>> So > >>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as > >>> personal. > >>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is > the > >>>> same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as > >>>> miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same > >>>> material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can > they > >>> do > >>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of > >>> universal > >>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical > >>>> analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. > >>> Wonderful, > >>>> eh? > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the > >>>>> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, > >>> assertions > >>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more > >>>>> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the > action > >>> away > >>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a > concept > >>>>> cannot mediate an action. > >>>>> > >>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant > way > >>>>> to demonstrate this. > >>>>> > >>>>> Best, > >>>>> Huw > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> he, he, Huw! > >>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very > >>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really > >>>>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to > >>>>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to > >>>>> separation. > >>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and > >>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? > >>>>> Andy > >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>> ------------ > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". > >>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the > >>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or > >>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and > >>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as > >>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements > >>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally > >>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to > >>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. > >>>>> > >>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to > >>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate > >>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if > >>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from > >>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. > >>>>> > >>>>> Best, > >>>>> Huw > >>>>> > >>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> >> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT > >>>>> tradition > >>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in > general, > >>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every > >>>>> action > >>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive > >>>>> contexts, > >>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite > >>>>> legitimately, > >>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In > >>> social > >>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other > >>>>> activities > >>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by > >>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic > >>> is > >>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that > I > >>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term > >>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather > >>>>> than the vague term "mediated". > >>>>> > >>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a > >>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to > >>>>> mean what > >>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context > >>> of > >>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of > >>>>> "mediation" in > >>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact > >>> that a > >>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of > >>>>> communication or > >>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. > >>>>> Artefacts, > >>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can > >>> of > >>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is > >>>>> that a > >>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for > >>>>> any one > >>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. > >>>>> Concepts > >>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their > >>>>> materiality, > >>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept > >>>>> in mind > >>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is > >>>>> mediated > >>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be > >>>>> aware > >>>>> of that. > >>>>> > >>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in > >>>>> qualified > >>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. > >>>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > >>>>> ------------------------------ > >>>>> ------------------------------------------ > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? > >>>>> > >>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we > >>>>> would need > >>>>> to include > >>>>> reflexes) > >>>>> > >>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in > >>>>> Bateson's man with > >>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include > >>>>> newborns). > >>>>> > >>>>> Just wonderin'. > >>>>> > >>>>> -greg > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner > >>>>> > >>>>> >> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Thanks for replies. > >>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided > >>>>> to stop > >>>>> talking about > >>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of > >>>>> adjectival > >>>>> use implies there > >>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He > >>> now > >>>>> speaks of > >>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of > >>>>> physical reflexes (and > >>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human > >>>>> action > >>>>> is mediated (and > >>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, > >>> it's > >>>>> worth noting that > >>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of > >>>>> action, but > >>>>> rather a > >>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; > >>> though > >>>>> there seems to be > >>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that > >>>>> assumption > >>>>> entails. > >>>>> David > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor > >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>> > >>> > >> > > > > > > > > > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From glassman.13@osu.edu Tue Sep 16 12:20:48 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 19:20:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> References: , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> But then Martin are you saying we can't critique our culture. Or if we could what would be the process. I guess all this comes from a conversation I was having this morning - what are the aims of education? ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:14 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception How could we step out of culture, Michael, if it sustains human life? Surely culture is pervasive: no human being lives outside culture. Created to a purpose? Not sure what you mean by that. Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:02 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we don't believe we can step outside of it? > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault along one of the roads not taken... > > Martin > > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > >> The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. >> >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. >> >> Martin >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >>> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. >>> >>> >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>> President >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>> www.mocombeian.com >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>> >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>> >>>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >>>> >>>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>
On 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Carol, >>>>> >>>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are >>>>> referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, >>>>> which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree that >>>>> culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as >>>>> sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated >>>>> ways we encounter them? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. Please >>>> explain. >>>> >>>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some of our >>>> suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am sure I wasn't the >>>> only who could imagine how lovely it would be to have a shower (or bath or >>>> wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >>>> >>>> >>>> Carol >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>> President >>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>> >>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald < >>>>> carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, >>>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>>> mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>>
Hi Andy, >>>>> >>>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the >>>>> same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only >>>>> universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of >>>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>>>> - as yet potential understanding >>>>> - a total lack of understanding. >>>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we >>>>> are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in >>>>> fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of >>>>> course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) >>>>> I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema >>>>> Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>>>> >>>>> Carol >>>>> >>>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Ah! I see! >>>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in >>>>>> mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and >>>>>> mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is >>>>>> mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>>>> the >>>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides >>>>>> an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if >>>>> mediation >>>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation >>>>>> to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that >>>>> if >>>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression >>>>>> other than "mediation." >>>>>> >>>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I >>>>>> like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to >>>>> use >>>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a >>>>> word, >>>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without >>>>>> exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was >>>>> born. I >>>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >>>>> So >>>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as >>>>> personal. >>>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the >>>>>> same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as >>>>>> miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same >>>>>> material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they >>>>> do >>>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of >>>>> universal >>>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical >>>>>> analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>>>> Wonderful, >>>>>> eh? >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >>>>>>> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, >>>>> assertions >>>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more >>>>>>> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action >>>>> away >>>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >>>>>>> cannot mediate an action. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way >>>>>>> to demonstrate this. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >>>>>>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >>>>>>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >>>>>>> separation. >>>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>>>> tradition >>>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>>>> action >>>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>>>> contexts, >>>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>>>> legitimately, >>>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>>>> social >>>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>>>> activities >>>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic >>>>> is >>>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>>>> mean what >>>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context >>>>> of >>>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>>>> "mediation" in >>>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>>>> that a >>>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>>>> communication or >>>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>>>> Artefacts, >>>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can >>>>> of >>>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>>>> that a >>>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>>>> any one >>>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>>>> Concepts >>>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>>>> materiality, >>>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>>>> in mind >>>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>>>> aware >>>>>>> of that. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>>>> qualified >>>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>>>> would need >>>>>>> to include >>>>>>> reflexes) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>>>> newborns). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>>>> to stop >>>>>>> talking about >>>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>>>> adjectival >>>>>>> use implies there >>>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He >>>>> now >>>>>>> speaks of >>>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>>>> action >>>>>>> is mediated (and >>>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>>>> it's >>>>>>> worth noting that >>>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>>>> action, but >>>>>>> rather a >>>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>>>> though >>>>>>> there seems to be >>>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>>>> assumption >>>>>>> entails. >>>>>>> David >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 12:25:20 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 20:25:20 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: On 16 September 2014 20:20, Glassman, Michael wrote: > But then Martin are you saying we can't critique our culture. Or if we > could what would be the process. I guess all this comes from a > conversation I was having this morning - what are the aims of education? > The purpose of a system is what it does. :) Huw > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:14 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > How could we step out of culture, Michael, if it sustains human life? > Surely culture is pervasive: no human being lives outside culture. Created > to a purpose? Not sure what you mean by that. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:02 PM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > > But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the > primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to > acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but > something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we > don't believe we can step outside of it? > > > > Michael > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf > of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > > > Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to > live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault > along one of the roads not taken... > > > > Martin > > > > > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > >> The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded to > in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the > mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its > another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. > >> > >> > >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > >> President > >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > >> www.mocombeian.com > >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > >> www.paulcmocombe.info > >> > >>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John > Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM > (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate > perception and direct perception
> >>
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not > only live in the material world but are components of that material world, > I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we > live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human > biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working > together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous > generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > >> > >>> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence > kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to > the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is > different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the > former but never access the object in itself. > >>> > >>> > >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > >>> President > >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > >>> www.mocombeian.com > >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > >>> www.paulcmocombe.info > >>> > >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John > Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM > (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate > perception and direct perception
> >>>
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am > more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind > creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to > the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material > reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' > that continues to dominate the social sciences today. > >>> > >>> Martin > >>> > >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > >>> > >>>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That > is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it > and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate > an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about > reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a > state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the > material world that is not mediated by culture? > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > >>>> President > >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > >>>> www.mocombeian.com > >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info > >>>> > >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol > Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 11:13 AM > (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate > perception and direct perception
> >>>>
On 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Carol, > >>>>> > >>>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you > are > >>>>> referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and > understandings, > >>>>> which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree > that > >>>>> culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as > >>>>> sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the > mediated > >>>>> ways we encounter them? > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. Please > >>>> explain. > >>>> > >>>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some of > our > >>>> suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am sure I > wasn't the > >>>> only who could imagine how lovely it would be to have a shower (or > bath or > >>>> wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Carol > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > >>>>> President > >>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > >>>>> www.mocombeian.com > >>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > >>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info > >>>>> > >>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol > Macdonald < > >>>>> carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM > (GMT-05:00) > >>>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, > Culture, > >>>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: > >>>>> mediate perception and direct perception
> >>>>>
Hi Andy, > >>>>> > >>>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at > the > >>>>> same time purports to account for "everything". But are there > really only > >>>>> universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of > >>>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; > >>>>> - as yet potential understanding > >>>>> - a total lack of understanding. > >>>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so > if we > >>>>> are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to > take in > >>>>> fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. > (And of > >>>>> course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) > >>>>> I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your > schema > >>>>> Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. > >>>>> > >>>>> Carol > >>>>> > >>>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Ah! I see! > >>>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature > or in > >>>>>> mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy > and > >>>>>> mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that > anything is > >>>>>> mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is > that > >>>>> the > >>>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions > provides > >>>>>> an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if > >>>>> mediation > >>>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with > artefact-mediation > >>>>>> to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer > that > >>>>> if > >>>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some > expression > >>>>>> other than "mediation." > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what > I > >>>>>> like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I > have to > >>>>> use > >>>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a > >>>>> word, > >>>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, > without > >>>>>> exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was > >>>>> born. I > >>>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce > them. > >>>>> So > >>>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as > >>>>> personal. > >>>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form > is the > >>>>>> same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as > >>>>>> miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same > >>>>>> material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can > they > >>>>> do > >>>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of > >>>>> universal > >>>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical > >>>>>> analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. > >>>>> Wonderful, > >>>>>> eh? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the > >>>>>>> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, > >>>>> assertions > >>>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become > more > >>>>>>> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the > action > >>>>> away > >>>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a > concept > >>>>>>> cannot mediate an action. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an > elegant way > >>>>>>> to demonstrate this. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Best, > >>>>>>> Huw > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> he, he, Huw! > >>>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very > >>>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really > >>>>>>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to > >>>>>>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to > >>>>>>> separation. > >>>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and > >>>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? > >>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>> ------------ > >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". > >>>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the > >>>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or > >>>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and > >>>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as > >>>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements > >>>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally > >>>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to > >>>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to > >>>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate > >>>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if > >>>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from > >>>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Best, > >>>>>>> Huw > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> >> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT > >>>>>>> tradition > >>>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in > general, > >>>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every > >>>>>>> action > >>>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive > >>>>>>> contexts, > >>>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite > >>>>>>> legitimately, > >>>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In > >>>>> social > >>>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other > >>>>>>> activities > >>>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by > >>>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic > >>>>> is > >>>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that > I > >>>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term > >>>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather > >>>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a > >>>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to > >>>>>>> mean what > >>>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context > >>>>> of > >>>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of > >>>>>>> "mediation" in > >>>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact > >>>>> that a > >>>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of > >>>>>>> communication or > >>>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. > >>>>>>> Artefacts, > >>>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can > >>>>> of > >>>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is > >>>>>>> that a > >>>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for > >>>>>>> any one > >>>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. > >>>>>>> Concepts > >>>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their > >>>>>>> materiality, > >>>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept > >>>>>>> in mind > >>>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is > >>>>>>> mediated > >>>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be > >>>>>>> aware > >>>>>>> of that. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in > >>>>>>> qualified > >>>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > >>>>>>> ------------------------------ > >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we > >>>>>>> would need > >>>>>>> to include > >>>>>>> reflexes) > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in > >>>>>>> Bateson's man with > >>>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include > >>>>>>> newborns). > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Just wonderin'. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -greg > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> >> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Thanks for replies. > >>>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided > >>>>>>> to stop > >>>>>>> talking about > >>>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of > >>>>>>> adjectival > >>>>>>> use implies there > >>>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He > >>>>> now > >>>>>>> speaks of > >>>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of > >>>>>>> physical reflexes (and > >>>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human > >>>>>>> action > >>>>>>> is mediated (and > >>>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, > >>>>> it's > >>>>>>> worth noting that > >>>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of > >>>>>>> action, but > >>>>>>> rather a > >>>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; > >>>>> though > >>>>>>> there seems to be > >>>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that > >>>>>>> assumption > >>>>>>> entails. > >>>>>>> David > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>>>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor > >>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Sep 16 12:30:58 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 19:30:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: We critique it from within. All the time. Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > But then Martin are you saying we can't critique our culture. Or if we could what would be the process. I guess all this comes from a conversation I was having this morning - what are the aims of education? > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:14 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > How could we step out of culture, Michael, if it sustains human life? Surely culture is pervasive: no human being lives outside culture. Created to a purpose? Not sure what you mean by that. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:02 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we don't believe we can step outside of it? >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >> >> Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault along one of the roads not taken... >> >> Martin >> >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >>> The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. >>> >>> >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>> President >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>> www.mocombeian.com >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>> >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>> >>>> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. >>>> >>>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>> >>>>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>> President >>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>> >>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>>
On 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Carol, >>>>>> >>>>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are >>>>>> referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, >>>>>> which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree that >>>>>> culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as >>>>>> sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated >>>>>> ways we encounter them? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. Please >>>>> explain. >>>>> >>>>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some of our >>>>> suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am sure I wasn't the >>>>> only who could imagine how lovely it would be to have a shower (or bath or >>>>> wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Carol >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>> President >>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>> >>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald < >>>>>> carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, >>>>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>>>> mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>>>
Hi Andy, >>>>>> >>>>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the >>>>>> same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only >>>>>> universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of >>>>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>>>>> - as yet potential understanding >>>>>> - a total lack of understanding. >>>>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we >>>>>> are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in >>>>>> fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of >>>>>> course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) >>>>>> I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema >>>>>> Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Ah! I see! >>>>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in >>>>>>> mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and >>>>>>> mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is >>>>>>> mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>>>>> the >>>>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides >>>>>>> an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if >>>>>> mediation >>>>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation >>>>>>> to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that >>>>>> if >>>>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression >>>>>>> other than "mediation." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I >>>>>>> like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to >>>>>> use >>>>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a >>>>>> word, >>>>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without >>>>>>> exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was >>>>>> born. I >>>>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >>>>>> So >>>>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as >>>>>> personal. >>>>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the >>>>>>> same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as >>>>>>> miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same >>>>>>> material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they >>>>>> do >>>>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of >>>>>> universal >>>>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical >>>>>>> analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>>>>> Wonderful, >>>>>>> eh? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >>>>>>>> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, >>>>>> assertions >>>>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more >>>>>>>> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action >>>>>> away >>>>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >>>>>>>> cannot mediate an action. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way >>>>>>>> to demonstrate this. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >>>>>>>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >>>>>>>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >>>>>>>> separation. >>>>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>>>>> tradition >>>>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>>>>> contexts, >>>>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>>>>> legitimately, >>>>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>>>>> social >>>>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>>>>> activities >>>>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic >>>>>> is >>>>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>>>>> mean what >>>>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>>>>> "mediation" in >>>>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>>>>> that a >>>>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>>>>> communication or >>>>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>>>>> Artefacts, >>>>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>>>>> any one >>>>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>>>>> Concepts >>>>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>>>>> materiality, >>>>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>>>>> in mind >>>>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>>>>> aware >>>>>>>> of that. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>>>>> qualified >>>>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>>>>> would need >>>>>>>> to include >>>>>>>> reflexes) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>>>>> newborns). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>>>>> to stop >>>>>>>> talking about >>>>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>>>>> adjectival >>>>>>>> use implies there >>>>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He >>>>>> now >>>>>>>> speaks of >>>>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>> is mediated (and >>>>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>>>>> it's >>>>>>>> worth noting that >>>>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>>>>> action, but >>>>>>>> rather a >>>>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>>>>> though >>>>>>>> there seems to be >>>>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>>>>> assumption >>>>>>>> entails. >>>>>>>> David >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 12:43:36 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 13:43:36 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: <50f7f5173d374b5fa9ed51a3b62501f9@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> <54178B49.9070205@mira.net> <50f7f5173d374b5fa9ed51a3b62501f9@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: David, I'd note that in addition to Andy's introduction, there was a "spirited" contribution (or two or three...) that use empirical stuff to contribute to theory. -greg On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 2:06 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: > Andy, > > > > Thanks for the link to the TOC of your edited volume, which perhaps > unintentionally illustrates my point that empirical studies using > CHAT/sociocultural theory generally aren't intended as contributions to > theory, per se; as you noted, the affordances for theorizing were brought > out by you, rather than by the authors as part of their motive for > producing the empirical work. > > > > I've hung out with cognitive psychologists quite a bit, and there's a very > clear demarcation between applied studies which utilize cognitive theory > for applicative purposes and pure studies whose sole raison d'?tre is to > inform theory. Furthermore, it is a fairly rare occurrence for anyone to > attempt to address theory in any other way than through the lens of > empirical studies. > > > > My own experience of this community includes appreciation of the tight > logic of their theorizing, and also of the inventiveness of researchers in > generating truly provocative data that they are then forced to contend. But > it also includes a sense of frustration with the absence of any critique of > or input to theory from outside of the little studies that, one after > another, niggle away at the theoretical infrastructure. Excluded, here, are > not only philosophical inputs to theory, but even broader methodological > constraints regarding the character of good theories. (My own grounding in > mathematical theorizing includes a deliciously salient sense of the > ?elegance? that makes a theory truly admirable and worthy.) > > > > Somehow, it seems noteworthy that CHAT/sociocultural psychology?whatever > its virtues?isn?t organized like other branches of psychology (e.g., > behavioral, cognitive, developmental) with respect to the role of empirical > data in theory construction. Andy, in your response to Jenna, you described > science as an objective practice that ?is not dependant on what you and I, > writing here on xmca in 2014, says it is.? The question all this raises is > whether CHAT/sociocultural psychology actually qualifies as a scientific > practice. > > > > David > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:59 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > > > > David, in the recently published book, "Collaborative Projects. An > Interdisciplinary Study," authors were invited to submit studies with > empirical content (in the sense in which you are using the word) which > illustrated the use of the concept of "project" within CHAT. > > > > > https://www.academia.edu/6756231/Collaborative_Projects._An_Interdisciplinary_Study > > > > As you can see from the Table of Contents, more than a dozen different > practical studies were contributed, and I am satisfied that the collection > functioned to illuminate the philosophical issues about the nature of "an > activity," and its ue as a unit of analysis, even though they are only > explicitly addressed in the long Introduction. > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > David H Kirshner wrote: > > > Mike, > > > > > > Clearly, as in Katherine Neal's response, and in MCA, CHAT/sociocultural > theory informs empirical research. > > > What's less clear is that empirical research informs CHAT/sociocultural > theorizing. > > > Not quite sure what to make of that. > > > > > > David > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > > > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 11:15 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > > > > > > Your followup comment is closely related to the second part of your > initiating message, David. So i will respond in line. > > > > > > Firstly, I think it would be helpful to distinguish between MCA and xmca. > > > The idea behind xmca was to provide a discussion forum for articles that > appear in MCA so that instead of authors having to wait 2+ years for > feedback on their ideas (which rarely comes, even then!), we could discuss > the published work and learn from it in a timely manner. By an large, that > effort has, in my opinion, failed. Thanks to the recent decision to have > the editors pick out articles for discussion which include the author(s) in > the discussion, this situation has been somewhat mitigated. But only > somewhat. xma discussions have all the characteristics of Vygotskian > chaining, as a rule. > > > > > > Secondly, when I take down a bundle of recent MCA issues and look at the > titles, they at least sound like they are about empirical matters ranging > across a wide variety of content areas. Are you saying that these articles > are not really empirical? Or that they are not really helping us to develop > better methods to deal with perceived problems of social value? Again, this > raises the question of "MCA or xmca". > > > > > > Lastly, perhaps it would be helpful if those of us who believe that > empirical work guided by CHAT ideas of some value has been produced in, > say, the past two decades, would post brief summiaries of that work with > references. > > > Maybe its just all verbal sound and fury, signifying the usual! > > > mike > > > > > > On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 8:50 AM, David H Kirshner > wrote: > > > > > > > > >> Does CHAT theory really advance with respect to empirical studies? > > >> If so, then why isn't the XMCA discussion a discussion about > > >> so-and-so's empirical results and how we should interpret them? > > >> Various branches of psychology (e.g., cognitive and developmental) do > > >> address concepts, and do conduct empirical research related to concepts. > > >> It's true, they rarely enter into full-blooded discussion of what is > > >> a concept. But perhaps that's because they're scientists rather than > > >> philosophers. They're operating within a framework that is bounded > > >> primarily by empirical and methodological expectations and > > >> obligations; theory evolves within those boundaries. > > >> It's not clear to me that the Vygotskyan research community ever > > >> operated in that fashion, and I'm wondering what would happen if it did. > > >> David > > >> > > >> > > >> -----Original Message----- > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > > >> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 10:23 AM > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > > >> > > >> Well, Lisa, I think that is a project which requires a lot of what > > >> David would call "philosophical" discussion. :) The Psychology of > > >> Concepts, as it is know to American psychology, i.e., the "mainstream" > > >> do endless laboratory tests and questionnaires and surveys and so far > > >> as I can see have still haven't figured out what a concept is. > > >> Andy > > >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >> - > > >> -- > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >> > > >> > > >> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > > >> > > >>> Well I am guilty for being fixated about thinking and talking about > > >>> methods and how to better understand how we can make a trustworthy > > >>> leap from understanding the world to understanding concepts. Again > > >>> just talking aloud. > > >>> > > >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > > >>> Psychology and Counseling > > >>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey > > >>> Education Complex > > >>> IT Online Program Coordinator University > > >>> of Tennessee > > >>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ > > >>> Knoxville, TN 37996 > > >>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > > >>> 865-974-7712 > > >>> > > >>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Andy Blunden > >>> > wrote: > > >>> > > >>> I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and we all have > > >>> our specific research interests. > > >>> But when we publish, most of us have something to report. > > >>> I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more of my share of > > >>> time arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest. > > >>> Andy > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >> - > > >> -- > > >> > > >>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > > >>> > > >>> Why is it that we came to what David stated as: > > >>> > > >>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over > > >>> facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical > > >>> elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost > > >>> completely detached from empirical specifics. > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > > >>> Psychology and Counseling > > >>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 > > >>> Bailey Education Complex > > >>> IT Online Program Coordinator > > >>> University of Tennessee > > >>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ > > >>> Knoxville, TN 37996 > > >>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > > >>> 865-974-7712 > > >>> > > >>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner > > >>> 20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>> > >>> >> wrote: > > >>> > > >>> Andy, > > >>> > > >>> I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific > > >>> project, > > >>> though it might initially have been conceived as such. > > >>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over > > >>> facts." > > >>> We are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, > > >>> distinctions, and qualifications almost completely > > >>> detached from > > >>> empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even > > >>> at the > > >>> level of theory, we're not all playing the same game. > > >>> > > >>> I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that > > >>> claims be > > >>> framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the > > >>> significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical > > >>> setting > > >>> theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In > > >>> this case, > > >>> there is a possibility that disagreements lead to > > >>> separation of > > >>> research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical agreement > > >>> as a > > >>> consequence. > > >>> > > >>> David > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> -----Original Message----- > > >>> From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net > > >>> > > >>> >] > > >>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM > > >>> To: David H Kirshner > > >>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >>> Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse > > >>> > > >>> David, > > >>> CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science > > >>> it > > >>> > > >> must > > >> > > >>> strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are > > >>> meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which > > >>> they > > >>> are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a > > >>> system of > > >>> concepts. People can agree on this or that hard > experimental > > >>> finding, but still not agree on the significance of that > > >>> claim. We > > >>> CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over > > >>> facts; > > >>> all of this is possible only to the extent that we share > > >>> concepts. > > >>> "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal > > >>> as it > > >>> is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is > > >>> ill-conceived to > > >>> think that this is a means of consolidating a current of > > >>> research > > >>> like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological, > > >>> I don't > > >>> think that makes any difference. > > >>> Andy > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >> - > > >> -- > > >> > > >>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> David H Kirshner wrote: > > >>> > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it > > >>> seems > > >>> inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing > > >>> efforts > > >>> to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from > > >>> efforts > > >>> > > >> to > > >> > > >>> solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In > > >>> tandem, is > > >>> ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or > > >>> philosophical > > >>> discourse. > > >>> > > > >>> > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of > > >>> CHAT > > >>> would not be better served by embedding theoretical > > >>> discussion in > > >>> analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be > > >>> to make > > >>> CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application > > >>> (though that > > >>> would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation > > >>> might > > >>> transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of > > >>> methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated > > >>> into > > >>> distinct psychological schools, each constrained by > > >>> methodological > > >>> strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical > > >>> environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community > > >>> could > > >>> look across these various schools to pursue broader > > >>> philosophical > > >>> problematics. > > >>> > > > >>> > David > > >>> > > > >>> > -----Original Message----- > > >>> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >>> > > >>> > >>> > > > >>> > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >>> > > >>> > >>> >] On Behalf Of Andy > > >>> Blunden > > >>> > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM > > >>> > To: Huw Lloyd > > >>> > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct > > >>> perception > > >>> > > > >>> > Ah! I see! > > >>> > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or > in > > >>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally > > >>> contain > > >>> both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem > > >>> with anyone > > >>> saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where > > >>> it > > >>> > > >> is > > >> > > >>> appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of > > >>> Vygotsky, > > >>> that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially > > >>> productive unit of analysis for science is lost if > > >>> mediation in > > >>> the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with > > >>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is > > >>> lost. > > >>> Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point > > >>> you were > > >>> referring to you used some expression other than > "mediation." > > >>> > > > >>> > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I > > >>> can do > > >>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or > > >>> thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my > > >>> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or > > >>> whatever - > > >>> but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are > > >>> products of the history and culture into which I was born. > > >>> I can > > >>> choose which artefact to use, but culture and history > produce > > >>> them. So every action I take is essentially > > >>> cultural-historical as > > >>> well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material > > >>> objects, > > >>> their physical form is the same for everyone, it is > > >>> universal. So > > >>> communication as much as miscommunication takes place > through > > >>> everyone interpreting the same material objects, > > >>> artefacts, that I > > >>> am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because > > >>> they > > >>> > > >> too > > >> > > >>> mediate their actions with the same set of universal > > >>> artefacts! So > > >>> all human action is opened to cultural and historical > > >>> > > >> analysis > > >> > > >>> which is as objective as any branch of natural science. > > >>> Wonderful, eh? > > >>> > > > >>> > Andy > > >>> > > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >> - > > >> > > >>> > -- > > >>> > *Andy Blunden* > > >>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > >>> > > > >>> >> If you want to study how action changes then you need > > >>> to study the > > >>> >> history and production of the action. Under such > > >>> circumstances, > > >>> >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production > > >>> of) actions > > >>> >> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, > > >>> through > > >>> >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then > > >>> it may seem > > >>> >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an > action. > > >>> >> > > >>> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) > > >>> are an elegant > > >>> >> way to demonstrate this. > > >>> >> > > >>> >> Best, > > >>> >> Huw > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > > >>> ablunden@mira.net%20%3cmailto:ablunden@mira.net>> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > > >>> ablunden@mira.net%20%3cmailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>>> wrote: > > >>> >> > > >>> >> he, he, Huw! > > >>> >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are > > >>> the very > > >>> >> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! > > >>> and I > > >>> really > > >>> >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally > > >>> being > > >>> used to > > >>> >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is > > >>> not equal to > > >>> >> separation. > > >>> >> I really don't know what you are referring to with > > >>> product and > > >>> >> history. Perhaps you could explain? > > >>> >> Andy > > >>> >> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >> - > > >> -- > > >> > > >>> >> *Andy Blunden* > > >>> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: > > >>> >> > > >>> >> I agree about precision, but not with a call > > >>> for "clarity". > > >>> >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or > > >>> reification of the > > >>> >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails > > >>> typologies or > > >>> >> other simplistic devices which prevent the > > >>> conception and > > >>> >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in > > >>> cases such as > > >>> >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the > > >>> entanglements > > >>> >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would > > >>> be equally > > >>> >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that > > >>> > > >> one > > >> > > >>> needs to > > >>> >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. > > >>> >> > > >>> >> I think it is this "need for simplification" > which > > >>> leads me to > > >>> >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, > > >>> why separate > > >>> >> the act from its production and history? > > >>> >> Of course, if one had the discipline to > de-couple > > >>> clarity from > > >>> >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the > > >>> problem. > > >>> >> > > >>> >> Best, > > >>> >> Huw > > >>> >> > > >>> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > > >>> ablunden@mira.net%20%3cmailto:ablunden@mira.net>> > > >>> ablunden@mira.net%20%3cmailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> > > >>> >> > >>> > >>> >> > > >>> > > > >>> ablunden@mira.net%20%3cmailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> > > >>> >> > >>> > >>> >>>> > > >>> > > >>> wrote: > > >>> >> > > >>> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that > > >>> in the CHAT > > >>> >> tradition > > >>> >> specifically, as opposed to the English > > >>> language in > > >>> general, > > >>> >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of > > >>> course, every > > >>> >> action > > >>> >> is both mediated and immediate, and in many > > >>> discursive > > >>> >> contexts, > > >>> >> "mediation" is a concept which may be > > >>> evoked quite > > >>> >> legitimately, > > >>> >> but with no special significant for the use > of > > >>> CHAT. In social > > >>> >> theory, for example, mediation of > > >>> activities by other > > >>> >> activities > > >>> >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as > > >>> mediation of > > >>> actions by > > >>> >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. > > >>> But if > > >>> the topic is > > >>> >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so > > >>> central, that I > > >>> >> prefer to spell it out and use the term > > >>> >> "artefact-mediated" rather > > >>> >> than the vague term "mediated". > > >>> >> > > >>> >> I have come across usages like "mediated by > > >>> such-and-such a > > >>> >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can > > >>> use words to > > >>> >> mean what > > >>> >> you like, but I find a formulation like > > >>> this in the > > >>> context of > > >>> >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the > > >>> idea of > > >>> >> "mediation" in > > >>> >> the most general sense in a way which > > >>> obscures the > > >>> fact that a > > >>> >> concept is not immediately present in any > > >>> act of > > >>> >> communication or > > >>> >> any other act, and therefore *cannot > > >>> mediate actions*. > > >>> >> Artefacts, > > >>> >> such as spoken words, which may be signs > for a > > >>> concept, can of > > >>> >> course mediate an act of communication. But > > >>> > > >> the > > >> > > >>> point is > > >>> >> that a > > >>> >> word is not universally and > unproblematically > > >>> > > >> a > > >> > > >>> sign for > > >>> >> any one > > >>> >> concept. It means different things to > > >>> different people. > > >>> >> Concepts > > >>> >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal > > >>> in their > > >>> >> materiality, > > >>> >> but particular in their meaning. So when we > > >>> have a > > >>> concept > > >>> >> in mind > > >>> >> when we use a word in communication, the > > >>> communication is > > >>> >> mediated > > >>> >> by the word not the concept, and it is a > > >>> mistake > > >>> not to be > > >>> >> aware > > >>> >> of that. > > >>> >> > > >>> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were > > >>> always used in > > >>> >> qualified > > >>> >> way so that its specific meaning is made > > >>> > > >> clear. > > >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> Andy > > >>> >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his > > >>> comment, too. > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >> - > > >> -- > > >> > > >>> >> *Andy Blunden* > > >>> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> Greg Thompson wrote: > > >>> >> > > >>> >> Does "mediation" only apply to language > > >>> > > >> and > > >> > > >>> culture? > > >>> >> > > >>> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in > > >>> which case we > > >>> >> would need > > >>> >> to include > > >>> >> reflexes) > > >>> >> > > >>> >> And does it include our socio-contextual > > >>> surround as in > > >>> >> Bateson's man with > > >>> >> the stick? (in which case, we would > > >>> need to include > > >>> >> newborns). > > >>> >> > > >>> >> Just wonderin'. > > >>> >> > > >>> >> -greg > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David > > >>> H Kirshner > > >>> >> > > > >>> dkirsh@lsu.edu%20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>> > > >>> dkirsh@lsu.edu%20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>> > > >>> dkirsh@lsu.edu%20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>>> > > >>> >> > > > >>> dkirsh@lsu.edu%20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>> > > >>> dkirsh@lsu.edu%20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>> > > >>> dkirsh@lsu.edu%20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>>>>> wrote: > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> Thanks for replies. > > >>> >> I'm recalling several years ago Jim > > >>> Greeno > > >>> decided > > >>> >> to stop > > >>> >> talking about > > >>> >> situated cognition because the > > >>> pragmatics of > > >>> >> adjectival > > >>> >> use implies there > > >>> >> has to be a contrasting non-situated > > >>> cognition. He now > > >>> >> speaks of > > >>> >> situativity theory. It seems, with > the > > >>> exception of > > >>> >> physical reflexes (and > > >>> >> perhaps pre-conscious infant > > >>> activity), all > > >>> human > > >>> >> action > > >>> >> is mediated (and > > >>> >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, > as > > >>> well). So, it's > > >>> >> worth noting that > > >>> >> "mediated action" doesn't specify a > > >>> kind of > > >>> >> action, but > > >>> >> rather a > > >>> >> theoretical assumption about all > human > > >>> action; though > > >>> >> there seems to be > > >>> >> some variation in interpretation of > > >>> what that > > >>> >> assumption > > >>> >> entails. > > >>> >> David > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From glassman.13@osu.edu Tue Sep 16 13:20:34 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 20:20:34 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Okay, here is a thought experiment. You are a character in a novel, let's say it is War and Peace. You have decided to critique the way in which Napoleon is presented in the novel. Yet the only information you have to make the critique is from your experiences in the novel. Everything fits together based on the way the narrative is set out. It is not that you no information on Napoleon outside the novel, it is that you do not realize that there is even the possibility that there might be information outside of the novel. You critique from within but the ability to critique is actually controlled by Tolstoy, who has his own reasons for portraying all the characters in the way he does. But you do not even realize there is a Tolstoy, this is simply the world that has been set up for you - as Huw suggests the purpose of the system is the system. Is there really any chance for a true critique or is the game rigged, are you always going to wind up in some place that we already determined by the novel itself. Now let's say you can as a character you can step outside the novel, realize it is a novel, understand that this is a system that Tolstoy has created for his own purposes (writers have been experimenting with this idea for generations). Isn't that a qualitatively different critique from within, and isn't this the only critique that allows you to escape your life as a character in the novel. If this makes no sense I apologize. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:30 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception We critique it from within. All the time. Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > But then Martin are you saying we can't critique our culture. Or if we could what would be the process. I guess all this comes from a conversation I was having this morning - what are the aims of education? > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:14 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > How could we step out of culture, Michael, if it sustains human life? Surely culture is pervasive: no human being lives outside culture. Created to a purpose? Not sure what you mean by that. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:02 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we don't believe we can step outside of it? >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >> >> Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault along one of the roads not taken... >> >> Martin >> >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >>> The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. >>> >>> >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>> President >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>> www.mocombeian.com >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>> >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>> >>>> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. >>>> >>>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>> >>>>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>> President >>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>> >>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>>
On 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Carol, >>>>>> >>>>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are >>>>>> referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, >>>>>> which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree that >>>>>> culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as >>>>>> sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated >>>>>> ways we encounter them? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. Please >>>>> explain. >>>>> >>>>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some of our >>>>> suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am sure I wasn't the >>>>> only who could imagine how lovely it would be to have a shower (or bath or >>>>> wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Carol >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>> President >>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>> >>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald < >>>>>> carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, >>>>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>>>> mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>>>
Hi Andy, >>>>>> >>>>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the >>>>>> same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only >>>>>> universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of >>>>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>>>>> - as yet potential understanding >>>>>> - a total lack of understanding. >>>>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we >>>>>> are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in >>>>>> fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of >>>>>> course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) >>>>>> I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema >>>>>> Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Ah! I see! >>>>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in >>>>>>> mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and >>>>>>> mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is >>>>>>> mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>>>>> the >>>>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides >>>>>>> an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if >>>>>> mediation >>>>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation >>>>>>> to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that >>>>>> if >>>>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression >>>>>>> other than "mediation." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I >>>>>>> like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to >>>>>> use >>>>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a >>>>>> word, >>>>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without >>>>>>> exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was >>>>>> born. I >>>>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >>>>>> So >>>>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as >>>>>> personal. >>>>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the >>>>>>> same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as >>>>>>> miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same >>>>>>> material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they >>>>>> do >>>>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of >>>>>> universal >>>>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical >>>>>>> analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>>>>> Wonderful, >>>>>>> eh? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >>>>>>>> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, >>>>>> assertions >>>>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more >>>>>>>> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action >>>>>> away >>>>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >>>>>>>> cannot mediate an action. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way >>>>>>>> to demonstrate this. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >>>>>>>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >>>>>>>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >>>>>>>> separation. >>>>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>>>>> tradition >>>>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>>>>> contexts, >>>>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>>>>> legitimately, >>>>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>>>>> social >>>>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>>>>> activities >>>>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic >>>>>> is >>>>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>>>>> mean what >>>>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>>>>> "mediation" in >>>>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>>>>> that a >>>>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>>>>> communication or >>>>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>>>>> Artefacts, >>>>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>>>>> any one >>>>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>>>>> Concepts >>>>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>>>>> materiality, >>>>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>>>>> in mind >>>>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>>>>> aware >>>>>>>> of that. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>>>>> qualified >>>>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>>>>> would need >>>>>>>> to include >>>>>>>> reflexes) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>>>>> newborns). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>>>>> to stop >>>>>>>> talking about >>>>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>>>>> adjectival >>>>>>>> use implies there >>>>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He >>>>>> now >>>>>>>> speaks of >>>>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>> is mediated (and >>>>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>>>>> it's >>>>>>>> worth noting that >>>>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>>>>> action, but >>>>>>>> rather a >>>>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>>>>> though >>>>>>>> there seems to be >>>>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>>>>> assumption >>>>>>>> entails. >>>>>>>> David >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Sep 16 13:42:38 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 20:42:38 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <533B37CC-0D81-4F9B-A400-6C75D0543C54@uniandes.edu.co> I am a character in a novel (you invite me to suppose). If I step out of the novel I cease to exist. When was the last time you bumped into Harry Potter on the street? Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 3:20 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Okay, here is a thought experiment. You are a character in a novel, let's say it is War and Peace. You have decided to critique the way in which Napoleon is presented in the novel. Yet the only information you have to make the critique is from your experiences in the novel. Everything fits together based on the way the narrative is set out. It is not that you no information on Napoleon outside the novel, it is that you do not realize that there is even the possibility that there might be information outside of the novel. You critique from within but the ability to critique is actually controlled by Tolstoy, who has his own reasons for portraying all the characters in the way he does. But you do not even realize there is a Tolstoy, this is simply the world that has been set up for you - as Huw suggests the purpose of the system is the system. Is there really any chance for a true critique or is the game rigged, are you always going to wind up in some place that we already determined by the novel itself. > > Now let's say you can as a character you can step outside the novel, realize it is a novel, understand that this is a system that Tolstoy has created for his own purposes (writers have been experimenting with this idea for generations). Isn't that a qualitatively different critique from within, and isn't this the only critique that allows you to escape your life as a character in the novel. > > If this makes no sense I apologize. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:30 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > We critique it from within. All the time. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> But then Martin are you saying we can't critique our culture. Or if we could what would be the process. I guess all this comes from a conversation I was having this morning - what are the aims of education? >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:14 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >> >> How could we step out of culture, Michael, if it sustains human life? Surely culture is pervasive: no human being lives outside culture. Created to a purpose? Not sure what you mean by that. >> >> Martin >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:02 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >>> But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we don't believe we can step outside of it? >>> >>> Michael >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >>> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >>> >>> Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault along one of the roads not taken... >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>> >>>> The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. >>>> >>>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>> >>>>> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>> President >>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>> >>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>>
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>> President >>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>> >>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>>>
On 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are >>>>>>> referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, >>>>>>> which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree that >>>>>>> culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as >>>>>>> sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated >>>>>>> ways we encounter them? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. Please >>>>>> explain. >>>>>> >>>>>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some of our >>>>>> suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am sure I wasn't the >>>>>> only who could imagine how lovely it would be to have a shower (or bath or >>>>>> wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>>> President >>>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>>> >>>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald < >>>>>>> carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, >>>>>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>>>>> mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>>>>
Hi Andy, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the >>>>>>> same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only >>>>>>> universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of >>>>>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>>>>>> - as yet potential understanding >>>>>>> - a total lack of understanding. >>>>>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we >>>>>>> are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in >>>>>>> fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of >>>>>>> course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) >>>>>>> I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema >>>>>>> Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ah! I see! >>>>>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in >>>>>>>> mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and >>>>>>>> mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is >>>>>>>> mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides >>>>>>>> an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if >>>>>>> mediation >>>>>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation >>>>>>>> to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that >>>>>>> if >>>>>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression >>>>>>>> other than "mediation." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I >>>>>>>> like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to >>>>>>> use >>>>>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a >>>>>>> word, >>>>>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without >>>>>>>> exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was >>>>>>> born. I >>>>>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >>>>>>> So >>>>>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as >>>>>>> personal. >>>>>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the >>>>>>>> same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as >>>>>>>> miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same >>>>>>>> material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they >>>>>>> do >>>>>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of >>>>>>> universal >>>>>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical >>>>>>>> analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>>>>>> Wonderful, >>>>>>>> eh? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >>>>>>>>> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, >>>>>>> assertions >>>>>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more >>>>>>>>> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action >>>>>>> away >>>>>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >>>>>>>>> cannot mediate an action. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way >>>>>>>>> to demonstrate this. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >>>>>>>>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >>>>>>>>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >>>>>>>>> separation. >>>>>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>>>>>> tradition >>>>>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>>>>>> contexts, >>>>>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>>>>>> legitimately, >>>>>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>>>>>> social >>>>>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>>>>>> activities >>>>>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>>>>>> mean what >>>>>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>>>>>> "mediation" in >>>>>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>>>>>> communication or >>>>>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>>>>>> Artefacts, >>>>>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>>>>>> any one >>>>>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>>>>>> Concepts >>>>>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>>>>>> materiality, >>>>>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>>>>>> in mind >>>>>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>>>>>> aware >>>>>>>>> of that. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>>>>>> qualified >>>>>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>>>>>> would need >>>>>>>>> to include >>>>>>>>> reflexes) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>>>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>>>>>> newborns). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>>>>>> to stop >>>>>>>>> talking about >>>>>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>>>>>> adjectival >>>>>>>>> use implies there >>>>>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He >>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>> speaks of >>>>>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>>>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>>> is mediated (and >>>>>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>>>>>> it's >>>>>>>>> worth noting that >>>>>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>>>>>> action, but >>>>>>>>> rather a >>>>>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>>>>>> though >>>>>>>>> there seems to be >>>>>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>>>>>> assumption >>>>>>>>> entails. >>>>>>>>> David >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > From deva_research@lineone.net Tue Sep 16 13:43:07 2014 From: deva_research@lineone.net (John Cummins) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 21:43:07 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <000001cfd1ee$d290cb80$77b26280$@net> Hi Folks, Mike suggests an interesting line of speculation. I'm wondering how far the limitations on our ability to critique are purely intellectual, or whether they may have some emotional element. Perhaps, in Mike's thought experiment, the 'author'-- or some other Deus ex machina ---may wave a magic wand that somehow transports us to a new position, from which we can carry out a different critique, but is our original limitation purely intellectual, I wonder, and therefore something that can be rectified solely by new information or a new perspective which causes us to value things differently? My impression is that our personal world view may have an emotional element, a sort of emotional 'glue' that holds it together, and it is this emotional element that is responsible for the totalising aspect of the world view. We may perhaps have an emotional need to believe that our world view is total, and that our values are universal. If this is so, it raises questions about the limitations of how far our purely intellectual critiques can extend, at least without a great deal of work, and this work is not just intellectual, restricted to the subject matter in hand, but is more like a sort of therapy John -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Glassman, Michael Sent: 16 September 2014 21:21 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Okay, here is a thought experiment. You are a character in a novel, let's say it is War and Peace. You have decided to critique the way in which Napoleon is presented in the novel. Yet the only information you have to make the critique is from your experiences in the novel. Everything fits together based on the way the narrative is set out. It is not that you no information on Napoleon outside the novel, it is that you do not realize that there is even the possibility that there might be information outside of the novel. You critique from within but the ability to critique is actually controlled by Tolstoy, who has his own reasons for portraying all the characters in the way he does. But you do not even realize there is a Tolstoy, this is simply the world that has been set up for you - as Huw suggests the purpose of the system is the system. Is there really any chance for a true critique or is the game rigged, are you always going to wind up in some place that we already dete rmined by the novel itself. Now let's say you can as a character you can step outside the novel, realize it is a novel, understand that this is a system that Tolstoy has created for his own purposes (writers have been experimenting with this idea for generations). Isn't that a qualitatively different critique from within, and isn't this the only critique that allows you to escape your life as a character in the novel. If this makes no sense I apologize. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:30 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception We critique it from within. All the time. Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > But then Martin are you saying we can't critique our culture. Or if we could what would be the process. I guess all this comes from a conversation I was having this morning - what are the aims of education? > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:14 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > How could we step out of culture, Michael, if it sustains human life? Surely culture is pervasive: no human being lives outside culture. Created to a purpose? Not sure what you mean by that. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:02 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we don't believe we can step outside of it? >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >> >> Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault along one of the roads not taken... >> >> Martin >> >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >>> The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. >>> >>> >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>> President >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>> www.mocombeian.com >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>> >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>> >>>> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. >>>> >>>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>> >>>>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>> President >>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>> >>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>>
On 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Carol, >>>>>> >>>>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are >>>>>> referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, >>>>>> which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree that >>>>>> culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as >>>>>> sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated >>>>>> ways we encounter them? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. Please >>>>> explain. >>>>> >>>>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some of our >>>>> suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am sure I wasn't the >>>>> only who could imagine how lovely it would be to have a shower (or bath or >>>>> wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Carol >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>> President >>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>> >>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald < >>>>>> carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, >>>>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>>>> mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>>>
Hi Andy, >>>>>> >>>>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the >>>>>> same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only >>>>>> universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of >>>>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>>>>> - as yet potential understanding >>>>>> - a total lack of understanding. >>>>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we >>>>>> are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in >>>>>> fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of >>>>>> course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) >>>>>> I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema >>>>>> Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Ah! I see! >>>>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in >>>>>>> mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and >>>>>>> mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is >>>>>>> mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>>>>> the >>>>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides >>>>>>> an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if >>>>>> mediation >>>>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation >>>>>>> to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that >>>>>> if >>>>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression >>>>>>> other than "mediation." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I >>>>>>> like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to >>>>>> use >>>>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a >>>>>> word, >>>>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without >>>>>>> exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was >>>>>> born. I >>>>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >>>>>> So >>>>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as >>>>>> personal. >>>>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the >>>>>>> same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as >>>>>>> miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same >>>>>>> material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they >>>>>> do >>>>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of >>>>>> universal >>>>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical >>>>>>> analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>>>>> Wonderful, >>>>>>> eh? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >>>>>>>> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, >>>>>> assertions >>>>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more >>>>>>>> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action >>>>>> away >>>>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >>>>>>>> cannot mediate an action. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way >>>>>>>> to demonstrate this. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >>>>>>>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >>>>>>>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >>>>>>>> separation. >>>>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>>>>> tradition >>>>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>>>>> contexts, >>>>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>>>>> legitimately, >>>>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>>>>> social >>>>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>>>>> activities >>>>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic >>>>>> is >>>>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>>>>> mean what >>>>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>>>>> "mediation" in >>>>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>>>>> that a >>>>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>>>>> communication or >>>>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>>>>> Artefacts, >>>>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>>>>> any one >>>>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>>>>> Concepts >>>>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>>>>> materiality, >>>>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>>>>> in mind >>>>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>>>>> aware >>>>>>>> of that. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>>>>> qualified >>>>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>>>>> would need >>>>>>>> to include >>>>>>>> reflexes) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>>>>> newborns). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>>>>> to stop >>>>>>>> talking about >>>>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>>>>> adjectival >>>>>>>> use implies there >>>>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He >>>>>> now >>>>>>>> speaks of >>>>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>> is mediated (and >>>>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>>>>> it's >>>>>>>> worth noting that >>>>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>>>>> action, but >>>>>>>> rather a >>>>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>>>>> though >>>>>>>> there seems to be >>>>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>>>>> assumption >>>>>>>> entails. >>>>>>>> David >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 13:51:39 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 05:51:39 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: looking for the collected works of L.S Vygotsky, Volumes as many available(?) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Don't forget that ALL the volumes are available--in doc and in pdf, if you can read Russian or if you know somebody who can help you translate them: http://www.marxists.org/russkij/vygotsky/index.htm The English volumes are quite indifferently translated in places (Volume One is a disaster, Volume Three much better). David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 17 September 2014 04:13, Rohini Nag wrote: > Thank you Huw. helped a lot. > > On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 12:25 AM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > >> http://marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/index.htm >> http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/xmcamail.2013_10.dir/msg00189.html >> >> On 16 September 2014 19:41, Rohini Nag wrote: >> >> > Thank you Daniel. Google books does not have the entire preview but this >> > seems workable for now. WorldCat too has the purchasable volumes, but our >> > university library can be approached I guess. >> > >> > R. >> > >> > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Daniel Hyman < >> daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com> >> > wrote: >> > >> > > Dear Rohini, >> > > >> > > Not sure if these leads address your questions directly, but they do >> > speak >> > > to what resources (however dear) present themselves online: >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > >> http://books.google.com/books/about/The_Collected_Works_of_L_S_Vygotsky.html?id=u8UTfKFWb5UC >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > >> http://www.worldcat.org/title/collected-works-1-problems-of-general-psychology-including-the-volume-thinking-and-speech/oclc/644973380/editions?referer=di&editionsView=true >> > > >> > > The WorldCat entries might facilitate an interlibrary loan of English >> > > Volume 1 (a translation of Russian Volume 2). >> > > >> > > Hope this helps, >> > > >> > > Dan >> > > >> > > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 5:08 AM, Rohini Nag >> wrote: >> > > >> > > > Dear X-MCA, >> > > > >> > > > Can any of you suggest where might we find *The Collected Works of >> L.S >> > > > Vygotsky*, Volumes I, II and III that can be downloadable, or if >> there >> > > is a >> > > > way to find scanned copies (if) available online? Or anybody have >> them >> > > with >> > > > you in a file format? >> > > > >> > > > Not all volumes (in print) are available here in India, and the one >> > that >> > > > is, is hugely expensive for our library resources. e-books are >> > > unavailable >> > > > too. Is there a way we can find them? >> > > > >> > > > Best, >> > > > Rohini >> > > > Jawaharlal Nehru University, >> > > > New Delhi-110067 >> > > > India >> > > > >> > > >> > >> From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Tue Sep 16 13:52:55 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 20:52:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102225ABC@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> But the culture each of us is within is not the same culture, surely, that anyone else is within. Culture is not an artefact in the sense that Andy talks about artefact -mediated communication so there is always space for noticing how others notice differently. Babies can pick up on the difference between interaction with a familiar and an unfamiliar partner, children form friendship groups which are defined by those they exclude as well as those they include and we travel to learn about ourselves and others by noticing how people do things differently in other places and other times. I would argue that it is only BY noticing differences in the ways others notice or pay attention to things that we are able to notice how WE notice things. It is by realising that we are not quite like other people that we can realise what we are like. And I apologise if I have completely misunderstood the point you were making, Michael! Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Glassman, Michael Sent: 16 September 2014 21:21 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Okay, here is a thought experiment. You are a character in a novel, let's say it is War and Peace. You have decided to critique the way in which Napoleon is presented in the novel. Yet the only information you have to make the critique is from your experiences in the novel. Everything fits together based on the way the narrative is set out. It is not that you no information on Napoleon outside the novel, it is that you do not realize that there is even the possibility that there might be information outside of the novel. You critique from within but the ability to critique is actually controlled by Tolstoy, who has his own reasons for portraying all the characters in the way he does. But you do not even realize there is a Tolstoy, this is simply the world that has been set up for you - as Huw suggests the purpose of the system is the system. Is there really any chance for a true critique or is the game rigged, are you always going to wind up in some place that we already determined by the novel itself. Now let's say you can as a character you can step outside the novel, realize it is a novel, understand that this is a system that Tolstoy has created for his own purposes (writers have been experimenting with this idea for generations). Isn't that a qualitatively different critique from within, and isn't this the only critique that allows you to escape your life as a character in the novel. If this makes no sense I apologize. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:30 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception We critique it from within. All the time. Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > But then Martin are you saying we can't critique our culture. Or if we could what would be the process. I guess all this comes from a conversation I was having this morning - what are the aims of education? > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer > [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:14 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > How could we step out of culture, Michael, if it sustains human life? Surely culture is pervasive: no human being lives outside culture. Created to a purpose? Not sure what you mean by that. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:02 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we don't believe we can step outside of it? >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on >> behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >> >> Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault along one of the roads not taken... >> >> Martin >> >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >>> The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. >>> >>> >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>> President >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>> www.mocombeian.com >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>> >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John >>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>> >>>> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. >>>> >>>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John >>>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>> >>>>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>> President >>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>> >>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>> Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 >>>>> 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture >>>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] >>>>> Re: mediate perception and direct perception
On >>>>> 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Carol, >>>>>> >>>>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations >>>>>> you are referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities >>>>>> and understandings, which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's >>>>>> will. I would agree that culture enframes them in a variety of >>>>>> ways. However, do they not, as sensations, tie us down to the >>>>>> material world irrespective of the mediated ways we encounter them? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. >>>>> Please explain. >>>>> >>>>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some >>>>> of our suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am >>>>> sure I wasn't the only who could imagine how lovely it would be to >>>>> have a shower (or bath or wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Carol >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>> President >>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>> >>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>>> Macdonald < carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 >>>>>> 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, >>>>>> Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>>>> mediate perception and direct perception
Hi >>>>>> Andy, >>>>>> >>>>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but >>>>>> at the same time purports to account for "everything". But are >>>>>> there really only universal artefacts? There must be at least the >>>>>> possibility of >>>>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>>>>> - as yet potential understanding >>>>>> - a total lack of understanding. >>>>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - >>>>>> so if we are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. >>>>>> We need to take in fluid, but everything apart from water also >>>>>> seems to be mediated. (And of course we serve water in culturally >>>>>> mediated ways.) I am sure I have too simplistic a view which >>>>>> misunderstands your schema Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Ah! I see! >>>>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in >>>>>>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally >>>>>>> contain both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem >>>>>>> with anyone saying that anything is mediated by anything else, >>>>>>> where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>>>>> the >>>>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions >>>>>>> provides an especially productive unit of analysis for science >>>>>>> is lost if >>>>>> mediation >>>>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with >>>>>>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. >>>>>>> Still, I would prefer that >>>>>> if >>>>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some >>>>>>> expression other than "mediation." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do >>>>>>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or >>>>>>> thoughts) I have to >>>>>> use >>>>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a >>>>>>> tool, a >>>>>> word, >>>>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, >>>>>>> without exception, are products of the history and culture into >>>>>>> which I was >>>>>> born. I >>>>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >>>>>> So >>>>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well >>>>>>> as >>>>>> personal. >>>>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical >>>>>>> form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So communication >>>>>>> as much as miscommunication takes place through everyone >>>>>>> interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I am >>>>>>> using in my actions. How can they >>>>>> do >>>>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set >>>>>>> of >>>>>> universal >>>>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and >>>>>>> historical analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>>>>> Wonderful, >>>>>>> eh? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>> -------- >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study >>>>>>>> the history and production of the action. Under such >>>>>>>> circumstances, >>>>>> assertions >>>>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become >>>>>>>> more obviously false. If one has simplified, through >>>>>>>> "clarity", the action >>>>>> away >>>>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a >>>>>>>> concept cannot mediate an action. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an >>>>>>>> elegant way to demonstrate this. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I >>>>>>>> really don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being >>>>>>>> used to obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not >>>>>>>> equal to separation. >>>>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>>>>> tradition >>>>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>>>>> contexts, >>>>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>>>>> legitimately, >>>>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>>>>> social >>>>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>>>>> activities >>>>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the >>>>>>>> topic >>>>>> is >>>>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>>>>> mean what >>>>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the >>>>>>>> context >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>>>>> "mediation" in >>>>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>>>>> that a >>>>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>>>>> communication or >>>>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>>>>> Artefacts, >>>>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, >>>>>>>> can >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>>>>> any one >>>>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>>>>> Concepts >>>>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>>>>> materiality, >>>>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>>>>> in mind >>>>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>>>>> aware >>>>>>>> of that. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>>>>> qualified >>>>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>>>>> would need >>>>>>>> to include >>>>>>>> reflexes) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>>>>> newborns). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>>>>> to stop >>>>>>>> talking about >>>>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>>>>> adjectival >>>>>>>> use implies there >>>>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. >>>>>>>> He >>>>>> now >>>>>>>> speaks of >>>>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>> is mediated (and >>>>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>>>>> it's >>>>>>>> worth noting that >>>>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>>>>> action, but >>>>>>>> rather a >>>>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>>>>> though >>>>>>>> there seems to be >>>>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>>>>> assumption >>>>>>>> entails. >>>>>>>> David >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Tue Sep 16 13:57:19 2014 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 14:57:19 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <20140916205718.5197965.40237.10469@ucdenver.edu> Yeah, Foucault wrote about this - the break limit. He also argued this in regards to our cultural constraints re:sex, that there? are sexual acts, but not sexual categories, for example, heterosexual. (historically that category appeared after homosexual.) Judith Butler as well pushed taking stances beyond cultural scripts. Bryant Alexander wrote about teaching as a way of drag, a performance? of revealing and concealing. Queer theory can provide leverage in stepping out of the novel. (An aside here, my opinion - critical theory, critical race theory, and queer theory is where you find ?the avant guard.) pIhillip Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone. From: ?Glassman, Michael Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:23 PM To: 9?eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Reply To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Okay, here is a thought experiment. You are a character in a novel, let's say it is War and Peace. You have decided to critique the way in which Napoleon is presented in the novel. Yet the only information you have to make the critique is from your experiences in the novel. Everything fits together based on the way the narrative is set out. It is not that you no information on Napoleon outside the novel, it is that you do not realize that there is even the possibility that there might be information outside of the novel. You critique from within but the ability to critique is actually controlled by Tolstoy, who has his own reasons for portraying all the characters in the way he does. But you do not even realize there is a Tolstoy, this is simply the world that has been set up for you - as Huw suggests the purpose of the system is the system. Is there really any chance for a true critique or is the game rigged, are you always going to wind up in some place that we already determined by the novel itself. Now let's say you can as a character you can step outside the novel, realize it is a novel, understand that this is a system that Tolstoy has created for his own purposes (writers have been experimenting with this idea for generations). Isn't that a qualitatively different critique from within, and isn't this the only critique that allows you to escape your life as a character in the novel. If this makes no sense I apologize. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:30 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception We critique it from within. All the time. Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > But then Martin are you saying we can't critique our culture. Or if we could what would be the process. I guess all this comes from a conversation I was having this morning - what are the aims of education? > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:14 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > How could we step out of culture, Michael, if it sustains human life? Surely culture is pervasive: no human being lives outside culture. Created to a purpose? Not sure what you mean by that. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:02 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we don't believe we can step outside of it? >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >> >> Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault along one of the roads not taken... >> >> Martin >> >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >>> The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. >>> >>> >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>> President >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>> www.mocombeian.com >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>> >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>> >>>> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. >>>> >>>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>> >>>>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>> President >>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>> >>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>>
On 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Carol, >>>>>> >>>>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are >>>>>> referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, >>>>>> which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree that >>>>>> culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as >>>>>> sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated >>>>>> ways we encounter them? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. Please >>>>> explain. >>>>> >>>>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some of our >>>>> suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am sure I wasn't the >>>>> only who could imagine how lovely it would be to have a shower (or bath or >>>>> wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Carol >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>> President >>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>> >>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald < >>>>>> carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, >>>>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>>>> mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>>>
Hi Andy, >>>>>> >>>>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the >>>>>> same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only >>>>>> universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of >>>>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>>>>> - as yet potential understanding >>>>>> - a total lack of understanding. >>>>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we >>>>>> are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in >>>>>> fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of >>>>>> course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) >>>>>> I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema >>>>>> Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Ah! I see! >>>>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in >>>>>>> mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and >>>>>>> mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is >>>>>>> mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>>>>> the >>>>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides >>>>>>> an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if >>>>>> mediation >>>>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation >>>>>>> to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that >>>>>> if >>>>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression >>>>>>> other than "mediation." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I >>>>>>> like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to >>>>>> use >>>>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a >>>>>> word, >>>>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without >>>>>>> exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was >>>>>> born. I >>>>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >>>>>> So >>>>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as >>>>>> personal. >>>>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the >>>>>>> same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as >>>>>>> miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same >>>>>>> material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they >>>>>> do >>>>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of >>>>>> universal >>>>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical >>>>>>> analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>>>>> Wonderful, >>>>>>> eh? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >>>>>>>> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, >>>>>> assertions >>>>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more >>>>>>>> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action >>>>>> away >>>>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >>>>>>>> cannot mediate an action. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way >>>>>>>> to demonstrate this. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >>>>>>>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >>>>>>>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >>>>>>>> separation. >>>>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>>>>> tradition >>>>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>>>>> contexts, >>>>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>>>>> legitimately, >>>>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>>>>> social >>>>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>>>>> activities >>>>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic >>>>>> is >>>>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>>>>> mean what >>>>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>>>>> "mediation" in >>>>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>>>>> that a >>>>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>>>>> communication or >>>>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>>>>> Artefacts, >>>>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>>>>> any one >>>>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>>>>> Concepts >>>>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>>>>> materiality, >>>>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>>>>> in mind >>>>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>>>>> aware >>>>>>>> of that. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>>>>> qualified >>>>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>>>>> would need >>>>>>>> to include >>>>>>>> reflexes) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>>>>> newborns). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>>>>> to stop >>>>>>>> talking about >>>>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>>>>> adjectival >>>>>>>> use implies there >>>>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He >>>>>> now >>>>>>>> speaks of >>>>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>> is mediated (and >>>>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>>>>> it's >>>>>>>> worth noting that >>>>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>>>>> action, but >>>>>>>> rather a >>>>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>>>>> though >>>>>>>> there seems to be >>>>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>>>>> assumption >>>>>>>> entails. >>>>>>>> David >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > From deva_research@lineone.net Tue Sep 16 14:10:51 2014 From: deva_research@lineone.net (John Cummins) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 22:10:51 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102225ABC@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102225ABC@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <000401cfd1f2$b27051f0$1750f5d0$@net> Hi Rod, I agree with what you say but there may be limitations to this happy state of learning about ourselves and others, and if so it would be relevant to educators to explore what these limitations might be. I agree that one might not expect there to be a class of limitations to learning over and above the physical limitations of the brain and the information available to it, especially as the brain is highly plastic physically, and we have great capacity to learn, but even so I suggest there may be additional types or classes of limitation. The most obvious place to begin looking would be in the possible desirability for a world view to have a degree of stability. It is hard work having to update, especially at a basic level. But I think the problem may be even more basic. As I suggested earlier, there may be a sort of emotional glue that holds things together. It makes it difficult for us to update; it means that on occasions we defend our world view with some aggression , and it is responsible for as degree of self deception or self delusion. From an evolutionary perspective, if this is true ( and of course it is just speculation at the moment), then because it is an obvious limitation on intelligent learning it must be part of a larger balance of adaptive costs and benefits. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rod Parker-Rees Sent: 16 September 2014 21:53 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception But the culture each of us is within is not the same culture, surely, that anyone else is within. Culture is not an artefact in the sense that Andy talks about artefact -mediated communication so there is always space for noticing how others notice differently. Babies can pick up on the difference between interaction with a familiar and an unfamiliar partner, children form friendship groups which are defined by those they exclude as well as those they include and we travel to learn about ourselves and others by noticing how people do things differently in other places and other times. I would argue that it is only BY noticing differences in the ways others notice or pay attention to things that we are able to notice how WE notice things. It is by realising that we are not quite like other people that we can realise what we are like. And I apologise if I have completely misunderstood the point you were making, Michael! Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Glassman, Michael Sent: 16 September 2014 21:21 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Okay, here is a thought experiment. You are a character in a novel, let's say it is War and Peace. You have decided to critique the way in which Napoleon is presented in the novel. Yet the only information you have to make the critique is from your experiences in the novel. Everything fits together based on the way the narrative is set out. It is not that you no information on Napoleon outside the novel, it is that you do not realize that there is even the possibility that there might be information outside of the novel. You critique from within but the ability to critique is actually controlled by Tolstoy, who has his own reasons for portraying all the characters in the way he does. But you do not even realize there is a Tolstoy, this is simply the world that has been set up for you - as Huw suggests the purpose of the system is the system. Is there really any chance for a true critique or is the game rigged, are you always going to wind up in some place that we already dete rmined by the novel itself. Now let's say you can as a character you can step outside the novel, realize it is a novel, understand that this is a system that Tolstoy has created for his own purposes (writers have been experimenting with this idea for generations). Isn't that a qualitatively different critique from within, and isn't this the only critique that allows you to escape your life as a character in the novel. If this makes no sense I apologize. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:30 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception We critique it from within. All the time. Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > But then Martin are you saying we can't critique our culture. Or if we could what would be the process. I guess all this comes from a conversation I was having this morning - what are the aims of education? > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer > [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:14 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > How could we step out of culture, Michael, if it sustains human life? Surely culture is pervasive: no human being lives outside culture. Created to a purpose? Not sure what you mean by that. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:02 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we don't believe we can step outside of it? >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on >> behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >> >> Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault along one of the roads not taken... >> >> Martin >> >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >>> The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. >>> >>> >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>> President >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>> www.mocombeian.com >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>> >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John >>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>> >>>> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. >>>> >>>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John >>>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>> >>>>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>> President >>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>> >>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>> Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 >>>>> 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture >>>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] >>>>> Re: mediate perception and direct perception
On >>>>> 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Carol, >>>>>> >>>>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations >>>>>> you are referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities >>>>>> and understandings, which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's >>>>>> will. I would agree that culture enframes them in a variety of >>>>>> ways. However, do they not, as sensations, tie us down to the >>>>>> material world irrespective of the mediated ways we encounter them? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. >>>>> Please explain. >>>>> >>>>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some >>>>> of our suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am >>>>> sure I wasn't the only who could imagine how lovely it would be to >>>>> have a shower (or bath or wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Carol >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>> President >>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>> >>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>>> Macdonald < carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 >>>>>> 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, >>>>>> Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>>>> mediate perception and direct perception
Hi >>>>>> Andy, >>>>>> >>>>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but >>>>>> at the same time purports to account for "everything". But are >>>>>> there really only universal artefacts? There must be at least the >>>>>> possibility of >>>>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>>>>> - as yet potential understanding >>>>>> - a total lack of understanding. >>>>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - >>>>>> so if we are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. >>>>>> We need to take in fluid, but everything apart from water also >>>>>> seems to be mediated. (And of course we serve water in culturally >>>>>> mediated ways.) I am sure I have too simplistic a view which >>>>>> misunderstands your schema Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Ah! I see! >>>>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in >>>>>>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally >>>>>>> contain both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem >>>>>>> with anyone saying that anything is mediated by anything else, >>>>>>> where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>>>>> the >>>>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions >>>>>>> provides an especially productive unit of analysis for science >>>>>>> is lost if >>>>>> mediation >>>>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with >>>>>>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. >>>>>>> Still, I would prefer that >>>>>> if >>>>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some >>>>>>> expression other than "mediation." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do >>>>>>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or >>>>>>> thoughts) I have to >>>>>> use >>>>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a >>>>>>> tool, a >>>>>> word, >>>>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, >>>>>>> without exception, are products of the history and culture into >>>>>>> which I was >>>>>> born. I >>>>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >>>>>> So >>>>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well >>>>>>> as >>>>>> personal. >>>>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical >>>>>>> form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So communication >>>>>>> as much as miscommunication takes place through everyone >>>>>>> interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I am >>>>>>> using in my actions. How can they >>>>>> do >>>>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set >>>>>>> of >>>>>> universal >>>>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and >>>>>>> historical analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>>>>> Wonderful, >>>>>>> eh? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>> -------- >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study >>>>>>>> the history and production of the action. Under such >>>>>>>> circumstances, >>>>>> assertions >>>>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become >>>>>>>> more obviously false. If one has simplified, through >>>>>>>> "clarity", the action >>>>>> away >>>>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a >>>>>>>> concept cannot mediate an action. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an >>>>>>>> elegant way to demonstrate this. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I >>>>>>>> really don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being >>>>>>>> used to obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not >>>>>>>> equal to separation. >>>>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>>>>> tradition >>>>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>>>>> contexts, >>>>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>>>>> legitimately, >>>>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>>>>> social >>>>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>>>>> activities >>>>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the >>>>>>>> topic >>>>>> is >>>>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>>>>> mean what >>>>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the >>>>>>>> context >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>>>>> "mediation" in >>>>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>>>>> that a >>>>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>>>>> communication or >>>>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>>>>> Artefacts, >>>>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, >>>>>>>> can >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>>>>> any one >>>>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>>>>> Concepts >>>>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>>>>> materiality, >>>>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>>>>> in mind >>>>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>>>>> aware >>>>>>>> of that. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>>>>> qualified >>>>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>>>>> would need >>>>>>>> to include >>>>>>>> reflexes) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>>>>> newborns). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>>>>> to stop >>>>>>>> talking about >>>>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>>>>> adjectival >>>>>>>> use implies there >>>>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. >>>>>>>> He >>>>>> now >>>>>>>> speaks of >>>>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>> is mediated (and >>>>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>>>>> it's >>>>>>>> worth noting that >>>>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>>>>> action, but >>>>>>>> rather a >>>>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>>>>> though >>>>>>>> there seems to be >>>>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>>>>> assumption >>>>>>>> entails. >>>>>>>> David >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Sep 16 14:13:35 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 21:13:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102225ABC@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102225ABC@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <54220168-C81B-4AD3-A508-D9B46958A0C0@uniandes.edu.co> Surely culture is the way we live *together*, Rod. Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 3:52 PM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > But the culture each of us is within is not the same culture, surely, that anyone else is within. Culture is not an artefact in the sense that Andy talks about artefact -mediated communication so there is always space for noticing how others notice differently. Babies can pick up on the difference between interaction with a familiar and an unfamiliar partner, children form friendship groups which are defined by those they exclude as well as those they include and we travel to learn about ourselves and others by noticing how people do things differently in other places and other times. I would argue that it is only BY noticing differences in the ways others notice or pay attention to things that we are able to notice how WE notice things. It is by realising that we are not quite like other people that we can realise what we are like. > > And I apologise if I have completely misunderstood the point you were making, Michael! > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Glassman, Michael > Sent: 16 September 2014 21:21 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > Okay, here is a thought experiment. You are a character in a novel, let's say it is War and Peace. You have decided to critique the way in which Napoleon is presented in the novel. Yet the only information you have to make the critique is from your experiences in the novel. Everything fits together based on the way the narrative is set out. It is not that you no information on Napoleon outside the novel, it is that you do not realize that there is even the possibility that there might be information outside of the novel. You critique from within but the ability to critique is actually controlled by Tolstoy, who has his own reasons for portraying all the characters in the way he does. But you do not even realize there is a Tolstoy, this is simply the world that has been set up for you - as Huw suggests the purpose of the system is the system. Is there really any chance for a true critique or is the game rigged, are you always going to wind up in some place that we already determined by the novel itself. > > Now let's say you can as a character you can step outside the novel, realize it is a novel, understand that this is a system that Tolstoy has created for his own purposes (writers have been experimenting with this idea for generations). Isn't that a qualitatively different critique from within, and isn't this the only critique that allows you to escape your life as a character in the novel. > > If this makes no sense I apologize. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:30 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > We critique it from within. All the time. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> But then Martin are you saying we can't critique our culture. Or if we could what would be the process. I guess all this comes from a conversation I was having this morning - what are the aims of education? >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer >> [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:14 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >> >> How could we step out of culture, Michael, if it sustains human life? Surely culture is pervasive: no human being lives outside culture. Created to a purpose? Not sure what you mean by that. >> >> Martin >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:02 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >>> But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we don't believe we can step outside of it? >>> >>> Michael >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on >>> behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >>> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >>> >>> Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault along one of the roads not taken... >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>> >>>> The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. >>>> >>>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John >>>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>> >>>>> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>> President >>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>> >>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John >>>>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>> President >>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>> >>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>>> Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 >>>>>> 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture >>>>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] >>>>>> Re: mediate perception and direct perception
On >>>>>> 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations >>>>>>> you are referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities >>>>>>> and understandings, which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's >>>>>>> will. I would agree that culture enframes them in a variety of >>>>>>> ways. However, do they not, as sensations, tie us down to the >>>>>>> material world irrespective of the mediated ways we encounter them? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. >>>>>> Please explain. >>>>>> >>>>>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some >>>>>> of our suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am >>>>>> sure I wasn't the only who could imagine how lovely it would be to >>>>>> have a shower (or bath or wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>>> President >>>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>>> >>>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>>>> Macdonald < carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 >>>>>>> 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, >>>>>>> Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>>>>> mediate perception and direct perception
Hi >>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but >>>>>>> at the same time purports to account for "everything". But are >>>>>>> there really only universal artefacts? There must be at least the >>>>>>> possibility of >>>>>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>>>>>> - as yet potential understanding >>>>>>> - a total lack of understanding. >>>>>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - >>>>>>> so if we are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. >>>>>>> We need to take in fluid, but everything apart from water also >>>>>>> seems to be mediated. (And of course we serve water in culturally >>>>>>> mediated ways.) I am sure I have too simplistic a view which >>>>>>> misunderstands your schema Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ah! I see! >>>>>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in >>>>>>>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally >>>>>>>> contain both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem >>>>>>>> with anyone saying that anything is mediated by anything else, >>>>>>>> where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions >>>>>>>> provides an especially productive unit of analysis for science >>>>>>>> is lost if >>>>>>> mediation >>>>>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with >>>>>>>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. >>>>>>>> Still, I would prefer that >>>>>>> if >>>>>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some >>>>>>>> expression other than "mediation." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do >>>>>>>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or >>>>>>>> thoughts) I have to >>>>>>> use >>>>>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a >>>>>>>> tool, a >>>>>>> word, >>>>>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, >>>>>>>> without exception, are products of the history and culture into >>>>>>>> which I was >>>>>>> born. I >>>>>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >>>>>>> So >>>>>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well >>>>>>>> as >>>>>>> personal. >>>>>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical >>>>>>>> form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So communication >>>>>>>> as much as miscommunication takes place through everyone >>>>>>>> interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I am >>>>>>>> using in my actions. How can they >>>>>>> do >>>>>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>> universal >>>>>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and >>>>>>>> historical analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>>>>>> Wonderful, >>>>>>>> eh? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>> -------- >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study >>>>>>>>> the history and production of the action. Under such >>>>>>>>> circumstances, >>>>>>> assertions >>>>>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become >>>>>>>>> more obviously false. If one has simplified, through >>>>>>>>> "clarity", the action >>>>>>> away >>>>>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a >>>>>>>>> concept cannot mediate an action. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an >>>>>>>>> elegant way to demonstrate this. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I >>>>>>>>> really don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being >>>>>>>>> used to obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not >>>>>>>>> equal to separation. >>>>>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>>>>>> tradition >>>>>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>>>>>> contexts, >>>>>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>>>>>> legitimately, >>>>>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>>>>>> social >>>>>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>>>>>> activities >>>>>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the >>>>>>>>> topic >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>>>>>> mean what >>>>>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the >>>>>>>>> context >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>>>>>> "mediation" in >>>>>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>>>>>> communication or >>>>>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>>>>>> Artefacts, >>>>>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, >>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>>>>>> any one >>>>>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>>>>>> Concepts >>>>>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>>>>>> materiality, >>>>>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>>>>>> in mind >>>>>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>>>>>> aware >>>>>>>>> of that. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>>>>>> qualified >>>>>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>>>>>> would need >>>>>>>>> to include >>>>>>>>> reflexes) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>>>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>>>>>> newborns). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>>>>>> to stop >>>>>>>>> talking about >>>>>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>>>>>> adjectival >>>>>>>>> use implies there >>>>>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. >>>>>>>>> He >>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>> speaks of >>>>>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>>>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>>> is mediated (and >>>>>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>>>>>> it's >>>>>>>>> worth noting that >>>>>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>>>>>> action, but >>>>>>>>> rather a >>>>>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>>>>>> though >>>>>>>>> there seems to be >>>>>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>>>>>> assumption >>>>>>>>> entails. >>>>>>>>> David >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 14:21:15 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 15:21:15 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102225ABC@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102225ABC@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <94F2BEBC-A3E9-4109-B4C2-B34F0F2C8D15@gmail.com> Vygotsky says you don't really know your first language until we learn a second. And how does Theory of Mind figure? On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:52 PM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > But the culture each of us is within is not the same culture, surely, that anyone else is within. Culture is not an artefact in the sense that Andy talks about artefact -mediated communication so there is always space for noticing how others notice differently. Babies can pick up on the difference between interaction with a familiar and an unfamiliar partner, children form friendship groups which are defined by those they exclude as well as those they include and we travel to learn about ourselves and others by noticing how people do things differently in other places and other times. I would argue that it is only BY noticing differences in the ways others notice or pay attention to things that we are able to notice how WE notice things. It is by realising that we are not quite like other people that we can realise what we are like. > > And I apologise if I have completely misunderstood the point you were making, Michael! > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Glassman, Michael > Sent: 16 September 2014 21:21 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > Okay, here is a thought experiment. You are a character in a novel, let's say it is War and Peace. You have decided to critique the way in which Napoleon is presented in the novel. Yet the only information you have to make the critique is from your experiences in the novel. Everything fits together based on the way the narrative is set out. It is not that you no information on Napoleon outside the novel, it is that you do not realize that there is even the possibility that there might be information outside of the novel. You critique from within but the ability to critique is actually controlled by Tolstoy, who has his own reasons for portraying all the characters in the way he does. But you do not even realize there is a Tolstoy, this is simply the world that has been set up for you - as Huw suggests the purpose of the system is the system. Is there really any chance for a true critique or is the game rigged, are you always going to wind up in some place that we already determined by the novel itself. > > Now let's say you can as a character you can step outside the novel, realize it is a novel, understand that this is a system that Tolstoy has created for his own purposes (writers have been experimenting with this idea for generations). Isn't that a qualitatively different critique from within, and isn't this the only critique that allows you to escape your life as a character in the novel. > > If this makes no sense I apologize. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:30 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > We critique it from within. All the time. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> But then Martin are you saying we can't critique our culture. Or if we could what would be the process. I guess all this comes from a conversation I was having this morning - what are the aims of education? >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer >> [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:14 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >> >> How could we step out of culture, Michael, if it sustains human life? Surely culture is pervasive: no human being lives outside culture. Created to a purpose? Not sure what you mean by that. >> >> Martin >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:02 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >>> But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we don't believe we can step outside of it? >>> >>> Michael >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on >>> behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >>> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >>> >>> Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault along one of the roads not taken... >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>> >>>> The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. >>>> >>>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John >>>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>> >>>>> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>> President >>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>> >>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John >>>>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>> President >>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>> >>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>>> Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 >>>>>> 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture >>>>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] >>>>>> Re: mediate perception and direct perception
On >>>>>> 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations >>>>>>> you are referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities >>>>>>> and understandings, which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's >>>>>>> will. I would agree that culture enframes them in a variety of >>>>>>> ways. However, do they not, as sensations, tie us down to the >>>>>>> material world irrespective of the mediated ways we encounter them? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. >>>>>> Please explain. >>>>>> >>>>>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some >>>>>> of our suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am >>>>>> sure I wasn't the only who could imagine how lovely it would be to >>>>>> have a shower (or bath or wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>>> President >>>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>>> >>>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>>>> Macdonald < carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 >>>>>>> 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, >>>>>>> Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>>>>> mediate perception and direct perception
Hi >>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but >>>>>>> at the same time purports to account for "everything". But are >>>>>>> there really only universal artefacts? There must be at least the >>>>>>> possibility of >>>>>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>>>>>> - as yet potential understanding >>>>>>> - a total lack of understanding. >>>>>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - >>>>>>> so if we are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. >>>>>>> We need to take in fluid, but everything apart from water also >>>>>>> seems to be mediated. (And of course we serve water in culturally >>>>>>> mediated ways.) I am sure I have too simplistic a view which >>>>>>> misunderstands your schema Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ah! I see! >>>>>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in >>>>>>>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally >>>>>>>> contain both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem >>>>>>>> with anyone saying that anything is mediated by anything else, >>>>>>>> where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions >>>>>>>> provides an especially productive unit of analysis for science >>>>>>>> is lost if >>>>>>> mediation >>>>>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with >>>>>>>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. >>>>>>>> Still, I would prefer that >>>>>>> if >>>>>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some >>>>>>>> expression other than "mediation." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do >>>>>>>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or >>>>>>>> thoughts) I have to >>>>>>> use >>>>>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a >>>>>>>> tool, a >>>>>>> word, >>>>>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, >>>>>>>> without exception, are products of the history and culture into >>>>>>>> which I was >>>>>>> born. I >>>>>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >>>>>>> So >>>>>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well >>>>>>>> as >>>>>>> personal. >>>>>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical >>>>>>>> form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So communication >>>>>>>> as much as miscommunication takes place through everyone >>>>>>>> interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I am >>>>>>>> using in my actions. How can they >>>>>>> do >>>>>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>> universal >>>>>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and >>>>>>>> historical analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>>>>>> Wonderful, >>>>>>>> eh? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>> -------- >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study >>>>>>>>> the history and production of the action. Under such >>>>>>>>> circumstances, >>>>>>> assertions >>>>>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become >>>>>>>>> more obviously false. If one has simplified, through >>>>>>>>> "clarity", the action >>>>>>> away >>>>>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a >>>>>>>>> concept cannot mediate an action. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an >>>>>>>>> elegant way to demonstrate this. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I >>>>>>>>> really don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being >>>>>>>>> used to obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not >>>>>>>>> equal to separation. >>>>>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>>>>>> tradition >>>>>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>>>>>> contexts, >>>>>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>>>>>> legitimately, >>>>>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>>>>>> social >>>>>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>>>>>> activities >>>>>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the >>>>>>>>> topic >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>>>>>> mean what >>>>>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the >>>>>>>>> context >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>>>>>> "mediation" in >>>>>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>>>>>> communication or >>>>>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>>>>>> Artefacts, >>>>>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, >>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>>>>>> any one >>>>>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>>>>>> Concepts >>>>>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>>>>>> materiality, >>>>>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>>>>>> in mind >>>>>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>>>>>> aware >>>>>>>>> of that. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>>>>>> qualified >>>>>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>>>>>> would need >>>>>>>>> to include >>>>>>>>> reflexes) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>>>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>>>>>> newborns). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>>>>>> to stop >>>>>>>>> talking about >>>>>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>>>>>> adjectival >>>>>>>>> use implies there >>>>>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. >>>>>>>>> He >>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>> speaks of >>>>>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>>>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>>> is mediated (and >>>>>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>>>>>> it's >>>>>>>>> worth noting that >>>>>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>>>>>> action, but >>>>>>>>> rather a >>>>>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>>>>>> though >>>>>>>>> there seems to be >>>>>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>>>>>> assumption >>>>>>>>> entails. >>>>>>>>> David >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 14:22:34 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 15:22:34 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <54220168-C81B-4AD3-A508-D9B46958A0C0@uniandes.edu.co> References: , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102225ABC@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <54220168-C81B-4AD3-A508-D9B46958A0C0@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <64716C3D-94B3-43FB-8246-6A1573F8FA36@gmail.com> Or the collaborative projects we engage in? On Sep 16, 2014, at 3:13 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Surely culture is the way we live *together*, Rod. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 3:52 PM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > >> But the culture each of us is within is not the same culture, surely, that anyone else is within. Culture is not an artefact in the sense that Andy talks about artefact -mediated communication so there is always space for noticing how others notice differently. Babies can pick up on the difference between interaction with a familiar and an unfamiliar partner, children form friendship groups which are defined by those they exclude as well as those they include and we travel to learn about ourselves and others by noticing how people do things differently in other places and other times. I would argue that it is only BY noticing differences in the ways others notice or pay attention to things that we are able to notice how WE notice things. It is by realising that we are not quite like other people that we can realise what we are like. >> >> And I apologise if I have completely misunderstood the point you were making, Michael! >> >> Rod >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Glassman, Michael >> Sent: 16 September 2014 21:21 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >> >> Okay, here is a thought experiment. You are a character in a novel, let's say it is War and Peace. You have decided to critique the way in which Napoleon is presented in the novel. Yet the only information you have to make the critique is from your experiences in the novel. Everything fits together based on the way the narrative is set out. It is not that you no information on Napoleon outside the novel, it is that you do not realize that there is even the possibility that there might be information outside of the novel. You critique from within but the ability to critique is actually controlled by Tolstoy, who has his own reasons for portraying all the characters in the way he does. But you do not even realize there is a Tolstoy, this is simply the world that has been set up for you - as Huw suggests the purpose of the system is the system. Is there really any chance for a true critique or is the game rigged, are you always going to wind up in some place that we already determined by the novel itself. >> >> Now let's say you can as a character you can step outside the novel, realize it is a novel, understand that this is a system that Tolstoy has created for his own purposes (writers have been experimenting with this idea for generations). Isn't that a qualitatively different critique from within, and isn't this the only critique that allows you to escape your life as a character in the novel. >> >> If this makes no sense I apologize. >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:30 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >> >> We critique it from within. All the time. >> >> Martin >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >>> But then Martin are you saying we can't critique our culture. Or if we could what would be the process. I guess all this comes from a conversation I was having this morning - what are the aims of education? >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer >>> [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >>> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:14 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >>> >>> How could we step out of culture, Michael, if it sustains human life? Surely culture is pervasive: no human being lives outside culture. Created to a purpose? Not sure what you mean by that. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:02 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>> >>>> But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we don't believe we can step outside of it? >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on >>>> behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >>>> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >>>> >>>> Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault along one of the roads not taken... >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>> >>>>> The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>> President >>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>> >>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John >>>>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>> President >>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>> >>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John >>>>>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>>> President >>>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>>> >>>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>>>> Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 >>>>>>> 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture >>>>>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] >>>>>>> Re: mediate perception and direct perception
On >>>>>>> 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Carol, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations >>>>>>>> you are referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities >>>>>>>> and understandings, which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's >>>>>>>> will. I would agree that culture enframes them in a variety of >>>>>>>> ways. However, do they not, as sensations, tie us down to the >>>>>>>> material world irrespective of the mediated ways we encounter them? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. >>>>>>> Please explain. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some >>>>>>> of our suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am >>>>>>> sure I wasn't the only who could imagine how lovely it would be to >>>>>>> have a shower (or bath or wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>>>> President >>>>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>>>>> Macdonald < carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 >>>>>>>> 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>>>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, >>>>>>>> Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>>>>>> mediate perception and direct perception
Hi >>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but >>>>>>>> at the same time purports to account for "everything". But are >>>>>>>> there really only universal artefacts? There must be at least the >>>>>>>> possibility of >>>>>>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>>>>>>> - as yet potential understanding >>>>>>>> - a total lack of understanding. >>>>>>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - >>>>>>>> so if we are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. >>>>>>>> We need to take in fluid, but everything apart from water also >>>>>>>> seems to be mediated. (And of course we serve water in culturally >>>>>>>> mediated ways.) I am sure I have too simplistic a view which >>>>>>>> misunderstands your schema Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ah! I see! >>>>>>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in >>>>>>>>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally >>>>>>>>> contain both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem >>>>>>>>> with anyone saying that anything is mediated by anything else, >>>>>>>>> where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions >>>>>>>>> provides an especially productive unit of analysis for science >>>>>>>>> is lost if >>>>>>>> mediation >>>>>>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with >>>>>>>>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. >>>>>>>>> Still, I would prefer that >>>>>>>> if >>>>>>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some >>>>>>>>> expression other than "mediation." >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do >>>>>>>>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or >>>>>>>>> thoughts) I have to >>>>>>>> use >>>>>>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a >>>>>>>>> tool, a >>>>>>>> word, >>>>>>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, >>>>>>>>> without exception, are products of the history and culture into >>>>>>>>> which I was >>>>>>>> born. I >>>>>>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >>>>>>>> So >>>>>>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well >>>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>> personal. >>>>>>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical >>>>>>>>> form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So communication >>>>>>>>> as much as miscommunication takes place through everyone >>>>>>>>> interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I am >>>>>>>>> using in my actions. How can they >>>>>>>> do >>>>>>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> universal >>>>>>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and >>>>>>>>> historical analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>>>>>>> Wonderful, >>>>>>>>> eh? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>> -------- >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study >>>>>>>>>> the history and production of the action. Under such >>>>>>>>>> circumstances, >>>>>>>> assertions >>>>>>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become >>>>>>>>>> more obviously false. If one has simplified, through >>>>>>>>>> "clarity", the action >>>>>>>> away >>>>>>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a >>>>>>>>>> concept cannot mediate an action. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an >>>>>>>>>> elegant way to demonstrate this. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>>>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>>>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I >>>>>>>>>> really don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being >>>>>>>>>> used to obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not >>>>>>>>>> equal to separation. >>>>>>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>>>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>>>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>>>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>>>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>>>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>>>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>>>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>>>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>>>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>>>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>>>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>>>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>>>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>>>>>>> tradition >>>>>>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>>>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>>>>>>> contexts, >>>>>>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>>>>>>> legitimately, >>>>>>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>>>>>>> social >>>>>>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>>>>>>> activities >>>>>>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>>>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the >>>>>>>>>> topic >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>>>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>>>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>>>>>>> mean what >>>>>>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the >>>>>>>>>> context >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>>>>>>> "mediation" in >>>>>>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>>>>>>> communication or >>>>>>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>>>>>>> Artefacts, >>>>>>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, >>>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>>>>>>> any one >>>>>>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>>>>>>> Concepts >>>>>>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>>>>>>> materiality, >>>>>>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>>>>>>> in mind >>>>>>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>>>>>>> aware >>>>>>>>>> of that. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>>>>>>> qualified >>>>>>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>>>>>>> would need >>>>>>>>>> to include >>>>>>>>>> reflexes) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>>>>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>>>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>>>>>>> newborns). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>>>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>>>>>>> to stop >>>>>>>>>> talking about >>>>>>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>>>>>>> adjectival >>>>>>>>>> use implies there >>>>>>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. >>>>>>>>>> He >>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>> speaks of >>>>>>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>>>>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>>>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>>>> is mediated (and >>>>>>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>>>>>>> it's >>>>>>>>>> worth noting that >>>>>>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>>>>>>> action, but >>>>>>>>>> rather a >>>>>>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>>>>>>> though >>>>>>>>>> there seems to be >>>>>>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>>>>>>> assumption >>>>>>>>>> entails. >>>>>>>>>> David >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> ________________________________ >> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] >> >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. >> > > From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Tue Sep 16 14:22:17 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 21:22:17 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <000401cfd1f2$b27051f0$1750f5d0$@net> References: , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102225ABC@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <000401cfd1f2$b27051f0$1750f5d0$@net> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102225B08@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Do you think, John, that one aspect of the 'emotional glue' might be the relative easiness of familiarity? Communication with familiar people is easier because we are better able (with less effort) to anticipate how they are likely to react - less need for constant updating and interactional vigilance. Of course this brings risks as well as benefits - xenophobia and fear/distrust of anything 'other' but not all people end up equally difference averse and most of us enjoy a balance between enjoying the easy comfort of familiarity and also sometimes seeking the excitement of novelty - it is dangerous ground but it might even be suggested that children tend to cast parents (and other caregivers) in different roles to support these different needs or wants. Habituation could be seen as a limitation of the brain - tuning out what remains the same and focusing on what changes but this has clear evolutionary advantages too! Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of John Cummins Sent: 16 September 2014 22:11 To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Hi Rod, I agree with what you say but there may be limitations to this happy state of learning about ourselves and others, and if so it would be relevant to educators to explore what these limitations might be. I agree that one might not expect there to be a class of limitations to learning over and above the physical limitations of the brain and the information available to it, especially as the brain is highly plastic physically, and we have great capacity to learn, but even so I suggest there may be additional types or classes of limitation. The most obvious place to begin looking would be in the possible desirability for a world view to have a degree of stability. It is hard work having to update, especially at a basic level. But I think the problem may be even more basic. As I suggested earlier, there may be a sort of emotional glue that holds things together. It makes it difficult for us to update; it means that on occasions we defend our world view with some aggression , and it is responsible for as degree of self deception or self delusion. From an evolutionary perspective, if this is true ( and of course it is just speculation at the moment), then because it is an obvious limitation on intelligent learning it must be part of a larger balance of adaptive costs and benefits. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rod Parker-Rees Sent: 16 September 2014 21:53 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception But the culture each of us is within is not the same culture, surely, that anyone else is within. Culture is not an artefact in the sense that Andy talks about artefact -mediated communication so there is always space for noticing how others notice differently. Babies can pick up on the difference between interaction with a familiar and an unfamiliar partner, children form friendship groups which are defined by those they exclude as well as those they include and we travel to learn about ourselves and others by noticing how people do things differently in other places and other times. I would argue that it is only BY noticing differences in the ways others notice or pay attention to things that we are able to notice how WE notice things. It is by realising that we are not quite like other people that we can realise what we are like. And I apologise if I have completely misunderstood the point you were making, Michael! Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Glassman, Michael Sent: 16 September 2014 21:21 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Okay, here is a thought experiment. You are a character in a novel, let's say it is War and Peace. You have decided to critique the way in which Napoleon is presented in the novel. Yet the only information you have to make the critique is from your experiences in the novel. Everything fits together based on the way the narrative is set out. It is not that you no information on Napoleon outside the novel, it is that you do not realize that there is even the possibility that there might be information outside of the novel. You critique from within but the ability to critique is actually controlled by Tolstoy, who has his own reasons for portraying all the characters in the way he does. But you do not even realize there is a Tolstoy, this is simply the world that has been set up for you - as Huw suggests the purpose of the system is the system. Is there really any chance for a true critique or is the game rigged, are you always going to wind up in some place that we already dete rmined by the novel itself. Now let's say you can as a character you can step outside the novel, realize it is a novel, understand that this is a system that Tolstoy has created for his own purposes (writers have been experimenting with this idea for generations). Isn't that a qualitatively different critique from within, and isn't this the only critique that allows you to escape your life as a character in the novel. If this makes no sense I apologize. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:30 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception We critique it from within. All the time. Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > But then Martin are you saying we can't critique our culture. Or if > we could what would be the process. I guess all this comes from a conversation I was having this morning - what are the aims of education? > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer > [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:14 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > How could we step out of culture, Michael, if it sustains human life? Surely culture is pervasive: no human being lives outside culture. Created to a purpose? Not sure what you mean by that. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:02 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the >> primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we don't believe we can step outside of it? >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on >> behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >> >> Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault along one of the roads not taken... >> >> Martin >> >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >>> The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded >>> to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. >>> >>> >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>> President >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>> www.mocombeian.com >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>> >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John >>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>> >>>> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence >>>> kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. >>>> >>>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John >>>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 >>>> PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>> >>>>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. >>>>> That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>> President >>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>> >>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>> Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 >>>>> 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture >>>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] >>>>> Re: mediate perception and direct perception
On >>>>> 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Carol, >>>>>> >>>>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations >>>>>> you are referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities >>>>>> and understandings, which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's >>>>>> will. I would agree that culture enframes them in a variety of >>>>>> ways. However, do they not, as sensations, tie us down to the >>>>>> material world irrespective of the mediated ways we encounter them? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. >>>>> Please explain. >>>>> >>>>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some >>>>> of our suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am >>>>> sure I wasn't the only who could imagine how lovely it would be to >>>>> have a shower (or bath or wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Carol >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>> President >>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>> >>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>>> Macdonald < carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 >>>>>> 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, >>>>>> Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>>>> mediate perception and direct perception
Hi >>>>>> Andy, >>>>>> >>>>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but >>>>>> at the same time purports to account for "everything". But are >>>>>> there really only universal artefacts? There must be at least the >>>>>> possibility of >>>>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>>>>> - as yet potential understanding >>>>>> - a total lack of understanding. >>>>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - >>>>>> so if we are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. >>>>>> We need to take in fluid, but everything apart from water also >>>>>> seems to be mediated. (And of course we serve water in culturally >>>>>> mediated ways.) I am sure I have too simplistic a view which >>>>>> misunderstands your schema Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Ah! I see! >>>>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in >>>>>>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally >>>>>>> contain both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem >>>>>>> with anyone saying that anything is mediated by anything else, >>>>>>> where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>>>>> the >>>>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions >>>>>>> provides an especially productive unit of analysis for science >>>>>>> is lost if >>>>>> mediation >>>>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with >>>>>>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. >>>>>>> Still, I would prefer that >>>>>> if >>>>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some >>>>>>> expression other than "mediation." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do >>>>>>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or >>>>>>> thoughts) I have to >>>>>> use >>>>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a >>>>>>> tool, a >>>>>> word, >>>>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, >>>>>>> without exception, are products of the history and culture into >>>>>>> which I was >>>>>> born. I >>>>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history >>>>>>> produce them. >>>>>> So >>>>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well >>>>>>> as >>>>>> personal. >>>>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical >>>>>>> form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So communication >>>>>>> as much as miscommunication takes place through everyone >>>>>>> interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I am >>>>>>> using in my actions. How can they >>>>>> do >>>>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set >>>>>>> of >>>>>> universal >>>>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and >>>>>>> historical analysis which is as objective as any branch of >>>>>>> natural science. >>>>>> Wonderful, >>>>>>> eh? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>> -------- >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study >>>>>>>> the history and production of the action. Under such >>>>>>>> circumstances, >>>>>> assertions >>>>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become >>>>>>>> more obviously false. If one has simplified, through >>>>>>>> "clarity", the action >>>>>> away >>>>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a >>>>>>>> concept cannot mediate an action. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an >>>>>>>> elegant way to demonstrate this. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I >>>>>>>> really don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being >>>>>>>> used to obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not >>>>>>>> equal to separation. >>>>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>>>>> tradition >>>>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>>>>> contexts, >>>>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>>>>> legitimately, >>>>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>>>>> social >>>>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>>>>> activities >>>>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the >>>>>>>> topic >>>>>> is >>>>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>>>>> mean what >>>>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the >>>>>>>> context >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>>>>> "mediation" in >>>>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>>>>> that a >>>>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>>>>> communication or >>>>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>>>>> Artefacts, >>>>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, >>>>>>>> can >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>>>>> any one >>>>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>>>>> Concepts >>>>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>>>>> materiality, >>>>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>>>>> in mind >>>>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>>>>> aware >>>>>>>> of that. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>>>>> qualified >>>>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>>>>> would need >>>>>>>> to include >>>>>>>> reflexes) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>>>>> newborns). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>>>>> to stop >>>>>>>> talking about >>>>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>>>>> adjectival >>>>>>>> use implies there >>>>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. >>>>>>>> He >>>>>> now >>>>>>>> speaks of >>>>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>> is mediated (and >>>>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>>>>> it's >>>>>>>> worth noting that >>>>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>>>>> action, but >>>>>>>> rather a >>>>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>>>>> though >>>>>>>> there seems to be >>>>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>>>>> assumption >>>>>>>> entails. >>>>>>>> David >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Tue Sep 16 14:24:47 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 21:24:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <54220168-C81B-4AD3-A508-D9B46958A0C0@uniandes.edu.co> References: , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102225ABC@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <54220168-C81B-4AD3-A508-D9B46958A0C0@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102225B1D@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Yes, but a 'way' is not a thing. I don't think you would ever be able to find two people who could agree on ALL the details of the way they live together. If they did they would have no reason to communicate! Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: 16 September 2014 22:14 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Surely culture is the way we live *together*, Rod. Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 3:52 PM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > But the culture each of us is within is not the same culture, surely, that anyone else is within. Culture is not an artefact in the sense that Andy talks about artefact -mediated communication so there is always space for noticing how others notice differently. Babies can pick up on the difference between interaction with a familiar and an unfamiliar partner, children form friendship groups which are defined by those they exclude as well as those they include and we travel to learn about ourselves and others by noticing how people do things differently in other places and other times. I would argue that it is only BY noticing differences in the ways others notice or pay attention to things that we are able to notice how WE notice things. It is by realising that we are not quite like other people that we can realise what we are like. > > And I apologise if I have completely misunderstood the point you were making, Michael! > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Glassman, > Michael > Sent: 16 September 2014 21:21 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > Okay, here is a thought experiment. You are a character in a novel, let's say it is War and Peace. You have decided to critique the way in which Napoleon is presented in the novel. Yet the only information you have to make the critique is from your experiences in the novel. Everything fits together based on the way the narrative is set out. It is not that you no information on Napoleon outside the novel, it is that you do not realize that there is even the possibility that there might be information outside of the novel. You critique from within but the ability to critique is actually controlled by Tolstoy, who has his own reasons for portraying all the characters in the way he does. But you do not even realize there is a Tolstoy, this is simply the world that has been set up for you - as Huw suggests the purpose of the system is the system. Is there really any chance for a true critique or is the game rigged, are you always going to wind up in some place that we already determined by the novel itself. > > Now let's say you can as a character you can step outside the novel, realize it is a novel, understand that this is a system that Tolstoy has created for his own purposes (writers have been experimenting with this idea for generations). Isn't that a qualitatively different critique from within, and isn't this the only critique that allows you to escape your life as a character in the novel. > > If this makes no sense I apologize. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer > [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:30 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > We critique it from within. All the time. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> But then Martin are you saying we can't critique our culture. Or if we could what would be the process. I guess all this comes from a conversation I was having this morning - what are the aims of education? >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer >> [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:14 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >> >> How could we step out of culture, Michael, if it sustains human life? Surely culture is pervasive: no human being lives outside culture. Created to a purpose? Not sure what you mean by that. >> >> Martin >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:02 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >>> But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we don't believe we can step outside of it? >>> >>> Michael >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on >>> behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >>> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >>> >>> Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault along one of the roads not taken... >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>> >>>> The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. >>>> >>>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John >>>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>> >>>>> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>> President >>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>> >>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin >>>>> John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>> President >>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>> >>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>>> Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 >>>>>> 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture >>>>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] >>>>>> Re: mediate perception and direct perception
On >>>>>> 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations >>>>>>> you are referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities >>>>>>> and understandings, which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's >>>>>>> will. I would agree that culture enframes them in a variety of >>>>>>> ways. However, do they not, as sensations, tie us down to the >>>>>>> material world irrespective of the mediated ways we encounter them? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. >>>>>> Please explain. >>>>>> >>>>>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today >>>>>> some of our suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. >>>>>> I am sure I wasn't the only who could imagine how lovely it would >>>>>> be to have a shower (or bath or wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>>> President >>>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>>> >>>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>>>> Macdonald < carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 >>>>>>> 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, >>>>>>> Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>>>>> mediate perception and direct perception
Hi >>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but >>>>>>> at the same time purports to account for "everything". But are >>>>>>> there really only universal artefacts? There must be at least >>>>>>> the possibility of >>>>>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>>>>>> - as yet potential understanding >>>>>>> - a total lack of understanding. >>>>>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation >>>>>>> - so if we are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. >>>>>>> We need to take in fluid, but everything apart from water also >>>>>>> seems to be mediated. (And of course we serve water in >>>>>>> culturally mediated ways.) I am sure I have too simplistic a >>>>>>> view which misunderstands your schema Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ah! I see! >>>>>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in >>>>>>>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally >>>>>>>> contain both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem >>>>>>>> with anyone saying that anything is mediated by anything else, >>>>>>>> where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of >>>>>>>> actions provides an especially productive unit of analysis for >>>>>>>> science is lost if >>>>>>> mediation >>>>>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with >>>>>>>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. >>>>>>>> Still, I would prefer that >>>>>>> if >>>>>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some >>>>>>>> expression other than "mediation." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do >>>>>>>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or >>>>>>>> thoughts) I have to >>>>>>> use >>>>>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a >>>>>>>> tool, a >>>>>>> word, >>>>>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, >>>>>>>> without exception, are products of the history and culture into >>>>>>>> which I was >>>>>>> born. I >>>>>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >>>>>>> So >>>>>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well >>>>>>>> as >>>>>>> personal. >>>>>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical >>>>>>>> form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So >>>>>>>> communication as much as miscommunication takes place through >>>>>>>> everyone interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, >>>>>>>> that I am using in my actions. How can they >>>>>>> do >>>>>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>> universal >>>>>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and >>>>>>>> historical analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>>>>>> Wonderful, >>>>>>>> eh? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>> -------- >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study >>>>>>>>> the history and production of the action. Under such >>>>>>>>> circumstances, >>>>>>> assertions >>>>>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions >>>>>>>>> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, through >>>>>>>>> "clarity", the action >>>>>>> away >>>>>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that >>>>>>>>> a concept cannot mediate an action. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an >>>>>>>>> elegant way to demonstrate this. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I >>>>>>>>> really don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally >>>>>>>>> being used to obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is >>>>>>>>> not equal to separation. >>>>>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>>>>>> tradition >>>>>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>>>>>> contexts, >>>>>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>>>>>> legitimately, >>>>>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>>>>>> social >>>>>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>>>>>> activities >>>>>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the >>>>>>>>> topic >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>>>>>> mean what >>>>>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the >>>>>>>>> context >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>>>>>> "mediation" in >>>>>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>>>>>> communication or >>>>>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>>>>>> Artefacts, >>>>>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, >>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>>>>>> any one >>>>>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>>>>>> Concepts >>>>>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>>>>>> materiality, >>>>>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>>>>>> in mind >>>>>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>>>>>> aware >>>>>>>>> of that. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>>>>>> qualified >>>>>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>>>>>> would need >>>>>>>>> to include >>>>>>>>> reflexes) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>>>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>>>>>> newborns). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>>>>>> to stop >>>>>>>>> talking about >>>>>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>>>>>> adjectival >>>>>>>>> use implies there >>>>>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. >>>>>>>>> He >>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>> speaks of >>>>>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>>>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>>> is mediated (and >>>>>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>>>>>> it's >>>>>>>>> worth noting that >>>>>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>>>>>> action, but >>>>>>>>> rather a >>>>>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>>>>>> though >>>>>>>>> there seems to be >>>>>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>>>>>> assumption >>>>>>>>> entails. >>>>>>>>> David >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] h.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Tue Sep 16 14:31:49 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 21:31:49 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <94F2BEBC-A3E9-4109-B4C2-B34F0F2C8D15@gmail.com> References: , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102225ABC@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <94F2BEBC-A3E9-4109-B4C2-B34F0F2C8D15@gmail.com> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102225B36@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> But is explicit, declarative knowledge (observing from outside) really a more real kind of knowing than transparent fluency? Not noticing your language is rather different, isn't it, from not knowing it? In the same way that experts often don't 'know' how they do what they do expertly (indeed their expertise may depend on the fact that their knowing has 'gone under the limen' so is not hamstrung by the need to make it convincing). I suspect that Theory of Mind is a gross oversimplification - as many sensible people have pointed out, we don't know minds, we know persons and persons in contexts at that! Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Henry G. Shonerd III Sent: 16 September 2014 22:21 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Vygotsky says you don't really know your first language until we learn a second. And how does Theory of Mind figure? On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:52 PM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > But the culture each of us is within is not the same culture, surely, that anyone else is within. Culture is not an artefact in the sense that Andy talks about artefact -mediated communication so there is always space for noticing how others notice differently. Babies can pick up on the difference between interaction with a familiar and an unfamiliar partner, children form friendship groups which are defined by those they exclude as well as those they include and we travel to learn about ourselves and others by noticing how people do things differently in other places and other times. I would argue that it is only BY noticing differences in the ways others notice or pay attention to things that we are able to notice how WE notice things. It is by realising that we are not quite like other people that we can realise what we are like. > > And I apologise if I have completely misunderstood the point you were making, Michael! > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Glassman, > Michael > Sent: 16 September 2014 21:21 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > Okay, here is a thought experiment. You are a character in a novel, let's say it is War and Peace. You have decided to critique the way in which Napoleon is presented in the novel. Yet the only information you have to make the critique is from your experiences in the novel. Everything fits together based on the way the narrative is set out. It is not that you no information on Napoleon outside the novel, it is that you do not realize that there is even the possibility that there might be information outside of the novel. You critique from within but the ability to critique is actually controlled by Tolstoy, who has his own reasons for portraying all the characters in the way he does. But you do not even realize there is a Tolstoy, this is simply the world that has been set up for you - as Huw suggests the purpose of the system is the system. Is there really any chance for a true critique or is the game rigged, are you always going to wind up in some place that we already determined by the novel itself. > > Now let's say you can as a character you can step outside the novel, realize it is a novel, understand that this is a system that Tolstoy has created for his own purposes (writers have been experimenting with this idea for generations). Isn't that a qualitatively different critique from within, and isn't this the only critique that allows you to escape your life as a character in the novel. > > If this makes no sense I apologize. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer > [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:30 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > We critique it from within. All the time. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> But then Martin are you saying we can't critique our culture. Or if we could what would be the process. I guess all this comes from a conversation I was having this morning - what are the aims of education? >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer >> [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:14 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >> >> How could we step out of culture, Michael, if it sustains human life? Surely culture is pervasive: no human being lives outside culture. Created to a purpose? Not sure what you mean by that. >> >> Martin >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:02 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >>> But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we don't believe we can step outside of it? >>> >>> Michael >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on >>> behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >>> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >>> >>> Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault along one of the roads not taken... >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>> >>>> The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. >>>> >>>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John >>>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>> >>>>> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>> President >>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>> >>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin >>>>> John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>> President >>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>> >>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>>> Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 >>>>>> 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture >>>>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] >>>>>> Re: mediate perception and direct perception
On >>>>>> 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations >>>>>>> you are referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities >>>>>>> and understandings, which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's >>>>>>> will. I would agree that culture enframes them in a variety of >>>>>>> ways. However, do they not, as sensations, tie us down to the >>>>>>> material world irrespective of the mediated ways we encounter them? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. >>>>>> Please explain. >>>>>> >>>>>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today >>>>>> some of our suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. >>>>>> I am sure I wasn't the only who could imagine how lovely it would >>>>>> be to have a shower (or bath or wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>>> President >>>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>>> >>>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>>>> Macdonald < carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 >>>>>>> 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, >>>>>>> Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>>>>> mediate perception and direct perception
Hi >>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but >>>>>>> at the same time purports to account for "everything". But are >>>>>>> there really only universal artefacts? There must be at least >>>>>>> the possibility of >>>>>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>>>>>> - as yet potential understanding >>>>>>> - a total lack of understanding. >>>>>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation >>>>>>> - so if we are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. >>>>>>> We need to take in fluid, but everything apart from water also >>>>>>> seems to be mediated. (And of course we serve water in >>>>>>> culturally mediated ways.) I am sure I have too simplistic a >>>>>>> view which misunderstands your schema Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ah! I see! >>>>>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in >>>>>>>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally >>>>>>>> contain both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem >>>>>>>> with anyone saying that anything is mediated by anything else, >>>>>>>> where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of >>>>>>>> actions provides an especially productive unit of analysis for >>>>>>>> science is lost if >>>>>>> mediation >>>>>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with >>>>>>>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. >>>>>>>> Still, I would prefer that >>>>>>> if >>>>>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some >>>>>>>> expression other than "mediation." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do >>>>>>>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or >>>>>>>> thoughts) I have to >>>>>>> use >>>>>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a >>>>>>>> tool, a >>>>>>> word, >>>>>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, >>>>>>>> without exception, are products of the history and culture into >>>>>>>> which I was >>>>>>> born. I >>>>>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >>>>>>> So >>>>>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well >>>>>>>> as >>>>>>> personal. >>>>>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical >>>>>>>> form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So >>>>>>>> communication as much as miscommunication takes place through >>>>>>>> everyone interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, >>>>>>>> that I am using in my actions. How can they >>>>>>> do >>>>>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>> universal >>>>>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and >>>>>>>> historical analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>>>>>> Wonderful, >>>>>>>> eh? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>> -------- >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study >>>>>>>>> the history and production of the action. Under such >>>>>>>>> circumstances, >>>>>>> assertions >>>>>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions >>>>>>>>> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, through >>>>>>>>> "clarity", the action >>>>>>> away >>>>>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that >>>>>>>>> a concept cannot mediate an action. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an >>>>>>>>> elegant way to demonstrate this. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I >>>>>>>>> really don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally >>>>>>>>> being used to obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is >>>>>>>>> not equal to separation. >>>>>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>>>>>> tradition >>>>>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>>>>>> contexts, >>>>>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>>>>>> legitimately, >>>>>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>>>>>> social >>>>>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>>>>>> activities >>>>>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the >>>>>>>>> topic >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>>>>>> mean what >>>>>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the >>>>>>>>> context >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>>>>>> "mediation" in >>>>>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>>>>>> communication or >>>>>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>>>>>> Artefacts, >>>>>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, >>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>>>>>> any one >>>>>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>>>>>> Concepts >>>>>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>>>>>> materiality, >>>>>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>>>>>> in mind >>>>>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>>>>>> aware >>>>>>>>> of that. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>>>>>> qualified >>>>>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>>>>>> would need >>>>>>>>> to include >>>>>>>>> reflexes) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>>>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>>>>>> newborns). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>>>>>> to stop >>>>>>>>> talking about >>>>>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>>>>>> adjectival >>>>>>>>> use implies there >>>>>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. >>>>>>>>> He >>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>> speaks of >>>>>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>>>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>>> is mediated (and >>>>>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>>>>>> it's >>>>>>>>> worth noting that >>>>>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>>>>>> action, but >>>>>>>>> rather a >>>>>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>>>>>> though >>>>>>>>> there seems to be >>>>>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>>>>>> assumption >>>>>>>>> entails. >>>>>>>>> David >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] h.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. 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From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 14:33:30 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 15:33:30 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <54220168-C81B-4AD3-A508-D9B46958A0C0@uniandes.edu.co> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102225ABC@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <54220168-C81B-4AD3-A508-D9B46958A0C0@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Martin, What about ethnocentrism? Isn't that a critique of a culture "from without"? (by that I don't mean a critique from nowhere, but rather I mean a critique from somewhere else). -greg On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 3:13 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Surely culture is the way we live *together*, Rod. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 3:52 PM, Rod Parker-Rees > wrote: > > > But the culture each of us is within is not the same culture, surely, > that anyone else is within. Culture is not an artefact in the sense that > Andy talks about artefact -mediated communication so there is always space > for noticing how others notice differently. Babies can pick up on the > difference between interaction with a familiar and an unfamiliar partner, > children form friendship groups which are defined by those they exclude as > well as those they include and we travel to learn about ourselves and > others by noticing how people do things differently in other places and > other times. I would argue that it is only BY noticing differences in the > ways others notice or pay attention to things that we are able to notice > how WE notice things. It is by realising that we are not quite like other > people that we can realise what we are like. > > > > And I apologise if I have completely misunderstood the point you were > making, Michael! > > > > Rod > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Glassman, Michael > > Sent: 16 September 2014 21:21 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > > > Okay, here is a thought experiment. You are a character in a novel, > let's say it is War and Peace. You have decided to critique the way in > which Napoleon is presented in the novel. Yet the only information you > have to make the critique is from your experiences in the novel. > Everything fits together based on the way the narrative is set out. It is > not that you no information on Napoleon outside the novel, it is that you > do not realize that there is even the possibility that there might be > information outside of the novel. You critique from within but the ability > to critique is actually controlled by Tolstoy, who has his own reasons for > portraying all the characters in the way he does. But you do not even > realize there is a Tolstoy, this is simply the world that has been set up > for you - as Huw suggests the purpose of the system is the system. Is > there really any chance for a true critique or is the game rigged, are you > always going to wind up in some place that we already determined by the > novel itself. > > > > Now let's say you can as a character you can step outside the novel, > realize it is a novel, understand that this is a system that Tolstoy has > created for his own purposes (writers have been experimenting with this > idea for generations). Isn't that a qualitatively different critique from > within, and isn't this the only critique that allows you to escape your > life as a character in the novel. > > > > If this makes no sense I apologize. > > > > Michael > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:30 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > > > We critique it from within. All the time. > > > > Martin > > > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > > >> But then Martin are you saying we can't critique our culture. Or if we > could what would be the process. I guess all this comes from a > conversation I was having this morning - what are the aims of education? > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer > >> [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > >> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:14 PM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > >> > >> How could we step out of culture, Michael, if it sustains human life? > Surely culture is pervasive: no human being lives outside culture. Created > to a purpose? Not sure what you mean by that. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:02 PM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > >> > >>> But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the > primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to > acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but > something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we > don't believe we can step outside of it? > >>> > >>> Michael > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>> [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on > >>> behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > >>> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > >>> > >>> Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to > live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault > along one of the roads not taken... > >>> > >>> Martin > >>> > >>> > >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > >>> > >>>> The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded > to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the > mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its > another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > >>>> President > >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > >>>> www.mocombeian.com > >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info > >>>> > >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John > >>>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 > PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate > perception and direct perception
Okay, Paul, but if we > start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but > are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different > conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which > culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we > cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the > tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, > fabricated, and shown us how to use. > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence > kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to > the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is > different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the > former but never access the object in itself. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > >>>>> President > >>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > >>>>> www.mocombeian.com > >>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > >>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info > >>>>> > >>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John > >>>>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 > PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate > perception and direct perception
Did Kant say that our > bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's > statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental > representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of > sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value > of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to > dominate the social sciences today. > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin > >>>>> > >>>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That > is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it > and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate > an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about > reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a > state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the > material world that is not mediated by culture? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > >>>>>> President > >>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > >>>>>> www.mocombeian.com > >>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > >>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info > >>>>>> > >>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol > >>>>>> Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 > >>>>>> 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture > >>>>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] > >>>>>> Re: mediate perception and direct perception
On > >>>>>> 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > >>>>>> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Carol, > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations > >>>>>>> you are referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities > >>>>>>> and understandings, which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's > >>>>>>> will. I would agree that culture enframes them in a variety of > >>>>>>> ways. However, do they not, as sensations, tie us down to the > >>>>>>> material world irrespective of the mediated ways we encounter them? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. > >>>>>> Please explain. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some > >>>>>> of our suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am > >>>>>> sure I wasn't the only who could imagine how lovely it would be to > >>>>>> have a shower (or bath or wash, depending on your culture); and we > know what water tastes like. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Carol > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > >>>>>>> President > >>>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > >>>>>>> www.mocombeian.com > >>>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > >>>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol > >>>>>>> Macdonald < carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 > >>>>>>> 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) > >>>>>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, > >>>>>>> Culture, Activity"
Subject: > [Xmca-l] Re: > >>>>>>> mediate perception and direct perception
Hi > >>>>>>> Andy, > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but > >>>>>>> at the same time purports to account for "everything". But are > >>>>>>> there really only universal artefacts? There must be at least the > >>>>>>> possibility of > >>>>>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; > >>>>>>> - as yet potential understanding > >>>>>>> - a total lack of understanding. > >>>>>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - > >>>>>>> so if we are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. > >>>>>>> We need to take in fluid, but everything apart from water also > >>>>>>> seems to be mediated. (And of course we serve water in culturally > >>>>>>> mediated ways.) I am sure I have too simplistic a view which > >>>>>>> misunderstands your schema Andy, but I am trying to keep open > Shotter's concerns. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Carol > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Ah! I see! > >>>>>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in > >>>>>>>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally > >>>>>>>> contain both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem > >>>>>>>> with anyone saying that anything is mediated by anything else, > >>>>>>>> where it is appropriate. My problem is that > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions > >>>>>>>> provides an especially productive unit of analysis for science > >>>>>>>> is lost if > >>>>>>> mediation > >>>>>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with > >>>>>>>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. > >>>>>>>> Still, I would prefer that > >>>>>>> if > >>>>>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some > >>>>>>>> expression other than "mediation." > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do > >>>>>>>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or > >>>>>>>> thoughts) I have to > >>>>>>> use > >>>>>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a > >>>>>>>> tool, a > >>>>>>> word, > >>>>>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, > >>>>>>>> without exception, are products of the history and culture into > >>>>>>>> which I was > >>>>>>> born. I > >>>>>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce > them. > >>>>>>> So > >>>>>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well > >>>>>>>> as > >>>>>>> personal. > >>>>>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical > >>>>>>>> form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So communication > >>>>>>>> as much as miscommunication takes place through everyone > >>>>>>>> interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I am > >>>>>>>> using in my actions. How can they > >>>>>>> do > >>>>>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set > >>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>> universal > >>>>>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and > >>>>>>>> historical analysis which is as objective as any branch of > natural science. > >>>>>>> Wonderful, > >>>>>>>> eh? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------- > >>>>>>>> -------- > >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study > >>>>>>>>> the history and production of the action. Under such > >>>>>>>>> circumstances, > >>>>>>> assertions > >>>>>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become > >>>>>>>>> more obviously false. If one has simplified, through > >>>>>>>>> "clarity", the action > >>>>>>> away > >>>>>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a > >>>>>>>>> concept cannot mediate an action. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an > >>>>>>>>> elegant way to demonstrate this. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Best, > >>>>>>>>> Huw > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> he, he, Huw! > >>>>>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very > >>>>>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I > >>>>>>>>> really don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being > >>>>>>>>> used to obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not > >>>>>>>>> equal to separation. > >>>>>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and > >>>>>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? > >>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>>> ------------ > >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". > >>>>>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the > >>>>>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or > >>>>>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and > >>>>>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as > >>>>>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements > >>>>>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally > >>>>>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to > >>>>>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to > >>>>>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate > >>>>>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if > >>>>>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from > >>>>>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Best, > >>>>>>>>> Huw > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> >> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT > >>>>>>>>> tradition > >>>>>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in > general, > >>>>>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every > >>>>>>>>> action > >>>>>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive > >>>>>>>>> contexts, > >>>>>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite > >>>>>>>>> legitimately, > >>>>>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In > >>>>>>> social > >>>>>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other > >>>>>>>>> activities > >>>>>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by > >>>>>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the > >>>>>>>>> topic > >>>>>>> is > >>>>>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that > I > >>>>>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term > >>>>>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather > >>>>>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a > >>>>>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to > >>>>>>>>> mean what > >>>>>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the > >>>>>>>>> context > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of > >>>>>>>>> "mediation" in > >>>>>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact > >>>>>>> that a > >>>>>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of > >>>>>>>>> communication or > >>>>>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. > >>>>>>>>> Artefacts, > >>>>>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, > >>>>>>>>> can > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is > >>>>>>>>> that a > >>>>>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for > >>>>>>>>> any one > >>>>>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. > >>>>>>>>> Concepts > >>>>>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their > >>>>>>>>> materiality, > >>>>>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept > >>>>>>>>> in mind > >>>>>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is > >>>>>>>>> mediated > >>>>>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be > >>>>>>>>> aware > >>>>>>>>> of that. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in > >>>>>>>>> qualified > >>>>>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. > >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------ > >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we > >>>>>>>>> would need > >>>>>>>>> to include > >>>>>>>>> reflexes) > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in > >>>>>>>>> Bateson's man with > >>>>>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include > >>>>>>>>> newborns). > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Just wonderin'. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> -greg > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> >> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Thanks for replies. > >>>>>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided > >>>>>>>>> to stop > >>>>>>>>> talking about > >>>>>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of > >>>>>>>>> adjectival > >>>>>>>>> use implies there > >>>>>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. > >>>>>>>>> He > >>>>>>> now > >>>>>>>>> speaks of > >>>>>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of > >>>>>>>>> physical reflexes (and > >>>>>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human > >>>>>>>>> action > >>>>>>>>> is mediated (and > >>>>>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, > >>>>>>> it's > >>>>>>>>> worth noting that > >>>>>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of > >>>>>>>>> action, but > >>>>>>>>> rather a > >>>>>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; > >>>>>>> though > >>>>>>>>> there seems to be > >>>>>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that > >>>>>>>>> assumption > >>>>>>>>> entails. > >>>>>>>>> David > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: > >>>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > ________________________________ > > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely > for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 14:41:53 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 14:41:53 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <54220168-C81B-4AD3-A508-D9B46958A0C0@uniandes.edu.co> References: , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102225ABC@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <54220168-C81B-4AD3-A508-D9B46958A0C0@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <5418aeac.082e460a.123c.ffffaaec@mx.google.com> I read the term perspectives as the way we move focus and communicate Within Culture and effective history. For example Kant's transcendental ideas share a perspective with Descartes and Locke merleau ponty's EXCESS gestures to perspectives as radical empiricism via William James The pluralism of perspectives cannot escape culture which is gadamers insight. M-Ponty's perspective expresses another tradition which is cognitive as gestalt. It says analysis is a perspective not fundamental. Culture is together but poly not mono. Mono is the expression of certainty and fundamental assumptions as a perspective. Poly or plural assumptions do not transcend like transcendental ideas but they are shared cultural and historical. On a side bar: Foucault was merleau pontys student and therefore foulcault was expressing and extending the teachers perspective. Also butler was gadamers student. Multiple perspectives as expressed by Mead Larry -----Original Message----- From: "Martin John Packer" Sent: ?2014-?09-?16 2:16 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Surely culture is the way we live *together*, Rod. Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 3:52 PM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > But the culture each of us is within is not the same culture, surely, that anyone else is within. Culture is not an artefact in the sense that Andy talks about artefact -mediated communication so there is always space for noticing how others notice differently. Babies can pick up on the difference between interaction with a familiar and an unfamiliar partner, children form friendship groups which are defined by those they exclude as well as those they include and we travel to learn about ourselves and others by noticing how people do things differently in other places and other times. I would argue that it is only BY noticing differences in the ways others notice or pay attention to things that we are able to notice how WE notice things. It is by realising that we are not quite like other people that we can realise what we are like. > > And I apologise if I have completely misunderstood the point you were making, Michael! > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Glassman, Michael > Sent: 16 September 2014 21:21 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > Okay, here is a thought experiment. You are a character in a novel, let's say it is War and Peace. You have decided to critique the way in which Napoleon is presented in the novel. Yet the only information you have to make the critique is from your experiences in the novel. Everything fits together based on the way the narrative is set out. It is not that you no information on Napoleon outside the novel, it is that you do not realize that there is even the possibility that there might be information outside of the novel. You critique from within but the ability to critique is actually controlled by Tolstoy, who has his own reasons for portraying all the characters in the way he does. But you do not even realize there is a Tolstoy, this is simply the world that has been set up for you - as Huw suggests the purpose of the system is the system. Is there really any chance for a true critique or is the game rigged, are you always going to wind up in some place that we already determined by the novel itself. > > Now let's say you can as a character you can step outside the novel, realize it is a novel, understand that this is a system that Tolstoy has created for his own purposes (writers have been experimenting with this idea for generations). Isn't that a qualitatively different critique from within, and isn't this the only critique that allows you to escape your life as a character in the novel. > > If this makes no sense I apologize. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:30 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > We critique it from within. All the time. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> But then Martin are you saying we can't critique our culture. Or if we could what would be the process. I guess all this comes from a conversation I was having this morning - what are the aims of education? >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer >> [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:14 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >> >> How could we step out of culture, Michael, if it sustains human life? Surely culture is pervasive: no human being lives outside culture. Created to a purpose? Not sure what you mean by that. >> >> Martin >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:02 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >>> But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we don't believe we can step outside of it? >>> >>> Michael >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on >>> behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >>> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >>> >>> Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault along one of the roads not taken... >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>> >>>> The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. >>>> >>>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John >>>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>> >>>>> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>> President >>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>> >>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John >>>>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>> President >>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>> >>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>>> Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 >>>>>> 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture >>>>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] >>>>>> Re: mediate perception and direct perception
On >>>>>> 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations >>>>>>> you are referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities >>>>>>> and understandings, which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's >>>>>>> will. I would agree that culture enframes them in a variety of >>>>>>> ways. However, do they not, as sensations, tie us down to the >>>>>>> material world irrespective of the mediated ways we encounter them? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. >>>>>> Please explain. >>>>>> >>>>>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some >>>>>> of our suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am >>>>>> sure I wasn't the only who could imagine how lovely it would be to >>>>>> have a shower (or bath or wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>>> President >>>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>>> >>>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>>>> Macdonald < carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 >>>>>>> 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, >>>>>>> Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>>>>> mediate perception and direct perception
Hi >>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but >>>>>>> at the same time purports to account for "everything". But are >>>>>>> there really only universal artefacts? There must be at least the >>>>>>> possibility of >>>>>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>>>>>> - as yet potential understanding >>>>>>> - a total lack of understanding. >>>>>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - >>>>>>> so if we are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. >>>>>>> We need to take in fluid, but everything apart from water also >>>>>>> seems to be mediated. (And of course we serve water in culturally >>>>>>> mediated ways.) I am sure I have too simplistic a view which >>>>>>> misunderstands your schema Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ah! I see! >>>>>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in >>>>>>>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally >>>>>>>> contain both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem >>>>>>>> with anyone saying that anything is mediated by anything else, >>>>>>>> where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions >>>>>>>> provides an especially productive unit of analysis for science >>>>>>>> is lost if >>>>>>> mediation >>>>>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with >>>>>>>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. >>>>>>>> Still, I would prefer that >>>>>>> if >>>>>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some >>>>>>>> expression other than "mediation." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do >>>>>>>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or >>>>>>>> thoughts) I have to >>>>>>> use >>>>>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a >>>>>>>> tool, a >>>>>>> word, >>>>>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, >>>>>>>> without exception, are products of the history and culture into >>>>>>>> which I was >>>>>>> born. I >>>>>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >>>>>>> So >>>>>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well >>>>>>>> as >>>>>>> personal. >>>>>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical >>>>>>>> form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So communication >>>>>>>> as much as miscommunication takes place through everyone >>>>>>>> interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I am >>>>>>>> using in my actions. How can they >>>>>>> do >>>>>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>> universal >>>>>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and >>>>>>>> historical analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>>>>>> Wonderful, >>>>>>>> eh? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>> -------- >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study >>>>>>>>> the history and production of the action. Under such >>>>>>>>> circumstances, >>>>>>> assertions >>>>>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become >>>>>>>>> more obviously false. If one has simplified, through >>>>>>>>> "clarity", the action >>>>>>> away >>>>>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a >>>>>>>>> concept cannot mediate an action. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an >>>>>>>>> elegant way to demonstrate this. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I >>>>>>>>> really don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being >>>>>>>>> used to obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not >>>>>>>>> equal to separation. >>>>>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>>>>>> tradition >>>>>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>>>>>> contexts, >>>>>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>>>>>> legitimately, >>>>>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>>>>>> social >>>>>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>>>>>> activities >>>>>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the >>>>>>>>> topic >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>>>>>> mean what >>>>>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the >>>>>>>>> context >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>>>>>> "mediation" in >>>>>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>>>>>> communication or >>>>>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>>>>>> Artefacts, >>>>>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, >>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>>>>>> any one >>>>>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>>>>>> Concepts >>>>>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>>>>>> materiality, >>>>>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>>>>>> in mind >>>>>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>>>>>> aware >>>>>>>>> of that. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>>>>>> qualified >>>>>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>>>>>> w [The entire original message is not included.] From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Sep 16 14:48:48 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 21:48:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102225ABC@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <54220168-C81B-4AD3-A508-D9B46958A0C0@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <5C4C6226-FF0B-465C-954F-2C08935FD887@uniandes.edu.co> >From another culture? Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 4:33 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Martin, > What about ethnocentrism? Isn't that a critique of a culture "from > without"? (by that I don't mean a critique from nowhere, but rather I mean > a critique from somewhere else). > -greg > > > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 3:13 PM, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> Surely culture is the way we live *together*, Rod. >> >> Martin >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 3:52 PM, Rod Parker-Rees >> wrote: >> >>> But the culture each of us is within is not the same culture, surely, >> that anyone else is within. Culture is not an artefact in the sense that >> Andy talks about artefact -mediated communication so there is always space >> for noticing how others notice differently. Babies can pick up on the >> difference between interaction with a familiar and an unfamiliar partner, >> children form friendship groups which are defined by those they exclude as >> well as those they include and we travel to learn about ourselves and >> others by noticing how people do things differently in other places and >> other times. I would argue that it is only BY noticing differences in the >> ways others notice or pay attention to things that we are able to notice >> how WE notice things. It is by realising that we are not quite like other >> people that we can realise what we are like. >>> >>> And I apologise if I have completely misunderstood the point you were >> making, Michael! >>> >>> Rod >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Glassman, Michael >>> Sent: 16 September 2014 21:21 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >>> >>> Okay, here is a thought experiment. You are a character in a novel, >> let's say it is War and Peace. You have decided to critique the way in >> which Napoleon is presented in the novel. Yet the only information you >> have to make the critique is from your experiences in the novel. >> Everything fits together based on the way the narrative is set out. It is >> not that you no information on Napoleon outside the novel, it is that you >> do not realize that there is even the possibility that there might be >> information outside of the novel. You critique from within but the ability >> to critique is actually controlled by Tolstoy, who has his own reasons for >> portraying all the characters in the way he does. But you do not even >> realize there is a Tolstoy, this is simply the world that has been set up >> for you - as Huw suggests the purpose of the system is the system. Is >> there really any chance for a true critique or is the game rigged, are you >> always going to wind up in some place that we already determined by the >> novel itself. >>> >>> Now let's say you can as a character you can step outside the novel, >> realize it is a novel, understand that this is a system that Tolstoy has >> created for his own purposes (writers have been experimenting with this >> idea for generations). Isn't that a qualitatively different critique from >> within, and isn't this the only critique that allows you to escape your >> life as a character in the novel. >>> >>> If this makes no sense I apologize. >>> >>> Michael >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >>> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:30 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >>> >>> We critique it from within. All the time. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Glassman, Michael >> wrote: >>> >>>> But then Martin are you saying we can't critique our culture. Or if we >> could what would be the process. I guess all this comes from a >> conversation I was having this morning - what are the aims of education? >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer >>>> [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >>>> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:14 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >>>> >>>> How could we step out of culture, Michael, if it sustains human life? >> Surely culture is pervasive: no human being lives outside culture. Created >> to a purpose? Not sure what you mean by that. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:02 PM, Glassman, Michael >> wrote: >>>> >>>>> But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the >> primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to >> acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but >> something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we >> don't believe we can step outside of it? >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on >>>>> behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >>>>> >>>>> Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to >> live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault >> along one of the roads not taken... >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < >> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded >> to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the >> mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its >> another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>> President >>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>> >>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John >>>>>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 >> PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < >> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate >> perception and direct perception
Okay, Paul, but if we >> start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but >> are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different >> conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which >> culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we >> cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the >> tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, >> fabricated, and shown us how to use. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < >> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence >> kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to >> the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is >> different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the >> former but never access the object in itself. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>>> President >>>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>>> >>>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John >>>>>>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 >> PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < >> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate >> perception and direct perception
Did Kant say that our >> bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's >> statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental >> representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of >> sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value >> of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to >> dominate the social sciences today. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < >> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That >> is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it >> and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate >> an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about >> reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a >> state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the >> material world that is not mediated by culture? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>>>> President >>>>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>>>>> Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 >>>>>>>> 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture >>>>>>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] >>>>>>>> Re: mediate perception and direct perception
On >>>>>>>> 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Carol, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations >>>>>>>>> you are referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities >>>>>>>>> and understandings, which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's >>>>>>>>> will. I would agree that culture enframes them in a variety of >>>>>>>>> ways. However, do they not, as sensations, tie us down to the >>>>>>>>> material world irrespective of the mediated ways we encounter them? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. >>>>>>>> Please explain. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some >>>>>>>> of our suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am >>>>>>>> sure I wasn't the only who could imagine how lovely it would be to >>>>>>>> have a shower (or bath or wash, depending on your culture); and we >> know what water tastes like. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>>>>> President >>>>>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>>>>>> Macdonald < carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 >>>>>>>>> 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>>>>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, >>>>>>>>> Culture, Activity"
Subject: >> [Xmca-l] Re: >>>>>>>>> mediate perception and direct perception
Hi >>>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but >>>>>>>>> at the same time purports to account for "everything". But are >>>>>>>>> there really only universal artefacts? There must be at least the >>>>>>>>> possibility of >>>>>>>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>>>>>>>> - as yet potential understanding >>>>>>>>> - a total lack of understanding. >>>>>>>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - >>>>>>>>> so if we are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. >>>>>>>>> We need to take in fluid, but everything apart from water also >>>>>>>>> seems to be mediated. (And of course we serve water in culturally >>>>>>>>> mediated ways.) I am sure I have too simplistic a view which >>>>>>>>> misunderstands your schema Andy, but I am trying to keep open >> Shotter's concerns. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ah! I see! >>>>>>>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in >>>>>>>>>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally >>>>>>>>>> contain both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem >>>>>>>>>> with anyone saying that anything is mediated by anything else, >>>>>>>>>> where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions >>>>>>>>>> provides an especially productive unit of analysis for science >>>>>>>>>> is lost if >>>>>>>>> mediation >>>>>>>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with >>>>>>>>>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. >>>>>>>>>> Still, I would prefer that >>>>>>>>> if >>>>>>>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some >>>>>>>>>> expression other than "mediation." >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do >>>>>>>>>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or >>>>>>>>>> thoughts) I have to >>>>>>>>> use >>>>>>>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a >>>>>>>>>> tool, a >>>>>>>>> word, >>>>>>>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, >>>>>>>>>> without exception, are products of the history and culture into >>>>>>>>>> which I was >>>>>>>>> born. I >>>>>>>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce >> them. >>>>>>>>> So >>>>>>>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well >>>>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>> personal. >>>>>>>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical >>>>>>>>>> form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So communication >>>>>>>>>> as much as miscommunication takes place through everyone >>>>>>>>>> interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I am >>>>>>>>>> using in my actions. How can they >>>>>>>>> do >>>>>>>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> universal >>>>>>>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and >>>>>>>>>> historical analysis which is as objective as any branch of >> natural science. >>>>>>>>> Wonderful, >>>>>>>>>> eh? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>>> -------- >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study >>>>>>>>>>> the history and production of the action. Under such >>>>>>>>>>> circumstances, >>>>>>>>> assertions >>>>>>>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become >>>>>>>>>>> more obviously false. If one has simplified, through >>>>>>>>>>> "clarity", the action >>>>>>>>> away >>>>>>>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a >>>>>>>>>>> concept cannot mediate an action. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an >>>>>>>>>>> elegant way to demonstrate this. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>>>>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>>>>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I >>>>>>>>>>> really don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being >>>>>>>>>>> used to obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not >>>>>>>>>>> equal to separation. >>>>>>>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>>>>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>>>>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>>>>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>>>>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>>>>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>>>>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>>>>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>>>>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>>>>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>>>>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>>>>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>>>>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>>>>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>>>>>>>> tradition >>>>>>>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in >> general, >>>>>>>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>>>>>>>> contexts, >>>>>>>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>>>>>>>> legitimately, >>>>>>>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>>>>>>>> social >>>>>>>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>>>>>>>> activities >>>>>>>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>>>>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the >>>>>>>>>>> topic >>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that >> I >>>>>>>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>>>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>>>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>>>>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>>>>>>>> mean what >>>>>>>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the >>>>>>>>>>> context >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>>>>>>>> "mediation" in >>>>>>>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>>>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>>>>>>>> communication or >>>>>>>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>>>>>>>> Artefacts, >>>>>>>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, >>>>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>>>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>>>>>>>> any one >>>>>>>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>>>>>>>> Concepts >>>>>>>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>>>>>>>> materiality, >>>>>>>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>>>>>>>> in mind >>>>>>>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>>>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>>>>>>>> aware >>>>>>>>>>> of that. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>>>>>>>> qualified >>>>>>>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>>>>>>>> would need >>>>>>>>>>> to include >>>>>>>>>>> reflexes) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>>>>>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>>>>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>>>>>>>> newborns). >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>>>>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>>>>>>>> to stop >>>>>>>>>>> talking about >>>>>>>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>>>>>>>> adjectival >>>>>>>>>>> use implies there >>>>>>>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. >>>>>>>>>>> He >>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>> speaks of >>>>>>>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>>>>>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>>>>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>>>>> is mediated (and >>>>>>>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>>>>>>>> it's >>>>>>>>>>> worth noting that >>>>>>>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>>>>>>>> action, but >>>>>>>>>>> rather a >>>>>>>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>>>>>>>> though >>>>>>>>>>> there seems to be >>>>>>>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>>>>>>>> assumption >>>>>>>>>>> entails. >>>>>>>>>>> David >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ________________________________ >>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >>> >>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely >> for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. >> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts >> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails >> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility >> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied >> by an official order form. >>> >> >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From deva_research@lineone.net Tue Sep 16 14:52:12 2014 From: deva_research@lineone.net (John Cummins) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 22:52:12 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102225B08@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102225ABC@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <000401cfd1f2$b27051f0$1750f5d0$@net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102225B08@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <000d01cfd1f8$7932a310$6b97e930$@net> Hi Rod, I'm sure you're right. We know that there are many heuristics the brain uses to promote economy of effort--see Daniel Kahneman's 'Thinking Fast and Slow'-- and that there has to be a balance between ease of familiarity and openness to novelty. My personal interest is in the evolution of the stress system, and whether it has any part in forming our world view. That could perhaps provide the sort of emotional glue that seems to underpin the sheer tenacity of our personal world views, and the aggression with which we defend them--and indeed seek to inflict them on other people. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rod Parker-Rees Sent: 16 September 2014 22:22 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Do you think, John, that one aspect of the 'emotional glue' might be the relative easiness of familiarity? Communication with familiar people is easier because we are better able (with less effort) to anticipate how they are likely to react - less need for constant updating and interactional vigilance. Of course this brings risks as well as benefits - xenophobia and fear/distrust of anything 'other' but not all people end up equally difference averse and most of us enjoy a balance between enjoying the easy comfort of familiarity and also sometimes seeking the excitement of novelty - it is dangerous ground but it might even be suggested that children tend to cast parents (and other caregivers) in different roles to support these different needs or wants. Habituation could be seen as a limitation of the brain - tuning out what remains the same and focusing on what changes but this has clear evolutionary advantages too! Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of John Cummins Sent: 16 September 2014 22:11 To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Hi Rod, I agree with what you say but there may be limitations to this happy state of learning about ourselves and others, and if so it would be relevant to educators to explore what these limitations might be. I agree that one might not expect there to be a class of limitations to learning over and above the physical limitations of the brain and the information available to it, especially as the brain is highly plastic physically, and we have great capacity to learn, but even so I suggest there may be additional types or classes of limitation. The most obvious place to begin looking would be in the possible desirability for a world view to have a degree of stability. It is hard work having to update, especially at a basic level. But I think the problem may be even more basic. As I suggested earlier, there may be a sort of emotional glue that holds things together. It makes it difficult for us to update; it means that on occasions we defend our world view with some aggression , and it is responsible for as degree of self deception or self delusion. From an evolutionary perspective, if this is true ( and of course it is just speculation at the moment), then because it is an obvious limitation on intelligent learning it must be part of a larger balance of adaptive costs and benefits. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rod Parker-Rees Sent: 16 September 2014 21:53 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception But the culture each of us is within is not the same culture, surely, that anyone else is within. Culture is not an artefact in the sense that Andy talks about artefact -mediated communication so there is always space for noticing how others notice differently. Babies can pick up on the difference between interaction with a familiar and an unfamiliar partner, children form friendship groups which are defined by those they exclude as well as those they include and we travel to learn about ourselves and others by noticing how people do things differently in other places and other times. I would argue that it is only BY noticing differences in the ways others notice or pay attention to things that we are able to notice how WE notice things. It is by realising that we are not quite like other people that we can realise what we are like. And I apologise if I have completely misunderstood the point you were making, Michael! Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Glassman, Michael Sent: 16 September 2014 21:21 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Okay, here is a thought experiment. You are a character in a novel, let's say it is War and Peace. You have decided to critique the way in which Napoleon is presented in the novel. Yet the only information you have to make the critique is from your experiences in the novel. Everything fits together based on the way the narrative is set out. It is not that you no information on Napoleon outside the novel, it is that you do not realize that there is even the possibility that there might be information outside of the novel. You critique from within but the ability to critique is actually controlled by Tolstoy, who has his own reasons for portraying all the characters in the way he does. But you do not even realize there is a Tolstoy, this is simply the world that has been set up for you - as Huw suggests the purpose of the system is the system. Is there really any chance for a true critique or is the game rigged, are you always going to wind up in some place that we already dete rmined by the novel itself. Now let's say you can as a character you can step outside the novel, realize it is a novel, understand that this is a system that Tolstoy has created for his own purposes (writers have been experimenting with this idea for generations). Isn't that a qualitatively different critique from within, and isn't this the only critique that allows you to escape your life as a character in the novel. If this makes no sense I apologize. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:30 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception We critique it from within. All the time. Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > But then Martin are you saying we can't critique our culture. Or if > we could what would be the process. I guess all this comes from a conversation I was having this morning - what are the aims of education? > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer > [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:14 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > How could we step out of culture, Michael, if it sustains human life? Surely culture is pervasive: no human being lives outside culture. Created to a purpose? Not sure what you mean by that. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:02 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the >> primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we don't believe we can step outside of it? >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on >> behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >> >> Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault along one of the roads not taken... >> >> Martin >> >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >>> The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded >>> to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. >>> >>> >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>> President >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>> www.mocombeian.com >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>> >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John >>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>> >>>> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence >>>> kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. >>>> >>>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John >>>> Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 >>>> PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>> >>>>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. >>>>> That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>> President >>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>> >>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>> Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 >>>>> 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture >>>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] >>>>> Re: mediate perception and direct perception
On >>>>> 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Carol, >>>>>> >>>>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations >>>>>> you are referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities >>>>>> and understandings, which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's >>>>>> will. I would agree that culture enframes them in a variety of >>>>>> ways. However, do they not, as sensations, tie us down to the >>>>>> material world irrespective of the mediated ways we encounter them? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. >>>>> Please explain. >>>>> >>>>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some >>>>> of our suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am >>>>> sure I wasn't the only who could imagine how lovely it would be to >>>>> have a shower (or bath or wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Carol >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>> President >>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>> >>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol >>>>>> Macdonald < carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 >>>>>> 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, >>>>>> Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>>>> mediate perception and direct perception
Hi >>>>>> Andy, >>>>>> >>>>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but >>>>>> at the same time purports to account for "everything". But are >>>>>> there really only universal artefacts? There must be at least the >>>>>> possibility of >>>>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>>>>> - as yet potential understanding >>>>>> - a total lack of understanding. >>>>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - >>>>>> so if we are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. >>>>>> We need to take in fluid, but everything apart from water also >>>>>> seems to be mediated. (And of course we serve water in culturally >>>>>> mediated ways.) I am sure I have too simplistic a view which >>>>>> misunderstands your schema Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Ah! I see! >>>>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in >>>>>>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally >>>>>>> contain both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem >>>>>>> with anyone saying that anything is mediated by anything else, >>>>>>> where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>>>>> the >>>>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions >>>>>>> provides an especially productive unit of analysis for science >>>>>>> is lost if >>>>>> mediation >>>>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with >>>>>>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. >>>>>>> Still, I would prefer that >>>>>> if >>>>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some >>>>>>> expression other than "mediation." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do >>>>>>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or >>>>>>> thoughts) I have to >>>>>> use >>>>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a >>>>>>> tool, a >>>>>> word, >>>>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, >>>>>>> without exception, are products of the history and culture into >>>>>>> which I was >>>>>> born. I >>>>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history >>>>>>> produce them. >>>>>> So >>>>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well >>>>>>> as >>>>>> personal. >>>>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical >>>>>>> form is the same for everyone, it is universal. So communication >>>>>>> as much as miscommunication takes place through everyone >>>>>>> interpreting the same material objects, artefacts, that I am >>>>>>> using in my actions. How can they >>>>>> do >>>>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set >>>>>>> of >>>>>> universal >>>>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and >>>>>>> historical analysis which is as objective as any branch of >>>>>>> natural science. >>>>>> Wonderful, >>>>>>> eh? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>> -------- >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study >>>>>>>> the history and production of the action. Under such >>>>>>>> circumstances, >>>>>> assertions >>>>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become >>>>>>>> more obviously false. If one has simplified, through >>>>>>>> "clarity", the action >>>>>> away >>>>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a >>>>>>>> concept cannot mediate an action. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an >>>>>>>> elegant way to demonstrate this. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I >>>>>>>> really don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being >>>>>>>> used to obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not >>>>>>>> equal to separation. >>>>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>>>>> tradition >>>>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>>>>> contexts, >>>>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>>>>> legitimately, >>>>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>>>>> social >>>>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>>>>> activities >>>>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the >>>>>>>> topic >>>>>> is >>>>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>>>>> mean what >>>>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the >>>>>>>> context >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>>>>> "mediation" in >>>>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>>>>> that a >>>>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>>>>> communication or >>>>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>>>>> Artefacts, >>>>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, >>>>>>>> can >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>>>>> any one >>>>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>>>>> Concepts >>>>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>>>>> materiality, >>>>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>>>>> in mind >>>>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>>>>> aware >>>>>>>> of that. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>>>>> qualified >>>>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>>>>> would need >>>>>>>> to include >>>>>>>> reflexes) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>>>>> newborns). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>>>>> to stop >>>>>>>> talking about >>>>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>>>>> adjectival >>>>>>>> use implies there >>>>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. >>>>>>>> He >>>>>> now >>>>>>>> speaks of >>>>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>> is mediated (and >>>>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>>>>> it's >>>>>>>> worth noting that >>>>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>>>>> action, but >>>>>>>> rather a >>>>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>>>>> though >>>>>>>> there seems to be >>>>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>>>>> assumption >>>>>>>> entails. >>>>>>>> David >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Tue Sep 16 15:56:02 2014 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 16:56:02 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Foucault Message-ID: Michel Foucault would not recognize the assertion that he carried forth Maurice Merleau-Ponty's philosophy - case in point, the philosopher who most deeply impressed Foucault was Jean Hyppolite. it was to Hyppolite that Foucault never ceased to acknowledge his debt. as for the influences on Butler, i can't tell. however, following sociocultural learning theory, since we're not behaviorist we don't view the student as replicating the instruction of the teacher, but rather as one of collaboration, approximations, and often an individual or shared innovation. phillip From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Sep 16 16:45:46 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 23:45:46 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Foucault did, however, study with Merleau-Ponty between 1946 and 1952 (obtaining his license in philosophy in 1948, in psychology in 1950, and a diploma in psychopathology in 1952). It was during this time that he first read Heidegger and Nietzsche. He studied with Hyppolite between 1954 and 1963. He inherited Hyppolite's chair at Coll?ge de France in 1970. Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 5:56 PM, White, Phillip wrote: > > Michel Foucault would not recognize the assertion that he carried forth Maurice Merleau-Ponty's philosophy - case in point, the philosopher who most deeply impressed Foucault was Jean Hyppolite. it was to Hyppolite that Foucault never ceased to acknowledge his debt. as for the influences on Butler, i can't tell. however, following sociocultural learning theory, since we're not behaviorist we don't view the student as replicating the instruction of the teacher, but rather as one of collaboration, approximations, and often an individual or shared innovation. > > phillip > > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Tue Sep 16 18:14:52 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 18:14:52 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <533B37CC-0D81-4F9B-A400-6C75D0543C54@uniandes.edu.co> References: , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <533B37CC-0D81-4F9B-A400-6C75D0543C54@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <5EE36E4B-683A-4A05-A2D7-2244B4AAB16E@gmail.com> Isn't this what a "rich" ethnographic description is supposed to be able to do? Provide so much detail that it makes possible more than one way to organize what one sees in it? As compared to a narrative, which is a very tight focus. Helena Helena Worthen Hworthen@illinois.edu On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > I am a character in a novel (you invite me to suppose). If I step out of the novel I cease to exist. When was the last time you bumped into Harry Potter on the street? > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 3:20 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> Okay, here is a thought experiment. You are a character in a novel, let's say it is War and Peace. You have decided to critique the way in which Napoleon is presented in the novel. Yet the only information you have to make the critique is from your experiences in the novel. Everything fits together based on the way the narrative is set out. It is not that you no information on Napoleon outside the novel, it is that you do not realize that there is even the possibility that there might be information outside of the novel. You critique from within but the ability to critique is actually controlled by Tolstoy, who has his own reasons for portraying all the characters in the way he does. But you do not even realize there is a Tolstoy, this is simply the world that has been set up for you - as Huw suggests the purpose of the system is the system. Is there really any chance for a true critique or is the game rigged, are you always going to wind up in some place that we already determined by the novel itself. >> >> Now let's say you can as a character you can step outside the novel, realize it is a novel, understand that this is a system that Tolstoy has created for his own purposes (writers have been experimenting with this idea for generations). Isn't that a qualitatively different critique from within, and isn't this the only critique that allows you to escape your life as a character in the novel. >> >> If this makes no sense I apologize. >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:30 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >> >> We critique it from within. All the time. >> >> Martin >> >> On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >>> But then Martin are you saying we can't critique our culture. Or if we could what would be the process. I guess all this comes from a conversation I was having this morning - what are the aims of education? >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >>> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:14 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >>> >>> How could we step out of culture, Michael, if it sustains human life? Surely culture is pervasive: no human being lives outside culture. Created to a purpose? Not sure what you mean by that. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 2:02 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>> >>>> But in order to do this don't we have to be able to challenge the primacy of culture as it exists now? And to do this don't we need to acknowledge that culture is not organic or necessarily pervasive but something that is created to a purpose. How do we critique something if we don't believe we can step outside of it? >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >>>> Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 2:49 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception >>>> >>>> Agreed, but I would say that the solution, if there is one, is not to live without culture but to live with a better culture. Follow Foucault along one of the roads not taken... >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:42 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>> >>>>> The problem I am having Martin is what adorno and horkheimer alluded to in the dialectic of enlightenment...where reason and culture becomes the mechanisms for our demise. It is one thing to have culture, but its another thing to have a culture associated with thanatos. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>> President >>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>> >>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 2:20 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>>
Okay, Paul, but if we start with the fact that our bodies not only live in the material world but are components of that material world, I think we end up with a different conclusion than Kant did. And can we live in a state of nature in which culture plays no role? No, because human biology has evolved so that we cannot survive except by living and working together, or without all the tools and other artifacts that previous generations have designed, fabricated, and shown us how to use. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:26 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Tying to the material world is my language martin...but in essence kant is saying the same thing, as a subject of experience we are tied to the object of experience vis-a-vis our form of sensibilities, which is different from the form of our understanding which can transcends the former but never access the object in itself. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>> President >>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>> >>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/16/2014 12:25 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>>>
Did Kant say that our bodies tie us to our material world? I am more familiar with Kant's statements that a universal, transcendental mind creates mental representations which enable each of us to bring 'order' to the 'chaos of sensations,' so that we can never truly know material reality. The value of Hegel consists in challenging this 'cognitivism' that continues to dominate the social sciences today. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 11:01 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I would think it is a problem in how sensations are mediated. That is, if kant is right and our bodies tie us to the material world... does it and our form of understanding coupled with the material world also dictate an unmediating universal way by which we humans should recursively go about reproducing and reorganizing our species-being? Simply put, is there a state of nature we should attempt to live-in dictated by our bodies and the material world that is not mediated by culture? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>>> President >>>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>>> >>>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:09/16/2014 11:13 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>>>>
On 15 Sep 2014 7:08 AM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Carol, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It would appear, to me at least, that the unmediated sensations you are >>>>>>>> referring to parallels kant ' s forms of sensibilities and understandings, >>>>>>>> which belong to the body and schopenhauer 's will. I would agree that >>>>>>>> culture enframes them in a variety of ways. However, do they not, as >>>>>>>> sensations, tie us down to the material world irrespective of the mediated >>>>>>>> ways we encounter them? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, I think so,and but I am not sure why that is a problem. Please >>>>>>> explain. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> However, surely we can also remember these sensations. Today some of our >>>>>>> suburbs had their water cut off for about 21 hours. I am sure I wasn't the >>>>>>> only who could imagine how lovely it would be to have a shower (or bath or >>>>>>> wash, depending on your culture); and we know what water tastes like. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>>>>>> President >>>>>>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>>>>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>>>>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>>>>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald < >>>>>>>> carolmacdon@gmail.com>
Date:09/15/2014 8:39 AM (GMT-05:00) >>>>>>>>
To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, >>>>>>>> Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: >>>>>>>> mediate perception and direct perception
>>>>>>>>
Hi Andy, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This seems to be an all inclusive scheme which ties us down, but at the >>>>>>>> same time purports to account for "everything". But are there really only >>>>>>>> universal artefacts? There must be at least the possibility of >>>>>>>> - misunderstanding (all though of course you (Andy) can do this; >>>>>>>> - as yet potential understanding >>>>>>>> - a total lack of understanding. >>>>>>>> And there is still the need to account for unmediated sensation - so if we >>>>>>>> are hungry, we need to eat; but the eating is mediated. We need to take in >>>>>>>> fluid, but everything apart from water also seems to be mediated. (And of >>>>>>>> course we serve water in culturally mediated ways.) >>>>>>>> I am sure I have too simplistic a view which misunderstands your schema >>>>>>>> Andy, but I am trying to keep open Shotter's concerns. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 14:02, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ah! I see! >>>>>>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in >>>>>>>>> mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and >>>>>>>>> mediation." I have no great problem with anyone saying that anything is >>>>>>>>> mediated by anything else, where it is appropriate. My problem is that >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> specific insight of Vygotsky, that artefact-mediation of actions provides >>>>>>>>> an especially productive unit of analysis for science is lost if >>>>>>>> mediation >>>>>>>>> in the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with artefact-mediation >>>>>>>>> to the point that artefact-mediation is lost. Still, I would prefer that >>>>>>>> if >>>>>>>>> you were to make the point you were referring to you used some expression >>>>>>>>> other than "mediation." >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I can do what I >>>>>>>>> like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or thoughts) I have to >>>>>>>> use >>>>>>>>> some material object to transmit my actions, so to speak - a tool, a >>>>>>>> word, >>>>>>>>> a gesture, or whatever - but all these artefacts which I use, without >>>>>>>>> exception, are products of the history and culture into which I was >>>>>>>> born. I >>>>>>>>> can choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce them. >>>>>>>> So >>>>>>>>> every action I take is essentially cultural-historical as well as >>>>>>>> personal. >>>>>>>>> Also, because artefacts are material objects, their physical form is the >>>>>>>>> same for everyone, it is universal. So communication as much as >>>>>>>>> miscommunication takes place through everyone interpreting the same >>>>>>>>> material objects, artefacts, that I am using in my actions. How can they >>>>>>>> do >>>>>>>>> that? Because they too mediate their actions with the same set of >>>>>>>> universal >>>>>>>>> artefacts! So all human action is opened to cultural and historical >>>>>>>>> analysis which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>>>>>>> Wonderful, >>>>>>>>> eh? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need to study the >>>>>>>>>> history and production of the action. Under such circumstances, >>>>>>>> assertions >>>>>>>>>> that concepts cannot mediate (the production of) actions become more >>>>>>>>>> obviously false. If one has simplified, through "clarity", the action >>>>>>>> away >>>>>>>>>> from its genetic base then it may seem correct to assert that a concept >>>>>>>>>> cannot mediate an action. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) are an elegant way >>>>>>>>>> to demonstrate this. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> he, he, Huw! >>>>>>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are the very >>>>>>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! and I really >>>>>>>>>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally being used to >>>>>>>>>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is not equal to >>>>>>>>>> separation. >>>>>>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with product and >>>>>>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call for "clarity". >>>>>>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or reification of the >>>>>>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails typologies or >>>>>>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the conception and >>>>>>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in cases such as >>>>>>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the entanglements >>>>>>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would be equally >>>>>>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that one needs to >>>>>>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which leads me to >>>>>>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, why separate >>>>>>>>>> the act from its production and history? Of course, if >>>>>>>>>> one had the discipline to de-couple clarity from >>>>>>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the problem. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that in the CHAT >>>>>>>>>> tradition >>>>>>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English language in general, >>>>>>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of course, every >>>>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many discursive >>>>>>>>>> contexts, >>>>>>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be evoked quite >>>>>>>>>> legitimately, >>>>>>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of CHAT. In >>>>>>>> social >>>>>>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of activities by other >>>>>>>>>> activities >>>>>>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as mediation of actions by >>>>>>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. But if the topic >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so central, that I >>>>>>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by such-and-such a >>>>>>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can use words to >>>>>>>>>> mean what >>>>>>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like this in the context >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the idea of >>>>>>>>>> "mediation" in >>>>>>>>>> the most general sense in a way which obscures the fact >>>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any act of >>>>>>>>>> communication or >>>>>>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot mediate actions*. >>>>>>>>>> Artefacts, >>>>>>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a concept, can >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But the point is >>>>>>>>>> that a >>>>>>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically a sign for >>>>>>>>>> any one >>>>>>>>>> concept. It means different things to different people. >>>>>>>>>> Concepts >>>>>>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal in their >>>>>>>>>> materiality, >>>>>>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we have a concept >>>>>>>>>> in mind >>>>>>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the communication is >>>>>>>>>> mediated >>>>>>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a mistake not to be >>>>>>>>>> aware >>>>>>>>>> of that. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were always used in >>>>>>>>>> qualified >>>>>>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made clear. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his comment, too. >>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language and culture? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in which case we >>>>>>>>>> would need >>>>>>>>>> to include >>>>>>>>>> reflexes) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual surround as in >>>>>>>>>> Bateson's man with >>>>>>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would need to include >>>>>>>>>> newborns). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Just wonderin'. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David H Kirshner >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Thanks for replies. >>>>>>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim Greeno decided >>>>>>>>>> to stop >>>>>>>>>> talking about >>>>>>>>>> situated cognition because the pragmatics of >>>>>>>>>> adjectival >>>>>>>>>> use implies there >>>>>>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated cognition. He >>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>> speaks of >>>>>>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the exception of >>>>>>>>>> physical reflexes (and >>>>>>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant activity), all human >>>>>>>>>> action >>>>>>>>>> is mediated (and >>>>>>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as well). So, >>>>>>>> it's >>>>>>>>>> worth noting that >>>>>>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a kind of >>>>>>>>>> action, but >>>>>>>>>> rather a >>>>>>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human action; >>>>>>>> though >>>>>>>>>> there seems to be >>>>>>>>>> some variation in interpretation of what that >>>>>>>>>> assumption >>>>>>>>>> entails. >>>>>>>>>> David >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Tue Sep 16 18:25:26 2014 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 19:25:26 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: Martin, yes, Foucault did study with Merleau-Ponty - and for a while Foucault used a marxist-existentialist framework that Sartre and Merleau-Ponty developed - and in a few years Foucault distanced himself from such a framework, with a great deal of mockery, when he came to realize that Sartre and Merleau-Ponty played no part in the resistance against the nazis. however, more to the point, i am uncomfortable with statements that suggest a one-to-one correspondence, or cause and effect, attributed to an instructor's teachings and a student's beliefs. if that were the case there would have been far more nuns and priests in this world. perhaps i'm over-reacting. phillip ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 5:45 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault Foucault did, however, study with Merleau-Ponty between 1946 and 1952 (obtaining his license in philosophy in 1948, in psychology in 1950, and a diploma in psychopathology in 1952). It was during this time that he first read Heidegger and Nietzsche. He studied with Hyppolite between 1954 and 1963. He inherited Hyppolite's chair at Coll?ge de France in 1970. Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 5:56 PM, White, Phillip wrote: > > Michel Foucault would not recognize the assertion that he carried forth Maurice Merleau-Ponty's philosophy - case in point, the philosopher who most deeply impressed Foucault was Jean Hyppolite. it was to Hyppolite that Foucault never ceased to acknowledge his debt. as for the influences on Butler, i can't tell. however, following sociocultural learning theory, since we're not behaviorist we don't view the student as replicating the instruction of the teacher, but rather as one of collaboration, approximations, and often an individual or shared innovation. > > phillip > > From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Tue Sep 16 18:32:40 2014 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 19:32:40 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <5EE36E4B-683A-4A05-A2D7-2244B4AAB16E@gmail.com> References: , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <533B37CC-0D81-4F9B-A400-6C75D0543C54@uniandes.edu.co>, <5EE36E4B-683A-4A05-A2D7-2244B4AAB16E@gmail.com> Message-ID: yes - or as Eisenhart taught me, make the strange common, and the common strange. which is, now that i think of it, Foucault's approach. Foucault, moving in opposite direction of Kant, looked to see what contingencies were cultural constructions, rather than universal. anyway - that's a vague recollection - and i've not the energy to search up the actual statements. phillip ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+phillip.white=ucdenver.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+phillip.white=ucdenver.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Helena Worthen [helenaworthen@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 7:14 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Isn't this what a "rich" ethnographic description is supposed to be able to do? Provide so much detail that it makes possible more than one way to organize what one sees in it? As compared to a narrative, which is a very tight focus. Helena Helena Worthen Hworthen@illinois.edu From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Sep 16 18:37:12 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 01:37:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> Me too. I'm not sure who suggested that. Although I don't know the details, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty founded Socialisme et Libert?, which is described as a small intellectual resistance group, Both fought; Sartre was in a German prisoner of war camp. Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology of ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were philosophers on ontology, and of history. Martin > i am uncomfortable with statements that suggest a one-to-one correspondence, or cause and effect, attributed to an instructor's teachings and a student's beliefs On Sep 16, 2014, at 8:25 PM, White, Phillip wrote: > Martin, yes, Foucault did study with Merleau-Ponty - and for a while Foucault used a marxist-existentialist framework that Sartre and Merleau-Ponty developed - and in a few years Foucault distanced himself from such a framework, with a great deal of mockery, when he came to realize that Sartre and Merleau-Ponty played no part in the resistance against the nazis. however, more to the point, i am uncomfortable with statements that suggest a one-to-one correspondence, or cause and effect, attributed to an instructor's teachings and a student's beliefs. if that were the case there would have been far more nuns and priests in this world. > > perhaps i'm over-reacting. > > phillip > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 5:45 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault > > Foucault did, however, study with Merleau-Ponty between 1946 and 1952 (obtaining his license in philosophy in 1948, in psychology in 1950, and a diploma in psychopathology in 1952). It was during this time that he first read Heidegger and Nietzsche. He studied with Hyppolite between 1954 and 1963. He inherited Hyppolite's chair at Coll?ge de France in 1970. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 5:56 PM, White, Phillip wrote: > >> >> Michel Foucault would not recognize the assertion that he carried forth Maurice Merleau-Ponty's philosophy - case in point, the philosopher who most deeply impressed Foucault was Jean Hyppolite. it was to Hyppolite that Foucault never ceased to acknowledge his debt. as for the influences on Butler, i can't tell. however, following sociocultural learning theory, since we're not behaviorist we don't view the student as replicating the instruction of the teacher, but rather as one of collaboration, approximations, and often an individual or shared innovation. >> >> phillip >> >> > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Sep 16 18:52:27 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 01:52:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <533B37CC-0D81-4F9B-A400-6C75D0543C54@uniandes.edu.co>, <5EE36E4B-683A-4A05-A2D7-2244B4AAB16E@gmail.com> Message-ID: <3252346F-413D-4D7E-AC17-BF76E92FBDB1@uniandes.edu.co> Right - Kant aimed to identify universal necessities in the seemingly contingent. Foucault aimed to unmask the contingencies in seemingly universal necessities. Martin On Sep 16, 2014, at 8:32 PM, White, Phillip wrote: > Foucault, moving in opposite direction of Kant, looked to see what contingencies were cultural constructions, rather than universal From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Tue Sep 16 18:53:38 2014 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 19:53:38 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> References: , , <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their work "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology of ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were philosophers on ontology, and of history." the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those peoples who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, and homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and i've come to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to think of theory as a way of autobiography. i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed here on xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail party. (that's a great metaphor!) p From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Sep 16 20:24:28 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 20:24:28 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Kenneth Burke: ?Imagine that you enter a parlor. You come late. When you arrive, others have long preceded you, and they are engaged in a heated discussion, too heated for them to pause and tell you exactly what it is about. In fact, the discussion had already begun long before any of them got there, so that no one present is qualified to retrace for you all the steps that had gone before. You listen for a while, until you decide that you have caught the tenor of the argument; then you put in your oar. Someone answers; you answer him; another comes to your defense; another aligns himself against you, to either the embarrassment or gratification of your opponent, depending on the quality of your ally?s assistance. However, the discussion is interminable. The hour grows late, you must depart. And you do depart, with the discussion still vigorously in progress.? On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 6:53 PM, White, Phillip wrote: > > as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their work > > "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology of > ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were philosophers on > ontology, and of history." > > the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those peoples > who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, and > homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and i've come > to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to think > of theory as a way of autobiography. > > i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed here on > xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail party. > (that's a great metaphor!) > > p > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Sep 16 20:37:12 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 20:37:12 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> <54178B49.9070205@mira.net> <50f7f5173d374b5fa9ed51a3b62501f9@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: ?Complicated discussion about CHAT and whether its a science or not. One thing to keep in mind, perhaps: Vygotsky said he was seeking to resolve the crisis in psychology as he diagnosed it a century ago. In my view, he did not resolve it. I made the argument at the end of Cultural Psychology and can post a draft of the chapter here if it needs rehearsing. I believe, to the extent that it can be solved, it requires one to take seriously the fusion of theory and practice. Seems like Vygotsky said something along these same lines, too, about practice being the crucible of theory. The question of what can be learned from an analysis of projects such as those present in Andy's collection seems an important one. I am biased. I would hate to think that i learned nothing from the past 30+ years of involvement in the 5th Dimension! mike ? On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 12:43 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > David, > I'd note that in addition to Andy's introduction, there was a "spirited" > contribution (or two or three...) that use empirical stuff to contribute to > theory. > -greg > > > > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 2:06 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: > > > Andy, > > > > > > > > Thanks for the link to the TOC of your edited volume, which perhaps > > unintentionally illustrates my point that empirical studies using > > CHAT/sociocultural theory generally aren't intended as contributions to > > theory, per se; as you noted, the affordances for theorizing were brought > > out by you, rather than by the authors as part of their motive for > > producing the empirical work. > > > > > > > > I've hung out with cognitive psychologists quite a bit, and there's a > very > > clear demarcation between applied studies which utilize cognitive theory > > for applicative purposes and pure studies whose sole raison d'?tre is to > > inform theory. Furthermore, it is a fairly rare occurrence for anyone to > > attempt to address theory in any other way than through the lens of > > empirical studies. > > > > > > > > My own experience of this community includes appreciation of the tight > > logic of their theorizing, and also of the inventiveness of researchers > in > > generating truly provocative data that they are then forced to contend. > But > > it also includes a sense of frustration with the absence of any critique > of > > or input to theory from outside of the little studies that, one after > > another, niggle away at the theoretical infrastructure. Excluded, here, > are > > not only philosophical inputs to theory, but even broader methodological > > constraints regarding the character of good theories. (My own grounding > in > > mathematical theorizing includes a deliciously salient sense of the > > ?elegance? that makes a theory truly admirable and worthy.) > > > > > > > > Somehow, it seems noteworthy that CHAT/sociocultural psychology?whatever > > its virtues?isn?t organized like other branches of psychology (e.g., > > behavioral, cognitive, developmental) with respect to the role of > empirical > > data in theory construction. Andy, in your response to Jenna, you > described > > science as an objective practice that ?is not dependant on what you and > I, > > writing here on xmca in 2014, says it is.? The question all this raises > is > > whether CHAT/sociocultural psychology actually qualifies as a scientific > > practice. > > > > > > > > David > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:59 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > > > > > > > > David, in the recently published book, "Collaborative Projects. An > > Interdisciplinary Study," authors were invited to submit studies with > > empirical content (in the sense in which you are using the word) which > > illustrated the use of the concept of "project" within CHAT. > > > > > > > > > > > https://www.academia.edu/6756231/Collaborative_Projects._An_Interdisciplinary_Study > > > > > > > > As you can see from the Table of Contents, more than a dozen different > > practical studies were contributed, and I am satisfied that the > collection > > functioned to illuminate the philosophical issues about the nature of "an > > activity," and its ue as a unit of analysis, even though they are only > > explicitly addressed in the long Introduction. > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > > > David H Kirshner wrote: > > > > > Mike, > > > > > > > > > > Clearly, as in Katherine Neal's response, and in MCA, > CHAT/sociocultural > > theory informs empirical research. > > > > > What's less clear is that empirical research informs CHAT/sociocultural > > theorizing. > > > > > Not quite sure what to make of that. > > > > > > > > > > David > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > > > > > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 11:15 AM > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > > > > > > > > > > Your followup comment is closely related to the second part of your > > initiating message, David. So i will respond in line. > > > > > > > > > > Firstly, I think it would be helpful to distinguish between MCA and > xmca. > > > > > The idea behind xmca was to provide a discussion forum for articles > that > > appear in MCA so that instead of authors having to wait 2+ years for > > feedback on their ideas (which rarely comes, even then!), we could > discuss > > the published work and learn from it in a timely manner. By an large, > that > > effort has, in my opinion, failed. Thanks to the recent decision to have > > the editors pick out articles for discussion which include the author(s) > in > > the discussion, this situation has been somewhat mitigated. But only > > somewhat. xma discussions have all the characteristics of Vygotskian > > chaining, as a rule. > > > > > > > > > > Secondly, when I take down a bundle of recent MCA issues and look at > the > > titles, they at least sound like they are about empirical matters ranging > > across a wide variety of content areas. Are you saying that these > articles > > are not really empirical? Or that they are not really helping us to > develop > > better methods to deal with perceived problems of social value? Again, > this > > raises the question of "MCA or xmca". > > > > > > > > > > Lastly, perhaps it would be helpful if those of us who believe that > > empirical work guided by CHAT ideas of some value has been produced in, > > say, the past two decades, would post brief summiaries of that work with > > references. > > > > > Maybe its just all verbal sound and fury, signifying the usual! > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 8:50 AM, David H Kirshner > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> Does CHAT theory really advance with respect to empirical studies? > > > > >> If so, then why isn't the XMCA discussion a discussion about > > > > >> so-and-so's empirical results and how we should interpret them? > > > > >> Various branches of psychology (e.g., cognitive and developmental) do > > > > >> address concepts, and do conduct empirical research related to > concepts. > > > > >> It's true, they rarely enter into full-blooded discussion of what is > > > > >> a concept. But perhaps that's because they're scientists rather than > > > > >> philosophers. They're operating within a framework that is bounded > > > > >> primarily by empirical and methodological expectations and > > > > >> obligations; theory evolves within those boundaries. > > > > >> It's not clear to me that the Vygotskyan research community ever > > > > >> operated in that fashion, and I'm wondering what would happen if it > did. > > > > >> David > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> -----Original Message----- > > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > > > > >> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 10:23 AM > > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > > > > >> > > > > >> Well, Lisa, I think that is a project which requires a lot of what > > > > >> David would call "philosophical" discussion. :) The Psychology of > > > > >> Concepts, as it is know to American psychology, i.e., the "mainstream" > > > > >> do endless laboratory tests and questionnaires and surveys and so far > > > > >> as I can see have still haven't figured out what a concept is. > > > > >> Andy > > > > >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > >> - > > > > >> -- > > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>> Well I am guilty for being fixated about thinking and talking about > > > > >>> methods and how to better understand how we can make a trustworthy > > > > >>> leap from understanding the world to understanding concepts. Again > > > > >>> just talking aloud. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > > > > >>> Psychology and Counseling > > > > >>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 > Bailey > > > > >>> Education Complex > > > > >>> IT Online Program Coordinator University > > > > >>> of Tennessee > > > > >>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ > > > > >>> Knoxville, TN 37996 > > > > >>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > > > > >>> 865-974-7712 > > > > >>> > > > > >>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Andy Blunden > > > >>> > wrote: > > > > >>> > > > > >>> I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and we all have > > > > >>> our specific research interests. > > > > >>> But when we publish, most of us have something to report. > > > > >>> I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more of my share > of > > > > >>> time arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest. > > > > >>> Andy > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > >> - > > > > >> -- > > > > >> > > > > >>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Why is it that we came to what David stated as: > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over > > > > >>> facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical > > > > >>> elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost > > > > >>> completely detached from empirical specifics. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor > Educational > > > > >>> Psychology and Counseling > > > > >>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ > A532 > > > > >>> Bailey Education Complex > > > > >>> IT Online Program Coordinator > > > > >>> University of Tennessee > > > > >>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ > > > > >>> Knoxville, TN 37996 > > > > >>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline > Phone: > > > > >>> 865-974-7712 > > > > >>> > > > > >>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner > > > > >>> % > > 20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>> > > > >>> >> wrote: > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Andy, > > > > >>> > > > > >>> I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific > > > > >>> project, > > > > >>> though it might initially have been conceived as such. > > > > >>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over > > > > >>> facts." > > > > >>> We are engaged in making endless theoretical > elaborations, > > > > >>> distinctions, and qualifications almost completely > > > > >>> detached from > > > > >>> empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even > > > > >>> at the > > > > >>> level of theory, we're not all playing the same game. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that > > > > >>> claims be > > > > >>> framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the > > > > >>> significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical > > > > >>> setting > > > > >>> theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In > > > > >>> this case, > > > > >>> there is a possibility that disagreements lead to > > > > >>> separation of > > > > >>> research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical > agreement > > > > >>> as a > > > > >>> consequence. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> David > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> -----Original Message----- > > > > >>> From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net > > > > >>> > > > > >>> >] > > > > >>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM > > > > >>> To: David H Kirshner > > > > >>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > >>> Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse > > > > >>> > > > > >>> David, > > > > >>> CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science > > > > >>> it > > > > >>> > > > > >> must > > > > >> > > > > >>> strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are > > > > >>> meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into > which > > > > >>> they > > > > >>> are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a > > > > >>> system of > > > > >>> concepts. People can agree on this or that hard > > experimental > > > > >>> finding, but still not agree on the significance of that > > > > >>> claim. We > > > > >>> CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over > > > > >>> facts; > > > > >>> all of this is possible only to the extent that we share > > > > >>> concepts. > > > > >>> "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a > goal > > > > >>> as it > > > > >>> is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is > > > > >>> ill-conceived to > > > > >>> think that this is a means of consolidating a current of > > > > >>> research > > > > >>> like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or > psychological, > > > > >>> I don't > > > > >>> think that makes any difference. > > > > >>> Andy > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > >> - > > > > >> -- > > > > >> > > > > >>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> David H Kirshner wrote: > > > > >>> > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, > it > > > > >>> seems > > > > >>> inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing > > > > >>> efforts > > > > >>> to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from > > > > >>> efforts > > > > >>> > > > > >> to > > > > >> > > > > >>> solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In > > > > >>> tandem, is > > > > >>> ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or > > > > >>> philosophical > > > > >>> discourse. > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement > of > > > > >>> CHAT > > > > >>> would not be better served by embedding theoretical > > > > >>> discussion in > > > > >>> analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be > > > > >>> to make > > > > >>> CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application > > > > >>> (though that > > > > >>> would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical > obligation > > > > >>> might > > > > >>> transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of > > > > >>> methodology. In that way, CHAT could become > differentiated > > > > >>> into > > > > >>> distinct psychological schools, each constrained by > > > > >>> methodological > > > > >>> strictures that also support a more homogeneous > theoretical > > > > >>> environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community > > > > >>> could > > > > >>> look across these various schools to pursue broader > > > > >>> philosophical > > > > >>> problematics. > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > David > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > -----Original Message----- > > > > >>> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > >>> >] On Behalf Of Andy > > > > >>> Blunden > > > > >>> > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM > > > > >>> > To: Huw Lloyd > > > > >>> > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > >>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct > > > > >>> perception > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > Ah! I see! > > > > >>> > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or > > in > > > > >>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally > > > > >>> contain > > > > >>> both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem > > > > >>> with anyone > > > > >>> saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where > > > > >>> it > > > > >>> > > > > >> is > > > > >> > > > > >>> appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of > > > > >>> Vygotsky, > > > > >>> that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially > > > > >>> productive unit of analysis for science is lost if > > > > >>> mediation in > > > > >>> the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with > > > > >>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation > is > > > > >>> lost. > > > > >>> Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point > > > > >>> you were > > > > >>> referring to you used some expression other than > > "mediation." > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I > > > > >>> can do > > > > >>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams > or > > > > >>> thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit > my > > > > >>> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or > > > > >>> whatever - > > > > >>> but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, > are > > > > >>> products of the history and culture into which I was > born. > > > > >>> I can > > > > >>> choose which artefact to use, but culture and history > > produce > > > > >>> them. So every action I take is essentially > > > > >>> cultural-historical as > > > > >>> well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material > > > > >>> objects, > > > > >>> their physical form is the same for everyone, it is > > > > >>> universal. So > > > > >>> communication as much as miscommunication takes place > > through > > > > >>> everyone interpreting the same material objects, > > > > >>> artefacts, that I > > > > >>> am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because > > > > >>> they > > > > >>> > > > > >> too > > > > >> > > > > >>> mediate their actions with the same set of universal > > > > >>> artefacts! So > > > > >>> all human action is opened to cultural and historical > > > > >>> > > > > >> analysis > > > > >> > > > > >>> which is as objective as any branch of natural science. > > > > >>> Wonderful, eh? > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > Andy > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > >> - > > > > >> > > > > >>> > -- > > > > >>> > *Andy Blunden* > > > > >>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> >> If you want to study how action changes then you need > > > > >>> to study the > > > > >>> >> history and production of the action. Under such > > > > >>> circumstances, > > > > >>> >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the > production > > > > >>> of) actions > > > > >>> >> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, > > > > >>> through > > > > >>> >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then > > > > >>> it may seem > > > > >>> >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an > > action. > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) > > > > >>> are an elegant > > > > >>> >> way to demonstrate this. > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> Best, > > > > >>> >> Huw > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > > > > >>> > ablunden@mira.net%20%3cmailto:ablunden@mira.net>> > > > > >>> > >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > > > >>> > ablunden@mira.net%20%3cmailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> he, he, Huw! > > > > >>> >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are > > > > >>> the very > > > > >>> >> problems that need to be remedied by > clarification! > > > > >>> and I > > > > >>> really > > > > >>> >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally > > > > >>> being > > > > >>> used to > > > > >>> >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is > > > > >>> not equal to > > > > >>> >> separation. > > > > >>> >> I really don't know what you are referring to with > > > > >>> product and > > > > >>> >> history. Perhaps you could explain? > > > > >>> >> Andy > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > >> - > > > > >> -- > > > > >> > > > > >>> >> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >>> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> I agree about precision, but not with a call > > > > >>> for "clarity". > > > > >>> >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or > > > > >>> reification of the > > > > >>> >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually > entails > > > > >>> typologies or > > > > >>> >> other simplistic devices which prevent the > > > > >>> conception and > > > > >>> >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in > > > > >>> cases such as > > > > >>> >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the > > > > >>> entanglements > > > > >>> >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would > > > > >>> be equally > > > > >>> >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state > that > > > > >>> > > > > >> one > > > > >> > > > > >>> needs to > > > > >>> >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> I think it is this "need for simplification" > > which > > > > >>> leads me to > > > > >>> >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, > > > > >>> why separate > > > > >>> >> the act from its production and history? > > > > >>> >> Of course, if one had the discipline to > > de-couple > > > > >>> clarity from > > > > >>> >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the > > > > >>> problem. > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> Best, > > > > >>> >> Huw > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > > > > >>> > ablunden@mira.net%20%3cmailto:ablunden@mira.net>> > > > > >>> > ablunden@mira.net%20%3cmailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> > > > > >>> >> > > > >>> > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> > ablunden@mira.net%20%3cmailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> > > > > >>> >> > > > >>> > > > >>> >>>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that > > > > >>> in the CHAT > > > > >>> >> tradition > > > > >>> >> specifically, as opposed to the English > > > > >>> language in > > > > >>> general, > > > > >>> >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. > Of > > > > >>> course, every > > > > >>> >> action > > > > >>> >> is both mediated and immediate, and in > many > > > > >>> discursive > > > > >>> >> contexts, > > > > >>> >> "mediation" is a concept which may be > > > > >>> evoked quite > > > > >>> >> legitimately, > > > > >>> >> but with no special significant for the > use > > of > > > > >>> CHAT. In social > > > > >>> >> theory, for example, mediation of > > > > >>> activities by other > > > > >>> >> activities > > > > >>> >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as > > > > >>> mediation of > > > > >>> actions by > > > > >>> >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. > > > > >>> But if > > > > >>> the topic is > > > > >>> >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is > so > > > > >>> central, that I > > > > >>> >> prefer to spell it out and use the term > > > > >>> >> "artefact-mediated" rather > > > > >>> >> than the vague term "mediated". > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> I have come across usages like "mediated > by > > > > >>> such-and-such a > > > > >>> >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can > > > > >>> use words to > > > > >>> >> mean what > > > > >>> >> you like, but I find a formulation like > > > > >>> this in the > > > > >>> context of > > > > >>> >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the > > > > >>> idea of > > > > >>> >> "mediation" in > > > > >>> >> the most general sense in a way which > > > > >>> obscures the > > > > >>> fact that a > > > > >>> >> concept is not immediately present in any > > > > >>> act of > > > > >>> >> communication or > > > > >>> >> any other act, and therefore *cannot > > > > >>> mediate actions*. > > > > >>> >> Artefacts, > > > > >>> >> such as spoken words, which may be signs > > for a > > > > >>> concept, can of > > > > >>> >> course mediate an act of communication. > But > > > > >>> > > > > >> the > > > > >> > > > > >>> point is > > > > >>> >> that a > > > > >>> >> word is not universally and > > unproblematically > > > > >>> > > > > >> a > > > > >> > > > > >>> sign for > > > > >>> >> any one > > > > >>> >> concept. It means different things to > > > > >>> different people. > > > > >>> >> Concepts > > > > >>> >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal > > > > >>> in their > > > > >>> >> materiality, > > > > >>> >> but particular in their meaning. So when > we > > > > >>> have a > > > > >>> concept > > > > >>> >> in mind > > > > >>> >> when we use a word in communication, the > > > > >>> communication is > > > > >>> >> mediated > > > > >>> >> by the word not the concept, and it is a > > > > >>> mistake > > > > >>> not to be > > > > >>> >> aware > > > > >>> >> of that. > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were > > > > >>> always used in > > > > >>> >> qualified > > > > >>> >> way so that its specific meaning is made > > > > >>> > > > > >> clear. > > > > >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> Andy > > > > >>> >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in > his > > > > >>> comment, too. > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > >> - > > > > >> -- > > > > >> > > > > >>> >> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >>> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> Greg Thompson wrote: > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> Does "mediation" only apply to > language > > > > >>> > > > > >> and > > > > >> > > > > >>> culture? > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in > > > > >>> which case we > > > > >>> >> would need > > > > >>> >> to include > > > > >>> >> reflexes) > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> And does it include our > socio-contextual > > > > >>> surround as in > > > > >>> >> Bateson's man with > > > > >>> >> the stick? (in which case, we would > > > > >>> need to include > > > > >>> >> newborns). > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> Just wonderin'. > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> -greg > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David > > > > >>> H Kirshner > > > > >>> >> dkirsh@lsu.edu > > > > > > > >>> > dkirsh@lsu.edu%20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>> > > > > >>> > dkirsh@lsu.edu%20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>> > > > > >>> > dkirsh@lsu.edu%20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>>> > > > > >>> >> > > > > > > >>> > dkirsh@lsu.edu%20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>> > > > > >>> > dkirsh@lsu.edu%20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>> > > > > >>> > dkirsh@lsu.edu%20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> Thanks for replies. > > > > >>> >> I'm recalling several years ago > Jim > > > > >>> Greeno > > > > >>> decided > > > > >>> >> to stop > > > > >>> >> talking about > > > > >>> >> situated cognition because the > > > > >>> pragmatics of > > > > >>> >> adjectival > > > > >>> >> use implies there > > > > >>> >> has to be a contrasting > non-situated > > > > >>> cognition. He now > > > > >>> >> speaks of > > > > >>> >> situativity theory. It seems, with > > the > > > > >>> exception of > > > > >>> >> physical reflexes (and > > > > >>> >> perhaps pre-conscious infant > > > > >>> activity), all > > > > >>> human > > > > >>> >> action > > > > >>> >> is mediated (and > > > > >>> >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, > > as > > > > >>> well). So, it's > > > > >>> >> worth noting that > > > > >>> >> "mediated action" doesn't specify > a > > > > >>> kind of > > > > >>> >> action, but > > > > >>> >> rather a > > > > >>> >> theoretical assumption about all > > human > > > > >>> action; though > > > > >>> >> there seems to be > > > > >>> >> some variation in interpretation > of > > > > >>> what that > > > > >>> >> assumption > > > > >>> >> entails. > > > > >>> >> David > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> >> > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From dkirsh@lsu.edu Tue Sep 16 21:12:03 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 04:12:03 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: <6987B572-6449-4D96-9D18-6A8D2BE1AEF5@gmail.com> References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> <54178B49.9070205@mira.net> <50f7f5173d374b5fa9ed51a3b62501f9@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <6987B572-6449-4D96-9D18-6A8D2BE1AEF5@gmail.com> Message-ID: <74b405cd7fa84793bcaae18dcbcd7eb1@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Helena, In reply to you, and also to Greg, I'm reposting in chronological order the exchanges (including off-line exchanges with Andy) that constitute this discussion. I think the off-line exchange answers the question you asked. (Note, it was Andy's suggestion that the off-line conversation be posted online. That conversation ends with a question Andy has posed that perhaps others can answer.) David -----First Message (i.e., earliest)----- Clearly, as in Katherine Neal's response, and in MCA, CHAT/sociocultural theory informs empirical research. What's less clear is that empirical research informs CHAT/sociocultural theorizing. Not quite sure what to make of that. David -----Second Message----- David, in the recently published book, "Collaborative Projects. An Interdisciplinary Study," authors were invited to submit studies with empirical content (in the sense in which you are using the word) which illustrated the use of the concept of "project" within CHAT. https://www.academia.edu/6756231/Collaborative_Projects._An_Interdisciplinary_Study As you can see from the Table of Contents, more than a dozen different practical studies were contributed, and I am satisfied that the collection functioned to illuminate the philosophical issues about the nature of "an activity," and its ue as a unit of analysis, even though they are only explicitly addressed in the long Introduction. Andy -----Third Message----- Andy, Thanks for the link to the TOC of your edited volume, which perhaps unintentionally illustrates my point that empirical studies using CHAT/sociocultural theory generally aren't intended as contributions to theory, per se; as you noted, the affordances for theorizing were brought out by you, rather than by the authors as part of their motive for producing the empirical work. I've hung out with cognitive psychologists quite a bit, and there's a very clear demarcation between applied studies which utilize cognitive theory for applicative purposes and pure studies whose sole raison d'?tre is to inform theory. Furthermore, it is a fairly rare occurrence for anyone to attempt to address theory in any other way than through the lens of empirical studies. My own experience of this community includes appreciation of the tight logic of their theorizing, and also of the inventiveness of researchers in generating truly provocative data that they are then forced to contend. But it also includes a sense of frustration with the absence of any critique of or input to theory from outside of the little studies that, one after another, niggle away at the theoretical infrastructure. Excluded, here, are not only philosophical inputs to theory, but even broader methodological constraints regarding the character of good theories. (My own grounding in mathematical theorizing includes a deliciously salient sense of the "elegance" that makes a theory truly admirable and worthy.) Somehow, it seems noteworthy that CHAT/sociocultural psychology-whatever its virtues-isn't organized like other branches of psychology (e.g., behavioral, cognitive, developmental) with respect to the role of empirical data in theory construction. Andy, in your response to Jenna, you described science as an objective practice that "is not dependant on what you and I, writing here on xmca in 2014, says it is." The question all this raises is whether CHAT/sociocultural psychology actually qualifies as a scientific practice. David -----Fourth Message (off-line)----- David, I think I misled you by making it seem as if the book had a dichotomy of theory here and data there. Not so. If you look at Brecht's and Anna's chapters you will see that the chapters had empirical content but were also theory-laden and the data was brought to bear on the theory: On Cognitive Psychology, I am only familiar with the Psychology of Concepts, so my comments are relevant only to that branch. I agree that they have shown a lot of ingenuity in their experimental work and this has led to a relatively rapid progress in its theory. But their theory begins at such a woeful level! If experimental work aims to "test" theory, it is not hard to "test" theory which hardly rises above common sense. And David, you have to give CHAT credit for the fact that it sets its standards very high for theory. Andy -----Fifth Message (off-line)----- Hi Andy, Thanks for sending these papers. I look forward to reading them. My point isn't that empirical evidence CAN'T inform theory, but that's not the usual vehicle whereby theory is advanced. You're much more aware of this literature than me. Do you disagree with the generalization that empirical work in CHAT/sociocultural is of an applied nature, notwithstanding occasional cases in which data are used to establish a theoretical position? Note that your observation about the relative lack of sophistication of cognitive theorization of concepts is kind of a celebration of that fact that CHAT/sociocultural theorizing is informed primarily by a theoretical/philosophical discourse, rather than one that is rooted in empirical evidence. So the question isn't a normative one--how should CHAT/sociocultural theory advance--but a description one--how does it advance. I should add that the problem with cognitive theorizing, as I see it, isn't only that it progresses slowly, but that it is fundamentally limited by its starting assumptions. The fundamental constructs of cognitive psychology come from the analogy of the serial digital computer to the human information processing system. I don't think that ever gets challenged within that paradigm. David -----Sixth Message (off-line)----- Andy said: I think the substantive and interesting question you raise here is: Has CHAT theorizing has advanced over the years as a result of insights of the form of empirical observations, or, as a result of critique of concepts? I don't know if I have enough of an overview of the history of CHAT to answer this. It would be good to keep it on the list because Mike Cole probably could answer authoritatively. My guess is that there have been occasional problems which have arisen and become subjects of wide discussion, particularly in the domain of education, and these have stimulated theoretical advance. But I really don't know. Andy ________________________ -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Helena Worthen Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 12:46 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse David - Can you elaborate on this, please? "...the affordances for theorizing were brought out by you, rather than by the authors as part of their motive for producing the empirical work"? On the one hand, I think that the affordances for theorizing (meaning, the opportunities for engaging with theory, right? Or the actions that can be allowed or supported by a particular theory? Or the way the effect of a theoretical framework can be surfaced and explored by empirical work?) ARE brought out by the authors in the book Andy edited. On the other hand, I guess I'd agree that the empirical work itself (meaning the research, the activities) was not motivated by the desire to contribute to theory. However, writing the chapters in which the empirical work is presented was clearly motivated by a desire to contribute to theory. Have I got it wrong? Helena Worthen hworthen@illinois.edu On Sep 16, 2014, at 1:06 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: > Andy, > > Thanks for the link to the TOC of your edited volume, which perhaps unintentionally illustrates my point that empirical studies using CHAT/sociocultural theory generally aren't intended as contributions to theory, per se; as you noted, the affordances for theorizing were brought out by you, rather than by the authors as part of their motive for producing the empirical work. > > I've hung out with cognitive psychologists quite a bit, and there's a very clear demarcation between applied studies which utilize cognitive theory for applicative purposes and pure studies whose sole raison d'?tre is to inform theory. Furthermore, it is a fairly rare occurrence for anyone to attempt to address theory in any other way than through the lens of empirical studies. > > My own experience of this community includes appreciation of the tight logic of their theorizing, and also of the inventiveness of researchers in generating truly provocative data that they are then forced to contend. But it also includes a sense of frustration with the absence of any critique of or input to theory from outside of the little studies that, one after another, niggle away at the theoretical infrastructure. Excluded, here, are not only philosophical inputs to theory, but even broader methodological constraints regarding the character of good theories. (My own grounding in mathematical theorizing includes a deliciously salient sense of the "elegance" that makes a theory truly admirable and worthy.) > > Somehow, it seems noteworthy that CHAT/sociocultural psychology-whatever its virtues-isn't organized like other branches of psychology (e.g., behavioral, cognitive, developmental) with respect to the role of empirical data in theory construction. Andy, in your response to Jenna, you described science as an objective practice that "is not dependant on what you and I, writing here on xmca in 2014, says it is." The question all this raises is whether CHAT/sociocultural psychology actually qualifies as a scientific practice. > > David > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:59 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > > David, in the recently published book, "Collaborative Projects. An Interdisciplinary Study," authors were invited to submit studies with empirical content (in the sense in which you are using the word) which illustrated the use of the concept of "project" within CHAT. > > https://www.academia.edu/6756231/Collaborative_Projects._An_Interdisciplinary_Study > > As you can see from the Table of Contents, more than a dozen different practical studies were contributed, and I am satisfied that the collection functioned to illuminate the philosophical issues about the nature of "an activity," and its ue as a unit of analysis, even though they are only explicitly addressed in the long Introduction. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > David H Kirshner wrote: > >> Mike, > >> > >> Clearly, as in Katherine Neal's response, and in MCA, CHAT/sociocultural theory informs empirical research. > >> What's less clear is that empirical research informs CHAT/sociocultural theorizing. > >> Not quite sure what to make of that. > >> > >> David > >> > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > >> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 11:15 AM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > >> > >> Your followup comment is closely related to the second part of your initiating message, David. So i will respond in line. > >> > >> Firstly, I think it would be helpful to distinguish between MCA and xmca. > >> The idea behind xmca was to provide a discussion forum for articles that appear in MCA so that instead of authors having to wait 2+ years for feedback on their ideas (which rarely comes, even then!), we could discuss the published work and learn from it in a timely manner. By an large, that effort has, in my opinion, failed. Thanks to the recent decision to have the editors pick out articles for discussion which include the author(s) in the discussion, this situation has been somewhat mitigated. But only somewhat. xma discussions have all the characteristics of Vygotskian chaining, as a rule. > >> > >> Secondly, when I take down a bundle of recent MCA issues and look at the titles, they at least sound like they are about empirical matters ranging across a wide variety of content areas. Are you saying that these articles are not really empirical? Or that they are not really helping us to develop better methods to deal with perceived problems of social value? Again, this raises the question of "MCA or xmca". > >> > >> Lastly, perhaps it would be helpful if those of us who believe that empirical work guided by CHAT ideas of some value has been produced in, say, the past two decades, would post brief summiaries of that work with references. > >> Maybe its just all verbal sound and fury, signifying the usual! > >> mike > >> > >> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 8:50 AM, David H Kirshner > wrote: > >> > >> > >>> Does CHAT theory really advance with respect to empirical studies? > >>> If so, then why isn't the XMCA discussion a discussion about > >>> so-and-so's empirical results and how we should interpret them? > >>> Various branches of psychology (e.g., cognitive and developmental) do > >>> address concepts, and do conduct empirical research related to concepts. > >>> It's true, they rarely enter into full-blooded discussion of what is > >>> a concept. But perhaps that's because they're scientists rather than > >>> philosophers. They're operating within a framework that is bounded > >>> primarily by empirical and methodological expectations and > >>> obligations; theory evolves within those boundaries. > >>> It's not clear to me that the Vygotskyan research community ever > >>> operated in that fashion, and I'm wondering what would happen if it did. > >>> David > >>> > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 10:23 AM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse > >>> > >>> Well, Lisa, I think that is a project which requires a lot of what > >>> David would call "philosophical" discussion. :) The Psychology of > >>> Concepts, as it is know to American psychology, i.e., the "mainstream" > >>> do endless laboratory tests and questionnaires and surveys and so far > >>> as I can see have still haven't figured out what a concept is. > >>> Andy > >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>> - > >>> -- > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > >>> > >>>> Well I am guilty for being fixated about thinking and talking about > >>>> methods and how to better understand how we can make a trustworthy > >>>> leap from understanding the world to understanding concepts. Again > >>>> just talking aloud. > >>>> > >>>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > >>>> Psychology and Counseling > >>>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 Bailey > >>>> Education Complex > >>>> IT Online Program Coordinator University > >>>> of Tennessee > >>>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ > >>>> Knoxville, TN 37996 > >>>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > >>>> 865-974-7712 > >>>> > >>>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Andy Blunden >>>> > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and we all have > >>>> our specific research interests. > >>>> But when we publish, most of us have something to report. > >>>> I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more of my share of > >>>> time arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest. > >>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>> - > >>> -- > >>> > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Why is it that we came to what David stated as: > >>>> > >>>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over > >>>> facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical > >>>> elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost > >>>> completely detached from empirical specifics. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational > >>>> Psychology and Counseling > >>>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 > >>>> Bailey Education Complex > >>>> IT Online Program Coordinator > >>>> University of Tennessee > >>>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ > >>>> Knoxville, TN 37996 > >>>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: > >>>> 865-974-7712 > >>>> > >>>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner > >>>> > >>>> >> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Andy, > >>>> > >>>> I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific > >>>> project, > >>>> though it might initially have been conceived as such. > >>>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over > >>>> facts." > >>>> We are engaged in making endless theoretical elaborations, > >>>> distinctions, and qualifications almost completely > >>>> detached from > >>>> empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even > >>>> at the > >>>> level of theory, we're not all playing the same game. > >>>> > >>>> I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that > >>>> claims be > >>>> framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the > >>>> significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical > >>>> setting > >>>> theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In > >>>> this case, > >>>> there is a possibility that disagreements lead to > >>>> separation of > >>>> research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical agreement > >>>> as a > >>>> consequence. > >>>> > >>>> David > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net > >>>> > >>>> >] > >>>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM > >>>> To: David H Kirshner > >>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>> Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse > >>>> > >>>> David, > >>>> CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science > >>>> it > >>>> > >>> must > >>> > >>>> strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are > >>>> meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into which > >>>> they > >>>> are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a > >>>> system of > >>>> concepts. People can agree on this or that hard experimental > >>>> finding, but still not agree on the significance of that > >>>> claim. We > >>>> CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over > >>>> facts; > >>>> all of this is possible only to the extent that we share > >>>> concepts. > >>>> "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a goal > >>>> as it > >>>> is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is > >>>> ill-conceived to > >>>> think that this is a means of consolidating a current of > >>>> research > >>>> like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or psychological, > >>>> I don't > >>>> think that makes any difference. > >>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>> - > >>> -- > >>> > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> David H Kirshner wrote: > >>>>> Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, it > >>>> seems > >>>> inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing > >>>> efforts > >>>> to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from > >>>> efforts > >>>> > >>> to > >>> > >>>> solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In > >>>> tandem, is > >>>> ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or > >>>> philosophical > >>>> discourse. > >>>>> > >>>>> I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement of > >>>> CHAT > >>>> would not be better served by embedding theoretical > >>>> discussion in > >>>> analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be > >>>> to make > >>>> CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application > >>>> (though that > >>>> would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical obligation > >>>> might > >>>> transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of > >>>> methodology. In that way, CHAT could become differentiated > >>>> into > >>>> distinct psychological schools, each constrained by > >>>> methodological > >>>> strictures that also support a more homogeneous theoretical > >>>> environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community > >>>> could > >>>> look across these various schools to pursue broader > >>>> philosophical > >>>> problematics. > >>>>> > >>>>> David > >>>>> > >>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> > >>>> >>>> > > >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> > >>>> >>>> >] On Behalf Of Andy > >>>> Blunden > >>>>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM > >>>>> To: Huw Lloyd > >>>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct > >>>> perception > >>>>> > >>>>> Ah! I see! > >>>>> As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in > >>>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally > >>>> contain > >>>> both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem > >>>> with anyone > >>>> saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where > >>>> it > >>>> > >>> is > >>> > >>>> appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of > >>>> Vygotsky, > >>>> that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially > >>>> productive unit of analysis for science is lost if > >>>> mediation in > >>>> the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with > >>>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation is > >>>> lost. > >>>> Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point > >>>> you were > >>>> referring to you used some expression other than "mediation." > >>>>> > >>>>> Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I > >>>> can do > >>>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams or > >>>> thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit my > >>>> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or > >>>> whatever - > >>>> but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, are > >>>> products of the history and culture into which I was born. > >>>> I can > >>>> choose which artefact to use, but culture and history produce > >>>> them. So every action I take is essentially > >>>> cultural-historical as > >>>> well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material > >>>> objects, > >>>> their physical form is the same for everyone, it is > >>>> universal. So > >>>> communication as much as miscommunication takes place through > >>>> everyone interpreting the same material objects, > >>>> artefacts, that I > >>>> am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because > >>>> they > >>>> > >>> too > >>> > >>>> mediate their actions with the same set of universal > >>>> artefacts! So > >>>> all human action is opened to cultural and historical > >>>> > >>> analysis > >>> > >>>> which is as objective as any branch of natural science. > >>>> Wonderful, eh? > >>>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>> - > >>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> If you want to study how action changes then you need > >>>> to study the > >>>>>> history and production of the action. Under such > >>>> circumstances, > >>>>>> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the production > >>>> of) actions > >>>>>> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, > >>>> through > >>>>>> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then > >>>> it may seem > >>>>>> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an action. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) > >>>> are an elegant > >>>>>> way to demonstrate this. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Best, > >>>>>> Huw > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden > >>>> > > >>>> >> > >>>>>> > > >>>> >>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> he, he, Huw! > >>>>>> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are > >>>> the very > >>>>>> problems that need to be remedied by clarification! > >>>> and I > >>>> really > >>>>>> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally > >>>> being > >>>> used to > >>>>>> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is > >>>> not equal to > >>>>>> separation. > >>>>>> I really don't know what you are referring to with > >>>> product and > >>>>>> history. Perhaps you could explain? > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>> - > >>> -- > >>> > >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I agree about precision, but not with a call > >>>> for "clarity". > >>>>>> Reduction to clarity is a projection or > >>>> reification of the > >>>>>> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually entails > >>>> typologies or > >>>>>> other simplistic devices which prevent the > >>>> conception and > >>>>>> perception of genetic relations. Actually in > >>>> cases such as > >>>>>> these we are interested in (clarifying) the > >>>> entanglements > >>>>>> between artefacts and mind. I think It would > >>>> be equally > >>>>>> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state that > >>>> > >>> one > >>> > >>>> needs to > >>>>>> obfuscate (see darkly) too. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I think it is this "need for simplification" which > >>>> leads me to > >>>>>> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, > >>>> why separate > >>>>>> the act from its production and history? > >>>>>> Of course, if one had the discipline to de-couple > >>>> clarity from > >>>>>> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the > >>>> problem. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Best, > >>>>>> Huw > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden > >>>> > > >>>> >> > >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >> > >>>> > > >>>> >> > >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> > >>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that > >>>> in the CHAT > >>>>>> tradition > >>>>>> specifically, as opposed to the English > >>>> language in > >>>> general, > >>>>>> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. Of > >>>> course, every > >>>>>> action > >>>>>> is both mediated and immediate, and in many > >>>> discursive > >>>>>> contexts, > >>>>>> "mediation" is a concept which may be > >>>> evoked quite > >>>>>> legitimately, > >>>>>> but with no special significant for the use of > >>>> CHAT. In social > >>>>>> theory, for example, mediation of > >>>> activities by other > >>>>>> activities > >>>>>> or institutions is as ubiquitous as > >>>> mediation of > >>>> actions by > >>>>>> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. > >>>> But if > >>>> the topic is > >>>>>> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is so > >>>> central, that I > >>>>>> prefer to spell it out and use the term > >>>>>> "artefact-mediated" rather > >>>>>> than the vague term "mediated". > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I have come across usages like "mediated by > >>>> such-and-such a > >>>>>> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can > >>>> use words to > >>>>>> mean what > >>>>>> you like, but I find a formulation like > >>>> this in the > >>>> context of > >>>>>> CHAT problematic, because it is using the > >>>> idea of > >>>>>> "mediation" in > >>>>>> the most general sense in a way which > >>>> obscures the > >>>> fact that a > >>>>>> concept is not immediately present in any > >>>> act of > >>>>>> communication or > >>>>>> any other act, and therefore *cannot > >>>> mediate actions*. > >>>>>> Artefacts, > >>>>>> such as spoken words, which may be signs for a > >>>> concept, can of > >>>>>> course mediate an act of communication. But > >>>> > >>> the > >>> > >>>> point is > >>>>>> that a > >>>>>> word is not universally and unproblematically > >>>> > >>> a > >>> > >>>> sign for > >>>>>> any one > >>>>>> concept. It means different things to > >>>> different people. > >>>>>> Concepts > >>>>>> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal > >>>> in their > >>>>>> materiality, > >>>>>> but particular in their meaning. So when we > >>>> have a > >>>> concept > >>>>>> in mind > >>>>>> when we use a word in communication, the > >>>> communication is > >>>>>> mediated > >>>>>> by the word not the concept, and it is a > >>>> mistake > >>>> not to be > >>>>>> aware > >>>>>> of that. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were > >>>> always used in > >>>>>> qualified > >>>>>> way so that its specific meaning is made > >>>> > >>> clear. > >>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> PS. And David Ki is completely right in his > >>>> comment, too. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>> - > >>> -- > >>> > >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Does "mediation" only apply to language > >>>> > >>> and > >>> > >>>> culture? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in > >>>> which case we > >>>>>> would need > >>>>>> to include > >>>>>> reflexes) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> And does it include our socio-contextual > >>>> surround as in > >>>>>> Bateson's man with > >>>>>> the stick? (in which case, we would > >>>> need to include > >>>>>> newborns). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Just wonderin'. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -greg > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David > >>>> H Kirshner > >>>>>> > > >>>> >> > >>>> > > >>>> >>> > >>>>>> > > >>>> >> > >>>> > > >>>> >>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Thanks for replies. > >>>>>> I'm recalling several years ago Jim > >>>> Greeno > >>>> decided > >>>>>> to stop > >>>>>> talking about > >>>>>> situated cognition because the > >>>> pragmatics of > >>>>>> adjectival > >>>>>> use implies there > >>>>>> has to be a contrasting non-situated > >>>> cognition. He now > >>>>>> speaks of > >>>>>> situativity theory. It seems, with the > >>>> exception of > >>>>>> physical reflexes (and > >>>>>> perhaps pre-conscious infant > >>>> activity), all > >>>> human > >>>>>> action > >>>>>> is mediated (and > >>>>>> perhaps a lot of non-human action, as > >>>> well). So, it's > >>>>>> worth noting that > >>>>>> "mediated action" doesn't specify a > >>>> kind of > >>>>>> action, but > >>>>>> rather a > >>>>>> theoretical assumption about all human > >>>> action; though > >>>>>> there seems to be > >>>>>> some variation in interpretation of > >>>> what that > >>>>>> assumption > >>>>>> entails. > >>>>>> David > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > From ablunden@mira.net Tue Sep 16 21:14:38 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 14:14:38 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> <54178B49.9070205@mira.net> <50f7f5173d374b5fa9ed51a3b62501f9@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <54190AAE.9020707@mira.net> I think Vygotsky spoke optimistically about resolving the crisis in Psychology because he was writing in the wake of the successful Russian Revolution. Alas it was not to be so. But as a Marxist he would know that without the resolution of the crisis of humanity there could be no resolution in the crisis of any of the special sciences. Which is all the more reason to tackle the disciplinary boundaries inhibiting the development of both psychology and social theory. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > ?Complicated discussion about CHAT and whether its a science or not. > > One thing to keep in mind, perhaps: Vygotsky said he was seeking to > resolve the crisis in psychology as he diagnosed it a century ago. In my > view, he did not resolve it. I made the argument at the end of Cultural > Psychology and can post a draft of the chapter here if it needs rehearsing. > I believe, to the extent that it can be solved, it requires one to take > seriously the fusion of theory and practice. Seems like Vygotsky said > something along these same lines, too, about practice being the crucible of > theory. > > The question of what can be learned from an analysis of projects such as > those present in Andy's collection seems an important one. I am biased. I > would hate to think that i learned nothing from the past 30+ years of > involvement in the 5th Dimension! > > mike > > ? > > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 12:43 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > >> David, >> I'd note that in addition to Andy's introduction, there was a "spirited" >> contribution (or two or three...) that use empirical stuff to contribute to >> theory. >> -greg >> >> >> >> On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 2:06 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: >> >> >>> Andy, >>> >>> >>> >>> Thanks for the link to the TOC of your edited volume, which perhaps >>> unintentionally illustrates my point that empirical studies using >>> CHAT/sociocultural theory generally aren't intended as contributions to >>> theory, per se; as you noted, the affordances for theorizing were brought >>> out by you, rather than by the authors as part of their motive for >>> producing the empirical work. >>> >>> >>> >>> I've hung out with cognitive psychologists quite a bit, and there's a >>> >> very >> >>> clear demarcation between applied studies which utilize cognitive theory >>> for applicative purposes and pure studies whose sole raison d'?tre is to >>> inform theory. Furthermore, it is a fairly rare occurrence for anyone to >>> attempt to address theory in any other way than through the lens of >>> empirical studies. >>> >>> >>> >>> My own experience of this community includes appreciation of the tight >>> logic of their theorizing, and also of the inventiveness of researchers >>> >> in >> >>> generating truly provocative data that they are then forced to contend. >>> >> But >> >>> it also includes a sense of frustration with the absence of any critique >>> >> of >> >>> or input to theory from outside of the little studies that, one after >>> another, niggle away at the theoretical infrastructure. Excluded, here, >>> >> are >> >>> not only philosophical inputs to theory, but even broader methodological >>> constraints regarding the character of good theories. (My own grounding >>> >> in >> >>> mathematical theorizing includes a deliciously salient sense of the >>> ?elegance? that makes a theory truly admirable and worthy.) >>> >>> >>> >>> Somehow, it seems noteworthy that CHAT/sociocultural psychology?whatever >>> its virtues?isn?t organized like other branches of psychology (e.g., >>> behavioral, cognitive, developmental) with respect to the role of >>> >> empirical >> >>> data in theory construction. Andy, in your response to Jenna, you >>> >> described >> >>> science as an objective practice that ?is not dependant on what you and >>> >> I, >> >>> writing here on xmca in 2014, says it is.? The question all this raises >>> >> is >> >>> whether CHAT/sociocultural psychology actually qualifies as a scientific >>> practice. >>> >>> >>> >>> David >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:59 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse >>> >>> >>> >>> David, in the recently published book, "Collaborative Projects. An >>> Interdisciplinary Study," authors were invited to submit studies with >>> empirical content (in the sense in which you are using the word) which >>> illustrated the use of the concept of "project" within CHAT. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> https://www.academia.edu/6756231/Collaborative_Projects._An_Interdisciplinary_Study >> >>> >>> As you can see from the Table of Contents, more than a dozen different >>> practical studies were contributed, and I am satisfied that the >>> >> collection >> >>> functioned to illuminate the philosophical issues about the nature of "an >>> activity," and its ue as a unit of analysis, even though they are only >>> explicitly addressed in the long Introduction. >>> >>> >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> David H Kirshner wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Mike, >>>> >>>> Clearly, as in Katherine Neal's response, and in MCA, >>>> >> CHAT/sociocultural >> >>> theory informs empirical research. >>> >>> >>>> What's less clear is that empirical research informs CHAT/sociocultural >>>> >>> theorizing. >>> >>> >>>> Not quite sure what to make of that. >>>> >>>> David >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole >>>> >>>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 11:15 AM >>>> >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse >>>> >>>> Your followup comment is closely related to the second part of your >>>> >>> initiating message, David. So i will respond in line. >>> >>> >>>> Firstly, I think it would be helpful to distinguish between MCA and >>>> >> xmca. >> >>>> The idea behind xmca was to provide a discussion forum for articles >>>> >> that >> >>> appear in MCA so that instead of authors having to wait 2+ years for >>> feedback on their ideas (which rarely comes, even then!), we could >>> >> discuss >> >>> the published work and learn from it in a timely manner. By an large, >>> >> that >> >>> effort has, in my opinion, failed. Thanks to the recent decision to have >>> the editors pick out articles for discussion which include the author(s) >>> >> in >> >>> the discussion, this situation has been somewhat mitigated. But only >>> somewhat. xma discussions have all the characteristics of Vygotskian >>> chaining, as a rule. >>> >>> >>>> Secondly, when I take down a bundle of recent MCA issues and look at >>>> >> the >> >>> titles, they at least sound like they are about empirical matters ranging >>> across a wide variety of content areas. Are you saying that these >>> >> articles >> >>> are not really empirical? Or that they are not really helping us to >>> >> develop >> >>> better methods to deal with perceived problems of social value? Again, >>> >> this >> >>> raises the question of "MCA or xmca". >>> >>> >>>> Lastly, perhaps it would be helpful if those of us who believe that >>>> >>> empirical work guided by CHAT ideas of some value has been produced in, >>> say, the past two decades, would post brief summiaries of that work with >>> references. >>> >>> >>>> Maybe its just all verbal sound and fury, signifying the usual! >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 8:50 AM, David H Kirshner >>> >>> > wrote: >>> >>> >>>>> Does CHAT theory really advance with respect to empirical studies? >>>>> >>>>> If so, then why isn't the XMCA discussion a discussion about >>>>> >>>>> so-and-so's empirical results and how we should interpret them? >>>>> >>>>> Various branches of psychology (e.g., cognitive and developmental) do >>>>> >>>>> address concepts, and do conduct empirical research related to >>>>> >> concepts. >> >>>>> It's true, they rarely enter into full-blooded discussion of what is >>>>> >>>>> a concept. But perhaps that's because they're scientists rather than >>>>> >>>>> philosophers. They're operating within a framework that is bounded >>>>> >>>>> primarily by empirical and methodological expectations and >>>>> >>>>> obligations; theory evolves within those boundaries. >>>>> >>>>> It's not clear to me that the Vygotskyan research community ever >>>>> >>>>> operated in that fashion, and I'm wondering what would happen if it >>>>> >> did. >> >>>>> David >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>> >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>> >>>>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 10:23 AM >>>>> >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse >>>>> >>>>> Well, Lisa, I think that is a project which requires a lot of what >>>>> >>>>> David would call "philosophical" discussion. :) The Psychology of >>>>> >>>>> Concepts, as it is know to American psychology, i.e., the "mainstream" >>>>> >>>>> do endless laboratory tests and questionnaires and surveys and so far >>>>> >>>>> as I can see have still haven't figured out what a concept is. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> >>>>> - >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Well I am guilty for being fixated about thinking and talking about >>>>>> >>>>>> methods and how to better understand how we can make a trustworthy >>>>>> >>>>>> leap from understanding the world to understanding concepts. Again >>>>>> >>>>>> just talking aloud. >>>>>> >>>>>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor Educational >>>>>> >>>>>> Psychology and Counseling >>>>>> >>>>>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ A532 >>>>>> >> Bailey >> >>>>>> Education Complex >>>>>> >>>>>> IT Online Program Coordinator University >>>>>> >>>>>> of Tennessee >>>>>> >>>>>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ >>>>>> >>>>>> Knoxville, TN 37996 >>>>>> >>>>>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline Phone: >>>>>> >>>>>> 865-974-7712 >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Andy Blunden >>>>> >>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and we all have >>>>>> >>>>>> our specific research interests. >>>>>> >>>>>> But when we publish, most of us have something to report. >>>>>> >>>>>> I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more of my share >>>>>> >> of >> >>>>>> time arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> >>>>> - >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Why is it that we came to what David stated as: >>>>>> >>>>>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over >>>>>> >>>>>> facts." We are engaged in making endless theoretical >>>>>> >>>>>> elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications almost >>>>>> >>>>>> completely detached from empirical specifics. >>>>>> >>>>>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor >>>>>> >> Educational >> >>>>>> Psychology and Counseling >>>>>> >>>>>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ >>>>>> >> A532 >> >>>>>> Bailey Education Complex >>>>>> >>>>>> IT Online Program Coordinator >>>>>> >>>>>> University of Tennessee >>>>>> >>>>>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ >>>>>> >>>>>> Knoxville, TN 37996 >>>>>> >>>>>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline >>>>>> >> Phone: >> >>>>>> 865-974-7712 >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H Kirshner >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >> % >> >>> 20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>> >> >>> >>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy, >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is a scientific >>>>>> >>>>>> project, >>>>>> >>>>>> though it might initially have been conceived as such. >>>>>> >>>>>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and argue over >>>>>> >>>>>> facts." >>>>>> >>>>>> We are engaged in making endless theoretical >>>>>> >> elaborations, >> >>>>>> distinctions, and qualifications almost completely >>>>>> >>>>>> detached from >>>>>> >>>>>> empirical specifics. And as your note has revealed, even >>>>>> >>>>>> at the >>>>>> >>>>>> level of theory, we're not all playing the same game. >>>>>> >>>>>> I agree with you that simply creating an obligation that >>>>>> >>>>>> claims be >>>>>> >>>>>> framed empirically does not imply we will "agree on the >>>>>> >>>>>> significance of that claim." But perhaps in an empirical >>>>>> >>>>>> setting >>>>>> >>>>>> theoretical issues surface as methodological issues. In >>>>>> >>>>>> this case, >>>>>> >>>>>> there is a possibility that disagreements lead to >>>>>> >>>>>> separation of >>>>>> >>>>>> research enterprises, with (greater) theoretical >>>>>> >> agreement >> >>>>>> as a >>>>>> >>>>>> consequence. >>>>>> >>>>>> David >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> >>>>>> From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >] >>>>>> >>>>>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM >>>>>> >>>>>> To: David H Kirshner >>>>>> >>>>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> >>>>>> Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse >>>>>> >>>>>> David, >>>>>> >>>>>> CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it is science >>>>>> >>>>>> it >>>>>> >>>>> must >>>>> >>>>>> strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are >>>>>> >>>>>> meaningful irrespective of the conceptual frame into >>>>>> >> which >> >>>>>> they >>>>>> >>>>>> are accepted. But as a project it is characterised by a >>>>>> >>>>>> system of >>>>>> >>>>>> concepts. People can agree on this or that hard >>>>>> >>> experimental >>> >>> >>>>>> finding, but still not agree on the significance of that >>>>>> >>>>>> claim. We >>>>>> >>>>>> CHATters talk to one another, collaborate and argue over >>>>>> >>>>>> facts; >>>>>> >>>>>> all of this is possible only to the extent that we share >>>>>> >>>>>> concepts. >>>>>> >>>>>> "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As worthy a >>>>>> >> goal >> >>>>>> as it >>>>>> >>>>>> is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it is >>>>>> >>>>>> ill-conceived to >>>>>> >>>>>> think that this is a means of consolidating a current of >>>>>> >>>>>> research >>>>>> >>>>>> like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or >>>>>> >> psychological, >> >>>>>> I don't >>>>>> >>>>>> think that makes any difference. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> >>>>> - >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> David H Kirshner wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact mediation, >>>>>> >> it >> >>>>>> seems >>>>>> >>>>>> inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to distinguishing >>>>>> >>>>>> efforts >>>>>> >>>>>> to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more fully, from >>>>>> >>>>>> efforts >>>>>> >>>>> to >>>>> >>>>>> solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In >>>>>> >>>>>> tandem, is >>>>>> >>>>>> ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a psychological or >>>>>> >>>>>> philosophical >>>>>> >>>>>> discourse. >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if advancement >>>>>> >> of >> >>>>>> CHAT >>>>>> >>>>>> would not be better served by embedding theoretical >>>>>> >>>>>> discussion in >>>>>> >>>>>> analysis of empirical data. The point, here, would not be >>>>>> >>>>>> to make >>>>>> >>>>>> CHAT more directly relevant to domains of application >>>>>> >>>>>> (though that >>>>>> >>>>>> would not be a bad thing). Rather, an empirical >>>>>> >> obligation >> >>>>>> might >>>>>> >>>>>> transmute (some) questions of theory into questions of >>>>>> >>>>>> methodology. In that way, CHAT could become >>>>>> >> differentiated >> >>>>>> into >>>>>> >>>>>> distinct psychological schools, each constrained by >>>>>> >>>>>> methodological >>>>>> >>>>>> strictures that also support a more homogeneous >>>>>> >> theoretical >> >>>>>> environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community >>>>>> >>>>>> could >>>>>> >>>>>> look across these various schools to pursue broader >>>>>> >>>>>> philosophical >>>>>> >>>>>> problematics. >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > David >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > -----Original Message----- >>>>>> >>>>>> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >] On Behalf Of Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> Blunden >>>>>> >>>>>> > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM >>>>>> >>>>>> > To: Huw Lloyd >>>>>> >>>>>> > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> >>>>>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct >>>>>> >>>>>> perception >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > Ah! I see! >>>>>> >>>>>> > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or >>>>>> >>> in >>> >>> >>>>>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally >>>>>> >>>>>> contain >>>>>> >>>>>> both immediacy and mediation." I have no great problem >>>>>> >>>>>> with anyone >>>>>> >>>>>> saying that anything is mediated by anything else, where >>>>>> >>>>>> it >>>>>> >>>>> is >>>>> >>>>>> appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of >>>>>> >>>>>> Vygotsky, >>>>>> >>>>>> that artefact-mediation of actions provides an especially >>>>>> >>>>>> productive unit of analysis for science is lost if >>>>>> >>>>>> mediation in >>>>>> >>>>>> the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT literature with >>>>>> >>>>>> artefact-mediation to the point that artefact-mediation >>>>>> >> is >> >>>>>> lost. >>>>>> >>>>>> Still, I would prefer that if you were to make the point >>>>>> >>>>>> you were >>>>>> >>>>>> referring to you used some expression other than >>>>>> >>> "mediation." >>> >>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > Artefact mediation of actions is a brilliant insight. I >>>>>> >>>>>> can do >>>>>> >>>>>> what I like, but to do anything (other than have dreams >>>>>> >> or >> >>>>>> thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit >>>>>> >> my >> >>>>>> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or >>>>>> >>>>>> whatever - >>>>>> >>>>>> but all these artefacts which I use, without exception, >>>>>> >> are >> >>>>>> products of the history and culture into which I was >>>>>> >> born. >> >>>>>> I can >>>>>> >>>>>> choose which artefact to use, but culture and history >>>>>> >>> produce >>> >>> >>>>>> them. So every action I take is essentially >>>>>> >>>>>> cultural-historical as >>>>>> >>>>>> well as personal. Also, because artefacts are material >>>>>> >>>>>> objects, >>>>>> >>>>>> their physical form is the same for everyone, it is >>>>>> >>>>>> universal. So >>>>>> >>>>>> communication as much as miscommunication takes place >>>>>> >>> through >>> >>> >>>>>> everyone interpreting the same material objects, >>>>>> >>>>>> artefacts, that I >>>>>> >>>>>> am using in my actions. How can they do that? Because >>>>>> >>>>>> they >>>>>> >>>>> too >>>>> >>>>>> mediate their actions with the same set of universal >>>>>> >>>>>> artefacts! So >>>>>> >>>>>> all human action is opened to cultural and historical >>>>>> >>>>> analysis >>>>> >>>>>> which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>>>>> >>>>>> Wonderful, eh? >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> >>>>> - >>>>> >>>>>> > -- >>>>>> >>>>>> > *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> >>>>>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> >> If you want to study how action changes then you need >>>>>> >>>>>> to study the >>>>>> >>>>>> >> history and production of the action. Under such >>>>>> >>>>>> circumstances, >>>>>> >>>>>> >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate (the >>>>>> >> production >> >>>>>> of) actions >>>>>> >>>>>> >> become more obviously false. If one has simplified, >>>>>> >>>>>> through >>>>>> >>>>>> >> "clarity", the action away from its genetic base then >>>>>> >>>>>> it may seem >>>>>> >>>>>> >> correct to assert that a concept cannot mediate an >>>>>> >>> action. >>> >>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation of volume) >>>>>> >>>>>> are an elegant >>>>>> >>>>>> >> way to demonstrate this. >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> Best, >>>>>> >>>>>> >> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>> ablunden@mira.net%20%3cmailto:ablunden@mira.net>> >>> >>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>> >> >>> >>> >>>>>> >> >>>>> >>> > >>> >>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>> ablunden@mira.net%20%3cmailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> he, he, Huw! >>>>>> >>>>>> >> For me, reduction, simplification and typology are >>>>>> >>>>>> the very >>>>>> >>>>>> >> problems that need to be remedied by >>>>>> >> clarification! >> >>>>>> and I >>>>>> >>>>>> really >>>>>> >>>>>> >> don't think obfuscation is ever helpful, generally >>>>>> >>>>>> being >>>>>> >>>>>> used to >>>>>> >>>>>> >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. Distinction is >>>>>> >>>>>> not equal to >>>>>> >>>>>> >> separation. >>>>>> >>>>>> >> I really don't know what you are referring to with >>>>>> >>>>>> product and >>>>>> >>>>>> >> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>> >>>>>> >> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> >>>>> - >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>>> >> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> >>>>>> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> I agree about precision, but not with a call >>>>>> >>>>>> for "clarity". >>>>>> >>>>>> >> Reduction to clarity is a projection or >>>>>> >>>>>> reification of the >>>>>> >>>>>> >> need for simplicity. Simplicity usually >>>>>> >> entails >> >>>>>> typologies or >>>>>> >>>>>> >> other simplistic devices which prevent the >>>>>> >>>>>> conception and >>>>>> >>>>>> >> perception of genetic relations. Actually in >>>>>> >>>>>> cases such as >>>>>> >>>>>> >> these we are interested in (clarifying) the >>>>>> >>>>>> entanglements >>>>>> >>>>>> >> between artefacts and mind. I think It would >>>>>> >>>>>> be equally >>>>>> >>>>>> >> appropriate and meaning-prompting to state >>>>>> >> that >> >>>>> one >>>>> >>>>>> needs to >>>>>> >>>>>> >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> I think it is this "need for simplification" >>>>>> >>> which >>> >>> >>>>>> leads me to >>>>>> >>>>>> >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. For example, >>>>>> >>>>>> why separate >>>>>> >>>>>> >> the act from its production and history? >>>>>> >>>>>> >> Of course, if one had the discipline to >>>>>> >>> de-couple >>> >>> >>>>>> clarity from >>>>>> >>>>>> >> modes of simplicity, then we wouldn't have the >>>>>> >>>>>> problem. >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> Best, >>>>>> >>>>>> >> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>> ablunden@mira.net%20%3cmailto:ablunden@mira.net>> >>> >>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>> ablunden@mira.net%20%3cmailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> >>> >>> >>>>>> >> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>> > >>> >>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>> ablunden@mira.net%20%3cmailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> >>> >>> >>>>>> >> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> My impression, Greg and David Ki, is that >>>>>> >>>>>> in the CHAT >>>>>> >>>>>> >> tradition >>>>>> >>>>>> >> specifically, as opposed to the English >>>>>> >>>>>> language in >>>>>> >>>>>> general, >>>>>> >>>>>> >> mediation refers to *artefact-mediation*. >>>>>> >> Of >> >>>>>> course, every >>>>>> >>>>>> >> action >>>>>> >>>>>> >> is both mediated and immediate, and in >>>>>> >> many >> >>>>>> discursive >>>>>> >>>>>> >> contexts, >>>>>> >>>>>> >> "mediation" is a concept which may be >>>>>> >>>>>> evoked quite >>>>>> >>>>>> >> legitimately, >>>>>> >>>>>> >> but with no special significant for the >>>>>> >> use >> >>> of >>> >>> >>>>>> CHAT. In social >>>>>> >>>>>> >> theory, for example, mediation of >>>>>> >>>>>> activities by other >>>>>> >>>>>> >> activities >>>>>> >>>>>> >> or institutions is as ubiquitous as >>>>>> >>>>>> mediation of >>>>>> >>>>>> actions by >>>>>> >>>>>> >> artefacts is in the domain of psychology. >>>>>> >>>>>> But if >>>>>> >>>>>> the topic is >>>>>> >>>>>> >> psychology, I think artefact-mediation is >>>>>> >> so >> >>>>>> central, that I >>>>>> >>>>>> >> prefer to spell it out and use the term >>>>>> >>>>>> >> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>> >>>>>> >> than the vague term "mediated". >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> I have come across usages like "mediated >>>>>> >> by >> >>>>>> such-and-such a >>>>>> >>>>>> >> concept." Like Alice in Wonderland one can >>>>>> >>>>>> use words to >>>>>> >>>>>> >> mean what >>>>>> >>>>>> >> you like, but I find a formulation like >>>>>> >>>>>> this in the >>>>>> >>>>>> context of >>>>>> >>>>>> >> CHAT problematic, because it is using the >>>>>> >>>>>> idea of >>>>>> >>>>>> >> "mediation" in >>>>>> >>>>>> >> the most general sense in a way which >>>>>> >>>>>> obscures the >>>>>> >>>>>> fact that a >>>>>> >>>>>> >> concept is not immediately present in any >>>>>> >>>>>> act of >>>>>> >>>>>> >> communication or >>>>>> >>>>>> >> any other act, and therefore *cannot >>>>>> >>>>>> mediate actions*. >>>>>> >>>>>> >> Artefacts, >>>>>> >>>>>> >> such as spoken words, which may be signs >>>>>> >>> for a >>> >>> >>>>>> concept, can of >>>>>> >>>>>> >> course mediate an act of communication. >>>>>> >> But >> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>>> point is >>>>>> >>>>>> >> that a >>>>>> >>>>>> >> word is not universally and >>>>>> >>> unproblematically >>> >>> >>>>> a >>>>> >>>>>> sign for >>>>>> >>>>>> >> any one >>>>>> >>>>>> >> concept. It means different things to >>>>>> >>>>>> different people. >>>>>> >>>>>> >> Concepts >>>>>> >>>>>> >> are not artefacts. Artefacts are universal >>>>>> >>>>>> in their >>>>>> >>>>>> >> materiality, >>>>>> >>>>>> >> but particular in their meaning. So when >>>>>> >> we >> >>>>>> have a >>>>>> >>>>>> concept >>>>>> >>>>>> >> in mind >>>>>> >>>>>> >> when we use a word in communication, the >>>>>> >>>>>> communication is >>>>>> >>>>>> >> mediated >>>>>> >>>>>> >> by the word not the concept, and it is a >>>>>> >>>>>> mistake >>>>>> >>>>>> not to be >>>>>> >>>>>> >> aware >>>>>> >>>>>> >> of that. >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> So I would prefer it if "mediation" were >>>>>> >>>>>> always used in >>>>>> >>>>>> >> qualified >>>>>> >>>>>> >> way so that its specific meaning is made >>>>>> >>>>> clear. >>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> >> PS. And David Ki is completely right in >>>>>> >> his >> >>>>>> comment, too. >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> >>>>> - >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>>> >> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> >>>>>> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> Does "mediation" only apply to >>>>>> >> language >> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>>> culture? >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> Or does it include nerve fibers? (in >>>>>> >>>>>> which case we >>>>>> >>>>>> >> would need >>>>>> >>>>>> >> to include >>>>>> >>>>>> >> reflexes) >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> And does it include our >>>>>> >> socio-contextual >> >>>>>> surround as in >>>>>> >>>>>> >> Bateson's man with >>>>>> >>>>>> >> the stick? (in which case, we would >>>>>> >>>>>> need to include >>>>>> >>>>>> >> newborns). >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> Just wonderin'. >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> -greg >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 2:48 PM, David >>>>>> >>>>>> H Kirshner >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>> >> dkirsh@lsu.edu >> >>> > >>> >>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>> dkirsh@lsu.edu%20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>> >>> >>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>> dkirsh@lsu.edu%20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>> >>> >>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>> dkirsh@lsu.edu%20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>>> >>> >>> >>>>>> >> >>>>> >>> > >>> >>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>> dkirsh@lsu.edu%20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>> >>> >>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>> dkirsh@lsu.edu%20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>> >>> >>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>> dkirsh@lsu.edu%20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>>>>>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> Thanks for replies. >>>>>> >>>>>> >> I'm recalling several years ago >>>>>> >> Jim >> >>>>>> Greeno >>>>>> >>>>>> decided >>>>>> >>>>>> >> to stop >>>>>> >>>>>> >> talking about >>>>>> >>>>>> >> situated cognition because the >>>>>> >>>>>> pragmatics of >>>>>> >>>>>> >> adjectival >>>>>> >>>>>> >> use implies there >>>>>> >>>>>> >> has to be a contrasting >>>>>> >> non-situated >> >>>>>> cognition. He now >>>>>> >>>>>> >> speaks of >>>>>> >>>>>> >> situativity theory. It seems, with >>>>>> >>> the >>> >>> >>>>>> exception of >>>>>> >>>>>> >> physical reflexes (and >>>>>> >>>>>> >> perhaps pre-conscious infant >>>>>> >>>>>> activity), all >>>>>> >>>>>> human >>>>>> >>>>>> >> action >>>>>> >>>>>> >> is mediated (and >>>>>> >>>>>> >> perhaps a lot of non-human action, >>>>>> >>> as >>> >>> >>>>>> well). So, it's >>>>>> >>>>>> >> worth noting that >>>>>> >>>>>> >> "mediated action" doesn't specify >>>>>> >> a >> >>>>>> kind of >>>>>> >>>>>> >> action, but >>>>>> >>>>>> >> rather a >>>>>> >>>>>> >> theoretical assumption about all >>>>>> >>> human >>> >>> >>>>>> action; though >>>>>> >>>>>> >> there seems to be >>>>>> >>>>>> >> some variation in interpretation >>>>>> >> of >> >>>>>> what that >>>>>> >>>>>> >> assumption >>>>>> >>>>>> >> entails. >>>>>> >>>>>> >> David >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>> >>> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Sep 16 22:02:29 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2014 22:02:29 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: <54190AAE.9020707@mira.net> References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> <54178B49.9070205@mira.net> <50f7f5173d374b5fa9ed51a3b62501f9@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54190AAE.9020707@mira.net> Message-ID: If others agree, Andy, then it provides a context within which to make judgments about the kind of enterprise CHAT has become, in its various instantations, which are certainly multiple! On the other hand, maybe I am just being dull, the problems have been solved. mike On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 9:14 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I think Vygotsky spoke optimistically about resolving the crisis in > Psychology because he was writing in the wake of the successful Russian > Revolution. Alas it was not to be so. But as a Marxist he would know that > without the resolution of the crisis of humanity there could be no > resolution in the crisis of any of the special sciences. Which is all the > more reason to tackle the disciplinary boundaries inhibiting the > development of both psychology and social theory. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: > >> ?Complicated discussion about CHAT and whether its a science or not. >> >> One thing to keep in mind, perhaps: Vygotsky said he was seeking to >> resolve the crisis in psychology as he diagnosed it a century ago. In my >> view, he did not resolve it. I made the argument at the end of Cultural >> Psychology and can post a draft of the chapter here if it needs >> rehearsing. >> I believe, to the extent that it can be solved, it requires one to take >> seriously the fusion of theory and practice. Seems like Vygotsky said >> something along these same lines, too, about practice being the crucible >> of >> theory. >> >> The question of what can be learned from an analysis of projects such as >> those present in Andy's collection seems an important one. I am biased. I >> would hate to think that i learned nothing from the past 30+ years of >> involvement in the 5th Dimension! >> >> mike >> >> ? >> >> On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 12:43 PM, Greg Thompson < >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> >> >>> David, >>> I'd note that in addition to Andy's introduction, there was a "spirited" >>> contribution (or two or three...) that use empirical stuff to contribute >>> to >>> theory. >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 2:06 AM, David H Kirshner >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Andy, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Thanks for the link to the TOC of your edited volume, which perhaps >>>> unintentionally illustrates my point that empirical studies using >>>> CHAT/sociocultural theory generally aren't intended as contributions to >>>> theory, per se; as you noted, the affordances for theorizing were >>>> brought >>>> out by you, rather than by the authors as part of their motive for >>>> producing the empirical work. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I've hung out with cognitive psychologists quite a bit, and there's a >>>> >>>> >>> very >>> >>> >>>> clear demarcation between applied studies which utilize cognitive theory >>>> for applicative purposes and pure studies whose sole raison d'?tre is to >>>> inform theory. Furthermore, it is a fairly rare occurrence for anyone to >>>> attempt to address theory in any other way than through the lens of >>>> empirical studies. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> My own experience of this community includes appreciation of the tight >>>> logic of their theorizing, and also of the inventiveness of researchers >>>> >>>> >>> in >>> >>> >>>> generating truly provocative data that they are then forced to contend. >>>> >>>> >>> But >>> >>> >>>> it also includes a sense of frustration with the absence of any critique >>>> >>>> >>> of >>> >>> >>>> or input to theory from outside of the little studies that, one after >>>> another, niggle away at the theoretical infrastructure. Excluded, here, >>>> >>>> >>> are >>> >>> >>>> not only philosophical inputs to theory, but even broader methodological >>>> constraints regarding the character of good theories. (My own grounding >>>> >>>> >>> in >>> >>> >>>> mathematical theorizing includes a deliciously salient sense of the >>>> ?elegance? that makes a theory truly admirable and worthy.) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Somehow, it seems noteworthy that CHAT/sociocultural psychology?whatever >>>> its virtues?isn?t organized like other branches of psychology (e.g., >>>> behavioral, cognitive, developmental) with respect to the role of >>>> >>>> >>> empirical >>> >>> >>>> data in theory construction. Andy, in your response to Jenna, you >>>> >>>> >>> described >>> >>> >>>> science as an objective practice that ?is not dependant on what you and >>>> >>>> >>> I, >>> >>> >>>> writing here on xmca in 2014, says it is.? The question all this raises >>>> >>>> >>> is >>> >>> >>>> whether CHAT/sociocultural psychology actually qualifies as a scientific >>>> practice. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> David >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:59 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> David, in the recently published book, "Collaborative Projects. An >>>> Interdisciplinary Study," authors were invited to submit studies with >>>> empirical content (in the sense in which you are using the word) which >>>> illustrated the use of the concept of "project" within CHAT. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> https://www.academia.edu/6756231/Collaborative_Projects._An_ >>> Interdisciplinary_Study >>> >>> >>>> >>>> As you can see from the Table of Contents, more than a dozen different >>>> practical studies were contributed, and I am satisfied that the >>>> >>>> >>> collection >>> >>> >>>> functioned to illuminate the philosophical issues about the nature of >>>> "an >>>> activity," and its ue as a unit of analysis, even though they are only >>>> explicitly addressed in the long Introduction. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> ------------ >>>> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> David H Kirshner wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Mike, >>>>> Clearly, as in Katherine Neal's response, and in MCA, >>>>> >>>>> >>>> CHAT/sociocultural >>> >>> >>>> theory informs empirical research. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> What's less clear is that empirical research informs CHAT/sociocultural >>>>> >>>>> >>>> theorizing. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Not quite sure what to make of that. >>>>> David >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike >>>>> cole >>>>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 11:15 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse >>>>> Your followup comment is closely related to the second part of >>>>> your >>>>> >>>>> >>>> initiating message, David. So i will respond in line. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Firstly, I think it would be helpful to distinguish between MCA and >>>>> >>>>> >>>> xmca. >>> >>> >>>> The idea behind xmca was to provide a discussion forum for articles >>>>> >>>>> >>>> that >>> >>> >>>> appear in MCA so that instead of authors having to wait 2+ years for >>>> feedback on their ideas (which rarely comes, even then!), we could >>>> >>>> >>> discuss >>> >>> >>>> the published work and learn from it in a timely manner. By an large, >>>> >>>> >>> that >>> >>> >>>> effort has, in my opinion, failed. Thanks to the recent decision to have >>>> the editors pick out articles for discussion which include the author(s) >>>> >>>> >>> in >>> >>> >>>> the discussion, this situation has been somewhat mitigated. But only >>>> somewhat. xma discussions have all the characteristics of Vygotskian >>>> chaining, as a rule. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Secondly, when I take down a bundle of recent MCA issues and look at >>>>> >>>>> >>>> the >>> >>> >>>> titles, they at least sound like they are about empirical matters >>>> ranging >>>> across a wide variety of content areas. Are you saying that these >>>> >>>> >>> articles >>> >>> >>>> are not really empirical? Or that they are not really helping us to >>>> >>>> >>> develop >>> >>> >>>> better methods to deal with perceived problems of social value? Again, >>>> >>>> >>> this >>> >>> >>>> raises the question of "MCA or xmca". >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Lastly, perhaps it would be helpful if those of us who believe that >>>>> >>>>> >>>> empirical work guided by CHAT ideas of some value has been produced in, >>>> say, the past two decades, would post brief summiaries of that work with >>>> references. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Maybe its just all verbal sound and fury, signifying the usual! >>>>> mike >>>>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 8:50 AM, David H Kirshner < >>>>> dkirsh@lsu.edu >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Does CHAT theory really advance with respect to empirical studies? >>>>>> If so, then why isn't the XMCA discussion a discussion about >>>>>> so-and-so's empirical results and how we should interpret >>>>>> them? >>>>>> Various branches of psychology (e.g., cognitive and >>>>>> developmental) do >>>>>> address concepts, and do conduct empirical research related >>>>>> to >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> concepts. >>> >>> >>>> It's true, they rarely enter into full-blooded discussion of what is >>>>>> a concept. But perhaps that's because they're scientists >>>>>> rather than >>>>>> philosophers. They're operating within a framework that is >>>>>> bounded >>>>>> primarily by empirical and methodological expectations and >>>>>> obligations; theory evolves within those boundaries. >>>>>> It's not clear to me that the Vygotskyan research community >>>>>> ever >>>>>> operated in that fashion, and I'm wondering what would >>>>>> happen if it >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> did. >>> >>> >>>> David >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>>>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 10:23 AM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse >>>>>> Well, Lisa, I think that is a project which requires a lot >>>>>> of what >>>>>> David would call "philosophical" discussion. :) The >>>>>> Psychology of >>>>>> Concepts, as it is know to American psychology, i.e., the >>>>>> "mainstream" >>>>>> do endless laboratory tests and questionnaires and surveys >>>>>> and so far >>>>>> as I can see have still haven't figured out what a concept >>>>>> is. >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>> --------------------------------------- >>>>>> - >>>>>> -- >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Well I am guilty for being fixated about thinking and talking about >>>>>>> methods and how to better understand how we can make a >>>>>>> trustworthy >>>>>>> leap from understanding the world to understanding >>>>>>> concepts. Again >>>>>>> just talking aloud. >>>>>>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor >>>>>>> Educational >>>>>>> Psychology and Counseling >>>>>>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ >>>>>>> A532 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Bailey >>> >>> >>>> Education Complex >>>>>>> IT Online Program Coordinator >>>>>>> University >>>>>>> of Tennessee >>>>>>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ >>>>>>> Knoxville, TN 37996 >>>>>>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline >>>>>>> Phone: >>>>>>> 865-974-7712 >>>>>>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 11:11 AM, Andy Blunden < >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net >>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>> I guess because xmca is a discussion list, Lisa, and >>>>>>> we all have >>>>>>> our specific research interests. >>>>>>> But when we publish, most of us have something to >>>>>>> report. >>>>>>> I have to plead guilty, I suppose, to spending more >>>>>>> of my share >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> of >>> >>> >>>> time arguing about concepts though. It is my special interest. >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>> - >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch wrote: >>>>>>> Why is it that we came to what David stated as: >>>>>>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate and >>>>>>> argue over >>>>>>> facts." We are engaged in making endless >>>>>>> theoretical >>>>>>> elaborations, distinctions, and qualifications >>>>>>> almost >>>>>>> completely detached from empirical specifics. >>>>>>> Lisa Yamagata-Lynch, Associate Professor >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Educational >>> >>> >>>> Psychology and Counseling >>>>>>> http://www.lisayamagatalynch.net/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> A532 >>> >>> >>>> Bailey Education Complex >>>>>>> IT Online Program Coordinator >>>>>>> University of Tennessee >>>>>>> http://itonline.utk.edu/ >>>>>>> Knoxville, TN 37996 >>>>>>> https://www.facebook.com/utkitonline >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Phone: >>> >>> >>>> 865-974-7712 >>>>>>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:56 AM, David H >>>>>>> Kirshner >>>>>>> >>>>>> dkirsh@lsu.edu >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> % >>> >>> >>>> 20%3cmailto:dkirsh@lsu.edu>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>> I don't think it's at all clear that CHAT is >>>>>>> a scientific >>>>>>> project, >>>>>>> though it might initially have been >>>>>>> conceived as such. >>>>>>> Generally, we CHATters do not "collaborate >>>>>>> and argue over >>>>>>> facts." >>>>>>> We are engaged in making endless theoretical >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> elaborations, >>> >>> >>>> distinctions, and qualifications almost completely >>>>>>> detached from >>>>>>> empirical specifics. And as your note has >>>>>>> revealed, even >>>>>>> at the >>>>>>> level of theory, we're not all playing the >>>>>>> same game. >>>>>>> I agree with you that simply creating an >>>>>>> obligation that >>>>>>> claims be >>>>>>> framed empirically does not imply we will >>>>>>> "agree on the >>>>>>> significance of that claim." But perhaps in >>>>>>> an empirical >>>>>>> setting >>>>>>> theoretical issues surface as methodological >>>>>>> issues. In >>>>>>> this case, >>>>>>> there is a possibility that disagreements >>>>>>> lead to >>>>>>> separation of >>>>>>> research enterprises, with (greater) >>>>>>> theoretical >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> agreement >>> >>> >>>> as a >>>>>>> consequence. >>>>>>> David >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>> From: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>>] >>>>>>> Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 9:24 AM >>>>>>> To: David H Kirshner >>>>>>> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: Re: CHAT Discourse >>>>>>> David, >>>>>>> CHAT is a scientific project. Insofar as it >>>>>>> is science >>>>>>> it >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> must >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> strive to produce empirically verifiable claims which are >>>>>>> meaningful irrespective of the conceptual >>>>>>> frame into >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> which >>> >>> >>>> they >>>>>>> are accepted. But as a project it is >>>>>>> characterised by a >>>>>>> system of >>>>>>> concepts. People can agree on this or that >>>>>>> hard >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> experimental >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> finding, but still not agree on the significance of that >>>>>>> claim. We >>>>>>> CHATters talk to one another, collaborate >>>>>>> and argue over >>>>>>> facts; >>>>>>> all of this is possible only to the extent >>>>>>> that we share >>>>>>> concepts. >>>>>>> "Facts" are the lingua franca of science. As >>>>>>> worthy a >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> goal >>> >>> >>>> as it >>>>>>> is to lay out some agreed facts, I think it >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> ill-conceived to >>>>>>> think that this is a means of consolidating >>>>>>> a current of >>>>>>> research >>>>>>> like CHAT. You can call it philosophical or >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> psychological, >>> >>> >>>> I don't >>>>>>> think that makes any difference. >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>> - >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David H Kirshner wrote: >>>>>>> > Following on Andy's discussion of artefact >>>>>>> mediation, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> it >>> >>> >>>> seems >>>>>>> inherently a problem of CHAT discourse to >>>>>>> distinguishing >>>>>>> efforts >>>>>>> to elaborate Vygotsky's psychology more >>>>>>> fully, from >>>>>>> efforts >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> to >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> solve the problems Vygotsky was addressing, de novo. In >>>>>>> tandem, is >>>>>>> ambiguity as to whether CHAT is a >>>>>>> psychological or >>>>>>> philosophical >>>>>>> discourse. >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > I wonder, in the spirit of psychology, if >>>>>>> advancement >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> of >>> >>> >>>> CHAT >>>>>>> would not be better served by embedding >>>>>>> theoretical >>>>>>> discussion in >>>>>>> analysis of empirical data. The point, here, >>>>>>> would not be >>>>>>> to make >>>>>>> CHAT more directly relevant to domains of >>>>>>> application >>>>>>> (though that >>>>>>> would not be a bad thing). Rather, an >>>>>>> empirical >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> obligation >>> >>> >>>> might >>>>>>> transmute (some) questions of theory into >>>>>>> questions of >>>>>>> methodology. In that way, CHAT could become >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> differentiated >>> >>> >>>> into >>>>>>> distinct psychological schools, each >>>>>>> constrained by >>>>>>> methodological >>>>>>> strictures that also support a more >>>>>>> homogeneous >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> theoretical >>> >>> >>>> environment. At the same time, a wide-open CHAT community >>>>>>> could >>>>>>> look across these various schools to pursue >>>>>>> broader >>>>>>> philosophical >>>>>>> problematics. >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > David >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > -----Original Message----- >>>>>>> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>>>>> > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >] On >>>>>>> Behalf Of Andy >>>>>>> Blunden >>>>>>> > Sent: Monday, September 15, 2014 7:02 AM >>>>>>> > To: Huw Lloyd >>>>>>> > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception >>>>>>> and direct >>>>>>> perception >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > Ah! I see! >>>>>>> > As Hegel said: "There is nothing, nothing >>>>>>> in heaven, or >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> in >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not equally >>>>>>> contain >>>>>>> both immediacy and mediation." I have no >>>>>>> great problem >>>>>>> with anyone >>>>>>> saying that anything is mediated by anything >>>>>>> else, where >>>>>>> it >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> is >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> appropriate. My problem is that the specific insight of >>>>>>> Vygotsky, >>>>>>> that artefact-mediation of actions provides >>>>>>> an especially >>>>>>> productive unit of analysis for science is >>>>>>> lost if >>>>>>> mediation in >>>>>>> the broad sense is mixed up in CHAT >>>>>>> literature with >>>>>>> artefact-mediation to the point that >>>>>>> artefact-mediation >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> is >>> >>> >>>> lost. >>>>>>> Still, I would prefer that if you were to >>>>>>> make the point >>>>>>> you were >>>>>>> referring to you used some expression other >>>>>>> than >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> "mediation." >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> > >>>>>>> > Artefact mediation of actions is a >>>>>>> brilliant insight. I >>>>>>> can do >>>>>>> what I like, but to do anything (other than >>>>>>> have dreams >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> or >>> >>> >>>> thoughts) I have to use some material object to transmit >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> my >>> >>> >>>> actions, so to speak - a tool, a word, a gesture, or >>>>>>> whatever - >>>>>>> but all these artefacts which I use, without >>>>>>> exception, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> are >>> >>> >>>> products of the history and culture into which I was >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> born. >>> >>> >>>> I can >>>>>>> choose which artefact to use, but culture >>>>>>> and history >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> produce >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> them. So every action I take is essentially >>>>>>> cultural-historical as >>>>>>> well as personal. Also, because artefacts >>>>>>> are material >>>>>>> objects, >>>>>>> their physical form is the same for >>>>>>> everyone, it is >>>>>>> universal. So >>>>>>> communication as much as miscommunication >>>>>>> takes place >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> through >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> everyone interpreting the same material objects, >>>>>>> artefacts, that I >>>>>>> am using in my actions. How can they do >>>>>>> that? Because >>>>>>> they >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> too >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> mediate their actions with the same set of universal >>>>>>> artefacts! So >>>>>>> all human action is opened to cultural and >>>>>>> historical >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> analysis >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> which is as objective as any branch of natural science. >>>>>>> Wonderful, eh? >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > Andy >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>> - >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> > -- >>>>>>> > *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> >> If you want to study how action changes >>>>>>> then you need >>>>>>> to study the >>>>>>> >> history and production of the action. >>>>>>> Under such >>>>>>> circumstances, >>>>>>> >> assertions that concepts cannot mediate >>>>>>> (the >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> production >>> >>> >>>> of) actions >>>>>>> >> become more obviously false. If one has >>>>>>> simplified, >>>>>>> through >>>>>>> >> "clarity", the action away from its >>>>>>> genetic base then >>>>>>> it may seem >>>>>>> >> correct to assert that a concept cannot >>>>>>> mediate an >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> action. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> The conservation tasks (e.g. conservation >>>>>>> of volume) >>>>>>> are an elegant >>>>>>> >> way to demonstrate this. >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> Best, >>>>>>> >> Huw >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> On 15 September 2014 04:26, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> >>>>>> mailto: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> ablunden@mira.net%20%3cmailto:ablunden@mira.net>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> ablunden@mira.net%20%3cmailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> he, he, Huw! >>>>>>> >> For me, reduction, simplification and >>>>>>> typology are >>>>>>> the very >>>>>>> >> problems that need to be remedied by >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> clarification! >>> >>> >>>> and I >>>>>>> really >>>>>>> >> don't think obfuscation is ever >>>>>>> helpful, generally >>>>>>> being >>>>>>> used to >>>>>>> >> obscure the genesis of phenomena. >>>>>>> Distinction is >>>>>>> not equal to >>>>>>> >> separation. >>>>>>> >> I really don't know what you are >>>>>>> referring to with >>>>>>> product and >>>>>>> >> history. Perhaps you could explain? >>>>>>> >> Andy >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>> - >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> I agree about precision, but not >>>>>>> with a call >>>>>>> for "clarity". >>>>>>> >> Reduction to clarity is a >>>>>>> projection or >>>>>>> reification of the >>>>>>> >> need for simplicity. Simplicity >>>>>>> usually >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> entails >>> >>> >>>> typologies or >>>>>>> >> other simplistic devices which >>>>>>> prevent the >>>>>>> conception and >>>>>>> >> perception of genetic relations. >>>>>>> Actually in >>>>>>> cases such as >>>>>>> >> these we are interested in >>>>>>> (clarifying) the >>>>>>> entanglements >>>>>>> >> between artefacts and mind. I >>>>>>> think It would >>>>>>> be equally >>>>>>> >> appropriate and meaning-prompting >>>>>>> to state >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> that >>> >>> >>>> one >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> needs to >>>>>>> >> obfuscate (see darkly) too. >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> I think it is this "need for >>>>>>> simplification" >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> which >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> leads me to >>>>>>> >> disagree with the 2nd paragraph. >>>>>>> For example, >>>>>>> why separate >>>>>>> >> the act from its production and >>>>>>> history? >>>>>>> >> Of course, if one had the >>>>>>> discipline to >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> de-couple >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> clarity from >>>>>>> >> modes of simplicity, then we >>>>>>> wouldn't have the >>>>>>> problem. >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> Best, >>>>>>> >> Huw >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> On 14 September 2014 07:02, Andy >>>>>>> Blunden >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> ablunden@mira.net%20%3cmailto:ablunden@mira.net>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> ablunden@mira.net%20%3cmailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> ablunden@mira.net >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >>>>>> ablunden@mira.net >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> > >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> ablunden@mira.net%20%3cmailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >> >>>>>> >>>>>> ablunden@mira.net >>>>>>> >>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> My impression, Greg and David >>>>>>> Ki, is that >>>>>>> in the CHAT >>>>>>> >> tradition >>>>>>> >> specifically, as opposed to >>>>>>> the English >>>>>>> language in >>>>>>> general, >>>>>>> >> mediation refers to >>>>>>> *artefact-mediation*. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Of >>> >>> >>>> course, every >>>>>>> >> action >>>>>>> >> is both mediated and >>>>>>> immediate, and in >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> many >>> >>> >>>> discursive >>>>>>> >> contexts, >>>>>>> >> "mediation" is a concept >>>>>>> which may be >>>>>>> evoked quite >>>>>>> >> legitimately, >>>>>>> >> but with no special >>>>>>> significant for the >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> use >>> >>> >>>> of >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> CHAT. In social >>>>>>> >> theory, for example, >>>>>>> mediation of >>>>>>> activities by other >>>>>>> >> activities >>>>>>> >> or institutions is as >>>>>>> ubiquitous as >>>>>>> mediation of >>>>>>> actions by >>>>>>> >> artefacts is in the domain of >>>>>>> psychology. >>>>>>> But if >>>>>>> the topic is >>>>>>> >> psychology, I think >>>>>>> artefact-mediation is >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> so >>> >>> >>>> central, that I >>>>>>> >> prefer to spell it out and >>>>>>> use the term >>>>>>> >> "artefact-mediated" rather >>>>>>> >> than the vague term >>>>>>> "mediated". >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> I have come across usages >>>>>>> like "mediated >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> by >>> >>> >>>> such-and-such a >>>>>>> >> concept." Like Alice in >>>>>>> Wonderland one can >>>>>>> use words to >>>>>>> >> mean what >>>>>>> >> you like, but I find a >>>>>>> formulation like >>>>>>> this in the >>>>>>> context of >>>>>>> >> CHAT problematic, because it >>>>>>> is using the >>>>>>> idea of >>>>>>> >> "mediation" in >>>>>>> >> the most general sense in a >>>>>>> way which >>>>>>> obscures the >>>>>>> fact that a >>>>>>> >> concept is not immediately >>>>>>> present in any >>>>>>> act of >>>>>>> >> communication or >>>>>>> >> any other act, and therefore >>>>>>> *cannot >>>>>>> mediate actions*. >>>>>>> >> Artefacts, >>>>>>> >> such as spoken words, which >>>>>>> may be signs >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> for a >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> concept, can of >>>>>>> >> course mediate an act of >>>>>>> communication. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> But >>> >>> >>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> point is >>>>>>> >> that a >>>>>>> >> word is not universally and >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> unproblematically >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> a >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> sign for >>>>>>> >> any one >>>>>>> >> concept. It means different >>>>>>> things to >>>>>>> different people. >>>>>>> >> Concepts >>>>>>> >> are not artefacts. Artefacts >>>>>>> are universal >>>>>>> in their >>>>>>> >> materiality, >>>>>>> >> but particular in their >>>>>>> meaning. So when >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> we >>> >>> >>>> have a >>>>>>> concept >>>>>>> >> in mind >>>>>>> >> when we use a word in >>>>>>> communication, the >>>>>>> communication is >>>>>>> >> mediated >>>>>>> >> by the word not the concept, >>>>>>> and it is a >>>>>>> mistake >>>>>>> not to be >>>>>>> >> aware >>>>>>> >> of that. >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> So I would prefer it if >>>>>>> "mediation" were >>>>>>> always used in >>>>>>> >> qualified >>>>>>> >> way so that its specific >>>>>>> meaning is made >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> clear. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> Andy >>>>>>> >> PS. And David Ki is >>>>>>> completely right in >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> his >>> >>> >>>> comment, too. >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>> - >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~ >>>>>>> andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> 7Eandy/> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> 7Eandy/> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> Does "mediation" only >>>>>>> apply to >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> language >>> >>> >>>> and >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> culture? >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> Or does it include nerve >>>>>>> fibers? (in >>>>>>> which case we >>>>>>> >> would need >>>>>>> >> to include >>>>>>> >> reflexes) >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> And does it include our >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> socio-contextual >>> >>> >>>> surround as in >>>>>> >>>>>> -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From ablunden@mira.net Tue Sep 16 22:37:50 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 15:37:50 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> <54178B49.9070205@mira.net> <50f7f5173d374b5fa9ed51a3b62501f9@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54190AAE.9020707@mira.net> Message-ID: <54191E2E.6040403@mira.net> I am sure that in this long thread, *someone* must have already said that philosophy (i.e., critique of concepts) and psychology (critique of data) both stimulate and challenge one another. Two independent processes which interact with one another, surely? Some currents of psychology remain content with the concepts of common sense and focus on observation, others are eternally dissatisfied with the concepts they use. But essentially it's the same process. What has driven me along the road to developing my approach to Activity Theory are both the (to me) obvious degradation of Vygotsky's concepts in the move to Activity Theory, *and* pressing problems like two halves of the country which seem to believe in mutually exclusive sets of facts about the world, like the fact that so many well-educated people believe the world was created 10,000 years ago by a Christian God, why countries which were well on the way to modernity 50 years ago have now confined their womenfolk indoors and behind veils, why priests abuse the children in their care and are protected by the hierarchy, why asbestos workers would not believe that the stuff was killing them even when half the town was dying of it, etc. - These kinds of situation are *data* for social theorists and it seemed to me that Vygotsky's ideas were the best thing going, but they had not been satisfactorily developed by Activity Theorists for social theory. The facts I am concerned with are pretty well, if not universally, recognised, but probably half the world has noticed. The problem is mainly the *concepts*. Some successful projects which have changed minds on a mass scale are the only way of getting more data, but even then the situation is not qualitatively different because the kind of projects I am interested in are real, not isolated in a laboratory, so as much open to contested interpretation as any of the facts I mentioned above and are not the kind of thing one experiments with. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > If others agree, Andy, then it provides a context within which to make > judgments about the kind of enterprise CHAT has become, in its various > instantations, which are certainly multiple! > > On the other hand, maybe I am just being dull, the problems have been > solved. > mike > > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 9:14 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > I think Vygotsky spoke optimistically about resolving the crisis > in Psychology because he was writing in the wake of the successful > Russian Revolution. Alas it was not to be so. But as a Marxist he > would know that without the resolution of the crisis of humanity > there could be no resolution in the crisis of any of the special > sciences. Which is all the more reason to tackle the disciplinary > boundaries inhibiting the development of both psychology and > social theory. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > mike cole wrote: > > ?Complicated discussion about CHAT and whether its a science > or not. > > One thing to keep in mind, perhaps: Vygotsky said he was > seeking to > resolve the crisis in psychology as he diagnosed it a century > ago. In my > view, he did not resolve it. I made the argument at the end of > Cultural > Psychology and can post a draft of the chapter here if it > needs rehearsing. > I believe, to the extent that it can be solved, it requires > one to take > seriously the fusion of theory and practice. Seems like > Vygotsky said > something along these same lines, too, about practice being > the crucible of > theory. > > The question of what can be learned from an analysis of > projects such as > those present in Andy's collection seems an important one. I > am biased. I > would hate to think that i learned nothing from the past 30+ > years of > involvement in the 5th Dimension! > > mike > > ? > > From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Wed Sep 17 00:32:49 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 07:32:49 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102225D26@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Xmca in a nutshell! Except here we can't notice pauses, heightened intensity or relaxed easiness nor can we pick up (easily) on the reactions of others as things are said - and people are joining in from different timezones and leaving at various times to eat, sleep or earn! But surely this joining in is the most crucial aspect of becoming part of human society (and it is a bit weird that we think the best way to help people into the conversation is to take them out of the room and tell them about how it is done!). Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: 17 September 2014 04:24 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault Kenneth Burke: ?Imagine that you enter a parlor. You come late. When you arrive, others have long preceded you, and they are engaged in a heated discussion, too heated for them to pause and tell you exactly what it is about. In fact, the discussion had already begun long before any of them got there, so that no one present is qualified to retrace for you all the steps that had gone before. You listen for a while, until you decide that you have caught the tenor of the argument; then you put in your oar. Someone answers; you answer him; another comes to your defense; another aligns himself against you, to either the embarrassment or gratification of your opponent, depending on the quality of your ally?s assistance. However, the discussion is interminable. The hour grows late, you must depart. And you do depart, with the discussion still vigorously in progress.? On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 6:53 PM, White, Phillip wrote: > > as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their work > > "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology > of ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were > philosophers on ontology, and of history." > > the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those > peoples who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally > ill, and homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. > and i've come to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. > i've begun to think of theory as a way of autobiography. > > i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed > here on xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail party. > (that's a great metaphor!) > > p > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From rakahu@utu.fi Wed Sep 17 02:35:35 2014 From: rakahu@utu.fi (Rauno Huttunen) Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 09:35:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hello, Excellent source on this matter is Fran?ois Dosse's book "History of Structuralism - The Rising Sign 1945-1966". Foucault's relationship with Hyppolite and Althussers is deal with detailed manner. Rauno Huttunen -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of White, Phillip Sent: 17. syyskuuta 2014 1:56 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Foucault Michel Foucault would not recognize the assertion that he carried forth Maurice Merleau-Ponty's philosophy - case in point, the philosopher who most deeply impressed Foucault was Jean Hyppolite. it was to Hyppolite that Foucault never ceased to acknowledge his debt. as for the influences on Butler, i can't tell. however, following sociocultural learning theory, since we're not behaviorist we don't view the student as replicating the instruction of the teacher, but rather as one of collaboration, approximations, and often an individual or shared innovation. phillip From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Sep 17 14:37:51 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 21:37:51 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Academic Search 2014, Professor of Psychology In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Academic Search 2014, Professor of Psychology The Department of Psychology at Universidad de los Andes (1st in Colombia, and 5th in Latin-America according to QS University Rankings), invites applications for a full-time professorial position with exclusive dedication, beginning January, 2015. Candidates are required to have a doctoral degree, as well as training or experience in one of the following areas: Organizational Psychology, Educational Psychology, Consumer Psychology, Health and Clinical Psychology, or Social Intervention. Responsibilities The selected candidate will be expected to: develop research and/or intervention projects in his/her area of expertise and procure external funding; teach at the undergraduate, graduate and extension levels; and participate in the activities and institutional development of the department and university. Further information about the Psychology Department and the Universidad de los Andes can be found athttp://psicologia.uniandes.edu.co Academic Requirements ? Completed doctorate in Psychology or related areas. ? Experience in research or intervention projects, and publications in scientific journals. ? Teaching experience is desirable, although not a requirement. Position The Department is interested in hiring a candidate in the category of Assistant or Associate Professor. A formal process based on the candidate?s qualifications and following university regulations will determine the salary and the specific category. Salaries and benefits are competitive in the Colombian context (for more information, please contact the department chair). Procedure Please send the following documents to the chair of the Psychology Department (in electronic or print format): 1. Curriculum vitae 2. Copy of relevant publications 3. Certifications of experience in research or intervention projects 4. Contact information of two academic or professional references 5. 3 page (maximum) essay detailing academic trajectory, research and professional interests, as well as possible contributions to the Department of Psychology at Universidad de los Andes 6. A course syllabus in the candidate?s area of expertise fitting the undergraduate program in psychology. Information about the undergraduate program can be found here: http://psicologia.uniandes.edu.co The selection committee includes two Department of Psychology associate professors, the chair of the Department of Psychology, and an associate or full professor at the School of Social Sciences. The committee will ask short-listed candidates to deliver a public presentation about their research and academic perspectives to an audience of students and professors of the department and the university. The department may declare the call null and void, or keep it open until a person meeting the requirements for the position is identified. Deadline: October 31st, 2014, 11:59pm (local time). Incomplete documents or documents delivered after the deadline will not be considered. Address Please send application to: Carolyn Finck, Chair, Department of Psychology, Universidad de los Andes, Carrera 1 # 18A-12 Bogot?, Colombia Or to: cfinck@uniandes.edu.co ===== El Departamento de Psicolog?a de la Universidad de los Andes desea vincular un/a profesor/a de planta de tiempo completo. El Departamento requiere candidatos con t?tulo de doctorado. S?lo se considerar?n candidatos con formaci?n o experiencia en alguna de las siguientes ?reas: psicolog?a organizacional, psicolog?a educativa, psicolog?a del consumidor, psicolog?a cl?nica y de la salud o intervenci?n social. Responsabilidades Se espera que la persona seleccionada desarrolle programas de investigaci?n o intervenci?n en su ?rea de experticia, busque y obtenga financiaci?n externa para sus iniciativas, realice labores de docencia a nivel de pregrado, posgrado y educaci?n continuada, participe activamente en las actividades propuestas para la consecuci?n de los objetivos estrat?gicos del Departamento y la Universidad. Mayor informaci?n sobre el Departamento de Psicolog?a y la Universidad de los Andes se puede encontrar en http://psicologia.uniandes.edu.co Requisitos ? Doctorado culminado en psicolog?a o disciplinas afines. ? Experiencia verificable en proyectos de investigaci?n o intervenci?n y publicaciones en revistas cient?ficas. ? Experiencia docente es deseable, aunque no necesaria. Cargo La persona seleccionada ser? contratada para ocupar el cargo de profesor/a asistente o asociado/a. El salario y la categor?a profesoral se definen teniendo en cuenta los procesos b?sicos del estatuto profesoral y las cualificaciones de la persona. La Universidad ofrece salarios y beneficios competitivos en el contexto nacional (Para mayor informaci?n, contactar la Direcci?n del Departamento). Fecha de iniciaci?n de labores: enero de 2015 Procedimiento Enviar a la direcci?n del Departamento de Psicolog?a los siguientes documentos (puede ser en f?sico o en versi?n electr?nica): 1. Hoja de vida 2. Copia de publicaciones representativas 3. Certificaciones de experiencia en proyectos de investigaci?n o intervenci?n. 4. Nombres, direcciones y correo electr?nico de dos referencias acad?micas o profesionales. 5. Ensayo de m?ximo tres p?ginas sobre trayectoria acad?mica, intereses investigativos y profesionales, adem?s de la perspectiva de su contribuci?n al desarrollo del Departamento de Psicolog?a de la Universidad de los Andes. 6. Un programa de curso en el ?rea de experticia que coincida con alguna de las asignaturas de pregrado ofrecidas por el Departamento. Informaci?n sobre el programa de estudios de psicolog?a puede encontrarse en http://psicologia.uniandes.edu.co La selecci?n estar? a cargo de un comit?, compuesto por dos profesores asociados del Departamento de Psicolog?a, la Directora del Departamento de Psicolog?a y un profesor asociado o titular de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. El comit? pedir? a los candidatos preseleccionados realizar una presentaci?n p?blica, ante profesores y estudiantes del Departamento y la Universidad, sobre su trabajo investigativo y perspectivas acad?micas. El Departamento podr? declarar desierta la convocatoria o mantenerla abierta hasta encontrar a la persona que re?na los requisitos exigidos para ocupar el cargo. Fecha l?mite para la entrega de documentos: Octubre 31 de 2014, 11:59pm (hora local). No ser?n considerados documentos incompletos ni aquellos entregados despu?s de la fecha y hora l?mite. Direcci?n de env?o Carolyn Finck, Departamento de Psicolog?a Carrera 1 # 18A-12 Bogot?, Colombia O en versi?n electr?nica a: cfinck@uniandes.edu.co From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Sep 17 15:42:46 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 16:42:46 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <3252346F-413D-4D7E-AC17-BF76E92FBDB1@uniandes.edu.co> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <533B37CC-0D81-4F9B-A400-6C75D0543C54@uniandes.edu.co> <5EE36E4B-683A-4A05-A2D7-2244B4AAB16E@gmail.com> <3252346F-413D-4D7E-AC17-BF76E92FBDB1@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Martin, I once heard that somewhere Foucault said (somewhat shockingly) that his life's work was an engagement with Kant. Phillip, and to Martin's point about not being able to step outside of the novel, (the following is taken from Daniel Chandler's web-book Semiotics for Beginners - http://visual-memory.co.uk/daniel/Documents/S4B/sem11.html): "As Hodge and Tripp note, there can hardly be 'an exhaustive semiotic analysis... because a "complete" analysis... would still be located in particular social and historical circumstances' (Hodge & Tripp 1986, 27) . This is reinforced by the poststructuralist stance that we cannot step outside our signifying systems. Semioticians seek to distance themselves from dominant codes by strategies aimed at *denaturalization*. The notion of 'making the familiar strange, and the strange familiar' is now a recurrent feature of artistic and photographic manifestos and of creative 'brainstorming' sessions in many fields. The phrase itself has been attributed to the German poet Novalis (1772-1801, aka Friedrich von Hardenberg), who declared that the essence of romanticism was 'to make the familiar strange, and the strange familiar'. The concept is found amongst other Romantic theorists such as Wordsworth and Coleridge. The notion is also closely associated with Surrealism and with Brechtian 'alienation'. However, its adoption by semioticians probably owes most to Russian Formalist criticism (Lemon & Reis 1965) . Victor Shklovsky argued in 1916 that the key function of art was *estrangement*, *defamiliarization* or 'making strange' (*ostranenie*) - i.e. renewing our perception of everyday things and events which are so familiar that our perception of them has become routinized (Hawkes 1977, 62-67 ). Russian Formalism was a key influence on the development of semiotics in Eastern Europe, and the legacy of 'making the familiar strange' is an important one for semiotics. However, as Simon Watney notes, the strategy of *defamiliarization* is itself, of course, ideological and has been associated with the notion that the tactic of surprise may serve to banish 'distortions' so that we may 'objectively' perceive 'reality' (Watney 1982, 173-4) . Clearly the strategy of 'making the familiar strange' needs to be coupled with an awareness that whilst we may be able to bypass one set of conventions we may never escape the framing of experience by convention. ?And here is the original "familiar strange" Novalis quote as he is defining Romantic style (in the German Romantic tradition): "*To romanticize the world is to make us aware of the magic, mystery and wonder of the world; it is to educate the senses to see the ordinary as extraordinary, the familiar as strange, the mundane as sacred, the finite as infinite.*"? ?Best, greg? On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 7:52 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Right - Kant aimed to identify universal necessities in the seemingly > contingent. Foucault aimed to unmask the contingencies in seemingly > universal necessities. > > Martin > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 8:32 PM, White, Phillip > wrote: > > > Foucault, moving in opposite direction of Kant, looked to see what > contingencies were cultural constructions, rather than universal > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Sep 17 16:07:43 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 16:07:43 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <533B37CC-0D81-4F9B-A400-6C75D0543C54@uniandes.edu.co> <5EE36E4B-683A-4A05-A2D7-2244B4AAB16E@gmail.com> <3252346F-413D-4D7E-AC17-BF76E92FBDB1@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Sounds like Novalis was cribbing from the writings of the Wizard of the 5th Dimension, Greg. And of course, the stramge-->familiar to familiar-strange dynamic is the ritual rite of passage in anthropology, or it was until both the familiar and the unfamiliar became so strange. mike Overall-- Isn't it just common sense that one cannot get a full understanding of a system one is a consituent part of? Passim the discussion of Shotter and others - reality overflows our attempts to understand it. Strange isn't it? mike On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 3:42 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Martin, > I once heard that somewhere Foucault said (somewhat shockingly) that his > life's work was an engagement with Kant. > Phillip, and to Martin's point about not being able to step outside of the > novel, (the following is taken from Daniel Chandler's web-book Semiotics > for Beginners - http://visual-memory.co.uk/daniel/Documents/S4B/sem11.html > ): > "As Hodge and Tripp note, there can hardly be 'an exhaustive semiotic > analysis... because a "complete" analysis... would still be located in > particular social and historical circumstances' (Hodge & Tripp 1986, 27) > < > http://visual-memory.co.uk/daniel/Documents/S4B/sem13.html#Hodge_&_Tripp_1986 > >. > This is reinforced by the poststructuralist stance that we cannot step > outside our signifying systems. Semioticians seek to distance themselves > from dominant codes by strategies aimed at *denaturalization*. The notion > of 'making the familiar strange, and the strange familiar' is now a > recurrent feature of artistic and photographic manifestos and of creative > 'brainstorming' sessions in many fields. The phrase itself has been > attributed to the German poet Novalis (1772-1801, aka Friedrich von > Hardenberg), who declared that the essence of romanticism was 'to make the > familiar strange, and the strange familiar'. The concept is found amongst > other Romantic theorists such as Wordsworth and Coleridge. The notion is > also closely associated with Surrealism and with Brechtian 'alienation'. > However, its adoption by semioticians probably owes most to Russian > Formalist criticism (Lemon & Reis 1965) > < > http://visual-memory.co.uk/daniel/Documents/S4B/sem13.html#Lemon_&_Reis_1965 > > > . Victor Shklovsky argued in 1916 that the key function of art was > *estrangement*, *defamiliarization* or 'making strange' (*ostranenie*) - > i.e. renewing our perception of everyday things and events which are so > familiar that our perception of them has become routinized (Hawkes 1977, > 62-67 > ). > Russian > Formalism was a key influence on the development of semiotics in Eastern > Europe, and the legacy of 'making the familiar strange' is an important one > for semiotics. However, as Simon Watney notes, the strategy of > *defamiliarization* is itself, of course, ideological and has been > associated with the notion that the tactic of surprise may serve to banish > 'distortions' so that we may 'objectively' perceive 'reality' (Watney 1982, > 173-4) > . > Clearly the strategy of 'making the familiar strange' needs to be coupled > with an awareness that whilst we may be able to bypass one set of > conventions we may never escape the framing of experience by convention. > > ?And here is the original "familiar strange" Novalis quote as he is > defining Romantic style (in the German Romantic tradition): > "*To romanticize the world is to make us aware of the magic, mystery and > wonder of the world; it is to educate the senses to see the ordinary as > extraordinary, the familiar as strange, the mundane as sacred, the finite > as infinite.*"? > > ?Best, > greg? > > > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 7:52 PM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > wrote: > > > Right - Kant aimed to identify universal necessities in the seemingly > > contingent. Foucault aimed to unmask the contingencies in seemingly > > universal necessities. > > > > Martin > > > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 8:32 PM, White, Phillip > > wrote: > > > > > Foucault, moving in opposite direction of Kant, looked to see what > > contingencies were cultural constructions, rather than universal > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From glassman.13@osu.edu Wed Sep 17 16:37:58 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 23:37:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <533B37CC-0D81-4F9B-A400-6C75D0543C54@uniandes.edu.co> <5EE36E4B-683A-4A05-A2D7-2244B4AAB16E@gmail.com> <3252346F-413D-4D7E-AC17-BF76E92FBDB1@uniandes.edu.co> , Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035335@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Greg and all, So where does education fall in all this? Is the educators job to make the strange familiar or is it to make the familiar strange, or is it to maintain the status quo? Maybe we cannot completely understand the system we are in, but is it important that we understand it just enough to begin to see the smoke and mirrors, the illusions that have been sold to us? Of course there are different types of education - but in the end is education supposed to protect the system or challenge it? As a teacher is your responsibility to be Andrew Lloyd Webber and get everybody singing the same tune and walking out of the classroom feeling mildly happy but that somehow something is missing (it must be the pastrami sandwich you had for lunch) or is the teacher supposed to be Bertolt Brecht, breaking down the wall that separate character from audience and demanding "What do you think?" So that some are stunned, others walk from the theater stiff kneed, and still others move to close the production down? Is is interesting about Foucault - in my department there is a joke about Foucault being the evil Dewey (the Dewey class and the Foucault class are often taught the same semester with the same students and there is back and forth discussion about it). Dewey and Foucault make many of the same points about our social existence, but whereas Dewey is the eternal optimist Foucault seems to think we're kind of screwed (all you Foucauldians can commence pouncing on me. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] Sent: Wednesday, September 17, 2014 7:07 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception Sounds like Novalis was cribbing from the writings of the Wizard of the 5th Dimension, Greg. And of course, the stramge-->familiar to familiar-strange dynamic is the ritual rite of passage in anthropology, or it was until both the familiar and the unfamiliar became so strange. mike Overall-- Isn't it just common sense that one cannot get a full understanding of a system one is a consituent part of? Passim the discussion of Shotter and others - reality overflows our attempts to understand it. Strange isn't it? mike On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 3:42 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Martin, > I once heard that somewhere Foucault said (somewhat shockingly) that his > life's work was an engagement with Kant. > Phillip, and to Martin's point about not being able to step outside of the > novel, (the following is taken from Daniel Chandler's web-book Semiotics > for Beginners - http://visual-memory.co.uk/daniel/Documents/S4B/sem11.html > ): > "As Hodge and Tripp note, there can hardly be 'an exhaustive semiotic > analysis... because a "complete" analysis... would still be located in > particular social and historical circumstances' (Hodge & Tripp 1986, 27) > < > http://visual-memory.co.uk/daniel/Documents/S4B/sem13.html#Hodge_&_Tripp_1986 > >. > This is reinforced by the poststructuralist stance that we cannot step > outside our signifying systems. Semioticians seek to distance themselves > from dominant codes by strategies aimed at *denaturalization*. The notion > of 'making the familiar strange, and the strange familiar' is now a > recurrent feature of artistic and photographic manifestos and of creative > 'brainstorming' sessions in many fields. The phrase itself has been > attributed to the German poet Novalis (1772-1801, aka Friedrich von > Hardenberg), who declared that the essence of romanticism was 'to make the > familiar strange, and the strange familiar'. The concept is found amongst > other Romantic theorists such as Wordsworth and Coleridge. The notion is > also closely associated with Surrealism and with Brechtian 'alienation'. > However, its adoption by semioticians probably owes most to Russian > Formalist criticism (Lemon & Reis 1965) > < > http://visual-memory.co.uk/daniel/Documents/S4B/sem13.html#Lemon_&_Reis_1965 > > > . Victor Shklovsky argued in 1916 that the key function of art was > *estrangement*, *defamiliarization* or 'making strange' (*ostranenie*) - > i.e. renewing our perception of everyday things and events which are so > familiar that our perception of them has become routinized (Hawkes 1977, > 62-67 > ). > Russian > Formalism was a key influence on the development of semiotics in Eastern > Europe, and the legacy of 'making the familiar strange' is an important one > for semiotics. However, as Simon Watney notes, the strategy of > *defamiliarization* is itself, of course, ideological and has been > associated with the notion that the tactic of surprise may serve to banish > 'distortions' so that we may 'objectively' perceive 'reality' (Watney 1982, > 173-4) > . > Clearly the strategy of 'making the familiar strange' needs to be coupled > with an awareness that whilst we may be able to bypass one set of > conventions we may never escape the framing of experience by convention. > > ?And here is the original "familiar strange" Novalis quote as he is > defining Romantic style (in the German Romantic tradition): > "*To romanticize the world is to make us aware of the magic, mystery and > wonder of the world; it is to educate the senses to see the ordinary as > extraordinary, the familiar as strange, the mundane as sacred, the finite > as infinite.*"? > > ?Best, > greg? > > > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 7:52 PM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > wrote: > > > Right - Kant aimed to identify universal necessities in the seemingly > > contingent. Foucault aimed to unmask the contingencies in seemingly > > universal necessities. > > > > Martin > > > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 8:32 PM, White, Phillip > > wrote: > > > > > Foucault, moving in opposite direction of Kant, looked to see what > > contingencies were cultural constructions, rather than universal > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From ewall@umich.edu Wed Sep 17 17:15:24 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 19:15:24 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035335@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034EDA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <84D9B6CA-33F0-4F12-9D02-BF26F2917A73@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F08@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9034F4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <533B37CC-0D81-4F9B-A400-6C75D0543C54@uniandes.edu.co> <5EE36E4B-683A-4A05-A2D7-2244B4AAB16E@gmail.com> <3252346F-413D-4D7E-AC17-BF76E92FBDB1@uniandes.edu.co> , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035335@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Michael If learning has anything to do with education, it is hard for me to imagine teaching that does not, to some degree and for the 'learner', make the strange familiar and the familiar strange. At, more or less, the same time I see a lot of maintaining status quo. I wonder sometimes whether trying to separate all these things out in some critique somewhat and at times obscures the phenomena. Ed On Sep 17, 2014, at 6:37 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Greg and all, > > So where does education fall in all this? Is the educators job to make the strange familiar or is it to make the familiar strange, or is it to maintain the status quo? Maybe we cannot completely understand the system we are in, but is it important that we understand it just enough to begin to see the smoke and mirrors, the illusions that have been sold to us? Of course there are different types of education - but in the end is education supposed to protect the system or challenge it? As a teacher is your responsibility to be Andrew Lloyd Webber and get everybody singing the same tune and walking out of the classroom feeling mildly happy but that somehow something is missing (it must be the pastrami sandwich you had for lunch) or is the teacher supposed to be Bertolt Brecht, breaking down the wall that separate character from audience and demanding "What do you think?" So that some are stunned, others walk from the theater stiff kneed, and still others move to close the production down? > > Is is interesting about Foucault - in my department there is a joke about Foucault being the evil Dewey (the Dewey class and the Foucault class are often taught the same semester with the same students and there is back and forth discussion about it). Dewey and Foucault make many of the same points about our social existence, but whereas Dewey is the eternal optimist Foucault seems to think we're kind of screwed (all you Foucauldians can commence pouncing on me. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, September 17, 2014 7:07 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: mediate perception and direct perception > > Sounds like Novalis was cribbing from the writings of the Wizard of the 5th > Dimension, Greg. And of course, the stramge-->familiar to familiar-strange > dynamic is the ritual rite of passage in anthropology, or it was until both > the familiar and the unfamiliar became so strange. > mike > > Overall-- Isn't it just common sense that one cannot get a full > understanding of a system one is a consituent part of? Passim the > discussion of Shotter and others - reality overflows our attempts to > understand it. > > Strange isn't it? > mike > > On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 3:42 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > >> Martin, >> I once heard that somewhere Foucault said (somewhat shockingly) that his >> life's work was an engagement with Kant. >> Phillip, and to Martin's point about not being able to step outside of the >> novel, (the following is taken from Daniel Chandler's web-book Semiotics >> for Beginners - http://visual-memory.co.uk/daniel/Documents/S4B/sem11.html >> ): >> "As Hodge and Tripp note, there can hardly be 'an exhaustive semiotic >> analysis... because a "complete" analysis... would still be located in >> particular social and historical circumstances' (Hodge & Tripp 1986, 27) >> < >> http://visual-memory.co.uk/daniel/Documents/S4B/sem13.html#Hodge_&_Tripp_1986 >>> . >> This is reinforced by the poststructuralist stance that we cannot step >> outside our signifying systems. Semioticians seek to distance themselves >> from dominant codes by strategies aimed at *denaturalization*. The notion >> of 'making the familiar strange, and the strange familiar' is now a >> recurrent feature of artistic and photographic manifestos and of creative >> 'brainstorming' sessions in many fields. The phrase itself has been >> attributed to the German poet Novalis (1772-1801, aka Friedrich von >> Hardenberg), who declared that the essence of romanticism was 'to make the >> familiar strange, and the strange familiar'. The concept is found amongst >> other Romantic theorists such as Wordsworth and Coleridge. The notion is >> also closely associated with Surrealism and with Brechtian 'alienation'. >> However, its adoption by semioticians probably owes most to Russian >> Formalist criticism (Lemon & Reis 1965) >> < >> http://visual-memory.co.uk/daniel/Documents/S4B/sem13.html#Lemon_&_Reis_1965 >>> >> . Victor Shklovsky argued in 1916 that the key function of art was >> *estrangement*, *defamiliarization* or 'making strange' (*ostranenie*) - >> i.e. renewing our perception of everyday things and events which are so >> familiar that our perception of them has become routinized (Hawkes 1977, >> 62-67 >> ). >> Russian >> Formalism was a key influence on the development of semiotics in Eastern >> Europe, and the legacy of 'making the familiar strange' is an important one >> for semiotics. However, as Simon Watney notes, the strategy of >> *defamiliarization* is itself, of course, ideological and has been >> associated with the notion that the tactic of surprise may serve to banish >> 'distortions' so that we may 'objectively' perceive 'reality' (Watney 1982, >> 173-4) >> . >> Clearly the strategy of 'making the familiar strange' needs to be coupled >> with an awareness that whilst we may be able to bypass one set of >> conventions we may never escape the framing of experience by convention. >> >> ?And here is the original "familiar strange" Novalis quote as he is >> defining Romantic style (in the German Romantic tradition): >> "*To romanticize the world is to make us aware of the magic, mystery and >> wonder of the world; it is to educate the senses to see the ordinary as >> extraordinary, the familiar as strange, the mundane as sacred, the finite >> as infinite.*"? >> >> ?Best, >> greg? >> >> >> On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 7:52 PM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>> wrote: >> >>> Right - Kant aimed to identify universal necessities in the seemingly >>> contingent. Foucault aimed to unmask the contingencies in seemingly >>> universal necessities. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 8:32 PM, White, Phillip >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Foucault, moving in opposite direction of Kant, looked to see what >>> contingencies were cultural constructions, rather than universal >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] > From h2cmng@yahoo.co.uk Wed Sep 17 17:18:52 2014 From: h2cmng@yahoo.co.uk (peter jones) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 01:18:52 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca In-Reply-To: <1410999406.69903.YahooMailNeo@web171504.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> References: <8D2C4DB1-CFE1-4A1D-8683-CE5A8551B35C@gmail.com> <6322AED9-6172-4B7C-8A08-4F0F1FE673D2@gmail.com> <4BDC889C-9B1B-4516-9F11-5549F0EF3003@gmail.com> <1410855310.36603.YahooMailNeo@web171501.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <1410999406.69903.YahooMailNeo@web171504.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1410999532.57312.YahooMailNeo@web171502.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Mike As I mentioned/ref. not my words. Communication-transmission is a model, one of several means of explanation. Considered within the conceptual framework - Hodges' model - Shannon and Weaver's entropy, noise, measures of information is mechanistic. Hodges' model is of course idealised. There are times when such a model 'fits' (correspondence as truth?) as in hearing - the inner ear - communication-conduction as transmission. Other occasions such as I encountered yesterday (now). In a care home, a man agitated was pulling and banging on a locked inner corridor door seeking to leave (it is in his best interests to stay). The door was shaking to the extent that walking outside to speak to staff, an open loose window outside in the inner (secure) garden was moving to-and-fro. The inner door noise was just audible outside. Ironically(?) the window was not banging it was silent and yet it signified - transmitted - distress elsewhere? Is there a sense that what we seek is a Goethean view of humanities-sciences(reality)?The debate (centuries and more long) is an ambiguous image or reversible figure and yet if we were delivered of this Goethean view then we could see both simultaneously - the whole? Elsewhere - Jones, P. (1996) Humans, Information, and Science, Journal of Advanced Nursing, 24(3),591-598 I tried to relate information, the mechanistic (Shannon & Weaver, and Dretske) to more humanistic concerns of mental health and meaning. I will look up the sources you have mentioned and thank you for the related points. I wish I had time to read more and in depth... Peter Jones Lancashire, UK Blogging at "Welcome to the QUAD" http://hodges-model.blogspot.com/ Hodges Health Career - Care Domains - Model http://www.p-jones.demon.co.uk/ h2cm: help 2C more - help 2 listen - help 2 care http://twitter.com/h2cm _______________________________ From: mike cole To: peter jones ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Tuesday, 16 September 2014, 17:54 Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca Peter-- I fully agree with the need for what you/Serres/Shannon-Weaver call noise in the process of communication. However, I think it is a cardinal error when he/you(?) write: With the advent of information science, a new figure for representing science becomes possible: this is the 'model' of communication. Accordingly, we have three elements: a message, a channel for transmitting it, and the noise, or interference, that accompanies the transmission. Noise calls for decipherment; it makes a reading of the message more difficult. And yet without it, there would be no message. This form of information science is, overtly, a sender-receiver TRANSMISSION model of communication. It assumes a linear temporal process. Such a reduction is tolerable only under very carefully prescribed constraints. The "third" part is noise, but the unidirectionality remains. A different way of thinking about this is offered by John Shotter in the piece that Rod sent around. He does not use the term, noise, but he does focus our attention on the necessity of uncertainty and co-participation as conditions of thought and action. I am all on board with the need for cross-talk between disciplines as well as theoretical traditions working within the same disciplines or with common concern. I also think that the invocation of parasitism is quite relevant to the way i have been thinking about human development, but communication-as-transmission seems like a mistake. Infected by George H. Mead in steamy san diego mike On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 1:15 AM, peter jones wrote: > >Michel Serres has written on these themes.... > >Fifty >Key Contemporary Thinkers by John Lechte, Routledge, 1994. > >With the recognition of the interrelation between different sciences >and different forms of knowledge, as well as between science and different >artistic practices, has come Serres's effort to plot the way that different >knowledge domains interpenetrate. Even more: Serres has set himself the >task of being a means of communication (a medium) between the sciences >and the arts - the Hermes of modern scholarships. With the advent of information >science, a new figure for representing science becomes possible: this is >the 'model' of communication. Accordingly, we have three elements: a message, >a channel for transmitting it, and the noise, or interference, that accompanies >the transmission. Noise calls for decipherment; it makes a reading of the >message more difficult. And yet without it, there would be no message. >There is, in short, no message without resistance. What Serres initially >finds intriguing about noise (rather than the message) is that it opens >up such a fertile avenue of reflection. Instead of remaining pure noise, >the latter becomes a means of transport. Thus in the first volume of the >Hermes series noise is analysed as the third, empirical element of the >message. Ideally, communication must be separated from noise. Noise is >what is not communicated; it is just there as a kind of chaos, as the empirical >third element of the message, the accidental part, the part of difference >that is excluded. Every formalism (mathematics, for example) is founded >on the exclusion of the third element of noise. Every formalism is a way >of moving from one region of knowledge to another. To communicate is to >move within a class of objects that have the same form. Form has to be >extracted from the cacophony of noise; form (communication) is the exclusion >of noise, an escape from the domain of the empirical. > > >In his book, The Parasite, Serres recalls that 'parasite' also means >noise (in French). A parasite is a noise in a channel. And so when describing >the rats' meals in a story from the fables of La Fontaine - the meals of >two parasites - Serres also refers to noise: 'The two companions scurry >off when they hear a noise at the door. It was only a noise, but it was >also a message, a bit of information producing panic: an interruption, >a corruption, a rupture of information. Was this noise really a message? >Wasn't it, rather, static, a parasite? > >see also: > >http://www.frieze.com/issue/article/joyeux-anniversaire/ > > >Peter Jones >Lancashire, UK >Blogging at "Welcome to the QUAD" >http://hodges-model.blogspot.com/ >http://twitter.com/h2cm > > >________________________________ > From: Larry Purss >To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >Sent: Tuesday, 16 September 2014, 8:43 >Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca > > > >Bahktin the trickster. >In Greek mythology that was Hermes the messenger who brought messages >between [mediated] the divine and the human realms. Bahktin definitely >overlaps with Hermes [and hermeneutics] >Larry > >On Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 8:42 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III >wrote: > >> Hi Greg, >> I'm convinced you are right. Like I say, Bakhtin just keeps popping up. >> The trickster? Rebelais? What is that about? >> Henry >> >> On Sep 14, 2014, at 8:49 AM, Greg Thompson >> wrote: >> >> > One reason I mention him is because of resonances with ideas. >> > But I also mention him as a kind of trickster figure as well as a student >> > of the trickster in writing (his dissertation was on Rabelais). >> > I also mention him as a writer who seems authentically engaged with >> > meaningful/emotive aspects of human existence (e.g., Toward a Philosophy >> of >> > the Act, and Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity). >> > And finally, I mention Bakhtin because I'm still not convinced that the >> > deep treasures of Bakhtin's work has yet been mined out. >> > -greg >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 8:13 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < >> hshonerd@gmail.com> >> > wrote: >> > >> >> Greg, >> >> Thank you for you good words and great question. I knew about Bakhtin, >> but >> >> have been finding him everywhere in the articles and chat of XMCA over >> the >> >> last week. Seriously. >> >> Henry >> >> >> >> On Sep 13, 2014, at 2:26 PM, Greg Thompson >> >> wrote: >> >> >> >>> I would hope that a certain amount of irreverence would be dear to most >> >>> people on this list! >> >>> But seriously Henry, have you come across Bakhtin's work at all? >> >>> Seems like another that you might want to throw in with the crowd of >> >>> healthy irreverents. >> >>> -greg >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 2:48 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < >> hshonerd@gmail.com >> >>> >> >>> wrote: >> >>> >> >>>> Mike and David, >> >>>> This is seriously getting to be a club that I, like Groucho, won't >> >> join, >> >>>> if it takes me as a member. I think all of this seriously evokes >> Andy's >> >>>> contention, in his notes for the upcoming presentation at the ISCAR >> >>>> conference (which XMCA has gotten) that, "Adults can grasp true >> >> concepts, >> >>>> and can change society, and a social theory has to treat adults as >> >> adults, >> >>>> and this is what the projects approach allows us to do. " If "adult" >> >> means >> >>>> the same as "serious", you can see why I have my doubts about joining >> >> the >> >>>> Unserious Scholar Club. On the other hand, if I can have some fun, as >> in >> >>>> the laughing warrior (forget gender stereotypes here, and dare me to >> >> talk >> >>>> about Jihad), then that's what I'm talking about. Incidentally, I >> loved >> >>>> Andy's notes. I could so relate it to CG. The emergent character of >> >> project >> >>>> realization he talks about applies very well to discourse, as you can >> >> see >> >>>> in the articles by Langacker I have sent out. Discourse IS a project >> and >> >>>> its outcome is typically not entirely clear in the minds of the >> >>>> interactants as they negotiate its waters. XMCA, of which this email >> is >> >> a >> >>>> "turn", is a prototypical "work in progress", as Andy puts it, since >> we >> >>>> clearly don't know where this will all end up. But I hope it can be >> fun >> >>>> along the way. >> >>>> Henry >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> On Sep 6, 2014, at 1:51 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>>> Hi Henry-- There goes my pile of books that need to be read before >> bed >> >>>> time! >> >>>>> Spinoza goes up there right next to Dead Souls. >> >>>>> >> >>>>> However, David having already claimed the mantle of unserious >> scholar, >> >>>> and >> >>>>> you having made the same claim, I am afraid that I have to make >> >> precisely >> >>>>> the same claim on the unrefutable grounds that no one pays me any >> >> longer >> >>>>> for what I do so I get to be as unserious as i can seriously be! >> >>>>> mike >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 12:33 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < >> >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >> >>>>> wrote: >> >>>>> >> >>>>>> Hi Mike, >> >>>>>> All I can say now is that Spinoza is famously quoted as having said, >> >>>> "The >> >>>>>> more clearly you understand yourself and your emotions, the more you >> >>>> become >> >>>>>> a lover of what is." This quote happens to appear in the >> introduction >> >>>> to a >> >>>>>> very popular self help book, Loving What Is, by Byron Katie (2002). >> I >> >>>>>> bought the book , obviously, because I thought I needed help. It >> did, >> >>>> but >> >>>>>> it also introduced me to Spinoza. And that has been a deeper "help". >> >> So, >> >>>>>> from a personal perspective, I can totally understand how Spinoza >> and >> >>>>>> periizhvanie would be connected. For all of you ESL teachers out >> >> there, >> >>>> who >> >>>>>> doesn't remember Krashen on the "affective filter" and I have been >> >>>> seeing a >> >>>>>> lot on character and education lately. Oh yes, and how failing is >> >>>> important >> >>>>>> to eventual success. Teasing out issues in the education of >> >>>>>> non-mainstreamers, and recognizing how the current system is toxic >> for >> >>>>>> everyone, I think Spinoza's analysis and the narrative of his life >> are >> >>>>>> powerful. Vygotsky hits me the same way. Cantor, the mathematician, >> >> and >> >>>>>> Pierce, the philosopher/logician/semiotician, also constantly come >> up >> >>>> for >> >>>>>> me. They were ridiculed by the received cognoscenti of the time, so >> >>>> much so >> >>>>>> that the suffered mental breakdowns. But they pushed on to develop >> >>>> tools in >> >>>>>> math and semiotics that seem to me are complementary with Vygotsky. >> >>>> Again I >> >>>>>> get to take the role of unserious scholar here, so think of my >> >> thoughts >> >>>> as >> >>>>>> gaming on line and don't take the game too seriously. >> >>>>>> Henry >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> On Sep 5, 2014, at 6:42 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Hi David and Henry-- >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> David-- I was intrigued by your comment that Spinoza is a >> >> controversial >> >>>>>>> topic on xmca. I googled Spinoza on the main web page and came up >> >> with >> >>>> 4K >> >>>>>>> plus hits (!!). My own impression is that few on this list, me >> >>>> included, >> >>>>>>> have engaged in serious study of Spinoza let alone the imprint of >> >>>> Spinoza >> >>>>>>> on Vygotsky. >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> What is the nature of the controversy? What is at stake? The topic >> is >> >>>> of >> >>>>>>> particular interest to me at present because I have been part of >> >>>>>>> discussions with people who are focused on Vygotsky's use of >> >>>> perezhivanie >> >>>>>>> in his later work, where the relation of emotion and cognition is a >> >>>>>> central >> >>>>>>> concern and Spinoza is clearly relevant. >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Henry and anyone interested in chasing down what has been written >> >> about >> >>>>>>> various topics in xmca chatter, take advantage of the nice google >> >>>> search >> >>>>>> at >> >>>>>>> lchc.ucsd.edu. >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> mike >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> (who enmeshed in the sense/meaning distinction in all of its >> >>>> multilingual >> >>>>>>> confusifications at present) >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> -- >> >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> >>> Assistant Professor >> >>> Department of Anthropology >> >>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> >>> Brigham Young University >> >>> Provo, UT 84602 >> >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > >> > >> > -- >> > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> > Assistant Professor >> > Department of Anthropology >> > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> > Brigham Young University >> > Provo, UT 84602 >> > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> >> > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Sep 17 18:10:25 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 10:10:25 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts about cultural "triple packages" In-Reply-To: <5ludl16dbj40lcf5cs4xnf9w.1410889516950@email.android.com> References: <5ludl16dbj40lcf5cs4xnf9w.1410889516950@email.android.com> Message-ID: Amy Chua and her husband are both, like Obama, professors of constitutional law, and this explains a lot: their individualism, their idealism, and their anecdotal approach to psychological research. Naturally, I agree with all of the criticisms made on those fronts; nevertheless I find myself in perverse sympathy with the talk, particularly the point she made about the non-cultural sources of poverty which seem to have been ignored by people on the list, perhaps because they come near the end of the talk. "The Triple Package" is not a great book (as you can probably tell from the "Seven Habits" style title). But it's still a book worth putting in context. I don't think it is really a generalization of Chua's book on parenting (which was actually very self-critical and not at all self-congratulatory). I think it is a generalization of Chua's last book, which was right in her own field, although like many books which lie in the middle of one's field it did have a quite personal trigger. As they say in their talk: all nations are unequal, but some are more unequal than others. The Philippines are one of those more unequal nations: Chua's grandparents are Filipino Chinese, and the Chinese in the Philippines are about one percent of the population and own some forty or fifty percent of the country's capital. So Chua's grandmother (or perhaps it was an aunt--I'm don't exactly remember) was horribly murdered by her driver. Nobody was punished, and the reason was that the police felt enormous sympathy for the driver's hatred of rich Chinese and released him on a technicality. At first, Chua was overcome with rage. But then she began to generalize; she realized that her grandmother's murder was actually part of a much wider pattern of constitutional change, where political democracy is combined with extremes of economic oligarchy, and consititutions make possible and even encourage demagogy and ethnic scapegoating of what we might call the richer oppressed (e.g. Indians in Uganda, Lebanese in Liberia, Tutsis in Rwanda, Croats in Serbia, Chinese in Indonesia, Jews just about everywhere). This is "culture" as a weapon in the hands of the powerful poor--people like Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Idi Amin, Slobadan Milosevic. But it must have occurred to Chua while she was writing the book that demagogy and scapegoating was only part of the story--I think this book is actually an argument that culture can also be forged into a weapon in the hands of the poor by precisely the family members who seem most powerless--not her own grandmother, but grandmothers like that of Sonja Sotomayor. Idealism? Of course. Chua ignores the real reasons for the success stories she tells, because they have nothing to do with these triple package values (values which she admits are shared by almost all ethnic groups). As Thomas Piketty points out in "Capital in the Twenty-first Century", economics seen over the long run is...well, it's a long arc, and it bends towards injustice. But precisely because the injustice towards which it bends admits so very few to the very rich, the very poor eventually play catch up, both iinternationally (China) and intra-nationally, while the majority of the ruling ethnic power are forced into the actual, not the nominal, middle class (i.e. in the USA, people who live on earned income and not returns on capital). There were two exceptions to all of this playing catch-up, and they happen to be the real "double package" on which American culture was materially founded: genocide and slavery. That is why I feel that treating the Native American and the black American experience as if it were somehow comparable to other immigrant experiences is really a form of Holocaust denial. The building where I live lodges mostly foreigners, and there are many Americans. One of the professors is black, American, and an incredibly successful and well known author in business studies. Like Barack Obama, he has a name--it's an African name, not the name of some slave-owning scoundrel; from the sound of it I suspect he calls himself a "Nigerian-American" and not "African-American". The other day I met his son in the elevator, and when I heard his name I told him I recognized it, because it goes at the top of every article his dad publishes. The kid was fairly incandescent with pride. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 17 September 2014 02:45, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > I am not a psychologist, but is this what is passing off as empirical psychological research? On another note, can we get some real psychologists to weigh in on the impact of spanking children on their psychological development. This Adrian Peterson thing is getting racial really quickly. By the way, my parents would be in prison today based on how I was spanked.... > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Henry G. Shonerd III"
Date:09/16/2014 1:12 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts about cultural "triple packages"
>
I am struck by how inauthentic (phony?) Chua and her husband are, even more so than most TED talks. As I listened, I remembered the work by Ogbu on oppositional responses of "involuntary immigrants" (Blacks as slaves, Native Americans and Hispanics caught up in the movement of national borders). I have heard Ogbu has been criticized, but he convinced me. > Henry > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 4:59 AM, Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > >> Thanks for sending, Greg. I also found it hard to keep watching. I have read Amy Chua's "tiger mom" book, and this TED talk seems to be a way to validate and extend the parenting ideas that she lays out in the book (which I find to be harsh and a bit mean-spirited). I have many issues with their claims, but I'll just mention two. >> >> First, I don't think their generalizations/facts are very useful. They perpetuate the idea, for example, that stereotypes are acceptable, especially if they're "true," which is probably where the comment that they're racist came from. It is also unhelpful to tell white, middle class parents one more time that "other" kids are going to outperform their kids and their kids are falling behind. This sort of scarcity rhetoric hurts kids and parents, in part because it sets up an us/them dichotomy. >> >> Second, as Greg said, there's no theory. I am suspect of facts, such as these, without theory because they don't account for how the facts were produced. >> >> Katie >> >> Katie Wester-Neal >> Doctoral Candidate >> University of Georgia >> >> >> >> >> >> On Sep 15, 2014, at 11:41 PM, "Greg Thompson" wrote: >> >> Been enjoying the party, and apropos of David's call for some facts (which >> I'm in full support of - despite being a theory-wonk), I thought I'd offer >> this Ted talk that was sent to me by an LCHC colleague: >> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHUMcxaqm9U >> >> Lots of facts in there, and not a little theory. >> >> They've got big claims about the facts of their program in inner-city >> schools and about inequality too (you have to listen to the end to hear >> about that). >> >> What do you think? >> >> Anything to it? >> >> Anyone have any facts to counter their facts? >> >> -greg >> >> p.s., I'm still listening to it right now. Not sure I'm going to be able >> to stomach the entire talk... getting a little queasy. Feeling like someone >> is selling me something that is going to cost me a ton and I'm not going to >> like. Ugh... >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Sep 17 20:43:33 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 20:43:33 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts about cultural "triple packages" In-Reply-To: References: <5ludl16dbj40lcf5cs4xnf9w.1410889516950@email.android.com> Message-ID: Interesting contextualization, David. thanks mike On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Amy Chua and her husband are both, like Obama, professors of > constitutional law, and this explains a lot: their individualism, > their idealism, and their anecdotal approach to psychological > research. Naturally, I agree with all of the criticisms made on those > fronts; nevertheless I find myself in perverse sympathy with the talk, > particularly the point she made about the non-cultural sources of > poverty which seem to have been ignored by people on the list, perhaps > because they come near the end of the talk. > > "The Triple Package" is not a great book (as you can probably tell > from the "Seven Habits" style title). But it's still a book worth > putting in context. I don't think it is really a generalization of > Chua's book on parenting (which was actually very self-critical and > not at all self-congratulatory). I think it is a generalization of > Chua's last book, which was right in her own field, although like many > books which lie in the middle of one's field it did have a quite > personal trigger. > > As they say in their talk: all nations are unequal, but some are more > unequal than others. The Philippines are one of those more unequal > nations: Chua's grandparents are Filipino Chinese, and the Chinese in > the Philippines are about one percent of the population and own some > forty or fifty percent of the country's capital. So Chua's grandmother > (or perhaps it was an aunt--I'm don't exactly remember) was horribly > murdered by her driver. Nobody was punished, and the reason was that > the police felt enormous sympathy for the driver's hatred of rich > Chinese and released him on a technicality. > > At first, Chua was overcome with rage. But then she began to > generalize; she realized that her grandmother's murder was actually > part of a much wider pattern of constitutional change, where political > democracy is combined with extremes of economic oligarchy, and > consititutions make possible and even encourage demagogy and ethnic > scapegoating of what we might call the richer oppressed (e.g. Indians > in Uganda, Lebanese in Liberia, Tutsis in Rwanda, Croats in Serbia, > Chinese in Indonesia, Jews just about everywhere). > > This is "culture" as a weapon in the hands of the powerful > poor--people like Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Idi Amin, Slobadan Milosevic. > But it must have occurred to Chua while she was writing the book that > demagogy and scapegoating was only part of the story--I think this > book is actually an argument that culture can also be forged into a > weapon in the hands of the poor by precisely the family members who > seem most powerless--not her own grandmother, but grandmothers like > that of Sonja Sotomayor. > > Idealism? Of course. Chua ignores the real reasons for the success > stories she tells, because they have nothing to do with these triple > package values (values which she admits are shared by almost all > ethnic groups). As Thomas Piketty points out in "Capital in the > Twenty-first Century", economics seen over the long run is...well, > it's a long arc, and it bends towards injustice. But precisely because > the injustice towards which it bends admits so very few to the very > rich, the very poor eventually play catch up, both iinternationally > (China) and intra-nationally, while the majority of the ruling ethnic > power are forced into the actual, not the nominal, middle class (i.e. > in the USA, people who live on earned income and not returns on > capital). > > There were two exceptions to all of this playing catch-up, and they > happen to be the real "double package" on which American culture was > materially founded: genocide and slavery. That is why I feel that > treating the Native American and the black American experience as if > it were somehow comparable to other immigrant experiences is really a > form of Holocaust denial. The building where I live lodges mostly > foreigners, and there are many Americans. One of the professors is > black, American, and an incredibly successful and well known author in > business studies. Like Barack Obama, he has a name--it's an African > name, not the name of some slave-owning scoundrel; from the sound of > it I suspect he calls himself a "Nigerian-American" and not > "African-American". The other day I met his son in the elevator, and > when I heard his name I told him I recognized it, because it goes at > the top of every article his dad publishes. The kid was fairly > incandescent with pride. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > On 17 September 2014 02:45, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > wrote: > > I am not a psychologist, but is this what is passing off as empirical > psychological research? On another note, can we get some real > psychologists to weigh in on the impact of spanking children on their > psychological development. This Adrian Peterson thing is getting racial > really quickly. By the way, my parents would be in prison today based on > how I was spanked.... > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > President > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > www.mocombeian.com > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Henry G. > Shonerd III"
Date:09/16/2014 1:12 PM > (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts > about cultural "triple packages"
> >
I am struck by how inauthentic (phony?) Chua and her husband are, > even more so than most TED talks. As I listened, I remembered the work by > Ogbu on oppositional responses of "involuntary immigrants" (Blacks as > slaves, Native Americans and Hispanics caught up in the movement of > national borders). I have heard Ogbu has been criticized, but he convinced > me. > > Henry > > > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 4:59 AM, Katherine Wester Neal > wrote: > > > >> Thanks for sending, Greg. I also found it hard to keep watching. I have > read Amy Chua's "tiger mom" book, and this TED talk seems to be a way to > validate and extend the parenting ideas that she lays out in the book > (which I find to be harsh and a bit mean-spirited). I have many issues with > their claims, but I'll just mention two. > >> > >> First, I don't think their generalizations/facts are very useful. They > perpetuate the idea, for example, that stereotypes are acceptable, > especially if they're "true," which is probably where the comment that > they're racist came from. It is also unhelpful to tell white, middle class > parents one more time that "other" kids are going to outperform their kids > and their kids are falling behind. This sort of scarcity rhetoric hurts > kids and parents, in part because it sets up an us/them dichotomy. > >> > >> Second, as Greg said, there's no theory. I am suspect of facts, such as > these, without theory because they don't account for how the facts were > produced. > >> > >> Katie > >> > >> Katie Wester-Neal > >> Doctoral Candidate > >> University of Georgia > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Sep 15, 2014, at 11:41 PM, "Greg Thompson" < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> wrote: > >> > >> Been enjoying the party, and apropos of David's call for some facts > (which > >> I'm in full support of - despite being a theory-wonk), I thought I'd > offer > >> this Ted talk that was sent to me by an LCHC colleague: > >> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHUMcxaqm9U > >> > >> Lots of facts in there, and not a little theory. > >> > >> They've got big claims about the facts of their program in inner-city > >> schools and about inequality too (you have to listen to the end to hear > >> about that). > >> > >> What do you think? > >> > >> Anything to it? > >> > >> Anyone have any facts to counter their facts? > >> > >> -greg > >> > >> p.s., I'm still listening to it right now. Not sure I'm going to be able > >> to stomach the entire talk... getting a little queasy. Feeling like > someone > >> is selling me something that is going to cost me a ton and I'm not > going to > >> like. Ugh... > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> Assistant Professor > >> Department of Anthropology > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> Brigham Young University > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > > > > > > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Sep 17 20:50:41 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 20:50:41 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca In-Reply-To: <1410999532.57312.YahooMailNeo@web171502.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> References: <8D2C4DB1-CFE1-4A1D-8683-CE5A8551B35C@gmail.com> <6322AED9-6172-4B7C-8A08-4F0F1FE673D2@gmail.com> <4BDC889C-9B1B-4516-9F11-5549F0EF3003@gmail.com> <1410855310.36603.YahooMailNeo@web171501.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <1410999406.69903.YahooMailNeo@web171504.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <1410999532.57312.YahooMailNeo@web171502.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Sorry for the mis-attribution, Peter. Yes. There are conditions under which the reduced model is a very useful approximation. For example, when sending morse code from Hawaii to submarines seeking to attack an enemy harbor far away. Everyone knows the goal, the topic, etc. The submarine captain must decode instructions and act on them. The major barrier is noise. There is this problem with "seeing both sides at once" that teaching communication has gotten me to think about a lot. There are not two sides to a coin, there are there sides -- the two sides and the "edge". If you hold the coin up at arm's length you can only see the edge and one side, to various extents. Only if you hold the coin so that the edge is directed squarely between your eyes, and move it very close to your eyes, can you see the two sides and the edge at the same time. But they are now out of focus. Seems like a useful metaphor for one of the many analytic problems we have. Try it. The effect is quite striking. mike On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 5:18 PM, peter jones wrote: > > > Mike > > As I mentioned/ref. not my words. > Communication-transmission is a model, one of several means of > explanation. Considered within the conceptual framework - Hodges' model - > Shannon and Weaver's entropy, noise, measures of information is > mechanistic. Hodges' model is of course idealised. > > There are times when such a model 'fits' (correspondence as truth?) as in > hearing - the inner ear - communication-conduction as transmission. > > Other occasions such as I encountered yesterday (now). In a care home, a > man agitated was pulling and banging on a locked inner corridor door > seeking to leave (it is in his best interests to stay). The door was > shaking to the extent that walking outside to speak to staff, an open loose > window outside in the inner (secure) garden was moving to-and-fro. The > inner door noise was just audible outside. Ironically(?) the window was not > banging it was silent and yet it signified - transmitted - distress > elsewhere? > > Is there a sense that what we seek is a Goethean view of > humanities-sciences(reality)?The debate (centuries and more long) is an > ambiguous image or reversible figure and yet if we were delivered of this > Goethean view then we could see both simultaneously - the whole? > > Elsewhere - Jones, P. (1996) Humans, Information, and Science, Journal of > Advanced Nursing, 24(3),591-598 > > I tried to relate information, the mechanistic (Shannon & Weaver, and > Dretske) to more humanistic concerns of mental health and meaning. > > I will look up the sources you have mentioned and thank you for the > related points. > I wish I had time to read more and in depth... > > > Peter Jones > Lancashire, UK > Blogging at "Welcome to the QUAD" > http://hodges-model.blogspot.com/ > Hodges Health Career - Care Domains - Model > http://www.p-jones.demon.co.uk/ > h2cm: help 2C more - help 2 listen - help 2 care > http://twitter.com/h2cm > > _______________________________ > From: mike cole > To: peter jones ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > Sent: Tuesday, 16 September 2014, 17:54 > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca > > > > Peter-- I fully agree with the need for what you/Serres/Shannon-Weaver > call noise in the process of communication. However, I think it is a > cardinal error when he/you(?) write: > > > With the advent of information science, a new figure for representing > science becomes possible: this is the 'model' of communication. > Accordingly, we have three elements: a message, a channel for transmitting > it, and the noise, or interference, that accompanies the transmission. > Noise calls for decipherment; it makes a reading of the message more > difficult. And yet without it, there would be no message. > > > This form of information science is, overtly, a sender-receiver > TRANSMISSION model of communication. It assumes a linear temporal process. > Such a reduction is tolerable only under very carefully prescribed > constraints. The "third" part is noise, but the unidirectionality remains. > > A different way of thinking about this is offered by John Shotter in the > piece that Rod sent around. He does not use the term, noise, but he does > focus our attention on the necessity of uncertainty and co-participation as > conditions of thought and action. > > I am all on board with the need for cross-talk between disciplines as well > as theoretical traditions working within the same disciplines or with > common concern. I also think that the invocation of parasitism is quite > relevant to the way i have been thinking about human development, but > communication-as-transmission seems like a mistake. > > Infected by George H. Mead in steamy san diego > mike > > > > > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 1:15 AM, peter jones wrote: > > > > > >Michel Serres has written on these themes.... > > > >Fifty > >Key Contemporary Thinkers by John Lechte, Routledge, 1994. > > > >With the recognition of the interrelation between different sciences > >and different forms of knowledge, as well as between science and different > >artistic practices, has come Serres's effort to plot the way that > different > >knowledge domains interpenetrate. Even more: Serres has set himself the > >task of being a means of communication (a medium) between the sciences > >and the arts - the Hermes of modern scholarships. With the advent of > information > >science, a new figure for representing science becomes possible: this is > >the 'model' of communication. Accordingly, we have three elements: a > message, > >a channel for transmitting it, and the noise, or interference, that > accompanies > >the transmission. Noise calls for decipherment; it makes a reading of the > >message more difficult. And yet without it, there would be no message. > >There is, in short, no message without resistance. What Serres initially > >finds intriguing about noise (rather than the message) is that it opens > >up such a fertile avenue of reflection. Instead of remaining pure > noise, > >the latter becomes a means of transport. Thus in the first volume of the > >Hermes series noise is analysed as the third, empirical element of the > >message. Ideally, communication must be separated from noise. Noise is > >what is not communicated; it is just there as a kind of chaos, as the > empirical > >third element of the message, the accidental part, the part of difference > >that is excluded. Every formalism (mathematics, for example) is founded > >on the exclusion of the third element of noise. Every formalism is a way > >of moving from one region of knowledge to another. To communicate is to > >move within a class of objects that have the same form. Form has to be > >extracted from the cacophony of noise; form > (communication) is the exclusion > >of noise, an escape from the domain of the empirical. > > > > > >In his book, The Parasite, Serres recalls that 'parasite' also means > >noise (in French). A parasite is a noise in a channel. And so when > describing > >the rats' meals in a story from the fables of La Fontaine - the meals of > >two parasites - Serres also refers to noise: 'The two companions scurry > >off when they hear a noise at the door. It was only a noise, but it was > >also a message, a bit of information producing panic: an interruption, > >a corruption, a rupture of information. Was this noise really a message? > >Wasn't it, rather, static, a parasite? > > > >see also: > > > >http://www.frieze.com/issue/article/joyeux-anniversaire/ > > > > > >Peter Jones > >Lancashire, UK > >Blogging at "Welcome to the QUAD" > >http://hodges-model.blogspot.com/ > >http://twitter.com/h2cm > > > > > >________________________________ > > From: Larry Purss > >To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >Sent: Tuesday, 16 September 2014, 8:43 > >Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca > > > > > > > >Bahktin the trickster. > >In Greek mythology > that was Hermes the messenger who brought messages > >between [mediated] the divine and the human realms. Bahktin definitely > >overlaps with Hermes [and hermeneutics] > >Larry > > > >On Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 8:42 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III > > >wrote: > > > >> Hi Greg, > >> I'm convinced you are right. Like I say, Bakhtin just keeps popping up. > >> The trickster? Rebelais? What is that about? > >> Henry > >> > >> On Sep 14, 2014, at 8:49 AM, Greg Thompson > >> wrote: > >> > >> > One reason I mention him is because of resonances with ideas. > >> > But I also mention him as a kind of trickster figure as well as a > student > >> > of the trickster in writing (his dissertation was on Rabelais). > >> > I also mention him as a writer who seems authentically engaged with > >> > meaningful/emotive aspects of human existence (e.g., Toward a > Philosophy > >> of > >> > the Act, and Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity). > >> > And finally, I mention Bakhtin because I'm still not convinced that > the > >> > deep treasures of Bakhtin's work has yet been mined out. > >> > -greg > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 8:13 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > >> > wrote: > >> > > >> >> Greg, > >> >> Thank you for you good words and great question. I knew about > Bakhtin, > >> but > >> >> have been finding him everywhere in the articles and chat of XMCA > over > >> the > >> >> last week. Seriously. > >> >> Henry > >> >> > >> >> On Sep 13, 2014, at 2:26 PM, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >> >> wrote: > >> >> > >> >>> I would hope that a certain amount of irreverence would be dear to > most > >> >>> people on this list! > >> >>> But seriously Henry, have you come across Bakhtin's work at all? > >> >>> Seems like another that you might want to throw in with the crowd of > >> >>> healthy irreverents. > >> >>> -greg > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 2:48 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > >> >>> > >> >>> wrote: > >> >>> > >> >>>> Mike and David, > >> >>>> This is seriously getting to be a club that I, like Groucho, won't > >> >> join, > >> >>>> if it takes me as a member. I think all of this seriously evokes > >> Andy's > >> >>>> contention, in his notes for the upcoming presentation at the ISCAR > >> >>>> conference (which XMCA has gotten) that, "Adults can grasp true > >> >> concepts, > >> >>>> and can change society, and a social theory has to treat adults as > >> >> adults, > >> >>>> and this is what the projects approach allows us to do. " If > "adult" > >> >> means > >> >>>> the same as "serious", you can see why I have my doubts about > joining > >> >> the > >> >>>> Unserious Scholar Club. On the other hand, if I can have some fun, > as > >> in > >> >>>> the laughing warrior (forget gender stereotypes here, and dare me > to > >> >> talk > >> >>>> about Jihad), then that's what I'm talking about. Incidentally, > I > >> loved > >> >>>> Andy's notes. I could so relate it to CG. The emergent character of > >> >> project > >> >>>> realization he talks about applies very well to discourse, as you > can > >> >> see > >> >>>> in the articles by Langacker I have sent out. Discourse IS a > project > >> and > >> >>>> its outcome is typically not > entirely clear in the minds of the > >> >>>> interactants as they negotiate its waters. XMCA, of which this > email > >> is > >> >> a > >> >>>> "turn", is a prototypical "work in progress", as Andy puts it, > since > >> we > >> >>>> clearly don't know where this will all end up. But I hope it can be > >> fun > >> >>>> along the way. > >> >>>> Henry > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>> On Sep 6, 2014, at 1:51 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> Hi Henry-- There goes my pile of books that need to be read before > >> bed > >> >>>> time! > >> >>>>> Spinoza goes up there right next to Dead Souls. > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> However, David having already claimed the mantle of unserious > >> scholar, > >> >>>> and > >> >>>>> you having made the same claim, I am afraid that I have to make > >> >> precisely > >> >>>>> the same claim on the unrefutable grounds that no one pays me any > >> >> longer > >> >>>>> for what I do so I get > to be as unserious as i can seriously be! > >> >>>>> mike > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 12:33 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > >> >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> > >> >>>>> wrote: > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>>> Hi Mike, > >> >>>>>> All I can say now is that Spinoza is famously quoted as having > said, > >> >>>> "The > >> >>>>>> more clearly you understand yourself and your emotions, the more > you > >> >>>> become > >> >>>>>> a lover of what is." This quote happens to appear in the > >> introduction > >> >>>> to a > >> >>>>>> very popular self help book, Loving What Is, by Byron Katie > (2002). > >> I > >> >>>>>> bought the book , obviously, > because I thought I needed help. It > >> did, > >> >>>> but > >> >>>>>> it also introduced me to Spinoza. And that has been a deeper > "help". > >> >> So, > >> >>>>>> from a personal perspective, I can totally understand how Spinoza > >> and > >> >>>>>> periizhvanie would be connected. For all of you ESL teachers out > >> >> there, > >> >>>> who > >> >>>>>> doesn't remember Krashen on the "affective filter" and I have > been > >> >>>> seeing a > >> >>>>>> lot on character and education lately. Oh yes, and how failing is > >> >>>> important > >> >>>>>> to eventual success. Teasing out issues in the education of > >> >>>>>> non-mainstreamers, and recognizing how the current system is > toxic > >> for > >> >>>>>> everyone, I think Spinoza's analysis and the narrative of his > life > >> are > >> >>>>>> powerful. Vygotsky hits me the same way. Cantor, the > mathematician, > >> >> and > >> >>>>>> Pierce, the philosopher/logician/semiotician, also constantly > come > >> > up > >> >>>> for > >> >>>>>> me. They were ridiculed by the received cognoscenti of the time, > so > >> >>>> much so > >> >>>>>> that the suffered mental breakdowns. But they pushed on to > develop > >> >>>> tools in > >> >>>>>> math and semiotics that seem to me are complementary with > Vygotsky. > >> >>>> Again I > >> >>>>>> get to take the role of unserious scholar here, so think of my > >> >> thoughts > >> >>>> as > >> >>>>>> gaming on line and don't take the game too seriously. > >> >>>>>> Henry > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> On Sep 5, 2014, at 6:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> Hi David and Henry-- > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> David-- I was intrigued by your comment that Spinoza is a > >> >> controversial > >> >>>>>>> topic on xmca. I googled Spinoza on the main web page and came > up > >> >> with > >> >>>> 4K > >> >>>>>>> plus hits (!!). My own impression is that few on this list, me > >> >>>> included, > >> > >>>>>>> have engaged in serious study of Spinoza let alone the imprint of > >> >>>> Spinoza > >> >>>>>>> on Vygotsky. > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> What is the nature of the controversy? What is at stake? The > topic > >> is > >> >>>> of > >> >>>>>>> particular interest to me at present because I have been part of > >> >>>>>>> discussions with people who are focused on Vygotsky's use of > >> >>>> perezhivanie > >> >>>>>>> in his later work, where the relation of emotion and cognition > is a > >> >>>>>> central > >> >>>>>>> concern and Spinoza is clearly relevant. > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> Henry and anyone interested in chasing down what has been > written > >> >> about > >> > >>>>>>> various topics in xmca chatter, take advantage of the nice google > >> >>>> search > >> >>>>>> at > >> >>>>>>> lchc.ucsd.edu. > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> mike > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> (who enmeshed in the sense/meaning distinction in all of its > >> >>>> multilingual > >> >>>>>>> confusifications at present) > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> -- > >> >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> >>> > Assistant Professor > >> >>> Department of Anthropology > >> >>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> >>> Brigham Young University > >> >>> Provo, UT 84602 > >> >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > > >> > -- > >> > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> > Assistant Professor > >> > Department of Anthropology > >> > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> > Brigham Young University > >> > Provo, UT 84602 > >> > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > >> > >> > > > > > -- > > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Sep 17 20:56:08 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 20:56:08 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: FINE Newsletter: Around the Clock: The Power of Anytime Learning In-Reply-To: <1118544038300.1101803074766.25640.0.601341JL.1002@scheduler.constantcontact.com> References: <1118544038300.1101803074766.25640.0.601341JL.1002@scheduler.constantcontact.com> Message-ID: There is a lot of interest in the topic of anytime learning. FYI mike ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Harvard Family Research Project Date: Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 10:46 AM Subject: FINE Newsletter: Around the Clock: The Power of Anytime Learning To: mcole@ucsd.edu [image: FINE: Family Involvement Network of Educators] *HARVARD FAMILY RESEARCH PROJECT* *SEPTEMBER 17, 2014 * [image: Statistics detailing anytime learning] *Dear Michael,* Time-how children spend it, and with whom-has important implications for social-emotional and cognitive development. In this issue , we look at how children's time is and* can *be spent learning across the day during the early childhood and elementary years. Addressing the more than 50 percent of families who wish that they knew how to improve the time that they spend with their children, and providing resources for the teachers, staff, and developers who support families, we - check in with a national nonprofit-ZERO TO THREE-about an app that they developed to help families support their child's learning during daily routines and downtime; - revisit the efforts of Cambridge, Massachusetts, to help families identify learning opportunities that begin when the school day ends; - look at how one Head Start program in New York City regularly shares data with families as a way to build family confidence and inspire engagement throughout the school years; and - explore the state of Maryland's approach to building a comprehensive family-engagement infrastructure across the years and places that children spend in early care and education. Read more... [image: HFRP logo] Quick Links - HFRP Interact - Family Engagement Policy - FINE Newsletter Archives - Family Engagement Resources & Publications - Recent HFRP News - Send Us Feedback [image: Follow us on Twitter] [image: Like us on Facebook] [image: Orange] *Commentary * [image: Finding Time Together publication cover] Finding Time Together: Families, Schools, and Communities Supporting Anywhere, Anytime Learning How do families spend time supporting their children's informal and formal learning beyond the school day and across settings? Find out how educators and institutions are helping families promote their children's learning experiences anytime, in school and beyond. Read more... *Voices From the Field * [image: Zero to Three Let's Play icon] Q & A with Rebecca Parlakian: Learn Anytime With the Let's Play App How can you turn daily bedtime and mealtime routines into learning opportunities for young children? How can commuting, shopping, and other everyday activities offer vibrant learning moments for children? Read about the Let's Play app to learn how! Read more... [image: Christine Patton] The Transition to Afterschool: One City's Approach to Connecting Young Children and Their Families to Learning and Enrichment Opportunities --Part Two How can you create a resource to help families of young children successfully transition to afterschool? What questions should be addressed? This video looks at one city's approach to helping connect families and their young children to afterschool enrichment opportunities. *Read more... * [image: Nell Shapiro] Sharing Assessment Data With Preschool Families in Preparation for Kindergarten What are the benefits and challenges of sharing assessment data with preschool families? How can you do so effectively? A preschool teacher writes about her experiences, and provides valuable tips on how to share data with families in preparation for kindergarten. Read more... *HFRP Research & Resources * [image: Racing to the Top: Maryland's Promising Practices in Family Engagement publication cover] Racing to the Top: Maryland's Promising Practices in Family Engagement Maryland is embedding a new family engagement definition statewide as a foundation of policy and infrastructure. Through comprehensive partnerships, the state brings to scale family engagement approaches and launches new initiatives. Read more... *Family Involvement News * [image: Father and daughter reading together] September 2014 News How can "two-generation" programs help parents influence children's development? What five ongoing family activities can help children's literacy development? What project will explore the effectiveness of new reading technology used by early education and parenting initiatives? Read to find out! Read more... *HFRP Interact * How Families, Schools, and Communities Are Reshaping Family Engagement to Reach All Learners This web conference on Tuesday, September 23, 2014, 1:00-2:00 p.m. EST*,* explores family engagement in anywhere, anytime learning and ways that families, schools, and community organizations can share responsibility for children's learning around the clock. Read more... ------------------------------ About Us Harvard Family Research Project (HFRP) is a leading national organization whose purpose is to shape 21st-century education by connecting the critical areas of student learning. Our focus is on anywhere, anytime learning approaches that extend from early childhood through college and connect families, schools, out-of-school time programs, and digital media. We build strategic partnerships with policymakers, practitioners, and community leaders to generate new thinking, stimulate innovation, and promote [image: Harvard Graduate School of Education logo] continuous improvement in education policy, practice, and evaluation. Our research and tools provide timely, relevant, and practical information for decision making. Addressing issues of access and equity in children's learning and identifying meaningful, effective family engagement practices that reinforce success for all children are central to our work. ------------------------------ * * [image: Like us on Facebook] [image: Follow us on Twitter] [image: View our videos on YouTube] Subscribe Like Us Follow Us Watch Us This email was sent to mcole@ucsd.edu by fine@gse.harvard.edu | Update Profile/Email Address | Rapid removal with SafeUnsubscribe ? | Privacy Policy . Harvard Family Research Project | 50 Church Street, 4th Floor | Cambridge | MA | 02138 -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp Wed Sep 17 21:17:12 2014 From: vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp (Wilkinson) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 13:17:12 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Razor's Edge, Interface, and metaphor (Spinoza thread) In-Reply-To: References: <8D2C4DB1-CFE1-4A1D-8683-CE5A8551B35C@gmail.com> <6322AED9-6172-4B7C-8A08-4F0F1FE673D2@gmail.com> <4BDC889C-9B1B-4516-9F11-5549F0EF3003@gmail.com> <1410855310.36603.YahooMailNeo@web171501.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <1410999406.69903.YahooMailNeo@web171504.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <1410999532.57312.YahooMailNeo@web171502.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <541A5CC8.1010005@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp> Mike, The structure of a coin makes a productive metaphor. Some coins are minted with words around the perimeter, to make it various. The problem of seeing both sides at once is both static and procedural, recalling the paradoxical nature of the participant/observer role of a anth/soc/com researcher ... I'm just "sticking my oar in" to participate in this wonderful discussion. Valerie Wilkinson Comparatist and Generalist (2014/09/18 12:50), mike cole wrote: > Sorry for the mis-attribution, Peter. > > Yes. There are conditions under which the reduced model is a very useful > approximation. For example, when sending > morse code from Hawaii to submarines seeking to attack an enemy harbor far > away. Everyone knows the goal, the topic, etc. The submarine captain must > decode instructions and act on them. The major barrier is noise. > > There is this problem with "seeing both sides at once" that teaching > communication has gotten me to think about a lot. > There are not two sides to a coin, there are there sides -- the two sides > and the "edge". If you hold the coin up at arm's length you can only see > the edge and one side, to various extents. Only if you hold the coin so > that the edge is directed squarely between your eyes, and move it very > close to your eyes, can you see the two sides and the edge at the same > time. But they are now out of focus. > > Seems like a useful metaphor for one of the many analytic problems we have. > Try it. The effect is quite striking. > mike > > On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 5:18 PM, peter jones wrote: > >> >> >> Mike >> >> As I mentioned/ref. not my words. >> Communication-transmission is a model, one of several means of >> explanation. Considered within the conceptual framework - Hodges' model - >> Shannon and Weaver's entropy, noise, measures of information is >> mechanistic. Hodges' model is of course idealised. >> >> There are times when such a model 'fits' (correspondence as truth?) as in >> hearing - the inner ear - communication-conduction as transmission. >> >> Other occasions such as I encountered yesterday (now). In a care home, a >> man agitated was pulling and banging on a locked inner corridor door >> seeking to leave (it is in his best interests to stay). The door was >> shaking to the extent that walking outside to speak to staff, an open loose >> window outside in the inner (secure) garden was moving to-and-fro. The >> inner door noise was just audible outside. Ironically(?) the window was not >> banging it was silent and yet it signified - transmitted - distress >> elsewhere? >> >> Is there a sense that what we seek is a Goethean view of >> humanities-sciences(reality)?The debate (centuries and more long) is an >> ambiguous image or reversible figure and yet if we were delivered of this >> Goethean view then we could see both simultaneously - the whole? >> >> Elsewhere - Jones, P. (1996) Humans, Information, and Science, Journal of >> Advanced Nursing, 24(3),591-598 >> >> I tried to relate information, the mechanistic (Shannon & Weaver, and >> Dretske) to more humanistic concerns of mental health and meaning. >> >> I will look up the sources you have mentioned and thank you for the >> related points. >> I wish I had time to read more and in depth... >> >> >> Peter Jones >> Lancashire, UK >> Blogging at "Welcome to the QUAD" >> http://hodges-model.blogspot.com/ >> Hodges Health Career - Care Domains - Model >> http://www.p-jones.demon.co.uk/ >> h2cm: help 2C more - help 2 listen - help 2 care >> http://twitter.com/h2cm >> >> _______________________________ >> From: mike cole >> To: peter jones ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < >> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> >> Sent: Tuesday, 16 September 2014, 17:54 >> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca >> >> >> >> Peter-- I fully agree with the need for what you/Serres/Shannon-Weaver >> call noise in the process of communication. However, I think it is a >> cardinal error when he/you(?) write: >> >> >> With the advent of information science, a new figure for representing >> science becomes possible: this is the 'model' of communication. >> Accordingly, we have three elements: a message, a channel for transmitting >> it, and the noise, or interference, that accompanies the transmission. >> Noise calls for decipherment; it makes a reading of the message more >> difficult. And yet without it, there would be no message. >> >> >> This form of information science is, overtly, a sender-receiver >> TRANSMISSION model of communication. It assumes a linear temporal process. >> Such a reduction is tolerable only under very carefully prescribed >> constraints. The "third" part is noise, but the unidirectionality remains. >> >> A different way of thinking about this is offered by John Shotter in the >> piece that Rod sent around. He does not use the term, noise, but he does >> focus our attention on the necessity of uncertainty and co-participation as >> conditions of thought and action. >> >> I am all on board with the need for cross-talk between disciplines as well >> as theoretical traditions working within the same disciplines or with >> common concern. I also think that the invocation of parasitism is quite >> relevant to the way i have been thinking about human development, but >> communication-as-transmission seems like a mistake. >> >> Infected by George H. Mead in steamy san diego >> mike >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 1:15 AM, peter jones wrote: >> >> >>> >>> Michel Serres has written on these themes.... >>> >>> Fifty >>> Key Contemporary Thinkers by John Lechte, Routledge, 1994. >>> >>> With the recognition of the interrelation between different sciences >>> and different forms of knowledge, as well as between science and different >>> artistic practices, has come Serres's effort to plot the way that >> different >>> knowledge domains interpenetrate. Even more: Serres has set himself the >>> task of being a means of communication (a medium) between the sciences >>> and the arts - the Hermes of modern scholarships. With the advent of >> information >>> science, a new figure for representing science becomes possible: this is >>> the 'model' of communication. Accordingly, we have three elements: a >> message, >>> a channel for transmitting it, and the noise, or interference, that >> accompanies >>> the transmission. Noise calls for decipherment; it makes a reading of the >>> message more difficult. And yet without it, there would be no message. >>> There is, in short, no message without resistance. What Serres initially >>> finds intriguing about noise (rather than the message) is that it opens >>> up such a fertile avenue of reflection. Instead of remaining pure >> noise, >>> the latter becomes a means of transport. Thus in the first volume of the >>> Hermes series noise is analysed as the third, empirical element of the >>> message. Ideally, communication must be separated from noise. Noise is >>> what is not communicated; it is just there as a kind of chaos, as the >> empirical >>> third element of the message, the accidental part, the part of difference >>> that is excluded. Every formalism (mathematics, for example) is founded >>> on the exclusion of the third element of noise. Every formalism is a way >>> of moving from one region of knowledge to another. To communicate is to >>> move within a class of objects that have the same form. Form has to be >>> extracted from the cacophony of noise; form >> (communication) is the exclusion >>> of noise, an escape from the domain of the empirical. >>> >>> >>> In his book, The Parasite, Serres recalls that 'parasite' also means >>> noise (in French). A parasite is a noise in a channel. And so when >> describing >>> the rats' meals in a story from the fables of La Fontaine - the meals of >>> two parasites - Serres also refers to noise: 'The two companions scurry >>> off when they hear a noise at the door. It was only a noise, but it was >>> also a message, a bit of information producing panic: an interruption, >>> a corruption, a rupture of information. Was this noise really a message? >>> Wasn't it, rather, static, a parasite? >>> >>> see also: >>> >>> http://www.frieze.com/issue/article/joyeux-anniversaire/ >>> >>> >>> Peter Jones >>> Lancashire, UK >>> Blogging at "Welcome to the QUAD" >>> http://hodges-model.blogspot.com/ >>> http://twitter.com/h2cm >>> >>> >>> ________________________________ >>> From: Larry Purss >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>> Sent: Tuesday, 16 September 2014, 8:43 >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Spinoza on xmca >>> >>> >>> >>> Bahktin the trickster. >>> In Greek mythology >> that was Hermes the messenger who brought messages >>> between [mediated] the divine and the human realms. Bahktin definitely >>> overlaps with Hermes [and hermeneutics] >>> Larry >>> >>> On Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 8:42 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III >> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Greg, >>>> I'm convinced you are right. Like I say, Bakhtin just keeps popping up. >>>> The trickster? Rebelais? What is that about? >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> On Sep 14, 2014, at 8:49 AM, Greg Thompson >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> One reason I mention him is because of resonances with ideas. >>>>> But I also mention him as a kind of trickster figure as well as a >> student >>>>> of the trickster in writing (his dissertation was on Rabelais). >>>>> I also mention him as a writer who seems authentically engaged with >>>>> meaningful/emotive aspects of human existence (e.g., Toward a >> Philosophy >>>> of >>>>> the Act, and Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity). >>>>> And finally, I mention Bakhtin because I'm still not convinced that >> the >>>>> deep treasures of Bakhtin's work has yet been mined out. >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 8:13 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Greg, >>>>>> Thank you for you good words and great question. I knew about >> Bakhtin, >>>> but >>>>>> have been finding him everywhere in the articles and chat of XMCA >> over >>>> the >>>>>> last week. Seriously. >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sep 13, 2014, at 2:26 PM, Greg Thompson < >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I would hope that a certain amount of irreverence would be dear to >> most >>>>>>> people on this list! >>>>>>> But seriously Henry, have you come across Bakhtin's work at all? >>>>>>> Seems like another that you might want to throw in with the crowd of >>>>>>> healthy irreverents. >>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 2:48 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Mike and David, >>>>>>>> This is seriously getting to be a club that I, like Groucho, won't >>>>>> join, >>>>>>>> if it takes me as a member. I think all of this seriously evokes >>>> Andy's >>>>>>>> contention, in his notes for the upcoming presentation at the ISCAR >>>>>>>> conference (which XMCA has gotten) that, "Adults can grasp true >>>>>> concepts, >>>>>>>> and can change society, and a social theory has to treat adults as >>>>>> adults, >>>>>>>> and this is what the projects approach allows us to do. " If >> "adult" >>>>>> means >>>>>>>> the same as "serious", you can see why I have my doubts about >> joining >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> Unserious Scholar Club. On the other hand, if I can have some fun, >> as >>>> in >>>>>>>> the laughing warrior (forget gender stereotypes here, and dare me >> to >>>>>> talk >>>>>>>> about Jihad), then that's what I'm talking about. Incidentally, >> I >>>> loved >>>>>>>> Andy's notes. I could so relate it to CG. The emergent character of >>>>>> project >>>>>>>> realization he talks about applies very well to discourse, as you >> can >>>>>> see >>>>>>>> in the articles by Langacker I have sent out. Discourse IS a >> project >>>> and >>>>>>>> its outcome is typically not >> entirely clear in the minds of the >>>>>>>> interactants as they negotiate its waters. XMCA, of which this >> email >>>> is >>>>>> a >>>>>>>> "turn", is a prototypical "work in progress", as Andy puts it, >> since >>>> we >>>>>>>> clearly don't know where this will all end up. But I hope it can be >>>> fun >>>>>>>> along the way. >>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sep 6, 2014, at 1:51 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hi Henry-- There goes my pile of books that need to be read before >>>> bed >>>>>>>> time! >>>>>>>>> Spinoza goes up there right next to Dead Souls. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> However, David having already claimed the mantle of unserious >>>> scholar, >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> you having made the same claim, I am afraid that I have to make >>>>>> precisely >>>>>>>>> the same claim on the unrefutable grounds that no one pays me any >>>>>> longer >>>>>>>>> for what I do so I get >> to be as unserious as i can seriously be! >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 6, 2014 at 12:33 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>>>>>> All I can say now is that Spinoza is famously quoted as having >> said, >>>>>>>> "The >>>>>>>>>> more clearly you understand yourself and your emotions, the more >> you >>>>>>>> become >>>>>>>>>> a lover of what is." This quote happens to appear in the >>>> introduction >>>>>>>> to a >>>>>>>>>> very popular self help book, Loving What Is, by Byron Katie >> (2002). >>>> I >>>>>>>>>> bought the book , obviously, >> because I thought I needed help. It >>>> did, >>>>>>>> but >>>>>>>>>> it also introduced me to Spinoza. And that has been a deeper >> "help". >>>>>> So, >>>>>>>>>> from a personal perspective, I can totally understand how Spinoza >>>> and >>>>>>>>>> periizhvanie would be connected. For all of you ESL teachers out >>>>>> there, >>>>>>>> who >>>>>>>>>> doesn't remember Krashen on the "affective filter" and I have >> been >>>>>>>> seeing a >>>>>>>>>> lot on character and education lately. Oh yes, and how failing is >>>>>>>> important >>>>>>>>>> to eventual success. Teasing out issues in the education of >>>>>>>>>> non-mainstreamers, and recognizing how the current system is >> toxic >>>> for >>>>>>>>>> everyone, I think Spinoza's analysis and the narrative of his >> life >>>> are >>>>>>>>>> powerful. Vygotsky hits me the same way. Cantor, the >> mathematician, >>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> Pierce, the philosopher/logician/semiotician, also constantly >> come >>>> >> up >>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>> me. They were ridiculed by the received cognoscenti of the time, >> so >>>>>>>> much so >>>>>>>>>> that the suffered mental breakdowns. But they pushed on to >> develop >>>>>>>> tools in >>>>>>>>>> math and semiotics that seem to me are complementary with >> Vygotsky. >>>>>>>> Again I >>>>>>>>>> get to take the role of unserious scholar here, so think of my >>>>>> thoughts >>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>> gaming on line and don't take the game too seriously. >>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Sep 5, 2014, at 6:42 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Hi David and Henry-- >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> David-- I was intrigued by your comment that Spinoza is a >>>>>> controversial >>>>>>>>>>> topic on xmca. I googled Spinoza on the main web page and came >> up >>>>>> with >>>>>>>> 4K >>>>>>>>>>> plus hits (!!). My own impression is that few on this list, me >>>>>>>> included, >>>> >> >>>>>>> have engaged in serious study of Spinoza let alone the imprint of >>>>>>>> Spinoza >>>>>>>>>>> on Vygotsky. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> What is the nature of the controversy? What is at stake? The >> topic >>>> is >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> particular interest to me at present because I have been part of >>>>>>>>>>> discussions with people who are focused on Vygotsky's use of >>>>>>>> perezhivanie >>>>>>>>>>> in his later work, where the relation of emotion and cognition >> is a >>>>>>>>>> central >>>>>>>>>>> concern and Spinoza is clearly relevant. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Henry and anyone interested in chasing down what has been >> written >>>>>> about >>>> >> >>>>>>> various topics in xmca chatter, take advantage of the nice google >>>>>>>> search >>>>>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>>>> lchc.ucsd.edu. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> (who enmeshed in the sense/meaning distinction in all of its >>>>>>>> multilingual >>>>>>>>>>> confusifications at present) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>>>> >> Assistant Professor >>>>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> >> >> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or >> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >> Gray, 2001] >> > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Sep 17 21:59:39 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 21:59:39 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Rauno Thanks for this lead. I went to google books and was intrigued by 45Dosse's introduction [and also intrigued by the term [the Rising Sign 1945-1966] Discussing the relations between teacher's and mentors I have noticed that it is not so much the following a SIMILAR trajectory but more a *question and answer* relationship. The relation of Heidegger TO Husserl as Heidegger *addresses* his responses to the concealment of the teacher. Gadamer's project was *addressed* to what was concealed within Heidegger. The mentor does not RE-PRESENT the teacher's perspective but is *called forth* to *answer* the teacher. This way of focusing on the psycho-dramatics contrasts with psycho=dynamics as analysis. There is a section of Dosse's introduction to this book that is relevant to our ongoing consideration of CHAT as a science. On page xxv Dosse writes: Can we, however, reflect upon man AS IF the Copernican-Galilean revolution, the Freudian and Marxist fractures, and the progress of the social sciences has not taken place? Pointing out the shortcomings of structuralism does not imply returning to the golden age of the Enlightenment. To the contrary it means moving forward toward a HISTORICAL humanism can be established.... We CALL upon the advances made in the social sciences to ANSWER to the emergence of a humanism of the possible, perhaps around the TRANSITORY FIGURE of a dialogic man" Rauno, thanks for this lead that was calling me to turn and focus my attention on the historical emergence of the rising sign and the questions with which we are engaged Larry On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 2:35 AM, Rauno Huttunen wrote: > Hello, > > Excellent source on this matter is Fran?ois Dosse's book "History of > Structuralism - The Rising Sign 1945-1966". Foucault's relationship with > Hyppolite and Althussers is deal with detailed manner. > > Rauno Huttunen > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of White, Phillip > Sent: 17. syyskuuta 2014 1:56 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Foucault > > > Michel Foucault would not recognize the assertion that he carried forth > Maurice Merleau-Ponty's philosophy - case in point, the philosopher who > most deeply impressed Foucault was Jean Hyppolite. it was to Hyppolite that > Foucault never ceased to acknowledge his debt. as for the influences on > Butler, i can't tell. however, following sociocultural learning theory, > since we're not behaviorist we don't view the student as replicating the > instruction of the teacher, but rather as one of collaboration, > approximations, and often an individual or shared innovation. > > phillip > > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Sep 17 22:50:17 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 23:50:17 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts about cultural "triple packages" In-Reply-To: References: <5ludl16dbj40lcf5cs4xnf9w.1410889516950@email.android.com> Message-ID: Thanks David and others. I guess I posted the video as something of a meditation on the question that had been posed on the other thread - namely: what to do with empirical stuff? The video is one where I feel a bit frustrated with the argument and am tempted to theorize away their findings but can't help but wonder how to confront their facts and figures with other facts and figures. I think David has at least pointed in the direction of the facts and figures that are needed. Most notably something that points to the particular configurations of capitalism that one confronts in different national settings and how these configurations of capitalism foster inequality and inevitably become top heavy (with 1% owning 50% of everything). The Amy/Jed solution suggests that everyone altogether could be just as successful as the current 1% if they just knew how to delay gratification (and were as self-assured and self-doubting as Amy and Jed). Anyone else have any other takes on their argument? And do you see this as the latest incarnation of the cultural deficit model, just with a few minor tweaks to make it sound less offensive? -greg On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 9:43 PM, mike cole wrote: > Interesting contextualization, David. thanks > mike > > On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > Amy Chua and her husband are both, like Obama, professors of > > constitutional law, and this explains a lot: their individualism, > > their idealism, and their anecdotal approach to psychological > > research. Naturally, I agree with all of the criticisms made on those > > fronts; nevertheless I find myself in perverse sympathy with the talk, > > particularly the point she made about the non-cultural sources of > > poverty which seem to have been ignored by people on the list, perhaps > > because they come near the end of the talk. > > > > "The Triple Package" is not a great book (as you can probably tell > > from the "Seven Habits" style title). But it's still a book worth > > putting in context. I don't think it is really a generalization of > > Chua's book on parenting (which was actually very self-critical and > > not at all self-congratulatory). I think it is a generalization of > > Chua's last book, which was right in her own field, although like many > > books which lie in the middle of one's field it did have a quite > > personal trigger. > > > > As they say in their talk: all nations are unequal, but some are more > > unequal than others. The Philippines are one of those more unequal > > nations: Chua's grandparents are Filipino Chinese, and the Chinese in > > the Philippines are about one percent of the population and own some > > forty or fifty percent of the country's capital. So Chua's grandmother > > (or perhaps it was an aunt--I'm don't exactly remember) was horribly > > murdered by her driver. Nobody was punished, and the reason was that > > the police felt enormous sympathy for the driver's hatred of rich > > Chinese and released him on a technicality. > > > > At first, Chua was overcome with rage. But then she began to > > generalize; she realized that her grandmother's murder was actually > > part of a much wider pattern of constitutional change, where political > > democracy is combined with extremes of economic oligarchy, and > > consititutions make possible and even encourage demagogy and ethnic > > scapegoating of what we might call the richer oppressed (e.g. Indians > > in Uganda, Lebanese in Liberia, Tutsis in Rwanda, Croats in Serbia, > > Chinese in Indonesia, Jews just about everywhere). > > > > This is "culture" as a weapon in the hands of the powerful > > poor--people like Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Idi Amin, Slobadan Milosevic. > > But it must have occurred to Chua while she was writing the book that > > demagogy and scapegoating was only part of the story--I think this > > book is actually an argument that culture can also be forged into a > > weapon in the hands of the poor by precisely the family members who > > seem most powerless--not her own grandmother, but grandmothers like > > that of Sonja Sotomayor. > > > > Idealism? Of course. Chua ignores the real reasons for the success > > stories she tells, because they have nothing to do with these triple > > package values (values which she admits are shared by almost all > > ethnic groups). As Thomas Piketty points out in "Capital in the > > Twenty-first Century", economics seen over the long run is...well, > > it's a long arc, and it bends towards injustice. But precisely because > > the injustice towards which it bends admits so very few to the very > > rich, the very poor eventually play catch up, both iinternationally > > (China) and intra-nationally, while the majority of the ruling ethnic > > power are forced into the actual, not the nominal, middle class (i.e. > > in the USA, people who live on earned income and not returns on > > capital). > > > > There were two exceptions to all of this playing catch-up, and they > > happen to be the real "double package" on which American culture was > > materially founded: genocide and slavery. That is why I feel that > > treating the Native American and the black American experience as if > > it were somehow comparable to other immigrant experiences is really a > > form of Holocaust denial. The building where I live lodges mostly > > foreigners, and there are many Americans. One of the professors is > > black, American, and an incredibly successful and well known author in > > business studies. Like Barack Obama, he has a name--it's an African > > name, not the name of some slave-owning scoundrel; from the sound of > > it I suspect he calls himself a "Nigerian-American" and not > > "African-American". The other day I met his son in the elevator, and > > when I heard his name I told him I recognized it, because it goes at > > the top of every article his dad publishes. The kid was fairly > > incandescent with pride. > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > On 17 September 2014 02:45, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > wrote: > > > I am not a psychologist, but is this what is passing off as empirical > > psychological research? On another note, can we get some real > > psychologists to weigh in on the impact of spanking children on their > > psychological development. This Adrian Peterson thing is getting racial > > really quickly. By the way, my parents would be in prison today based on > > how I was spanked.... > > > > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > President > > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > www.mocombeian.com > > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Henry G. > > Shonerd III"
Date:09/16/2014 1:12 PM > > (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts > > about cultural "triple packages"
> > >
I am struck by how inauthentic (phony?) Chua and her husband are, > > even more so than most TED talks. As I listened, I remembered the work by > > Ogbu on oppositional responses of "involuntary immigrants" (Blacks as > > slaves, Native Americans and Hispanics caught up in the movement of > > national borders). I have heard Ogbu has been criticized, but he > convinced > > me. > > > Henry > > > > > > On Sep 16, 2014, at 4:59 AM, Katherine Wester Neal > > wrote: > > > > > >> Thanks for sending, Greg. I also found it hard to keep watching. I > have > > read Amy Chua's "tiger mom" book, and this TED talk seems to be a way to > > validate and extend the parenting ideas that she lays out in the book > > (which I find to be harsh and a bit mean-spirited). I have many issues > with > > their claims, but I'll just mention two. > > >> > > >> First, I don't think their generalizations/facts are very useful. They > > perpetuate the idea, for example, that stereotypes are acceptable, > > especially if they're "true," which is probably where the comment that > > they're racist came from. It is also unhelpful to tell white, middle > class > > parents one more time that "other" kids are going to outperform their > kids > > and their kids are falling behind. This sort of scarcity rhetoric hurts > > kids and parents, in part because it sets up an us/them dichotomy. > > >> > > >> Second, as Greg said, there's no theory. I am suspect of facts, such > as > > these, without theory because they don't account for how the facts were > > produced. > > >> > > >> Katie > > >> > > >> Katie Wester-Neal > > >> Doctoral Candidate > > >> University of Georgia > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On Sep 15, 2014, at 11:41 PM, "Greg Thompson" < > > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> wrote: > > >> > > >> Been enjoying the party, and apropos of David's call for some facts > > (which > > >> I'm in full support of - despite being a theory-wonk), I thought I'd > > offer > > >> this Ted talk that was sent to me by an LCHC colleague: > > >> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHUMcxaqm9U > > >> > > >> Lots of facts in there, and not a little theory. > > >> > > >> They've got big claims about the facts of their program in inner-city > > >> schools and about inequality too (you have to listen to the end to > hear > > >> about that). > > >> > > >> What do you think? > > >> > > >> Anything to it? > > >> > > >> Anyone have any facts to counter their facts? > > >> > > >> -greg > > >> > > >> p.s., I'm still listening to it right now. Not sure I'm going to be > able > > >> to stomach the entire talk... getting a little queasy. Feeling like > > someone > > >> is selling me something that is going to cost me a ton and I'm not > > going to > > >> like. Ugh... > > >> > > >> > > >> -- > > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >> Assistant Professor > > >> Department of Anthropology > > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >> Brigham Young University > > >> Provo, UT 84602 > > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Wed Sep 17 22:59:00 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 15:59:00 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts about cultural "triple packages" In-Reply-To: References: <5ludl16dbj40lcf5cs4xnf9w.1410889516950@email.android.com> Message-ID: <541A74A4.1000002@mira.net> As I said before I found the individualism positively scary. And we see, don't we, what kind of society is produced by this "I will get to the top of the heap by whatever it takes" mentality produces. And as from David Ke's interesting post, we see that whoever gets to the top of the heap will inevitably do so over the bodies of those who come second, and be desperately unhappy about their success anyway. But since culture is not something one can acquire at Saturday homework club, I guess we should not worry too much about the damage they might do. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Greg Thompson wrote: > Thanks David and others. > > I guess I posted the video as something of a meditation on the question > that had been posed on the other thread - namely: what to do with empirical > stuff? > > The video is one where I feel a bit frustrated with the argument and am > tempted to theorize away their findings but can't help but wonder how to > confront their facts and figures with other facts and figures. > > I think David has at least pointed in the direction of the facts and > figures that are needed. Most notably something that points to the > particular configurations of capitalism that one confronts in different > national settings and how these configurations of capitalism foster > inequality and inevitably become top heavy (with 1% owning 50% of > everything). The Amy/Jed solution suggests that everyone altogether could > be just as successful as the current 1% if they just knew how to delay > gratification (and were as self-assured and self-doubting as Amy and Jed). > > Anyone else have any other takes on their argument? > > And do you see this as the latest incarnation of the cultural deficit > model, just with a few minor tweaks to make it sound less offensive? > > -greg > > > > > > On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 9:43 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >> Interesting contextualization, David. thanks >> mike >> >> On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >> >> >>> Amy Chua and her husband are both, like Obama, professors of >>> constitutional law, and this explains a lot: their individualism, >>> their idealism, and their anecdotal approach to psychological >>> research. Naturally, I agree with all of the criticisms made on those >>> fronts; nevertheless I find myself in perverse sympathy with the talk, >>> particularly the point she made about the non-cultural sources of >>> poverty which seem to have been ignored by people on the list, perhaps >>> because they come near the end of the talk. >>> >>> "The Triple Package" is not a great book (as you can probably tell >>> from the "Seven Habits" style title). But it's still a book worth >>> putting in context. I don't think it is really a generalization of >>> Chua's book on parenting (which was actually very self-critical and >>> not at all self-congratulatory). I think it is a generalization of >>> Chua's last book, which was right in her own field, although like many >>> books which lie in the middle of one's field it did have a quite >>> personal trigger. >>> >>> As they say in their talk: all nations are unequal, but some are more >>> unequal than others. The Philippines are one of those more unequal >>> nations: Chua's grandparents are Filipino Chinese, and the Chinese in >>> the Philippines are about one percent of the population and own some >>> forty or fifty percent of the country's capital. So Chua's grandmother >>> (or perhaps it was an aunt--I'm don't exactly remember) was horribly >>> murdered by her driver. Nobody was punished, and the reason was that >>> the police felt enormous sympathy for the driver's hatred of rich >>> Chinese and released him on a technicality. >>> >>> At first, Chua was overcome with rage. But then she began to >>> generalize; she realized that her grandmother's murder was actually >>> part of a much wider pattern of constitutional change, where political >>> democracy is combined with extremes of economic oligarchy, and >>> consititutions make possible and even encourage demagogy and ethnic >>> scapegoating of what we might call the richer oppressed (e.g. Indians >>> in Uganda, Lebanese in Liberia, Tutsis in Rwanda, Croats in Serbia, >>> Chinese in Indonesia, Jews just about everywhere). >>> >>> This is "culture" as a weapon in the hands of the powerful >>> poor--people like Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Idi Amin, Slobadan Milosevic. >>> But it must have occurred to Chua while she was writing the book that >>> demagogy and scapegoating was only part of the story--I think this >>> book is actually an argument that culture can also be forged into a >>> weapon in the hands of the poor by precisely the family members who >>> seem most powerless--not her own grandmother, but grandmothers like >>> that of Sonja Sotomayor. >>> >>> Idealism? Of course. Chua ignores the real reasons for the success >>> stories she tells, because they have nothing to do with these triple >>> package values (values which she admits are shared by almost all >>> ethnic groups). As Thomas Piketty points out in "Capital in the >>> Twenty-first Century", economics seen over the long run is...well, >>> it's a long arc, and it bends towards injustice. But precisely because >>> the injustice towards which it bends admits so very few to the very >>> rich, the very poor eventually play catch up, both iinternationally >>> (China) and intra-nationally, while the majority of the ruling ethnic >>> power are forced into the actual, not the nominal, middle class (i.e. >>> in the USA, people who live on earned income and not returns on >>> capital). >>> >>> There were two exceptions to all of this playing catch-up, and they >>> happen to be the real "double package" on which American culture was >>> materially founded: genocide and slavery. That is why I feel that >>> treating the Native American and the black American experience as if >>> it were somehow comparable to other immigrant experiences is really a >>> form of Holocaust denial. The building where I live lodges mostly >>> foreigners, and there are many Americans. One of the professors is >>> black, American, and an incredibly successful and well known author in >>> business studies. Like Barack Obama, he has a name--it's an African >>> name, not the name of some slave-owning scoundrel; from the sound of >>> it I suspect he calls himself a "Nigerian-American" and not >>> "African-American". The other day I met his son in the elevator, and >>> when I heard his name I told him I recognized it, because it goes at >>> the top of every article his dad publishes. The kid was fairly >>> incandescent with pride. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> >>> On 17 September 2014 02:45, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> I am not a psychologist, but is this what is passing off as empirical >>>> >>> psychological research? On another note, can we get some real >>> psychologists to weigh in on the impact of spanking children on their >>> psychological development. This Adrian Peterson thing is getting racial >>> really quickly. By the way, my parents would be in prison today based on >>> how I was spanked.... >>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: "Henry G. >>>> >>> Shonerd III"
Date:09/16/2014 1:12 PM >>> (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < >>> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts >>> about cultural "triple packages"
>>> >>>>
I am struck by how inauthentic (phony?) Chua and her husband are, >>>> >>> even more so than most TED talks. As I listened, I remembered the work by >>> Ogbu on oppositional responses of "involuntary immigrants" (Blacks as >>> slaves, Native Americans and Hispanics caught up in the movement of >>> national borders). I have heard Ogbu has been criticized, but he >>> >> convinced >> >>> me. >>> >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 4:59 AM, Katherine Wester Neal >>>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>>> Thanks for sending, Greg. I also found it hard to keep watching. I >>>>> >> have >> >>> read Amy Chua's "tiger mom" book, and this TED talk seems to be a way to >>> validate and extend the parenting ideas that she lays out in the book >>> (which I find to be harsh and a bit mean-spirited). I have many issues >>> >> with >> >>> their claims, but I'll just mention two. >>> >>>>> First, I don't think their generalizations/facts are very useful. They >>>>> >>> perpetuate the idea, for example, that stereotypes are acceptable, >>> especially if they're "true," which is probably where the comment that >>> they're racist came from. It is also unhelpful to tell white, middle >>> >> class >> >>> parents one more time that "other" kids are going to outperform their >>> >> kids >> >>> and their kids are falling behind. This sort of scarcity rhetoric hurts >>> kids and parents, in part because it sets up an us/them dichotomy. >>> >>>>> Second, as Greg said, there's no theory. I am suspect of facts, such >>>>> >> as >> >>> these, without theory because they don't account for how the facts were >>> produced. >>> >>>>> Katie >>>>> >>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>> Doctoral Candidate >>>>> University of Georgia >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sep 15, 2014, at 11:41 PM, "Greg Thompson" < >>>>> >>> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>>> Been enjoying the party, and apropos of David's call for some facts >>>>> >>> (which >>> >>>>> I'm in full support of - despite being a theory-wonk), I thought I'd >>>>> >>> offer >>> >>>>> this Ted talk that was sent to me by an LCHC colleague: >>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHUMcxaqm9U >>>>> >>>>> Lots of facts in there, and not a little theory. >>>>> >>>>> They've got big claims about the facts of their program in inner-city >>>>> schools and about inequality too (you have to listen to the end to >>>>> >> hear >> >>>>> about that). >>>>> >>>>> What do you think? >>>>> >>>>> Anything to it? >>>>> >>>>> Anyone have any facts to counter their facts? >>>>> >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> p.s., I'm still listening to it right now. Not sure I'm going to be >>>>> >> able >> >>>>> to stomach the entire talk... getting a little queasy. Feeling like >>>>> >>> someone >>> >>>>> is selling me something that is going to cost me a ton and I'm not >>>>> >>> going to >>> >>>>> like. Ugh... >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> -- >> >> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or >> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >> Gray, 2001] >> >> > > > > From djwdoc@yahoo.com Thu Sep 18 00:30:45 2014 From: djwdoc@yahoo.com (Douglas Williams) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 00:30:45 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: <54191E2E.6040403@mira.net> References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> <54178B49.9070205@mira.net> <50f7f5173d374b5fa9ed51a3b62501f9@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54190AAE.9020707@mira.net> <54191E2E.6040403@mira.net> Message-ID: <1411025445.72307.YahooMailNeo@web164704.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> Hi-- This is an interesting question for me, in part because I've tried to apply some theory to practice in a non-educational environment, and not particularly successfully, in part because it sounded like abstract philosophy to my interlocutors. I'd be interested in hearing what people here, who know these things more deeply than I do, think of what I see as a thread of continuity, leading from the interaction between Russian psychologists and German psychologists in the 1920s and early 1930s, to Lewin and Action Research, with its strong emphasis on human freedom, and from there to Deming, Juran, and the Total Quality (TQ) movement. The TQ instrumental method of management combines a certain degree of what looks a lot like sociocultural ideas to me, mixed in with the instrumental technology of statistical measurement. In some sense, though the idea of human development and freedom is significantly diminished, I think the TQ movement is at least a--what should one say--adopted orphan child, perhaps; a lost child borne of a social science movement greatly troubled by premature deaths and adverse sociopolitical situations, but a sturdy child adopted by Capitalism because it produces statistically measurable results of greater worker satisfaction and productivity. This is most famous in its industrial applications, but also is there in more professional applications, as I think Engestrom has been trying to show. If there is a thread there, then how could that thread be built upon and expanded? TQ is not what you would want, I am sure; but to make more of an applied science of CHAT research, I would think that giving a thought or two about how TQ has moved into the canon of business practice might be valuable, as well as pointing out similarities and continuities of known successful practice. From my standpoint as at least a semi-failed bricoleur of applied practice, speaking too much of innovation, philosophy and conceptual models is counterproductive in the conference rooms where schedules, measurement, and ostentatious pragmatism are worshiped. I don't think it's an accident that CHAT has its strongest cases of application in the educational field, where an affinity to theory inherent in the field makes applying theory to practice a much easier case to make. In the instrumental world of business management, which is where applications of theory might be most powerful, you have to speak in dialogue with fiduciary duty. To make an applied science out of philosophy, you need to have experiments, with controls; this is something that Lewin does beautifully in his Action Research work, and there is a good deal more than pragmatic utilitarianism in that early Action Research work as well. I wonder if a little organizational and institutional barriers might be broken down to reclaim a portion of that lost legacy for CHAT, and to see what tools of practice might be applied. And what experiments might be done to make the case that this is not just academic woolgathering, but vital, serious, and powerfully productive practice? I just have questions and no answers, and now I'll go away and wonder to myself... Regards, Doug ________________________________ From: Andy Blunden To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 10:37 PM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse I am sure that in this long thread, *someone* must have already said that philosophy (i.e., critique of concepts) and psychology (critique of data) both stimulate and challenge one another. Two independent processes which interact with one another, surely? Some currents of psychology remain content with the concepts of common sense and focus on observation, others are eternally dissatisfied with the concepts they use. But essentially it's the same process. What has driven me along the road to developing my approach to Activity Theory are both the (to me) obvious degradation of Vygotsky's concepts in the move to Activity Theory, *and* pressing problems like two halves of the country which seem to believe in mutually exclusive sets of facts about the world, like the fact that so many well-educated people believe the world was created 10,000 years ago by a Christian God, why countries which were well on the way to modernity 50 years ago have now confined their womenfolk indoors and behind veils, why priests abuse the children in their care and are protected by the hierarchy, why asbestos workers would not believe that the stuff was killing them even when half the town was dying of it, etc. - These kinds of situation are *data* for social theorists and it seemed to me that Vygotsky's ideas were the best thing going, but they had not been satisfactorily developed by Activity Theorists for social theory. The facts I am concerned with are pretty well, if not universally, recognised, but probably half the world has noticed. The problem is mainly the *concepts*. Some successful projects which have changed minds on a mass scale are the only way of getting more data, but even then the situation is not qualitatively different because the kind of projects I am interested in are real, not isolated in a laboratory, so as much open to contested interpretation as any of the facts I mentioned above and are not the kind of thing one experiments with. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > If others agree, Andy, then it provides a context within which to make > judgments about the kind of enterprise CHAT has become, in its various > instantations, which are certainly multiple! > > On the other hand, maybe I am just being dull, the problems have been > solved. > mike > > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 9:14 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > I think Vygotsky spoke optimistically about resolving the crisis > in Psychology because he was writing in the wake of the successful > Russian Revolution. Alas it was not to be so. But as a Marxist he > would know that without the resolution of the crisis of humanity > there could be no resolution in the crisis of any of the special > sciences. Which is all the more reason to tackle the disciplinary > boundaries inhibiting the development of both psychology and > social theory. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > mike cole wrote: > > ?Complicated discussion about CHAT and whether its a science > or not. > > One thing to keep in mind, perhaps: Vygotsky said he was > seeking to > resolve the crisis in psychology as he diagnosed it a century > ago. In my > view, he did not resolve it. I made the argument at the end of > Cultural > Psychology and can post a draft of the chapter here if it > needs rehearsing. > I believe, to the extent that it can be solved, it requires > one to take > seriously the fusion of theory and practice. Seems like > Vygotsky said > something along these same lines, too, about practice being > the crucible of > theory. > > The question of what can be learned from an analysis of > projects such as > those present in Andy's collection seems an important one. I > am biased. I > would hate to think that i learned nothing from the past 30+ > years of > involvement in the 5th Dimension! > > mike > > ? > > From djwdoc@yahoo.com Thu Sep 18 00:30:45 2014 From: djwdoc@yahoo.com (Douglas Williams) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 00:30:45 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse In-Reply-To: <54191E2E.6040403@mira.net> References: <5416F688.9090106@mira.net> <697edb5b78294b889b5889cfab0f7aea@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5417018B.7040905@mira.net> <54170438.60905@mira.net> <54178B49.9070205@mira.net> <50f7f5173d374b5fa9ed51a3b62501f9@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <54190AAE.9020707@mira.net> <54191E2E.6040403@mira.net> Message-ID: <1411025445.72307.YahooMailNeo@web164704.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> Hi-- This is an interesting question for me, in part because I've tried to apply some theory to practice in a non-educational environment, and not particularly successfully, in part because it sounded like abstract philosophy to my interlocutors. I'd be interested in hearing what people here, who know these things more deeply than I do, think of what I see as a thread of continuity, leading from the interaction between Russian psychologists and German psychologists in the 1920s and early 1930s, to Lewin and Action Research, with its strong emphasis on human freedom, and from there to Deming, Juran, and the Total Quality (TQ) movement. The TQ instrumental method of management combines a certain degree of what looks a lot like sociocultural ideas to me, mixed in with the instrumental technology of statistical measurement. In some sense, though the idea of human development and freedom is significantly diminished, I think the TQ movement is at least a--what should one say--adopted orphan child, perhaps; a lost child borne of a social science movement greatly troubled by premature deaths and adverse sociopolitical situations, but a sturdy child adopted by Capitalism because it produces statistically measurable results of greater worker satisfaction and productivity. This is most famous in its industrial applications, but also is there in more professional applications, as I think Engestrom has been trying to show. If there is a thread there, then how could that thread be built upon and expanded? TQ is not what you would want, I am sure; but to make more of an applied science of CHAT research, I would think that giving a thought or two about how TQ has moved into the canon of business practice might be valuable, as well as pointing out similarities and continuities of known successful practice. From my standpoint as at least a semi-failed bricoleur of applied practice, speaking too much of innovation, philosophy and conceptual models is counterproductive in the conference rooms where schedules, measurement, and ostentatious pragmatism are worshiped. I don't think it's an accident that CHAT has its strongest cases of application in the educational field, where an affinity to theory inherent in the field makes applying theory to practice a much easier case to make. In the instrumental world of business management, which is where applications of theory might be most powerful, you have to speak in dialogue with fiduciary duty. To make an applied science out of philosophy, you need to have experiments, with controls; this is something that Lewin does beautifully in his Action Research work, and there is a good deal more than pragmatic utilitarianism in that early Action Research work as well. I wonder if a little organizational and institutional barriers might be broken down to reclaim a portion of that lost legacy for CHAT, and to see what tools of practice might be applied. And what experiments might be done to make the case that this is not just academic woolgathering, but vital, serious, and powerfully productive practice? I just have questions and no answers, and now I'll go away and wonder to myself... Regards, Doug ________________________________ From: Andy Blunden To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 10:37 PM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT Discourse I am sure that in this long thread, *someone* must have already said that philosophy (i.e., critique of concepts) and psychology (critique of data) both stimulate and challenge one another. Two independent processes which interact with one another, surely? Some currents of psychology remain content with the concepts of common sense and focus on observation, others are eternally dissatisfied with the concepts they use. But essentially it's the same process. What has driven me along the road to developing my approach to Activity Theory are both the (to me) obvious degradation of Vygotsky's concepts in the move to Activity Theory, *and* pressing problems like two halves of the country which seem to believe in mutually exclusive sets of facts about the world, like the fact that so many well-educated people believe the world was created 10,000 years ago by a Christian God, why countries which were well on the way to modernity 50 years ago have now confined their womenfolk indoors and behind veils, why priests abuse the children in their care and are protected by the hierarchy, why asbestos workers would not believe that the stuff was killing them even when half the town was dying of it, etc. - These kinds of situation are *data* for social theorists and it seemed to me that Vygotsky's ideas were the best thing going, but they had not been satisfactorily developed by Activity Theorists for social theory. The facts I am concerned with are pretty well, if not universally, recognised, but probably half the world has noticed. The problem is mainly the *concepts*. Some successful projects which have changed minds on a mass scale are the only way of getting more data, but even then the situation is not qualitatively different because the kind of projects I am interested in are real, not isolated in a laboratory, so as much open to contested interpretation as any of the facts I mentioned above and are not the kind of thing one experiments with. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > If others agree, Andy, then it provides a context within which to make > judgments about the kind of enterprise CHAT has become, in its various > instantations, which are certainly multiple! > > On the other hand, maybe I am just being dull, the problems have been > solved. > mike > > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 9:14 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > I think Vygotsky spoke optimistically about resolving the crisis > in Psychology because he was writing in the wake of the successful > Russian Revolution. Alas it was not to be so. But as a Marxist he > would know that without the resolution of the crisis of humanity > there could be no resolution in the crisis of any of the special > sciences. Which is all the more reason to tackle the disciplinary > boundaries inhibiting the development of both psychology and > social theory. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > mike cole wrote: > > ?Complicated discussion about CHAT and whether its a science > or not. > > One thing to keep in mind, perhaps: Vygotsky said he was > seeking to > resolve the crisis in psychology as he diagnosed it a century > ago. In my > view, he did not resolve it. I made the argument at the end of > Cultural > Psychology and can post a draft of the chapter here if it > needs rehearsing. > I believe, to the extent that it can be solved, it requires > one to take > seriously the fusion of theory and practice. Seems like > Vygotsky said > something along these same lines, too, about practice being > the crucible of > theory. > > The question of what can be learned from an analysis of > projects such as > those present in Andy's collection seems an important one. I > am biased. I > would hate to think that i learned nothing from the past 30+ > years of > involvement in the 5th Dimension! > > mike > > ? > > From wester@uga.edu Thu Sep 18 07:26:30 2014 From: wester@uga.edu (Katherine Wester Neal) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 14:26:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts about cultural "triple packages" In-Reply-To: <541A74A4.1000002@mira.net> References: <5ludl16dbj40lcf5cs4xnf9w.1410889516950@email.android.com> , <541A74A4.1000002@mira.net> Message-ID: <1411050446434.66209@uga.edu> To Greg's question about the empirical stuff, yes, I think it is possible to find facts that work against Amy and Jed's facts. Their facts are one interpretation of what's going on based in their particular understanding of how the world works, one where the triple package is what everyone really needs to succeed. They talked about how some big charter school groups contacted them about the triple package and what it could do for students, which makes me think of New Orleans, where the public schools are currently nearly 100% charter. It's good that the Orleans Parish School Board doesn't have much control any more (I am from New Orleans and still spend a month or so there every year, and the schools truly were in dire straits before Katrina). But here's an article that, in part, presents some empirical research that may help disprove the triple package idea: http://apps.npr.org/the-end-of-neighborhood-schools/ I think that address will have to be cut and pasted because I can't get it to link. The facts from the researchers in the article could be used to counter Amy and Jed's facts. As one researcher said, "There is extreme effort to control, rather than engage, students in the classroom." But that control only leads to a definition of success that revolves around a single, multiple-choice test. (Later, the same researcher says: "There aren?t many projects, discussions, or kids reading literature. They are really teaching what will be tested at the exclusion of all other materials. I had a science teacher tell me that if there was an earthquake in New Orleans, she wouldn?t have the time to cover it if it weren?t on the test.") I think this kind of control, or as Greg said "delay of gratification," is what Amy and Jed are selling in the triple package; it's the magic bullet. But if this sort of control in schools doesn't lead to useful learning, doesn't that fact show that the triple package isn't actually what one needs for success? A deeper reading of the research might turn up more facts that don't line up with what Amy and Jed present. Katie Katie Wester-Neal Doctoral candidate University of Georgia ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: Thursday, September 18, 2014 1:59 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts about cultural "triple packages" As I said before I found the individualism positively scary. And we see, don't we, what kind of society is produced by this "I will get to the top of the heap by whatever it takes" mentality produces. And as from David Ke's interesting post, we see that whoever gets to the top of the heap will inevitably do so over the bodies of those who come second, and be desperately unhappy about their success anyway. But since culture is not something one can acquire at Saturday homework club, I guess we should not worry too much about the damage they might do. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Greg Thompson wrote: > Thanks David and others. > > I guess I posted the video as something of a meditation on the question > that had been posed on the other thread - namely: what to do with empirical > stuff? > > The video is one where I feel a bit frustrated with the argument and am > tempted to theorize away their findings but can't help but wonder how to > confront their facts and figures with other facts and figures. > > I think David has at least pointed in the direction of the facts and > figures that are needed. Most notably something that points to the > particular configurations of capitalism that one confronts in different > national settings and how these configurations of capitalism foster > inequality and inevitably become top heavy (with 1% owning 50% of > everything). The Amy/Jed solution suggests that everyone altogether could > be just as successful as the current 1% if they just knew how to delay > gratification (and were as self-assured and self-doubting as Amy and Jed). > > Anyone else have any other takes on their argument? > > And do you see this as the latest incarnation of the cultural deficit > model, just with a few minor tweaks to make it sound less offensive? > > -greg > > > > > > On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 9:43 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >> Interesting contextualization, David. thanks >> mike >> >> On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >> >> >>> Amy Chua and her husband are both, like Obama, professors of >>> constitutional law, and this explains a lot: their individualism, >>> their idealism, and their anecdotal approach to psychological >>> research. Naturally, I agree with all of the criticisms made on those >>> fronts; nevertheless I find myself in perverse sympathy with the talk, >>> particularly the point she made about the non-cultural sources of >>> poverty which seem to have been ignored by people on the list, perhaps >>> because they come near the end of the talk. >>> >>> "The Triple Package" is not a great book (as you can probably tell >>> from the "Seven Habits" style title). But it's still a book worth >>> putting in context. I don't think it is really a generalization of >>> Chua's book on parenting (which was actually very self-critical and >>> not at all self-congratulatory). I think it is a generalization of >>> Chua's last book, which was right in her own field, although like many >>> books which lie in the middle of one's field it did have a quite >>> personal trigger. >>> >>> As they say in their talk: all nations are unequal, but some are more >>> unequal than others. The Philippines are one of those more unequal >>> nations: Chua's grandparents are Filipino Chinese, and the Chinese in >>> the Philippines are about one percent of the population and own some >>> forty or fifty percent of the country's capital. So Chua's grandmother >>> (or perhaps it was an aunt--I'm don't exactly remember) was horribly >>> murdered by her driver. Nobody was punished, and the reason was that >>> the police felt enormous sympathy for the driver's hatred of rich >>> Chinese and released him on a technicality. >>> >>> At first, Chua was overcome with rage. But then she began to >>> generalize; she realized that her grandmother's murder was actually >>> part of a much wider pattern of constitutional change, where political >>> democracy is combined with extremes of economic oligarchy, and >>> consititutions make possible and even encourage demagogy and ethnic >>> scapegoating of what we might call the richer oppressed (e.g. Indians >>> in Uganda, Lebanese in Liberia, Tutsis in Rwanda, Croats in Serbia, >>> Chinese in Indonesia, Jews just about everywhere). >>> >>> This is "culture" as a weapon in the hands of the powerful >>> poor--people like Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Idi Amin, Slobadan Milosevic. >>> But it must have occurred to Chua while she was writing the book that >>> demagogy and scapegoating was only part of the story--I think this >>> book is actually an argument that culture can also be forged into a >>> weapon in the hands of the poor by precisely the family members who >>> seem most powerless--not her own grandmother, but grandmothers like >>> that of Sonja Sotomayor. >>> >>> Idealism? Of course. Chua ignores the real reasons for the success >>> stories she tells, because they have nothing to do with these triple >>> package values (values which she admits are shared by almost all >>> ethnic groups). As Thomas Piketty points out in "Capital in the >>> Twenty-first Century", economics seen over the long run is...well, >>> it's a long arc, and it bends towards injustice. But precisely because >>> the injustice towards which it bends admits so very few to the very >>> rich, the very poor eventually play catch up, both iinternationally >>> (China) and intra-nationally, while the majority of the ruling ethnic >>> power are forced into the actual, not the nominal, middle class (i.e. >>> in the USA, people who live on earned income and not returns on >>> capital). >>> >>> There were two exceptions to all of this playing catch-up, and they >>> happen to be the real "double package" on which American culture was >>> materially founded: genocide and slavery. That is why I feel that >>> treating the Native American and the black American experience as if >>> it were somehow comparable to other immigrant experiences is really a >>> form of Holocaust denial. The building where I live lodges mostly >>> foreigners, and there are many Americans. One of the professors is >>> black, American, and an incredibly successful and well known author in >>> business studies. Like Barack Obama, he has a name--it's an African >>> name, not the name of some slave-owning scoundrel; from the sound of >>> it I suspect he calls himself a "Nigerian-American" and not >>> "African-American". The other day I met his son in the elevator, and >>> when I heard his name I told him I recognized it, because it goes at >>> the top of every article his dad publishes. The kid was fairly >>> incandescent with pride. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> >>> On 17 September 2014 02:45, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> I am not a psychologist, but is this what is passing off as empirical >>>> >>> psychological research?? On another note, can we get some real >>> psychologists to weigh in on the impact of spanking children on their >>> psychological development.? This Adrian Peterson thing is getting racial >>> really quickly.? By the way, my parents would be in prison today based on >>> how I was spanked.... >>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: "Henry G. >>>> >>> Shonerd III"
Date:09/16/2014? 1:12 PM >>> (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < >>> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts >>> about cultural "triple packages"
>>> >>>>
I am struck by how inauthentic (phony?) Chua and her husband are, >>>> >>> even more so than most TED talks. As I listened, I remembered the work by >>> Ogbu on oppositional responses of "involuntary immigrants" (Blacks as >>> slaves, Native Americans and Hispanics caught up in the movement of >>> national borders). I have heard Ogbu has been criticized, but he >>> >> convinced >> >>> me. >>> >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 4:59 AM, Katherine Wester Neal >>>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>>> Thanks for sending, Greg. I also found it hard to keep watching. I >>>>> >> have >> >>> read Amy Chua's "tiger mom" book, and this TED talk seems to be a way to >>> validate and extend the parenting ideas that she lays out in the book >>> (which I find to be harsh and a bit mean-spirited). I have many issues >>> >> with >> >>> their claims, but I'll just mention two. >>> >>>>> First, I don't think their generalizations/facts are very useful. They >>>>> >>> perpetuate the idea, for example, that stereotypes are acceptable, >>> especially if they're "true," which is probably where the comment that >>> they're racist came from. It is also unhelpful to tell white, middle >>> >> class >> >>> parents one more time that "other" kids are going to outperform their >>> >> kids >> >>> and their kids are falling behind. This sort of scarcity rhetoric hurts >>> kids and parents, in part because it sets up an us/them dichotomy. >>> >>>>> Second, as Greg said, there's no theory. I am suspect of facts, such >>>>> >> as >> >>> these, without theory because they don't account for how the facts were >>> produced. >>> >>>>> Katie >>>>> >>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>> Doctoral Candidate >>>>> University of Georgia >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sep 15, 2014, at 11:41 PM, "Greg Thompson" < >>>>> >>> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>>> Been enjoying the party, and apropos of David's call for some facts >>>>> >>> (which >>> >>>>> I'm in full support of - despite being a theory-wonk), I thought I'd >>>>> >>> offer >>> >>>>> this Ted talk that was sent to me by an LCHC colleague: >>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHUMcxaqm9U >>>>> >>>>> Lots of facts in there, and not a little theory. >>>>> >>>>> They've got big claims about the facts of their program in inner-city >>>>> schools and about inequality too (you have to listen to the end to >>>>> >> hear >> >>>>> about that). >>>>> >>>>> What do you think? >>>>> >>>>> Anything to it? >>>>> >>>>> Anyone have any facts to counter their facts? >>>>> >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> p.s., I'm still listening to it right now. Not sure I'm going to be >>>>> >> able >> >>>>> to stomach the entire talk... getting a little queasy. Feeling like >>>>> >>> someone >>> >>>>> is selling me something that is going to cost me a ton and I'm not >>>>> >>> going to >>> >>>>> like. Ugh... >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> -- >> >> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or >> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >> Gray, 2001] >> >> > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Sep 18 08:25:50 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 08:25:50 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: My apologies if my "chaining" off your comment about cocktail parties distracted from the main point of the ongoing discussion, Phillip. Could you say more about what an historical ontology of oneself means? I can understand the truth of the idea that In any interaction with others, whether at a cocktail party or in an academic discussion group, one is creating one's own history and that an autobiography is a self history from ego's point of view. If one theorizes, then theorizing is a mode of activity/experience that becomes the material of autobiography. I am still back on David's earlier claim that cultural historical approaches to understanding human development do not view data as ways of testing/evaluating/improving theory. I may have gotten confused by thinking that the discussion on Foucault, Merleau-P, et. Were part of that discussion. A lot swirling around at once. A pathway out of the thicket would be gratefully received. Mike On Tuesday, September 16, 2014, White, Phillip wrote: > > as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their work > > "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology of > ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were philosophers on > ontology, and of history." > > the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those peoples > who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, and > homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and i've come > to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to think > of theory as a way of autobiography. > > i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed here on > xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail party. > (that's a great metaphor!) > > p > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Sep 18 08:58:14 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 08:58:14 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts about cultural "triple packages" In-Reply-To: <1411050446434.66209@uga.edu> References: <5ludl16dbj40lcf5cs4xnf9w.1410889516950@email.android.com> <541A74A4.1000002@mira.net> <1411050446434.66209@uga.edu> Message-ID: Folks. I have a strong feeling that a discussion about whether or not there are empirical facts to counter the facts that are offered for the triple factor theory of demographic group academic success do not address the issues raised by David Ki, whatever their interest. Its important, for example, to know that the 3-4th generation of immigrants in some recent cases regress to American academic mediocrity. But is someone suggesting that this power couple has provided a new theory of culture, human development, and education that will put an end to poverty in the US, an explicit claim at the beginning of their talk? They are offering a theory in the sense that, say, Piaget, or Vyogtsky, or Foucault, or Bartlett, or..... were theorizing? It seems we should be examining research programs of people who are seen as important to the development of theories of development that accord culture a significant role in that process and that engage with those theories in terms of data generated from different settings where the theory is invoked as relevant to interpretation, reinterpretation, criticism. If one wants to get some idea of why it might be that Asian American kids are doing well in our schools and universities, at present, visit your local university library on a Saturday afternoon and check out the demographics of the students you see there. Meantime, the question put to us concerned the role of data, such as the data that are presented in journals such as MCA, or the data presented by Wertsch, or Engestrom, or Luria, or Salho or Edwards or Valsiner or ........ in the intellectual enterprise we might refer to as bio-social-historical-situated-embodied-critical-ecological- studies/theory/undertakings. Interesting as they are, videos such as the one Greg offered us do not leave me much enlightened about the question put to us. Could i get some help here understanding what I am missing? And how best to proceed to make progress on the question posed? mike On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 7:26 AM, Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > > To Greg's question about the empirical stuff, yes, I think it is possible > to find facts that work against Amy and Jed's facts. Their facts are one > interpretation of what's going on based in their particular understanding > of how the world works, one where the triple package is what everyone > really needs to succeed. > > They talked about how some big charter school groups contacted them about > the triple package and what it could do for students, which makes me think > of New Orleans, where the public schools are currently nearly 100% charter. > It's good that the Orleans Parish School Board doesn't have much control > any more (I am from New Orleans and still spend a month or so there every > year, and the schools truly were in dire straits before Katrina). But > here's an article that, in part, presents some empirical research that may > help disprove the triple package idea: > > http://apps.npr.org/the-end-of-neighborhood-schools/ > > I think that address will have to be cut and pasted because I can't get it > to link. > > The facts from the researchers in the article could be used to counter Amy > and Jed's facts. As one researcher said, "There is extreme effort to > control, rather than engage, students in the classroom." But that control > only leads to a definition of success that revolves around a single, > multiple-choice test. (Later, the same researcher says: "There aren?t many > projects, discussions, or kids reading literature. They are really teaching > what will be tested at the exclusion of all other materials. I had a > science teacher tell me that if there was an earthquake in New Orleans, she > wouldn?t have the time to cover it if it weren?t on the test.") I think > this kind of control, or as Greg said "delay of gratification," is what Amy > and Jed are selling in the triple package; it's the magic bullet. But if > this sort of control in schools doesn't lead to useful learning, doesn't > that fact show that the triple package isn't actually what one needs for > success? A deeper reading of the research might turn up more facts that > don't line up with what Amy and Jed present. > > Katie > > Katie Wester-Neal > Doctoral candidate > University of Georgia > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: Thursday, September 18, 2014 1:59 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts about cultural "triple packages" > > As I said before I found the individualism positively scary. > And we see, don't we, what kind of society is produced by this "I will > get to the top of the heap by whatever it takes" mentality produces. > And as from David Ke's interesting post, we see that whoever gets to the > top of the heap will inevitably do so over the bodies of those who come > second, and be desperately unhappy about their success anyway. > But since culture is not something one can acquire at Saturday homework > club, I guess we should not worry too much about the damage they might do. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > Thanks David and others. > > > > I guess I posted the video as something of a meditation on the question > > that had been posed on the other thread - namely: what to do with > empirical > > stuff? > > > > The video is one where I feel a bit frustrated with the argument and am > > tempted to theorize away their findings but can't help but wonder how to > > confront their facts and figures with other facts and figures. > > > > I think David has at least pointed in the direction of the facts and > > figures that are needed. Most notably something that points to the > > particular configurations of capitalism that one confronts in different > > national settings and how these configurations of capitalism foster > > inequality and inevitably become top heavy (with 1% owning 50% of > > everything). The Amy/Jed solution suggests that everyone altogether could > > be just as successful as the current 1% if they just knew how to delay > > gratification (and were as self-assured and self-doubting as Amy and > Jed). > > > > Anyone else have any other takes on their argument? > > > > And do you see this as the latest incarnation of the cultural deficit > > model, just with a few minor tweaks to make it sound less offensive? > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 9:43 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > >> Interesting contextualization, David. thanks > >> mike > >> > >> On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg > >> wrote: > >> > >> > >>> Amy Chua and her husband are both, like Obama, professors of > >>> constitutional law, and this explains a lot: their individualism, > >>> their idealism, and their anecdotal approach to psychological > >>> research. Naturally, I agree with all of the criticisms made on those > >>> fronts; nevertheless I find myself in perverse sympathy with the talk, > >>> particularly the point she made about the non-cultural sources of > >>> poverty which seem to have been ignored by people on the list, perhaps > >>> because they come near the end of the talk. > >>> > >>> "The Triple Package" is not a great book (as you can probably tell > >>> from the "Seven Habits" style title). But it's still a book worth > >>> putting in context. I don't think it is really a generalization of > >>> Chua's book on parenting (which was actually very self-critical and > >>> not at all self-congratulatory). I think it is a generalization of > >>> Chua's last book, which was right in her own field, although like many > >>> books which lie in the middle of one's field it did have a quite > >>> personal trigger. > >>> > >>> As they say in their talk: all nations are unequal, but some are more > >>> unequal than others. The Philippines are one of those more unequal > >>> nations: Chua's grandparents are Filipino Chinese, and the Chinese in > >>> the Philippines are about one percent of the population and own some > >>> forty or fifty percent of the country's capital. So Chua's grandmother > >>> (or perhaps it was an aunt--I'm don't exactly remember) was horribly > >>> murdered by her driver. Nobody was punished, and the reason was that > >>> the police felt enormous sympathy for the driver's hatred of rich > >>> Chinese and released him on a technicality. > >>> > >>> At first, Chua was overcome with rage. But then she began to > >>> generalize; she realized that her grandmother's murder was actually > >>> part of a much wider pattern of constitutional change, where political > >>> democracy is combined with extremes of economic oligarchy, and > >>> consititutions make possible and even encourage demagogy and ethnic > >>> scapegoating of what we might call the richer oppressed (e.g. Indians > >>> in Uganda, Lebanese in Liberia, Tutsis in Rwanda, Croats in Serbia, > >>> Chinese in Indonesia, Jews just about everywhere). > >>> > >>> This is "culture" as a weapon in the hands of the powerful > >>> poor--people like Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Idi Amin, Slobadan Milosevic. > >>> But it must have occurred to Chua while she was writing the book that > >>> demagogy and scapegoating was only part of the story--I think this > >>> book is actually an argument that culture can also be forged into a > >>> weapon in the hands of the poor by precisely the family members who > >>> seem most powerless--not her own grandmother, but grandmothers like > >>> that of Sonja Sotomayor. > >>> > >>> Idealism? Of course. Chua ignores the real reasons for the success > >>> stories she tells, because they have nothing to do with these triple > >>> package values (values which she admits are shared by almost all > >>> ethnic groups). As Thomas Piketty points out in "Capital in the > >>> Twenty-first Century", economics seen over the long run is...well, > >>> it's a long arc, and it bends towards injustice. But precisely because > >>> the injustice towards which it bends admits so very few to the very > >>> rich, the very poor eventually play catch up, both iinternationally > >>> (China) and intra-nationally, while the majority of the ruling ethnic > >>> power are forced into the actual, not the nominal, middle class (i.e. > >>> in the USA, people who live on earned income and not returns on > >>> capital). > >>> > >>> There were two exceptions to all of this playing catch-up, and they > >>> happen to be the real "double package" on which American culture was > >>> materially founded: genocide and slavery. That is why I feel that > >>> treating the Native American and the black American experience as if > >>> it were somehow comparable to other immigrant experiences is really a > >>> form of Holocaust denial. The building where I live lodges mostly > >>> foreigners, and there are many Americans. One of the professors is > >>> black, American, and an incredibly successful and well known author in > >>> business studies. Like Barack Obama, he has a name--it's an African > >>> name, not the name of some slave-owning scoundrel; from the sound of > >>> it I suspect he calls himself a "Nigerian-American" and not > >>> "African-American". The other day I met his son in the elevator, and > >>> when I heard his name I told him I recognized it, because it goes at > >>> the top of every article his dad publishes. The kid was fairly > >>> incandescent with pride. > >>> > >>> David Kellogg > >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>> > >>> > >>> On 17 September 2014 02:45, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com > >>> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> I am not a psychologist, but is this what is passing off as empirical > >>>> > >>> psychological research? On another note, can we get some real > >>> psychologists to weigh in on the impact of spanking children on their > >>> psychological development. This Adrian Peterson thing is getting > racial > >>> really quickly. By the way, my parents would be in prison today based > on > >>> how I was spanked.... > >>> > >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > >>>> President > >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > >>>> www.mocombeian.com > >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info > >>>> > >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: "Henry G. > >>>> > >>> Shonerd III"
Date:09/16/2014 1:12 PM > >>> (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > >>> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts > >>> about cultural "triple packages"
> >>> > >>>>
I am struck by how inauthentic (phony?) Chua and her husband > are, > >>>> > >>> even more so than most TED talks. As I listened, I remembered the work > by > >>> Ogbu on oppositional responses of "involuntary immigrants" (Blacks as > >>> slaves, Native Americans and Hispanics caught up in the movement of > >>> national borders). I have heard Ogbu has been criticized, but he > >>> > >> convinced > >> > >>> me. > >>> > >>>> Henry > >>>> > >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 4:59 AM, Katherine Wester Neal > >>>> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>>> Thanks for sending, Greg. I also found it hard to keep watching. I > >>>>> > >> have > >> > >>> read Amy Chua's "tiger mom" book, and this TED talk seems to be a way > to > >>> validate and extend the parenting ideas that she lays out in the book > >>> (which I find to be harsh and a bit mean-spirited). I have many issues > >>> > >> with > >> > >>> their claims, but I'll just mention two. > >>> > >>>>> First, I don't think their generalizations/facts are very useful. > They > >>>>> > >>> perpetuate the idea, for example, that stereotypes are acceptable, > >>> especially if they're "true," which is probably where the comment that > >>> they're racist came from. It is also unhelpful to tell white, middle > >>> > >> class > >> > >>> parents one more time that "other" kids are going to outperform their > >>> > >> kids > >> > >>> and their kids are falling behind. This sort of scarcity rhetoric hurts > >>> kids and parents, in part because it sets up an us/them dichotomy. > >>> > >>>>> Second, as Greg said, there's no theory. I am suspect of facts, such > >>>>> > >> as > >> > >>> these, without theory because they don't account for how the facts were > >>> produced. > >>> > >>>>> Katie > >>>>> > >>>>> Katie Wester-Neal > >>>>> Doctoral Candidate > >>>>> University of Georgia > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On Sep 15, 2014, at 11:41 PM, "Greg Thompson" < > >>>>> > >>> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> wrote: > >>> > >>>>> Been enjoying the party, and apropos of David's call for some facts > >>>>> > >>> (which > >>> > >>>>> I'm in full support of - despite being a theory-wonk), I thought I'd > >>>>> > >>> offer > >>> > >>>>> this Ted talk that was sent to me by an LCHC colleague: > >>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHUMcxaqm9U > >>>>> > >>>>> Lots of facts in there, and not a little theory. > >>>>> > >>>>> They've got big claims about the facts of their program in inner-city > >>>>> schools and about inequality too (you have to listen to the end to > >>>>> > >> hear > >> > >>>>> about that). > >>>>> > >>>>> What do you think? > >>>>> > >>>>> Anything to it? > >>>>> > >>>>> Anyone have any facts to counter their facts? > >>>>> > >>>>> -greg > >>>>> > >>>>> p.s., I'm still listening to it right now. Not sure I'm going to be > >>>>> > >> able > >> > >>>>> to stomach the entire talk... getting a little queasy. Feeling like > >>>>> > >>> someone > >>> > >>>>> is selling me something that is going to cost me a ton and I'm not > >>>>> > >>> going to > >>> > >>>>> like. Ugh... > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>>> Assistant Professor > >>>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>>> Brigham Young University > >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >> -- > >> > >> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and > re- > >> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more > or > >> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > >> Gray, 2001] > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Sep 18 09:17:37 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 09:17:37 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Position Availability at San Jose State University In-Reply-To: <018101cfd292$415d1070$c4173150$@sjsu.edu> References: <018101cfd292$415d1070$c4173150$@sjsu.edu> Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Emily Slusser Date: Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 9:13 AM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Position Availability at San Jose State University To: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org *San Jos? State University (San Jos?, California) Announcement of Position Availability* *(Subject to Budgetary Approval)* *Child & Adolescent Development * *Job Opening ID Number*: JOID 22939 *Rank*: Open rank *Qualifications*: *Required: * Doctorate in child and adolescent development or related field by time of appointment. For appointment at the advanced rank, must have broad teaching experience and demonstrate scholarly/professional achievement commensurate with a tenured appointment at advanced rank; An area of research focus in early childhood education or in developmental research applied to community settings; An awareness of and sensitivity to the educational goals of a diverse population as might have been gained in cross-cultural study, training, teaching, and/or comparable experience; An established research program; and Evidence of successful university-level teaching experience. *Preferred: * Demonstrated ability to work collaboratively across disciplines; and Experience developing partnerships in community settings or in early education contexts. *Responsibilities: * Teach undergraduate and some graduate courses; Advise undergraduate and masters students; Develop a productive program of research focused on early education contexts or community settings serving children, youth, and families; Participate in shared governance by service on committees at all levels of the University; Be an active participant in department activities and initiatives; and Meet the needs of a highly diverse student population using appropriate course materials, teaching strategies, and advisement techniques. *Salary Range:* Commensurate with qualifications and experience. *Starting Date:* August 18, 2015 *Eligibility:* Employment is contingent upon proof of eligibility to work in the United States. *Application:* For full consideration, upload a letter of application, vitae, statements of teaching interests/philosophy, research plans, three letters of recommendation by October 13, 2014 at apply.interfolio.com/25845. Please include JOID Number (JOID 22939) on all correspondence. Chair- Search Committee Department of Child and Adolescent Development San Jos? State University One Washington Square San Jos?, CA 95192-0075 San Jos? State University is California?s oldest institution of public higher learning. The campus is located on the southern end of San Francisco Bay in downtown San Jos? (Pop. 1,000,000), hub of the world-famous Silicon Valley high-technology research and development center. Many of California?s most popular national, recreational, and cultural attractions are conveniently close. A member of the 23-campus CSU system, San Jos? State University enrolls approximately 30,000 students, a significant percentage of whom are members of minority groups. The University is committed to increasing the diversity of its faculty so our disciplines, students, and the community can benefit from multiple ethnic and gender perspectives. San Jos? State University is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Employer. We consider qualified applicants for employment without regard to race, color, religion, national origin, age, gender, gender identity/expression, sexual orientation, genetic information, medical condition, marital status, veteran status, or disability. This policy applies to all San Jos? State University students, faculty, and staff as well as University programs and activities. Reasonable accommodations are made for applicants with disabilities who self-disclose. Note that all San Jos? State University employees are considered mandated reporters under the California Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act and are required to comply with the requirements set forth in CSU Executive Order 1083 as a condition of employment. The latest San Jos? State University Safety 101 Uniform Campus Crime and Security Report is available. You may request a copy of San Jos? State University?s annual safety report by contacting the University Police Department at (408) 924-2222 or by visiting the University Police Department website at (http://www.sjsu.edu/police.) _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 22939-ChAD_PosDesc_EDU1.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 177644 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140918/461d77b6/attachment.pdf From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Sep 18 09:31:43 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 10:31:43 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts about cultural "triple packages" In-Reply-To: References: <5ludl16dbj40lcf5cs4xnf9w.1410889516950@email.android.com> <541A74A4.1000002@mira.net> <1411050446434.66209@uga.edu> Message-ID: Yes, mike, agreed - it was an obtuse provocation (the worst sort!). It doesn't really get to the question that David Ki was raising (or, at least, not without playing with his meanings against his intentions). Fair enough. So let me propose this as a topic on a separate set of issues (should I change the thread name?), not entirely unrelated to questions about the data presented by Wertsch or Engestrom or Luria or Salho or Edwards or Valsiner or... Perhaps it is useful to think about for a couple of reasons: 1. This is how academic work (of the sort mentioned) is being digested for mass consumption. Amy and Jed put forward a theory that (purportedly) draws on "groundbreaking" (I remember that from the video) psychological research of the past 20 years. This makes it sound like this is the state of the art research that they are working with (yes, it goes back to marshmallows!). As if "just the facts." 2. Relatedly, as "academics", we need to be aware of what is passing for common sense in order to make connections with those who self-identify as "non-academics". Dismissing their theories as not being big enough theories (as in Bartlett, Piaget, Vygotsky, or Foucault) does not speak to the fact that the Amy and Jed are going to heard by and potentially have an effect on the thinking of hundreds of thousands of people, perhaps more. And worst of all, they are keeping hidden those important assumptions that David spoke about. In fact, their discourse reinforces those hidden assumptions. So where is the CHAT voice in popular books and popular press? I personally feel like CHAT and related thinkers have lots to say about these issues, so how can we help these voices to be heard? (and the institutional cloistering of academia is self-imposed as much as it is externally imposed!). Perhaps this is old hat (and I do recall a conversation on XMCA that touched on some of this maybe 4 or 5 years ago). But it is an issue that will never be entirely irrelevant - until we are. -greg On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, mike cole wrote: > Folks. > > I have a strong feeling that a discussion about whether or not there are > empirical facts to counter the facts that are offered for the triple factor > theory of demographic group academic success do not address the issues > raised by David Ki, whatever their interest. Its important, for example, to > know that the 3-4th generation of immigrants in some recent cases regress > to American academic mediocrity. But is someone suggesting that this power > couple has provided a new theory of culture, human development, and > education that will put an end to poverty in the US, an explicit claim at > the beginning of their talk? They are offering a theory in the sense that, > say, Piaget, or Vyogtsky, > or Foucault, or Bartlett, or..... were theorizing? > > It seems we should be examining research programs of people who are seen as > important to the development of theories of development that accord culture > a significant role in that process and that engage with those theories in > terms of data generated from different settings where the theory is invoked > as relevant to interpretation, reinterpretation, criticism. > > If one wants to get some idea of why it might be that Asian American kids > are doing well in our schools and universities, at present, visit your > local university library on a Saturday afternoon and check out the > demographics of the students you see there. > > Meantime, the question put to us concerned the role of data, such as the > data that are presented in journals such as MCA, or the data presented by > Wertsch, or Engestrom, or Luria, or Salho or Edwards or Valsiner or > ........ in the intellectual enterprise we might refer to as > bio-social-historical-situated-embodied-critical-ecological- > studies/theory/undertakings. > > Interesting as they are, videos such as the one Greg offered us do not > leave me much enlightened about the question put to us. Could i get some > help here understanding what I am missing? And how best to proceed to make > progress on the question posed? > > mike > > On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 7:26 AM, Katherine Wester Neal > wrote: > > > > > To Greg's question about the empirical stuff, yes, I think it is possible > > to find facts that work against Amy and Jed's facts. Their facts are one > > interpretation of what's going on based in their particular understanding > > of how the world works, one where the triple package is what everyone > > really needs to succeed. > > > > They talked about how some big charter school groups contacted them about > > the triple package and what it could do for students, which makes me > think > > of New Orleans, where the public schools are currently nearly 100% > charter. > > It's good that the Orleans Parish School Board doesn't have much control > > any more (I am from New Orleans and still spend a month or so there every > > year, and the schools truly were in dire straits before Katrina). But > > here's an article that, in part, presents some empirical research that > may > > help disprove the triple package idea: > > > > http://apps.npr.org/the-end-of-neighborhood-schools/ > > > > I think that address will have to be cut and pasted because I can't get > it > > to link. > > > > The facts from the researchers in the article could be used to counter > Amy > > and Jed's facts. As one researcher said, "There is extreme effort to > > control, rather than engage, students in the classroom." But that control > > only leads to a definition of success that revolves around a single, > > multiple-choice test. (Later, the same researcher says: "There aren?t > many > > projects, discussions, or kids reading literature. They are really > teaching > > what will be tested at the exclusion of all other materials. I had a > > science teacher tell me that if there was an earthquake in New Orleans, > she > > wouldn?t have the time to cover it if it weren?t on the test.") I think > > this kind of control, or as Greg said "delay of gratification," is what > Amy > > and Jed are selling in the triple package; it's the magic bullet. But if > > this sort of control in schools doesn't lead to useful learning, doesn't > > that fact show that the triple package isn't actually what one needs for > > success? A deeper reading of the research might turn up more facts that > > don't line up with what Amy and Jed present. > > > > Katie > > > > Katie Wester-Neal > > Doctoral candidate > > University of Georgia > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > Sent: Thursday, September 18, 2014 1:59 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts about cultural "triple packages" > > > > As I said before I found the individualism positively scary. > > And we see, don't we, what kind of society is produced by this "I will > > get to the top of the heap by whatever it takes" mentality produces. > > And as from David Ke's interesting post, we see that whoever gets to the > > top of the heap will inevitably do so over the bodies of those who come > > second, and be desperately unhappy about their success anyway. > > But since culture is not something one can acquire at Saturday homework > > club, I guess we should not worry too much about the damage they might > do. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > > Thanks David and others. > > > > > > I guess I posted the video as something of a meditation on the question > > > that had been posed on the other thread - namely: what to do with > > empirical > > > stuff? > > > > > > The video is one where I feel a bit frustrated with the argument and am > > > tempted to theorize away their findings but can't help but wonder how > to > > > confront their facts and figures with other facts and figures. > > > > > > I think David has at least pointed in the direction of the facts and > > > figures that are needed. Most notably something that points to the > > > particular configurations of capitalism that one confronts in different > > > national settings and how these configurations of capitalism foster > > > inequality and inevitably become top heavy (with 1% owning 50% of > > > everything). The Amy/Jed solution suggests that everyone altogether > could > > > be just as successful as the current 1% if they just knew how to delay > > > gratification (and were as self-assured and self-doubting as Amy and > > Jed). > > > > > > Anyone else have any other takes on their argument? > > > > > > And do you see this as the latest incarnation of the cultural deficit > > > model, just with a few minor tweaks to make it sound less offensive? > > > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 9:43 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > >> Interesting contextualization, David. thanks > > >> mike > > >> > > >> On Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 6:10 PM, David Kellogg > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >> > > >>> Amy Chua and her husband are both, like Obama, professors of > > >>> constitutional law, and this explains a lot: their individualism, > > >>> their idealism, and their anecdotal approach to psychological > > >>> research. Naturally, I agree with all of the criticisms made on those > > >>> fronts; nevertheless I find myself in perverse sympathy with the > talk, > > >>> particularly the point she made about the non-cultural sources of > > >>> poverty which seem to have been ignored by people on the list, > perhaps > > >>> because they come near the end of the talk. > > >>> > > >>> "The Triple Package" is not a great book (as you can probably tell > > >>> from the "Seven Habits" style title). But it's still a book worth > > >>> putting in context. I don't think it is really a generalization of > > >>> Chua's book on parenting (which was actually very self-critical and > > >>> not at all self-congratulatory). I think it is a generalization of > > >>> Chua's last book, which was right in her own field, although like > many > > >>> books which lie in the middle of one's field it did have a quite > > >>> personal trigger. > > >>> > > >>> As they say in their talk: all nations are unequal, but some are more > > >>> unequal than others. The Philippines are one of those more unequal > > >>> nations: Chua's grandparents are Filipino Chinese, and the Chinese in > > >>> the Philippines are about one percent of the population and own some > > >>> forty or fifty percent of the country's capital. So Chua's > grandmother > > >>> (or perhaps it was an aunt--I'm don't exactly remember) was horribly > > >>> murdered by her driver. Nobody was punished, and the reason was that > > >>> the police felt enormous sympathy for the driver's hatred of rich > > >>> Chinese and released him on a technicality. > > >>> > > >>> At first, Chua was overcome with rage. But then she began to > > >>> generalize; she realized that her grandmother's murder was actually > > >>> part of a much wider pattern of constitutional change, where > political > > >>> democracy is combined with extremes of economic oligarchy, and > > >>> consititutions make possible and even encourage demagogy and ethnic > > >>> scapegoating of what we might call the richer oppressed (e.g. Indians > > >>> in Uganda, Lebanese in Liberia, Tutsis in Rwanda, Croats in Serbia, > > >>> Chinese in Indonesia, Jews just about everywhere). > > >>> > > >>> This is "culture" as a weapon in the hands of the powerful > > >>> poor--people like Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Idi Amin, Slobadan Milosevic. > > >>> But it must have occurred to Chua while she was writing the book that > > >>> demagogy and scapegoating was only part of the story--I think this > > >>> book is actually an argument that culture can also be forged into a > > >>> weapon in the hands of the poor by precisely the family members who > > >>> seem most powerless--not her own grandmother, but grandmothers like > > >>> that of Sonja Sotomayor. > > >>> > > >>> Idealism? Of course. Chua ignores the real reasons for the success > > >>> stories she tells, because they have nothing to do with these triple > > >>> package values (values which she admits are shared by almost all > > >>> ethnic groups). As Thomas Piketty points out in "Capital in the > > >>> Twenty-first Century", economics seen over the long run is...well, > > >>> it's a long arc, and it bends towards injustice. But precisely > because > > >>> the injustice towards which it bends admits so very few to the very > > >>> rich, the very poor eventually play catch up, both iinternationally > > >>> (China) and intra-nationally, while the majority of the ruling ethnic > > >>> power are forced into the actual, not the nominal, middle class (i.e. > > >>> in the USA, people who live on earned income and not returns on > > >>> capital). > > >>> > > >>> There were two exceptions to all of this playing catch-up, and they > > >>> happen to be the real "double package" on which American culture was > > >>> materially founded: genocide and slavery. That is why I feel that > > >>> treating the Native American and the black American experience as if > > >>> it were somehow comparable to other immigrant experiences is really a > > >>> form of Holocaust denial. The building where I live lodges mostly > > >>> foreigners, and there are many Americans. One of the professors is > > >>> black, American, and an incredibly successful and well known author > in > > >>> business studies. Like Barack Obama, he has a name--it's an African > > >>> name, not the name of some slave-owning scoundrel; from the sound of > > >>> it I suspect he calls himself a "Nigerian-American" and not > > >>> "African-American". The other day I met his son in the elevator, and > > >>> when I heard his name I told him I recognized it, because it goes at > > >>> the top of every article his dad publishes. The kid was fairly > > >>> incandescent with pride. > > >>> > > >>> David Kellogg > > >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> On 17 September 2014 02:45, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com > > >>> > > >>> wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> I am not a psychologist, but is this what is passing off as > empirical > > >>>> > > >>> psychological research? On another note, can we get some real > > >>> psychologists to weigh in on the impact of spanking children on their > > >>> psychological development. This Adrian Peterson thing is getting > > racial > > >>> really quickly. By the way, my parents would be in prison today > based > > on > > >>> how I was spanked.... > > >>> > > >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > >>>> President > > >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > >>>> www.mocombeian.com > > >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info > > >>>> > > >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: "Henry G. > > >>>> > > >>> Shonerd III"
Date:09/16/2014 1:12 > PM > > >>> (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > >>> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Some facts > > >>> about cultural "triple packages"
> > >>> > > >>>>
I am struck by how inauthentic (phony?) Chua and her husband > > are, > > >>>> > > >>> even more so than most TED talks. As I listened, I remembered the > work > > by > > >>> Ogbu on oppositional responses of "involuntary immigrants" (Blacks as > > >>> slaves, Native Americans and Hispanics caught up in the movement of > > >>> national borders). I have heard Ogbu has been criticized, but he > > >>> > > >> convinced > > >> > > >>> me. > > >>> > > >>>> Henry > > >>>> > > >>>> On Sep 16, 2014, at 4:59 AM, Katherine Wester Neal > > >>>> > > >>> wrote: > > >>> > > >>>>> Thanks for sending, Greg. I also found it hard to keep watching. I > > >>>>> > > >> have > > >> > > >>> read Amy Chua's "tiger mom" book, and this TED talk seems to be a way > > to > > >>> validate and extend the parenting ideas that she lays out in the book > > >>> (which I find to be harsh and a bit mean-spirited). I have many > issues > > >>> > > >> with > > >> > > >>> their claims, but I'll just mention two. > > >>> > > >>>>> First, I don't think their generalizations/facts are very useful. > > They > > >>>>> > > >>> perpetuate the idea, for example, that stereotypes are acceptable, > > >>> especially if they're "true," which is probably where the comment > that > > >>> they're racist came from. It is also unhelpful to tell white, middle > > >>> > > >> class > > >> > > >>> parents one more time that "other" kids are going to outperform their > > >>> > > >> kids > > >> > > >>> and their kids are falling behind. This sort of scarcity rhetoric > hurts > > >>> kids and parents, in part because it sets up an us/them dichotomy. > > >>> > > >>>>> Second, as Greg said, there's no theory. I am suspect of facts, > such > > >>>>> > > >> as > > >> > > >>> these, without theory because they don't account for how the facts > were > > >>> produced. > > >>> > > >>>>> Katie > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Katie Wester-Neal > > >>>>> Doctoral Candidate > > >>>>> University of Georgia > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> On Sep 15, 2014, at 11:41 PM, "Greg Thompson" < > > >>>>> > > >>> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> wrote: > > >>> > > >>>>> Been enjoying the party, and apropos of David's call for some facts > > >>>>> > > >>> (which > > >>> > > >>>>> I'm in full support of - despite being a theory-wonk), I thought > I'd > > >>>>> > > >>> offer > > >>> > > >>>>> this Ted talk that was sent to me by an LCHC colleague: > > >>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHUMcxaqm9U > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Lots of facts in there, and not a little theory. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> They've got big claims about the facts of their program in > inner-city > > >>>>> schools and about inequality too (you have to listen to the end to > > >>>>> > > >> hear > > >> > > >>>>> about that). > > >>>>> > > >>>>> What do you think? > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Anything to it? > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Anyone have any facts to counter their facts? > > >>>>> > > >>>>> -greg > > >>>>> > > >>>>> p.s., I'm still listening to it right now. Not sure I'm going to be > > >>>>> > > >> able > > >> > > >>>>> to stomach the entire talk... getting a little queasy. Feeling like > > >>>>> > > >>> someone > > >>> > > >>>>> is selling me something that is going to cost me a ton and I'm not > > >>>>> > > >>> going to > > >>> > > >>>>> like. Ugh... > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> -- > > >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >>>>> Assistant Professor > > >>>>> Department of Anthropology > > >>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >>>>> Brigham Young University > > >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 > > >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>> > > >> -- > > >> > > >> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and > > re- > > >> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > more > > or > > >> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > > >> Gray, 2001] > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Sep 18 09:35:46 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 10:35:46 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: I thought it was Martin who had mentioned Foucault's "historical ontology of ourselves"? I'd love to hear more too (note this is where Martin's book The Science of Qualitative Research leaves off. I'd love to hear the argument enlivened once again). Martin? -greg On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:25 AM, mike cole wrote: > My apologies if my "chaining" off your comment about cocktail parties > distracted from the main point of the ongoing discussion, Phillip. > > Could you say more about what an historical ontology of oneself means? I > can understand the truth of the idea that In any interaction with others, > whether at a cocktail party or in an academic discussion group, one is > creating one's own history and that an autobiography is a self history from > ego's point of view. If one theorizes, then theorizing is a mode of > activity/experience that becomes the material of autobiography. > > I am still back on David's earlier claim that cultural historical > approaches to understanding human development do not view data as ways of > testing/evaluating/improving theory. I may have gotten confused by thinking > that the discussion on Foucault, Merleau-P, et. Were part of that > discussion. A lot swirling around at once. > > A pathway out of the thicket would be gratefully received. > Mike > > On Tuesday, September 16, 2014, White, Phillip > > wrote: > > > > > as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their work > > > > "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology of > > ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were philosophers on > > ontology, and of history." > > > > the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those peoples > > who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, and > > homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and i've > come > > to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to think > > of theory as a way of autobiography. > > > > i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed here > on > > xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail party. > > (that's a great metaphor!) > > > > p > > > > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Sep 18 09:58:31 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 16:58:31 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: I was simply responding to Paul M.'s (rhetorical?) question as to whether there might be a state of nature to which we could return that would be outside culture. I said that this is not possible for homo sapiens - we need culture to survive. Michael G. then suggested that if we can't step outside culture we cannot critique it. I replied again in the negative, and made a passing reference to Foucault who engaged in research that was critical of culture from inside: one of his ideas was to work with marginalized groups to explore ways of living that the mainstream has ignored. Larry then suggested that Foucault was following Merleau-Ponty's lead, and Phillip responded that Foucault was more influenced by Hyppolite. I countered by suggesting that Foucault's research program - exploring what he called "the historical ontology of ourselves" - in other words, how we are constituted historically (and culturally) as specific kinds of person - was at least consistent with the interests of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. Phew! What a tangled web we weave. Martin On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:35 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > I thought it was Martin who had mentioned Foucault's "historical ontology > of ourselves"? > > I'd love to hear more too (note this is where Martin's book The Science of > Qualitative Research leaves off. I'd love to hear the argument enlivened > once again). > > Martin? > -greg > > On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:25 AM, mike cole wrote: > >> My apologies if my "chaining" off your comment about cocktail parties >> distracted from the main point of the ongoing discussion, Phillip. >> >> Could you say more about what an historical ontology of oneself means? I >> can understand the truth of the idea that In any interaction with others, >> whether at a cocktail party or in an academic discussion group, one is >> creating one's own history and that an autobiography is a self history from >> ego's point of view. If one theorizes, then theorizing is a mode of >> activity/experience that becomes the material of autobiography. >> >> I am still back on David's earlier claim that cultural historical >> approaches to understanding human development do not view data as ways of >> testing/evaluating/improving theory. I may have gotten confused by thinking >> that the discussion on Foucault, Merleau-P, et. Were part of that >> discussion. A lot swirling around at once. >> >> A pathway out of the thicket would be gratefully received. >> Mike >> >> On Tuesday, September 16, 2014, White, Phillip >> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their work >>> >>> "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology of >>> ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were philosophers on >>> ontology, and of history." >>> >>> the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those peoples >>> who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, and >>> homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and i've >> come >>> to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to think >>> of theory as a way of autobiography. >>> >>> i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed here >> on >>> xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail party. >>> (that's a great metaphor!) >>> >>> p >>> >>> >> >> -- >> >> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or >> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >> Gray, 2001] >> > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Sep 18 10:15:21 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 10:15:21 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Thanks for the recap, Martin. Then we got to Phillip who talked about theorizing and autobiography as part of the Foucault thread. Is the move from ourselveS to ourselF important? With the critique of culture issue, it seems that the sense of A culture as AN historically formation of human lifeways and Culture, as the medium of all forms of human life, are getting conflated in the discussion. The project of criticizing various values and practices that are part of the cultural conditions of our own society (conditions plural) seems doable, if necessarily contest. A critique of human Culture as a medium of human life seems considerably more problematic. mike On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > I was simply responding to Paul M.'s (rhetorical?) question as to whether > there might be a state of nature to which we could return that would be > outside culture. I said that this is not possible for homo sapiens - we > need culture to survive. Michael G. then suggested that if we can't step > outside culture we cannot critique it. I replied again in the negative, and > made a passing reference to Foucault who engaged in research that was > critical of culture from inside: one of his ideas was to work with > marginalized groups to explore ways of living that the mainstream has > ignored. Larry then suggested that Foucault was following Merleau-Ponty's > lead, and Phillip responded that Foucault was more influenced by Hyppolite. > I countered by suggesting that Foucault's research program - exploring what > he called "the historical ontology of ourselves" - in other words, how we > are constituted historically (and culturally) as specific kinds of person - > was at least consistent with the interests of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. > > Phew! What a tangled web we weave. > > Martin > > On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:35 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > I thought it was Martin who had mentioned Foucault's "historical ontology > > of ourselves"? > > > > I'd love to hear more too (note this is where Martin's book The Science > of > > Qualitative Research leaves off. I'd love to hear the argument enlivened > > once again). > > > > Martin? > > -greg > > > > On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:25 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > >> My apologies if my "chaining" off your comment about cocktail parties > >> distracted from the main point of the ongoing discussion, Phillip. > >> > >> Could you say more about what an historical ontology of oneself means? I > >> can understand the truth of the idea that In any interaction with > others, > >> whether at a cocktail party or in an academic discussion group, one is > >> creating one's own history and that an autobiography is a self history > from > >> ego's point of view. If one theorizes, then theorizing is a mode of > >> activity/experience that becomes the material of autobiography. > >> > >> I am still back on David's earlier claim that cultural historical > >> approaches to understanding human development do not view data as ways > of > >> testing/evaluating/improving theory. I may have gotten confused by > thinking > >> that the discussion on Foucault, Merleau-P, et. Were part of that > >> discussion. A lot swirling around at once. > >> > >> A pathway out of the thicket would be gratefully received. > >> Mike > >> > >> On Tuesday, September 16, 2014, White, Phillip < > Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu > >>> > >> wrote: > >> > >>> > >>> as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their work > >>> > >>> "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology > of > >>> ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were philosophers > on > >>> ontology, and of history." > >>> > >>> the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those > peoples > >>> who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, and > >>> homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and i've > >> come > >>> to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to > think > >>> of theory as a way of autobiography. > >>> > >>> i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed here > >> on > >>> xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail party. > >>> (that's a great metaphor!) > >>> > >>> p > >>> > >>> > >> > >> -- > >> > >> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and > re- > >> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more > or > >> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > >> Gray, 2001] > >> > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Thu Sep 18 10:20:57 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 13:20:57 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault Message-ID: I have the flu and wish I could continue the conversation, but I have been in bed for the past 3 days...anyways, the climate change issue I think is a force that will impact how we go about recursively organizing and reproducing our being in the world. ?If we fail to change our culture, we die! Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:09/18/2014 12:58 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault
I was simply responding to Paul M.'s (rhetorical?) question as to whether there might be a state of nature to which we could return that would be outside culture. I said that this is not possible for homo sapiens - we need culture to survive. Michael G. then suggested that if we can't step outside culture we cannot critique it. I replied again in the negative, and made a passing reference to Foucault who engaged in research that was critical of culture from inside: one of his ideas was to work with marginalized groups to explore ways of living that the mainstream has ignored. Larry then suggested that Foucault was following Merleau-Ponty's lead, and Phillip responded that Foucault was more influenced by Hyppolite. I countered by suggesting that Foucault's research program - exploring what he called "the historical ontology of ourselves" - in other words, how we are constituted historically (and culturally) as specific kinds of person - was at least consistent with the interests of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. Phew! What a tangled web we weave. Martin On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:35 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > I thought it was Martin who had mentioned Foucault's "historical ontology > of ourselves"? > > I'd love to hear more too (note this is where Martin's book The Science of > Qualitative Research leaves off. I'd love to hear the argument enlivened > once again). > > Martin? > -greg > > On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:25 AM, mike cole wrote: > >> My apologies if my "chaining" off your comment about cocktail parties >> distracted from the main point of the ongoing discussion, Phillip. >> >> Could you say more about what an historical ontology of oneself means? I >> can understand the truth of the idea that In any interaction with others, >> whether at a cocktail party or in an academic discussion group, one is >> creating one's own history and that an autobiography is a self history from >> ego's point of view. If one theorizes, then theorizing is a mode of >> activity/experience that becomes the material of autobiography. >> >> I am still back on David's earlier claim that cultural historical >> approaches to understanding human development do not view data as ways of >> testing/evaluating/improving theory. I may have gotten confused by thinking >> that the discussion on Foucault, Merleau-P, et. Were part of that >> discussion. A lot swirling around at once. >> >> A pathway out of the thicket would be gratefully received. >> Mike >> >> On Tuesday, September 16, 2014, White, Phillip >> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their work >>> >>> "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology of >>> ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were philosophers on >>> ontology, and of history." >>> >>> the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those peoples >>> who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, and >>> homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and i've >> come >>> to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to think >>> of theory as a way of autobiography. >>> >>> i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed here >> on >>> xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail party. >>> (that's a great metaphor!) >>> >>> p >>> >>> >> >> -- >> >> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or >> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >> Gray, 2001] >> > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Sep 18 11:37:03 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 12:37:03 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Mike,, A little historical ontology of myself. I was in Berkeley and Cuba with the Weathermen in the 60s when we were thinking in terms of a critique of not just A culture, but CULTURE: Che, revolution. Middle class white kids mostly, we even thought we might be willing to die to make a better world, like Che. Mostly we hurt each other's feelings trying to decide whose consciousness was highest. It's embarrassing to talk about it. Now I'm a retired education prof working as a sub in two great charter schools in Albuquerque, breaking good. Reading the XMA/XMCA dialog, I find much better grounding than consciousness raising sessions of the 60s, and I find Bloch's optimism (See Andy's website) warranted. Like the song goes: I'm still willin'. I have been scrambling to catch up on the thinking of "academic" giants as I read your posts, convinced you wouldn't post them if you didn't think they were important for this dialog. In other words I trust this dialog as it looks back. I understand Mike's problem with posting the Amy and Jed talk, though I think it is helpful that we have taken on the messiness of the moment. It's looking forward, the Novum, where I find my optimism. I don't think it's crazy to think that CHAT can be "popularized", can be part of changing popular narratives. I love Vygotsky because he worked so feverishly, with others, to make that happen, for children. It seems to me that the reason Amy and Jed are important for this dialog is because schools ARE the key to changing the narrative. Or so I think and feel. And getting real dialog into the schools, not test prep, is what will change everything. That's the concept I think is worth aiming for. Again, so I think and feel. Henry On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:15 AM, mike cole wrote: > Thanks for the recap, Martin. Then we got to Phillip who talked about > theorizing and autobiography as part of the Foucault thread. Is the move > from ourselveS to ourselF important? > > With the critique of culture issue, it seems that the sense of A culture as > AN historically formation of human lifeways and Culture, as the medium of > all forms of human life, are getting conflated in the discussion. The > project of criticizing various values and practices that are part of the > cultural conditions of our own society (conditions plural) seems doable, if > necessarily contest. A critique of human Culture as a medium of human life > seems considerably more problematic. > > mike > > > > On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> I was simply responding to Paul M.'s (rhetorical?) question as to whether >> there might be a state of nature to which we could return that would be >> outside culture. I said that this is not possible for homo sapiens - we >> need culture to survive. Michael G. then suggested that if we can't step >> outside culture we cannot critique it. I replied again in the negative, and >> made a passing reference to Foucault who engaged in research that was >> critical of culture from inside: one of his ideas was to work with >> marginalized groups to explore ways of living that the mainstream has >> ignored. Larry then suggested that Foucault was following Merleau-Ponty's >> lead, and Phillip responded that Foucault was more influenced by Hyppolite. >> I countered by suggesting that Foucault's research program - exploring what >> he called "the historical ontology of ourselves" - in other words, how we >> are constituted historically (and culturally) as specific kinds of person - >> was at least consistent with the interests of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. >> >> Phew! What a tangled web we weave. >> >> Martin >> >> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:35 AM, Greg Thompson >> wrote: >> >>> I thought it was Martin who had mentioned Foucault's "historical ontology >>> of ourselves"? >>> >>> I'd love to hear more too (note this is where Martin's book The Science >> of >>> Qualitative Research leaves off. I'd love to hear the argument enlivened >>> once again). >>> >>> Martin? >>> -greg >>> >>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:25 AM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>>> My apologies if my "chaining" off your comment about cocktail parties >>>> distracted from the main point of the ongoing discussion, Phillip. >>>> >>>> Could you say more about what an historical ontology of oneself means? I >>>> can understand the truth of the idea that In any interaction with >> others, >>>> whether at a cocktail party or in an academic discussion group, one is >>>> creating one's own history and that an autobiography is a self history >> from >>>> ego's point of view. If one theorizes, then theorizing is a mode of >>>> activity/experience that becomes the material of autobiography. >>>> >>>> I am still back on David's earlier claim that cultural historical >>>> approaches to understanding human development do not view data as ways >> of >>>> testing/evaluating/improving theory. I may have gotten confused by >> thinking >>>> that the discussion on Foucault, Merleau-P, et. Were part of that >>>> discussion. A lot swirling around at once. >>>> >>>> A pathway out of the thicket would be gratefully received. >>>> Mike >>>> >>>> On Tuesday, September 16, 2014, White, Phillip < >> Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu >>>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their work >>>>> >>>>> "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology >> of >>>>> ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were philosophers >> on >>>>> ontology, and of history." >>>>> >>>>> the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those >> peoples >>>>> who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, and >>>>> homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and i've >>>> come >>>>> to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to >> think >>>>> of theory as a way of autobiography. >>>>> >>>>> i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed here >>>> on >>>>> xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail party. >>>>> (that's a great metaphor!) >>>>> >>>>> p >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and >> re- >>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more >> or >>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>>> Gray, 2001] >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> >> > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] From boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Thu Sep 18 12:00:14 2014 From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu (Robert Lake) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 15:00:14 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Hi Henry, Have you written of your '60's experiences anywhere? If not you might consider it. RL On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 2:37 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > Mike,, > A little historical ontology of myself. I was in Berkeley and Cuba with > the Weathermen in the 60s when we were thinking in terms of a critique of > not just A culture, but CULTURE: Che, revolution. Middle class white kids > mostly, we even thought we might be willing to die to make a better world, > like Che. Mostly we hurt each other's feelings trying to decide whose > consciousness was highest. It's embarrassing to talk about it. Now I'm a > retired education prof working as a sub in two great charter schools in > Albuquerque, breaking good. Reading the XMA/XMCA dialog, I find much better > grounding than consciousness raising sessions of the 60s, and I find > Bloch's optimism (See Andy's website) warranted. Like the song goes: I'm > still willin'. I have been scrambling to catch up on the thinking of > "academic" giants as I read your posts, convinced you wouldn't post them if > you didn't think they were important for this dialog. In other words I > trust this dialog as it looks back. I understand Mike's problem with > posting the Amy and Jed talk, though I think it is helpful that we have > taken on the messiness of the moment. It's looking forward, the Novum, > where I find my optimism. I don't think it's crazy to think that CHAT can > be "popularized", can be part of changing popular narratives. I love > Vygotsky because he worked so feverishly, with others, to make that happen, > for children. It seems to me that the reason Amy and Jed are important for > this dialog is because schools ARE the key to changing the narrative. Or so > I think and feel. And getting real dialog into the schools, not test prep, > is what will change everything. That's the concept I think is worth aiming > for. Again, so I think and feel. > Henry > > On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:15 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > Thanks for the recap, Martin. Then we got to Phillip who talked about > > theorizing and autobiography as part of the Foucault thread. Is the move > > from ourselveS to ourselF important? > > > > With the critique of culture issue, it seems that the sense of A culture > as > > AN historically formation of human lifeways and Culture, as the medium of > > all forms of human life, are getting conflated in the discussion. The > > project of criticizing various values and practices that are part of the > > cultural conditions of our own society (conditions plural) seems doable, > if > > necessarily contest. A critique of human Culture as a medium of human > life > > seems considerably more problematic. > > > > mike > > > > > > > > On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > >> wrote: > > > >> I was simply responding to Paul M.'s (rhetorical?) question as to > whether > >> there might be a state of nature to which we could return that would be > >> outside culture. I said that this is not possible for homo sapiens - we > >> need culture to survive. Michael G. then suggested that if we can't step > >> outside culture we cannot critique it. I replied again in the negative, > and > >> made a passing reference to Foucault who engaged in research that was > >> critical of culture from inside: one of his ideas was to work with > >> marginalized groups to explore ways of living that the mainstream has > >> ignored. Larry then suggested that Foucault was following > Merleau-Ponty's > >> lead, and Phillip responded that Foucault was more influenced by > Hyppolite. > >> I countered by suggesting that Foucault's research program - exploring > what > >> he called "the historical ontology of ourselves" - in other words, how > we > >> are constituted historically (and culturally) as specific kinds of > person - > >> was at least consistent with the interests of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. > >> > >> Phew! What a tangled web we weave. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:35 AM, Greg Thompson > >> wrote: > >> > >>> I thought it was Martin who had mentioned Foucault's "historical > ontology > >>> of ourselves"? > >>> > >>> I'd love to hear more too (note this is where Martin's book The Science > >> of > >>> Qualitative Research leaves off. I'd love to hear the argument > enlivened > >>> once again). > >>> > >>> Martin? > >>> -greg > >>> > >>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:25 AM, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>>> My apologies if my "chaining" off your comment about cocktail parties > >>>> distracted from the main point of the ongoing discussion, Phillip. > >>>> > >>>> Could you say more about what an historical ontology of oneself > means? I > >>>> can understand the truth of the idea that In any interaction with > >> others, > >>>> whether at a cocktail party or in an academic discussion group, one is > >>>> creating one's own history and that an autobiography is a self history > >> from > >>>> ego's point of view. If one theorizes, then theorizing is a mode of > >>>> activity/experience that becomes the material of autobiography. > >>>> > >>>> I am still back on David's earlier claim that cultural historical > >>>> approaches to understanding human development do not view data as ways > >> of > >>>> testing/evaluating/improving theory. I may have gotten confused by > >> thinking > >>>> that the discussion on Foucault, Merleau-P, et. Were part of that > >>>> discussion. A lot swirling around at once. > >>>> > >>>> A pathway out of the thicket would be gratefully received. > >>>> Mike > >>>> > >>>> On Tuesday, September 16, 2014, White, Phillip < > >> Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu > >>>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their > work > >>>>> > >>>>> "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology > >> of > >>>>> ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were philosophers > >> on > >>>>> ontology, and of history." > >>>>> > >>>>> the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those > >> peoples > >>>>> who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, and > >>>>> homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and i've > >>>> come > >>>>> to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to > >> think > >>>>> of theory as a way of autobiography. > >>>>> > >>>>> i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed > here > >>>> on > >>>>> xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail party. > >>>>> (that's a great metaphor!) > >>>>> > >>>>> p > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> > >>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and > >> re- > >>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > more > >> or > >>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > >>>> Gray, 2001] > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>> Assistant Professor > >>> Department of Anthropology > >>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>> Brigham Young University > >>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more > or > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > > Gray, 2001] > > > -- *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor Social Foundations of Education Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading Georgia Southern University Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group P. O. Box 8144 Phone: (912) 478-0355 Fax: (912) 478-5382 Statesboro, GA 30460 From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Sep 18 12:08:07 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 12:08:07 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Thanks for the bit of autobiography, Henry. I am too confused about uses of ontology to know if it is that too! On my web page at lchc.ucsd.edu you will find this quotation. *Apropos Thoughts on Revolutions and Their Causes* (From C. Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities*, Ch 15) Along the Paris streets, the death carts rumble, hollow and harsh. Six tumbrels carry the day's wine to La Guillotine. All the devouring and insatiate monsters imagined since imagination could record itself, are fused in the one realization, Guillotine. And yet there is not in France, with its rich variety of soil and climate, a blade, a leaf, a root, a sprig, a peppercorn, which will grow to maturity under conditions more certain than those that have produced this horror. Crush human humanity out of shape once more, under similar hammers, and it will twist itself into the same tortured forms. Sow the same seed of rapacious license and oppression over again, and it will surely yield the same fruit, according to its kind. I believe that this is a HOPEFUL assessment of the human condition. I see around me counter examples that make me wonder. I am less sanquine about schooling as a solution. It appears to exacerbate, not alleviate, the problem of species self anhilitation through over consumption that Paul brought up. It has a very long history in this regard. mike On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 11:37 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > Mike,, > A little historical ontology of myself. I was in Berkeley and Cuba with > the Weathermen in the 60s when we were thinking in terms of a critique of > not just A culture, but CULTURE: Che, revolution. Middle class white kids > mostly, we even thought we might be willing to die to make a better world, > like Che. Mostly we hurt each other's feelings trying to decide whose > consciousness was highest. It's embarrassing to talk about it. Now I'm a > retired education prof working as a sub in two great charter schools in > Albuquerque, breaking good. Reading the XMA/XMCA dialog, I find much better > grounding than consciousness raising sessions of the 60s, and I find > Bloch's optimism (See Andy's website) warranted. Like the song goes: I'm > still willin'. I have been scrambling to catch up on the thinking of > "academic" giants as I read your posts, convinced you wouldn't post them if > you didn't think they were important for this dialog. In other words I > trust this dialog as it looks back. I understand Mike's problem with > posting the Amy and Jed talk, though I think it is helpful that we have > taken on the messiness of the moment. It's looking forward, the Novum, > where I find my optimism. I don't think it's crazy to think that CHAT can > be "popularized", can be part of changing popular narratives. I love > Vygotsky because he worked so feverishly, with others, to make that happen, > for children. It seems to me that the reason Amy and Jed are important for > this dialog is because schools ARE the key to changing the narrative. Or so > I think and feel. And getting real dialog into the schools, not test prep, > is what will change everything. That's the concept I think is worth aiming > for. Again, so I think and feel. > Henry > > On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:15 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > Thanks for the recap, Martin. Then we got to Phillip who talked about > > theorizing and autobiography as part of the Foucault thread. Is the move > > from ourselveS to ourselF important? > > > > With the critique of culture issue, it seems that the sense of A culture > as > > AN historically formation of human lifeways and Culture, as the medium of > > all forms of human life, are getting conflated in the discussion. The > > project of criticizing various values and practices that are part of the > > cultural conditions of our own society (conditions plural) seems doable, > if > > necessarily contest. A critique of human Culture as a medium of human > life > > seems considerably more problematic. > > > > mike > > > > > > > > On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > >> wrote: > > > >> I was simply responding to Paul M.'s (rhetorical?) question as to > whether > >> there might be a state of nature to which we could return that would be > >> outside culture. I said that this is not possible for homo sapiens - we > >> need culture to survive. Michael G. then suggested that if we can't step > >> outside culture we cannot critique it. I replied again in the negative, > and > >> made a passing reference to Foucault who engaged in research that was > >> critical of culture from inside: one of his ideas was to work with > >> marginalized groups to explore ways of living that the mainstream has > >> ignored. Larry then suggested that Foucault was following > Merleau-Ponty's > >> lead, and Phillip responded that Foucault was more influenced by > Hyppolite. > >> I countered by suggesting that Foucault's research program - exploring > what > >> he called "the historical ontology of ourselves" - in other words, how > we > >> are constituted historically (and culturally) as specific kinds of > person - > >> was at least consistent with the interests of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. > >> > >> Phew! What a tangled web we weave. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:35 AM, Greg Thompson > >> wrote: > >> > >>> I thought it was Martin who had mentioned Foucault's "historical > ontology > >>> of ourselves"? > >>> > >>> I'd love to hear more too (note this is where Martin's book The Science > >> of > >>> Qualitative Research leaves off. I'd love to hear the argument > enlivened > >>> once again). > >>> > >>> Martin? > >>> -greg > >>> > >>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:25 AM, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>>> My apologies if my "chaining" off your comment about cocktail parties > >>>> distracted from the main point of the ongoing discussion, Phillip. > >>>> > >>>> Could you say more about what an historical ontology of oneself > means? I > >>>> can understand the truth of the idea that In any interaction with > >> others, > >>>> whether at a cocktail party or in an academic discussion group, one is > >>>> creating one's own history and that an autobiography is a self history > >> from > >>>> ego's point of view. If one theorizes, then theorizing is a mode of > >>>> activity/experience that becomes the material of autobiography. > >>>> > >>>> I am still back on David's earlier claim that cultural historical > >>>> approaches to understanding human development do not view data as ways > >> of > >>>> testing/evaluating/improving theory. I may have gotten confused by > >> thinking > >>>> that the discussion on Foucault, Merleau-P, et. Were part of that > >>>> discussion. A lot swirling around at once. > >>>> > >>>> A pathway out of the thicket would be gratefully received. > >>>> Mike > >>>> > >>>> On Tuesday, September 16, 2014, White, Phillip < > >> Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu > >>>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their > work > >>>>> > >>>>> "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology > >> of > >>>>> ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were philosophers > >> on > >>>>> ontology, and of history." > >>>>> > >>>>> the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those > >> peoples > >>>>> who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, and > >>>>> homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and i've > >>>> come > >>>>> to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to > >> think > >>>>> of theory as a way of autobiography. > >>>>> > >>>>> i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed > here > >>>> on > >>>>> xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail party. > >>>>> (that's a great metaphor!) > >>>>> > >>>>> p > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> > >>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and > >> re- > >>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > more > >> or > >>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > >>>> Gray, 2001] > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>> Assistant Professor > >>> Department of Anthropology > >>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>> Brigham Young University > >>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more > or > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > > Gray, 2001] > > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Sep 18 15:05:29 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 16:05:29 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Hi Robert, I have not and, off the top of my head, think it wouldn't be of great interest to anyone else. Like I say, it's embarrassing to be on either end of that kind of bullying. None of what happened to me was unforgivable, though it has always made me very sensitive to bullying in ANY context, especially between peers. It happens all the time in classrooms, in schools. The small cuts, nicely fashioned to keep one in line. "Classroom management" keeps a lid on it. Kids aren't naturally mean, it's learned. It should be at the center of a dialog in schools that pretend to be inclusive. I think of "multicultural" courses for student teachers focused on gender, class, race, religion, are ABOUT bullying but not praxis, at least from my own experience trying to teach it to student teachers. I was part of the problem, though I think I taught the courses in good faith. I'm pretty sure that's at the root of the dialog we are having here: How to have it in schools. Well, really throughout society. What's good for kids is good for adults. ZPD rules! Henry On Sep 18, 2014, at 1:00 PM, Robert Lake wrote: > Hi Henry, > Have you written of your '60's experiences anywhere? > If not you might consider it. > RL > > On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 2:37 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: > >> Mike,, >> A little historical ontology of myself. I was in Berkeley and Cuba with >> the Weathermen in the 60s when we were thinking in terms of a critique of >> not just A culture, but CULTURE: Che, revolution. Middle class white kids >> mostly, we even thought we might be willing to die to make a better world, >> like Che. Mostly we hurt each other's feelings trying to decide whose >> consciousness was highest. It's embarrassing to talk about it. Now I'm a >> retired education prof working as a sub in two great charter schools in >> Albuquerque, breaking good. Reading the XMA/XMCA dialog, I find much better >> grounding than consciousness raising sessions of the 60s, and I find >> Bloch's optimism (See Andy's website) warranted. Like the song goes: I'm >> still willin'. I have been scrambling to catch up on the thinking of >> "academic" giants as I read your posts, convinced you wouldn't post them if >> you didn't think they were important for this dialog. In other words I >> trust this dialog as it looks back. I understand Mike's problem with >> posting the Amy and Jed talk, though I think it is helpful that we have >> taken on the messiness of the moment. It's looking forward, the Novum, >> where I find my optimism. I don't think it's crazy to think that CHAT can >> be "popularized", can be part of changing popular narratives. I love >> Vygotsky because he worked so feverishly, with others, to make that happen, >> for children. It seems to me that the reason Amy and Jed are important for >> this dialog is because schools ARE the key to changing the narrative. Or so >> I think and feel. And getting real dialog into the schools, not test prep, >> is what will change everything. That's the concept I think is worth aiming >> for. Again, so I think and feel. >> Henry >> >> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:15 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >>> Thanks for the recap, Martin. Then we got to Phillip who talked about >>> theorizing and autobiography as part of the Foucault thread. Is the move >>> from ourselveS to ourselF important? >>> >>> With the critique of culture issue, it seems that the sense of A culture >> as >>> AN historically formation of human lifeways and Culture, as the medium of >>> all forms of human life, are getting conflated in the discussion. The >>> project of criticizing various values and practices that are part of the >>> cultural conditions of our own society (conditions plural) seems doable, >> if >>> necessarily contest. A critique of human Culture as a medium of human >> life >>> seems considerably more problematic. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>> wrote: >>> >>>> I was simply responding to Paul M.'s (rhetorical?) question as to >> whether >>>> there might be a state of nature to which we could return that would be >>>> outside culture. I said that this is not possible for homo sapiens - we >>>> need culture to survive. Michael G. then suggested that if we can't step >>>> outside culture we cannot critique it. I replied again in the negative, >> and >>>> made a passing reference to Foucault who engaged in research that was >>>> critical of culture from inside: one of his ideas was to work with >>>> marginalized groups to explore ways of living that the mainstream has >>>> ignored. Larry then suggested that Foucault was following >> Merleau-Ponty's >>>> lead, and Phillip responded that Foucault was more influenced by >> Hyppolite. >>>> I countered by suggesting that Foucault's research program - exploring >> what >>>> he called "the historical ontology of ourselves" - in other words, how >> we >>>> are constituted historically (and culturally) as specific kinds of >> person - >>>> was at least consistent with the interests of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. >>>> >>>> Phew! What a tangled web we weave. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:35 AM, Greg Thompson >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I thought it was Martin who had mentioned Foucault's "historical >> ontology >>>>> of ourselves"? >>>>> >>>>> I'd love to hear more too (note this is where Martin's book The Science >>>> of >>>>> Qualitative Research leaves off. I'd love to hear the argument >> enlivened >>>>> once again). >>>>> >>>>> Martin? >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:25 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> My apologies if my "chaining" off your comment about cocktail parties >>>>>> distracted from the main point of the ongoing discussion, Phillip. >>>>>> >>>>>> Could you say more about what an historical ontology of oneself >> means? I >>>>>> can understand the truth of the idea that In any interaction with >>>> others, >>>>>> whether at a cocktail party or in an academic discussion group, one is >>>>>> creating one's own history and that an autobiography is a self history >>>> from >>>>>> ego's point of view. If one theorizes, then theorizing is a mode of >>>>>> activity/experience that becomes the material of autobiography. >>>>>> >>>>>> I am still back on David's earlier claim that cultural historical >>>>>> approaches to understanding human development do not view data as ways >>>> of >>>>>> testing/evaluating/improving theory. I may have gotten confused by >>>> thinking >>>>>> that the discussion on Foucault, Merleau-P, et. Were part of that >>>>>> discussion. A lot swirling around at once. >>>>>> >>>>>> A pathway out of the thicket would be gratefully received. >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tuesday, September 16, 2014, White, Phillip < >>>> Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu >>>>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their >> work >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology >>>> of >>>>>>> ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were philosophers >>>> on >>>>>>> ontology, and of history." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those >>>> peoples >>>>>>> who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, and >>>>>>> homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and i've >>>>>> come >>>>>>> to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to >>>> think >>>>>>> of theory as a way of autobiography. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed >> here >>>>>> on >>>>>>> xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail party. >>>>>>> (that's a great metaphor!) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> p >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and >>>> re- >>>>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but >> more >>>> or >>>>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>>>>> Gray, 2001] >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more >> or >>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>> Gray, 2001] >> >> >> > > > -- > > *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor > Social Foundations of Education > Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > Georgia Southern University > Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group > P. O. Box 8144 > Phone: (912) 478-0355 > Fax: (912) 478-5382 > Statesboro, GA 30460 From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Sep 18 15:32:48 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 16:32:48 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <1231D8E4-C12D-46C4-839B-0C4A4BF6281B@gmail.com> Mike, Hopeful? Best of times, worst of times. I know what you are saying that schools aren't the solution, they're the problem. But I work in two charter schools where I want to give it a chance, if only as a substitute teacher. One has as its focus service learning, the other the education of Native Americans in an urban setting. I hope they are different from the New Orleans charters that Katherine gave us links to. (The links worked!) After 25 years of telling other people how to do it, I am seeing if I can stand the heat again. As a high school teacher on the Navajo Reservation before that, I had one good year (my first year) when I could do pretty much what I wanted, and the rest of the time I got tons of programmed learning materials (Random House) and lost my way. I admit it: I lacked the imagination to deal creatively with the problem. As a teacher educator, I tried to , but always felt inauthentic, even when I was, passionate. Karma: my bad conscience and a need to get it right, which is why I am in this dialog and why I am subbing. Add to that my rage against the American way of aging and dying. At my age (71), I have good reason to be terrified. There oughta be a law. Henry On Sep 18, 2014, at 1:08 PM, mike cole wrote: > Thanks for the bit of autobiography, Henry. I am too confused about uses of > ontology to know if it is that too! > > On my web page at lchc.ucsd.edu you will find this quotation. > > *Apropos Thoughts on Revolutions and Their Causes* > > (From C. Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities*, Ch 15) > > Along the Paris streets, the death carts rumble, hollow and harsh. > Six tumbrels carry the day's wine to La Guillotine. All the devouring and > insatiate monsters imagined since imagination could record itself, are > fused in the one realization, Guillotine. And yet there is not in France, > with its rich variety of soil and climate, a blade, a leaf, a root, a > sprig, a peppercorn, which will grow to maturity under conditions more > certain than those that have produced this horror. Crush human humanity out > of shape once more, under similar hammers, and it will twist itself into > the same tortured forms. Sow the same seed of rapacious license and > oppression over again, and it will surely yield the same fruit, according > to its kind. > > I believe that this is a HOPEFUL assessment of the human condition. I see > around me counter examples that make me wonder. I am less sanquine about > schooling as a solution. It appears to exacerbate, not alleviate, the > problem of species self anhilitation through over consumption that Paul > brought up. It has a very long history in this regard. > > mike > > On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 11:37 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: > >> Mike,, >> A little historical ontology of myself. I was in Berkeley and Cuba with >> the Weathermen in the 60s when we were thinking in terms of a critique of >> not just A culture, but CULTURE: Che, revolution. Middle class white kids >> mostly, we even thought we might be willing to die to make a better world, >> like Che. Mostly we hurt each other's feelings trying to decide whose >> consciousness was highest. It's embarrassing to talk about it. Now I'm a >> retired education prof working as a sub in two great charter schools in >> Albuquerque, breaking good. Reading the XMA/XMCA dialog, I find much better >> grounding than consciousness raising sessions of the 60s, and I find >> Bloch's optimism (See Andy's website) warranted. Like the song goes: I'm >> still willin'. I have been scrambling to catch up on the thinking of >> "academic" giants as I read your posts, convinced you wouldn't post them if >> you didn't think they were important for this dialog. In other words I >> trust this dialog as it looks back. I understand Mike's problem with >> posting the Amy and Jed talk, though I think it is helpful that we have >> taken on the messiness of the moment. It's looking forward, the Novum, >> where I find my optimism. I don't think it's crazy to think that CHAT can >> be "popularized", can be part of changing popular narratives. I love >> Vygotsky because he worked so feverishly, with others, to make that happen, >> for children. It seems to me that the reason Amy and Jed are important for >> this dialog is because schools ARE the key to changing the narrative. Or so >> I think and feel. And getting real dialog into the schools, not test prep, >> is what will change everything. That's the concept I think is worth aiming >> for. Again, so I think and feel. >> Henry >> >> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:15 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >>> Thanks for the recap, Martin. Then we got to Phillip who talked about >>> theorizing and autobiography as part of the Foucault thread. Is the move >>> from ourselveS to ourselF important? >>> >>> With the critique of culture issue, it seems that the sense of A culture >> as >>> AN historically formation of human lifeways and Culture, as the medium of >>> all forms of human life, are getting conflated in the discussion. The >>> project of criticizing various values and practices that are part of the >>> cultural conditions of our own society (conditions plural) seems doable, >> if >>> necessarily contest. A critique of human Culture as a medium of human >> life >>> seems considerably more problematic. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>> wrote: >>> >>>> I was simply responding to Paul M.'s (rhetorical?) question as to >> whether >>>> there might be a state of nature to which we could return that would be >>>> outside culture. I said that this is not possible for homo sapiens - we >>>> need culture to survive. Michael G. then suggested that if we can't step >>>> outside culture we cannot critique it. I replied again in the negative, >> and >>>> made a passing reference to Foucault who engaged in research that was >>>> critical of culture from inside: one of his ideas was to work with >>>> marginalized groups to explore ways of living that the mainstream has >>>> ignored. Larry then suggested that Foucault was following >> Merleau-Ponty's >>>> lead, and Phillip responded that Foucault was more influenced by >> Hyppolite. >>>> I countered by suggesting that Foucault's research program - exploring >> what >>>> he called "the historical ontology of ourselves" - in other words, how >> we >>>> are constituted historically (and culturally) as specific kinds of >> person - >>>> was at least consistent with the interests of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. >>>> >>>> Phew! What a tangled web we weave. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:35 AM, Greg Thompson >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I thought it was Martin who had mentioned Foucault's "historical >> ontology >>>>> of ourselves"? >>>>> >>>>> I'd love to hear more too (note this is where Martin's book The Science >>>> of >>>>> Qualitative Research leaves off. I'd love to hear the argument >> enlivened >>>>> once again). >>>>> >>>>> Martin? >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:25 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> My apologies if my "chaining" off your comment about cocktail parties >>>>>> distracted from the main point of the ongoing discussion, Phillip. >>>>>> >>>>>> Could you say more about what an historical ontology of oneself >> means? I >>>>>> can understand the truth of the idea that In any interaction with >>>> others, >>>>>> whether at a cocktail party or in an academic discussion group, one is >>>>>> creating one's own history and that an autobiography is a self history >>>> from >>>>>> ego's point of view. If one theorizes, then theorizing is a mode of >>>>>> activity/experience that becomes the material of autobiography. >>>>>> >>>>>> I am still back on David's earlier claim that cultural historical >>>>>> approaches to understanding human development do not view data as ways >>>> of >>>>>> testing/evaluating/improving theory. I may have gotten confused by >>>> thinking >>>>>> that the discussion on Foucault, Merleau-P, et. Were part of that >>>>>> discussion. A lot swirling around at once. >>>>>> >>>>>> A pathway out of the thicket would be gratefully received. >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tuesday, September 16, 2014, White, Phillip < >>>> Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu >>>>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their >> work >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology >>>> of >>>>>>> ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were philosophers >>>> on >>>>>>> ontology, and of history." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those >>>> peoples >>>>>>> who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, and >>>>>>> homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and i've >>>>>> come >>>>>>> to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to >>>> think >>>>>>> of theory as a way of autobiography. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed >> here >>>>>> on >>>>>>> xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail party. >>>>>>> (that's a great metaphor!) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> p >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and >>>> re- >>>>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but >> more >>>> or >>>>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>>>>> Gray, 2001] >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more >> or >>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>> Gray, 2001] >> >> >> > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Sep 18 16:42:19 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 17:42:19 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <2C83E631-1957-4EB1-A763-4B3165CE917D@gmail.com> Mike, Sorry about the twisted use of perfectly good words. Hopeful? Best of times, worst of times. I know what you are saying that schools aren't the solution, they're the problem. But is the work you have been doing aimed at NO schools or better schools? Hmmm... I work in two charter schools where I want to give schools a chance, if only as a substitute teacher. One has as its focus service learning, the other the education of Native Americans in an urban setting. I hope they are different from the New Orleans charters that Katherine gave us links to, which were sort of forced on those poor people. (The links worked!) After 25 years of telling other people how to do it, I am seeing if I can stand the heat again. As a high school teacher on the Navajo Reservation before that, I had one good year (my first year) when I could do pretty much what I wanted, and the rest of the time I got tons of programmed learning materials (Random House) and lost my way. I admit it: I lacked the imagination to deal creatively with the problem. As a teacher educator, I tried to , but always felt inauthentic, even when I was, passionate. And I got great evals from my students. Karma: my bad conscience and a need to get it right, which is why I am in this dialog, reading as fast as I can, and why I am subbing. Add to that my rage against the American way of aging and dying. At my age (71), I have good reason to be terrified. There oughta be a law. Henry On Sep 18, 2014, at 1:08 PM, mike cole wrote: > Thanks for the bit of autobiography, Henry. I am too confused about uses of > ontology to know if it is that too! > > On my web page at lchc.ucsd.edu you will find this quotation. > > *Apropos Thoughts on Revolutions and Their Causes* > > (From C. Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities*, Ch 15) > > Along the Paris streets, the death carts rumble, hollow and harsh. > Six tumbrels carry the day's wine to La Guillotine. All the devouring and > insatiate monsters imagined since imagination could record itself, are > fused in the one realization, Guillotine. And yet there is not in France, > with its rich variety of soil and climate, a blade, a leaf, a root, a > sprig, a peppercorn, which will grow to maturity under conditions more > certain than those that have produced this horror. Crush human humanity out > of shape once more, under similar hammers, and it will twist itself into > the same tortured forms. Sow the same seed of rapacious license and > oppression over again, and it will surely yield the same fruit, according > to its kind. > > I believe that this is a HOPEFUL assessment of the human condition. I see > around me counter examples that make me wonder. I am less sanquine about > schooling as a solution. It appears to exacerbate, not alleviate, the > problem of species self anhilitation through over consumption that Paul > brought up. It has a very long history in this regard. > > mike > > On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 11:37 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: > >> Mike,, >> A little historical ontology of myself. I was in Berkeley and Cuba with >> the Weathermen in the 60s when we were thinking in terms of a critique of >> not just A culture, but CULTURE: Che, revolution. Middle class white kids >> mostly, we even thought we might be willing to die to make a better world, >> like Che. Mostly we hurt each other's feelings trying to decide whose >> consciousness was highest. It's embarrassing to talk about it. Now I'm a >> retired education prof working as a sub in two great charter schools in >> Albuquerque, breaking good. Reading the XMA/XMCA dialog, I find much better >> grounding than consciousness raising sessions of the 60s, and I find >> Bloch's optimism (See Andy's website) warranted. Like the song goes: I'm >> still willin'. I have been scrambling to catch up on the thinking of >> "academic" giants as I read your posts, convinced you wouldn't post them if >> you didn't think they were important for this dialog. In other words I >> trust this dialog as it looks back. I understand Mike's problem with >> posting the Amy and Jed talk, though I think it is helpful that we have >> taken on the messiness of the moment. It's looking forward, the Novum, >> where I find my optimism. I don't think it's crazy to think that CHAT can >> be "popularized", can be part of changing popular narratives. I love >> Vygotsky because he worked so feverishly, with others, to make that happen, >> for children. It seems to me that the reason Amy and Jed are important for >> this dialog is because schools ARE the key to changing the narrative. Or so >> I think and feel. And getting real dialog into the schools, not test prep, >> is what will change everything. That's the concept I think is worth aiming >> for. Again, so I think and feel. >> Henry >> >> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:15 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >>> Thanks for the recap, Martin. Then we got to Phillip who talked about >>> theorizing and autobiography as part of the Foucault thread. Is the move >>> from ourselveS to ourselF important? >>> >>> With the critique of culture issue, it seems that the sense of A culture >> as >>> AN historically formation of human lifeways and Culture, as the medium of >>> all forms of human life, are getting conflated in the discussion. The >>> project of criticizing various values and practices that are part of the >>> cultural conditions of our own society (conditions plural) seems doable, >> if >>> necessarily contest. A critique of human Culture as a medium of human >> life >>> seems considerably more problematic. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>> wrote: >>> >>>> I was simply responding to Paul M.'s (rhetorical?) question as to >> whether >>>> there might be a state of nature to which we could return that would be >>>> outside culture. I said that this is not possible for homo sapiens - we >>>> need culture to survive. Michael G. then suggested that if we can't step >>>> outside culture we cannot critique it. I replied again in the negative, >> and >>>> made a passing reference to Foucault who engaged in research that was >>>> critical of culture from inside: one of his ideas was to work with >>>> marginalized groups to explore ways of living that the mainstream has >>>> ignored. Larry then suggested that Foucault was following >> Merleau-Ponty's >>>> lead, and Phillip responded that Foucault was more influenced by >> Hyppolite. >>>> I countered by suggesting that Foucault's research program - exploring >> what >>>> he called "the historical ontology of ourselves" - in other words, how >> we >>>> are constituted historically (and culturally) as specific kinds of >> person - >>>> was at least consistent with the interests of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. >>>> >>>> Phew! What a tangled web we weave. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:35 AM, Greg Thompson >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I thought it was Martin who had mentioned Foucault's "historical >> ontology >>>>> of ourselves"? >>>>> >>>>> I'd love to hear more too (note this is where Martin's book The Science >>>> of >>>>> Qualitative Research leaves off. I'd love to hear the argument >> enlivened >>>>> once again). >>>>> >>>>> Martin? >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:25 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> My apologies if my "chaining" off your comment about cocktail parties >>>>>> distracted from the main point of the ongoing discussion, Phillip. >>>>>> >>>>>> Could you say more about what an historical ontology of oneself >> means? I >>>>>> can understand the truth of the idea that In any interaction with >>>> others, >>>>>> whether at a cocktail party or in an academic discussion group, one is >>>>>> creating one's own history and that an autobiography is a self history >>>> from >>>>>> ego's point of view. If one theorizes, then theorizing is a mode of >>>>>> activity/experience that becomes the material of autobiography. >>>>>> >>>>>> I am still back on David's earlier claim that cultural historical >>>>>> approaches to understanding human development do not view data as ways >>>> of >>>>>> testing/evaluating/improving theory. I may have gotten confused by >>>> thinking >>>>>> that the discussion on Foucault, Merleau-P, et. Were part of that >>>>>> discussion. A lot swirling around at once. >>>>>> >>>>>> A pathway out of the thicket would be gratefully received. >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tuesday, September 16, 2014, White, Phillip < >>>> Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu >>>>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their >> work >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology >>>> of >>>>>>> ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were philosophers >>>> on >>>>>>> ontology, and of history." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those >>>> peoples >>>>>>> who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, and >>>>>>> homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and i've >>>>>> come >>>>>>> to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to >>>> think >>>>>>> of theory as a way of autobiography. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed >> here >>>>>> on >>>>>>> xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail party. >>>>>>> (that's a great metaphor!) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> p >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and >>>> re- >>>>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but >> more >>>> or >>>>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>>>>> Gray, 2001] >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more >> or >>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>> Gray, 2001] >> >> >> > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] From boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Thu Sep 18 17:47:18 2014 From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu (Robert Lake) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 20:47:18 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: There you go Henry. You have touched on a vital topic that needs more attention. Your 60's experience provides a great back story for your passion against bullying. On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 6:05 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > Hi Robert, > I have not and, off the top of my head, think it wouldn't be of great > interest to anyone else. Like I say, it's embarrassing to be on either end > of that kind of bullying. None of what happened to me was unforgivable, > though it has always made me very sensitive to bullying in ANY context, > especially between peers. It happens all the time in classrooms, in > schools. The small cuts, nicely fashioned to keep one in line. "Classroom > management" keeps a lid on it. Kids aren't naturally mean, it's learned. It > should be at the center of a dialog in schools that pretend to be > inclusive. I think of "multicultural" courses for student teachers focused > on gender, class, race, religion, are ABOUT bullying but not praxis, at > least from my own experience trying to teach it to student teachers. I was > part of the problem, though I think I taught the courses in good faith. I'm > pretty sure that's at the root of the dialog we are having here: How to > have it in schools. Well, really throughout society. What's good for kids > is good for adults. ZPD rules! > Henry > > On Sep 18, 2014, at 1:00 PM, Robert Lake > wrote: > > > Hi Henry, > > Have you written of your '60's experiences anywhere? > > If not you might consider it. > > RL > > > > On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 2:37 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > wrote: > > > >> Mike,, > >> A little historical ontology of myself. I was in Berkeley and Cuba with > >> the Weathermen in the 60s when we were thinking in terms of a critique > of > >> not just A culture, but CULTURE: Che, revolution. Middle class white > kids > >> mostly, we even thought we might be willing to die to make a better > world, > >> like Che. Mostly we hurt each other's feelings trying to decide whose > >> consciousness was highest. It's embarrassing to talk about it. Now I'm a > >> retired education prof working as a sub in two great charter schools in > >> Albuquerque, breaking good. Reading the XMA/XMCA dialog, I find much > better > >> grounding than consciousness raising sessions of the 60s, and I find > >> Bloch's optimism (See Andy's website) warranted. Like the song goes: I'm > >> still willin'. I have been scrambling to catch up on the thinking of > >> "academic" giants as I read your posts, convinced you wouldn't post > them if > >> you didn't think they were important for this dialog. In other words I > >> trust this dialog as it looks back. I understand Mike's problem with > >> posting the Amy and Jed talk, though I think it is helpful that we have > >> taken on the messiness of the moment. It's looking forward, the Novum, > >> where I find my optimism. I don't think it's crazy to think that CHAT > can > >> be "popularized", can be part of changing popular narratives. I love > >> Vygotsky because he worked so feverishly, with others, to make that > happen, > >> for children. It seems to me that the reason Amy and Jed are important > for > >> this dialog is because schools ARE the key to changing the narrative. > Or so > >> I think and feel. And getting real dialog into the schools, not test > prep, > >> is what will change everything. That's the concept I think is worth > aiming > >> for. Again, so I think and feel. > >> Henry > >> > >> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:15 AM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >>> Thanks for the recap, Martin. Then we got to Phillip who talked about > >>> theorizing and autobiography as part of the Foucault thread. Is the > move > >>> from ourselveS to ourselF important? > >>> > >>> With the critique of culture issue, it seems that the sense of A > culture > >> as > >>> AN historically formation of human lifeways and Culture, as the medium > of > >>> all forms of human life, are getting conflated in the discussion. The > >>> project of criticizing various values and practices that are part of > the > >>> cultural conditions of our own society (conditions plural) seems > doable, > >> if > >>> necessarily contest. A critique of human Culture as a medium of human > >> life > >>> seems considerably more problematic. > >>> > >>> mike > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, Martin John Packer < > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > >>>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> I was simply responding to Paul M.'s (rhetorical?) question as to > >> whether > >>>> there might be a state of nature to which we could return that would > be > >>>> outside culture. I said that this is not possible for homo sapiens - > we > >>>> need culture to survive. Michael G. then suggested that if we can't > step > >>>> outside culture we cannot critique it. I replied again in the > negative, > >> and > >>>> made a passing reference to Foucault who engaged in research that was > >>>> critical of culture from inside: one of his ideas was to work with > >>>> marginalized groups to explore ways of living that the mainstream has > >>>> ignored. Larry then suggested that Foucault was following > >> Merleau-Ponty's > >>>> lead, and Phillip responded that Foucault was more influenced by > >> Hyppolite. > >>>> I countered by suggesting that Foucault's research program - exploring > >> what > >>>> he called "the historical ontology of ourselves" - in other words, how > >> we > >>>> are constituted historically (and culturally) as specific kinds of > >> person - > >>>> was at least consistent with the interests of Merleau-Ponty and > Sartre. > >>>> > >>>> Phew! What a tangled web we weave. > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:35 AM, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> I thought it was Martin who had mentioned Foucault's "historical > >> ontology > >>>>> of ourselves"? > >>>>> > >>>>> I'd love to hear more too (note this is where Martin's book The > Science > >>>> of > >>>>> Qualitative Research leaves off. I'd love to hear the argument > >> enlivened > >>>>> once again). > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin? > >>>>> -greg > >>>>> > >>>>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:25 AM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> My apologies if my "chaining" off your comment about cocktail > parties > >>>>>> distracted from the main point of the ongoing discussion, Phillip. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Could you say more about what an historical ontology of oneself > >> means? I > >>>>>> can understand the truth of the idea that In any interaction with > >>>> others, > >>>>>> whether at a cocktail party or in an academic discussion group, one > is > >>>>>> creating one's own history and that an autobiography is a self > history > >>>> from > >>>>>> ego's point of view. If one theorizes, then theorizing is a mode of > >>>>>> activity/experience that becomes the material of autobiography. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I am still back on David's earlier claim that cultural historical > >>>>>> approaches to understanding human development do not view data as > ways > >>>> of > >>>>>> testing/evaluating/improving theory. I may have gotten confused by > >>>> thinking > >>>>>> that the discussion on Foucault, Merleau-P, et. Were part of that > >>>>>> discussion. A lot swirling around at once. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> A pathway out of the thicket would be gratefully received. > >>>>>> Mike > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Tuesday, September 16, 2014, White, Phillip < > >>>> Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their > >> work > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical > ontology > >>>> of > >>>>>>> ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were > philosophers > >>>> on > >>>>>>> ontology, and of history." > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those > >>>> peoples > >>>>>>> who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, > and > >>>>>>> homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and > i've > >>>>>> come > >>>>>>> to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to > >>>> think > >>>>>>> of theory as a way of autobiography. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed > >> here > >>>>>> on > >>>>>>> xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail > party. > >>>>>>> (that's a great metaphor!) > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> p > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction > and > >>>> re- > >>>>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > >> more > >>>> or > >>>>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, > and > >>>>>> Gray, 2001] > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>>> Assistant Professor > >>>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>>> Brigham Young University > >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> > >>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and > re- > >>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more > >> or > >>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > >>> Gray, 2001] > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > > > *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor > > Social Foundations of Education > > Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > > Georgia Southern University > > Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group > > P. O. Box 8144 > > Phone: (912) 478-0355 > > Fax: (912) 478-5382 > > Statesboro, GA 30460 > > > -- *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor Social Foundations of Education Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading Georgia Southern University Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group P. O. Box 8144 Phone: (912) 478-0355 Fax: (912) 478-5382 Statesboro, GA 30460 From wester@uga.edu Thu Sep 18 20:09:11 2014 From: wester@uga.edu (Katherine Wester Neal) Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2014 03:09:11 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: <2C83E631-1957-4EB1-A763-4B3165CE917D@gmail.com> References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> , <2C83E631-1957-4EB1-A763-4B3165CE917D@gmail.com> Message-ID: <67A0F245-A945-4F68-ADFD-BE751BF33980@uga.edu> Yes, education is, in many ways, contributing to "species self annihilation through over consumption" (among other things). But I am a first generation college graduate in my family, and even though there is much that goes wrong with and in education, my experiences lead me to believe that it can do good. I had several years as a middle grades teacher where it seemed that some good was happening, despite those pesky tests. I'm hoping to continue, at least in my own (small) way, to try to do some good through education. My former middle grades students would say that is so "corny," and they would be correct! But I persist in my optimism anyway. Katie Katie Wester-Neal Doctoral candidate University of Georgia On Sep 18, 2014, at 7:44 PM, "Henry G. Shonerd III" wrote: Mike, Sorry about the twisted use of perfectly good words. Hopeful? Best of times, worst of times. I know what you are saying that schools aren't the solution, they're the problem. But is the work you have been doing aimed at NO schools or better schools? Hmmm... I work in two charter schools where I want to give schools a chance, if only as a substitute teacher. One has as its focus service learning, the other the education of Native Americans in an urban setting. I hope they are different from the New Orleans charters that Katherine gave us links to, which were sort of forced on those poor people. (The links worked!) After 25 years of telling other people how to do it, I am seeing if I can stand the heat again. As a high school teacher on the Navajo Reservation before that, I had one good year (my first year) when I could do pretty much what I wanted, and the rest of the time I got tons of programmed learning materials (Random House) and lost my way. I admit it: I lacked the imagination to deal creatively with the problem. As a teacher educator, I tried to , but always felt inauthentic, even when I was, passionate. And I got great evals from my students. Karma: my bad conscience and a need to get it right, which is why I am in this dialog, reading as fast as I can, and why I am subbing. Add to that my rage against the American way of aging and dying. At my age (71), I have good reason to be terrified. There oughta be a law. Henry > On Sep 18, 2014, at 1:08 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Thanks for the bit of autobiography, Henry. I am too confused about uses of > ontology to know if it is that too! > > On my web page at lchc.ucsd.edu you will find this quotation. > > *Apropos Thoughts on Revolutions and Their Causes* > > (From C. Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities*, Ch 15) > > Along the Paris streets, the death carts rumble, hollow and harsh. > Six tumbrels carry the day's wine to La Guillotine. All the devouring and > insatiate monsters imagined since imagination could record itself, are > fused in the one realization, Guillotine. And yet there is not in France, > with its rich variety of soil and climate, a blade, a leaf, a root, a > sprig, a peppercorn, which will grow to maturity under conditions more > certain than those that have produced this horror. Crush human humanity out > of shape once more, under similar hammers, and it will twist itself into > the same tortured forms. Sow the same seed of rapacious license and > oppression over again, and it will surely yield the same fruit, according > to its kind. > > I believe that this is a HOPEFUL assessment of the human condition. I see > around me counter examples that make me wonder. I am less sanquine about > schooling as a solution. It appears to exacerbate, not alleviate, the > problem of species self anhilitation through over consumption that Paul > brought up. It has a very long history in this regard. > > mike > > On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 11:37 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: > >> Mike,, >> A little historical ontology of myself. I was in Berkeley and Cuba with >> the Weathermen in the 60s when we were thinking in terms of a critique of >> not just A culture, but CULTURE: Che, revolution. Middle class white kids >> mostly, we even thought we might be willing to die to make a better world, >> like Che. Mostly we hurt each other's feelings trying to decide whose >> consciousness was highest. It's embarrassing to talk about it. Now I'm a >> retired education prof working as a sub in two great charter schools in >> Albuquerque, breaking good. Reading the XMA/XMCA dialog, I find much better >> grounding than consciousness raising sessions of the 60s, and I find >> Bloch's optimism (See Andy's website) warranted. Like the song goes: I'm >> still willin'. I have been scrambling to catch up on the thinking of >> "academic" giants as I read your posts, convinced you wouldn't post them if >> you didn't think they were important for this dialog. In other words I >> trust this dialog as it looks back. I understand Mike's problem with >> posting the Amy and Jed talk, though I think it is helpful that we have >> taken on the messiness of the moment. It's looking forward, the Novum, >> where I find my optimism. I don't think it's crazy to think that CHAT can >> be "popularized", can be part of changing popular narratives. I love >> Vygotsky because he worked so feverishly, with others, to make that happen, >> for children. It seems to me that the reason Amy and Jed are important for >> this dialog is because schools ARE the key to changing the narrative. Or so >> I think and feel. And getting real dialog into the schools, not test prep, >> is what will change everything. That's the concept I think is worth aiming >> for. Again, so I think and feel. >> Henry >> >>> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:15 AM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> Thanks for the recap, Martin. Then we got to Phillip who talked about >>> theorizing and autobiography as part of the Foucault thread. Is the move >>> from ourselveS to ourselF important? >>> >>> With the critique of culture issue, it seems that the sense of A culture >> as >>> AN historically formation of human lifeways and Culture, as the medium of >>> all forms of human life, are getting conflated in the discussion. The >>> project of criticizing various values and practices that are part of the >>> cultural conditions of our own society (conditions plural) seems doable, >> if >>> necessarily contest. A critique of human Culture as a medium of human >> life >>> seems considerably more problematic. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>> wrote: >>> >>>> I was simply responding to Paul M.'s (rhetorical?) question as to >> whether >>>> there might be a state of nature to which we could return that would be >>>> outside culture. I said that this is not possible for homo sapiens - we >>>> need culture to survive. Michael G. then suggested that if we can't step >>>> outside culture we cannot critique it. I replied again in the negative, >> and >>>> made a passing reference to Foucault who engaged in research that was >>>> critical of culture from inside: one of his ideas was to work with >>>> marginalized groups to explore ways of living that the mainstream has >>>> ignored. Larry then suggested that Foucault was following >> Merleau-Ponty's >>>> lead, and Phillip responded that Foucault was more influenced by >> Hyppolite. >>>> I countered by suggesting that Foucault's research program - exploring >> what >>>> he called "the historical ontology of ourselves" - in other words, how >> we >>>> are constituted historically (and culturally) as specific kinds of >> person - >>>> was at least consistent with the interests of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. >>>> >>>> Phew! What a tangled web we weave. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:35 AM, Greg Thompson >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I thought it was Martin who had mentioned Foucault's "historical >> ontology >>>>> of ourselves"? >>>>> >>>>> I'd love to hear more too (note this is where Martin's book The Science >>>> of >>>>> Qualitative Research leaves off. I'd love to hear the argument >> enlivened >>>>> once again). >>>>> >>>>> Martin? >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:25 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> My apologies if my "chaining" off your comment about cocktail parties >>>>>> distracted from the main point of the ongoing discussion, Phillip. >>>>>> >>>>>> Could you say more about what an historical ontology of oneself >> means? I >>>>>> can understand the truth of the idea that In any interaction with >>>> others, >>>>>> whether at a cocktail party or in an academic discussion group, one is >>>>>> creating one's own history and that an autobiography is a self history >>>> from >>>>>> ego's point of view. If one theorizes, then theorizing is a mode of >>>>>> activity/experience that becomes the material of autobiography. >>>>>> >>>>>> I am still back on David's earlier claim that cultural historical >>>>>> approaches to understanding human development do not view data as ways >>>> of >>>>>> testing/evaluating/improving theory. I may have gotten confused by >>>> thinking >>>>>> that the discussion on Foucault, Merleau-P, et. Were part of that >>>>>> discussion. A lot swirling around at once. >>>>>> >>>>>> A pathway out of the thicket would be gratefully received. >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tuesday, September 16, 2014, White, Phillip < >>>> Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their >> work >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology >>>> of >>>>>>> ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were philosophers >>>> on >>>>>>> ontology, and of history." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those >>>> peoples >>>>>>> who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, and >>>>>>> homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and i've >>>>>> come >>>>>>> to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to >>>> think >>>>>>> of theory as a way of autobiography. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed >> here >>>>>> on >>>>>>> xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail party. >>>>>>> (that's a great metaphor!) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> p >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and >>>> re- >>>>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but >> more >>>> or >>>>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>>>>> Gray, 2001] >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more >> or >>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>> Gray, 2001] > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Sep 18 20:25:43 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 21:25:43 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <2136517E-A610-4B06-8690-3C9D23C58EB8@gmail.com> I should add, I'm just a sensitive guy. I can imagine some people saying, "Just get over it!!" or "Get a little resilience!" or "Fight back!" Drawing attention to my little nicks would embarrass me. We were brats who thought we would change the world. We were posturing. I don't mean the 60s youth movement was all bad, but some of it lacked grounding. I do suspect that my sense of injustice in the world is at least in part a projection of these "unresolved issues", maybe not a bad thing. But when all is said and done, I don't think I could remember enough detail to tell a good story, even if it were a good story. If I could remember it, it would be bathos. I could easily imagine, however, that others would have a different story, one worth telling. On Sep 18, 2014, at 6:47 PM, Robert Lake wrote: > There you go Henry. You have touched on a vital topic > that needs more attention. Your 60's experience provides > a great back story for your passion against bullying. > > On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 6:05 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: > >> Hi Robert, >> I have not and, off the top of my head, think it wouldn't be of great >> interest to anyone else. Like I say, it's embarrassing to be on either end >> of that kind of bullying. None of what happened to me was unforgivable, >> though it has always made me very sensitive to bullying in ANY context, >> especially between peers. It happens all the time in classrooms, in >> schools. The small cuts, nicely fashioned to keep one in line. "Classroom >> management" keeps a lid on it. Kids aren't naturally mean, it's learned. It >> should be at the center of a dialog in schools that pretend to be >> inclusive. I think of "multicultural" courses for student teachers focused >> on gender, class, race, religion, are ABOUT bullying but not praxis, at >> least from my own experience trying to teach it to student teachers. I was >> part of the problem, though I think I taught the courses in good faith. I'm >> pretty sure that's at the root of the dialog we are having here: How to >> have it in schools. Well, really throughout society. What's good for kids >> is good for adults. ZPD rules! >> Henry >> >> On Sep 18, 2014, at 1:00 PM, Robert Lake >> wrote: >> >>> Hi Henry, >>> Have you written of your '60's experiences anywhere? >>> If not you might consider it. >>> RL >>> >>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 2:37 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < >> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Mike,, >>>> A little historical ontology of myself. I was in Berkeley and Cuba with >>>> the Weathermen in the 60s when we were thinking in terms of a critique >> of >>>> not just A culture, but CULTURE: Che, revolution. Middle class white >> kids >>>> mostly, we even thought we might be willing to die to make a better >> world, >>>> like Che. Mostly we hurt each other's feelings trying to decide whose >>>> consciousness was highest. It's embarrassing to talk about it. Now I'm a >>>> retired education prof working as a sub in two great charter schools in >>>> Albuquerque, breaking good. Reading the XMA/XMCA dialog, I find much >> better >>>> grounding than consciousness raising sessions of the 60s, and I find >>>> Bloch's optimism (See Andy's website) warranted. Like the song goes: I'm >>>> still willin'. I have been scrambling to catch up on the thinking of >>>> "academic" giants as I read your posts, convinced you wouldn't post >> them if >>>> you didn't think they were important for this dialog. In other words I >>>> trust this dialog as it looks back. I understand Mike's problem with >>>> posting the Amy and Jed talk, though I think it is helpful that we have >>>> taken on the messiness of the moment. It's looking forward, the Novum, >>>> where I find my optimism. I don't think it's crazy to think that CHAT >> can >>>> be "popularized", can be part of changing popular narratives. I love >>>> Vygotsky because he worked so feverishly, with others, to make that >> happen, >>>> for children. It seems to me that the reason Amy and Jed are important >> for >>>> this dialog is because schools ARE the key to changing the narrative. >> Or so >>>> I think and feel. And getting real dialog into the schools, not test >> prep, >>>> is what will change everything. That's the concept I think is worth >> aiming >>>> for. Again, so I think and feel. >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:15 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>>> Thanks for the recap, Martin. Then we got to Phillip who talked about >>>>> theorizing and autobiography as part of the Foucault thread. Is the >> move >>>>> from ourselveS to ourselF important? >>>>> >>>>> With the critique of culture issue, it seems that the sense of A >> culture >>>> as >>>>> AN historically formation of human lifeways and Culture, as the medium >> of >>>>> all forms of human life, are getting conflated in the discussion. The >>>>> project of criticizing various values and practices that are part of >> the >>>>> cultural conditions of our own society (conditions plural) seems >> doable, >>>> if >>>>> necessarily contest. A critique of human Culture as a medium of human >>>> life >>>>> seems considerably more problematic. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, Martin John Packer < >>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I was simply responding to Paul M.'s (rhetorical?) question as to >>>> whether >>>>>> there might be a state of nature to which we could return that would >> be >>>>>> outside culture. I said that this is not possible for homo sapiens - >> we >>>>>> need culture to survive. Michael G. then suggested that if we can't >> step >>>>>> outside culture we cannot critique it. I replied again in the >> negative, >>>> and >>>>>> made a passing reference to Foucault who engaged in research that was >>>>>> critical of culture from inside: one of his ideas was to work with >>>>>> marginalized groups to explore ways of living that the mainstream has >>>>>> ignored. Larry then suggested that Foucault was following >>>> Merleau-Ponty's >>>>>> lead, and Phillip responded that Foucault was more influenced by >>>> Hyppolite. >>>>>> I countered by suggesting that Foucault's research program - exploring >>>> what >>>>>> he called "the historical ontology of ourselves" - in other words, how >>>> we >>>>>> are constituted historically (and culturally) as specific kinds of >>>> person - >>>>>> was at least consistent with the interests of Merleau-Ponty and >> Sartre. >>>>>> >>>>>> Phew! What a tangled web we weave. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:35 AM, Greg Thompson < >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I thought it was Martin who had mentioned Foucault's "historical >>>> ontology >>>>>>> of ourselves"? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I'd love to hear more too (note this is where Martin's book The >> Science >>>>>> of >>>>>>> Qualitative Research leaves off. I'd love to hear the argument >>>> enlivened >>>>>>> once again). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin? >>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:25 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My apologies if my "chaining" off your comment about cocktail >> parties >>>>>>>> distracted from the main point of the ongoing discussion, Phillip. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Could you say more about what an historical ontology of oneself >>>> means? I >>>>>>>> can understand the truth of the idea that In any interaction with >>>>>> others, >>>>>>>> whether at a cocktail party or in an academic discussion group, one >> is >>>>>>>> creating one's own history and that an autobiography is a self >> history >>>>>> from >>>>>>>> ego's point of view. If one theorizes, then theorizing is a mode of >>>>>>>> activity/experience that becomes the material of autobiography. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I am still back on David's earlier claim that cultural historical >>>>>>>> approaches to understanding human development do not view data as >> ways >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> testing/evaluating/improving theory. I may have gotten confused by >>>>>> thinking >>>>>>>> that the discussion on Foucault, Merleau-P, et. Were part of that >>>>>>>> discussion. A lot swirling around at once. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> A pathway out of the thicket would be gratefully received. >>>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Tuesday, September 16, 2014, White, Phillip < >>>>>> Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their >>>> work >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical >> ontology >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were >> philosophers >>>>>> on >>>>>>>>> ontology, and of history." >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those >>>>>> peoples >>>>>>>>> who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, >> and >>>>>>>>> homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and >> i've >>>>>>>> come >>>>>>>>> to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to >>>>>> think >>>>>>>>> of theory as a way of autobiography. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed >>>> here >>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>> xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail >> party. >>>>>>>>> (that's a great metaphor!) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> p >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction >> and >>>>>> re- >>>>>>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but >>>> more >>>>>> or >>>>>>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, >> and >>>>>>>> Gray, 2001] >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and >> re- >>>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more >>>> or >>>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>>>> Gray, 2001] >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor >>> Social Foundations of Education >>> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading >>> Georgia Southern University >>> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group >>> P. O. Box 8144 >>> Phone: (912) 478-0355 >>> Fax: (912) 478-5382 >>> Statesboro, GA 30460 >> >> >> > > > -- > > *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor > Social Foundations of Education > Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > Georgia Southern University > Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group > P. O. Box 8144 > Phone: (912) 478-0355 > Fax: (912) 478-5382 > Statesboro, GA 30460 From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Sep 18 21:09:41 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 22:09:41 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Hope In-Reply-To: <67A0F245-A945-4F68-ADFD-BE751BF33980@uga.edu> References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> , <2C83E631-1957-4EB1-A763-4B3165CE917D@gmail.com> <67A0F245-A945-4F68-ADFD-BE751BF33980@uga.edu> Message-ID: Katie, I admire your chutzpah. And what's wrong with corny? The middle schoolers I work with at the Native American charter school love corn. They just like to give the old white guy sub a hard time and chat with each other rather than do the reading and writing they are assigned. It's hard to think and "write down the bones". Engaging them in a critical dialog (like about bullying), getting them to listen to me and each other can be like pulling teeth. But it's still early in the year. Patience, persistence and a sense of humor. (Just like Mike and Andy. Vera has that too. Didn't Vygotsky?) But at both schools where I sub they don't build the curriculum and teacher evaluation around passing tests. Many teachers I know in "regular" schools don't think of test-driven curriculum and teacher evaluation as pesky so much as evil, and getting worse all the time. Keep the faith. Or rather keep hope. Like Bloch. Henry On Sep 18, 2014, at 9:09 PM, Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > Yes, education is, in many ways, contributing to "species self annihilation through over consumption" (among other things). But I am a first generation college graduate in my family, and even though there is much that goes wrong with and in education, my experiences lead me to believe that it can do good. > > I had several years as a middle grades teacher where it seemed that some good was happening, despite those pesky tests. I'm hoping to continue, at least in my own (small) way, to try to do some good through education. My former middle grades students would say that is so "corny," and they would be correct! But I persist in my optimism anyway. > > Katie > > Katie Wester-Neal > Doctoral candidate > University of Georgia > > > On Sep 18, 2014, at 7:44 PM, "Henry G. Shonerd III" wrote: > > Mike, > Sorry about the twisted use of perfectly good words. Hopeful? Best of times, worst of times. I know what you are saying that schools aren't the solution, they're the problem. But is the work you have been doing aimed at NO schools or better schools? Hmmm... I work in two charter schools where I want to give schools a chance, if only as a substitute teacher. One has as its focus service learning, the other the education of Native Americans in an urban setting. I hope they are different from the New Orleans charters that Katherine gave us links to, which were sort of forced on those poor people. (The links worked!) After 25 years of telling other people how to do it, I am seeing if I can stand the heat again. As a high school teacher on the Navajo Reservation before that, I had one good year (my first year) when I could do pretty much what I wanted, and the rest of the time I got tons of programmed learning materials (Random House) and lost my way. I admit it: I lacked the imagination to deal creatively with the problem. As a teacher educator, I tried to , but always felt inauthentic, even when I was, passionate. And I got great evals from my students. Karma: my bad conscience and a need to get it right, which is why I am in this dialog, reading as fast as I can, and why I am subbing. Add to that my rage against the American way of aging and dying. At my age (71), I have good reason to be terrified. There oughta be a law. > Henry > >> On Sep 18, 2014, at 1:08 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> Thanks for the bit of autobiography, Henry. I am too confused about uses of >> ontology to know if it is that too! >> >> On my web page at lchc.ucsd.edu you will find this quotation. >> >> *Apropos Thoughts on Revolutions and Their Causes* >> >> (From C. Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities*, Ch 15) >> >> Along the Paris streets, the death carts rumble, hollow and harsh. >> Six tumbrels carry the day's wine to La Guillotine. All the devouring and >> insatiate monsters imagined since imagination could record itself, are >> fused in the one realization, Guillotine. And yet there is not in France, >> with its rich variety of soil and climate, a blade, a leaf, a root, a >> sprig, a peppercorn, which will grow to maturity under conditions more >> certain than those that have produced this horror. Crush human humanity out >> of shape once more, under similar hammers, and it will twist itself into >> the same tortured forms. Sow the same seed of rapacious license and >> oppression over again, and it will surely yield the same fruit, according >> to its kind. >> >> I believe that this is a HOPEFUL assessment of the human condition. I see >> around me counter examples that make me wonder. I am less sanquine about >> schooling as a solution. It appears to exacerbate, not alleviate, the >> problem of species self anhilitation through over consumption that Paul >> brought up. It has a very long history in this regard. >> >> mike >> >> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 11:37 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III >> wrote: >> >>> Mike,, >>> A little historical ontology of myself. I was in Berkeley and Cuba with >>> the Weathermen in the 60s when we were thinking in terms of a critique of >>> not just A culture, but CULTURE: Che, revolution. Middle class white kids >>> mostly, we even thought we might be willing to die to make a better world, >>> like Che. Mostly we hurt each other's feelings trying to decide whose >>> consciousness was highest. It's embarrassing to talk about it. Now I'm a >>> retired education prof working as a sub in two great charter schools in >>> Albuquerque, breaking good. Reading the XMA/XMCA dialog, I find much better >>> grounding than consciousness raising sessions of the 60s, and I find >>> Bloch's optimism (See Andy's website) warranted. Like the song goes: I'm >>> still willin'. I have been scrambling to catch up on the thinking of >>> "academic" giants as I read your posts, convinced you wouldn't post them if >>> you didn't think they were important for this dialog. In other words I >>> trust this dialog as it looks back. I understand Mike's problem with >>> posting the Amy and Jed talk, though I think it is helpful that we have >>> taken on the messiness of the moment. It's looking forward, the Novum, >>> where I find my optimism. I don't think it's crazy to think that CHAT can >>> be "popularized", can be part of changing popular narratives. I love >>> Vygotsky because he worked so feverishly, with others, to make that happen, >>> for children. It seems to me that the reason Amy and Jed are important for >>> this dialog is because schools ARE the key to changing the narrative. Or so >>> I think and feel. And getting real dialog into the schools, not test prep, >>> is what will change everything. That's the concept I think is worth aiming >>> for. Again, so I think and feel. >>> Henry >>> >>>> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:15 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> Thanks for the recap, Martin. Then we got to Phillip who talked about >>>> theorizing and autobiography as part of the Foucault thread. Is the move >>>> from ourselveS to ourselF important? >>>> >>>> With the critique of culture issue, it seems that the sense of A culture >>> as >>>> AN historically formation of human lifeways and Culture, as the medium of >>>> all forms of human life, are getting conflated in the discussion. The >>>> project of criticizing various values and practices that are part of the >>>> cultural conditions of our own society (conditions plural) seems doable, >>> if >>>> necessarily contest. A critique of human Culture as a medium of human >>> life >>>> seems considerably more problematic. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, Martin John Packer < >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I was simply responding to Paul M.'s (rhetorical?) question as to >>> whether >>>>> there might be a state of nature to which we could return that would be >>>>> outside culture. I said that this is not possible for homo sapiens - we >>>>> need culture to survive. Michael G. then suggested that if we can't step >>>>> outside culture we cannot critique it. I replied again in the negative, >>> and >>>>> made a passing reference to Foucault who engaged in research that was >>>>> critical of culture from inside: one of his ideas was to work with >>>>> marginalized groups to explore ways of living that the mainstream has >>>>> ignored. Larry then suggested that Foucault was following >>> Merleau-Ponty's >>>>> lead, and Phillip responded that Foucault was more influenced by >>> Hyppolite. >>>>> I countered by suggesting that Foucault's research program - exploring >>> what >>>>> he called "the historical ontology of ourselves" - in other words, how >>> we >>>>> are constituted historically (and culturally) as specific kinds of >>> person - >>>>> was at least consistent with the interests of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. >>>>> >>>>> Phew! What a tangled web we weave. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:35 AM, Greg Thompson >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I thought it was Martin who had mentioned Foucault's "historical >>> ontology >>>>>> of ourselves"? >>>>>> >>>>>> I'd love to hear more too (note this is where Martin's book The Science >>>>> of >>>>>> Qualitative Research leaves off. I'd love to hear the argument >>> enlivened >>>>>> once again). >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin? >>>>>> -greg >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:25 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My apologies if my "chaining" off your comment about cocktail parties >>>>>>> distracted from the main point of the ongoing discussion, Phillip. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Could you say more about what an historical ontology of oneself >>> means? I >>>>>>> can understand the truth of the idea that In any interaction with >>>>> others, >>>>>>> whether at a cocktail party or in an academic discussion group, one is >>>>>>> creating one's own history and that an autobiography is a self history >>>>> from >>>>>>> ego's point of view. If one theorizes, then theorizing is a mode of >>>>>>> activity/experience that becomes the material of autobiography. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I am still back on David's earlier claim that cultural historical >>>>>>> approaches to understanding human development do not view data as ways >>>>> of >>>>>>> testing/evaluating/improving theory. I may have gotten confused by >>>>> thinking >>>>>>> that the discussion on Foucault, Merleau-P, et. Were part of that >>>>>>> discussion. A lot swirling around at once. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> A pathway out of the thicket would be gratefully received. >>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Tuesday, September 16, 2014, White, Phillip < >>>>> Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their >>> work >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology >>>>> of >>>>>>>> ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were philosophers >>>>> on >>>>>>>> ontology, and of history." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those >>>>> peoples >>>>>>>> who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, and >>>>>>>> homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and i've >>>>>>> come >>>>>>>> to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to >>>>> think >>>>>>>> of theory as a way of autobiography. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed >>> here >>>>>>> on >>>>>>>> xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail party. >>>>>>>> (that's a great metaphor!) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> p >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and >>>>> re- >>>>>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but >>> more >>>>> or >>>>>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>>>>>> Gray, 2001] >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more >>> or >>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>>> Gray, 2001] >> >> >> -- >> >> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or >> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >> Gray, 2001] > > > From wester@uga.edu Fri Sep 19 04:06:22 2014 From: wester@uga.edu (Katherine Wester Neal) Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2014 11:06:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Hope In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> , <2C83E631-1957-4EB1-A763-4B3165CE917D@gmail.com> <67A0F245-A945-4F68-ADFD-BE751BF33980@uga.edu>, Message-ID: <6835B900-ADAB-4AAC-AB93-0E51C6745F59@uga.edu> Thanks. Henry! Evil is a much better word for the tests, but hope is also a better word for what I feel. Katie Katie Wester-Neal Doctoral candidate University of Georgia On Sep 19, 2014, at 12:11 AM, "Henry G. Shonerd III" wrote: Katie, I admire your chutzpah. And what's wrong with corny? The middle schoolers I work with at the Native American charter school love corn. They just like to give the old white guy sub a hard time and chat with each other rather than do the reading and writing they are assigned. It's hard to think and "write down the bones". Engaging them in a critical dialog (like about bullying), getting them to listen to me and each other can be like pulling teeth. But it's still early in the year. Patience, persistence and a sense of humor. (Just like Mike and Andy. Vera has that too. Didn't Vygotsky?) But at both schools where I sub they don't build the curriculum and teacher evaluation around passing tests. Many teachers I know in "regular" schools don't think of test-driven curriculum and teacher evaluation as pesky so much as evil, and getting worse all the time. Keep the faith. Or rather keep hope. Like Bloch. Henry > On Sep 18, 2014, at 9:09 PM, Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > > Yes, education is, in many ways, contributing to "species self annihilation through over consumption" (among other things). But I am a first generation college graduate in my family, and even though there is much that goes wrong with and in education, my experiences lead me to believe that it can do good. > > I had several years as a middle grades teacher where it seemed that some good was happening, despite those pesky tests. I'm hoping to continue, at least in my own (small) way, to try to do some good through education. My former middle grades students would say that is so "corny," and they would be correct! But I persist in my optimism anyway. > > Katie > > Katie Wester-Neal > Doctoral candidate > University of Georgia > > > On Sep 18, 2014, at 7:44 PM, "Henry G. Shonerd III" wrote: > > Mike, > Sorry about the twisted use of perfectly good words. Hopeful? Best of times, worst of times. I know what you are saying that schools aren't the solution, they're the problem. But is the work you have been doing aimed at NO schools or better schools? Hmmm... I work in two charter schools where I want to give schools a chance, if only as a substitute teacher. One has as its focus service learning, the other the education of Native Americans in an urban setting. I hope they are different from the New Orleans charters that Katherine gave us links to, which were sort of forced on those poor people. (The links worked!) After 25 years of telling other people how to do it, I am seeing if I can stand the heat again. As a high school teacher on the Navajo Reservation before that, I had one good year (my first year) when I could do pretty much what I wanted, and the rest of the time I got tons of programmed learning materials (Random House) and lost my way. I admit it: I lacked the imagination to deal creatively with the problem. As a teacher educator, I tried to , but always felt inauthentic, even when I was, passionate. And I got great evals from my students. Karma: my bad conscience and a need to get it right, which is why I am in this dialog, reading as fast as I can, and why I am subbing. Add to that my rage against the American way of aging and dying. At my age (71), I have good reason to be terrified. There oughta be a law. > Henry > >> On Sep 18, 2014, at 1:08 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> Thanks for the bit of autobiography, Henry. I am too confused about uses of >> ontology to know if it is that too! >> >> On my web page at lchc.ucsd.edu you will find this quotation. >> >> *Apropos Thoughts on Revolutions and Their Causes* >> >> (From C. Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities*, Ch 15) >> >> Along the Paris streets, the death carts rumble, hollow and harsh. >> Six tumbrels carry the day's wine to La Guillotine. All the devouring and >> insatiate monsters imagined since imagination could record itself, are >> fused in the one realization, Guillotine. And yet there is not in France, >> with its rich variety of soil and climate, a blade, a leaf, a root, a >> sprig, a peppercorn, which will grow to maturity under conditions more >> certain than those that have produced this horror. Crush human humanity out >> of shape once more, under similar hammers, and it will twist itself into >> the same tortured forms. Sow the same seed of rapacious license and >> oppression over again, and it will surely yield the same fruit, according >> to its kind. >> >> I believe that this is a HOPEFUL assessment of the human condition. I see >> around me counter examples that make me wonder. I am less sanquine about >> schooling as a solution. It appears to exacerbate, not alleviate, the >> problem of species self anhilitation through over consumption that Paul >> brought up. It has a very long history in this regard. >> >> mike >> >> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 11:37 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III >> wrote: >> >>> Mike,, >>> A little historical ontology of myself. I was in Berkeley and Cuba with >>> the Weathermen in the 60s when we were thinking in terms of a critique of >>> not just A culture, but CULTURE: Che, revolution. Middle class white kids >>> mostly, we even thought we might be willing to die to make a better world, >>> like Che. Mostly we hurt each other's feelings trying to decide whose >>> consciousness was highest. It's embarrassing to talk about it. Now I'm a >>> retired education prof working as a sub in two great charter schools in >>> Albuquerque, breaking good. Reading the XMA/XMCA dialog, I find much better >>> grounding than consciousness raising sessions of the 60s, and I find >>> Bloch's optimism (See Andy's website) warranted. Like the song goes: I'm >>> still willin'. I have been scrambling to catch up on the thinking of >>> "academic" giants as I read your posts, convinced you wouldn't post them if >>> you didn't think they were important for this dialog. In other words I >>> trust this dialog as it looks back. I understand Mike's problem with >>> posting the Amy and Jed talk, though I think it is helpful that we have >>> taken on the messiness of the moment. It's looking forward, the Novum, >>> where I find my optimism. I don't think it's crazy to think that CHAT can >>> be "popularized", can be part of changing popular narratives. I love >>> Vygotsky because he worked so feverishly, with others, to make that happen, >>> for children. It seems to me that the reason Amy and Jed are important for >>> this dialog is because schools ARE the key to changing the narrative. Or so >>> I think and feel. And getting real dialog into the schools, not test prep, >>> is what will change everything. That's the concept I think is worth aiming >>> for. Again, so I think and feel. >>> Henry >>> >>>> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:15 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> Thanks for the recap, Martin. Then we got to Phillip who talked about >>>> theorizing and autobiography as part of the Foucault thread. Is the move >>>> from ourselveS to ourselF important? >>>> >>>> With the critique of culture issue, it seems that the sense of A culture >>> as >>>> AN historically formation of human lifeways and Culture, as the medium of >>>> all forms of human life, are getting conflated in the discussion. The >>>> project of criticizing various values and practices that are part of the >>>> cultural conditions of our own society (conditions plural) seems doable, >>> if >>>> necessarily contest. A critique of human Culture as a medium of human >>> life >>>> seems considerably more problematic. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, Martin John Packer < >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I was simply responding to Paul M.'s (rhetorical?) question as to >>> whether >>>>> there might be a state of nature to which we could return that would be >>>>> outside culture. I said that this is not possible for homo sapiens - we >>>>> need culture to survive. Michael G. then suggested that if we can't step >>>>> outside culture we cannot critique it. I replied again in the negative, >>> and >>>>> made a passing reference to Foucault who engaged in research that was >>>>> critical of culture from inside: one of his ideas was to work with >>>>> marginalized groups to explore ways of living that the mainstream has >>>>> ignored. Larry then suggested that Foucault was following >>> Merleau-Ponty's >>>>> lead, and Phillip responded that Foucault was more influenced by >>> Hyppolite. >>>>> I countered by suggesting that Foucault's research program - exploring >>> what >>>>> he called "the historical ontology of ourselves" - in other words, how >>> we >>>>> are constituted historically (and culturally) as specific kinds of >>> person - >>>>> was at least consistent with the interests of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. >>>>> >>>>> Phew! What a tangled web we weave. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:35 AM, Greg Thompson >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I thought it was Martin who had mentioned Foucault's "historical >>> ontology >>>>>> of ourselves"? >>>>>> >>>>>> I'd love to hear more too (note this is where Martin's book The Science >>>>> of >>>>>> Qualitative Research leaves off. I'd love to hear the argument >>> enlivened >>>>>> once again). >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin? >>>>>> -greg >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:25 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My apologies if my "chaining" off your comment about cocktail parties >>>>>>> distracted from the main point of the ongoing discussion, Phillip. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Could you say more about what an historical ontology of oneself >>> means? I >>>>>>> can understand the truth of the idea that In any interaction with >>>>> others, >>>>>>> whether at a cocktail party or in an academic discussion group, one is >>>>>>> creating one's own history and that an autobiography is a self history >>>>> from >>>>>>> ego's point of view. If one theorizes, then theorizing is a mode of >>>>>>> activity/experience that becomes the material of autobiography. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I am still back on David's earlier claim that cultural historical >>>>>>> approaches to understanding human development do not view data as ways >>>>> of >>>>>>> testing/evaluating/improving theory. I may have gotten confused by >>>>> thinking >>>>>>> that the discussion on Foucault, Merleau-P, et. Were part of that >>>>>>> discussion. A lot swirling around at once. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> A pathway out of the thicket would be gratefully received. >>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Tuesday, September 16, 2014, White, Phillip < >>>>> Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their >>> work >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology >>>>> of >>>>>>>> ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were philosophers >>>>> on >>>>>>>> ontology, and of history." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those >>>>> peoples >>>>>>>> who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, and >>>>>>>> homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and i've >>>>>>> come >>>>>>>> to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to >>>>> think >>>>>>>> of theory as a way of autobiography. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed >>> here >>>>>>> on >>>>>>>> xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail party. >>>>>>>> (that's a great metaphor!) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> p >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and >>>>> re- >>>>>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but >>> more >>>>> or >>>>>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>>>>>> Gray, 2001] >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more >>> or >>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>>> Gray, 2001] >> >> >> -- >> >> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or >> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >> Gray, 2001] From helenaworthen@gmail.com Fri Sep 19 08:54:30 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2014 08:54:30 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: <2136517E-A610-4B06-8690-3C9D23C58EB8@gmail.com> References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> <2136517E-A610-4B06-8690-3C9D23C58EB8@gmail.com> Message-ID: Henry and Robert: There is a middle ground where I don't see a lot getting written, published or discussed. I don't mean nothing -- I mean a lot. There are people on this list like Robert Lake who seem to be in a place to do exactly what I'm referring to. Your book, https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-praxis/we-saved-the-best-for-you/ would be an indication of this. The middle ground I'm talking about is something between the hostile rejections of 60's left movement groups written by complete outsiders on the one hand, and self-criticizing rejections of experience in those groups by people who were deep inside and who are now, age 70 (my age, too!) asking "What could we have POSSIBLY been thinking?" I would like to see something in between. Those movements, for all their internal drama, mistakes, etc and frequent bad behavior, made a big difference. They DID change the world, in fact. I would like to see a careful interpretive version of those intertwined stories that explains where these New Left movements came from and what elements of them survive today. One that treats them respectfully, acknowledging the bad stuff but not scorning or slandering the good stuff. Henry, maybe you know of such a book. Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Sep 18, 2014, at 8:25 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > I should add, I'm just a sensitive guy. I can imagine some people saying, "Just get over it!!" or "Get a little resilience!" or "Fight back!" Drawing attention to my little nicks would embarrass me. We were brats who thought we would change the world. We were posturing. I don't mean the 60s youth movement was all bad, but some of it lacked grounding. I do suspect that my sense of injustice in the world is at least in part a projection of these "unresolved issues", maybe not a bad thing. But when all is said and done, I don't think I could remember enough detail to tell a good story, even if it were a good story. If I could remember it, it would be bathos. I could easily imagine, however, that others would have a different story, one worth telling. > > > On Sep 18, 2014, at 6:47 PM, Robert Lake wrote: > >> There you go Henry. You have touched on a vital topic >> that needs more attention. Your 60's experience provides >> a great back story for your passion against bullying. >> >> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 6:05 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III >> wrote: >> >>> Hi Robert, >>> I have not and, off the top of my head, think it wouldn't be of great >>> interest to anyone else. Like I say, it's embarrassing to be on either end >>> of that kind of bullying. None of what happened to me was unforgivable, >>> though it has always made me very sensitive to bullying in ANY context, >>> especially between peers. It happens all the time in classrooms, in >>> schools. The small cuts, nicely fashioned to keep one in line. "Classroom >>> management" keeps a lid on it. Kids aren't naturally mean, it's learned. It >>> should be at the center of a dialog in schools that pretend to be >>> inclusive. I think of "multicultural" courses for student teachers focused >>> on gender, class, race, religion, are ABOUT bullying but not praxis, at >>> least from my own experience trying to teach it to student teachers. I was >>> part of the problem, though I think I taught the courses in good faith. I'm >>> pretty sure that's at the root of the dialog we are having here: How to >>> have it in schools. Well, really throughout society. What's good for kids >>> is good for adults. ZPD rules! >>> Henry >>> >>> On Sep 18, 2014, at 1:00 PM, Robert Lake >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Henry, >>>> Have you written of your '60's experiences anywhere? >>>> If not you might consider it. >>>> RL >>>> >>>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 2:37 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < >>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Mike,, >>>>> A little historical ontology of myself. I was in Berkeley and Cuba with >>>>> the Weathermen in the 60s when we were thinking in terms of a critique >>> of >>>>> not just A culture, but CULTURE: Che, revolution. Middle class white >>> kids >>>>> mostly, we even thought we might be willing to die to make a better >>> world, >>>>> like Che. Mostly we hurt each other's feelings trying to decide whose >>>>> consciousness was highest. It's embarrassing to talk about it. Now I'm a >>>>> retired education prof working as a sub in two great charter schools in >>>>> Albuquerque, breaking good. Reading the XMA/XMCA dialog, I find much >>> better >>>>> grounding than consciousness raising sessions of the 60s, and I find >>>>> Bloch's optimism (See Andy's website) warranted. Like the song goes: I'm >>>>> still willin'. I have been scrambling to catch up on the thinking of >>>>> "academic" giants as I read your posts, convinced you wouldn't post >>> them if >>>>> you didn't think they were important for this dialog. In other words I >>>>> trust this dialog as it looks back. I understand Mike's problem with >>>>> posting the Amy and Jed talk, though I think it is helpful that we have >>>>> taken on the messiness of the moment. It's looking forward, the Novum, >>>>> where I find my optimism. I don't think it's crazy to think that CHAT >>> can >>>>> be "popularized", can be part of changing popular narratives. I love >>>>> Vygotsky because he worked so feverishly, with others, to make that >>> happen, >>>>> for children. It seems to me that the reason Amy and Jed are important >>> for >>>>> this dialog is because schools ARE the key to changing the narrative. >>> Or so >>>>> I think and feel. And getting real dialog into the schools, not test >>> prep, >>>>> is what will change everything. That's the concept I think is worth >>> aiming >>>>> for. Again, so I think and feel. >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:15 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Thanks for the recap, Martin. Then we got to Phillip who talked about >>>>>> theorizing and autobiography as part of the Foucault thread. Is the >>> move >>>>>> from ourselveS to ourselF important? >>>>>> >>>>>> With the critique of culture issue, it seems that the sense of A >>> culture >>>>> as >>>>>> AN historically formation of human lifeways and Culture, as the medium >>> of >>>>>> all forms of human life, are getting conflated in the discussion. The >>>>>> project of criticizing various values and practices that are part of >>> the >>>>>> cultural conditions of our own society (conditions plural) seems >>> doable, >>>>> if >>>>>> necessarily contest. A critique of human Culture as a medium of human >>>>> life >>>>>> seems considerably more problematic. >>>>>> >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, Martin John Packer < >>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I was simply responding to Paul M.'s (rhetorical?) question as to >>>>> whether >>>>>>> there might be a state of nature to which we could return that would >>> be >>>>>>> outside culture. I said that this is not possible for homo sapiens - >>> we >>>>>>> need culture to survive. Michael G. then suggested that if we can't >>> step >>>>>>> outside culture we cannot critique it. I replied again in the >>> negative, >>>>> and >>>>>>> made a passing reference to Foucault who engaged in research that was >>>>>>> critical of culture from inside: one of his ideas was to work with >>>>>>> marginalized groups to explore ways of living that the mainstream has >>>>>>> ignored. Larry then suggested that Foucault was following >>>>> Merleau-Ponty's >>>>>>> lead, and Phillip responded that Foucault was more influenced by >>>>> Hyppolite. >>>>>>> I countered by suggesting that Foucault's research program - exploring >>>>> what >>>>>>> he called "the historical ontology of ourselves" - in other words, how >>>>> we >>>>>>> are constituted historically (and culturally) as specific kinds of >>>>> person - >>>>>>> was at least consistent with the interests of Merleau-Ponty and >>> Sartre. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Phew! What a tangled web we weave. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:35 AM, Greg Thompson < >>> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I thought it was Martin who had mentioned Foucault's "historical >>>>> ontology >>>>>>>> of ourselves"? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I'd love to hear more too (note this is where Martin's book The >>> Science >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> Qualitative Research leaves off. I'd love to hear the argument >>>>> enlivened >>>>>>>> once again). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin? >>>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:25 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> My apologies if my "chaining" off your comment about cocktail >>> parties >>>>>>>>> distracted from the main point of the ongoing discussion, Phillip. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Could you say more about what an historical ontology of oneself >>>>> means? I >>>>>>>>> can understand the truth of the idea that In any interaction with >>>>>>> others, >>>>>>>>> whether at a cocktail party or in an academic discussion group, one >>> is >>>>>>>>> creating one's own history and that an autobiography is a self >>> history >>>>>>> from >>>>>>>>> ego's point of view. If one theorizes, then theorizing is a mode of >>>>>>>>> activity/experience that becomes the material of autobiography. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I am still back on David's earlier claim that cultural historical >>>>>>>>> approaches to understanding human development do not view data as >>> ways >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> testing/evaluating/improving theory. I may have gotten confused by >>>>>>> thinking >>>>>>>>> that the discussion on Foucault, Merleau-P, et. Were part of that >>>>>>>>> discussion. A lot swirling around at once. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> A pathway out of the thicket would be gratefully received. >>>>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, September 16, 2014, White, Phillip < >>>>>>> Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their >>>>> work >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical >>> ontology >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were >>> philosophers >>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>>> ontology, and of history." >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those >>>>>>> peoples >>>>>>>>>> who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, >>> and >>>>>>>>>> homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and >>> i've >>>>>>>>> come >>>>>>>>>> to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to >>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>> of theory as a way of autobiography. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed >>>>> here >>>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>>> xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail >>> party. >>>>>>>>>> (that's a great metaphor!) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> p >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction >>> and >>>>>>> re- >>>>>>>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but >>>>> more >>>>>>> or >>>>>>>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, >>> and >>>>>>>>> Gray, 2001] >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and >>> re- >>>>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more >>>>> or >>>>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >>>>>> Gray, 2001] >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor >>>> Social Foundations of Education >>>> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading >>>> Georgia Southern University >>>> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group >>>> P. O. Box 8144 >>>> Phone: (912) 478-0355 >>>> Fax: (912) 478-5382 >>>> Statesboro, GA 30460 >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> >> *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor >> Social Foundations of Education >> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading >> Georgia Southern University >> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group >> P. O. Box 8144 >> Phone: (912) 478-0355 >> Fax: (912) 478-5382 >> Statesboro, GA 30460 > > From boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Fri Sep 19 09:39:56 2014 From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu (Robert Lake) Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2014 12:39:56 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> <2136517E-A610-4B06-8690-3C9D23C58EB8@gmail.com> Message-ID: Dear Helena and Henry, You have so clearly described why I asked Henry about writing his experiences from the 60's down. There is a middle ground, a third space or what Maxine Greene called the dialectic of freedom. If there is not such a book as you describe, then one should be written. *Robert Lake* And concerning hope, listen to Cornel West. *Those who have never despaired have neither lived nor loved. Hope is * *inseparable from despair. Those of us who truly hope make despair a constant * *companion whom we outwrestle every day owing to our commitment to * *justice, love, and hope" *(West, 2008, p. 185). *Hope on a tightrope: Words & wisdom*. Carlesbad, CA. Smiley Books On Fri, Sep 19, 2014 at 11:54 AM, Helena Worthen wrote: > Henry and Robert: > > There is a middle ground where I don't see a lot getting written, > published or discussed. > > I don't mean nothing -- I mean a lot. There are people on this list like > Robert Lake who seem to be in a place to do exactly what I'm referring to. > Your book, > https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-praxis/we-saved-the-best-for-you/ > would be an indication of this. > > The middle ground I'm talking about is something between the hostile > rejections of 60's left movement groups written by complete outsiders on > the one hand, and self-criticizing rejections of experience in those groups > by people who were deep inside and who are now, age 70 (my age, too!) > asking "What could we have POSSIBLY been thinking?" > > I would like to see something in between. Those movements, for all their > internal drama, mistakes, etc and frequent bad behavior, made a big > difference. They DID change the world, in fact. > > I would like to see a careful interpretive version of those intertwined > stories that explains where these New Left movements came from and what > elements of them survive today. One that treats them respectfully, > acknowledging the bad stuff but not scorning or slandering the good stuff. > > Henry, maybe you know of such a book. > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Sep 18, 2014, at 8:25 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > > > I should add, I'm just a sensitive guy. I can imagine some people > saying, "Just get over it!!" or "Get a little resilience!" or "Fight back!" > Drawing attention to my little nicks would embarrass me. We were brats who > thought we would change the world. We were posturing. I don't mean the 60s > youth movement was all bad, but some of it lacked grounding. I do suspect > that my sense of injustice in the world is at least in part a projection of > these "unresolved issues", maybe not a bad thing. But when all is said and > done, I don't think I could remember enough detail to tell a good story, > even if it were a good story. If I could remember it, it would be bathos. I > could easily imagine, however, that others would have a different story, > one worth telling. > > > > > > On Sep 18, 2014, at 6:47 PM, Robert Lake > wrote: > > > >> There you go Henry. You have touched on a vital topic > >> that needs more attention. Your 60's experience provides > >> a great back story for your passion against bullying. > >> > >> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 6:05 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > hshonerd@gmail.com> > >> wrote: > >> > >>> Hi Robert, > >>> I have not and, off the top of my head, think it wouldn't be of great > >>> interest to anyone else. Like I say, it's embarrassing to be on either > end > >>> of that kind of bullying. None of what happened to me was unforgivable, > >>> though it has always made me very sensitive to bullying in ANY context, > >>> especially between peers. It happens all the time in classrooms, in > >>> schools. The small cuts, nicely fashioned to keep one in line. > "Classroom > >>> management" keeps a lid on it. Kids aren't naturally mean, it's > learned. It > >>> should be at the center of a dialog in schools that pretend to be > >>> inclusive. I think of "multicultural" courses for student teachers > focused > >>> on gender, class, race, religion, are ABOUT bullying but not praxis, at > >>> least from my own experience trying to teach it to student teachers. I > was > >>> part of the problem, though I think I taught the courses in good > faith. I'm > >>> pretty sure that's at the root of the dialog we are having here: How to > >>> have it in schools. Well, really throughout society. What's good for > kids > >>> is good for adults. ZPD rules! > >>> Henry > >>> > >>> On Sep 18, 2014, at 1:00 PM, Robert Lake > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Hi Henry, > >>>> Have you written of your '60's experiences anywhere? > >>>> If not you might consider it. > >>>> RL > >>>> > >>>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 2:37 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > >>> hshonerd@gmail.com> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Mike,, > >>>>> A little historical ontology of myself. I was in Berkeley and Cuba > with > >>>>> the Weathermen in the 60s when we were thinking in terms of a > critique > >>> of > >>>>> not just A culture, but CULTURE: Che, revolution. Middle class white > >>> kids > >>>>> mostly, we even thought we might be willing to die to make a better > >>> world, > >>>>> like Che. Mostly we hurt each other's feelings trying to decide whose > >>>>> consciousness was highest. It's embarrassing to talk about it. Now > I'm a > >>>>> retired education prof working as a sub in two great charter schools > in > >>>>> Albuquerque, breaking good. Reading the XMA/XMCA dialog, I find much > >>> better > >>>>> grounding than consciousness raising sessions of the 60s, and I find > >>>>> Bloch's optimism (See Andy's website) warranted. Like the song goes: > I'm > >>>>> still willin'. I have been scrambling to catch up on the thinking of > >>>>> "academic" giants as I read your posts, convinced you wouldn't post > >>> them if > >>>>> you didn't think they were important for this dialog. In other words > I > >>>>> trust this dialog as it looks back. I understand Mike's problem with > >>>>> posting the Amy and Jed talk, though I think it is helpful that we > have > >>>>> taken on the messiness of the moment. It's looking forward, the > Novum, > >>>>> where I find my optimism. I don't think it's crazy to think that CHAT > >>> can > >>>>> be "popularized", can be part of changing popular narratives. I love > >>>>> Vygotsky because he worked so feverishly, with others, to make that > >>> happen, > >>>>> for children. It seems to me that the reason Amy and Jed are > important > >>> for > >>>>> this dialog is because schools ARE the key to changing the narrative. > >>> Or so > >>>>> I think and feel. And getting real dialog into the schools, not test > >>> prep, > >>>>> is what will change everything. That's the concept I think is worth > >>> aiming > >>>>> for. Again, so I think and feel. > >>>>> Henry > >>>>> > >>>>> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:15 AM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Thanks for the recap, Martin. Then we got to Phillip who talked > about > >>>>>> theorizing and autobiography as part of the Foucault thread. Is the > >>> move > >>>>>> from ourselveS to ourselF important? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> With the critique of culture issue, it seems that the sense of A > >>> culture > >>>>> as > >>>>>> AN historically formation of human lifeways and Culture, as the > medium > >>> of > >>>>>> all forms of human life, are getting conflated in the discussion. > The > >>>>>> project of criticizing various values and practices that are part of > >>> the > >>>>>> cultural conditions of our own society (conditions plural) seems > >>> doable, > >>>>> if > >>>>>> necessarily contest. A critique of human Culture as a medium of > human > >>>>> life > >>>>>> seems considerably more problematic. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> mike > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, Martin John Packer < > >>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> I was simply responding to Paul M.'s (rhetorical?) question as to > >>>>> whether > >>>>>>> there might be a state of nature to which we could return that > would > >>> be > >>>>>>> outside culture. I said that this is not possible for homo sapiens > - > >>> we > >>>>>>> need culture to survive. Michael G. then suggested that if we can't > >>> step > >>>>>>> outside culture we cannot critique it. I replied again in the > >>> negative, > >>>>> and > >>>>>>> made a passing reference to Foucault who engaged in research that > was > >>>>>>> critical of culture from inside: one of his ideas was to work with > >>>>>>> marginalized groups to explore ways of living that the mainstream > has > >>>>>>> ignored. Larry then suggested that Foucault was following > >>>>> Merleau-Ponty's > >>>>>>> lead, and Phillip responded that Foucault was more influenced by > >>>>> Hyppolite. > >>>>>>> I countered by suggesting that Foucault's research program - > exploring > >>>>> what > >>>>>>> he called "the historical ontology of ourselves" - in other words, > how > >>>>> we > >>>>>>> are constituted historically (and culturally) as specific kinds of > >>>>> person - > >>>>>>> was at least consistent with the interests of Merleau-Ponty and > >>> Sartre. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Phew! What a tangled web we weave. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:35 AM, Greg Thompson < > >>> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I thought it was Martin who had mentioned Foucault's "historical > >>>>> ontology > >>>>>>>> of ourselves"? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I'd love to hear more too (note this is where Martin's book The > >>> Science > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>> Qualitative Research leaves off. I'd love to hear the argument > >>>>> enlivened > >>>>>>>> once again). > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Martin? > >>>>>>>> -greg > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:25 AM, mike cole > wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> My apologies if my "chaining" off your comment about cocktail > >>> parties > >>>>>>>>> distracted from the main point of the ongoing discussion, > Phillip. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Could you say more about what an historical ontology of oneself > >>>>> means? I > >>>>>>>>> can understand the truth of the idea that In any interaction with > >>>>>>> others, > >>>>>>>>> whether at a cocktail party or in an academic discussion group, > one > >>> is > >>>>>>>>> creating one's own history and that an autobiography is a self > >>> history > >>>>>>> from > >>>>>>>>> ego's point of view. If one theorizes, then theorizing is a mode > of > >>>>>>>>> activity/experience that becomes the material of autobiography. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I am still back on David's earlier claim that cultural historical > >>>>>>>>> approaches to understanding human development do not view data as > >>> ways > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> testing/evaluating/improving theory. I may have gotten confused > by > >>>>>>> thinking > >>>>>>>>> that the discussion on Foucault, Merleau-P, et. Were part of that > >>>>>>>>> discussion. A lot swirling around at once. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> A pathway out of the thicket would be gratefully received. > >>>>>>>>> Mike > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, September 16, 2014, White, Phillip < > >>>>>>> Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of > their > >>>>> work > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical > >>> ontology > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>> ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were > >>> philosophers > >>>>>>> on > >>>>>>>>>> ontology, and of history." > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with > those > >>>>>>> peoples > >>>>>>>>>> who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally > ill, > >>> and > >>>>>>>>>> homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and > >>> i've > >>>>>>>>> come > >>>>>>>>>> to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've > begun to > >>>>>>> think > >>>>>>>>>> of theory as a way of autobiography. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography > performed > >>>>> here > >>>>>>>>> on > >>>>>>>>>> xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail > >>> party. > >>>>>>>>>> (that's a great metaphor!) > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> p > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction > >>> and > >>>>>>> re- > >>>>>>>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently > but > >>>>> more > >>>>>>> or > >>>>>>>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > Griffiths, > >>> and > >>>>>>>>> Gray, 2001] > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>>>>>> Assistant Professor > >>>>>>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>>>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>>>>>> Brigham Young University > >>>>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction > and > >>> re- > >>>>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > more > >>>>> or > >>>>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, > and > >>>>>> Gray, 2001] > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> > >>>> *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor > >>>> Social Foundations of Education > >>>> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > >>>> Georgia Southern University > >>>> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group > >>>> P. O. Box 8144 > >>>> Phone: (912) 478-0355 > >>>> Fax: (912) 478-5382 > >>>> Statesboro, GA 30460 > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> > >> *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor > >> Social Foundations of Education > >> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > >> Georgia Southern University > >> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group > >> P. O. Box 8144 > >> Phone: (912) 478-0355 > >> Fax: (912) 478-5382 > >> Statesboro, GA 30460 > > > > > > > -- *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor Social Foundations of Education Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading Georgia Southern University Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group P. O. Box 8144 Phone: (912) 478-0355 Fax: (912) 478-5382 Statesboro, GA 30460 From tom.richardson3@googlemail.com Fri Sep 19 09:52:21 2014 From: tom.richardson3@googlemail.com (Tom Richardson) Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2014 17:52:21 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Where's the 'Like' button?, Phillip - so many of the threads on xmca are fascinating, although I canoften only crwl paiinfully through the specific 'jargon'/register/vocabulary of any particular discipline / area Tom (an intermittent interloper) On 17 September 2014 02:53, White, Phillip wrote: > > as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their work > > "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology of > ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were philosophers on > ontology, and of history." > > the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those peoples > who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, and > homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and i've come > to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to think > of theory as a way of autobiography. > > i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed here on > xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail party. > (that's a great metaphor!) > > p > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Sep 19 11:44:10 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2014 18:44:10 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?q?Foucault?= In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> <2136517E-A610-4B06-8690-3C9D23C58EB8@gmail.com> , Message-ID: This writing from the middle seems to be the focus of Francois Dosse?s books on France.. He perceives May 1968 as a turning point [for example in the ascendence of structuralism [the rising sign] and after May 1968 the descending of structuralism [the setting sign] He has written another fascinating book on the COMPLIMENTARY working relationship of Deleuze and Guattari who met in 1969 and collaborated for 20 years. The two volume ?The History of Structuralism is on Google Books. The book on Deleuze and Guattari is on Kindle [for $14 dollars] Dosse through his writings *traces* the development of both ideas and concepts AS dialogical. As I read the *way* Dosse traces the very different styles and characters of this pair AS COMPLIMENTARY it opens up the complexity of dialogical processes and *arrangements* in general. A way to move from the particular to the general in the emergence of ideas and concepts. It is the *complex relationship* that Dosse is tracing, using 1968 as a demarcation. Dosse?s *style* of writing [in the liminal space demarcating the personal and cultural] develops a deep insight into THIS MOMENT IN FRENCH history Sent from Windows Mail From: Robert Lake Sent: ?Friday?, ?September? ?19?, ?2014 ?9?:?39? ?AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Dear Helena and Henry, You have so clearly described why I asked Henry about writing his experiences from the 60's down. There is a middle ground, a third space or what Maxine Greene called the dialectic of freedom. If there is not such a book as you describe, then one should be written. *Robert Lake* And concerning hope, listen to Cornel West. *Those who have never despaired have neither lived nor loved. Hope is * *inseparable from despair. Those of us who truly hope make despair a constant * *companion whom we outwrestle every day owing to our commitment to * *justice, love, and hope" *(West, 2008, p. 185). *Hope on a tightrope: Words & wisdom*. Carlesbad, CA. Smiley Books On Fri, Sep 19, 2014 at 11:54 AM, Helena Worthen wrote: > Henry and Robert: > > There is a middle ground where I don't see a lot getting written, > published or discussed. > > I don't mean nothing -- I mean a lot. There are people on this list like > Robert Lake who seem to be in a place to do exactly what I'm referring to. > Your book, > https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-praxis/we-saved-the-best-for-you/ > would be an indication of this. > > The middle ground I'm talking about is something between the hostile > rejections of 60's left movement groups written by complete outsiders on > the one hand, and self-criticizing rejections of experience in those groups > by people who were deep inside and who are now, age 70 (my age, too!) > asking "What could we have POSSIBLY been thinking?" > > I would like to see something in between. Those movements, for all their > internal drama, mistakes, etc and frequent bad behavior, made a big > difference. They DID change the world, in fact. > > I would like to see a careful interpretive version of those intertwined > stories that explains where these New Left movements came from and what > elements of them survive today. One that treats them respectfully, > acknowledging the bad stuff but not scorning or slandering the good stuff. > > Henry, maybe you know of such a book. > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Sep 18, 2014, at 8:25 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > > > I should add, I'm just a sensitive guy. I can imagine some people > saying, "Just get over it!!" or "Get a little resilience!" or "Fight back!" > Drawing attention to my little nicks would embarrass me. We were brats who > thought we would change the world. We were posturing. I don't mean the 60s > youth movement was all bad, but some of it lacked grounding. I do suspect > that my sense of injustice in the world is at least in part a projection of > these "unresolved issues", maybe not a bad thing. But when all is said and > done, I don't think I could remember enough detail to tell a good story, > even if it were a good story. If I could remember it, it would be bathos. I > could easily imagine, however, that others would have a different story, > one worth telling. > > > > > > On Sep 18, 2014, at 6:47 PM, Robert Lake > wrote: > > > >> There you go Henry. You have touched on a vital topic > >> that needs more attention. Your 60's experience provides > >> a great back story for your passion against bullying. > >> > >> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 6:05 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > hshonerd@gmail.com> > >> wrote: > >> > >>> Hi Robert, > >>> I have not and, off the top of my head, think it wouldn't be of great > >>> interest to anyone else. Like I say, it's embarrassing to be on either > end > >>> of that kind of bullying. None of what happened to me was unforgivable, > >>> though it has always made me very sensitive to bullying in ANY context, > >>> especially between peers. It happens all the time in classrooms, in > >>> schools. The small cuts, nicely fashioned to keep one in line. > "Classroom > >>> management" keeps a lid on it. Kids aren't naturally mean, it's > learned. It > >>> should be at the center of a dialog in schools that pretend to be > >>> inclusive. I think of "multicultural" courses for student teachers > focused > >>> on gender, class, race, religion, are ABOUT bullying but not praxis, at > >>> least from my own experience trying to teach it to student teachers. I > was > >>> part of the problem, though I think I taught the courses in good > faith. I'm > >>> pretty sure that's at the root of the dialog we are having here: How to > >>> have it in schools. Well, really throughout society. What's good for > kids > >>> is good for adults. ZPD rules! > >>> Henry > >>> > >>> On Sep 18, 2014, at 1:00 PM, Robert Lake > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Hi Henry, > >>>> Have you written of your '60's experiences anywhere? > >>>> If not you might consider it. > >>>> RL > >>>> > >>>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 2:37 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III < > >>> hshonerd@gmail.com> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Mike,, > >>>>> A little historical ontology of myself. I was in Berkeley and Cuba > with > >>>>> the Weathermen in the 60s when we were thinking in terms of a > critique > >>> of > >>>>> not just A culture, but CULTURE: Che, revolution. Middle class white > >>> kids > >>>>> mostly, we even thought we might be willing to die to make a better > >>> world, > >>>>> like Che. Mostly we hurt each other's feelings trying to decide whose > >>>>> consciousness was highest. It's embarrassing to talk about it. Now > I'm a > >>>>> retired education prof working as a sub in two great charter schools > in > >>>>> Albuquerque, breaking good. Reading the XMA/XMCA dialog, I find much > >>> better > >>>>> grounding than consciousness raising sessions of the 60s, and I find > >>>>> Bloch's optimism (See Andy's website) warranted. Like the song goes: > I'm > >>>>> still willin'. I have been scrambling to catch up on the thinking of > >>>>> "academic" giants as I read your posts, convinced you wouldn't post > >>> them if > >>>>> you didn't think they were important for this dialog. In other words > I > >>>>> trust this dialog as it looks back. I understand Mike's problem with > >>>>> posting the Amy and Jed talk, though I think it is helpful that we > have > >>>>> taken on the messiness of the moment. It's looking forward, the > Novum, > >>>>> where I find my optimism. I don't think it's crazy to think that CHAT > >>> can > >>>>> be "popularized", can be part of changing popular narratives. I love > >>>>> Vygotsky because he worked so feverishly, with others, to make that > >>> happen, > >>>>> for children. It seems to me that the reason Amy and Jed are > important > >>> for > >>>>> this dialog is because schools ARE the key to changing the narrative. > >>> Or so > >>>>> I think and feel. And getting real dialog into the schools, not test > >>> prep, > >>>>> is what will change everything. That's the concept I think is worth > >>> aiming > >>>>> for. Again, so I think and feel. > >>>>> Henry > >>>>> > >>>>> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:15 AM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Thanks for the recap, Martin. Then we got to Phillip who talked > about > >>>>>> theorizing and autobiography as part of the Foucault thread. Is the > >>> move > >>>>>> from ourselveS to ourselF important? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> With the critique of culture issue, it seems that the sense of A > >>> culture > >>>>> as > >>>>>> AN historically formation of human lifeways and Culture, as the > medium > >>> of > >>>>>> all forms of human life, are getting conflated in the discussion. > The > >>>>>> project of criticizing various values and practices that are part of > >>> the > >>>>>> cultural conditions of our own society (conditions plural) seems > >>> doable, > >>>>> if > >>>>>> necessarily contest. A critique of human Culture as a medium of > human > >>>>> life > >>>>>> seems considerably more problematic. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> mike > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, Martin John Packer < > >>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> I was simply responding to Paul M.'s (rhetorical?) question as to > >>>>> whether > >>>>>>> there might be a state of nature to which we could return that > would > >>> be > >>>>>>> outside culture. I said that this is not possible for homo sapiens > - > >>> we > >>>>>>> need culture to survive. Michael G. then suggested that if we can't > >>> step > >>>>>>> outside culture we cannot critique it. I replied again in the > >>> negative, > >>>>> and > >>>>>>> made a passing reference to Foucault who engaged in research that > was > >>>>>>> critical of culture from inside: one of his ideas was to work with > >>>>>>> marginalized groups to explore ways of living that the mainstream > has > >>>>>>> ignored. Larry then suggested that Foucault was following > >>>>> Merleau-Ponty's > >>>>>>> lead, and Phillip responded that Foucault was more influenced by > >>>>> Hyppolite. > >>>>>>> I countered by suggesting that Foucault's research program - > exploring > >>>>> what > >>>>>>> he called "the historical ontology of ourselves" - in other words, > how > >>>>> we > >>>>>>> are constituted historically (and culturally) as specific kinds of > >>>>> person - > >>>>>>> was at least consistent with the interests of Merleau-Ponty and > >>> Sartre. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Phew! What a tangled web we weave. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:35 AM, Greg Thompson < > >>> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I thought it was Martin who had mentioned Foucault's "historical > >>>>> ontology > >>>>>>>> of ourselves"? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I'd love to hear more too (note this is where Martin's book The > >>> Science > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>> Qualitative Research leaves off. I'd love to hear the argument > >>>>> enlivened > >>>>>>>> once again). > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Martin? > >>>>>>>> -greg > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 9:25 AM, mike cole > wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> My apologies if my "chaining" off your comment about cocktail > >>> parties > >>>>>>>>> distracted from the main point of the ongoing discussion, > Phillip. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Could you say more about what an historical ontology of oneself > >>>>> means? I > >>>>>>>>> can understand the truth of the idea that In any interaction with > >>>>>>> others, > >>>>>>>>> whether at a cocktail party or in an academic discussion group, > one > >>> is > >>>>>>>>> creating one's own history and that an autobiography is a self > >>> history > >>>>>>> from > >>>>>>>>> ego's point of view. If one theorizes, then theorizing is a mode > of > >>>>>>>>> activity/experience that becomes the material of autobiography. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I am still back on David's earlier claim that cultural historical > >>>>>>>>> approaches to understanding human development do not view data as > >>> ways > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> testing/evaluating/improving theory. I may have gotten confused > by > >>>>>>> thinking > >>>>>>>>> that the discussion on Foucault, Merleau-P, et. Were part of that > >>>>>>>>> discussion. A lot swirling around at once. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> A pathway out of the thicket would be gratefully received. > >>>>>>>>> Mike > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, September 16, 2014, White, Phillip < > >>>>>>> Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of > their > >>>>> work > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical > >>> ontology > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>> ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were > >>> philosophers > >>>>>>> on > >>>>>>>>>> ontology, and of history." > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with > those > >>>>>>> peoples > >>>>>>>>>> who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally > ill, > >>> and > >>>>>>>>>> homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and > >>> i've > >>>>>>>>> come > >>>>>>>>>> to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've > begun to > >>>>>>> think > >>>>>>>>>> of theory as a way of autobiography. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography > performed > >>>>> here > >>>>>>>>> on > >>>>>>>>>> xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail > >>> party. > >>>>>>>>>> (that's a great metaphor!) > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> p > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction > >>> and > >>>>>>> re- > >>>>>>>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently > but > >>>>> more > >>>>>>> or > >>>>>>>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > Griffiths, > >>> and > >>>>>>>>> Gray, 2001] > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>>>>>> Assistant Professor > >>>>>>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>>>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>>>>>> Brigham Young University > >>>>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction > and > >>> re- > >>>>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > more > >>>>> or > >>>>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, > and > >>>>>> Gray, 2001] > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> > >>>> *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor > >>>> Social Foundations of Education > >>>> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > >>>> Georgia Southern University > >>>> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group > >>>> P. O. Box 8144 > >>>> Phone: (912) 478-0355 > >>>> Fax: (912) 478-5382 > >>>> Statesboro, GA 30460 > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> > >> *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor > >> Social Foundations of Education > >> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > >> Georgia Southern University > >> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group > >> P. O. Box 8144 > >> Phone: (912) 478-0355 > >> Fax: (912) 478-5382 > >> Statesboro, GA 30460 > > > > > > > -- *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor Social Foundations of Education Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading Georgia Southern University Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group P. O. Box 8144 Phone: (912) 478-0355 Fax: (912) 478-5382 Statesboro, GA 30460 From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Sep 19 11:44:10 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2014 18:44:10 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?q?Foucault?= In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> <2136517E-A610-4B06-8690-3C9D23C58EB8@gmail.com> , Message-ID: From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Fri Sep 19 14:17:11 2014 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2014 15:17:11 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> , Message-ID: Tom, what you write about xmca being so fascinating is, i think, an accurate reflection of its initial vision. Eve Ekeblad of Gothenburg, Sweden, has a small web site on xmca's history: XLCHC came into being in 1984 as a medium for discussion of research on learning and development with a general concern for issues of education in modern technological societies and a special concern about the ways in which educational systems are a source of socially engendered social inequality. The "call letters" of this discussion group (to borrow terminology from another medium) indicate its initial goals. LCHC is the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition, a research unit founded at the Rockefeller University in the early 1970's which moved to the University of California, San Diego in 1978. Until 1984, LCHC had an ethnically diverse faculty that conducted an active post-doctoral program in the use of comparative methods for studying culture and cognition with special interest in problems of learning and development in school and non-school settings. By 1984, two years into the Reagan-Bush era, we had lost virtually all of our minority group faculty, our research concerns were explicitly rejected by federal funding agencies, and we were denied post-doctoral funds on the grounds that there was insufficient minority group faculty. :-) XLCHC was one response to this non-benign neglect. The "X" in the title had a dual significance: First, it was meant to provide a medium for continued interaction and cooperation by the many visitors and post-doctoral fellows with whom we had interacted in the past, that is, for "ex-LCHCers." Second, it was meant to provide a broadened constituency for discussion of the issues traditionally associated with the Laboratory by including scholars and graduate students from around the world who wished to participate. i don't know if this description has been superseded or not. i began to participate on this list in the early 1990's, and it can still be a painful crawl. phillip ____________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Tom Richardson [tom.richardson3@googlemail.com] Sent: Friday, September 19, 2014 10:52 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault Where's the 'Like' button?, Phillip - so many of the threads on xmca are fascinating, although I canoften only crwl paiinfully through the specific 'jargon'/register/vocabulary of any particular discipline / area Tom (an intermittent interloper) On 17 September 2014 02:53, White, Phillip wrote: > > as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their work > > "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology of > ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were philosophers on > ontology, and of history." > > the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those peoples > who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, and > homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and i've come > to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to think > of theory as a way of autobiography. > > i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed here on > xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail party. > (that's a great metaphor!) > > p > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Sep 19 16:19:22 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2014 16:19:22 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: The historical stuff sounds right to me. Virtually the entire archive, repeated repeated repeated pages and all, are available for people to inspect should they have the desire. There is even a data base version of the archive, but where it is at the moment beats me! Thanks for the memories, Phillip!! mike On Fri, Sep 19, 2014 at 2:17 PM, White, Phillip wrote: > Tom, what you write about xmca being so fascinating is, i think, an > accurate reflection of its initial vision. Eve Ekeblad of Gothenburg, > Sweden, has a small web site on xmca's history: > > XLCHC came into being in 1984 as a medium for discussion of research on > learning and development with a general concern for issues of education in > modern technological societies and a special concern about the ways in > which educational systems are a source of socially engendered social > inequality. The "call letters" of this discussion group (to borrow > terminology from another medium) indicate its initial goals. LCHC is the > Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition, a research unit founded at the > Rockefeller University in the early 1970's which moved to the University of > California, San Diego in 1978. Until 1984, LCHC had an ethnically diverse > faculty that conducted an active post-doctoral program in the use of > comparative methods for studying culture and cognition with special > interest in problems of learning and development in school and non-school > settings. By 1984, two years into the Reagan-Bush era, we had lost > virtually all of our minority group faculty, our research concerns were > explicitly rejected by federal funding agencies, and we were denied > post-doctoral funds on the grounds that there was insufficient minority > group faculty. :-) > XLCHC was one response to this non-benign neglect. The "X" in the title > had a dual significance: First, it was meant to provide a medium for > continued interaction and cooperation by the many visitors and > post-doctoral fellows with whom we had interacted in the past, that is, for > "ex-LCHCers." Second, it was meant to provide a broadened constituency for > discussion of the issues traditionally associated with the Laboratory by > including scholars and graduate students from around the world who wished > to participate. > > i don't know if this description has been superseded or not. > > i began to participate on this list in the early 1990's, and it can still > be a painful crawl. > > phillip > > > ____________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Tom Richardson [tom.richardson3@googlemail.com] > Sent: Friday, September 19, 2014 10:52 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault > > Where's the 'Like' button?, Phillip - so many of the threads on xmca are > fascinating, although I canoften only crwl paiinfully through the specific > 'jargon'/register/vocabulary of any particular discipline / area > > Tom (an intermittent interloper) > > On 17 September 2014 02:53, White, Phillip > wrote: > > > > > as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their work > > > > "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology of > > ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were philosophers on > > ontology, and of history." > > > > the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those peoples > > who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, and > > homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and i've > come > > to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to think > > of theory as a way of autobiography. > > > > i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed here > on > > xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail party. > > (that's a great metaphor!) > > > > p > > > > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Sep 19 16:22:54 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2014 16:22:54 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] NSF Rotator Program Director opportunity: Science of Learning In-Reply-To: <339f096ee256486d864590d9d188b3c4@BY2PR0301MB0773.namprd03.prod.outlook.com> References: <339f096ee256486d864590d9d188b3c4@BY2PR0301MB0773.namprd03.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: POWER$$$$ to the xmcamasses!! :-) mike ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Namy, Laura Date: Fri, Sep 19, 2014 at 1:48 PM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] NSF Rotator Program Director opportunity: Science of Learning To: "cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org" Colleagues, The National Science Foundation?s Behavioral and Cognitive Sciences Division has recently posted a position for a rotating Program Director in the Science of Learning. Rotators serve by taking a leave of absence from their universities or current appointments for between 1 and 3 years to serve as a Program Director. It is an opportunity to learn about the inner goings-on of the Foundation and play an integral role in shaping research on learning. Because the Foundation wants rotators who are active researchers in their field, there is excellent support for rotators? ability to maintain their own research activities while at the Foundation. Applicants may have a degree in psychology, cognitive science, learning science, and/or neuroscience and should be at least 6 years post-Ph.D. Please feel free to contact me if you have questions about the position or about how life as a rotator at NSF works. Applications will be accepted through October 28, 2014. https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/381240300?org=BCS Best, Laura *Laura L. Namy* Director, Developmental and Learning Sciences Program National Science Foundation 4201 Wilson Blvd Arlington, VA 22230 Tel: 703.292.7305 _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From tom.richardson3@googlemail.com Sat Sep 20 02:57:32 2014 From: tom.richardson3@googlemail.com (Tom Richardson) Date: Sat, 20 Sep 2014 10:57:32 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault In-Reply-To: References: <2E2CE61A-C1A6-4F44-BAEA-D81CD1E41810@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Hi Phillip Thank you so much for this-beyond-the-call-of-courtesy-even reply. It testifies to the continued, belligerent existence of a *human* longing, not merely to understand learning-and-development-in-society, but to change it! Best wishes Tom Middlesbrough UK On 19 September 2014 22:17, White, Phillip wrote: > Tom, what you write about xmca being so fascinating is, i think, an > accurate reflection of its initial vision. Eve Ekeblad of Gothenburg, > Sweden, has a small web site on xmca's history: > > XLCHC came into being in 1984 as a medium for discussion of research on > learning and development with a general concern for issues of education in > modern technological societies and a special concern about the ways in > which educational systems are a source of socially engendered social > inequality. The "call letters" of this discussion group (to borrow > terminology from another medium) indicate its initial goals. LCHC is the > Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition, a research unit founded at the > Rockefeller University in the early 1970's which moved to the University of > California, San Diego in 1978. Until 1984, LCHC had an ethnically diverse > faculty that conducted an active post-doctoral program in the use of > comparative methods for studying culture and cognition with special > interest in problems of learning and development in school and non-school > settings. By 1984, two years into the Reagan-Bush era, we had lost > virtually all of our minority group faculty, our research concerns were > explicitly rejected by federal funding agencies, and we were denied > post-doctoral funds on the grounds that there was insufficient minority > group faculty. :-) > XLCHC was one response to this non-benign neglect. The "X" in the title > had a dual significance: First, it was meant to provide a medium for > continued interaction and cooperation by the many visitors and > post-doctoral fellows with whom we had interacted in the past, that is, for > "ex-LCHCers." Second, it was meant to provide a broadened constituency for > discussion of the issues traditionally associated with the Laboratory by > including scholars and graduate students from around the world who wished > to participate. > > i don't know if this description has been superseded or not. > > i began to participate on this list in the early 1990's, and it can still > be a painful crawl. > > phillip > > > ____________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of Tom Richardson [tom.richardson3@googlemail.com] > Sent: Friday, September 19, 2014 10:52 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Foucault > > Where's the 'Like' button?, Phillip - so many of the threads on xmca are > fascinating, although I canoften only crwl paiinfully through the specific > 'jargon'/register/vocabulary of any particular discipline / area > > Tom (an intermittent interloper) > > On 17 September 2014 02:53, White, Phillip > wrote: > > > > > as you write, Martin, yes, they had similar descriptions of their work > > > > "Foucault came to describe his work overall as a "historical ontology of > > ourselves." Certainly both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were philosophers on > > ontology, and of history." > > > > the difference is, i believe, that Foucault identified with those peoples > > who have been marginalized: prisoners, those deemed mentally ill, and > > homosexuals. he said that his writings were autobiography. and i've > come > > to understand my own work as a way of autobiography. i've begun to think > > of theory as a way of autobiography. > > > > i believe that i recognize a great deal of autobiography performed here > on > > xmca - just as one sees autobiography performed at a cocktail party. > > (that's a great metaphor!) > > > > p > > > > > From aiddings@email.arizona.edu Sat Sep 20 07:11:23 2014 From: aiddings@email.arizona.edu (Iddings, Ana C - (aiddings)) Date: Sat, 20 Sep 2014 14:11:23 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Position Available at the University of Arizona Message-ID: The Department of Teaching, Learning and Sociocultural Studies College of Education, University of Arizona Announces a Tenure-Track Position in Early Childhood Education The University of Arizona, College of Education has established an innovative approach to undergraduate and graduate programs in early childhood education with a focus on Communities as Resources in Early Childhood Teacher Education?CREATE (www.createarizona.org)--and is currently searching for an Early Childhood Education specialist for appointment to a tenure-track position at the Assistant Professor level effective August 2015. This position offers an opportunity to join the internationally recognized department of Teaching, Learning and Sociocultural Studies (TLS) comprised of two outstanding graduate programs: Language Reading and Culture (LRC) and Teaching and Teacher Education (TTE), and undergraduate programs in early childhood education, elementary education, and literacy, learning & leadership. TLS faculty engage in interdisciplinary research and teaching as well as a departmental commitment to social justice. TLS provides a collaborative work environment for faculty research and grant development and encourages cross-program and cross-departmental research initiatives. The successful candidate will be joining a highly regarded group of faculty as well as a vibrant early childhood community in Southern Arizona?a dynamic transnational border region, in proximity to the 21 Tribal Nations of Arizona. In addition, our College is the home of Worlds of Words International Collection of Children?s and Adolescent Literature (www.wow.lit.org), which boasts one of the largest international collections of children?s literature in the world. Existing faculty research and teaching interests related to Early Childhood Education include the teaching and learning ecologies of linguistically/culturally diverse students; family and community resources in diverse in- and out- of school contexts; partnerships between family-community-school; early childhood teacher education; equity and social justice education; children?s rights and participation; and children?s literature. We seek to enhance our leadership and scholarly contributions in this field and to further strengthen our undergraduate and graduate programs in Early Childhood Education. The successful candidate will establish and maintain an active research program and compile a strong record of scholarly achievement, including securing grant support for his/her research program. Qualifications: ? Applicants must hold a Ph.D. or Ed.D. in Early Childhood Education or a related field. ? Teaching experience at the early childhood or elementary school level is preferred. ? A record of university-level teaching preferred. ? Commitment to linguistic and culturally diverse populations. ? Enthusiasm for working in a multidisciplinary and community environment ? Interest in active and collaborative learning, the instructional use of innovative technology, and hybrid and online learning is highly desirable. ? Experience in and commitment to securing extramural funding for research and program development Responsibilities: ? Advising and teaching in both graduate and undergraduate programs, ? Teaching courses related to Early Childhood Education and the content areas with emphasis from birth to early grades. ? Developing an externally funded program of research leading to recognition as a nationally known early childhood educator Application Process: Please complete the electronic application form (XXXX) and attach a letter of interest, a statement of research and teaching interests, and your curriculum vitae on-line at: http://www.hr.arizona.edu Submit any further inquiries to: Dr. Ana Christina da Silva Iddings, Search Committee Chair Department of Teaching, Learning and Sociocultural Studies P. O. Box 210069 College of Education, University of Arizona Tucson, AZ 85721-0069 Applications will be reviewed starting on October 30, 2014. Review will continue until the position is filled. For further information please call (520) 621-2928. The University of Arizona is an EEO/AA Employer. Women and minorities are strongly urged to apply. ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] Sent: Thursday, September 18, 2014 9:17 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Position Availability at San Jose State University ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Emily Slusser Date: Wed, Sep 17, 2014 at 9:13 AM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Position Availability at San Jose State University To: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org *San Jos? State University (San Jos?, California) Announcement of Position Availability* *(Subject to Budgetary Approval)* *Child & Adolescent Development * *Job Opening ID Number*: JOID 22939 *Rank*: Open rank *Qualifications*: *Required: * Doctorate in child and adolescent development or related field by time of appointment. For appointment at the advanced rank, must have broad teaching experience and demonstrate scholarly/professional achievement commensurate with a tenured appointment at advanced rank; An area of research focus in early childhood education or in developmental research applied to community settings; An awareness of and sensitivity to the educational goals of a diverse population as might have been gained in cross-cultural study, training, teaching, and/or comparable experience; An established research program; and Evidence of successful university-level teaching experience. *Preferred: * Demonstrated ability to work collaboratively across disciplines; and Experience developing partnerships in community settings or in early education contexts. *Responsibilities: * Teach undergraduate and some graduate courses; Advise undergraduate and masters students; Develop a productive program of research focused on early education contexts or community settings serving children, youth, and families; Participate in shared governance by service on committees at all levels of the University; Be an active participant in department activities and initiatives; and Meet the needs of a highly diverse student population using appropriate course materials, teaching strategies, and advisement techniques. *Salary Range:* Commensurate with qualifications and experience. *Starting Date:* August 18, 2015 *Eligibility:* Employment is contingent upon proof of eligibility to work in the United States. *Application:* For full consideration, upload a letter of application, vitae, statements of teaching interests/philosophy, research plans, three letters of recommendation by October 13, 2014 at apply.interfolio.com/25845. Please include JOID Number (JOID 22939) on all correspondence. Chair- Search Committee Department of Child and Adolescent Development San Jos? State University One Washington Square San Jos?, CA 95192-0075 San Jos? State University is California?s oldest institution of public higher learning. The campus is located on the southern end of San Francisco Bay in downtown San Jos? (Pop. 1,000,000), hub of the world-famous Silicon Valley high-technology research and development center. Many of California?s most popular national, recreational, and cultural attractions are conveniently close. A member of the 23-campus CSU system, San Jos? State University enrolls approximately 30,000 students, a significant percentage of whom are members of minority groups. The University is committed to increasing the diversity of its faculty so our disciplines, students, and the community can benefit from multiple ethnic and gender perspectives. San Jos? State University is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Employer. We consider qualified applicants for employment without regard to race, color, religion, national origin, age, gender, gender identity/expression, sexual orientation, genetic information, medical condition, marital status, veteran status, or disability. This policy applies to all San Jos? State University students, faculty, and staff as well as University programs and activities. Reasonable accommodations are made for applicants with disabilities who self-disclose. Note that all San Jos? State University employees are considered mandated reporters under the California Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act and are required to comply with the requirements set forth in CSU Executive Order 1083 as a condition of employment. The latest San Jos? State University Safety 101 Uniform Campus Crime and Security Report is available. You may request a copy of San Jos? State University?s annual safety report by contacting the University Police Department at (408) 924-2222 or by visiting the University Police Department website at (http://www.sjsu.edu/police.) _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From smago@uga.edu Sun Sep 21 03:31:42 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Sun, 21 Sep 2014 10:31:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] in the eye of the beholder Message-ID: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-science-is-done/ From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Sun Sep 21 08:18:33 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Sun, 21 Sep 2014 12:18:33 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to primatology. David Enviado desde mi iPhone > El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky escribi?: > > http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-science-is-done/ From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Sep 21 09:42:23 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 21 Sep 2014 09:42:23 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is GREAT reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. mike On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss wrote: > What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to primatology. > David > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > > > El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky escribi?: > > > > > http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-science-is-done/ > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Sun Sep 21 10:31:28 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Sun, 21 Sep 2014 14:31:28 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> This article is revelant for this topic: http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf Enviado desde mi iPhone > El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole escribi?: > > The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is GREAT > reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. > > mike > > On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss > wrote: > >> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to primatology. >> David >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky escribi?: >> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-science-is-done/ > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Sun Sep 21 14:57:19 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Sun, 21 Sep 2014 21:57:19 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) of being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary socialisation?). Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Preiss Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder This article is revelant for this topic: http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf Enviado desde mi iPhone > El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole escribi?: > > The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is GREAT > reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. > > mike > > On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss > wrote: > >> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to primatology. >> David >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky escribi?: >> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-s >> cience-is-done/ > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and > re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Sep 21 17:45:08 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 01:45:08 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Constructing your fears away. Message-ID: Taking a browsing break, I found a ted episode that I do like... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zo62S0ulqhA Which reminds me, in a small yet still beautiful way, of diving for the first time in a Scottish loch. Also, it'd be interesting hearing about the psychological theories applied at NASA. Chris suggests that it's all quite active-oriented. Best, Huw From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Sun Sep 21 18:11:10 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Sun, 21 Sep 2014 22:11:10 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in recent scientific writing. Enviado desde mi iPhone > El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees escribi?: > > Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) of being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary socialisation?). > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Preiss > Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > > This article is revelant for this topic: http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > >> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole escribi?: >> >> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is GREAT >> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. >> >> mike >> >> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss >> wrote: >> >>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to primatology. >>> David >>> >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>> >>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky escribi?: >>> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-s >>> cience-is-done/ >> >> >> -- >> >> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and >> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but >> more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, >> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Sep 21 18:16:59 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 01:16:59 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> Message-ID: <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the researchers are not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not diverse. Martin On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss wrote: > Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in recent scientific writing. > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > >> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees escribi?: >> >> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) of being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary socialisation?). >> >> Rod >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Preiss >> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >> This article is revelant for this topic: http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >>> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole escribi?: >>> >>> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is GREAT >>> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss >>> wrote: >>> >>>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to primatology. >>>> David >>>> >>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>>> >>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky escribi?: >>>> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-s >>>> cience-is-done/ >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and >>> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but >>> more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, >>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] >> >> ________________________________ >> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] >> >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. >> > From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Sun Sep 21 18:41:02 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Sun, 21 Sep 2014 22:41:02 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: And they make claims for all humankind. Enviado desde mi iPhone > El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer escribi?: > > So there are two distinct problems here: First, the researchers are not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not diverse. > > Martin > >> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss wrote: >> >> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in recent scientific writing. >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >>> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees escribi?: >>> >>> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) of being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary socialisation?). >>> >>> Rod >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Preiss >>> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >>> >>> This article is revelant for this topic: http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >>> >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>> >>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole escribi?: >>>> >>>> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is GREAT >>>> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to primatology. >>>>> David >>>>> >>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>>>> >>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky escribi?: >>>>> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-s >>>>> cience-is-done/ >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and >>>> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but >>>> more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, >>>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] >>> >>> ________________________________ >>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] >>> >>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Sep 21 18:40:45 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 21 Sep 2014 18:40:45 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: It's the first message that is new. The second has been an unaccepted criticism for at least half a century. Both are right! Mike On Sunday, September 21, 2014, Martin John Packer wrote: > So there are two distinct problems here: First, the researchers are not > diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not diverse. > > Martin > > On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss > wrote: > > > Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in recent > scientific writing. > > > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > > > >> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees < > R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk > escribi?: > >> > >> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) of > being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary > socialisation?). > >> > >> Rod > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu ] On Behalf Of David Preiss > >> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > >> > >> This article is revelant for this topic: > http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf > >> > >> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >> > >>> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole > > escribi?: > >>> > >>> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is GREAT > >>> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. > >>> > >>> mike > >>> > >>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss > > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to primatology. > >>>> David > >>>> > >>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>>> > >>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky > escribi?: > >>>> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-s > >>>> cience-is-done/ > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> > >>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and > >>> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > >>> more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > >>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] > >> > >> ________________________________ > >> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > >> > >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely > for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > >> > > > > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu Sun Sep 21 20:18:40 2014 From: mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu (Zavala, Miguel) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 03:18:40 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: Message-ID: This study can be linked to ideas generated by Science & Technology Studies (which I characterize as a meta-reflection on how science is situated and culturally mediated). But it can also be linked to the work of Sandra Harding and others on standpoint theory. It's not just that one's lenses are gendered, racialized, etc., which is often framed as the issue of "perspective," often couched as something individual. Perhaps, as standpoint theorists content, science is/should be perspectival, meaning the achievement of collectives. Miguel On 9/21/14 6:40 PM, "mike cole" wrote: >It's the first message that is new. The second has been an unaccepted >criticism for at least half a century. >Both are right! > >Mike > >On Sunday, September 21, 2014, Martin John Packer > >wrote: > >> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the researchers are not >> diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not diverse. >> >> Martin >> >> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss > > wrote: >> >> > Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in recent >> scientific writing. >> > >> > Enviado desde mi iPhone >> > >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees < >> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk > escribi?: >> >> >> >> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) of >> being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary >> socialisation?). >> >> >> >> Rod >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu ] On Behalf Of David >>Preiss >> >> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 >> >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >> >> >> This article is revelant for this topic: >> http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >> >> >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> >>> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole >> >> escribi?: >> >>> >> >>> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is GREAT >> >>> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. >> >>> >> >>> mike >> >>> >> >>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss >>> > >> >>> wrote: >> >>> >> >>>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to primatology. >> >>>> David >> >>>> >> >>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >>>> >> >>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky > > escribi?: >> >>>> >>http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-s >> >>>> cience-is-done/ >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> -- >> >>> >> >>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction >>and >> >>> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently >>but >> >>> more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, >> >>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] >> >> >> >> ________________________________ >> >> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >> >> >> >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely >> for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on >>it. >> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University >>accepts >> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan >>emails >> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept >>responsibility >> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless >>accompanied >> by an official order form. >> >> >> > >> >> >> > >-- > >Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or >less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >Gray, 2001] From glassman.13@osu.edu Sun Sep 21 20:19:15 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 03:19:15 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co>, Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> It seems to me that articles like this can be a double edged sword. They use examples where culture has an influence on how we see things but then offer the generalization that science is perspective. This is the same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the climatologists have a liberal bias. Science is based on individual perspective until it doesn't. I'm their book is a much more nuanced discussion. This is a really complex issue which at this particular moment has extraordinary import. Maybe we need to find other ways to discuss this - like warranted assertability. Perhaps I have been spending too much time reading about the politics of climate change lately and it has spooked me. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder And they make claims for all humankind. Enviado desde mi iPhone > El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer escribi?: > > So there are two distinct problems here: First, the researchers are not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not diverse. > > Martin > >> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss wrote: >> >> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in recent scientific writing. >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >>> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees escribi?: >>> >>> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) of being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary socialisation?). >>> >>> Rod >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Preiss >>> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >>> >>> This article is revelant for this topic: http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >>> >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>> >>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole escribi?: >>>> >>>> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is GREAT >>>> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to primatology. >>>>> David >>>>> >>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>>>> >>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky escribi?: >>>>> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-s >>>>> cience-is-done/ >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and >>>> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but >>>> more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, >>>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] >>> >>> ________________________________ >>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] >>> >>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > > From bazerman@education.ucsb.edu Sun Sep 21 20:50:25 2014 From: bazerman@education.ucsb.edu (Charles Bazerman) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 11:50:25 +0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Michael, I am with you, and not only because of climate change deniers. The sociocultural critique has been important to show that humans make knowledge, and they do it from their own interests and perspectives. Yet, various disciplines and sciences, have come to know more about the world in ways that are less entangled with the limits of individual or small group perceptions and interests. Disciplines do represent the world outside of themselves, gathering data--of course selectively through their own devices, their means of collection, forms of inscription and display, etc... Historically, the methodological standards in different fields have evolved to include more awareness of the contingency, fragility, and specificity of samples, data and analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our tools. This is what methodology is all about. I tend to view objectivity not as an absolute, but an awareness of ways in which we are entangled with the phenomena we are trying to study, and to find ways to disentangle ourselves less. So from this perspective, incorporating the sociocultural critique creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of our data, representation, and analysis. Over the last few decades, we have been struggling in different disciplines to incorporate this critique but yet maintain the disciplinary projects of advancing contingent, but useful and reliable knowledge. I like your term warranted assertability. I myself have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of being able to give a good account of your research actions when queried from various directions. But it is important to the advance of knowledge that we find ways to gather and understand information about the world (in which we are both living parts and the constructors of knowledge about that world including ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of our knowledge but does not evaporate our confidence in that knowledge into a vapor of contingency only. I have struggled with this issue for many years in my work on the rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, drawing on the work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems important to me over many years), but more work needs to be done to crystallize an understanding that leaves science and social science standing despite it being created by poor, frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed vision. best, Chuck ----- Original Message ----- From: "Glassman, Michael" Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > It seems to me that articles like this can be a double edged sword. > They use examples where culture has an influence on how we see things > but then offer the generalization that science is perspective. This > is the same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the > climatologists have a liberal bias. Science is based on individual > perspective until it doesn't. I'm their book is a much more nuanced > discussion. This is a really complex issue which at this particular > moment has extraordinary import. Maybe we need to find other ways to > discuss this - like warranted assertability. Perhaps I have been > spending too much time reading about the politics of climate change > lately and it has spooked me. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com] > Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > > And they make claims for all humankind. > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > > > El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer > escribi?: > > > > So there are two distinct problems here: First, the researchers are > not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not diverse. > > > > Martin > > > >> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss > wrote: > >> > >> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in > recent scientific writing. > >> > >> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >> > >>> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees > escribi?: > >>> > >>> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) > of being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary socialisation?). > >>> > >>> Rod > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Preiss > >>> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > >>> > >>> This article is revelant for this topic: http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf > >>> > >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>> > >>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole escribi?: > >>>> > >>>> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is GREAT > >>>> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. > >>>> > >>>> mike > >>>> > >>>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to primatology. > >>>>> David > >>>>> > >>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>>>> > >>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky escribi?: > >>>>> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-s > >>>>> cience-is-done/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> > >>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction > and > >>>> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are > contingently but > >>>> more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > >>>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] > >>> > >>> ________________________________ > >>> [ > >>> > >>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended > solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you > are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use > of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not > rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the > sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet > emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth > University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your > responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth > University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after > it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an > order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Sep 21 22:57:34 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 15:57:34 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> Michael, Charles. This is an issue which I think can be tackled by Activity Theory, not just climate denial, but a whole range of belief/disbelief problems like this. Social justice issues and social change in general depend on understanding and solving these kind of prejudice and scepticism. Postmodern relativism has given us a poisoned chalice indeed. I believe that Activity Theory is well placed to solve this category of problem and give some guidance as to how to tackle deeply held but irrational prejudice. Developed using 'project' as the unit of analysis I think Activity Theory gives us a really useful theory of ideology which has the advantage of being firmly connected to a living tradition in psychological science and meaningfully connected to how people live their lives. Taking Creationism as an example, among European and American societies, the USA boasts the largest percentage of people in the world who believe that God created the world just as it is today about 10,000 years ago. They are rivalled only by Turkey. And it does not correlate with lack of education. In fact, among Republican voters, the more educated you are the more likely you are to believe in the Old Testament story of Genesis and not Darwin. A significant percentage of Democrat voters also believe in Creationism, but this declines with education. The point is that when people evaluate evidence, as Charles was suggesting, we do so by integrating the new data into our existing conceptual frame. I regularly dismiss all sorts of news and theories because it doesn't fit into my conceptual frame! We all do. The reason why there is so much Creationism in the US is that Darwin versus the Old Testament has been *politicised*. You prefer the Old Testament for guidance as to the origin of species rather than science (personal experience can shed no light on the question) because it is a litmus test for adherence to the Good Life, just as some people hate bicycle-riders because it is a signal of support for Greeny ideas which are deemed hostile to the ordinary person. I believe that Climate Denial is part of the same issue. In Australia there are rather too many Climate Deniers because the issue has become politicised. Officially the conservative government accepts the science, but every knows they don't and this is reflected in policies like appointing climate deniers to head committees to review energy policy, repealing the carbon price, etc., etc. There are a higher percentage of climate deniers in Australia, as a result, than in Europe where the climate is not politicised in that way. One's conceptual frame is unified through commitment to a life-project. Opinions and evidence which don't fit the conceptual frame generated by the central concept of a life-project, its vision of the Good Life. There is a 10 minute talk on this in relation to denial of the dangers posed to health by asbestos here: https://www.academia.edu/8179060/Activity_as_Project_The_Case_of_Asbestos Apologies for going on too long. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Charles Bazerman wrote: > Michael, > I am with you, and not only because of climate change deniers. The sociocultural critique has been important to show that humans make knowledge, and they do it from their own interests and perspectives. Yet, various disciplines and sciences, have come to know more about the world in ways that are less entangled with the limits of individual or small group perceptions and interests. > > Disciplines do represent the world outside of themselves, gathering data--of course selectively through their own devices, their means of collection, forms of inscription and display, etc... Historically, the methodological standards in different fields have evolved to include more awareness of the contingency, fragility, and specificity of samples, data and analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our tools. This is what methodology is all about. I tend to view objectivity not as an absolute, but an awareness of ways in which we are entangled with the phenomena we are trying to study, and to find ways to disentangle ourselves less. > > So from this perspective, incorporating the sociocultural critique creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of our data, representation, and analysis. Over the last few decades, we have been struggling in different disciplines to incorporate this critique but yet maintain the disciplinary projects of advancing contingent, but useful and reliable knowledge. I like your term warranted assertability. I myself have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of being able to give a good account of your research actions when queried from various directions. But it is important to the advance of knowledge that we find ways to gather and understand information about the world (in which we are both living parts and the constructors of knowledge about that world including ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of our knowledge but does not evaporate our confidence in that knowledge into a vapor of contingency only. > > I have struggled with this issue for many years in my work on the rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, drawing on the work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems important to me over many years), but more work needs to be done to crystallize an understanding that leaves science and social science standing despite it being created by poor, frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed vision. > best, > Chuck > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Glassman, Michael" > Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > >> It seems to me that articles like this can be a double edged sword. >> They use examples where culture has an influence on how we see things >> but then offer the generalization that science is perspective. This >> is the same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the >> climatologists have a liberal bias. Science is based on individual >> perspective until it doesn't. I'm their book is a much more nuanced >> discussion. This is a really complex issue which at this particular >> moment has extraordinary import. Maybe we need to find other ways to >> discuss this - like warranted assertability. Perhaps I have been >> spending too much time reading about the politics of climate change >> lately and it has spooked me. >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com] >> Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >> And they make claims for all humankind. >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >>> El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer >>> >> escribi?: >> >>> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the researchers are >>> >> not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not diverse. >> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>>> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss >>>> >> wrote: >> >>>> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in >>>> >> recent scientific writing. >> >>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>>> >>>> >>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees >>>>> >> escribi?: >> >>>>> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) >>>>> >> of being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary socialisation?). >> >>>>> Rod >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Preiss >> >>>>> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >>>>> >>>>> This article is revelant for this topic: http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >>>>> >>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole escribi?: >>>>>> >>>>>> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is GREAT >>>>>> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. >>>>>> >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to primatology. >>>>>>> David >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky escribi?: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-s >>>>>>> cience-is-done/ >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction >>>>>> >> and >> >>>>>> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are >>>>>> >> contingently but >> >>>>>> more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, >>>>>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] >>>>>> >>>>> ________________________________ >>>>> [ >>>>> >>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended >>>>> >> solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you >> are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use >> of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not >> rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the >> sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet >> emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth >> University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your >> responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth >> University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after >> it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an >> order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. >> >>> >> > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Sep 21 23:12:46 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sun, 21 Sep 2014 23:12:46 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Miguel, You wrote, "It's not just that one's lenses are gendered, racialized, etc., which is often framed as the issue of "perspective," often couched as something individual. Perhaps, as standpoint theorists content, science is/should be perspectival, meaning the achievement of collectives. This term *perspectival* is the achievement of collectives *through* historical movements. I was reading recently about the confluence of perspectives within Descartes. He was profoundly influenced by the small minority of people who wer beginning to consider the world AS a mechanism LIKE a clock. He was also deeply embedded in the perspective of his Jesuit education. BOTH these perspectives [one radical and novel the other *common sense* wer both implicated in Descartes *meditations* He was producing a synergy. The warranted assertability of EACH perspective could be viewed as contradictory and discontinuous. However, the particular *way* Descartes *formed* a novel SYNERGISTIC perspective [*I* think therefore *I* am ] has evolved to *be* a dominant warranted assertability [in the way the Jesuit perspective was dominant in Descartes epoch] THIS way of considering the *perspectival* points to a very complex development [if seen as continuous.] Another perspective is to see the new *perspective* as *enveloping* the previous perspective which emphasizes the *discontinuities* between the two perspectives. I would suggest that BOTH *perspectives* are *valid* depending on the *way* one orients to the questions and answers. Perspectives and perspectival standpoints are multi verses or poly verses. Not individual but multiple and each perspectival view is implicated [and inherited] within particular historical developments/envelopments. Mike recently sent Raymond Williams article on the meaning of *mediation* I would suggest the term *perspectival* also has a complex historical development. Do we need to replace the term *perspective* as implying an interior subjective view? or can the term *perspective* include the historical collective understanding of SHARED perspectives. Larry On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 PM, Zavala, Miguel < mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> wrote: > This study can be linked to ideas generated by Science & Technology > Studies (which I characterize as a meta-reflection on how science is > situated and culturally mediated). But it can also be linked to the work > of Sandra Harding and others on standpoint theory. > > It's not just that one's lenses are gendered, racialized, etc., which is > often framed as the issue of "perspective," often couched as something > individual. Perhaps, as standpoint theorists content, science is/should > be perspectival, meaning the achievement of collectives. > > Miguel > > > On 9/21/14 6:40 PM, "mike cole" wrote: > > >It's the first message that is new. The second has been an unaccepted > >criticism for at least half a century. > >Both are right! > > > >Mike > > > >On Sunday, September 21, 2014, Martin John Packer > > > >wrote: > > > >> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the researchers are not > >> diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not diverse. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss >> > wrote: > >> > >> > Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in recent > >> scientific writing. > >> > > >> > Enviado desde mi iPhone > >> > > >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees < > >> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk > escribi?: > >> >> > >> >> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) of > >> being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary > >> socialisation?). > >> >> > >> >> Rod > >> >> > >> >> -----Original Message----- > >> >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu ] On Behalf Of David > >>Preiss > >> >> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 > >> >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > >> >> > >> >> This article is revelant for this topic: > >> http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf > >> >> > >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >> >> > >> >>> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole >>> > >> escribi?: > >> >>> > >> >>> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is GREAT > >> >>> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. > >> >>> > >> >>> mike > >> >>> > >> >>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss > >> >> > > >> >>> wrote: > >> >>> > >> >>>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to primatology. > >> >>>> David > >> >>>> > >> >>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky >> > escribi?: > >> >>>> > >>http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-s > >> >>>> cience-is-done/ > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> -- > >> >>> > >> >>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction > >>and > >> >>> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently > >>but > >> >>> more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > >> >>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] > >> >> > >> >> ________________________________ > >> >> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > >> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > >> >> > >> >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely > >> for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > >> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > >> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on > >>it. > >> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > >> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > >> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University > >>accepts > >> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan > >>emails > >> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept > >>responsibility > >> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > >> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless > >>accompanied > >> by an official order form. > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> > > > >-- > > > >Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > >construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > >less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > >Gray, 2001] > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Sep 21 23:58:02 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sun, 21 Sep 2014 23:58:02 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, Taking project as the KEY concept and stating that projects are shared collective desires to change *concepts* is highlighted in your example. The *intended* project is to change people's understanding of asbestos as a miracle substance to a deadly substance. Returning to the article Peter posted on *perspectival* assumptions as being collective and developing the concept of *perspective* away from its subjective bias to taking *perspectival* as collective could be understood as a *project* [writing articles to change others concepts of *perspectival* I sense an *overlap* and possible synergy between notions of *changing concepts* intentionally AND realizing changing perspectives by *looking* with an intentional focus. Are we referring to similar phenomena?? The inherent stability of concepts/perspectives and the intentional projects to change the *shape* of harmful perspectives/concepts. Is there a bias to see perspectives AS images and concepts AS linguistic? Is this the question of multi-modality [recently shared on line]?? I appreciated the clarity of the example of asbestos workers who shared an understanding of asbestos [as a miracle substance that was actually deadly] The relations between perspective taking, interpretive understanding, and concept development is the question I'm left with. Larry Larry On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 10:57 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Michael, Charles. > This is an issue which I think can be tackled by Activity Theory, not just > climate denial, but a whole range of belief/disbelief problems like this. > Social justice issues and social change in general depend on understanding > and solving these kind of prejudice and scepticism. Postmodern relativism > has given us a poisoned chalice indeed. > > I believe that Activity Theory is well placed to solve this category of > problem and give some guidance as to how to tackle deeply held but > irrational prejudice. Developed using 'project' as the unit of analysis I > think Activity Theory gives us a really useful theory of ideology which has > the advantage of being firmly connected to a living tradition in > psychological science and meaningfully connected to how people live their > lives. > Taking Creationism as an example, among European and American societies, > the USA boasts the largest percentage of people in the world who believe > that God created the world just as it is today about 10,000 years ago. They > are rivalled only by Turkey. And it does not correlate with lack of > education. In fact, among Republican voters, the more educated you are the > more likely you are to believe in the Old Testament story of Genesis and > not Darwin. A significant percentage of Democrat voters also believe in > Creationism, but this declines with education. > > The point is that when people evaluate evidence, as Charles was > suggesting, we do so by integrating the new data into our existing > conceptual frame. I regularly dismiss all sorts of news and theories > because it doesn't fit into my conceptual frame! We all do. The reason why > there is so much Creationism in the US is that Darwin versus the Old > Testament has been *politicised*. You prefer the Old Testament for guidance > as to the origin of species rather than science (personal experience can > shed no light on the question) because it is a litmus test for adherence to > the Good Life, just as some people hate bicycle-riders because it is a > signal of support for Greeny ideas which are deemed hostile to the ordinary > person. I believe that Climate Denial is part of the same issue. In > Australia there are rather too many Climate Deniers because the issue has > become politicised. Officially the conservative government accepts the > science, but every knows they don't and this is reflected in policies like > appointing climate deniers to head committees to review energy policy, > repealing the carbon price, etc., etc. There are a higher percentage of > climate deniers in Australia, as a result, than in Europe where the climate > is not politicised in that way. > > One's conceptual frame is unified through commitment to a life-project. > Opinions and evidence which don't fit the conceptual frame generated by the > central concept of a life-project, its vision of the Good Life. There is a > 10 minute talk on this in relation to denial of the dangers posed to health > by asbestos here: https://www.academia.edu/8179060/Activity_as_Project_ > The_Case_of_Asbestos > > Apologies for going on too long. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Charles Bazerman wrote: > >> Michael, >> I am with you, and not only because of climate change deniers. The >> sociocultural critique has been important to show that humans make >> knowledge, and they do it from their own interests and perspectives. Yet, >> various disciplines and sciences, have come to know more about the world in >> ways that are less entangled with the limits of individual or small group >> perceptions and interests. >> Disciplines do represent the world outside of themselves, gathering >> data--of course selectively through their own devices, their means of >> collection, forms of inscription and display, etc... Historically, the >> methodological standards in different fields have evolved to include more >> awareness of the contingency, fragility, and specificity of samples, data >> and analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our tools. This is what >> methodology is all about. I tend to view objectivity not as an absolute, >> but an awareness of ways in which we are entangled with the phenomena we >> are trying to study, and to find ways to disentangle ourselves less. >> So from this perspective, incorporating the sociocultural critique >> creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of our data, >> representation, and analysis. Over the last few decades, we have been >> struggling in different disciplines to incorporate this critique but yet >> maintain the disciplinary projects of advancing contingent, but useful and >> reliable knowledge. I like your term warranted assertability. I myself >> have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of being able to give a >> good account of your research actions when queried from various directions. >> But it is important to the advance of knowledge that we find ways to gather >> and understand information about the world (in which we are both living >> parts and the constructors of knowledge about that world including >> ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of our knowledge but does not >> evaporate our confidence in that knowledge into a vapor of contingency only. >> >> I have struggled with this issue for many years in my work on the >> rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, drawing on the >> work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems important to me over many >> years), but more work needs to be done to crystallize an understanding that >> leaves science and social science standing despite it being created by >> poor, frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed vision. >> best, >> Chuck >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: "Glassman, Michael" >> Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> >> >> >>> It seems to me that articles like this can be a double edged sword. >>> They use examples where culture has an influence on how we see things but >>> then offer the generalization that science is perspective. This is the >>> same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the climatologists >>> have a liberal bias. Science is based on individual perspective until it >>> doesn't. I'm their book is a much more nuanced discussion. This is a >>> really complex issue which at this particular moment has extraordinary >>> import. Maybe we need to find other ways to discuss this - like warranted >>> assertability. Perhaps I have been spending too much time reading about >>> the politics of climate change lately and it has spooked me. >>> >>> Michael >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>> on behalf of David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com] >>> Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >>> >>> And they make claims for all humankind. >>> >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>> >>> >>> >>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer >>>> >>> escribi?: >>> >>> >>>> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the researchers are >>>> >>>> >>> not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not diverse. >>> >>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss >>>>> >>>>> >>>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in >>>>> >>>> recent scientific writing. >>> >>> >>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees >>>>>> >>>>> escribi?: >>> >>> >>>> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> of being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary >>> socialisation?). >>> >>> >>>> Rod >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Preiss >>> >>> >>>> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >>>>>> >>>>>> This article is revelant for this topic: http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~ >>>>>> henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >>>>>> >>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole escribi?: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is GREAT >>>>>>> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss < >>>>>>> daviddpreiss@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to primatology. >>>>>>>> David >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky >>>>>>>>> escribi?: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view- >>>>>>>> affects-how-s >>>>>>>> cience-is-done/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> and >>> >>> >>>> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are >>>>>>> >>>>>> contingently but >>> >>> >>>> more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, >>>>>>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> ________________________________ >>>>>> [ >>>>>> >>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you >>> are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of >>> the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on >>> it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts >>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails >>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility >>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied >>> by an official order form. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> > > > > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Mon Sep 22 00:27:42 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 09:27:42 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> Message-ID: Dear Andy I haven't kept up with the previous 15 conversations, but need to add my tuppence worth. I believe that God created the world, but not anything literal about the Bible. We need to know what triggered the Big Bang. Even Richard Dawkins the professed atheist is agnostic about this very point. Also it seems that the order of creation, although allegorical, seems to map out the order of events, although Biblically we really have to give "day" a different time frame. I just say this in case this example can be accommodated in your theory. Carol On 22 September 2014 08:58, Larry Purss wrote: > Andy, > > Taking project as the KEY concept and stating that projects are shared > collective desires to change *concepts* is highlighted in your example. > The *intended* project is to change people's understanding of asbestos as a > miracle substance to a deadly substance. > > Returning to the article Peter posted on *perspectival* assumptions as > being collective and developing the concept of *perspective* away from its > subjective bias to taking *perspectival* as collective could be understood > as a *project* [writing articles to change others concepts of > *perspectival* > > I sense an *overlap* and possible synergy between notions of *changing > concepts* intentionally AND realizing changing perspectives by *looking* > with an intentional focus. > Are we referring to similar phenomena?? > The inherent stability of concepts/perspectives and the intentional > projects to change the *shape* of harmful perspectives/concepts. > Is there a bias to see perspectives AS images and concepts AS linguistic? > Is this the question of multi-modality [recently shared on line]?? > > I appreciated the clarity of the example of asbestos workers who shared an > understanding of asbestos [as a miracle substance that was actually > deadly] > > The relations between perspective taking, interpretive understanding, and > concept development is the question I'm left with. > Larry > > Larry > > > > On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 10:57 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Michael, Charles. > > This is an issue which I think can be tackled by Activity Theory, not > just > > climate denial, but a whole range of belief/disbelief problems like this. > > Social justice issues and social change in general depend on > understanding > > and solving these kind of prejudice and scepticism. Postmodern relativism > > has given us a poisoned chalice indeed. > > > > I believe that Activity Theory is well placed to solve this category of > > problem and give some guidance as to how to tackle deeply held but > > irrational prejudice. Developed using 'project' as the unit of analysis I > > think Activity Theory gives us a really useful theory of ideology which > has > > the advantage of being firmly connected to a living tradition in > > psychological science and meaningfully connected to how people live their > > lives. > > Taking Creationism as an example, among European and American societies, > > the USA boasts the largest percentage of people in the world who believe > > that God created the world just as it is today about 10,000 years ago. > They > > are rivalled only by Turkey. And it does not correlate with lack of > > education. In fact, among Republican voters, the more educated you are > the > > more likely you are to believe in the Old Testament story of Genesis and > > not Darwin. A significant percentage of Democrat voters also believe in > > Creationism, but this declines with education. > > > > The point is that when people evaluate evidence, as Charles was > > suggesting, we do so by integrating the new data into our existing > > conceptual frame. I regularly dismiss all sorts of news and theories > > because it doesn't fit into my conceptual frame! We all do. The reason > why > > there is so much Creationism in the US is that Darwin versus the Old > > Testament has been *politicised*. You prefer the Old Testament for > guidance > > as to the origin of species rather than science (personal experience can > > shed no light on the question) because it is a litmus test for adherence > to > > the Good Life, just as some people hate bicycle-riders because it is a > > signal of support for Greeny ideas which are deemed hostile to the > ordinary > > person. I believe that Climate Denial is part of the same issue. In > > Australia there are rather too many Climate Deniers because the issue has > > become politicised. Officially the conservative government accepts the > > science, but every knows they don't and this is reflected in policies > like > > appointing climate deniers to head committees to review energy policy, > > repealing the carbon price, etc., etc. There are a higher percentage of > > climate deniers in Australia, as a result, than in Europe where the > climate > > is not politicised in that way. > > > > One's conceptual frame is unified through commitment to a life-project. > > Opinions and evidence which don't fit the conceptual frame generated by > the > > central concept of a life-project, its vision of the Good Life. There is > a > > 10 minute talk on this in relation to denial of the dangers posed to > health > > by asbestos here: https://www.academia.edu/8179060/Activity_as_Project_ > > The_Case_of_Asbestos > > > > Apologies for going on too long. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > Charles Bazerman wrote: > > > >> Michael, > >> I am with you, and not only because of climate change deniers. The > >> sociocultural critique has been important to show that humans make > >> knowledge, and they do it from their own interests and perspectives. > Yet, > >> various disciplines and sciences, have come to know more about the > world in > >> ways that are less entangled with the limits of individual or small > group > >> perceptions and interests. > >> Disciplines do represent the world outside of themselves, gathering > >> data--of course selectively through their own devices, their means of > >> collection, forms of inscription and display, etc... Historically, the > >> methodological standards in different fields have evolved to include > more > >> awareness of the contingency, fragility, and specificity of samples, > data > >> and analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our tools. This is > what > >> methodology is all about. I tend to view objectivity not as an > absolute, > >> but an awareness of ways in which we are entangled with the phenomena we > >> are trying to study, and to find ways to disentangle ourselves less. > >> So from this perspective, incorporating the sociocultural critique > >> creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of our data, > >> representation, and analysis. Over the last few decades, we have been > >> struggling in different disciplines to incorporate this critique but yet > >> maintain the disciplinary projects of advancing contingent, but useful > and > >> reliable knowledge. I like your term warranted assertability. I myself > >> have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of being able to > give a > >> good account of your research actions when queried from various > directions. > >> But it is important to the advance of knowledge that we find ways to > gather > >> and understand information about the world (in which we are both living > >> parts and the constructors of knowledge about that world including > >> ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of our knowledge but does not > >> evaporate our confidence in that knowledge into a vapor of contingency > only. > >> > >> I have struggled with this issue for many years in my work on the > >> rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, drawing on > the > >> work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems important to me over many > >> years), but more work needs to be done to crystallize an understanding > that > >> leaves science and social science standing despite it being created by > >> poor, frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed vision. > >> best, > >> Chuck > >> > >> ----- Original Message ----- > >> From: "Glassman, Michael" > >> Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >> > >> > >> > >>> It seems to me that articles like this can be a double edged sword. > >>> They use examples where culture has an influence on how we see things > but > >>> then offer the generalization that science is perspective. This is the > >>> same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the climatologists > >>> have a liberal bias. Science is based on individual perspective > until it > >>> doesn't. I'm their book is a much more nuanced discussion. This is > a > >>> really complex issue which at this particular moment has extraordinary > >>> import. Maybe we need to find other ways to discuss this - like > warranted > >>> assertability. Perhaps I have been spending too much time reading > about > >>> the politics of climate change lately and it has spooked me. > >>> > >>> Michael > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] > >>> on behalf of David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com] > >>> Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > >>> > >>> And they make claims for all humankind. > >>> > >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer > >>>> > >>> escribi?: > >>> > >>> > >>>> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the researchers are > >>>> > >>>> > >>> not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not diverse. > >>> > >>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>>> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in > >>>>> > >>>> recent scientific writing. > >>> > >>> > >>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees > >>>>>> > >>>>> escribi?: > >>> > >>> > >>>> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> of being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary > >>> socialisation?). > >>> > >>> > >>>> Rod > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>> > >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Preiss > >>> > >>> > >>>> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 > >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > >>>>>> > >>>>>> This article is revelant for this topic: http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~ > >>>>>> henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole escribi?: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is > GREAT > >>>>>>> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss < > >>>>>>> daviddpreiss@gmail.com> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to primatology. > >>>>>>>> David > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky > >>>>>>>>> escribi?: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view- > >>>>>>>> affects-how-s > >>>>>>>> cience-is-done/ > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> and > >>> > >>> > >>>> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> contingently but > >>> > >>> > >>>> more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > >>>>>>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> ________________________________ > >>>>>> [ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you > >>> are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use > of > >>> the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not > rely on > >>> it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > >>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > >>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University > accepts > >>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan > emails > >>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept > responsibility > >>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > >>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless > accompanied > >>> by an official order form. > >>> > >>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 22 01:35:05 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 18:35:05 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> Message-ID: <541FDF39.8000301@mira.net> As you know, Carol, my recent research has led me through the belief-systems and activity of a range of Christian denominations and I have learnt to value the enormous contribution which Christians have made to social change activism and the pursuit of social justice over the past 400 years, before which time the question is moot. Generally speaking all sorts of theology are consistent with all sorts of social practice and even metaphysical beliefs. The correlations are complex. Believing that God created the world does not imply any kind of supposedly literal or selective reading of the Bible and nor does it necessarily imply rejection of Darwinian evolution. Surveys about Creationism usually sort people into three categories; (1) God created the world 10,000 years ago or less; (2) God created the world by means of evolution, etc., or some such formulation consistent both with science and with Christian moral convictions; and (3) God had nothing to do with it. I think you would be (2), Carol. To be a Creationist requires a huge leap of faith about immense detail. It means believing things like "God created cows so man would have milk." I don't know where Spinoza and Hegel fit in that little 3-part scheme. I don't know what you mean by "order of creation". Do you mean "God created X on the Nth day" and so on? Creationism in the US is (I believe) a political position: it is a very specific array of concepts. Belief in God is in itself not a political question. The political question is only: if you believe in God, how do you conceive of Him (or Her)? Does God approve of public health, etc? The Big Bang is something else. No physicist thinks this is a closed question. Personally I think the solution to the obvious contradictions is that time, like space, is finite but unbounded. Plausible, involves no insuperable logical contradictions, no Prime Mover or First Cause, or Before Time, but it is all still an open question. But I think to insert God wherever you find an open question is just silly. It is a bit like John R.Searle who inserts quantum uncertainty into human biology to solve the problem of free will or introducing UFOs to explain unexplained events. God is fine, but he is not the answer to any unsolved problem of physics or biology. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Carol Macdonald wrote: > Dear Andy > > I haven't kept up with the previous 15 conversations, but need to add > my tuppence worth. I believe that God created the world, but not > anything literal about the Bible. We need to know what triggered the > Big Bang. Even Richard Dawkins the professed atheist is agnostic > about this very point. Also it seems that the order of creation, > although allegorical, seems to map out the order of events, although > Biblically we really have to give "day" a different time frame. > > I just say this in case this example can be accommodated in your theory. > > Carol > > On 22 September 2014 08:58, Larry Purss > wrote: > > Andy, > > Taking project as the KEY concept and stating that projects are shared > collective desires to change *concepts* is highlighted in your > example. > The *intended* project is to change people's understanding of > asbestos as a > miracle substance to a deadly substance. > > Returning to the article Peter posted on *perspectival* assumptions as > being collective and developing the concept of *perspective* away > from its > subjective bias to taking *perspectival* as collective could be > understood > as a *project* [writing articles to change others concepts of > *perspectival* > > I sense an *overlap* and possible synergy between notions of *changing > concepts* intentionally AND realizing changing perspectives by > *looking* > with an intentional focus. > Are we referring to similar phenomena?? > The inherent stability of concepts/perspectives and the intentional > projects to change the *shape* of harmful perspectives/concepts. > Is there a bias to see perspectives AS images and concepts AS > linguistic? > Is this the question of multi-modality [recently shared on line]?? > > I appreciated the clarity of the example of asbestos workers who > shared an > understanding of asbestos [as a miracle substance that was actually > deadly] > > The relations between perspective taking, interpretive > understanding, and > concept development is the question I'm left with. > Larry > > Larry > > > > On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 10:57 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > Michael, Charles. > > This is an issue which I think can be tackled by Activity > Theory, not just > > climate denial, but a whole range of belief/disbelief problems > like this. > > Social justice issues and social change in general depend on > understanding > > and solving these kind of prejudice and scepticism. Postmodern > relativism > > has given us a poisoned chalice indeed. > > > > I believe that Activity Theory is well placed to solve this > category of > > problem and give some guidance as to how to tackle deeply held but > > irrational prejudice. Developed using 'project' as the unit of > analysis I > > think Activity Theory gives us a really useful theory of > ideology which has > > the advantage of being firmly connected to a living tradition in > > psychological science and meaningfully connected to how people > live their > > lives. > > Taking Creationism as an example, among European and American > societies, > > the USA boasts the largest percentage of people in the world who > believe > > that God created the world just as it is today about 10,000 > years ago. They > > are rivalled only by Turkey. And it does not correlate with lack of > > education. In fact, among Republican voters, the more educated > you are the > > more likely you are to believe in the Old Testament story of > Genesis and > > not Darwin. A significant percentage of Democrat voters also > believe in > > Creationism, but this declines with education. > > > > The point is that when people evaluate evidence, as Charles was > > suggesting, we do so by integrating the new data into our existing > > conceptual frame. I regularly dismiss all sorts of news and theories > > because it doesn't fit into my conceptual frame! We all do. The > reason why > > there is so much Creationism in the US is that Darwin versus the Old > > Testament has been *politicised*. You prefer the Old Testament > for guidance > > as to the origin of species rather than science (personal > experience can > > shed no light on the question) because it is a litmus test for > adherence to > > the Good Life, just as some people hate bicycle-riders because > it is a > > signal of support for Greeny ideas which are deemed hostile to > the ordinary > > person. I believe that Climate Denial is part of the same issue. In > > Australia there are rather too many Climate Deniers because the > issue has > > become politicised. Officially the conservative government > accepts the > > science, but every knows they don't and this is reflected in > policies like > > appointing climate deniers to head committees to review energy > policy, > > repealing the carbon price, etc., etc. There are a higher > percentage of > > climate deniers in Australia, as a result, than in Europe where > the climate > > is not politicised in that way. > > > > One's conceptual frame is unified through commitment to a > life-project. > > Opinions and evidence which don't fit the conceptual frame > generated by the > > central concept of a life-project, its vision of the Good Life. > There is a > > 10 minute talk on this in relation to denial of the dangers > posed to health > > by asbestos here: > https://www.academia.edu/8179060/Activity_as_Project_ > > The_Case_of_Asbestos > > > > Apologies for going on too long. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > Charles Bazerman wrote: > > > >> Michael, > >> I am with you, and not only because of climate change deniers. The > >> sociocultural critique has been important to show that humans make > >> knowledge, and they do it from their own interests and > perspectives. Yet, > >> various disciplines and sciences, have come to know more about > the world in > >> ways that are less entangled with the limits of individual or > small group > >> perceptions and interests. > >> Disciplines do represent the world outside of themselves, gathering > >> data--of course selectively through their own devices, their > means of > >> collection, forms of inscription and display, etc... > Historically, the > >> methodological standards in different fields have evolved to > include more > >> awareness of the contingency, fragility, and specificity of > samples, data > >> and analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our tools. > This is what > >> methodology is all about. I tend to view objectivity not as an > absolute, > >> but an awareness of ways in which we are entangled with the > phenomena we > >> are trying to study, and to find ways to disentangle ourselves > less. > >> So from this perspective, incorporating the sociocultural critique > >> creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of our data, > >> representation, and analysis. Over the last few decades, we > have been > >> struggling in different disciplines to incorporate this > critique but yet > >> maintain the disciplinary projects of advancing contingent, but > useful and > >> reliable knowledge. I like your term warranted assertability. > I myself > >> have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of being > able to give a > >> good account of your research actions when queried from various > directions. > >> But it is important to the advance of knowledge that we find > ways to gather > >> and understand information about the world (in which we are > both living > >> parts and the constructors of knowledge about that world including > >> ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of our knowledge but > does not > >> evaporate our confidence in that knowledge into a vapor of > contingency only. > >> > >> I have struggled with this issue for many years in my work on the > >> rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, > drawing on the > >> work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems important to me > over many > >> years), but more work needs to be done to crystallize an > understanding that > >> leaves science and social science standing despite it being > created by > >> poor, frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed vision. > >> best, > >> Chuck > >> > >> ----- Original Message ----- > >> From: "Glassman, Michael" > > >> Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > >> > >> > >> > >>> It seems to me that articles like this can be a double edged > sword. > >>> They use examples where culture has an influence on how we see > things but > >>> then offer the generalization that science is perspective. > This is the > >>> same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the > climatologists > >>> have a liberal bias. Science is based on individual > perspective until it > >>> doesn't. I'm their book is a much more nuanced discussion. > This is a > >>> really complex issue which at this particular moment has > extraordinary > >>> import. Maybe we need to find other ways to discuss this - > like warranted > >>> assertability. Perhaps I have been spending too much time > reading about > >>> the politics of climate change lately and it has spooked me. > >>> > >>> Michael > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] > >>> on behalf of David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com > ] > >>> Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > >>> > >>> And they make claims for all humankind. > >>> > >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer > >>>> > >>> > > escribi?: > >>> > >>> > >>>> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the > researchers are > >>>> > >>>> > >>> not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not diverse. > >>> > >>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss > > > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>>> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in > >>>>> > >>>> recent scientific writing. > >>> > >>> > >>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees > >>>>>> > >>>>> > escribi?: > >>> > >>> > >>>> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> of being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary > >>> socialisation?). > >>> > >>> > >>>> Rod > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >>>>>> > >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] On Behalf Of David Preiss > >>> > >>> > >>>> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 > >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > >>>>>> > >>>>>> This article is revelant for this topic: > http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~ > >>>>>> henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole > escribi?: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by > MIT is GREAT > >>>>>>> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss < > >>>>>>> daviddpreiss@gmail.com > > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to > primatology. > >>>>>>>> David > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky > > > >>>>>>>>> escribi?: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view- > >>>>>>>> affects-how-s > >>>>>>>> cience-is-done/ > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of > construction > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> and > >>> > >>> > >>>> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> contingently but > >>> > >>> > >>>> more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > >>>>>>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> ________________________________ > >>>>>> [ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. > If you > >>> are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or > other use of > >>> the information contained is strictly prohibited and you > should not rely on > >>> it. If you have received this email in error please let the > sender know > >>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails > are not > >>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth > University accepts > >>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to > scan emails > >>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept > responsibility > >>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email > or its > >>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless > accompanied > >>> by an official order form. > >>> > >>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 22 02:27:39 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 19:27:39 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> Message-ID: <541FEB8B.1080103@mira.net> Larry, you have addressed three questions to me, so I will try to respond to them in turn. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Larry Purss wrote: > I sense an *overlap* and possible synergy between notions of *changing > concepts* intentionally AND realizing changing perspectives by > *looking* with an intentional focus. > Are we referring to similar phenomena?? Well, I guess so. I was responding to Michael Glassman's response to the postmodern conservative take on science as perspectival, i.e., one perspective alongside other at least equally valid perspectives, such as Climate Change Denial. It seemed to me that Activity Theory offered an alternative to the idea of "perspectives" which are inherently relative. > Is there a bias to see perspectives AS images and concepts AS > linguistic? Is this the question of multi-modality [recently shared > on line]?? Well I think any of your "AS"es degrade the original proposition, Larry. Take the asbestos issue. People died as a result of that project. Death transcends linguistics. Likewise images. There is more than an image involved in breathing in asbestos fibres. I don't know about multimodality. > > Larry > > > > On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 10:57 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > Michael, Charles. > This is an issue which I think can be tackled by Activity Theory, > not just climate denial, but a whole range of belief/disbelief > problems like this. Social justice issues and social change in > general depend on understanding and solving these kind of > prejudice and scepticism. Postmodern relativism has given us a > poisoned chalice indeed. > > I believe that Activity Theory is well placed to solve this > category of problem and give some guidance as to how to tackle > deeply held but irrational prejudice. Developed using 'project' as > the unit of analysis I think Activity Theory gives us a really > useful theory of ideology which has the advantage of being firmly > connected to a living tradition in psychological science and > meaningfully connected to how people live their lives. > Taking Creationism as an example, among European and American > societies, the USA boasts the largest percentage of people in the > world who believe that God created the world just as it is today > about 10,000 years ago. They are rivalled only by Turkey. And it > does not correlate with lack of education. In fact, among > Republican voters, the more educated you are the more likely you > are to believe in the Old Testament story of Genesis and not > Darwin. A significant percentage of Democrat voters also believe > in Creationism, but this declines with education. > > The point is that when people evaluate evidence, as Charles was > suggesting, we do so by integrating the new data into our existing > conceptual frame. I regularly dismiss all sorts of news and > theories because it doesn't fit into my conceptual frame! We all > do. The reason why there is so much Creationism in the US is that > Darwin versus the Old Testament has been *politicised*. You prefer > the Old Testament for guidance as to the origin of species rather > than science (personal experience can shed no light on the > question) because it is a litmus test for adherence to the Good > Life, just as some people hate bicycle-riders because it is a > signal of support for Greeny ideas which are deemed hostile to the > ordinary person. I believe that Climate Denial is part of the same > issue. In Australia there are rather too many Climate Deniers > because the issue has become politicised. Officially the > conservative government accepts the science, but every knows they > don't and this is reflected in policies like appointing climate > deniers to head committees to review energy policy, repealing the > carbon price, etc., etc. There are a higher percentage of climate > deniers in Australia, as a result, than in Europe where the > climate is not politicised in that way. > > One's conceptual frame is unified through commitment to a > life-project. Opinions and evidence which don't fit the conceptual > frame generated by the central concept of a life-project, its > vision of the Good Life. There is a 10 minute talk on this in > relation to denial of the dangers posed to health by asbestos > here: > https://www.academia.edu/8179060/Activity_as_Project_The_Case_of_Asbestos > > Apologies for going on too long. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > Charles Bazerman wrote: > > Michael, > I am with you, and not only because of climate change > deniers. The sociocultural critique has been important to > show that humans make knowledge, and they do it from their own > interests and perspectives. Yet, various disciplines and > sciences, have come to know more about the world in ways that > are less entangled with the limits of individual or small > group perceptions and interests. > Disciplines do represent the world outside of themselves, > gathering data--of course selectively through their own > devices, their means of collection, forms of inscription and > display, etc... Historically, the methodological standards in > different fields have evolved to include more awareness of the > contingency, fragility, and specificity of samples, data and > analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our tools. > This is what methodology is all about. I tend to view > objectivity not as an absolute, but an awareness of ways in > which we are entangled with the phenomena we are trying to > study, and to find ways to disentangle ourselves less. > So from this perspective, incorporating the sociocultural > critique creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of > our data, representation, and analysis. Over the last few > decades, we have been struggling in different disciplines to > incorporate this critique but yet maintain the disciplinary > projects of advancing contingent, but useful and reliable > knowledge. I like your term warranted assertability. I myself > have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of being > able to give a good account of your research actions when > queried from various directions. But it is important to the > advance of knowledge that we find ways to gather and > understand information about the world (in which we are both > living parts and the constructors of knowledge about that > world including ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of > our knowledge but does not evaporate our confidence in that > knowledge into a vapor of contingency only. > > I have struggled with this issue for many years in my work on > the rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, > drawing on the work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems > important to me over many years), but more work needs to be > done to crystallize an understanding that leaves science and > social science standing despite it being created by poor, > frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed vision. > best, > Chuck > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Glassman, Michael" > > Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > > > > It seems to me that articles like this can be a double > edged sword. They use examples where culture has an > influence on how we see things but then offer the > generalization that science is perspective. This is the > same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the > climatologists have a liberal bias. Science is based on > individual perspective until it doesn't. I'm their book > is a much more nuanced discussion. This is a really > complex issue which at this particular moment has > extraordinary import. Maybe we need to find other ways to > discuss this - like warranted assertability. Perhaps I > have been spending too much time reading about the > politics of climate change lately and it has spooked me. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] on behalf of > David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com > ] > Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > > And they make claims for all humankind. > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > > > > El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer > > > > escribi?: > > > So there are two distinct problems here: First, the > researchers are > > not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not > diverse. > > > Martin > > > > On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss > > > > wrote: > > > Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies > I've seen in > > recent scientific writing. > > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > > > > El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees > > > > escribi?: > > > Great article, David - highlights the > importance (at every level) > > of being aware of what others might find odd about us > (secondary socialisation?). > > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] On Behalf Of > David Preiss > > > Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > > This article is revelant for this topic: > http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf > > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > > > > El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole > > > escribi?: > > The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" > published by MIT is GREAT > reading. Seeing this in Scientific > American is super. > > mike > > On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David > Preiss > > wrote: > > > > What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved > the references to primatology. > David > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > > > > El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter > Smagorinsky > escribi?: > > > http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-s > cience-is-done/ > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... > "processes of construction > > and > > > re- construction in which heterogeneous > resources are > > contingently but > > > more or less reliably reassembled for each > life cycle." [Oyama, > Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] > > > ________________________________ > [ > > This email and any files with it are > confidential and intended > > solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is > addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then > copying, distribution or other use of the information > contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely > on it. If you have received this email in error please let > the sender know immediately and delete it from your > system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. > While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no > responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility > to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University > does not accept responsibility for any changes made after > it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments > constitutes an order for goods or services unless > accompanied by an official order form. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From smago@uga.edu Mon Sep 22 02:31:44 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 09:31:44 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> Message-ID: Agreed David. For a second I thought the article might be from the Journal of Irreproducible Results. http://www.jir.com/ -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Preiss Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:11 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in recent scientific writing. Enviado desde mi iPhone > El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees escribi?: > > Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) of being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary socialisation?). > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Preiss > Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > > This article is revelant for this topic: > http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > >> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole escribi?: >> >> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is GREAT >> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. >> >> mike >> >> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss >> >> wrote: >> >>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to primatology. >>> David >>> >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>> >>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky escribi?: >>> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view-affects-how- >>> s >>> cience-is-done/ >> >> >> -- >> >> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and >> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently >> but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, >> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] h.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > From deva_research@lineone.net Mon Sep 22 03:02:36 2014 From: deva_research@lineone.net (John Cummins) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 11:02:36 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <541FDF39.8000301@mira.net> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FDF39.8000301@mira.net> Message-ID: <000601cfd64c$5681cf00$03856d00$@net> A great discussion! I am not sufficiently familiar with AT to comment, but there is another approach--not necessarily antagonistic to AT--availed by the study of World-views. This is still quite a nascent field, and as far as I can make out it is largely dominated by social scientists. My take on this is that we may be under-estimating the importance of biology. No one really knows why we have a World-view, in the sense of a reasonably stable and enduring conceptual and evaluative framework, through whose lens we see the world, though contributors to this discussion are certainly highly alert to the problems this brings. To the extent that biologically-oriented psychologists are beginning to study this, the favoured approach is that there are complex systems ( ie brains) that fall into certain stable configurations, and a person's World-view is such a stable configuration. Also, there are some advantages in stability--for example it enables you to have a whole raft of biases and quick and dirty heuristics. Andy sees the unifying factor as a sort of lifetime unified vision of what constitutes the good life. Alternatively, that vision could be an effect, rather than the unifying cause. For example, the sorts of values we are discussing ( religious, political, environmental etc) may tend to fall into patterns or constellations, as a sort of sub-set of the elements in one's World view. Jonathan Haidt's group has some good data on the values element of this , though as they are social scientists I don't think their explanations are biological enough. ( Please feel free to shoot me down here !). If you don't agree with this biological approach, I'd ask you to consider a question: These world views-- that we seem to defend aggressively; that we have difficulty updating; that presumably impair our ability to learn and create, and therefore presumably impact on our much-vaunted flexible intelligence----how do we square their existence with evolutionary approaches? Why have they been allowed to persist? There are only two main types of response, I suggest. Either as humans we have a talent for constructing appallingly unsuitable social conditions that create these problems, or there is an underlying biological dynamic here, involving both costs and benefits, with the rigidity of the world view having both easily identified costs, but mysterious benefits. Of course, there could be an interplay between the two factors, which I suspect is the case. Either way, we need to get this one right. Again, my two cents' worth..I think there is a biological element, and it is considerably more powerful than the 'stable configuration' dynamic mentioned above John -----Originalple, Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: 22 September 2014 09:35. Either To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder As you know, Carol, my recent research has led me through the belief-systems and activity of a range of Christian denominations and I have learnt to value the enormous contribution which Christians have made to social change activism and the pursuit of social justice over the past 400 years, before which time the question is moot. Generally speaking all sorts of theology are consistent with all sorts of social practice and even metaphysical beliefs. The correlations are complex. Believing that God created the world does not imply any kind of supposedly literal or selective reading of the Bible and nor does it necessarily imply rejection of Darwinian evolution. Surveys about Creationism usually sort people into three categories; (1) God created the world 10,000 years ago or less; (2) God created the world by means of evolution, etc., or some such formulation consistent both with science and with Christian moral convictions; and (3) God had nothing to do with it. I think you would be (2), Carol. To be a Creationist requires a huge leap of faith about immense detail. It means believing things like "God created cows so man would have milk." I don't know where Spinoza and Hegel fit in that little 3-part scheme. I don't know what you mean by "order of creation". Do you mean "God created X on the Nth day" and so on? Creationism in the US is (I believe) a political position: it is a very specific array of concepts. Belief in God is in itself not a political question. The political question is only: if you believe in God, how do you conceive of Him (or Her)? Does God approve of public health, etc? The Big Bang is something else. No physicist thinks this is a closed question. Personally I think the solution to the obvious contradictions is that time, like space, is finite but unbounded. Plausible, involves no insuperable logical contradictions, no Prime Mover or First Cause, or Before Time, but it is all still an open question. But I think to insert God wherever you find an open question is just silly. It is a bit like John R.Searle who inserts quantum uncertainty into human biology to solve the problem of free will or introducing UFOs to explain unexplained events. God is fine, but he is not the answer to any unsolved problem of physics or biology. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Carol Macdonald wrote: > Dear Andy > > I haven't kept up with the previous 15 conversations, but need to add > my tuppence worth. I believe that God created the world, but not > anything literal about the Bible. We need to know what triggered the > Big Bang. Even Richard Dawkins the professed atheist is agnostic > about this very point. Also it seems that the order of creation, > although allegorical, seems to map out the order of events, although > Biblically we really have to give "day" a different time frame. > > I just say this in case this example can be accommodated in your theory. > > Carol > > On 22 September 2014 08:58, Larry Purss > wrote: > > Andy, > > Taking project as the KEY concept and stating that projects are shared > collective desires to change *concepts* is highlighted in your > example. > The *intended* project is to change people's understanding of > asbestos as a > miracle substance to a deadly substance. > > Returning to the article Peter posted on *perspectival* assumptions as > being collective and developing the concept of *perspective* away > from its > subjective bias to taking *perspectival* as collective could be > understood > as a *project* [writing articles to change others concepts of > *perspectival* > > I sense an *overlap* and possible synergy between notions of *changing > concepts* intentionally AND realizing changing perspectives by > *looking* > with an intentional focus. > Are we referring to similar phenomena?? > The inherent stability of concepts/perspectives and the intentional > projects to change the *shape* of harmful perspectives/concepts. > Is there a bias to see perspectives AS images and concepts AS > linguistic? > Is this the question of multi-modality [recently shared on line]?? > > I appreciated the clarity of the example of asbestos workers who > shared an > understanding of asbestos [as a miracle substance that was actually > deadly] > > The relations between perspective taking, interpretive > understanding, and > concept development is the question I'm left with. > Larry > > Larry > > > > On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 10:57 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > Michael, Charles. > > This is an issue which I think can be tackled by Activity > Theory, not just > > climate denial, but a whole range of belief/disbelief problems > like this. > > Social justice issues and social change in general depend on > understanding > > and solving these kind of prejudice and scepticism. Postmodern > relativism > > has given us a poisoned chalice indeed. > > > > I believe that Activity Theory is well placed to solve this > category of > > problem and give some guidance as to how to tackle deeply held but > > irrational prejudice. Developed using 'project' as the unit of > analysis I > > think Activity Theory gives us a really useful theory of > ideology which has > > the advantage of being firmly connected to a living tradition in > > psychological science and meaningfully connected to how people > live their > > lives. > > Taking Creationism as an example, among European and American > societies, > > the USA boasts the largest percentage of people in the world who > believe > > that God created the world just as it is today about 10,000 > years ago. They > > are rivalled only by Turkey. And it does not correlate with lack of > > education. In fact, among Republican voters, the more educated > you are the > > more likely you are to believe in the Old Testament story of > Genesis and > > not Darwin. A significant percentage of Democrat voters also > believe in > > Creationism, but this declines with education. > > > > The point is that when people evaluate evidence, as Charles was > > suggesting, we do so by integrating the new data into our existing > > conceptual frame. I regularly dismiss all sorts of news and theories > > because it doesn't fit into my conceptual frame! We all do. The > reason why > > there is so much Creationism in the US is that Darwin versus the Old > > Testament has been *politicised*. You prefer the Old Testament > for guidance > > as to the origin of species rather than science (personal > experience can > > shed no light on the question) because it is a litmus test for > adherence to > > the Good Life, just as some people hate bicycle-riders because > it is a > > signal of support for Greeny ideas which are deemed hostile to > the ordinary > > person. I believe that Climate Denial is part of the same issue. In > > Australia there are rather too many Climate Deniers because the > issue has > > become politicised. Officially the conservative government > accepts the > > science, but every knows they don't and this is reflected in > policies like > > appointing climate deniers to head committees to review energy > policy, > > repealing the carbon price, etc., etc. There are a higher > percentage of > > climate deniers in Australia, as a result, than in Europe where > the climate > > is not politicised in that way. > > > > One's conceptual frame is unified through commitment to a > life-project. > > Opinions and evidence which don't fit the conceptual frame > generated by the > > central concept of a life-project, its vision of the Good Life. > There is a > > 10 minute talk on this in relation to denial of the dangers > posed to health > > by asbestos here: > https://www.academia.edu/8179060/Activity_as_Project_ > > The_Case_of_Asbestos > > > > Apologies for going on too long. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > Charles Bazerman wrote: > > > >> Michael, > >> I am with you, and not only because of climate change deniers. The > >> sociocultural critique has been important to show that humans make > >> knowledge, and they do it from their own interests and > perspectives. Yet, > >> various disciplines and sciences, have come to know more about > the world in > >> ways that are less entangled with the limits of individual or > small group > >> perceptions and interests. > >> Disciplines do represent the world outside of themselves, gathering > >> data--of course selectively through their own devices, their > means of > >> collection, forms of inscription and display, etc... > Historically, the > >> methodological standards in different fields have evolved to > include more > >> awareness of the contingency, fragility, and specificity of > samples, data > >> and analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our tools. > This is what > >> methodology is all about. I tend to view objectivity not as an > absolute, > >> but an awareness of ways in which we are entangled with the > phenomena we > >> are trying to study, and to find ways to disentangle ourselves > less. > >> So from this perspective, incorporating the sociocultural critique > >> creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of our data, > >> representation, and analysis. Over the last few decades, we > have been > >> struggling in different disciplines to incorporate this > critique but yet > >> maintain the disciplinary projects of advancing contingent, but > useful and > >> reliable knowledge. I like your term warranted assertability. > I myself > >> have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of being > able to give a > >> good account of your research actions when queried from various > directions. > >> But it is important to the advance of knowledge that we find > ways to gather > >> and understand information about the world (in which we are > both living > >> parts and the constructors of knowledge about that world including > >> ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of our knowledge but > does not > >> evaporate our confidence in that knowledge into a vapor of > contingency only. > >> > >> I have struggled with this issue for many years in my work on the > >> rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, > drawing on the > >> work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems important to me > over many > >> years), but more work needs to be done to crystallize an > understanding that > >> leaves science and social science standing despite it being > created by > >> poor, frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed vision. > >> best, > >> Chuck > >> > >> ----- Original Message ----- > >> From: "Glassman, Michael" > > >> Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > >> > >> > >> > >>> It seems to me that articles like this can be a double edged > sword. > >>> They use examples where culture has an influence on how we see > things but > >>> then offer the generalization that science is perspective. > This is the > >>> same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the > climatologists > >>> have a liberal bias. Science is based on individual > perspective until it > >>> doesn't. I'm their book is a much more nuanced discussion. > This is a > >>> really complex issue which at this particular moment has > extraordinary > >>> import. Maybe we need to find other ways to discuss this - > like warranted > >>> assertability. Perhaps I have been spending too much time > reading about > >>> the politics of climate change lately and it has spooked me. > >>> > >>> Michael > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] > >>> on behalf of David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com > ] > >>> Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > >>> > >>> And they make claims for all humankind. > >>> > >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer > >>>> > >>> > > escribi?: > >>> > >>> > >>>> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the > researchers are > >>>> > >>>> > >>> not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not diverse. > >>> > >>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss > > > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>>> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in > >>>>> > >>>> recent scientific writing. > >>> > >>> > >>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees > >>>>>> > >>>>> > escribi?: > >>> > >>> > >>>> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> of being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary > >>> socialisation?). > >>> > >>> > >>>> Rod > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >>>>>> > >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] On Behalf Of David Preiss > >>> > >>> > >>>> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 > >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > >>>>>> > >>>>>> This article is revelant for this topic: > http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~ > >>>>>> henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole > escribi?: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by > MIT is GREAT > >>>>>>> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss < > >>>>>>> daviddpreiss@gmail.com > > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to > primatology. > >>>>>>>> David > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky > > > >>>>>>>>> escribi?: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view- > >>>>>>>> affects-how-s > >>>>>>>> cience-is-done/ > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of > construction > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> and > >>> > >>> > >>>> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> contingently but > >>> > >>> > >>>> more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > >>>>>>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> ________________________________ > >>>>>> [ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. > If you > >>> are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or > other use of > >>> the information contained is strictly prohibited and you > should not rely on > >>> it. If you have received this email in error please let the > sender know > >>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails > are not > >>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth > University accepts > >>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to > scan emails > >>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept > responsibility > >>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email > or its > >>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless > accompanied > >>> by an official order form. > >>> > >>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 22 03:09:54 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 20:09:54 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <000601cfd64c$5681cf00$03856d00$@net> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FDF39.8000301@mira.net> <000601cfd64c$5681cf00$03856d00$@net> Message-ID: <541FF572.7090308@mira.net> Just three comments on yours, John. 1. I don't think world-views are marked by stability actually. What is interesting about them is that they are dynamic, continually changing. 2. I don't think world-views "impair our ability to learn and create." On the contrary, it is only thanks to culture that we can learn or create ... but of course just what we can learn and create is to some extent constrained by culture and world-views. 3. I don't think biology has a lot to tell us at this level, any more than does physics. But there are of course many different takes on these problems! :) Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ John Cummins wrote: > A great discussion! > > I am not sufficiently familiar with AT to comment, but there is another > approach--not necessarily antagonistic to AT--availed by the study of > World-views. This is still quite a nascent field, and as far as I can make > out it is largely dominated by social scientists. > > My take on this is that we may be under-estimating the importance of > biology. No one really knows why we have a World-view, in the sense of a > reasonably stable and enduring conceptual and evaluative framework, through > whose lens we see the world, though contributors to this discussion are > certainly highly alert to the problems this brings. > > To the extent that biologically-oriented psychologists are beginning to > study this, the favoured approach is that there are complex systems ( ie > brains) that fall into certain stable configurations, and a person's > World-view is such a stable configuration. Also, there are some advantages > in stability--for example it enables you to have a whole raft of biases and > quick and dirty heuristics. > > Andy sees the unifying factor as a sort of lifetime unified vision of what > constitutes the good life. Alternatively, that vision could be an effect, > rather than the unifying cause. For example, the sorts of values we are > discussing ( religious, political, environmental etc) may tend to fall into > patterns or constellations, as a sort of sub-set of the elements in one's > World view. Jonathan Haidt's group has some good data on the values element > of this , though as they are social scientists I don't think their > explanations are biological enough. ( Please feel free to shoot me down here > !). > > If you don't agree with this biological approach, I'd ask you to consider a > question: These world views-- that we seem to defend aggressively; that we > have difficulty updating; that presumably impair our ability to learn and > create, and therefore presumably impact on our much-vaunted flexible > intelligence----how do we square their existence with evolutionary > approaches? Why have they been allowed to persist? There are only two main > types of response, I suggest. Either as humans we have a talent for > constructing appallingly unsuitable social conditions that create these > problems, or there is an underlying biological dynamic here, involving both > costs and benefits, with the rigidity of the world view having both easily > identified costs, but mysterious benefits. Of course, there could be an > interplay between the two factors, which I suspect is the case. Either way, > we need to get this one right. > > Again, my two cents' worth..I think there is a biological element, and it is > considerably more powerful than the 'stable configuration' dynamic mentioned > above > > John > > -----Originalple, Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: 22 September 2014 09:35. Either > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > > As you know, Carol, my recent research has led me through the > belief-systems and activity of a range of Christian denominations and I > have learnt to value the enormous contribution which Christians have > made to social change activism and the pursuit of social justice over > the past 400 years, before which time the question is moot. Generally > speaking all sorts of theology are consistent with all sorts of social > practice and even metaphysical beliefs. The correlations are complex. > > Believing that God created the world does not imply any kind of > supposedly literal or selective reading of the Bible and nor does it > necessarily imply rejection of Darwinian evolution. Surveys about > Creationism usually sort people into three categories; (1) God created > the world 10,000 years ago or less; (2) God created the world by means > of evolution, etc., or some such formulation consistent both with > science and with Christian moral convictions; and (3) God had nothing to > do with it. I think you would be (2), Carol. To be a Creationist > requires a huge leap of faith about immense detail. It means believing > things like "God created cows so man would have milk." I don't know > where Spinoza and Hegel fit in that little 3-part scheme. I don't know > what you mean by "order of creation". Do you mean "God created X on the > Nth day" and so on? > > Creationism in the US is (I believe) a political position: it is a very > specific array of concepts. Belief in God is in itself not a political > question. The political question is only: if you believe in God, how do > you conceive of Him (or Her)? Does God approve of public health, etc? > > The Big Bang is something else. No physicist thinks this is a closed > question. Personally I think the solution to the obvious contradictions > is that time, like space, is finite but unbounded. Plausible, involves > no insuperable logical contradictions, no Prime Mover or First Cause, or > Before Time, but it is all still an open question. But I think to insert > God wherever you find an open question is just silly. It is a bit like > John R.Searle who inserts quantum uncertainty into human biology to > solve the problem of free will or introducing UFOs to explain > unexplained events. God is fine, but he is not the answer to any > unsolved problem of physics or biology. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Carol Macdonald wrote: > >> Dear Andy >> >> I haven't kept up with the previous 15 conversations, but need to add >> my tuppence worth. I believe that God created the world, but not >> anything literal about the Bible. We need to know what triggered the >> Big Bang. Even Richard Dawkins the professed atheist is agnostic >> about this very point. Also it seems that the order of creation, >> although allegorical, seems to map out the order of events, although >> Biblically we really have to give "day" a different time frame. >> >> I just say this in case this example can be accommodated in your theory. >> >> Carol >> >> On 22 September 2014 08:58, Larry Purss > > wrote: >> >> Andy, >> >> Taking project as the KEY concept and stating that projects are shared >> collective desires to change *concepts* is highlighted in your >> example. >> The *intended* project is to change people's understanding of >> asbestos as a >> miracle substance to a deadly substance. >> >> Returning to the article Peter posted on *perspectival* assumptions as >> being collective and developing the concept of *perspective* away >> from its >> subjective bias to taking *perspectival* as collective could be >> understood >> as a *project* [writing articles to change others concepts of >> *perspectival* >> >> I sense an *overlap* and possible synergy between notions of *changing >> concepts* intentionally AND realizing changing perspectives by >> *looking* >> with an intentional focus. >> Are we referring to similar phenomena?? >> The inherent stability of concepts/perspectives and the intentional >> projects to change the *shape* of harmful perspectives/concepts. >> Is there a bias to see perspectives AS images and concepts AS >> linguistic? >> Is this the question of multi-modality [recently shared on line]?? >> >> I appreciated the clarity of the example of asbestos workers who >> shared an >> understanding of asbestos [as a miracle substance that was actually >> deadly] >> >> The relations between perspective taking, interpretive >> understanding, and >> concept development is the question I'm left with. >> Larry >> >> Larry >> >> >> >> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 10:57 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> > Michael, Charles. >> > This is an issue which I think can be tackled by Activity >> Theory, not just >> > climate denial, but a whole range of belief/disbelief problems >> like this. >> > Social justice issues and social change in general depend on >> understanding >> > and solving these kind of prejudice and scepticism. Postmodern >> relativism >> > has given us a poisoned chalice indeed. >> > >> > I believe that Activity Theory is well placed to solve this >> category of >> > problem and give some guidance as to how to tackle deeply held but >> > irrational prejudice. Developed using 'project' as the unit of >> analysis I >> > think Activity Theory gives us a really useful theory of >> ideology which has >> > the advantage of being firmly connected to a living tradition in >> > psychological science and meaningfully connected to how people >> live their >> > lives. >> > Taking Creationism as an example, among European and American >> societies, >> > the USA boasts the largest percentage of people in the world who >> believe >> > that God created the world just as it is today about 10,000 >> years ago. They >> > are rivalled only by Turkey. And it does not correlate with lack of >> > education. In fact, among Republican voters, the more educated >> you are the >> > more likely you are to believe in the Old Testament story of >> Genesis and >> > not Darwin. A significant percentage of Democrat voters also >> believe in >> > Creationism, but this declines with education. >> > >> > The point is that when people evaluate evidence, as Charles was >> > suggesting, we do so by integrating the new data into our existing >> > conceptual frame. I regularly dismiss all sorts of news and theories >> > because it doesn't fit into my conceptual frame! We all do. The >> reason why >> > there is so much Creationism in the US is that Darwin versus the Old >> > Testament has been *politicised*. You prefer the Old Testament >> for guidance >> > as to the origin of species rather than science (personal >> experience can >> > shed no light on the question) because it is a litmus test for >> adherence to >> > the Good Life, just as some people hate bicycle-riders because >> it is a >> > signal of support for Greeny ideas which are deemed hostile to >> the ordinary >> > person. I believe that Climate Denial is part of the same issue. In >> > Australia there are rather too many Climate Deniers because the >> issue has >> > become politicised. Officially the conservative government >> accepts the >> > science, but every knows they don't and this is reflected in >> policies like >> > appointing climate deniers to head committees to review energy >> policy, >> > repealing the carbon price, etc., etc. There are a higher >> percentage of >> > climate deniers in Australia, as a result, than in Europe where >> the climate >> > is not politicised in that way. >> > >> > One's conceptual frame is unified through commitment to a >> life-project. >> > Opinions and evidence which don't fit the conceptual frame >> generated by the >> > central concept of a life-project, its vision of the Good Life. >> There is a >> > 10 minute talk on this in relation to denial of the dangers >> posed to health >> > by asbestos here: >> https://www.academia.edu/8179060/Activity_as_Project_ >> > The_Case_of_Asbestos >> > >> > Apologies for going on too long. >> > Andy >> > >> >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> > *Andy Blunden* >> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> > >> > >> > >> > Charles Bazerman wrote: >> > >> >> Michael, >> >> I am with you, and not only because of climate change deniers. The >> >> sociocultural critique has been important to show that humans make >> >> knowledge, and they do it from their own interests and >> perspectives. Yet, >> >> various disciplines and sciences, have come to know more about >> the world in >> >> ways that are less entangled with the limits of individual or >> small group >> >> perceptions and interests. >> >> Disciplines do represent the world outside of themselves, gathering >> >> data--of course selectively through their own devices, their >> means of >> >> collection, forms of inscription and display, etc... >> Historically, the >> >> methodological standards in different fields have evolved to >> include more >> >> awareness of the contingency, fragility, and specificity of >> samples, data >> >> and analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our tools. >> This is what >> >> methodology is all about. I tend to view objectivity not as an >> absolute, >> >> but an awareness of ways in which we are entangled with the >> phenomena we >> >> are trying to study, and to find ways to disentangle ourselves >> less. >> >> So from this perspective, incorporating the sociocultural critique >> >> creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of our data, >> >> representation, and analysis. Over the last few decades, we >> have been >> >> struggling in different disciplines to incorporate this >> critique but yet >> >> maintain the disciplinary projects of advancing contingent, but >> useful and >> >> reliable knowledge. I like your term warranted assertability. >> I myself >> >> have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of being >> able to give a >> >> good account of your research actions when queried from various >> directions. >> >> But it is important to the advance of knowledge that we find >> ways to gather >> >> and understand information about the world (in which we are >> both living >> >> parts and the constructors of knowledge about that world including >> >> ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of our knowledge but >> does not >> >> evaporate our confidence in that knowledge into a vapor of >> contingency only. >> >> >> >> I have struggled with this issue for many years in my work on the >> >> rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, >> drawing on the >> >> work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems important to me >> over many >> >> years), but more work needs to be done to crystallize an >> understanding that >> >> leaves science and social science standing despite it being >> created by >> >> poor, frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed vision. >> >> best, >> >> Chuck >> >> >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> >> From: "Glassman, Michael" > > >> >> Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> It seems to me that articles like this can be a double edged >> sword. >> >>> They use examples where culture has an influence on how we see >> things but >> >>> then offer the generalization that science is perspective. >> This is the >> >>> same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the >> climatologists >> >>> have a liberal bias. Science is based on individual >> perspective until it >> >>> doesn't. I'm their book is a much more nuanced discussion. >> This is a >> >>> really complex issue which at this particular moment has >> extraordinary >> >>> import. Maybe we need to find other ways to discuss this - >> like warranted >> >>> assertability. Perhaps I have been spending too much time >> reading about >> >>> the politics of climate change lately and it has spooked me. >> >>> >> >>> Michael >> >>> ________________________________________ >> >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] >> >>> on behalf of David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com >> ] >> >>> Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM >> >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >>> >> >>> And they make claims for all humankind. >> >>> >> >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer >> >>>> >> >>> > >> escribi?: >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the >> researchers are >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not diverse. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Martin >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss >> > >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>> wrote: >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in >> >>>>> >> >>>> recent scientific writing. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees >> >>>>>> >> >>>>> > > escribi?: >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>> of being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary >> >>> socialisation?). >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Rod >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >> >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] On Behalf Of David Preiss >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 >> >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> This article is revelant for this topic: >> http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~ >> >>>>>> henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole > > escribi?: >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by >> MIT is GREAT >> >>>>>>> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> mike >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss < >> >>>>>>> daviddpreiss@gmail.com > >> >>>>>>> wrote: >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to >> primatology. >> >>>>>>>> David >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky >> > >> >>>>>>>>> escribi?: >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view- >> >>>>>>>> affects-how-s >> >>>>>>>> cience-is-done/ >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> -- >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of >> construction >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> and >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> contingently but >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, >> >>>>>>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> ________________________________ >> >>>>>> [ >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>> solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. >> If you >> >>> are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or >> other use of >> >>> the information contained is strictly prohibited and you >> should not rely on >> >>> it. If you have received this email in error please let the >> sender know >> >>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails >> are not >> >>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth >> University accepts >> >>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to >> scan emails >> >>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept >> responsibility >> >>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email >> or its >> >>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless >> accompanied >> >>> by an official order form. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > >> > >> > >> > >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> Developmental psycholinguist >> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> >> >> >> > > > > From deva_research@lineone.net Mon Sep 22 03:31:44 2014 From: deva_research@lineone.net (John Cummins) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 11:31:44 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <541FF572.7090308@mira.net> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FDF39.8000301@mira.net> <000601cfd64c$5681cf00$03856d00$@net> <541FF572.7090308@mira.net> Message-ID: <000001cfd650$67ff0e10$37fd2a30$@net> Hi Andy, Thanks for the comments. I'm a fellow traveller in the sense of hoping that you are right, and that social problems can be dealt with by the time-honoured methods of education and social activism. The problem is that the stakes at this stage ( not least environmental) are far too high for us not to be investigating other factors, in this case biological. Biological and social approaches are not at all antagonistic, at least in my view. Also, regarding long-term stability, to what extent do you see one's world view as being related to one's personality and one's self concept? John -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: 22 September 2014 11:10 To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder Just three comments on yours, John. 1. I don't think world-views are marked by stability actually. What is interesting about them is that they are dynamic, continually changing. 2. I don't think world-views "impair our ability to learn and create." On the contrary, it is only thanks to culture that we can learn or create ... but of course just what we can learn and create is to some extent constrained by culture and world-views. 3. I don't think biology has a lot to tell us at this level, any more than does physics. But there are of course many different takes on these problems! :) Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ John Cummins wrote: > A great discussion! > > I am not sufficiently familiar with AT to comment, but there is another > approach--not necessarily antagonistic to AT--availed by the study of > World-views. This is still quite a nascent field, and as far as I can make > out it is largely dominated by social scientists. > > My take on this is that we may be under-estimating the importance of > biology. No one really knows why we have a World-view, in the sense of a > reasonably stable and enduring conceptual and evaluative framework, through > whose lens we see the world, though contributors to this discussion are > certainly highly alert to the problems this brings. > > To the extent that biologically-oriented psychologists are beginning to > study this, the favoured approach is that there are complex systems ( ie > brains) that fall into certain stable configurations, and a person's > World-view is such a stable configuration. Also, there are some advantages > in stability--for example it enables you to have a whole raft of biases and > quick and dirty heuristics. > > Andy sees the unifying factor as a sort of lifetime unified vision of what > constitutes the good life. Alternatively, that vision could be an effect, > rather than the unifying cause. For example, the sorts of values we are > discussing ( religious, political, environmental etc) may tend to fall into > patterns or constellations, as a sort of sub-set of the elements in one's > World view. Jonathan Haidt's group has some good data on the values element > of this , though as they are social scientists I don't think their > explanations are biological enough. ( Please feel free to shoot me down here > !). > > If you don't agree with this biological approach, I'd ask you to consider a > question: These world views-- that we seem to defend aggressively; that we > have difficulty updating; that presumably impair our ability to learn and > create, and therefore presumably impact on our much-vaunted flexible > intelligence----how do we square their existence with evolutionary > approaches? Why have they been allowed to persist? There are only two main > types of response, I suggest. Either as humans we have a talent for > constructing appallingly unsuitable social conditions that create these > problems, or there is an underlying biological dynamic here, involving both > costs and benefits, with the rigidity of the world view having both easily > identified costs, but mysterious benefits. Of course, there could be an > interplay between the two factors, which I suspect is the case. Either way, > we need to get this one right. > > Again, my two cents' worth..I think there is a biological element, and it is > considerably more powerful than the 'stable configuration' dynamic mentioned > above > > John > > -----Originalple, Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: 22 September 2014 09:35. Either > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > > As you know, Carol, my recent research has led me through the > belief-systems and activity of a range of Christian denominations and I > have learnt to value the enormous contribution which Christians have > made to social change activism and the pursuit of social justice over > the past 400 years, before which time the question is moot. Generally > speaking all sorts of theology are consistent with all sorts of social > practice and even metaphysical beliefs. The correlations are complex. > > Believing that God created the world does not imply any kind of > supposedly literal or selective reading of the Bible and nor does it > necessarily imply rejection of Darwinian evolution. Surveys about > Creationism usually sort people into three categories; (1) God created > the world 10,000 years ago or less; (2) God created the world by means > of evolution, etc., or some such formulation consistent both with > science and with Christian moral convictions; and (3) God had nothing to > do with it. I think you would be (2), Carol. To be a Creationist > requires a huge leap of faith about immense detail. It means believing > things like "God created cows so man would have milk." I don't know > where Spinoza and Hegel fit in that little 3-part scheme. I don't know > what you mean by "order of creation". Do you mean "God created X on the > Nth day" and so on? > > Creationism in the US is (I believe) a political position: it is a very > specific array of concepts. Belief in God is in itself not a political > question. The political question is only: if you believe in God, how do > you conceive of Him (or Her)? Does God approve of public health, etc? > > The Big Bang is something else. No physicist thinks this is a closed > question. Personally I think the solution to the obvious contradictions > is that time, like space, is finite but unbounded. Plausible, involves > no insuperable logical contradictions, no Prime Mover or First Cause, or > Before Time, but it is all still an open question. But I think to insert > God wherever you find an open question is just silly. It is a bit like > John R.Searle who inserts quantum uncertainty into human biology to > solve the problem of free will or introducing UFOs to explain > unexplained events. God is fine, but he is not the answer to any > unsolved problem of physics or biology. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Carol Macdonald wrote: > >> Dear Andy >> >> I haven't kept up with the previous 15 conversations, but need to add >> my tuppence worth. I believe that God created the world, but not >> anything literal about the Bible. We need to know what triggered the >> Big Bang. Even Richard Dawkins the professed atheist is agnostic >> about this very point. Also it seems that the order of creation, >> although allegorical, seems to map out the order of events, although >> Biblically we really have to give "day" a different time frame. >> >> I just say this in case this example can be accommodated in your theory. >> >> Carol >> >> On 22 September 2014 08:58, Larry Purss > > wrote: >> >> Andy, >> >> Taking project as the KEY concept and stating that projects are shared >> collective desires to change *concepts* is highlighted in your >> example. >> The *intended* project is to change people's understanding of >> asbestos as a >> miracle substance to a deadly substance. >> >> Returning to the article Peter posted on *perspectival* assumptions as >> being collective and developing the concept of *perspective* away >> from its >> subjective bias to taking *perspectival* as collective could be >> understood >> as a *project* [writing articles to change others concepts of >> *perspectival* >> >> I sense an *overlap* and possible synergy between notions of *changing >> concepts* intentionally AND realizing changing perspectives by >> *looking* >> with an intentional focus. >> Are we referring to similar phenomena?? >> The inherent stability of concepts/perspectives and the intentional >> projects to change the *shape* of harmful perspectives/concepts. >> Is there a bias to see perspectives AS images and concepts AS >> linguistic? >> Is this the question of multi-modality [recently shared on line]?? >> >> I appreciated the clarity of the example of asbestos workers who >> shared an >> understanding of asbestos [as a miracle substance that was actually >> deadly] >> >> The relations between perspective taking, interpretive >> understanding, and >> concept development is the question I'm left with. >> Larry >> >> Larry >> >> >> >> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 10:57 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> > Michael, Charles. >> > This is an issue which I think can be tackled by Activity >> Theory, not just >> > climate denial, but a whole range of belief/disbelief problems >> like this. >> > Social justice issues and social change in general depend on >> understanding >> > and solving these kind of prejudice and scepticism. Postmodern >> relativism >> > has given us a poisoned chalice indeed. >> > >> > I believe that Activity Theory is well placed to solve this >> category of >> > problem and give some guidance as to how to tackle deeply held but >> > irrational prejudice. Developed using 'project' as the unit of >> analysis I >> > think Activity Theory gives us a really useful theory of >> ideology which has >> > the advantage of being firmly connected to a living tradition in >> > psychological science and meaningfully connected to how people >> live their >> > lives. >> > Taking Creationism as an example, among European and American >> societies, >> > the USA boasts the largest percentage of people in the world who >> believe >> > that God created the world just as it is today about 10,000 >> years ago. They >> > are rivalled only by Turkey. And it does not correlate with lack of >> > education. In fact, among Republican voters, the more educated >> you are the >> > more likely you are to believe in the Old Testament story of >> Genesis and >> > not Darwin. A significant percentage of Democrat voters also >> believe in >> > Creationism, but this declines with education. >> > >> > The point is that when people evaluate evidence, as Charles was >> > suggesting, we do so by integrating the new data into our existing >> > conceptual frame. I regularly dismiss all sorts of news and theories >> > because it doesn't fit into my conceptual frame! We all do. The >> reason why >> > there is so much Creationism in the US is that Darwin versus the Old >> > Testament has been *politicised*. You prefer the Old Testament >> for guidance >> > as to the origin of species rather than science (personal >> experience can >> > shed no light on the question) because it is a litmus test for >> adherence to >> > the Good Life, just as some people hate bicycle-riders because >> it is a >> > signal of support for Greeny ideas which are deemed hostile to >> the ordinary >> > person. I believe that Climate Denial is part of the same issue. In >> > Australia there are rather too many Climate Deniers because the >> issue has >> > become politicised. Officially the conservative government >> accepts the >> > science, but every knows they don't and this is reflected in >> policies like >> > appointing climate deniers to head committees to review energy >> policy, >> > repealing the carbon price, etc., etc. There are a higher >> percentage of >> > climate deniers in Australia, as a result, than in Europe where >> the climate >> > is not politicised in that way. >> > >> > One's conceptual frame is unified through commitment to a >> life-project. >> > Opinions and evidence which don't fit the conceptual frame >> generated by the >> > central concept of a life-project, its vision of the Good Life. >> There is a >> > 10 minute talk on this in relation to denial of the dangers >> posed to health >> > by asbestos here: >> https://www.academia.edu/8179060/Activity_as_Project_ >> > The_Case_of_Asbestos >> > >> > Apologies for going on too long. >> > Andy >> > >> >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> > *Andy Blunden* >> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> > >> > >> > >> > Charles Bazerman wrote: >> > >> >> Michael, >> >> I am with you, and not only because of climate change deniers. The >> >> sociocultural critique has been important to show that humans make >> >> knowledge, and they do it from their own interests and >> perspectives. Yet, >> >> various disciplines and sciences, have come to know more about >> the world in >> >> ways that are less entangled with the limits of individual or >> small group >> >> perceptions and interests. >> >> Disciplines do represent the world outside of themselves, gathering >> >> data--of course selectively through their own devices, their >> means of >> >> collection, forms of inscription and display, etc... >> Historically, the >> >> methodological standards in different fields have evolved to >> include more >> >> awareness of the contingency, fragility, and specificity of >> samples, data >> >> and analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our tools. >> This is what >> >> methodology is all about. I tend to view objectivity not as an >> absolute, >> >> but an awareness of ways in which we are entangled with the >> phenomena we >> >> are trying to study, and to find ways to disentangle ourselves >> less. >> >> So from this perspective, incorporating the sociocultural critique >> >> creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of our data, >> >> representation, and analysis. Over the last few decades, we >> have been >> >> struggling in different disciplines to incorporate this >> critique but yet >> >> maintain the disciplinary projects of advancing contingent, but >> useful and >> >> reliable knowledge. I like your term warranted assertability. >> I myself >> >> have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of being >> able to give a >> >> good account of your research actions when queried from various >> directions. >> >> But it is important to the advance of knowledge that we find >> ways to gather >> >> and understand information about the world (in which we are >> both living >> >> parts and the constructors of knowledge about that world including >> >> ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of our knowledge but >> does not >> >> evaporate our confidence in that knowledge into a vapor of >> contingency only. >> >> >> >> I have struggled with this issue for many years in my work on the >> >> rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, >> drawing on the >> >> work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems important to me >> over many >> >> years), but more work needs to be done to crystallize an >> understanding that >> >> leaves science and social science standing despite it being >> created by >> >> poor, frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed vision. >> >> best, >> >> Chuck >> >> >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> >> From: "Glassman, Michael" > > >> >> Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> It seems to me that articles like this can be a double edged >> sword. >> >>> They use examples where culture has an influence on how we see >> things but >> >>> then offer the generalization that science is perspective. >> This is the >> >>> same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the >> climatologists >> >>> have a liberal bias. Science is based on individual >> perspective until it >> >>> doesn't. I'm their book is a much more nuanced discussion. >> This is a >> >>> really complex issue which at this particular moment has >> extraordinary >> >>> import. Maybe we need to find other ways to discuss this - >> like warranted >> >>> assertability. Perhaps I have been spending too much time >> reading about >> >>> the politics of climate change lately and it has spooked me. >> >>> >> >>> Michael >> >>> ________________________________________ >> >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] >> >>> on behalf of David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com >> ] >> >>> Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM >> >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >>> >> >>> And they make claims for all humankind. >> >>> >> >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer >> >>>> >> >>> > >> escribi?: >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the >> researchers are >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not diverse. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Martin >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss >> > >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>> wrote: >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in >> >>>>> >> >>>> recent scientific writing. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees >> >>>>>> >> >>>>> > > escribi?: >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>> of being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary >> >>> socialisation?). >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Rod >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >> >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] On Behalf Of David Preiss >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 >> >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> This article is revelant for this topic: >> http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~ >> >>>>>> henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole > > escribi?: >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by >> MIT is GREAT >> >>>>>>> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> mike >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss < >> >>>>>>> daviddpreiss@gmail.com > >> >>>>>>> wrote: >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to >> primatology. >> >>>>>>>> David >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky >> > >> >>>>>>>>> escribi?: >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view- >> >>>>>>>> affects-how-s >> >>>>>>>> cience-is-done/ >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> -- >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of >> construction >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> and >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> contingently but >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, >> >>>>>>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> ________________________________ >> >>>>>> [ >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>> solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. >> If you >> >>> are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or >> other use of >> >>> the information contained is strictly prohibited and you >> should not rely on >> >>> it. If you have received this email in error please let the >> sender know >> >>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails >> are not >> >>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth >> University accepts >> >>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to >> scan emails >> >>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept >> responsibility >> >>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email >> or its >> >>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless >> accompanied >> >>> by an official order form. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > >> > >> > >> > >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> Developmental psycholinguist >> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> >> >> >> > > > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Mon Sep 22 03:41:28 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 06:41:28 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder Message-ID: The fundamental question for me is, knowing that just about everything we do may possibly be enframed by culture, can we in an husserlian sense bracket culture to get at the noumena? ?I believe that there is a noumenal world that we can know about once we deconstruct the aspect of our species-being that conceals the noumenal world from us. ?Ideology, language, our senses, etc. are all aspects of our species-being that, paradoxically conceals and reveals the noumenal world to us. ?This is a bit positivist on my part, but i believe that the objective of philosophy and science is to understand and deconstruct the ways our species-being limits us in order so that we can devise ways using technology to understand the nature of reality as such, paradoxically, through our species-being. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info? Race and Class Distinctions within Black Communities? www.routledge.com/9780415714372 -------- Original message -------- From: Andy Blunden Date: 09/22/2014 4:35 AM (GMT-05:00) To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder As you know, Carol, my recent research has led me through the belief-systems and activity of a range of Christian denominations and I have learnt to value the enormous contribution which Christians have made to social change activism and the pursuit of social justice over the past 400 years, before which time the question is moot. Generally speaking all sorts of theology are consistent with all sorts of social practice and even metaphysical beliefs. The correlations are complex. Believing that God created the world does not imply any kind of supposedly literal or selective reading of the Bible and nor does it necessarily imply rejection of Darwinian evolution. Surveys about Creationism usually sort people into three categories; (1) God created the world 10,000 years ago or less; (2) God created the world by means of evolution, etc., or some such formulation consistent both with science and with Christian moral convictions; and (3) God had nothing to do with it. I think you would be (2), Carol. To be a Creationist requires a huge leap of faith about immense detail. It means believing things like "God created cows so man would have milk." I don't know where Spinoza and Hegel fit in that little 3-part scheme. I don't know what you mean by "order of creation". Do you mean "God created X on the Nth day" and so on? Creationism in the US is (I believe) a political position: it is a very specific array of concepts. Belief in God is in itself not a political question. The political question is only: if you believe in God, how do you conceive of Him (or Her)? Does God approve of public health, etc? The Big Bang is something else. No physicist thinks this is a closed question. Personally I think the solution to the obvious contradictions is that time, like space, is finite but unbounded. Plausible, involves no insuperable logical contradictions, no Prime Mover or First Cause, or Before Time, but it is all still an open question. But I think to insert God wherever you find an open question is just silly. It is a bit like John R.Searle who inserts quantum uncertainty into human biology to solve the problem of free will or introducing UFOs to explain unexplained events. God is fine, but he is not the answer to any unsolved problem of physics or biology. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Carol Macdonald wrote: > Dear Andy > > I haven't kept up with the previous 15 conversations, but need to add > my tuppence worth. I believe that God created the world, but not > anything literal about the Bible. We need to know what triggered the > Big Bang. Even Richard Dawkins the professed atheist is agnostic > about this very point. Also it seems that the order of creation, > although allegorical, seems to map out the order of events, although > Biblically we really have to give "day" a different time frame. > > I just say this in case this example can be accommodated in your theory. > > Carol > > On 22 September 2014 08:58, Larry Purss > wrote: > > Andy, > > Taking project as the KEY concept and stating that projects are shared > collective desires to change *concepts* is highlighted in your > example. > The *intended* project is to change people's understanding of > asbestos as a > miracle substance to a deadly substance. > > Returning to the article Peter posted on *perspectival* assumptions as > being collective and developing the concept of *perspective* away > from its > subjective bias to taking *perspectival* as collective could be > understood > as a *project* [writing articles to change others concepts of > *perspectival* > > I sense an *overlap* and possible synergy between notions of *changing > concepts* intentionally AND realizing changing perspectives by > *looking* > with an intentional focus. > Are we referring to similar phenomena?? > The inherent stability of concepts/perspectives and the intentional > projects to change the *shape* of harmful perspectives/concepts. > Is there a bias to see perspectives AS images and concepts AS > linguistic? > Is this the question of multi-modality [recently shared on line]?? > > I appreciated the clarity of the example of asbestos workers who > shared an > understanding of asbestos [as a miracle substance that was actually > deadly] > > The relations between perspective taking, interpretive > understanding, and > concept development is the question I'm left with. > Larry > > Larry > > > > On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 10:57 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > Michael, Charles. > > This is an issue which I think can be tackled by Activity > Theory, not just > > climate denial, but a whole range of belief/disbelief problems > like this. > > Social justice issues and social change in general depend on > understanding > > and solving these kind of prejudice and scepticism. Postmodern > relativism > > has given us a poisoned chalice indeed. > > > > I believe that Activity Theory is well placed to solve this > category of > > problem and give some guidance as to how to tackle deeply held but > > irrational prejudice. Developed using 'project' as the unit of > analysis I > > think Activity Theory gives us a really useful theory of > ideology which has > > the advantage of being firmly connected to a living tradition in > > psychological science and meaningfully connected to how people > live their > > lives. > > Taking Creationism as an example, among European and American > societies, > > the USA boasts the largest percentage of people in the world who > believe > > that God created the world just as it is today about 10,000 > years ago. They > > are rivalled only by Turkey. And it does not correlate with lack of > > education. In fact, among Republican voters, the more educated > you are the > > more likely you are to believe in the Old Testament story of > Genesis and > > not Darwin. A significant percentage of Democrat voters also > believe in > > Creationism, but this declines with education. > > > > The point is that when people evaluate evidence, as Charles was > > suggesting, we do so by integrating the new data into our existing > > conceptual frame. I regularly dismiss all sorts of news and theories > > because it doesn't fit into my conceptual frame! We all do. The > reason why > > there is so much Creationism in the US is that Darwin versus the Old > > Testament has been *politicised*. You prefer the Old Testament > for guidance > > as to the origin of species rather than science (personal > experience can > > shed no light on the question) because it is a litmus test for > adherence to > > the Good Life, just as some people hate bicycle-riders because > it is a > > signal of support for Greeny ideas which are deemed hostile to > the ordinary > > person. I believe that Climate Denial is part of the same issue. In > > Australia there are rather too many Climate Deniers because the > issue has > > become politicised. Officially the conservative government > accepts the > > science, but every knows they don't and this is reflected in > policies like > > appointing climate deniers to head committees to review energy > policy, > > repealing the carbon price, etc., etc. There are a higher > percentage of > > climate deniers in Australia, as a result, than in Europe where > the climate > > is not politicised in that way. > > > > One's conceptual frame is unified through commitment to a > life-project. > > Opinions and evidence which don't fit the conceptual frame > generated by the > > central concept of a life-project, its vision of the Good Life. > There is a > > 10 minute talk on this in relation to denial of the dangers > posed to health > > by asbestos here: > https://www.academia.edu/8179060/Activity_as_Project_ > > The_Case_of_Asbestos > > > > Apologies for going on too long. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > Charles Bazerman wrote: > > > >> Michael, > >> I am with you, and not only because of climate change deniers. The > >> sociocultural critique has been important to show that humans make > >> knowledge, and they do it from their own interests and > perspectives. Yet, > >> various disciplines and sciences, have come to know more about > the world in > >> ways that are less entangled with the limits of individual or > small group > >> perceptions and interests. > >> Disciplines do represent the world outside of themselves, gathering > >> data--of course selectively through their own devices, their > means of > >> collection, forms of inscription and display, etc... > Historically, the > >> methodological standards in different fields have evolved to > include more > >> awareness of the contingency, fragility, and specificity of > samples, data > >> and analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our tools. > This is what > >> methodology is all about. I tend to view objectivity not as an > absolute, > >> but an awareness of ways in which we are entangled with the > phenomena we > >> are trying to study, and to find ways to disentangle ourselves > less. > >> So from this perspective, incorporating the sociocultural critique > >> creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of our data, > >> representation, and analysis. Over the last few decades, we > have been > >> struggling in different disciplines to incorporate this > critique but yet > >> maintain the disciplinary projects of advancing contingent, but > useful and > >> reliable knowledge. I like your term warranted assertability. > I myself > >> have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of being > able to give a > >> good account of your research actions when queried from various > directions. > >> But it is important to the advance of knowledge that we find > ways to gather > >> and understand information about the world (in which we are > both living > >> parts and the constructors of knowledge about that world including > >> ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of our knowledge but > does not > >> evaporate our confidence in that knowledge into a vapor of > contingency only. > >> > >> I have struggled with this issue for many years in my work on the > >> rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, > drawing on the > >> work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems important to me > over many > >> years), but more work needs to be done to crystallize an > understanding that > >> leaves science and social science standing despite it being > created by > >> poor, frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed vision. > >> best, > >> Chuck > >> > >> ----- Original Message ----- > >> From: "Glassman, Michael" > > >> Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > >> > >> > >> > >>> It seems to me that articles like this can be a double edged > sword. > >>> They use examples where culture has an influence on how we see > things but > >>> then offer the generalization that science is perspective. > This is the > >>> same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the > climatologists > >>> have a liberal bias. Science is based on individual > perspective until it > >>> doesn't. I'm their book is a much more nuanced discussion. > This is a > >>> really complex issue which at this particular moment has > extraordinary > >>> import. Maybe we need to find other ways to discuss this - > like warranted > >>> assertability. Perhaps I have been spending too much time > reading about > >>> the politics of climate change lately and it has spooked me. > >>> > >>> Michael > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] > >>> on behalf of David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com > ] > >>> Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > >>> > >>> And they make claims for all humankind. > >>> > >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer > >>>> > >>> > > escribi?: > >>> > >>> > >>>> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the > researchers are > >>>> > >>>> > >>> not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not diverse. > >>> > >>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss > > > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>>> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in > >>>>> > >>>> recent scientific writing. > >>> > >>> > >>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees > >>>>>> > >>>>> > escribi?: > >>> > >>> > >>>> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> of being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary > >>> socialisation?). > >>> > >>> > >>>> Rod > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >>>>>> > >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] On Behalf Of David Preiss > >>> > >>> > >>>> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 > >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > >>>>>> > >>>>>> This article is revelant for this topic: > http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~ > >>>>>> henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole > escribi?: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by > MIT is GREAT > >>>>>>> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss < > >>>>>>> daviddpreiss@gmail.com > > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to > primatology. > >>>>>>>> David > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky > > > >>>>>>>>> escribi?: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view- > >>>>>>>> affects-how-s > >>>>>>>> cience-is-done/ > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of > construction > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> and > >>> > >>> > >>>> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> contingently but > >>> > >>> > >>>> more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > >>>>>>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> ________________________________ > >>>>>> [ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. > If you > >>> are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or > other use of > >>> the information contained is strictly prohibited and you > should not rely on > >>> it. If you have received this email in error please let the > sender know > >>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails > are not > >>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth > University accepts > >>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to > scan emails > >>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept > responsibility > >>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email > or its > >>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless > accompanied > >>> by an official order form. > >>> > >>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > From patrick.jaki@gmail.com Mon Sep 22 04:46:18 2014 From: patrick.jaki@gmail.com (Patrick Jaki) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 13:46:18 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <541FDF39.8000301@mira.net> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FDF39.8000301@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, let me attempt a response to some of the things you have said in response to Carol. Largely I am in agree with you. Yes (Christian) theology is consistent with social practices and metaphysical beliefs. The three surveys you allude to state the findings based on how the question is asked. I believe if the questions are asked differently, it is probable that the findings might be also different. If Carol is in 2, i.e., where creation and evolution interface, does it not follow that details about creation become superfluous? Is it just possible that creationism started it and evolution continues to complete it? I say so because of the reference made to 'faith' and 'details'. My position is that my understanding of faith requires the opposite, i.e., complete details become irrelevant. What counts is the truth of the activity. In this case that creationism accounts for the ontological beginnings of things. Does God approve of a health system? Yes, a just health system. This is embedded in the social practices and is linked to the Christian metaphysical beliefs as provided for in the idea of a just God. To God in every unexplained occurrence is rather a common phenomenon. For example, a child dies of some disease and it is exclaimed: It was God's will that he should die. In this case it is the death that is unexplained. I am loath to accept such apportionment of responsibility. But is there something that can be said, in theology, that the answer solely rests with God? And why not in some instances of physics and biology? I don't know if I am taking away or adding to the discussion. Patrick On 22 September 2014 10:35, Andy Blunden wrote: > As you know, Carol, my recent research has led me through the > belief-systems and activity of a range of Christian denominations and I > have learnt to value the enormous contribution which Christians have made > to social change activism and the pursuit of social justice over the past > 400 years, before which time the question is moot. Generally speaking all > sorts of theology are consistent with all sorts of social practice and even > metaphysical beliefs. The correlations are complex. > > Believing that God created the world does not imply any kind of supposedly > literal or selective reading of the Bible and nor does it necessarily imply > rejection of Darwinian evolution. Surveys about Creationism usually sort > people into three categories; (1) God created the world 10,000 years ago or > less; (2) God created the world by means of evolution, etc., or some such > formulation consistent both with science and with Christian moral > convictions; and (3) God had nothing to do with it. I think you would be > (2), Carol. To be a Creationist requires a huge leap of faith about immense > detail. It means believing things like "God created cows so man would have > milk." I don't know where Spinoza and Hegel fit in that little 3-part > scheme. I don't know what you mean by "order of creation". Do you mean "God > created X on the Nth day" and so on? > > Creationism in the US is (I believe) a political position: it is a very > specific array of concepts. Belief in God is in itself not a political > question. The political question is only: if you believe in God, how do you > conceive of Him (or Her)? Does God approve of public health, etc? > > The Big Bang is something else. No physicist thinks this is a closed > question. Personally I think the solution to the obvious contradictions is > that time, like space, is finite but unbounded. Plausible, involves no > insuperable logical contradictions, no Prime Mover or First Cause, or > Before Time, but it is all still an open question. But I think to insert > God wherever you find an open question is just silly. It is a bit like John > R.Searle who inserts quantum uncertainty into human biology to solve the > problem of free will or introducing UFOs to explain unexplained events. God > is fine, but he is not the answer to any unsolved problem of physics or > biology. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Carol Macdonald wrote: > >> Dear Andy >> >> I haven't kept up with the previous 15 conversations, but need to add my >> tuppence worth. I believe that God created the world, but not anything >> literal about the Bible. We need to know what triggered the Big Bang. >> Even Richard Dawkins the professed atheist is agnostic about this very >> point. Also it seems that the order of creation, although allegorical, >> seems to map out the order of events, although Biblically we really have to >> give "day" a different time frame. >> >> I just say this in case this example can be accommodated in your theory. >> >> Carol >> >> On 22 September 2014 08:58, Larry Purss > lpscholar2@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> Andy, >> >> Taking project as the KEY concept and stating that projects are shared >> collective desires to change *concepts* is highlighted in your >> example. >> The *intended* project is to change people's understanding of >> asbestos as a >> miracle substance to a deadly substance. >> >> Returning to the article Peter posted on *perspectival* assumptions as >> being collective and developing the concept of *perspective* away >> from its >> subjective bias to taking *perspectival* as collective could be >> understood >> as a *project* [writing articles to change others concepts of >> *perspectival* >> >> I sense an *overlap* and possible synergy between notions of *changing >> concepts* intentionally AND realizing changing perspectives by >> *looking* >> with an intentional focus. >> Are we referring to similar phenomena?? >> The inherent stability of concepts/perspectives and the intentional >> projects to change the *shape* of harmful perspectives/concepts. >> Is there a bias to see perspectives AS images and concepts AS >> linguistic? >> Is this the question of multi-modality [recently shared on line]?? >> >> I appreciated the clarity of the example of asbestos workers who >> shared an >> understanding of asbestos [as a miracle substance that was actually >> deadly] >> >> The relations between perspective taking, interpretive >> understanding, and >> concept development is the question I'm left with. >> Larry >> >> Larry >> >> >> >> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 10:57 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> > Michael, Charles. >> > This is an issue which I think can be tackled by Activity >> Theory, not just >> > climate denial, but a whole range of belief/disbelief problems >> like this. >> > Social justice issues and social change in general depend on >> understanding >> > and solving these kind of prejudice and scepticism. Postmodern >> relativism >> > has given us a poisoned chalice indeed. >> > >> > I believe that Activity Theory is well placed to solve this >> category of >> > problem and give some guidance as to how to tackle deeply held but >> > irrational prejudice. Developed using 'project' as the unit of >> analysis I >> > think Activity Theory gives us a really useful theory of >> ideology which has >> > the advantage of being firmly connected to a living tradition in >> > psychological science and meaningfully connected to how people >> live their >> > lives. >> > Taking Creationism as an example, among European and American >> societies, >> > the USA boasts the largest percentage of people in the world who >> believe >> > that God created the world just as it is today about 10,000 >> years ago. They >> > are rivalled only by Turkey. And it does not correlate with lack of >> > education. In fact, among Republican voters, the more educated >> you are the >> > more likely you are to believe in the Old Testament story of >> Genesis and >> > not Darwin. A significant percentage of Democrat voters also >> believe in >> > Creationism, but this declines with education. >> > >> > The point is that when people evaluate evidence, as Charles was >> > suggesting, we do so by integrating the new data into our existing >> > conceptual frame. I regularly dismiss all sorts of news and theories >> > because it doesn't fit into my conceptual frame! We all do. The >> reason why >> > there is so much Creationism in the US is that Darwin versus the Old >> > Testament has been *politicised*. You prefer the Old Testament >> for guidance >> > as to the origin of species rather than science (personal >> experience can >> > shed no light on the question) because it is a litmus test for >> adherence to >> > the Good Life, just as some people hate bicycle-riders because >> it is a >> > signal of support for Greeny ideas which are deemed hostile to >> the ordinary >> > person. I believe that Climate Denial is part of the same issue. In >> > Australia there are rather too many Climate Deniers because the >> issue has >> > become politicised. Officially the conservative government >> accepts the >> > science, but every knows they don't and this is reflected in >> policies like >> > appointing climate deniers to head committees to review energy >> policy, >> > repealing the carbon price, etc., etc. There are a higher >> percentage of >> > climate deniers in Australia, as a result, than in Europe where >> the climate >> > is not politicised in that way. >> > >> > One's conceptual frame is unified through commitment to a >> life-project. >> > Opinions and evidence which don't fit the conceptual frame >> generated by the >> > central concept of a life-project, its vision of the Good Life. >> There is a >> > 10 minute talk on this in relation to denial of the dangers >> posed to health >> > by asbestos here: >> https://www.academia.edu/8179060/Activity_as_Project_ >> > The_Case_of_Asbestos >> > >> > Apologies for going on too long. >> > Andy >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> > *Andy Blunden* >> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> > >> > >> > >> > Charles Bazerman wrote: >> > >> >> Michael, >> >> I am with you, and not only because of climate change deniers. The >> >> sociocultural critique has been important to show that humans make >> >> knowledge, and they do it from their own interests and >> perspectives. Yet, >> >> various disciplines and sciences, have come to know more about >> the world in >> >> ways that are less entangled with the limits of individual or >> small group >> >> perceptions and interests. >> >> Disciplines do represent the world outside of themselves, gathering >> >> data--of course selectively through their own devices, their >> means of >> >> collection, forms of inscription and display, etc... >> Historically, the >> >> methodological standards in different fields have evolved to >> include more >> >> awareness of the contingency, fragility, and specificity of >> samples, data >> >> and analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our tools. >> This is what >> >> methodology is all about. I tend to view objectivity not as an >> absolute, >> >> but an awareness of ways in which we are entangled with the >> phenomena we >> >> are trying to study, and to find ways to disentangle ourselves >> less. >> >> So from this perspective, incorporating the sociocultural critique >> >> creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of our data, >> >> representation, and analysis. Over the last few decades, we >> have been >> >> struggling in different disciplines to incorporate this >> critique but yet >> >> maintain the disciplinary projects of advancing contingent, but >> useful and >> >> reliable knowledge. I like your term warranted assertability. >> I myself >> >> have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of being >> able to give a >> >> good account of your research actions when queried from various >> directions. >> >> But it is important to the advance of knowledge that we find >> ways to gather >> >> and understand information about the world (in which we are >> both living >> >> parts and the constructors of knowledge about that world including >> >> ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of our knowledge but >> does not >> >> evaporate our confidence in that knowledge into a vapor of >> contingency only. >> >> >> >> I have struggled with this issue for many years in my work on the >> >> rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, >> drawing on the >> >> work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems important to me >> over many >> >> years), but more work needs to be done to crystallize an >> understanding that >> >> leaves science and social science standing despite it being >> created by >> >> poor, frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed vision. >> >> best, >> >> Chuck >> >> >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> >> From: "Glassman, Michael" > > >> >> Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> It seems to me that articles like this can be a double edged >> sword. >> >>> They use examples where culture has an influence on how we see >> things but >> >>> then offer the generalization that science is perspective. >> This is the >> >>> same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the >> climatologists >> >>> have a liberal bias. Science is based on individual >> perspective until it >> >>> doesn't. I'm their book is a much more nuanced discussion. >> This is a >> >>> really complex issue which at this particular moment has >> extraordinary >> >>> import. Maybe we need to find other ways to discuss this - >> like warranted >> >>> assertability. Perhaps I have been spending too much time >> reading about >> >>> the politics of climate change lately and it has spooked me. >> >>> >> >>> Michael >> >>> ________________________________________ >> >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] >> >>> on behalf of David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com >> ] >> >>> Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM >> >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >>> >> >>> And they make claims for all humankind. >> >>> >> >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer >> >>>> >> >>> > >> escribi?: >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the >> researchers are >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not diverse. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Martin >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss >> > >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>> wrote: >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in >> >>>>> >> >>>> recent scientific writing. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees >> >>>>>> >> >>>>> > > escribi?: >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>> of being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary >> >>> socialisation?). >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Rod >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >> >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] On Behalf Of David Preiss >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 >> >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> This article is revelant for this topic: >> http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~ >> >>>>>> henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole > > escribi?: >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by >> MIT is GREAT >> >>>>>>> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> mike >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss < >> >>>>>>> daviddpreiss@gmail.com > >> >>>>>>> wrote: >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to >> primatology. >> >>>>>>>> David >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky >> > >> >> >>>>>>>>> escribi?: >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view- >> >>>>>>>> affects-how-s >> >>>>>>>> cience-is-done/ >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> -- >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of >> construction >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> and >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> contingently but >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, >> >>>>>>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> ________________________________ >> >>>>>> [ >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>> solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. >> If you >> >>> are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or >> other use of >> >>> the information contained is strictly prohibited and you >> should not rely on >> >>> it. If you have received this email in error please let the >> sender know >> >>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails >> are not >> >>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth >> University accepts >> >>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to >> scan emails >> >>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept >> responsibility >> >>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email >> or its >> >>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless >> accompanied >> >>> by an official order form. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > >> > >> > >> > >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> Developmental psycholinguist >> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of >> Linguistics, Unisa >> >> >> >> > -- *Odwora Jaki* *Mob: (27) 079 643 1097 <%2827%29%C2%A0%20079%20643%201097>P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Sep 22 05:56:22 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 13:56:22 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> Message-ID: > > > One's conceptual frame is unified through commitment to a life-project. > Opinions and evidence which don't fit the conceptual frame generated by the > central concept of a life-project, its vision of the Good Life. There is a > 10 minute talk on this in relation to denial of the dangers posed to health > by asbestos here: https://www.academia.edu/8179060/Activity_as_Project_ > The_Case_of_Asbestos > > Apologies for going on too long. > Andy > I've caught up with this thread, briefly. Andy, I think your article could be tightened up a little on the notion of objective as simple. You make the case towards the end that objective need should not be considered as unproblematic (which can be generalised to the notion that anything objective should not be taken as unproblematic). However you also state early on: "Far from there being any need which is met by asbestos and provides an objective motive for its production, it is now universally acknowledged that asbestos kills people." Which, to me, seems to confuse the substance with the functional (technological) properties deemed to be of good value, i.e. that it would be a mistake to state that asbestos itself fulfils a need, rather it is the functional relations fulfilled and established by it, that was deemed productive. I don't think this undermines your point about projects here, but it does, I think, change the view that Leontyev's formulation was not adequate sociologically, to an assertion about how to construe motive (i.e. as related to a means of production). There is, of course, a new danger that one takes the concept in "projects" as some new kind of fixed point. But I think there is already a tradition here, in the form of myth as a means of production. Best, Huw > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Charles Bazerman wrote: > >> Michael, >> I am with you, and not only because of climate change deniers. The >> sociocultural critique has been important to show that humans make >> knowledge, and they do it from their own interests and perspectives. Yet, >> various disciplines and sciences, have come to know more about the world in >> ways that are less entangled with the limits of individual or small group >> perceptions and interests. >> Disciplines do represent the world outside of themselves, gathering >> data--of course selectively through their own devices, their means of >> collection, forms of inscription and display, etc... Historically, the >> methodological standards in different fields have evolved to include more >> awareness of the contingency, fragility, and specificity of samples, data >> and analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our tools. This is what >> methodology is all about. I tend to view objectivity not as an absolute, >> but an awareness of ways in which we are entangled with the phenomena we >> are trying to study, and to find ways to disentangle ourselves less. >> So from this perspective, incorporating the sociocultural critique >> creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of our data, >> representation, and analysis. Over the last few decades, we have been >> struggling in different disciplines to incorporate this critique but yet >> maintain the disciplinary projects of advancing contingent, but useful and >> reliable knowledge. I like your term warranted assertability. I myself >> have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of being able to give a >> good account of your research actions when queried from various directions. >> But it is important to the advance of knowledge that we find ways to gather >> and understand information about the world (in which we are both living >> parts and the constructors of knowledge about that world including >> ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of our knowledge but does not >> evaporate our confidence in that knowledge into a vapor of contingency only. >> >> I have struggled with this issue for many years in my work on the >> rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, drawing on the >> work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems important to me over many >> years), but more work needs to be done to crystallize an understanding that >> leaves science and social science standing despite it being created by >> poor, frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed vision. >> best, >> Chuck >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: "Glassman, Michael" >> Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> >> >> >>> It seems to me that articles like this can be a double edged sword. >>> They use examples where culture has an influence on how we see things but >>> then offer the generalization that science is perspective. This is the >>> same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the climatologists >>> have a liberal bias. Science is based on individual perspective until it >>> doesn't. I'm their book is a much more nuanced discussion. This is a >>> really complex issue which at this particular moment has extraordinary >>> import. Maybe we need to find other ways to discuss this - like warranted >>> assertability. Perhaps I have been spending too much time reading about >>> the politics of climate change lately and it has spooked me. >>> >>> Michael >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>> on behalf of David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com] >>> Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >>> >>> And they make claims for all humankind. >>> >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>> >>> >>> >>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer >>>> >>> escribi?: >>> >>> >>>> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the researchers are >>>> >>>> >>> not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not diverse. >>> >>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss >>>>> >>>>> >>>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in >>>>> >>>> recent scientific writing. >>> >>> >>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees >>>>>> >>>>> escribi?: >>> >>> >>>> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> of being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary >>> socialisation?). >>> >>> >>>> Rod >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Preiss >>> >>> >>>> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >>>>>> >>>>>> This article is revelant for this topic: http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~ >>>>>> henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >>>>>> >>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole escribi?: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is GREAT >>>>>>> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss < >>>>>>> daviddpreiss@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to primatology. >>>>>>>> David >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky >>>>>>>>> escribi?: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view- >>>>>>>> affects-how-s >>>>>>>> cience-is-done/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> and >>> >>> >>>> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are >>>>>>> >>>>>> contingently but >>> >>> >>>> more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, >>>>>>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> ________________________________ >>>>>> [ >>>>>> >>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you >>> are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of >>> the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on >>> it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts >>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails >>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility >>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied >>> by an official order form. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 22 06:14:30 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 23:14:30 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FDF39.8000301@mira.net> Message-ID: <542020B6.4090405@mira.net> Patrick, I don't know if perhaps I have opened up a line of discussion which can only end in unhappiness. I don't think we've ever had a discussion of theology on xmca. I don't know that it is feasible. I think that theological position which accepts natural processes as a sufficient basis for explaining the world, but in some way or another credits the creation of these processes, or their initiation, or the formation of the laws governing them, or whatever, to God, does no harm to most scientific activity. After all, Isaac Newton himself thought that God set the universe in motion, and there is plenty of evidence that these kinds of theological beliefs are compatible with scientific work. But let's not get carried away with that. Evolution by natural selection is *the* basic principle of biology. There is no science of biology without it. Creationism was what I was talking about, not one of the Deistic beliefs which are quite commonly held by practising, perfectly intelligent scientists. I will stick to my closing line from before though: God is not the answer to any unsolved problem of physics or biology. Ask a metaphysical question, you get a metaphysical answer. You mention the case of some child dying and the response: "It was God's will." I don't see this as meaning that God was causally responsible, rather than the bus that ran over the child. But the luck, the chance, or whatever, that it was *this* child and not some other. "It is in the hands of God." Leaving aside issues like vulnerability due to economic conditions, etc., such judgments are not contrary to science. It is just a way of finding meaning in what is in itself meaningless, but can be vested with meaning by, for example, a grieving community. Of course, it is to be hoped that children are still told to look both ways before crossing the road. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Patrick Jaki wrote: > Andy, let me attempt a response to some of the things you have said in > response to Carol. Largely I am in agree with you. > > Yes (Christian) theology is consistent with social practices and > metaphysical beliefs. The three surveys you allude to state the > findings based on how the question is asked. I believe if the > questions are asked differently, it is probable that the findings > might be also different. > > If Carol is in 2, i.e., where creation and evolution interface, does > it not follow that details about creation become superfluous? Is it > just possible that creationism started it and evolution continues to > complete it? I say so because of the reference made to 'faith' and > 'details'. My position is that my understanding of faith requires the > opposite, i.e., complete details become irrelevant. What counts is > the truth of the activity. In this case that creationism accounts for > the ontological beginnings of things. > > Does God approve of a health system? Yes, a just health system. This > is embedded in the social practices and is linked to the Christian > metaphysical beliefs as provided for in the idea of a just God. > > To God in every unexplained occurrence is rather a common phenomenon. > For example, a child dies of some disease and it is exclaimed: It was > God's will that he should die. In this case it is the death that is > unexplained. I am loath to accept such apportionment of > responsibility. But is there something that can be said, in theology, > that the answer solely rests with God? And why not in some instances > of physics and biology? > > I don't know if I am taking away or adding to the discussion. > > Patrick > > > > > On 22 September 2014 10:35, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > As you know, Carol, my recent research has led me through the > belief-systems and activity of a range of Christian denominations > and I have learnt to value the enormous contribution which > Christians have made to social change activism and the pursuit of > social justice over the past 400 years, before which time the > question is moot. Generally speaking all sorts of theology are > consistent with all sorts of social practice and even metaphysical > beliefs. The correlations are complex. > > Believing that God created the world does not imply any kind of > supposedly literal or selective reading of the Bible and nor does > it necessarily imply rejection of Darwinian evolution. Surveys > about Creationism usually sort people into three categories; (1) > God created the world 10,000 years ago or less; (2) God created > the world by means of evolution, etc., or some such formulation > consistent both with science and with Christian moral convictions; > and (3) God had nothing to do with it. I think you would be (2), > Carol. To be a Creationist requires a huge leap of faith about > immense detail. It means believing things like "God created cows > so man would have milk." I don't know where Spinoza and Hegel fit > in that little 3-part scheme. I don't know what you mean by "order > of creation". Do you mean "God created X on the Nth day" and so on? > > Creationism in the US is (I believe) a political position: it is a > very specific array of concepts. Belief in God is in itself not a > political question. The political question is only: if you believe > in God, how do you conceive of Him (or Her)? Does God approve of > public health, etc? > > The Big Bang is something else. No physicist thinks this is a > closed question. Personally I think the solution to the obvious > contradictions is that time, like space, is finite but unbounded. > Plausible, involves no insuperable logical contradictions, no > Prime Mover or First Cause, or Before Time, but it is all still an > open question. But I think to insert God wherever you find an open > question is just silly. It is a bit like John R.Searle who inserts > quantum uncertainty into human biology to solve the problem of > free will or introducing UFOs to explain unexplained events. God > is fine, but he is not the answer to any unsolved problem of > physics or biology. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Carol Macdonald wrote: > > Dear Andy > > I haven't kept up with the previous 15 conversations, but need > to add my tuppence worth. I believe that God created the > world, but not anything literal about the Bible. We need to > know what triggered the Big Bang. Even Richard Dawkins the > professed atheist is agnostic about this very point. Also it > seems that the order of creation, although allegorical, seems > to map out the order of events, although Biblically we really > have to give "day" a different time frame. > > I just say this in case this example can be accommodated in > your theory. > > Carol > > On 22 September 2014 08:58, Larry Purss >> wrote: > > Andy, > > Taking project as the KEY concept and stating that > projects are shared > collective desires to change *concepts* is highlighted in your > example. > The *intended* project is to change people's understanding of > asbestos as a > miracle substance to a deadly substance. > > Returning to the article Peter posted on *perspectival* > assumptions as > being collective and developing the concept of > *perspective* away > from its > subjective bias to taking *perspectival* as collective > could be > understood > as a *project* [writing articles to change others concepts of > *perspectival* > > I sense an *overlap* and possible synergy between notions > of *changing > concepts* intentionally AND realizing changing perspectives by > *looking* > with an intentional focus. > Are we referring to similar phenomena?? > The inherent stability of concepts/perspectives and the > intentional > projects to change the *shape* of harmful > perspectives/concepts. > Is there a bias to see perspectives AS images and concepts AS > linguistic? > Is this the question of multi-modality [recently shared on > line]?? > > I appreciated the clarity of the example of asbestos > workers who > shared an > understanding of asbestos [as a miracle substance that was > actually > deadly] > > The relations between perspective taking, interpretive > understanding, and > concept development is the question I'm left with. > Larry > > Larry > > > > On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 10:57 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > > Michael, Charles. > > This is an issue which I think can be tackled by Activity > Theory, not just > > climate denial, but a whole range of belief/disbelief > problems > like this. > > Social justice issues and social change in general depend on > understanding > > and solving these kind of prejudice and scepticism. > Postmodern > relativism > > has given us a poisoned chalice indeed. > > > > I believe that Activity Theory is well placed to solve this > category of > > problem and give some guidance as to how to tackle > deeply held but > > irrational prejudice. Developed using 'project' as the > unit of > analysis I > > think Activity Theory gives us a really useful theory of > ideology which has > > the advantage of being firmly connected to a living > tradition in > > psychological science and meaningfully connected to how > people > live their > > lives. > > Taking Creationism as an example, among European and > American > societies, > > the USA boasts the largest percentage of people in the > world who > believe > > that God created the world just as it is today about 10,000 > years ago. They > > are rivalled only by Turkey. And it does not correlate > with lack of > > education. In fact, among Republican voters, the more > educated > you are the > > more likely you are to believe in the Old Testament story of > Genesis and > > not Darwin. A significant percentage of Democrat voters also > believe in > > Creationism, but this declines with education. > > > > The point is that when people evaluate evidence, as > Charles was > > suggesting, we do so by integrating the new data into > our existing > > conceptual frame. I regularly dismiss all sorts of news > and theories > > because it doesn't fit into my conceptual frame! We all > do. The > reason why > > there is so much Creationism in the US is that Darwin > versus the Old > > Testament has been *politicised*. You prefer the Old > Testament > for guidance > > as to the origin of species rather than science (personal > experience can > > shed no light on the question) because it is a litmus > test for > adherence to > > the Good Life, just as some people hate bicycle-riders > because > it is a > > signal of support for Greeny ideas which are deemed > hostile to > the ordinary > > person. I believe that Climate Denial is part of the > same issue. In > > Australia there are rather too many Climate Deniers > because the > issue has > > become politicised. Officially the conservative government > accepts the > > science, but every knows they don't and this is reflected in > policies like > > appointing climate deniers to head committees to review > energy > policy, > > repealing the carbon price, etc., etc. There are a higher > percentage of > > climate deniers in Australia, as a result, than in > Europe where > the climate > > is not politicised in that way. > > > > One's conceptual frame is unified through commitment to a > life-project. > > Opinions and evidence which don't fit the conceptual frame > generated by the > > central concept of a life-project, its vision of the > Good Life. > There is a > > 10 minute talk on this in relation to denial of the dangers > posed to health > > by asbestos here: > https://www.academia.edu/8179060/Activity_as_Project_ > > The_Case_of_Asbestos > > > > Apologies for going on too long. > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > > Charles Bazerman wrote: > > > >> Michael, > >> I am with you, and not only because of climate change > deniers. The > >> sociocultural critique has been important to show that > humans make > >> knowledge, and they do it from their own interests and > perspectives. Yet, > >> various disciplines and sciences, have come to know > more about > the world in > >> ways that are less entangled with the limits of > individual or > small group > >> perceptions and interests. > >> Disciplines do represent the world outside of > themselves, gathering > >> data--of course selectively through their own devices, > their > means of > >> collection, forms of inscription and display, etc... > Historically, the > >> methodological standards in different fields have > evolved to > include more > >> awareness of the contingency, fragility, and specificity of > samples, data > >> and analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our > tools. This is what > >> methodology is all about. I tend to view objectivity > not as an > absolute, > >> but an awareness of ways in which we are entangled with the > phenomena we > >> are trying to study, and to find ways to disentangle > ourselves > less. > >> So from this perspective, incorporating the > sociocultural critique > >> creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of > our data, > >> representation, and analysis. Over the last few decades, we > have been > >> struggling in different disciplines to incorporate this > critique but yet > >> maintain the disciplinary projects of advancing > contingent, but > useful and > >> reliable knowledge. I like your term warranted > assertability. > I myself > >> have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of > being > able to give a > >> good account of your research actions when queried from > various > directions. > >> But it is important to the advance of knowledge that we > find > ways to gather > >> and understand information about the world (in which we are > both living > >> parts and the constructors of knowledge about that > world including > >> ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of our > knowledge but > does not > >> evaporate our confidence in that knowledge into a vapor of > contingency only. > >> > >> I have struggled with this issue for many years in my > work on the > >> rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, > drawing on the > >> work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems important > to me > over many > >> years), but more work needs to be done to crystallize an > understanding that > >> leaves science and social science standing despite it being > created by > >> poor, frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed > vision. > >> best, > >> Chuck > >> > >> ----- Original Message ----- > >> From: "Glassman, Michael" > >> > >> Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > >> > >> > >> > >> > >>> It seems to me that articles like this can be a double > edged > sword. > >>> They use examples where culture has an influence on > how we see > things but > >>> then offer the generalization that science is > perspective. This is the > >>> same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the > climatologists > >>> have a liberal bias. Science is based on individual > perspective until it > >>> doesn't. I'm their book is a much more nuanced > discussion. This is a > >>> really complex issue which at this particular moment has > extraordinary > >>> import. Maybe we need to find other ways to discuss > this - > like warranted > >>> assertability. Perhaps I have been spending too much time > reading about > >>> the politics of climate change lately and it has > spooked me. > >>> > >>> Michael > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >] > >>> on behalf of David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com > > >] > >>> Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > >>> > >>> And they make claims for all humankind. > >>> > >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer > >>>> > >>> > >> > escribi?: > >>> > >>> > >>>> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the > researchers are > >>>> > >>>> > >>> not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are > not diverse. > >>> > >>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss > > >> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>>> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've > seen in > >>>>> > >>>> recent scientific writing. > >>> > >>> > >>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >> escribi?: > >>> > >>> > >>>> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at > every level) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> of being aware of what others might find odd about > us (secondary > >>> socialisation?). > >>> > >>> > >>>> Rod > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >>>>>> > >>>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >] On Behalf Of David > Preiss > >>> > >>> > >>>> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 > >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > >>>>>> > >>>>>> This article is revelant for this topic: > http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~ > > >>>>>> henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole > > >> escribi?: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" > published by > MIT is GREAT > >>>>>>> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss < > >>>>>>> daviddpreiss@gmail.com > >> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to > primatology. > >>>>>>>> David > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky > > >> > > >>>>>>>>> escribi?: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view- > >>>>>>>> affects-how-s > >>>>>>>> cience-is-done/ > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of > construction > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> and > >>> > >>> > >>>> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> contingently but > >>> > >>> > >>>> more or less reliably reassembled for each life > cycle." [Oyama, > >>>>>>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> ________________________________ > >>>>>> [ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential > and intended > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is > addressed. > If you > >>> are not the intended recipient then copying, > distribution or > other use of > >>> the information contained is strictly prohibited and you > should not rely on > >>> it. If you have received this email in error please > let the > sender know > >>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). > Internet emails > are not > >>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth > University accepts > >>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your > responsibility to > scan emails > >>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept > responsibility > >>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in > this email > or its > >>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services > unless > accompanied > >>> by an official order form. > >>> > >>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: > Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > > > > > -- > *Odwora Jaki* > > *Mob: (27) 079 643 1097 > > P. O Box 505 > Wits > Johannesburg > 2050 > > _South Africa_* From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 22 06:32:47 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 23:32:47 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> Message-ID: <542024FF.6040702@mira.net> It's an 12 minute talk, Huw, (8 mins for discussion) aimed at critiquing the foundations of AT, proposing a new foundation, and presenting an outline of how asbestos was first produced and then banned. :) The full story is in the book. But thanks for the pointer. I'll try to address it. I don't touch on AN Leontyev's dualism of need and object, but you have raised it. There is a need for insulation material for buildings. There is also a need for buildings that don't give you cancer. The need for insulation does not find an adequate object in asbestos because asbestos fails to meet the need for safety. A need can be met by different objects. I can resolve that contradiction by spelling out the need more precisely. But asbestos production *was* the object and yet it didn't meet the need - for safe insulation. But the real object of the talk is to critique the idea that if a social formation is producing something (either because the Central Ctee said so or because the market said so) then ipso facto there is an objective need for it. This is OK for dealing with the child who is not doing their homework and failing to learn to read. The teacher with some good reason thinks they have the final say, the Truth, about the objective need for literacy. But the fact is that the Central Committee and the Market both get it very wrong sometimes. And these are after all, for social theory, the interesting cases. In large measure that is the problem I am addressing myself to. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > One's conceptual frame is unified through commitment to a > life-project. Opinions and evidence which don't fit the conceptual > frame generated by the central concept of a life-project, its > vision of the Good Life. There is a 10 minute talk on this in > relation to denial of the dangers posed to health by asbestos > here: > https://www.academia.edu/8179060/Activity_as_Project_The_Case_of_Asbestos > > Apologies for going on too long. > Andy > > > I've caught up with this thread, briefly. > > Andy, I think your article could be tightened up a little on the > notion of objective as simple. You make the case towards the end that > objective need should not be considered as unproblematic (which can be > generalised to the notion that anything objective should not be taken > as unproblematic). However you also state early on: > > "Far from there being any need which is met by asbestos and provides > an objective motive for its production, it is now universally > acknowledged that asbestos kills people." > > Which, to me, seems to confuse the substance with the functional > (technological) properties deemed to be of good value, i.e. that it > would be a mistake to state that asbestos itself fulfils a need, > rather it is the functional relations fulfilled and established by it, > that was deemed productive. > > I don't think this undermines your point about projects here, but it > does, I think, change the view that Leontyev's formulation was not > adequate sociologically, to an assertion about how to construe motive > (i.e. as related to a means of production). > > There is, of course, a new danger that one takes the concept in > "projects" as some new kind of fixed point. But I think there is > already a tradition here, in the form of myth as a means of production. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > Charles Bazerman wrote: > > Michael, > I am with you, and not only because of climate change > deniers. The sociocultural critique has been important to > show that humans make knowledge, and they do it from their own > interests and perspectives. Yet, various disciplines and > sciences, have come to know more about the world in ways that > are less entangled with the limits of individual or small > group perceptions and interests. > Disciplines do represent the world outside of themselves, > gathering data--of course selectively through their own > devices, their means of collection, forms of inscription and > display, etc... Historically, the methodological standards in > different fields have evolved to include more awareness of the > contingency, fragility, and specificity of samples, data and > analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our tools. > This is what methodology is all about. I tend to view > objectivity not as an absolute, but an awareness of ways in > which we are entangled with the phenomena we are trying to > study, and to find ways to disentangle ourselves less. > So from this perspective, incorporating the sociocultural > critique creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of > our data, representation, and analysis. Over the last few > decades, we have been struggling in different disciplines to > incorporate this critique but yet maintain the disciplinary > projects of advancing contingent, but useful and reliable > knowledge. I like your term warranted assertability. I myself > have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of being > able to give a good account of your research actions when > queried from various directions. But it is important to the > advance of knowledge that we find ways to gather and > understand information about the world (in which we are both > living parts and the constructors of knowledge about that > world including ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of > our knowledge but does not evaporate our confidence in that > knowledge into a vapor of contingency only. > > I have struggled with this issue for many years in my work on > the rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, > drawing on the work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems > important to me over many years), but more work needs to be > done to crystallize an understanding that leaves science and > social science standing despite it being created by poor, > frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed vision. > best, > Chuck > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Glassman, Michael" > > Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > > > > It seems to me that articles like this can be a double > edged sword. They use examples where culture has an > influence on how we see things but then offer the > generalization that science is perspective. This is the > same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the > climatologists have a liberal bias. Science is based on > individual perspective until it doesn't. I'm their book > is a much more nuanced discussion. This is a really > complex issue which at this particular moment has > extraordinary import. Maybe we need to find other ways to > discuss this - like warranted assertability. Perhaps I > have been spending too much time reading about the > politics of climate change lately and it has spooked me. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] on behalf of > David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com > ] > Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > > And they make claims for all humankind. > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > > > > El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer > > > > escribi?: > > > So there are two distinct problems here: First, the > researchers are > > not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not > diverse. > > > Martin > > > > On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss > > > > wrote: > > > Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies > I've seen in > > recent scientific writing. > > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > > > > El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees > > > > escribi?: > > > Great article, David - highlights the > importance (at every level) > > of being aware of what others might find odd about us > (secondary socialisation?). > > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] On Behalf Of > David Preiss > > > Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > > This article is revelant for this topic: > http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf > > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > > > > El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole > > > escribi?: > > The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" > published by MIT is GREAT > reading. Seeing this in Scientific > American is super. > > mike > > On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David > Preiss > > wrote: > > > > What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved > the references to primatology. > David > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > > > > El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter > Smagorinsky > escribi?: > > > http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-s > cience-is-done/ > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... > "processes of construction > > and > > > re- construction in which heterogeneous > resources are > > contingently but > > > more or less reliably reassembled for each > life cycle." [Oyama, > Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] > > > ________________________________ > [ > > This email and any files with it are > confidential and intended > > solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is > addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then > copying, distribution or other use of the information > contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely > on it. If you have received this email in error please let > the sender know immediately and delete it from your > system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. > While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no > responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility > to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University > does not accept responsibility for any changes made after > it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments > constitutes an order for goods or services unless > accompanied by an official order form. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Sep 22 07:08:13 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 07:08:13 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <541FEB8B.1080103@mira.net> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FEB8B.1080103@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, I want to draw attention to your comment: "science as perspectival, i.e., one perspective alongside other at least equally valid perspectives, such as Climate Change Denial. It seemed to me that Activity Theory offered an alternative to the idea of "perspectives" which are inherently relative." The *idea* of perspectives which are INHERENTLY relative seems to be the *complex* aspect of the understanding of *perspectives*. The assumption that you have your perspective and I have my perspective and Creationism co-exists alongside Evolution. Andy, if we *look* at the idea of *perspectives* not as merely relative, but also shared [and even *general] we seem to be occupying similar realms to the notion of *developing concepts*. The comment that in contrast to *perspectives* which are *relative* concepts are NOT as relative [or possibly more shared and therefore warrante BECAUSE asbestos ACTUALLY KILLS, we are now in the realm of *IS* and the understanding that we must ACT [and develop concepts] to respond to the actual *IS*. [actual existence]. I have a *sense* there is actually more overlap between the concept *perspective* and the concept *concept*. The notion of *activity theory* as *holding to a course* [charting a course] that stays *true to course* with a *steady bearing* gestures to Merleau Ponty's understanding of SENS [as inclusive of BOTH sense and direction] My comments can be *seen* as holding to a particular *course* as does *activity theory* Merleau-Ponty's notion of *chiasm* where binocular vision is NOT a summing of two distinct monocular visions but a gestalt re-configuration that *envelops* and *deepens* [metaphorically] relative perspectives which when they *lead to* [ZPD ?] *taking a bearing* and moving in a SHARED direction can be viewed AS *activity theory*. Creationism [or the *sensation fallacy* of M-P's project] can be viewed as *perspectives* or as *concepts* which hopefully call forth the need for SHARED responses/activity. Raymond Williams understanding of *determinism* and *overdeterminism* seems to have a place in this exploration of activity, directions, bearings, taking a course and other actual material events *realized* metaphorically. Larry On Mon, Sep 22, 2014 at 2:27 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Larry, you have addressed three questions to me, so I will try to respond > to them in turn. > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > Larry Purss wrote: > >> I sense an *overlap* and possible synergy between notions of *changing >> concepts* intentionally AND realizing changing perspectives by *looking* >> with an intentional focus. Are we referring to similar phenomena?? >> > Well, I guess so. I was responding to Michael Glassman's response to the > postmodern conservative take on science as perspectival, i.e., one > perspective alongside other at least equally valid perspectives, such as > Climate Change Denial. It seemed to me that Activity Theory offered an > alternative to the idea of "perspectives" which are inherently relative. > >> Is there a bias to see perspectives AS images and concepts AS >> linguistic? Is this the question of multi-modality [recently shared on >> line]?? >> > Well I think any of your "AS"es degrade the original proposition, Larry. > Take the asbestos issue. People died as a result of that project. Death > transcends linguistics. Likewise images. There is more than an image > involved in breathing in asbestos fibres. I don't know about multimodality. > >> >> Larry >> >> >> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 10:57 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> Michael, Charles. >> This is an issue which I think can be tackled by Activity Theory, >> not just climate denial, but a whole range of belief/disbelief >> problems like this. Social justice issues and social change in >> general depend on understanding and solving these kind of >> prejudice and scepticism. Postmodern relativism has given us a >> poisoned chalice indeed. >> >> I believe that Activity Theory is well placed to solve this >> category of problem and give some guidance as to how to tackle >> deeply held but irrational prejudice. Developed using 'project' as >> the unit of analysis I think Activity Theory gives us a really >> useful theory of ideology which has the advantage of being firmly >> connected to a living tradition in psychological science and >> meaningfully connected to how people live their lives. >> Taking Creationism as an example, among European and American >> societies, the USA boasts the largest percentage of people in the >> world who believe that God created the world just as it is today >> about 10,000 years ago. They are rivalled only by Turkey. And it >> does not correlate with lack of education. In fact, among >> Republican voters, the more educated you are the more likely you >> are to believe in the Old Testament story of Genesis and not >> Darwin. A significant percentage of Democrat voters also believe >> in Creationism, but this declines with education. >> >> The point is that when people evaluate evidence, as Charles was >> suggesting, we do so by integrating the new data into our existing >> conceptual frame. I regularly dismiss all sorts of news and >> theories because it doesn't fit into my conceptual frame! We all >> do. The reason why there is so much Creationism in the US is that >> Darwin versus the Old Testament has been *politicised*. You prefer >> the Old Testament for guidance as to the origin of species rather >> than science (personal experience can shed no light on the >> question) because it is a litmus test for adherence to the Good >> Life, just as some people hate bicycle-riders because it is a >> signal of support for Greeny ideas which are deemed hostile to the >> ordinary person. I believe that Climate Denial is part of the same >> issue. In Australia there are rather too many Climate Deniers >> because the issue has become politicised. Officially the >> conservative government accepts the science, but every knows they >> don't and this is reflected in policies like appointing climate >> deniers to head committees to review energy policy, repealing the >> carbon price, etc., etc. There are a higher percentage of climate >> deniers in Australia, as a result, than in Europe where the >> climate is not politicised in that way. >> >> One's conceptual frame is unified through commitment to a >> life-project. Opinions and evidence which don't fit the conceptual >> frame generated by the central concept of a life-project, its >> vision of the Good Life. There is a 10 minute talk on this in >> relation to denial of the dangers posed to health by asbestos >> here: >> https://www.academia.edu/8179060/Activity_as_Project_ >> The_Case_of_Asbestos >> >> Apologies for going on too long. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> Charles Bazerman wrote: >> >> Michael, >> I am with you, and not only because of climate change >> deniers. The sociocultural critique has been important to >> show that humans make knowledge, and they do it from their own >> interests and perspectives. Yet, various disciplines and >> sciences, have come to know more about the world in ways that >> are less entangled with the limits of individual or small >> group perceptions and interests. >> Disciplines do represent the world outside of themselves, >> gathering data--of course selectively through their own >> devices, their means of collection, forms of inscription and >> display, etc... Historically, the methodological standards in >> different fields have evolved to include more awareness of the >> contingency, fragility, and specificity of samples, data and >> analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our tools. >> This is what methodology is all about. I tend to view >> objectivity not as an absolute, but an awareness of ways in >> which we are entangled with the phenomena we are trying to >> study, and to find ways to disentangle ourselves less. >> So from this perspective, incorporating the sociocultural >> critique creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of >> our data, representation, and analysis. Over the last few >> decades, we have been struggling in different disciplines to >> incorporate this critique but yet maintain the disciplinary >> projects of advancing contingent, but useful and reliable >> knowledge. I like your term warranted assertability. I myself >> have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of being >> able to give a good account of your research actions when >> queried from various directions. But it is important to the >> advance of knowledge that we find ways to gather and >> understand information about the world (in which we are both >> living parts and the constructors of knowledge about that >> world including ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of >> our knowledge but does not evaporate our confidence in that >> knowledge into a vapor of contingency only. >> >> I have struggled with this issue for many years in my work on >> the rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, >> drawing on the work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems >> important to me over many years), but more work needs to be >> done to crystallize an understanding that leaves science and >> social science standing despite it being created by poor, >> frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed vision. >> best, >> Chuck >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: "Glassman, Michael" > > >> Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> > >> >> >> It seems to me that articles like this can be a double >> edged sword. They use examples where culture has an >> influence on how we see things but then offer the >> generalization that science is perspective. This is the >> same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the >> climatologists have a liberal bias. Science is based on >> individual perspective until it doesn't. I'm their book >> is a much more nuanced discussion. This is a really >> complex issue which at this particular moment has >> extraordinary import. Maybe we need to find other ways to >> discuss this - like warranted assertability. Perhaps I >> have been spending too much time reading about the >> politics of climate change lately and it has spooked me. >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] on behalf of >> David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com >> ] >> Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >> And they make claims for all humankind. >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer >> > >> escribi?: >> >> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the >> researchers are >> not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not >> diverse. >> >> Martin >> >> >> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss >> > > >> wrote: >> >> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies >> I've seen in >> recent scientific writing. >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees >> >> > > escribi?: >> >> Great article, David - highlights the >> importance (at every level) >> of being aware of what others might find odd about us >> (secondary socialisation?). >> >> Rod >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] On Behalf Of >> David Preiss >> >> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >> This article is revelant for this topic: >> http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~ >> henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >> > 7Ehenrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf> >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole >> > >> escribi?: >> >> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" >> published by MIT is GREAT >> reading. Seeing this in Scientific >> American is super. >> >> mike >> >> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David >> Preiss > > >> wrote: >> >> >> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved >> the references to primatology. >> David >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter >> Smagorinsky > > escribi?: >> >> >> http://www.scientificamerican. >> com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-s >> cience-is-done/ >> >> -- >> >> Development and Evolution are both ... >> "processes of construction >> and >> >> re- construction in which heterogeneous >> resources are >> contingently but >> >> more or less reliably reassembled for each >> life cycle." [Oyama, >> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] >> >> ________________________________ >> [ >> >> This email and any files with it are >> confidential and intended >> solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is >> addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then >> copying, distribution or other use of the information >> contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely >> on it. If you have received this email in error please let >> the sender know immediately and delete it from your >> system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. >> While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no >> responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility >> to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University >> does not accept responsibility for any changes made after >> it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments >> constitutes an order for goods or services unless >> accompanied by an official order form. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > From dkirsh@lsu.edu Mon Sep 22 08:02:59 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 15:02:59 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FEB8B.1080103@mira.net> Message-ID: <22e89f518fea43f39ee2fbb249e7eab3@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Let's not write-off relativism too quickly. Asbestos "ACTUALLY KILLS," not because asbestos actually kills, but because we are entrenched in a scientific ideology that maintains asbestos kills. Perhaps others on this list are more sophisticated in their scientific knowledge than me, but I have no personal knowledge of how or why asbestos kills, and I could easily be persuaded otherwise (for example, it took about 30 seconds for me to come to firmly believe that Pluto is not a planet, after all). My belief that is does kill is mediated by social institutions that institute a regime of truth to which I am subject. The climate change debate highlights the political nature of our knowledge. What is such a travesty in the oil industry-funded reports that call into question the human contribution to global warming is not that scientific knowledge is completely homogeneous, and that alternative perspectives are illegitimate. Indeed, there may well be some legitimate disagreement among scientists on this question. However, the scientist is obligated not only to practice good science, but also to support the regime of truth within which the scientific perspective remains dominant in our culture. Within the institutions of science, there are established mechanisms for achieving consensus on scientific matters. The obligation of scientists is to operate within that system of dispute resolution. Going "above the heads" of the scientific community to communicate their non-normative scientific perspectives directly to the public does not advance their work as scientists (i.e., does not advance a goal of establishing a new scientific consensus on climate change), but it does erode the regime of truth within which institutions of science have been empowered. It provides sustenance and support to a wide range of discourse communities (conspiracy theorists; religious fundamentalists) that operate in ways that are antithetical to the rational processes of decision making that science champions. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss Sent: Monday, September 22, 2014 9:08 AM To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder Andy, I want to draw attention to your comment: "science as perspectival, i.e., one perspective alongside other at least equally valid perspectives, such as Climate Change Denial. It seemed to me that Activity Theory offered an alternative to the idea of "perspectives" which are inherently relative." The *idea* of perspectives which are INHERENTLY relative seems to be the *complex* aspect of the understanding of *perspectives*. The assumption that you have your perspective and I have my perspective and Creationism co-exists alongside Evolution. Andy, if we *look* at the idea of *perspectives* not as merely relative, but also shared [and even *general] we seem to be occupying similar realms to the notion of *developing concepts*. The comment that in contrast to *perspectives* which are *relative* concepts are NOT as relative [or possibly more shared and therefore warrante BECAUSE asbestos ACTUALLY KILLS, we are now in the realm of *IS* and the understanding that we must ACT [and develop concepts] to respond to the actual *IS*. [actual existence]. I have a *sense* there is actually more overlap between the concept *perspective* and the concept *concept*. The notion of *activity theory* as *holding to a course* [charting a course] that stays *true to course* with a *steady bearing* gestures to Merleau Ponty's understanding of SENS [as inclusive of BOTH sense and direction] My comments can be *seen* as holding to a particular *course* as does *activity theory* Merleau-Ponty's notion of *chiasm* where binocular vision is NOT a summing of two distinct monocular visions but a gestalt re-configuration that *envelops* and *deepens* [metaphorically] relative perspectives which when they *lead to* [ZPD ?] *taking a bearing* and moving in a SHARED direction can be viewed AS *activity theory*. Creationism [or the *sensation fallacy* of M-P's project] can be viewed as *perspectives* or as *concepts* which hopefully call forth the need for SHARED responses/activity. Raymond Williams understanding of *determinism* and *overdeterminism* seems to have a place in this exploration of activity, directions, bearings, taking a course and other actual material events *realized* metaphorically. Larry On Mon, Sep 22, 2014 at 2:27 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Larry, you have addressed three questions to me, so I will try to > respond to them in turn. > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > > Larry Purss wrote: > >> I sense an *overlap* and possible synergy between notions of >> *changing >> concepts* intentionally AND realizing changing perspectives by >> *looking* with an intentional focus. Are we referring to similar phenomena?? >> > Well, I guess so. I was responding to Michael Glassman's response to > the postmodern conservative take on science as perspectival, i.e., one > perspective alongside other at least equally valid perspectives, such > as Climate Change Denial. It seemed to me that Activity Theory offered > an alternative to the idea of "perspectives" which are inherently relative. > >> Is there a bias to see perspectives AS images and concepts AS >> linguistic? Is this the question of multi-modality [recently shared >> on line]?? >> > Well I think any of your "AS"es degrade the original proposition, Larry. > Take the asbestos issue. People died as a result of that project. > Death transcends linguistics. Likewise images. There is more than an > image involved in breathing in asbestos fibres. I don't know about multimodality. > >> >> Larry >> >> >> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 10:57 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> Michael, Charles. >> This is an issue which I think can be tackled by Activity Theory, >> not just climate denial, but a whole range of belief/disbelief >> problems like this. Social justice issues and social change in >> general depend on understanding and solving these kind of >> prejudice and scepticism. Postmodern relativism has given us a >> poisoned chalice indeed. >> >> I believe that Activity Theory is well placed to solve this >> category of problem and give some guidance as to how to tackle >> deeply held but irrational prejudice. Developed using 'project' as >> the unit of analysis I think Activity Theory gives us a really >> useful theory of ideology which has the advantage of being firmly >> connected to a living tradition in psychological science and >> meaningfully connected to how people live their lives. >> Taking Creationism as an example, among European and American >> societies, the USA boasts the largest percentage of people in the >> world who believe that God created the world just as it is today >> about 10,000 years ago. They are rivalled only by Turkey. And it >> does not correlate with lack of education. In fact, among >> Republican voters, the more educated you are the more likely you >> are to believe in the Old Testament story of Genesis and not >> Darwin. A significant percentage of Democrat voters also believe >> in Creationism, but this declines with education. >> >> The point is that when people evaluate evidence, as Charles was >> suggesting, we do so by integrating the new data into our existing >> conceptual frame. I regularly dismiss all sorts of news and >> theories because it doesn't fit into my conceptual frame! We all >> do. The reason why there is so much Creationism in the US is that >> Darwin versus the Old Testament has been *politicised*. You prefer >> the Old Testament for guidance as to the origin of species rather >> than science (personal experience can shed no light on the >> question) because it is a litmus test for adherence to the Good >> Life, just as some people hate bicycle-riders because it is a >> signal of support for Greeny ideas which are deemed hostile to the >> ordinary person. I believe that Climate Denial is part of the same >> issue. In Australia there are rather too many Climate Deniers >> because the issue has become politicised. Officially the >> conservative government accepts the science, but every knows they >> don't and this is reflected in policies like appointing climate >> deniers to head committees to review energy policy, repealing the >> carbon price, etc., etc. There are a higher percentage of climate >> deniers in Australia, as a result, than in Europe where the >> climate is not politicised in that way. >> >> One's conceptual frame is unified through commitment to a >> life-project. Opinions and evidence which don't fit the conceptual >> frame generated by the central concept of a life-project, its >> vision of the Good Life. There is a 10 minute talk on this in >> relation to denial of the dangers posed to health by asbestos >> here: >> https://www.academia.edu/8179060/Activity_as_Project_ >> The_Case_of_Asbestos >> >> Apologies for going on too long. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> Charles Bazerman wrote: >> >> Michael, >> I am with you, and not only because of climate change >> deniers. The sociocultural critique has been important to >> show that humans make knowledge, and they do it from their own >> interests and perspectives. Yet, various disciplines and >> sciences, have come to know more about the world in ways that >> are less entangled with the limits of individual or small >> group perceptions and interests. >> Disciplines do represent the world outside of themselves, >> gathering data--of course selectively through their own >> devices, their means of collection, forms of inscription and >> display, etc... Historically, the methodological standards in >> different fields have evolved to include more awareness of the >> contingency, fragility, and specificity of samples, data and >> analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our tools. >> This is what methodology is all about. I tend to view >> objectivity not as an absolute, but an awareness of ways in >> which we are entangled with the phenomena we are trying to >> study, and to find ways to disentangle ourselves less. >> So from this perspective, incorporating the sociocultural >> critique creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of >> our data, representation, and analysis. Over the last few >> decades, we have been struggling in different disciplines to >> incorporate this critique but yet maintain the disciplinary >> projects of advancing contingent, but useful and reliable >> knowledge. I like your term warranted assertability. I myself >> have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of being >> able to give a good account of your research actions when >> queried from various directions. But it is important to the >> advance of knowledge that we find ways to gather and >> understand information about the world (in which we are both >> living parts and the constructors of knowledge about that >> world including ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of >> our knowledge but does not evaporate our confidence in that >> knowledge into a vapor of contingency only. >> >> I have struggled with this issue for many years in my work on >> the rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, >> drawing on the work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems >> important to me over many years), but more work needs to be >> done to crystallize an understanding that leaves science and >> social science standing despite it being created by poor, >> frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed vision. >> best, >> Chuck >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: "Glassman, Michael" > > >> Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> > >> >> >> It seems to me that articles like this can be a double >> edged sword. They use examples where culture has an >> influence on how we see things but then offer the >> generalization that science is perspective. This is the >> same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the >> climatologists have a liberal bias. Science is based on >> individual perspective until it doesn't. I'm their book >> is a much more nuanced discussion. This is a really >> complex issue which at this particular moment has >> extraordinary import. Maybe we need to find other ways to >> discuss this - like warranted assertability. Perhaps I >> have been spending too much time reading about the >> politics of climate change lately and it has spooked me. >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] on behalf of >> David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com >> ] >> Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >> And they make claims for all humankind. >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer >> > >> escribi?: >> >> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the >> researchers are >> not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not >> diverse. >> >> Martin >> >> >> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss >> > > >> wrote: >> >> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies >> I've seen in >> recent scientific writing. >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees >> >> > > escribi?: >> >> Great article, David - highlights the >> importance (at every level) >> of being aware of what others might find odd about us >> (secondary socialisation?). >> >> Rod >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] On Behalf Of >> David Preiss >> >> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the >> beholder >> >> This article is revelant for this topic: >> http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~ >> henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >> > 7Ehenrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf> >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole >> > >> escribi?: >> >> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" >> published by MIT is GREAT >> reading. Seeing this in Scientific >> American is super. >> >> mike >> >> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David >> Preiss > > >> wrote: >> >> >> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved >> the references to primatology. >> David >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter >> Smagorinsky > > escribi?: >> >> >> http://www.scientificamerican. >> com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-s >> cience-is-done/ >> >> -- >> >> Development and Evolution are both ... >> "processes of construction >> and >> >> re- construction in which heterogeneous >> resources are >> contingently but >> >> more or less reliably reassembled for each >> life cycle." [Oyama, >> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] >> >> ________________________________ >> [ >> >> This email and any files with it are >> confidential and intended >> solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is >> addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then >> copying, distribution or other use of the information >> contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely >> on it. If you have received this email in error please let >> the sender know immediately and delete it from your >> system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. >> While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no >> responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility >> to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University >> does not accept responsibility for any changes made after >> it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments >> constitutes an order for goods or services unless >> accompanied by an official order form. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > From glassman.13@osu.edu Mon Sep 22 08:23:16 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 15:23:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <22e89f518fea43f39ee2fbb249e7eab3@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FEB8B.1080103@mira.net> , <22e89f518fea43f39ee2fbb249e7eab3@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035B8C@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Hi David, Isn't the answer the same empiricism that was being discussed earlier? I think coal mines cause black lung disease because black lung disease is found in a much, much higher level of coal miners. I think Asbestos kills because a much, much higher percentage of asbestos workers die from lung problems. I think climate change is occurring because the polar ice caps are melting. I think it is caused by humans because there is more carbon in the atmosphere and there seems to be a correlation between increased carbon and melting of the polar ice caps. The evidence is correlational but it's pretty strong. To get back to warranted assertability - Dewey's term - if I found only a couple of more coal miners with black lung disease I don't have a very strong argument. I can assert the coal causes black lung but the amount of evidence I have does not warrant a strong assertion. The stronger the assertion I make then the more ideological it is. However if there are multiple studies that show a much higher number of coal miners with black lung disease then I can assert that the coal causes black lung disease and it is warranted more on the empirical evidence than on any ideology. If you claim that I am wrong and being ideological then you are making an assertion. However if I have the empirical evidence behind me your accusation is less warranted. We can't be sure about anything, but we can make choices and decisions if we are careful. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of David H Kirshner [dkirsh@lsu.edu] Sent: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:02 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder Let's not write-off relativism too quickly. Asbestos "ACTUALLY KILLS," not because asbestos actually kills, but because we are entrenched in a scientific ideology that maintains asbestos kills. Perhaps others on this list are more sophisticated in their scientific knowledge than me, but I have no personal knowledge of how or why asbestos kills, and I could easily be persuaded otherwise (for example, it took about 30 seconds for me to come to firmly believe that Pluto is not a planet, after all). My belief that is does kill is mediated by social institutions that institute a regime of truth to which I am subject. The climate change debate highlights the political nature of our knowledge. What is such a travesty in the oil industry-funded reports that call into question the human contribution to global warming is not that scientific knowledge is completely homogeneous, and that alternative perspectives are illegitimate. Indeed, there may well be some legitimate disagreement among scientists on this question. However, the scientist is obligated not only to practice good science, but also to support the regime of truth within which the scientific perspective remains dominant in our culture. Within the institutions of science, there are established mechanisms for achieving consensus on scientific matters. The obligation of scientists is to operate within that system of dispute resolution. Going "above the heads" of the scientific community to communicate their non-normative scientific perspectives directly to the public does not advance their work as scientists (i.e., does not advance a goal of establishing a new scientific consensus on climate change), but it does erode the regime of truth within which institutions of science have been empowered. It provides sustenance and support to a wide range of discourse communities (conspiracy theorists; religious fundamentalists) that operate in ways that are antithetical to the rational processes of decision making that science champions. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss Sent: Monday, September 22, 2014 9:08 AM To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder Andy, I want to draw attention to your comment: "science as perspectival, i.e., one perspective alongside other at least equally valid perspectives, such as Climate Change Denial. It seemed to me that Activity Theory offered an alternative to the idea of "perspectives" which are inherently relative." The *idea* of perspectives which are INHERENTLY relative seems to be the *complex* aspect of the understanding of *perspectives*. The assumption that you have your perspective and I have my perspective and Creationism co-exists alongside Evolution. Andy, if we *look* at the idea of *perspectives* not as merely relative, but also shared [and even *general] we seem to be occupying similar realms to the notion of *developing concepts*. The comment that in contrast to *perspectives* which are *relative* concepts are NOT as relative [or possibly more shared and therefore warrante BECAUSE asbestos ACTUALLY KILLS, we are now in the realm of *IS* and the understanding that we must ACT [and develop concepts] to respond to the actual *IS*. [actual existence]. I have a *sense* there is actually more overlap between the concept *perspective* and the concept *concept*. The notion of *activity theory* as *holding to a course* [charting a course] that stays *true to course* with a *steady bearing* gestures to Merleau Ponty's understanding of SENS [as inclusive of BOTH sense and direction] My comments can be *seen* as holding to a particular *course* as does *activity theory* Merleau-Ponty's notion of *chiasm* where binocular vision is NOT a summing of two distinct monocular visions but a gestalt re-configuration that *envelops* and *deepens* [metaphorically] relative perspectives which when they *lead to* [ZPD ?] *taking a bearing* and moving in a SHARED direction can be viewed AS *activity theory*. Creationism [or the *sensation fallacy* of M-P's project] can be viewed as *perspectives* or as *concepts* which hopefully call forth the need for SHARED responses/activity. Raymond Williams understanding of *determinism* and *overdeterminism* seems to have a place in this exploration of activity, directions, bearings, taking a course and other actual material events *realized* metaphorically. Larry On Mon, Sep 22, 2014 at 2:27 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Larry, you have addressed three questions to me, so I will try to > respond to them in turn. > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > > Larry Purss wrote: > >> I sense an *overlap* and possible synergy between notions of >> *changing >> concepts* intentionally AND realizing changing perspectives by >> *looking* with an intentional focus. Are we referring to similar phenomena?? >> > Well, I guess so. I was responding to Michael Glassman's response to > the postmodern conservative take on science as perspectival, i.e., one > perspective alongside other at least equally valid perspectives, such > as Climate Change Denial. It seemed to me that Activity Theory offered > an alternative to the idea of "perspectives" which are inherently relative. > >> Is there a bias to see perspectives AS images and concepts AS >> linguistic? Is this the question of multi-modality [recently shared >> on line]?? >> > Well I think any of your "AS"es degrade the original proposition, Larry. > Take the asbestos issue. People died as a result of that project. > Death transcends linguistics. Likewise images. There is more than an > image involved in breathing in asbestos fibres. I don't know about multimodality. > >> >> Larry >> >> >> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 10:57 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> Michael, Charles. >> This is an issue which I think can be tackled by Activity Theory, >> not just climate denial, but a whole range of belief/disbelief >> problems like this. Social justice issues and social change in >> general depend on understanding and solving these kind of >> prejudice and scepticism. Postmodern relativism has given us a >> poisoned chalice indeed. >> >> I believe that Activity Theory is well placed to solve this >> category of problem and give some guidance as to how to tackle >> deeply held but irrational prejudice. Developed using 'project' as >> the unit of analysis I think Activity Theory gives us a really >> useful theory of ideology which has the advantage of being firmly >> connected to a living tradition in psychological science and >> meaningfully connected to how people live their lives. >> Taking Creationism as an example, among European and American >> societies, the USA boasts the largest percentage of people in the >> world who believe that God created the world just as it is today >> about 10,000 years ago. They are rivalled only by Turkey. And it >> does not correlate with lack of education. In fact, among >> Republican voters, the more educated you are the more likely you >> are to believe in the Old Testament story of Genesis and not >> Darwin. A significant percentage of Democrat voters also believe >> in Creationism, but this declines with education. >> >> The point is that when people evaluate evidence, as Charles was >> suggesting, we do so by integrating the new data into our existing >> conceptual frame. I regularly dismiss all sorts of news and >> theories because it doesn't fit into my conceptual frame! We all >> do. The reason why there is so much Creationism in the US is that >> Darwin versus the Old Testament has been *politicised*. You prefer >> the Old Testament for guidance as to the origin of species rather >> than science (personal experience can shed no light on the >> question) because it is a litmus test for adherence to the Good >> Life, just as some people hate bicycle-riders because it is a >> signal of support for Greeny ideas which are deemed hostile to the >> ordinary person. I believe that Climate Denial is part of the same >> issue. In Australia there are rather too many Climate Deniers >> because the issue has become politicised. Officially the >> conservative government accepts the science, but every knows they >> don't and this is reflected in policies like appointing climate >> deniers to head committees to review energy policy, repealing the >> carbon price, etc., etc. There are a higher percentage of climate >> deniers in Australia, as a result, than in Europe where the >> climate is not politicised in that way. >> >> One's conceptual frame is unified through commitment to a >> life-project. Opinions and evidence which don't fit the conceptual >> frame generated by the central concept of a life-project, its >> vision of the Good Life. There is a 10 minute talk on this in >> relation to denial of the dangers posed to health by asbestos >> here: >> https://www.academia.edu/8179060/Activity_as_Project_ >> The_Case_of_Asbestos >> >> Apologies for going on too long. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> Charles Bazerman wrote: >> >> Michael, >> I am with you, and not only because of climate change >> deniers. The sociocultural critique has been important to >> show that humans make knowledge, and they do it from their own >> interests and perspectives. Yet, various disciplines and >> sciences, have come to know more about the world in ways that >> are less entangled with the limits of individual or small >> group perceptions and interests. >> Disciplines do represent the world outside of themselves, >> gathering data--of course selectively through their own >> devices, their means of collection, forms of inscription and >> display, etc... Historically, the methodological standards in >> different fields have evolved to include more awareness of the >> contingency, fragility, and specificity of samples, data and >> analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our tools. >> This is what methodology is all about. I tend to view >> objectivity not as an absolute, but an awareness of ways in >> which we are entangled with the phenomena we are trying to >> study, and to find ways to disentangle ourselves less. >> So from this perspective, incorporating the sociocultural >> critique creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of >> our data, representation, and analysis. Over the last few >> decades, we have been struggling in different disciplines to >> incorporate this critique but yet maintain the disciplinary >> projects of advancing contingent, but useful and reliable >> knowledge. I like your term warranted assertability. I myself >> have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of being >> able to give a good account of your research actions when >> queried from various directions. But it is important to the >> advance of knowledge that we find ways to gather and >> understand information about the world (in which we are both >> living parts and the constructors of knowledge about that >> world including ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of >> our knowledge but does not evaporate our confidence in that >> knowledge into a vapor of contingency only. >> >> I have struggled with this issue for many years in my work on >> the rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, >> drawing on the work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems >> important to me over many years), but more work needs to be >> done to crystallize an understanding that leaves science and >> social science standing despite it being created by poor, >> frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed vision. >> best, >> Chuck >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: "Glassman, Michael" > > >> Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> > >> >> >> It seems to me that articles like this can be a double >> edged sword. They use examples where culture has an >> influence on how we see things but then offer the >> generalization that science is perspective. This is the >> same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the >> climatologists have a liberal bias. Science is based on >> individual perspective until it doesn't. I'm their book >> is a much more nuanced discussion. This is a really >> complex issue which at this particular moment has >> extraordinary import. Maybe we need to find other ways to >> discuss this - like warranted assertability. Perhaps I >> have been spending too much time reading about the >> politics of climate change lately and it has spooked me. >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] on behalf of >> David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com >> ] >> Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >> And they make claims for all humankind. >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer >> > >> escribi?: >> >> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the >> researchers are >> not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not >> diverse. >> >> Martin >> >> >> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss >> > > >> wrote: >> >> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies >> I've seen in >> recent scientific writing. >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees >> >> > > escribi?: >> >> Great article, David - highlights the >> importance (at every level) >> of being aware of what others might find odd about us >> (secondary socialisation?). >> >> Rod >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] On Behalf Of >> David Preiss >> >> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the >> beholder >> >> This article is revelant for this topic: >> http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~ >> henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >> > 7Ehenrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf> >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole >> > >> escribi?: >> >> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" >> published by MIT is GREAT >> reading. Seeing this in Scientific >> American is super. >> >> mike >> >> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David >> Preiss > > >> wrote: >> >> >> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved >> the references to primatology. >> David >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter >> Smagorinsky > > escribi?: >> >> >> http://www.scientificamerican. >> com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-s >> cience-is-done/ >> >> -- >> >> Development and Evolution are both ... >> "processes of construction >> and >> >> re- construction in which heterogeneous >> resources are >> contingently but >> >> more or less reliably reassembled for each >> life cycle." [Oyama, >> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] >> >> ________________________________ >> [ >> >> This email and any files with it are >> confidential and intended >> solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is >> addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then >> copying, distribution or other use of the information >> contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely >> on it. If you have received this email in error please let >> the sender know immediately and delete it from your >> system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. >> While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no >> responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility >> to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University >> does not accept responsibility for any changes made after >> it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments >> constitutes an order for goods or services unless >> accompanied by an official order form. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Mon Sep 22 08:27:50 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:27:50 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <8A01BA57-5EF7-4086-AF76-19FE8C060876@gmail.com> Hi Chuck, I certainly empathise with your take on this issue. But that's not the spirit one finds in many contemporary behavioural science journals or, even, in many psychology departments across the globe. Quite the contrary, we are in a time where western psychology is very optimistic about the universal nature of its findings, however many of them have been collected in WEIRD populations. The use of the evolutionary framework has certainly helped to advance this notion of universality, which is not that new actually. G.S. Hall and all the early recapitulationists (ontogeny recapitulates philogeny) really thought they were unveiling human nature. David On Sep 22, 2014, at 12:50 AM, Charles Bazerman wrote: > Michael, > I am with you, and not only because of climate change deniers. The sociocultural critique has been important to show that humans make knowledge, and they do it from their own interests and perspectives. Yet, various disciplines and sciences, have come to know more about the world in ways that are less entangled with the limits of individual or small group perceptions and interests. > > Disciplines do represent the world outside of themselves, gathering data--of course selectively through their own devices, their means of collection, forms of inscription and display, etc... Historically, the methodological standards in different fields have evolved to include more awareness of the contingency, fragility, and specificity of samples, data and analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our tools. This is what methodology is all about. I tend to view objectivity not as an absolute, but an awareness of ways in which we are entangled with the phenomena we are trying to study, and to find ways to disentangle ourselves less. > > So from this perspective, incorporating the sociocultural critique creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of our data, representation, and analysis. Over the last few decades, we have been struggling in different disciplines to incorporate this critique but yet maintain the disciplinary projects of advancing contingent, but useful and reliable knowledge. I like your term warranted assertability. I myself have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of being able to give a good account of your research actions when queried from various directions. But it is important to the advance of knowledge that we find ways to gather and understand information about the world (in which we are both living parts and the constructors of knowledge about that world including ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of our knowledge but does not evaporate our confidence in that knowledge into a vapor of contingency only. > > I have struggled with this issue for many years in my work on the rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, drawing on the work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems important to me over many years), but more work needs to be done to crystallize an understanding that leaves science and social science standing despite it being created by poor, frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed vision. > best, > Chuck > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Glassman, Michael" > Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >> It seems to me that articles like this can be a double edged sword. >> They use examples where culture has an influence on how we see things >> but then offer the generalization that science is perspective. This >> is the same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the >> climatologists have a liberal bias. Science is based on individual >> perspective until it doesn't. I'm their book is a much more nuanced >> discussion. This is a really complex issue which at this particular >> moment has extraordinary import. Maybe we need to find other ways to >> discuss this - like warranted assertability. Perhaps I have been >> spending too much time reading about the politics of climate change >> lately and it has spooked me. >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com] >> Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >> And they make claims for all humankind. >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >>> El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer >> escribi?: >>> >>> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the researchers are >> not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not diverse. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>>> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss >> wrote: >>>> >>>> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in >> recent scientific writing. >>>> >>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>>> >>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees >> escribi?: >>>>> >>>>> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) >> of being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary socialisation?). >>>>> >>>>> Rod >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Preiss >>>>> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >>>>> >>>>> This article is revelant for this topic: http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >>>>> >>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>>>> >>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole escribi?: >>>>>> >>>>>> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is GREAT >>>>>> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. >>>>>> >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved the references to primatology. >>>>>>> David >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter Smagorinsky escribi?: >>>>>>> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-s >>>>>>> cience-is-done/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction >> and >>>>>> re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are >> contingently but >>>>>> more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, >>>>>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] >>>>> >>>>> ________________________________ >>>>> [ >>>>> >>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended >> solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you >> are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use >> of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not >> rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the >> sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet >> emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth >> University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your >> responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth >> University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after >> it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an >> order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. >>> >>> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 22 08:30:15 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 01:30:15 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035B8C@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FEB8B.1080103@mira.net> , <22e89f518fea43f39ee2fbb249e7eab3@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035B8C@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <54204087.9040501@mira.net> Correlation is not causality, Michael. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi David, > > Isn't the answer the same empiricism that was being discussed earlier? I think coal mines cause black lung disease because black lung disease is found in a much, much higher level of coal miners. I think Asbestos kills because a much, much higher percentage of asbestos workers die from lung problems. I think climate change is occurring because the polar ice caps are melting. I think it is caused by humans because there is more carbon in the atmosphere and there seems to be a correlation between increased carbon and melting of the polar ice caps. The evidence is correlational but it's pretty strong. > > To get back to warranted assertability - Dewey's term - if I found only a couple of more coal miners with black lung disease I don't have a very strong argument. I can assert the coal causes black lung but the amount of evidence I have does not warrant a strong assertion. The stronger the assertion I make then the more ideological it is. However if there are multiple studies that show a much higher number of coal miners with black lung disease then I can assert that the coal causes black lung disease and it is warranted more on the empirical evidence than on any ideology. If you claim that I am wrong and being ideological then you are making an assertion. However if I have the empirical evidence behind me your accusation is less warranted. > > We can't be sure about anything, but we can make choices and decisions if we are careful. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of David H Kirshner [dkirsh@lsu.edu] > Sent: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:02 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > > Let's not write-off relativism too quickly. > Asbestos "ACTUALLY KILLS," not because asbestos actually kills, but because we are entrenched in a scientific ideology that maintains asbestos kills. Perhaps others on this list are more sophisticated in their scientific knowledge than me, but I have no personal knowledge of how or why asbestos kills, and I could easily be persuaded otherwise (for example, it took about 30 seconds for me to come to firmly believe that Pluto is not a planet, after all). My belief that is does kill is mediated by social institutions that institute a regime of truth to which I am subject. > > The climate change debate highlights the political nature of our knowledge. What is such a travesty in the oil industry-funded reports that call into question the human contribution to global warming is not that scientific knowledge is completely homogeneous, and that alternative perspectives are illegitimate. Indeed, there may well be some legitimate disagreement among scientists on this question. However, the scientist is obligated not only to practice good science, but also to support the regime of truth within which the scientific perspective remains dominant in our culture. Within the institutions of science, there are established mechanisms for achieving consensus on scientific matters. The obligation of scientists is to operate within that system of dispute resolution. Going "above the heads" of the scientific community to communicate their non-normative scientific perspectives directly to the public does not advance their work as scientists (i.e., does not advance a g > oal of establishing a new scientific consensus on climate change), but it does erode the regime of truth within which institutions of science have been empowered. It provides sustenance and support to a wide range of discourse communities (conspiracy theorists; religious fundamentalists) that operate in ways that are antithetical to the rational processes of decision making that science champions. > > David > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss > Sent: Monday, September 22, 2014 9:08 AM > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > > Andy, I want to draw attention to your comment: > > "science as perspectival, i.e., one perspective alongside other at least equally valid perspectives, such as Climate Change Denial. It seemed to me that Activity Theory offered an alternative to the idea of "perspectives" > which are inherently relative." > > The *idea* of perspectives which are INHERENTLY relative seems to be the > *complex* aspect of the understanding of *perspectives*. > The assumption that you have your perspective and I have my perspective and Creationism co-exists alongside Evolution. > > Andy, if we *look* at the idea of *perspectives* not as merely relative, but also shared [and even *general] we seem to be occupying similar realms to the notion of *developing concepts*. > > The comment that in contrast to *perspectives* which are > *relative* concepts are NOT as relative [or possibly more shared and therefore warrante BECAUSE asbestos ACTUALLY KILLS, we are now in the realm of *IS* and the understanding that we must ACT [and develop concepts] to respond to the actual *IS*. [actual existence]. > > I have a *sense* there is actually more overlap between the concept > *perspective* and the concept *concept*. > The notion of *activity theory* as *holding to a course* [charting a course] that stays *true to course* with a *steady bearing* gestures to Merleau Ponty's understanding of SENS [as inclusive of BOTH sense and direction] My comments can be *seen* as holding to a particular *course* as does *activity theory* Merleau-Ponty's notion of *chiasm* where binocular vision is NOT a summing of two distinct monocular visions but a gestalt re-configuration that > *envelops* and *deepens* [metaphorically] relative perspectives which when they *lead to* [ZPD ?] *taking a bearing* and moving in a SHARED direction can be viewed AS *activity theory*. > > Creationism [or the *sensation fallacy* of M-P's project] can be viewed as *perspectives* or as *concepts* which hopefully call forth the need for SHARED responses/activity. > > Raymond Williams understanding of *determinism* and *overdeterminism* seems to have a place in this exploration of activity, directions, bearings, taking a course and other actual material events *realized* metaphorically. > > Larry > > > > > On Mon, Sep 22, 2014 at 2:27 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Larry, you have addressed three questions to me, so I will try to >> respond to them in turn. >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >> >> Larry Purss wrote: >> >> >>> I sense an *overlap* and possible synergy between notions of >>> *changing >>> concepts* intentionally AND realizing changing perspectives by >>> *looking* with an intentional focus. Are we referring to similar phenomena?? >>> >>> >> Well, I guess so. I was responding to Michael Glassman's response to >> the postmodern conservative take on science as perspectival, i.e., one >> perspective alongside other at least equally valid perspectives, such >> as Climate Change Denial. It seemed to me that Activity Theory offered >> an alternative to the idea of "perspectives" which are inherently relative. >> >> >>> Is there a bias to see perspectives AS images and concepts AS >>> linguistic? Is this the question of multi-modality [recently shared >>> on line]?? >>> >>> >> Well I think any of your "AS"es degrade the original proposition, Larry. >> Take the asbestos issue. People died as a result of that project. >> Death transcends linguistics. Likewise images. There is more than an >> image involved in breathing in asbestos fibres. I don't know about multimodality. >> >> >>> Larry >>> >>> >>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 10:57 PM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >>> >>> Michael, Charles. >>> This is an issue which I think can be tackled by Activity Theory, >>> not just climate denial, but a whole range of belief/disbelief >>> problems like this. Social justice issues and social change in >>> general depend on understanding and solving these kind of >>> prejudice and scepticism. Postmodern relativism has given us a >>> poisoned chalice indeed. >>> >>> I believe that Activity Theory is well placed to solve this >>> category of problem and give some guidance as to how to tackle >>> deeply held but irrational prejudice. Developed using 'project' as >>> the unit of analysis I think Activity Theory gives us a really >>> useful theory of ideology which has the advantage of being firmly >>> connected to a living tradition in psychological science and >>> meaningfully connected to how people live their lives. >>> Taking Creationism as an example, among European and American >>> societies, the USA boasts the largest percentage of people in the >>> world who believe that God created the world just as it is today >>> about 10,000 years ago. They are rivalled only by Turkey. And it >>> does not correlate with lack of education. In fact, among >>> Republican voters, the more educated you are the more likely you >>> are to believe in the Old Testament story of Genesis and not >>> Darwin. A significant percentage of Democrat voters also believe >>> in Creationism, but this declines with education. >>> >>> The point is that when people evaluate evidence, as Charles was >>> suggesting, we do so by integrating the new data into our existing >>> conceptual frame. I regularly dismiss all sorts of news and >>> theories because it doesn't fit into my conceptual frame! We all >>> do. The reason why there is so much Creationism in the US is that >>> Darwin versus the Old Testament has been *politicised*. You prefer >>> the Old Testament for guidance as to the origin of species rather >>> than science (personal experience can shed no light on the >>> question) because it is a litmus test for adherence to the Good >>> Life, just as some people hate bicycle-riders because it is a >>> signal of support for Greeny ideas which are deemed hostile to the >>> ordinary person. I believe that Climate Denial is part of the same >>> issue. In Australia there are rather too many Climate Deniers >>> because the issue has become politicised. Officially the >>> conservative government accepts the science, but every knows they >>> don't and this is reflected in policies like appointing climate >>> deniers to head committees to review energy policy, repealing the >>> carbon price, etc., etc. There are a higher percentage of climate >>> deniers in Australia, as a result, than in Europe where the >>> climate is not politicised in that way. >>> >>> One's conceptual frame is unified through commitment to a >>> life-project. Opinions and evidence which don't fit the conceptual >>> frame generated by the central concept of a life-project, its >>> vision of the Good Life. There is a 10 minute talk on this in >>> relation to denial of the dangers posed to health by asbestos >>> here: >>> https://www.academia.edu/8179060/Activity_as_Project_ >>> The_Case_of_Asbestos >>> >>> Apologies for going on too long. >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> ------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Charles Bazerman wrote: >>> >>> Michael, >>> I am with you, and not only because of climate change >>> deniers. The sociocultural critique has been important to >>> show that humans make knowledge, and they do it from their own >>> interests and perspectives. Yet, various disciplines and >>> sciences, have come to know more about the world in ways that >>> are less entangled with the limits of individual or small >>> group perceptions and interests. >>> Disciplines do represent the world outside of themselves, >>> gathering data--of course selectively through their own >>> devices, their means of collection, forms of inscription and >>> display, etc... Historically, the methodological standards in >>> different fields have evolved to include more awareness of the >>> contingency, fragility, and specificity of samples, data and >>> analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our tools. >>> This is what methodology is all about. I tend to view >>> objectivity not as an absolute, but an awareness of ways in >>> which we are entangled with the phenomena we are trying to >>> study, and to find ways to disentangle ourselves less. >>> So from this perspective, incorporating the sociocultural >>> critique creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of >>> our data, representation, and analysis. Over the last few >>> decades, we have been struggling in different disciplines to >>> incorporate this critique but yet maintain the disciplinary >>> projects of advancing contingent, but useful and reliable >>> knowledge. I like your term warranted assertability. I myself >>> have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of being >>> able to give a good account of your research actions when >>> queried from various directions. But it is important to the >>> advance of knowledge that we find ways to gather and >>> understand information about the world (in which we are both >>> living parts and the constructors of knowledge about that >>> world including ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of >>> our knowledge but does not evaporate our confidence in that >>> knowledge into a vapor of contingency only. >>> >>> I have struggled with this issue for many years in my work on >>> the rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, >>> drawing on the work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems >>> important to me over many years), but more work needs to be >>> done to crystallize an understanding that leaves science and >>> social science standing despite it being created by poor, >>> frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed vision. >>> best, >>> Chuck >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> From: "Glassman, Michael" >> > >>> Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>> > >>> >>> >>> It seems to me that articles like this can be a double >>> edged sword. They use examples where culture has an >>> influence on how we see things but then offer the >>> generalization that science is perspective. This is the >>> same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the >>> climatologists have a liberal bias. Science is based on >>> individual perspective until it doesn't. I'm their book >>> is a much more nuanced discussion. This is a really >>> complex issue which at this particular moment has >>> extraordinary import. Maybe we need to find other ways to >>> discuss this - like warranted assertability. Perhaps I >>> have been spending too much time reading about the >>> politics of climate change lately and it has spooked me. >>> >>> Michael >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> ] on behalf of >>> David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com >>> ] >>> Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >>> >>> And they make claims for all humankind. >>> >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>> >>> >>> El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer >>> > >>> escribi?: >>> >>> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the >>> researchers are >>> not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not >>> diverse. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss >>> >> > >>> wrote: >>> >>> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies >>> I've seen in >>> recent scientific writing. >>> >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>> >>> >>> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees >>> >>> >> > escribi?: >>> >>> Great article, David - highlights the >>> importance (at every level) >>> of being aware of what others might find odd about us >>> (secondary socialisation?). >>> >>> Rod >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> ] On Behalf Of >>> David Preiss >>> >>> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the >>> beholder >>> >>> This article is revelant for this topic: >>> http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~ >>> henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >>> >> 7Ehenrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf> >>> >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>> >>> >>> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole >>> > >>> escribi?: >>> >>> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" >>> published by MIT is GREAT >>> reading. Seeing this in Scientific >>> American is super. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David >>> Preiss >> > >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved >>> the references to primatology. >>> David >>> >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>> >>> >>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter >>> Smagorinsky >> > escribi?: >>> >>> >>> http://www.scientificamerican. >>> com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-s >>> cience-is-done/ >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Development and Evolution are both ... >>> "processes of construction >>> and >>> >>> re- construction in which heterogeneous >>> resources are >>> contingently but >>> >>> more or less reliably reassembled for each >>> life cycle." [Oyama, >>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] >>> >>> ________________________________ >>> [ >>> >>> This email and any files with it are >>> confidential and intended >>> solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is >>> addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then >>> copying, distribution or other use of the information >>> contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely >>> on it. If you have received this email in error please let >>> the sender know immediately and delete it from your >>> system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. >>> While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no >>> responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility >>> to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University >>> does not accept responsibility for any changes made after >>> it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments >>> constitutes an order for goods or services unless >>> accompanied by an official order form. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> > > > > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Mon Sep 22 08:33:59 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 15:33:59 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <54204087.9040501@mira.net> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FEB8B.1080103@mira.net> , <22e89f518fea43f39ee2fbb249e7eab3@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035B8C@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <54204087.9040501@mira.net> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035BB1@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> That's true. But generally it's pretty much all we got in this ball game. That's why it's warranted assertability and not truth. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Andy Blunden [ablunden@mira.net] Sent: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:30 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder Correlation is not causality, Michael. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi David, > > Isn't the answer the same empiricism that was being discussed earlier? I think coal mines cause black lung disease because black lung disease is found in a much, much higher level of coal miners. I think Asbestos kills because a much, much higher percentage of asbestos workers die from lung problems. I think climate change is occurring because the polar ice caps are melting. I think it is caused by humans because there is more carbon in the atmosphere and there seems to be a correlation between increased carbon and melting of the polar ice caps. The evidence is correlational but it's pretty strong. > > To get back to warranted assertability - Dewey's term - if I found only a couple of more coal miners with black lung disease I don't have a very strong argument. I can assert the coal causes black lung but the amount of evidence I have does not warrant a strong assertion. The stronger the assertion I make then the more ideological it is. However if there are multiple studies that show a much higher number of coal miners with black lung disease then I can assert that the coal causes black lung disease and it is warranted more on the empirical evidence than on any ideology. If you claim that I am wrong and being ideological then you are making an assertion. However if I have the empirical evidence behind me your accusation is less warranted. > > We can't be sure about anything, but we can make choices and decisions if we are careful. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of David H Kirshner [dkirsh@lsu.edu] > Sent: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:02 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > > Let's not write-off relativism too quickly. > Asbestos "ACTUALLY KILLS," not because asbestos actually kills, but because we are entrenched in a scientific ideology that maintains asbestos kills. Perhaps others on this list are more sophisticated in their scientific knowledge than me, but I have no personal knowledge of how or why asbestos kills, and I could easily be persuaded otherwise (for example, it took about 30 seconds for me to come to firmly believe that Pluto is not a planet, after all). My belief that is does kill is mediated by social institutions that institute a regime of truth to which I am subject. > > The climate change debate highlights the political nature of our knowledge. What is such a travesty in the oil industry-funded reports that call into question the human contribution to global warming is not that scientific knowledge is completely homogeneous, and that alternative perspectives are illegitimate. Indeed, there may well be some legitimate disagreement among scientists on this question. However, the scientist is obligated not only to practice good science, but also to support the regime of truth within which the scientific perspective remains dominant in our culture. Within the institutions of science, there are established mechanisms for achieving consensus on scientific matters. The obligation of scientists is to operate within that system of dispute resolution. Going "above the heads" of the scientific community to communicate their non-normative scientific perspectives directly to the public does not advance their work as scientists (i.e., does not advance a g > oal of establishing a new scientific consensus on climate change), but it does erode the regime of truth within which institutions of science have been empowered. It provides sustenance and support to a wide range of discourse communities (conspiracy theorists; religious fundamentalists) that operate in ways that are antithetical to the rational processes of decision making that science champions. > > David > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss > Sent: Monday, September 22, 2014 9:08 AM > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > > Andy, I want to draw attention to your comment: > > "science as perspectival, i.e., one perspective alongside other at least equally valid perspectives, such as Climate Change Denial. It seemed to me that Activity Theory offered an alternative to the idea of "perspectives" > which are inherently relative." > > The *idea* of perspectives which are INHERENTLY relative seems to be the > *complex* aspect of the understanding of *perspectives*. > The assumption that you have your perspective and I have my perspective and Creationism co-exists alongside Evolution. > > Andy, if we *look* at the idea of *perspectives* not as merely relative, but also shared [and even *general] we seem to be occupying similar realms to the notion of *developing concepts*. > > The comment that in contrast to *perspectives* which are > *relative* concepts are NOT as relative [or possibly more shared and therefore warrante BECAUSE asbestos ACTUALLY KILLS, we are now in the realm of *IS* and the understanding that we must ACT [and develop concepts] to respond to the actual *IS*. [actual existence]. > > I have a *sense* there is actually more overlap between the concept > *perspective* and the concept *concept*. > The notion of *activity theory* as *holding to a course* [charting a course] that stays *true to course* with a *steady bearing* gestures to Merleau Ponty's understanding of SENS [as inclusive of BOTH sense and direction] My comments can be *seen* as holding to a particular *course* as does *activity theory* Merleau-Ponty's notion of *chiasm* where binocular vision is NOT a summing of two distinct monocular visions but a gestalt re-configuration that > *envelops* and *deepens* [metaphorically] relative perspectives which when they *lead to* [ZPD ?] *taking a bearing* and moving in a SHARED direction can be viewed AS *activity theory*. > > Creationism [or the *sensation fallacy* of M-P's project] can be viewed as *perspectives* or as *concepts* which hopefully call forth the need for SHARED responses/activity. > > Raymond Williams understanding of *determinism* and *overdeterminism* seems to have a place in this exploration of activity, directions, bearings, taking a course and other actual material events *realized* metaphorically. > > Larry > > > > > On Mon, Sep 22, 2014 at 2:27 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Larry, you have addressed three questions to me, so I will try to >> respond to them in turn. >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >> >> Larry Purss wrote: >> >> >>> I sense an *overlap* and possible synergy between notions of >>> *changing >>> concepts* intentionally AND realizing changing perspectives by >>> *looking* with an intentional focus. Are we referring to similar phenomena?? >>> >>> >> Well, I guess so. I was responding to Michael Glassman's response to >> the postmodern conservative take on science as perspectival, i.e., one >> perspective alongside other at least equally valid perspectives, such >> as Climate Change Denial. It seemed to me that Activity Theory offered >> an alternative to the idea of "perspectives" which are inherently relative. >> >> >>> Is there a bias to see perspectives AS images and concepts AS >>> linguistic? Is this the question of multi-modality [recently shared >>> on line]?? >>> >>> >> Well I think any of your "AS"es degrade the original proposition, Larry. >> Take the asbestos issue. People died as a result of that project. >> Death transcends linguistics. Likewise images. There is more than an >> image involved in breathing in asbestos fibres. I don't know about multimodality. >> >> >>> Larry >>> >>> >>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 10:57 PM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >>> >>> Michael, Charles. >>> This is an issue which I think can be tackled by Activity Theory, >>> not just climate denial, but a whole range of belief/disbelief >>> problems like this. Social justice issues and social change in >>> general depend on understanding and solving these kind of >>> prejudice and scepticism. Postmodern relativism has given us a >>> poisoned chalice indeed. >>> >>> I believe that Activity Theory is well placed to solve this >>> category of problem and give some guidance as to how to tackle >>> deeply held but irrational prejudice. Developed using 'project' as >>> the unit of analysis I think Activity Theory gives us a really >>> useful theory of ideology which has the advantage of being firmly >>> connected to a living tradition in psychological science and >>> meaningfully connected to how people live their lives. >>> Taking Creationism as an example, among European and American >>> societies, the USA boasts the largest percentage of people in the >>> world who believe that God created the world just as it is today >>> about 10,000 years ago. They are rivalled only by Turkey. And it >>> does not correlate with lack of education. In fact, among >>> Republican voters, the more educated you are the more likely you >>> are to believe in the Old Testament story of Genesis and not >>> Darwin. A significant percentage of Democrat voters also believe >>> in Creationism, but this declines with education. >>> >>> The point is that when people evaluate evidence, as Charles was >>> suggesting, we do so by integrating the new data into our existing >>> conceptual frame. I regularly dismiss all sorts of news and >>> theories because it doesn't fit into my conceptual frame! We all >>> do. The reason why there is so much Creationism in the US is that >>> Darwin versus the Old Testament has been *politicised*. You prefer >>> the Old Testament for guidance as to the origin of species rather >>> than science (personal experience can shed no light on the >>> question) because it is a litmus test for adherence to the Good >>> Life, just as some people hate bicycle-riders because it is a >>> signal of support for Greeny ideas which are deemed hostile to the >>> ordinary person. I believe that Climate Denial is part of the same >>> issue. In Australia there are rather too many Climate Deniers >>> because the issue has become politicised. Officially the >>> conservative government accepts the science, but every knows they >>> don't and this is reflected in policies like appointing climate >>> deniers to head committees to review energy policy, repealing the >>> carbon price, etc., etc. There are a higher percentage of climate >>> deniers in Australia, as a result, than in Europe where the >>> climate is not politicised in that way. >>> >>> One's conceptual frame is unified through commitment to a >>> life-project. Opinions and evidence which don't fit the conceptual >>> frame generated by the central concept of a life-project, its >>> vision of the Good Life. There is a 10 minute talk on this in >>> relation to denial of the dangers posed to health by asbestos >>> here: >>> https://www.academia.edu/8179060/Activity_as_Project_ >>> The_Case_of_Asbestos >>> >>> Apologies for going on too long. >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> ------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Charles Bazerman wrote: >>> >>> Michael, >>> I am with you, and not only because of climate change >>> deniers. The sociocultural critique has been important to >>> show that humans make knowledge, and they do it from their own >>> interests and perspectives. Yet, various disciplines and >>> sciences, have come to know more about the world in ways that >>> are less entangled with the limits of individual or small >>> group perceptions and interests. >>> Disciplines do represent the world outside of themselves, >>> gathering data--of course selectively through their own >>> devices, their means of collection, forms of inscription and >>> display, etc... Historically, the methodological standards in >>> different fields have evolved to include more awareness of the >>> contingency, fragility, and specificity of samples, data and >>> analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our tools. >>> This is what methodology is all about. I tend to view >>> objectivity not as an absolute, but an awareness of ways in >>> which we are entangled with the phenomena we are trying to >>> study, and to find ways to disentangle ourselves less. >>> So from this perspective, incorporating the sociocultural >>> critique creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of >>> our data, representation, and analysis. Over the last few >>> decades, we have been struggling in different disciplines to >>> incorporate this critique but yet maintain the disciplinary >>> projects of advancing contingent, but useful and reliable >>> knowledge. I like your term warranted assertability. I myself >>> have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of being >>> able to give a good account of your research actions when >>> queried from various directions. But it is important to the >>> advance of knowledge that we find ways to gather and >>> understand information about the world (in which we are both >>> living parts and the constructors of knowledge about that >>> world including ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of >>> our knowledge but does not evaporate our confidence in that >>> knowledge into a vapor of contingency only. >>> >>> I have struggled with this issue for many years in my work on >>> the rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, >>> drawing on the work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems >>> important to me over many years), but more work needs to be >>> done to crystallize an understanding that leaves science and >>> social science standing despite it being created by poor, >>> frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed vision. >>> best, >>> Chuck >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> From: "Glassman, Michael" >> > >>> Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>> > >>> >>> >>> It seems to me that articles like this can be a double >>> edged sword. They use examples where culture has an >>> influence on how we see things but then offer the >>> generalization that science is perspective. This is the >>> same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the >>> climatologists have a liberal bias. Science is based on >>> individual perspective until it doesn't. I'm their book >>> is a much more nuanced discussion. This is a really >>> complex issue which at this particular moment has >>> extraordinary import. Maybe we need to find other ways to >>> discuss this - like warranted assertability. Perhaps I >>> have been spending too much time reading about the >>> politics of climate change lately and it has spooked me. >>> >>> Michael >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> ] on behalf of >>> David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com >>> ] >>> Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >>> >>> And they make claims for all humankind. >>> >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>> >>> >>> El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer >>> > >>> escribi?: >>> >>> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the >>> researchers are >>> not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not >>> diverse. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss >>> >> > >>> wrote: >>> >>> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies >>> I've seen in >>> recent scientific writing. >>> >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>> >>> >>> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees >>> >>> >> > escribi?: >>> >>> Great article, David - highlights the >>> importance (at every level) >>> of being aware of what others might find odd about us >>> (secondary socialisation?). >>> >>> Rod >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>> >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> ] On Behalf Of >>> David Preiss >>> >>> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the >>> beholder >>> >>> This article is revelant for this topic: >>> http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~ >>> henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >>> >> 7Ehenrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf> >>> >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>> >>> >>> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole >>> > >>> escribi?: >>> >>> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" >>> published by MIT is GREAT >>> reading. Seeing this in Scientific >>> American is super. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David >>> Preiss >> > >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved >>> the references to primatology. >>> David >>> >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >>> >>> >>> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter >>> Smagorinsky >> > escribi?: >>> >>> >>> http://www.scientificamerican. >>> com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-s >>> cience-is-done/ >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Development and Evolution are both ... >>> "processes of construction >>> and >>> >>> re- construction in which heterogeneous >>> resources are >>> contingently but >>> >>> more or less reliably reassembled for each >>> life cycle." [Oyama, >>> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] >>> >>> ________________________________ >>> [ >>> >>> This email and any files with it are >>> confidential and intended >>> solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is >>> addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then >>> copying, distribution or other use of the information >>> contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely >>> on it. If you have received this email in error please let >>> the sender know immediately and delete it from your >>> system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. >>> While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no >>> responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility >>> to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University >>> does not accept responsibility for any changes made after >>> it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments >>> constitutes an order for goods or services unless >>> accompanied by an official order form. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> > > > > > From dkirsh@lsu.edu Mon Sep 22 08:36:09 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 15:36:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035B8C@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FEB8B.1080103@mira.net> , <22e89f518fea43f39ee2fbb249e7eab3@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035B8C@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <8525adf9ad844a5db6d3b88a44f8e19b@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Michael, Warranted assertability is a cornerstone of rationality, which I actively support through my professional contributions as a mathematics educator. It's true that the ideology of science, does also include the belief that warranted assertability gives us some kind of access to the "real world." But though I support scientific rationality as a political commitment, I don't feel obligated to all of the mores and folkways of the scientific community. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Glassman, Michael Sent: Monday, September 22, 2014 10:23 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder Hi David, Isn't the answer the same empiricism that was being discussed earlier? I think coal mines cause black lung disease because black lung disease is found in a much, much higher level of coal miners. I think Asbestos kills because a much, much higher percentage of asbestos workers die from lung problems. I think climate change is occurring because the polar ice caps are melting. I think it is caused by humans because there is more carbon in the atmosphere and there seems to be a correlation between increased carbon and melting of the polar ice caps. The evidence is correlational but it's pretty strong. To get back to warranted assertability - Dewey's term - if I found only a couple of more coal miners with black lung disease I don't have a very strong argument. I can assert the coal causes black lung but the amount of evidence I have does not warrant a strong assertion. The stronger the assertion I make then the more ideological it is. However if there are multiple studies that show a much higher number of coal miners with black lung disease then I can assert that the coal causes black lung disease and it is warranted more on the empirical evidence than on any ideology. If you claim that I am wrong and being ideological then you are making an assertion. However if I have the empirical evidence behind me your accusation is less warranted. We can't be sure about anything, but we can make choices and decisions if we are careful. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of David H Kirshner [dkirsh@lsu.edu] Sent: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:02 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder Let's not write-off relativism too quickly. Asbestos "ACTUALLY KILLS," not because asbestos actually kills, but because we are entrenched in a scientific ideology that maintains asbestos kills. Perhaps others on this list are more sophisticated in their scientific knowledge than me, but I have no personal knowledge of how or why asbestos kills, and I could easily be persuaded otherwise (for example, it took about 30 seconds for me to come to firmly believe that Pluto is not a planet, after all). My belief that is does kill is mediated by social institutions that institute a regime of truth to which I am subject. The climate change debate highlights the political nature of our knowledge. What is such a travesty in the oil industry-funded reports that call into question the human contribution to global warming is not that scientific knowledge is completely homogeneous, and that alternative perspectives are illegitimate. Indeed, there may well be some legitimate disagreement among scientists on this question. However, the scientist is obligated not only to practice good science, but also to support the regime of truth within which the scientific perspective remains dominant in our culture. Within the institutions of science, there are established mechanisms for achieving consensus on scientific matters. The obligation of scientists is to operate within that system of dispute resolution. Going "above the heads" of the scientific community to communicate their non-normative scientific perspectives directly to the public does not advance their work as scientists (i.e., does not advance a goal of establishing a new scientific consensus on climate change), but it does erode the regime of truth within which institutions of science have been empowered. It provides sustenance and support to a wide range of discourse communities (conspiracy theorists; religious fundamentalists) that operate in ways that are antithetical to the rational processes of decision making that science champions. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss Sent: Monday, September 22, 2014 9:08 AM To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder Andy, I want to draw attention to your comment: "science as perspectival, i.e., one perspective alongside other at least equally valid perspectives, such as Climate Change Denial. It seemed to me that Activity Theory offered an alternative to the idea of "perspectives" which are inherently relative." The *idea* of perspectives which are INHERENTLY relative seems to be the *complex* aspect of the understanding of *perspectives*. The assumption that you have your perspective and I have my perspective and Creationism co-exists alongside Evolution. Andy, if we *look* at the idea of *perspectives* not as merely relative, but also shared [and even *general] we seem to be occupying similar realms to the notion of *developing concepts*. The comment that in contrast to *perspectives* which are *relative* concepts are NOT as relative [or possibly more shared and therefore warrante BECAUSE asbestos ACTUALLY KILLS, we are now in the realm of *IS* and the understanding that we must ACT [and develop concepts] to respond to the actual *IS*. [actual existence]. I have a *sense* there is actually more overlap between the concept *perspective* and the concept *concept*. The notion of *activity theory* as *holding to a course* [charting a course] that stays *true to course* with a *steady bearing* gestures to Merleau Ponty's understanding of SENS [as inclusive of BOTH sense and direction] My comments can be *seen* as holding to a particular *course* as does *activity theory* Merleau-Ponty's notion of *chiasm* where binocular vision is NOT a summing of two distinct monocular visions but a gestalt re-configuration that *envelops* and *deepens* [metaphorically] relative perspectives which when they *lead to* [ZPD ?] *taking a bearing* and moving in a SHARED direction can be viewed AS *activity theory*. Creationism [or the *sensation fallacy* of M-P's project] can be viewed as *perspectives* or as *concepts* which hopefully call forth the need for SHARED responses/activity. Raymond Williams understanding of *determinism* and *overdeterminism* seems to have a place in this exploration of activity, directions, bearings, taking a course and other actual material events *realized* metaphorically. Larry On Mon, Sep 22, 2014 at 2:27 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Larry, you have addressed three questions to me, so I will try to > respond to them in turn. > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > > Larry Purss wrote: > >> I sense an *overlap* and possible synergy between notions of >> *changing >> concepts* intentionally AND realizing changing perspectives by >> *looking* with an intentional focus. Are we referring to similar phenomena?? >> > Well, I guess so. I was responding to Michael Glassman's response to > the postmodern conservative take on science as perspectival, i.e., one > perspective alongside other at least equally valid perspectives, such > as Climate Change Denial. It seemed to me that Activity Theory offered > an alternative to the idea of "perspectives" which are inherently relative. > >> Is there a bias to see perspectives AS images and concepts AS >> linguistic? Is this the question of multi-modality [recently shared >> on line]?? >> > Well I think any of your "AS"es degrade the original proposition, Larry. > Take the asbestos issue. People died as a result of that project. > Death transcends linguistics. Likewise images. There is more than an > image involved in breathing in asbestos fibres. I don't know about multimodality. > >> >> Larry >> >> >> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 10:57 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> Michael, Charles. >> This is an issue which I think can be tackled by Activity Theory, >> not just climate denial, but a whole range of belief/disbelief >> problems like this. Social justice issues and social change in >> general depend on understanding and solving these kind of >> prejudice and scepticism. Postmodern relativism has given us a >> poisoned chalice indeed. >> >> I believe that Activity Theory is well placed to solve this >> category of problem and give some guidance as to how to tackle >> deeply held but irrational prejudice. Developed using 'project' as >> the unit of analysis I think Activity Theory gives us a really >> useful theory of ideology which has the advantage of being firmly >> connected to a living tradition in psychological science and >> meaningfully connected to how people live their lives. >> Taking Creationism as an example, among European and American >> societies, the USA boasts the largest percentage of people in the >> world who believe that God created the world just as it is today >> about 10,000 years ago. They are rivalled only by Turkey. And it >> does not correlate with lack of education. In fact, among >> Republican voters, the more educated you are the more likely you >> are to believe in the Old Testament story of Genesis and not >> Darwin. A significant percentage of Democrat voters also believe >> in Creationism, but this declines with education. >> >> The point is that when people evaluate evidence, as Charles was >> suggesting, we do so by integrating the new data into our existing >> conceptual frame. I regularly dismiss all sorts of news and >> theories because it doesn't fit into my conceptual frame! We all >> do. The reason why there is so much Creationism in the US is that >> Darwin versus the Old Testament has been *politicised*. You prefer >> the Old Testament for guidance as to the origin of species rather >> than science (personal experience can shed no light on the >> question) because it is a litmus test for adherence to the Good >> Life, just as some people hate bicycle-riders because it is a >> signal of support for Greeny ideas which are deemed hostile to the >> ordinary person. I believe that Climate Denial is part of the same >> issue. In Australia there are rather too many Climate Deniers >> because the issue has become politicised. Officially the >> conservative government accepts the science, but every knows they >> don't and this is reflected in policies like appointing climate >> deniers to head committees to review energy policy, repealing the >> carbon price, etc., etc. There are a higher percentage of climate >> deniers in Australia, as a result, than in Europe where the >> climate is not politicised in that way. >> >> One's conceptual frame is unified through commitment to a >> life-project. Opinions and evidence which don't fit the conceptual >> frame generated by the central concept of a life-project, its >> vision of the Good Life. There is a 10 minute talk on this in >> relation to denial of the dangers posed to health by asbestos >> here: >> https://www.academia.edu/8179060/Activity_as_Project_ >> The_Case_of_Asbestos >> >> Apologies for going on too long. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> Charles Bazerman wrote: >> >> Michael, >> I am with you, and not only because of climate change >> deniers. The sociocultural critique has been important to >> show that humans make knowledge, and they do it from their own >> interests and perspectives. Yet, various disciplines and >> sciences, have come to know more about the world in ways that >> are less entangled with the limits of individual or small >> group perceptions and interests. >> Disciplines do represent the world outside of themselves, >> gathering data--of course selectively through their own >> devices, their means of collection, forms of inscription and >> display, etc... Historically, the methodological standards in >> different fields have evolved to include more awareness of the >> contingency, fragility, and specificity of samples, data and >> analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our tools. >> This is what methodology is all about. I tend to view >> objectivity not as an absolute, but an awareness of ways in >> which we are entangled with the phenomena we are trying to >> study, and to find ways to disentangle ourselves less. >> So from this perspective, incorporating the sociocultural >> critique creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of >> our data, representation, and analysis. Over the last few >> decades, we have been struggling in different disciplines to >> incorporate this critique but yet maintain the disciplinary >> projects of advancing contingent, but useful and reliable >> knowledge. I like your term warranted assertability. I myself >> have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of being >> able to give a good account of your research actions when >> queried from various directions. But it is important to the >> advance of knowledge that we find ways to gather and >> understand information about the world (in which we are both >> living parts and the constructors of knowledge about that >> world including ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of >> our knowledge but does not evaporate our confidence in that >> knowledge into a vapor of contingency only. >> >> I have struggled with this issue for many years in my work on >> the rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, >> drawing on the work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems >> important to me over many years), but more work needs to be >> done to crystallize an understanding that leaves science and >> social science standing despite it being created by poor, >> frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed vision. >> best, >> Chuck >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: "Glassman, Michael" > > >> Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> > >> >> >> It seems to me that articles like this can be a double >> edged sword. They use examples where culture has an >> influence on how we see things but then offer the >> generalization that science is perspective. This is the >> same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the >> climatologists have a liberal bias. Science is based on >> individual perspective until it doesn't. I'm their book >> is a much more nuanced discussion. This is a really >> complex issue which at this particular moment has >> extraordinary import. Maybe we need to find other ways to >> discuss this - like warranted assertability. Perhaps I >> have been spending too much time reading about the >> politics of climate change lately and it has spooked me. >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] on behalf of >> David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com >> ] >> Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >> And they make claims for all humankind. >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer >> > >> escribi?: >> >> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the >> researchers are >> not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not >> diverse. >> >> Martin >> >> >> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss >> > > >> wrote: >> >> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies >> I've seen in >> recent scientific writing. >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees >> >> > > escribi?: >> >> Great article, David - highlights the >> importance (at every level) >> of being aware of what others might find odd about us >> (secondary socialisation?). >> >> Rod >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] On Behalf Of >> David Preiss >> >> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the >> beholder >> >> This article is revelant for this topic: >> http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~ >> henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >> > 7Ehenrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf> >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole >> > >> escribi?: >> >> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" >> published by MIT is GREAT >> reading. Seeing this in Scientific >> American is super. >> >> mike >> >> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David >> Preiss > > >> wrote: >> >> >> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved >> the references to primatology. >> David >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter >> Smagorinsky > > escribi?: >> >> >> http://www.scientificamerican. >> com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-s >> cience-is-done/ >> >> -- >> >> Development and Evolution are both ... >> "processes of construction >> and >> >> re- construction in which heterogeneous >> resources are >> contingently but >> >> more or less reliably reassembled for each >> life cycle." [Oyama, >> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] >> >> ________________________________ >> [ >> >> This email and any files with it are >> confidential and intended >> solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is >> addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then >> copying, distribution or other use of the information >> contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely >> on it. If you have received this email in error please let >> the sender know immediately and delete it from your >> system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. >> While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no >> responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility >> to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University >> does not accept responsibility for any changes made after >> it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments >> constitutes an order for goods or services unless >> accompanied by an official order form. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 22 08:38:38 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 01:38:38 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <22e89f518fea43f39ee2fbb249e7eab3@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FEB8B.1080103@mira.net> <22e89f518fea43f39ee2fbb249e7eab3@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <5420427E.4090709@mira.net> There is such a thing as objective truth, David. The claim that asbestos kills, once established, is extremely robust. And it is not just a statistical correlation, microscopic examination of lung tissue can prove it. I sort of agree with what you say, David, but relativism is also relative. The test of objectivity is the "robustness" of the claim, its capacity to withstand sceptical criticism. Up to a point, the asbestos companies were able to use the tactics - just like the tobacco industry and the climate deniers - such as putting contrary information, supported by those posing as scientists, into the public domain to create the illusion of a "debate", and buying off or intimidating those who spoke the truth. But in the end the case against them became so strong that the only way the truth that asbestos kills can now be undermined is by some kind of "higher truth" which sublates the irrefutable truth of medical science. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David H Kirshner wrote: > Let's not write-off relativism too quickly. > Asbestos "ACTUALLY KILLS," not because asbestos actually kills, but because we are entrenched in a scientific ideology that maintains asbestos kills. Perhaps others on this list are more sophisticated in their scientific knowledge than me, but I have no personal knowledge of how or why asbestos kills, and I could easily be persuaded otherwise (for example, it took about 30 seconds for me to come to firmly believe that Pluto is not a planet, after all). My belief that it does kill is mediated by social institutions that institute a regime of truth to which I am subject. > > The climate change debate highlights the political nature of our knowledge. What is such a travesty in the oil industry-funded reports that call into question the human contribution to global warming is not that scientific knowledge is completely homogeneous, and that alternative perspectives are illegitimate. Indeed, there may well be some legitimate disagreement among scientists on this question. However, the scientist is obligated not only to practice good science, but also to support the regime of truth within which the scientific perspective remains dominant in our culture. Within the institutions of science, there are established mechanisms for achieving consensus on scientific matters. The obligation of scientists is to operate within that system of dispute resolution. Going "above the heads" of the scientific community to communicate their non-normative scientific perspectives directly to the public does not advance their work as scientists (i.e., does not advance a goal of establishing a new scientific consensus on climate change), but it does erode the regime of truth within which institutions of science have been empowered. It provides sustenance and support to a wide range of discourse communities (conspiracy theorists; religious fundamentalists) that operate in ways that are antithetical to the rational processes of decision making that science champions. > > David > > - > From boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Mon Sep 22 08:45:38 2014 From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu (Robert Lake) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 11:45:38 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <5420427E.4090709@mira.net> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FEB8B.1080103@mira.net> <22e89f518fea43f39ee2fbb249e7eab3@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5420427E.4090709@mira.net> Message-ID: Yes! Some things are just "true like ice or fire" Robert Zimmerman (*Love minus Zero-No Limit*). On Mon, Sep 22, 2014 at 11:38 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > There is such a thing as objective truth, David. The claim that asbestos > kills, once established, is extremely robust. And it is not just a > statistical correlation, microscopic examination of lung tissue can prove > it. I sort of agree with what you say, David, but relativism is also > relative. The test of objectivity is the "robustness" of the claim, its > capacity to withstand sceptical criticism. Up to a point, the asbestos > companies were able to use the tactics - just like the tobacco industry and > the climate deniers - such as putting contrary information, supported by > those posing as scientists, into the public domain to create the illusion > of a "debate", and buying off or intimidating those who spoke the truth. > But in the end the case against them became so strong that the only way the > truth that asbestos kills can now be undermined is by some kind of "higher > truth" which sublates the irrefutable truth of medical science. Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > David H Kirshner wrote: > >> Let's not write-off relativism too quickly. Asbestos "ACTUALLY KILLS," >> not because asbestos actually kills, but because we are entrenched in a >> scientific ideology that maintains asbestos kills. Perhaps others on this >> list are more sophisticated in their scientific knowledge than me, but I >> have no personal knowledge of how or why asbestos kills, and I could easily >> be persuaded otherwise (for example, it took about 30 seconds for me to >> come to firmly believe that Pluto is not a planet, after all). My belief >> that it does kill is mediated by social institutions that institute a >> regime of truth to which I am subject. >> >> The climate change debate highlights the political nature of our >> knowledge. What is such a travesty in the oil industry-funded reports that >> call into question the human contribution to global warming is not that >> scientific knowledge is completely homogeneous, and that alternative >> perspectives are illegitimate. Indeed, there may well be some legitimate >> disagreement among scientists on this question. However, the scientist is >> obligated not only to practice good science, but also to support the regime >> of truth within which the scientific perspective remains dominant in our >> culture. Within the institutions of science, there are established >> mechanisms for achieving consensus on scientific matters. The obligation of >> scientists is to operate within that system of dispute resolution. Going >> "above the heads" of the scientific community to communicate their >> non-normative scientific perspectives directly to the public does not >> advance their work as scientists (i.e., does not advance a goal of >> establishing a new scientific consensus on climate change), but it does >> erode the regime of truth within which institutions of science have been >> empowered. It provides sustenance and support to a wide range of discourse >> communities (conspiracy theorists; religious fundamentalists) that operate >> in ways that are antithetical to the rational processes of decision making >> that science champions. >> David >> >> - >> >> > > > -- *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor Social Foundations of Education Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading Georgia Southern University Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group P. O. Box 8144 Phone: (912) 478-0355 Fax: (912) 478-5382 Statesboro, GA 30460 From jennamcjenna@gmail.com Mon Sep 22 08:59:04 2014 From: jennamcjenna@gmail.com (Jenna McWilliams) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 09:59:04 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <5420427E.4090709@mira.net> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FEB8B.1080103@mira.net> <22e89f518fea43f39ee2fbb249e7eab3@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5420427E.4090709@mira.net> Message-ID: <54204748.3020403@gmail.com> Imagine being a scientist who does their work from inside of, let's say, a queer and female-bodied container. You see the Scientific American article that Peter forwarded on and you think, well...this really isn't news--it's what lots of us non-mainstream (queer, female, nonwhite, disabled, genderqueer/transgender) researchers have known for what seems like forever. It's also well and widely discussed, as Miguel pointed out, in Science and Technology Studies. Obviously, you think. Obviously science is shaped by the identities of the people who engage it. Obviously people who work from within bodies that fall outside of the mainstream are sometimes attuned to phenomena that are overlooked by the more mainstream bodies and minds that dominate what we today call "science." Obviously the field needs to make room for those people and that research, too. Then imagine jumping onto one of your favorite listservs and seeing the point of the Scientific American article equated with climate change deniers and anti-science creationists. It would be easy to feel disappointed, when encountering this on your favorite listserv--to see the work of those who aim to reshape science to account for multiple perspectives and experiences equated with opinions that are generally characterized as willful ignorance by those who do science. It would be easy to wish this conversation hadn't gone to that place. But perhaps I'm misinterpreting the discussion. My queer and female body sometimes reacts particularly strongly to certain forms of discourse and certain forms of arguments that others might let pass. -- Jenna (Jake) McWilliams Learning Sciences Program, Indiana University jenmcwil@indiana.edu > Andy Blunden > Monday, September 22, 2014 9:38 AM > There is such a thing as objective truth, David. The claim that > asbestos kills, once established, is extremely robust. And it is not > just a statistical correlation, microscopic examination of lung tissue > can prove it. I sort of agree with what you say, David, but relativism > is also relative. The test of objectivity is the "robustness" of the > claim, its capacity to withstand sceptical criticism. Up to a point, > the asbestos companies were able to use the tactics - just like the > tobacco industry and the climate deniers - such as putting contrary > information, supported by those posing as scientists, into the public > domain to create the illusion of a "debate", and buying off or > intimidating those who spoke the truth. But in the end the case > against them became so strong that the only way the truth that > asbestos kills can now be undermined is by some kind of "higher truth" > which sublates the irrefutable truth of medical science. Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > David Preiss > Sunday, September 21, 2014 7:11 PM > Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in recent > scientific writing. > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > > > Rod Parker-Rees > Sunday, September 21, 2014 3:57 PM > Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) of > being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary > socialisation?). > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Preiss > Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > > This article is revelant for this topic: > http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely > for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not > the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely > on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender > know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails > are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth > University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your > responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth > University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after > it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an > order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > > > David Preiss > Sunday, September 21, 2014 11:31 AM > This article is revelant for this topic: > http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > > > > mike cole > Sunday, September 21, 2014 10:42 AM > The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is GREAT > reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. > > mike > > On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Mon Sep 22 09:32:17 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 16:32:17 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <54204748.3020403@gmail.com> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FEB8B.1080103@mira.net> <22e89f518fea43f39ee2fbb249e7eab3@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5420427E.4090709@mira.net>,<54204748.3020403@gmail.com> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035BF6@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Hi Jenna, It is not so much a difficulty with people having different perspectives as much as the idea that maybe the way we are discussing it is not working (precisely because people are appropriating it for their own purposes) and maybe we need to explore different ways of discussing and understanding some very real phenomenon. So I can't look at something from another person's point of view so let me do so from a point of view that is closer to home for me (with apologies if this seems too trivial). Let's say a researcher is observing a classroom in China and compares it to an American classroom and sees the children working together to achieve a goal and the researcher says, "ah, that is the result of the more cooperative Chinese culture, different from our individualized culture." This is based on limited observations and a moderate knowledge of Chinese history. The researcher can make the assertion of course, but how much credence should be given. Another person is watching the same classroom in relation to American classrooms, but it is somebody who lived through the cultural revolution. They don't see this as part of the Chinese culture but the strong attempts to sublimate individual identification in the context of the whole - it is based on a strong political ideological decision about which direction to take society which is still being played out in the early childhood classroom. Also an assertion, but again how warranted based on limited evidence. In both cases we can say it is based on perspectives, but one perspective does not really have that much of an advantage over the other. You say the scientific findings are based very much on this perspective and you would be right. Okay, now say two scientists exploring what is going on with climate change. One person comes from a more progressive background and is working in a context where there is a great deal of empirical evidence, literally hundreds of studies saying that climate change is being caused by humans and following on this evidence offers a finding saying that there is human additions to climate The second scientist comes from a strong neoliberal, free market background and is very sincere, but follows a much, much smaller scientific trajectory and observing the same phenomena claims that there is no human addition to climate change. This second scientist is also making an assertion. And if the first scientist argues the second scientist says, but that is your different perspective. In both cases the findings are also based on perspectives - and in the case I am posing sincere perspectives. How then do we determine that this second situation is different from the first? Why do we say yes findings are based on perspective in the first but hesitate to say so in the second? I would suggest it is really hard. And I would suggest it is difficult because of the way we are discussing the issue. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Jenna McWilliams [jennamcjenna@gmail.com] Sent: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:59 AM To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder Imagine being a scientist who does their work from inside of, let's say, a queer and female-bodied container. You see the Scientific American article that Peter forwarded on and you think, well...this really isn't news--it's what lots of us non-mainstream (queer, female, nonwhite, disabled, genderqueer/transgender) researchers have known for what seems like forever. It's also well and widely discussed, as Miguel pointed out, in Science and Technology Studies. Obviously, you think. Obviously science is shaped by the identities of the people who engage it. Obviously people who work from within bodies that fall outside of the mainstream are sometimes attuned to phenomena that are overlooked by the more mainstream bodies and minds that dominate what we today call "science." Obviously the field needs to make room for those people and that research, too. Then imagine jumping onto one of your favorite listservs and seeing the point of the Scientific American article equated with climate change deniers and anti-science creationists. It would be easy to feel disappointed, when encountering this on your favorite listserv--to see the work of those who aim to reshape science to account for multiple perspectives and experiences equated with opinions that are generally characterized as willful ignorance by those who do science. It would be easy to wish this conversation hadn't gone to that place. But perhaps I'm misinterpreting the discussion. My queer and female body sometimes reacts particularly strongly to certain forms of discourse and certain forms of arguments that others might let pass. -- Jenna (Jake) McWilliams Learning Sciences Program, Indiana University jenmcwil@indiana.edu > Andy Blunden > Monday, September 22, 2014 9:38 AM > There is such a thing as objective truth, David. The claim that > asbestos kills, once established, is extremely robust. And it is not > just a statistical correlation, microscopic examination of lung tissue > can prove it. I sort of agree with what you say, David, but relativism > is also relative. The test of objectivity is the "robustness" of the > claim, its capacity to withstand sceptical criticism. Up to a point, > the asbestos companies were able to use the tactics - just like the > tobacco industry and the climate deniers - such as putting contrary > information, supported by those posing as scientists, into the public > domain to create the illusion of a "debate", and buying off or > intimidating those who spoke the truth. But in the end the case > against them became so strong that the only way the truth that > asbestos kills can now be undermined is by some kind of "higher truth" > which sublates the irrefutable truth of medical science. Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > David Preiss > Sunday, September 21, 2014 7:11 PM > Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in recent > scientific writing. > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > > > Rod Parker-Rees > Sunday, September 21, 2014 3:57 PM > Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) of > being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary > socialisation?). > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Preiss > Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > > This article is revelant for this topic: > http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely > for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not > the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely > on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender > know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails > are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth > University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your > responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth > University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after > it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an > order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > > > David Preiss > Sunday, September 21, 2014 11:31 AM > This article is revelant for this topic: > http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > > > > mike cole > Sunday, September 21, 2014 10:42 AM > The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is GREAT > reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. > > mike > > On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss > > From deva_research@lineone.net Mon Sep 22 09:38:10 2014 From: deva_research@lineone.net (John Cummins) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 17:38:10 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <54204748.3020403@gmail.com> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FEB8B.1080103@mira.net> <22e89f518fea43f39ee2fbb249e7eab3@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5420427E.4090709@mira.net> <54204748.3020403@gmail.com> Message-ID: <000c01cfd683$98db1c30$ca915490$@net> Apropos the Scientific American article, below is a recent abstract of a recent article, and also ( I hope) a functional link to a preprint of the whole paper. John Authors: Jos? L. Duarte, Jarret T. Crawford, Charlotta Stern, Jonathan Haidt, Lee Jussim, and Philip E. Tetlock Deadline for Commentary Proposals: Monday August 11, 2014 Abstract: Psychologists have demonstrated the value of diversity, particularly diversity of viewpoints, for enhancing creativity, discovery, and problem solving. But one key type of viewpoint diversity is lacking in academic psychology in general and social psychology in particular: political diversity. This article reviews the available evidence and finds support for four claims: 1) Academic psychology once had considerable political diversity, but has lost nearly all of it in the last 50 years; 2) This lack of political diversity can undermine the validity of social psychological science via mechanisms such as the embedding of liberal values into research questions and methods, steering researchers away from important but politically unpalatable research topics, and producing conclusions that mischaracterize liberals and conservatives alike; 3) Increased political diversity would improve social psychological science by reducing the impact of bias mechanisms such as confirmation bias, and by empowering dissenting minorities to improve the quality of the majority's thinking; and 4) The underrepresentation of non-liberals in social psychology is most likely due to a combination of self-selection, hostile climate, and discrimination. We close with recommendations for increasing political diversity in social psychology. Keywords: Social psychology, diversity, politics, bias, sociology of science Download Target Article Preprint (please give the page a few moments to load): http://journals.cambridge.org/BBSJournal/Call/Duarte_preprint From mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu Mon Sep 22 11:10:42 2014 From: mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu (Zavala, Miguel) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 18:10:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035BF6@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: To add to the discussion, We seem to be steering into debates age old on knowledge, objectivity, etc. These debates have been going on for quite some time, at least in Western (Greco) traditions, the tension between 'phenomena' and 'noumena', which philosophers of science have reflected upon (see the discussion-debate on Galileo's scientific rationalism) and later positivists seemed to fold into their world-system. But what happens when epistemological questions (and debates) are made secondary, in a dialectical sense, and we privilege metaphysical-ethical ways of being-knowing? How do these debates or questions over objectivity and what is 'real' get reframed and reinvented? I point folks to Sandra Harding's work on 'strong objectivity', which provides a distinct argument and framing of the question of 'objectivity' and 'knowledge.' You can access her article here: http://130.58.92.210/Students/phys29_2013/ElectronicReadings/Week%2012/Hard ing.pdf http://130.58.92.210/Students/phys29_2013/ElectronicReadings/Week%2012/Hard ing.pdf. "Strong Objectivity? It's a clear, quick read. Be well, Miguel Za vala On 9/22/14 9:32 AM, "Glassman, Michael" wrote: >Hi Jenna, > >It is not so much a difficulty with people having different perspectives >as much as the idea that maybe the way we are discussing it is not >working (precisely because people are appropriating it for their own >purposes) and maybe we need to explore different ways of discussing and >understanding some very real phenomenon. > >So I can't look at something from another person's point of view so let >me do so from a point of view that is closer to home for me (with >apologies if this seems too trivial). Let's say a researcher is >observing a classroom in China and compares it to an American classroom >and sees the children working together to achieve a goal and the >researcher says, "ah, that is the result of the more cooperative Chinese >culture, different from our individualized culture." This is based on >limited observations and a moderate knowledge of Chinese history. The >researcher can make the assertion of course, but how much credence should >be given. > >Another person is watching the same classroom in relation to American >classrooms, but it is somebody who lived through the cultural revolution. > They don't see this as part of the Chinese culture but the strong >attempts to sublimate individual identification in the context of the >whole - it is based on a strong political ideological decision about >which direction to take society which is still being played out in the >early childhood classroom. Also an assertion, but again how warranted >based on limited evidence. > >In both cases we can say it is based on perspectives, but one perspective >does not really have that much of an advantage over the other. You say >the scientific findings are based very much on this perspective and you >would be right. > >Okay, now say two scientists exploring what is going on with climate >change. One person comes from a more progressive background and is >working in a context where there is a great deal of empirical evidence, >literally hundreds of studies saying that climate change is being caused >by humans and following on this evidence offers a finding saying that >there is human additions to climate > >The second scientist comes from a strong neoliberal, free market >background and is very sincere, but follows a much, much smaller >scientific trajectory and observing the same phenomena claims that there >is no human addition to climate change. This second scientist is also >making an assertion. And if the first scientist argues the second >scientist says, but that is your different perspective. > >In both cases the findings are also based on perspectives - and in the >case I am posing sincere perspectives. How then do we determine that >this second situation is different from the first? Why do we say yes >findings are based on perspective in the first but hesitate to say so in >the second? I would suggest it is really hard. And I would suggest it >is difficult because of the way we are discussing the issue. > >Michael >________________________________________ >From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >on behalf of Jenna McWilliams [jennamcjenna@gmail.com] >Sent: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:59 AM >To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > >Imagine being a scientist who does their work from inside of, let's say, >a queer and female-bodied container. You see the Scientific American >article that Peter forwarded on and you think, well...this really isn't >news--it's what lots of us non-mainstream (queer, female, nonwhite, >disabled, genderqueer/transgender) researchers have known for what seems >like forever. It's also well and widely discussed, as Miguel pointed >out, in Science and Technology Studies. Obviously, you think. Obviously >science is shaped by the identities of the people who engage it. >Obviously people who work from within bodies that fall outside of the >mainstream are sometimes attuned to phenomena that are overlooked by the >more mainstream bodies and minds that dominate what we today call >"science." Obviously the field needs to make room for those people and >that research, too. > >Then imagine jumping onto one of your favorite listservs and seeing the >point of the Scientific American article equated with climate change >deniers and anti-science creationists. It would be easy to feel >disappointed, when encountering this on your favorite listserv--to see >the work of those who aim to reshape science to account for multiple >perspectives and experiences equated with opinions that are generally >characterized as willful ignorance by those who do science. It would be >easy to wish this conversation hadn't gone to that place. > >But perhaps I'm misinterpreting the discussion. My queer and female body >sometimes reacts particularly strongly to certain forms of discourse and >certain forms of arguments that others might let pass. > > > > > > >-- >Jenna (Jake) McWilliams >Learning Sciences Program, Indiana University >jenmcwil@indiana.edu > > >> Andy Blunden >> Monday, September 22, 2014 9:38 AM >> There is such a thing as objective truth, David. The claim that >> asbestos kills, once established, is extremely robust. And it is not >> just a statistical correlation, microscopic examination of lung tissue >> can prove it. I sort of agree with what you say, David, but relativism >> is also relative. The test of objectivity is the "robustness" of the >> claim, its capacity to withstand sceptical criticism. Up to a point, >> the asbestos companies were able to use the tactics - just like the >> tobacco industry and the climate deniers - such as putting contrary >> information, supported by those posing as scientists, into the public >> domain to create the illusion of a "debate", and buying off or >> intimidating those who spoke the truth. But in the end the case >> against them became so strong that the only way the truth that >> asbestos kills can now be undermined is by some kind of "higher truth" >> which sublates the irrefutable truth of medical science. Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> David Preiss >> Sunday, September 21, 2014 7:11 PM >> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in recent >> scientific writing. >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> Rod Parker-Rees >> Sunday, September 21, 2014 3:57 PM >> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) of >> being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary >> socialisation?). >> >> Rod >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Preiss >> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >> This article is revelant for this topic: >> http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> ________________________________ >> >>[http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]>c.uk/worldclass> >> >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely >> for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not >> the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely >> on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender >> know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails >> are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth >> University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your >> responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth >> University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after >> it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an >> order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order >>form. >> >> >> David Preiss >> Sunday, September 21, 2014 11:31 AM >> This article is revelant for this topic: >> http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> >> mike cole >> Sunday, September 21, 2014 10:42 AM >> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is GREAT >> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. >> >> mike >> >> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss >> >> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Sep 22 11:50:33 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 12:50:33 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <000c01cfd683$98db1c30$ca915490$@net> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FEB8B.1080103@mira.net> <22e89f518fea43f39ee2fbb249e7eab3@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5420427E.4090709@mira.net> <54204748.3020403@gmail.com> <000c01cfd683$98db1c30$ca915490$@net> Message-ID: <1368B968-9FD1-441A-BC55-AC104E1CE00C@gmail.com> Amazing dialog! What I have gotten out of it, with due regard to my encyclopedic ignorance: 1) I liked the Sandra Harry reference on perspectives. Langacker devotes considerable ink to "construal" in grammatical analysis. 2) The comment on linguistic vs. imagistic construals, i.e. multimodal, is very useful to me, and lacking in mainstream linguistics, 3) I think I must be a Humian: I don't think causality can be demonstrated. So maybe science isn't about truth at all, but rather collective skepticism and humility. (Scientists used to know that queers were weird. Well, maybe WEIRDs are queer, not normal.) The consequences are global and frightening, but the models of what is causing climate change are not truth, they are models. The question is what predictions we can make using those models and what predictions we can make (again, using models) about any measures we might take to avert disaster predicted by the models. And I suspect that scientists can not win the public relations battle by claiming truth. The "doubts" of climate change deniers, ironically, are part of skeptical science, not some discovery of a massive conspiracy. 4) Asbestos is more like tobacco than climate change. The (and X-rays) predictions of what happens when you go into the mine, or smoke, are convincing to practically anyone, though that hasn't always been the case. 5) Truth, for me, is about sticking with life projects despite lack of easy certainty, which is why I like the inclusion of hope in the chat. And I like the idea that it's all a creative work in progress. And I think this XMA/XMCA dialogic project gives ME hope! I know my construals may be lacking in coherence, but I respect and trust this community to help me get it right. Good old ZPD! Henry On Sep 22, 2014, at 10:38 AM, "John Cummins" wrote: > Apropos the Scientific American article, below is a recent abstract of a recent article, and also ( I hope) a functional link to a preprint of the whole paper. > > John > > > Authors: Jos? L. Duarte, Jarret T. Crawford, Charlotta Stern, Jonathan Haidt, Lee Jussim, and Philip E. Tetlock > > Deadline for Commentary Proposals: Monday August 11, 2014 > > Abstract: Psychologists have demonstrated the value of diversity, particularly diversity of viewpoints, for enhancing creativity, discovery, and problem solving. But one key type of viewpoint diversity is lacking in academic psychology in general and social psychology in particular: political diversity. This article reviews the available evidence and finds support for four claims: 1) Academic psychology once had considerable political diversity, but has lost nearly all of it in the last 50 years; 2) This lack of political diversity can undermine the validity of social psychological science via mechanisms such as the embedding of liberal values into research questions and methods, steering researchers away from important but politically unpalatable research topics, and producing conclusions that mischaracterize liberals and conservatives alike; 3) Increased political diversity would improve social psychological science by reducing the impact of bias mechanisms such as > confirmation bias, and by empowering dissenting minorities to improve the quality of the majority's thinking; and 4) The underrepresentation of non-liberals in social psychology is most likely due to a combination of self-selection, hostile climate, and discrimination. We close with recommendations for increasing political diversity in social psychology. > > Keywords: Social psychology, diversity, politics, bias, sociology of science > > > Download Target Article Preprint (please give the page a few moments to load): > http://journals.cambridge.org/BBSJournal/Call/Duarte_preprint > > > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Mon Sep 22 12:14:17 2014 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 19:14:17 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder Message-ID: <36ad87a8b4e34a4c95fb8e8921e46de3@CO2PR0501MB855.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> Hello everyone, Miguel put forward an interesting question: "But what happens when epistemological questions (and debates) are made secondary, in a dialectical sense, and we privilege metaphysical-ethical ways of being-knowing?" When we privilege ethical ways of knowing, we might be engaging in ideologizing. Ideology is also a knowledge production system, just not a science system of knowledge production. The same can be attributed to religion, myth, and art, and other systems of knowledge production. Just to clarify, the main social function of these systems might not be knowledge production; however, they also have such outcomes as well. Best wishes, Lubomir Lubo From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Sep 22 15:25:33 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 23:25:33 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <542024FF.6040702@mira.net> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <542024FF.6040702@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi Andy, So it was the object until it was fully recognised that it shouldn't be. Why does this contradict Leontyev? Best, Huw On 22 September 2014 14:32, Andy Blunden wrote: > It's an 12 minute talk, Huw, (8 mins for discussion) aimed at critiquing > the foundations of AT, proposing a new foundation, and presenting an > outline of how asbestos was first produced and then banned. :) The full > story is in the book. But thanks for the pointer. I'll try to address it. > > I don't touch on AN Leontyev's dualism of need and object, but you have > raised it. There is a need for insulation material for buildings. There is > also a need for buildings that don't give you cancer. The need for > insulation does not find an adequate object in asbestos because asbestos > fails to meet the need for safety. A need can be met by different objects. > I can resolve that contradiction by spelling out the need more precisely. > But asbestos production *was* the object and yet it didn't meet the need - > for safe insulation. > > But the real object of the talk is to critique the idea that if a social > formation is producing something (either because the Central Ctee said so > or because the market said so) then ipso facto there is an objective need > for it. This is OK for dealing with the child who is not doing their > homework and failing to learn to read. The teacher with some good reason > thinks they have the final say, the Truth, about the objective need for > literacy. But the fact is that the Central Committee and the Market both > get it very wrong sometimes. And these are after all, for social theory, > the interesting cases. In large measure that is the problem I am addressing > myself to. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> >> >> One's conceptual frame is unified through commitment to a >> life-project. Opinions and evidence which don't fit the conceptual >> frame generated by the central concept of a life-project, its >> vision of the Good Life. There is a 10 minute talk on this in >> relation to denial of the dangers posed to health by asbestos >> here: >> https://www.academia.edu/8179060/Activity_as_Project_ >> The_Case_of_Asbestos >> >> Apologies for going on too long. >> Andy >> >> >> I've caught up with this thread, briefly. >> >> Andy, I think your article could be tightened up a little on the notion >> of objective as simple. You make the case towards the end that objective >> need should not be considered as unproblematic (which can be generalised to >> the notion that anything objective should not be taken as unproblematic). >> However you also state early on: >> >> "Far from there being any need which is met by asbestos and provides an >> objective motive for its production, it is now universally acknowledged >> that asbestos kills people." >> >> Which, to me, seems to confuse the substance with the functional >> (technological) properties deemed to be of good value, i.e. that it would >> be a mistake to state that asbestos itself fulfils a need, rather it is the >> functional relations fulfilled and established by it, that was deemed >> productive. >> >> I don't think this undermines your point about projects here, but it >> does, I think, change the view that Leontyev's formulation was not adequate >> sociologically, to an assertion about how to construe motive (i.e. as >> related to a means of production). >> >> There is, of course, a new danger that one takes the concept in >> "projects" as some new kind of fixed point. But I think there is already a >> tradition here, in the form of myth as a means of production. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> Charles Bazerman wrote: >> >> Michael, >> I am with you, and not only because of climate change >> deniers. The sociocultural critique has been important to >> show that humans make knowledge, and they do it from their own >> interests and perspectives. Yet, various disciplines and >> sciences, have come to know more about the world in ways that >> are less entangled with the limits of individual or small >> group perceptions and interests. >> Disciplines do represent the world outside of themselves, >> gathering data--of course selectively through their own >> devices, their means of collection, forms of inscription and >> display, etc... Historically, the methodological standards in >> different fields have evolved to include more awareness of the >> contingency, fragility, and specificity of samples, data and >> analysis--along with increasing cleverness of our tools. >> This is what methodology is all about. I tend to view >> objectivity not as an absolute, but an awareness of ways in >> which we are entangled with the phenomena we are trying to >> study, and to find ways to disentangle ourselves less. >> So from this perspective, incorporating the sociocultural >> critique creates challenges to maintain the persuasiveness of >> our data, representation, and analysis. Over the last few >> decades, we have been struggling in different disciplines to >> incorporate this critique but yet maintain the disciplinary >> projects of advancing contingent, but useful and reliable >> knowledge. I like your term warranted assertability. I myself >> have relied on the idea of accountability--in terms of being >> able to give a good account of your research actions when >> queried from various directions. But it is important to the >> advance of knowledge that we find ways to gather and >> understand information about the world (in which we are both >> living parts and the constructors of knowledge about that >> world including ourselves) that recognizes the contingency of >> our knowledge but does not evaporate our confidence in that >> knowledge into a vapor of contingency only. >> >> I have struggled with this issue for many years in my work on >> the rhetoric of science and have discussed it in various ways, >> drawing on the work of many others (Ludwik Fleck still seems >> important to me over many years), but more work needs to be >> done to crystallize an understanding that leaves science and >> social science standing despite it being created by poor, >> frail, interested, humans of limited and skewed vision. >> best, >> Chuck >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: "Glassman, Michael" > > >> Date: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:21 am >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> > >> >> >> It seems to me that articles like this can be a double >> edged sword. They use examples where culture has an >> influence on how we see things but then offer the >> generalization that science is perspective. This is the >> same line you hear by climate deniers who claim that the >> climatologists have a liberal bias. Science is based on >> individual perspective until it doesn't. I'm their book >> is a much more nuanced discussion. This is a really >> complex issue which at this particular moment has >> extraordinary import. Maybe we need to find other ways to >> discuss this - like warranted assertability. Perhaps I >> have been spending too much time reading about the >> politics of climate change lately and it has spooked me. >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] on behalf of >> David Preiss [daviddpreiss@gmail.com >> ] >> Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 9:41 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >> And they make claims for all humankind. >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 22:16, Martin John Packer >> > >> escribi?: >> >> So there are two distinct problems here: First, the >> researchers are >> not diverse. Second, the people they (we?) study are not >> diverse. >> >> Martin >> >> >> On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:11 PM, David Preiss >> > > >> wrote: >> >> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies >> I've seen in >> recent scientific writing. >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 18:57, Rod Parker-Rees >> >> > > escribi?: >> >> Great article, David - highlights the >> importance (at every level) >> of being aware of what others might find odd about us >> (secondary socialisation?). >> >> Rod >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] On Behalf Of >> David Preiss >> >> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >> This article is revelant for this topic: >> http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~ >> henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >> > 7Ehenrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf> >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 13:42, mike cole >> > >> escribi?: >> >> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" >> published by MIT is GREAT >> reading. Seeing this in Scientific >> American is super. >> >> mike >> >> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David >> Preiss > > >> wrote: >> >> >> What a fantastic piece Peter! Loved >> the references to primatology. >> David >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> El 21-09-2014, a las 7:31, Peter >> Smagorinsky > > escribi?: >> >> >> http://www.scientificamerican. >> com/article/point-of-view-affects-how-s >> cience-is-done/ >> >> -- >> >> Development and Evolution are both ... >> "processes of construction >> and >> >> re- construction in which heterogeneous >> resources are >> contingently but >> >> more or less reliably reassembled for each >> life cycle." [Oyama, >> Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] >> >> ________________________________ >> [ >> >> This email and any files with it are >> confidential and intended >> solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is >> addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then >> copying, distribution or other use of the information >> contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely >> on it. If you have received this email in error please let >> the sender know immediately and delete it from your >> system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. >> While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no >> responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility >> to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University >> does not accept responsibility for any changes made after >> it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments >> constitutes an order for goods or services unless >> accompanied by an official order form. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Sep 22 17:17:14 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2014 17:17:14 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035BF6@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Miguel et al-- In an earlier message, I urged that people interested in the Scientific American article that Peter sent around read the book by Medin and Bang, *Who's Asking *(MIT Press, 2014). Miguel's suggestion that people read Harding is right on. Her work is among many discussed in Chapter 2, "Unsettling Science" which takes up a number of issues being raised here. The conclusion to this chapter states, in part...... It seems to us that the history of science that we learned in school lis a clear case of European ethnoscience.......(which) represents one set of orientations among many and one set of values among many. These values need to be made explicit and the possibility of a broader set of values acknowledged." I have been interrupted in my writing of a review of the book for MCA in which, for a lot of reasons, I will urge that people read the book and take it very seriously. I think it relevant to note that several of the basic research results from these authors have been published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, an institution not known for its championing of diversity. Given the critical nature of the authors' stance toward Western Ethnoscience, pretty amazing that they can get their voices heard, let alone supported, in the venues they have been featured in, including *Scientific American.* mike On Mon, Sep 22, 2014 at 11:10 AM, Zavala, Miguel < mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> wrote: > To add to the discussion, > > We seem to be steering into debates age old on knowledge, objectivity, > etc. These debates have been going on for quite some time, at least in > Western (Greco) traditions, the tension between 'phenomena' and 'noumena', > which philosophers of science have reflected upon (see the > discussion-debate on Galileo's scientific rationalism) and later > positivists seemed to fold into their world-system. > > But what happens when epistemological questions (and debates) are made > secondary, in a dialectical sense, and we privilege metaphysical-ethical > ways of being-knowing? How do these debates or questions over objectivity > and what is 'real' get reframed and reinvented? > > I point folks to Sandra Harding's work on 'strong objectivity', which > provides a distinct argument and framing of the question of 'objectivity' > and 'knowledge.' > > You can access her article here: > http://130.58.92.210/Students/phys29_2013/ElectronicReadings/Week%2012/Hard > ing.pdf > > http://130.58.92.210/Students/phys29_2013/ElectronicReadings/Week%2012/Hard > ing.pdf. "Strong Objectivity? > < > http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&ved=0CEYQFj > AF&url=http%3A%2F%2F130.58.92.210%2FStudents%2Fphys29_2013%2FElectronicRead > ings%2FWeek%252012%2FHarding.pdf&ei=IWUgVIToB4itogSPo4CIDA&usg=AFQjCNEAry5b > Yje_NxtI14Q_zgOjrf8Sbg&bvm=bv.75775273,d.cGU> > > It's a clear, quick read. > > Be well, > > Miguel Za vala > > > > On 9/22/14 9:32 AM, "Glassman, Michael" wrote: > > >Hi Jenna, > > > >It is not so much a difficulty with people having different perspectives > >as much as the idea that maybe the way we are discussing it is not > >working (precisely because people are appropriating it for their own > >purposes) and maybe we need to explore different ways of discussing and > >understanding some very real phenomenon. > > > >So I can't look at something from another person's point of view so let > >me do so from a point of view that is closer to home for me (with > >apologies if this seems too trivial). Let's say a researcher is > >observing a classroom in China and compares it to an American classroom > >and sees the children working together to achieve a goal and the > >researcher says, "ah, that is the result of the more cooperative Chinese > >culture, different from our individualized culture." This is based on > >limited observations and a moderate knowledge of Chinese history. The > >researcher can make the assertion of course, but how much credence should > >be given. > > > >Another person is watching the same classroom in relation to American > >classrooms, but it is somebody who lived through the cultural revolution. > > They don't see this as part of the Chinese culture but the strong > >attempts to sublimate individual identification in the context of the > >whole - it is based on a strong political ideological decision about > >which direction to take society which is still being played out in the > >early childhood classroom. Also an assertion, but again how warranted > >based on limited evidence. > > > >In both cases we can say it is based on perspectives, but one perspective > >does not really have that much of an advantage over the other. You say > >the scientific findings are based very much on this perspective and you > >would be right. > > > >Okay, now say two scientists exploring what is going on with climate > >change. One person comes from a more progressive background and is > >working in a context where there is a great deal of empirical evidence, > >literally hundreds of studies saying that climate change is being caused > >by humans and following on this evidence offers a finding saying that > >there is human additions to climate > > > >The second scientist comes from a strong neoliberal, free market > >background and is very sincere, but follows a much, much smaller > >scientific trajectory and observing the same phenomena claims that there > >is no human addition to climate change. This second scientist is also > >making an assertion. And if the first scientist argues the second > >scientist says, but that is your different perspective. > > > >In both cases the findings are also based on perspectives - and in the > >case I am posing sincere perspectives. How then do we determine that > >this second situation is different from the first? Why do we say yes > >findings are based on perspective in the first but hesitate to say so in > >the second? I would suggest it is really hard. And I would suggest it > >is difficult because of the way we are discussing the issue. > > > >Michael > >________________________________________ > >From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >on behalf of Jenna McWilliams [jennamcjenna@gmail.com] > >Sent: Monday, September 22, 2014 11:59 AM > >To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > > > >Imagine being a scientist who does their work from inside of, let's say, > >a queer and female-bodied container. You see the Scientific American > >article that Peter forwarded on and you think, well...this really isn't > >news--it's what lots of us non-mainstream (queer, female, nonwhite, > >disabled, genderqueer/transgender) researchers have known for what seems > >like forever. It's also well and widely discussed, as Miguel pointed > >out, in Science and Technology Studies. Obviously, you think. Obviously > >science is shaped by the identities of the people who engage it. > >Obviously people who work from within bodies that fall outside of the > >mainstream are sometimes attuned to phenomena that are overlooked by the > >more mainstream bodies and minds that dominate what we today call > >"science." Obviously the field needs to make room for those people and > >that research, too. > > > >Then imagine jumping onto one of your favorite listservs and seeing the > >point of the Scientific American article equated with climate change > >deniers and anti-science creationists. It would be easy to feel > >disappointed, when encountering this on your favorite listserv--to see > >the work of those who aim to reshape science to account for multiple > >perspectives and experiences equated with opinions that are generally > >characterized as willful ignorance by those who do science. It would be > >easy to wish this conversation hadn't gone to that place. > > > >But perhaps I'm misinterpreting the discussion. My queer and female body > >sometimes reacts particularly strongly to certain forms of discourse and > >certain forms of arguments that others might let pass. > > > > > > > > > > > > > >-- > >Jenna (Jake) McWilliams > >Learning Sciences Program, Indiana University > >jenmcwil@indiana.edu > > > > > >> Andy Blunden > >> Monday, September 22, 2014 9:38 AM > >> There is such a thing as objective truth, David. The claim that > >> asbestos kills, once established, is extremely robust. And it is not > >> just a statistical correlation, microscopic examination of lung tissue > >> can prove it. I sort of agree with what you say, David, but relativism > >> is also relative. The test of objectivity is the "robustness" of the > >> claim, its capacity to withstand sceptical criticism. Up to a point, > >> the asbestos companies were able to use the tactics - just like the > >> tobacco industry and the climate deniers - such as putting contrary > >> information, supported by those posing as scientists, into the public > >> domain to create the illusion of a "debate", and buying off or > >> intimidating those who spoke the truth. But in the end the case > >> against them became so strong that the only way the truth that > >> asbestos kills can now be undermined is by some kind of "higher truth" > >> which sublates the irrefutable truth of medical science. Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> David Preiss > >> Sunday, September 21, 2014 7:11 PM > >> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in recent > >> scientific writing. > >> > >> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >> > >> > >> Rod Parker-Rees > >> Sunday, September 21, 2014 3:57 PM > >> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) of > >> being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary > >> socialisation?). > >> > >> Rod > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Preiss > >> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > >> > >> This article is revelant for this topic: > >> http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf > >> > >> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >> > >> > >> ________________________________ > >> > >>[http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.a > >>c.uk/worldclass> > >> > >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely > >> for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not > >> the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > >> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely > >> on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender > >> know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails > >> are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth > >> University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your > >> responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth > >> University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after > >> it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an > >> order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order > >>form. > >> > >> > >> David Preiss > >> Sunday, September 21, 2014 11:31 AM > >> This article is revelant for this topic: > >> http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf > >> > >> Enviado desde mi iPhone > >> > >> > >> > >> mike cole > >> Sunday, September 21, 2014 10:42 AM > >> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is GREAT > >> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. > >> > >> mike > >> > >> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss > >> > >> > > > > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 22 17:19:53 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 10:19:53 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <54204748.3020403@gmail.com> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FEB8B.1080103@mira.net> <22e89f518fea43f39ee2fbb249e7eab3@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5420427E.4090709@mira.net> <54204748.3020403@gmail.com> Message-ID: <5420BCA9.10806@mira.net> Jenna and David, I am coming from a Hegelian-Marxist perspective. Not a naive positivist perspective. Firstly, natural science (as opposed to human science) makes as its object (Arbeitsgegenstand) a material world taken to exist independently of human activity, which is knowable by means of human activity. It is a project like any other (one I have a commitment to) but it is not thereby a universal gateway to absolute truth. But science in general has broader scope and I think everyone on this list recognises that its claims are in general far less robust. But I have tried to be careful in how I have formulated a view here. I have said that something may count as objective so long as it can withstand sceptical critique, and I should add "within that community." The idea that asbestos is only poisonous from one or another point of view is a very poisonous point of view. It relies for its maintenance on very oppressive forms of inequality and domination. But it has fallen to critique. My observation is that it cannot recover from that critique. One might find that there is after all a cure for mesothelioma or that it was not asbestos but some component of asbestos which is the actual causal agent, but further developments of the idea which sublate the truth that asbestos kills people also retain that truth while negating it. That is always possible. So the point is Jenna, that there is critique and critique. The postmodern idea of the relativism of truth (initially a "left-wing" standpoint) has been enthusiastically embraced by *conservative* people to argue that their view - which might be women are inferior and gays are evil or whatever - are equally valid to ideas such as the moral equality of all human beings or whatever. The point is not to equate climate-denial and creationism with gender critique of science, but to figure out how to *avoid* that equation! Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Jenna McWilliams wrote: > Imagine being a scientist who does their work from inside of, let's > say, a queer and female-bodied container. You see the Scientific > American article that Peter forwarded on and you think, well...this > really isn't news--it's what lots of us non-mainstream (queer, female, > nonwhite, disabled, genderqueer/transgender) researchers have known > for what seems like forever. It's also well and widely discussed, as > Miguel pointed out, in Science and Technology Studies. Obviously, you > think. Obviously science is shaped by the identities of the people who > engage it. Obviously people who work from within bodies that fall > outside of the mainstream are sometimes attuned to phenomena that are > overlooked by the more mainstream bodies and minds that dominate what > we today call "science." Obviously the field needs to make room for > those people and that research, too. > > Then imagine jumping onto one of your favorite listservs and seeing > the point of the Scientific American article equated with climate > change deniers and anti-science creationists. It would be easy to feel > disappointed, when encountering this on your favorite listserv--to see > the work of those who aim to reshape science to account for multiple > perspectives and experiences equated with opinions that are generally > characterized as willful ignorance by those who do science. It would > be easy to wish this conversation hadn't gone to that place. > > But perhaps I'm misinterpreting the discussion. My queer and female > body sometimes reacts particularly strongly to certain forms of > discourse and certain forms of arguments that others might let pass. > > > > > > > -- > Jenna (Jake) McWilliams > Learning Sciences Program, Indiana University > jenmcwil@indiana.edu > > >> Andy Blunden >> Monday, September 22, 2014 9:38 AM >> There is such a thing as objective truth, David. The claim that >> asbestos kills, once established, is extremely robust. And it is not >> just a statistical correlation, microscopic examination of lung >> tissue can prove it. I sort of agree with what you say, David, but >> relativism is also relative. The test of objectivity is the >> "robustness" of the claim, its capacity to withstand sceptical >> criticism. Up to a point, the asbestos companies were able to use the >> tactics - just like the tobacco industry and the climate deniers - >> such as putting contrary information, supported by those posing as >> scientists, into the public domain to create the illusion of a >> "debate", and buying off or intimidating those who spoke the truth. >> But in the end the case against them became so strong that the only >> way the truth that asbestos kills can now be undermined is by some >> kind of "higher truth" which sublates the irrefutable truth of >> medical science. Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> David Preiss >> Sunday, September 21, 2014 7:11 PM >> Loved the WEIRD acronym. One of the best ironies I've seen in recent >> scientific writing. >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> Rod Parker-Rees >> Sunday, September 21, 2014 3:57 PM >> Great article, David - highlights the importance (at every level) of >> being aware of what others might find odd about us (secondary >> socialisation?). >> >> Rod >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Preiss >> Sent: 21 September 2014 18:31 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder >> >> This article is revelant for this topic: >> http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> ________________________________ >> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] >> >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely >> for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not >> the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely >> on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender >> know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails >> are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth >> University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your >> responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth >> University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after >> it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an >> order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. >> >> >> David Preiss >> Sunday, September 21, 2014 11:31 AM >> This article is revelant for this topic: >> http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> >> >> mike cole >> Sunday, September 21, 2014 10:42 AM >> The book by Medin and Bang, "Who's asking" published by MIT is GREAT >> reading. Seeing this in Scientific American is super. >> >> mike >> >> On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 8:18 AM, David Preiss >> >> From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 22 17:31:49 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 10:31:49 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <542024FF.6040702@mira.net> Message-ID: <5420BF75.2010007@mira.net> Exactly, Huw. But I am interested in the change! You expressed that change on the passive voice. But it was an active struggle to change that concept. It's object was a concept which was *contrary* to conventional wisdom. ANL's AT is ok before and after a revolution but fails to understand the overthrow of the former and its replacement by another. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Huw Lloyd wrote: > Hi Andy, > > So it was the object until it was fully recognised that it shouldn't > be. Why does this contradict Leontyev? > > Best, > Huw > > On 22 September 2014 14:32, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > It's an 12 minute talk, Huw, (8 mins for discussion) aimed at > critiquing the foundations of AT, proposing a new foundation, and > presenting an outline of how asbestos was first produced and then > banned. :) The full story is in the book. But thanks for the > pointer. I'll try to address it. > > I don't touch on AN Leontyev's dualism of need and object, but you > have raised it. There is a need for insulation material for > buildings. There is also a need for buildings that don't give you > cancer. The need for insulation does not find an adequate object > in asbestos because asbestos fails to meet the need for safety. A > need can be met by different objects. I can resolve that > contradiction by spelling out the need more precisely. But > asbestos production *was* the object and yet it didn't meet the > need - for safe insulation. > > But the real object of the talk is to critique the idea that if a > social formation is producing something (either because the > Central Ctee said so or because the market said so) then ipso > facto there is an objective need for it. This is OK for dealing > with the child who is not doing their homework and failing to > learn to read. The teacher with some good reason thinks they have > the final say, the Truth, about the objective need for literacy. > But the fact is that the Central Committee and the Market both get > it very wrong sometimes. And these are after all, for social > theory, the interesting cases. In large measure that is the > problem I am addressing myself to. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Sep 22 18:33:34 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 02:33:34 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <5420BF75.2010007@mira.net> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <542024FF.6040702@mira.net> <5420BF75.2010007@mira.net> Message-ID: On 23 September 2014 01:31, Andy Blunden wrote: > Exactly, Huw. But I am interested in the change! > You expressed that change on the passive voice. But it was an active > struggle to change that concept. It's object was a concept which was > *contrary* to conventional wisdom. ANL's AT is ok before and after a > revolution but fails to understand the overthrow of the former and its > replacement by another. Ok, good, so there's no contradiction. With respect to change, AT is not imputing any generalisation of the specific local object. For the actor, the object ceases to be the object when it is recognised as being inadequate or harmful. >From the AT perspective we have numerous activities coming together around various collective enterprises, many of which may have "asbestos" as their object or concern, but have rather different objects of activity. Even for those with an ostensibly comparable object, the object comes into existence and is rejected at different times. Hence overthrow or other forms of change are manifest in the changing localised needs. So this still doesn't address why this a "grave defect in Leontyev's version of AT, which prevents it from ever being taken seriously as a social theory". I suspect what you need to address are these "project" level regularities and how they extend or disagree with AT and provide better explanatory power. In what I read, you don't do that... the only clue I have presently is that you may be imputing "project" level object to localised activities. Best, Huw > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> Hi Andy, >> >> So it was the object until it was fully recognised that it shouldn't be. >> Why does this contradict Leontyev? >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> On 22 September 2014 14:32, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> It's an 12 minute talk, Huw, (8 mins for discussion) aimed at >> critiquing the foundations of AT, proposing a new foundation, and >> presenting an outline of how asbestos was first produced and then >> banned. :) The full story is in the book. But thanks for the >> pointer. I'll try to address it. >> >> I don't touch on AN Leontyev's dualism of need and object, but you >> have raised it. There is a need for insulation material for >> buildings. There is also a need for buildings that don't give you >> cancer. The need for insulation does not find an adequate object >> in asbestos because asbestos fails to meet the need for safety. A >> need can be met by different objects. I can resolve that >> contradiction by spelling out the need more precisely. But >> asbestos production *was* the object and yet it didn't meet the >> need - for safe insulation. >> >> But the real object of the talk is to critique the idea that if a >> social formation is producing something (either because the >> Central Ctee said so or because the market said so) then ipso >> facto there is an objective need for it. This is OK for dealing >> with the child who is not doing their homework and failing to >> learn to read. The teacher with some good reason thinks they have >> the final say, the Truth, about the objective need for literacy. >> But the fact is that the Central Committee and the Market both get >> it very wrong sometimes. And these are after all, for social >> theory, the interesting cases. In large measure that is the >> problem I am addressing myself to. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Sep 22 18:55:32 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 11:55:32 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <542024FF.6040702@mira.net> <5420BF75.2010007@mira.net> Message-ID: <5420D314.4010602@mira.net> Huw, I simply cannot respond to your challenge within the medium of a listserv. Your scepticism is justified but all I can do is pique your interest. But let me make this one point. It is a maxim widely agreed in CHAT, that in order to understand something you must understand its coming-into-being, or in Goethe's words: "Science is the history of science." A social theory which tells you how things work until they don't work any more, is as useful as Linnaeus's Systema Naturae. Some descriptive use, but does not give you the kind of insight which the Theory of Evolution gives. Expounding the "project regularities" asks for a protracted exposition. Try https://www.academia.edu/2365533/Collaborative_Project_as_a_Concept_for_Interdisciplinary_Human_Science_Research Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > On 23 September 2014 01:31, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > Exactly, Huw. But I am interested in the change! > You expressed that change on the passive voice. But it was an > active struggle to change that concept. It's object was a concept > which was *contrary* to conventional wisdom. ANL's AT is ok before > and after a revolution but fails to understand the overthrow of > the former and its replacement by another. > > > Ok, good, so there's no contradiction. With respect to change, AT is > not imputing any generalisation of the specific local object. For the > actor, the object ceases to be the object when it is recognised as > being inadequate or harmful. > > From the AT perspective we have numerous activities coming together > around various collective enterprises, many of which may have > "asbestos" as their object or concern, but have rather different > objects of activity. Even for those with an ostensibly comparable > object, the object comes into existence and is rejected at different > times. Hence overthrow or other forms of change are manifest in the > changing localised needs. > > So this still doesn't address why this a "grave defect in Leontyev's > version of AT, which prevents it from ever being taken seriously as a > social theory". > > I suspect what you need to address are these "project" level > regularities and how they extend or disagree with AT and provide > better explanatory power. In what I read, you don't do that... the > only clue I have presently is that you may be imputing "project" level > object to localised activities. > > Best, > Huw > > From bazerman@education.ucsb.edu Mon Sep 22 19:33:00 2014 From: bazerman@education.ucsb.edu (Charles Bazerman) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 10:33:00 +0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <54204748.3020403@gmail.com> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FEB8B.1080103@mira.net> <22e89f518fea43f39ee2fbb249e7eab3@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5420427E.4090709@mira.net> <54204748.3020403@gmail.com> Message-ID: Let me explain my comments better. I think the WEIRD article is wonderful. I think it is very important to recognize that knowledge is produced by humans in social configurations through rhetorical means. I think it is very important to understand the limited perspectives that have gone into the construction of our knowledge and how to expand those perspectives to get richer, fuller views that produce results that are more reliable and more widely applicable and are less stigmatizing of human variation, ideologies, cultures. It is important to the advance of knowledge to understand these things. It is also important for us to understand how it is we can keep creating progressively better maps of the world we live in and are part of. Concepts such as accountability (as I used it), and warrantable assertability (as Michael and Dewey used it), is to bring knowledge production into human processes, which are fallible, contingent, and limited, but which advance by bringing more persuasive evidence to bear in order to reframe perspectives and make more phenomena persuasively visible. This is exactly what the WEIRD article does and what Medin and Bang do. This is exactly what persuasive gender, ethnicity, and cultural studies do. Having lived through the "science wars" of the eighties, having produced a rhetorical history of scientific papers, and having been attacked both by one side as being an enemy of science and by the other as being a naive realist, I see the project of finding a way to understand the production and use of evidence within different rhetorical discursive fields as a significant and incomplete task. The value is both methodological/epistemological and political. The politics of this are that showing we have ways for the empirical project to go forward but in more enlightened ways will in the long run gain more allies than only opposing and rejecting the science we find narrow in its perspective. Otherwise we are too easily perceived as "enemies of science." The culture of science aims at moving forward and will find ways of incorporating persuasive views that do not put it in a dead end. We do not do ourselves a service by making it appear our opposition is so categorical as to appear to impose a dead end. The successes of science are sufficient that they will just roll over any roadblock we attempt to put in place. Not long ago, for example, the general belief was that it was a single thing and that the writing aspect was trivial. By now, almost all recognize that scientific writing has a history and evolves and varies. That does not discredit scientific writing, but is just the way things work out in the human practice of co ming to knowledge. Many scientists are incorporating contingent, historical, rhetorical, and cultural perspectives in their understandings of what they are doing. But the project of expanding our view is long, and perhaps never ending. Yet we seek, like the blind person with the stick, to understand our surroundings and our selves, so that we can move more freely and successfully through the world. Concerning Climate-Change deniers, creationists, and others, our account of science needs to be able to warrant why we do not find their claims or their evidence, such as it is, persuasive. And we need to be able to distinguish on principled grounds, the difference between such regressive ideologies which ignore persuasive evidence and substantive cultural critiques which are grounded in persuasive evidence and open our eyes wider, to understand that it is important to ask, who is asking and who is WEIRD. Chuck From smago@uga.edu Tue Sep 23 03:21:01 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 10:21:01 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Special Issue in Th & Psy on Language and the Self In-Reply-To: <54213CC9.3070309@lmu.de> References: <54213CC9.3070309@lmu.de> Message-ID: <663ebdfc5d6a430ab3bce1b26147a5ec@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> I've mainly been a conversation starter this fall--I have a lot of demands on me presently that are limiting extensive engagement with the ensuing discussions. Here's another piece that some might find interesting, and that I am included on because I was among the reviewers for the issue. (Yes, I do believe in the peer review process.) The intro is all she sent us, but perhaps university libraries can provide pdf's to those who wish to follow up with the articles. p -----Original Message----- From: Marie-C?cile Bertau [mailto:bertau@lmu.de] Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2014 5:27 AM Subject: Special Issue in Th & Psy on Language and the Self Dear authors, dear peer reviewers, The holiday and conference season is now definitely over, so it is time to send you the completed special issue you all contributed to, published this August. I take that opportunity to thank you all again, with a particular emphasis on those of you, whose texts were /not /published: the reviewers. As I wrote in the introduction, all article rely on texts which remain themselves hidden. These texts are inspiring, careful, in the best sense critical and intense dialogues with their text. They are immensely precious to any author: peer reviewers are the best readers, I think, so serious, and so fully addressed in their doing. For your convenience, I attach the introduction for an overview of the contributions, as well as the cover of the issue for the TOC it includes. In case of interest, I will be pleased to send you any one of the articles as pdf. Best wishes to you all, Marie-C?cile -- PD Dr. Marie-C?cile Bertau -- psycholinguist -- University of Munich Institute for Phonetics and Speech Processing Schellingstrasse 3, 80799 M?nchen Tel. ++49-89-2180-2759 http://www.bertau.de/ -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Bertau_Intro_ThPsy2014.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 381505 bytes Desc: Bertau_Intro_ThPsy2014.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140923/4c16af76/attachment-0002.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: TAP_24_4_cover_REV1.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 627323 bytes Desc: TAP_24_4_cover_REV1.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140923/4c16af76/attachment-0003.pdf From deva_research@lineone.net Tue Sep 23 03:47:10 2014 From: deva_research@lineone.net (John Cummins) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 11:47:10 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FEB8B.1080103@mira.net> <22e89f518fea43f39ee2fbb249e7eab3@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5420427E.4090709@mira.net> <54204748.3020403@gmail.com> Message-ID: <000601cfd71b$ba8941c0$2f9bc540$@net> Mike quotes below the conclusion of chapter two of Hardings' book. ''It seems to us that the history of science that we learned in school lies a clear case of European ethnoscience.......(which) represents one set of orientations among many and one set of values among many. These values need to be made explicit and the possibility of a broader set of values acknowledged." I believe this makes an important distinction- that between orientation and values, though I don't know the extent to which this distinction is discussed in the main text. My feeling is that in this discussion we are tending to see these two things as much the same, or at least we may be seeing orientation and standpoint as the main element, with values as a sort of watered down follow -on, arising from orientation and standpoint. And I think we are focusing on orientation, as this is the most obviously contingent and the more likely product of social context. But most of the specific examples under discussion here--climate change, fundamentalism, discrimination, and so on, can be usefully considered as issues concerning values, rather than orientation. Sorry to keep banging on about biology here-- by way of brief background I'm an amateur primatologist with no formal background in any relevant area, and I joined the group to learn about Vygotsky, rather than as some sort of undercover biological fifth columnist---but you might want to check out Jonathan Haidt's excellent 'TED' talk on the origins of values, bearing in mind he is a social psychologist, and look at the patterns into which values fall. Values such as fairness and concern over suffering are universal, whilst others tend to fall into two camps, or at least between two poles. These are, on the one hand, unhappiness with change and uncertainty, preference for social stability and hierarchy, group loyalty, and purity. The opposite pole would prefer, or at least be more tolerant towards, change, and would prefer more egalitarian and inclusive social systems. This is backed up by Haidt's impressive data. There is no obvious reason to assume this is a biological phenomenon, but I think such an argument can be made, though I don't want to try the group's patience by taking up even more of everyone's time here. In brief, I think it may revolve around the stress system. On this view, it is not that one's standpoint gives us access to different data sets, though this may be the case, it is that our value systems cause us to weight the value of those data differently. On a quick fly-past, a fundamentalist would have a strong dislike of ambivalence, and a climate change denier would have a dislike of the universal --social elements of dealing with the problem; saying the whole world is our -in-group is the same as saying there are no in groups or out -groups, which is unacceptable to that value system John From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Sep 23 05:33:07 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 05:33:07 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FEB8B.1080103@mira.net> <22e89f518fea43f39ee2fbb249e7eab3@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5420427E.4090709@mira.net> <54204748.3020403@gmail.com> Message-ID: <5421688a.4e58460a.2a25.3554@mx.google.com> Charles the exploring orientaiting as distinct to values is interesting. Merleau ponty discussed Sens as both (sense And orientation). Meaningful directio and directed meaning Values (as expressive cognitions) perform these directed sense SENS -----Original Message----- From: "Charles Bazerman" Sent: ?2014-?09-?22 7:38 PM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder Let me explain my comments better. I think the WEIRD article is wonderful. I think it is very important to recognize that knowledge is produced by humans in social configurations through rhetorical means. I think it is very important to understand the limited perspectives that have gone into the construction of our knowledge and how to expand those perspectives to get richer, fuller views that produce results that are more reliable and more widely applicable and are less stigmatizing of human variation, ideologies, cultures. It is important to the advance of knowledge to understand these things. It is also important for us to understand how it is we can keep creating progressively better maps of the world we live in and are part of. Concepts such as accountability (as I used it), and warrantable assertability (as Michael and Dewey used it), is to bring knowledge production into human processes, which are fallible, contingent, and limited, but which advance by bringing more persuasive evidence to bear in order to reframe perspectives and make more phenomena persuasively visible. This is exactly what the WEIRD article does and what Medin and Bang do. This is exactly what persuasive gender, ethnicity, and cultural studies do. Having lived through the "science wars" of the eighties, having produced a rhetorical history of scientific papers, and having been attacked both by one side as being an enemy of science and by the other as being a naive realist, I see the project of finding a way to understand the production and use of evidence within different rhetorical discursive fields as a significant and incomplete task. The value is both methodological/epistemological and political. The politics of this are that showing we have ways for the empirical project to go forward but in more enlightened ways will in the long run gain more allies than only opposing and rejecting the science we find narrow in its perspective. Otherwise we are too easily perceived as "enemies of science." The culture of science aims at moving forward and will find ways of incorporating persuasive views that do not put it in a dead end. We do not do ourselves a service by making it appear our opposition is so categorical as to appear to impose a dead end. The successes of science are sufficient that they will just roll over any roadblock we attempt to put in place. Not long ago, for example, the general belief was that it was a single thing and that the writing aspect was trivial. By now, almost all recognize that scientific writing has a history and evolves and varies. That does not discredit scientific writing, but is just the way things work out in the human practice of co ming to knowledge. Many scientists are incorporating contingent, historical, rhetorical, and cultural perspectives in their understandings of what they are doing. But the project of expanding our view is long, and perhaps never ending. Yet we seek, like the blind person with the stick, to understand our surroundings and our selves, so that we can move more freely and successfully through the world. Concerning Climate-Change deniers, creationists, and others, our account of science needs to be able to warrant why we do not find their claims or their evidence, such as it is, persuasive. And we need to be able to distinguish on principled grounds, the difference between such regressive ideologies which ignore persuasive evidence and substantive cultural critiques which are grounded in persuasive evidence and open our eyes wider, to understand that it is important to ask, who is asking and who is WEIRD. Chuck From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Sep 23 07:38:13 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 07:38:13 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: <5421688a.4e58460a.2a25.3554@mx.google.com> References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FEB8B.1080103@mira.net> <22e89f518fea43f39ee2fbb249e7eab3@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5420427E.4090709@mira.net> <54204748.3020403@gmail.com> <5421688a.4e58460a.2a25.3554@mx.google.com> Message-ID: I meant to address to John Cummins, [not Charles] John, your question focuses our attention on ways of *orienting* [direction] and *values* and their relations. Their distinctions also overlap. Orientations express values and values guide orientation. The theme of thought and *cognitions* as *expressive cognitions* suggests that *thoughts* and *values* are expressions expressing orientations. On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 5:33 AM, Lplarry wrote: > Charles the exploring orientaiting as distinct to values is interesting. > Merleau ponty discussed Sens as both (sense And orientation). Meaningful > directio and directed meaning > Values (as expressive cognitions) perform these directed sense SENS > ------------------------------ > From: Charles Bazerman > Sent: ?2014-?09-?22 7:38 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > > Let me explain my comments better. I think the WEIRD article is > wonderful. I think it is very important to recognize that knowledge is > produced by humans in social configurations through rhetorical means. I > think it is very important to understand the limited perspectives that have > gone into the construction of our knowledge and how to expand those > perspectives to get richer, fuller views that produce results that are more > reliable and more widely applicable and are less stigmatizing of human > variation, ideologies, cultures. It is important to the advance of > knowledge to understand these things. It is also important for us to > understand how it is we can keep creating progressively better maps of the > world we live in and are part of. > > Concepts such as accountability (as I used it), and warrantable > assertability (as Michael and Dewey used it), is to bring knowledge > production into human processes, which are fallible, contingent, and > limited, but which advance by bringing more persuasive evidence to bear in > order to reframe perspectives and make more phenomena persuasively > visible. This is exactly what the WEIRD article does and what Medin and > Bang do. This is exactly what persuasive gender, ethnicity, and cultural > studies do. > > Having lived through the "science wars" of the eighties, having produced a > rhetorical history of scientific papers, and having been attacked both by > one side as being an enemy of science and by the other as being a naive > realist, I see the project of finding a way to understand the production > and use of evidence within different rhetorical discursive fields as a > significant and incomplete task. The value is both > methodological/epistemological and political. > > The politics of this are that showing we have ways for the empirical > project to go forward but in more enlightened ways will in the long run > gain more allies than only opposing and rejecting the science we find > narrow in its perspective. Otherwise we are too easily perceived as > "enemies of science." The culture of science aims at moving forward and > will find ways of incorporating persuasive views that do not put it in a > dead end. We do not do ourselves a service by making it appear our > opposition is so categorical as to appear to impose a dead end. The > successes of science are sufficient that they will just roll over any > roadblock we attempt to put in place. Not long ago, for example, the > general belief was that it was a single thing and that the writing aspect > was trivial. By now, almost all recognize that scientific writing has a > history and evolves and varies. That does not discredit scientific > writing, but is just the way things work out in the human practice of co > ming to knowledge. Many scientists are incorporating contingent, > historical, rhetorical, and cultural perspectives in their understandings > of what they are doing. But the project of expanding our view is long, and > perhaps never ending. Yet we seek, like the blind person with the stick, > to understand our surroundings and our selves, so that we can move more > freely and successfully through the world. > > Concerning Climate-Change deniers, creationists, and others, our account > of science needs to be able to warrant why we do not find their claims or > their evidence, such as it is, persuasive. And we need to be able to > distinguish on principled grounds, the difference between such regressive > ideologies which ignore persuasive evidence and substantive cultural > critiques which are grounded in persuasive evidence and open our eyes > wider, to understand that it is important to ask, who is asking and who is > WEIRD. > > Chuck > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue Sep 23 07:37:32 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 08:37:32 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] The history of science fiction and imagined worlds Message-ID: Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on the other thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others might be interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in politics: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" to works such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply political act. -greg -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue Sep 23 07:48:25 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (greg.a.thompson@gmail.com) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 08:48:25 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Special Issue in Th & Psy on Language and the Self In-Reply-To: <663ebdfc5d6a430ab3bce1b26147a5ec@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> References: <54213CC9.3070309@lmu.de> <663ebdfc5d6a430ab3bce1b26147a5ec@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: This looks fantastically interesting. Anyone else interested in taking up an article or two for discussion? Peter, do you have any suggestions as to which piece is most xmca relevant? Greg Sent from my iPhone > On Sep 23, 2014, at 4:21 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > > I've mainly been a conversation starter this fall--I have a lot of demands on me presently that are limiting extensive engagement with the ensuing discussions. Here's another piece that some might find interesting, and that I am included on because I was among the reviewers for the issue. (Yes, I do believe in the peer review process.) The intro is all she sent us, but perhaps university libraries can provide pdf's to those who wish to follow up with the articles. p > > -----Original Message----- > From: Marie-C?cile Bertau [mailto:bertau@lmu.de] > Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2014 5:27 AM > Subject: Special Issue in Th & Psy on Language and the Self > > Dear authors, dear peer reviewers, > > The holiday and conference season is now definitely over, so it is time to send you the completed special issue you all contributed to, published this August. I take that opportunity to thank you all again, with a particular emphasis on those of you, whose texts were /not > /published: the reviewers. As I wrote in the introduction, all article rely on texts which remain themselves hidden. These texts are inspiring, careful, in the best sense critical and intense dialogues with their text. They are immensely precious to any author: peer reviewers are the best readers, I think, so serious, and so fully addressed in their doing. > > For your convenience, I attach the introduction for an overview of the contributions, as well as the cover of the issue for the TOC it includes. In case of interest, I will be pleased to send you any one of the articles as pdf. > > Best wishes to you all, > Marie-C?cile > > -- > PD Dr. Marie-C?cile Bertau > -- psycholinguist -- > University of Munich > Institute for Phonetics and Speech Processing Schellingstrasse 3, 80799 M?nchen Tel. ++49-89-2180-2759 http://www.bertau.de/ > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Sep 23 07:57:01 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 07:57:01 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Greg, Thanks for this adjunct that highlights the imaginal. Charles Peirce played with the concept *interpretive musings* but he also explored *abduction*. Here is a quote from Robert Corrigan on this theme. "For Peirce ideas are leading ideas [orientation] that could emerge out of creative and free associations. His technical term for this LARGER species of ideation is *abduction* As opposed to deduction and induction ideas CAN LEAP BEYOND the current data. [EXCESS] On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on the other > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others might be > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in politics: > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" to works > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply political act. > > -greg > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue Sep 23 08:24:56 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 09:24:56 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Larry, ?So, am I getting this right: science fiction = abduction? If so, I imagine there is a paper somewhere in there... -greg? On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 8:57 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Greg, > Thanks for this adjunct that highlights the imaginal. > Charles Peirce played with the concept *interpretive musings* but he also > explored *abduction*. > Here is a quote from Robert Corrigan on this theme. > "For Peirce ideas are leading ideas [orientation] that could emerge out of > creative and free associations. His technical term for this LARGER species > of ideation is *abduction* As opposed to deduction and induction ideas CAN > LEAP BEYOND the current data. > [EXCESS] > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on the other > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others might be > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in politics: > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > > > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" to works > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. > > > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply political act. > > > > -greg > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From smago@uga.edu Tue Sep 23 08:28:07 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 15:28:07 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Special Issue in Th & Psy on Language and the Self In-Reply-To: References: <54213CC9.3070309@lmu.de> <663ebdfc5d6a430ab3bce1b26147a5ec@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <1f350bde4da14e2fbba81209a8bbb9c1@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Sorry to say that I'm just too far behind in everything right now to take on Greg's invitation, but I hope others can fill in for me. Thanks for understanding, Peter -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2014 10:48 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Special Issue in Th & Psy on Language and the Self This looks fantastically interesting. Anyone else interested in taking up an article or two for discussion? Peter, do you have any suggestions as to which piece is most xmca relevant? Greg Sent from my iPhone > On Sep 23, 2014, at 4:21 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > > I've mainly been a conversation starter this fall--I have a lot of demands on me presently that are limiting extensive engagement with the ensuing discussions. Here's another piece that some might find interesting, and that I am included on because I was among the reviewers for the issue. (Yes, I do believe in the peer review process.) The intro is all she sent us, but perhaps university libraries can provide pdf's to those who wish to follow up with the articles. p > > -----Original Message----- > From: Marie-C?cile Bertau [mailto:bertau@lmu.de] > Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2014 5:27 AM > Subject: Special Issue in Th & Psy on Language and the Self > > Dear authors, dear peer reviewers, > > The holiday and conference season is now definitely over, so it is time to send you the completed special issue you all contributed to, published this August. I take that opportunity to thank you all again, with a particular emphasis on those of you, whose texts were /not > /published: the reviewers. As I wrote in the introduction, all article rely on texts which remain themselves hidden. These texts are inspiring, careful, in the best sense critical and intense dialogues with their text. They are immensely precious to any author: peer reviewers are the best readers, I think, so serious, and so fully addressed in their doing. > > For your convenience, I attach the introduction for an overview of the contributions, as well as the cover of the issue for the TOC it includes. In case of interest, I will be pleased to send you any one of the articles as pdf. > > Best wishes to you all, > Marie-C?cile > > -- > PD Dr. Marie-C?cile Bertau > -- psycholinguist -- > University of Munich > Institute for Phonetics and Speech Processing Schellingstrasse 3, 80799 M?nchen Tel. ++49-89-2180-2759 http://www.bertau.de/ > > > From deva_research@lineone.net Tue Sep 23 08:32:05 2014 From: deva_research@lineone.net (John Cummins) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 16:32:05 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FEB8B.1080103@mira.net> <22e89f518fea43f39ee2fbb249e7eab3@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5420427E.4090709@mira.net> <54204748.3020403@gmail.com> <5421688a.4e58460a.2a25.3554@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <001a01cfd743$880edd90$982c98b0$@net> Hi Larry, I'm sure you're right that there is a complex interaction between the two. John -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss Sent: 23 September 2014 15:38 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder I meant to address to John Cummins, [not Charles] John, your question focuses our attention on ways of *orienting* [direction] and *values* and their relations. Their distinctions also overlap. Orientations express values and values guide orientation. The theme of thought and *cognitions* as *expressive cognitions* suggests that *thoughts* and *values* are expressions expressing orientations. On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 5:33 AM, Lplarry wrote: > Charles the exploring orientaiting as distinct to values is interesting. > Merleau ponty discussed Sens as both (sense And orientation). Meaningful > directio and directed meaning > Values (as expressive cognitions) perform these directed sense SENS > ------------------------------ > From: Charles Bazerman > Sent: ?2014-?09-?22 7:38 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > > Let me explain my comments better. I think the WEIRD article is > wonderful. I think it is very important to recognize that knowledge is > produced by humans in social configurations through rhetorical means. I > think it is very important to understand the limited perspectives that have > gone into the construction of our knowledge and how to expand those > perspectives to get richer, fuller views that produce results that are more > reliable and more widely applicable and are less stigmatizing of human > variation, ideologies, cultures. It is important to the advance of > knowledge to understand these things. It is also important for us to > understand how it is we can keep creating progressively better maps of the > world we live in and are part of. > > Concepts such as accountability (as I used it), and warrantable > assertability (as Michael and Dewey used it), is to bring knowledge > production into human processes, which are fallible, contingent, and > limited, but which advance by bringing more persuasive evidence to bear in > order to reframe perspectives and make more phenomena persuasively > visible. This is exactly what the WEIRD article does and what Medin and > Bang do. This is exactly what persuasive gender, ethnicity, and cultural > studies do. > > Having lived through the "science wars" of the eighties, having produced a > rhetorical history of scientific papers, and having been attacked both by > one side as being an enemy of science and by the other as being a naive > realist, I see the project of finding a way to understand the production > and use of evidence within different rhetorical discursive fields as a > significant and incomplete task. The value is both > methodological/epistemological and political. > > The politics of this are that showing we have ways for the empirical > project to go forward but in more enlightened ways will in the long run > gain more allies than only opposing and rejecting the science we find > narrow in its perspective. Otherwise we are too easily perceived as > "enemies of science." The culture of science aims at moving forward and > will find ways of incorporating persuasive views that do not put it in a > dead end. We do not do ourselves a service by making it appear our > opposition is so categorical as to appear to impose a dead end. The > successes of science are sufficient that they will just roll over any > roadblock we attempt to put in place. Not long ago, for example, the > general belief was that it was a single thing and that the writing aspect > was trivial. By now, almost all recognize that scientific writing has a > history and evolves and varies. That does not discredit scientific > writing, but is just the way things work out in the human practice of co > ming to knowledge. Many scientists are incorporating contingent, > historical, rhetorical, and cultural perspectives in their understandings > of what they are doing. But the project of expanding our view is long, and > perhaps never ending. Yet we seek, like the blind person with the stick, > to understand our surroundings and our selves, so that we can move more > freely and successfully through the world. > > Concerning Climate-Change deniers, creationists, and others, our account > of science needs to be able to warrant why we do not find their claims or > their evidence, such as it is, persuasive. And we need to be able to > distinguish on principled grounds, the difference between such regressive > ideologies which ignore persuasive evidence and substantive cultural > critiques which are grounded in persuasive evidence and open our eyes > wider, to understand that it is important to ask, who is asking and who is > WEIRD. > > Chuck > > From deva_research@lineone.net Tue Sep 23 08:37:04 2014 From: deva_research@lineone.net (John Cummins) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 16:37:04 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder In-Reply-To: References: <7d282232e4bb411bb62a403f1a6535d8@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <6A00015B-8057-47C1-89A0-C36B0B2DC48F@gmail.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222765F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <510061CD-C73C-4738-B8E7-105991F8BC65@gmail.com> <251E31BF-D2B2-4174-A4EF-5DFA710974EC@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9035A35@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <541FBA4E.6030001@mira.net> <541FEB8B.1080103@mira.net> <22e89f518fea43f39ee2fbb249e7eab3@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> <5420427E.4090709@mira.net> <54204748.3020403@gmail.com> <5421688a.4e58460a.2a25.3554@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <000001cfd744$3a69bd70$af3d3850$@net> Also, I am only just trying to catch up with Ron Ingelhart's long-term surveys of world values, that show a generational shift towards more liberal values as societies modernise economically. My question would be to what extent is this relationship wholly causal, or is it perhaps partly correlative, expressing at least some involvement by a fundamental biological causality, with the biology responding to the external context. It is a shame that research into the areas is largely within academic silos. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss Sent: 23 September 2014 15:38 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder I meant to address to John Cummins, [not Charles] John, your question focuses our attention on ways of *orienting* [direction] and *values* and their relations. Their distinctions also overlap. Orientations express values and values guide orientation. The theme of thought and *cognitions* as *expressive cognitions* suggests that *thoughts* and *values* are expressions expressing orientations. On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 5:33 AM, Lplarry wrote: > Charles the exploring orientaiting as distinct to values is interesting. > Merleau ponty discussed Sens as both (sense And orientation). Meaningful > directio and directed meaning > Values (as expressive cognitions) perform these directed sense SENS > ------------------------------ > From: Charles Bazerman > Sent: ?2014-?09-?22 7:38 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: in the eye of the beholder > > Let me explain my comments better. I think the WEIRD article is > wonderful. I think it is very important to recognize that knowledge is > produced by humans in social configurations through rhetorical means. I > think it is very important to understand the limited perspectives that have > gone into the construction of our knowledge and how to expand those > perspectives to get richer, fuller views that produce results that are more > reliable and more widely applicable and are less stigmatizing of human > variation, ideologies, cultures. It is important to the advance of > knowledge to understand these things. It is also important for us to > understand how it is we can keep creating progressively better maps of the > world we live in and are part of. > > Concepts such as accountability (as I used it), and warrantable > assertability (as Michael and Dewey used it), is to bring knowledge > production into human processes, which are fallible, contingent, and > limited, but which advance by bringing more persuasive evidence to bear in > order to reframe perspectives and make more phenomena persuasively > visible. This is exactly what the WEIRD article does and what Medin and > Bang do. This is exactly what persuasive gender, ethnicity, and cultural > studies do. > > Having lived through the "science wars" of the eighties, having produced a > rhetorical history of scientific papers, and having been attacked both by > one side as being an enemy of science and by the other as being a naive > realist, I see the project of finding a way to understand the production > and use of evidence within different rhetorical discursive fields as a > significant and incomplete task. The value is both > methodological/epistemological and political. > > The politics of this are that showing we have ways for the empirical > project to go forward but in more enlightened ways will in the long run > gain more allies than only opposing and rejecting the science we find > narrow in its perspective. Otherwise we are too easily perceived as > "enemies of science." The culture of science aims at moving forward and > will find ways of incorporating persuasive views that do not put it in a > dead end. We do not do ourselves a service by making it appear our > opposition is so categorical as to appear to impose a dead end. The > successes of science are sufficient that they will just roll over any > roadblock we attempt to put in place. Not long ago, for example, the > general belief was that it was a single thing and that the writing aspect > was trivial. By now, almost all recognize that scientific writing has a > history and evolves and varies. That does not discredit scientific > writing, but is just the way things work out in the human practice of co > ming to knowledge. Many scientists are incorporating contingent, > historical, rhetorical, and cultural perspectives in their understandings > of what they are doing. But the project of expanding our view is long, and > perhaps never ending. Yet we seek, like the blind person with the stick, > to understand our surroundings and our selves, so that we can move more > freely and successfully through the world. > > Concerning Climate-Change deniers, creationists, and others, our account > of science needs to be able to warrant why we do not find their claims or > their evidence, such as it is, persuasive. And we need to be able to > distinguish on principled grounds, the difference between such regressive > ideologies which ignore persuasive evidence and substantive cultural > critiques which are grounded in persuasive evidence and open our eyes > wider, to understand that it is important to ask, who is asking and who is > WEIRD. > > Chuck > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Sep 23 09:46:57 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 09:46:57 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] NOUN Database 2.0 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Does anyone "here" have an interest in this data base? If so, it would be very interesting to know who's asking? Who is being asked? mike ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Jessica Horst Date: Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 9:34 AM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] NOUN Database 2.0 To: "cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org" Cc: Michael Hout Dear colleagues: I am pleased to announce that the Novel Object & Unusual Name (NOUN) Database has been updated and the 2nd Edition is now available! This new edition includes 64 primary images and 10 object categories. Information about the objects? novelty and name-ability are also included. Finally, there is an alphabetical list of novel names (pseudo-words). I hope that this resource will be helpful for many of you as you plan your next studies. You can learn more about the NOUN Database on the WORD Lab website: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/wordlab/noun and/or my collaborator?s (Michael Hout) website: http://michaelhout.com/?page_id=441 A handy PDF of information and the catalogue of images is available in A4 and US Letter format. Best wishes, ~Jessica ******************************** Dr. Jessica S. Horst Associate Professor University of Sussex School of Psychology Brighton BN1 9QH United Kingdom Email: jessica@sussex.ac.uk Tel: +44 (0)1273 87 3084 Lab: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/wordlab Lab FB: https://www.facebook.com/sussexwordlab _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Sep 23 09:56:30 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 17:56:30 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] NOUN Database 2.0 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 23 September 2014 17:46, mike cole wrote: > Does anyone "here" have an interest in this data base? If so, it would be > very interesting to know who's asking? Who is being asked? > > " it is important to have good experimental control, which can be difficult when studying word learning and categorization because children have so much out-of-lab experience with words and objects." ( http://www.sussex.ac.uk/wordlab/noun) On the subject of databases/archives is anyone aware of collections of video footage of classroom activity (longitudinal would be ideal)? Best, Huw > mike > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Jessica Horst > Date: Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 9:34 AM > Subject: [COGDEVSOC] NOUN Database 2.0 > To: "cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org" > Cc: Michael Hout > > > Dear colleagues: > > I am pleased to announce that the Novel Object & Unusual Name (NOUN) > Database has been updated and the 2nd Edition is now available! This new > edition includes 64 primary images and 10 object categories. Information > about the objects? novelty and name-ability are also included. Finally, > there is an alphabetical list of novel names (pseudo-words). I hope that > this resource will be helpful for many of you as you plan your next > studies. > > You can learn more about the NOUN Database on the WORD Lab website: > http://www.sussex.ac.uk/wordlab/noun and/or my collaborator?s (Michael > Hout) website: http://michaelhout.com/?page_id=441 > > A handy PDF of information and the catalogue of images is available in A4 > < > https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=noun-database-2nded-a4.pdf&site=390 > > > and US Letter > < > https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=noun-database-2nded-usletter.pdf&site=390 > > > format. > > Best wishes, > ~Jessica > > ******************************** > Dr. Jessica S. Horst > Associate Professor > > University of Sussex > School of Psychology > Brighton BN1 9QH > United Kingdom > > Email: jessica@sussex.ac.uk > Tel: +44 (0)1273 87 3084 > Lab: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/wordlab > Lab FB: https://www.facebook.com/sussexwordlab > > _______________________________________________ > To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: > cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org > (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, > your message > will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) > > To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: > http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org > > > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Sep 23 11:52:11 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 11:52:11 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Another good job at UCSD Message-ID: The Department of Education Studies here at UC San Diego is searching for a > new faculty member (Assistant, Associate or Full Professor ) in > Transformational Deaf Education. The position is described at: > http://tinyurl.com/Deaf-Education-Search > > If you are interested in this position, we welcome your application. > Please let anyone that you think might be interested know about this > position. We are excited to be adding a faculty member in this important > area of education, and hope that you can help us in our search. > > Jim Levin > Professor, Department of Education Studies > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Sep 23 17:54:07 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 17:54:07 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Special Issue in Th & Psy on Language and the Self In-Reply-To: <1f350bde4da14e2fbba81209a8bbb9c1@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> References: <54213CC9.3070309@lmu.de> <663ebdfc5d6a430ab3bce1b26147a5ec@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> <1f350bde4da14e2fbba81209a8bbb9c1@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: I suspect that you are not alone, Peter. I doubt if there is anyone in this conversation for whom it is not true! As they say, "life gets in the way." mike On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 8:28 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > Sorry to say that I'm just too far behind in everything right now to take > on Greg's invitation, but I hope others can fill in for me. Thanks for > understanding, Peter > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2014 10:48 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Special Issue in Th & Psy on Language and the > Self > > This looks fantastically interesting. > Anyone else interested in taking up an article or two for discussion? > Peter, do you have any suggestions as to which piece is most xmca relevant? > Greg > > Sent from my iPhone > > > On Sep 23, 2014, at 4:21 AM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > > > > I've mainly been a conversation starter this fall--I have a lot of > demands on me presently that are limiting extensive engagement with the > ensuing discussions. Here's another piece that some might find interesting, > and that I am included on because I was among the reviewers for the issue. > (Yes, I do believe in the peer review process.) The intro is all she sent > us, but perhaps university libraries can provide pdf's to those who wish to > follow up with the articles. p > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Marie-C?cile Bertau [mailto:bertau@lmu.de] > > Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2014 5:27 AM > > Subject: Special Issue in Th & Psy on Language and the Self > > > > Dear authors, dear peer reviewers, > > > > The holiday and conference season is now definitely over, so it is time > to send you the completed special issue you all contributed to, published > this August. I take that opportunity to thank you all again, with a > particular emphasis on those of you, whose texts were /not > > /published: the reviewers. As I wrote in the introduction, all article > rely on texts which remain themselves hidden. These texts are inspiring, > careful, in the best sense critical and intense dialogues with their text. > They are immensely precious to any author: peer reviewers are the best > readers, I think, so serious, and so fully addressed in their doing. > > > > For your convenience, I attach the introduction for an overview of the > contributions, as well as the cover of the issue for the TOC it includes. > In case of interest, I will be pleased to send you any one of the articles > as pdf. > > > > Best wishes to you all, > > Marie-C?cile > > > > -- > > PD Dr. Marie-C?cile Bertau > > -- psycholinguist -- > > University of Munich > > Institute for Phonetics and Speech Processing Schellingstrasse 3, 80799 > M?nchen Tel. ++49-89-2180-2759 http://www.bertau.de/ > > > > > > > > > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Sep 23 17:59:33 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 17:59:33 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central component, Greg. So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the wrong conversation here?). Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? Perhaps the two talks will aid the discussion. mike On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on the other > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others might be > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in politics: > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" to works > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply political act. > > -greg > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue Sep 23 19:38:10 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 20:38:10 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" more than I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss of an epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a there there?). Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, I know that you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the concrete" - which makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or something else? A "made real"?). But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented social constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word "ontological"?). Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was proposing: http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=en I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks since it can be tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and they can be hit or miss. But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I originally sent in this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it interesting (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? Others? -greg On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole wrote: > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central component, > Greg. > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the wrong conversation > here?). > > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? Perhaps the > two talks will aid the discussion. > mike > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on the other > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others might be > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in politics: > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > > > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" to works > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. > > > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply political act. > > > > -greg > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Sep 23 20:10:40 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 20:10:40 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the discussions, Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two others suffer from the same difficulties. My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If that's a mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general rule, but when they are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, seems like a relatively painless way to figure out what other participants in the discussion are trying to communicate. Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*? !! :-))) Rockin chair mike Thanks On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" more than > I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss of an > epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a there there?). > > Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, I know that > you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the concrete" - which > makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or something > else? A "made real"?). > > But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented social > constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word "ontological"?). > > Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was proposing: > http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=en > > I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks since it can be > tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and they can be hit > or miss. > But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I originally sent in > this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it interesting > (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? > Others? > -greg > > > > > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central component, > > Greg. > > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the wrong > conversation > > here?). > > > > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? Perhaps the > > two talks will aid the discussion. > > mike > > > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > wrote: > > > > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on the > other > > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others might > be > > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in politics: > > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > > > > > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" to > works > > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. > > > > > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply political > act. > > > > > > -greg > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more > or > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > > Gray, 2001] > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray, 2001] From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue Sep 23 21:22:07 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2014 13:22:07 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how cramped, ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of imaginary worlds is. The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it is only with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately "believe" in a fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual creator. That is, adult play only begins with people who were the peers of my grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also be imaginary worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of people, but they do not signify, because the effort of believing in them in order to inhabit them is not differentiated from believing in them because you think they are true. Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional delusion is very much older than this. At the end of Don Quixote, the old man's neighbors try their very best to convince Don Quixote to go on inhabiting the novelistic world he has created for them, and fail; there is no suggestion that they do this because they believe the old man's world is real. There was a spate of similar novels in English in eighteenth century (e.g. Charlotte Lennox's "the Female Quixote"), and Jane Austen's first novel, Northanger Abbey, is a romance about a woman whose whole attraction is that she actually assumes only the very best motives in real people, and reserves her fascination with ill will for the reading of Gothic novels; when she meets with a genuinely nasty character (General Tilney) for the first time, she imputes Gothic motives to him where there are only mundane and mercenary ones, and the novel ends with the half disenchantment of the heroine and half enchantment of the General's son, both quite deliberately acts of metacognition. But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much earlier. "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a particular kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became parodistsic. "Dream of the Red Chamber" is about a stone left over from when the world was made, which is reincarnated by a sensitive young man who falls in with one cousin and marries another. It is also about a garden, built for a one day visit to her family by one of the Emperor's concubines, which eventually bankrupts the family. But the children of the family are allowed to run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety of fancies: at various places we are told that various parts of the novel, and even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the minds of others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, almost every fiction manuscript was passed around in a community (rather as Jane Austen's manuscripts were shared in her family) and "Dream of the Red Chamber" was probably finished by someone else (the last third of it was written well after the death of the author, but computer analysis has not definitively proven that it was written by someone else). I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is that, like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we keep thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and the preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist thinking (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and wonder) are the last word and not merely latest one. I spend a great deal of the time that I spend writing half-listening to eighteenth century operas, which are in very obvious ways imaginary worlds which we enter only by voluntarily checking our linguistic assumptions in the cloakroom. In less obvious ways, it seems to me, these imaginary worlds are interested in a clash that we no longer take very seriously. It's the clash between a form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, because empirical, and one which is narrowly rationalist, because puritanical. The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act of forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro). The strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness by its very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don Giovanni gets around this problem by making repentance a precondition for forgiveness, and then by arguing that the truly damnable will never repent, not even as they are actually being damned. We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism and merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching. There is the humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary negotiations of meaning between human beings--and the rationalist belief in the inflexible, innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere it seems to have been subsumed in the general opposition between art and science that we find in Saler's talk. Part of the point of my book is really to try to revive it--in the form of a humanizing dialogic tendency in story telling versus a more rationalizing narrativistic one. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two chapters for free at.... https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-praxis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/ (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of it not as an interface between the virtual world and the real one, but only as yet another interface between this virtual world and the next one!) dk On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole wrote: > Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the discussions, > Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two others suffer > from the same difficulties. > > My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If that's a > mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general rule, but when they > are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, seems like a > relatively painless way to figure out what other participants in the > discussion are trying to communicate. > > Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*? !! :-))) > > Rockin chair mike > > Thanks > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > >> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" more than >> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss of an >> epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a there there?). >> >> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, I know that >> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the concrete" - which >> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or something >> else? A "made real"?). >> >> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented social >> constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word "ontological"?). >> >> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was proposing: >> http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=en >> >> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks since it can be >> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and they can be hit >> or miss. >> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I originally sent in >> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it interesting >> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? >> Others? >> -greg >> >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central component, >> > Greg. >> > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the wrong >> conversation >> > here?). >> > >> > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? Perhaps the >> > two talks will aid the discussion. >> > mike >> > >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson < >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> >> > wrote: >> > >> > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on the >> other >> > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others might >> be >> > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in politics: >> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo >> > > >> > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" to >> works >> > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. >> > > >> > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply political >> act. >> > > >> > > -greg >> > > >> > > -- >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> > > Assistant Professor >> > > Department of Anthropology >> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> > > Brigham Young University >> > > Provo, UT 84602 >> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> > -- >> > >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more >> or >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >> > Gray, 2001] >> > >> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Sep 23 22:40:25 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 22:40:25 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Fascinating David, your comment: "and the rationalist belief in the inflexible, innate laws of grammar" can be placed alongside Peirce's comment: "The scientific imagination DREAMS of explanations and laws" For Peirce the origin of new ideas and scientific hypothesis were particulary important questions. Peirce was not a romanticist, as he wanted to produce a harmony of creativity and logic and in order to find this harmony Peirce reformulated logic in a radical way. He composed the *logic of relatives* a new logic of interpretation which allowed for the change and growth of SYSTEMS of thought.. There seems to be a play of *transversals* that involves science fiction Larry On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 9:22 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how cramped, > ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of imaginary worlds > is. > > The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of > imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it is only > with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately "believe" in a > fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual creator. That is, > adult play only begins with people who were the peers of my > grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also be imaginary > worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of people, but they do not > signify, because the effort of believing in them in order to inhabit > them is not differentiated from believing in them because you think > they are true. > > Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional > "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional delusion > is very much older than this. At the end of Don Quixote, the old man's > neighbors try their very best to convince Don Quixote to go on > inhabiting the novelistic world he has created for them, and fail; > there is no suggestion that they do this because they believe the old > man's world is real. There was a spate of similar novels in English in > eighteenth century (e.g. Charlotte Lennox's "the Female Quixote"), and > Jane Austen's first novel, Northanger Abbey, is a romance about a > woman whose whole attraction is that she actually assumes only the > very best motives in real people, and reserves her fascination with > ill will for the reading of Gothic novels; when she meets with a > genuinely nasty character (General Tilney) for the first time, she > imputes Gothic motives to him where there are only mundane and > mercenary ones, and the novel ends with the half disenchantment of the > heroine and half enchantment of the General's son, both quite > deliberately acts of metacognition. > > But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much earlier. > "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a particular > kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became parodistsic. "Dream of > the Red Chamber" is about a stone left over from when the world was > made, which is reincarnated by a sensitive young man who falls in with > one cousin and marries another. It is also about a garden, built for a > one day visit to her family by one of the Emperor's concubines, which > eventually bankrupts the family. But the children of the family are > allowed to run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety of fancies: > at various places we are told that various parts of the novel, and > even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the minds of > others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, almost every > fiction manuscript was passed around in a community (rather as Jane > Austen's manuscripts were shared in her family) and "Dream of the Red > Chamber" was probably finished by someone else (the last third of it > was written well after the death of the author, but computer analysis > has not definitively proven that it was written by someone else). > > I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is that, > like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we keep > thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and the > preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist thinking > (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and wonder) are the > last word and not merely latest one. I spend a great deal of the time > that I spend writing half-listening to eighteenth century operas, > which are in very obvious ways imaginary worlds which we enter only by > voluntarily checking our linguistic assumptions in the cloakroom. In > less obvious ways, it seems to me, these imaginary worlds are > interested in a clash that we no longer take very seriously. It's the > clash between a form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, because > empirical, and one which is narrowly rationalist, because puritanical. > The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act of > forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro). The > strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness by its > very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don Giovanni gets > around this problem by making repentance a precondition for > forgiveness, and then by arguing that the truly damnable will never > repent, not even as they are actually being damned. > > We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism and > merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching. There is the > humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary negotiations of meaning > between human beings--and the rationalist belief in the inflexible, > innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere it seems to have been subsumed > in the general opposition between art and science that we find in > Saler's talk. Part of the point of my book is really to try to revive > it--in the form of a humanizing dialogic tendency in story telling > versus a more rationalizing narrativistic one. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and > everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two chapters > for free at.... > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-praxis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/ > > > (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of it not > as an interface between the virtual world and the real one, but only > as yet another interface between this virtual world and the next one!) > > dk > > > > On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole wrote: > > Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the discussions, > > Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two others > suffer > > from the same difficulties. > > > > My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If that's a > > mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general rule, but when > they > > are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, seems like a > > relatively painless way to figure out what other participants in the > > discussion are trying to communicate. > > > > Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*? !! :-))) > > > > Rockin chair mike > > > > Thanks > > > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > wrote: > > > >> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" more > than > >> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss of an > >> epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a there > there?). > >> > >> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, I know > that > >> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the concrete" - which > >> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or something > >> else? A "made real"?). > >> > >> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented social > >> constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word "ontological"?). > >> > >> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was proposing: > >> http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=en > >> > >> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks since it > can be > >> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and they can be > hit > >> or miss. > >> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I originally sent in > >> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it interesting > >> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? > >> Others? > >> -greg > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central component, > >> > Greg. > >> > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the wrong > >> conversation > >> > here?). > >> > > >> > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? Perhaps > the > >> > two talks will aid the discussion. > >> > mike > >> > > >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson < > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >> > wrote: > >> > > >> > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on the > >> other > >> > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others > might > >> be > >> > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in politics: > >> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > >> > > > >> > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" to > >> works > >> > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. > >> > > > >> > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply political > >> act. > >> > > > >> > > -greg > >> > > > >> > > -- > >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> > > Assistant Professor > >> > > Department of Anthropology > >> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> > > Brigham Young University > >> > > Provo, UT 84602 > >> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > -- > >> > > >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and > re- > >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > more > >> or > >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > >> > Gray, 2001] > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> Assistant Professor > >> Department of Anthropology > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> Brigham Young University > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more > or > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > > Gray, 2001] > From deva_research@lineone.net Wed Sep 24 01:53:02 2014 From: deva_research@lineone.net (John Cummins) Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2014 09:53:02 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <000901cfd7d4$f3475290$d9d5f7b0$@net> Yes Greg, that's the link to the Haidt TED talk. Thanks for posting it. John -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: 24 September 2014 03:38 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" more than I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss of an epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a there there?). Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, I know that you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the concrete" - which makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or something else? A "made real"?). But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented social constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word "ontological"?). Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was proposing: http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=en I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks since it can be tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and they can be hit or miss. But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I originally sent in this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it interesting (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? Others? -greg On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole wrote: > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central component, > Greg. > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the wrong conversation > here?). > > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? Perhaps the > two talks will aid the discussion. > mike > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on the other > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others might be > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in politics: > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > > > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" to works > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. > > > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply political act. > > > > -greg > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > -- > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more or > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > Gray, 2001] > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From tom.richardson3@googlemail.com Wed Sep 24 02:04:45 2014 From: tom.richardson3@googlemail.com (Tom Richardson) Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2014 10:04:45 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Greg Thanks for this - entertaining! But why doesn't Michael S. go right back to all religious belief - surely Christians are just such 'geeks', long before Sherlock H. 'believers'? Tom Middlesbrough UK On 23 September 2014 15:37, Greg Thompson wrote: > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on the other > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others might be > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in politics: > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" to works > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply political act. > > -greg > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Wed Sep 24 07:29:22 2014 From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu (Robert Lake) Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2014 10:29:22 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Relevant to "imagined worlds discussion-(see underlined section at least).Series: Why humanities? Previous | Index The death of universities Academia has become a servant of the status quo. Its malaise runs so much deeper than tuition fees - Share 5926 - - - inShare36 - Email - [image: Terry Eagleton] - - Terry Eagleton - - The Guardian , Friday 17 December 2010 17.00 EST - Jump to comments (326) Are the humanities about to disappear from our universities? The question is absurd. It would be like asking whether alcohol is about to disappear from pubs, or egoism from Hollywood. Just as there cannot be a pub without alcohol, so there cannot be a university without the humanities. If history, philosophy and so on vanish from academic life, what they leave in their wake may be a technical training facility or corporate research institute. But it will not be a university in the classical sense of the term, and it would be deceptive to call it one. Neither, however, can there be a university in the full sense of the word when the humanities exist in isolation from other disciplines. The quickest way of devaluing these subjects ? short of disposing of them altogether ? is to reduce them to an agreeable bonus. Real men study law and engineering, while ideas and values are for sissies. The humanities should constitute the core of any university worth the name. The study of history and philosophy, accompanied by some acquaintance with art and literature, should be for lawyers and engineers as well as for those who study in arts faculties. If the humanities are not under such dire threat in the United States, it is, among other things, because they are seen as being an integral part of higher education as such. When they first emerged in their present shape around the turn of the 18th century, the so-called humane disciplines had a crucial social role. It was to foster and protect the kind of values for which a philistine social order had precious little time. The modern humanities and industrial capitalism were more or less twinned at birth. To preserve a set of values and ideas under siege, you needed among other things institutions known as universities set somewhat apart from everyday social life. This remoteness meant that humane study could be lamentably ineffectual. But it also allowed the humanities to launch a critique of conventional wisdom. >From time to time, as in the late 1960s and in these last few weeks in Britain, that critique would take to the streets , confronting how we actually live with how we might live. *What we have witnessed in our own time is the death of universities as centres of critique. Since Margaret Thatcher, the role of academia has been to service the status quo, not challenge it in the name of justice, tradition, imagination, human welfare, the free play of the mind or alternative visions of the future. We will not change this simply by increasing state funding of the humanities as opposed to slashing it to nothing. We will change it by insisting that a critical reflection on human values and principles should be central to everything that goes on in universities, not just to the study of Rembrandt or Rimbaud.* In the end, the humanities can only be defended by stressing how indispensable they are; and this means insisting on their vital role in the whole business of academic learning, rather than protesting that, like some poor relation, they don't cost much to be housed. How can this be achieved in practice? Financially speaking, it can't be. Governments are intent on shrinking the humanities, not expanding them. Might not too much investment in teaching Shelley mean falling behind our economic competitors? But there is no university without humane inquiry, which means that universities and advanced capitalism are fundamentally incompatible. And the political implications of that run far deeper than the question of student fees. On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 12:22 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how cramped, > ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of imaginary worlds > is. > > The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of > imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it is only > with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately "believe" in a > fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual creator. That is, > adult play only begins with people who were the peers of my > grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also be imaginary > worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of people, but they do not > signify, because the effort of believing in them in order to inhabit > them is not differentiated from believing in them because you think > they are true. > > Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional > "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional delusion > is very much older than this. At the end of Don Quixote, the old man's > neighbors try their very best to convince Don Quixote to go on > inhabiting the novelistic world he has created for them, and fail; > there is no suggestion that they do this because they believe the old > man's world is real. There was a spate of similar novels in English in > eighteenth century (e.g. Charlotte Lennox's "the Female Quixote"), and > Jane Austen's first novel, Northanger Abbey, is a romance about a > woman whose whole attraction is that she actually assumes only the > very best motives in real people, and reserves her fascination with > ill will for the reading of Gothic novels; when she meets with a > genuinely nasty character (General Tilney) for the first time, she > imputes Gothic motives to him where there are only mundane and > mercenary ones, and the novel ends with the half disenchantment of the > heroine and half enchantment of the General's son, both quite > deliberately acts of metacognition. > > But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much earlier. > "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a particular > kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became parodistsic. "Dream of > the Red Chamber" is about a stone left over from when the world was > made, which is reincarnated by a sensitive young man who falls in with > one cousin and marries another. It is also about a garden, built for a > one day visit to her family by one of the Emperor's concubines, which > eventually bankrupts the family. But the children of the family are > allowed to run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety of fancies: > at various places we are told that various parts of the novel, and > even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the minds of > others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, almost every > fiction manuscript was passed around in a community (rather as Jane > Austen's manuscripts were shared in her family) and "Dream of the Red > Chamber" was probably finished by someone else (the last third of it > was written well after the death of the author, but computer analysis > has not definitively proven that it was written by someone else). > > I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is that, > like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we keep > thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and the > preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist thinking > (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and wonder) are the > last word and not merely latest one. I spend a great deal of the time > that I spend writing half-listening to eighteenth century operas, > which are in very obvious ways imaginary worlds which we enter only by > voluntarily checking our linguistic assumptions in the cloakroom. In > less obvious ways, it seems to me, these imaginary worlds are > interested in a clash that we no longer take very seriously. It's the > clash between a form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, because > empirical, and one which is narrowly rationalist, because puritanical. > The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act of > forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro). The > strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness by its > very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don Giovanni gets > around this problem by making repentance a precondition for > forgiveness, and then by arguing that the truly damnable will never > repent, not even as they are actually being damned. > > We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism and > merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching. There is the > humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary negotiations of meaning > between human beings--and the rationalist belief in the inflexible, > innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere it seems to have been subsumed > in the general opposition between art and science that we find in > Saler's talk. Part of the point of my book is really to try to revive > it--in the form of a humanizing dialogic tendency in story telling > versus a more rationalizing narrativistic one. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and > everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two chapters > for free at.... > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-praxis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/ > > > (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of it not > as an interface between the virtual world and the real one, but only > as yet another interface between this virtual world and the next one!) > > dk > > > > On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole wrote: > > Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the discussions, > > Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two others > suffer > > from the same difficulties. > > > > My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If that's a > > mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general rule, but when > they > > are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, seems like a > > relatively painless way to figure out what other participants in the > > discussion are trying to communicate. > > > > Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*? !! :-))) > > > > Rockin chair mike > > > > Thanks > > > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > wrote: > > > >> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" more > than > >> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss of an > >> epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a there > there?). > >> > >> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, I know > that > >> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the concrete" - which > >> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or something > >> else? A "made real"?). > >> > >> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented social > >> constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word "ontological"?). > >> > >> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was proposing: > >> http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=en > >> > >> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks since it > can be > >> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and they can be > hit > >> or miss. > >> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I originally sent in > >> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it interesting > >> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? > >> Others? > >> -greg > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central component, > >> > Greg. > >> > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the wrong > >> conversation > >> > here?). > >> > > >> > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? Perhaps > the > >> > two talks will aid the discussion. > >> > mike > >> > > >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson < > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >> > wrote: > >> > > >> > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on the > >> other > >> > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others > might > >> be > >> > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in politics: > >> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > >> > > > >> > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" to > >> works > >> > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. > >> > > > >> > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply political > >> act. > >> > > > >> > > -greg > >> > > > >> > > -- > >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> > > Assistant Professor > >> > > Department of Anthropology > >> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> > > Brigham Young University > >> > > Provo, UT 84602 > >> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > -- > >> > > >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and > re- > >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > more > >> or > >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > >> > Gray, 2001] > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> Assistant Professor > >> Department of Anthropology > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> Brigham Young University > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more > or > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > > Gray, 2001] > -- *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor Social Foundations of Education Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading Georgia Southern University Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group P. O. Box 8144 Phone: (912) 478-0355 Fax: (912) 478-5382 Statesboro, GA 30460 From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Sep 24 07:34:09 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2014 07:34:09 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: After watching the two TED talks, I would like to focus on the general *theme* that I experienced. The question of the reality of the imaginal AND the imaginal basis of the real. The place we locate the real and the imaginary has I believe a permeable border and there is a *midworld* that exists in the liminal space that is the *border*. David points out how ethnocentric the perspective. I would say the assumptions and biasis of what is real and what is imaginal is ethnocentric. The relation of the perceptual/conceptual to what *IS* [both being and becoming] is also implicated in this thread. Peirce and Merleau Ponty both engaged deeply with this question of the perceptual/conceptual. A more radical way to orient is to understand that the imaginal IS reality and also the real IS imaginary. Pierce talked about the relativity of *logics* which overlaps with William James radical empiricism that suggests we exist in a pluralistic multi VERSE not a uni VERSE. A final thought is the specific topic of ingroup behaviour and *loyalty* and Andy's orienting to projects. To participate in *developing* concepts is *loyalty* an aspect of *developing* concepts? For example Descarte's loyalty to the cult of thinkers who saw the world as mechanical and functioning like a clock. That was a shared concept. Larry On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 2:04 AM, Tom Richardson < tom.richardson3@googlemail.com> wrote: > Hi Greg > Thanks for this - entertaining! > > But why doesn't Michael S. go right back to all religious belief - surely > Christians are just such 'geeks', long before Sherlock H. 'believers'? > Tom > Middlesbrough UK > > On 23 September 2014 15:37, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on the other > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others might be > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in politics: > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > > > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" to works > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. > > > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply political act. > > > > -greg > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > From deva_research@lineone.net Wed Sep 24 07:41:21 2014 From: deva_research@lineone.net (John Cummins) Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2014 15:41:21 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <000901cfd805$9b9a98f0$d2cfcad0$@net> I thought David Kellogg's comment below very thought-provoking: ''In less obvious ways, it seems to me, these imaginary worlds are interested in a clash that we no longer take very seriously. It's the clash between a form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, because empirical, and one which is narrowly rationalist, because puritanical.'' From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Sep 24 07:43:41 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2014 07:43:41 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Robert, Yes. You passionately stated: " the role of academia has been to service the status quo, not challenge it in the name of justice, tradition, imagination, human welfare, the free play of the mind or alternative visions of the future. I will suggest that this may be an example of Andy's *developing* a *concept* that requires joint *activity* to reawaken THIS *truth* [real and imaginal]. The university must be *re-imagined* and the present trajectory re-directed. SENS: [sense and direction] Larry On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 7:29 AM, Robert Lake wrote: > Relevant to "imagined worlds discussion-(see underlined section at > least).Series: Why humanities? > > Previous > < > http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/dec/01/science-geeks-unite-higher-education-funding > > > | Index > The death of universities > Academia has become a servant of the status quo. Its malaise runs so much > deeper than tuition fees > > - Share > < > https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/dec/17/death-universities-malaise-tuition-fees > > > 5926 > - > - > - inShare36 > - Email > < > http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/dec/17/death-universities-malaise-tuition-fees# > > > > > - [image: Terry Eagleton] > > - > - Terry Eagleton > - > - The Guardian , Friday 17 > December 2010 17.00 EST > - Jump to comments (326) > < > http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/dec/17/death-universities-malaise-tuition-fees#start-of-comments > > > > Are the humanities about > to disappear from our universities? The question is absurd. It would be > like asking whether alcohol is about to disappear from pubs, or egoism from > Hollywood. Just as there cannot be a pub without alcohol, so there cannot > be a university without the humanities. If history, philosophy and so on > vanish from academic life, what they leave in their wake may be a technical > training facility or corporate research institute. But it will not be a > university in the classical sense of the term, and it would be deceptive to > call it one. > > Neither, however, can there be a university in the full sense of the word > when the humanities exist in isolation from other disciplines. The quickest > way of devaluing these subjects ? short of disposing of them altogether ? > is to reduce them to an agreeable bonus. Real men study law and > engineering, while ideas and values are for sissies. The humanities should > constitute the core of any university worth the name. The study of history > and philosophy, accompanied by some acquaintance with art and literature, > should be for lawyers and engineers as well as for those who study in arts > faculties. If the humanities are not under such dire threat in the United > States, it is, among other things, because they are seen as being an > integral part of higher education as such. > > When they first emerged in their present shape around the turn of the 18th > century, the so-called humane disciplines had a crucial social role. It was > to foster and protect the kind of values for which a philistine social > order had precious little time. The modern humanities and industrial > capitalism were more or less twinned at birth. To preserve a set of values > and ideas under siege, you needed among other things institutions known as > universities set somewhat apart from everyday social life. This remoteness > meant that humane study could be lamentably ineffectual. But it also > allowed the humanities to launch a critique of conventional wisdom. > > >From time to time, as in the late 1960s and in these last few weeks in > Britain, that critique would take to the streets > < > http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2010/dec/12/riots-fire-anger-defining-political-moment > >, > confronting how we actually live with how we might live. > > *What we have witnessed in our own time is the death of universities as > centres of critique. Since Margaret Thatcher, the role of academia has been > to service the status quo, not challenge it in the name of justice, > tradition, imagination, human welfare, the free play of the mind or > alternative visions of the future. We will not change this simply by > increasing state funding of the humanities as opposed to slashing it to > nothing. We will change it by insisting that a critical reflection on human > values and principles should be central to everything that goes on in > universities, not just to the study of Rembrandt or Rimbaud.* > > In the end, the humanities can only be defended by stressing how > indispensable they are; and this means insisting on their vital role in the > whole business of academic learning, rather than protesting that, like some > poor relation, they don't cost much to be housed. > > How can this be achieved in practice? Financially speaking, it can't be. > Governments are intent on shrinking the humanities, not expanding them. > > Might not too much investment in teaching Shelley mean falling behind our > economic competitors? But there is no university without humane inquiry, > which means that universities and advanced capitalism are fundamentally > incompatible. And the political implications of that run far deeper than > the question of student fees. > > On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 12:22 AM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how cramped, > > ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of imaginary worlds > > is. > > > > The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of > > imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it is only > > with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately "believe" in a > > fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual creator. That is, > > adult play only begins with people who were the peers of my > > grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also be imaginary > > worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of people, but they do not > > signify, because the effort of believing in them in order to inhabit > > them is not differentiated from believing in them because you think > > they are true. > > > > Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional > > "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional delusion > > is very much older than this. At the end of Don Quixote, the old man's > > neighbors try their very best to convince Don Quixote to go on > > inhabiting the novelistic world he has created for them, and fail; > > there is no suggestion that they do this because they believe the old > > man's world is real. There was a spate of similar novels in English in > > eighteenth century (e.g. Charlotte Lennox's "the Female Quixote"), and > > Jane Austen's first novel, Northanger Abbey, is a romance about a > > woman whose whole attraction is that she actually assumes only the > > very best motives in real people, and reserves her fascination with > > ill will for the reading of Gothic novels; when she meets with a > > genuinely nasty character (General Tilney) for the first time, she > > imputes Gothic motives to him where there are only mundane and > > mercenary ones, and the novel ends with the half disenchantment of the > > heroine and half enchantment of the General's son, both quite > > deliberately acts of metacognition. > > > > But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much earlier. > > "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a particular > > kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became parodistsic. "Dream of > > the Red Chamber" is about a stone left over from when the world was > > made, which is reincarnated by a sensitive young man who falls in with > > one cousin and marries another. It is also about a garden, built for a > > one day visit to her family by one of the Emperor's concubines, which > > eventually bankrupts the family. But the children of the family are > > allowed to run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety of fancies: > > at various places we are told that various parts of the novel, and > > even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the minds of > > others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, almost every > > fiction manuscript was passed around in a community (rather as Jane > > Austen's manuscripts were shared in her family) and "Dream of the Red > > Chamber" was probably finished by someone else (the last third of it > > was written well after the death of the author, but computer analysis > > has not definitively proven that it was written by someone else). > > > > I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is that, > > like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we keep > > thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and the > > preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist thinking > > (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and wonder) are the > > last word and not merely latest one. I spend a great deal of the time > > that I spend writing half-listening to eighteenth century operas, > > which are in very obvious ways imaginary worlds which we enter only by > > voluntarily checking our linguistic assumptions in the cloakroom. In > > less obvious ways, it seems to me, these imaginary worlds are > > interested in a clash that we no longer take very seriously. It's the > > clash between a form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, because > > empirical, and one which is narrowly rationalist, because puritanical. > > The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act of > > forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro). The > > strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness by its > > very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don Giovanni gets > > around this problem by making repentance a precondition for > > forgiveness, and then by arguing that the truly damnable will never > > repent, not even as they are actually being damned. > > > > We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism and > > merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching. There is the > > humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary negotiations of meaning > > between human beings--and the rationalist belief in the inflexible, > > innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere it seems to have been subsumed > > in the general opposition between art and science that we find in > > Saler's talk. Part of the point of my book is really to try to revive > > it--in the form of a humanizing dialogic tendency in story telling > > versus a more rationalizing narrativistic one. > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and > > everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two chapters > > for free at.... > > > > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-praxis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/ > > > > > > (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of it not > > as an interface between the virtual world and the real one, but only > > as yet another interface between this virtual world and the next one!) > > > > dk > > > > > > > > On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole wrote: > > > Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the > discussions, > > > Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two others > > suffer > > > from the same difficulties. > > > > > > My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If that's a > > > mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general rule, but when > > they > > > are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, seems like a > > > relatively painless way to figure out what other participants in the > > > discussion are trying to communicate. > > > > > > Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*? !! :-))) > > > > > > Rockin chair mike > > > > > > Thanks > > > > > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson < > > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > > wrote: > > > > > >> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" more > > than > > >> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss of an > > >> epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a there > > there?). > > >> > > >> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, I know > > that > > >> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the concrete" - > which > > >> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or something > > >> else? A "made real"?). > > >> > > >> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented social > > >> constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word > "ontological"?). > > >> > > >> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was > proposing: > > >> http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=en > > >> > > >> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks since it > > can be > > >> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and they can be > > hit > > >> or miss. > > >> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I originally sent > in > > >> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it > interesting > > >> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? > > >> Others? > > >> -greg > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >> > > >> > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central > component, > > >> > Greg. > > >> > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the wrong > > >> conversation > > >> > here?). > > >> > > > >> > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? Perhaps > > the > > >> > two talks will aid the discussion. > > >> > mike > > >> > > > >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson < > > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > >> > wrote: > > >> > > > >> > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on the > > >> other > > >> > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others > > might > > >> be > > >> > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in politics: > > >> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > > >> > > > > >> > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" to > > >> works > > >> > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. > > >> > > > > >> > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply > political > > >> act. > > >> > > > > >> > > -greg > > >> > > > > >> > > -- > > >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >> > > Assistant Professor > > >> > > Department of Anthropology > > >> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >> > > Brigham Young University > > >> > > Provo, UT 84602 > > >> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > -- > > >> > > > >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction > and > > re- > > >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > > more > > >> or > > >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, > and > > >> > Gray, 2001] > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> -- > > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >> Assistant Professor > > >> Department of Anthropology > > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >> Brigham Young University > > >> Provo, UT 84602 > > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and > re- > > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more > > or > > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > > > Gray, 2001] > > > > > > -- > > *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor > Social Foundations of Education > Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > Georgia Southern University > Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group > P. O. Box 8144 > Phone: (912) 478-0355 > Fax: (912) 478-5382 > Statesboro, GA 30460 > From smago@uga.edu Wed Sep 24 08:37:47 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2014 15:37:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <3243a1c09d0c41d08db958c86f6bace5@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> I don't see "academia" as so monolithic. Plenty of university activists have been around for a long time. Some private colleges have radical traditions (e.g., Oberlin, Wesleyan). If anything, universities are generally considered to be far more liberal than their host communities and states, at least to hear the taxpayers howl about our radical faculty. Individuals on my university's faculty have formed a Freedom University to provide free classes for undocumented immigrants and support their petitions for residential tuition. I'm not saying that universities are populated entirely by free thinkers, just that I fundamentally disagree with any effort to characterize them all as being the same in any way. p -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss Sent: Wednesday, September 24, 2014 10:44 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds Robert, Yes. You passionately stated: " the role of academia has been to service the status quo, not challenge it in the name of justice, tradition, imagination, human welfare, the free play of the mind or alternative visions of the future. I will suggest that this may be an example of Andy's *developing* a *concept* that requires joint *activity* to reawaken THIS *truth* [real and imaginal]. The university must be *re-imagined* and the present trajectory re-directed. SENS: [sense and direction] Larry On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 7:29 AM, Robert Lake wrote: > Relevant to "imagined worlds discussion-(see underlined section at > least).Series: Why humanities? > > Previous > < > http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/dec/01/science-geeks-uni > te-higher-education-funding > > > | Index > > The death of universities > Academia has become a servant of the status quo. Its malaise runs so > much deeper than tuition fees > > - Share > < > https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=http://www.theguardian.co > m/commentisfree/2010/dec/17/death-universities-malaise-tuition-fees > > > 5926 > - > - > - inShare36 > - Email > < > http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/dec/17/death-universitie > s-malaise-tuition-fees# > > > > > - [image: Terry Eagleton] > > - > - Terry Eagleton > - > - The Guardian , Friday 17 > December 2010 17.00 EST > - Jump to comments (326) > < > http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/dec/17/death-universitie > s-malaise-tuition-fees#start-of-comments > > > > Are the humanities > about to disappear from our universities? The question is absurd. It > would be like asking whether alcohol is about to disappear from pubs, > or egoism from Hollywood. Just as there cannot be a pub without > alcohol, so there cannot be a university without the humanities. If > history, philosophy and so on vanish from academic life, what they > leave in their wake may be a technical training facility or corporate > research institute. But it will not be a university in the classical > sense of the term, and it would be deceptive to call it one. > > Neither, however, can there be a university in the full sense of the > word when the humanities exist in isolation from other disciplines. > The quickest way of devaluing these subjects ? short of disposing of > them altogether ? is to reduce them to an agreeable bonus. Real men > study law and engineering, while ideas and values are for sissies. The > humanities should constitute the core of any university worth the > name. The study of history and philosophy, accompanied by some > acquaintance with art and literature, should be for lawyers and > engineers as well as for those who study in arts faculties. If the > humanities are not under such dire threat in the United States, it is, > among other things, because they are seen as being an integral part of higher education as such. > > When they first emerged in their present shape around the turn of the > 18th century, the so-called humane disciplines had a crucial social > role. It was to foster and protect the kind of values for which a > philistine social order had precious little time. The modern > humanities and industrial capitalism were more or less twinned at > birth. To preserve a set of values and ideas under siege, you needed > among other things institutions known as universities set somewhat > apart from everyday social life. This remoteness meant that humane > study could be lamentably ineffectual. But it also allowed the humanities to launch a critique of conventional wisdom. > > >From time to time, as in the late 1960s and in these last few weeks > >in > Britain, that critique would take to the streets < > http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2010/dec/12/riots-fire-anger-defin > ing-political-moment > >, > confronting how we actually live with how we might live. > > *What we have witnessed in our own time is the death of universities > as centres of critique. Since Margaret Thatcher, the role of academia > has been to service the status quo, not challenge it in the name of > justice, tradition, imagination, human welfare, the free play of the > mind or alternative visions of the future. We will not change this > simply by increasing state funding of the humanities as opposed to > slashing it to nothing. We will change it by insisting that a critical > reflection on human values and principles should be central to > everything that goes on in universities, not just to the study of > Rembrandt or Rimbaud.* > > In the end, the humanities can only be defended by stressing how > indispensable they are; and this means insisting on their vital role > in the whole business of academic learning, rather than protesting > that, like some poor relation, they don't cost much to be housed. > > How can this be achieved in practice? Financially speaking, it can't be. > Governments are intent on shrinking the humanities, not expanding them. > > Might not too much investment in teaching Shelley mean falling behind > our economic competitors? But there is no university without humane > inquiry, which means that universities and advanced capitalism are > fundamentally incompatible. And the political implications of that run > far deeper than the question of student fees. > > On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 12:22 AM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how cramped, > > ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of imaginary > > worlds is. > > > > The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of > > imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it is > > only with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately > > "believe" in a fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual > > creator. That is, adult play only begins with people who were the > > peers of my grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also be > > imaginary worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of people, but > > they do not signify, because the effort of believing in them in > > order to inhabit them is not differentiated from believing in them > > because you think they are true. > > > > Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional > > "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional delusion > > is very much older than this. At the end of Don Quixote, the old > > man's neighbors try their very best to convince Don Quixote to go on > > inhabiting the novelistic world he has created for them, and fail; > > there is no suggestion that they do this because they believe the > > old man's world is real. There was a spate of similar novels in > > English in eighteenth century (e.g. Charlotte Lennox's "the Female > > Quixote"), and Jane Austen's first novel, Northanger Abbey, is a > > romance about a woman whose whole attraction is that she actually > > assumes only the very best motives in real people, and reserves her > > fascination with ill will for the reading of Gothic novels; when she > > meets with a genuinely nasty character (General Tilney) for the > > first time, she imputes Gothic motives to him where there are only > > mundane and mercenary ones, and the novel ends with the half > > disenchantment of the heroine and half enchantment of the General's > > son, both quite deliberately acts of metacognition. > > > > But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much earlier. > > "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a particular > > kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became parodistsic. "Dream of > > the Red Chamber" is about a stone left over from when the world was > > made, which is reincarnated by a sensitive young man who falls in > > with one cousin and marries another. It is also about a garden, > > built for a one day visit to her family by one of the Emperor's > > concubines, which eventually bankrupts the family. But the children > > of the family are allowed to run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety of fancies: > > at various places we are told that various parts of the novel, and > > even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the minds of > > others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, almost every > > fiction manuscript was passed around in a community (rather as Jane > > Austen's manuscripts were shared in her family) and "Dream of the > > Red Chamber" was probably finished by someone else (the last third > > of it was written well after the death of the author, but computer > > analysis has not definitively proven that it was written by someone else). > > > > I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is > > that, like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we keep > > thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and the > > preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist thinking > > (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and wonder) are > > the last word and not merely latest one. I spend a great deal of the > > time that I spend writing half-listening to eighteenth century > > operas, which are in very obvious ways imaginary worlds which we > > enter only by voluntarily checking our linguistic assumptions in the > > cloakroom. In less obvious ways, it seems to me, these imaginary > > worlds are interested in a clash that we no longer take very > > seriously. It's the clash between a form of knowledge which is > > broadly humanist, because empirical, and one which is narrowly rationalist, because puritanical. > > The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act of > > forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro). > > The strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness by > > its very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don Giovanni > > gets around this problem by making repentance a precondition for > > forgiveness, and then by arguing that the truly damnable will never > > repent, not even as they are actually being damned. > > > > We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism and > > merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching. There is > > the humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary negotiations of > > meaning between human beings--and the rationalist belief in the > > inflexible, innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere it seems to have > > been subsumed in the general opposition between art and science that > > we find in Saler's talk. Part of the point of my book is really to > > try to revive it--in the form of a humanizing dialogic tendency in > > story telling versus a more rationalizing narrativistic one. > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and > > everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two > > chapters for free at.... > > > > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-pr > axis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/ > > > > > > (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of it > > not as an interface between the virtual world and the real one, but > > only as yet another interface between this virtual world and the > > next one!) > > > > dk > > > > > > > > On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole wrote: > > > Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the > discussions, > > > Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two > > > others > > suffer > > > from the same difficulties. > > > > > > My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If > > > that's a mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general > > > rule, but when > > they > > > are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, seems > > > like a relatively painless way to figure out what other > > > participants in the discussion are trying to communicate. > > > > > > Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*? !! :-))) > > > > > > Rockin chair mike > > > > > > Thanks > > > > > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson < > > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > > wrote: > > > > > >> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" > > >> more > > than > > >> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss of > > >> an epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a > > >> there > > there?). > > >> > > >> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, I > > >> know > > that > > >> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the concrete" - > which > > >> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or > > >> something else? A "made real"?). > > >> > > >> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented social > > >> constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word > "ontological"?). > > >> > > >> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was > proposing: > > >> http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?languag > > >> e=en > > >> > > >> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks since > > >> it > > can be > > >> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and they > > >> can be > > hit > > >> or miss. > > >> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I originally > > >> sent > in > > >> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it > interesting > > >> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? > > >> Others? > > >> -greg > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >> > > >> > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central > component, > > >> > Greg. > > >> > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the wrong > > >> conversation > > >> > here?). > > >> > > > >> > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? > > >> > Perhaps > > the > > >> > two talks will aid the discussion. > > >> > mike > > >> > > > >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson < > > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > >> > wrote: > > >> > > > >> > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions > > >> > > on the > > >> other > > >> > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that > > >> > > others > > might > > >> be > > >> > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in politics: > > >> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > > >> > > > > >> > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the > > >> > > otherwise" to > > >> works > > >> > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. > > >> > > > > >> > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply > political > > >> act. > > >> > > > > >> > > -greg > > >> > > > > >> > > -- > > >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >> > > Assistant Professor > > >> > > Department of Anthropology > > >> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >> > > Brigham Young University > > >> > > Provo, UT 84602 > > >> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > -- > > >> > > > >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of > > >> > construction > and > > re- > > >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently > > >> > but > > more > > >> or > > >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > > >> > Griffiths, > and > > >> > Gray, 2001] > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> -- > > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >> Assistant Professor > > >> Department of Anthropology > > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >> Brigham Young University > > >> Provo, UT 84602 > > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction > > > and > re- > > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > > > more > > or > > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, > > > and Gray, 2001] > > > > > > -- > > *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor Social Foundations of > Education Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading Georgia > Southern University > Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group P. O. > Box 8144 > Phone: (912) 478-0355 > Fax: (912) 478-5382 > Statesboro, GA 30460 > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Sep 24 10:58:18 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2014 10:58:18 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Outlining Opportunities for Inequality Research In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: William T. Grant Foundation Date: Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 10:25 AM Subject: Outlining Opportunities for Inequality Research To: Michael [image: William T. Grant Foundation] [image: Twitter] [image: YouTube] *Outlining Opportunities for Inequality Research * *Research and Responses to Inequality* In ?Inequality Matters ,? the first paper in our series surveying the broad landscape of inequality research, Stanford University?s Prudence Carter and Sean Reardon identify areas where research might lead to new responses to inequality. Today on the WTG blog, Professors Carter and Reardon summarize some of their findings and underscore opportunities for researchers to better understand and tackle this growing issue, with a focus on children and youth. READ MORE ON OUR BLOG [image: Read More] [image: William T. Grant Foundation] Supporting research to improve the lives of young people Contact Us 570 Lexington Avenue, 18th Floor New York, NY 10022-6837 Tel: 212.752.0071 Fax: 212.752.1398 [image: Twitter] [image: YouTube] Quick Links Apply For Grantees Privacy Policy Transparency Statement This email was sent to mcole@ucsd.edu *why did I get this?* unsubscribe from this list update subscription preferences William T. Grant Foundation ? 570 Lexington Avenue, 18th floor ? New York, NY 10022 ? USA -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Wed Sep 24 12:14:00 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2014 16:14:00 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: <3243a1c09d0c41d08db958c86f6bace5@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> References: <3243a1c09d0c41d08db958c86f6bace5@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <2AAB11BA-2DA3-4952-A691-01FC65CD7396@gmail.com> I suscribe Peter's words entirely. However their limitations, universities have so many intellectual interstices. Commonly, those interstices are their most attractive places. I usually encourage my students to look for (or inventing) those spaces and care less about the formal curriculum. On Sep 24, 2014, at 12:37 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote: > I don't see "academia" as so monolithic. Plenty of university activists have been around for a long time. Some private colleges have radical traditions (e.g., Oberlin, Wesleyan). If anything, universities are generally considered to be far more liberal than their host communities and states, at least to hear the taxpayers howl about our radical faculty. Individuals on my university's faculty have formed a Freedom University to provide free classes for undocumented immigrants and support their petitions for residential tuition. > > I'm not saying that universities are populated entirely by free thinkers, just that I fundamentally disagree with any effort to characterize them all as being the same in any way. p > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss > Sent: Wednesday, September 24, 2014 10:44 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds > > Robert, Yes. > You passionately stated: > " the role of academia has been to service the status quo, not challenge it in the name of justice, tradition, imagination, human welfare, the free play of the mind or alternative visions of the future. > > I will suggest that this may be an example of Andy's *developing* a *concept* that requires joint *activity* to reawaken THIS *truth* [real and imaginal]. > > The university must be *re-imagined* and the present trajectory re-directed. SENS: [sense and direction] Larry > > On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 7:29 AM, Robert Lake > wrote: > >> Relevant to "imagined worlds discussion-(see underlined section at >> least).Series: Why humanities? >> >> Previous >> < >> http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/dec/01/science-geeks-uni >> te-higher-education-funding >>> >> | Index >> >> The death of universities >> Academia has become a servant of the status quo. Its malaise runs so >> much deeper than tuition fees >> >> - Share >> < >> https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=http://www.theguardian.co >> m/commentisfree/2010/dec/17/death-universities-malaise-tuition-fees >>> >> 5926 >> - >> - >> - inShare36 >> - Email >> < >> http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/dec/17/death-universitie >> s-malaise-tuition-fees# >>> >> >> >> - [image: Terry Eagleton] >> >> - >> - Terry Eagleton >> - >> - The Guardian , Friday 17 >> December 2010 17.00 EST >> - Jump to comments (326) >> < >> http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/dec/17/death-universitie >> s-malaise-tuition-fees#start-of-comments >>> >> >> Are the humanities >> about to disappear from our universities? The question is absurd. It >> would be like asking whether alcohol is about to disappear from pubs, >> or egoism from Hollywood. Just as there cannot be a pub without >> alcohol, so there cannot be a university without the humanities. If >> history, philosophy and so on vanish from academic life, what they >> leave in their wake may be a technical training facility or corporate >> research institute. But it will not be a university in the classical >> sense of the term, and it would be deceptive to call it one. >> >> Neither, however, can there be a university in the full sense of the >> word when the humanities exist in isolation from other disciplines. >> The quickest way of devaluing these subjects ? short of disposing of >> them altogether ? is to reduce them to an agreeable bonus. Real men >> study law and engineering, while ideas and values are for sissies. The >> humanities should constitute the core of any university worth the >> name. The study of history and philosophy, accompanied by some >> acquaintance with art and literature, should be for lawyers and >> engineers as well as for those who study in arts faculties. If the >> humanities are not under such dire threat in the United States, it is, >> among other things, because they are seen as being an integral part of higher education as such. >> >> When they first emerged in their present shape around the turn of the >> 18th century, the so-called humane disciplines had a crucial social >> role. It was to foster and protect the kind of values for which a >> philistine social order had precious little time. The modern >> humanities and industrial capitalism were more or less twinned at >> birth. To preserve a set of values and ideas under siege, you needed >> among other things institutions known as universities set somewhat >> apart from everyday social life. This remoteness meant that humane >> study could be lamentably ineffectual. But it also allowed the humanities to launch a critique of conventional wisdom. >> >>> From time to time, as in the late 1960s and in these last few weeks >>> in >> Britain, that critique would take to the streets < >> http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2010/dec/12/riots-fire-anger-defin >> ing-political-moment >>> , >> confronting how we actually live with how we might live. >> >> *What we have witnessed in our own time is the death of universities >> as centres of critique. Since Margaret Thatcher, the role of academia >> has been to service the status quo, not challenge it in the name of >> justice, tradition, imagination, human welfare, the free play of the >> mind or alternative visions of the future. We will not change this >> simply by increasing state funding of the humanities as opposed to >> slashing it to nothing. We will change it by insisting that a critical >> reflection on human values and principles should be central to >> everything that goes on in universities, not just to the study of >> Rembrandt or Rimbaud.* >> >> In the end, the humanities can only be defended by stressing how >> indispensable they are; and this means insisting on their vital role >> in the whole business of academic learning, rather than protesting >> that, like some poor relation, they don't cost much to be housed. >> >> How can this be achieved in practice? Financially speaking, it can't be. >> Governments are intent on shrinking the humanities, not expanding them. >> >> Might not too much investment in teaching Shelley mean falling behind >> our economic competitors? But there is no university without humane >> inquiry, which means that universities and advanced capitalism are >> fundamentally incompatible. And the political implications of that run >> far deeper than the question of student fees. >> >> On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 12:22 AM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >> >>> Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how cramped, >>> ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of imaginary >>> worlds is. >>> >>> The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of >>> imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it is >>> only with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately >>> "believe" in a fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual >>> creator. That is, adult play only begins with people who were the >>> peers of my grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also be >>> imaginary worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of people, but >>> they do not signify, because the effort of believing in them in >>> order to inhabit them is not differentiated from believing in them >>> because you think they are true. >>> >>> Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional >>> "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional delusion >>> is very much older than this. At the end of Don Quixote, the old >>> man's neighbors try their very best to convince Don Quixote to go on >>> inhabiting the novelistic world he has created for them, and fail; >>> there is no suggestion that they do this because they believe the >>> old man's world is real. There was a spate of similar novels in >>> English in eighteenth century (e.g. Charlotte Lennox's "the Female >>> Quixote"), and Jane Austen's first novel, Northanger Abbey, is a >>> romance about a woman whose whole attraction is that she actually >>> assumes only the very best motives in real people, and reserves her >>> fascination with ill will for the reading of Gothic novels; when she >>> meets with a genuinely nasty character (General Tilney) for the >>> first time, she imputes Gothic motives to him where there are only >>> mundane and mercenary ones, and the novel ends with the half >>> disenchantment of the heroine and half enchantment of the General's >>> son, both quite deliberately acts of metacognition. >>> >>> But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much earlier. >>> "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a particular >>> kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became parodistsic. "Dream of >>> the Red Chamber" is about a stone left over from when the world was >>> made, which is reincarnated by a sensitive young man who falls in >>> with one cousin and marries another. It is also about a garden, >>> built for a one day visit to her family by one of the Emperor's >>> concubines, which eventually bankrupts the family. But the children >>> of the family are allowed to run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety of fancies: >>> at various places we are told that various parts of the novel, and >>> even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the minds of >>> others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, almost every >>> fiction manuscript was passed around in a community (rather as Jane >>> Austen's manuscripts were shared in her family) and "Dream of the >>> Red Chamber" was probably finished by someone else (the last third >>> of it was written well after the death of the author, but computer >>> analysis has not definitively proven that it was written by someone else). >>> >>> I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is >>> that, like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we keep >>> thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and the >>> preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist thinking >>> (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and wonder) are >>> the last word and not merely latest one. I spend a great deal of the >>> time that I spend writing half-listening to eighteenth century >>> operas, which are in very obvious ways imaginary worlds which we >>> enter only by voluntarily checking our linguistic assumptions in the >>> cloakroom. In less obvious ways, it seems to me, these imaginary >>> worlds are interested in a clash that we no longer take very >>> seriously. It's the clash between a form of knowledge which is >>> broadly humanist, because empirical, and one which is narrowly rationalist, because puritanical. >>> The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act of >>> forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro). >>> The strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness by >>> its very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don Giovanni >>> gets around this problem by making repentance a precondition for >>> forgiveness, and then by arguing that the truly damnable will never >>> repent, not even as they are actually being damned. >>> >>> We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism and >>> merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching. There is >>> the humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary negotiations of >>> meaning between human beings--and the rationalist belief in the >>> inflexible, innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere it seems to have >>> been subsumed in the general opposition between art and science that >>> we find in Saler's talk. Part of the point of my book is really to >>> try to revive it--in the form of a humanizing dialogic tendency in >>> story telling versus a more rationalizing narrativistic one. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and >>> everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two >>> chapters for free at.... >>> >>> >>> >> https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-pr >> axis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/ >>> >>> >>> (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of it >>> not as an interface between the virtual world and the real one, but >>> only as yet another interface between this virtual world and the >>> next one!) >>> >>> dk >>> >>> >>> >>> On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole wrote: >>>> Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the >> discussions, >>>> Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two >>>> others >>> suffer >>>> from the same difficulties. >>>> >>>> My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If >>>> that's a mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general >>>> rule, but when >>> they >>>> are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, seems >>>> like a relatively painless way to figure out what other >>>> participants in the discussion are trying to communicate. >>>> >>>> Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*? !! :-))) >>>> >>>> Rockin chair mike >>>> >>>> Thanks >>>> >>>> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson < >>> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" >>>>> more >>> than >>>>> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss of >>>>> an epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a >>>>> there >>> there?). >>>>> >>>>> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, I >>>>> know >>> that >>>>> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the concrete" - >> which >>>>> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or >>>>> something else? A "made real"?). >>>>> >>>>> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented social >>>>> constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word >> "ontological"?). >>>>> >>>>> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was >> proposing: >>>>> http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?languag >>>>> e=en >>>>> >>>>> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks since >>>>> it >>> can be >>>>> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and they >>>>> can be >>> hit >>>>> or miss. >>>>> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I originally >>>>> sent >> in >>>>> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it >> interesting >>>>> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? >>>>> Others? >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central >> component, >>>>>> Greg. >>>>>> So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the wrong >>>>> conversation >>>>>> here?). >>>>>> >>>>>> Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? >>>>>> Perhaps >>> the >>>>>> two talks will aid the discussion. >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson < >>>>> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions >>>>>>> on the >>>>> other >>>>>>> thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that >>>>>>> others >>> might >>>>> be >>>>>>> interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in politics: >>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the >>>>>>> otherwise" to >>>>> works >>>>>>> such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply >> political >>>>> act. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> >>>>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of >>>>>> construction >> and >>> re- >>>>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently >>>>>> but >>> more >>>>> or >>>>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, >>>>>> Griffiths, >> and >>>>>> Gray, 2001] >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction >>>> and >> re- >>>> construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but >>>> more >>> or >>>> less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, >>>> and Gray, 2001] >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor Social Foundations of >> Education Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading Georgia >> Southern University >> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group P. O. >> Box 8144 >> Phone: (912) 478-0355 >> Fax: (912) 478-5382 >> Statesboro, GA 30460 >> > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Sep 24 16:22:06 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2014 08:22:06 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Larry-- I've been trying to construct a materialist history of English language teaching; that is, one that doesn't view it as one fashion atrocity after another. The first thing I did was to divide its six hundred year history into roughly three two-hundred year periods--an "interpersonal" one which begins with Henry V and Katherine de Valois and basically works the way that phrasebooks work today, given tremendous impetus by Caxton's introduction of the printing press. To me, the printing press contains within it the key insight (or rather, as you would say, the key pipe dream) of structuralism: the idea that word is made of interchangeable parts, rather like one of Henry Ford's Model T's. But the interesting thing is that nobody really managed to get that dream out of the material artefact of the printing press until Saussure. Verily, the word is only ready when the concept is; or in this case, the vehicle of the idea is only read when the driver is! So Caxton's printing press was used to sell spices and beef bouillon across the English channel. It wasn't until the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre (1573) that anyone even tried to do more than trade with English, and even then it was only for one generation--the 300,000 Huguenots (ten percent of the English population in those days) were all fully bilingual, and the move died out. Now, the Huguenots were extreme rationalists--Cartesians, if you like. Today we are quite familiar with the idea that conservatives are more interested in philosophy than policy--since they want everything except individuals, families and corporations to disappear, they have no interest in changing society or government. That was the Huguenots: they believed in Haidt's five values of purity, authority, ingroup solidarity, justice...and forgiveness...in preciselythat order, the reverse of what Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings posited (rather closer to what Piaget and Kohlberg wanted). And when they left France, they didn't take all their ideas with them. The remaining rationalists, in the form of the Jansenists, retreated to Port Royal and created the first really scientific grammars of a modern language (French, as it happened, but it was actually designed as a universal grammar of any and all human languages). Pascal was one of them. And I think I see, in the idea of a prescriptive grammar that would provide scientific explanations and laws binding on any human language with no exceptions whatsoever, the real birth of the concept of the sentence as composed of interchangeable parts. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 24 September 2014 14:40, Larry Purss wrote: > Fascinating > David, your comment: > > "and the rationalist belief in the inflexible, innate laws of grammar" > > can be placed alongside Peirce's comment: > "The scientific imagination DREAMS of explanations and laws" > > For Peirce the origin of new ideas and scientific hypothesis were > particulary important questions. Peirce was not a romanticist, as he wanted > to produce a harmony of creativity and logic and in order to find this > harmony Peirce reformulated logic in a radical way. > He composed the *logic of relatives* a new logic of interpretation which > allowed for the change and growth of SYSTEMS of thought.. > > There seems to be a play of *transversals* that involves science fiction > Larry > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 9:22 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how cramped, >> ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of imaginary worlds >> is. >> >> The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of >> imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it is only >> with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately "believe" in a >> fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual creator. That is, >> adult play only begins with people who were the peers of my >> grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also be imaginary >> worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of people, but they do not >> signify, because the effort of believing in them in order to inhabit >> them is not differentiated from believing in them because you think >> they are true. >> >> Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional >> "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional delusion >> is very much older than this. At the end of Don Quixote, the old man's >> neighbors try their very best to convince Don Quixote to go on >> inhabiting the novelistic world he has created for them, and fail; >> there is no suggestion that they do this because they believe the old >> man's world is real. There was a spate of similar novels in English in >> eighteenth century (e.g. Charlotte Lennox's "the Female Quixote"), and >> Jane Austen's first novel, Northanger Abbey, is a romance about a >> woman whose whole attraction is that she actually assumes only the >> very best motives in real people, and reserves her fascination with >> ill will for the reading of Gothic novels; when she meets with a >> genuinely nasty character (General Tilney) for the first time, she >> imputes Gothic motives to him where there are only mundane and >> mercenary ones, and the novel ends with the half disenchantment of the >> heroine and half enchantment of the General's son, both quite >> deliberately acts of metacognition. >> >> But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much earlier. >> "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a particular >> kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became parodistsic. "Dream of >> the Red Chamber" is about a stone left over from when the world was >> made, which is reincarnated by a sensitive young man who falls in with >> one cousin and marries another. It is also about a garden, built for a >> one day visit to her family by one of the Emperor's concubines, which >> eventually bankrupts the family. But the children of the family are >> allowed to run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety of fancies: >> at various places we are told that various parts of the novel, and >> even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the minds of >> others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, almost every >> fiction manuscript was passed around in a community (rather as Jane >> Austen's manuscripts were shared in her family) and "Dream of the Red >> Chamber" was probably finished by someone else (the last third of it >> was written well after the death of the author, but computer analysis >> has not definitively proven that it was written by someone else). >> >> I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is that, >> like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we keep >> thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and the >> preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist thinking >> (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and wonder) are the >> last word and not merely latest one. I spend a great deal of the time >> that I spend writing half-listening to eighteenth century operas, >> which are in very obvious ways imaginary worlds which we enter only by >> voluntarily checking our linguistic assumptions in the cloakroom. In >> less obvious ways, it seems to me, these imaginary worlds are >> interested in a clash that we no longer take very seriously. It's the >> clash between a form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, because >> empirical, and one which is narrowly rationalist, because puritanical. >> The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act of >> forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro). The >> strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness by its >> very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don Giovanni gets >> around this problem by making repentance a precondition for >> forgiveness, and then by arguing that the truly damnable will never >> repent, not even as they are actually being damned. >> >> We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism and >> merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching. There is the >> humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary negotiations of meaning >> between human beings--and the rationalist belief in the inflexible, >> innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere it seems to have been subsumed >> in the general opposition between art and science that we find in >> Saler's talk. Part of the point of my book is really to try to revive >> it--in the form of a humanizing dialogic tendency in story telling >> versus a more rationalizing narrativistic one. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and >> everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two chapters >> for free at.... >> >> >> https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-praxis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/ >> >> >> (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of it not >> as an interface between the virtual world and the real one, but only >> as yet another interface between this virtual world and the next one!) >> >> dk >> >> >> >> On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole wrote: >> > Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the discussions, >> > Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two others >> suffer >> > from the same difficulties. >> > >> > My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If that's a >> > mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general rule, but when >> they >> > are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, seems like a >> > relatively painless way to figure out what other participants in the >> > discussion are trying to communicate. >> > >> > Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*? !! :-))) >> > >> > Rockin chair mike >> > >> > Thanks >> > >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson < >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> >> > wrote: >> > >> >> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" more >> than >> >> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss of an >> >> epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a there >> there?). >> >> >> >> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, I know >> that >> >> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the concrete" - which >> >> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or something >> >> else? A "made real"?). >> >> >> >> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented social >> >> constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word "ontological"?). >> >> >> >> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was proposing: >> >> http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=en >> >> >> >> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks since it >> can be >> >> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and they can be >> hit >> >> or miss. >> >> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I originally sent in >> >> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it interesting >> >> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? >> >> Others? >> >> -greg >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> >> >> > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central component, >> >> > Greg. >> >> > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the wrong >> >> conversation >> >> > here?). >> >> > >> >> > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? Perhaps >> the >> >> > two talks will aid the discussion. >> >> > mike >> >> > >> >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson < >> >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> >> >> > wrote: >> >> > >> >> > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on the >> >> other >> >> > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others >> might >> >> be >> >> > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in politics: >> >> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo >> >> > > >> >> > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" to >> >> works >> >> > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. >> >> > > >> >> > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply political >> >> act. >> >> > > >> >> > > -greg >> >> > > >> >> > > -- >> >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> >> > > Assistant Professor >> >> > > Department of Anthropology >> >> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> >> > > Brigham Young University >> >> > > Provo, UT 84602 >> >> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> > > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > -- >> >> > >> >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and >> re- >> >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but >> more >> >> or >> >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >> >> > Gray, 2001] >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> >> Assistant Professor >> >> Department of Anthropology >> >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> >> Brigham Young University >> >> Provo, UT 84602 >> >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> >> > >> > >> > >> > -- >> > >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more >> or >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >> > Gray, 2001] >> From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Sep 24 16:38:21 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2014 08:38:21 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: <000901cfd805$9b9a98f0$d2cfcad0$@net> References: <000901cfd805$9b9a98f0$d2cfcad0$@net> Message-ID: John-- Well, the thought was provoked by reading Hamlet in the context of all the Revenge tragedies showing at rival houses at the time. It struck me that they were really MUCH more like the blockbusters of our own time: an unrighted wrong, a lone avenger, a splatter-fest in which the hero and everybody else dies, and a strong element of either the highly improbable or the downright supernatural. That sounds like Hamlet, but it isn't. Sure, there's a ghost--that was the playbook, you know. And there's a splatter-fest too. But as Vygotsky points out, NOTHING HAPPENS in between--for nigh on four long hours. Just feellings, thinkings, talkings...no doings. At the end, the ghost is AWOL, there is NO gloating or even a sense of justice done at the end. And...this is the part we all miss in our righteous relief at the king's death...Laertes and Hamlet forgive each other before they die. Now, here's the problem. Forgiveness survived, and the "Ur-Hamlet" Revenge Plays didn't. Why? It seems to me that Hamlet survived because the NEXT big battle of ideas was that between the broadly humanist, empirical, notions of forgiveness and understanding that Hamlet espouses and the inexorable rationalism of Protestant ideas of justice, and at crucial moments (e.g. the Scottish Enlightenment, the English Restoration, the Romantic reaction to the French Revolution, and German idealism) it was the humanist view of Shakespeare that trumped rationalism. But in our own time, it's the other way around. No wonder the play drove Tolstoy crazy. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 24 September 2014 23:41, John Cummins wrote: > I thought David Kellogg's comment below very thought-provoking: > > ''In less obvious ways, it seems to me, these imaginary worlds are > interested in a clash that we no longer take very seriously. It's the > clash between a form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, because > empirical, and one which is narrowly rationalist, because puritanical.'' > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Sep 24 23:16:10 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2014 23:16:10 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: David, Thanks for this tracing of the materialist basis of the development of teaching English. I seem to be circling around this notion of *sens* as both sense/meaning AND orientation/focussing. Francois Dosse's name was mentioned on this site and I have been reviewing his books focussing on the contemporary French scene. He wrote a book on the "Empire of Meaning" Here is a fragment written by Michelle Baliff who wrote a book review of "Empire of Meaning" Michelle wrote: As the title suggests, the newly born paradigm attempts to redefine what it means to be human.However, such an attempt, according to Dosse, is not a ?pure and simple return to the subject or to a form of precritical humanism,? but rather an attempt to question, ?on the level of the individual, what ?being together,? or the social bond, is based on? (xvi). ?On the level of the individual? means a methodological concern with the ?instituter? rather than the ?instituted? (xvi) in order to theorize how social beings act, thereby reintroducing the social sciences to ?social. action? (182). Indeed, ?action,? according to Dosse, is the determining word of this new paradigm, a paradigm that attempts to bypass the epistemological crisis by not asking how subjects know, but how they exercise agency via a ?double hermeneutic.? The emphasis on hermeneutics comes as no surprise to the reader; the book is, after all, dedicated to Paul Ricoeur. Dosse explains that the new paradigm, much like a call Richard Rorty made in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, *moves from epistemology to hermeneutics, from *episteme *to *phronesis. *Such a move, Dosse writes, ?accords a central position to action endowed with meaning, rehabilitates the intentionality and the justifications of the actors in a reciprocal determination of doing and saying. The social is then no longer conceived as a thing; it is no longer the object of reification, for the actor and the observer are both held in a relation of interpretation that implicates intersubjectivity? (xvi). This way of orienting does have a few blind spots. Dosse mentions: #Its valorization of social actors #this new paradigms way of orienting by insisting on establishing a grammar of "intersubjective agreement" of social actors which ignores the resistance of instituted plots #in the orientation to situational rationality and this new paradigms attentiveness [focus] to the present moment may overlook or downplay the historical thickness of social phenomena. I agree with the mentioned "blind spots" while valorizing social actors. Dosse, using Andy's language, is engaged in the project of intentionally focussing on the concept *action* [saying AND doing]. Michelle Ballif ends her book review by suggesting Francois Dosse is reorienting our attention FROM the inefficiency of the knowing subject [episteme] TO the agency of the social actor thereby contributing to a redynamizing a public sphere articulated around the diversity of EXPRESSION. This new paradigm will hopefully enact the construction of a common space produced by common questions. Dosse is making a wager that a shared *project* can be developed creating a dynamic common space that will reinvent the commons. Is this mere fantasy and imaginal or can Dosse's writing contribute to a project where the concept of *action* generates a science fiction of possiblity? Larry On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 4:22 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Larry-- > > I've been trying to construct a materialist history of English > language teaching; that is, one that doesn't view it as one fashion > atrocity after another. The first thing I did was to divide its six > hundred year history into roughly three two-hundred year periods--an > "interpersonal" one which begins with Henry V and Katherine de Valois > and basically works the way that phrasebooks work today, given > tremendous impetus by Caxton's introduction of the printing press. > > To me, the printing press contains within it the key insight (or > rather, as you would say, the key pipe dream) of structuralism: the > idea that word is made of interchangeable parts, rather like one of > Henry Ford's Model T's. But the interesting thing is that nobody > really managed to get that dream out of the material artefact of the > printing press until Saussure. Verily, the word is only ready when the > concept is; or in this case, the vehicle of the idea is only read when > the driver is! > > So Caxton's printing press was used to sell spices and beef bouillon > across the English channel. It wasn't until the Saint Bartholomew's > Day Massacre (1573) that anyone even tried to do more than trade with > English, and even then it was only for one generation--the 300,000 > Huguenots (ten percent of the English population in those days) were > all fully bilingual, and the move died out. > > Now, the Huguenots were extreme rationalists--Cartesians, if you like. > Today we are quite familiar with the idea that conservatives are more > interested in philosophy than policy--since they want everything > except individuals, families and corporations to disappear, they have > no interest in changing society or government. That was the Huguenots: > they believed in Haidt's five values of purity, authority, ingroup > solidarity, justice...and forgiveness...in preciselythat order, the > reverse of what Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings posited (rather closer > to what Piaget and Kohlberg wanted). > > And when they left France, they didn't take all their ideas with them. > The remaining rationalists, in the form of the Jansenists, retreated > to Port Royal and created the first really scientific grammars of a > modern language (French, as it happened, but it was actually designed > as a universal grammar of any and all human languages). Pascal was one > of them. And I think I see, in the idea of a prescriptive grammar that > would provide scientific explanations and laws binding on any human > language with no exceptions whatsoever, the real birth of the concept > of the sentence as composed of interchangeable parts. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > On 24 September 2014 14:40, Larry Purss wrote: > > Fascinating > > David, your comment: > > > > "and the rationalist belief in the inflexible, innate laws of grammar" > > > > can be placed alongside Peirce's comment: > > "The scientific imagination DREAMS of explanations and laws" > > > > For Peirce the origin of new ideas and scientific hypothesis were > > particulary important questions. Peirce was not a romanticist, as he > wanted > > to produce a harmony of creativity and logic and in order to find this > > harmony Peirce reformulated logic in a radical way. > > He composed the *logic of relatives* a new logic of interpretation which > > allowed for the change and growth of SYSTEMS of thought.. > > > > There seems to be a play of *transversals* that involves science fiction > > Larry > > > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 9:22 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > >> Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how cramped, > >> ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of imaginary worlds > >> is. > >> > >> The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of > >> imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it is only > >> with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately "believe" in a > >> fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual creator. That is, > >> adult play only begins with people who were the peers of my > >> grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also be imaginary > >> worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of people, but they do not > >> signify, because the effort of believing in them in order to inhabit > >> them is not differentiated from believing in them because you think > >> they are true. > >> > >> Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional > >> "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional delusion > >> is very much older than this. At the end of Don Quixote, the old man's > >> neighbors try their very best to convince Don Quixote to go on > >> inhabiting the novelistic world he has created for them, and fail; > >> there is no suggestion that they do this because they believe the old > >> man's world is real. There was a spate of similar novels in English in > >> eighteenth century (e.g. Charlotte Lennox's "the Female Quixote"), and > >> Jane Austen's first novel, Northanger Abbey, is a romance about a > >> woman whose whole attraction is that she actually assumes only the > >> very best motives in real people, and reserves her fascination with > >> ill will for the reading of Gothic novels; when she meets with a > >> genuinely nasty character (General Tilney) for the first time, she > >> imputes Gothic motives to him where there are only mundane and > >> mercenary ones, and the novel ends with the half disenchantment of the > >> heroine and half enchantment of the General's son, both quite > >> deliberately acts of metacognition. > >> > >> But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much earlier. > >> "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a particular > >> kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became parodistsic. "Dream of > >> the Red Chamber" is about a stone left over from when the world was > >> made, which is reincarnated by a sensitive young man who falls in with > >> one cousin and marries another. It is also about a garden, built for a > >> one day visit to her family by one of the Emperor's concubines, which > >> eventually bankrupts the family. But the children of the family are > >> allowed to run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety of fancies: > >> at various places we are told that various parts of the novel, and > >> even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the minds of > >> others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, almost every > >> fiction manuscript was passed around in a community (rather as Jane > >> Austen's manuscripts were shared in her family) and "Dream of the Red > >> Chamber" was probably finished by someone else (the last third of it > >> was written well after the death of the author, but computer analysis > >> has not definitively proven that it was written by someone else). > >> > >> I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is that, > >> like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we keep > >> thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and the > >> preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist thinking > >> (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and wonder) are the > >> last word and not merely latest one. I spend a great deal of the time > >> that I spend writing half-listening to eighteenth century operas, > >> which are in very obvious ways imaginary worlds which we enter only by > >> voluntarily checking our linguistic assumptions in the cloakroom. In > >> less obvious ways, it seems to me, these imaginary worlds are > >> interested in a clash that we no longer take very seriously. It's the > >> clash between a form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, because > >> empirical, and one which is narrowly rationalist, because puritanical. > >> The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act of > >> forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro). The > >> strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness by its > >> very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don Giovanni gets > >> around this problem by making repentance a precondition for > >> forgiveness, and then by arguing that the truly damnable will never > >> repent, not even as they are actually being damned. > >> > >> We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism and > >> merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching. There is the > >> humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary negotiations of meaning > >> between human beings--and the rationalist belief in the inflexible, > >> innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere it seems to have been subsumed > >> in the general opposition between art and science that we find in > >> Saler's talk. Part of the point of my book is really to try to revive > >> it--in the form of a humanizing dialogic tendency in story telling > >> versus a more rationalizing narrativistic one. > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > >> By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and > >> everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two chapters > >> for free at.... > >> > >> > >> > https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-praxis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/ > >> > >> > >> (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of it not > >> as an interface between the virtual world and the real one, but only > >> as yet another interface between this virtual world and the next one!) > >> > >> dk > >> > >> > >> > >> On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole wrote: > >> > Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the > discussions, > >> > Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two others > >> suffer > >> > from the same difficulties. > >> > > >> > My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If that's a > >> > mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general rule, but when > >> they > >> > are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, seems like a > >> > relatively painless way to figure out what other participants in the > >> > discussion are trying to communicate. > >> > > >> > Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*? !! :-))) > >> > > >> > Rockin chair mike > >> > > >> > Thanks > >> > > >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson < > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >> > wrote: > >> > > >> >> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" > more > >> than > >> >> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss of an > >> >> epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a there > >> there?). > >> >> > >> >> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, I know > >> that > >> >> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the concrete" - > which > >> >> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or > something > >> >> else? A "made real"?). > >> >> > >> >> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented social > >> >> constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word > "ontological"?). > >> >> > >> >> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was > proposing: > >> >> > http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=en > >> >> > >> >> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks since it > >> can be > >> >> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and they can > be > >> hit > >> >> or miss. > >> >> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I originally > sent in > >> >> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it > interesting > >> >> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? > >> >> Others? > >> >> -greg > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> >> > >> >> > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central > component, > >> >> > Greg. > >> >> > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the wrong > >> >> conversation > >> >> > here?). > >> >> > > >> >> > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? > Perhaps > >> the > >> >> > two talks will aid the discussion. > >> >> > mike > >> >> > > >> >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson < > >> >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >> >> > wrote: > >> >> > > >> >> > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on > the > >> >> other > >> >> > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others > >> might > >> >> be > >> >> > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in > politics: > >> >> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > >> >> > > > >> >> > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" > to > >> >> works > >> >> > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. > >> >> > > > >> >> > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply > political > >> >> act. > >> >> > > > >> >> > > -greg > >> >> > > > >> >> > > -- > >> >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> >> > > Assistant Professor > >> >> > > Department of Anthropology > >> >> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> >> > > Brigham Young University > >> >> > > Provo, UT 84602 > >> >> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> >> > > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > -- > >> >> > > >> >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction > and > >> re- > >> >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > >> more > >> >> or > >> >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, > and > >> >> > Gray, 2001] > >> >> > > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> -- > >> >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> >> Assistant Professor > >> >> Department of Anthropology > >> >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> >> Brigham Young University > >> >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> >> > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > -- > >> > > >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and > re- > >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > more > >> or > >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > >> > Gray, 2001] > >> > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Sep 24 23:45:10 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2014 00:45:10 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: David, Thanks for this wonderfully thoughtful note. As I posted my note to the video, I was reading Max Gluckman's Rituals of Rebellion. In that book, Gluckman describes rituals in which people invert the norms of society for a period of time. This is clearly living in an imagined world (perhaps as much as living in the world full of upright norms), but this wouldn't make it onto Saler's radar. So I agree with your concern about ethnocentrism. At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something different about these two types of imagined worlds, with the other (rationalist) type of imagined worlds that, as you note, are perhaps more contrived, more intentionally made. But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to say that the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems that this points to differences in ontology. The intentionally made imaginary is a result of a naturalist ontology (here you see I am buying some of Saler's argument about a Weberian disenchantment with modernity). In a naturalist ontology, the world is just there in "all its base materiality." Nothing more, nothing less. There is no space for the rich imagined world of myth, belief, and religion (or so it is believed). In other worlds, there is space for something more. Anyway, I think there was too much for me to chew on in your post. Still thinking about it... -greg On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 10:22 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how cramped, > ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of imaginary worlds > is. > > The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of > imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it is only > with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately "believe" in a > fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual creator. That is, > adult play only begins with people who were the peers of my > grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also be imaginary > worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of people, but they do not > signify, because the effort of believing in them in order to inhabit > them is not differentiated from believing in them because you think > they are true. > > Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional > "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional delusion > is very much older than this. At the end of Don Quixote, the old man's > neighbors try their very best to convince Don Quixote to go on > inhabiting the novelistic world he has created for them, and fail; > there is no suggestion that they do this because they believe the old > man's world is real. There was a spate of similar novels in English in > eighteenth century (e.g. Charlotte Lennox's "the Female Quixote"), and > Jane Austen's first novel, Northanger Abbey, is a romance about a > woman whose whole attraction is that she actually assumes only the > very best motives in real people, and reserves her fascination with > ill will for the reading of Gothic novels; when she meets with a > genuinely nasty character (General Tilney) for the first time, she > imputes Gothic motives to him where there are only mundane and > mercenary ones, and the novel ends with the half disenchantment of the > heroine and half enchantment of the General's son, both quite > deliberately acts of metacognition. > > But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much earlier. > "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a particular > kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became parodistsic. "Dream of > the Red Chamber" is about a stone left over from when the world was > made, which is reincarnated by a sensitive young man who falls in with > one cousin and marries another. It is also about a garden, built for a > one day visit to her family by one of the Emperor's concubines, which > eventually bankrupts the family. But the children of the family are > allowed to run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety of fancies: > at various places we are told that various parts of the novel, and > even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the minds of > others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, almost every > fiction manuscript was passed around in a community (rather as Jane > Austen's manuscripts were shared in her family) and "Dream of the Red > Chamber" was probably finished by someone else (the last third of it > was written well after the death of the author, but computer analysis > has not definitively proven that it was written by someone else). > > I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is that, > like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we keep > thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and the > preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist thinking > (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and wonder) are the > last word and not merely latest one. I spend a great deal of the time > that I spend writing half-listening to eighteenth century operas, > which are in very obvious ways imaginary worlds which we enter only by > voluntarily checking our linguistic assumptions in the cloakroom. In > less obvious ways, it seems to me, these imaginary worlds are > interested in a clash that we no longer take very seriously. It's the > clash between a form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, because > empirical, and one which is narrowly rationalist, because puritanical. > The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act of > forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro). The > strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness by its > very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don Giovanni gets > around this problem by making repentance a precondition for > forgiveness, and then by arguing that the truly damnable will never > repent, not even as they are actually being damned. > > We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism and > merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching. There is the > humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary negotiations of meaning > between human beings--and the rationalist belief in the inflexible, > innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere it seems to have been subsumed > in the general opposition between art and science that we find in > Saler's talk. Part of the point of my book is really to try to revive > it--in the form of a humanizing dialogic tendency in story telling > versus a more rationalizing narrativistic one. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and > everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two chapters > for free at.... > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-praxis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/ > > > (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of it not > as an interface between the virtual world and the real one, but only > as yet another interface between this virtual world and the next one!) > > dk > > > > On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole wrote: > > Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the discussions, > > Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two others > suffer > > from the same difficulties. > > > > My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If that's a > > mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general rule, but when > they > > are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, seems like a > > relatively painless way to figure out what other participants in the > > discussion are trying to communicate. > > > > Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*? !! :-))) > > > > Rockin chair mike > > > > Thanks > > > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > wrote: > > > >> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" more > than > >> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss of an > >> epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a there > there?). > >> > >> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, I know > that > >> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the concrete" - which > >> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or something > >> else? A "made real"?). > >> > >> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented social > >> constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word "ontological"?). > >> > >> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was proposing: > >> http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=en > >> > >> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks since it > can be > >> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and they can be > hit > >> or miss. > >> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I originally sent in > >> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it interesting > >> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? > >> Others? > >> -greg > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central component, > >> > Greg. > >> > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the wrong > >> conversation > >> > here?). > >> > > >> > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? Perhaps > the > >> > two talks will aid the discussion. > >> > mike > >> > > >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson < > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >> > wrote: > >> > > >> > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on the > >> other > >> > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others > might > >> be > >> > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in politics: > >> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > >> > > > >> > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" to > >> works > >> > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. > >> > > > >> > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply political > >> act. > >> > > > >> > > -greg > >> > > > >> > > -- > >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> > > Assistant Professor > >> > > Department of Anthropology > >> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> > > Brigham Young University > >> > > Provo, UT 84602 > >> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > -- > >> > > >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and > re- > >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > more > >> or > >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > >> > Gray, 2001] > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> Assistant Professor > >> Department of Anthropology > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> Brigham Young University > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more > or > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > > Gray, 2001] > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From deva_research@lineone.net Thu Sep 25 06:26:45 2014 From: deva_research@lineone.net (John Cummins) Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2014 14:26:45 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <001601cfd8c4$5a3f4800$0ebdd800$@net> Again, another interesting post David, I'm attempting to develop an approach to understanding the evolutionary and biological origins of metaphor that, crucially, involves emotion. Hardly an original concept, I agree, but I have a slightly unusual slant on things. I don't want to clog up the discussion with this, but if anyone is interested I can send them my notes as they stand--about five pages in MS Word format, longer in the format it seems to go into of its own accord as an email attachment. Anyway, the point, vis-a-vis David's comments on interchangeable parts, is that once emotion is involved, or is even the driver, the parts are not interchangeable in the same way. The whole thing is much more 'loaded' or 'sticky'. A case could be made that the imaginary realm thereby become re-enchanted. Or perhaps I 'm overstating the case-- these are still early days ! John -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg Sent: 25 September 2014 00:22 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds Larry-- I've been trying to construct a materialist history of English language teaching; that is, one that doesn't view it as one fashion atrocity after another. The first thing I did was to divide its six hundred year history into roughly three two-hundred year periods--an "interpersonal" one which begins with Henry V and Katherine de Valois and basically works the way that phrasebooks work today, given tremendous impetus by Caxton's introduction of the printing press. To me, the printing press contains within it the key insight (or rather, as you would say, the key pipe dream) of structuralism: the idea that word is made of interchangeable parts, rather like one of Henry Ford's Model T's. But the interesting thing is that nobody really managed to get that dream out of the material artefact of the printing press until Saussure. Verily, the word is only ready when the concept is; or in this case, the vehicle of the idea is only read when the driver is! So Caxton's printing press was used to sell spices and beef bouillon across the English channel. It wasn't until the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre (1573) that anyone even tried to do more than trade with English, and even then it was only for one generation--the 300,000 Huguenots (ten percent of the English population in those days) were all fully bilingual, and the move died out. Now, the Huguenots were extreme rationalists--Cartesians, if you like. Today we are quite familiar with the idea that conservatives are more interested in philosophy than policy--since they want everything except individuals, families and corporations to disappear, they have no interest in changing society or government. That was the Huguenots: they believed in Haidt's five values of purity, authority, ingroup solidarity, justice...and forgiveness...in preciselythat order, the reverse of what Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings posited (rather closer to what Piaget and Kohlberg wanted). And when they left France, they didn't take all their ideas with them. The remaining rationalists, in the form of the Jansenists, retreated to Port Royal and created the first really scientific grammars of a modern language (French, as it happened, but it was actually designed as a universal grammar of any and all human languages). Pascal was one of them. And I think I see, in the idea of a prescriptive grammar that would provide scientific explanations and laws binding on any human language with no exceptions whatsoever, the real birth of the concept of the sentence as composed of interchangeable parts. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 24 September 2014 14:40, Larry Purss wrote: > Fascinating > David, your comment: > > "and the rationalist belief in the inflexible, innate laws of grammar" > > can be placed alongside Peirce's comment: > "The scientific imagination DREAMS of explanations and laws" > > For Peirce the origin of new ideas and scientific hypothesis were > particulary important questions. Peirce was not a romanticist, as he wanted > to produce a harmony of creativity and logic and in order to find this > harmony Peirce reformulated logic in a radical way. > He composed the *logic of relatives* a new logic of interpretation which > allowed for the change and growth of SYSTEMS of thought.. > > There seems to be a play of *transversals* that involves science fiction > Larry > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 9:22 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how cramped, >> ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of imaginary worlds >> is. >> >> The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of >> imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it is only >> with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately "believe" in a >> fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual creator. That is, >> adult play only begins with people who were the peers of my >> grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also be imaginary >> worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of people, but they do not >> signify, because the effort of believing in them in order to inhabit >> them is not differentiated from believing in them because you think >> they are true. >> >> Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional >> "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional delusion >> is very much older than this. At the end of Don Quixote, the old man's >> neighbors try their very best to convince Don Quixote to go on >> inhabiting the novelistic world he has created for them, and fail; >> there is no suggestion that they do this because they believe the old >> man's world is real. There was a spate of similar novels in English in >> eighteenth century (e.g. Charlotte Lennox's "the Female Quixote"), and >> Jane Austen's first novel, Northanger Abbey, is a romance about a >> woman whose whole attraction is that she actually assumes only the >> very best motives in real people, and reserves her fascination with >> ill will for the reading of Gothic novels; when she meets with a >> genuinely nasty character (General Tilney) for the first time, she >> imputes Gothic motives to him where there are only mundane and >> mercenary ones, and the novel ends with the half disenchantment of the >> heroine and half enchantment of the General's son, both quite >> deliberately acts of metacognition. >> >> But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much earlier. >> "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a particular >> kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became parodistsic. "Dream of >> the Red Chamber" is about a stone left over from when the world was >> made, which is reincarnated by a sensitive young man who falls in with >> one cousin and marries another. It is also about a garden, built for a >> one day visit to her family by one of the Emperor's concubines, which >> eventually bankrupts the family. But the children of the family are >> allowed to run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety of fancies: >> at various places we are told that various parts of the novel, and >> even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the minds of >> others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, almost every >> fiction manuscript was passed around in a community (rather as Jane >> Austen's manuscripts were shared in her family) and "Dream of the Red >> Chamber" was probably finished by someone else (the last third of it >> was written well after the death of the author, but computer analysis >> has not definitively proven that it was written by someone else). >> >> I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is that, >> like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we keep >> thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and the >> preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist thinking >> (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and wonder) are the >> last word and not merely latest one. I spend a great deal of the time >> that I spend writing half-listening to eighteenth century operas, >> which are in very obvious ways imaginary worlds which we enter only by >> voluntarily checking our linguistic assumptions in the cloakroom. In >> less obvious ways, it seems to me, these imaginary worlds are >> interested in a clash that we no longer take very seriously. It's the >> clash between a form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, because >> empirical, and one which is narrowly rationalist, because puritanical. >> The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act of >> forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro). The >> strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness by its >> very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don Giovanni gets >> around this problem by making repentance a precondition for >> forgiveness, and then by arguing that the truly damnable will never >> repent, not even as they are actually being damned. >> >> We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism and >> merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching. There is the >> humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary negotiations of meaning >> between human beings--and the rationalist belief in the inflexible, >> innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere it seems to have been subsumed >> in the general opposition between art and science that we find in >> Saler's talk. Part of the point of my book is really to try to revive >> it--in the form of a humanizing dialogic tendency in story telling >> versus a more rationalizing narrativistic one. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and >> everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two chapters >> for free at.... >> >> >> https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-praxis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/ >> >> >> (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of it not >> as an interface between the virtual world and the real one, but only >> as yet another interface between this virtual world and the next one!) >> >> dk >> >> >> >> On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole wrote: >> > Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the discussions, >> > Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two others >> suffer >> > from the same difficulties. >> > >> > My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If that's a >> > mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general rule, but when >> they >> > are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, seems like a >> > relatively painless way to figure out what other participants in the >> > discussion are trying to communicate. >> > >> > Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*? !! :-))) >> > >> > Rockin chair mike >> > >> > Thanks >> > >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson < >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> >> > wrote: >> > >> >> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" more >> than >> >> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss of an >> >> epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a there >> there?). >> >> >> >> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, I know >> that >> >> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the concrete" - which >> >> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or something >> >> else? A "made real"?). >> >> >> >> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented social >> >> constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word "ontological"?). >> >> >> >> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was proposing: >> >> http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=en >> >> >> >> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks since it >> can be >> >> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and they can be >> hit >> >> or miss. >> >> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I originally sent in >> >> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it interesting >> >> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? >> >> Others? >> >> -greg >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> >> >> > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central component, >> >> > Greg. >> >> > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the wrong >> >> conversation >> >> > here?). >> >> > >> >> > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? Perhaps >> the >> >> > two talks will aid the discussion. >> >> > mike >> >> > >> >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson < >> >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> >> >> > wrote: >> >> > >> >> > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on the >> >> other >> >> > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others >> might >> >> be >> >> > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in politics: >> >> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo >> >> > > >> >> > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" to >> >> works >> >> > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. >> >> > > >> >> > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply political >> >> act. >> >> > > >> >> > > -greg >> >> > > >> >> > > -- >> >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> >> > > Assistant Professor >> >> > > Department of Anthropology >> >> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> >> > > Brigham Young University >> >> > > Provo, UT 84602 >> >> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> > > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > -- >> >> > >> >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and >> re- >> >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but >> more >> >> or >> >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >> >> > Gray, 2001] >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> >> Assistant Professor >> >> Department of Anthropology >> >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> >> Brigham Young University >> >> Provo, UT 84602 >> >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> >> > >> > >> > >> > -- >> > >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and re- >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more >> or >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >> > Gray, 2001] >> From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Sep 25 06:56:26 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2014 06:56:26 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Greg, and David The questions generated by reflections considering types of the imaginal such as: # natural ontology that says something exists because the world just *is* [nothing more, nothing less] in all its base materiality. # the imaginal *as* reality opening up an enchanted world of myth, belief and religion. # the *intentionally* constructed [made] imaginal that brings into *form* [structure] that are rational # the gestalt perception of multiple poly arrangements of the real AND imaginal [*and* NOT as addition but as chiasm or binocular depth perceiving/conceiving] Greg SAYS he *feels* [intuits, speculates?] : "At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something different about these two TYPES of imagined worlds, with the other (rationalist) type of imagined worlds that, as you note, are perhaps more contrived, more intentionally made." Then Greg makes a value observation that he notes is a difference that makes a difference: : "But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to say that the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems that this points to differences in ontology." These various "types" when privileged are possibly "reductions" or "abstractions" from the EXCESS which Merleau Ponty explores through *expressive cognition* The notions of reversals, and transversals, and the personification of THIS movement of orientations [orientations in sense] can be personified in the person of Hermes [the trickster]. Hillman, who plays within the ontology suggesting the imaginal is reality suggests the *I* [ego] is that personification [as imaginal] that *takes* itself literally, not metaphorically. If we see *through* the myth of the *I* as a literalization of the social actor [as intentional maker or constructor] then we possibly open up the EXCESS [of *is*] to explore relations between *is* [material, being, becoming] with the imaginal *as if* to create a *chiasm* or binocular vision in *depth* [which is NOT a summation of the *is* and *and is*] but is a gestalt *type* historically constituted through *expressive cognition* [Merleau Ponty's term] Greg, this *feeling* as a way of orienting to make *sense* through *types* seems like *interpretive musings* [Peirce] Just wondering Larry On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 11:45 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > David, > Thanks for this wonderfully thoughtful note. > As I posted my note to the video, I was reading Max Gluckman's Rituals of > Rebellion. In that book, Gluckman describes rituals in which people invert > the norms of society for a period of time. This is clearly living in an > imagined world (perhaps as much as living in the world full of upright > norms), but this wouldn't make it onto Saler's radar. So I agree with your > concern about ethnocentrism. > At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something different > about these two types of imagined worlds, with the other (rationalist) type > of imagined worlds that, as you note, are perhaps more contrived, more > intentionally made. > But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to say that > the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems that this points to > differences in ontology. The intentionally made imaginary is a result of a > naturalist ontology (here you see I am buying some of Saler's argument > about a Weberian disenchantment with modernity). In a naturalist ontology, > the world is just there in "all its base materiality." Nothing more, > nothing less. There is no space for the rich imagined world of myth, > belief, and religion (or so it is believed). In other worlds, there is > space for something more. > Anyway, I think there was too much for me to chew on in your post. > Still thinking about it... > -greg > > > > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 10:22 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how cramped, > > ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of imaginary worlds > > is. > > > > The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of > > imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it is only > > with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately "believe" in a > > fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual creator. That is, > > adult play only begins with people who were the peers of my > > grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also be imaginary > > worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of people, but they do not > > signify, because the effort of believing in them in order to inhabit > > them is not differentiated from believing in them because you think > > they are true. > > > > Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional > > "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional delusion > > is very much older than this. At the end of Don Quixote, the old man's > > neighbors try their very best to convince Don Quixote to go on > > inhabiting the novelistic world he has created for them, and fail; > > there is no suggestion that they do this because they believe the old > > man's world is real. There was a spate of similar novels in English in > > eighteenth century (e.g. Charlotte Lennox's "the Female Quixote"), and > > Jane Austen's first novel, Northanger Abbey, is a romance about a > > woman whose whole attraction is that she actually assumes only the > > very best motives in real people, and reserves her fascination with > > ill will for the reading of Gothic novels; when she meets with a > > genuinely nasty character (General Tilney) for the first time, she > > imputes Gothic motives to him where there are only mundane and > > mercenary ones, and the novel ends with the half disenchantment of the > > heroine and half enchantment of the General's son, both quite > > deliberately acts of metacognition. > > > > But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much earlier. > > "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a particular > > kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became parodistsic. "Dream of > > the Red Chamber" is about a stone left over from when the world was > > made, which is reincarnated by a sensitive young man who falls in with > > one cousin and marries another. It is also about a garden, built for a > > one day visit to her family by one of the Emperor's concubines, which > > eventually bankrupts the family. But the children of the family are > > allowed to run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety of fancies: > > at various places we are told that various parts of the novel, and > > even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the minds of > > others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, almost every > > fiction manuscript was passed around in a community (rather as Jane > > Austen's manuscripts were shared in her family) and "Dream of the Red > > Chamber" was probably finished by someone else (the last third of it > > was written well after the death of the author, but computer analysis > > has not definitively proven that it was written by someone else). > > > > I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is that, > > like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we keep > > thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and the > > preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist thinking > > (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and wonder) are the > > last word and not merely latest one. I spend a great deal of the time > > that I spend writing half-listening to eighteenth century operas, > > which are in very obvious ways imaginary worlds which we enter only by > > voluntarily checking our linguistic assumptions in the cloakroom. In > > less obvious ways, it seems to me, these imaginary worlds are > > interested in a clash that we no longer take very seriously. It's the > > clash between a form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, because > > empirical, and one which is narrowly rationalist, because puritanical. > > The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act of > > forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro). The > > strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness by its > > very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don Giovanni gets > > around this problem by making repentance a precondition for > > forgiveness, and then by arguing that the truly damnable will never > > repent, not even as they are actually being damned. > > > > We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism and > > merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching. There is the > > humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary negotiations of meaning > > between human beings--and the rationalist belief in the inflexible, > > innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere it seems to have been subsumed > > in the general opposition between art and science that we find in > > Saler's talk. Part of the point of my book is really to try to revive > > it--in the form of a humanizing dialogic tendency in story telling > > versus a more rationalizing narrativistic one. > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and > > everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two chapters > > for free at.... > > > > > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-praxis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/ > > > > > > (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of it not > > as an interface between the virtual world and the real one, but only > > as yet another interface between this virtual world and the next one!) > > > > dk > > > > > > > > On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole wrote: > > > Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the > discussions, > > > Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two others > > suffer > > > from the same difficulties. > > > > > > My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If that's a > > > mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general rule, but when > > they > > > are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, seems like a > > > relatively painless way to figure out what other participants in the > > > discussion are trying to communicate. > > > > > > Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*? !! :-))) > > > > > > Rockin chair mike > > > > > > Thanks > > > > > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson < > > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > > wrote: > > > > > >> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" more > > than > > >> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss of an > > >> epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a there > > there?). > > >> > > >> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, I know > > that > > >> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the concrete" - > which > > >> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or something > > >> else? A "made real"?). > > >> > > >> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented social > > >> constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word > "ontological"?). > > >> > > >> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was > proposing: > > >> http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=en > > >> > > >> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks since it > > can be > > >> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and they can be > > hit > > >> or miss. > > >> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I originally sent > in > > >> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it > interesting > > >> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? > > >> Others? > > >> -greg > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >> > > >> > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central > component, > > >> > Greg. > > >> > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the wrong > > >> conversation > > >> > here?). > > >> > > > >> > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? Perhaps > > the > > >> > two talks will aid the discussion. > > >> > mike > > >> > > > >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson < > > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > >> > wrote: > > >> > > > >> > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on the > > >> other > > >> > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others > > might > > >> be > > >> > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in politics: > > >> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > > >> > > > > >> > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" to > > >> works > > >> > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. > > >> > > > > >> > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply > political > > >> act. > > >> > > > > >> > > -greg > > >> > > > > >> > > -- > > >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >> > > Assistant Professor > > >> > > Department of Anthropology > > >> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >> > > Brigham Young University > > >> > > Provo, UT 84602 > > >> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > -- > > >> > > > >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction > and > > re- > > >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > > more > > >> or > > >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, > and > > >> > Gray, 2001] > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> -- > > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >> Assistant Professor > > >> Department of Anthropology > > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >> Brigham Young University > > >> Provo, UT 84602 > > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and > re- > > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more > > or > > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > > > Gray, 2001] > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Thu Sep 25 07:48:16 2014 From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu (Robert Lake) Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2014 10:48:16 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: <001601cfd8c4$5a3f4800$0ebdd800$@net> References: <001601cfd8c4$5a3f4800$0ebdd800$@net> Message-ID: Hi John, I would be interested in seeing your notes. Thanks for sharing. RL On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 9:26 AM, John Cummins wrote: > Again, another interesting post David, > > I'm attempting to develop an approach to understanding the evolutionary > and biological origins of metaphor that, crucially, involves emotion. > Hardly an original concept, I agree, but I have a slightly unusual slant on > things. I don't want to clog up the discussion with this, but if anyone is > interested I can send them my notes as they stand--about five pages in MS > Word format, longer in the format it seems to go into of its own accord as > an email attachment. Anyway, the point, vis-a-vis David's comments on > interchangeable parts, is that once emotion is involved, or is even the > driver, the parts are not interchangeable in the same way. The whole thing > is much more 'loaded' or 'sticky'. A case could be made that the imaginary > realm thereby become re-enchanted. Or perhaps I 'm overstating the case-- > these are still early days ! > > John > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > Sent: 25 September 2014 00:22 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds > > Larry-- > > I've been trying to construct a materialist history of English > language teaching; that is, one that doesn't view it as one fashion > atrocity after another. The first thing I did was to divide its six > hundred year history into roughly three two-hundred year periods--an > "interpersonal" one which begins with Henry V and Katherine de Valois > and basically works the way that phrasebooks work today, given > tremendous impetus by Caxton's introduction of the printing press. > > To me, the printing press contains within it the key insight (or > rather, as you would say, the key pipe dream) of structuralism: the > idea that word is made of interchangeable parts, rather like one of > Henry Ford's Model T's. But the interesting thing is that nobody > really managed to get that dream out of the material artefact of the > printing press until Saussure. Verily, the word is only ready when the > concept is; or in this case, the vehicle of the idea is only read when > the driver is! > > So Caxton's printing press was used to sell spices and beef bouillon > across the English channel. It wasn't until the Saint Bartholomew's > Day Massacre (1573) that anyone even tried to do more than trade with > English, and even then it was only for one generation--the 300,000 > Huguenots (ten percent of the English population in those days) were > all fully bilingual, and the move died out. > > Now, the Huguenots were extreme rationalists--Cartesians, if you like. > Today we are quite familiar with the idea that conservatives are more > interested in philosophy than policy--since they want everything > except individuals, families and corporations to disappear, they have > no interest in changing society or government. That was the Huguenots: > they believed in Haidt's five values of purity, authority, ingroup > solidarity, justice...and forgiveness...in preciselythat order, the > reverse of what Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings posited (rather closer > to what Piaget and Kohlberg wanted). > > And when they left France, they didn't take all their ideas with them. > The remaining rationalists, in the form of the Jansenists, retreated > to Port Royal and created the first really scientific grammars of a > modern language (French, as it happened, but it was actually designed > as a universal grammar of any and all human languages). Pascal was one > of them. And I think I see, in the idea of a prescriptive grammar that > would provide scientific explanations and laws binding on any human > language with no exceptions whatsoever, the real birth of the concept > of the sentence as composed of interchangeable parts. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > On 24 September 2014 14:40, Larry Purss wrote: > > Fascinating > > David, your comment: > > > > "and the rationalist belief in the inflexible, innate laws of grammar" > > > > can be placed alongside Peirce's comment: > > "The scientific imagination DREAMS of explanations and laws" > > > > For Peirce the origin of new ideas and scientific hypothesis were > > particulary important questions. Peirce was not a romanticist, as he > wanted > > to produce a harmony of creativity and logic and in order to find this > > harmony Peirce reformulated logic in a radical way. > > He composed the *logic of relatives* a new logic of interpretation which > > allowed for the change and growth of SYSTEMS of thought.. > > > > There seems to be a play of *transversals* that involves science fiction > > Larry > > > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 9:22 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > >> Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how cramped, > >> ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of imaginary worlds > >> is. > >> > >> The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of > >> imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it is only > >> with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately "believe" in a > >> fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual creator. That is, > >> adult play only begins with people who were the peers of my > >> grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also be imaginary > >> worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of people, but they do not > >> signify, because the effort of believing in them in order to inhabit > >> them is not differentiated from believing in them because you think > >> they are true. > >> > >> Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional > >> "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional delusion > >> is very much older than this. At the end of Don Quixote, the old man's > >> neighbors try their very best to convince Don Quixote to go on > >> inhabiting the novelistic world he has created for them, and fail; > >> there is no suggestion that they do this because they believe the old > >> man's world is real. There was a spate of similar novels in English in > >> eighteenth century (e.g. Charlotte Lennox's "the Female Quixote"), and > >> Jane Austen's first novel, Northanger Abbey, is a romance about a > >> woman whose whole attraction is that she actually assumes only the > >> very best motives in real people, and reserves her fascination with > >> ill will for the reading of Gothic novels; when she meets with a > >> genuinely nasty character (General Tilney) for the first time, she > >> imputes Gothic motives to him where there are only mundane and > >> mercenary ones, and the novel ends with the half disenchantment of the > >> heroine and half enchantment of the General's son, both quite > >> deliberately acts of metacognition. > >> > >> But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much earlier. > >> "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a particular > >> kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became parodistsic. "Dream of > >> the Red Chamber" is about a stone left over from when the world was > >> made, which is reincarnated by a sensitive young man who falls in with > >> one cousin and marries another. It is also about a garden, built for a > >> one day visit to her family by one of the Emperor's concubines, which > >> eventually bankrupts the family. But the children of the family are > >> allowed to run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety of fancies: > >> at various places we are told that various parts of the novel, and > >> even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the minds of > >> others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, almost every > >> fiction manuscript was passed around in a community (rather as Jane > >> Austen's manuscripts were shared in her family) and "Dream of the Red > >> Chamber" was probably finished by someone else (the last third of it > >> was written well after the death of the author, but computer analysis > >> has not definitively proven that it was written by someone else). > >> > >> I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is that, > >> like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we keep > >> thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and the > >> preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist thinking > >> (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and wonder) are the > >> last word and not merely latest one. I spend a great deal of the time > >> that I spend writing half-listening to eighteenth century operas, > >> which are in very obvious ways imaginary worlds which we enter only by > >> voluntarily checking our linguistic assumptions in the cloakroom. In > >> less obvious ways, it seems to me, these imaginary worlds are > >> interested in a clash that we no longer take very seriously. It's the > >> clash between a form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, because > >> empirical, and one which is narrowly rationalist, because puritanical. > >> The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act of > >> forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro). The > >> strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness by its > >> very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don Giovanni gets > >> around this problem by making repentance a precondition for > >> forgiveness, and then by arguing that the truly damnable will never > >> repent, not even as they are actually being damned. > >> > >> We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism and > >> merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching. There is the > >> humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary negotiations of meaning > >> between human beings--and the rationalist belief in the inflexible, > >> innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere it seems to have been subsumed > >> in the general opposition between art and science that we find in > >> Saler's talk. Part of the point of my book is really to try to revive > >> it--in the form of a humanizing dialogic tendency in story telling > >> versus a more rationalizing narrativistic one. > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > >> By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and > >> everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two chapters > >> for free at.... > >> > >> > >> > https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-praxis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/ > >> > >> > >> (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of it not > >> as an interface between the virtual world and the real one, but only > >> as yet another interface between this virtual world and the next one!) > >> > >> dk > >> > >> > >> > >> On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole wrote: > >> > Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the > discussions, > >> > Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two others > >> suffer > >> > from the same difficulties. > >> > > >> > My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If that's a > >> > mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general rule, but when > >> they > >> > are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, seems like a > >> > relatively painless way to figure out what other participants in the > >> > discussion are trying to communicate. > >> > > >> > Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*? !! :-))) > >> > > >> > Rockin chair mike > >> > > >> > Thanks > >> > > >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson < > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >> > wrote: > >> > > >> >> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" > more > >> than > >> >> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss of an > >> >> epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a there > >> there?). > >> >> > >> >> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, I know > >> that > >> >> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the concrete" - > which > >> >> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or > something > >> >> else? A "made real"?). > >> >> > >> >> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented social > >> >> constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word > "ontological"?). > >> >> > >> >> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was > proposing: > >> >> > http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=en > >> >> > >> >> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks since it > >> can be > >> >> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and they can > be > >> hit > >> >> or miss. > >> >> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I originally > sent in > >> >> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it > interesting > >> >> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? > >> >> Others? > >> >> -greg > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> >> > >> >> > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central > component, > >> >> > Greg. > >> >> > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the wrong > >> >> conversation > >> >> > here?). > >> >> > > >> >> > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? > Perhaps > >> the > >> >> > two talks will aid the discussion. > >> >> > mike > >> >> > > >> >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson < > >> >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >> >> > wrote: > >> >> > > >> >> > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on > the > >> >> other > >> >> > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others > >> might > >> >> be > >> >> > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in > politics: > >> >> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > >> >> > > > >> >> > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" > to > >> >> works > >> >> > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. > >> >> > > > >> >> > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply > political > >> >> act. > >> >> > > > >> >> > > -greg > >> >> > > > >> >> > > -- > >> >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> >> > > Assistant Professor > >> >> > > Department of Anthropology > >> >> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> >> > > Brigham Young University > >> >> > > Provo, UT 84602 > >> >> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> >> > > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > -- > >> >> > > >> >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction > and > >> re- > >> >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > >> more > >> >> or > >> >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, > and > >> >> > Gray, 2001] > >> >> > > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> -- > >> >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> >> Assistant Professor > >> >> Department of Anthropology > >> >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> >> Brigham Young University > >> >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> >> > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > -- > >> > > >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and > re- > >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > more > >> or > >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and > >> > Gray, 2001] > >> > > > -- *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor Social Foundations of Education Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading Georgia Southern University Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group P. O. Box 8144 Phone: (912) 478-0355 Fax: (912) 478-5382 Statesboro, GA 30460 From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Sep 25 07:57:49 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2014 07:57:49 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: This topic of types of ontologies was engaged with by Peirce who proposed his 3 categories of experience. Firstness: Is the category of bare immediacy. *is* Pure undiscriminated presence. Epistemologically firstness is immediate and VIVID BUT INDESCRIBABLE experience. Metaphysically firstness is *possibility* that could *become* qualities that are general. [redness, pain] Firstness is unorganized, unreflected, and uncognized. Yet general qualities can *emerge* in metaphysical firstness. SECONDNESS: Secondness is characterized by its RESISTANCE TO OUR INTENTIONS or expectations. Epistemolgically secondness is experienced as a shock to habitual patterns of awareness. Secondness is particular and disruptive. Metaphysically secondness is characterized as NONEGO [what is other] That is it cannot be associated with the *self* since it actively contradicts the VOLITIONS of the self. THIRDNESS depends upon both firstness and secondness and functions as THEIR MEDIATION. Thirdness is conceptual and conscious. It is the realm of general repeatable habitual experiences AND [in general] thirdness is cognitive. All uniformities [in knowledge OR REALITY] are *modes* of thirdness insofar as they are general. Human ACTION is GOVERNED by the thirdness that IS cognitively present. Without thirdness we are left with the confusing and uncognizable world of immediacy [firstness] and resistance [secondness] Peirce seems to be playing in this realm of reality and imaginal Larry On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 6:56 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Greg, and David > > The questions generated by reflections considering types of the imaginal > such as: > > # natural ontology that says something exists because the world just *is* > [nothing more, nothing less] in all its base materiality. > > # the imaginal *as* reality opening up an enchanted world of myth, belief > and religion. > > # the *intentionally* constructed [made] imaginal that brings into *form* > [structure] that are rational > > # the gestalt perception of multiple poly arrangements of the real AND > imaginal [*and* NOT as addition but as chiasm or binocular depth > perceiving/conceiving] > > Greg SAYS he *feels* [intuits, speculates?] : > > "At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something different > about these two TYPES of imagined worlds, with the other (rationalist) type > of imagined worlds that, as you note, are perhaps more contrived, more > intentionally made." > > Then Greg makes a value observation that he notes is a difference that > makes a difference: > : > "But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to say > that the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems that this > points to differences in ontology." > > These various "types" when privileged are possibly "reductions" or > "abstractions" from the EXCESS which Merleau Ponty explores through > *expressive cognition* The notions of reversals, and transversals, and the > personification of THIS movement of orientations [orientations in sense] > can be personified in the person of Hermes [the trickster]. > > Hillman, who plays within the ontology suggesting the imaginal is reality > suggests the *I* [ego] is that personification [as imaginal] that *takes* > itself literally, not metaphorically. If we see *through* the myth of the > *I* as a literalization of the social actor [as intentional maker or > constructor] then we possibly open up the EXCESS [of *is*] to explore > relations between *is* [material, being, becoming] with the imaginal *as > if* to create a *chiasm* or binocular vision in *depth* [which is NOT a > summation of the *is* and *and is*] but is a gestalt *type* historically > constituted through *expressive cognition* [Merleau Ponty's term] > > Greg, this *feeling* as a way of orienting to make *sense* through *types* > seems like *interpretive musings* [Peirce] > > Just wondering > Larry > > > > > > On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 11:45 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > >> David, >> Thanks for this wonderfully thoughtful note. >> As I posted my note to the video, I was reading Max Gluckman's Rituals of >> Rebellion. In that book, Gluckman describes rituals in which people invert >> the norms of society for a period of time. This is clearly living in an >> imagined world (perhaps as much as living in the world full of upright >> norms), but this wouldn't make it onto Saler's radar. So I agree with your >> concern about ethnocentrism. >> At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something different >> about these two types of imagined worlds, with the other (rationalist) >> type >> of imagined worlds that, as you note, are perhaps more contrived, more >> intentionally made. >> But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to say that >> the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems that this points to >> differences in ontology. The intentionally made imaginary is a result of a >> naturalist ontology (here you see I am buying some of Saler's argument >> about a Weberian disenchantment with modernity). In a naturalist ontology, >> the world is just there in "all its base materiality." Nothing more, >> nothing less. There is no space for the rich imagined world of myth, >> belief, and religion (or so it is believed). In other worlds, there is >> space for something more. >> Anyway, I think there was too much for me to chew on in your post. >> Still thinking about it... >> -greg >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 10:22 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >> >> > Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how cramped, >> > ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of imaginary worlds >> > is. >> > >> > The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of >> > imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it is only >> > with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately "believe" in a >> > fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual creator. That is, >> > adult play only begins with people who were the peers of my >> > grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also be imaginary >> > worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of people, but they do not >> > signify, because the effort of believing in them in order to inhabit >> > them is not differentiated from believing in them because you think >> > they are true. >> > >> > Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional >> > "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional delusion >> > is very much older than this. At the end of Don Quixote, the old man's >> > neighbors try their very best to convince Don Quixote to go on >> > inhabiting the novelistic world he has created for them, and fail; >> > there is no suggestion that they do this because they believe the old >> > man's world is real. There was a spate of similar novels in English in >> > eighteenth century (e.g. Charlotte Lennox's "the Female Quixote"), and >> > Jane Austen's first novel, Northanger Abbey, is a romance about a >> > woman whose whole attraction is that she actually assumes only the >> > very best motives in real people, and reserves her fascination with >> > ill will for the reading of Gothic novels; when she meets with a >> > genuinely nasty character (General Tilney) for the first time, she >> > imputes Gothic motives to him where there are only mundane and >> > mercenary ones, and the novel ends with the half disenchantment of the >> > heroine and half enchantment of the General's son, both quite >> > deliberately acts of metacognition. >> > >> > But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much earlier. >> > "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a particular >> > kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became parodistsic. "Dream of >> > the Red Chamber" is about a stone left over from when the world was >> > made, which is reincarnated by a sensitive young man who falls in with >> > one cousin and marries another. It is also about a garden, built for a >> > one day visit to her family by one of the Emperor's concubines, which >> > eventually bankrupts the family. But the children of the family are >> > allowed to run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety of fancies: >> > at various places we are told that various parts of the novel, and >> > even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the minds of >> > others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, almost every >> > fiction manuscript was passed around in a community (rather as Jane >> > Austen's manuscripts were shared in her family) and "Dream of the Red >> > Chamber" was probably finished by someone else (the last third of it >> > was written well after the death of the author, but computer analysis >> > has not definitively proven that it was written by someone else). >> > >> > I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is that, >> > like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we keep >> > thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and the >> > preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist thinking >> > (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and wonder) are the >> > last word and not merely latest one. I spend a great deal of the time >> > that I spend writing half-listening to eighteenth century operas, >> > which are in very obvious ways imaginary worlds which we enter only by >> > voluntarily checking our linguistic assumptions in the cloakroom. In >> > less obvious ways, it seems to me, these imaginary worlds are >> > interested in a clash that we no longer take very seriously. It's the >> > clash between a form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, because >> > empirical, and one which is narrowly rationalist, because puritanical. >> > The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act of >> > forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro). The >> > strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness by its >> > very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don Giovanni gets >> > around this problem by making repentance a precondition for >> > forgiveness, and then by arguing that the truly damnable will never >> > repent, not even as they are actually being damned. >> > >> > We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism and >> > merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching. There is the >> > humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary negotiations of meaning >> > between human beings--and the rationalist belief in the inflexible, >> > innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere it seems to have been subsumed >> > in the general opposition between art and science that we find in >> > Saler's talk. Part of the point of my book is really to try to revive >> > it--in the form of a humanizing dialogic tendency in story telling >> > versus a more rationalizing narrativistic one. >> > >> > David Kellogg >> > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> > >> > By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and >> > everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two chapters >> > for free at.... >> > >> > >> > >> https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-praxis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/ >> > >> > >> > (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of it not >> > as an interface between the virtual world and the real one, but only >> > as yet another interface between this virtual world and the next one!) >> > >> > dk >> > >> > >> > >> > On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole wrote: >> > > Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the >> discussions, >> > > Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two others >> > suffer >> > > from the same difficulties. >> > > >> > > My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If that's a >> > > mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general rule, but when >> > they >> > > are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, seems like a >> > > relatively painless way to figure out what other participants in the >> > > discussion are trying to communicate. >> > > >> > > Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*? !! :-))) >> > > >> > > Rockin chair mike >> > > >> > > Thanks >> > > >> > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson < >> > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> >> > > wrote: >> > > >> > >> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" >> more >> > than >> > >> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss of an >> > >> epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a there >> > there?). >> > >> >> > >> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, I know >> > that >> > >> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the concrete" - >> which >> > >> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or >> something >> > >> else? A "made real"?). >> > >> >> > >> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented social >> > >> constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word >> "ontological"?). >> > >> >> > >> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was >> proposing: >> > >> >> http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=en >> > >> >> > >> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks since it >> > can be >> > >> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and they can >> be >> > hit >> > >> or miss. >> > >> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I originally >> sent in >> > >> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it >> interesting >> > >> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? >> > >> Others? >> > >> -greg >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole wrote: >> > >> >> > >> > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central >> component, >> > >> > Greg. >> > >> > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the wrong >> > >> conversation >> > >> > here?). >> > >> > >> > >> > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? >> Perhaps >> > the >> > >> > two talks will aid the discussion. >> > >> > mike >> > >> > >> > >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson < >> > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> >> > >> > wrote: >> > >> > >> > >> > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on >> the >> > >> other >> > >> > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others >> > might >> > >> be >> > >> > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in >> politics: >> > >> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo >> > >> > > >> > >> > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" >> to >> > >> works >> > >> > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. >> > >> > > >> > >> > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply >> political >> > >> act. >> > >> > > >> > >> > > -greg >> > >> > > >> > >> > > -- >> > >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> > >> > > Assistant Professor >> > >> > > Department of Anthropology >> > >> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> > >> > > Brigham Young University >> > >> > > Provo, UT 84602 >> > >> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > -- >> > >> > >> > >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction >> and >> > re- >> > >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but >> > more >> > >> or >> > >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, >> and >> > >> > Gray, 2001] >> > >> > >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> -- >> > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> > >> Assistant Professor >> > >> Department of Anthropology >> > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> > >> Brigham Young University >> > >> Provo, UT 84602 >> > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > >> >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > -- >> > > >> > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction and >> re- >> > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but >> more >> > or >> > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, and >> > > Gray, 2001] >> > >> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Sep 25 08:51:22 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2014 09:51:22 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Larry, I really appreciate your descriptions of Peirce's 3 categories of experience. From my reading of Peirce, this seems as close to the text as I have seen. But I wonder, now what? (or, perhaps a bit more bluntly "so what?"). What do you make of this way of introducing differences that are purported to make a difference? What can we do with these categories? Particularly as they related to the imaginal, the imaginated, and the imagination. And lurking somewhere in the back of my head is Mike's voice shouting that even the ontology of naturalism involves imagination (i.e. mediation or "into image-making" - see Etienne Pelaprat and Mike's paper on Minding the Gap) - and perhaps this is where there is much less of a difference between the individual subscribing to a naturalist ontology and one who lives in a world inhabited by spirits of dead ancestors and such - both require a kind of meconnaissance, a mis-recognizing of the mediated nature of the world and both FEEL that they know the world in its immediacy (or perhaps just in a "more immediate, less mediated" way than the other). Just as I feel that I am grasping a more immediate and unmediated truth by making this very statement. We all imagine our hold on the world to be immediate. And perhaps it is best that this is so since it is difficult to imagine knowing how to go on if we really were immediately in the world - as in a kind of perpetual Peircean firstness. Imagining that is to imagine the unimaginable. -greg On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 8:57 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > This topic of types of ontologies was engaged with by Peirce who proposed > his 3 categories of experience. > > Firstness: Is the category of bare immediacy. *is* Pure undiscriminated > presence. Epistemologically firstness is immediate and VIVID BUT > INDESCRIBABLE experience. Metaphysically firstness is *possibility* that > could *become* qualities that are general. [redness, pain] Firstness is > unorganized, unreflected, and uncognized. Yet general qualities can > *emerge* in metaphysical firstness. > > SECONDNESS: Secondness is characterized by its RESISTANCE TO OUR INTENTIONS > or expectations. Epistemolgically secondness is experienced as a shock to > habitual patterns of awareness. Secondness is particular and disruptive. > Metaphysically secondness is characterized as NONEGO [what is other] That > is it cannot be associated with the *self* since it actively contradicts > the VOLITIONS of the self. > > THIRDNESS depends upon both firstness and secondness and functions as THEIR > MEDIATION. Thirdness is conceptual and conscious. It is the realm of > general repeatable habitual experiences AND [in general] thirdness is > cognitive. All uniformities [in knowledge OR REALITY] are *modes* of > thirdness insofar as they are general. > Human ACTION is GOVERNED by the thirdness that IS cognitively present. > Without thirdness we are left with the confusing and uncognizable world of > immediacy [firstness] and resistance [secondness] > > Peirce seems to be playing in this realm of reality and imaginal > Larry > > On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 6:56 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > Greg, and David > > > > The questions generated by reflections considering types of the imaginal > > such as: > > > > # natural ontology that says something exists because the world just *is* > > [nothing more, nothing less] in all its base materiality. > > > > # the imaginal *as* reality opening up an enchanted world of myth, belief > > and religion. > > > > # the *intentionally* constructed [made] imaginal that brings into *form* > > [structure] that are rational > > > > # the gestalt perception of multiple poly arrangements of the real AND > > imaginal [*and* NOT as addition but as chiasm or binocular depth > > perceiving/conceiving] > > > > Greg SAYS he *feels* [intuits, speculates?] : > > > > "At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something different > > about these two TYPES of imagined worlds, with the other (rationalist) > type > > of imagined worlds that, as you note, are perhaps more contrived, more > > intentionally made." > > > > Then Greg makes a value observation that he notes is a difference that > > makes a difference: > > : > > "But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to say > > that the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems that this > > points to differences in ontology." > > > > These various "types" when privileged are possibly "reductions" or > > "abstractions" from the EXCESS which Merleau Ponty explores through > > *expressive cognition* The notions of reversals, and transversals, and > the > > personification of THIS movement of orientations [orientations in sense] > > can be personified in the person of Hermes [the trickster]. > > > > Hillman, who plays within the ontology suggesting the imaginal is reality > > suggests the *I* [ego] is that personification [as imaginal] that *takes* > > itself literally, not metaphorically. If we see *through* the myth of > the > > *I* as a literalization of the social actor [as intentional maker or > > constructor] then we possibly open up the EXCESS [of *is*] to explore > > relations between *is* [material, being, becoming] with the imaginal *as > > if* to create a *chiasm* or binocular vision in *depth* [which is NOT a > > summation of the *is* and *and is*] but is a gestalt *type* historically > > constituted through *expressive cognition* [Merleau Ponty's term] > > > > Greg, this *feeling* as a way of orienting to make *sense* through > *types* > > seems like *interpretive musings* [Peirce] > > > > Just wondering > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 11:45 PM, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > > > wrote: > > > >> David, > >> Thanks for this wonderfully thoughtful note. > >> As I posted my note to the video, I was reading Max Gluckman's Rituals > of > >> Rebellion. In that book, Gluckman describes rituals in which people > invert > >> the norms of society for a period of time. This is clearly living in an > >> imagined world (perhaps as much as living in the world full of upright > >> norms), but this wouldn't make it onto Saler's radar. So I agree with > your > >> concern about ethnocentrism. > >> At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something different > >> about these two types of imagined worlds, with the other (rationalist) > >> type > >> of imagined worlds that, as you note, are perhaps more contrived, more > >> intentionally made. > >> But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to say > that > >> the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems that this points > to > >> differences in ontology. The intentionally made imaginary is a result > of a > >> naturalist ontology (here you see I am buying some of Saler's argument > >> about a Weberian disenchantment with modernity). In a naturalist > ontology, > >> the world is just there in "all its base materiality." Nothing more, > >> nothing less. There is no space for the rich imagined world of myth, > >> belief, and religion (or so it is believed). In other worlds, there is > >> space for something more. > >> Anyway, I think there was too much for me to chew on in your post. > >> Still thinking about it... > >> -greg > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 10:22 PM, David Kellogg > >> wrote: > >> > >> > Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how cramped, > >> > ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of imaginary worlds > >> > is. > >> > > >> > The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of > >> > imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it is only > >> > with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately "believe" in a > >> > fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual creator. That is, > >> > adult play only begins with people who were the peers of my > >> > grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also be imaginary > >> > worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of people, but they do not > >> > signify, because the effort of believing in them in order to inhabit > >> > them is not differentiated from believing in them because you think > >> > they are true. > >> > > >> > Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional > >> > "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional delusion > >> > is very much older than this. At the end of Don Quixote, the old man's > >> > neighbors try their very best to convince Don Quixote to go on > >> > inhabiting the novelistic world he has created for them, and fail; > >> > there is no suggestion that they do this because they believe the old > >> > man's world is real. There was a spate of similar novels in English in > >> > eighteenth century (e.g. Charlotte Lennox's "the Female Quixote"), and > >> > Jane Austen's first novel, Northanger Abbey, is a romance about a > >> > woman whose whole attraction is that she actually assumes only the > >> > very best motives in real people, and reserves her fascination with > >> > ill will for the reading of Gothic novels; when she meets with a > >> > genuinely nasty character (General Tilney) for the first time, she > >> > imputes Gothic motives to him where there are only mundane and > >> > mercenary ones, and the novel ends with the half disenchantment of the > >> > heroine and half enchantment of the General's son, both quite > >> > deliberately acts of metacognition. > >> > > >> > But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much earlier. > >> > "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a particular > >> > kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became parodistsic. "Dream of > >> > the Red Chamber" is about a stone left over from when the world was > >> > made, which is reincarnated by a sensitive young man who falls in with > >> > one cousin and marries another. It is also about a garden, built for a > >> > one day visit to her family by one of the Emperor's concubines, which > >> > eventually bankrupts the family. But the children of the family are > >> > allowed to run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety of fancies: > >> > at various places we are told that various parts of the novel, and > >> > even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the minds of > >> > others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, almost every > >> > fiction manuscript was passed around in a community (rather as Jane > >> > Austen's manuscripts were shared in her family) and "Dream of the Red > >> > Chamber" was probably finished by someone else (the last third of it > >> > was written well after the death of the author, but computer analysis > >> > has not definitively proven that it was written by someone else). > >> > > >> > I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is that, > >> > like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we keep > >> > thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and the > >> > preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist thinking > >> > (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and wonder) are the > >> > last word and not merely latest one. I spend a great deal of the time > >> > that I spend writing half-listening to eighteenth century operas, > >> > which are in very obvious ways imaginary worlds which we enter only by > >> > voluntarily checking our linguistic assumptions in the cloakroom. In > >> > less obvious ways, it seems to me, these imaginary worlds are > >> > interested in a clash that we no longer take very seriously. It's the > >> > clash between a form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, because > >> > empirical, and one which is narrowly rationalist, because puritanical. > >> > The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act of > >> > forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro). The > >> > strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness by its > >> > very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don Giovanni gets > >> > around this problem by making repentance a precondition for > >> > forgiveness, and then by arguing that the truly damnable will never > >> > repent, not even as they are actually being damned. > >> > > >> > We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism and > >> > merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching. There is the > >> > humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary negotiations of meaning > >> > between human beings--and the rationalist belief in the inflexible, > >> > innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere it seems to have been subsumed > >> > in the general opposition between art and science that we find in > >> > Saler's talk. Part of the point of my book is really to try to revive > >> > it--in the form of a humanizing dialogic tendency in story telling > >> > versus a more rationalizing narrativistic one. > >> > > >> > David Kellogg > >> > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > > >> > By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and > >> > everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two chapters > >> > for free at.... > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-praxis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/ > >> > > >> > > >> > (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of it not > >> > as an interface between the virtual world and the real one, but only > >> > as yet another interface between this virtual world and the next one!) > >> > > >> > dk > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole wrote: > >> > > Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the > >> discussions, > >> > > Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two others > >> > suffer > >> > > from the same difficulties. > >> > > > >> > > My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If that's > a > >> > > mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general rule, but > when > >> > they > >> > > are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, seems like > a > >> > > relatively painless way to figure out what other participants in the > >> > > discussion are trying to communicate. > >> > > > >> > > Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*? !! :-))) > >> > > > >> > > Rockin chair mike > >> > > > >> > > Thanks > >> > > > >> > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson < > >> > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >> > > wrote: > >> > > > >> > >> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" > >> more > >> > than > >> > >> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss of > an > >> > >> epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a there > >> > there?). > >> > >> > >> > >> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, I > know > >> > that > >> > >> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the concrete" - > >> which > >> > >> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or > >> something > >> > >> else? A "made real"?). > >> > >> > >> > >> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented social > >> > >> constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word > >> "ontological"?). > >> > >> > >> > >> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was > >> proposing: > >> > >> > >> http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=en > >> > >> > >> > >> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks since > it > >> > can be > >> > >> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and they can > >> be > >> > hit > >> > >> or miss. > >> > >> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I originally > >> sent in > >> > >> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it > >> interesting > >> > >> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? > >> > >> Others? > >> > >> -greg > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> > >> > >> > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central > >> component, > >> > >> > Greg. > >> > >> > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the wrong > >> > >> conversation > >> > >> > here?). > >> > >> > > >> > >> > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? > >> Perhaps > >> > the > >> > >> > two talks will aid the discussion. > >> > >> > mike > >> > >> > > >> > >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson < > >> > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >> > >> > wrote: > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on > >> the > >> > >> other > >> > >> > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others > >> > might > >> > >> be > >> > >> > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in > >> politics: > >> > >> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" > >> to > >> > >> works > >> > >> > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply > >> political > >> > >> act. > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > -greg > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > -- > >> > >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> > >> > > Assistant Professor > >> > >> > > Department of Anthropology > >> > >> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> > >> > > Brigham Young University > >> > >> > > Provo, UT 84602 > >> > >> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > -- > >> > >> > > >> > >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction > >> and > >> > re- > >> > >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently > but > >> > more > >> > >> or > >> > >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > Griffiths, > >> and > >> > >> > Gray, 2001] > >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> > >> Assistant Professor > >> > >> Department of Anthropology > >> > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> > >> Brigham Young University > >> > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > >> > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > -- > >> > > > >> > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction > and > >> re- > >> > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > >> more > >> > or > >> > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, > and > >> > > Gray, 2001] > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> Assistant Professor > >> Department of Anthropology > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> Brigham Young University > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Sep 25 09:54:09 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Lplarry) Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2014 09:54:09 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <542448c1.4241320a.0f64.ffffbb1b@mx.google.com> Greg on my phone so limited. My answer is I see a connection with merleau ponty There are no fundamental realities that we can *know*. All Is fallible. BUT There Is a Natural world and There Is. Pr?sence. However to *be* knowable requires thirdness. the notion of *excess* which Is expressed within a community of interpreters requires going BEYOND a r?duction to firstness secondness or thirdness. I believe This opens a clearing for Merleau Pontys notion of expressive cognition as thirdness engaging firstness and secondness including historical thirdness as a mediating pr?sence. Peirce also was exploring interpretive musings and abduction which also Is EXCESS and imaginal Peirce was engaging the r?sistance of *is* and the volition of thirdness in a TYPE pf expressive cognition -----Original Message----- From: "Greg Thompson" Sent: ?2014-?09-?25 8:53 AM To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds Larry, I really appreciate your descriptions of Peirce's 3 categories of experience. From my reading of Peirce, this seems as close to the text as I have seen. But I wonder, now what? (or, perhaps a bit more bluntly "so what?"). What do you make of this way of introducing differences that are purported to make a difference? What can we do with these categories? Particularly as they related to the imaginal, the imaginated, and the imagination. And lurking somewhere in the back of my head is Mike's voice shouting that even the ontology of naturalism involves imagination (i.e. mediation or "into image-making" - see Etienne Pelaprat and Mike's paper on Minding the Gap) - and perhaps this is where there is much less of a difference between the individual subscribing to a naturalist ontology and one who lives in a world inhabited by spirits of dead ancestors and such - both require a kind of meconnaissance, a mis-recognizing of the mediated nature of the world and both FEEL that they know the world in its immediacy (or perhaps just in a "more immediate, less mediated" way than the other). Just as I feel that I am grasping a more immediate and unmediated truth by making this very statement. We all imagine our hold on the world to be immediate. And perhaps it is best that this is so since it is difficult to imagine knowing how to go on if we really were immediately in the world - as in a kind of perpetual Peircean firstness. Imagining that is to imagine the unimaginable. -greg On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 8:57 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > This topic of types of ontologies was engaged with by Peirce who proposed > his 3 categories of experience. > > Firstness: Is the category of bare immediacy. *is* Pure undiscriminated > presence. Epistemologically firstness is immediate and VIVID BUT > INDESCRIBABLE experience. Metaphysically firstness is *possibility* that > could *become* qualities that are general. [redness, pain] Firstness is > unorganized, unreflected, and uncognized. Yet general qualities can > *emerge* in metaphysical firstness. > > SECONDNESS: Secondness is characterized by its RESISTANCE TO OUR INTENTIONS > or expectations. Epistemolgically secondness is experienced as a shock to > habitual patterns of awareness. Secondness is particular and disruptive. > Metaphysically secondness is characterized as NONEGO [what is other] That > is it cannot be associated with the *self* since it actively contradicts > the VOLITIONS of the self. > > THIRDNESS depends upon both firstness and secondness and functions as THEIR > MEDIATION. Thirdness is conceptual and conscious. It is the realm of > general repeatable habitual experiences AND [in general] thirdness is > cognitive. All uniformities [in knowledge OR REALITY] are *modes* of > thirdness insofar as they are general. > Human ACTION is GOVERNED by the thirdness that IS cognitively present. > Without thirdness we are left with the confusing and uncognizable world of > immediacy [firstness] and resistance [secondness] > > Peirce seems to be playing in this realm of reality and imaginal > Larry > > On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 6:56 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > Greg, and David > > > > The questions generated by reflections considering types of the imaginal > > such as: > > > > # natural ontology that says something exists because the world just *is* > > [nothing more, nothing less] in all its base materiality. > > > > # the imaginal *as* reality opening up an enchanted world of myth, belief > > and religion. > > > > # the *intentionally* constructed [made] imaginal that brings into *form* > > [structure] that are rational > > > > # the gestalt perception of multiple poly arrangements of the real AND > > imaginal [*and* NOT as addition but as chiasm or binocular depth > > perceiving/conceiving] > > > > Greg SAYS he *feels* [intuits, speculates?] : > > > > "At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something different > > about these two TYPES of imagined worlds, with the other (rationalist) > type > > of imagined worlds that, as you note, are perhaps more contrived, more > > intentionally made." > > > > Then Greg makes a value observation that he notes is a difference that > > makes a difference: > > : > > "But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to say > > that the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems that this > > points to differences in ontology." > > > > These various "types" when privileged are possibly "reductions" or > > "abstractions" from the EXCESS which Merleau Ponty explores through > > *expressive cognition* The notions of reversals, and transversals, and > the > > personification of THIS movement of orientations [orientations in sense] > > can be personified in the person of Hermes [the trickster]. > > > > Hillman, who plays within the ontology suggesting the imaginal is reality > > suggests the *I* [ego] is that personification [as imaginal] that *takes* > > itself literally, not metaphorically. If we see *through* the myth of > the > > *I* as a literalization of the social actor [as intentional maker or > > constructor] then we possibly open up the EXCESS [of *is*] to explore > > relations between *is* [material, being, becoming] with the imaginal *as > > if* to create a *chiasm* or binocular vision in *depth* [which is NOT a > > summation of the *is* and *and is*] but is a gestalt *type* historically > > constituted through *expressive cognition* [Merleau Ponty's term] > > > > Greg, this *feeling* as a way of orienting to make *sense* through > *types* > > seems like *interpretive musings* [Peirce] > > > > Just wondering > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 11:45 PM, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > > > wrote: > > > >> David, > >> Thanks for this wonderfully thoughtful note. > >> As I posted my note to the video, I was reading Max Gluckman's Rituals > of > >> Rebellion. In that book, Gluckman describes rituals in which people > invert > >> the norms of society for a period of time. This is clearly living in an > >> imagined world (perhaps as much as living in the world full of upright > >> norms), but this wouldn't make it onto Saler's radar. So I agree with > your > >> concern about ethnocentrism. > >> At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something different > >> about these two types of imagined worlds, with the other (rationalist) > >> type > >> of imagined worlds that, as you note, are perhaps more contrived, more > >> intentionally made. > >> But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to say > that > >> the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems that this points > to > >> differences in ontology. The intentionally made imaginary is a result > of a > >> naturalist ontology (here you see I am buying some of Saler's argument > >> about a Weberian disenchantment with modernity). In a naturalist > ontology, > >> the world is just there in "all its base materiality." Nothing more, > >> nothing less. There is no space for the rich imagined world of myth, > >> belief, and religion (or so it is believed). In other worlds, there is > >> space for something more. > >> Anyway, I think there was too much for me to chew on in your post. > >> Still thinking about it... > >> -greg > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 10:22 PM, David Kellogg > >> wrote: > >> > >> > Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how cramped, > >> > ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of imaginary worlds > >> > is. > >> > > >> > The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of > >> > imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it is only > >> > with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately "believe" in a > >> > fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual creator. That is, > >> > adult play only begins with people who were the peers of my > >> > grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also be imaginary > >> > worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of people, but they do not > >> > signify, because the effort of believing in them in order to inhabit > >> > them is not differentiated from believing in them because you think > >> > they are true. > >> > > >> > Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional > >> > "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional delusion > >> > is very much older than this. At the end of Don Quixote, the old man's > >> > neighbors try their very best to convince Don Quixote to go on > >> > inhabiting the novelistic world he has created for them, and fail; > >> > there is no suggestion that they do this because they believe the old > >> > man's world is real. There was a spate of similar novels in English in > >> > eighteenth century (e.g. Charlotte Lennox's "the Female Quixote"), and > >> > Jane Austen's first novel, Northanger Abbey, is a romance about a > >> > woman whose whole attraction is that she actually assumes only the > >> > very best motives in real people, and reserves her fascination with > >> > ill will for the reading of Gothic novels; when she meets with a > >> > genuinely nasty character (General Tilney) for the first time, she > >> > imputes Gothic motives to him where there are only mundane and > >> > mercenary ones, and the novel ends with the half disenchantment of the > >> > heroine and half enchantment of the General's son, both quite > >> > deliberately acts of metacognition. > >> > > >> > But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much earlier. > >> > "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a particular > >> > kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became parodistsic. "Dream of > >> > the Red Chamber" is about a stone left over from when the world was > >> > made, which is reincarnated by a sensitive young man who falls in with > >> > one cousin and marries another. It is also about a garden, built for a > >> > one day visit to her family by one of the Emperor's concubines, which > >> > eventually bankrupts the family. But the children of the family are > >> > allowed to run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety of fancies: > >> > at various places we are told that various parts of the novel, and > >> > even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the minds of > >> > others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, almost every > >> > fiction manuscript was passed around in a community (rather as Jane > >> > Austen's manuscripts were shared in her family) and "Dream of the Red > >> > Chamber" was probably finished by someone else (the last third of it > >> > was written well after the death of the author, but computer analysis > >> > has not definitively proven that it was written by someone else). > >> > > >> > I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is that, > >> > like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we keep > >> > thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and the > >> > preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist thinking > >> > (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and wonder) are the > >> > last word and not merely latest one. I spend a great deal of the time > >> > that I spend writing half-listening to eighteenth century operas, > >> > which are in very obvious ways imaginary worlds which we enter only by > >> > voluntarily checking our linguistic assumptions in the cloakroom. In > >> > less obvious ways, it seems to me, these imaginary worlds are > >> > interested in a clash that we no longer take very seriously. It's the > >> > clash between a form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, because > >> > empirical, and one which is narrowly rationalist, because puritanical. > >> > The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act of > >> > forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro). The > >> > strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness by its > >> > very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don Giovanni gets > >> > around this problem by making repentance a precondition for > >> > forgiveness, and then by arguing that the truly damnable will never > >> > repent, not even as they are actually being damned. > >> > > >> > We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism and > >> > merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching. There is the > >> > humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary negotiations of meaning > >> > between human beings--and the rationalist belief in the inflexible, > >> > innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere it seems to have been subsumed > >> > in the general opposition between art and science that we find in > >> > Saler's talk. Part of the point of my book is really to try to revive > >> > it--in the form of a humanizing dialogic tendency in story telling > >> > versus a more rationalizing narrativistic one. > >> > > >> > David Kellogg > >> > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > > >> > By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and > >> > everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two chapters > >> > for free at.... > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-praxis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/ > >> > > >> > > >> > (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of it not > >> > as an interface between the virtual world and the real one, but only > >> > as yet another interface between this virtual world and the next one!) > >> > > >> > dk > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole wrote: > >> > > Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the > >> discussions, > >> > > Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two others > >> > suffer > >> > > from the same difficulties. > >> > > > >> > > My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If that's > a > >> > > mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general rule, but > when > >> > they > >> > > are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, seems like > a > >> > > relatively painless way to figure out what other participants in the > >> > > discussion are trying to communicate. > >> > > > >> > > Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*? !! :-))) > >> > > > >> > > Rockin chair mike > >> > > > >> > > Thanks > >> > > > >> > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson < > >> > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >> > > wrote: > >> > > > >> > >> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" > >> more > >> > than > >> > >> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss of > an > >> > >> epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a there > >> > there?). > >> > >> > >> > >> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, I > know > >> > that > >> > >> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the concrete" - > >> which > >> > >> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or > >> something > >> > >> else? A "made real"?). > >> > >> > >> > >> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented social > >> > >> constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word > >> "ontological"?). > >> > >> > >> > >> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was > >> proposing: > >> > >> > >> http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=en > >> > >> > >> > >> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks since > it > >> > can be > >> > >> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and they can > >> be > >> > hit > >> > >> or miss. > >> > >> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I originally > >> sent in > >> > >> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it > >> interesting > >> > >> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? > >> > >> Others? > >> > >> -greg > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> > >> > >> > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central > >> component, > >> > >> > Greg. > >> > >> > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the wrong > >> > >> conversation > >> > >> > here?). > >> > >> > > >> > >> > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? > >> Perhaps > >> > the > >> > >> > two talks will aid the discussion. > >> > >> > mike > >> > >> > > >> > >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson < > >> > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >> > >> > wrote: > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on > >> the > >> > >> other > >> > >> > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others > >> > might > >> > >> be > >> > >> > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in > >> politics: > >> > >> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" > >> to > >> > >> works > >> > >> > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply > >> political > >> > >> act. > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > -greg > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > -- > >> > >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> > >> > > Assistant Professor > >> > >> > > Department of Anthropology > >> > >> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> > >> > > Brigham Young University > >> > >> > > Provo, UT 84602 > >> > >> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > -- > >> > >> > > >> > >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction > >> and > >> > re- > >> > >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently > but > >> > more > >> > >> or > >> > >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > Griffiths, > >> and > >> > >> > Gray, 2001] > >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> > >> Assistant Professor > >> > >> Department of Anthropology > >> > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> > >> Brigham Young University > >> > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > >> > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > -- > >> > > > >> > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction > and > >> re- > >> > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > >> more > >> > or > >> > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, > and > >> > > Gray, 2001] > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> Assistant Professor > >> Department of Anthropology > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> Brigham Young University > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Sep 25 22:01:06 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2014 22:01:06 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: We were only trying to whisper Greg, that the physiologically requisite conditions for sensing the world require that we separate from the world and recombine with it as an ongoing process or our sensory field framents and eventually d s pp ears. With Tim Ingold due here next week, this and related topics will not go away. I am still going back and forth between the two videos and considering David's erudite and thought provoking comments on them, or provoked by them. So far I have only gotten to the part where I am given a choice between Chez Panise and Applebees and wondering why class is not part of the discussion, but instead innate individual differences explain one's preferences as well as the preferences of the people in the audience. Way more in these messages than I can properly grok! mike On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 8:51 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Larry, I really appreciate your descriptions of Peirce's 3 categories of > experience. From my reading of Peirce, this seems as close to the text as I > have seen. > But I wonder, now what? (or, perhaps a bit more bluntly "so what?"). > What do you make of this way of introducing differences that are purported > to make a difference? > What can we do with these categories? Particularly as they related to the > imaginal, the imaginated, and the imagination. > > And lurking somewhere in the back of my head is Mike's voice shouting that > even the ontology of naturalism involves imagination (i.e. mediation or > "into image-making" - see Etienne Pelaprat and Mike's paper on Minding the > Gap) - and perhaps this is where there is much less of a difference between > the individual subscribing to a naturalist ontology and one who lives in a > world inhabited by spirits of dead ancestors and such - both require a kind > of meconnaissance, a mis-recognizing of the mediated nature of the world > and both FEEL that they know the world in its immediacy (or perhaps just in > a "more immediate, less mediated" way than the other). Just as I feel that > I am grasping a more immediate and unmediated truth by making this very > statement. We all imagine our hold on the world to be immediate. And > perhaps it is best that this is so since it is difficult to imagine knowing > how to go on if we really were immediately in the world - as in a kind of > perpetual Peircean firstness. > > Imagining that is to imagine the unimaginable. > > -greg > > On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 8:57 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > This topic of types of ontologies was engaged with by Peirce who proposed > > his 3 categories of experience. > > > > Firstness: Is the category of bare immediacy. *is* Pure undiscriminated > > presence. Epistemologically firstness is immediate and VIVID BUT > > INDESCRIBABLE experience. Metaphysically firstness is *possibility* that > > could *become* qualities that are general. [redness, pain] Firstness is > > unorganized, unreflected, and uncognized. Yet general qualities can > > *emerge* in metaphysical firstness. > > > > SECONDNESS: Secondness is characterized by its RESISTANCE TO OUR > INTENTIONS > > or expectations. Epistemolgically secondness is experienced as a shock to > > habitual patterns of awareness. Secondness is particular and disruptive. > > Metaphysically secondness is characterized as NONEGO [what is other] That > > is it cannot be associated with the *self* since it actively contradicts > > the VOLITIONS of the self. > > > > THIRDNESS depends upon both firstness and secondness and functions as > THEIR > > MEDIATION. Thirdness is conceptual and conscious. It is the realm of > > general repeatable habitual experiences AND [in general] thirdness is > > cognitive. All uniformities [in knowledge OR REALITY] are *modes* of > > thirdness insofar as they are general. > > Human ACTION is GOVERNED by the thirdness that IS cognitively present. > > Without thirdness we are left with the confusing and uncognizable world > of > > immediacy [firstness] and resistance [secondness] > > > > Peirce seems to be playing in this realm of reality and imaginal > > Larry > > > > On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 6:56 AM, Larry Purss > wrote: > > > > > Greg, and David > > > > > > The questions generated by reflections considering types of the > imaginal > > > such as: > > > > > > # natural ontology that says something exists because the world just > *is* > > > [nothing more, nothing less] in all its base materiality. > > > > > > # the imaginal *as* reality opening up an enchanted world of myth, > belief > > > and religion. > > > > > > # the *intentionally* constructed [made] imaginal that brings into > *form* > > > [structure] that are rational > > > > > > # the gestalt perception of multiple poly arrangements of the real AND > > > imaginal [*and* NOT as addition but as chiasm or binocular depth > > > perceiving/conceiving] > > > > > > Greg SAYS he *feels* [intuits, speculates?] : > > > > > > "At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something > different > > > about these two TYPES of imagined worlds, with the other (rationalist) > > type > > > of imagined worlds that, as you note, are perhaps more contrived, more > > > intentionally made." > > > > > > Then Greg makes a value observation that he notes is a difference that > > > makes a difference: > > > : > > > "But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to say > > > that the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems that this > > > points to differences in ontology." > > > > > > These various "types" when privileged are possibly "reductions" or > > > "abstractions" from the EXCESS which Merleau Ponty explores through > > > *expressive cognition* The notions of reversals, and transversals, and > > the > > > personification of THIS movement of orientations [orientations in > sense] > > > can be personified in the person of Hermes [the trickster]. > > > > > > Hillman, who plays within the ontology suggesting the imaginal is > reality > > > suggests the *I* [ego] is that personification [as imaginal] that > *takes* > > > itself literally, not metaphorically. If we see *through* the myth of > > the > > > *I* as a literalization of the social actor [as intentional maker or > > > constructor] then we possibly open up the EXCESS [of *is*] to explore > > > relations between *is* [material, being, becoming] with the imaginal > *as > > > if* to create a *chiasm* or binocular vision in *depth* [which is NOT a > > > summation of the *is* and *and is*] but is a gestalt *type* > historically > > > constituted through *expressive cognition* [Merleau Ponty's term] > > > > > > Greg, this *feeling* as a way of orienting to make *sense* through > > *types* > > > seems like *interpretive musings* [Peirce] > > > > > > Just wondering > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 11:45 PM, Greg Thompson < > > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > > > > wrote: > > > > > >> David, > > >> Thanks for this wonderfully thoughtful note. > > >> As I posted my note to the video, I was reading Max Gluckman's Rituals > > of > > >> Rebellion. In that book, Gluckman describes rituals in which people > > invert > > >> the norms of society for a period of time. This is clearly living in > an > > >> imagined world (perhaps as much as living in the world full of upright > > >> norms), but this wouldn't make it onto Saler's radar. So I agree with > > your > > >> concern about ethnocentrism. > > >> At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something > different > > >> about these two types of imagined worlds, with the other (rationalist) > > >> type > > >> of imagined worlds that, as you note, are perhaps more contrived, more > > >> intentionally made. > > >> But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to say > > that > > >> the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems that this > points > > to > > >> differences in ontology. The intentionally made imaginary is a result > > of a > > >> naturalist ontology (here you see I am buying some of Saler's argument > > >> about a Weberian disenchantment with modernity). In a naturalist > > ontology, > > >> the world is just there in "all its base materiality." Nothing more, > > >> nothing less. There is no space for the rich imagined world of myth, > > >> belief, and religion (or so it is believed). In other worlds, there is > > >> space for something more. > > >> Anyway, I think there was too much for me to chew on in your post. > > >> Still thinking about it... > > >> -greg > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 10:22 PM, David Kellogg > > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >> > Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how cramped, > > >> > ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of imaginary > worlds > > >> > is. > > >> > > > >> > The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of > > >> > imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it is > only > > >> > with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately "believe" in > a > > >> > fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual creator. That is, > > >> > adult play only begins with people who were the peers of my > > >> > grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also be imaginary > > >> > worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of people, but they do > not > > >> > signify, because the effort of believing in them in order to inhabit > > >> > them is not differentiated from believing in them because you think > > >> > they are true. > > >> > > > >> > Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional > > >> > "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional delusion > > >> > is very much older than this. At the end of Don Quixote, the old > man's > > >> > neighbors try their very best to convince Don Quixote to go on > > >> > inhabiting the novelistic world he has created for them, and fail; > > >> > there is no suggestion that they do this because they believe the > old > > >> > man's world is real. There was a spate of similar novels in English > in > > >> > eighteenth century (e.g. Charlotte Lennox's "the Female Quixote"), > and > > >> > Jane Austen's first novel, Northanger Abbey, is a romance about a > > >> > woman whose whole attraction is that she actually assumes only the > > >> > very best motives in real people, and reserves her fascination with > > >> > ill will for the reading of Gothic novels; when she meets with a > > >> > genuinely nasty character (General Tilney) for the first time, she > > >> > imputes Gothic motives to him where there are only mundane and > > >> > mercenary ones, and the novel ends with the half disenchantment of > the > > >> > heroine and half enchantment of the General's son, both quite > > >> > deliberately acts of metacognition. > > >> > > > >> > But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much earlier. > > >> > "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a particular > > >> > kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became parodistsic. "Dream of > > >> > the Red Chamber" is about a stone left over from when the world was > > >> > made, which is reincarnated by a sensitive young man who falls in > with > > >> > one cousin and marries another. It is also about a garden, built > for a > > >> > one day visit to her family by one of the Emperor's concubines, > which > > >> > eventually bankrupts the family. But the children of the family are > > >> > allowed to run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety of > fancies: > > >> > at various places we are told that various parts of the novel, and > > >> > even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the minds of > > >> > others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, almost every > > >> > fiction manuscript was passed around in a community (rather as Jane > > >> > Austen's manuscripts were shared in her family) and "Dream of the > Red > > >> > Chamber" was probably finished by someone else (the last third of it > > >> > was written well after the death of the author, but computer > analysis > > >> > has not definitively proven that it was written by someone else). > > >> > > > >> > I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is > that, > > >> > like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we keep > > >> > thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and the > > >> > preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist thinking > > >> > (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and wonder) are > the > > >> > last word and not merely latest one. I spend a great deal of the > time > > >> > that I spend writing half-listening to eighteenth century operas, > > >> > which are in very obvious ways imaginary worlds which we enter only > by > > >> > voluntarily checking our linguistic assumptions in the cloakroom. In > > >> > less obvious ways, it seems to me, these imaginary worlds are > > >> > interested in a clash that we no longer take very seriously. It's > the > > >> > clash between a form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, because > > >> > empirical, and one which is narrowly rationalist, because > puritanical. > > >> > The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act of > > >> > forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro). > The > > >> > strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness by its > > >> > very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don Giovanni gets > > >> > around this problem by making repentance a precondition for > > >> > forgiveness, and then by arguing that the truly damnable will never > > >> > repent, not even as they are actually being damned. > > >> > > > >> > We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism and > > >> > merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching. There is > the > > >> > humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary negotiations of > meaning > > >> > between human beings--and the rationalist belief in the inflexible, > > >> > innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere it seems to have been subsumed > > >> > in the general opposition between art and science that we find in > > >> > Saler's talk. Part of the point of my book is really to try to > revive > > >> > it--in the form of a humanizing dialogic tendency in story telling > > >> > versus a more rationalizing narrativistic one. > > >> > > > >> > David Kellogg > > >> > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > >> > > > >> > By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and > > >> > everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two > chapters > > >> > for free at.... > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-praxis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/ > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of it > not > > >> > as an interface between the virtual world and the real one, but only > > >> > as yet another interface between this virtual world and the next > one!) > > >> > > > >> > dk > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole wrote: > > >> > > Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the > > >> discussions, > > >> > > Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two > others > > >> > suffer > > >> > > from the same difficulties. > > >> > > > > >> > > My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If > that's > > a > > >> > > mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general rule, but > > when > > >> > they > > >> > > are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, seems > like > > a > > >> > > relatively painless way to figure out what other participants in > the > > >> > > discussion are trying to communicate. > > >> > > > > >> > > Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*? !! :-))) > > >> > > > > >> > > Rockin chair mike > > >> > > > > >> > > Thanks > > >> > > > > >> > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson < > > >> > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > >> > > wrote: > > >> > > > > >> > >> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" > > >> more > > >> > than > > >> > >> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss of > > an > > >> > >> epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a > there > > >> > there?). > > >> > >> > > >> > >> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, I > > know > > >> > that > > >> > >> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the concrete" - > > >> which > > >> > >> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or > > >> something > > >> > >> else? A "made real"?). > > >> > >> > > >> > >> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented social > > >> > >> constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word > > >> "ontological"?). > > >> > >> > > >> > >> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was > > >> proposing: > > >> > >> > > >> http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=en > > >> > >> > > >> > >> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks since > > it > > >> > can be > > >> > >> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and they > can > > >> be > > >> > hit > > >> > >> or miss. > > >> > >> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I originally > > >> sent in > > >> > >> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it > > >> interesting > > >> > >> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? > > >> > >> Others? > > >> > >> -greg > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole > wrote: > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central > > >> component, > > >> > >> > Greg. > > >> > >> > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the wrong > > >> > >> conversation > > >> > >> > here?). > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? > > >> Perhaps > > >> > the > > >> > >> > two talks will aid the discussion. > > >> > >> > mike > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson < > > >> > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > >> > >> > wrote: > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions > on > > >> the > > >> > >> other > > >> > >> > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that > others > > >> > might > > >> > >> be > > >> > >> > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in > > >> politics: > > >> > >> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the > otherwise" > > >> to > > >> > >> works > > >> > >> > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and > Rabelais. > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply > > >> political > > >> > >> act. > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > > -greg > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > > -- > > >> > >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >> > >> > > Assistant Professor > > >> > >> > > Department of Anthropology > > >> > >> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >> > >> > > Brigham Young University > > >> > >> > > Provo, UT 84602 > > >> > >> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > -- > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of > construction > > >> and > > >> > re- > > >> > >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently > > but > > >> > more > > >> > >> or > > >> > >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > > Griffiths, > > >> and > > >> > >> > Gray, 2001] > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> -- > > >> > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >> > >> Assistant Professor > > >> > >> Department of Anthropology > > >> > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >> > >> Brigham Young University > > >> > >> Provo, UT 84602 > > >> > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > >> > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > -- > > >> > > > > >> > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of construction > > and > > >> re- > > >> > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but > > >> more > > >> > or > > >> > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, Griffiths, > > and > > >> > > Gray, 2001] > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> -- > > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >> Assistant Professor > > >> Department of Anthropology > > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >> Brigham Young University > > >> Provo, UT 84602 > > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp Thu Sep 25 22:12:47 2014 From: vwilk@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp (valerie A. Wilkinson) Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2014 14:12:47 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <00d301cfd948$83556c40$8a0044c0$@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp> Mike, I love that you use the term "grok" and in this context! This is a topic where grokking is essential - not atomizing nor synthesizing but taking new stuff on board as we evolve and new forms emerge. Vandy (Valerie Wilkinson) -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Friday, September 26, 2014 14:01 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds We were only trying to whisper Greg, that the physiologically requisite conditions for sensing the world require that we separate from the world and recombine with it as an ongoing process or our sensory field framents and eventually d s pp ears. With Tim Ingold due here next week, this and related topics will not go away. I am still going back and forth between the two videos and considering David's erudite and thought provoking comments on them, or provoked by them. So far I have only gotten to the part where I am given a choice between Chez Panise and Applebees and wondering why class is not part of the discussion, but instead innate individual differences explain one's preferences as well as the preferences of the people in the audience. Way more in these messages than I can properly grok! mike On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 8:51 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Larry, I really appreciate your descriptions of Peirce's 3 categories > of experience. From my reading of Peirce, this seems as close to the > text as I have seen. > But I wonder, now what? (or, perhaps a bit more bluntly "so what?"). > What do you make of this way of introducing differences that are > purported to make a difference? > What can we do with these categories? Particularly as they related to > the imaginal, the imaginated, and the imagination. > > And lurking somewhere in the back of my head is Mike's voice shouting > that even the ontology of naturalism involves imagination (i.e. > mediation or "into image-making" - see Etienne Pelaprat and Mike's > paper on Minding the > Gap) - and perhaps this is where there is much less of a difference > between the individual subscribing to a naturalist ontology and one > who lives in a world inhabited by spirits of dead ancestors and such - > both require a kind of meconnaissance, a mis-recognizing of the > mediated nature of the world and both FEEL that they know the world in > its immediacy (or perhaps just in a "more immediate, less mediated" > way than the other). Just as I feel that I am grasping a more > immediate and unmediated truth by making this very statement. We all > imagine our hold on the world to be immediate. And perhaps it is best > that this is so since it is difficult to imagine knowing how to go on > if we really were immediately in the world - as in a kind of perpetual Peircean firstness. > > Imagining that is to imagine the unimaginable. > > -greg > > On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 8:57 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > This topic of types of ontologies was engaged with by Peirce who > > proposed his 3 categories of experience. > > > > Firstness: Is the category of bare immediacy. *is* Pure > > undiscriminated presence. Epistemologically firstness is immediate > > and VIVID BUT INDESCRIBABLE experience. Metaphysically firstness is > > *possibility* that could *become* qualities that are general. > > [redness, pain] Firstness is unorganized, unreflected, and > > uncognized. Yet general qualities can > > *emerge* in metaphysical firstness. > > > > SECONDNESS: Secondness is characterized by its RESISTANCE TO OUR > INTENTIONS > > or expectations. Epistemolgically secondness is experienced as a > > shock to habitual patterns of awareness. Secondness is particular and disruptive. > > Metaphysically secondness is characterized as NONEGO [what is other] > > That is it cannot be associated with the *self* since it actively > > contradicts the VOLITIONS of the self. > > > > THIRDNESS depends upon both firstness and secondness and functions > > as > THEIR > > MEDIATION. Thirdness is conceptual and conscious. It is the realm of > > general repeatable habitual experiences AND [in general] thirdness > > is cognitive. All uniformities [in knowledge OR REALITY] are *modes* > > of thirdness insofar as they are general. > > Human ACTION is GOVERNED by the thirdness that IS cognitively present. > > Without thirdness we are left with the confusing and uncognizable > > world > of > > immediacy [firstness] and resistance [secondness] > > > > Peirce seems to be playing in this realm of reality and imaginal > > Larry > > > > On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 6:56 AM, Larry Purss > wrote: > > > > > Greg, and David > > > > > > The questions generated by reflections considering types of the > imaginal > > > such as: > > > > > > # natural ontology that says something exists because the world > > > just > *is* > > > [nothing more, nothing less] in all its base materiality. > > > > > > # the imaginal *as* reality opening up an enchanted world of myth, > belief > > > and religion. > > > > > > # the *intentionally* constructed [made] imaginal that brings into > *form* > > > [structure] that are rational > > > > > > # the gestalt perception of multiple poly arrangements of the real > > > AND imaginal [*and* NOT as addition but as chiasm or binocular > > > depth perceiving/conceiving] > > > > > > Greg SAYS he *feels* [intuits, speculates?] : > > > > > > "At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something > different > > > about these two TYPES of imagined worlds, with the other > > > (rationalist) > > type > > > of imagined worlds that, as you note, are perhaps more contrived, > > > more intentionally made." > > > > > > Then Greg makes a value observation that he notes is a difference > > > that makes a difference: > > > : > > > "But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to > > > say that the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems > > > that this points to differences in ontology." > > > > > > These various "types" when privileged are possibly "reductions" or > > > "abstractions" from the EXCESS which Merleau Ponty explores > > > through *expressive cognition* The notions of reversals, and > > > transversals, and > > the > > > personification of THIS movement of orientations [orientations in > sense] > > > can be personified in the person of Hermes [the trickster]. > > > > > > Hillman, who plays within the ontology suggesting the imaginal is > reality > > > suggests the *I* [ego] is that personification [as imaginal] that > *takes* > > > itself literally, not metaphorically. If we see *through* the > > > myth of > > the > > > *I* as a literalization of the social actor [as intentional maker > > > or constructor] then we possibly open up the EXCESS [of *is*] to > > > explore relations between *is* [material, being, becoming] with > > > the imaginal > *as > > > if* to create a *chiasm* or binocular vision in *depth* [which is > > > NOT a summation of the *is* and *and is*] but is a gestalt *type* > historically > > > constituted through *expressive cognition* [Merleau Ponty's term] > > > > > > Greg, this *feeling* as a way of orienting to make *sense* through > > *types* > > > seems like *interpretive musings* [Peirce] > > > > > > Just wondering > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 11:45 PM, Greg Thompson < > > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > > > > wrote: > > > > > >> David, > > >> Thanks for this wonderfully thoughtful note. > > >> As I posted my note to the video, I was reading Max Gluckman's > > >> Rituals > > of > > >> Rebellion. In that book, Gluckman describes rituals in which > > >> people > > invert > > >> the norms of society for a period of time. This is clearly living > > >> in > an > > >> imagined world (perhaps as much as living in the world full of > > >> upright norms), but this wouldn't make it onto Saler's radar. So > > >> I agree with > > your > > >> concern about ethnocentrism. > > >> At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something > different > > >> about these two types of imagined worlds, with the other > > >> (rationalist) type of imagined worlds that, as you note, are > > >> perhaps more contrived, more intentionally made. > > >> But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to > > >> say > > that > > >> the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems that this > points > > to > > >> differences in ontology. The intentionally made imaginary is a > > >> result > > of a > > >> naturalist ontology (here you see I am buying some of Saler's > > >> argument about a Weberian disenchantment with modernity). In a > > >> naturalist > > ontology, > > >> the world is just there in "all its base materiality." Nothing > > >> more, nothing less. There is no space for the rich imagined world > > >> of myth, belief, and religion (or so it is believed). In other > > >> worlds, there is space for something more. > > >> Anyway, I think there was too much for me to chew on in your post. > > >> Still thinking about it... > > >> -greg > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 10:22 PM, David Kellogg > > >> > > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >> > Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how > > >> > cramped, ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of > > >> > imaginary > worlds > > >> > is. > > >> > > > >> > The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of > > >> > imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it > > >> > is > only > > >> > with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately > > >> > "believe" in > a > > >> > fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual creator. That > > >> > is, adult play only begins with people who were the peers of my > > >> > grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also be > > >> > imaginary worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of people, > > >> > but they do > not > > >> > signify, because the effort of believing in them in order to > > >> > inhabit them is not differentiated from believing in them > > >> > because you think they are true. > > >> > > > >> > Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional > > >> > "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional > > >> > delusion is very much older than this. At the end of Don > > >> > Quixote, the old > man's > > >> > neighbors try their very best to convince Don Quixote to go on > > >> > inhabiting the novelistic world he has created for them, and > > >> > fail; there is no suggestion that they do this because they > > >> > believe the > old > > >> > man's world is real. There was a spate of similar novels in > > >> > English > in > > >> > eighteenth century (e.g. Charlotte Lennox's "the Female > > >> > Quixote"), > and > > >> > Jane Austen's first novel, Northanger Abbey, is a romance about > > >> > a woman whose whole attraction is that she actually assumes > > >> > only the very best motives in real people, and reserves her > > >> > fascination with ill will for the reading of Gothic novels; > > >> > when she meets with a genuinely nasty character (General > > >> > Tilney) for the first time, she imputes Gothic motives to him > > >> > where there are only mundane and mercenary ones, and the novel > > >> > ends with the half disenchantment of > the > > >> > heroine and half enchantment of the General's son, both quite > > >> > deliberately acts of metacognition. > > >> > > > >> > But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much earlier. > > >> > "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a > > >> > particular kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became > > >> > parodistsic. "Dream of the Red Chamber" is about a stone left > > >> > over from when the world was made, which is reincarnated by a > > >> > sensitive young man who falls in > with > > >> > one cousin and marries another. It is also about a garden, > > >> > built > for a > > >> > one day visit to her family by one of the Emperor's concubines, > which > > >> > eventually bankrupts the family. But the children of the family > > >> > are allowed to run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety > > >> > of > fancies: > > >> > at various places we are told that various parts of the novel, > > >> > and even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the > > >> > minds of others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, > > >> > almost every fiction manuscript was passed around in a > > >> > community (rather as Jane Austen's manuscripts were shared in > > >> > her family) and "Dream of the > Red > > >> > Chamber" was probably finished by someone else (the last third > > >> > of it was written well after the death of the author, but > > >> > computer > analysis > > >> > has not definitively proven that it was written by someone else). > > >> > > > >> > I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is > that, > > >> > like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we keep > > >> > thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and the > > >> > preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist > > >> > thinking (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and > > >> > wonder) are > the > > >> > last word and not merely latest one. I spend a great deal of > > >> > the > time > > >> > that I spend writing half-listening to eighteenth century > > >> > operas, which are in very obvious ways imaginary worlds which > > >> > we enter only > by > > >> > voluntarily checking our linguistic assumptions in the > > >> > cloakroom. In less obvious ways, it seems to me, these > > >> > imaginary worlds are interested in a clash that we no longer > > >> > take very seriously. It's > the > > >> > clash between a form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, > > >> > because empirical, and one which is narrowly rationalist, > > >> > because > puritanical. > > >> > The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act > > >> > of forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro). > The > > >> > strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness > > >> > by its very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don > > >> > Giovanni gets around this problem by making repentance a > > >> > precondition for forgiveness, and then by arguing that the > > >> > truly damnable will never repent, not even as they are actually being damned. > > >> > > > >> > We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism > > >> > and merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching. > > >> > There is > the > > >> > humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary negotiations of > meaning > > >> > between human beings--and the rationalist belief in the > > >> > inflexible, innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere it seems to > > >> > have been subsumed in the general opposition between art and > > >> > science that we find in Saler's talk. Part of the point of my > > >> > book is really to try to > revive > > >> > it--in the form of a humanizing dialogic tendency in story > > >> > telling versus a more rationalizing narrativistic one. > > >> > > > >> > David Kellogg > > >> > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > >> > > > >> > By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and > > >> > everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two > chapters > > >> > for free at.... > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-pr > axis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/ > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of > > >> > it > not > > >> > as an interface between the virtual world and the real one, but > > >> > only as yet another interface between this virtual world and > > >> > the next > one!) > > >> > > > >> > dk > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole wrote: > > >> > > Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the > > >> discussions, > > >> > > Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two > others > > >> > suffer > > >> > > from the same difficulties. > > >> > > > > >> > > My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If > that's > > a > > >> > > mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general rule, > > >> > > but > > when > > >> > they > > >> > > are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, > > >> > > seems > like > > a > > >> > > relatively painless way to figure out what other participants > > >> > > in > the > > >> > > discussion are trying to communicate. > > >> > > > > >> > > Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*? !! :-))) > > >> > > > > >> > > Rockin chair mike > > >> > > > > >> > > Thanks > > >> > > > > >> > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson < > > >> > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > >> > > wrote: > > >> > > > > >> > >> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" > > >> more > > >> > than > > >> > >> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the > > >> > >> abyss of > > an > > >> > >> epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a > there > > >> > there?). > > >> > >> > > >> > >> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, > > >> > >> Mike, I > > know > > >> > that > > >> > >> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the > > >> > >> concrete" - > > >> which > > >> > >> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or > > >> something > > >> > >> else? A "made real"?). > > >> > >> > > >> > >> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented > > >> > >> social constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful > > >> > >> word > > >> "ontological"?). > > >> > >> > > >> > >> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was > > >> proposing: > > >> > >> > > >> http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?languag > > >> e=en > > >> > >> > > >> > >> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks > > >> > >> since > > it > > >> > can be > > >> > >> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and > > >> > >> they > can > > >> be > > >> > hit > > >> > >> or miss. > > >> > >> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I > > >> > >> originally > > >> sent in > > >> > >> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it > > >> interesting > > >> > >> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? > > >> > >> Others? > > >> > >> -greg > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole > wrote: > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a > > >> > >> > central > > >> component, > > >> > >> > Greg. > > >> > >> > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the > > >> > >> > wrong > > >> > >> conversation > > >> > >> > here?). > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? > > >> Perhaps > > >> > the > > >> > >> > two talks will aid the discussion. > > >> > >> > mike > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson < > > >> > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > >> > >> > wrote: > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" > > >> > >> > > discussions > on > > >> the > > >> > >> other > > >> > >> > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that > others > > >> > might > > >> > >> be > > >> > >> > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in > > >> politics: > > >> > >> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the > otherwise" > > >> to > > >> > >> works > > >> > >> > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and > Rabelais. > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a > > >> > >> > > deeply > > >> political > > >> > >> act. > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > > -greg > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > > -- > > >> > >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >> > >> > > Assistant Professor > > >> > >> > > Department of Anthropology > > >> > >> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University > > >> > >> > > Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > -- > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of > construction > > >> and > > >> > re- > > >> > >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are > > >> > >> > contingently > > but > > >> > more > > >> > >> or > > >> > >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > > Griffiths, > > >> and > > >> > >> > Gray, 2001] > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> -- > > >> > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >> > >> Assistant Professor > > >> > >> Department of Anthropology > > >> > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, > > >> > >> UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > >> > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > -- > > >> > > > > >> > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of > > >> > > construction > > and > > >> re- > > >> > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are > > >> > > contingently but > > >> more > > >> > or > > >> > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > > >> > > Griffiths, > > and > > >> > > Gray, 2001] > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> -- > > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >> Assistant Professor > > >> Department of Anthropology > > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >> Brigham Young University > > >> Provo, UT 84602 > > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Fri Sep 26 01:05:24 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2014 08:05:24 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222A284@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Sorry to step into a long and fascinating thread without having had time to take in all of the arguments but I felt I had to respond to your comment, Greg, ' since it is difficult to imagine knowing how to go on if we really were immediately in the world - as in a kind of perpetual Peircean firstness'. I would argue that it is one of the great advantages of the cycle of generations that we don't have to imagine this because we (many of us) have regular opportunities to SEE it in the lives of babies - who do, somehow (and not least because of the support they get from others), manage to go on in a Peircean firstness. All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: 25 September 2014 16:51 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds Larry, I really appreciate your descriptions of Peirce's 3 categories of experience. From my reading of Peirce, this seems as close to the text as I have seen. But I wonder, now what? (or, perhaps a bit more bluntly "so what?"). What do you make of this way of introducing differences that are purported to make a difference? What can we do with these categories? Particularly as they related to the imaginal, the imaginated, and the imagination. And lurking somewhere in the back of my head is Mike's voice shouting that even the ontology of naturalism involves imagination (i.e. mediation or "into image-making" - see Etienne Pelaprat and Mike's paper on Minding the Gap) - and perhaps this is where there is much less of a difference between the individual subscribing to a naturalist ontology and one who lives in a world inhabited by spirits of dead ancestors and such - both require a kind of meconnaissance, a mis-recognizing of the mediated nature of the world and both FEEL that they know the world in its immediacy (or perhaps just in a "more immediate, less mediated" way than the other). Just as I feel that I am grasping a more immediate and unmediated truth by making this very statement. We all imagine our hold on the world to be immediate. And perhaps it is best that this is so since it is difficult to imagine knowing how to go on if we really were immediately in the world - as in a kind of perpetual Peircean firstness. Imagining that is to imagine the unimaginable. -greg On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 8:57 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > This topic of types of ontologies was engaged with by Peirce who > proposed his 3 categories of experience. > > Firstness: Is the category of bare immediacy. *is* Pure > undiscriminated presence. Epistemologically firstness is immediate and > VIVID BUT INDESCRIBABLE experience. Metaphysically firstness is > *possibility* that could *become* qualities that are general. > [redness, pain] Firstness is unorganized, unreflected, and uncognized. > Yet general qualities can > *emerge* in metaphysical firstness. > > SECONDNESS: Secondness is characterized by its RESISTANCE TO OUR > INTENTIONS or expectations. Epistemolgically secondness is experienced > as a shock to habitual patterns of awareness. Secondness is particular and disruptive. > Metaphysically secondness is characterized as NONEGO [what is other] > That is it cannot be associated with the *self* since it actively > contradicts the VOLITIONS of the self. > > THIRDNESS depends upon both firstness and secondness and functions as > THEIR MEDIATION. Thirdness is conceptual and conscious. It is the > realm of general repeatable habitual experiences AND [in general] > thirdness is cognitive. All uniformities [in knowledge OR REALITY] are > *modes* of thirdness insofar as they are general. > Human ACTION is GOVERNED by the thirdness that IS cognitively present. > Without thirdness we are left with the confusing and uncognizable > world of immediacy [firstness] and resistance [secondness] > > Peirce seems to be playing in this realm of reality and imaginal Larry > > On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 6:56 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > Greg, and David > > > > The questions generated by reflections considering types of the > > imaginal such as: > > > > # natural ontology that says something exists because the world just > > *is* [nothing more, nothing less] in all its base materiality. > > > > # the imaginal *as* reality opening up an enchanted world of myth, > > belief and religion. > > > > # the *intentionally* constructed [made] imaginal that brings into > > *form* [structure] that are rational > > > > # the gestalt perception of multiple poly arrangements of the real > > AND imaginal [*and* NOT as addition but as chiasm or binocular depth > > perceiving/conceiving] > > > > Greg SAYS he *feels* [intuits, speculates?] : > > > > "At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something > > different about these two TYPES of imagined worlds, with the other > > (rationalist) > type > > of imagined worlds that, as you note, are perhaps more contrived, > > more intentionally made." > > > > Then Greg makes a value observation that he notes is a difference > > that makes a difference: > > : > > "But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to > > say that the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems > > that this points to differences in ontology." > > > > These various "types" when privileged are possibly "reductions" or > > "abstractions" from the EXCESS which Merleau Ponty explores through > > *expressive cognition* The notions of reversals, and transversals, > > and > the > > personification of THIS movement of orientations [orientations in > > sense] can be personified in the person of Hermes [the trickster]. > > > > Hillman, who plays within the ontology suggesting the imaginal is > > reality suggests the *I* [ego] is that personification [as imaginal] > > that *takes* itself literally, not metaphorically. If we see > > *through* the myth of > the > > *I* as a literalization of the social actor [as intentional maker or > > constructor] then we possibly open up the EXCESS [of *is*] to > > explore relations between *is* [material, being, becoming] with the > > imaginal *as > > if* to create a *chiasm* or binocular vision in *depth* [which is > > NOT a summation of the *is* and *and is*] but is a gestalt *type* > > historically constituted through *expressive cognition* [Merleau > > Ponty's term] > > > > Greg, this *feeling* as a way of orienting to make *sense* through > *types* > > seems like *interpretive musings* [Peirce] > > > > Just wondering > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 11:45 PM, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > > > wrote: > > > >> David, > >> Thanks for this wonderfully thoughtful note. > >> As I posted my note to the video, I was reading Max Gluckman's > >> Rituals > of > >> Rebellion. In that book, Gluckman describes rituals in which people > invert > >> the norms of society for a period of time. This is clearly living > >> in an imagined world (perhaps as much as living in the world full > >> of upright norms), but this wouldn't make it onto Saler's radar. So > >> I agree with > your > >> concern about ethnocentrism. > >> At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something > >> different about these two types of imagined worlds, with the other > >> (rationalist) type of imagined worlds that, as you note, are > >> perhaps more contrived, more intentionally made. > >> But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to > >> say > that > >> the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems that this > >> points > to > >> differences in ontology. The intentionally made imaginary is a > >> result > of a > >> naturalist ontology (here you see I am buying some of Saler's > >> argument about a Weberian disenchantment with modernity). In a > >> naturalist > ontology, > >> the world is just there in "all its base materiality." Nothing > >> more, nothing less. There is no space for the rich imagined world > >> of myth, belief, and religion (or so it is believed). In other > >> worlds, there is space for something more. > >> Anyway, I think there was too much for me to chew on in your post. > >> Still thinking about it... > >> -greg > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 10:22 PM, David Kellogg > >> > >> wrote: > >> > >> > Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how cramped, > >> > ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of imaginary > >> > worlds is. > >> > > >> > The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of > >> > imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it is > >> > only with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately > >> > "believe" in a fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual > >> > creator. That is, adult play only begins with people who were the > >> > peers of my grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also > >> > be imaginary worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of > >> > people, but they do not signify, because the effort of believing > >> > in them in order to inhabit them is not differentiated from > >> > believing in them because you think they are true. > >> > > >> > Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional > >> > "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional > >> > delusion is very much older than this. At the end of Don Quixote, > >> > the old man's neighbors try their very best to convince Don > >> > Quixote to go on inhabiting the novelistic world he has created > >> > for them, and fail; there is no suggestion that they do this > >> > because they believe the old man's world is real. There was a > >> > spate of similar novels in English in eighteenth century (e.g. > >> > Charlotte Lennox's "the Female Quixote"), and Jane Austen's first > >> > novel, Northanger Abbey, is a romance about a woman whose whole > >> > attraction is that she actually assumes only the very best > >> > motives in real people, and reserves her fascination with ill > >> > will for the reading of Gothic novels; when she meets with a > >> > genuinely nasty character (General Tilney) for the first time, > >> > she imputes Gothic motives to him where there are only mundane > >> > and mercenary ones, and the novel ends with the half > >> > disenchantment of the heroine and half enchantment of the General's son, both quite deliberately acts of metacognition. > >> > > >> > But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much earlier. > >> > "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a > >> > particular kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became > >> > parodistsic. "Dream of the Red Chamber" is about a stone left > >> > over from when the world was made, which is reincarnated by a > >> > sensitive young man who falls in with one cousin and marries > >> > another. It is also about a garden, built for a one day visit to > >> > her family by one of the Emperor's concubines, which eventually > >> > bankrupts the family. But the children of the family are allowed to run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety of fancies: > >> > at various places we are told that various parts of the novel, > >> > and even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the minds > >> > of others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, almost > >> > every fiction manuscript was passed around in a community (rather > >> > as Jane Austen's manuscripts were shared in her family) and > >> > "Dream of the Red Chamber" was probably finished by someone else > >> > (the last third of it was written well after the death of the > >> > author, but computer analysis has not definitively proven that it was written by someone else). > >> > > >> > I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is > >> > that, like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we > >> > keep thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and > >> > the preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist > >> > thinking (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and > >> > wonder) are the last word and not merely latest one. I spend a > >> > great deal of the time that I spend writing half-listening to > >> > eighteenth century operas, which are in very obvious ways > >> > imaginary worlds which we enter only by voluntarily checking our > >> > linguistic assumptions in the cloakroom. In less obvious ways, it > >> > seems to me, these imaginary worlds are interested in a clash > >> > that we no longer take very seriously. It's the clash between a > >> > form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, because empirical, and one which is narrowly rationalist, because puritanical. > >> > The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act of > >> > forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro). > >> > The strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness > >> > by its very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don > >> > Giovanni gets around this problem by making repentance a > >> > precondition for forgiveness, and then by arguing that the truly > >> > damnable will never repent, not even as they are actually being damned. > >> > > >> > We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism > >> > and merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching. > >> > There is the humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary > >> > negotiations of meaning between human beings--and the rationalist > >> > belief in the inflexible, innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere > >> > it seems to have been subsumed in the general opposition between > >> > art and science that we find in Saler's talk. Part of the point > >> > of my book is really to try to revive it--in the form of a > >> > humanizing dialogic tendency in story telling versus a more rationalizing narrativistic one. > >> > > >> > David Kellogg > >> > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > > >> > By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and > >> > everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two > >> > chapters for free at.... > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-pr > axis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/ > >> > > >> > > >> > (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of it > >> > not as an interface between the virtual world and the real one, > >> > but only as yet another interface between this virtual world and > >> > the next one!) > >> > > >> > dk > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole wrote: > >> > > Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the > >> discussions, > >> > > Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two > >> > > others > >> > suffer > >> > > from the same difficulties. > >> > > > >> > > My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If > >> > > that's > a > >> > > mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general rule, > >> > > but > when > >> > they > >> > > are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, seems > >> > > like > a > >> > > relatively painless way to figure out what other participants > >> > > in the discussion are trying to communicate. > >> > > > >> > > Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*? !! :-))) > >> > > > >> > > Rockin chair mike > >> > > > >> > > Thanks > >> > > > >> > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson < > >> > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >> > > wrote: > >> > > > >> > >> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" > >> more > >> > than > >> > >> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss > >> > >> of > an > >> > >> epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a > >> > >> there > >> > there?). > >> > >> > >> > >> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, > >> > >> I > know > >> > that > >> > >> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the > >> > >> concrete" - > >> which > >> > >> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or > >> something > >> > >> else? A "made real"?). > >> > >> > >> > >> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented > >> > >> social constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word > >> "ontological"?). > >> > >> > >> > >> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was > >> proposing: > >> > >> > >> http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language= > >> en > >> > >> > >> > >> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks > >> > >> since > it > >> > can be > >> > >> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and > >> > >> they can > >> be > >> > hit > >> > >> or miss. > >> > >> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I > >> > >> originally > >> sent in > >> > >> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it > >> interesting > >> > >> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? > >> > >> Others? > >> > >> -greg > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> > >> > >> > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central > >> component, > >> > >> > Greg. > >> > >> > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the > >> > >> > wrong > >> > >> conversation > >> > >> > here?). > >> > >> > > >> > >> > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? > >> Perhaps > >> > the > >> > >> > two talks will aid the discussion. > >> > >> > mike > >> > >> > > >> > >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson < > >> > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >> > >> > wrote: > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" > >> > >> > > discussions on > >> the > >> > >> other > >> > >> > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that > >> > >> > > others > >> > might > >> > >> be > >> > >> > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in > >> politics: > >> > >> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" > >> to > >> > >> works > >> > >> > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply > >> political > >> > >> act. > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > -greg > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > -- > >> > >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> > >> > > Assistant Professor > >> > >> > > Department of Anthropology > >> > >> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University > >> > >> > > Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > -- > >> > >> > > >> > >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of > >> > >> > construction > >> and > >> > re- > >> > >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are > >> > >> > contingently > but > >> > more > >> > >> or > >> > >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > Griffiths, > >> and > >> > >> > Gray, 2001] > >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> > >> Assistant Professor > >> > >> Department of Anthropology > >> > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> > >> Brigham Young University > >> > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > >> > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > -- > >> > > > >> > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of > >> > > construction > and > >> re- > >> > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently > >> > > but > >> more > >> > or > >> > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > >> > > Griffiths, > and > >> > > Gray, 2001] > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> Assistant Professor > >> Department of Anthropology > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> Brigham Young University > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Sep 27 12:48:52 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 27 Sep 2014 12:48:52 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Assistant Professor position in Critical Literacy - Tufts University Department of Education In-Reply-To: <195D9077-AF6A-49D3-ABF4-2220BB372771@tufts.edu> References: <195D9077-AF6A-49D3-ABF4-2220BB372771@tufts.edu> Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Gravel, Brian Date: Sat, Sep 27, 2014 at 12:46 PM Subject: Assistant Professor position in Critical Literacy - Tufts University Department of Education To: Hi friends and colleagues, I?m a member of the search committee at Tufts University for an Assistant Professor in Critical Literacy. I?ve attached the position description. Would you kindly pass this position announcement along to potential candidates, and consider applying yourself if that is appropriate? We appreciate your help! Take care, Brian *Brian Gravel, Ph.D.* Department of Education Tufts University Paige Hall Medford, MA 02155 brian.gravel@tufts.edu p. 617.627.4201 f. 617.627.3901 -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Critical Literacy Announcement Fall 2014.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 63249 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20140927/9f3bde20/attachment.pdf From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Sep 27 13:20:20 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 27 Sep 2014 14:20:20 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222A284@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222A284@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: Rod, seems like Mike's whispered idea of "recombination with" seems important to grasping the human relation to firstness. Here are Mike's whispered words: "the physiologically requisite conditions for sensing the world require that we separate from the world and recombine with it as an ongoing process or our sensory field fragments and eventually disappears." I take this to be a definition of "mediation" and of second/thirdness - the separation from the world. But, as with Peirce, this separation is not a Derrida-ian (following Saussure) split of the world into an ideal and material world, for in Mike's description the subject returns and recombines with the world "as an ongoing process" - in a sense returning to an apparent firstness (as well as a firstness for others). That was a bit abstract, but I'm happy to try and tease it out with an example if anyone is interested. But perhaps this is a bit too tedious... -greg? p.s. "grok" seems important to this conversation about immediacy, following Wikipedia's quote from Heinlein's sci-fi book Stranger in a Strange Land: " Grok means to understand so thoroughly that the observer becomes a part of the observed?to merge, blend, intermarry, lose identity in group experience. It means almost everything that we mean by religion, philosophy, and science?and it means as little to us (because of our Earthling assumptions) as color means to a blind man." And btw, my initial contact with Michael Saler had to do with his interest in Heinlein's connection to General Semantics... Feeling grokked... On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 2:05 AM, Rod Parker-Rees < R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > Sorry to step into a long and fascinating thread without having had time > to take in all of the arguments but I felt I had to respond to your > comment, Greg, ' since it is difficult to imagine knowing how to go on if > we really were immediately in the world - as in a kind of perpetual > Peircean firstness'. > > I would argue that it is one of the great advantages of the cycle of > generations that we don't have to imagine this because we (many of us) have > regular opportunities to SEE it in the lives of babies - who do, somehow > (and not least because of the support they get from others), manage to go > on in a Peircean firstness. > > All the best, > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: 25 September 2014 16:51 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds > > Larry, I really appreciate your descriptions of Peirce's 3 categories of > experience. From my reading of Peirce, this seems as close to the text as I > have seen. > But I wonder, now what? (or, perhaps a bit more bluntly "so what?"). > What do you make of this way of introducing differences that are purported > to make a difference? > What can we do with these categories? Particularly as they related to the > imaginal, the imaginated, and the imagination. > > And lurking somewhere in the back of my head is Mike's voice shouting that > even the ontology of naturalism involves imagination (i.e. mediation or > "into image-making" - see Etienne Pelaprat and Mike's paper on Minding the > Gap) - and perhaps this is where there is much less of a difference > between the individual subscribing to a naturalist ontology and one who > lives in a world inhabited by spirits of dead ancestors and such - both > require a kind of meconnaissance, a mis-recognizing of the mediated nature > of the world and both FEEL that they know the world in its immediacy (or > perhaps just in a "more immediate, less mediated" way than the other). Just > as I feel that I am grasping a more immediate and unmediated truth by > making this very statement. We all imagine our hold on the world to be > immediate. And perhaps it is best that this is so since it is difficult to > imagine knowing how to go on if we really were immediately in the world - > as in a kind of perpetual Peircean firstness. > > Imagining that is to imagine the unimaginable. > > -greg > > On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 8:57 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > This topic of types of ontologies was engaged with by Peirce who > > proposed his 3 categories of experience. > > > > Firstness: Is the category of bare immediacy. *is* Pure > > undiscriminated presence. Epistemologically firstness is immediate and > > VIVID BUT INDESCRIBABLE experience. Metaphysically firstness is > > *possibility* that could *become* qualities that are general. > > [redness, pain] Firstness is unorganized, unreflected, and uncognized. > > Yet general qualities can > > *emerge* in metaphysical firstness. > > > > SECONDNESS: Secondness is characterized by its RESISTANCE TO OUR > > INTENTIONS or expectations. Epistemolgically secondness is experienced > > as a shock to habitual patterns of awareness. Secondness is particular > and disruptive. > > Metaphysically secondness is characterized as NONEGO [what is other] > > That is it cannot be associated with the *self* since it actively > > contradicts the VOLITIONS of the self. > > > > THIRDNESS depends upon both firstness and secondness and functions as > > THEIR MEDIATION. Thirdness is conceptual and conscious. It is the > > realm of general repeatable habitual experiences AND [in general] > > thirdness is cognitive. All uniformities [in knowledge OR REALITY] are > > *modes* of thirdness insofar as they are general. > > Human ACTION is GOVERNED by the thirdness that IS cognitively present. > > Without thirdness we are left with the confusing and uncognizable > > world of immediacy [firstness] and resistance [secondness] > > > > Peirce seems to be playing in this realm of reality and imaginal Larry > > > > On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 6:56 AM, Larry Purss > wrote: > > > > > Greg, and David > > > > > > The questions generated by reflections considering types of the > > > imaginal such as: > > > > > > # natural ontology that says something exists because the world just > > > *is* [nothing more, nothing less] in all its base materiality. > > > > > > # the imaginal *as* reality opening up an enchanted world of myth, > > > belief and religion. > > > > > > # the *intentionally* constructed [made] imaginal that brings into > > > *form* [structure] that are rational > > > > > > # the gestalt perception of multiple poly arrangements of the real > > > AND imaginal [*and* NOT as addition but as chiasm or binocular depth > > > perceiving/conceiving] > > > > > > Greg SAYS he *feels* [intuits, speculates?] : > > > > > > "At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something > > > different about these two TYPES of imagined worlds, with the other > > > (rationalist) > > type > > > of imagined worlds that, as you note, are perhaps more contrived, > > > more intentionally made." > > > > > > Then Greg makes a value observation that he notes is a difference > > > that makes a difference: > > > : > > > "But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to > > > say that the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems > > > that this points to differences in ontology." > > > > > > These various "types" when privileged are possibly "reductions" or > > > "abstractions" from the EXCESS which Merleau Ponty explores through > > > *expressive cognition* The notions of reversals, and transversals, > > > and > > the > > > personification of THIS movement of orientations [orientations in > > > sense] can be personified in the person of Hermes [the trickster]. > > > > > > Hillman, who plays within the ontology suggesting the imaginal is > > > reality suggests the *I* [ego] is that personification [as imaginal] > > > that *takes* itself literally, not metaphorically. If we see > > > *through* the myth of > > the > > > *I* as a literalization of the social actor [as intentional maker or > > > constructor] then we possibly open up the EXCESS [of *is*] to > > > explore relations between *is* [material, being, becoming] with the > > > imaginal *as > > > if* to create a *chiasm* or binocular vision in *depth* [which is > > > NOT a summation of the *is* and *and is*] but is a gestalt *type* > > > historically constituted through *expressive cognition* [Merleau > > > Ponty's term] > > > > > > Greg, this *feeling* as a way of orienting to make *sense* through > > *types* > > > seems like *interpretive musings* [Peirce] > > > > > > Just wondering > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 11:45 PM, Greg Thompson < > > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > > > > wrote: > > > > > >> David, > > >> Thanks for this wonderfully thoughtful note. > > >> As I posted my note to the video, I was reading Max Gluckman's > > >> Rituals > > of > > >> Rebellion. In that book, Gluckman describes rituals in which people > > invert > > >> the norms of society for a period of time. This is clearly living > > >> in an imagined world (perhaps as much as living in the world full > > >> of upright norms), but this wouldn't make it onto Saler's radar. So > > >> I agree with > > your > > >> concern about ethnocentrism. > > >> At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something > > >> different about these two types of imagined worlds, with the other > > >> (rationalist) type of imagined worlds that, as you note, are > > >> perhaps more contrived, more intentionally made. > > >> But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to > > >> say > > that > > >> the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems that this > > >> points > > to > > >> differences in ontology. The intentionally made imaginary is a > > >> result > > of a > > >> naturalist ontology (here you see I am buying some of Saler's > > >> argument about a Weberian disenchantment with modernity). In a > > >> naturalist > > ontology, > > >> the world is just there in "all its base materiality." Nothing > > >> more, nothing less. There is no space for the rich imagined world > > >> of myth, belief, and religion (or so it is believed). In other > > >> worlds, there is space for something more. > > >> Anyway, I think there was too much for me to chew on in your post. > > >> Still thinking about it... > > >> -greg > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 10:22 PM, David Kellogg > > >> > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >> > Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how cramped, > > >> > ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of imaginary > > >> > worlds is. > > >> > > > >> > The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of > > >> > imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it is > > >> > only with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately > > >> > "believe" in a fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual > > >> > creator. That is, adult play only begins with people who were the > > >> > peers of my grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also > > >> > be imaginary worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of > > >> > people, but they do not signify, because the effort of believing > > >> > in them in order to inhabit them is not differentiated from > > >> > believing in them because you think they are true. > > >> > > > >> > Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional > > >> > "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional > > >> > delusion is very much older than this. At the end of Don Quixote, > > >> > the old man's neighbors try their very best to convince Don > > >> > Quixote to go on inhabiting the novelistic world he has created > > >> > for them, and fail; there is no suggestion that they do this > > >> > because they believe the old man's world is real. There was a > > >> > spate of similar novels in English in eighteenth century (e.g. > > >> > Charlotte Lennox's "the Female Quixote"), and Jane Austen's first > > >> > novel, Northanger Abbey, is a romance about a woman whose whole > > >> > attraction is that she actually assumes only the very best > > >> > motives in real people, and reserves her fascination with ill > > >> > will for the reading of Gothic novels; when she meets with a > > >> > genuinely nasty character (General Tilney) for the first time, > > >> > she imputes Gothic motives to him where there are only mundane > > >> > and mercenary ones, and the novel ends with the half > > >> > disenchantment of the heroine and half enchantment of the General's > son, both quite deliberately acts of metacognition. > > >> > > > >> > But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much earlier. > > >> > "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a > > >> > particular kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became > > >> > parodistsic. "Dream of the Red Chamber" is about a stone left > > >> > over from when the world was made, which is reincarnated by a > > >> > sensitive young man who falls in with one cousin and marries > > >> > another. It is also about a garden, built for a one day visit to > > >> > her family by one of the Emperor's concubines, which eventually > > >> > bankrupts the family. But the children of the family are allowed to > run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety of fancies: > > >> > at various places we are told that various parts of the novel, > > >> > and even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the minds > > >> > of others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, almost > > >> > every fiction manuscript was passed around in a community (rather > > >> > as Jane Austen's manuscripts were shared in her family) and > > >> > "Dream of the Red Chamber" was probably finished by someone else > > >> > (the last third of it was written well after the death of the > > >> > author, but computer analysis has not definitively proven that it > was written by someone else). > > >> > > > >> > I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is > > >> > that, like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we > > >> > keep thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and > > >> > the preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist > > >> > thinking (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and > > >> > wonder) are the last word and not merely latest one. I spend a > > >> > great deal of the time that I spend writing half-listening to > > >> > eighteenth century operas, which are in very obvious ways > > >> > imaginary worlds which we enter only by voluntarily checking our > > >> > linguistic assumptions in the cloakroom. In less obvious ways, it > > >> > seems to me, these imaginary worlds are interested in a clash > > >> > that we no longer take very seriously. It's the clash between a > > >> > form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, because empirical, and > one which is narrowly rationalist, because puritanical. > > >> > The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act of > > >> > forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro). > > >> > The strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness > > >> > by its very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don > > >> > Giovanni gets around this problem by making repentance a > > >> > precondition for forgiveness, and then by arguing that the truly > > >> > damnable will never repent, not even as they are actually being > damned. > > >> > > > >> > We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism > > >> > and merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching. > > >> > There is the humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary > > >> > negotiations of meaning between human beings--and the rationalist > > >> > belief in the inflexible, innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere > > >> > it seems to have been subsumed in the general opposition between > > >> > art and science that we find in Saler's talk. Part of the point > > >> > of my book is really to try to revive it--in the form of a > > >> > humanizing dialogic tendency in story telling versus a more > rationalizing narrativistic one. > > >> > > > >> > David Kellogg > > >> > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > >> > > > >> > By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and > > >> > everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two > > >> > chapters for free at.... > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-pr > > axis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/ > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of it > > >> > not as an interface between the virtual world and the real one, > > >> > but only as yet another interface between this virtual world and > > >> > the next one!) > > >> > > > >> > dk > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole wrote: > > >> > > Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the > > >> discussions, > > >> > > Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two > > >> > > others > > >> > suffer > > >> > > from the same difficulties. > > >> > > > > >> > > My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If > > >> > > that's > > a > > >> > > mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general rule, > > >> > > but > > when > > >> > they > > >> > > are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, seems > > >> > > like > > a > > >> > > relatively painless way to figure out what other participants > > >> > > in the discussion are trying to communicate. > > >> > > > > >> > > Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*? !! :-))) > > >> > > > > >> > > Rockin chair mike > > >> > > > > >> > > Thanks > > >> > > > > >> > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson < > > >> > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > >> > > wrote: > > >> > > > > >> > >> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into "reality" > > >> more > > >> > than > > >> > >> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss > > >> > >> of > > an > > >> > >> epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a > > >> > >> there > > >> > there?). > > >> > >> > > >> > >> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, > > >> > >> I > > know > > >> > that > > >> > >> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the > > >> > >> concrete" - > > >> which > > >> > >> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or > > >> something > > >> > >> else? A "made real"?). > > >> > >> > > >> > >> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented > > >> > >> social constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word > > >> "ontological"?). > > >> > >> > > >> > >> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was > > >> proposing: > > >> > >> > > >> http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language= > > >> en > > >> > >> > > >> > >> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks > > >> > >> since > > it > > >> > can be > > >> > >> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and > > >> > >> they can > > >> be > > >> > hit > > >> > >> or miss. > > >> > >> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I > > >> > >> originally > > >> sent in > > >> > >> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it > > >> interesting > > >> > >> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? > > >> > >> Others? > > >> > >> -greg > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole > wrote: > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central > > >> component, > > >> > >> > Greg. > > >> > >> > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the > > >> > >> > wrong > > >> > >> conversation > > >> > >> > here?). > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? > > >> Perhaps > > >> > the > > >> > >> > two talks will aid the discussion. > > >> > >> > mike > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson < > > >> > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > >> > >> > wrote: > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" > > >> > >> > > discussions on > > >> the > > >> > >> other > > >> > >> > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that > > >> > >> > > others > > >> > might > > >> > >> be > > >> > >> > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in > > >> politics: > > >> > >> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the > otherwise" > > >> to > > >> > >> works > > >> > >> > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and > Rabelais. > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply > > >> political > > >> > >> act. > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > > -greg > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > > -- > > >> > >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >> > >> > > Assistant Professor > > >> > >> > > Department of Anthropology > > >> > >> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University > > >> > >> > > Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > -- > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of > > >> > >> > construction > > >> and > > >> > re- > > >> > >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are > > >> > >> > contingently > > but > > >> > more > > >> > >> or > > >> > >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > > Griffiths, > > >> and > > >> > >> > Gray, 2001] > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> -- > > >> > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >> > >> Assistant Professor > > >> > >> Department of Anthropology > > >> > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >> > >> Brigham Young University > > >> > >> Provo, UT 84602 > > >> > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > >> > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > -- > > >> > > > > >> > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of > > >> > > construction > > and > > >> re- > > >> > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently > > >> > > but > > >> more > > >> > or > > >> > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > > >> > > Griffiths, > > and > > >> > > Gray, 2001] > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> -- > > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >> Assistant Professor > > >> Department of Anthropology > > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >> Brigham Young University > > >> Provo, UT 84602 > > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Sep 28 16:48:31 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sun, 28 Sep 2014 16:48:31 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222A284@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: Greg, I encourage you to follow Mike's lead on *recombination* as the mediating process of separating and reconnecting firstness. Mike's concept of the *gap* and the question of what is happening within the gap also seems important. I have been reflecting on Peirce's secondness that posits *resistance* [constraints] as also KEY to firstness and thirdness. I wonder if whenever we develop *theory* and *models* firstness is engaged through secondness [what goes BEYOND [excess] to *all* theory*? Grokking as a phenomena but also secondness and our way to groke firstness and secondness as *significant signs* Peirce also explored *sign phenomena* and suggested EVERY SIGN INCLUDES, iconic, indexical, and symbolic significations. Not as discrete but as simultaneous and never in pure forms. The same sign phenomena can be reflected from the *angle* of iconic [pictures, images, resemblance] AND indexical [pointing or *gesturing* to the PARTICULAR UNIQUE CASE] AND symbolic [pointing or indicating the significance BEYOND the particular towards the *general*. What seems KEY is Peirce suggests all signs INCLUDE all three categories of signification SIMULTANEOUSLY. We can focus on one or the other *angle* of sign phenomena as more significant [while the other aspects recede into the background] but all three aspects are always *present* in ALL indicating actions. To return to the exploration of *recombination* and *mediation* is it possible to consider mediating phenomena as simultaneously iconic indexical and symbolic. Then the indicating *this* or *that* CASE becomes indexical and unique examples recombined. The same phenomena can be considered iconic *This* resembles *that* as recombination. However from another angle this same phenomena can be significant of *general* recombining interpretations. For example the separating from the *field* and recombining as an example of a general aspect of human *nature* Greg, I want to encourage you to follow your *hunch* and go further with this loose thread of an *idea* exploring phenomena as recombinations as the biological person *perceives* the encompassing surround [field, clearing horizon] Larry On Sat, Sep 27, 2014 at 1:20 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Rod, seems like Mike's whispered idea of "recombination with" seems > important to grasping the human relation to firstness. Here are Mike's > whispered words: > > "the physiologically requisite conditions for sensing the world require > that we separate from the world > and recombine with it as an ongoing process or our sensory field fragments > and > eventually disappears." > > I take this to be a definition of "mediation" and of second/thirdness - the > separation from the world. But, as with Peirce, this separation is not a > Derrida-ian (following Saussure) split of the world into an ideal and > material world, for in Mike's description the subject returns and > recombines with the world "as an ongoing process" - in a sense returning to > an apparent firstness (as well as a firstness for others). > > That was a bit abstract, but I'm happy to try and tease it out with an > example if anyone is interested. But perhaps this is a bit too tedious... > -greg? > p.s. "grok" seems important to this conversation about immediacy, following > Wikipedia's quote from Heinlein's sci-fi book Stranger in a Strange Land: > " > Grok means to understand so thoroughly that the observer becomes a part of > the observed?to merge, blend, intermarry, lose identity in group > experience. It means almost everything that we mean by religion, > philosophy, and science?and it means as little to us (because of our > Earthling assumptions) as color means to a blind man." > And btw, my initial contact with Michael Saler had to do with his interest > in Heinlein's connection to General Semantics... Feeling grokked... > > > > > On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 2:05 AM, Rod Parker-Rees < > R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > > > Sorry to step into a long and fascinating thread without having had time > > to take in all of the arguments but I felt I had to respond to your > > comment, Greg, ' since it is difficult to imagine knowing how to go on if > > we really were immediately in the world - as in a kind of perpetual > > Peircean firstness'. > > > > I would argue that it is one of the great advantages of the cycle of > > generations that we don't have to imagine this because we (many of us) > have > > regular opportunities to SEE it in the lives of babies - who do, somehow > > (and not least because of the support they get from others), manage to go > > on in a Peircean firstness. > > > > All the best, > > > > Rod > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > > Sent: 25 September 2014 16:51 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds > > > > Larry, I really appreciate your descriptions of Peirce's 3 categories of > > experience. From my reading of Peirce, this seems as close to the text > as I > > have seen. > > But I wonder, now what? (or, perhaps a bit more bluntly "so what?"). > > What do you make of this way of introducing differences that are > purported > > to make a difference? > > What can we do with these categories? Particularly as they related to the > > imaginal, the imaginated, and the imagination. > > > > And lurking somewhere in the back of my head is Mike's voice shouting > that > > even the ontology of naturalism involves imagination (i.e. mediation or > > "into image-making" - see Etienne Pelaprat and Mike's paper on Minding > the > > Gap) - and perhaps this is where there is much less of a difference > > between the individual subscribing to a naturalist ontology and one who > > lives in a world inhabited by spirits of dead ancestors and such - both > > require a kind of meconnaissance, a mis-recognizing of the mediated > nature > > of the world and both FEEL that they know the world in its immediacy (or > > perhaps just in a "more immediate, less mediated" way than the other). > Just > > as I feel that I am grasping a more immediate and unmediated truth by > > making this very statement. We all imagine our hold on the world to be > > immediate. And perhaps it is best that this is so since it is difficult > to > > imagine knowing how to go on if we really were immediately in the world - > > as in a kind of perpetual Peircean firstness. > > > > Imagining that is to imagine the unimaginable. > > > > -greg > > > > On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 8:57 AM, Larry Purss > wrote: > > > > > This topic of types of ontologies was engaged with by Peirce who > > > proposed his 3 categories of experience. > > > > > > Firstness: Is the category of bare immediacy. *is* Pure > > > undiscriminated presence. Epistemologically firstness is immediate and > > > VIVID BUT INDESCRIBABLE experience. Metaphysically firstness is > > > *possibility* that could *become* qualities that are general. > > > [redness, pain] Firstness is unorganized, unreflected, and uncognized. > > > Yet general qualities can > > > *emerge* in metaphysical firstness. > > > > > > SECONDNESS: Secondness is characterized by its RESISTANCE TO OUR > > > INTENTIONS or expectations. Epistemolgically secondness is experienced > > > as a shock to habitual patterns of awareness. Secondness is particular > > and disruptive. > > > Metaphysically secondness is characterized as NONEGO [what is other] > > > That is it cannot be associated with the *self* since it actively > > > contradicts the VOLITIONS of the self. > > > > > > THIRDNESS depends upon both firstness and secondness and functions as > > > THEIR MEDIATION. Thirdness is conceptual and conscious. It is the > > > realm of general repeatable habitual experiences AND [in general] > > > thirdness is cognitive. All uniformities [in knowledge OR REALITY] are > > > *modes* of thirdness insofar as they are general. > > > Human ACTION is GOVERNED by the thirdness that IS cognitively present. > > > Without thirdness we are left with the confusing and uncognizable > > > world of immediacy [firstness] and resistance [secondness] > > > > > > Peirce seems to be playing in this realm of reality and imaginal Larry > > > > > > On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 6:56 AM, Larry Purss > > wrote: > > > > > > > Greg, and David > > > > > > > > The questions generated by reflections considering types of the > > > > imaginal such as: > > > > > > > > # natural ontology that says something exists because the world just > > > > *is* [nothing more, nothing less] in all its base materiality. > > > > > > > > # the imaginal *as* reality opening up an enchanted world of myth, > > > > belief and religion. > > > > > > > > # the *intentionally* constructed [made] imaginal that brings into > > > > *form* [structure] that are rational > > > > > > > > # the gestalt perception of multiple poly arrangements of the real > > > > AND imaginal [*and* NOT as addition but as chiasm or binocular depth > > > > perceiving/conceiving] > > > > > > > > Greg SAYS he *feels* [intuits, speculates?] : > > > > > > > > "At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something > > > > different about these two TYPES of imagined worlds, with the other > > > > (rationalist) > > > type > > > > of imagined worlds that, as you note, are perhaps more contrived, > > > > more intentionally made." > > > > > > > > Then Greg makes a value observation that he notes is a difference > > > > that makes a difference: > > > > : > > > > "But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to > > > > say that the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems > > > > that this points to differences in ontology." > > > > > > > > These various "types" when privileged are possibly "reductions" or > > > > "abstractions" from the EXCESS which Merleau Ponty explores through > > > > *expressive cognition* The notions of reversals, and transversals, > > > > and > > > the > > > > personification of THIS movement of orientations [orientations in > > > > sense] can be personified in the person of Hermes [the trickster]. > > > > > > > > Hillman, who plays within the ontology suggesting the imaginal is > > > > reality suggests the *I* [ego] is that personification [as imaginal] > > > > that *takes* itself literally, not metaphorically. If we see > > > > *through* the myth of > > > the > > > > *I* as a literalization of the social actor [as intentional maker or > > > > constructor] then we possibly open up the EXCESS [of *is*] to > > > > explore relations between *is* [material, being, becoming] with the > > > > imaginal *as > > > > if* to create a *chiasm* or binocular vision in *depth* [which is > > > > NOT a summation of the *is* and *and is*] but is a gestalt *type* > > > > historically constituted through *expressive cognition* [Merleau > > > > Ponty's term] > > > > > > > > Greg, this *feeling* as a way of orienting to make *sense* through > > > *types* > > > > seems like *interpretive musings* [Peirce] > > > > > > > > Just wondering > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 11:45 PM, Greg Thompson < > > > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >> David, > > > >> Thanks for this wonderfully thoughtful note. > > > >> As I posted my note to the video, I was reading Max Gluckman's > > > >> Rituals > > > of > > > >> Rebellion. In that book, Gluckman describes rituals in which people > > > invert > > > >> the norms of society for a period of time. This is clearly living > > > >> in an imagined world (perhaps as much as living in the world full > > > >> of upright norms), but this wouldn't make it onto Saler's radar. So > > > >> I agree with > > > your > > > >> concern about ethnocentrism. > > > >> At the same time I can't help but feel like there is something > > > >> different about these two types of imagined worlds, with the other > > > >> (rationalist) type of imagined worlds that, as you note, are > > > >> perhaps more contrived, more intentionally made. > > > >> But to say that there is a difference here worth noting is not to > > > >> say > > > that > > > >> the latter is superior to the former. Rather, it seems that this > > > >> points > > > to > > > >> differences in ontology. The intentionally made imaginary is a > > > >> result > > > of a > > > >> naturalist ontology (here you see I am buying some of Saler's > > > >> argument about a Weberian disenchantment with modernity). In a > > > >> naturalist > > > ontology, > > > >> the world is just there in "all its base materiality." Nothing > > > >> more, nothing less. There is no space for the rich imagined world > > > >> of myth, belief, and religion (or so it is believed). In other > > > >> worlds, there is space for something more. > > > >> Anyway, I think there was too much for me to chew on in your post. > > > >> Still thinking about it... > > > >> -greg > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 10:22 PM, David Kellogg > > > >> > > > >> wrote: > > > >> > > > >> > Yes, I was impressed. But mostly I was impressed by how cramped, > > > >> > ethnocentric and also present-centric Saler's view of imaginary > > > >> > worlds is. > > > >> > > > > >> > The argument, as I understand it, is that the colonization of > > > >> > imaginary worlds only begins with Sherlock Holmes, because it is > > > >> > only with Sherlock Holmes that people began to deliberately > > > >> > "believe" in a fictional creation and "disbelieve" in the actual > > > >> > creator. That is, adult play only begins with people who were the > > > >> > peers of my grandparents. Hoaxes, myths, and religions may also > > > >> > be imaginary worlds that are inhabited by large numbers of > > > >> > people, but they do not signify, because the effort of believing > > > >> > in them in order to inhabit them is not differentiated from > > > >> > believing in them because you think they are true. > > > >> > > > > >> > Of course, the distinction between the conscious, volitional > > > >> > "suspension of disbelief" and non-conscious, non-volitional > > > >> > delusion is very much older than this. At the end of Don Quixote, > > > >> > the old man's neighbors try their very best to convince Don > > > >> > Quixote to go on inhabiting the novelistic world he has created > > > >> > for them, and fail; there is no suggestion that they do this > > > >> > because they believe the old man's world is real. There was a > > > >> > spate of similar novels in English in eighteenth century (e.g. > > > >> > Charlotte Lennox's "the Female Quixote"), and Jane Austen's first > > > >> > novel, Northanger Abbey, is a romance about a woman whose whole > > > >> > attraction is that she actually assumes only the very best > > > >> > motives in real people, and reserves her fascination with ill > > > >> > will for the reading of Gothic novels; when she meets with a > > > >> > genuinely nasty character (General Tilney) for the first time, > > > >> > she imputes Gothic motives to him where there are only mundane > > > >> > and mercenary ones, and the novel ends with the half > > > >> > disenchantment of the heroine and half enchantment of the > General's > > son, both quite deliberately acts of metacognition. > > > >> > > > > >> > But as with so many things, the Chinese thought of it much > earlier. > > > >> > "Journey to the West" started out as "fan fiction" of a > > > >> > particular kind of Buddhist adventure novel, and became > > > >> > parodistsic. "Dream of the Red Chamber" is about a stone left > > > >> > over from when the world was made, which is reincarnated by a > > > >> > sensitive young man who falls in with one cousin and marries > > > >> > another. It is also about a garden, built for a one day visit to > > > >> > her family by one of the Emperor's concubines, which eventually > > > >> > bankrupts the family. But the children of the family are allowed > to > > run wild there, and they indulge a wide variety of fancies: > > > >> > at various places we are told that various parts of the novel, > > > >> > and even whole families, are simply willful fictions in the minds > > > >> > of others. Actually, in the days before mass printing, almost > > > >> > every fiction manuscript was passed around in a community (rather > > > >> > as Jane Austen's manuscripts were shared in her family) and > > > >> > "Dream of the Red Chamber" was probably finished by someone else > > > >> > (the last third of it was written well after the death of the > > > >> > author, but computer analysis has not definitively proven that it > > was written by someone else). > > > >> > > > > >> > I think that the reason we tend to make howlers like Saler's is > > > >> > that, like fish, we just can't see the water we swim in, and we > > > >> > keep thinking that our own age is somehow uniquely modern, and > > > >> > the preoccupations of our own brands of irrealist and realist > > > >> > thinking (e.g. between art and science, between rationality and > > > >> > wonder) are the last word and not merely latest one. I spend a > > > >> > great deal of the time that I spend writing half-listening to > > > >> > eighteenth century operas, which are in very obvious ways > > > >> > imaginary worlds which we enter only by voluntarily checking our > > > >> > linguistic assumptions in the cloakroom. In less obvious ways, it > > > >> > seems to me, these imaginary worlds are interested in a clash > > > >> > that we no longer take very seriously. It's the clash between a > > > >> > form of knowledge which is broadly humanist, because empirical, > and > > one which is narrowly rationalist, because puritanical. > > > >> > The humanist agenda demands that the opera must end in an act of > > > >> > forgiveness (as the Count is forgiven in the Marriage of Figaro). > > > >> > The strictly rationalist agenda forbids this (because forgiveness > > > >> > by its very nature is a kind of diremption of justice). Don > > > >> > Giovanni gets around this problem by making repentance a > > > >> > precondition for forgiveness, and then by arguing that the truly > > > >> > damnable will never repent, not even as they are actually being > > damned. > > > >> > > > > >> > We still see traces of this clash between empiricistic humanism > > > >> > and merciless rationalism in my own field, language teaching. > > > >> > There is the humanist belief in words--empirical, temporary > > > >> > negotiations of meaning between human beings--and the rationalist > > > >> > belief in the inflexible, innate laws of grammar. But elsewhere > > > >> > it seems to have been subsumed in the general opposition between > > > >> > art and science that we find in Saler's talk. Part of the point > > > >> > of my book is really to try to revive it--in the form of a > > > >> > humanizing dialogic tendency in story telling versus a more > > rationalizing narrativistic one. > > > >> > > > > >> > David Kellogg > > > >> > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > >> > > > > >> > By the way...the index of the book has at last been fixed, and > > > >> > everybody and their grandchildren can download the first two > > > >> > chapters for free at.... > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/imagination-and-pr > > > axis/the-great-globe-and-all-who-it-inherit/ > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > (Yes, even xmca postings sometimes carry promotions...think of it > > > >> > not as an interface between the virtual world and the real one, > > > >> > but only as yet another interface between this virtual world and > > > >> > the next one!) > > > >> > > > > >> > dk > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > On 24 September 2014 12:10, mike cole wrote: > > > >> > > Just trying to keep some minimum level of continuity in the > > > >> discussions, > > > >> > > Greg. Maybe its just my problem alone, but I think one or two > > > >> > > others > > > >> > suffer > > > >> > > from the same difficulties. > > > >> > > > > > >> > > My intention is to watch both and consider them together. If > > > >> > > that's > > > a > > > >> > > mistake, my loss! I do not watch TED talks as a general rule, > > > >> > > but > > > when > > > >> > they > > > >> > > are specifically called out by xmca members as relevant, seems > > > >> > > like > > > a > > > >> > > relatively painless way to figure out what other participants > > > >> > > in the discussion are trying to communicate. > > > >> > > > > > >> > > Easier than reading, for example, *Who's Asking*? !! :-))) > > > >> > > > > > >> > > Rockin chair mike > > > >> > > > > > >> > > Thanks > > > >> > > > > > >> > > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:38 PM, Greg Thompson < > > > >> > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > > >> > > wrote: > > > >> > > > > > >> > >> I thought the other tread was beginning to descend into > "reality" > > > >> more > > > >> > than > > > >> > >> I care to (or perhaps worse, spiraling downward into the abyss > > > >> > >> of > > > an > > > >> > >> epistemologically-minded social constructionism - is there a > > > >> > >> there > > > >> > there?). > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> Seemed like good reason to soar in the imagination (yes, Mike, > > > >> > >> I > > > know > > > >> > that > > > >> > >> you prefer to invert that metaphor and "ascend to the > > > >> > >> concrete" - > > > >> which > > > >> > >> makes me wonder what you mean by "the concrete"? Reality? Or > > > >> something > > > >> > >> else? A "made real"?). > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> But I'd agree that it is on point with a "making"-oriented > > > >> > >> social constructionism (trying to avoid using that awful word > > > >> "ontological"?). > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> Anyway, I think this is the Haidt talk that John Cummins was > > > >> proposing: > > > >> > >> > > > >> http://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language= > > > >> en > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> I'm wondering if people are a bit fed up with the Ted talks > > > >> > >> since > > > it > > > >> > can be > > > >> > >> tough to find 20 minutes to watch/listen to a Ted talk and > > > >> > >> they can > > > >> be > > > >> > hit > > > >> > >> or miss. > > > >> > >> But I would again strongly recommend the Saler talk I > > > >> > >> originally > > > >> sent in > > > >> > >> this email. I thought David Ke, in particular, would find it > > > >> interesting > > > >> > >> (or at least point out where it is wrong). David? > > > >> > >> Others? > > > >> > >> -greg > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 6:59 PM, mike cole > > wrote: > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > I thought the other tread involved imagination as a central > > > >> component, > > > >> > >> > Greg. > > > >> > >> > So not clear why this is a distraction. (Or am i in the > > > >> > >> > wrong > > > >> > >> conversation > > > >> > >> > here?). > > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > Can you find the Haight TED talk that was recommended to us? > > > >> Perhaps > > > >> > the > > > >> > >> > two talks will aid the discussion. > > > >> > >> > mike > > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > On Tue, Sep 23, 2014 at 7:37 AM, Greg Thompson < > > > >> > >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > > >> > >> > wrote: > > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" > > > >> > >> > > discussions on > > > >> the > > > >> > >> other > > > >> > >> > > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that > > > >> > >> > > others > > > >> > might > > > >> > >> be > > > >> > >> > > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in > > > >> politics: > > > >> > >> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > > > >> > >> > > > > > >> > >> > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the > > otherwise" > > > >> to > > > >> > >> works > > > >> > >> > > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and > > Rabelais. > > > >> > >> > > > > > >> > >> > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply > > > >> political > > > >> > >> act. > > > >> > >> > > > > > >> > >> > > -greg > > > >> > >> > > > > > >> > >> > > -- > > > >> > >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > >> > >> > > Assistant Professor > > > >> > >> > > Department of Anthropology > > > >> > >> > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University > > > >> > >> > > Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > >> > >> > > > > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > -- > > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of > > > >> > >> > construction > > > >> and > > > >> > re- > > > >> > >> > construction in which heterogeneous resources are > > > >> > >> > contingently > > > but > > > >> > more > > > >> > >> or > > > >> > >> > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > > > Griffiths, > > > >> and > > > >> > >> > Gray, 2001] > > > >> > >> > > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> > > > >> > >> -- > > > >> > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > >> > >> Assistant Professor > > > >> > >> Department of Anthropology > > > >> > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > >> > >> Brigham Young University > > > >> > >> Provo, UT 84602 > > > >> > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > >> > >> > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > -- > > > >> > > > > > >> > > Development and Evolution are both ... "processes of > > > >> > > construction > > > and > > > >> re- > > > >> > > construction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently > > > >> > > but > > > >> more > > > >> > or > > > >> > > less reliably reassembled for each life cycle." [Oyama, > > > >> > > Griffiths, > > > and > > > >> > > Gray, 2001] > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> -- > > > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > >> Assistant Professor > > > >> Department of Anthropology > > > >> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > >> Brigham Young University > > > >> Provo, UT 84602 > > > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > ________________________________ > > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on > it. > > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan > emails > > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > > by an official order form. > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From djwdoc@yahoo.com Mon Sep 29 11:22:50 2014 From: djwdoc@yahoo.com (Douglas Williams) Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2014 11:22:50 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1412014970.30056.YahooMailNeo@web162103.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> Hi-- I may have missed a response (I'm speed-reading as I am poaching time from work), but I just wanted to add a second to Tom's comment here. Religions are all about possible worlds, in dystopic or utopic forms, and about ways of getting there, which, if they often resort to deus ex machina means, also implicitly postulate possible actions to bring or to avoid about such worlds. Similarly, Plato's Republic is a possible world. More's Utopia is a possible world. The act of re-imagining what is and what has been into new ideas of what could be--that tertiary place that Morse Peckham (Man's Rage for Chaos) and Marx Wartofsky (Models) talk about--or even what could never be, yet could influence the tyranny of present reality, is perhaps the last refuge of the uniquely human differences between us and other creatures. But time for me to post my other note, and stop stealing time from the present.... Doug ________________________________ From: Tom Richardson To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Wednesday, September 24, 2014 2:04 AM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The history of science fiction and imagined worlds Hi Greg Thanks for this - entertaining! But why doesn't Michael S. go right back to all religious belief - surely Christians are just such 'geeks', long before Sherlock H. 'believers'? Tom Middlesbrough UK On 23 September 2014 15:37, Greg Thompson wrote: > Apologies for distracting from the "real world" discussions on the other > thread, but I came across this Ted talk and thought that others might be > interested in the history and role of imagined worlds in politics: > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUtErxgz7Mo > > But perhaps it is worth tracing otherworlds and "the otherwise" to works > such as those of Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and Rabelais. > > Seems like imagining other worlds has always been a deeply political act. > > -greg > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From djwdoc@yahoo.com Mon Sep 29 11:37:36 2014 From: djwdoc@yahoo.com (Douglas Williams) Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2014 11:37:36 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Activity/CHAT, work teams, and the utopian reconciliation of production and consumption In-Reply-To: <00d301cfd948$83556c40$8a0044c0$@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp> References: <00d301cfd948$83556c40$8a0044c0$@inf.shizuoka.ac.jp> Message-ID: <1412015856.46388.YahooMailNeo@web162101.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> Hi-- I have Engestrom's Teams and Knots on order, and I'm aware that there is an expanding literature on what Engestrom has called "horozontal" development of activity systems in the workplace, but I am wondering if anyone might have particular recommendations for recent applied work on the engagements of polyphonic communities in the workplace. It is my experience that in both the creation and consumption of products, multiple communities interact with each other through the medium of the product. The result is a kind of co-construction of the object out of consumer use and developmental modeling and practices, but in general, the dialogues through which this happens are rather tortured. I am aware of the Action Research approach to the issue, but while getting people to examine unspoken reasons for dysfunctional interactions is not a bad start, I'm interested in as much practical, contextualized examples of system remediation as I can find...keeping in mind that all too often, when one speaks the word "theory" in the world of deadlines and remorselessly urgent action, conflicting voices invariably unite in reaching for their guns--happily, only in the abstract sense, though negative results are real enough. As you see, I have my own version of science fiction on the mind. Regards, Doug From krisgu@ucla.edu Mon Sep 29 14:46:19 2014 From: krisgu@ucla.edu (Kris Gutierrez) Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2014 14:46:19 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] DML 2015 Call for Proposals Starts now Message-ID: The 2015 Digital Media Learning Conference call for proposals starts today. The conference theme, Equity by Design, should be of interest to many of you interested in digital and networked media and designing for robust and equitable learning. The conference will be held in Los Angeles, June 11-13, 2015. Hope to see you there. Kris http://dml2015.dmlhub.net/call-for-proposals/ Kris D. Guti?rrez, Ph.D. Professor Graduate School of Education University of California, Berkeley gutierrkd@berkeley.edu From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue Sep 30 13:25:58 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2014 14:25:58 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Help? Vygotsky train ride Message-ID: I was trying to find an XMCA post that mentioned a train ride that Vygotsky was taking on his way to London and was writing a letter to his wife (yes, I know that a boat would have to be involved at some point if he wanted to get to London...). I searched the archives for the usual words but couldn't find it. Does anyone remember this conversation? Or, does anyone know about the letters that V would have written? -greg -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson