[Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion

Sun Oct 12 21:37:32 PDT 2014

Keep pushing ahead and time will tell, Greg. If there is no pushback you
have achieved perpetual free motion!
:-))
mike

On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:10 PM, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Mike and Huw,
> I have some fear that this will be a distraction from the main thread but
> briefly, Huw, that is helpful as I inch toward an understanding of how we
> might get out of coherence vs. correspondence dualism. Latour (sorry for
> introducing outsiders here! He is an important social theorist, esp. in
> anthropology, and has published in MCA, so there's that...) says that the
> "real" is that which "pushes back." I feel like he is in some ways
> paraphrasing Dewey here, but I haven't quite been able to find where we
> might find something like that in Dewey. Perhaps you can keep an eye out as
> you read?
>
> Mike, I'm still processing/imagining your comments. Unknown whether they
> will return to the hall of shadows or become a real object for me.
>
> -greg
>
>
>
> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:19 PM, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>
> > Huw and Greg et al--
> >
> > Greg: And if you happen to have an extra moment, I wonder if you could
> say
> > a bit
> > > about HOW Dewey makes the case for objects not existing prior to being
> > > made-as-such?
> >
> >
> > Huw: Well, I haven't dug very far.  But its fairly clear from his letter
> > that it
> > is part of the process of inquiry, i.e. that one proposes the objects
> that
> > one studies in the process of addressing a real problem upon which the
> > inquiry is based.
> >
> > Here is Mike's guess:
> > In the process of inquiry, one is always imagining next moments. The
> object
> > arises out of imagination, or the imagined turns out to be unembodied and
> > returns to the hall of shadows.
> >
> > Quicker than a wink.
> > mike
> >
> > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:16 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > On 12 October 2014 03:40, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > > Huw,
> > > > Can you give us a little more about the Nagel introduction? How does
> > > Nagel
> > > > make that error?
> > > >
> > >
> > > He critiques the predicate of the change (or difference) that Dewey
> > asserts
> > > in the process of investigation/inquiry.  Nagel's consideration of this
> > > change was merely the instrumental imposition rather than recognising
> the
> > > construal of the object as a construction and a difference.  From his
> > > writing it was apparent to me that he misses this.  The peculiarity is
> > that
> > > this is the introduction to Dewey's volume on logic as inquiry.
> > >
> > >
> > > >
> > > > And if you happen to have an extra moment, I wonder if you could say
> a
> > > bit
> > > > about HOW Dewey makes the case for objects not existing prior to
> being
> > > > made-as-such?
> > >
> > >
> > > Well, I haven't dug very far.  But its fairly clear from his letter
> that
> > it
> > > is part of the process of inquiry, i.e. that one proposes the objects
> > that
> > > one studies in the process of addressing a real problem upon which the
> > > inquiry is based.
> > >
> > >
> > > > I've been chatting elsewhere with Jay Lemke and others about
> > > > Bruno Latour's and Tim Ingold's separate uses of "correspondence" in
> > ways
> > > > that go against the classical notions of "correspondence" as in
> > > > correspondence theory (i.e. the measure of the value of a science is
> > the
> > > > extent to which it corresponds to reality).
> > > >
> > >
> > > Well, in the little I've read Dewey argued that social science exceeds
> > > natural science in certain dimensions of concreteness (if I remember
> > > correctly).  But I think he was writing of a pre-quantum physics.  As a
> > > mode of inquiry coherence would, I am surmising, be more valued than
> > > "correspondence" -- afterall, correspondence with what?
> > >
> > >
> > > >
> > > > I'm wondering how these views might be different from Dewey's take on
> > the
> > > > matter (in a lot of ways, I'm sure, but also similar in others). But
> I
> > > > haven't read Dewey lately or with these ideas in mind and I could
> use a
> > > leg
> > > > up...
> > > >
> > >
> > > I don't know how they relate to your other theorists on correspondence.
> > > But I do know you won't get very far by orientation alone.  By
> > orientation,
> > > all you get to do is shake and feel the parcel (paraphrasing Hector
> from
> > > "The History Boys").  From what I can tell, Dewey would advocate
> getting
> > > technical with your authentic problem (which you would absolutely have
> to
> > > do to use it productively) and recognise that the problem of interest
> is
> > > part of the root of your inquiry.  Perhaps not the "leg up" you were
> > hoping
> > > for!
> > >
> > > Best,
> > > Huw
> > >
> > >
> > > >
> > > > Thanks,
> > > > -greg
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 5:05 PM, Huw Lloyd <
> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> > > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > My own excursion has been to explore writings relating to Dewey
> > (simply
> > > > > something I had out off and found time to explore).  Which, it
> turns
> > > out,
> > > > > are (to my reading) another pithy way to express the logical
> > problems I
> > > > was
> > > > > reading in David's narrative.  But this might be because I already
> > > > > "understand" the problem.
> > > > >
> > > > > Anyway, the interesting writings were "A letter from Dewey" that is
> > in
> > > > the
> > > > > appendix of "Knowing and Known" and Ernest Nagel's introduction to
> > > > Dewey's
> > > > > "Logic: The Theory of Inquiry".
> > > > >
> > > > > One of the rather interesting things about reading Nagel's
> > > introduction,
> > > > is
> > > > > that he makes an ontological error that Dewey referred to in his
> > letter
> > > > (I
> > > > > believe).  The error was that an "object" (not its referent) is
> > > > > existentially existent beyond and before its social construction.
> > > > > Something that we CHAT enthusiasts should be familiar with.
> > > > >
> > > > > Nevertheless (as a psychologist) I am interested in the truth of
> > > errors,
> > > > > and Nagel's introduction was certainly helpful in enlivening the
> > > prospect
> > > > > of the 500 page volume (vol. 12 of the later works).  Of course, I
> > > could
> > > > be
> > > > > naively wrong about it, but all the pieces line up for me here,
> > > including
> > > > > some passages that are remarkably aligned with DE /
> El'konin-Davydov
> > > > > theory.
> > > > >
> > > > > Best,
> > > > > Huw
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > On 11 October 2014 22:38, Henry G. Shonerd III <hshonerd@gmail.com
> >
> > > > wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > Paul,
> > > > > > Let me think about it. I appreciate your reference to Derrida. I
> am
> > > > > > reading like crazy to keep up with you guys!
> > > > > > Henry
> > > > > > P.S. I am pretty dedicated to reading the references, links on
> the
> > > > XMCA.
> > > > > > But I use Wikipedia constantly. Is this a bad thing?
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 3:21 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <
> > > > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com>
> > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Henry,
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Clearly, your bike riding belongs to the perlocutionary
> category.
> > > > But
> > > > > > what is the syntax and semantics that gave rise to it?  The
> > thinking
> > > > that
> > > > > > it leads to, or is there another declarative or imperative
> > statement,
> > > > > I.e.
> > > > > > You are an environmentalists?  This is where the searle/derrida
> > > debate
> > > > > > takes off.  The issues of intentionality, continuity,
> > discontinuity
> > > > are
> > > > > > that not also an aspect of language.  Hence derrida ' s notion of
> > the
> > > > > > potentiality for the deferment of meaning and why  jacques lacan
> > > posits
> > > > > the
> > > > > > unconscious to be structured like language...to account for the
> > > > > > discontinuity of both language and the unconscious, which
> although
> > we
> > > > can
> > > > > > think them apart are not.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> > > > > > > President
> > > > > > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
> > > > > > > www.mocombeian.com
> > > > > > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com
> > > > > > > www.paulcmocombe.info
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > <div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: "Henry
> G.
> > > > > > Shonerd III" <hshonerd@gmail.com> </div><div>Date:10/11/2014
> 4:14
> > > PM
> > > > > > (GMT-05:00) </div><div>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> > > > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> </div><div>Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to
> > > > > > broaden/enliven the xmca discussion </div><div>
> > > > > > > </div>Mike and Paul,
> > > > > > > Paul assumes your thinking about the XMCA dialog had nothing to
> > do
> > > > with
> > > > > > your driving. I find that riding my bike to the university in the
> > > > morning
> > > > > > sets loose thinking about what's "on my plate" intellectually.
> The
> > > same
> > > > > > thing happens when I am dancing to music with others (I do Nia,
> > very
> > > > > > popular in some places). Lakoff's claim that cognition is
> embodied
> > is
> > > > > > typically related to metaphor, but I am interested in how the
> > > > > phonological
> > > > > > pole of language is iconic, not just with onomatopoeia, but with
> > all
> > > > > forms
> > > > > > of sound symbolism. And I assume that the phonological pole is a
> > > subset
> > > > > of
> > > > > > the sematic pole. The indexical, iconic, symbolic aspects of
> > > language,
> > > > > > would it be fair to say they are on a continuum, rather than
> > > > > discontinuous?
> > > > > > Temporal aspects of language (including within speech and
> writing),
> > > > > > wouldn't they figure in with the making (including comprehension)
> > of
> > > > > > meaning? I am sure David said as much back a while. Am I making
> > sense
> > > > > that
> > > > > > relates at all to the on-going dialog?
> > > > > > > Henry
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 12:59 PM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" <
> > > > > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >> Mike,
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about
> > the
> > > > xmca
> > > > > > conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the
> > speech
> > > > > act,
> > > > > > comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing.  It is
> > simply
> > > > > > background information for us the reader (I am not going to
> > reiterate
> > > > the
> > > > > > debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue
> > of
> > > > > > background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the
> > way
> > > > > based
> > > > > > on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is
> > > correct
> > > > > on
> > > > > > the argument).
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely
> psychological
> > > and
> > > > > > semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary,
> illocutionary,
> > > and
> > > > > > perlocutionary categories.  This psychological act of thinking is
> > the
> > > > > > element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking.
> > > However,
> > > > in
> > > > > > order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background,
> > > > > > intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private
> > language,
> > > > for
> > > > > > example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech
> act?
> > > > > > Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing
> outside
> > > the
> > > > > text.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> > > > > > >> President
> > > > > > >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
> > > > > > >> www.mocombeian.com
> > > > > > >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com
> > > > > > >> www.paulcmocombe.info
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> <div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: mike
> > cole
> > > <
> > > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu> </div><div>Date:10/11/2014  1:10 PM  (GMT-05:00)
> > > > > > </div><div>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> > > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> > > > > > </div><div>Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca
> > > > > discussion
> > > > > > </div><div>
> > > > > > >> </div>Thanks Paul --
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same
> > > > > question:
> > > > > > >> How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation
> > differ,
> > > > > Paul,
> > > > > > >> such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them?
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views,
> > David
> > > > Ke?
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> What are the major implications of the differences??
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> mike
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe <
> > > > > > >> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote:
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >>> Martin,
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>> I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory
> > of
> > > > > speech
> > > > > > >>> act, but not austin's.
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe
> > > > > > >>> President
> > > > > > >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc.
> > > > > > >>> www.mocombeian.com
> > > > > > >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com
> > > > > > >>> www.paulcmocombe.info
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>> <div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: mike
> > > cole <
> > > > > > >>> mcole@ucsd.edu> </div><div>Date:10/10/2014  7:48 PM
> > (GMT-05:00)
> > > > > > >>> </div><div>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> > > > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> > > > > > >>> </div><div>Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the
> > xmca
> > > > > > discussion
> > > > > > >>> </div><div>
> > > > > > >>> </div>Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking
> > > about
> > > > > the
> > > > > > >>> conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with
> > > > words,
> > > > > > but i
> > > > > > >>> was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was
> > > all a
> > > > > > jumble
> > > > > > >>> of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with
> > the
> > > > > belief
> > > > > > >>> that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character?
> > > > > > >>> mike
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>> On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer <
> > > > > > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co>
> > > > > > >>> wrote:
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>>> Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by
> > > recognizing
> > > > > that
> > > > > > >>>> both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character?
> Acting
> > > > > requires
> > > > > > >>>> ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in
> > the
> > > > > > world.
> > > > > > >>>> Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking
> > > > (thinking
> > > > > > with
> > > > > > >>>> words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation
> in
> > > the
> > > > > > form
> > > > > > >>> of
> > > > > > >>>> new signs.
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>> ?
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>> Martin
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>> On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss <
> lpscholar2@gmail.com
> > >
> > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>>> I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by
> > > > > exploring
> > > > > > >>>>> *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY
> > INSIGHT
> > > > > that
> > > > > > >>> word
> > > > > > >>>>> meaning is BEST understood -
> > > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>> "as MODES  of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN
> as
> > > > > > >>> operations,
> > > > > > >>>>> actions, and activities."
> > > > > > >>>>>
> > > > > > >>>>> This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word
> > > > meanings.
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>>
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>> --
> > > > > > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
> science
> > > with
> > > > > an
> > > > > > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >> --
> > > > > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
> > > with
> > > > an
> > > > > > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> > > > > > >>
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > > Assistant Professor
> > > > Department of Anthropology
> > > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > > Brigham Young University
> > > > Provo, UT 84602
> > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > > >
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >
>
>
>
> --
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>

-- 
It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.