[Xmca-l] Re: The mirror has two candles

[Huw Lloyd]

Larry,

Time shows up in the senses... and memory.

It might be an opportune moment to peek at Bateson's process-from diagrams
(pp. 194, 196):

http://philosophyofinformationandcommunication.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/bateson-gregory-mind-and-nature.pdf

Sfard (and others) also refer to history of reification of mathematical
concepts.

Best,
Huw



On 20 October 2014 14:44, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> I want to respond to this theme by bringing in the notion of *mediated
> action* AS the best *unit of analysis*. Wertsch weaved together Vygotsky
> and Bakhtin and showed utterances AS *mediated actions*
> The place of the *ideal* in relation to *objects* is the theme.
>
> Now I want to weave in Anna Sfard's exploration of mathematical *entities*
> AS having a dual *nature*. This extension is from an article she just
> posted on the web [On the Dual Nature of Mathematical Conceptions]
>
> Page 4 is her elaborating this dual nature as follows.
>
> [is] Treating mathematical conceptions AS IF they referred to some abstract
> OBJECTS the only possibility of relating to mathematical concepts? THIS
> KIND of conception [interpretation] Anna labels *structural*. THIS TYPE of
> utterance [mediated action] prevails in mathematical discourse situations
> as mediational means
> However, there ARE different KINDS of mathematical definitions that
> *reveal* quite a different approach to these same concepts.
> Functions can be defined not only AS *a set of ordered pairs* BUT ALSO AS a
> process of *getting from one system to another* [skemp referenced]
>
> Symmetry can BE conceived [interpreted] AS a static property of geometric
> forms BUT ALSO AS a *kind* of transformation.  This latter TYPE of
> description [genre] SPEAKS AS IF the mathematical notion is about
> processes, algorithms, ACTIONS, [rather than speaking of these mathematical
> notions AS IF they ARE *objects*
> THIS TYPE OF GENRE *reflects* an Operational interpretation [rather than
> structural interpretation] of mathematical conceptions.
>
> Seeing a mathematical *entity* AS *an object* *means* being capable of
> gesturing [referring] to the mathematical concept  AS IF the mathematical
> concept were A REAL THING [a static structure actually existing somewhere
> in time and space but timeless] It also *means* being able to *recognize*
> the *idea* at a glance AND to manipulate this mathematical conception AS IF
> the structure existed AS A WHOLE [without going into details or analysis]
> AS AN EXISTING OBJECT.
>
> Using Hadamard's *metaphor* we can SAY that *structural genres* endows a
> concept with a KIND of *physiognomy* which ALLOWS a person to think of this
> concept AS a unique, THING [entity] however complicated this concept may
> BE.
>
> JUST AS WE SEE A FACE OF A MAN.
>
> In contrast, interpreting A concept AS A PROCESS implies regarding THIS
> PARTICULAR mathematical concept AS A POTENTIAL [existant] rather than an
> ACTUAL EXISTING ENTITY. In operational kinds of genres the *entity* COMES
> INTO EXISTENCE upon request in a sequence of actions.
> THUS
> whereas the structural genre IS timeless [static] instantaneous, and
> integrative, the operational genre is dynamic, sequential, and detailed. In
> other words different mediational means within *mediated action* produce
> radically different notions of the place of concepts as interpretants that
> exist [in actuality or in potential]
>
> THEREFORE the play involves different TYPES of *seeing* and different TYPES
> of *saying*.
>
> BOTH are equally *true*
>
> I have been exploring *objects of activity* *units of analysis* and
> *mediated action* through Anna Sfard's exploration of mathematical
> conceptions which do not appear through the 5 senses but DO EXIST.
>
> Larry
>
> On Sun, Oct 19, 2014 at 4:00 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > Hi David,
> >
> > I don't think anyone is going to argue against the paper's defamatory
> > quality.  Everything he says against LSV can be taken with a pinch of
> salt
> > if we assume he was trying to protect his colleagues.
> >
> > What remains is therefore what is countered and proposed with respect to
> > the subject of the environment.
> >
> > Best,
> > Huw
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On 19 October 2014 23:38, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > First of all, a word of appreciation to Martin for his candle in the
> > > mirror and his delightful formulation of "Plump Materialism", and also
> > > to Michael for recognizing the beauty of the image and using it to
> > > revitalize a thread that was growing somewhat tiresome to me: no fault
> > > of the participants; it was my own inability to see past "fatalistic
> > > determinism", "captive to bourgeois theories", and ANL's other fatuous
> > > formulae. As Mike points out, this is not just name calling: these are
> > > blood libels.
> > >
> > > Secondly, let me put in a word for Andy's counter-blast. For those of
> > > you who have not read it; it is available on Andy's academia.edu page,
> > > and it's well worth a look:
> > >
> > >
> > >
> >
> http://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky
> > >
> > > Thirdly--can I draw attention to the top of page fourteen of ANL's
> > > dishonest and dishonorable hatchet job? Here he rounds on Basov for
> > > non-Marxist, idealist notion that humans in some way "double" the
> > > natural environment. ANL returns to this theme at the bottom of the
> > > page where he says:
> > >
> > > "To the animal, however, any “artificial” object created by humans is
> > > simply
> > > a natural object, it is nature because the animal’s relation toward it
> > > will always
> > > be an instinctive relation. Thus, of course, in reality there is no
> > > doubling of the
> > > environment. The environment as a whole is transformed into a human
> > > environment,
> > > that is, for the human being, into a social environment, based on the
> > > fact that humans themselves relate to it in human terms, that is, as
> > > social humans."
> > >
> > > Note the use of "Thus"; it marks a shameless non sequitur. First of
> > > all, it is a non sequitur to say that because animals and very small
> > > children treat i-phones as natural objects, THEREFORE there is no
> > > doubling of the environment Secondly, it is a non sequitur to say that
> > > the environment "as a whole" becomes a human environment (because
> > > animals and infants do NOT see it that way??) without any trace of the
> > > natural environment. But the biggest non-sequitur is the least
> > > explicit: it is the insinuation that the process of social
> > > idealization of nature that we call enculturation is prima facie
> > > subversive of Marxism.
> > >
> > > Consider the following, from a great subversive of Marxism and primal
> > > plump materialist:
> > >
> > > "We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human.
> > > A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a
> > > bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells.
> > > But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is
> > > this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he
> > > erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a
> > > result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its
> > > commencement." (Capital, Vol 1, Chapter III, Part 7)
> > >
> > > What is THIS if not a doubling of reality--a mirror with two candles?
> > >
> > > David Kellogg
> > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > >
> > >
> > > have a look:
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On 20 October 2014 00:15, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > Here's an example memory paper abstract by Sereda (2011), titled "A
> > > > Theoretical Model of Memory
> > > > as a Mechanism for Systematically Organizing Individual Experience"
> > > >
> > > > "In order to improve the explanatory potential of activity theory,
> this
> > > > article
> > > > proposes a theoretical model of human memory as a mechanism for
> > > > the systematic organization of individual experience, organization
> that
> > > > is an essential condition for performing future activity. The model
> > rests
> > > > on the idea that the main factor in human memory is the motivational
> > > > and semantic sets of personality and thus orientation toward the
> future
> > > > (prospective orientation)."
> > > >
> > > > The storehouse metaphor as used in psychology merely reflects a
> rather
> > > poor
> > > > approach.
> > > >
> > > > Best,
> > > > Huw
> > > >
> > > > On 19 October 2014 15:20, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu>
> > wrote:
> > > >
> > > >> Hi Larry,
> > > >>
> > > >> I renamed this thread because it seems to be taking a tangent from
> the
> > > >> very rich discussion on LSV and ANL, but perhaps it might circle
> back.
> > > >> Anyway, I thought Martin's very interesting illustration deserves a
> > > moment
> > > >> of fame.  I wonder if memory is the right word in current
> > > circumstance.  In
> > > >> U.S. psychology memory is very often viewed as a storehouse of
> > > information
> > > >> where you send your messages back to retrieve information when
> needed
> > to
> > > >> apply to the current situation.  Do you think Pierce would see the
> > > overall
> > > >> process this way (did he actually talk about memory?)  For him it
> > seems
> > > it
> > > >> would be part of a more active process of establishing relationships
> > of
> > > >> that which came before with that which is currently being explored.
> > > >>
> > > >> Michael
> > > >> ________________________________________
> > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [
> > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu]
> > > >> on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com [lpscholar2@gmail.com]
> > > >> Sent: Sunday, October 19, 2014 6:40 AM
> > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL
> > > >>
> > > >> Michael Glassman and Martin and How
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> I want to ex-tend the exploration of *models* and *memories* and
> > > >> *contextualism* as linked in Michael’s rejoinder to Martin.
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> Michael wrote “if ALL you can *see* [perceive] is what is IN the
> > mirror
> > > >> [metaphor of reflection AS mirroring] how do you “know” there IS a
> > > mirror
> > > >>
> > > >> The IF IMPLIED is the ‘ALL’ .
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> However, is that “all there IS” in *seeing*?
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> IS “memory* also existent as an existent IN seeing?
> > > >>
> > > >> In other words, do *interpretants* ACTUALLY exist IN FACT? [as such]
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> Umberto Eco suggests there is both ORPHIC knowing/seeing [when
> Picasso
> > > >> paints THAT PARTICULAR yellow shoe in a painting the SINGULARITY of
> > THAT
> > > >> experience IS “orphic”
> > > >>
> > > >> POETS and artists are “biased” to privilege THIS WAY of knowing
> > > [Peirce's
> > > >> secondness as orphic and possibly orphaned]
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> HOWEVER, Umberto Eco suggests that this orphic “knowing* is also
> > > >> *indicative* [indexical] of further *interpreting* AND THIS TYPE of
> > > >> *knowing* EX-TENDS Orphic knowing. [Peirce's tiredness]
> > > >>
> > > >> Now in Peirce's metaphysics THIS interpreting creating interpretants
> > > also
> > > >> is EXISTING as facts.
> > > >>
> > > >> Is this transforming orphic [what IS present] TO forming
> > *interpretants*
> > > >> AS *something* that actually exists {through the interpreting
> process}
> > > >> INCLUDE memory but that IS NOT ALL.
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>  IS creative imagining potentially existent?  that goes BEYOND
> memory?
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> I believe Umberto Eco’s question of a deeper knowing than
> > orphic/orphan
> > > >> knowing *things-in-themselves* EX-tending BEYOND the orphic
> > > [secondness] to
> > > >> INCLUDE interpreting and forming actual *interpretants* [tiredness]
> > > must be
> > > >> considered within the memory process.
> > > >>
> > > >> This returns to *models* that are necessary but NOT ALL there *is*.
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> The *relation* between *orphic* knowing and *interpreting* knowing
> > > seems a
> > > >> KEY question [and may ex-tend back into metaphysics?
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> Larry
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> Sent from Windows Mail
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> From: Glassman, Michael
> > > >> Sent: ‎Saturday‎, ‎October‎ ‎18‎, ‎2014 ‎5‎:‎18‎ ‎PM
> > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> Hi Martin,
> > > >>
> > > >> That's a very interesting metaphor, but let me see if I can take it
> a
> > > step
> > > >> further.  Basically you seem to be saying that Vygotsky is making a
> > > >> mechanistic argument - I'm not talking about the more colloquial
> > > expression
> > > >> of mechanistic but the one that Pepper talks about in World
> > Hypothesis.
> > > >> You are looking into the mirror and seeing the reflection of a
> candle
> > -
> > > but
> > > >> you are making the assumption that there must be a mechanism that is
> > > >> causing the reflection of the candle.  You cannot know this
> mechanism
> > > >> itself - it is too difficult to reach - but you can build models
> that
> > > bring
> > > >> us closer to understanding. This I think is almost exactly how
> Pepper
> > > >> discusses this root metaphor.  Our goal as scientists is to find the
> > > >> mediate description of the underlying mechanism.  This
> > > >> Pragmatists/Conextualists would say this is dualism - not the
> dualism
> > > you
> > > >> get from Formism where you depend on your mind to bring you closer
> to
> > a
> > > >> known but unreachable ideal, but in the sense that there is this
> > > mechanism
> > > >> that exists that is somehow separate from and causing the reflection
> > in
> > > the
> > > >> mirror.  So the Contextualist asks, if all you can see is what is in
> > the
> > > >> mirror how do you know there is a mirror.  That is the only
> > information
> > > you
> > > >> have and you have to base all interpretation of the world on that
> > > >> information - to suggest you are looking at a reflection is an
> > > assumption
> > > >> based on a belief system that there must be causing what you are
> > > seeing.  I
> > > >> think you are right, Vygotsky wants to assume the mirror, but in the
> > end
> > > >> doesn't that suggest a dualism to his thinking.
> > > >>
> > > >> Michael
> > > >> ________________________________________
> > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [
> > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu]
> > > >> on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co]
> > > >> Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 6:38 PM
> > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL
> > > >>
> > > >> Hi Michael,
> > > >>
> > > >> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances.
> > > Every
> > > >> science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain*
> > appearance.
> > > One
> > > >> of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a
> burning
> > > >> candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle
> > > burning
> > > >> behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study
> > that
> > > >> second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the
> > > mirror,
> > > >> in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image'
> of
> > a
> > > >> second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror.
> > > >>
> > > >> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those
> of
> > us
> > > >> raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and
> feelings
> > > >> exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call
> > "the
> > > >> mind."  A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain
> how
> > > that
> > > >> appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal
> > > >> thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because
> we
> > > can
> > > >> use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a
> fibre
> > > >> bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and
> > > >> Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and
> > > >> neurofunctioning).  The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a
> *folk*
> > > >> psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try
> > to
> > > >> make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own
> > > >> psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot
> > > study
> > > >> the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can,
> > however,
> > > >> set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did.
> > > >>
> > > >> Martin
> > > >>
> > > >> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael <glassman.13@osu.edu
> >
> > > >> wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >> >  I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up
> > for
> > > >> being critiqued for going inside the head.  It was a choice, I don't
> > > think
> > > >> he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which
> I
> > > think
> > > >> you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what
> > > develops
> > > >> if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops
> > > (remember
> > > >> I am suggesting individual development here).
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > >
> > >
> >
>