[Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion

Greg Thompson greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
Thu Oct 9 10:27:59 PDT 2014 

Rod,

Hmmm....

-greg

On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 2:42 AM, Rod Parker-Rees <
R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:

> David,
>
> I share what I take to be your emphasis on the distinction between 'words
> in their speaking' and 'already spoken words' (to borrow Shotter's terms).
> Communication surely predates language and your account of Volosinov's and
> Vygotsky's thought experiment about a one word language reminded me of
> Steven Mithen's (2005) book 'The singing Neanderthals' in which he argues
> for a pre-language mode of communication which he calls Hmmmm because it
> was holistic (not composed of segmented elements), manipulative
> (influencing emotional states and hence behaviour), multimodal (using both
> sound and gesture), musical (rhythmic, and melodic), and mimetic (using
> sound symbolism and mimetic gestures). As Vygotsky points out, babies are
> importantly unlike Neanderthals because they are surrounded by people who
> are fluent users of the fully developed form of communication which the
> baby will learn to use, but still their communication is non-linguistic and
> non-conceptual.
>
> I have to apologise for not reading back through this full thread (yet)
> but I am familiar with a distinction between znachenie and smysl   - tema
> is not a term I have come across. I will read back to find explanations.
>
> Can Russian speakers also tell me whether the term obuchenie carries more
> of the sense of learning the person as well as the 'content matter' when
> teacher and learner engage each other in conversation? I was struck by the
> way Russians tend to list their pedagogical lineage in terms of who their
> teacher studied with.
>
> All the best,
>
> Rod
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu
> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu]
> On Behalf Of David Kellogg
> Sent: 08 October 2014 23:00
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
>
> Itzhak Perlman is also making gentle fun of Yo-yo Ma's little game of "six
> degrees of separation", whereby Ma insists on the direct face-to-face
> contact between us and the departed masters via a chain of aging masters.
> In this too, I am in sympathy with Ma: it is why I shelled out the huge
> registration fee to go to ISCAR, and also why I was a little disappointed
> not to see Mike there (although secretly relieved since I know he is an
> unbruised fruit that does not travel so well these days, and it was a
> gruelling flight even for a tough nut like me). It is also why last year at
> this time I forked over a similar fee to go and spend two weeks in
> Guangzhou in the company of Michael Halliday.
>
> Of course I know it is possible to communicate with some of these masters
> through the email (though not Halliday, who considers human speech to be
> the most developed form of human communications technology precisely
> because it is the oldest). But it turns out that when we reduce speech to
> nothing but vowels and consonants and nouns and verbs, we have to
> reconstruct for ourselves the immense good will and cheer that is
> transmitted effortlessly, iconically, and indexically in face-to-face
> encounters, and this greatly impedes (my) understanding.
>
> That is why Martin's proposal that we consider both tool-mediated activity
> and sign-mediated speech to be forms of semiotic mediation appeals. I think
> it might resolve the key problem that LSV leaves us with at the end of
> Chapter Two of HDHMF when he warns against those who consider signs to be
> "psychological tools" (pace Kozulin, Bordrova and Leong), and says that
> they are only "logically" (pace Huw) members of a common category; with the
> precise relationship between them (i.e.
> the historical relationship between them) to be worked out. Tools and
> signs are functionally quite different even where they appear to co-occur
> (like the blade of the axe and the decorations on the handle, as Volosinov
> says): one acts on the environment and mediates a subject-object
> relationship, while the other presupposes somehow empathetically
> reconstructing the mental state of another subject. Yet there must be some
> deep internal link or we could not have evolved the one out of the other.
> That internal link, it seems to me, is the physical presence of the other
> in the environment, in all of his or her smiling and grimacing, sweating
> and stinking glory, and the internal link is necessarily stronger in the
> case of "tema" than in the case of "znachenie".
>
> The idea that the latter is merely meaning potential and the former is
> actual, realized, materialized meaning comes straight from Halliday.
> But the (for me, linked) idea that the latter is the most stable pole of
> word value and the former the least so comes straight from Volosinov, who
> influenced Halliday via the Prague linguists. Volosinov derives it from a
> long analysis of the great schools of linguistics somewhat similar to
> Mike's recent ruminations on the great schools of psychological thought:
> there were centuries where linguistics was synonymous with the study of
> disembodied speech (vowels and consonants rather than intonation and
> stress, writing rather than speaking, and literature rather than everyday
> language), and there was a century--the nineteenth--where the opposite
> tendency held sway (von Humboldt, Potebnia, but above all the school of
> Kurt Vossler). We can also derive Volosinov's conclusion
> logically--"znachenie" is actually produced by abstraction and
> generalization from "tema", and both processes would lend it a
> self-similarity, a stability, which cannot obtain with "tema".
>
> I am now quite certain that Volosinov and Vygotsky were in direct,
> face-to-face contact during the last two years of LSV's life when he worked
> at the Herzen Pedagogical Institute in Leningrad. In any case, both of them
> pose exactly the same thought experiment (which is also posed in the work
> of Marr, who by some accounts took part in LSV's weekly meetings with
> Eisenstein). Both wondered what a language which consisted of a single word
> would sound like, and asked if it would even be a language at all. And both
> came up with the same answer.
>
> It would sound like an obscenity, tossed back and forth between drunken
> workmen on a street, as recorded in the diary of the great writer Fyodor
> Dostoevsky. That is, the meaning would be conveyed not referentially but
> indexically, not through articulation but through prosody, not through
> grammar but through revoicing. You can produce some of the same effect in
> English if you imagine the following conversation, slurring the initial and
> final consonants and assimilating the middle vowel to a kind of schwa sound
> (the vowel you make with your tongue in the exact middle of your mouth).
>
> A: (Wh)e(re)?
> B: (Th)e(re)!
> C: (Wh)e(n)??
> D: (Th)e(n)!!
> E: (Wh)a(t)???
> F: (Th)a(t)!!!
>
> Volosinov concludes that it would indeed be speech, because the essence of
> speech is "tema" and not "znachenie", its inner quality is precisely this
> kind of mutability and only its outer form is self-similarity. Speech is,
> essentially, grunts and groans and not grammar. But of course that means
> that both poles are present, and must be present, for speech to be language.
>
> David Kellogg
> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>
> PS: I think the reinterpretation of SSD as "context" is exactly what Andy
> was referring to: the hypostatization of "society" as a kind of enveloping
> cultural given from which the subject has no choice and over which the
> subject has no control. Those who use the Engstrom triangle as a kind of
> inventory of stuff to talk about are content to overcome this danger by
> sticking a two headed arrow between "subject"
> and "rules" or "subject" and "community" or "subject" and "division of
> labor". But this only poses the problem; it doesn't solve it. By the way,
> exactly the same problem occurs in Hallidayan linguistics when people talk
> about context. Halliday himself is quite clear that somethinig only becomes
> context when you attend to it and select it from the environment for the
> transformation into meaning, but people imagine that attending and
> transforming is something you actually do to context.
>
> dk
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On 8 October 2014 09:15, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> > Thanks for all the clarifying, David. I will go back and read the
> > texts you point to.
> >
> > The way you push forward the sense/meaning issue is totally new to me
> > and quite different from what I have been reading in arguments among
> > contemporary Russians, viz:
> >
> >  So "smysl" is "tema"; it is something like "realized, actual meaning"
> > while "znachenie" is something like "potential, possible meaning".
> > Tema is what happens when we activate a particular layer in the great
> > palimpsest of possible meanings left in each word by our
> > contemporaries and ancestors.
> >
> > How do we connect this to the notion, from LSV, that znachenie
> > (meaning) is the most stable pole of smysl (sense)? The various
> > translations/interpretations of these terms are really confusing me.
> > Where does tema from and where is it taking us?
> >
> > mike
> > PS-- Any notion of who/where "social situation of development" is
> > reinterpreted as "context."?
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Oct 7, 2014 at 3:12 PM, David Kellogg <dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> >> Larry, Mike, Huw, Andy--
> >>
> >> (and above all the real "objects" of broadening and enlivening the
> >> discussion, you by-standers and handwringers, perhaps intimidated by
> >> the pointing and handwaving, and unwilling to contribute lest the
> >> discussion become less sharpened and pointed....)
> >>
> >> There were several issues that seemed to pop up session after session
> >> at ISCAR, quite independently of who raised them. Yes, "the real
> >> Vygotsky" was certainly one of them, and Holbrook was not the only
> >> person to talk this way; I did too, and I do think that a world where
> >> the original Vygotsky is not recoverable is just as bad as a world
> >> where Vygotsky is completely forgotten. But in the context of ISCAR,
> >> the "real Vygotsky" was often a response to many speakers who would
> >> like to emphasize the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky.
> >>
> >> There were two ways of doing this. One was to simply say that of
> >> course Vygotsky was a Marxist, but then everybody was Marxist back
> >> then, and it was not much more important than being a liberal
> >> Democrat today. Interestingly, in the Making of Mind, Luria said that
> >> this is a description which could well apply to many psychologists of
> >> his time, including himself, but not to Vygotsky. A more
> >> sophisticated way of emphasizing the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky
> >> requires a "real Vygotsky" of a different kind. Writers like our good
> >> friend Nikolai Veresov have tried to do this by emphasizing the
> >> PRE-Marxist Vygotsky, especially Vygotsky the phenomenologist,
> >> student of Gustav Shpet who was a student of Husserl himself.
> >>
> >> I was formerly little puzzled by this move. Seth argued that it was
> >> valid, because of Vygotsky's ties to Lewin and Lewin's ideas about
> >> the force of objects and the fields of attractors created thereby.
> >> Lewin was certainly an attractor for Vygotsky, but Vygotsky actually
> >> uses Lewin to criticize phenomenological analysis in Chapter Three of
> >> HDHMF (see Vol. 4, p. 69). Elsewhere, Vygotsky is very critical of
> >> the founders of phenomenology, iincluding Husserl (p. 7).
> >>
> >> But now I think that Larry (and Martin, who has raised the same
> >> connection) is on to something. For it is also in HDHMF that Vygotsky
> >> bruits the idea that attention is a kind of gateway function, that
> >> the indicative is the primordial function of speech and thinking, and
> >> that there is nevertheless a qualitative difference between noticing
> >> something and internalizing it as a meaning--all of these are
> >> Husserlian ideas. Even the knotted handkerchief, which I myself have
> >> attributed to Vygotsky and to a peculiarly Russian practice, comes
> >> from the work of Husserl (Logical Investigations, Vol. I, pp.
> >> 269-333). I think that as a real historical materialist Vygotsky
> >> rejected Husserl's absolute opposition between symbol and index, but
> >> he didn't forget it when he set about trying to build a bridge
> >> between the two.
> >>
> >> Mike wonders about a text where Vygotsky rejects "activity" as a unit
> >> of analysis for everything but behavior. No such text exists, of
> >> course; if you read what I wrote carefully (I know, it's a trial
> >> sometimes, but at least I am a larger target then the minimalist Huw)
> >> you will see that I refer to a my OWN rejection, not Vygotsky's. What
> >> Vygotsky says in "Problem of the Environment" is that he wants to
> >> introduce "a number of different" units of analysis which are used in
> >> pedological analyses, of which "perezhivanie" is one, and
> >> "sense/signification" a very different one. (Andy is wrong to impute
> >> importance to the count noun form here; Vygotsky often uses it as a
> >> verb, I "live experience" something). I have always assumed that this
> >> means:
> >>
> >> a) Perezhivanie is quite specific to the problem Vygotsky raises in
> >> this lecture, which is how three different children can respond so
> >> differently to the one and the same form of child abuse.
> >>
> >> b) "Sense/signification" is also a unit of analysis, what Vygotsky
> >> refers to in Thinking and Speech as "the meaningful word". (This was
> >> also the object of textological attention in Holbrook's presentation).
> >>
> >> Mike also wonders about where Leontiev raises the possibility of
> >> applying Marxist theory directly to psychology. In many places, but
> >> perhaps most prominently in Problems of the Development of Mind (see
> >> pp. 236-237, 255). Holbrook had other quotations of this type, and I
> >> think there is a link between them and what Luria's remark that back
> >> then everybody in psychology was a "Marxist", but nobody except
> >> Vygotsky was much of a Marxist. Holbrook is right here.
> >>
> >> Mike asks if there is practical activity without thinking. I think
> >> that Vygotsky would say that there is thinking and there is verbal
> >> thinking (or, as Holbrook now insists, "thinking with words"). What
> >> monkeys do with sticks is called practical intelligence in Chapter
> >> Four of Thinking and Speech. It is practical activity, and it's
> >> thinking. But it's not a unit of thinking and speech, and therefore I
> >> think there is some light between what Vygotsky is willing to call
> >> "activity" and "praxis"; it's not the case that "praxis" is just a
> >> Greek word for "activity". I recognize, though, that for Andy what
> >> monkeys do with sticks does not count as activity (and I also
> >> recognize that I was muddling "activity" and "action"--sorry about
> >> that).
> >>
> >> Like Mike, I am paleo with regard to sense and meaning, and like Mike
> >> I recognize that it is hard to tell how deep the waters are here
> >> since they have been muddied. I think they were first muddied by
> >> Vygotsky himself, because he refers the distinction to Paulhan, where
> >> no such distinction is found (Paulhan just talks about connotation
> >> and denotation). But I think it's easy to unmuddy the waters and I
> >> think they are very deep indeed: Vygotsky uses Paulhan as a foil,
> >> taking the actual distinction from Volosinov, who was working at the
> >> Herzen Institute at exactly the same moment that Vygotsky was writing
> >> of this distinction. Zavershneva has said that Vygotsky cites
> >> Volosinov in his unpublished manuscripts, but that the citation is
> >> always removed by the editor in publication.  So "smysl" is "tema";
> >> it is something like "realized, actual meaning" while "znachenie" is
> >> something like "potential, possible meaning". Tema is what happens
> >> when we activate a particular layer in the great palimpsest of
> >> possible meanings left in each word by our contemporaries and ancestors.
> >>
> >> I'm currently writing the endnotes for our new volume of Vygotsky's
> >> lectures on pedology, so I am very aware of the issue that Huw
> >> appears to be raising (although Huw is so very gnomic in his lofty
> >> remarks on my supposed illogicality and my more systemic problems
> >> that it is hard to be sure). In Lecture Six, Vygotsky says in one
> >> paragraph that dividing off psychological from physiological
> >> development is methodologically impermissable, but in the very next
> >> paragraph, and indeed in the layout of the book, he says
> >> "dismemberment is nevertheless necessary". On the one hand, he says
> >> that there is no action, no motility, not even thinking without both
> >> the mind and the brain, and on the other he says that even within the
> >> body there are distinct lines of development and that physiology is
> >> "a summarizable concept". He is acutely aware of the contradiction,
> >> but by the end of the lecture he resolves it. We just have to keep in
> >> mind that things that we take apart for the purpose of analysis are
> >> inextricably joined in clinical practice. I suppose you can say it is
> >> a logical contradiction if you want, particularly if by that you mean
> >> it is a contradiction that only exists in the ideal world, that is,
> >> in logic and does not really pose a problem in life.
> >>
> >> The problem is with the word "text" is the same, Huw. For Hallidayans
> >> like me, a text is precisely a semantic object; it's not made of
> >> paper and ink. Viewed interpersonally, a text is a coherent and
> >> cohesive exchange. Viewed intra-mentally, it's a representation of
> >> thinking. It is objective, but it's objective the way that
> >> mathematics and language itself is objective, not the way that three
> >> actual apples or a physical book is objective. Dixit.
> >>
> >> David Kellogg
> >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >>
> >> (PS: I'm afraid I didn't get the systemic reproach at all. It's hard
> >> for a fish to see the density of water, much less to see the density
> >> of the fish!)
> >>
> >> dk
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 7 October 2014 23:11, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> > The understanding of action and activity AS BOTH thinking and
> >> > behaviour contrasting with an appeal to differentiate the aspects
> >> > thinking and behaviour.
> >> > The notion *species* was introduced by David K as returning to
> >> > Vygotsky's words as he used them [paleo return] or we will loose
> >> > this species as it becomes extinct.
> >> >
> >> > Therefore Leontiev's theory could also be considered a separate
> >> > *species* with its own characteristics, features, and object of
> activity.
> >> > SO in my return to the species of Activity theory I turned to one
> >> > of Leontiev's students [Victor Kaptelinin] in his 2005 MCA article
> >> > "The
> >> Object
> >> > of Activity: Making sense of the Sense Maker"
> >> >
> >> > Kaptelinin opens his article with this fragment from the *species*
> >> > of Leontiev's own specified object of activity [activity theory]
> >> >
> >> > "A basic or, as is sometimes said, a CONSTITUTING characteristic of
> >> > activity is its objectivity or, rather object relatedness. Properly
> >> > the CONCEPT of its object, gegenstand, is already IMPLICITLY
> >> > contained in the very concept of activity. The expression
> >> > objectless activity is DEVOID of any meaning. Objectivity may SEEM
> >> > objectless, but SCIENTIFIC
> >> investigations
> >> > OF activity NECESSARILY REQUIRES discovering its object.
> >> > THUS the object of activity IS TWOFOLD:
> >> > First, in its INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE as SUBORDINATING TO ITSELF and
> >> > transforming the activity of the subject [The question arises if
> >> > this subordinating is the object's *motive* - LP] AND Second, as an
> >> > IMAGE OF the object, as a product OF its property of psychological
> >> > reflection THAT IS realized AS AN ACTIVITY OF THE SUBJECT, and
> >> > cannot exist OTHERWISE."
> >> >
> >> > This paragraph which Kaptelian offers as a *specimen* of a
> >> > particular and unique *species* of expression seems to present a
> >> > clear *case* to hold up to Vygotsky's *species* .
> >> > I would add that Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative *species* that
> >> > is
> >> also
> >> > looking at objects of activity from another *angle* of vision.
> >> >
> >> > Are Vygotsky, Leontiev, and Merleau-Ponty all gesturing at the same
> >> > phenomena and walking around this *object* [imagined? or real?]
> >> > from various vantage points.
> >> >
> >> > I will pause by returning to the second quality of the TWOFOLD
> >> > quality of the *object of activity*
> >> >
> >> > "SECOND as an IMAGE OF the object, AS a product OF its
> >> > PSYCHOLOGICAL REFLECTION that is REALIZED [brought into form -LP]
> >> > AS an activity OF the SUBJECT and cannot exist OTHERWISE.
> >> >
> >> > Is this a new *species*??
> >> >
> >> > Larry
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 4:55 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> wrote:
> >> >
> >> >> Mike, what I got out of Seth's intervention was just a plea for
> >> >> people
> >> to
> >> >> stop claiming to have the "real Vygotsky" and I thoroughly agreed
> >> >> with
> >> him.
> >> >> And so far as I know Marx uses the German word for Activity, viz.,
> >> >> Taetigkeit, in "Theses on Feuerbach" - that word which pre-dates
> >> >> "behaviour" and "consciousness" by centuries, but which is
> >> >> sometimes referred to nowadays as a unity of these two
> >> >> abstractions, and it was
> >> only
> >> >> later interpreters that introduced the term "praxis", which being
> >> >> Greek sounds a lot cleverer. Action and Activity, in my view and
> >> etymologically,
> >> >> are both thinking and behaving.
> >> >> Andy
> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> >> ------
> >> >> *Andy Blunden*
> >> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> mike cole wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >>> Thanks, David. I think i understand better what you mean by "LSV
> >> rejects
> >> >>> "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior,and
> >> >>> most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Somehow I was
> >> >>> expecting text from LSV where he says "activity is not a unit of
> >> >>> analysis" because of
> >> all
> >> >>> the places in his text where he uses the term activity as a sort
> >> >>> of
> >> "lay
> >> >>> term".
> >> >>>
> >> >>> ...
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>>  Holbrook Mahn.
> >> >>>> Holbrook began by saying that:
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> a) We do not "borrow" concepts made for one discipline and "apply"
> >> >>>> them to another. Not even dialectical materialism can be
> >> >>>> "applied" to psychology (or even sociology or economics--Marx
> >> >>>> didn't do applied philosophy!). Holbrook then produced a number
> >> >>>> of quotations from The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in
> >> >>>> Psychology to show that Vygotsky knew this, and countered with
> >> >>>> other quotations from Problems of the Development of the Mind to
> show that Leontiev did not know this.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> I know places where LSV is clear on this score, in Historical
> >> >>>> meaning,
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>> for example, but not the evidence of Leontiev's errors.
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> b) The term "praxis" has been thus borrowed. It doesn't refer to
> >> >>>> practical activity: it refers to a unity of thinking and practice.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Borrowed from Marx by ..??? by Leontiev? There is any form of
> >> >>> practical activity without human thinking?
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> c) The term "social situation of development" has been thus
> >> >>>> borrowed; it does not refer to a "context" but to the child's
> >> >>>> relationship to the environment.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> By whom? I am always in a puzzle about the use of this term.
> >> >>> Isn't perezhivanie the term that LSV uses to talk about relation
> >> >>> of child to environment? At least, there seems to be a lot of
> chatter about issue.
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> d) The term "unit of analysis" does not refer to a God particle
> >> >>>> that is indifferent to the problem of analysis. ygotsky did not
> >> >>>> imagine a "unit of analysis" that fit any and all problems in
> >> >>>> psychology. Each unit of analysis is specific to a particular
> problem of unity (e.g.
> >> >>>> the problem of the unity of the child and his or her environment
> >> >>>> in Problem of the Environment and the problem of the unity of
> >> >>>> verbal thinking in Thinking and Speech).
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> Amen to that.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> e) The term "verbal thinking" is a mistranslation: Vygotsky is
> >> >>>> talking about thinking by language, or thinking through word
> >> >>>> meanings, and not some kind of verbalizable inner speech (which
> >> >>>> does exist, but which is a distinct layer from thinking).
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>> There is a lot of confusion around this issue and would probably
> >> >>> need somewhat separate discussion. I interpret in the former way.
> >> >>> The role
> >> of
> >> >>> meaning in inner speech, and the usefulness or not of the
> >> >>> sense/meaning distinction has me confused. Dima Leontiev has put
> >> >>> the distinction
> >> behind
> >> >>> him and now refers to "cultural meaning" (paleo meaning
> >> >>>
> >> >>> ) and
> >> >>> "personal meaning (paleo sense)." I am paleo in this regard.
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> Most of this has been said before, not least by Vygotsky
> >> >>>> himself. I know that Holbrook has been saying it at least since
> >> >>>> 2007 when I first heard him at the American Association for
> >> >>>> Applied Linguistics in Costa Mesa, and he develops it at some
> length in:
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> https://www.academia.edu/1803017/Vygotskys_Analysis_of_
> >> >>>> Childrens_Meaning-Making_Processes
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> Mahn, H. (2012). Vygotsky's Analysis of Children's
> >> >>>> Meaning-Making Processes, International Journal of Educational
> >> >>>> Psychology1(2):100-126
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> It's been said by others too: Mike Cole actually makes many of
> >> >>>> the same points in discussing how the Kharkov school deviated
> >> >>>> from the work of Vygotsk,
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> I did not know enough to make many of these points in 1978! They
> >> >>> certainly distanced themselves from LSV and PI Zinchenko went
> >> >>> after the natural-cultural memory distinction,
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> and J.V. Wertsch is quite explicit in his revisionism when he
> >> >>>> presents "mediated activity" as a unit of analysis in opposition
> >> >>>> to "word meaning".
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> mediated ACTION and often as not, mediated action in context.
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> But of course since a unit of analysis must preserve in some
> >> >>>> shape or form the essential properties of the whole, the use of
> >> >>>> "mediated activity"
> >> >>>> (action)
> >> >>>> cannot be a unit of analysis for the mind if we wish to retain
> >> >>>> the idea that the mind has a semantic structure (that is, if the
> >> >>>> "whole" is structured something like a text or a discourse
> >> >>>> rather than like driving a car, shooting a gun, or hunting
> >> >>>> animals).
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> When we get to semantic structure of consciousness, we know there
> >> >>> was a break between LSV and his buddies. It seems that it is in
> >> >>> arriving at
> >> this
> >> >>> formulation that the charges of idealism and sign-o-centrism kick
> in.
> >> >>>
> >> >>> My difficulty is in making arguments about consciousness-
> >> >>> -in-general, perhaps a relic of my behaviorist past. Luria
> >> >>> appears to have come
> >> around
> >> >>> on this issue. I have had a difficult time understanding the
> >> >>> changes in Leontiev's thought over the period of the 30's and 40's.
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> Now, in the discussion of Holbrook's presentation, this
> >> >>>> wild-haired guy who looked a little like Itzhak Perlman rose to
> >> >>>> argue that Leontiev's interpretation was really one fair
> >> >>>> interpretation, and that it really was addressed towards a
> >> >>>> specific problem, which is how to prevent dualism from arising
> >> >>>> (that is, how to explain how word meaning could arise
> historically).Through joint mediated activity?
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> He also said that Holbrook was juxtaposing quotations out of
> >> >>>> context: the quotes that showed Vygotsky arguing against a
> >> >>>> "Marxist psychology" were directed against a very specific group
> >> >>>> of vulgar Marxists (e.g. Zalkind) and that is why Vygotsky uses
> >> >>>> scare quotes around "Marxist".
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Not so?
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> I then muddied the waters, first by addressing the wild-haired
> >> >>>> guy instead of Holbrook (a major breach of protocol) and then by
> >> >>>> arguing that speech really is sui generis, because it is a form of
> "activity"
> >> >>>> (if we must call it that) whose conditions of comprehension are
> >> >>>> no longer recoverable from the activity itself (and so the unit
> >> >>>> of analysis for verbal thinking cannot be sought in activity).
> >> >>>> There wasn't enough time to really develop what I wanted to say,
> >> >>>> so I went over to continue the discussion, and it turned out
> >> >>>> that the wild haired guy was none other than Seth Chaiklin, who
> >> >>>> is, we all know, one of the foremost paleo-Vygotskyans when it
> >> >>>> comes to the much misinterpreted concept of the ZPD.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Speech is a form of activity or a means of activity? Or of action?
> >> >>>
> >> >>> I guess I do not understand. If its worthwhile, perhaps spell the
> >> >>> idea out here?
> >> >>>
> >> >>> So far as I can tell, there are ONLY misinterpretations of the
> Zoped.
> >> Seth
> >> >>> was right on about it being used in Anglo-American discourse as
> >> something
> >> >>> akin to zone of proximal learning,fitting into the associationist
> >> >>> view
> >> of
> >> >>> development as more learning. But the one right interpretation
> >> >>> has
> >> escaped
> >> >>> my notice.
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Thanks again for taking the trouble to write that out. Perhaps it
> >> >>> will
> >> be
> >> >>> generative for people.
> >> >>> mike
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> David Kellogg
> >> >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> PS: Holbrook DID get one thing wrong. Stalin did not argue that
> >> >>>> language was purely ideal and superstructural; that was Marr's
> >> >>>> position. Stalin, or whoever ghost wrote his articles, argued
> >> >>>> that language was base, and therefore somehow material, whatever
> >> >>>> that means. But Stalin was not really interested in ideas; he
> >> >>>> was just out for Marr's blood.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> On 6 October 2014 22:21, mike cole <mcole@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>> Hi David--
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> The specific example of your comments on originals and
> >> >>>>> adaptations
> >> hits
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>> on
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>> a point it would be helpful to hear more about:
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> You wrote:
> >> >>>>>  Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a
> >> >>>>> somewhat similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and
> >> >>>>> me clinging rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan
> >> >>>>> interpretation which
> >> actually
> >> >>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but
> >> >>>>> behavior, and most certainly as a unit of psychological
> >> >>>>> analysis. Seth's argument was pragmatist: for certain practical
> >> >>>>> applications, we need new interpretations, including
> >> >>>>> revisionist ones. Mine was an argument in favor of species
> >> >>>>> diversity: when the revisionist account supplants the original
> >> >>>>> to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no longer
> >> >>>>> accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts
> >> (and
> >> >>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at
> >> >>>>> least recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole
> >> >>>>> species of thinking that has become extinct).
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> 1.   Could you guide us to a text you recommend where this
> >> >>>>> interpretation
> >> >>>>> is laid out?
> >> >>>>> 2. What sort of revision was Seth suggesting and why?
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> I have been reading Russian discussions around this issue.
> >> Clarification
> >> >>>>> would be helpful.
> >> >>>>> mike
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:37 AM, David Kellogg
> >> >>>>> <dkellogg60@gmail.com
> >> >
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>> wrote:
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own
> >> >>>>> bed and
> >> >>>>>> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing
> this:
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn,
> >> >>>>>> played, as Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT
> >> >>>>>> Davydov)
> >> Stradivarius
> >> >>>>>> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very
> >> >>>>>> first time in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout
> >> >>>>>> this concert, Ma
> >> has
> >> >>>>>> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman
> >> >>>>>> has
> >> been
> >> >>>>>> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal
> >> interpretation.
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if
> >> >>>>>> Mendelssohn himself had heard the sonata played on that very
> >> >>>>>> cello, then he, Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that
> >> >>>>>> Mendelssohn had
> >> occupied,
> >> >>>>>> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer
> >> >>>>>> to Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with
> >> >>>>>> period instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts
> >> >>>>>> them and starts to play.
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a
> >> >>>>>> somewhat similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and
> >> >>>>>> me clinging rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan
> >> >>>>>> interpretation which
> >> actually
> >> >>>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but
> >> >>>>>> behavior, and most certainly as a unit of psychological
> >> >>>>>> analysis. Seth's argument was pragmatist: for certain
> >> >>>>>> practical applications, we need new interpretations, including
> >> >>>>>> revisionist ones. Mine was an
> >> argument
> >> >>>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account
> >> supplants
> >> >>>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original
> >> >>>>>> argument is
> >> no
> >> >>>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original
> >> >>>>>> texts
> >> (and
> >> >>>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at
> >> >>>>>> least recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole
> >> >>>>>> species of thinking that has become extinct).
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>> David Kellogg
> >> >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in
> >> >>>>>> Sydney was not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I
> >> >>>>>> think I would have liked it better if she had used those terms
> >> >>>>>> a little more
> >> imprecisely,
> >> >>>>>> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION
> >> >>>>>> might
> >> have
> >> >>>>>> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was
> >> >>>>>> contemplating.
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a
> >> >>>>>> world without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour
> >> >>>>>> jobs are replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this
> >> >>>>>> was a rather dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed
> >> >>>>>> us what she called
> >> the
> >> >>>>>> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also
> >> >>>>>> human identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in
> >> >>>>>> the
> >> conference
> >> >>>>>> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time
> >> >>>>>> for
> >> the
> >> >>>>>> spiritual side of life.
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the
> "object"
> >> of
> >> >>>>>> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working
> >> >>>>>> class
> >> is
> >> >>>>>> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex
> >> workers
> >> >>>>>> and atomized into the social position of housewives.
> >> >>>>>> Inequality is
> >> now
> >> >>>>>> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history
> >> >>>>>> tells us that the result of this is not going to be individual
> >> spirituality
> >> >>>>>> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is
> >> >>>>>> if
> >> that
> >> >>>>>> force is organized, social, and directed against social
> >> >>>>>> equality rather than against fellow members of the working class.
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>> dk
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>> On 5 October 2014 13:38, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie
> >> >>>>>>> Nardi
> >> I
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>> had
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>> the
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if
> >> >>>>>>> she
> >> has
> >> >>>>>>> written something on "object" that is very good news.
> >> >>>>>>> I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't
> >> >>>>>>> think one
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>> good
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>> book
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long
> >> >>>>>>> while I
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>> have
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>> been
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie"
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>> without
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>> an
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of
> >> "substance"
> >> >>>>>>> whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains
> >> outstanding
> >> >>>>>>> differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that
> >> >>>>>>> almost all
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>> bar
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>> one
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is
> >> >>>>>>> a
> >> step
> >> >>>>>>> forward, and people are aware of the differences in
> >> >>>>>>> interpretation
> >> and
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>> they
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a
> >> >>>>>>> while,
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>> maybe
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>> this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>> consistency
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>> in
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>> optimistic.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>> Andy
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
> >> >>>> ------------
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>> *Andy Blunden*
> >> >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> mike cole wrote:
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>> Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy.
> >> >>>>>>>> I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds
> >> >>>>>>>> that
> >> go
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> U
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>> discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a
> >> >>>>> shower of
> >> >>>>>>>> interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings?
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> (Whatever
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>> object means!).  :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on
> >> >>>>> basics of
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> AT
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>> is
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable!
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>> Mike
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>> On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden
> >> >>>>>>>> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>     I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were
> >> >>>>>>>> a
> >> little
> >> >>>>>>>>     slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also
> >> >>>>>>>> iscar-ers
> >> and
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> we
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>>     were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress.
> >> >>>>>>>>     Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger
> on a
> >> >>>>>>>>     Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and
> >> >>>>>>>> tablets
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> etc.,
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>>     so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were
> >> >>>>>>>>     oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists.
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>     My impressions of CHAT research:
> >> >>>>>>>>     On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp
> and
> >> >>>>>>>>     critical in relation to the dominant political forces,
> >> >>>>>>>> and
> >> still
> >> >>>>>>>>     way out in front in understanding the several developmental
> >> >>>>>>>>     processes which all contribute to our actions
> (phylogenesis,
> >> >>>>>>>>     historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis,
> >> >>>>>>>> microgenesis),
> >> and
> >> >>>>>>>>     not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great
> >> >>>>>>>>     community of research, relatively lacking in the
> >> competitiveness
> >> >>>>>>>>     and jealousy which infects most research communities.
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>     On the negative side:
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>        * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society"
> >> >>>>>>>> as
> >> some
> >> >>>>>>>>          homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces
> >> >>>>>>>> problems
> >> into
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> the
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>>          social situation on which they try to focus, i.e.,
> >> >>>>> people
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> lack
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>> a
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>          viable social theory or the ability to use theory
> >> >>>>>>> they
> >> have
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> to
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>>          analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated
> way.
> >> >>>>>>>>        * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us.
> >> Only a
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> small
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>          minority know what it means and use the idea in
> >> >>>>>>> their
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> research.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>>        * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> confusion;
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>>          few researchers using the concept are clear on what
> >> >>>>> the
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> concept
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>>          is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront
> >> >>>>> and
> >> >>>>>>>>     attempt to
> >> >>>>>>>>          resolve the methodological differences (I refer to
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> systematic
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>>          difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings)
> >> >>>>> within
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> the
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>          CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the
> >> >>>>>>> relatively
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> civil
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>          relations between researchers - people prefer to let
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> differences
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>          just fester without openly discussing them. The old
> >> >>>>>>> Soviet
> >> >>>>>>>>          approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far
> >> >>>>>>>> the
> >> other
> >> >>>>>>>>     way. :)
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>     Andy
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
> >> >>>> ------------
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>>     *Andy Blunden*
> >> >>>>>>>>     http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> >> >>>>>>>>     <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>     mike cole wrote:
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>         Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous
> response to
> >> >>>>>>>>         someone who
> >> >>>>>>>>         wrote backto xmca instead of me.
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>         Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an
> >> >>>>>>>>         interesting and
> >> >>>>>>>>         unassuming guy.
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>         Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca
> >> discussion??
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>         mike
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>> --
> >> >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural
> >> >>>>>>>> science
> >> with
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>> an
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>>
> >> >>>>> --
> >> >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science
> >> >>>>> with
> >> an
> >> >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an
> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch.
> ________________________________
> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]<
> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass>
>
> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for
> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the
> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the
> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it.
> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know
> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not
> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts
> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails
> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility
> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its
> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied
> by an official order form.
>
>


-- 
Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Anthropology
882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson

More information about the xmca-l mailing list