From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Oct 1 06:01:17 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2014 06:01:17 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Phenomenology as lived experience Message-ID: Greg, Your inquiry of the *gap* forming when perception requires separating from and re-composing or the perceptual field disappears from awareness has be reflecting on *lived experience*, Peirce's firstness, and *mediation*. Imagine a musical score played as a living experience. Now imagine a musician playing each single note as notated on the musical score and re-cording each *individual* note. After playing each note and re-cording the individual notes the musician re-assembles and plays back the notes in a series. How do you imagine the experience of listening to this reassembled individual notes which had been composed as singularities. Would anything be *missing* .Would we be orienting to go BEYOND the singular notes. Is there *something* in EXCESS of the individual notes played in a series? Can this *something extra* be indicated through the concept of *lived experience* as phenomenological?? Is this lived experience *intersubjective* [or intrasubjective if you are trying to imagine that there are not two discrete individualities who exist first as subjects and then meet and conjoin]. Intersubjective as I use the term is phenomenological in a similar way that music is internotational AS living [not lived] experience. In language use, John Shotter's saying as lived experience in contrast with the said. Peirce tried to re-configure *reasoning* as a practice [I would say a lived experience] as distinct from the *theory* of reasoning or metareasoning [reasoning about reasoning]. I have a sense [and Peirce would include BOTH perception AND inference in sense] that music that is played as individual notes is an abstracting secondary derived practice extracted from the lived experience. When the individual notes are reassembled in a series, and the gaps filled in between each note *something* will still be missing [and deadened] in the re-playing [the said]. What I think [or infer or sense] is missing is the actual lived experience between I and Thou [the phenomenological experience]] that is always in EXCESS of our abstracting and analyzing and reassembling of the individualities as notations. Larry From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Oct 1 09:30:40 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2014 09:30:40 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Assistant Professor Position at Michigan State University In-Reply-To: <318AB389-DBE3-40B7-9606-5A6AF6CCB345@msu.edu> References: <318AB389-DBE3-40B7-9606-5A6AF6CCB345@msu.edu> Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Lisa Linnenbrink-Garcia Date: Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 6:08 AM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Assistant Professor Position at Michigan State University To: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org Dear colleagues, I am writing to notify you of the following position at Michigan State University. Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions. *Assistant Professor - Educational Psychology - Michigan State University* The Educational Psychology and Educational Technology (EPET) program at Michigan State University (MSU) invites applications for a tenure-track position at the level of Assistant Professor to begin Fall 2015. EPET is a nationally ranked graduate program that produces scholars and leaders in the study of learning, development, and technology in relation to education and broader cultural practices. We are seeking candidates with interests in the application of psychology to education. We welcome applicants who study teaching and learning in a range of environments ? e.g., formal or informal, face-to-face or technologically mediated. The specific focus of candidates? interest is open, though preference will be given to candidates whose research complements and extends the interests of current EPET faculty. Broad areas of interest may include socio-emotional development, learning processes and cognitive development, contextual and cultural influences on learning and development, and motivation and engagement. Ideal candidates will have earned a doctorate in educational psychology or a closely related field, as we are looking for candidates to teach graduate classes in educational psychology, cognitive development, social-emotional development, and/or cultural influences on teaching and learning. Successful candidates will show the potential to develop a nationally recognized, externally funded program of research. This individual will be expected to teach graduate courses, advise Ph.D. students, and participate in professional, college, and departmental service activities. The EPET program is a unique and award-winning program that integrates the fields of educational psychology and educational technology both in terms of research and in innovative program offerings. EPET is one of five programs in the Department of Counseling, Educational Psychology, and Special Education (CEPSE) within the College of Education. For more information, please visit our website at http://edutech.msu.edu. Interested persons should apply to position #0091 via the link at https://jobs.msu.edu. Applications should include: (1) a cover letter detailing qualifications for the position and a statement of research and teaching interests, (2) curriculum vitae, (3) up to three representative publications, and (4) names and contact information for three references. Please contact the chair of the search committee, Dr. Lisa Linnenbrink-Garcia, llgarcia@msu.edu, (517) 432-1817, if you have questions about the position. Review of applications will begin October 31, 2014 and continue until the position is filled. MSU is an affirmative action, equal opportunity employer and is committed to achieving excellence through cultural diversity. The university actively encourages applications and/or nominations of women, persons of color, veterans and person with disabilities. Best wishes, Lisa Linnenbrink-Garcia, Ph.D. Associate Professor Educational Psychology & Educational Technology Michigan State University 620 Farm Lane Room 513E Erickson Hall East Lansing, MI 48824-1034 517-432-1817 llgarcia@msu.edu _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From the_yasya@yahoo.com Wed Oct 1 12:19:33 2014 From: the_yasya@yahoo.com (Anton Yasnitsky) Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2014 12:19:33 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help? Vygotsky train ride In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1412191173.16514.YahooMailNeo@web160104.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> van der Veer, R. & Zavershneva, E. (2011). To Moscow with Love: Partial Reconstruction of Vygotsky?s Trip to London. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 45(4), 458?474 Open access, html/pdf: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12124-011-9173-8 On Tuesday, September 30, 2014 4:25 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: I was trying to find an XMCA post that mentioned a train ride that Vygotsky was taking on his way to London and was writing a letter to his wife (yes, I know that a boat would have to be involved at some point if he wanted to get to London...). I searched the archives for the usual words but couldn't find it. Does anyone remember this conversation? Or, does anyone know about the letters that V would have written? -greg -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Oct 2 08:44:26 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2014 09:44:26 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Phenomenology as lived experience In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Larry, I like your metaphor for the importance of syntagmatic relations in experience (see what I did there?). Seems like a close kin to this phenomena would be computer animated voices. If you have ever tried to have Adobe read a pdf to you, you'll know what I'm talking about. Each word is pronounced adequately (usually) but at the level of the sentence it lacks the coherence of a human speaker. It is just one word after another (with a pause when it comes to a comma or paragraph). And when computers are able to give intonation to sentences, then it gets scary. Check out the WOPR in the 80's classic film Wargames: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ecPeSmF_ikc I also had a colleague that once was working on getting computers to produce sentence-level intonation. When they tried it out with students, the female students in particular said that they thought that the computers were "creepy" b.c. it sounded like the computers were "coming onto them" (in the colloquial sense of "hitting on" or making romantic advances). So, indeed, the flow to experience is essential to human life. But perhaps we had that already with William James and even Immanuel Kant. What seems most interesting to me is the Peircean idea that you mentioned of reasoning as lived experience.* So, what's up with that? Can you say more about that? How is reasoning lived experience? -greg *(and true, that may be nothing new either - consider Hamann or Goethe or others in the German Romantic tradition, among other traditions). On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 7:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Greg, > Your inquiry of the *gap* forming when perception requires separating from > and re-composing or the perceptual field disappears from awareness has be > reflecting on *lived experience*, Peirce's firstness, and *mediation*. > > Imagine a musical score played as a living experience. > Now imagine a musician playing each single note as notated on the musical > score and re-cording each *individual* note. > After playing each note and re-cording the individual notes the musician > re-assembles and plays back the notes in a series. > How do you imagine the experience of listening to this reassembled > individual notes which had been composed as singularities. Would anything > be *missing* .Would we be orienting to go BEYOND the singular notes. Is > there *something* in EXCESS of the individual notes played in a series? Can > this *something extra* be indicated through the concept of *lived > experience* as phenomenological?? > Is this lived experience *intersubjective* [or intrasubjective if you are > trying to imagine that there are not two discrete individualities who > exist first as subjects and then meet and conjoin]. > > Intersubjective as I use the term is phenomenological in a similar way that > music is internotational AS living [not lived] experience. > > In language use, John Shotter's saying as lived experience in contrast with > the said. > > Peirce tried to re-configure *reasoning* as a practice [I would say a lived > experience] as distinct from the *theory* of reasoning or metareasoning > [reasoning about reasoning]. > > I have a sense [and Peirce would include BOTH perception AND inference in > sense] that music that is played as individual notes is an abstracting > secondary derived practice extracted from the lived experience. When the > individual notes are reassembled in a series, and the gaps filled in > between each note *something* will still be missing [and deadened] in the > re-playing [the said]. What I think [or infer or sense] is missing is the > actual lived experience between I and Thou [the phenomenological > experience]] that is always in EXCESS of our abstracting and analyzing > and reassembling of the individualities as notations. > Larry > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Oct 2 09:21:04 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2014 10:21:04 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [Race Workshop] FW: Launch of Institute for Critical Social Inquiry (ICSI) with Talal Asad, Simon Critchley, and Patricia J. Williams In-Reply-To: <08ABB9D90F01164C9F102512785C90A330960D82@XM-MBX-03-PROD.ad.uchicago.edu> References: <542C5340.9010906@uchicago.edu> <08ABB9D90F01164C9F102512785C90A330960D82@XM-MBX-03-PROD.ad.uchicago.edu> Message-ID: perhaps of interest. -greg ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Tracye Matthews Date: Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 1:48 PM Subject: [Race Workshop] FW: Launch of Institute for Critical Social Inquiry (ICSI) with Talal Asad, Simon Critchley, and Patricia J. Williams To: "reproduction-of-race-workshop@lists.uchicago.edu" < reproduction-of-race-workshop@lists.uchicago.edu> Dear Colleagues, I am thrilled to announce the launch of the *Institute for Critical Social Inquiry (ICSI)* at the New School for Social Research . Each summer, the ICSI will offer advanced graduate students and junior faculty from around the world the opportunity to spend one week at the New School's campus in Greenwich Village working closely with major thinkers who have shaped the course of contemporary social inquiry. This summer, we are excited to offer three seminars : *Secularism*, led by *Distinguished Professor Talal Asad* (CUNY); *Heidegger* led by *Hans Jonas Distinguished Professor Simon Critchley *(NSSR); and *Racial Formations and Justice Today*, led by *James L. Dohr Professor of Law Patricia J. Williams* (Columbia). The 2015 Summer Session runs June 14-21. Applications are due February 1st, 2015, but we encourage applicants to seek funding from their home institutions as early as possible. A limited number of travel grants are available for US applicants and significant tuition scholarships are available for applicants from the Global South. Please take a look at our website and share this announcement widely with your friends, colleagues, and graduate students. *http://www.instituteforcriticalsocialinquiry.org/ * Best, Charles Charles A. McDonald | The New School for Social Research Program Coordinator, Institute for Critical Social Inquiry (ICSI) PhD Candidate, Anthropology and History Teaching Fellow, Eugene Lang College mcdoc390@newschool.edu www.instituteforcriticalsocialinquiry.org *From:* sar-l-bounces+palmie=uchicago.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [ sar-l-bounces+palmie=uchicago.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Charles McDonald [mcdoc390@newschool.edu] -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: ICSI F14 Ad.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 455515 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141002/09ca2af4/attachment-0001.pdf From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Oct 2 10:05:17 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2014 11:05:17 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Phenomenology as lived experience In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ?Larry, and here is a recent articulation of the problematic of splitting reason from lived activity. It is from Tim Ingold's paper "That's enough about Ethnography" in the open source journal Hau: "These questions, however, are founded upon a certain understanding of immanence and transcendence, deeply rooted in the protocols of normal science, according to which human existence is constitutionally split between being in the world and knowing about it. The alleged contradiction between participation and observation is no more than a corollary of this split. As human beings, it seems, we can aspire to truth about the world only by way of an emancipation that takes us from it and leaves us strangers to ourselves (Ingold 2013: 5). Anthropology, surely, cannot passively acquiesce to this excision of knowing from being. More than any other discipline in the human sciences, it has the means and the determination to show how knowledge grows from the crucible of lives lived with others. "? On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 7:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Greg, > Your inquiry of the *gap* forming when perception requires separating from > and re-composing or the perceptual field disappears from awareness has be > reflecting on *lived experience*, Peirce's firstness, and *mediation*. > > Imagine a musical score played as a living experience. > Now imagine a musician playing each single note as notated on the musical > score and re-cording each *individual* note. > After playing each note and re-cording the individual notes the musician > re-assembles and plays back the notes in a series. > How do you imagine the experience of listening to this reassembled > individual notes which had been composed as singularities. Would anything > be *missing* .Would we be orienting to go BEYOND the singular notes. Is > there *something* in EXCESS of the individual notes played in a series? Can > this *something extra* be indicated through the concept of *lived > experience* as phenomenological?? > Is this lived experience *intersubjective* [or intrasubjective if you are > trying to imagine that there are not two discrete individualities who > exist first as subjects and then meet and conjoin]. > > Intersubjective as I use the term is phenomenological in a similar way that > music is internotational AS living [not lived] experience. > > In language use, John Shotter's saying as lived experience in contrast with > the said. > > Peirce tried to re-configure *reasoning* as a practice [I would say a lived > experience] as distinct from the *theory* of reasoning or metareasoning > [reasoning about reasoning]. > > I have a sense [and Peirce would include BOTH perception AND inference in > sense] that music that is played as individual notes is an abstracting > secondary derived practice extracted from the lived experience. When the > individual notes are reassembled in a series, and the gaps filled in > between each note *something* will still be missing [and deadened] in the > re-playing [the said]. What I think [or infer or sense] is missing is the > actual lived experience between I and Thou [the phenomenological > experience]] that is always in EXCESS of our abstracting and analyzing > and reassembling of the individualities as notations. > Larry > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From carolmacdon@gmail.com Thu Oct 2 10:21:51 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2014 19:21:51 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Phenomenology as lived experience In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Greg Please could you send me the reference details? I'd love to have a look. Thanks Carol On 2 October 2014 19:05, Greg Thompson wrote: > Larry, > and here is a recent articulation of the problematic of splitting reason > from lived activity. It is from Tim Ingold's paper "That's enough about > Ethnography" in the open source journal Hau: > > "These questions, however, are founded upon a certain understanding of > immanence and transcendence, deeply rooted in the protocols of normal > science, > according to which human existence is constitutionally split between being > in the > world and knowing about it. The alleged contradiction between participation > and > observation is no more than a corollary of this split. As human beings, it > seems, we > can aspire to truth about the world only by way of an emancipation that > takes us > from it and leaves us strangers to ourselves (Ingold 2013: 5). > Anthropology, surely, cannot passively acquiesce to this excision of > knowing > from being. More than any other discipline in the human sciences, it has > the means > and the determination to show how knowledge grows from the crucible of > lives > lived with others. " > > On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 7:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > Greg, > > Your inquiry of the *gap* forming when perception requires separating > from > > and re-composing or the perceptual field disappears from awareness has be > > reflecting on *lived experience*, Peirce's firstness, and *mediation*. > > > > Imagine a musical score played as a living experience. > > Now imagine a musician playing each single note as notated on the musical > > score and re-cording each *individual* note. > > After playing each note and re-cording the individual notes the musician > > re-assembles and plays back the notes in a series. > > How do you imagine the experience of listening to this reassembled > > individual notes which had been composed as singularities. Would anything > > be *missing* .Would we be orienting to go BEYOND the singular notes. Is > > there *something* in EXCESS of the individual notes played in a series? > Can > > this *something extra* be indicated through the concept of *lived > > experience* as phenomenological?? > > Is this lived experience *intersubjective* [or intrasubjective if you are > > trying to imagine that there are not two discrete individualities who > > exist first as subjects and then meet and conjoin]. > > > > Intersubjective as I use the term is phenomenological in a similar way > that > > music is internotational AS living [not lived] experience. > > > > In language use, John Shotter's saying as lived experience in contrast > with > > the said. > > > > Peirce tried to re-configure *reasoning* as a practice [I would say a > lived > > experience] as distinct from the *theory* of reasoning or metareasoning > > [reasoning about reasoning]. > > > > I have a sense [and Peirce would include BOTH perception AND inference in > > sense] that music that is played as individual notes is an abstracting > > secondary derived practice extracted from the lived experience. When the > > individual notes are reassembled in a series, and the gaps filled in > > between each note *something* will still be missing [and deadened] in the > > re-playing [the said]. What I think [or infer or sense] is missing is the > > actual lived experience between I and Thou [the phenomenological > > experience]] that is always in EXCESS of our abstracting and analyzing > > and reassembling of the individualities as notations. > > Larry > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Oct 2 10:35:22 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2014 11:35:22 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Phenomenology as lived experience In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Try this: http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau4.1.021 You should be able to get the pdf from here. -greg On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 11:21 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > Hi Greg > > Please could you send me the reference details? I'd love to have a look. > > Thanks > Carol > > On 2 October 2014 19:05, Greg Thompson wrote: > > > Larry, > > and here is a recent articulation of the problematic of splitting reason > > from lived activity. It is from Tim Ingold's paper "That's enough about > > Ethnography" in the open source journal Hau: > > > > "These questions, however, are founded upon a certain understanding of > > immanence and transcendence, deeply rooted in the protocols of normal > > science, > > according to which human existence is constitutionally split between > being > > in the > > world and knowing about it. The alleged contradiction between > participation > > and > > observation is no more than a corollary of this split. As human beings, > it > > seems, we > > can aspire to truth about the world only by way of an emancipation that > > takes us > > from it and leaves us strangers to ourselves (Ingold 2013: 5). > > Anthropology, surely, cannot passively acquiesce to this excision of > > knowing > > from being. More than any other discipline in the human sciences, it has > > the means > > and the determination to show how knowledge grows from the crucible of > > lives > > lived with others. " > > > > On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 7:01 AM, Larry Purss > wrote: > > > > > Greg, > > > Your inquiry of the *gap* forming when perception requires separating > > from > > > and re-composing or the perceptual field disappears from awareness has > be > > > reflecting on *lived experience*, Peirce's firstness, and *mediation*. > > > > > > Imagine a musical score played as a living experience. > > > Now imagine a musician playing each single note as notated on the > musical > > > score and re-cording each *individual* note. > > > After playing each note and re-cording the individual notes the > musician > > > re-assembles and plays back the notes in a series. > > > How do you imagine the experience of listening to this reassembled > > > individual notes which had been composed as singularities. Would > anything > > > be *missing* .Would we be orienting to go BEYOND the singular notes. Is > > > there *something* in EXCESS of the individual notes played in a series? > > Can > > > this *something extra* be indicated through the concept of *lived > > > experience* as phenomenological?? > > > Is this lived experience *intersubjective* [or intrasubjective if you > are > > > trying to imagine that there are not two discrete individualities who > > > exist first as subjects and then meet and conjoin]. > > > > > > Intersubjective as I use the term is phenomenological in a similar way > > that > > > music is internotational AS living [not lived] experience. > > > > > > In language use, John Shotter's saying as lived experience in contrast > > with > > > the said. > > > > > > Peirce tried to re-configure *reasoning* as a practice [I would say a > > lived > > > experience] as distinct from the *theory* of reasoning or metareasoning > > > [reasoning about reasoning]. > > > > > > I have a sense [and Peirce would include BOTH perception AND inference > in > > > sense] that music that is played as individual notes is an abstracting > > > secondary derived practice extracted from the lived experience. When > the > > > individual notes are reassembled in a series, and the gaps filled in > > > between each note *something* will still be missing [and deadened] in > the > > > re-playing [the said]. What I think [or infer or sense] is missing is > the > > > actual lived experience between I and Thou [the phenomenological > > > experience]] that is always in EXCESS of our abstracting and analyzing > > > and reassembling of the individualities as notations. > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From tom.richardson3@googlemail.com Thu Oct 2 10:36:10 2014 From: tom.richardson3@googlemail.com (Tom Richardson) Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2014 18:36:10 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Phenomenology as lived experience In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau4.1.021/665 On 2 October 2014 18:21, Carol Macdonald wrote: > Hi Greg > > Please could you send me the reference details? I'd love to have a look. > > Thanks > Carol > > On 2 October 2014 19:05, Greg Thompson wrote: > > > Larry, > > and here is a recent articulation of the problematic of splitting reason > > from lived activity. It is from Tim Ingold's paper "That's enough about > > Ethnography" in the open source journal Hau: > > > > "These questions, however, are founded upon a certain understanding of > > immanence and transcendence, deeply rooted in the protocols of normal > > science, > > according to which human existence is constitutionally split between > being > > in the > > world and knowing about it. The alleged contradiction between > participation > > and > > observation is no more than a corollary of this split. As human beings, > it > > seems, we > > can aspire to truth about the world only by way of an emancipation that > > takes us > > from it and leaves us strangers to ourselves (Ingold 2013: 5). > > Anthropology, surely, cannot passively acquiesce to this excision of > > knowing > > from being. More than any other discipline in the human sciences, it has > > the means > > and the determination to show how knowledge grows from the crucible of > > lives > > lived with others. " > > > > On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 7:01 AM, Larry Purss > wrote: > > > > > Greg, > > > Your inquiry of the *gap* forming when perception requires separating > > from > > > and re-composing or the perceptual field disappears from awareness has > be > > > reflecting on *lived experience*, Peirce's firstness, and *mediation*. > > > > > > Imagine a musical score played as a living experience. > > > Now imagine a musician playing each single note as notated on the > musical > > > score and re-cording each *individual* note. > > > After playing each note and re-cording the individual notes the > musician > > > re-assembles and plays back the notes in a series. > > > How do you imagine the experience of listening to this reassembled > > > individual notes which had been composed as singularities. Would > anything > > > be *missing* .Would we be orienting to go BEYOND the singular notes. Is > > > there *something* in EXCESS of the individual notes played in a series? > > Can > > > this *something extra* be indicated through the concept of *lived > > > experience* as phenomenological?? > > > Is this lived experience *intersubjective* [or intrasubjective if you > are > > > trying to imagine that there are not two discrete individualities who > > > exist first as subjects and then meet and conjoin]. > > > > > > Intersubjective as I use the term is phenomenological in a similar way > > that > > > music is internotational AS living [not lived] experience. > > > > > > In language use, John Shotter's saying as lived experience in contrast > > with > > > the said. > > > > > > Peirce tried to re-configure *reasoning* as a practice [I would say a > > lived > > > experience] as distinct from the *theory* of reasoning or metareasoning > > > [reasoning about reasoning]. > > > > > > I have a sense [and Peirce would include BOTH perception AND inference > in > > > sense] that music that is played as individual notes is an abstracting > > > secondary derived practice extracted from the lived experience. When > the > > > individual notes are reassembled in a series, and the gaps filled in > > > between each note *something* will still be missing [and deadened] in > the > > > re-playing [the said]. What I think [or infer or sense] is missing is > the > > > actual lived experience between I and Thou [the phenomenological > > > experience]] that is always in EXCESS of our abstracting and analyzing > > > and reassembling of the individualities as notations. > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Oct 2 10:59:37 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2014 10:59:37 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Phenomenology as lived experience In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Greg, Peirce explored the relation of reason and logic. He suggests that acts or practices of reasoning are not following RULES of logic. Logic [as rules] is the realm of *theory of reasoning* AFTER the fact and imposed [derived secondary] from the acts of reasoning. This parallels Merleau-Ponty's critiques of sense *data* or Shotter's distinction between the saying [lived experience] and the said. the KEY term for Peirce is *abduction* which explores the *supposed* aspect of reasoning as interpretive *musings* . The imaginal aspect of reasoning that goes BEYOND the *data* THIS imaginal aspect is phenomenological lived experience. Kathleen Hull in her article "Why Hanker After Logic? Mathematical, Imagination, and Creativity in Peirce's Systematic Philosophy" gives a clear explanation of interpretive musing and abduction. I will summarize a few of her interpretive musings in her *reading* OF Peirce's notion of abduction. Peirce says abduction is hampered by logical *rules* but abduction IS logical inference [and perception] and does have a definite logical form. Abduction is a continuous process IN TIME and as a process is not liable to being CUT UP in distinct arguments. Abductions AS *supposings* or wagers or guesses or hypothetical reasonings are NOT the result of a SELF-CONTROLLED and critical logic. This is not to say they are *illogical* but only that their logic can ONLY be re-constructed AFTER THE FACTS. [re-presented in comparison to presented] Abduction as a living movement of thinking is to be contrasted with reaching a conclusion BASED on syllogisms. Peirce makes it clear there is a *conceptual inquiry* in the process of populating or dwelling within this abductive horizon but it is NOT TO BE REDUCED TO facts of psychology, not be reduced to facts of sociology, not be reduced to facts of science. The conceptual inquiry *in which* the hypothesis is INITIALLY PROPOSED is not a reductive logical system in the sense of CONSCIOUSLY AND AGENTIVELY following *a* set of rules. [syllogism] Peirce does claim that abduction follows logical operations that do not occur by chance, he emphasizes "That NO reason whatsoever can be given for it, as far as I can discover, AND IT NEEDS NO REASON, since it merely offers suggestions". In other words that discovery is logical AND that no reason can be given for discovery is Peirce's interpretive musing. This musing questions the assumption that IF a new hypothesis is logical we must be able to give reasons for this discovery IN THE FIRST PLACE. To understand Peirce's musement we must enter his metaphysics. Peirce says that for those who believe in a reality INDEPENDENT of how we may think it, there ARE HARD FACTS which intrude in a compulsory way. He mentions these HARD FACTS: 1. PERCEPTS - having an entirely irrational INSISTENCY 2. PERCEPTUAL JUDGEMENTS - the onlwy way we can know ABOUT percepts; AND they likewise COMPEL ACCEPTANCE without ANY ASSIGNABLE REASON. 3. MATHEMATICAL DEMONSTRATIONS - constituted by "indefensible compulsiveness" These three "unreasonable compulsory FACTS" are similar in that they ALL DISPLAY THE ASPECT OF SECONDNESS. SECONDNESS DISPLAYS itself in our VERY IMAGININGS suggests that AS WE DEMONSTRATE we are SURPRISED by the outcomes UNFOLDING within our abductions, and musings and diagrammatic experiments. [showings] For Peirce what is central is this *secondness* this COMPULSIVENESS that we are in the *grip of* and that has us. This notion challenges the notion of *a self-controlled thinker following a rule* Greg, I hope this opens a horizon for exploring reasoning as living experience phenomenologically Larry On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 6:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Greg, > Your inquiry of the *gap* forming when perception requires separating from > and re-composing or the perceptual field disappears from awareness has be > reflecting on *lived experience*, Peirce's firstness, and *mediation*. > > Imagine a musical score played as a living experience. > Now imagine a musician playing each single note as notated on the musical > score and re-cording each *individual* note. > After playing each note and re-cording the individual notes the musician > re-assembles and plays back the notes in a series. > How do you imagine the experience of listening to this reassembled > individual notes which had been composed as singularities. Would anything > be *missing* .Would we be orienting to go BEYOND the singular notes. Is > there *something* in EXCESS of the individual notes played in a series? Can > this *something extra* be indicated through the concept of *lived > experience* as phenomenological?? > Is this lived experience *intersubjective* [or intrasubjective if you are > trying to imagine that there are not two discrete individualities who > exist first as subjects and then meet and conjoin]. > > Intersubjective as I use the term is phenomenological in a similar way > that music is internotational AS living [not lived] experience. > > In language use, John Shotter's saying as lived experience in contrast > with the said. > > Peirce tried to re-configure *reasoning* as a practice [I would say a > lived experience] as distinct from the *theory* of reasoning or > metareasoning [reasoning about reasoning]. > > I have a sense [and Peirce would include BOTH perception AND inference in > sense] that music that is played as individual notes is an abstracting > secondary derived practice extracted from the lived experience. When the > individual notes are reassembled in a series, and the gaps filled in > between each note *something* will still be missing [and deadened] in the > re-playing [the said]. What I think [or infer or sense] is missing is the > actual lived experience between I and Thou [the phenomenological > experience]] that is always in EXCESS of our abstracting and analyzing > and reassembling of the individualities as notations. > Larry > > > > > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Thu Oct 2 11:04:37 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2014 20:04:37 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Phenomenology as lived experience In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Got it - thanks. Carol On 2 October 2014 19:35, Greg Thompson wrote: > Try this: > http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau4.1.021 > You should be able to get the pdf from here. > -greg > > On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 11:21 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > > > Hi Greg > > > > Please could you send me the reference details? I'd love to have a look. > > > > Thanks > > Carol > > > > On 2 October 2014 19:05, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > > > Larry, > > > and here is a recent articulation of the problematic of splitting > reason > > > from lived activity. It is from Tim Ingold's paper "That's enough about > > > Ethnography" in the open source journal Hau: > > > > > > "These questions, however, are founded upon a certain understanding of > > > immanence and transcendence, deeply rooted in the protocols of normal > > > science, > > > according to which human existence is constitutionally split between > > being > > > in the > > > world and knowing about it. The alleged contradiction between > > participation > > > and > > > observation is no more than a corollary of this split. As human beings, > > it > > > seems, we > > > can aspire to truth about the world only by way of an emancipation that > > > takes us > > > from it and leaves us strangers to ourselves (Ingold 2013: 5). > > > Anthropology, surely, cannot passively acquiesce to this excision of > > > knowing > > > from being. More than any other discipline in the human sciences, it > has > > > the means > > > and the determination to show how knowledge grows from the crucible of > > > lives > > > lived with others. " > > > > > > On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 7:01 AM, Larry Purss > > wrote: > > > > > > > Greg, > > > > Your inquiry of the *gap* forming when perception requires separating > > > from > > > > and re-composing or the perceptual field disappears from awareness > has > > be > > > > reflecting on *lived experience*, Peirce's firstness, and > *mediation*. > > > > > > > > Imagine a musical score played as a living experience. > > > > Now imagine a musician playing each single note as notated on the > > musical > > > > score and re-cording each *individual* note. > > > > After playing each note and re-cording the individual notes the > > musician > > > > re-assembles and plays back the notes in a series. > > > > How do you imagine the experience of listening to this reassembled > > > > individual notes which had been composed as singularities. Would > > anything > > > > be *missing* .Would we be orienting to go BEYOND the singular notes. > Is > > > > there *something* in EXCESS of the individual notes played in a > series? > > > Can > > > > this *something extra* be indicated through the concept of *lived > > > > experience* as phenomenological?? > > > > Is this lived experience *intersubjective* [or intrasubjective if you > > are > > > > trying to imagine that there are not two discrete individualities who > > > > exist first as subjects and then meet and conjoin]. > > > > > > > > Intersubjective as I use the term is phenomenological in a similar > way > > > that > > > > music is internotational AS living [not lived] experience. > > > > > > > > In language use, John Shotter's saying as lived experience in > contrast > > > with > > > > the said. > > > > > > > > Peirce tried to re-configure *reasoning* as a practice [I would say a > > > lived > > > > experience] as distinct from the *theory* of reasoning or > metareasoning > > > > [reasoning about reasoning]. > > > > > > > > I have a sense [and Peirce would include BOTH perception AND > inference > > in > > > > sense] that music that is played as individual notes is an > abstracting > > > > secondary derived practice extracted from the lived experience. When > > the > > > > individual notes are reassembled in a series, and the gaps filled in > > > > between each note *something* will still be missing [and deadened] in > > the > > > > re-playing [the said]. What I think [or infer or sense] is missing is > > the > > > > actual lived experience between I and Thou [the phenomenological > > > > experience]] that is always in EXCESS of our abstracting and > analyzing > > > > and reassembling of the individualities as notations. > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu Oct 2 13:47:58 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2014 05:47:58 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help? Vygotsky train ride In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Greg: There is a "reconstruction" of the trip to London by Rene Van der Veer: van der Veer, R. and Zavershneva, E. (2011). To Moscow with love: Partial reconstruction of Vygotsky?s trip to London. J Integrative Psychological and Behavioral science. (Published with open access at Springerlink.com) I remember him fighting with his wife before he left and then making up through letters, and also being somewhat astonished that there was no reference to the Great General Strike, which must have occurred just before his trip. It's also very interesting to read the reconstruction side by side with the paper which Vygotsky wrote for the conference and never presented. At first glance the paper seems a little sophomoric: it confirms what people say about Vygotsky starting his career as an apparatchik (of Kornilov at Moscow U and of Krupskaya in the Narkompros). But it contains at least three of the key ideas that are still there, after all the vicissitudes of his stormy life, in Thinking and Speech: the rejection of dualism, the sophisticated materialism based on social relations, and the approach to language that is semic rather than syntactic. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 1 October 2014 05:25, Greg Thompson wrote: > I was trying to find an XMCA post that mentioned a train ride that Vygotsky > was taking on his way to London and was writing a letter to his wife (yes, > I know that a boat would have to be involved at some point if he wanted to > get to London...). > I searched the archives for the usual words but couldn't find it. > Does anyone remember this conversation? Or, does anyone know about the > letters that V would have written? > -greg > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Oct 3 07:34:41 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2014 07:34:41 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Phenomenology as lived experience In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Greg, I want to follow through on Peirce's notion of abduction in relation to *secondness* and *thirdness* from Kathleen Hull's close reading of Peirce. It engages with the notion of *self-control* and *mastery* as pragmatic [or phronesis] The notion of secondness is what is radical in Peirce's claim so it is the *aspect* or *angle* or *perspective* or *quality* that needs to be engaged phenomenologically as just *showing up* For Peirce *percepts* and *perceptual judgements* and *mathematical diagrammatic demonstrations* hard HARD FACTS that *show up*. There IS a compulsive, insistent, disturbing, forceful *secondness* that offers NO reasons involved in percepts, and perceptual judgements, and mathematical diagrammatic demonstrations. In Peirce's metaphysics *thirdness* is ALSO PERCEIVED as generality within observational demonstration. [showing up] In Kathleen Hull's reading: "Thirdness IS perceived. Similar to the way the percept 'simply KNOCKS AT THE PORTAL OF MY SOUL and stands THERE there in the doorway [Peirce CP7 .619] - IT is insistent, it disturds me, it is a forceful THING, it offers no reasons, it COMPELS me to acknowledge IT, AND IT IS OUT OF MY CONTROL, so, too, do the ideas and diagrams which ' SPRING UP IN OUR MINDS' [Peirce CP7 .619] Conjectures, hypothesis, and ideas RECOMMEND THEMSELVES to me 'more or less forcefully AS reasonable' [Peirce] " [Hull page 283] For Peirce the *reasonable* is BEYOND [IN EXCESS OF] *strict logic* I *read* Peirce as exploring the same realm as Merleau-Ponty and phenomenological experience *knocking a the door and standing THERE. Is the *imaginal* existing AS HARD FACTS? Larry On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 10:59 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Greg, > Peirce explored the relation of reason and logic. > He suggests that acts or practices of reasoning are not following RULES of > logic. Logic [as rules] is the realm of *theory of reasoning* AFTER the > fact and imposed [derived secondary] from the acts of reasoning. This > parallels Merleau-Ponty's critiques of sense *data* or Shotter's > distinction between the saying [lived experience] and the said. > > the KEY term for Peirce is *abduction* which explores the *supposed* > aspect of reasoning as interpretive *musings* . The imaginal aspect of > reasoning that goes BEYOND the *data* THIS imaginal aspect is > phenomenological lived experience. > Kathleen Hull in her article "Why Hanker After Logic? Mathematical, > Imagination, and Creativity in Peirce's Systematic Philosophy" gives a > clear explanation of interpretive musing and abduction. > > I will summarize a few of her interpretive musings in her *reading* OF > Peirce's notion of abduction. > Peirce says abduction is hampered by logical *rules* but abduction IS > logical inference [and perception] and does have a definite logical form. > Abduction is a continuous process IN TIME and as a process is not liable to > being CUT UP in distinct arguments. Abductions AS *supposings* or wagers or > guesses or hypothetical reasonings are NOT the result of a SELF-CONTROLLED > and critical logic. This is not to say they are *illogical* but only that > their logic can ONLY be re-constructed AFTER THE FACTS. [re-presented in > comparison to presented] > Abduction as a living movement of thinking is to be contrasted with > reaching a conclusion BASED on syllogisms. > Peirce makes it clear there is a *conceptual inquiry* in the process of > populating or dwelling within this abductive horizon but it is NOT TO BE > REDUCED TO facts of psychology, not be reduced to facts of sociology, not > be reduced to facts of science. > The conceptual inquiry *in which* the hypothesis is INITIALLY PROPOSED is > not a reductive logical system in the sense of CONSCIOUSLY AND AGENTIVELY > following *a* set of rules. [syllogism] > Peirce does claim that abduction follows logical operations that do not > occur by chance, he emphasizes > "That NO reason whatsoever can be given for it, as far as I can discover, > AND IT NEEDS NO REASON, since it merely offers suggestions". > In other words that discovery is logical AND that no reason can be given > for discovery is Peirce's interpretive musing. This musing questions the > assumption that IF a new hypothesis is logical we must be able to give > reasons for this discovery IN THE FIRST PLACE. > To understand Peirce's musement we must enter his metaphysics. Peirce says > that for those who believe in a reality INDEPENDENT of how we may think it, > there ARE HARD FACTS which intrude in a compulsory way. He mentions these > HARD FACTS: > 1. PERCEPTS - having an entirely irrational INSISTENCY > 2. PERCEPTUAL JUDGEMENTS - the onlwy way we can know ABOUT percepts; AND > they likewise COMPEL ACCEPTANCE without ANY ASSIGNABLE REASON. > 3. MATHEMATICAL DEMONSTRATIONS - constituted by "indefensible > compulsiveness" > > These three "unreasonable compulsory FACTS" are similar in that they ALL > DISPLAY THE ASPECT OF SECONDNESS. > > SECONDNESS DISPLAYS itself in our VERY IMAGININGS suggests that AS WE > DEMONSTRATE we are SURPRISED by the outcomes UNFOLDING within our > abductions, and musings and diagrammatic experiments. [showings] For Peirce > what is central is this *secondness* this COMPULSIVENESS that we are in the > *grip of* and that has us. This notion challenges the notion of *a > self-controlled thinker following a rule* > > Greg, I hope this opens a horizon for exploring reasoning as living > experience phenomenologically > Larry > > > > On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 6:01 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > >> Greg, >> Your inquiry of the *gap* forming when perception requires separating >> from and re-composing or the perceptual field disappears from awareness has >> be reflecting on *lived experience*, Peirce's firstness, and *mediation*. >> >> Imagine a musical score played as a living experience. >> Now imagine a musician playing each single note as notated on the musical >> score and re-cording each *individual* note. >> After playing each note and re-cording the individual notes the musician >> re-assembles and plays back the notes in a series. >> How do you imagine the experience of listening to this reassembled >> individual notes which had been composed as singularities. Would anything >> be *missing* .Would we be orienting to go BEYOND the singular notes. Is >> there *something* in EXCESS of the individual notes played in a series? Can >> this *something extra* be indicated through the concept of *lived >> experience* as phenomenological?? >> Is this lived experience *intersubjective* [or intrasubjective if you are >> trying to imagine that there are not two discrete individualities who >> exist first as subjects and then meet and conjoin]. >> >> Intersubjective as I use the term is phenomenological in a similar way >> that music is internotational AS living [not lived] experience. >> >> In language use, John Shotter's saying as lived experience in contrast >> with the said. >> >> Peirce tried to re-configure *reasoning* as a practice [I would say a >> lived experience] as distinct from the *theory* of reasoning or >> metareasoning [reasoning about reasoning]. >> >> I have a sense [and Peirce would include BOTH perception AND inference in >> sense] that music that is played as individual notes is an abstracting >> secondary derived practice extracted from the lived experience. When the >> individual notes are reassembled in a series, and the gaps filled in >> between each note *something* will still be missing [and deadened] in the >> re-playing [the said]. What I think [or infer or sense] is missing is the >> actual lived experience between I and Thou [the phenomenological >> experience]] that is always in EXCESS of our abstracting and analyzing >> and reassembling of the individualities as notations. >> Larry >> >> >> >> >> > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sat Oct 4 08:48:15 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 4 Oct 2014 15:48:15 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] the activity of writing In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> Anyone happen to have a copy of this? Purves, A. C., & Purves, W. C. (1986). Viewpoints: Cultures, text models, and the activity of writing. Research in the Teaching of English, 174-197. Martin From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Oct 4 09:01:48 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 4 Oct 2014 09:01:48 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the activity of writing In-Reply-To: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: I have sent a copy of the paper on the activity of writing to Martin. If anyone else wants it, ask me at mcole@ucsd.edu mike On Sat, Oct 4, 2014 at 8:48 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Anyone happen to have a copy of this? > > Purves, A. C., & Purves, W. C. (1986). Viewpoints: Cultures, text models, > and the activity of writing. Research in the Teaching of English, 174-197. > > Martin > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From carolmacdon@gmail.com Sat Oct 4 09:05:20 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Sat, 4 Oct 2014 18:05:20 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the activity of writing In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Mike I would also like a copy please. Thanks Carol On 4 October 2014 18:01, mike cole wrote: > I have sent a copy of the paper on the activity of writing to Martin. If > anyone else wants it, > ask me at mcole@ucsd.edu > mike > > On Sat, Oct 4, 2014 at 8:48 AM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > wrote: > > > Anyone happen to have a copy of this? > > > > Purves, A. C., & Purves, W. C. (1986). Viewpoints: Cultures, text models, > > and the activity of writing. Research in the Teaching of English, > 174-197. > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Oct 4 09:17:35 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 4 Oct 2014 09:17:35 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the activity of writing In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: On Sat, Oct 4, 2014 at 9:05 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > Mike > > I would also like a copy please. > > Thanks > Carol > > On 4 October 2014 18:01, mike cole wrote: > > > I have sent a copy of the paper on the activity of writing to Martin. If > > anyone else wants it, > > ask me at mcole@ucsd.edu > > mike > > > > On Sat, Oct 4, 2014 at 8:48 AM, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > > > > > Anyone happen to have a copy of this? > > > > > > Purves, A. C., & Purves, W. C. (1986). Viewpoints: Cultures, text > models, > > > and the activity of writing. Research in the Teaching of English, > > 174-197. > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Viewpoints.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 3317899 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141004/e5adc2a4/attachment-0001.pdf From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Oct 4 09:20:50 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 4 Oct 2014 09:20:50 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the activity of writing In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: OOOps! I asked that people write to me personally and did not take care to respond personally to request for the article that Martin asked for. My apologies if I spamed people. Could I ask again, please, politely, that people take the time to respond personally to such requests when asked to do so? thanks. mike On Sat, Oct 4, 2014 at 9:17 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > On Sat, Oct 4, 2014 at 9:05 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > >> Mike >> >> I would also like a copy please. >> >> Thanks >> Carol >> >> On 4 October 2014 18:01, mike cole wrote: >> >> > I have sent a copy of the paper on the activity of writing to Martin. If >> > anyone else wants it, >> > ask me at mcole@ucsd.edu >> > mike >> > >> > On Sat, Oct 4, 2014 at 8:48 AM, Martin John Packer < >> > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >> > wrote: >> > >> > > Anyone happen to have a copy of this? >> > > >> > > Purves, A. C., & Purves, W. C. (1986). Viewpoints: Cultures, text >> models, >> > > and the activity of writing. Research in the Teaching of English, >> > 174-197. >> > > >> > > Martin >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > >> > >> > -- >> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > >> >> >> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> Developmental psycholinguist >> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From bluetanso@googlemail.com Sat Oct 4 09:22:44 2014 From: bluetanso@googlemail.com (Hugh O'Donnell) Date: Sat, 4 Oct 2014 17:22:44 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the activity of writing In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Mike I'd like one too - I teach Secondary English here in Scotland. Hugh On 4 Oct 2014 17:03, "mike cole" wrote: > I have sent a copy of the paper on the activity of writing to Martin. If > anyone else wants it, > ask me at mcole@ucsd.edu > mike > > On Sat, Oct 4, 2014 at 8:48 AM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > wrote: > > > Anyone happen to have a copy of this? > > > > Purves, A. C., & Purves, W. C. (1986). Viewpoints: Cultures, text models, > > and the activity of writing. Research in the Teaching of English, > 174-197. > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From smago@uga.edu Sat Oct 4 09:50:43 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Sat, 4 Oct 2014 16:50:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the activity of writing In-Reply-To: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Martin et al., here y'go. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2014 11:48 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] the activity of writing Anyone happen to have a copy of this? Purves, A. C., & Purves, W. C. (1986). Viewpoints: Cultures, text models, and the activity of writing. Research in the Teaching of English, 174-197. Martin -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: RTE0202Viewpoints (1).pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 3658282 bytes Desc: RTE0202Viewpoints (1).pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141004/e7c4bb69/attachment-0001.pdf From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Oct 4 09:49:24 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 4 Oct 2014 09:49:24 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the activity of writing In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response to someone who wrote backto xmca instead of me. Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an interesting and unassuming guy. Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion?? mike On Sat, Oct 4, 2014 at 9:22 AM, Hugh O'Donnell wrote: > Mike > > I'd like one too - I teach Secondary English here in Scotland. > > Hugh > On 4 Oct 2014 17:03, "mike cole" wrote: > > > I have sent a copy of the paper on the activity of writing to Martin. If > > anyone else wants it, > > ask me at mcole@ucsd.edu > > mike > > > > On Sat, Oct 4, 2014 at 8:48 AM, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > > > > > Anyone happen to have a copy of this? > > > > > > Purves, A. C., & Purves, W. C. (1986). Viewpoints: Cultures, text > models, > > > and the activity of writing. Research in the Teaching of English, > > 174-197. > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From smago@uga.edu Sat Oct 4 09:50:43 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Sat, 4 Oct 2014 16:50:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the activity of writing In-Reply-To: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Martin et al., here y'go. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2014 11:48 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] the activity of writing Anyone happen to have a copy of this? Purves, A. C., & Purves, W. C. (1986). Viewpoints: Cultures, text models, and the activity of writing. Research in the Teaching of English, 174-197. Martin -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: RTE0202Viewpoints (1).pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 3658282 bytes Desc: RTE0202Viewpoints (1).pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141004/e7c4bb69/attachment-0003.pdf From ablunden@mira.net Sat Oct 4 19:03:50 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 05 Oct 2014 13:03:50 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were a little slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also iscar-ers and we were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger on a Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and tablets etc., so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. My impressions of CHAT research: On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp and critical in relation to the dominant political forces, and still way out in front in understanding the several developmental processes which all contribute to our actions (phylogenesis, historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, microgenesis), and not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great community of research, relatively lacking in the competitiveness and jealousy which infects most research communities. On the negative side: * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" as some homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces problems into the social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., people lack a viable social theory or the ability to use theory they have to analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated way. * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. Only a small minority know what it means and use the idea in their research. * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of confusion; few researchers using the concept are clear on what the concept is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront and attempt to resolve the methodological differences (I refer to systematic difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) within the CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the relatively civil relations between researchers - people prefer to let differences just fester without openly discussing them. The old Soviet approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far the other way. :) Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response to someone who > wrote backto xmca instead of me. > > Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an interesting and > unassuming guy. > > Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion?? > > mike > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Oct 4 21:13:37 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 4 Oct 2014 21:13:37 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> Message-ID: Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds that go U discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a shower of interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? (Whatever object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on basics of AT is one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! Mike On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden wrote: > I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were a little slow this > last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also iscar-ers and we were all chatting > like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. Everyone (and I mean everyone, > including every passenger on a Sydney suburban train as well) has their > iPhones and tablets etc., so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess > they were oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. > > My impressions of CHAT research: > On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp and critical in > relation to the dominant political forces, and still way out in front in > understanding the several developmental processes which all contribute to > our actions (phylogenesis, historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, > microgenesis), and not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a > great community of research, relatively lacking in the competitiveness and > jealousy which infects most research communities. > > On the negative side: > > * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" as some > homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces problems into the > social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., people lack a > viable social theory or the ability to use theory they have to > analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated way. > * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. Only a small > minority know what it means and use the idea in their research. > * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of confusion; > few researchers using the concept are clear on what the concept > is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront and attempt to > resolve the methodological differences (I refer to systematic > difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) within the > CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the relatively civil > relations between researchers - people prefer to let differences > just fester without openly discussing them. The old Soviet > approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far the other way. :) > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: > >> Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response to someone who >> wrote backto xmca instead of me. >> >> Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an interesting and >> unassuming guy. >> >> Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion?? >> >> mike >> >> >> > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From ablunden@mira.net Sat Oct 4 21:38:09 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 05 Oct 2014 15:38:09 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> Message-ID: <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie Nardi I had the great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if she has written something on "object" that is very good news. I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't think one good book or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long while I have been jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie" without an article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of "substance" whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains outstanding differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that almost all bar one now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is a step forward, and people are aware of the differences in interpretation and they are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a while, maybe this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual consistency in our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am optimistic. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. > > I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds that go U > discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a shower of > interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? > (Whatever object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on > basics of AT is one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! > > Mike > > On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were a little > slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also iscar-ers and we > were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. > Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger on a > Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and tablets etc., > so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were > oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. > > My impressions of CHAT research: > On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp and > critical in relation to the dominant political forces, and still > way out in front in understanding the several developmental > processes which all contribute to our actions (phylogenesis, > historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, microgenesis), and > not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great > community of research, relatively lacking in the competitiveness > and jealousy which infects most research communities. > > On the negative side: > > * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" as some > homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces problems into the > social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., people lack a > viable social theory or the ability to use theory they have to > analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated way. > * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. Only a small > minority know what it means and use the idea in their research. > * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of confusion; > few researchers using the concept are clear on what the concept > is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront and > attempt to > resolve the methodological differences (I refer to systematic > difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) within the > CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the relatively civil > relations between researchers - people prefer to let differences > just fester without openly discussing them. The old Soviet > approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far the other > way. :) > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > mike cole wrote: > > Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response to > someone who > wrote backto xmca instead of me. > > Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an > interesting and > unassuming guy. > > Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion?? > > mike > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Oct 5 00:37:21 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 5 Oct 2014 16:37:21 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> Message-ID: This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own bed and listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, played, as Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) Stradivarius that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very first time in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma has been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has been pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal interpretation. So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if Mendelssohn himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had occupied, and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and starts to play. Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which actually rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts (and this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of thinking that has become extinct). David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in Sydney was not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I would have liked it better if she had used those terms a little more imprecisely, in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might have made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was contemplating. For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a world without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she called the "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also human identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the conference pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time for the spiritual side of life. What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the "object" of "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working class is being ground down into the economic position of short term sex workers and atomized into the social position of housewives. Inequality is now at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history tells us that the result of this is not going to be individual spirituality but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if that force is organized, social, and directed against social equality rather than against fellow members of the working class. dk On 5 October 2014 13:38, Andy Blunden wrote: > I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie Nardi I had the > great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if she has > written something on "object" that is very good news. > I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't think one good book > or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long while I have been > jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie" without an > article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of "substance" > whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains outstanding > differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that almost all bar one > now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is a step > forward, and people are aware of the differences in interpretation and they > are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a while, maybe > this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual consistency in > our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am optimistic. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: >> >> Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. >> I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds that go U >> discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a shower of >> interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? (Whatever >> object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on basics of AT is >> one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! >> >> Mike >> >> On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were a little >> slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also iscar-ers and we >> were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. >> Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger on a >> Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and tablets etc., >> so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were >> oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. >> >> My impressions of CHAT research: >> On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp and >> critical in relation to the dominant political forces, and still >> way out in front in understanding the several developmental >> processes which all contribute to our actions (phylogenesis, >> historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, microgenesis), and >> not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great >> community of research, relatively lacking in the competitiveness >> and jealousy which infects most research communities. >> >> On the negative side: >> >> * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" as some >> homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces problems into the >> social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., people lack a >> viable social theory or the ability to use theory they have to >> analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated way. >> * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. Only a small >> minority know what it means and use the idea in their research. >> * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of confusion; >> few researchers using the concept are clear on what the concept >> is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront and >> attempt to >> resolve the methodological differences (I refer to systematic >> difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) within the >> CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the relatively civil >> relations between researchers - people prefer to let differences >> just fester without openly discussing them. The old Soviet >> approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far the other >> way. :) >> >> Andy >> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> mike cole wrote: >> >> Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response to >> someone who >> wrote backto xmca instead of me. >> >> Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an >> interesting and >> unassuming guy. >> >> Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion?? >> >> mike >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Oct 5 00:49:31 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 05 Oct 2014 18:49:31 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> Message-ID: <5430F80B.10806@mira.net> So David, when you read Chapter 5 of Thinking and Speech, what do you call those combinations of sign-mediated actions which Vygotsky describes with words such as "complex" or "pseudoconcept" or "heap"? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David Kellogg wrote: > This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own bed and > listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ > > It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, played, as > Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) Stradivarius > that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very first time > in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma has > been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has been > pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal interpretation. > > So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if Mendelssohn > himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, > Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had occupied, > and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to > Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period > instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and starts > to play. > > Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat > similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging > rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which actually > rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, > and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's > argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need > new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument > in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants > the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no > longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts (and > this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least > recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of > thinking that has become extinct). > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in Sydney was > not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I would have > liked it better if she had used those terms a little more imprecisely, > in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might have > made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was > contemplating. > > For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a world > without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are > replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather > dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she called the > "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also human > identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the conference > pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time for the > spiritual side of life. > > What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the "object" of > "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working class is > being ground down into the economic position of short term sex workers > and atomized into the social position of housewives. Inequality is now > at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history tells > us that the result of this is not going to be individual spirituality > but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if that > force is organized, social, and directed against social equality > rather than against fellow members of the working class. > > dk > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Oct 5 07:23:08 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sun, 5 Oct 2014 07:23:08 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <5430F80B.10806@mira.net> References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <5430F80B.10806@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy , David The Purves article on writing as *activity* *acts* and *operations* is translating what I read is another language game of *process* and *composing processeS* that refer to *conscious* and *unconscious* processes that emerge or recede into the unconscious. THIS particular act of *translation* [from process language TO activity language] and asking us to become *dis-embedded* from the terms *process* and *unconscious* and shift to a language of *activity* as meaning processeS and *operations* in relation to *acts* as coming in and out of conscious awareness seems like an example of the use of *activity* and *acts* and *operations* as gesturing at the same phenomena [knowledge, awareness, focussing, coming into and out of *being as begings] as other language games [pragmatism, phenomenology, etc] as observing and commenting on these *processes/activities*. I *read* [and translated] the terms of activity theory [as presented in this particular article] as gesturing towards the phenomena of moving and dwelling and preferring one particular language game over another. I couldn't help *hearing* this article as an invitation to *dwell* or *occupy* THIS way of performing as activities, acts, and operations [which come in and out of *focus* or *attention* or *attunement*. The metaphor of psycho -dramatics and being invited *on stage* to perform THIS ACT with these ACTORS. My question is if this particular language game is more *instrumental* than other alternatives and as instrumental is *preferable*? [a question of *ought*] Should this particular language game with the terms *activity* acts* and *operations* BE LIMITED to *behaviour* or is the language game more EXPANSIVE and going BEYOND behaviour to play in the realm of *the* unconscious and conscious moving into and out of awareness. I also am *reading* Peirce's *secondness* [as inhibition of SELF-control] and letting phenomena BE PRESENT as compelling and THERE prior to thirdness [general, symbolic as within nature as present and showing up when SELF-control is inhibited] Larry On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:49 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > So David, when you read Chapter 5 of Thinking and Speech, what do you call > those combinations of sign-mediated actions which Vygotsky describes with > words such as "complex" or "pseudoconcept" or "heap"? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > David Kellogg wrote: > >> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own bed and >> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: >> >> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ >> >> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, played, as >> Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) Stradivarius >> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very first time >> in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma has >> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has been >> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal interpretation. >> >> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if Mendelssohn >> himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, >> Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had occupied, >> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to >> Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period >> instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and starts >> to play. >> >> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat >> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging >> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which actually >> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, >> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's >> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need >> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument >> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants >> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no >> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts (and >> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least >> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of >> thinking that has become extinct). >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in Sydney was >> not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I would have >> liked it better if she had used those terms a little more imprecisely, >> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might have >> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was >> contemplating. >> >> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a world >> without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are >> replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather >> dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she called the >> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also human >> identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the conference >> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time for the >> spiritual side of life. >> >> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the "object" of >> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working class is >> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex workers >> and atomized into the social position of housewives. Inequality is now >> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history tells >> us that the result of this is not going to be individual spirituality >> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if that >> force is organized, social, and directed against social equality >> rather than against fellow members of the working class. >> >> dk >> >> > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Oct 5 11:41:02 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sun, 5 Oct 2014 11:41:02 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <5430F80B.10806@mira.net> Message-ID: How to broaden and enliven the chat? Bringing Tim to the discussion and the theme of *active* and *passive* orienting as SENS. Here is an attached article from a Merleau-Pony angle on moving in the world - contrasting with the more cognitive inferential approach. At least juxtaposing active and passive as notions will engender reflection on activity, acts, and operations [unconscious or conscious?] [PS Peirce suggests simultaneously BOTH "perceptual AND inferential *processeS* through abductive ways of moving. I sense Tim Ingold playing within these play grounds On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 7:23 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Andy , David > > The Purves article on writing as *activity* *acts* and *operations* is > translating what I read is another language game of *process* and > *composing processeS* that refer to *conscious* and *unconscious* processes > that emerge or recede into the unconscious. > > THIS particular act of *translation* [from process language TO activity > language] and asking us to become *dis-embedded* from the terms *process* > and *unconscious* and shift to a language of *activity* as meaning > processeS and *operations* in relation to *acts* as coming in and out of > conscious awareness seems like an example of the use of *activity* and > *acts* and *operations* as gesturing at the same phenomena [knowledge, > awareness, focussing, coming into and out of *being as begings] as other > language games [pragmatism, phenomenology, etc] as observing and commenting > on these *processes/activities*. > > I *read* [and translated] the terms of activity theory [as presented in > this particular article] as gesturing towards the phenomena of moving and > dwelling and preferring one particular language game over another. > > I couldn't help *hearing* this article as an invitation to *dwell* or > *occupy* THIS way of performing as activities, acts, and operations [which > come in and out of *focus* or *attention* or *attunement*. > > The metaphor of psycho -dramatics and being invited *on stage* to perform > THIS ACT with these ACTORS. > > My question is if this particular language game is more *instrumental* > than other alternatives and as instrumental is *preferable*? [a question of > *ought*] > > Should this particular language game with the terms *activity* acts* and > *operations* BE LIMITED to *behaviour* or is the language game more > EXPANSIVE and going BEYOND behaviour to play in the realm of *the* > unconscious and conscious moving into and out of awareness. > > I also am *reading* Peirce's *secondness* [as inhibition of SELF-control] > and letting phenomena BE PRESENT as compelling and THERE prior to thirdness > [general, symbolic as within nature as present and showing up when > SELF-control is inhibited] > > Larry > > On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:49 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> So David, when you read Chapter 5 of Thinking and Speech, what do you >> call those combinations of sign-mediated actions which Vygotsky describes >> with words such as "complex" or "pseudoconcept" or "heap"? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own bed and >>> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: >>> >>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ >>> >>> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, played, as >>> Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) Stradivarius >>> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very first time >>> in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma has >>> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has been >>> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal interpretation. >>> >>> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if Mendelssohn >>> himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, >>> Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had occupied, >>> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to >>> Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period >>> instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and starts >>> to play. >>> >>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat >>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging >>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which actually >>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, >>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's >>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need >>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument >>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants >>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no >>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts (and >>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least >>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of >>> thinking that has become extinct). >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in Sydney was >>> not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I would have >>> liked it better if she had used those terms a little more imprecisely, >>> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might have >>> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was >>> contemplating. >>> >>> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a world >>> without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are >>> replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather >>> dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she called the >>> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also human >>> identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the conference >>> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time for the >>> spiritual side of life. >>> >>> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the "object" of >>> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working class is >>> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex workers >>> and atomized into the social position of housewives. Inequality is now >>> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history tells >>> us that the result of this is not going to be individual spirituality >>> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if that >>> force is organized, social, and directed against social equality >>> rather than against fellow members of the working class. >>> >>> dk >>> >>> >> >> > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: OCTOBER 4 2014 MACLAREN KYM Merleau Ponty on Emotions.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 204614 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141005/f34a9bbd/attachment.pdf From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun Oct 5 12:02:36 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sun, 5 Oct 2014 13:02:36 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <5430F80B.10806@mira.net> Message-ID: Larry, I'm having a hard time keeping up with you here. Can you give us a primer on "active" and "passive" orienting as SENS? I'd love to get to this paper, but it was pretty dense and I'm not sure that I have the means to bridge to it. Could you help me to make my way over there? -greg On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:41 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > How to broaden and enliven the chat? > > Bringing Tim to the discussion and the theme of *active* and *passive* > orienting as SENS. > > Here is an attached article from a Merleau-Pony angle on moving in the > world - contrasting with the > more cognitive inferential approach. > > At least juxtaposing active and passive as notions will engender reflection > on activity, acts, and operations [unconscious or conscious?] > > [PS Peirce suggests simultaneously BOTH "perceptual AND inferential > *processeS* through abductive ways of moving. > > I sense Tim Ingold playing within these play grounds > > On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 7:23 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > Andy , David > > > > The Purves article on writing as *activity* *acts* and *operations* is > > translating what I read is another language game of *process* and > > *composing processeS* that refer to *conscious* and *unconscious* > processes > > that emerge or recede into the unconscious. > > > > THIS particular act of *translation* [from process language TO activity > > language] and asking us to become *dis-embedded* from the terms *process* > > and *unconscious* and shift to a language of *activity* as meaning > > processeS and *operations* in relation to *acts* as coming in and out of > > conscious awareness seems like an example of the use of *activity* and > > *acts* and *operations* as gesturing at the same phenomena [knowledge, > > awareness, focussing, coming into and out of *being as begings] as other > > language games [pragmatism, phenomenology, etc] as observing and > commenting > > on these *processes/activities*. > > > > I *read* [and translated] the terms of activity theory [as presented in > > this particular article] as gesturing towards the phenomena of moving and > > dwelling and preferring one particular language game over another. > > > > I couldn't help *hearing* this article as an invitation to *dwell* or > > *occupy* THIS way of performing as activities, acts, and operations > [which > > come in and out of *focus* or *attention* or *attunement*. > > > > The metaphor of psycho -dramatics and being invited *on stage* to perform > > THIS ACT with these ACTORS. > > > > My question is if this particular language game is more *instrumental* > > than other alternatives and as instrumental is *preferable*? [a question > of > > *ought*] > > > > Should this particular language game with the terms *activity* acts* and > > *operations* BE LIMITED to *behaviour* or is the language game more > > EXPANSIVE and going BEYOND behaviour to play in the realm of *the* > > unconscious and conscious moving into and out of awareness. > > > > I also am *reading* Peirce's *secondness* [as inhibition of SELF-control] > > and letting phenomena BE PRESENT as compelling and THERE prior to > thirdness > > [general, symbolic as within nature as present and showing up when > > SELF-control is inhibited] > > > > Larry > > > > On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:49 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >> So David, when you read Chapter 5 of Thinking and Speech, what do you > >> call those combinations of sign-mediated actions which Vygotsky > describes > >> with words such as "complex" or "pseudoconcept" or "heap"? > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> David Kellogg wrote: > >> > >>> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own bed and > >>> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: > >>> > >>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ > >>> > >>> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, played, as > >>> Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) Stradivarius > >>> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very first time > >>> in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma has > >>> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has been > >>> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal interpretation. > >>> > >>> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if Mendelssohn > >>> himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, > >>> Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had occupied, > >>> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to > >>> Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period > >>> instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and starts > >>> to play. > >>> > >>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat > >>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging > >>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which actually > >>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, > >>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's > >>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need > >>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument > >>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants > >>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no > >>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts (and > >>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least > >>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of > >>> thinking that has become extinct). > >>> > >>> David Kellogg > >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>> > >>> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in Sydney was > >>> not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I would have > >>> liked it better if she had used those terms a little more imprecisely, > >>> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might have > >>> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was > >>> contemplating. > >>> > >>> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a world > >>> without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are > >>> replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather > >>> dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she called the > >>> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also human > >>> identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the conference > >>> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time for the > >>> spiritual side of life. > >>> > >>> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the "object" of > >>> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working class is > >>> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex workers > >>> and atomized into the social position of housewives. Inequality is now > >>> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history tells > >>> us that the result of this is not going to be individual spirituality > >>> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if that > >>> force is organized, social, and directed against social equality > >>> rather than against fellow members of the working class. > >>> > >>> dk > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Oct 5 13:09:56 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 5 Oct 2014 21:09:56 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> Message-ID: I get the impression I'm joining a discussion started elsewhere but I took that 2005 article as an exercise in checking my understandings. Basically, I concur with where Victor arrived at (model c), however he seems to have omitted the relation between compelling motive and true motive. If one understands "true motive" as the origin of the compelling motive, then there's isn't a discrepancy on this issue. Best, Huw On 5 October 2014 05:38, Andy Blunden wrote: > I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie Nardi I had > the great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if she has > written something on "object" that is very good news. > I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't think one good > book or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long while I > have been jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie" > without an article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of > "substance" whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains > outstanding differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that almost > all bar one now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is a > step forward, and people are aware of the differences in interpretation and > they are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a while, > maybe this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual > consistency in our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am > optimistic. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: > >> Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. >> I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds that go U >> discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a shower of >> interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? (Whatever >> object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on basics of AT is >> one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! >> >> Mike >> >> On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were a little >> slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also iscar-ers and we >> were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. >> Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger on a >> Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and tablets etc., >> so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were >> oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. >> >> My impressions of CHAT research: >> On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp and >> critical in relation to the dominant political forces, and still >> way out in front in understanding the several developmental >> processes which all contribute to our actions (phylogenesis, >> historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, microgenesis), and >> not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great >> community of research, relatively lacking in the competitiveness >> and jealousy which infects most research communities. >> >> On the negative side: >> >> * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" as some >> homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces problems into the >> social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., people lack a >> viable social theory or the ability to use theory they have to >> analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated way. >> * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. Only a small >> minority know what it means and use the idea in their research. >> * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of confusion; >> few researchers using the concept are clear on what the concept >> is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront and >> attempt to >> resolve the methodological differences (I refer to systematic >> difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) within the >> CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the relatively civil >> relations between researchers - people prefer to let differences >> just fester without openly discussing them. The old Soviet >> approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far the other >> way. :) >> >> Andy >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> mike cole wrote: >> >> Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response to >> someone who >> wrote backto xmca instead of me. >> >> Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an >> interesting and >> unassuming guy. >> >> Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion?? >> >> mike >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Oct 5 19:12:39 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 06 Oct 2014 13:12:39 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <5430F80B.10806@mira.net> Message-ID: <5431FA97.6030104@mira.net> Well David, I agree that we should not "fall into the trap of using the same term for the explanandum and the explanans" but I also like Goethe's words: "German frequently and fittingly makes use of the word "Bildung" to describe the end product and what is in the process of production as well." Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David Kellogg wrote: > Andy: > > Yes, I was hoping to talk about this in connection with YOUR > presentation on collaborative projects, but time, as you remember, > didn't really allow us to do this. > > I take heaps, complexes, and pseudoconcepts to be the precise forms > that word meaning takes as it develops in the experimental subjects of > Chapter Five. I take it that we can generalize these results to the > actual word meanings that children use outside the laboratory too, but > that they remain forms of word meaning and better understood as modes > of semantic abstraction and generalization than as operations, > actions, and activities. It seems to me that replacing the one with > the other results eventually in abandoning what for me is the key > insight of Vygotsky's later years, the insight that the structure of > the mind is not behavioral or biological but rather semantic; the mind > is structured like a text, or like a dialogue. > > Consider the long nominal group produced by Halliday's three year old child: > > "Look at those two splendid old electric trains with pantographs!" (p. > 364 of Halliday's Introduction to Functional Grammar, M.A.K. Halliday > and C.M.I.M. Matthiessen, London: Routledge, 2014). > > So in Chapter Five itself, Vygotsky calls them "functional equivalents > of the concept". That is, they are the form of abstraction and > generalization that the child uses when the adult would use a concept. > That's why I take the heaps to be realized by Deictics like "this" and > "that" and "these" and 'those" and "there" and "then" and even (to a > very limited extent, because of the visiographic limitation of the > heap) "thus". I take the complexes to be realized, at least when the > child is the stage in which affective perception becomes internally > differentiated (i.e. early childhood, roughly age one to three years > old) by Epithets like "good", "bad", color words, size words, etc. Of > course, referring is an act of speech, and an act of speech can > realize an act of thinking in different ways, so complexes can ALSO be > realized by Deictics, and even by words that adults take to be > concepts (e.g. Classifiers, and Things), which is how the > pseudoconcept arises. But I don't see that either the act of meaning > or the act of speech is usefully described, in the context of Chapter > Five, as activity; that was what Ach and Reumeuth were doing when they > used the original "Suchmethode" (because "choosing" is an activity), > and that was why they considered the main explanatory principle at > work to be the "determining tendency" (very similar to Leontiev's > "motive"!). So Vygotsky doesn't use the term activity to describe the > functional equivalents of concepts created by the child (he does use > the term "activity" elsewhere, but it is to describe behavior). > > In Chapter Six things change a little, and reconciling the two > chapters is an unfinished project by our late colleague Paula Towsey. > First of all, Vygotsky recognizes that basing concept formation too > narrowly on the blocks results in preconcepts (the term he uses) that > are too much like Things and not enough like processes. Secondly, > Vygotsky recognizes that there are not five forms of complex but a > potentially infinite number of "lines of latitude" along each line of > semantic longitude, depending on the degree of abstraction or > generalization. And thirdly, Vygotsky recognizes that generalization > too is generalizable: children can and do create collections of > associative complexes (imaginary characters are often structured like > this), chains of collections (stories that involve teams of imaginary > characters), and even diffuse complexes of chains of collections of > associations (child drawings can often be analyzed in this way). Here > Vygotsky uses the term "pre-concept", perhaps to emphasize the > teleological aspect of the development of word meaning in dialogue > with an already developed form. I am happy to agree to call the > dialogue itself a form of activity (so long as we make it clear that > it is verbal activity, and that it is therefore a form of subject to > subject activity and not the activity of a subject wielding a tool > against an object). But if we call this dialogue activity, how can we > say that its outcome, that is, the preconcept, is also an activity > without falling into the trap of using the same term for the > explanandum and the explanans? > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 5 October 2014 16:49, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> So David, when you read Chapter 5 of Thinking and Speech, what do you call >> those combinations of sign-mediated actions which Vygotsky describes with >> words such as "complex" or "pseudoconcept" or "heap"? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own bed and >>> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: >>> >>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ >>> >>> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, played, as >>> Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) Stradivarius >>> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very first time >>> in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma has >>> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has been >>> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal interpretation. >>> >>> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if Mendelssohn >>> himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, >>> Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had occupied, >>> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to >>> Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period >>> instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and starts >>> to play. >>> >>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat >>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging >>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which actually >>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, >>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's >>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need >>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument >>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants >>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no >>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts (and >>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least >>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of >>> thinking that has become extinct). >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in Sydney was >>> not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I would have >>> liked it better if she had used those terms a little more imprecisely, >>> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might have >>> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was >>> contemplating. >>> >>> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a world >>> without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are >>> replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather >>> dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she called the >>> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also human >>> identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the conference >>> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time for the >>> spiritual side of life. >>> >>> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the "object" of >>> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working class is >>> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex workers >>> and atomized into the social position of housewives. Inequality is now >>> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history tells >>> us that the result of this is not going to be individual spirituality >>> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if that >>> force is organized, social, and directed against social equality >>> rather than against fellow members of the working class. >>> >>> dk >>> >>> >> > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Oct 5 21:31:54 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 6 Oct 2014 13:31:54 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help? Vygotsky train ride In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Greg-- I just realized that Vygotsky's trip to London was in June 1925, but the General Strike was not until May 1926. But Vygotsky was travelling to London during the anti-communist hysteria generated around the Daily Mail's forged "Zinoviev Letter". Maybe that's why they didn't want him to present his paper. It does include some pretty rousing revolutionary stuff! David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 1 October 2014 05:25, Greg Thompson wrote: > I was trying to find an XMCA post that mentioned a train ride that Vygotsky > was taking on his way to London and was writing a letter to his wife (yes, > I know that a boat would have to be involved at some point if he wanted to > get to London...). > I searched the archives for the usual words but couldn't find it. > Does anyone remember this conversation? Or, does anyone know about the > letters that V would have written? > -greg > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Oct 6 06:21:02 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 6 Oct 2014 06:21:02 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi David-- The specific example of your comments on originals and adaptations hits on a point it would be helpful to hear more about: You wrote: Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which actually rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts (and this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of thinking that has become extinct). ?1. Could you guide us to a text you recommend where this interpretation is laid out? 2. What sort of revision was Seth suggesting and why?? ?I have been reading Russian discussions around this issue. Clarification would be helpful. mike? On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:37 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own bed and > listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ > > It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, played, as > Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) Stradivarius > that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very first time > in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma has > been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has been > pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal interpretation. > > So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if Mendelssohn > himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, > Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had occupied, > and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to > Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period > instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and starts > to play. > > Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat > similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging > rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which actually > rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, > and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's > argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need > new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument > in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants > the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no > longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts (and > this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least > recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of > thinking that has become extinct). > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in Sydney was > not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I would have > liked it better if she had used those terms a little more imprecisely, > in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might have > made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was > contemplating. > > For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a world > without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are > replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather > dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she called the > "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also human > identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the conference > pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time for the > spiritual side of life. > > What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the "object" of > "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working class is > being ground down into the economic position of short term sex workers > and atomized into the social position of housewives. Inequality is now > at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history tells > us that the result of this is not going to be individual spirituality > but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if that > force is organized, social, and directed against social equality > rather than against fellow members of the working class. > > dk > > > On 5 October 2014 13:38, Andy Blunden wrote: > > I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie Nardi I had > the > > great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if she has > > written something on "object" that is very good news. > > I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't think one good > book > > or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long while I have > been > > jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie" without > an > > article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of "substance" > > whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains outstanding > > differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that almost all bar > one > > now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is a step > > forward, and people are aware of the differences in interpretation and > they > > are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a while, maybe > > this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual consistency > in > > our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am optimistic. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > mike cole wrote: > >> > >> Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. > >> I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds that go U > >> discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a shower of > >> interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? (Whatever > >> object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on basics of AT > is > >> one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! > >> > >> Mike > >> > >> On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: > >> > >> I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were a little > >> slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also iscar-ers and we > >> were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. > >> Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger on a > >> Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and tablets etc., > >> so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were > >> oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. > >> > >> My impressions of CHAT research: > >> On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp and > >> critical in relation to the dominant political forces, and still > >> way out in front in understanding the several developmental > >> processes which all contribute to our actions (phylogenesis, > >> historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, microgenesis), and > >> not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great > >> community of research, relatively lacking in the competitiveness > >> and jealousy which infects most research communities. > >> > >> On the negative side: > >> > >> * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" as some > >> homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces problems into the > >> social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., people lack > a > >> viable social theory or the ability to use theory they have to > >> analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated way. > >> * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. Only a > small > >> minority know what it means and use the idea in their research. > >> * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of confusion; > >> few researchers using the concept are clear on what the concept > >> is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront and > >> attempt to > >> resolve the methodological differences (I refer to systematic > >> difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) within > the > >> CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the relatively > civil > >> relations between researchers - people prefer to let > differences > >> just fester without openly discussing them. The old Soviet > >> approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far the other > >> way. :) > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> > >> mike cole wrote: > >> > >> Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response to > >> someone who > >> wrote backto xmca instead of me. > >> > >> Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an > >> interesting and > >> unassuming guy. > >> > >> Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion?? > >> > >> mike > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> > >> > >> > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Oct 6 09:12:36 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 6 Oct 2014 09:12:36 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Clinical Associate Professor of Applied Human Development In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Melissa Koenig Date: Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 9:10 AM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Clinical Associate Professor of Applied Human Development To: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org Please see below on behalf of Kathleen Corriveau: *Clinical Associate Professor of Applied Human Development* The School of Education at Boston University invites applications for a full-time Clinical Associate Professor of Human Development. We are seeking a faculty member who shares the School of Education?s commitment to the preparation of educators and the advancement of evidence-based practice. Candidates should also share our commitment to supporting and improving education with scholarship. *Responsibilities:* The successful candidate will help advance the master?s program in applied human development, teach graduate courses in the Counseling Psychology and Human Development cluster, advise masters and doctoral students; and publish scholarly work. The position will join the faculty in Counseling Psychology and Human Development and while the research expertise is open, the successful candidate?s expertise is expected to complement the current faculty in Applied Human Development. The successful candidate would be one who has demonstrated specialization in research and practice related to youth populations. Specific course expertise in child and adolescent development in the context of schooling, designing effective learning environments in or out of school is preferred. A history of program development and leadership as well as extramural funding is highly desirable. This Clinical Associate Professor position begins July 1, 2015. Applicants from diverse backgrounds are strongly encouraged to apply. Salary is competitive and commensurate with experience. *Qualifications:* - An earned doctorate in education, psychology, or other related field is required; - Excellent organizational skills. Preference will be given to applicants with a history of leadership and/or program development; - A history of participating in interdisciplinary research is highly desirable; - Prior college or university teaching experience; and - Excellent oral, written, and presentation skills. Preference will be given to applicants with expertise in positive youth development, particularly in areas that are complementary to the range of interests and skills of the current faculty. Salary is competitive and commensurate with experience. Inquiries may be directed to the Chair of the Search Committee: Dr. Amie Grills agrills@bu.edu Review of applications will begin *November 1, 2014* and will continue until the position is filled. Applicants should submit the following documents electronically to sedsrch@bu.edu: - Cover letter explaining suitability for position - Current curriculum vitae - Three letters of reference - Samples of program development and evaluation - Samples of scholarship - Unofficial copies of undergraduate and graduate transcripts *We are an equal opportunity employer and all qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability status, protected veteran status, or any other characteristic protected by law. We are a VEVRAA Federal Contractor.* Kathleen H. Corriveau Peter Paul Assistant Professor Human Development Boston University School of Education Boston, MA 02215 Office: 2 Silber Way, Room 240 Phone: 617-353-3259 Email: kcorriv@bu.edu Lab: www.bu.edu/learninglab -- Melissa Koenig Associate Professor Institute of Child Development University of Minnesota Minneapolis, MN 55455 (o) 612-625-6251 Lab: http://www.cehd.umn.edu/icd/research/elel/default.html _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Oct 6 13:34:55 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 6 Oct 2014 13:34:55 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Job position at a Science Museum In-Reply-To: <3968F14518723E43A506DBC8ED534A6D53DD6588@CIO-KRC-D1MBX05.osuad.osu.edu> References: <3968F14518723E43A506DBC8ED534A6D53DD6588@CIO-KRC-D1MBX05.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Wagner, Laura Date: Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 11:20 AM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Job position at a Science Museum To: "cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org" Can you please post this to the CDS listserv? Thanks! Laura Wagner wagner.602@osu.edu *Senior Research Associate* As part of the Lifelong Learning Group team, the Senior Research Associate will direct and support the delivery of high-quality research, evaluation, and consulting projects with external clients in the informal learning field, as well as supervise and mentor other researchers. The successful candidate will contribute to development and dissemination of field-wide insights into informal learning and the value of visitor studies across the informal learning field. *About the Lifelong Learning Group* The Lifelong Learning Group is a research and evaluation consulting group that specializes in the study of learning across the lifespan, striving to serve the informal learning field by promoting rigorous research and evaluation in support of the development and improvement of meaningful, innovative learning experiences. Based in Columbus, Ohio, and operating as part of COSI, the Lifelong Learning Group works with external organizations to help them develop concepts, test ideas, and understand the impact of their exhibits and programs. This position will be located in Columbus, Ohio, at the Center for Research and Evaluation at COSI. For a full position description, qualifications, and to apply, visit: https://www.appone.com/MainInfoReq.asp?R_ID=933073 -Rita Rita Deedrick Director of the COSI Center for Research and Evaluation COSI's Planetarium opens November 22, 2014. Visit www.cosi.org/planetarium to find out how you can support this 60-foot window to the skies. _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Oct 6 14:07:30 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 7 Oct 2014 06:07:30 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> Message-ID: Mike: I'll do my best! My discussion with Seth began with a presentation by Holbrook Mahn. Holbrook began by saying that: a) We do not "borrow" concepts made for one discipline and "apply" them to another. Not even dialectical materialism can be "applied" to psychology (or even sociology or economics--Marx didn't do applied philosophy!). Holbrook then produced a number of quotations from The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology to show that Vygotsky knew this, and countered with other quotations from Problems of the Development of the Mind to show that Leontiev did not know this. b) The term "praxis" has been thus borrowed. It doesn't refer to practical activity: it refers to a unity of thinking and practice. c) The term "social situation of development" has been thus borrowed; it does not refer to a "context" but to the child's relationship to the environment. d) The term "unit of analysis" does not refer to a God particle that is indifferent to the problem of analysis. ygotsky did not imagine a "unit of analysis" that fit any and all problems in psychology. Each unit of analysis is specific to a particular problem of unity (e.g. the problem of the unity of the child and his or her environment in Problem of the Environment and the problem of the unity of verbal thinking in Thinking and Speech). e) The term "verbal thinking" is a mistranslation: Vygotsky is talking about thinking by language, or thinking through word meanings, and not some kind of verbalizable inner speech (which does exist, but which is a distinct layer from thinking). Most of this has been said before, not least by Vygotsky himself. I know that Holbrook has been saying it at least since 2007 when I first heard him at the American Association for Applied Linguistics in Costa Mesa, and he develops it at some length in: https://www.academia.edu/1803017/Vygotskys_Analysis_of_Childrens_Meaning-Making_Processes Mahn, H. (2012). Vygotsky's Analysis of Children's Meaning-Making Processes, International Journal of Educational Psychology1(2):100-126 It's been said by others too: Mike Cole actually makes many of the same points in discussing how the Kharkov school deviated from the work of Vygotsk, and J.V. Wertsch is quite explicit in his revisionism when he presents "mediated activity" as a unit of analysis in opposition to "word meaning". But of course since a unit of analysis must preserve in some shape or form the essential properties of the whole, the use of "mediated activity" cannot be a unit of analysis for the mind if we wish to retain the idea that the mind has a semantic structure (that is, if the "whole" is structured something like a text or a discourse rather than like driving a car, shooting a gun, or hunting animals). Now, in the discussion of Holbrook's presentation, this wild-haired guy who looked a little like Itzhak Perlman rose to argue that Leontiev's interpretation was really one fair interpretation, and that it really was addressed towards a specific problem, which is how to prevent dualism from arising (that is, how to explain how word meaning could arise historically). He also said that Holbrook was juxtaposing quotations out of context: the quotes that showed Vygotsky arguing against a "Marxist psychology" were directed against a very specific group of vulgar Marxists (e.g. Zalkind) and that is why Vygotsky uses scare quotes around "Marxist". I then muddied the waters, first by addressing the wild-haired guy instead of Holbrook (a major breach of protocol) and then by arguing that speech really is sui generis, because it is a form of "activity" (if we must call it that) whose conditions of comprehension are no longer recoverable from the activity itself (and so the unit of analysis for verbal thinking cannot be sought in activity). There wasn't enough time to really develop what I wanted to say, so I went over to continue the discussion, and it turned out that the wild haired guy was none other than Seth Chaiklin, who is, we all know, one of the foremost paleo-Vygotskyans when it comes to the much misinterpreted concept of the ZPD. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies PS: Holbrook DID get one thing wrong. Stalin did not argue that language was purely ideal and superstructural; that was Marr's position. Stalin, or whoever ghost wrote his articles, argued that language was base, and therefore somehow material, whatever that means. But Stalin was not really interested in ideas; he was just out for Marr's blood. On 6 October 2014 22:21, mike cole wrote: > Hi David-- > > The specific example of your comments on originals and adaptations hits on > a point it would be helpful to hear more about: > > You wrote: > Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat > similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging > rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which actually > rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, > and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's > argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need > new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument > in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants > the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no > longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts (and > this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least > recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of > thinking that has become extinct). > > 1. Could you guide us to a text you recommend where this interpretation > is laid out? > 2. What sort of revision was Seth suggesting and why? > > I have been reading Russian discussions around this issue. Clarification > would be helpful. > mike > > > > On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:37 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own bed and >> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: >> >> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ >> >> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, played, as >> Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) Stradivarius >> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very first time >> in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma has >> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has been >> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal interpretation. >> >> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if Mendelssohn >> himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, >> Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had occupied, >> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to >> Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period >> instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and starts >> to play. >> >> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat >> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging >> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which actually >> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, >> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's >> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need >> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument >> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants >> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no >> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts (and >> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least >> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of >> thinking that has become extinct). >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in Sydney was >> not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I would have >> liked it better if she had used those terms a little more imprecisely, >> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might have >> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was >> contemplating. >> >> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a world >> without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are >> replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather >> dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she called the >> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also human >> identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the conference >> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time for the >> spiritual side of life. >> >> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the "object" of >> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working class is >> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex workers >> and atomized into the social position of housewives. Inequality is now >> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history tells >> us that the result of this is not going to be individual spirituality >> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if that >> force is organized, social, and directed against social equality >> rather than against fellow members of the working class. >> >> dk >> >> >> On 5 October 2014 13:38, Andy Blunden wrote: >> > I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie Nardi I had >> the >> > great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if she has >> > written something on "object" that is very good news. >> > I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't think one good >> book >> > or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long while I have >> been >> > jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie" without >> an >> > article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of "substance" >> > whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains outstanding >> > differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that almost all bar >> one >> > now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is a step >> > forward, and people are aware of the differences in interpretation and >> they >> > are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a while, maybe >> > this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual consistency >> in >> > our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am optimistic. >> > >> > Andy >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> > *Andy Blunden* >> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> > >> > >> > mike cole wrote: >> >> >> >> Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. >> >> I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds that go U >> >> discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a shower of >> >> interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? (Whatever >> >> object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on basics of AT >> is >> >> one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! >> >> >> >> Mike >> >> >> >> On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden > >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were a little >> >> slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also iscar-ers and we >> >> were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. >> >> Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger on a >> >> Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and tablets etc., >> >> so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were >> >> oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. >> >> >> >> My impressions of CHAT research: >> >> On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp and >> >> critical in relation to the dominant political forces, and still >> >> way out in front in understanding the several developmental >> >> processes which all contribute to our actions (phylogenesis, >> >> historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, microgenesis), and >> >> not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great >> >> community of research, relatively lacking in the competitiveness >> >> and jealousy which infects most research communities. >> >> >> >> On the negative side: >> >> >> >> * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" as some >> >> homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces problems into the >> >> social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., people lack >> a >> >> viable social theory or the ability to use theory they have to >> >> analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated way. >> >> * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. Only a >> small >> >> minority know what it means and use the idea in their research. >> >> * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of confusion; >> >> few researchers using the concept are clear on what the concept >> >> is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront and >> >> attempt to >> >> resolve the methodological differences (I refer to systematic >> >> difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) within >> the >> >> CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the relatively >> civil >> >> relations between researchers - people prefer to let >> differences >> >> just fester without openly discussing them. The old Soviet >> >> approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far the other >> >> way. :) >> >> >> >> Andy >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> *Andy Blunden* >> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> mike cole wrote: >> >> >> >> Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response to >> >> someone who >> >> wrote backto xmca instead of me. >> >> >> >> Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an >> >> interesting and >> >> unassuming guy. >> >> >> >> Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion?? >> >> >> >> mike >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > >> > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Oct 6 14:10:57 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 6 Oct 2014 15:10:57 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help? Vygotsky train ride In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thanks for this David! On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 10:31 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Greg-- > > I just realized that Vygotsky's trip to London was in June 1925, but > the General Strike was not until May 1926. But Vygotsky was > travelling to London during the anti-communist hysteria generated > around the Daily Mail's forged "Zinoviev Letter". Maybe that's why > they didn't want him to present his paper. It does include some pretty > rousing revolutionary stuff! > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > On 1 October 2014 05:25, Greg Thompson wrote: > > I was trying to find an XMCA post that mentioned a train ride that > Vygotsky > > was taking on his way to London and was writing a letter to his wife > (yes, > > I know that a boat would have to be involved at some point if he wanted > to > > get to London...). > > I searched the archives for the usual words but couldn't find it. > > Does anyone remember this conversation? Or, does anyone know about the > > letters that V would have written? > > -greg > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Oct 6 15:28:18 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 6 Oct 2014 15:28:18 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> Message-ID: Thanks, David. I think i understand better what you mean by "LSV rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior,and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Somehow I was expecting text from LSV where he says "activity is not a unit of analysis" because of all the places in his text where he uses the term activity as a sort of "lay term". ?...? > Holbrook Mahn. > Holbrook began by saying that: > > a) We do not "borrow" concepts made for one discipline and "apply" > them to another. Not even dialectical materialism can be "applied" to > psychology (or even sociology or economics--Marx didn't do applied > philosophy!). Holbrook then produced a number of quotations from The > Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology to show that Vygotsky > knew this, and countered with other quotations from Problems of the > Development of the Mind to show that Leontiev did not know this. > > ?I know places where LSV is clear on this score, in Historical meaning, for example, but not the evidence of Leontiev's errors. ? > b) The term "praxis" has been thus borrowed. It doesn't refer to > practical activity: it refers to a unity of thinking and practice. > ?Borrowed from Marx by ..??? by Leontiev? There is any form of practical activity without human thinking? ? > > c) The term "social situation of development" has been thus borrowed; > it does not refer to a "context" but to the child's relationship to > the environment. > By whom? I am always in a puzzle about the use of this term. Isn't perezhivanie the term that LSV uses to talk about relation of child to environment? At least, there seems to be a lot of chatter about issue.? > > d) The term "unit of analysis" does not refer to a God particle that > is indifferent to the problem of analysis. ygotsky did not imagine a > "unit of analysis" that fit any and all problems in psychology. Each > unit of analysis is specific to a particular problem of unity (e.g. > the problem of the unity of the child and his or her environment in > Problem of the Environment and the problem of the unity of verbal > thinking in Thinking and Speech). > > ?Amen to that. ? > e) The term "verbal thinking" is a mistranslation: Vygotsky is talking > about thinking by language, or thinking through word meanings, and not > some kind of verbalizable inner speech (which does exist, but which is > a distinct layer from thinking). > ?There is a lot of confusion around this issue and would probably need somewhat separate discussion. I interpret in the former way. The role of meaning in inner speech, and the usefulness or not of the sense/meaning distinction has me confused. Dima Leontiev has put the distinction behind him and now refers to "cultural meaning" (paleo meaning ? ?) and "personal meaning (paleo sense)." I am paleo in this regard.? > > Most of this has been said before, not least by Vygotsky himself. I > know that Holbrook has been saying it at least since 2007 when I first > heard him at the American Association for Applied Linguistics in Costa > Mesa, and he develops it at some length in: > > > https://www.academia.edu/1803017/Vygotskys_Analysis_of_Childrens_Meaning-Making_Processes > > Mahn, H. (2012). Vygotsky's Analysis of Children's Meaning-Making > Processes, International Journal of Educational Psychology1(2):100-126 > > It's been said by others too: Mike Cole actually makes many of the > same points in discussing how the Kharkov school deviated from the > work of Vygotsk, ?I did not know enough to make many of these points in 1978! They certainly distanced themselves from LSV and PI Zinchenko went after the natural-cultural memory distinction,? ?? > and J.V. Wertsch is quite explicit in his revisionism > when he presents "mediated activity" as a unit of analysis in > opposition to "word meaning". ?mediated ACTION and often as not, mediated action in context.? > But of course since a unit of analysis > must preserve in some shape or form the essential properties of the > whole, the use of "mediated activity" > ?(action) ? > cannot be a unit of analysis for > the mind if we wish to retain the idea that the mind has a semantic > structure (that is, if the "whole" is structured something like a text > or a discourse rather than like driving a car, shooting a gun, or > hunting animals). > ?When we get to semantic structure of consciousness, we know there was a break between LSV and his buddies. It seems that it is in arriving at this formulation that the charges of idealism and sign-o-centrism kick in.? ?My difficulty is in making arguments about consciousness- -in-general, perhaps a relic of my behaviorist past. Luria appears to have come around on this issue. I have had a difficult time understanding the changes in Leontiev's thought over the period of the 30's and 40's. ? > > Now, in the discussion of Holbrook's presentation, this wild-haired > guy who looked a little like Itzhak Perlman rose to argue that > Leontiev's interpretation was really one fair interpretation, and that > it really was addressed towards a specific problem, which is how to > prevent dualism from arising (that is, how to explain how word meaning > could arise historically).?Through joint mediated activity?? > He also said that Holbrook was juxtaposing > quotations out of context: the quotes that showed Vygotsky arguing > against a "Marxist psychology" were directed against a very specific > group of vulgar Marxists (e.g. Zalkind) and that is why Vygotsky uses > scare quotes around "Marxist". > ?Not so?? > > I then muddied the waters, first by addressing the wild-haired guy > instead of Holbrook (a major breach of protocol) and then by arguing > that speech really is sui generis, because it is a form of "activity" > (if we must call it that) whose conditions of comprehension are no > longer recoverable from the activity itself (and so the unit of > analysis for verbal thinking cannot be sought in activity). There > wasn't enough time to really develop what I wanted to say, so I went > over to continue the discussion, and it turned out that the wild > haired guy was none other than Seth Chaiklin, who is, we all know, one > of the foremost paleo-Vygotskyans when it comes to the much > misinterpreted concept of the ZPD. > ?Speech is a form of activity or a means of activity? Or of action?? ?I guess I do not understand. If its worthwhile, perhaps spell the idea out here? So far as I can tell, there are ONLY misinterpretations of the Zoped. Seth was right on about it being used in Anglo-American discourse as something akin to zone of proximal learning,fitting into the associationist view of development as more learning. But the one right interpretation has escaped my notice.? ?Thanks again for taking the trouble to write that out. Perhaps it will be generative for people. mike? > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > PS: Holbrook DID get one thing wrong. Stalin did not argue that > language was purely ideal and superstructural; that was Marr's > position. Stalin, or whoever ghost wrote his articles, argued that > language was base, and therefore somehow material, whatever that > means. But Stalin was not really interested in ideas; he was just out > for Marr's blood. > > > > > > On 6 October 2014 22:21, mike cole wrote: > > Hi David-- > > > > The specific example of your comments on originals and adaptations hits > on > > a point it would be helpful to hear more about: > > > > You wrote: > > Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat > > similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging > > rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which actually > > rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, > > and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's > > argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need > > new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument > > in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants > > the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no > > longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts (and > > this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least > > recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of > > thinking that has become extinct). > > > > 1. Could you guide us to a text you recommend where this interpretation > > is laid out? > > 2. What sort of revision was Seth suggesting and why? > > > > I have been reading Russian discussions around this issue. Clarification > > would be helpful. > > mike > > > > > > > > On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:37 AM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > >> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own bed and > >> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: > >> > >> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ > >> > >> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, played, as > >> Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) Stradivarius > >> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very first time > >> in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma has > >> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has been > >> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal interpretation. > >> > >> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if Mendelssohn > >> himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, > >> Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had occupied, > >> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to > >> Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period > >> instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and starts > >> to play. > >> > >> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat > >> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging > >> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which actually > >> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, > >> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's > >> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need > >> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument > >> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants > >> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no > >> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts (and > >> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least > >> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of > >> thinking that has become extinct). > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > >> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in Sydney was > >> not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I would have > >> liked it better if she had used those terms a little more imprecisely, > >> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might have > >> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was > >> contemplating. > >> > >> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a world > >> without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are > >> replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather > >> dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she called the > >> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also human > >> identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the conference > >> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time for the > >> spiritual side of life. > >> > >> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the "object" of > >> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working class is > >> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex workers > >> and atomized into the social position of housewives. Inequality is now > >> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history tells > >> us that the result of this is not going to be individual spirituality > >> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if that > >> force is organized, social, and directed against social equality > >> rather than against fellow members of the working class. > >> > >> dk > >> > >> > >> On 5 October 2014 13:38, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> > I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie Nardi I > had > >> the > >> > great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if she has > >> > written something on "object" that is very good news. > >> > I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't think one > good > >> book > >> > or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long while I > have > >> been > >> > jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie" > without > >> an > >> > article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of "substance" > >> > whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains outstanding > >> > differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that almost all > bar > >> one > >> > now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is a step > >> > forward, and people are aware of the differences in interpretation and > >> they > >> > are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a while, > maybe > >> > this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual > consistency > >> in > >> > our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am > optimistic. > >> > > >> > Andy > >> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> > *Andy Blunden* > >> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > > >> > > >> > mike cole wrote: > >> >> > >> >> Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. > >> >> I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds that go > U > >> >> discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a shower of > >> >> interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? > (Whatever > >> >> object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on basics of > AT > >> is > >> >> one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! > >> >> > >> >> Mike > >> >> > >> >> On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden >> >> > wrote: > >> >> > >> >> I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were a little > >> >> slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also iscar-ers and > we > >> >> were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. > >> >> Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger on a > >> >> Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and tablets > etc., > >> >> so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were > >> >> oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. > >> >> > >> >> My impressions of CHAT research: > >> >> On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp and > >> >> critical in relation to the dominant political forces, and still > >> >> way out in front in understanding the several developmental > >> >> processes which all contribute to our actions (phylogenesis, > >> >> historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, microgenesis), and > >> >> not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great > >> >> community of research, relatively lacking in the competitiveness > >> >> and jealousy which infects most research communities. > >> >> > >> >> On the negative side: > >> >> > >> >> * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" as some > >> >> homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces problems into > the > >> >> social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., people > lack > >> a > >> >> viable social theory or the ability to use theory they have > to > >> >> analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated way. > >> >> * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. Only a > >> small > >> >> minority know what it means and use the idea in their > research. > >> >> * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of > confusion; > >> >> few researchers using the concept are clear on what the > concept > >> >> is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront and > >> >> attempt to > >> >> resolve the methodological differences (I refer to > systematic > >> >> difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) within > >> the > >> >> CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the relatively > >> civil > >> >> relations between researchers - people prefer to let > >> differences > >> >> just fester without openly discussing them. The old Soviet > >> >> approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far the other > >> >> way. :) > >> >> > >> >> Andy > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> >> *Andy Blunden* > >> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> mike cole wrote: > >> >> > >> >> Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response to > >> >> someone who > >> >> wrote backto xmca instead of me. > >> >> > >> >> Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an > >> >> interesting and > >> >> unassuming guy. > >> >> > >> >> Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion?? > >> >> > >> >> mike > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> -- > >> >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > >> >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Oct 6 16:19:41 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 7 Oct 2014 00:19:41 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> Message-ID: > > > ?Thanks again for taking the trouble to write that out. Perhaps it will be > generative for people. > mike? > > I count two fairly obvious (?) logical inconsistencies and one more "systemic" problem. 1. A profound concern for a materialistically interconnected world obviates notions of solitary disciplines. 2. Semantic "structure" is not text, or text-like (unless you're being generous with the term). Rather, text can evoke and carry semantic structure. 3. A claimed concern for semantics, but a clear (scholarly) focus on what the authors said rather than the (logical) veracity of what was said. Perhaps a linguist/semiotician will step in and clarify that logic is a fundamental component of semantics as understood in such fields. I'm curious about the Kharkov-as-deviant thread. But I suspect this is the same problem -- i.e. attention to the words and not the deeds. Regarding the theme "broadening and enlivening" I am offering "tightening and sharpening". So it looks like I'm saying the question is wrong, but I don't know what the problem was ... something to do with conceptual difficulties being communicated at ISCAR, perhaps? All the best, Huw > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > PS: Holbrook DID get one thing wrong. Stalin did not argue that > > language was purely ideal and superstructural; that was Marr's > > position. Stalin, or whoever ghost wrote his articles, argued that > > language was base, and therefore somehow material, whatever that > > means. But Stalin was not really interested in ideas; he was just out > > for Marr's blood. > > > > > > > > > > > > On 6 October 2014 22:21, mike cole wrote: > > > Hi David-- > > > > > > The specific example of your comments on originals and adaptations hits > > on > > > a point it would be helpful to hear more about: > > > > > > You wrote: > > > Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat > > > similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging > > > rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which actually > > > rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, > > > and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's > > > argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need > > > new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument > > > in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants > > > the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no > > > longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts (and > > > this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least > > > recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of > > > thinking that has become extinct). > > > > > > 1. Could you guide us to a text you recommend where this > interpretation > > > is laid out? > > > 2. What sort of revision was Seth suggesting and why? > > > > > > I have been reading Russian discussions around this issue. > Clarification > > > would be helpful. > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:37 AM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > > > > >> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own bed and > > >> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: > > >> > > >> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ > > >> > > >> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, played, as > > >> Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) Stradivarius > > >> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very first time > > >> in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma has > > >> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has been > > >> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal interpretation. > > >> > > >> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if Mendelssohn > > >> himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, > > >> Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had occupied, > > >> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to > > >> Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period > > >> instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and starts > > >> to play. > > >> > > >> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat > > >> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging > > >> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which actually > > >> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, > > >> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's > > >> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need > > >> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument > > >> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants > > >> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no > > >> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts (and > > >> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least > > >> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of > > >> thinking that has become extinct). > > >> > > >> David Kellogg > > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > >> > > >> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in Sydney was > > >> not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I would have > > >> liked it better if she had used those terms a little more imprecisely, > > >> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might have > > >> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was > > >> contemplating. > > >> > > >> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a world > > >> without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are > > >> replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather > > >> dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she called the > > >> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also human > > >> identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the conference > > >> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time for the > > >> spiritual side of life. > > >> > > >> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the "object" of > > >> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working class is > > >> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex workers > > >> and atomized into the social position of housewives. Inequality is now > > >> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history tells > > >> us that the result of this is not going to be individual spirituality > > >> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if that > > >> force is organized, social, and directed against social equality > > >> rather than against fellow members of the working class. > > >> > > >> dk > > >> > > >> > > >> On 5 October 2014 13:38, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> > I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie Nardi I > > had > > >> the > > >> > great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if she > has > > >> > written something on "object" that is very good news. > > >> > I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't think one > > good > > >> book > > >> > or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long while I > > have > > >> been > > >> > jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie" > > without > > >> an > > >> > article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of > "substance" > > >> > whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains > outstanding > > >> > differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that almost all > > bar > > >> one > > >> > now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is a step > > >> > forward, and people are aware of the differences in interpretation > and > > >> they > > >> > are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a while, > > maybe > > >> > this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual > > consistency > > >> in > > >> > our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am > > optimistic. > > >> > > > >> > Andy > > >> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> > *Andy Blunden* > > >> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > mike cole wrote: > > >> >> > > >> >> Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. > > >> >> I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds that > go > > U > > >> >> discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a shower of > > >> >> interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? > > (Whatever > > >> >> object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on basics of > > AT > > >> is > > >> >> one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! > > >> >> > > >> >> Mike > > >> >> > > >> >> On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden > >> >> > wrote: > > >> >> > > >> >> I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were a > little > > >> >> slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also iscar-ers and > > we > > >> >> were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. > > >> >> Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger on a > > >> >> Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and tablets > > etc., > > >> >> so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were > > >> >> oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. > > >> >> > > >> >> My impressions of CHAT research: > > >> >> On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp and > > >> >> critical in relation to the dominant political forces, and > still > > >> >> way out in front in understanding the several developmental > > >> >> processes which all contribute to our actions (phylogenesis, > > >> >> historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, microgenesis), > and > > >> >> not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great > > >> >> community of research, relatively lacking in the > competitiveness > > >> >> and jealousy which infects most research communities. > > >> >> > > >> >> On the negative side: > > >> >> > > >> >> * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" as some > > >> >> homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces problems > into > > the > > >> >> social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., people > > lack > > >> a > > >> >> viable social theory or the ability to use theory they > have > > to > > >> >> analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated > way. > > >> >> * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. Only > a > > >> small > > >> >> minority know what it means and use the idea in their > > research. > > >> >> * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of > > confusion; > > >> >> few researchers using the concept are clear on what the > > concept > > >> >> is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront and > > >> >> attempt to > > >> >> resolve the methodological differences (I refer to > > systematic > > >> >> difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) > within > > >> the > > >> >> CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the relatively > > >> civil > > >> >> relations between researchers - people prefer to let > > >> differences > > >> >> just fester without openly discussing them. The old Soviet > > >> >> approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far the > other > > >> >> way. :) > > >> >> > > >> >> Andy > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> mike cole wrote: > > >> >> > > >> >> Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response to > > >> >> someone who > > >> >> wrote backto xmca instead of me. > > >> >> > > >> >> Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an > > >> >> interesting and > > >> >> unassuming guy. > > >> >> > > >> >> Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca > discussion?? > > >> >> > > >> >> mike > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> -- > > >> >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > > an > > >> >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Oct 6 16:55:24 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 07 Oct 2014 10:55:24 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> Message-ID: <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> Mike, what I got out of Seth's intervention was just a plea for people to stop claiming to have the "real Vygotsky" and I thoroughly agreed with him. And so far as I know Marx uses the German word for Activity, viz., Taetigkeit, in "Theses on Feuerbach" - that word which pre-dates "behaviour" and "consciousness" by centuries, but which is sometimes referred to nowadays as a unity of these two abstractions, and it was only later interpreters that introduced the term "praxis", which being Greek sounds a lot cleverer. Action and Activity, in my view and etymologically, are both thinking and behaving. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > Thanks, David. I think i understand better what you mean by "LSV rejects > "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior,and most > certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Somehow I was expecting text > from LSV where he says "activity is not a unit of analysis" because of all > the places in his text where he uses the term activity as a sort of "lay > term". > > ?...? > >> Holbrook Mahn. >> Holbrook began by saying that: >> >> a) We do not "borrow" concepts made for one discipline and "apply" >> them to another. Not even dialectical materialism can be "applied" to >> psychology (or even sociology or economics--Marx didn't do applied >> philosophy!). Holbrook then produced a number of quotations from The >> Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology to show that Vygotsky >> knew this, and countered with other quotations from Problems of the >> Development of the Mind to show that Leontiev did not know this. >> >> ?I know places where LSV is clear on this score, in Historical meaning, >> > for example, but not the evidence of Leontiev's errors. > ? > > > >> b) The term "praxis" has been thus borrowed. It doesn't refer to >> practical activity: it refers to a unity of thinking and practice. >> >> > > ?Borrowed from Marx by ..??? by Leontiev? There is any form of practical > activity without human thinking? ? > > > >> c) The term "social situation of development" has been thus borrowed; >> it does not refer to a "context" but to the child's relationship to >> the environment. >> >> > > By whom? I am always in a puzzle about the use of this term. Isn't > perezhivanie the term that LSV uses to talk about relation of child to > environment? At least, there seems to be a lot of chatter about issue.? > > > >> d) The term "unit of analysis" does not refer to a God particle that >> is indifferent to the problem of analysis. ygotsky did not imagine a >> "unit of analysis" that fit any and all problems in psychology. Each >> unit of analysis is specific to a particular problem of unity (e.g. >> the problem of the unity of the child and his or her environment in >> Problem of the Environment and the problem of the unity of verbal >> thinking in Thinking and Speech). >> >> ?Amen to that. ? >> > > > >> e) The term "verbal thinking" is a mistranslation: Vygotsky is talking >> about thinking by language, or thinking through word meanings, and not >> some kind of verbalizable inner speech (which does exist, but which is >> a distinct layer from thinking). >> >> > ?There is a lot of confusion around this issue and would probably need > somewhat separate discussion. I interpret in the former way. The role of > meaning in inner speech, and the usefulness or not of the sense/meaning > distinction has me confused. Dima Leontiev has put the distinction behind > him and now refers to "cultural meaning" (paleo meaning ? > > ?) and > "personal meaning (paleo sense)." I am paleo in this regard.? > > >> Most of this has been said before, not least by Vygotsky himself. I >> know that Holbrook has been saying it at least since 2007 when I first >> heard him at the American Association for Applied Linguistics in Costa >> Mesa, and he develops it at some length in: >> >> >> https://www.academia.edu/1803017/Vygotskys_Analysis_of_Childrens_Meaning-Making_Processes >> >> Mahn, H. (2012). Vygotsky's Analysis of Children's Meaning-Making >> Processes, International Journal of Educational Psychology1(2):100-126 >> >> It's been said by others too: Mike Cole actually makes many of the >> same points in discussing how the Kharkov school deviated from the >> work of Vygotsk, >> > > > ?I did not know enough to make many of these points in 1978! They certainly > distanced themselves from LSV and PI Zinchenko went after the > natural-cultural memory distinction,? > > > ?? > > > >> and J.V. Wertsch is quite explicit in his revisionism >> when he presents "mediated activity" as a unit of analysis in >> opposition to "word meaning". >> > > > ?mediated ACTION and often as not, mediated action in context.? > > >> But of course since a unit of analysis >> must preserve in some shape or form the essential properties of the >> whole, the use of "mediated activity" >> ?(action) ? >> cannot be a unit of analysis for >> the mind if we wish to retain the idea that the mind has a semantic >> structure (that is, if the "whole" is structured something like a text >> or a discourse rather than like driving a car, shooting a gun, or >> hunting animals). >> >> > > ?When we get to semantic structure of consciousness, we know there was a > break between LSV and his buddies. It seems that it is in arriving at this > formulation that the charges of idealism and sign-o-centrism kick in.? > > ?My difficulty is in making arguments about consciousness- -in-general, > perhaps a relic of my behaviorist past. Luria appears to have come around > on this issue. I have had a difficult time understanding the changes in > Leontiev's thought over the period of the 30's and 40's. ? > > >> Now, in the discussion of Holbrook's presentation, this wild-haired >> guy who looked a little like Itzhak Perlman rose to argue that >> Leontiev's interpretation was really one fair interpretation, and that >> it really was addressed towards a specific problem, which is how to >> prevent dualism from arising (that is, how to explain how word meaning >> could arise historically).?Through joint mediated activity?? >> > > > > > >> He also said that Holbrook was juxtaposing >> quotations out of context: the quotes that showed Vygotsky arguing >> against a "Marxist psychology" were directed against a very specific >> group of vulgar Marxists (e.g. Zalkind) and that is why Vygotsky uses >> scare quotes around "Marxist". >> >> > > ?Not so?? > > > >> I then muddied the waters, first by addressing the wild-haired guy >> instead of Holbrook (a major breach of protocol) and then by arguing >> that speech really is sui generis, because it is a form of "activity" >> (if we must call it that) whose conditions of comprehension are no >> longer recoverable from the activity itself (and so the unit of >> analysis for verbal thinking cannot be sought in activity). There >> wasn't enough time to really develop what I wanted to say, so I went >> over to continue the discussion, and it turned out that the wild >> haired guy was none other than Seth Chaiklin, who is, we all know, one >> of the foremost paleo-Vygotskyans when it comes to the much >> misinterpreted concept of the ZPD. >> >> > > ?Speech is a form of activity or a means of activity? Or of action?? > > ?I guess I do not understand. If its worthwhile, perhaps spell the idea out > here? > > So far as I can tell, there are ONLY misinterpretations of the Zoped. Seth > was right on about it being used in Anglo-American discourse as something > akin to zone of proximal learning,fitting into the associationist view of > development as more learning. But the one right interpretation has escaped > my notice.? > > ?Thanks again for taking the trouble to write that out. Perhaps it will be > generative for people. > mike? > > > >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> PS: Holbrook DID get one thing wrong. Stalin did not argue that >> language was purely ideal and superstructural; that was Marr's >> position. Stalin, or whoever ghost wrote his articles, argued that >> language was base, and therefore somehow material, whatever that >> means. But Stalin was not really interested in ideas; he was just out >> for Marr's blood. >> >> >> >> >> >> On 6 October 2014 22:21, mike cole wrote: >> >>> Hi David-- >>> >>> The specific example of your comments on originals and adaptations hits >>> >> on >> >>> a point it would be helpful to hear more about: >>> >>> You wrote: >>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat >>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging >>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which actually >>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, >>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's >>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need >>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument >>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants >>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no >>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts (and >>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least >>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of >>> thinking that has become extinct). >>> >>> 1. Could you guide us to a text you recommend where this interpretation >>> is laid out? >>> 2. What sort of revision was Seth suggesting and why? >>> >>> I have been reading Russian discussions around this issue. Clarification >>> would be helpful. >>> mike >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:37 AM, David Kellogg >>> >> wrote: >> >>>> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own bed and >>>> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: >>>> >>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ >>>> >>>> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, played, as >>>> Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) Stradivarius >>>> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very first time >>>> in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma has >>>> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has been >>>> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal interpretation. >>>> >>>> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if Mendelssohn >>>> himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, >>>> Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had occupied, >>>> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to >>>> Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period >>>> instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and starts >>>> to play. >>>> >>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat >>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging >>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which actually >>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, >>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's >>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need >>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument >>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants >>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no >>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts (and >>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least >>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of >>>> thinking that has become extinct). >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in Sydney was >>>> not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I would have >>>> liked it better if she had used those terms a little more imprecisely, >>>> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might have >>>> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was >>>> contemplating. >>>> >>>> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a world >>>> without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are >>>> replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather >>>> dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she called the >>>> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also human >>>> identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the conference >>>> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time for the >>>> spiritual side of life. >>>> >>>> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the "object" of >>>> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working class is >>>> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex workers >>>> and atomized into the social position of housewives. Inequality is now >>>> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history tells >>>> us that the result of this is not going to be individual spirituality >>>> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if that >>>> force is organized, social, and directed against social equality >>>> rather than against fellow members of the working class. >>>> >>>> dk >>>> >>>> >>>> On 5 October 2014 13:38, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>>> I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie Nardi I >>>>> >> had >> >>>> the >>>> >>>>> great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if she has >>>>> written something on "object" that is very good news. >>>>> I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't think one >>>>> >> good >> >>>> book >>>> >>>>> or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long while I >>>>> >> have >> >>>> been >>>> >>>>> jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie" >>>>> >> without >> >>>> an >>>> >>>>> article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of "substance" >>>>> whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains outstanding >>>>> differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that almost all >>>>> >> bar >> >>>> one >>>> >>>>> now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is a step >>>>> forward, and people are aware of the differences in interpretation and >>>>> >>>> they >>>> >>>>> are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a while, >>>>> >> maybe >> >>>>> this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual >>>>> >> consistency >> >>>> in >>>> >>>>> our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am >>>>> >> optimistic. >> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. >>>>>> I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds that go >>>>>> >> U >> >>>>>> discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a shower of >>>>>> interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? >>>>>> >> (Whatever >> >>>>>> object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on basics of >>>>>> >> AT >> >>>> is >>>> >>>>>> one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! >>>>>> >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden >>>>> > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were a little >>>>>> slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also iscar-ers and >>>>>> >> we >> >>>>>> were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. >>>>>> Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger on a >>>>>> Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and tablets >>>>>> >> etc., >> >>>>>> so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were >>>>>> oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. >>>>>> >>>>>> My impressions of CHAT research: >>>>>> On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp and >>>>>> critical in relation to the dominant political forces, and still >>>>>> way out in front in understanding the several developmental >>>>>> processes which all contribute to our actions (phylogenesis, >>>>>> historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, microgenesis), and >>>>>> not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great >>>>>> community of research, relatively lacking in the competitiveness >>>>>> and jealousy which infects most research communities. >>>>>> >>>>>> On the negative side: >>>>>> >>>>>> * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" as some >>>>>> homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces problems into >>>>>> >> the >> >>>>>> social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., people >>>>>> >> lack >> >>>> a >>>> >>>>>> viable social theory or the ability to use theory they have >>>>>> >> to >> >>>>>> analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated way. >>>>>> * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. Only a >>>>>> >>>> small >>>> >>>>>> minority know what it means and use the idea in their >>>>>> >> research. >> >>>>>> * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of >>>>>> >> confusion; >> >>>>>> few researchers using the concept are clear on what the >>>>>> >> concept >> >>>>>> is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront and >>>>>> attempt to >>>>>> resolve the methodological differences (I refer to >>>>>> >> systematic >> >>>>>> difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) within >>>>>> >>>> the >>>> >>>>>> CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the relatively >>>>>> >>>> civil >>>> >>>>>> relations between researchers - people prefer to let >>>>>> >>>> differences >>>> >>>>>> just fester without openly discussing them. The old Soviet >>>>>> approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far the other >>>>>> way. :) >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response to >>>>>> someone who >>>>>> wrote backto xmca instead of me. >>>>>> >>>>>> Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an >>>>>> interesting and >>>>>> unassuming guy. >>>>>> >>>>>> Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion?? >>>>>> >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>> >> an >> >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Oct 7 07:11:47 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 7 Oct 2014 07:11:47 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> Message-ID: The understanding of action and activity AS BOTH thinking and behaviour contrasting with an appeal to differentiate the aspects thinking and behaviour. The notion *species* was introduced by David K as returning to Vygotsky's words as he used them [paleo return] or we will loose this species as it becomes extinct. Therefore Leontiev's theory could also be considered a separate *species* with its own characteristics, features, and object of activity. SO in my return to the species of Activity theory I turned to one of Leontiev's students [Victor Kaptelinin] in his 2005 MCA article "The Object of Activity: Making sense of the Sense Maker" Kaptelinin opens his article with this fragment from the *species* of Leontiev's own specified object of activity [activity theory] "A basic or, as is sometimes said, a CONSTITUTING characteristic of activity is its objectivity or, rather object relatedness. Properly the CONCEPT of its object, gegenstand, is already IMPLICITLY contained in the very concept of activity. The expression objectless activity is DEVOID of any meaning. Objectivity may SEEM objectless, but SCIENTIFIC investigations OF activity NECESSARILY REQUIRES discovering its object. THUS the object of activity IS TWOFOLD: First, in its INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE as SUBORDINATING TO ITSELF and transforming the activity of the subject [The question arises if this subordinating is the object's *motive* - LP] AND Second, as an IMAGE OF the object, as a product OF its property of psychological reflection THAT IS realized AS AN ACTIVITY OF THE SUBJECT, and cannot exist OTHERWISE." This paragraph which Kaptelian offers as a *specimen* of a particular and unique *species* of expression seems to present a clear *case* to hold up to Vygotsky's *species* . I would add that Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative *species* that is also looking at objects of activity from another *angle* of vision. Are Vygotsky, Leontiev, and Merleau-Ponty all gesturing at the same phenomena and walking around this *object* [imagined? or real?] from various vantage points. I will pause by returning to the second quality of the TWOFOLD quality of the *object of activity* "SECOND as an IMAGE OF the object, AS a product OF its PSYCHOLOGICAL REFLECTION that is REALIZED [brought into form -LP] AS an activity OF the SUBJECT and cannot exist OTHERWISE. Is this a new *species*?? Larry On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 4:55 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Mike, what I got out of Seth's intervention was just a plea for people to > stop claiming to have the "real Vygotsky" and I thoroughly agreed with him. > And so far as I know Marx uses the German word for Activity, viz., > Taetigkeit, in "Theses on Feuerbach" - that word which pre-dates > "behaviour" and "consciousness" by centuries, but which is sometimes > referred to nowadays as a unity of these two abstractions, and it was only > later interpreters that introduced the term "praxis", which being Greek > sounds a lot cleverer. Action and Activity, in my view and etymologically, > are both thinking and behaving. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: > >> Thanks, David. I think i understand better what you mean by "LSV rejects >> "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior,and most >> certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Somehow I was expecting >> text >> from LSV where he says "activity is not a unit of analysis" because of all >> the places in his text where he uses the term activity as a sort of "lay >> term". >> >> ?...? >> >> >>> Holbrook Mahn. >>> Holbrook began by saying that: >>> >>> a) We do not "borrow" concepts made for one discipline and "apply" >>> them to another. Not even dialectical materialism can be "applied" to >>> psychology (or even sociology or economics--Marx didn't do applied >>> philosophy!). Holbrook then produced a number of quotations from The >>> Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology to show that Vygotsky >>> knew this, and countered with other quotations from Problems of the >>> Development of the Mind to show that Leontiev did not know this. >>> >>> ?I know places where LSV is clear on this score, in Historical meaning, >>> >>> >> for example, but not the evidence of Leontiev's errors. >> ? >> >> >> >> >>> b) The term "praxis" has been thus borrowed. It doesn't refer to >>> practical activity: it refers to a unity of thinking and practice. >>> >>> >>> >> >> ?Borrowed from Marx by ..??? by Leontiev? There is any form of practical >> activity without human thinking? ? >> >> >> >> >>> c) The term "social situation of development" has been thus borrowed; >>> it does not refer to a "context" but to the child's relationship to >>> the environment. >>> >>> >>> >> >> By whom? I am always in a puzzle about the use of this term. Isn't >> perezhivanie the term that LSV uses to talk about relation of child to >> environment? At least, there seems to be a lot of chatter about issue.? >> >> >> >> >>> d) The term "unit of analysis" does not refer to a God particle that >>> is indifferent to the problem of analysis. ygotsky did not imagine a >>> "unit of analysis" that fit any and all problems in psychology. Each >>> unit of analysis is specific to a particular problem of unity (e.g. >>> the problem of the unity of the child and his or her environment in >>> Problem of the Environment and the problem of the unity of verbal >>> thinking in Thinking and Speech). >>> >>> ?Amen to that. ? >>> >>> >> >> >> >> >>> e) The term "verbal thinking" is a mistranslation: Vygotsky is talking >>> about thinking by language, or thinking through word meanings, and not >>> some kind of verbalizable inner speech (which does exist, but which is >>> a distinct layer from thinking). >>> >>> >>> >> ?There is a lot of confusion around this issue and would probably need >> somewhat separate discussion. I interpret in the former way. The role of >> meaning in inner speech, and the usefulness or not of the sense/meaning >> distinction has me confused. Dima Leontiev has put the distinction behind >> him and now refers to "cultural meaning" (paleo meaning ? >> >> ?) and >> "personal meaning (paleo sense)." I am paleo in this regard.? >> >> >> >>> Most of this has been said before, not least by Vygotsky himself. I >>> know that Holbrook has been saying it at least since 2007 when I first >>> heard him at the American Association for Applied Linguistics in Costa >>> Mesa, and he develops it at some length in: >>> >>> >>> https://www.academia.edu/1803017/Vygotskys_Analysis_of_ >>> Childrens_Meaning-Making_Processes >>> >>> Mahn, H. (2012). Vygotsky's Analysis of Children's Meaning-Making >>> Processes, International Journal of Educational Psychology1(2):100-126 >>> >>> It's been said by others too: Mike Cole actually makes many of the >>> same points in discussing how the Kharkov school deviated from the >>> work of Vygotsk, >>> >>> >> >> >> ?I did not know enough to make many of these points in 1978! They >> certainly >> distanced themselves from LSV and PI Zinchenko went after the >> natural-cultural memory distinction,? >> >> >> ?? >> >> >> >> >>> and J.V. Wertsch is quite explicit in his revisionism >>> when he presents "mediated activity" as a unit of analysis in >>> opposition to "word meaning". >>> >>> >> >> >> ?mediated ACTION and often as not, mediated action in context.? >> >> >> >>> But of course since a unit of analysis >>> must preserve in some shape or form the essential properties of the >>> whole, the use of "mediated activity" >>> ?(action) ? >>> cannot be a unit of analysis for >>> the mind if we wish to retain the idea that the mind has a semantic >>> structure (that is, if the "whole" is structured something like a text >>> or a discourse rather than like driving a car, shooting a gun, or >>> hunting animals). >>> >>> >>> >> >> ?When we get to semantic structure of consciousness, we know there was a >> break between LSV and his buddies. It seems that it is in arriving at this >> formulation that the charges of idealism and sign-o-centrism kick in.? >> >> ?My difficulty is in making arguments about consciousness- -in-general, >> perhaps a relic of my behaviorist past. Luria appears to have come around >> on this issue. I have had a difficult time understanding the changes in >> Leontiev's thought over the period of the 30's and 40's. ? >> >> >> >>> Now, in the discussion of Holbrook's presentation, this wild-haired >>> guy who looked a little like Itzhak Perlman rose to argue that >>> Leontiev's interpretation was really one fair interpretation, and that >>> it really was addressed towards a specific problem, which is how to >>> prevent dualism from arising (that is, how to explain how word meaning >>> could arise historically).?Through joint mediated activity?? >>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> He also said that Holbrook was juxtaposing >>> quotations out of context: the quotes that showed Vygotsky arguing >>> against a "Marxist psychology" were directed against a very specific >>> group of vulgar Marxists (e.g. Zalkind) and that is why Vygotsky uses >>> scare quotes around "Marxist". >>> >>> >>> >> >> ?Not so?? >> >> >> >> >>> I then muddied the waters, first by addressing the wild-haired guy >>> instead of Holbrook (a major breach of protocol) and then by arguing >>> that speech really is sui generis, because it is a form of "activity" >>> (if we must call it that) whose conditions of comprehension are no >>> longer recoverable from the activity itself (and so the unit of >>> analysis for verbal thinking cannot be sought in activity). There >>> wasn't enough time to really develop what I wanted to say, so I went >>> over to continue the discussion, and it turned out that the wild >>> haired guy was none other than Seth Chaiklin, who is, we all know, one >>> of the foremost paleo-Vygotskyans when it comes to the much >>> misinterpreted concept of the ZPD. >>> >>> >>> >> >> ?Speech is a form of activity or a means of activity? Or of action?? >> >> ?I guess I do not understand. If its worthwhile, perhaps spell the idea >> out >> here? >> >> So far as I can tell, there are ONLY misinterpretations of the Zoped. Seth >> was right on about it being used in Anglo-American discourse as something >> akin to zone of proximal learning,fitting into the associationist view of >> development as more learning. But the one right interpretation has escaped >> my notice.? >> >> ?Thanks again for taking the trouble to write that out. Perhaps it will be >> generative for people. >> mike? >> >> >> >> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> PS: Holbrook DID get one thing wrong. Stalin did not argue that >>> language was purely ideal and superstructural; that was Marr's >>> position. Stalin, or whoever ghost wrote his articles, argued that >>> language was base, and therefore somehow material, whatever that >>> means. But Stalin was not really interested in ideas; he was just out >>> for Marr's blood. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 6 October 2014 22:21, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Hi David-- >>>> >>>> The specific example of your comments on originals and adaptations hits >>>> >>>> >>> on >>> >>> >>>> a point it would be helpful to hear more about: >>>> >>>> You wrote: >>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat >>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging >>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which actually >>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, >>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's >>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need >>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument >>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants >>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no >>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts (and >>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least >>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of >>>> thinking that has become extinct). >>>> >>>> 1. Could you guide us to a text you recommend where this >>>> interpretation >>>> is laid out? >>>> 2. What sort of revision was Seth suggesting and why? >>>> >>>> I have been reading Russian discussions around this issue. Clarification >>>> would be helpful. >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:37 AM, David Kellogg >>>> >>>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own bed and >>>>> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: >>>>> >>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ >>>>> >>>>> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, played, as >>>>> Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) Stradivarius >>>>> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very first time >>>>> in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma has >>>>> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has been >>>>> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal interpretation. >>>>> >>>>> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if Mendelssohn >>>>> himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, >>>>> Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had occupied, >>>>> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to >>>>> Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period >>>>> instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and starts >>>>> to play. >>>>> >>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat >>>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging >>>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which actually >>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, >>>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's >>>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need >>>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument >>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants >>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no >>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts (and >>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least >>>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of >>>>> thinking that has become extinct). >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>> >>>>> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in Sydney was >>>>> not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I would have >>>>> liked it better if she had used those terms a little more imprecisely, >>>>> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might have >>>>> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was >>>>> contemplating. >>>>> >>>>> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a world >>>>> without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are >>>>> replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather >>>>> dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she called the >>>>> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also human >>>>> identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the conference >>>>> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time for the >>>>> spiritual side of life. >>>>> >>>>> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the "object" of >>>>> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working class is >>>>> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex workers >>>>> and atomized into the social position of housewives. Inequality is now >>>>> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history tells >>>>> us that the result of this is not going to be individual spirituality >>>>> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if that >>>>> force is organized, social, and directed against social equality >>>>> rather than against fellow members of the working class. >>>>> >>>>> dk >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 5 October 2014 13:38, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie Nardi I >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> had >>> >>> >>>> the >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if she has >>>>>> written something on "object" that is very good news. >>>>>> I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't think one >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> good >>> >>> >>>> book >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long while I >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> have >>> >>> >>>> been >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie" >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> without >>> >>> >>>> an >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of "substance" >>>>>> whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains outstanding >>>>>> differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that almost all >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> bar >>> >>> >>>> one >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is a step >>>>>> forward, and people are aware of the differences in interpretation and >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> they >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a while, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> maybe >>> >>> >>>> this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> consistency >>> >>> >>>> in >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> optimistic. >>> >>> >>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> ------------ >>> >>> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. >>>>>>> I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds that go >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> U >>> >>> >>>> discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a shower of >>>>>>> interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> (Whatever >>> >>> >>>> object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on basics of >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> AT >>> >>> >>>> is >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden >>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were a little >>>>>>> slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also iscar-ers and >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> we >>> >>> >>>> were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. >>>>>>> Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger on a >>>>>>> Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and tablets >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> etc., >>> >>> >>>> so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were >>>>>>> oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My impressions of CHAT research: >>>>>>> On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp and >>>>>>> critical in relation to the dominant political forces, and still >>>>>>> way out in front in understanding the several developmental >>>>>>> processes which all contribute to our actions (phylogenesis, >>>>>>> historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, microgenesis), and >>>>>>> not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great >>>>>>> community of research, relatively lacking in the competitiveness >>>>>>> and jealousy which infects most research communities. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On the negative side: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" as some >>>>>>> homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces problems into >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>> >>> >>>> social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., people >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> lack >>> >>> >>>> a >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> viable social theory or the ability to use theory they have >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> to >>> >>> >>>> analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated way. >>>>>>> * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. Only a >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> small >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> minority know what it means and use the idea in their >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> research. >>> >>> >>>> * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> confusion; >>> >>> >>>> few researchers using the concept are clear on what the >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> concept >>> >>> >>>> is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront and >>>>>>> attempt to >>>>>>> resolve the methodological differences (I refer to >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> systematic >>> >>> >>>> difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) within >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the relatively >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> civil >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> relations between researchers - people prefer to let >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> differences >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> just fester without openly discussing them. The old Soviet >>>>>>> approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far the other >>>>>>> way. :) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> ------------ >>> >>> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response to >>>>>>> someone who >>>>>>> wrote backto xmca instead of me. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an >>>>>>> interesting and >>>>>>> unassuming guy. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion?? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> an >>> >>> >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue Oct 7 15:12:36 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2014 07:12:36 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> Message-ID: Larry, Mike, Huw, Andy-- (and above all the real "objects" of broadening and enlivening the discussion, you by-standers and handwringers, perhaps intimidated by the pointing and handwaving, and unwilling to contribute lest the discussion become less sharpened and pointed....) There were several issues that seemed to pop up session after session at ISCAR, quite independently of who raised them. Yes, "the real Vygotsky" was certainly one of them, and Holbrook was not the only person to talk this way; I did too, and I do think that a world where the original Vygotsky is not recoverable is just as bad as a world where Vygotsky is completely forgotten. But in the context of ISCAR, the "real Vygotsky" was often a response to many speakers who would like to emphasize the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky. There were two ways of doing this. One was to simply say that of course Vygotsky was a Marxist, but then everybody was Marxist back then, and it was not much more important than being a liberal Democrat today. Interestingly, in the Making of Mind, Luria said that this is a description which could well apply to many psychologists of his time, including himself, but not to Vygotsky. A more sophisticated way of emphasizing the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky requires a "real Vygotsky" of a different kind. Writers like our good friend Nikolai Veresov have tried to do this by emphasizing the PRE-Marxist Vygotsky, especially Vygotsky the phenomenologist, student of Gustav Shpet who was a student of Husserl himself. I was formerly little puzzled by this move. Seth argued that it was valid, because of Vygotsky's ties to Lewin and Lewin's ideas about the force of objects and the fields of attractors created thereby. Lewin was certainly an attractor for Vygotsky, but Vygotsky actually uses Lewin to criticize phenomenological analysis in Chapter Three of HDHMF (see Vol. 4, p. 69). Elsewhere, Vygotsky is very critical of the founders of phenomenology, iincluding Husserl (p. 7). But now I think that Larry (and Martin, who has raised the same connection) is on to something. For it is also in HDHMF that Vygotsky bruits the idea that attention is a kind of gateway function, that the indicative is the primordial function of speech and thinking, and that there is nevertheless a qualitative difference between noticing something and internalizing it as a meaning--all of these are Husserlian ideas. Even the knotted handkerchief, which I myself have attributed to Vygotsky and to a peculiarly Russian practice, comes from the work of Husserl (Logical Investigations, Vol. I, pp. 269-333). I think that as a real historical materialist Vygotsky rejected Husserl's absolute opposition between symbol and index, but he didn't forget it when he set about trying to build a bridge between the two. Mike wonders about a text where Vygotsky rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for everything but behavior. No such text exists, of course; if you read what I wrote carefully (I know, it's a trial sometimes, but at least I am a larger target then the minimalist Huw) you will see that I refer to a my OWN rejection, not Vygotsky's. What Vygotsky says in "Problem of the Environment" is that he wants to introduce "a number of different" units of analysis which are used in pedological analyses, of which "perezhivanie" is one, and "sense/signification" a very different one. (Andy is wrong to impute importance to the count noun form here; Vygotsky often uses it as a verb, I "live experience" something). I have always assumed that this means: a) Perezhivanie is quite specific to the problem Vygotsky raises in this lecture, which is how three different children can respond so differently to the one and the same form of child abuse. b) "Sense/signification" is also a unit of analysis, what Vygotsky refers to in Thinking and Speech as "the meaningful word". (This was also the object of textological attention in Holbrook's presentation). Mike also wonders about where Leontiev raises the possibility of applying Marxist theory directly to psychology. In many places, but perhaps most prominently in Problems of the Development of Mind (see pp. 236-237, 255). Holbrook had other quotations of this type, and I think there is a link between them and what Luria's remark that back then everybody in psychology was a "Marxist", but nobody except Vygotsky was much of a Marxist. Holbrook is right here. Mike asks if there is practical activity without thinking. I think that Vygotsky would say that there is thinking and there is verbal thinking (or, as Holbrook now insists, "thinking with words"). What monkeys do with sticks is called practical intelligence in Chapter Four of Thinking and Speech. It is practical activity, and it's thinking. But it's not a unit of thinking and speech, and therefore I think there is some light between what Vygotsky is willing to call "activity" and "praxis"; it's not the case that "praxis" is just a Greek word for "activity". I recognize, though, that for Andy what monkeys do with sticks does not count as activity (and I also recognize that I was muddling "activity" and "action"--sorry about that). Like Mike, I am paleo with regard to sense and meaning, and like Mike I recognize that it is hard to tell how deep the waters are here since they have been muddied. I think they were first muddied by Vygotsky himself, because he refers the distinction to Paulhan, where no such distinction is found (Paulhan just talks about connotation and denotation). But I think it's easy to unmuddy the waters and I think they are very deep indeed: Vygotsky uses Paulhan as a foil, taking the actual distinction from Volosinov, who was working at the Herzen Institute at exactly the same moment that Vygotsky was writing of this distinction. Zavershneva has said that Vygotsky cites Volosinov in his unpublished manuscripts, but that the citation is always removed by the editor in publication. So "smysl" is "tema"; it is something like "realized, actual meaning" while "znachenie" is something like "potential, possible meaning". Tema is what happens when we activate a particular layer in the great palimpsest of possible meanings left in each word by our contemporaries and ancestors. I'm currently writing the endnotes for our new volume of Vygotsky's lectures on pedology, so I am very aware of the issue that Huw appears to be raising (although Huw is so very gnomic in his lofty remarks on my supposed illogicality and my more systemic problems that it is hard to be sure). In Lecture Six, Vygotsky says in one paragraph that dividing off psychological from physiological development is methodologically impermissable, but in the very next paragraph, and indeed in the layout of the book, he says "dismemberment is nevertheless necessary". On the one hand, he says that there is no action, no motility, not even thinking without both the mind and the brain, and on the other he says that even within the body there are distinct lines of development and that physiology is "a summarizable concept". He is acutely aware of the contradiction, but by the end of the lecture he resolves it. We just have to keep in mind that things that we take apart for the purpose of analysis are inextricably joined in clinical practice. I suppose you can say it is a logical contradiction if you want, particularly if by that you mean it is a contradiction that only exists in the ideal world, that is, in logic and does not really pose a problem in life. The problem is with the word "text" is the same, Huw. For Hallidayans like me, a text is precisely a semantic object; it's not made of paper and ink. Viewed interpersonally, a text is a coherent and cohesive exchange. Viewed intra-mentally, it's a representation of thinking. It is objective, but it's objective the way that mathematics and language itself is objective, not the way that three actual apples or a physical book is objective. Dixit. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (PS: I'm afraid I didn't get the systemic reproach at all. It's hard for a fish to see the density of water, much less to see the density of the fish!) dk On 7 October 2014 23:11, Larry Purss wrote: > The understanding of action and activity AS BOTH thinking and behaviour > contrasting with an appeal to differentiate the aspects thinking and > behaviour. > The notion *species* was introduced by David K as returning to Vygotsky's > words as he used them [paleo return] or we will loose this species as it > becomes extinct. > > Therefore Leontiev's theory could also be considered a separate *species* > with its own characteristics, features, and object of activity. > SO in my return to the species of Activity theory I turned to one of > Leontiev's students [Victor Kaptelinin] in his 2005 MCA article "The Object > of Activity: Making sense of the Sense Maker" > > Kaptelinin opens his article with this fragment from the *species* of > Leontiev's own specified object of activity [activity theory] > > "A basic or, as is sometimes said, a CONSTITUTING characteristic of > activity is its objectivity or, rather object relatedness. Properly the > CONCEPT of its object, gegenstand, is already IMPLICITLY contained in the > very concept of activity. The expression objectless activity is DEVOID of > any meaning. Objectivity may SEEM objectless, but SCIENTIFIC investigations > OF activity NECESSARILY REQUIRES discovering its object. > THUS the object of activity IS TWOFOLD: > First, in its INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE as SUBORDINATING TO ITSELF and > transforming the activity of the subject [The question arises if this > subordinating is the object's *motive* - LP] > AND > Second, as an IMAGE OF the object, as a product OF its property of > psychological reflection THAT IS realized AS AN ACTIVITY OF THE SUBJECT, > and cannot exist OTHERWISE." > > This paragraph which Kaptelian offers as a *specimen* of a particular and > unique *species* of expression seems to present a clear *case* to hold up > to Vygotsky's *species* . > I would add that Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative *species* that is also > looking at objects of activity from another *angle* of vision. > > Are Vygotsky, Leontiev, and Merleau-Ponty all gesturing at the same > phenomena and walking around this *object* [imagined? or real?] from > various vantage points. > > I will pause by returning to the second quality of the TWOFOLD quality of > the *object of activity* > > "SECOND as an IMAGE OF the object, AS a product OF its PSYCHOLOGICAL > REFLECTION that is REALIZED [brought into form -LP] AS an activity OF the > SUBJECT and cannot exist OTHERWISE. > > Is this a new *species*?? > > Larry > > > On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 4:55 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Mike, what I got out of Seth's intervention was just a plea for people to >> stop claiming to have the "real Vygotsky" and I thoroughly agreed with him. >> And so far as I know Marx uses the German word for Activity, viz., >> Taetigkeit, in "Theses on Feuerbach" - that word which pre-dates >> "behaviour" and "consciousness" by centuries, but which is sometimes >> referred to nowadays as a unity of these two abstractions, and it was only >> later interpreters that introduced the term "praxis", which being Greek >> sounds a lot cleverer. Action and Activity, in my view and etymologically, >> are both thinking and behaving. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> mike cole wrote: >> >>> Thanks, David. I think i understand better what you mean by "LSV rejects >>> "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior,and most >>> certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Somehow I was expecting >>> text >>> from LSV where he says "activity is not a unit of analysis" because of all >>> the places in his text where he uses the term activity as a sort of "lay >>> term". >>> >>> ... >>> >>> >>>> Holbrook Mahn. >>>> Holbrook began by saying that: >>>> >>>> a) We do not "borrow" concepts made for one discipline and "apply" >>>> them to another. Not even dialectical materialism can be "applied" to >>>> psychology (or even sociology or economics--Marx didn't do applied >>>> philosophy!). Holbrook then produced a number of quotations from The >>>> Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology to show that Vygotsky >>>> knew this, and countered with other quotations from Problems of the >>>> Development of the Mind to show that Leontiev did not know this. >>>> >>>> I know places where LSV is clear on this score, in Historical meaning, >>>> >>>> >>> for example, but not the evidence of Leontiev's errors. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> b) The term "praxis" has been thus borrowed. It doesn't refer to >>>> practical activity: it refers to a unity of thinking and practice. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> Borrowed from Marx by ..??? by Leontiev? There is any form of practical >>> activity without human thinking? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> c) The term "social situation of development" has been thus borrowed; >>>> it does not refer to a "context" but to the child's relationship to >>>> the environment. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> By whom? I am always in a puzzle about the use of this term. Isn't >>> perezhivanie the term that LSV uses to talk about relation of child to >>> environment? At least, there seems to be a lot of chatter about issue. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> d) The term "unit of analysis" does not refer to a God particle that >>>> is indifferent to the problem of analysis. ygotsky did not imagine a >>>> "unit of analysis" that fit any and all problems in psychology. Each >>>> unit of analysis is specific to a particular problem of unity (e.g. >>>> the problem of the unity of the child and his or her environment in >>>> Problem of the Environment and the problem of the unity of verbal >>>> thinking in Thinking and Speech). >>>> >>>> Amen to that. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> e) The term "verbal thinking" is a mistranslation: Vygotsky is talking >>>> about thinking by language, or thinking through word meanings, and not >>>> some kind of verbalizable inner speech (which does exist, but which is >>>> a distinct layer from thinking). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> There is a lot of confusion around this issue and would probably need >>> somewhat separate discussion. I interpret in the former way. The role of >>> meaning in inner speech, and the usefulness or not of the sense/meaning >>> distinction has me confused. Dima Leontiev has put the distinction behind >>> him and now refers to "cultural meaning" (paleo meaning >>> >>> ) and >>> "personal meaning (paleo sense)." I am paleo in this regard. >>> >>> >>> >>>> Most of this has been said before, not least by Vygotsky himself. I >>>> know that Holbrook has been saying it at least since 2007 when I first >>>> heard him at the American Association for Applied Linguistics in Costa >>>> Mesa, and he develops it at some length in: >>>> >>>> >>>> https://www.academia.edu/1803017/Vygotskys_Analysis_of_ >>>> Childrens_Meaning-Making_Processes >>>> >>>> Mahn, H. (2012). Vygotsky's Analysis of Children's Meaning-Making >>>> Processes, International Journal of Educational Psychology1(2):100-126 >>>> >>>> It's been said by others too: Mike Cole actually makes many of the >>>> same points in discussing how the Kharkov school deviated from the >>>> work of Vygotsk, >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> I did not know enough to make many of these points in 1978! They >>> certainly >>> distanced themselves from LSV and PI Zinchenko went after the >>> natural-cultural memory distinction, >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> and J.V. Wertsch is quite explicit in his revisionism >>>> when he presents "mediated activity" as a unit of analysis in >>>> opposition to "word meaning". >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> mediated ACTION and often as not, mediated action in context. >>> >>> >>> >>>> But of course since a unit of analysis >>>> must preserve in some shape or form the essential properties of the >>>> whole, the use of "mediated activity" >>>> (action) >>>> cannot be a unit of analysis for >>>> the mind if we wish to retain the idea that the mind has a semantic >>>> structure (that is, if the "whole" is structured something like a text >>>> or a discourse rather than like driving a car, shooting a gun, or >>>> hunting animals). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> When we get to semantic structure of consciousness, we know there was a >>> break between LSV and his buddies. It seems that it is in arriving at this >>> formulation that the charges of idealism and sign-o-centrism kick in. >>> >>> My difficulty is in making arguments about consciousness- -in-general, >>> perhaps a relic of my behaviorist past. Luria appears to have come around >>> on this issue. I have had a difficult time understanding the changes in >>> Leontiev's thought over the period of the 30's and 40's. >>> >>> >>> >>>> Now, in the discussion of Holbrook's presentation, this wild-haired >>>> guy who looked a little like Itzhak Perlman rose to argue that >>>> Leontiev's interpretation was really one fair interpretation, and that >>>> it really was addressed towards a specific problem, which is how to >>>> prevent dualism from arising (that is, how to explain how word meaning >>>> could arise historically).Through joint mediated activity? >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> He also said that Holbrook was juxtaposing >>>> quotations out of context: the quotes that showed Vygotsky arguing >>>> against a "Marxist psychology" were directed against a very specific >>>> group of vulgar Marxists (e.g. Zalkind) and that is why Vygotsky uses >>>> scare quotes around "Marxist". >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> Not so? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> I then muddied the waters, first by addressing the wild-haired guy >>>> instead of Holbrook (a major breach of protocol) and then by arguing >>>> that speech really is sui generis, because it is a form of "activity" >>>> (if we must call it that) whose conditions of comprehension are no >>>> longer recoverable from the activity itself (and so the unit of >>>> analysis for verbal thinking cannot be sought in activity). There >>>> wasn't enough time to really develop what I wanted to say, so I went >>>> over to continue the discussion, and it turned out that the wild >>>> haired guy was none other than Seth Chaiklin, who is, we all know, one >>>> of the foremost paleo-Vygotskyans when it comes to the much >>>> misinterpreted concept of the ZPD. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> Speech is a form of activity or a means of activity? Or of action? >>> >>> I guess I do not understand. If its worthwhile, perhaps spell the idea >>> out >>> here? >>> >>> So far as I can tell, there are ONLY misinterpretations of the Zoped. Seth >>> was right on about it being used in Anglo-American discourse as something >>> akin to zone of proximal learning,fitting into the associationist view of >>> development as more learning. But the one right interpretation has escaped >>> my notice. >>> >>> Thanks again for taking the trouble to write that out. Perhaps it will be >>> generative for people. >>> mike >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> PS: Holbrook DID get one thing wrong. Stalin did not argue that >>>> language was purely ideal and superstructural; that was Marr's >>>> position. Stalin, or whoever ghost wrote his articles, argued that >>>> language was base, and therefore somehow material, whatever that >>>> means. But Stalin was not really interested in ideas; he was just out >>>> for Marr's blood. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 6 October 2014 22:21, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Hi David-- >>>>> >>>>> The specific example of your comments on originals and adaptations hits >>>>> >>>>> >>>> on >>>> >>>> >>>>> a point it would be helpful to hear more about: >>>>> >>>>> You wrote: >>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat >>>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging >>>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which actually >>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, >>>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's >>>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need >>>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument >>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants >>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no >>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts (and >>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least >>>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of >>>>> thinking that has become extinct). >>>>> >>>>> 1. Could you guide us to a text you recommend where this >>>>> interpretation >>>>> is laid out? >>>>> 2. What sort of revision was Seth suggesting and why? >>>>> >>>>> I have been reading Russian discussions around this issue. Clarification >>>>> would be helpful. >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:37 AM, David Kellogg >>>>> >>>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own bed and >>>>>> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: >>>>>> >>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ >>>>>> >>>>>> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, played, as >>>>>> Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) Stradivarius >>>>>> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very first time >>>>>> in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma has >>>>>> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has been >>>>>> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal interpretation. >>>>>> >>>>>> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if Mendelssohn >>>>>> himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, >>>>>> Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had occupied, >>>>>> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to >>>>>> Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period >>>>>> instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and starts >>>>>> to play. >>>>>> >>>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat >>>>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging >>>>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which actually >>>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, >>>>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's >>>>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need >>>>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument >>>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants >>>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no >>>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts (and >>>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least >>>>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of >>>>>> thinking that has become extinct). >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>> >>>>>> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in Sydney was >>>>>> not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I would have >>>>>> liked it better if she had used those terms a little more imprecisely, >>>>>> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might have >>>>>> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was >>>>>> contemplating. >>>>>> >>>>>> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a world >>>>>> without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are >>>>>> replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather >>>>>> dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she called the >>>>>> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also human >>>>>> identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the conference >>>>>> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time for the >>>>>> spiritual side of life. >>>>>> >>>>>> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the "object" of >>>>>> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working class is >>>>>> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex workers >>>>>> and atomized into the social position of housewives. Inequality is now >>>>>> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history tells >>>>>> us that the result of this is not going to be individual spirituality >>>>>> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if that >>>>>> force is organized, social, and directed against social equality >>>>>> rather than against fellow members of the working class. >>>>>> >>>>>> dk >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 5 October 2014 13:38, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie Nardi I >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> had >>>> >>>> >>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if she has >>>>>>> written something on "object" that is very good news. >>>>>>> I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't think one >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> good >>>> >>>> >>>>> book >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long while I >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> have >>>> >>>> >>>>> been >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie" >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> without >>>> >>>> >>>>> an >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of "substance" >>>>>>> whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains outstanding >>>>>>> differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that almost all >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> bar >>>> >>>> >>>>> one >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is a step >>>>>>> forward, and people are aware of the differences in interpretation and >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> they >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a while, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> maybe >>>> >>>> >>>>> this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> consistency >>>> >>>> >>>>> in >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> optimistic. >>>> >>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> ------------ >>>> >>>> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. >>>>>>>> I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds that go >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> U >>>> >>>> >>>>> discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a shower of >>>>>>>> interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> (Whatever >>>> >>>> >>>>> object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on basics of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> AT >>>> >>>> >>>>> is >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were a little >>>>>>>> slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also iscar-ers and >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> we >>>> >>>> >>>>> were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. >>>>>>>> Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger on a >>>>>>>> Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and tablets >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> etc., >>>> >>>> >>>>> so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were >>>>>>>> oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My impressions of CHAT research: >>>>>>>> On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp and >>>>>>>> critical in relation to the dominant political forces, and still >>>>>>>> way out in front in understanding the several developmental >>>>>>>> processes which all contribute to our actions (phylogenesis, >>>>>>>> historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, microgenesis), and >>>>>>>> not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great >>>>>>>> community of research, relatively lacking in the competitiveness >>>>>>>> and jealousy which infects most research communities. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On the negative side: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" as some >>>>>>>> homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces problems into >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>> >>>> >>>>> social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., people >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> lack >>>> >>>> >>>>> a >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> viable social theory or the ability to use theory they have >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> to >>>> >>>> >>>>> analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated way. >>>>>>>> * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. Only a >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> small >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> minority know what it means and use the idea in their >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> research. >>>> >>>> >>>>> * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> confusion; >>>> >>>> >>>>> few researchers using the concept are clear on what the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> concept >>>> >>>> >>>>> is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront and >>>>>>>> attempt to >>>>>>>> resolve the methodological differences (I refer to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> systematic >>>> >>>> >>>>> difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) within >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the relatively >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> civil >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> relations between researchers - people prefer to let >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> differences >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> just fester without openly discussing them. The old Soviet >>>>>>>> approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far the other >>>>>>>> way. :) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> ------------ >>>> >>>> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response to >>>>>>>> someone who >>>>>>>> wrote backto xmca instead of me. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an >>>>>>>> interesting and >>>>>>>> unassuming guy. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion?? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> an >>>> >>>> >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Oct 7 17:15:01 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 7 Oct 2014 17:15:01 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> Message-ID: Thanks for all the clarifying, David. I will go back and read the texts you point to. The way you push forward the sense/meaning issue is totally new to me and quite different from what I have been reading in arguments among contemporary Russians, viz: So "smysl" is "tema"; it is something like "realized, actual meaning" while "znachenie" is something like "potential, possible meaning". Tema is what happens when we activate a particular layer in the great palimpsest of possible meanings left in each word by our contemporaries and ancestors. How do we connect this to the notion, from LSV, that znachenie (meaning) is the most stable pole of smysl (sense)? The various translations/interpretations of these terms are really confusing me. Where does tema from and where is it taking us? mike PS-- Any notion of who/where "social situation of development" is reinterpreted as "context."? On Tue, Oct 7, 2014 at 3:12 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Larry, Mike, Huw, Andy-- > > (and above all the real "objects" of broadening and enlivening the > discussion, you by-standers and handwringers, perhaps intimidated by > the pointing and handwaving, and unwilling to contribute lest the > discussion become less sharpened and pointed....) > > There were several issues that seemed to pop up session after session > at ISCAR, quite independently of who raised them. Yes, "the real > Vygotsky" was certainly one of them, and Holbrook was not the only > person to talk this way; I did too, and I do think that a world where > the original Vygotsky is not recoverable is just as bad as a world > where Vygotsky is completely forgotten. But in the context of ISCAR, > the "real Vygotsky" was often a response to many speakers who would > like to emphasize the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky. > > There were two ways of doing this. One was to simply say that of > course Vygotsky was a Marxist, but then everybody was Marxist back > then, and it was not much more important than being a liberal Democrat > today. Interestingly, in the Making of Mind, Luria said that this is a > description which could well apply to many psychologists of his time, > including himself, but not to Vygotsky. A more sophisticated way of > emphasizing the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky requires a "real > Vygotsky" of a different kind. Writers like our good friend Nikolai > Veresov have tried to do this by emphasizing the PRE-Marxist Vygotsky, > especially Vygotsky the phenomenologist, student of Gustav Shpet who > was a student of Husserl himself. > > I was formerly little puzzled by this move. Seth argued that it was > valid, because of Vygotsky's ties to Lewin and Lewin's ideas about the > force of objects and the fields of attractors created thereby. Lewin > was certainly an attractor for Vygotsky, but Vygotsky actually uses > Lewin to criticize phenomenological analysis in Chapter Three of HDHMF > (see Vol. 4, p. 69). Elsewhere, Vygotsky is very critical of the > founders of phenomenology, iincluding Husserl (p. 7). > > But now I think that Larry (and Martin, who has raised the same > connection) is on to something. For it is also in HDHMF that Vygotsky > bruits the idea that attention is a kind of gateway function, that the > indicative is the primordial function of speech and thinking, and that > there is nevertheless a qualitative difference between noticing > something and internalizing it as a meaning--all of these are > Husserlian ideas. Even the knotted handkerchief, which I myself have > attributed to Vygotsky and to a peculiarly Russian practice, comes > from the work of Husserl (Logical Investigations, Vol. I, pp. > 269-333). I think that as a real historical materialist Vygotsky > rejected Husserl's absolute opposition between symbol and index, but > he didn't forget it when he set about trying to build a bridge between > the two. > > Mike wonders about a text where Vygotsky rejects "activity" as a unit > of analysis for everything but behavior. No such text exists, of > course; if you read what I wrote carefully (I know, it's a trial > sometimes, but at least I am a larger target then the minimalist Huw) > you will see that I refer to a my OWN rejection, not Vygotsky's. What > Vygotsky says in "Problem of the Environment" is that he wants to > introduce "a number of different" units of analysis which are used in > pedological analyses, of which "perezhivanie" is one, and > "sense/signification" a very different one. (Andy is wrong to impute > importance to the count noun form here; Vygotsky often uses it as a > verb, I "live experience" something). I have always assumed that this > means: > > a) Perezhivanie is quite specific to the problem Vygotsky raises in > this lecture, which is how three different children can respond so > differently to the one and the same form of child abuse. > > b) "Sense/signification" is also a unit of analysis, what Vygotsky > refers to in Thinking and Speech as "the meaningful word". (This was > also the object of textological attention in Holbrook's presentation). > > Mike also wonders about where Leontiev raises the possibility of > applying Marxist theory directly to psychology. In many places, but > perhaps most prominently in Problems of the Development of Mind (see > pp. 236-237, 255). Holbrook had other quotations of this type, and I > think there is a link between them and what Luria's remark that back > then everybody in psychology was a "Marxist", but nobody except > Vygotsky was much of a Marxist. Holbrook is right here. > > Mike asks if there is practical activity without thinking. I think > that Vygotsky would say that there is thinking and there is verbal > thinking (or, as Holbrook now insists, "thinking with words"). What > monkeys do with sticks is called practical intelligence in Chapter > Four of Thinking and Speech. It is practical activity, and it's > thinking. But it's not a unit of thinking and speech, and therefore I > think there is some light between what Vygotsky is willing to call > "activity" and "praxis"; it's not the case that "praxis" is just a > Greek word for "activity". I recognize, though, that for Andy what > monkeys do with sticks does not count as activity (and I also > recognize that I was muddling "activity" and "action"--sorry about > that). > > Like Mike, I am paleo with regard to sense and meaning, and like Mike > I recognize that it is hard to tell how deep the waters are here since > they have been muddied. I think they were first muddied by Vygotsky > himself, because he refers the distinction to Paulhan, where no such > distinction is found (Paulhan just talks about connotation and > denotation). But I think it's easy to unmuddy the waters and I think > they are very deep indeed: Vygotsky uses Paulhan as a foil, taking the > actual distinction from Volosinov, who was working at the Herzen > Institute at exactly the same moment that Vygotsky was writing of this > distinction. Zavershneva has said that Vygotsky cites Volosinov in his > unpublished manuscripts, but that the citation is always removed by > the editor in publication. So "smysl" is "tema"; it is something like > "realized, actual meaning" while "znachenie" is something like > "potential, possible meaning". Tema is what happens when we activate a > particular layer in the great palimpsest of possible meanings left in > each word by our contemporaries and ancestors. > > I'm currently writing the endnotes for our new volume of Vygotsky's > lectures on pedology, so I am very aware of the issue that Huw appears > to be raising (although Huw is so very gnomic in his lofty remarks on > my supposed illogicality and my more systemic problems that it is hard > to be sure). In Lecture Six, Vygotsky says in one paragraph that > dividing off psychological from physiological development is > methodologically impermissable, but in the very next paragraph, and > indeed in the layout of the book, he says "dismemberment is > nevertheless necessary". On the one hand, he says that there is no > action, no motility, not even thinking without both the mind and the > brain, and on the other he says that even within the body there are > distinct lines of development and that physiology is "a summarizable > concept". He is acutely aware of the contradiction, but by the end of > the lecture he resolves it. We just have to keep in mind that things > that we take apart for the purpose of analysis are inextricably joined > in clinical practice. I suppose you can say it is a logical > contradiction if you want, particularly if by that you mean it is a > contradiction that only exists in the ideal world, that is, in logic > and does not really pose a problem in life. > > The problem is with the word "text" is the same, Huw. For Hallidayans > like me, a text is precisely a semantic object; it's not made of paper > and ink. Viewed interpersonally, a text is a coherent and cohesive > exchange. Viewed intra-mentally, it's a representation of thinking. It > is objective, but it's objective the way that mathematics and language > itself is objective, not the way that three actual apples or a > physical book is objective. Dixit. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > (PS: I'm afraid I didn't get the systemic reproach at all. It's hard > for a fish to see the density of water, much less to see the density > of the fish!) > > dk > > > > On 7 October 2014 23:11, Larry Purss wrote: > > The understanding of action and activity AS BOTH thinking and behaviour > > contrasting with an appeal to differentiate the aspects thinking and > > behaviour. > > The notion *species* was introduced by David K as returning to Vygotsky's > > words as he used them [paleo return] or we will loose this species as it > > becomes extinct. > > > > Therefore Leontiev's theory could also be considered a separate *species* > > with its own characteristics, features, and object of activity. > > SO in my return to the species of Activity theory I turned to one of > > Leontiev's students [Victor Kaptelinin] in his 2005 MCA article "The > Object > > of Activity: Making sense of the Sense Maker" > > > > Kaptelinin opens his article with this fragment from the *species* of > > Leontiev's own specified object of activity [activity theory] > > > > "A basic or, as is sometimes said, a CONSTITUTING characteristic of > > activity is its objectivity or, rather object relatedness. Properly the > > CONCEPT of its object, gegenstand, is already IMPLICITLY contained in the > > very concept of activity. The expression objectless activity is DEVOID of > > any meaning. Objectivity may SEEM objectless, but SCIENTIFIC > investigations > > OF activity NECESSARILY REQUIRES discovering its object. > > THUS the object of activity IS TWOFOLD: > > First, in its INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE as SUBORDINATING TO ITSELF and > > transforming the activity of the subject [The question arises if this > > subordinating is the object's *motive* - LP] > > AND > > Second, as an IMAGE OF the object, as a product OF its property of > > psychological reflection THAT IS realized AS AN ACTIVITY OF THE SUBJECT, > > and cannot exist OTHERWISE." > > > > This paragraph which Kaptelian offers as a *specimen* of a particular and > > unique *species* of expression seems to present a clear *case* to hold up > > to Vygotsky's *species* . > > I would add that Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative *species* that is > also > > looking at objects of activity from another *angle* of vision. > > > > Are Vygotsky, Leontiev, and Merleau-Ponty all gesturing at the same > > phenomena and walking around this *object* [imagined? or real?] from > > various vantage points. > > > > I will pause by returning to the second quality of the TWOFOLD quality of > > the *object of activity* > > > > "SECOND as an IMAGE OF the object, AS a product OF its PSYCHOLOGICAL > > REFLECTION that is REALIZED [brought into form -LP] AS an activity OF the > > SUBJECT and cannot exist OTHERWISE. > > > > Is this a new *species*?? > > > > Larry > > > > > > On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 4:55 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >> Mike, what I got out of Seth's intervention was just a plea for people > to > >> stop claiming to have the "real Vygotsky" and I thoroughly agreed with > him. > >> And so far as I know Marx uses the German word for Activity, viz., > >> Taetigkeit, in "Theses on Feuerbach" - that word which pre-dates > >> "behaviour" and "consciousness" by centuries, but which is sometimes > >> referred to nowadays as a unity of these two abstractions, and it was > only > >> later interpreters that introduced the term "praxis", which being Greek > >> sounds a lot cleverer. Action and Activity, in my view and > etymologically, > >> are both thinking and behaving. > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> mike cole wrote: > >> > >>> Thanks, David. I think i understand better what you mean by "LSV > rejects > >>> "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior,and most > >>> certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Somehow I was expecting > >>> text > >>> from LSV where he says "activity is not a unit of analysis" because of > all > >>> the places in his text where he uses the term activity as a sort of > "lay > >>> term". > >>> > >>> ... > >>> > >>> > >>>> Holbrook Mahn. > >>>> Holbrook began by saying that: > >>>> > >>>> a) We do not "borrow" concepts made for one discipline and "apply" > >>>> them to another. Not even dialectical materialism can be "applied" to > >>>> psychology (or even sociology or economics--Marx didn't do applied > >>>> philosophy!). Holbrook then produced a number of quotations from The > >>>> Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology to show that Vygotsky > >>>> knew this, and countered with other quotations from Problems of the > >>>> Development of the Mind to show that Leontiev did not know this. > >>>> > >>>> I know places where LSV is clear on this score, in Historical meaning, > >>>> > >>>> > >>> for example, but not the evidence of Leontiev's errors. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> b) The term "praxis" has been thus borrowed. It doesn't refer to > >>>> practical activity: it refers to a unity of thinking and practice. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> Borrowed from Marx by ..??? by Leontiev? There is any form of practical > >>> activity without human thinking? > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> c) The term "social situation of development" has been thus borrowed; > >>>> it does not refer to a "context" but to the child's relationship to > >>>> the environment. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> By whom? I am always in a puzzle about the use of this term. Isn't > >>> perezhivanie the term that LSV uses to talk about relation of child to > >>> environment? At least, there seems to be a lot of chatter about issue. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> d) The term "unit of analysis" does not refer to a God particle that > >>>> is indifferent to the problem of analysis. ygotsky did not imagine a > >>>> "unit of analysis" that fit any and all problems in psychology. Each > >>>> unit of analysis is specific to a particular problem of unity (e.g. > >>>> the problem of the unity of the child and his or her environment in > >>>> Problem of the Environment and the problem of the unity of verbal > >>>> thinking in Thinking and Speech). > >>>> > >>>> Amen to that. > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> e) The term "verbal thinking" is a mistranslation: Vygotsky is talking > >>>> about thinking by language, or thinking through word meanings, and not > >>>> some kind of verbalizable inner speech (which does exist, but which is > >>>> a distinct layer from thinking). > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> There is a lot of confusion around this issue and would probably need > >>> somewhat separate discussion. I interpret in the former way. The role > of > >>> meaning in inner speech, and the usefulness or not of the sense/meaning > >>> distinction has me confused. Dima Leontiev has put the distinction > behind > >>> him and now refers to "cultural meaning" (paleo meaning > >>> > >>> ) and > >>> "personal meaning (paleo sense)." I am paleo in this regard. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> Most of this has been said before, not least by Vygotsky himself. I > >>>> know that Holbrook has been saying it at least since 2007 when I first > >>>> heard him at the American Association for Applied Linguistics in Costa > >>>> Mesa, and he develops it at some length in: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> https://www.academia.edu/1803017/Vygotskys_Analysis_of_ > >>>> Childrens_Meaning-Making_Processes > >>>> > >>>> Mahn, H. (2012). Vygotsky's Analysis of Children's Meaning-Making > >>>> Processes, International Journal of Educational Psychology1(2):100-126 > >>>> > >>>> It's been said by others too: Mike Cole actually makes many of the > >>>> same points in discussing how the Kharkov school deviated from the > >>>> work of Vygotsk, > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> I did not know enough to make many of these points in 1978! They > >>> certainly > >>> distanced themselves from LSV and PI Zinchenko went after the > >>> natural-cultural memory distinction, > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> and J.V. Wertsch is quite explicit in his revisionism > >>>> when he presents "mediated activity" as a unit of analysis in > >>>> opposition to "word meaning". > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> mediated ACTION and often as not, mediated action in context. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> But of course since a unit of analysis > >>>> must preserve in some shape or form the essential properties of the > >>>> whole, the use of "mediated activity" > >>>> (action) > >>>> cannot be a unit of analysis for > >>>> the mind if we wish to retain the idea that the mind has a semantic > >>>> structure (that is, if the "whole" is structured something like a text > >>>> or a discourse rather than like driving a car, shooting a gun, or > >>>> hunting animals). > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> When we get to semantic structure of consciousness, we know there was a > >>> break between LSV and his buddies. It seems that it is in arriving at > this > >>> formulation that the charges of idealism and sign-o-centrism kick in. > >>> > >>> My difficulty is in making arguments about consciousness- -in-general, > >>> perhaps a relic of my behaviorist past. Luria appears to have come > around > >>> on this issue. I have had a difficult time understanding the changes in > >>> Leontiev's thought over the period of the 30's and 40's. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> Now, in the discussion of Holbrook's presentation, this wild-haired > >>>> guy who looked a little like Itzhak Perlman rose to argue that > >>>> Leontiev's interpretation was really one fair interpretation, and that > >>>> it really was addressed towards a specific problem, which is how to > >>>> prevent dualism from arising (that is, how to explain how word meaning > >>>> could arise historically).Through joint mediated activity? > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> He also said that Holbrook was juxtaposing > >>>> quotations out of context: the quotes that showed Vygotsky arguing > >>>> against a "Marxist psychology" were directed against a very specific > >>>> group of vulgar Marxists (e.g. Zalkind) and that is why Vygotsky uses > >>>> scare quotes around "Marxist". > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> Not so? > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> I then muddied the waters, first by addressing the wild-haired guy > >>>> instead of Holbrook (a major breach of protocol) and then by arguing > >>>> that speech really is sui generis, because it is a form of "activity" > >>>> (if we must call it that) whose conditions of comprehension are no > >>>> longer recoverable from the activity itself (and so the unit of > >>>> analysis for verbal thinking cannot be sought in activity). There > >>>> wasn't enough time to really develop what I wanted to say, so I went > >>>> over to continue the discussion, and it turned out that the wild > >>>> haired guy was none other than Seth Chaiklin, who is, we all know, one > >>>> of the foremost paleo-Vygotskyans when it comes to the much > >>>> misinterpreted concept of the ZPD. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> Speech is a form of activity or a means of activity? Or of action? > >>> > >>> I guess I do not understand. If its worthwhile, perhaps spell the idea > >>> out > >>> here? > >>> > >>> So far as I can tell, there are ONLY misinterpretations of the Zoped. > Seth > >>> was right on about it being used in Anglo-American discourse as > something > >>> akin to zone of proximal learning,fitting into the associationist view > of > >>> development as more learning. But the one right interpretation has > escaped > >>> my notice. > >>> > >>> Thanks again for taking the trouble to write that out. Perhaps it will > be > >>> generative for people. > >>> mike > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> David Kellogg > >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>> > >>>> PS: Holbrook DID get one thing wrong. Stalin did not argue that > >>>> language was purely ideal and superstructural; that was Marr's > >>>> position. Stalin, or whoever ghost wrote his articles, argued that > >>>> language was base, and therefore somehow material, whatever that > >>>> means. But Stalin was not really interested in ideas; he was just out > >>>> for Marr's blood. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On 6 October 2014 22:21, mike cole wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Hi David-- > >>>>> > >>>>> The specific example of your comments on originals and adaptations > hits > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> on > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> a point it would be helpful to hear more about: > >>>>> > >>>>> You wrote: > >>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat > >>>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging > >>>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which > actually > >>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, > >>>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's > >>>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need > >>>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument > >>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants > >>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no > >>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts > (and > >>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least > >>>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of > >>>>> thinking that has become extinct). > >>>>> > >>>>> 1. Could you guide us to a text you recommend where this > >>>>> interpretation > >>>>> is laid out? > >>>>> 2. What sort of revision was Seth suggesting and why? > >>>>> > >>>>> I have been reading Russian discussions around this issue. > Clarification > >>>>> would be helpful. > >>>>> mike > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:37 AM, David Kellogg > > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own bed and > >>>>>> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, played, as > >>>>>> Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) > Stradivarius > >>>>>> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very first time > >>>>>> in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma > has > >>>>>> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has > been > >>>>>> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal > interpretation. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if Mendelssohn > >>>>>> himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, > >>>>>> Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had > occupied, > >>>>>> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to > >>>>>> Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period > >>>>>> instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and starts > >>>>>> to play. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat > >>>>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging > >>>>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which > actually > >>>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, > >>>>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's > >>>>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need > >>>>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an > argument > >>>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account > supplants > >>>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is > no > >>>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts > (and > >>>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least > >>>>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of > >>>>>> thinking that has become extinct). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>> > >>>>>> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in Sydney was > >>>>>> not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I would have > >>>>>> liked it better if she had used those terms a little more > imprecisely, > >>>>>> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might > have > >>>>>> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was > >>>>>> contemplating. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a world > >>>>>> without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are > >>>>>> replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather > >>>>>> dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she called > the > >>>>>> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also human > >>>>>> identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the > conference > >>>>>> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time for > the > >>>>>> spiritual side of life. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the "object" > of > >>>>>> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working class > is > >>>>>> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex > workers > >>>>>> and atomized into the social position of housewives. Inequality is > now > >>>>>> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history tells > >>>>>> us that the result of this is not going to be individual > spirituality > >>>>>> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if > that > >>>>>> force is organized, social, and directed against social equality > >>>>>> rather than against fellow members of the working class. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> dk > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 5 October 2014 13:38, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie Nardi > I > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> had > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> the > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if she > has > >>>>>>> written something on "object" that is very good news. > >>>>>>> I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't think one > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> good > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> book > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long while I > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> have > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> been > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie" > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> without > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> an > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of > "substance" > >>>>>>> whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains > outstanding > >>>>>>> differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that almost all > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> bar > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> one > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is a > step > >>>>>>> forward, and people are aware of the differences in interpretation > and > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> they > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a while, > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> maybe > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> consistency > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> in > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> optimistic. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> ------------ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. > >>>>>>>> I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds that > go > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> U > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a shower of > >>>>>>>> interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> (Whatever > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on basics of > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> AT > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> is > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Mike > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were a > little > >>>>>>>> slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also iscar-ers > and > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> we > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. > >>>>>>>> Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger on a > >>>>>>>> Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and tablets > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> etc., > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were > >>>>>>>> oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> My impressions of CHAT research: > >>>>>>>> On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp and > >>>>>>>> critical in relation to the dominant political forces, and > still > >>>>>>>> way out in front in understanding the several developmental > >>>>>>>> processes which all contribute to our actions (phylogenesis, > >>>>>>>> historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, microgenesis), > and > >>>>>>>> not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great > >>>>>>>> community of research, relatively lacking in the > competitiveness > >>>>>>>> and jealousy which infects most research communities. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On the negative side: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" as > some > >>>>>>>> homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces problems > into > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> the > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., people > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> lack > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> a > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> viable social theory or the ability to use theory they > have > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> to > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated way. > >>>>>>>> * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. > Only a > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> small > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> minority know what it means and use the idea in their > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> research. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> confusion; > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> few researchers using the concept are clear on what the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> concept > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront and > >>>>>>>> attempt to > >>>>>>>> resolve the methodological differences (I refer to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> systematic > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) within > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the relatively > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> civil > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> relations between researchers - people prefer to let > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> differences > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> just fester without openly discussing them. The old Soviet > >>>>>>>> approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far the > other > >>>>>>>> way. :) > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> ------------ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response to > >>>>>>>> someone who > >>>>>>>> wrote backto xmca instead of me. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an > >>>>>>>> interesting and > >>>>>>>> unassuming guy. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca > discussion?? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> an > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Oct 7 18:29:38 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2014 02:29:38 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> Message-ID: Both elegant and wry: a pleasure to read, David. It is sometimes impressive that the more one works upon a written text, the more the text itself comes to guide the work. The clarity of each move can be reflected in the text until it is the text itself which achieves a certain guiding clarity. The little conscious moves are in response to this background, but the background is composed of these little moves. If there is anything "deep" about my gnomic comments, then I attribute it to such guidance. I think more would be less. If we take meaning as synonymous with the "texture" of things and do not impose any orderliness upon it other than the form manifest in attending to it (grasping, weighing, sensing), as I understand you to be indicating, then we can apply the following substitution to your earlier assertion: "... since a unit of analysis must preserve in some shape or form the essential properties of the whole, the use of "mediated activity" cannot be a unit of analysis for the mind if we wish to retain the idea that the mind has a text(ure)". or "mediated activity does not preserve the text(ure)". This is false because the manipulation of devices to accomplish some transformation reveals the consequences of the manipulations by which such texture is built up. The texture is manifest in the changes that show up in the mediated activity. Best, Huw On 7 October 2014 23:12, David Kellogg wrote: > Larry, Mike, Huw, Andy-- > > (and above all the real "objects" of broadening and enlivening the > discussion, you by-standers and handwringers, perhaps intimidated by > the pointing and handwaving, and unwilling to contribute lest the > discussion become less sharpened and pointed....) > > There were several issues that seemed to pop up session after session > at ISCAR, quite independently of who raised them. Yes, "the real > Vygotsky" was certainly one of them, and Holbrook was not the only > person to talk this way; I did too, and I do think that a world where > the original Vygotsky is not recoverable is just as bad as a world > where Vygotsky is completely forgotten. But in the context of ISCAR, > the "real Vygotsky" was often a response to many speakers who would > like to emphasize the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky. > > There were two ways of doing this. One was to simply say that of > course Vygotsky was a Marxist, but then everybody was Marxist back > then, and it was not much more important than being a liberal Democrat > today. Interestingly, in the Making of Mind, Luria said that this is a > description which could well apply to many psychologists of his time, > including himself, but not to Vygotsky. A more sophisticated way of > emphasizing the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky requires a "real > Vygotsky" of a different kind. Writers like our good friend Nikolai > Veresov have tried to do this by emphasizing the PRE-Marxist Vygotsky, > especially Vygotsky the phenomenologist, student of Gustav Shpet who > was a student of Husserl himself. > > I was formerly little puzzled by this move. Seth argued that it was > valid, because of Vygotsky's ties to Lewin and Lewin's ideas about the > force of objects and the fields of attractors created thereby. Lewin > was certainly an attractor for Vygotsky, but Vygotsky actually uses > Lewin to criticize phenomenological analysis in Chapter Three of HDHMF > (see Vol. 4, p. 69). Elsewhere, Vygotsky is very critical of the > founders of phenomenology, iincluding Husserl (p. 7). > > But now I think that Larry (and Martin, who has raised the same > connection) is on to something. For it is also in HDHMF that Vygotsky > bruits the idea that attention is a kind of gateway function, that the > indicative is the primordial function of speech and thinking, and that > there is nevertheless a qualitative difference between noticing > something and internalizing it as a meaning--all of these are > Husserlian ideas. Even the knotted handkerchief, which I myself have > attributed to Vygotsky and to a peculiarly Russian practice, comes > from the work of Husserl (Logical Investigations, Vol. I, pp. > 269-333). I think that as a real historical materialist Vygotsky > rejected Husserl's absolute opposition between symbol and index, but > he didn't forget it when he set about trying to build a bridge between > the two. > > Mike wonders about a text where Vygotsky rejects "activity" as a unit > of analysis for everything but behavior. No such text exists, of > course; if you read what I wrote carefully (I know, it's a trial > sometimes, but at least I am a larger target then the minimalist Huw) > you will see that I refer to a my OWN rejection, not Vygotsky's. What > Vygotsky says in "Problem of the Environment" is that he wants to > introduce "a number of different" units of analysis which are used in > pedological analyses, of which "perezhivanie" is one, and > "sense/signification" a very different one. (Andy is wrong to impute > importance to the count noun form here; Vygotsky often uses it as a > verb, I "live experience" something). I have always assumed that this > means: > > a) Perezhivanie is quite specific to the problem Vygotsky raises in > this lecture, which is how three different children can respond so > differently to the one and the same form of child abuse. > > b) "Sense/signification" is also a unit of analysis, what Vygotsky > refers to in Thinking and Speech as "the meaningful word". (This was > also the object of textological attention in Holbrook's presentation). > > Mike also wonders about where Leontiev raises the possibility of > applying Marxist theory directly to psychology. In many places, but > perhaps most prominently in Problems of the Development of Mind (see > pp. 236-237, 255). Holbrook had other quotations of this type, and I > think there is a link between them and what Luria's remark that back > then everybody in psychology was a "Marxist", but nobody except > Vygotsky was much of a Marxist. Holbrook is right here. > > Mike asks if there is practical activity without thinking. I think > that Vygotsky would say that there is thinking and there is verbal > thinking (or, as Holbrook now insists, "thinking with words"). What > monkeys do with sticks is called practical intelligence in Chapter > Four of Thinking and Speech. It is practical activity, and it's > thinking. But it's not a unit of thinking and speech, and therefore I > think there is some light between what Vygotsky is willing to call > "activity" and "praxis"; it's not the case that "praxis" is just a > Greek word for "activity". I recognize, though, that for Andy what > monkeys do with sticks does not count as activity (and I also > recognize that I was muddling "activity" and "action"--sorry about > that). > > Like Mike, I am paleo with regard to sense and meaning, and like Mike > I recognize that it is hard to tell how deep the waters are here since > they have been muddied. I think they were first muddied by Vygotsky > himself, because he refers the distinction to Paulhan, where no such > distinction is found (Paulhan just talks about connotation and > denotation). But I think it's easy to unmuddy the waters and I think > they are very deep indeed: Vygotsky uses Paulhan as a foil, taking the > actual distinction from Volosinov, who was working at the Herzen > Institute at exactly the same moment that Vygotsky was writing of this > distinction. Zavershneva has said that Vygotsky cites Volosinov in his > unpublished manuscripts, but that the citation is always removed by > the editor in publication. So "smysl" is "tema"; it is something like > "realized, actual meaning" while "znachenie" is something like > "potential, possible meaning". Tema is what happens when we activate a > particular layer in the great palimpsest of possible meanings left in > each word by our contemporaries and ancestors. > > I'm currently writing the endnotes for our new volume of Vygotsky's > lectures on pedology, so I am very aware of the issue that Huw appears > to be raising (although Huw is so very gnomic in his lofty remarks on > my supposed illogicality and my more systemic problems that it is hard > to be sure). In Lecture Six, Vygotsky says in one paragraph that > dividing off psychological from physiological development is > methodologically impermissable, but in the very next paragraph, and > indeed in the layout of the book, he says "dismemberment is > nevertheless necessary". On the one hand, he says that there is no > action, no motility, not even thinking without both the mind and the > brain, and on the other he says that even within the body there are > distinct lines of development and that physiology is "a summarizable > concept". He is acutely aware of the contradiction, but by the end of > the lecture he resolves it. We just have to keep in mind that things > that we take apart for the purpose of analysis are inextricably joined > in clinical practice. I suppose you can say it is a logical > contradiction if you want, particularly if by that you mean it is a > contradiction that only exists in the ideal world, that is, in logic > and does not really pose a problem in life. > > The problem is with the word "text" is the same, Huw. For Hallidayans > like me, a text is precisely a semantic object; it's not made of paper > and ink. Viewed interpersonally, a text is a coherent and cohesive > exchange. Viewed intra-mentally, it's a representation of thinking. It > is objective, but it's objective the way that mathematics and language > itself is objective, not the way that three actual apples or a > physical book is objective. Dixit. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > (PS: I'm afraid I didn't get the systemic reproach at all. It's hard > for a fish to see the density of water, much less to see the density > of the fish!) > > dk > > > > On 7 October 2014 23:11, Larry Purss wrote: > > The understanding of action and activity AS BOTH thinking and behaviour > > contrasting with an appeal to differentiate the aspects thinking and > > behaviour. > > The notion *species* was introduced by David K as returning to Vygotsky's > > words as he used them [paleo return] or we will loose this species as it > > becomes extinct. > > > > Therefore Leontiev's theory could also be considered a separate *species* > > with its own characteristics, features, and object of activity. > > SO in my return to the species of Activity theory I turned to one of > > Leontiev's students [Victor Kaptelinin] in his 2005 MCA article "The > Object > > of Activity: Making sense of the Sense Maker" > > > > Kaptelinin opens his article with this fragment from the *species* of > > Leontiev's own specified object of activity [activity theory] > > > > "A basic or, as is sometimes said, a CONSTITUTING characteristic of > > activity is its objectivity or, rather object relatedness. Properly the > > CONCEPT of its object, gegenstand, is already IMPLICITLY contained in the > > very concept of activity. The expression objectless activity is DEVOID of > > any meaning. Objectivity may SEEM objectless, but SCIENTIFIC > investigations > > OF activity NECESSARILY REQUIRES discovering its object. > > THUS the object of activity IS TWOFOLD: > > First, in its INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE as SUBORDINATING TO ITSELF and > > transforming the activity of the subject [The question arises if this > > subordinating is the object's *motive* - LP] > > AND > > Second, as an IMAGE OF the object, as a product OF its property of > > psychological reflection THAT IS realized AS AN ACTIVITY OF THE SUBJECT, > > and cannot exist OTHERWISE." > > > > This paragraph which Kaptelian offers as a *specimen* of a particular and > > unique *species* of expression seems to present a clear *case* to hold up > > to Vygotsky's *species* . > > I would add that Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative *species* that is > also > > looking at objects of activity from another *angle* of vision. > > > > Are Vygotsky, Leontiev, and Merleau-Ponty all gesturing at the same > > phenomena and walking around this *object* [imagined? or real?] from > > various vantage points. > > > > I will pause by returning to the second quality of the TWOFOLD quality of > > the *object of activity* > > > > "SECOND as an IMAGE OF the object, AS a product OF its PSYCHOLOGICAL > > REFLECTION that is REALIZED [brought into form -LP] AS an activity OF the > > SUBJECT and cannot exist OTHERWISE. > > > > Is this a new *species*?? > > > > Larry > > > > > > On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 4:55 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >> Mike, what I got out of Seth's intervention was just a plea for people > to > >> stop claiming to have the "real Vygotsky" and I thoroughly agreed with > him. > >> And so far as I know Marx uses the German word for Activity, viz., > >> Taetigkeit, in "Theses on Feuerbach" - that word which pre-dates > >> "behaviour" and "consciousness" by centuries, but which is sometimes > >> referred to nowadays as a unity of these two abstractions, and it was > only > >> later interpreters that introduced the term "praxis", which being Greek > >> sounds a lot cleverer. Action and Activity, in my view and > etymologically, > >> are both thinking and behaving. > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> mike cole wrote: > >> > >>> Thanks, David. I think i understand better what you mean by "LSV > rejects > >>> "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior,and most > >>> certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Somehow I was expecting > >>> text > >>> from LSV where he says "activity is not a unit of analysis" because of > all > >>> the places in his text where he uses the term activity as a sort of > "lay > >>> term". > >>> > >>> ... > >>> > >>> > >>>> Holbrook Mahn. > >>>> Holbrook began by saying that: > >>>> > >>>> a) We do not "borrow" concepts made for one discipline and "apply" > >>>> them to another. Not even dialectical materialism can be "applied" to > >>>> psychology (or even sociology or economics--Marx didn't do applied > >>>> philosophy!). Holbrook then produced a number of quotations from The > >>>> Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology to show that Vygotsky > >>>> knew this, and countered with other quotations from Problems of the > >>>> Development of the Mind to show that Leontiev did not know this. > >>>> > >>>> I know places where LSV is clear on this score, in Historical meaning, > >>>> > >>>> > >>> for example, but not the evidence of Leontiev's errors. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> b) The term "praxis" has been thus borrowed. It doesn't refer to > >>>> practical activity: it refers to a unity of thinking and practice. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> Borrowed from Marx by ..??? by Leontiev? There is any form of practical > >>> activity without human thinking? > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> c) The term "social situation of development" has been thus borrowed; > >>>> it does not refer to a "context" but to the child's relationship to > >>>> the environment. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> By whom? I am always in a puzzle about the use of this term. Isn't > >>> perezhivanie the term that LSV uses to talk about relation of child to > >>> environment? At least, there seems to be a lot of chatter about issue. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> d) The term "unit of analysis" does not refer to a God particle that > >>>> is indifferent to the problem of analysis. ygotsky did not imagine a > >>>> "unit of analysis" that fit any and all problems in psychology. Each > >>>> unit of analysis is specific to a particular problem of unity (e.g. > >>>> the problem of the unity of the child and his or her environment in > >>>> Problem of the Environment and the problem of the unity of verbal > >>>> thinking in Thinking and Speech). > >>>> > >>>> Amen to that. > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> e) The term "verbal thinking" is a mistranslation: Vygotsky is talking > >>>> about thinking by language, or thinking through word meanings, and not > >>>> some kind of verbalizable inner speech (which does exist, but which is > >>>> a distinct layer from thinking). > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> There is a lot of confusion around this issue and would probably need > >>> somewhat separate discussion. I interpret in the former way. The role > of > >>> meaning in inner speech, and the usefulness or not of the sense/meaning > >>> distinction has me confused. Dima Leontiev has put the distinction > behind > >>> him and now refers to "cultural meaning" (paleo meaning > >>> > >>> ) and > >>> "personal meaning (paleo sense)." I am paleo in this regard. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> Most of this has been said before, not least by Vygotsky himself. I > >>>> know that Holbrook has been saying it at least since 2007 when I first > >>>> heard him at the American Association for Applied Linguistics in Costa > >>>> Mesa, and he develops it at some length in: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> https://www.academia.edu/1803017/Vygotskys_Analysis_of_ > >>>> Childrens_Meaning-Making_Processes > >>>> > >>>> Mahn, H. (2012). Vygotsky's Analysis of Children's Meaning-Making > >>>> Processes, International Journal of Educational Psychology1(2):100-126 > >>>> > >>>> It's been said by others too: Mike Cole actually makes many of the > >>>> same points in discussing how the Kharkov school deviated from the > >>>> work of Vygotsk, > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> I did not know enough to make many of these points in 1978! They > >>> certainly > >>> distanced themselves from LSV and PI Zinchenko went after the > >>> natural-cultural memory distinction, > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> and J.V. Wertsch is quite explicit in his revisionism > >>>> when he presents "mediated activity" as a unit of analysis in > >>>> opposition to "word meaning". > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> mediated ACTION and often as not, mediated action in context. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> But of course since a unit of analysis > >>>> must preserve in some shape or form the essential properties of the > >>>> whole, the use of "mediated activity" > >>>> (action) > >>>> cannot be a unit of analysis for > >>>> the mind if we wish to retain the idea that the mind has a semantic > >>>> structure (that is, if the "whole" is structured something like a text > >>>> or a discourse rather than like driving a car, shooting a gun, or > >>>> hunting animals). > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> When we get to semantic structure of consciousness, we know there was a > >>> break between LSV and his buddies. It seems that it is in arriving at > this > >>> formulation that the charges of idealism and sign-o-centrism kick in. > >>> > >>> My difficulty is in making arguments about consciousness- -in-general, > >>> perhaps a relic of my behaviorist past. Luria appears to have come > around > >>> on this issue. I have had a difficult time understanding the changes in > >>> Leontiev's thought over the period of the 30's and 40's. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> Now, in the discussion of Holbrook's presentation, this wild-haired > >>>> guy who looked a little like Itzhak Perlman rose to argue that > >>>> Leontiev's interpretation was really one fair interpretation, and that > >>>> it really was addressed towards a specific problem, which is how to > >>>> prevent dualism from arising (that is, how to explain how word meaning > >>>> could arise historically).Through joint mediated activity? > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> He also said that Holbrook was juxtaposing > >>>> quotations out of context: the quotes that showed Vygotsky arguing > >>>> against a "Marxist psychology" were directed against a very specific > >>>> group of vulgar Marxists (e.g. Zalkind) and that is why Vygotsky uses > >>>> scare quotes around "Marxist". > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> Not so? > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> I then muddied the waters, first by addressing the wild-haired guy > >>>> instead of Holbrook (a major breach of protocol) and then by arguing > >>>> that speech really is sui generis, because it is a form of "activity" > >>>> (if we must call it that) whose conditions of comprehension are no > >>>> longer recoverable from the activity itself (and so the unit of > >>>> analysis for verbal thinking cannot be sought in activity). There > >>>> wasn't enough time to really develop what I wanted to say, so I went > >>>> over to continue the discussion, and it turned out that the wild > >>>> haired guy was none other than Seth Chaiklin, who is, we all know, one > >>>> of the foremost paleo-Vygotskyans when it comes to the much > >>>> misinterpreted concept of the ZPD. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> Speech is a form of activity or a means of activity? Or of action? > >>> > >>> I guess I do not understand. If its worthwhile, perhaps spell the idea > >>> out > >>> here? > >>> > >>> So far as I can tell, there are ONLY misinterpretations of the Zoped. > Seth > >>> was right on about it being used in Anglo-American discourse as > something > >>> akin to zone of proximal learning,fitting into the associationist view > of > >>> development as more learning. But the one right interpretation has > escaped > >>> my notice. > >>> > >>> Thanks again for taking the trouble to write that out. Perhaps it will > be > >>> generative for people. > >>> mike > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> David Kellogg > >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>> > >>>> PS: Holbrook DID get one thing wrong. Stalin did not argue that > >>>> language was purely ideal and superstructural; that was Marr's > >>>> position. Stalin, or whoever ghost wrote his articles, argued that > >>>> language was base, and therefore somehow material, whatever that > >>>> means. But Stalin was not really interested in ideas; he was just out > >>>> for Marr's blood. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On 6 October 2014 22:21, mike cole wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Hi David-- > >>>>> > >>>>> The specific example of your comments on originals and adaptations > hits > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> on > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> a point it would be helpful to hear more about: > >>>>> > >>>>> You wrote: > >>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat > >>>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging > >>>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which > actually > >>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, > >>>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's > >>>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need > >>>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument > >>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants > >>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no > >>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts > (and > >>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least > >>>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of > >>>>> thinking that has become extinct). > >>>>> > >>>>> 1. Could you guide us to a text you recommend where this > >>>>> interpretation > >>>>> is laid out? > >>>>> 2. What sort of revision was Seth suggesting and why? > >>>>> > >>>>> I have been reading Russian discussions around this issue. > Clarification > >>>>> would be helpful. > >>>>> mike > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:37 AM, David Kellogg > > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own bed and > >>>>>> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, played, as > >>>>>> Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) > Stradivarius > >>>>>> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very first time > >>>>>> in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma > has > >>>>>> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has > been > >>>>>> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal > interpretation. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if Mendelssohn > >>>>>> himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, > >>>>>> Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had > occupied, > >>>>>> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to > >>>>>> Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period > >>>>>> instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and starts > >>>>>> to play. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat > >>>>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging > >>>>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which > actually > >>>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, > >>>>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's > >>>>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need > >>>>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an > argument > >>>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account > supplants > >>>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is > no > >>>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts > (and > >>>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least > >>>>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of > >>>>>> thinking that has become extinct). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>> > >>>>>> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in Sydney was > >>>>>> not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I would have > >>>>>> liked it better if she had used those terms a little more > imprecisely, > >>>>>> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might > have > >>>>>> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was > >>>>>> contemplating. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a world > >>>>>> without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are > >>>>>> replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather > >>>>>> dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she called > the > >>>>>> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also human > >>>>>> identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the > conference > >>>>>> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time for > the > >>>>>> spiritual side of life. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the "object" > of > >>>>>> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working class > is > >>>>>> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex > workers > >>>>>> and atomized into the social position of housewives. Inequality is > now > >>>>>> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history tells > >>>>>> us that the result of this is not going to be individual > spirituality > >>>>>> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if > that > >>>>>> force is organized, social, and directed against social equality > >>>>>> rather than against fellow members of the working class. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> dk > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 5 October 2014 13:38, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie Nardi > I > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> had > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> the > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if she > has > >>>>>>> written something on "object" that is very good news. > >>>>>>> I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't think one > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> good > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> book > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long while I > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> have > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> been > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie" > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> without > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> an > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of > "substance" > >>>>>>> whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains > outstanding > >>>>>>> differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that almost all > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> bar > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> one > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is a > step > >>>>>>> forward, and people are aware of the differences in interpretation > and > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> they > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a while, > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> maybe > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> consistency > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> in > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> optimistic. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> ------------ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. > >>>>>>>> I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds that > go > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> U > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a shower of > >>>>>>>> interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> (Whatever > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on basics of > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> AT > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> is > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Mike > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were a > little > >>>>>>>> slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also iscar-ers > and > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> we > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. > >>>>>>>> Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger on a > >>>>>>>> Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and tablets > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> etc., > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were > >>>>>>>> oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> My impressions of CHAT research: > >>>>>>>> On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp and > >>>>>>>> critical in relation to the dominant political forces, and > still > >>>>>>>> way out in front in understanding the several developmental > >>>>>>>> processes which all contribute to our actions (phylogenesis, > >>>>>>>> historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, microgenesis), > and > >>>>>>>> not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great > >>>>>>>> community of research, relatively lacking in the > competitiveness > >>>>>>>> and jealousy which infects most research communities. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On the negative side: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" as > some > >>>>>>>> homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces problems > into > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> the > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., people > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> lack > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> a > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> viable social theory or the ability to use theory they > have > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> to > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated way. > >>>>>>>> * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. > Only a > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> small > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> minority know what it means and use the idea in their > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> research. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> confusion; > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> few researchers using the concept are clear on what the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> concept > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront and > >>>>>>>> attempt to > >>>>>>>> resolve the methodological differences (I refer to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> systematic > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) within > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the relatively > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> civil > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> relations between researchers - people prefer to let > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> differences > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> just fester without openly discussing them. The old Soviet > >>>>>>>> approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far the > other > >>>>>>>> way. :) > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> ------------ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response to > >>>>>>>> someone who > >>>>>>>> wrote backto xmca instead of me. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an > >>>>>>>> interesting and > >>>>>>>> unassuming guy. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca > discussion?? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> an > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Oct 8 00:06:36 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2014 01:06:36 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> Message-ID: LMDHA, >From the peanut gallery of the by-standers and hand wringers, I want to say that I think the chat is very enlivened. This dialog that has the comfortable feel of an interactive poetry slam for me. Earlier today I read Larry's riff on Vygotsky, Leontiev and Merleau-Ponty and thought someone had lost their mind, re-read it before I read David's response to Larry and started to make more sense of both, then I read Huw's turn and felt like I might be getting the hang of what's going on. To get thread of the discourse, its cohesion and coherence, I have been going forward and backwards within and between turns, only possible because the discourse has been made electronically permanent. What flows like water for you five high flyers is an archeological dig for me, but I find it's worth the effort. Respectfully Henry On Oct 7, 2014, at 7:29 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Both elegant and wry: a pleasure to read, David. > > It is sometimes impressive that the more one works upon a written text, the > more the text itself comes to guide the work. The clarity of each move can > be reflected in the text until it is the text itself which achieves a > certain guiding clarity. The little conscious moves are in response to > this background, but the background is composed of these little moves. > > If there is anything "deep" about my gnomic comments, then I attribute it > to such guidance. I think more would be less. > > If we take meaning as synonymous with the "texture" of things and do not > impose any orderliness upon it other than the form manifest in attending to > it (grasping, weighing, sensing), as I understand you to be indicating, > then we can apply the following substitution to your earlier assertion: > > "... since a unit of analysis must preserve in some shape or form the > essential properties of the whole, the use of "mediated activity" cannot be > a unit of analysis for the mind if we wish to retain the idea that the mind > has a text(ure)". > > or > > "mediated activity does not preserve the text(ure)". > > This is false because the manipulation of devices to accomplish some > transformation reveals the consequences of the manipulations by which such > texture is built up. The texture is manifest in the changes that show up > in the mediated activity. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > > On 7 October 2014 23:12, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Larry, Mike, Huw, Andy-- >> >> (and above all the real "objects" of broadening and enlivening the >> discussion, you by-standers and handwringers, perhaps intimidated by >> the pointing and handwaving, and unwilling to contribute lest the >> discussion become less sharpened and pointed....) >> >> There were several issues that seemed to pop up session after session >> at ISCAR, quite independently of who raised them. Yes, "the real >> Vygotsky" was certainly one of them, and Holbrook was not the only >> person to talk this way; I did too, and I do think that a world where >> the original Vygotsky is not recoverable is just as bad as a world >> where Vygotsky is completely forgotten. But in the context of ISCAR, >> the "real Vygotsky" was often a response to many speakers who would >> like to emphasize the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky. >> >> There were two ways of doing this. One was to simply say that of >> course Vygotsky was a Marxist, but then everybody was Marxist back >> then, and it was not much more important than being a liberal Democrat >> today. Interestingly, in the Making of Mind, Luria said that this is a >> description which could well apply to many psychologists of his time, >> including himself, but not to Vygotsky. A more sophisticated way of >> emphasizing the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky requires a "real >> Vygotsky" of a different kind. Writers like our good friend Nikolai >> Veresov have tried to do this by emphasizing the PRE-Marxist Vygotsky, >> especially Vygotsky the phenomenologist, student of Gustav Shpet who >> was a student of Husserl himself. >> >> I was formerly little puzzled by this move. Seth argued that it was >> valid, because of Vygotsky's ties to Lewin and Lewin's ideas about the >> force of objects and the fields of attractors created thereby. Lewin >> was certainly an attractor for Vygotsky, but Vygotsky actually uses >> Lewin to criticize phenomenological analysis in Chapter Three of HDHMF >> (see Vol. 4, p. 69). Elsewhere, Vygotsky is very critical of the >> founders of phenomenology, iincluding Husserl (p. 7). >> >> But now I think that Larry (and Martin, who has raised the same >> connection) is on to something. For it is also in HDHMF that Vygotsky >> bruits the idea that attention is a kind of gateway function, that the >> indicative is the primordial function of speech and thinking, and that >> there is nevertheless a qualitative difference between noticing >> something and internalizing it as a meaning--all of these are >> Husserlian ideas. Even the knotted handkerchief, which I myself have >> attributed to Vygotsky and to a peculiarly Russian practice, comes >> from the work of Husserl (Logical Investigations, Vol. I, pp. >> 269-333). I think that as a real historical materialist Vygotsky >> rejected Husserl's absolute opposition between symbol and index, but >> he didn't forget it when he set about trying to build a bridge between >> the two. >> >> Mike wonders about a text where Vygotsky rejects "activity" as a unit >> of analysis for everything but behavior. No such text exists, of >> course; if you read what I wrote carefully (I know, it's a trial >> sometimes, but at least I am a larger target then the minimalist Huw) >> you will see that I refer to a my OWN rejection, not Vygotsky's. What >> Vygotsky says in "Problem of the Environment" is that he wants to >> introduce "a number of different" units of analysis which are used in >> pedological analyses, of which "perezhivanie" is one, and >> "sense/signification" a very different one. (Andy is wrong to impute >> importance to the count noun form here; Vygotsky often uses it as a >> verb, I "live experience" something). I have always assumed that this >> means: >> >> a) Perezhivanie is quite specific to the problem Vygotsky raises in >> this lecture, which is how three different children can respond so >> differently to the one and the same form of child abuse. >> >> b) "Sense/signification" is also a unit of analysis, what Vygotsky >> refers to in Thinking and Speech as "the meaningful word". (This was >> also the object of textological attention in Holbrook's presentation). >> >> Mike also wonders about where Leontiev raises the possibility of >> applying Marxist theory directly to psychology. In many places, but >> perhaps most prominently in Problems of the Development of Mind (see >> pp. 236-237, 255). Holbrook had other quotations of this type, and I >> think there is a link between them and what Luria's remark that back >> then everybody in psychology was a "Marxist", but nobody except >> Vygotsky was much of a Marxist. Holbrook is right here. >> >> Mike asks if there is practical activity without thinking. I think >> that Vygotsky would say that there is thinking and there is verbal >> thinking (or, as Holbrook now insists, "thinking with words"). What >> monkeys do with sticks is called practical intelligence in Chapter >> Four of Thinking and Speech. It is practical activity, and it's >> thinking. But it's not a unit of thinking and speech, and therefore I >> think there is some light between what Vygotsky is willing to call >> "activity" and "praxis"; it's not the case that "praxis" is just a >> Greek word for "activity". I recognize, though, that for Andy what >> monkeys do with sticks does not count as activity (and I also >> recognize that I was muddling "activity" and "action"--sorry about >> that). >> >> Like Mike, I am paleo with regard to sense and meaning, and like Mike >> I recognize that it is hard to tell how deep the waters are here since >> they have been muddied. I think they were first muddied by Vygotsky >> himself, because he refers the distinction to Paulhan, where no such >> distinction is found (Paulhan just talks about connotation and >> denotation). But I think it's easy to unmuddy the waters and I think >> they are very deep indeed: Vygotsky uses Paulhan as a foil, taking the >> actual distinction from Volosinov, who was working at the Herzen >> Institute at exactly the same moment that Vygotsky was writing of this >> distinction. Zavershneva has said that Vygotsky cites Volosinov in his >> unpublished manuscripts, but that the citation is always removed by >> the editor in publication. So "smysl" is "tema"; it is something like >> "realized, actual meaning" while "znachenie" is something like >> "potential, possible meaning". Tema is what happens when we activate a >> particular layer in the great palimpsest of possible meanings left in >> each word by our contemporaries and ancestors. >> >> I'm currently writing the endnotes for our new volume of Vygotsky's >> lectures on pedology, so I am very aware of the issue that Huw appears >> to be raising (although Huw is so very gnomic in his lofty remarks on >> my supposed illogicality and my more systemic problems that it is hard >> to be sure). In Lecture Six, Vygotsky says in one paragraph that >> dividing off psychological from physiological development is >> methodologically impermissable, but in the very next paragraph, and >> indeed in the layout of the book, he says "dismemberment is >> nevertheless necessary". On the one hand, he says that there is no >> action, no motility, not even thinking without both the mind and the >> brain, and on the other he says that even within the body there are >> distinct lines of development and that physiology is "a summarizable >> concept". He is acutely aware of the contradiction, but by the end of >> the lecture he resolves it. We just have to keep in mind that things >> that we take apart for the purpose of analysis are inextricably joined >> in clinical practice. I suppose you can say it is a logical >> contradiction if you want, particularly if by that you mean it is a >> contradiction that only exists in the ideal world, that is, in logic >> and does not really pose a problem in life. >> >> The problem is with the word "text" is the same, Huw. For Hallidayans >> like me, a text is precisely a semantic object; it's not made of paper >> and ink. Viewed interpersonally, a text is a coherent and cohesive >> exchange. Viewed intra-mentally, it's a representation of thinking. It >> is objective, but it's objective the way that mathematics and language >> itself is objective, not the way that three actual apples or a >> physical book is objective. Dixit. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> (PS: I'm afraid I didn't get the systemic reproach at all. It's hard >> for a fish to see the density of water, much less to see the density >> of the fish!) >> >> dk >> >> >> >> On 7 October 2014 23:11, Larry Purss wrote: >>> The understanding of action and activity AS BOTH thinking and behaviour >>> contrasting with an appeal to differentiate the aspects thinking and >>> behaviour. >>> The notion *species* was introduced by David K as returning to Vygotsky's >>> words as he used them [paleo return] or we will loose this species as it >>> becomes extinct. >>> >>> Therefore Leontiev's theory could also be considered a separate *species* >>> with its own characteristics, features, and object of activity. >>> SO in my return to the species of Activity theory I turned to one of >>> Leontiev's students [Victor Kaptelinin] in his 2005 MCA article "The >> Object >>> of Activity: Making sense of the Sense Maker" >>> >>> Kaptelinin opens his article with this fragment from the *species* of >>> Leontiev's own specified object of activity [activity theory] >>> >>> "A basic or, as is sometimes said, a CONSTITUTING characteristic of >>> activity is its objectivity or, rather object relatedness. Properly the >>> CONCEPT of its object, gegenstand, is already IMPLICITLY contained in the >>> very concept of activity. The expression objectless activity is DEVOID of >>> any meaning. Objectivity may SEEM objectless, but SCIENTIFIC >> investigations >>> OF activity NECESSARILY REQUIRES discovering its object. >>> THUS the object of activity IS TWOFOLD: >>> First, in its INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE as SUBORDINATING TO ITSELF and >>> transforming the activity of the subject [The question arises if this >>> subordinating is the object's *motive* - LP] >>> AND >>> Second, as an IMAGE OF the object, as a product OF its property of >>> psychological reflection THAT IS realized AS AN ACTIVITY OF THE SUBJECT, >>> and cannot exist OTHERWISE." >>> >>> This paragraph which Kaptelian offers as a *specimen* of a particular and >>> unique *species* of expression seems to present a clear *case* to hold up >>> to Vygotsky's *species* . >>> I would add that Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative *species* that is >> also >>> looking at objects of activity from another *angle* of vision. >>> >>> Are Vygotsky, Leontiev, and Merleau-Ponty all gesturing at the same >>> phenomena and walking around this *object* [imagined? or real?] from >>> various vantage points. >>> >>> I will pause by returning to the second quality of the TWOFOLD quality of >>> the *object of activity* >>> >>> "SECOND as an IMAGE OF the object, AS a product OF its PSYCHOLOGICAL >>> REFLECTION that is REALIZED [brought into form -LP] AS an activity OF the >>> SUBJECT and cannot exist OTHERWISE. >>> >>> Is this a new *species*?? >>> >>> Larry >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 4:55 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> Mike, what I got out of Seth's intervention was just a plea for people >> to >>>> stop claiming to have the "real Vygotsky" and I thoroughly agreed with >> him. >>>> And so far as I know Marx uses the German word for Activity, viz., >>>> Taetigkeit, in "Theses on Feuerbach" - that word which pre-dates >>>> "behaviour" and "consciousness" by centuries, but which is sometimes >>>> referred to nowadays as a unity of these two abstractions, and it was >> only >>>> later interpreters that introduced the term "praxis", which being Greek >>>> sounds a lot cleverer. Action and Activity, in my view and >> etymologically, >>>> are both thinking and behaving. >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>>> Thanks, David. I think i understand better what you mean by "LSV >> rejects >>>>> "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior,and most >>>>> certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Somehow I was expecting >>>>> text >>>>> from LSV where he says "activity is not a unit of analysis" because of >> all >>>>> the places in his text where he uses the term activity as a sort of >> "lay >>>>> term". >>>>> >>>>> ... >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Holbrook Mahn. >>>>>> Holbrook began by saying that: >>>>>> >>>>>> a) We do not "borrow" concepts made for one discipline and "apply" >>>>>> them to another. Not even dialectical materialism can be "applied" to >>>>>> psychology (or even sociology or economics--Marx didn't do applied >>>>>> philosophy!). Holbrook then produced a number of quotations from The >>>>>> Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology to show that Vygotsky >>>>>> knew this, and countered with other quotations from Problems of the >>>>>> Development of the Mind to show that Leontiev did not know this. >>>>>> >>>>>> I know places where LSV is clear on this score, in Historical meaning, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> for example, but not the evidence of Leontiev's errors. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> b) The term "praxis" has been thus borrowed. It doesn't refer to >>>>>> practical activity: it refers to a unity of thinking and practice. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Borrowed from Marx by ..??? by Leontiev? There is any form of practical >>>>> activity without human thinking? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> c) The term "social situation of development" has been thus borrowed; >>>>>> it does not refer to a "context" but to the child's relationship to >>>>>> the environment. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> By whom? I am always in a puzzle about the use of this term. Isn't >>>>> perezhivanie the term that LSV uses to talk about relation of child to >>>>> environment? At least, there seems to be a lot of chatter about issue. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> d) The term "unit of analysis" does not refer to a God particle that >>>>>> is indifferent to the problem of analysis. ygotsky did not imagine a >>>>>> "unit of analysis" that fit any and all problems in psychology. Each >>>>>> unit of analysis is specific to a particular problem of unity (e.g. >>>>>> the problem of the unity of the child and his or her environment in >>>>>> Problem of the Environment and the problem of the unity of verbal >>>>>> thinking in Thinking and Speech). >>>>>> >>>>>> Amen to that. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> e) The term "verbal thinking" is a mistranslation: Vygotsky is talking >>>>>> about thinking by language, or thinking through word meanings, and not >>>>>> some kind of verbalizable inner speech (which does exist, but which is >>>>>> a distinct layer from thinking). >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> There is a lot of confusion around this issue and would probably need >>>>> somewhat separate discussion. I interpret in the former way. The role >> of >>>>> meaning in inner speech, and the usefulness or not of the sense/meaning >>>>> distinction has me confused. Dima Leontiev has put the distinction >> behind >>>>> him and now refers to "cultural meaning" (paleo meaning >>>>> >>>>> ) and >>>>> "personal meaning (paleo sense)." I am paleo in this regard. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Most of this has been said before, not least by Vygotsky himself. I >>>>>> know that Holbrook has been saying it at least since 2007 when I first >>>>>> heard him at the American Association for Applied Linguistics in Costa >>>>>> Mesa, and he develops it at some length in: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> https://www.academia.edu/1803017/Vygotskys_Analysis_of_ >>>>>> Childrens_Meaning-Making_Processes >>>>>> >>>>>> Mahn, H. (2012). Vygotsky's Analysis of Children's Meaning-Making >>>>>> Processes, International Journal of Educational Psychology1(2):100-126 >>>>>> >>>>>> It's been said by others too: Mike Cole actually makes many of the >>>>>> same points in discussing how the Kharkov school deviated from the >>>>>> work of Vygotsk, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I did not know enough to make many of these points in 1978! They >>>>> certainly >>>>> distanced themselves from LSV and PI Zinchenko went after the >>>>> natural-cultural memory distinction, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> and J.V. Wertsch is quite explicit in his revisionism >>>>>> when he presents "mediated activity" as a unit of analysis in >>>>>> opposition to "word meaning". >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> mediated ACTION and often as not, mediated action in context. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> But of course since a unit of analysis >>>>>> must preserve in some shape or form the essential properties of the >>>>>> whole, the use of "mediated activity" >>>>>> (action) >>>>>> cannot be a unit of analysis for >>>>>> the mind if we wish to retain the idea that the mind has a semantic >>>>>> structure (that is, if the "whole" is structured something like a text >>>>>> or a discourse rather than like driving a car, shooting a gun, or >>>>>> hunting animals). >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> When we get to semantic structure of consciousness, we know there was a >>>>> break between LSV and his buddies. It seems that it is in arriving at >> this >>>>> formulation that the charges of idealism and sign-o-centrism kick in. >>>>> >>>>> My difficulty is in making arguments about consciousness- -in-general, >>>>> perhaps a relic of my behaviorist past. Luria appears to have come >> around >>>>> on this issue. I have had a difficult time understanding the changes in >>>>> Leontiev's thought over the period of the 30's and 40's. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Now, in the discussion of Holbrook's presentation, this wild-haired >>>>>> guy who looked a little like Itzhak Perlman rose to argue that >>>>>> Leontiev's interpretation was really one fair interpretation, and that >>>>>> it really was addressed towards a specific problem, which is how to >>>>>> prevent dualism from arising (that is, how to explain how word meaning >>>>>> could arise historically).Through joint mediated activity? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> He also said that Holbrook was juxtaposing >>>>>> quotations out of context: the quotes that showed Vygotsky arguing >>>>>> against a "Marxist psychology" were directed against a very specific >>>>>> group of vulgar Marxists (e.g. Zalkind) and that is why Vygotsky uses >>>>>> scare quotes around "Marxist". >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Not so? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> I then muddied the waters, first by addressing the wild-haired guy >>>>>> instead of Holbrook (a major breach of protocol) and then by arguing >>>>>> that speech really is sui generis, because it is a form of "activity" >>>>>> (if we must call it that) whose conditions of comprehension are no >>>>>> longer recoverable from the activity itself (and so the unit of >>>>>> analysis for verbal thinking cannot be sought in activity). There >>>>>> wasn't enough time to really develop what I wanted to say, so I went >>>>>> over to continue the discussion, and it turned out that the wild >>>>>> haired guy was none other than Seth Chaiklin, who is, we all know, one >>>>>> of the foremost paleo-Vygotskyans when it comes to the much >>>>>> misinterpreted concept of the ZPD. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Speech is a form of activity or a means of activity? Or of action? >>>>> >>>>> I guess I do not understand. If its worthwhile, perhaps spell the idea >>>>> out >>>>> here? >>>>> >>>>> So far as I can tell, there are ONLY misinterpretations of the Zoped. >> Seth >>>>> was right on about it being used in Anglo-American discourse as >> something >>>>> akin to zone of proximal learning,fitting into the associationist view >> of >>>>> development as more learning. But the one right interpretation has >> escaped >>>>> my notice. >>>>> >>>>> Thanks again for taking the trouble to write that out. Perhaps it will >> be >>>>> generative for people. >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>> >>>>>> PS: Holbrook DID get one thing wrong. Stalin did not argue that >>>>>> language was purely ideal and superstructural; that was Marr's >>>>>> position. Stalin, or whoever ghost wrote his articles, argued that >>>>>> language was base, and therefore somehow material, whatever that >>>>>> means. But Stalin was not really interested in ideas; he was just out >>>>>> for Marr's blood. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 6 October 2014 22:21, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi David-- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The specific example of your comments on originals and adaptations >> hits >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> on >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> a point it would be helpful to hear more about: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You wrote: >>>>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat >>>>>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging >>>>>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which >> actually >>>>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, >>>>>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's >>>>>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need >>>>>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument >>>>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants >>>>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no >>>>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts >> (and >>>>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least >>>>>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of >>>>>>> thinking that has become extinct). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 1. Could you guide us to a text you recommend where this >>>>>>> interpretation >>>>>>> is laid out? >>>>>>> 2. What sort of revision was Seth suggesting and why? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I have been reading Russian discussions around this issue. >> Clarification >>>>>>> would be helpful. >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:37 AM, David Kellogg >> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own bed and >>>>>>>> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, played, as >>>>>>>> Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) >> Stradivarius >>>>>>>> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very first time >>>>>>>> in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma >> has >>>>>>>> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has >> been >>>>>>>> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal >> interpretation. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if Mendelssohn >>>>>>>> himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, >>>>>>>> Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had >> occupied, >>>>>>>> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to >>>>>>>> Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period >>>>>>>> instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and starts >>>>>>>> to play. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat >>>>>>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging >>>>>>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which >> actually >>>>>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, >>>>>>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's >>>>>>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need >>>>>>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an >> argument >>>>>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account >> supplants >>>>>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is >> no >>>>>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts >> (and >>>>>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least >>>>>>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of >>>>>>>> thinking that has become extinct). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in Sydney was >>>>>>>> not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I would have >>>>>>>> liked it better if she had used those terms a little more >> imprecisely, >>>>>>>> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might >> have >>>>>>>> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was >>>>>>>> contemplating. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a world >>>>>>>> without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are >>>>>>>> replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather >>>>>>>> dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she called >> the >>>>>>>> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also human >>>>>>>> identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the >> conference >>>>>>>> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time for >> the >>>>>>>> spiritual side of life. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the "object" >> of >>>>>>>> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working class >> is >>>>>>>> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex >> workers >>>>>>>> and atomized into the social position of housewives. Inequality is >> now >>>>>>>> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history tells >>>>>>>> us that the result of this is not going to be individual >> spirituality >>>>>>>> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if >> that >>>>>>>> force is organized, social, and directed against social equality >>>>>>>> rather than against fellow members of the working class. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> dk >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 5 October 2014 13:38, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie Nardi >> I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> had >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if she >> has >>>>>>>>> written something on "object" that is very good news. >>>>>>>>> I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't think one >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> good >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> book >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long while I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> have >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> been >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie" >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> without >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> an >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of >> "substance" >>>>>>>>> whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains >> outstanding >>>>>>>>> differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that almost all >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> bar >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> one >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is a >> step >>>>>>>>> forward, and people are aware of the differences in interpretation >> and >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> they >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a while, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> maybe >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> consistency >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> in >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> optimistic. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> ------------ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. >>>>>>>>>> I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds that >> go >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> U >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a shower of >>>>>>>>>> interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (Whatever >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on basics of >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> AT >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were a >> little >>>>>>>>>> slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also iscar-ers >> and >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> we >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. >>>>>>>>>> Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger on a >>>>>>>>>> Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and tablets >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> etc., >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were >>>>>>>>>> oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> My impressions of CHAT research: >>>>>>>>>> On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp and >>>>>>>>>> critical in relation to the dominant political forces, and >> still >>>>>>>>>> way out in front in understanding the several developmental >>>>>>>>>> processes which all contribute to our actions (phylogenesis, >>>>>>>>>> historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, microgenesis), >> and >>>>>>>>>> not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great >>>>>>>>>> community of research, relatively lacking in the >> competitiveness >>>>>>>>>> and jealousy which infects most research communities. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On the negative side: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" as >> some >>>>>>>>>> homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces problems >> into >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., people >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> lack >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> a >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> viable social theory or the ability to use theory they >> have >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated way. >>>>>>>>>> * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. >> Only a >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> small >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> minority know what it means and use the idea in their >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> research. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> confusion; >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> few researchers using the concept are clear on what the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> concept >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront and >>>>>>>>>> attempt to >>>>>>>>>> resolve the methodological differences (I refer to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> systematic >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) within >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the relatively >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> civil >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> relations between researchers - people prefer to let >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> differences >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> just fester without openly discussing them. The old Soviet >>>>>>>>>> approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far the >> other >>>>>>>>>> way. :) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> ------------ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response to >>>>>>>>>> someone who >>>>>>>>>> wrote backto xmca instead of me. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an >>>>>>>>>> interesting and >>>>>>>>>> unassuming guy. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca >> discussion?? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >> with >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> an >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >> an >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >> From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Oct 8 07:09:51 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2014 07:09:51 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> Message-ID: Henry, By commenting, you have passed over from bystanding to standing at the door and then entering and becoming embedded. The image of poetry slam and grasping for cohesion helps to situate the movement of this enlivening discussion. We have been exploring *texture* and *text[ure]* in relation to *mind* and *mediated activity* [Huw's response] and David's use of the term *species* to explore Vygotsky's project which is aligned with and *seriously* extending Marx's ontology [of labour??] David mentions that Vygotsky was not only acknowledging Marx but took seriously the project of extending Marx's analysis of the ontology of *labour*. I also want to hold in view David's acknowledgement of *attention* as the *gateway function* and hope we follow that thread further. This explores language as gesture and the KEY INSIGHT of *indicative gesturing* which Martin has discussed. These multiple themes suggest the metaphor of *loose threads* as the way I experience this emerging dialogue. In this spirit of loose threads I want to pick up one earlier thread from this conversation when David addressed Andy. I have been trying to grasp the differences between Andy's and David's orientations as they approach activity theory as a *species* of thinking. Andy was asking how David could *limit* activity to *behaviour* and not extend activity to the *psychological* realm. David commented: "I take heaps, complexes, and pseudoconcepts to be the precise forms that word meaning takes as it develops in the experimental subjects of Chapter Five. I take it that we can generalize these results to the actual word meanings that children use outside the laboratory too, BUT that they remain forms of word meaning and better understood as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization than as operations, actions, and activities. It seems to me that REPLACING the one with the other results eventually in abandoning what for me is the KEY INSIGHT of Vygotsky's later years, the insight that the structure of the mind is not behavioral or biological but rather semantic; the mind is structured like a text, or like a dialogue." I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by exploring *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT that word meaning is BEST understood - "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as operations, actions, and activities." This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings. Larry On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 12:06 AM, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > LMDHA, > >From the peanut gallery of the by-standers and hand wringers, I want to > say that I think the chat is very enlivened. This dialog that has the > comfortable feel of an interactive poetry slam for me. Earlier today I read > Larry's riff on Vygotsky, Leontiev and Merleau-Ponty and thought someone > had lost their mind, re-read it before I read David's response to Larry and > started to make more sense of both, then I read Huw's turn and felt like I > might be getting the hang of what's going on. To get thread of the > discourse, its cohesion and coherence, I have been going forward and > backwards within and between turns, only possible because the discourse has > been made electronically permanent. What flows like water for you five high > flyers is an archeological dig for me, but I find it's worth the effort. > Respectfully > Henry > > > > On Oct 7, 2014, at 7:29 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > Both elegant and wry: a pleasure to read, David. > > > > It is sometimes impressive that the more one works upon a written text, > the > > more the text itself comes to guide the work. The clarity of each move > can > > be reflected in the text until it is the text itself which achieves a > > certain guiding clarity. The little conscious moves are in response to > > this background, but the background is composed of these little moves. > > > > If there is anything "deep" about my gnomic comments, then I attribute it > > to such guidance. I think more would be less. > > > > If we take meaning as synonymous with the "texture" of things and do not > > impose any orderliness upon it other than the form manifest in attending > to > > it (grasping, weighing, sensing), as I understand you to be indicating, > > then we can apply the following substitution to your earlier assertion: > > > > "... since a unit of analysis must preserve in some shape or form the > > essential properties of the whole, the use of "mediated activity" cannot > be > > a unit of analysis for the mind if we wish to retain the idea that the > mind > > has a text(ure)". > > > > or > > > > "mediated activity does not preserve the text(ure)". > > > > This is false because the manipulation of devices to accomplish some > > transformation reveals the consequences of the manipulations by which > such > > texture is built up. The texture is manifest in the changes that show up > > in the mediated activity. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 7 October 2014 23:12, David Kellogg wrote: > > > >> Larry, Mike, Huw, Andy-- > >> > >> (and above all the real "objects" of broadening and enlivening the > >> discussion, you by-standers and handwringers, perhaps intimidated by > >> the pointing and handwaving, and unwilling to contribute lest the > >> discussion become less sharpened and pointed....) > >> > >> There were several issues that seemed to pop up session after session > >> at ISCAR, quite independently of who raised them. Yes, "the real > >> Vygotsky" was certainly one of them, and Holbrook was not the only > >> person to talk this way; I did too, and I do think that a world where > >> the original Vygotsky is not recoverable is just as bad as a world > >> where Vygotsky is completely forgotten. But in the context of ISCAR, > >> the "real Vygotsky" was often a response to many speakers who would > >> like to emphasize the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky. > >> > >> There were two ways of doing this. One was to simply say that of > >> course Vygotsky was a Marxist, but then everybody was Marxist back > >> then, and it was not much more important than being a liberal Democrat > >> today. Interestingly, in the Making of Mind, Luria said that this is a > >> description which could well apply to many psychologists of his time, > >> including himself, but not to Vygotsky. A more sophisticated way of > >> emphasizing the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky requires a "real > >> Vygotsky" of a different kind. Writers like our good friend Nikolai > >> Veresov have tried to do this by emphasizing the PRE-Marxist Vygotsky, > >> especially Vygotsky the phenomenologist, student of Gustav Shpet who > >> was a student of Husserl himself. > >> > >> I was formerly little puzzled by this move. Seth argued that it was > >> valid, because of Vygotsky's ties to Lewin and Lewin's ideas about the > >> force of objects and the fields of attractors created thereby. Lewin > >> was certainly an attractor for Vygotsky, but Vygotsky actually uses > >> Lewin to criticize phenomenological analysis in Chapter Three of HDHMF > >> (see Vol. 4, p. 69). Elsewhere, Vygotsky is very critical of the > >> founders of phenomenology, iincluding Husserl (p. 7). > >> > >> But now I think that Larry (and Martin, who has raised the same > >> connection) is on to something. For it is also in HDHMF that Vygotsky > >> bruits the idea that attention is a kind of gateway function, that the > >> indicative is the primordial function of speech and thinking, and that > >> there is nevertheless a qualitative difference between noticing > >> something and internalizing it as a meaning--all of these are > >> Husserlian ideas. Even the knotted handkerchief, which I myself have > >> attributed to Vygotsky and to a peculiarly Russian practice, comes > >> from the work of Husserl (Logical Investigations, Vol. I, pp. > >> 269-333). I think that as a real historical materialist Vygotsky > >> rejected Husserl's absolute opposition between symbol and index, but > >> he didn't forget it when he set about trying to build a bridge between > >> the two. > >> > >> Mike wonders about a text where Vygotsky rejects "activity" as a unit > >> of analysis for everything but behavior. No such text exists, of > >> course; if you read what I wrote carefully (I know, it's a trial > >> sometimes, but at least I am a larger target then the minimalist Huw) > >> you will see that I refer to a my OWN rejection, not Vygotsky's. What > >> Vygotsky says in "Problem of the Environment" is that he wants to > >> introduce "a number of different" units of analysis which are used in > >> pedological analyses, of which "perezhivanie" is one, and > >> "sense/signification" a very different one. (Andy is wrong to impute > >> importance to the count noun form here; Vygotsky often uses it as a > >> verb, I "live experience" something). I have always assumed that this > >> means: > >> > >> a) Perezhivanie is quite specific to the problem Vygotsky raises in > >> this lecture, which is how three different children can respond so > >> differently to the one and the same form of child abuse. > >> > >> b) "Sense/signification" is also a unit of analysis, what Vygotsky > >> refers to in Thinking and Speech as "the meaningful word". (This was > >> also the object of textological attention in Holbrook's presentation). > >> > >> Mike also wonders about where Leontiev raises the possibility of > >> applying Marxist theory directly to psychology. In many places, but > >> perhaps most prominently in Problems of the Development of Mind (see > >> pp. 236-237, 255). Holbrook had other quotations of this type, and I > >> think there is a link between them and what Luria's remark that back > >> then everybody in psychology was a "Marxist", but nobody except > >> Vygotsky was much of a Marxist. Holbrook is right here. > >> > >> Mike asks if there is practical activity without thinking. I think > >> that Vygotsky would say that there is thinking and there is verbal > >> thinking (or, as Holbrook now insists, "thinking with words"). What > >> monkeys do with sticks is called practical intelligence in Chapter > >> Four of Thinking and Speech. It is practical activity, and it's > >> thinking. But it's not a unit of thinking and speech, and therefore I > >> think there is some light between what Vygotsky is willing to call > >> "activity" and "praxis"; it's not the case that "praxis" is just a > >> Greek word for "activity". I recognize, though, that for Andy what > >> monkeys do with sticks does not count as activity (and I also > >> recognize that I was muddling "activity" and "action"--sorry about > >> that). > >> > >> Like Mike, I am paleo with regard to sense and meaning, and like Mike > >> I recognize that it is hard to tell how deep the waters are here since > >> they have been muddied. I think they were first muddied by Vygotsky > >> himself, because he refers the distinction to Paulhan, where no such > >> distinction is found (Paulhan just talks about connotation and > >> denotation). But I think it's easy to unmuddy the waters and I think > >> they are very deep indeed: Vygotsky uses Paulhan as a foil, taking the > >> actual distinction from Volosinov, who was working at the Herzen > >> Institute at exactly the same moment that Vygotsky was writing of this > >> distinction. Zavershneva has said that Vygotsky cites Volosinov in his > >> unpublished manuscripts, but that the citation is always removed by > >> the editor in publication. So "smysl" is "tema"; it is something like > >> "realized, actual meaning" while "znachenie" is something like > >> "potential, possible meaning". Tema is what happens when we activate a > >> particular layer in the great palimpsest of possible meanings left in > >> each word by our contemporaries and ancestors. > >> > >> I'm currently writing the endnotes for our new volume of Vygotsky's > >> lectures on pedology, so I am very aware of the issue that Huw appears > >> to be raising (although Huw is so very gnomic in his lofty remarks on > >> my supposed illogicality and my more systemic problems that it is hard > >> to be sure). In Lecture Six, Vygotsky says in one paragraph that > >> dividing off psychological from physiological development is > >> methodologically impermissable, but in the very next paragraph, and > >> indeed in the layout of the book, he says "dismemberment is > >> nevertheless necessary". On the one hand, he says that there is no > >> action, no motility, not even thinking without both the mind and the > >> brain, and on the other he says that even within the body there are > >> distinct lines of development and that physiology is "a summarizable > >> concept". He is acutely aware of the contradiction, but by the end of > >> the lecture he resolves it. We just have to keep in mind that things > >> that we take apart for the purpose of analysis are inextricably joined > >> in clinical practice. I suppose you can say it is a logical > >> contradiction if you want, particularly if by that you mean it is a > >> contradiction that only exists in the ideal world, that is, in logic > >> and does not really pose a problem in life. > >> > >> The problem is with the word "text" is the same, Huw. For Hallidayans > >> like me, a text is precisely a semantic object; it's not made of paper > >> and ink. Viewed interpersonally, a text is a coherent and cohesive > >> exchange. Viewed intra-mentally, it's a representation of thinking. It > >> is objective, but it's objective the way that mathematics and language > >> itself is objective, not the way that three actual apples or a > >> physical book is objective. Dixit. > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > >> (PS: I'm afraid I didn't get the systemic reproach at all. It's hard > >> for a fish to see the density of water, much less to see the density > >> of the fish!) > >> > >> dk > >> > >> > >> > >> On 7 October 2014 23:11, Larry Purss wrote: > >>> The understanding of action and activity AS BOTH thinking and behaviour > >>> contrasting with an appeal to differentiate the aspects thinking and > >>> behaviour. > >>> The notion *species* was introduced by David K as returning to > Vygotsky's > >>> words as he used them [paleo return] or we will loose this species as > it > >>> becomes extinct. > >>> > >>> Therefore Leontiev's theory could also be considered a separate > *species* > >>> with its own characteristics, features, and object of activity. > >>> SO in my return to the species of Activity theory I turned to one of > >>> Leontiev's students [Victor Kaptelinin] in his 2005 MCA article "The > >> Object > >>> of Activity: Making sense of the Sense Maker" > >>> > >>> Kaptelinin opens his article with this fragment from the *species* of > >>> Leontiev's own specified object of activity [activity theory] > >>> > >>> "A basic or, as is sometimes said, a CONSTITUTING characteristic of > >>> activity is its objectivity or, rather object relatedness. Properly the > >>> CONCEPT of its object, gegenstand, is already IMPLICITLY contained in > the > >>> very concept of activity. The expression objectless activity is DEVOID > of > >>> any meaning. Objectivity may SEEM objectless, but SCIENTIFIC > >> investigations > >>> OF activity NECESSARILY REQUIRES discovering its object. > >>> THUS the object of activity IS TWOFOLD: > >>> First, in its INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE as SUBORDINATING TO ITSELF and > >>> transforming the activity of the subject [The question arises if this > >>> subordinating is the object's *motive* - LP] > >>> AND > >>> Second, as an IMAGE OF the object, as a product OF its property of > >>> psychological reflection THAT IS realized AS AN ACTIVITY OF THE > SUBJECT, > >>> and cannot exist OTHERWISE." > >>> > >>> This paragraph which Kaptelian offers as a *specimen* of a particular > and > >>> unique *species* of expression seems to present a clear *case* to hold > up > >>> to Vygotsky's *species* . > >>> I would add that Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative *species* that is > >> also > >>> looking at objects of activity from another *angle* of vision. > >>> > >>> Are Vygotsky, Leontiev, and Merleau-Ponty all gesturing at the same > >>> phenomena and walking around this *object* [imagined? or real?] from > >>> various vantage points. > >>> > >>> I will pause by returning to the second quality of the TWOFOLD quality > of > >>> the *object of activity* > >>> > >>> "SECOND as an IMAGE OF the object, AS a product OF its PSYCHOLOGICAL > >>> REFLECTION that is REALIZED [brought into form -LP] AS an activity OF > the > >>> SUBJECT and cannot exist OTHERWISE. > >>> > >>> Is this a new *species*?? > >>> > >>> Larry > >>> > >>> > >>> On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 4:55 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>> > >>>> Mike, what I got out of Seth's intervention was just a plea for people > >> to > >>>> stop claiming to have the "real Vygotsky" and I thoroughly agreed with > >> him. > >>>> And so far as I know Marx uses the German word for Activity, viz., > >>>> Taetigkeit, in "Theses on Feuerbach" - that word which pre-dates > >>>> "behaviour" and "consciousness" by centuries, but which is sometimes > >>>> referred to nowadays as a unity of these two abstractions, and it was > >> only > >>>> later interpreters that introduced the term "praxis", which being > Greek > >>>> sounds a lot cleverer. Action and Activity, in my view and > >> etymologically, > >>>> are both thinking and behaving. > >>>> Andy > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Thanks, David. I think i understand better what you mean by "LSV > >> rejects > >>>>> "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior,and most > >>>>> certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Somehow I was > expecting > >>>>> text > >>>>> from LSV where he says "activity is not a unit of analysis" because > of > >> all > >>>>> the places in his text where he uses the term activity as a sort of > >> "lay > >>>>> term". > >>>>> > >>>>> ... > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> Holbrook Mahn. > >>>>>> Holbrook began by saying that: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> a) We do not "borrow" concepts made for one discipline and "apply" > >>>>>> them to another. Not even dialectical materialism can be "applied" > to > >>>>>> psychology (or even sociology or economics--Marx didn't do applied > >>>>>> philosophy!). Holbrook then produced a number of quotations from The > >>>>>> Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology to show that Vygotsky > >>>>>> knew this, and countered with other quotations from Problems of the > >>>>>> Development of the Mind to show that Leontiev did not know this. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I know places where LSV is clear on this score, in Historical > meaning, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> for example, but not the evidence of Leontiev's errors. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> b) The term "praxis" has been thus borrowed. It doesn't refer to > >>>>>> practical activity: it refers to a unity of thinking and practice. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Borrowed from Marx by ..??? by Leontiev? There is any form of > practical > >>>>> activity without human thinking? > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> c) The term "social situation of development" has been thus > borrowed; > >>>>>> it does not refer to a "context" but to the child's relationship to > >>>>>> the environment. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> By whom? I am always in a puzzle about the use of this term. Isn't > >>>>> perezhivanie the term that LSV uses to talk about relation of child > to > >>>>> environment? At least, there seems to be a lot of chatter about > issue. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> d) The term "unit of analysis" does not refer to a God particle that > >>>>>> is indifferent to the problem of analysis. ygotsky did not imagine a > >>>>>> "unit of analysis" that fit any and all problems in psychology. Each > >>>>>> unit of analysis is specific to a particular problem of unity (e.g. > >>>>>> the problem of the unity of the child and his or her environment in > >>>>>> Problem of the Environment and the problem of the unity of verbal > >>>>>> thinking in Thinking and Speech). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Amen to that. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> e) The term "verbal thinking" is a mistranslation: Vygotsky is > talking > >>>>>> about thinking by language, or thinking through word meanings, and > not > >>>>>> some kind of verbalizable inner speech (which does exist, but which > is > >>>>>> a distinct layer from thinking). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> There is a lot of confusion around this issue and would probably need > >>>>> somewhat separate discussion. I interpret in the former way. The role > >> of > >>>>> meaning in inner speech, and the usefulness or not of the > sense/meaning > >>>>> distinction has me confused. Dima Leontiev has put the distinction > >> behind > >>>>> him and now refers to "cultural meaning" (paleo meaning > >>>>> > >>>>> ) and > >>>>> "personal meaning (paleo sense)." I am paleo in this regard. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> Most of this has been said before, not least by Vygotsky himself. I > >>>>>> know that Holbrook has been saying it at least since 2007 when I > first > >>>>>> heard him at the American Association for Applied Linguistics in > Costa > >>>>>> Mesa, and he develops it at some length in: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> https://www.academia.edu/1803017/Vygotskys_Analysis_of_ > >>>>>> Childrens_Meaning-Making_Processes > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Mahn, H. (2012). Vygotsky's Analysis of Children's Meaning-Making > >>>>>> Processes, International Journal of Educational > Psychology1(2):100-126 > >>>>>> > >>>>>> It's been said by others too: Mike Cole actually makes many of the > >>>>>> same points in discussing how the Kharkov school deviated from the > >>>>>> work of Vygotsk, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> I did not know enough to make many of these points in 1978! They > >>>>> certainly > >>>>> distanced themselves from LSV and PI Zinchenko went after the > >>>>> natural-cultural memory distinction, > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> and J.V. Wertsch is quite explicit in his revisionism > >>>>>> when he presents "mediated activity" as a unit of analysis in > >>>>>> opposition to "word meaning". > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> mediated ACTION and often as not, mediated action in context. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> But of course since a unit of analysis > >>>>>> must preserve in some shape or form the essential properties of the > >>>>>> whole, the use of "mediated activity" > >>>>>> (action) > >>>>>> cannot be a unit of analysis for > >>>>>> the mind if we wish to retain the idea that the mind has a semantic > >>>>>> structure (that is, if the "whole" is structured something like a > text > >>>>>> or a discourse rather than like driving a car, shooting a gun, or > >>>>>> hunting animals). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> When we get to semantic structure of consciousness, we know there > was a > >>>>> break between LSV and his buddies. It seems that it is in arriving at > >> this > >>>>> formulation that the charges of idealism and sign-o-centrism kick in. > >>>>> > >>>>> My difficulty is in making arguments about consciousness- > -in-general, > >>>>> perhaps a relic of my behaviorist past. Luria appears to have come > >> around > >>>>> on this issue. I have had a difficult time understanding the changes > in > >>>>> Leontiev's thought over the period of the 30's and 40's. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> Now, in the discussion of Holbrook's presentation, this wild-haired > >>>>>> guy who looked a little like Itzhak Perlman rose to argue that > >>>>>> Leontiev's interpretation was really one fair interpretation, and > that > >>>>>> it really was addressed towards a specific problem, which is how to > >>>>>> prevent dualism from arising (that is, how to explain how word > meaning > >>>>>> could arise historically).Through joint mediated activity? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> He also said that Holbrook was juxtaposing > >>>>>> quotations out of context: the quotes that showed Vygotsky arguing > >>>>>> against a "Marxist psychology" were directed against a very specific > >>>>>> group of vulgar Marxists (e.g. Zalkind) and that is why Vygotsky > uses > >>>>>> scare quotes around "Marxist". > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Not so? > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> I then muddied the waters, first by addressing the wild-haired guy > >>>>>> instead of Holbrook (a major breach of protocol) and then by arguing > >>>>>> that speech really is sui generis, because it is a form of > "activity" > >>>>>> (if we must call it that) whose conditions of comprehension are no > >>>>>> longer recoverable from the activity itself (and so the unit of > >>>>>> analysis for verbal thinking cannot be sought in activity). There > >>>>>> wasn't enough time to really develop what I wanted to say, so I went > >>>>>> over to continue the discussion, and it turned out that the wild > >>>>>> haired guy was none other than Seth Chaiklin, who is, we all know, > one > >>>>>> of the foremost paleo-Vygotskyans when it comes to the much > >>>>>> misinterpreted concept of the ZPD. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Speech is a form of activity or a means of activity? Or of action? > >>>>> > >>>>> I guess I do not understand. If its worthwhile, perhaps spell the > idea > >>>>> out > >>>>> here? > >>>>> > >>>>> So far as I can tell, there are ONLY misinterpretations of the Zoped. > >> Seth > >>>>> was right on about it being used in Anglo-American discourse as > >> something > >>>>> akin to zone of proximal learning,fitting into the associationist > view > >> of > >>>>> development as more learning. But the one right interpretation has > >> escaped > >>>>> my notice. > >>>>> > >>>>> Thanks again for taking the trouble to write that out. Perhaps it > will > >> be > >>>>> generative for people. > >>>>> mike > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>> > >>>>>> PS: Holbrook DID get one thing wrong. Stalin did not argue that > >>>>>> language was purely ideal and superstructural; that was Marr's > >>>>>> position. Stalin, or whoever ghost wrote his articles, argued that > >>>>>> language was base, and therefore somehow material, whatever that > >>>>>> means. But Stalin was not really interested in ideas; he was just > out > >>>>>> for Marr's blood. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 6 October 2014 22:21, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Hi David-- > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> The specific example of your comments on originals and adaptations > >> hits > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> on > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> a point it would be helpful to hear more about: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> You wrote: > >>>>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat > >>>>>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging > >>>>>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which > >> actually > >>>>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, > >>>>>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's > >>>>>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we > need > >>>>>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an > argument > >>>>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account > supplants > >>>>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is > no > >>>>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts > >> (and > >>>>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least > >>>>>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of > >>>>>>> thinking that has become extinct). > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> 1. Could you guide us to a text you recommend where this > >>>>>>> interpretation > >>>>>>> is laid out? > >>>>>>> 2. What sort of revision was Seth suggesting and why? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I have been reading Russian discussions around this issue. > >> Clarification > >>>>>>> would be helpful. > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:37 AM, David Kellogg < > dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own bed > and > >>>>>>>> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, played, > as > >>>>>>>> Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) > >> Stradivarius > >>>>>>>> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very first > time > >>>>>>>> in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma > >> has > >>>>>>>> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has > >> been > >>>>>>>> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal > >> interpretation. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if > Mendelssohn > >>>>>>>> himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, > >>>>>>>> Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had > >> occupied, > >>>>>>>> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to > >>>>>>>> Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period > >>>>>>>> instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and > starts > >>>>>>>> to play. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat > >>>>>>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging > >>>>>>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which > >> actually > >>>>>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but > behavior, > >>>>>>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's > >>>>>>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we > need > >>>>>>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an > >> argument > >>>>>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account > >> supplants > >>>>>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is > >> no > >>>>>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts > >> (and > >>>>>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least > >>>>>>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of > >>>>>>>> thinking that has become extinct). > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in Sydney > was > >>>>>>>> not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I would > have > >>>>>>>> liked it better if she had used those terms a little more > >> imprecisely, > >>>>>>>> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might > >> have > >>>>>>>> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was > >>>>>>>> contemplating. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a > world > >>>>>>>> without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are > >>>>>>>> replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather > >>>>>>>> dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she called > >> the > >>>>>>>> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also human > >>>>>>>> identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the > >> conference > >>>>>>>> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time for > >> the > >>>>>>>> spiritual side of life. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the > "object" > >> of > >>>>>>>> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working > class > >> is > >>>>>>>> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex > >> workers > >>>>>>>> and atomized into the social position of housewives. Inequality is > >> now > >>>>>>>> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history > tells > >>>>>>>> us that the result of this is not going to be individual > >> spirituality > >>>>>>>> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if > >> that > >>>>>>>> force is organized, social, and directed against social equality > >>>>>>>> rather than against fellow members of the working class. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> dk > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On 5 October 2014 13:38, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie > Nardi > >> I > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> had > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if she > >> has > >>>>>>>>> written something on "object" that is very good news. > >>>>>>>>> I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't think > one > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> good > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> book > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long while > I > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> have > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> been > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie" > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> without > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> an > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of > >> "substance" > >>>>>>>>> whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains > >> outstanding > >>>>>>>>> differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that almost > all > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> bar > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> one > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is a > >> step > >>>>>>>>> forward, and people are aware of the differences in > interpretation > >> and > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> they > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a > while, > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> maybe > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> consistency > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> optimistic. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>> ------------ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. > >>>>>>>>>> I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds > that > >> go > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> U > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a shower of > >>>>>>>>>> interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> (Whatever > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on basics of > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> AT > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> is > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Mike > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were a > >> little > >>>>>>>>>> slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also iscar-ers > >> and > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> we > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. > >>>>>>>>>> Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger on a > >>>>>>>>>> Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and tablets > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> etc., > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were > >>>>>>>>>> oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> My impressions of CHAT research: > >>>>>>>>>> On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp > and > >>>>>>>>>> critical in relation to the dominant political forces, and > >> still > >>>>>>>>>> way out in front in understanding the several developmental > >>>>>>>>>> processes which all contribute to our actions (phylogenesis, > >>>>>>>>>> historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, microgenesis), > >> and > >>>>>>>>>> not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great > >>>>>>>>>> community of research, relatively lacking in the > >> competitiveness > >>>>>>>>>> and jealousy which infects most research communities. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On the negative side: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" as > >> some > >>>>>>>>>> homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces problems > >> into > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., people > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> lack > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> a > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> viable social theory or the ability to use theory they > >> have > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated way. > >>>>>>>>>> * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. > >> Only a > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> small > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> minority know what it means and use the idea in their > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> research. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> confusion; > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> few researchers using the concept are clear on what the > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> concept > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront and > >>>>>>>>>> attempt to > >>>>>>>>>> resolve the methodological differences (I refer to > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> systematic > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) > within > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the > relatively > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> civil > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> relations between researchers - people prefer to let > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> differences > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> just fester without openly discussing them. The old > Soviet > >>>>>>>>>> approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far the > >> other > >>>>>>>>>> way. :) > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>> ------------ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response > to > >>>>>>>>>> someone who > >>>>>>>>>> wrote backto xmca instead of me. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an > >>>>>>>>>> interesting and > >>>>>>>>>> unassuming guy. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca > >> discussion?? > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > >> with > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> an > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > >> an > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >> > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Oct 8 09:06:45 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2014 09:06:45 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Assistant Professor Position in School Psychology at Syracuse University In-Reply-To: <01c501cfe304$174117f0$45c347d0$@syr.edu> References: <01c501cfe304$174117f0$45c347d0$@syr.edu> Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Natalie Russo Date: Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 7:28 AM Subject: Re: [COGDEVSOC] Assistant Professor Position in School Psychology at Syracuse University To: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org Cc: Lawrence J Lewandowski Dear Colleagues, Please find below an advertising for a tenure-track faculty position in School psychology at Syracuse University. Thank you, Natalie Russo, Ph.D. Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology Syracuse University Office: 403 Huntington Hall Phone: 315-443-2024 Email: nrusso@syr.edu http://thecollege.syr.edu/profiles/pages/russo-natalie.html *FACULTY SEARCH IN SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY.* The Department of Psychology at Syracuse University invites applications for a tenure-track Assistant Professor position to join their APA-, NASP-, and NCATE-accredited School Psychology training program. We are seeking a scholar with a scientist-practitioner philosophy, a strong record of research productivity, potential to develop an independent, externally-funded research program, and commitment to teaching excellence at both the graduate and undergraduate levels. Area of research specialization is open, but preference will be given to candidates with substantive interests in either school-based services for children?s learning and behavior problems (RtI, SWPBS, school mental health) or assessment and treatment of pediatric disorders (ADHD, LD, EBD, TBI, cancer). In addition, preference will be given to candidates who can engage in areas of collaborative research related to other programs in the department, which include cognitive-behavioral approaches to childhood disorders as well as adolescent and adult health psychology (Clinical Psychology), social issues such as relationships, stigma, and prejudice (Social Psychology), and neuropsychological issues such as attention, memory, decision-making, and quantitative modeling of human cognition (Cognition, Brain, and Behavior). Responsibilities of the position include teaching undergraduate and graduate courses in developmental psychology as well as courses in the candidate?s area of expertise. In addition, the candidate will be expected to advise undergraduates as well as graduate students, direct student theses and dissertations, supervise clinical practica, and serve on departmental committees. Candidates should be eligible for licensure as a psychologist in the state of New York. Syracuse University is an equal opportunity, affirmative-action institution. The university and department have a strong commitment to achieving diversity among faculty and staff. We are particularly interested in receiving applications from members of underrepresented groups and strongly encourage women and persons of color to apply for these positions. Further, the Department of Psychology and broader Syracuse community provides a rich and supportive environment for inclusive research involving ethnically and economically diverse populations. Syracuse is located in beautiful Upstate New York. The city and surrounding areas offer outstanding school systems, a modest cost of living, proximity to nature (Adirondack Mountains, Thousand Islands, Lake Ontario, and the Finger Lakes) and easy access to major eastern cities. Several major medical centers, including SUNY Upstate Medical Center, the Syracuse VA Medical Center, are in close proximity to Syracuse University and offer opportunities for interdisciplinary research. More information about the department may be found at http://psychweb.syr.edu/. Applicants must complete a brief online faculty application at http://www.sujobopps.com. Attach electronic copies of your curriculum vitae and a cover letter describing your research and teaching interests. Three letters of recommendation are required. Detailed instructions for uploading their confidential recommendation letter into the system will be sent to references identified in your application. Applications will be reviewed beginning November 1, 2014 and will continue until the position is filled. Our goal is to fill the position by January 1, 2015. *From:* cogdevsoc [mailto:cogdevsoc-bounces@lists.cogdevsoc.org] *On Behalf Of *JULIEN MAYOR *Sent:* Wednesday, October 08, 2014 7:02 AM *To:* cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org *Subject:* [COGDEVSOC] Assistant/Associate Professorship in Psychology at the University of Nottingham, Malaysia Campus * Apologies for cross-posting * Dear colleagues, please find the following advertisement for a position of Assistant/Associate Professor in Psychology at the University of Nottingham - Malaysia Campus. Developmentalists are welcome to apply! Kind regards, Julien Mayor *---* *University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus* *School of Psychology* *Assistant/Associate Professor in Psychology * An Assistant/Associate Professor post is available in our School of Psychology at the Malaysia Campus. The successful candidate will have access to labs equipped with high quality research facilities, including eye tracking and EEG. We seek a talented individual with a proven record of research and teaching with expertise in any area of experimental psychology or cognitive neuroscience. Candidates who are qualified to use our laboratory facilities are especially welcome. To be successful, candidates should have a PhD in Psychology or a related discipline, along with evidence of student-centred tertiary teaching in Psychology. Duties will include research, administration and teaching through lectures, practical classes, tutorials and project supervision as directed by the Head of School. The School covers the specialisms of cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, including vision research and biological psychology; social and health psychology, including evolutionary and clinical psychology; and developmental psychology. Further information about the School?s profile is available on our website: http://www.nottingham.edu.my/Psychology/index.aspx Informal enquiries about these positions may be addressed to Dr Elizabeth Sheppard, Head of School (UNMC) at elizabeth.sheppard@nottingham.edu.my. Applications, specifying the job being applied for, with current curriculum vitae, should be sent to the Faculty Manager at salma.abdkadir@nottingham.edu.my. Application deadline: 5th November 2014 *---Associate ProfessorSchool of Psychology, Faculty of ScienceThe University of Nottingham - Malaysia CampusJalan Broga, 43500 SemenyihSelangor Darul EhsanMalaysiaTel: +6(0) 389248238* << This message and any attachment are intended solely for the addressee and may contain confidential information. If you have received this message in error, please send it back to me, and immediately delete it. Please do not use, copy or disclose the information contained in this message or in any attachment. Any views or opinions expressed by the author of this email do not necessarily reflect the views of the University of Nottingham. This message has been checked for viruses but the contents of an attachment may still contain software viruses which could damage your computer system: you are advised to perform your own checks. Email communications with the University of Nottingham may be monitored as permitted by UK & Malaysia legislation. >> _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Oct 8 09:28:40 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2014 16:28:40 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> Message-ID: Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing that both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting requires ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the world. Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking with words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the form of new signs. ? Martin On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by exploring > *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT that word > meaning is BEST understood - > > "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as operations, > actions, and activities." > > This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings. From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Oct 8 09:56:31 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2014 09:56:31 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> Message-ID: David et al-- I began reading some of the texts to which David referred us last night. I have the following suggestion for a means by which we might be able to understand our misunderstandings a little better. The suggestion is this: Lets jointly read two articles, both of which are available in PDF so that all can read them and neither is so long that it will erode the rest of our lives. 1. LS Vygotsky on the Problem of the Environment (available at marxists.org ) 2. A.N. Leontiev's critical article about LSV's ideas about the role of the environment in development. I suggest this pair because they raise a lot of the issues under discussion. David wrote that he has concluded that Perezhivanie is quite specific to the problem Vygotsky raises in this lecture, which is how three different children can respond so differently to the one and the same form of child abuse. >From recent discussions with contemporary Russians in what they refer to as "cultural historical psychology" I have encountered a lot of variability in how perezhivanie is thought about and many appear to believe that this pair of articles illuminate principled differences between the two. Also, the comparative reading should help to clarify the point that David has made that units of analysis have to be specified with respect to the questions, "units for what?" I attach the Leontiev article assuming that everyone can find the LSV chapter on marxists.org. I hope this seems a useful discussion. I, at least, am going to go through this exercise. I came away from the extensive Russian discussion pretty confused about issues and need to re-visit them in any event. Headers for this discussion might be: LSV-ANL-environment so that people can delete if they see it coming and are not interested. mike On Tue, Oct 7, 2014 at 5:15 PM, mike cole wrote: > Thanks for all the clarifying, David. I will go back and read the texts > you point to. > > The way you push forward the sense/meaning issue is totally new to me and > quite different from what I have been reading in arguments among > contemporary Russians, viz: > > So "smysl" is "tema"; it is something like > "realized, actual meaning" while "znachenie" is something like > "potential, possible meaning". Tema is what happens when we activate a > particular layer in the great palimpsest of possible meanings left in > each word by our contemporaries and ancestors. > > How do we connect this to the notion, from LSV, that znachenie (meaning) > is the most stable pole of smysl (sense)? The various > translations/interpretations of these terms are really confusing me. Where > does tema from and where is it taking us? > > mike > PS-- Any notion of who/where "social situation of development" is > reinterpreted as "context."? > > > On Tue, Oct 7, 2014 at 3:12 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >> Larry, Mike, Huw, Andy-- >> >> (and above all the real "objects" of broadening and enlivening the >> discussion, you by-standers and handwringers, perhaps intimidated by >> the pointing and handwaving, and unwilling to contribute lest the >> discussion become less sharpened and pointed....) >> >> There were several issues that seemed to pop up session after session >> at ISCAR, quite independently of who raised them. Yes, "the real >> Vygotsky" was certainly one of them, and Holbrook was not the only >> person to talk this way; I did too, and I do think that a world where >> the original Vygotsky is not recoverable is just as bad as a world >> where Vygotsky is completely forgotten. But in the context of ISCAR, >> the "real Vygotsky" was often a response to many speakers who would >> like to emphasize the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky. >> >> There were two ways of doing this. One was to simply say that of >> course Vygotsky was a Marxist, but then everybody was Marxist back >> then, and it was not much more important than being a liberal Democrat >> today. Interestingly, in the Making of Mind, Luria said that this is a >> description which could well apply to many psychologists of his time, >> including himself, but not to Vygotsky. A more sophisticated way of >> emphasizing the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky requires a "real >> Vygotsky" of a different kind. Writers like our good friend Nikolai >> Veresov have tried to do this by emphasizing the PRE-Marxist Vygotsky, >> especially Vygotsky the phenomenologist, student of Gustav Shpet who >> was a student of Husserl himself. >> >> I was formerly little puzzled by this move. Seth argued that it was >> valid, because of Vygotsky's ties to Lewin and Lewin's ideas about the >> force of objects and the fields of attractors created thereby. Lewin >> was certainly an attractor for Vygotsky, but Vygotsky actually uses >> Lewin to criticize phenomenological analysis in Chapter Three of HDHMF >> (see Vol. 4, p. 69). Elsewhere, Vygotsky is very critical of the >> founders of phenomenology, iincluding Husserl (p. 7). >> >> But now I think that Larry (and Martin, who has raised the same >> connection) is on to something. For it is also in HDHMF that Vygotsky >> bruits the idea that attention is a kind of gateway function, that the >> indicative is the primordial function of speech and thinking, and that >> there is nevertheless a qualitative difference between noticing >> something and internalizing it as a meaning--all of these are >> Husserlian ideas. Even the knotted handkerchief, which I myself have >> attributed to Vygotsky and to a peculiarly Russian practice, comes >> from the work of Husserl (Logical Investigations, Vol. I, pp. >> 269-333). I think that as a real historical materialist Vygotsky >> rejected Husserl's absolute opposition between symbol and index, but >> he didn't forget it when he set about trying to build a bridge between >> the two. >> >> Mike wonders about a text where Vygotsky rejects "activity" as a unit >> of analysis for everything but behavior. No such text exists, of >> course; if you read what I wrote carefully (I know, it's a trial >> sometimes, but at least I am a larger target then the minimalist Huw) >> you will see that I refer to a my OWN rejection, not Vygotsky's. What >> Vygotsky says in "Problem of the Environment" is that he wants to >> introduce "a number of different" units of analysis which are used in >> pedological analyses, of which "perezhivanie" is one, and >> "sense/signification" a very different one. (Andy is wrong to impute >> importance to the count noun form here; Vygotsky often uses it as a >> verb, I "live experience" something). I have always assumed that this >> means: >> >> a) Perezhivanie is quite specific to the problem Vygotsky raises in >> this lecture, which is how three different children can respond so >> differently to the one and the same form of child abuse. >> >> b) "Sense/signification" is also a unit of analysis, what Vygotsky >> refers to in Thinking and Speech as "the meaningful word". (This was >> also the object of textological attention in Holbrook's presentation). >> >> Mike also wonders about where Leontiev raises the possibility of >> applying Marxist theory directly to psychology. In many places, but >> perhaps most prominently in Problems of the Development of Mind (see >> pp. 236-237, 255). Holbrook had other quotations of this type, and I >> think there is a link between them and what Luria's remark that back >> then everybody in psychology was a "Marxist", but nobody except >> Vygotsky was much of a Marxist. Holbrook is right here. >> >> Mike asks if there is practical activity without thinking. I think >> that Vygotsky would say that there is thinking and there is verbal >> thinking (or, as Holbrook now insists, "thinking with words"). What >> monkeys do with sticks is called practical intelligence in Chapter >> Four of Thinking and Speech. It is practical activity, and it's >> thinking. But it's not a unit of thinking and speech, and therefore I >> think there is some light between what Vygotsky is willing to call >> "activity" and "praxis"; it's not the case that "praxis" is just a >> Greek word for "activity". I recognize, though, that for Andy what >> monkeys do with sticks does not count as activity (and I also >> recognize that I was muddling "activity" and "action"--sorry about >> that). >> >> Like Mike, I am paleo with regard to sense and meaning, and like Mike >> I recognize that it is hard to tell how deep the waters are here since >> they have been muddied. I think they were first muddied by Vygotsky >> himself, because he refers the distinction to Paulhan, where no such >> distinction is found (Paulhan just talks about connotation and >> denotation). But I think it's easy to unmuddy the waters and I think >> they are very deep indeed: Vygotsky uses Paulhan as a foil, taking the >> actual distinction from Volosinov, who was working at the Herzen >> Institute at exactly the same moment that Vygotsky was writing of this >> distinction. Zavershneva has said that Vygotsky cites Volosinov in his >> unpublished manuscripts, but that the citation is always removed by >> the editor in publication. So "smysl" is "tema"; it is something like >> "realized, actual meaning" while "znachenie" is something like >> "potential, possible meaning". Tema is what happens when we activate a >> particular layer in the great palimpsest of possible meanings left in >> each word by our contemporaries and ancestors. >> >> I'm currently writing the endnotes for our new volume of Vygotsky's >> lectures on pedology, so I am very aware of the issue that Huw appears >> to be raising (although Huw is so very gnomic in his lofty remarks on >> my supposed illogicality and my more systemic problems that it is hard >> to be sure). In Lecture Six, Vygotsky says in one paragraph that >> dividing off psychological from physiological development is >> methodologically impermissable, but in the very next paragraph, and >> indeed in the layout of the book, he says "dismemberment is >> nevertheless necessary". On the one hand, he says that there is no >> action, no motility, not even thinking without both the mind and the >> brain, and on the other he says that even within the body there are >> distinct lines of development and that physiology is "a summarizable >> concept". He is acutely aware of the contradiction, but by the end of >> the lecture he resolves it. We just have to keep in mind that things >> that we take apart for the purpose of analysis are inextricably joined >> in clinical practice. I suppose you can say it is a logical >> contradiction if you want, particularly if by that you mean it is a >> contradiction that only exists in the ideal world, that is, in logic >> and does not really pose a problem in life. >> >> The problem is with the word "text" is the same, Huw. For Hallidayans >> like me, a text is precisely a semantic object; it's not made of paper >> and ink. Viewed interpersonally, a text is a coherent and cohesive >> exchange. Viewed intra-mentally, it's a representation of thinking. It >> is objective, but it's objective the way that mathematics and language >> itself is objective, not the way that three actual apples or a >> physical book is objective. Dixit. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> (PS: I'm afraid I didn't get the systemic reproach at all. It's hard >> for a fish to see the density of water, much less to see the density >> of the fish!) >> >> dk >> >> >> >> On 7 October 2014 23:11, Larry Purss wrote: >> > The understanding of action and activity AS BOTH thinking and behaviour >> > contrasting with an appeal to differentiate the aspects thinking and >> > behaviour. >> > The notion *species* was introduced by David K as returning to >> Vygotsky's >> > words as he used them [paleo return] or we will loose this species as it >> > becomes extinct. >> > >> > Therefore Leontiev's theory could also be considered a separate >> *species* >> > with its own characteristics, features, and object of activity. >> > SO in my return to the species of Activity theory I turned to one of >> > Leontiev's students [Victor Kaptelinin] in his 2005 MCA article "The >> Object >> > of Activity: Making sense of the Sense Maker" >> > >> > Kaptelinin opens his article with this fragment from the *species* of >> > Leontiev's own specified object of activity [activity theory] >> > >> > "A basic or, as is sometimes said, a CONSTITUTING characteristic of >> > activity is its objectivity or, rather object relatedness. Properly the >> > CONCEPT of its object, gegenstand, is already IMPLICITLY contained in >> the >> > very concept of activity. The expression objectless activity is DEVOID >> of >> > any meaning. Objectivity may SEEM objectless, but SCIENTIFIC >> investigations >> > OF activity NECESSARILY REQUIRES discovering its object. >> > THUS the object of activity IS TWOFOLD: >> > First, in its INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE as SUBORDINATING TO ITSELF and >> > transforming the activity of the subject [The question arises if this >> > subordinating is the object's *motive* - LP] >> > AND >> > Second, as an IMAGE OF the object, as a product OF its property of >> > psychological reflection THAT IS realized AS AN ACTIVITY OF THE SUBJECT, >> > and cannot exist OTHERWISE." >> > >> > This paragraph which Kaptelian offers as a *specimen* of a particular >> and >> > unique *species* of expression seems to present a clear *case* to hold >> up >> > to Vygotsky's *species* . >> > I would add that Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative *species* that is >> also >> > looking at objects of activity from another *angle* of vision. >> > >> > Are Vygotsky, Leontiev, and Merleau-Ponty all gesturing at the same >> > phenomena and walking around this *object* [imagined? or real?] from >> > various vantage points. >> > >> > I will pause by returning to the second quality of the TWOFOLD quality >> of >> > the *object of activity* >> > >> > "SECOND as an IMAGE OF the object, AS a product OF its PSYCHOLOGICAL >> > REFLECTION that is REALIZED [brought into form -LP] AS an activity OF >> the >> > SUBJECT and cannot exist OTHERWISE. >> > >> > Is this a new *species*?? >> > >> > Larry >> > >> > >> > On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 4:55 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> > >> >> Mike, what I got out of Seth's intervention was just a plea for people >> to >> >> stop claiming to have the "real Vygotsky" and I thoroughly agreed with >> him. >> >> And so far as I know Marx uses the German word for Activity, viz., >> >> Taetigkeit, in "Theses on Feuerbach" - that word which pre-dates >> >> "behaviour" and "consciousness" by centuries, but which is sometimes >> >> referred to nowadays as a unity of these two abstractions, and it was >> only >> >> later interpreters that introduced the term "praxis", which being Greek >> >> sounds a lot cleverer. Action and Activity, in my view and >> etymologically, >> >> are both thinking and behaving. >> >> Andy >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> *Andy Blunden* >> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> mike cole wrote: >> >> >> >>> Thanks, David. I think i understand better what you mean by "LSV >> rejects >> >>> "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior,and most >> >>> certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Somehow I was expecting >> >>> text >> >>> from LSV where he says "activity is not a unit of analysis" because >> of all >> >>> the places in his text where he uses the term activity as a sort of >> "lay >> >>> term". >> >>> >> >>> ... >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Holbrook Mahn. >> >>>> Holbrook began by saying that: >> >>>> >> >>>> a) We do not "borrow" concepts made for one discipline and "apply" >> >>>> them to another. Not even dialectical materialism can be "applied" to >> >>>> psychology (or even sociology or economics--Marx didn't do applied >> >>>> philosophy!). Holbrook then produced a number of quotations from The >> >>>> Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology to show that Vygotsky >> >>>> knew this, and countered with other quotations from Problems of the >> >>>> Development of the Mind to show that Leontiev did not know this. >> >>>> >> >>>> I know places where LSV is clear on this score, in Historical >> meaning, >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> for example, but not the evidence of Leontiev's errors. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> b) The term "praxis" has been thus borrowed. It doesn't refer to >> >>>> practical activity: it refers to a unity of thinking and practice. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> Borrowed from Marx by ..??? by Leontiev? There is any form of >> practical >> >>> activity without human thinking? >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> c) The term "social situation of development" has been thus borrowed; >> >>>> it does not refer to a "context" but to the child's relationship to >> >>>> the environment. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> By whom? I am always in a puzzle about the use of this term. Isn't >> >>> perezhivanie the term that LSV uses to talk about relation of child to >> >>> environment? At least, there seems to be a lot of chatter about issue. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> d) The term "unit of analysis" does not refer to a God particle that >> >>>> is indifferent to the problem of analysis. ygotsky did not imagine a >> >>>> "unit of analysis" that fit any and all problems in psychology. Each >> >>>> unit of analysis is specific to a particular problem of unity (e.g. >> >>>> the problem of the unity of the child and his or her environment in >> >>>> Problem of the Environment and the problem of the unity of verbal >> >>>> thinking in Thinking and Speech). >> >>>> >> >>>> Amen to that. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> e) The term "verbal thinking" is a mistranslation: Vygotsky is >> talking >> >>>> about thinking by language, or thinking through word meanings, and >> not >> >>>> some kind of verbalizable inner speech (which does exist, but which >> is >> >>>> a distinct layer from thinking). >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> There is a lot of confusion around this issue and would probably need >> >>> somewhat separate discussion. I interpret in the former way. The role >> of >> >>> meaning in inner speech, and the usefulness or not of the >> sense/meaning >> >>> distinction has me confused. Dima Leontiev has put the distinction >> behind >> >>> him and now refers to "cultural meaning" (paleo meaning >> >>> >> >>> ) and >> >>> "personal meaning (paleo sense)." I am paleo in this regard. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Most of this has been said before, not least by Vygotsky himself. I >> >>>> know that Holbrook has been saying it at least since 2007 when I >> first >> >>>> heard him at the American Association for Applied Linguistics in >> Costa >> >>>> Mesa, and he develops it at some length in: >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> https://www.academia.edu/1803017/Vygotskys_Analysis_of_ >> >>>> Childrens_Meaning-Making_Processes >> >>>> >> >>>> Mahn, H. (2012). Vygotsky's Analysis of Children's Meaning-Making >> >>>> Processes, International Journal of Educational >> Psychology1(2):100-126 >> >>>> >> >>>> It's been said by others too: Mike Cole actually makes many of the >> >>>> same points in discussing how the Kharkov school deviated from the >> >>>> work of Vygotsk, >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> I did not know enough to make many of these points in 1978! They >> >>> certainly >> >>> distanced themselves from LSV and PI Zinchenko went after the >> >>> natural-cultural memory distinction, >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> and J.V. Wertsch is quite explicit in his revisionism >> >>>> when he presents "mediated activity" as a unit of analysis in >> >>>> opposition to "word meaning". >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> mediated ACTION and often as not, mediated action in context. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> But of course since a unit of analysis >> >>>> must preserve in some shape or form the essential properties of the >> >>>> whole, the use of "mediated activity" >> >>>> (action) >> >>>> cannot be a unit of analysis for >> >>>> the mind if we wish to retain the idea that the mind has a semantic >> >>>> structure (that is, if the "whole" is structured something like a >> text >> >>>> or a discourse rather than like driving a car, shooting a gun, or >> >>>> hunting animals). >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> When we get to semantic structure of consciousness, we know there was >> a >> >>> break between LSV and his buddies. It seems that it is in arriving at >> this >> >>> formulation that the charges of idealism and sign-o-centrism kick in. >> >>> >> >>> My difficulty is in making arguments about consciousness- -in-general, >> >>> perhaps a relic of my behaviorist past. Luria appears to have come >> around >> >>> on this issue. I have had a difficult time understanding the changes >> in >> >>> Leontiev's thought over the period of the 30's and 40's. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Now, in the discussion of Holbrook's presentation, this wild-haired >> >>>> guy who looked a little like Itzhak Perlman rose to argue that >> >>>> Leontiev's interpretation was really one fair interpretation, and >> that >> >>>> it really was addressed towards a specific problem, which is how to >> >>>> prevent dualism from arising (that is, how to explain how word >> meaning >> >>>> could arise historically).Through joint mediated activity? >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> He also said that Holbrook was juxtaposing >> >>>> quotations out of context: the quotes that showed Vygotsky arguing >> >>>> against a "Marxist psychology" were directed against a very specific >> >>>> group of vulgar Marxists (e.g. Zalkind) and that is why Vygotsky uses >> >>>> scare quotes around "Marxist". >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> Not so? >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> I then muddied the waters, first by addressing the wild-haired guy >> >>>> instead of Holbrook (a major breach of protocol) and then by arguing >> >>>> that speech really is sui generis, because it is a form of "activity" >> >>>> (if we must call it that) whose conditions of comprehension are no >> >>>> longer recoverable from the activity itself (and so the unit of >> >>>> analysis for verbal thinking cannot be sought in activity). There >> >>>> wasn't enough time to really develop what I wanted to say, so I went >> >>>> over to continue the discussion, and it turned out that the wild >> >>>> haired guy was none other than Seth Chaiklin, who is, we all know, >> one >> >>>> of the foremost paleo-Vygotskyans when it comes to the much >> >>>> misinterpreted concept of the ZPD. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> Speech is a form of activity or a means of activity? Or of action? >> >>> >> >>> I guess I do not understand. If its worthwhile, perhaps spell the idea >> >>> out >> >>> here? >> >>> >> >>> So far as I can tell, there are ONLY misinterpretations of the Zoped. >> Seth >> >>> was right on about it being used in Anglo-American discourse as >> something >> >>> akin to zone of proximal learning,fitting into the associationist >> view of >> >>> development as more learning. But the one right interpretation has >> escaped >> >>> my notice. >> >>> >> >>> Thanks again for taking the trouble to write that out. Perhaps it >> will be >> >>> generative for people. >> >>> mike >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> David Kellogg >> >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >>>> >> >>>> PS: Holbrook DID get one thing wrong. Stalin did not argue that >> >>>> language was purely ideal and superstructural; that was Marr's >> >>>> position. Stalin, or whoever ghost wrote his articles, argued that >> >>>> language was base, and therefore somehow material, whatever that >> >>>> means. But Stalin was not really interested in ideas; he was just out >> >>>> for Marr's blood. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> On 6 October 2014 22:21, mike cole wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> Hi David-- >> >>>>> >> >>>>> The specific example of your comments on originals and adaptations >> hits >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>> on >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> a point it would be helpful to hear more about: >> >>>>> >> >>>>> You wrote: >> >>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat >> >>>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging >> >>>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which >> actually >> >>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, >> >>>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's >> >>>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need >> >>>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an >> argument >> >>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account >> supplants >> >>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is >> no >> >>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts >> (and >> >>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least >> >>>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of >> >>>>> thinking that has become extinct). >> >>>>> >> >>>>> 1. Could you guide us to a text you recommend where this >> >>>>> interpretation >> >>>>> is laid out? >> >>>>> 2. What sort of revision was Seth suggesting and why? >> >>>>> >> >>>>> I have been reading Russian discussions around this issue. >> Clarification >> >>>>> would be helpful. >> >>>>> mike >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:37 AM, David Kellogg < >> dkellogg60@gmail.com> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>> wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own bed and >> >>>>>> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, played, as >> >>>>>> Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) >> Stradivarius >> >>>>>> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very first >> time >> >>>>>> in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma >> has >> >>>>>> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has >> been >> >>>>>> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal >> interpretation. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if >> Mendelssohn >> >>>>>> himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, >> >>>>>> Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had >> occupied, >> >>>>>> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to >> >>>>>> Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period >> >>>>>> instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and >> starts >> >>>>>> to play. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat >> >>>>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging >> >>>>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which >> actually >> >>>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, >> >>>>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's >> >>>>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we >> need >> >>>>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an >> argument >> >>>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account >> supplants >> >>>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is >> no >> >>>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts >> (and >> >>>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least >> >>>>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of >> >>>>>> thinking that has become extinct). >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> David Kellogg >> >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in Sydney was >> >>>>>> not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I would >> have >> >>>>>> liked it better if she had used those terms a little more >> imprecisely, >> >>>>>> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might >> have >> >>>>>> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was >> >>>>>> contemplating. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a world >> >>>>>> without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are >> >>>>>> replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather >> >>>>>> dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she called >> the >> >>>>>> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also human >> >>>>>> identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the >> conference >> >>>>>> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time for >> the >> >>>>>> spiritual side of life. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the >> "object" of >> >>>>>> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working >> class is >> >>>>>> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex >> workers >> >>>>>> and atomized into the social position of housewives. Inequality is >> now >> >>>>>> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history >> tells >> >>>>>> us that the result of this is not going to be individual >> spirituality >> >>>>>> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if >> that >> >>>>>> force is organized, social, and directed against social equality >> >>>>>> rather than against fellow members of the working class. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> dk >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> On 5 October 2014 13:38, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie >> Nardi I >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> had >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> the >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if she >> has >> >>>>>>> written something on "object" that is very good news. >> >>>>>>> I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't think one >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> good >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> book >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long while I >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> have >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> been >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie" >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> without >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> an >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of >> "substance" >> >>>>>>> whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains >> outstanding >> >>>>>>> differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that almost >> all >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> bar >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> one >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is a >> step >> >>>>>>> forward, and people are aware of the differences in >> interpretation and >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> they >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a >> while, >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> maybe >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> consistency >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> in >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> optimistic. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> Andy >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>>> ------------ >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. >> >>>>>>>> I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds >> that go >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> U >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a shower of >> >>>>>>>> interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> (Whatever >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on basics of >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> AT >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> is >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Mike >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>> > wrote: >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were a >> little >> >>>>>>>> slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also iscar-ers >> and >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> we >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. >> >>>>>>>> Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger on a >> >>>>>>>> Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and tablets >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> etc., >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were >> >>>>>>>> oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> My impressions of CHAT research: >> >>>>>>>> On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp >> and >> >>>>>>>> critical in relation to the dominant political forces, and >> still >> >>>>>>>> way out in front in understanding the several developmental >> >>>>>>>> processes which all contribute to our actions (phylogenesis, >> >>>>>>>> historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, microgenesis), >> and >> >>>>>>>> not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great >> >>>>>>>> community of research, relatively lacking in the >> competitiveness >> >>>>>>>> and jealousy which infects most research communities. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> On the negative side: >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" as >> some >> >>>>>>>> homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces problems >> into >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> the >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., people >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> lack >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> a >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> viable social theory or the ability to use theory they >> have >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> to >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated way. >> >>>>>>>> * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. >> Only a >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> small >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> minority know what it means and use the idea in their >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> research. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> confusion; >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> few researchers using the concept are clear on what the >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> concept >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront and >> >>>>>>>> attempt to >> >>>>>>>> resolve the methodological differences (I refer to >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> systematic >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) >> within >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> the >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the >> relatively >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> civil >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> relations between researchers - people prefer to let >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> differences >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> just fester without openly discussing them. The old >> Soviet >> >>>>>>>> approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far the >> other >> >>>>>>>> way. :) >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Andy >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>>> ------------ >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response >> to >> >>>>>>>> someone who >> >>>>>>>> wrote backto xmca instead of me. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an >> >>>>>>>> interesting and >> >>>>>>>> unassuming guy. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca >> discussion?? >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> mike >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> -- >> >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >> with >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> an >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>> -- >> >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >> an >> >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >> > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: leontiev.lsv.env.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 94612 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141008/805d92bd/attachment.pdf From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Oct 8 10:22:29 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2014 10:22:29 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> Message-ID: ?Another thought that struck me as i thought about David's extension of discussion of issues raised at ISCAR was the "activity" / "praxis" issue.? The thought was this: One significant impediment to mutual understanding of each other sufficient to distinguish disagreements from misunderstandings, is that we come from such varied backgrounds, both academically and in terms of our life experiences and research foci. This struck me particularly in the discussion that followed David's mention of activity not equaling praxis. What struck me is the comments that started to elaborate on the issue by going to Husserl and meanings of the terms in greek, and generally, what I would call "high academic classical theory." But I am not equipped by education to follow the discussion very far in that direction. I was educated in the tradition of American learning theory and my philosophy teachers in college and grad school were logical positivists/behaviorist/experimentalists -- champions of the first psychology. So what I know about classical European social theory is auto-didactic and picked up from the writings of colleagues. What my education and early research experiences in Africa and Mexico did equip me for was the need to ground analyses of cross-cultural differences in (cognitive) development in the everyday activities of people, where by "everyday activity" I meant activities like rice farming in Liberia, or court cases, or house building or....... My background did not predispose me to be happy with Vygotsky, Luria's cross-cultural work, and certainly not into discussions of activity arising from Marxist theory by Leontiev. (What was this connection between culturally mediated activity (as I conceived of it) and labor?) Naive? Sure. But in that naivte, and finding a lot to like in reading the materials that ended up in Mind in Society, I glommed onto the following statement by Leontiev when I encountered it in about 1980: Human psychology is concerned with the activity of concrete individuals that takes place either in conditions of open association, in the midst of people, or eye to eye with the surrounding object world ? before the potter?s wheel or behind the writing desk. Under whatever kind of conditions and forms human activity takes place, whatever kind of structure it assumes, it must not be considered as isolated from social relations, from the life of society. Leontiev goes on to write some other stuff about production that did not thrill me, but at least I had found a common point between the ideas of the Vygotskian school our efforts to understand the role of culture in development. They reinforced comments in Luria's autobio which were left there on a quite general plane and not follow up upon -- Luria was otherwise occupied at the time. Bottom line. I REALLY appreciate learning about the deep historical/academic roots of the ideas we discuss, but often cannot follow the them knowledgeably, so when those who work in this way argue that so and so said such and such, I am let to take their word for it. And when they disagree, I try to withhold judgment and fall back on my own history of inquiry waiting for clarification. To me, the idea that the acid test of theory is in practice, is both paleo Vygotskian and essential to my work. It leaves me in the odd position of concluding that LSV did not, and his followers have not, found a general science of development that resolves that old crisis in psychology. Sorry for the long winded note. Lets call it cathartic, a way of living through my experience of reading XMCA mail yesterday and re-living (pere-zhivanie) (overagain-living) it. mike On Tue, Oct 7, 2014 at 3:12 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Larry, Mike, Huw, Andy-- > > (and above all the real "objects" of broadening and enlivening the > discussion, you by-standers and handwringers, perhaps intimidated by > the pointing and handwaving, and unwilling to contribute lest the > discussion become less sharpened and pointed....) > > There were several issues that seemed to pop up session after session > at ISCAR, quite independently of who raised them. Yes, "the real > Vygotsky" was certainly one of them, and Holbrook was not the only > person to talk this way; I did too, and I do think that a world where > the original Vygotsky is not recoverable is just as bad as a world > where Vygotsky is completely forgotten. But in the context of ISCAR, > the "real Vygotsky" was often a response to many speakers who would > like to emphasize the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky. > > There were two ways of doing this. One was to simply say that of > course Vygotsky was a Marxist, but then everybody was Marxist back > then, and it was not much more important than being a liberal Democrat > today. Interestingly, in the Making of Mind, Luria said that this is a > description which could well apply to many psychologists of his time, > including himself, but not to Vygotsky. A more sophisticated way of > emphasizing the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky requires a "real > Vygotsky" of a different kind. Writers like our good friend Nikolai > Veresov have tried to do this by emphasizing the PRE-Marxist Vygotsky, > especially Vygotsky the phenomenologist, student of Gustav Shpet who > was a student of Husserl himself. > > I was formerly little puzzled by this move. Seth argued that it was > valid, because of Vygotsky's ties to Lewin and Lewin's ideas about the > force of objects and the fields of attractors created thereby. Lewin > was certainly an attractor for Vygotsky, but Vygotsky actually uses > Lewin to criticize phenomenological analysis in Chapter Three of HDHMF > (see Vol. 4, p. 69). Elsewhere, Vygotsky is very critical of the > founders of phenomenology, iincluding Husserl (p. 7). > > But now I think that Larry (and Martin, who has raised the same > connection) is on to something. For it is also in HDHMF that Vygotsky > bruits the idea that attention is a kind of gateway function, that the > indicative is the primordial function of speech and thinking, and that > there is nevertheless a qualitative difference between noticing > something and internalizing it as a meaning--all of these are > Husserlian ideas. Even the knotted handkerchief, which I myself have > attributed to Vygotsky and to a peculiarly Russian practice, comes > from the work of Husserl (Logical Investigations, Vol. I, pp. > 269-333). I think that as a real historical materialist Vygotsky > rejected Husserl's absolute opposition between symbol and index, but > he didn't forget it when he set about trying to build a bridge between > the two. > > Mike wonders about a text where Vygotsky rejects "activity" as a unit > of analysis for everything but behavior. No such text exists, of > course; if you read what I wrote carefully (I know, it's a trial > sometimes, but at least I am a larger target then the minimalist Huw) > you will see that I refer to a my OWN rejection, not Vygotsky's. What > Vygotsky says in "Problem of the Environment" is that he wants to > introduce "a number of different" units of analysis which are used in > pedological analyses, of which "perezhivanie" is one, and > "sense/signification" a very different one. (Andy is wrong to impute > importance to the count noun form here; Vygotsky often uses it as a > verb, I "live experience" something). I have always assumed that this > means: > > a) Perezhivanie is quite specific to the problem Vygotsky raises in > this lecture, which is how three different children can respond so > differently to the one and the same form of child abuse. > > b) "Sense/signification" is also a unit of analysis, what Vygotsky > refers to in Thinking and Speech as "the meaningful word". (This was > also the object of textological attention in Holbrook's presentation). > > Mike also wonders about where Leontiev raises the possibility of > applying Marxist theory directly to psychology. In many places, but > perhaps most prominently in Problems of the Development of Mind (see > pp. 236-237, 255). Holbrook had other quotations of this type, and I > think there is a link between them and what Luria's remark that back > then everybody in psychology was a "Marxist", but nobody except > Vygotsky was much of a Marxist. Holbrook is right here. > > Mike asks if there is practical activity without thinking. I think > that Vygotsky would say that there is thinking and there is verbal > thinking (or, as Holbrook now insists, "thinking with words"). What > monkeys do with sticks is called practical intelligence in Chapter > Four of Thinking and Speech. It is practical activity, and it's > thinking. But it's not a unit of thinking and speech, and therefore I > think there is some light between what Vygotsky is willing to call > "activity" and "praxis"; it's not the case that "praxis" is just a > Greek word for "activity". I recognize, though, that for Andy what > monkeys do with sticks does not count as activity (and I also > recognize that I was muddling "activity" and "action"--sorry about > that). > > Like Mike, I am paleo with regard to sense and meaning, and like Mike > I recognize that it is hard to tell how deep the waters are here since > they have been muddied. I think they were first muddied by Vygotsky > himself, because he refers the distinction to Paulhan, where no such > distinction is found (Paulhan just talks about connotation and > denotation). But I think it's easy to unmuddy the waters and I think > they are very deep indeed: Vygotsky uses Paulhan as a foil, taking the > actual distinction from Volosinov, who was working at the Herzen > Institute at exactly the same moment that Vygotsky was writing of this > distinction. Zavershneva has said that Vygotsky cites Volosinov in his > unpublished manuscripts, but that the citation is always removed by > the editor in publication. So "smysl" is "tema"; it is something like > "realized, actual meaning" while "znachenie" is something like > "potential, possible meaning". Tema is what happens when we activate a > particular layer in the great palimpsest of possible meanings left in > each word by our contemporaries and ancestors. > > I'm currently writing the endnotes for our new volume of Vygotsky's > lectures on pedology, so I am very aware of the issue that Huw appears > to be raising (although Huw is so very gnomic in his lofty remarks on > my supposed illogicality and my more systemic problems that it is hard > to be sure). In Lecture Six, Vygotsky says in one paragraph that > dividing off psychological from physiological development is > methodologically impermissable, but in the very next paragraph, and > indeed in the layout of the book, he says "dismemberment is > nevertheless necessary". On the one hand, he says that there is no > action, no motility, not even thinking without both the mind and the > brain, and on the other he says that even within the body there are > distinct lines of development and that physiology is "a summarizable > concept". He is acutely aware of the contradiction, but by the end of > the lecture he resolves it. We just have to keep in mind that things > that we take apart for the purpose of analysis are inextricably joined > in clinical practice. I suppose you can say it is a logical > contradiction if you want, particularly if by that you mean it is a > contradiction that only exists in the ideal world, that is, in logic > and does not really pose a problem in life. > > The problem is with the word "text" is the same, Huw. For Hallidayans > like me, a text is precisely a semantic object; it's not made of paper > and ink. Viewed interpersonally, a text is a coherent and cohesive > exchange. Viewed intra-mentally, it's a representation of thinking. It > is objective, but it's objective the way that mathematics and language > itself is objective, not the way that three actual apples or a > physical book is objective. Dixit. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > (PS: I'm afraid I didn't get the systemic reproach at all. It's hard > for a fish to see the density of water, much less to see the density > of the fish!) > > dk > > > > On 7 October 2014 23:11, Larry Purss wrote: > > The understanding of action and activity AS BOTH thinking and behaviour > > contrasting with an appeal to differentiate the aspects thinking and > > behaviour. > > The notion *species* was introduced by David K as returning to Vygotsky's > > words as he used them [paleo return] or we will loose this species as it > > becomes extinct. > > > > Therefore Leontiev's theory could also be considered a separate *species* > > with its own characteristics, features, and object of activity. > > SO in my return to the species of Activity theory I turned to one of > > Leontiev's students [Victor Kaptelinin] in his 2005 MCA article "The > Object > > of Activity: Making sense of the Sense Maker" > > > > Kaptelinin opens his article with this fragment from the *species* of > > Leontiev's own specified object of activity [activity theory] > > > > "A basic or, as is sometimes said, a CONSTITUTING characteristic of > > activity is its objectivity or, rather object relatedness. Properly the > > CONCEPT of its object, gegenstand, is already IMPLICITLY contained in the > > very concept of activity. The expression objectless activity is DEVOID of > > any meaning. Objectivity may SEEM objectless, but SCIENTIFIC > investigations > > OF activity NECESSARILY REQUIRES discovering its object. > > THUS the object of activity IS TWOFOLD: > > First, in its INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE as SUBORDINATING TO ITSELF and > > transforming the activity of the subject [The question arises if this > > subordinating is the object's *motive* - LP] > > AND > > Second, as an IMAGE OF the object, as a product OF its property of > > psychological reflection THAT IS realized AS AN ACTIVITY OF THE SUBJECT, > > and cannot exist OTHERWISE." > > > > This paragraph which Kaptelian offers as a *specimen* of a particular and > > unique *species* of expression seems to present a clear *case* to hold up > > to Vygotsky's *species* . > > I would add that Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative *species* that is > also > > looking at objects of activity from another *angle* of vision. > > > > Are Vygotsky, Leontiev, and Merleau-Ponty all gesturing at the same > > phenomena and walking around this *object* [imagined? or real?] from > > various vantage points. > > > > I will pause by returning to the second quality of the TWOFOLD quality of > > the *object of activity* > > > > "SECOND as an IMAGE OF the object, AS a product OF its PSYCHOLOGICAL > > REFLECTION that is REALIZED [brought into form -LP] AS an activity OF the > > SUBJECT and cannot exist OTHERWISE. > > > > Is this a new *species*?? > > > > Larry > > > > > > On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 4:55 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >> Mike, what I got out of Seth's intervention was just a plea for people > to > >> stop claiming to have the "real Vygotsky" and I thoroughly agreed with > him. > >> And so far as I know Marx uses the German word for Activity, viz., > >> Taetigkeit, in "Theses on Feuerbach" - that word which pre-dates > >> "behaviour" and "consciousness" by centuries, but which is sometimes > >> referred to nowadays as a unity of these two abstractions, and it was > only > >> later interpreters that introduced the term "praxis", which being Greek > >> sounds a lot cleverer. Action and Activity, in my view and > etymologically, > >> are both thinking and behaving. > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> mike cole wrote: > >> > >>> Thanks, David. I think i understand better what you mean by "LSV > rejects > >>> "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior,and most > >>> certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Somehow I was expecting > >>> text > >>> from LSV where he says "activity is not a unit of analysis" because of > all > >>> the places in his text where he uses the term activity as a sort of > "lay > >>> term". > >>> > >>> ... > >>> > >>> > >>>> Holbrook Mahn. > >>>> Holbrook began by saying that: > >>>> > >>>> a) We do not "borrow" concepts made for one discipline and "apply" > >>>> them to another. Not even dialectical materialism can be "applied" to > >>>> psychology (or even sociology or economics--Marx didn't do applied > >>>> philosophy!). Holbrook then produced a number of quotations from The > >>>> Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology to show that Vygotsky > >>>> knew this, and countered with other quotations from Problems of the > >>>> Development of the Mind to show that Leontiev did not know this. > >>>> > >>>> I know places where LSV is clear on this score, in Historical meaning, > >>>> > >>>> > >>> for example, but not the evidence of Leontiev's errors. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> b) The term "praxis" has been thus borrowed. It doesn't refer to > >>>> practical activity: it refers to a unity of thinking and practice. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> Borrowed from Marx by ..??? by Leontiev? There is any form of practical > >>> activity without human thinking? > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> c) The term "social situation of development" has been thus borrowed; > >>>> it does not refer to a "context" but to the child's relationship to > >>>> the environment. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> By whom? I am always in a puzzle about the use of this term. Isn't > >>> perezhivanie the term that LSV uses to talk about relation of child to > >>> environment? At least, there seems to be a lot of chatter about issue. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> d) The term "unit of analysis" does not refer to a God particle that > >>>> is indifferent to the problem of analysis. ygotsky did not imagine a > >>>> "unit of analysis" that fit any and all problems in psychology. Each > >>>> unit of analysis is specific to a particular problem of unity (e.g. > >>>> the problem of the unity of the child and his or her environment in > >>>> Problem of the Environment and the problem of the unity of verbal > >>>> thinking in Thinking and Speech). > >>>> > >>>> Amen to that. > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> e) The term "verbal thinking" is a mistranslation: Vygotsky is talking > >>>> about thinking by language, or thinking through word meanings, and not > >>>> some kind of verbalizable inner speech (which does exist, but which is > >>>> a distinct layer from thinking). > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> There is a lot of confusion around this issue and would probably need > >>> somewhat separate discussion. I interpret in the former way. The role > of > >>> meaning in inner speech, and the usefulness or not of the sense/meaning > >>> distinction has me confused. Dima Leontiev has put the distinction > behind > >>> him and now refers to "cultural meaning" (paleo meaning > >>> > >>> ) and > >>> "personal meaning (paleo sense)." I am paleo in this regard. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> Most of this has been said before, not least by Vygotsky himself. I > >>>> know that Holbrook has been saying it at least since 2007 when I first > >>>> heard him at the American Association for Applied Linguistics in Costa > >>>> Mesa, and he develops it at some length in: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> https://www.academia.edu/1803017/Vygotskys_Analysis_of_ > >>>> Childrens_Meaning-Making_Processes > >>>> > >>>> Mahn, H. (2012). Vygotsky's Analysis of Children's Meaning-Making > >>>> Processes, International Journal of Educational Psychology1(2):100-126 > >>>> > >>>> It's been said by others too: Mike Cole actually makes many of the > >>>> same points in discussing how the Kharkov school deviated from the > >>>> work of Vygotsk, > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> I did not know enough to make many of these points in 1978! They > >>> certainly > >>> distanced themselves from LSV and PI Zinchenko went after the > >>> natural-cultural memory distinction, > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> and J.V. Wertsch is quite explicit in his revisionism > >>>> when he presents "mediated activity" as a unit of analysis in > >>>> opposition to "word meaning". > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> mediated ACTION and often as not, mediated action in context. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> But of course since a unit of analysis > >>>> must preserve in some shape or form the essential properties of the > >>>> whole, the use of "mediated activity" > >>>> (action) > >>>> cannot be a unit of analysis for > >>>> the mind if we wish to retain the idea that the mind has a semantic > >>>> structure (that is, if the "whole" is structured something like a text > >>>> or a discourse rather than like driving a car, shooting a gun, or > >>>> hunting animals). > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> When we get to semantic structure of consciousness, we know there was a > >>> break between LSV and his buddies. It seems that it is in arriving at > this > >>> formulation that the charges of idealism and sign-o-centrism kick in. > >>> > >>> My difficulty is in making arguments about consciousness- -in-general, > >>> perhaps a relic of my behaviorist past. Luria appears to have come > around > >>> on this issue. I have had a difficult time understanding the changes in > >>> Leontiev's thought over the period of the 30's and 40's. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> Now, in the discussion of Holbrook's presentation, this wild-haired > >>>> guy who looked a little like Itzhak Perlman rose to argue that > >>>> Leontiev's interpretation was really one fair interpretation, and that > >>>> it really was addressed towards a specific problem, which is how to > >>>> prevent dualism from arising (that is, how to explain how word meaning > >>>> could arise historically).Through joint mediated activity? > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> He also said that Holbrook was juxtaposing > >>>> quotations out of context: the quotes that showed Vygotsky arguing > >>>> against a "Marxist psychology" were directed against a very specific > >>>> group of vulgar Marxists (e.g. Zalkind) and that is why Vygotsky uses > >>>> scare quotes around "Marxist". > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> Not so? > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> I then muddied the waters, first by addressing the wild-haired guy > >>>> instead of Holbrook (a major breach of protocol) and then by arguing > >>>> that speech really is sui generis, because it is a form of "activity" > >>>> (if we must call it that) whose conditions of comprehension are no > >>>> longer recoverable from the activity itself (and so the unit of > >>>> analysis for verbal thinking cannot be sought in activity). There > >>>> wasn't enough time to really develop what I wanted to say, so I went > >>>> over to continue the discussion, and it turned out that the wild > >>>> haired guy was none other than Seth Chaiklin, who is, we all know, one > >>>> of the foremost paleo-Vygotskyans when it comes to the much > >>>> misinterpreted concept of the ZPD. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> Speech is a form of activity or a means of activity? Or of action? > >>> > >>> I guess I do not understand. If its worthwhile, perhaps spell the idea > >>> out > >>> here? > >>> > >>> So far as I can tell, there are ONLY misinterpretations of the Zoped. > Seth > >>> was right on about it being used in Anglo-American discourse as > something > >>> akin to zone of proximal learning,fitting into the associationist view > of > >>> development as more learning. But the one right interpretation has > escaped > >>> my notice. > >>> > >>> Thanks again for taking the trouble to write that out. Perhaps it will > be > >>> generative for people. > >>> mike > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> David Kellogg > >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>> > >>>> PS: Holbrook DID get one thing wrong. Stalin did not argue that > >>>> language was purely ideal and superstructural; that was Marr's > >>>> position. Stalin, or whoever ghost wrote his articles, argued that > >>>> language was base, and therefore somehow material, whatever that > >>>> means. But Stalin was not really interested in ideas; he was just out > >>>> for Marr's blood. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On 6 October 2014 22:21, mike cole wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Hi David-- > >>>>> > >>>>> The specific example of your comments on originals and adaptations > hits > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> on > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> a point it would be helpful to hear more about: > >>>>> > >>>>> You wrote: > >>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat > >>>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging > >>>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which > actually > >>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, > >>>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's > >>>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need > >>>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument > >>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants > >>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no > >>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts > (and > >>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least > >>>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of > >>>>> thinking that has become extinct). > >>>>> > >>>>> 1. Could you guide us to a text you recommend where this > >>>>> interpretation > >>>>> is laid out? > >>>>> 2. What sort of revision was Seth suggesting and why? > >>>>> > >>>>> I have been reading Russian discussions around this issue. > Clarification > >>>>> would be helpful. > >>>>> mike > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:37 AM, David Kellogg > > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own bed and > >>>>>> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, played, as > >>>>>> Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) > Stradivarius > >>>>>> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very first time > >>>>>> in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma > has > >>>>>> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has > been > >>>>>> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal > interpretation. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if Mendelssohn > >>>>>> himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, > >>>>>> Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had > occupied, > >>>>>> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to > >>>>>> Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period > >>>>>> instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and starts > >>>>>> to play. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat > >>>>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging > >>>>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which > actually > >>>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, > >>>>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's > >>>>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need > >>>>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an > argument > >>>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account > supplants > >>>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is > no > >>>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts > (and > >>>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least > >>>>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of > >>>>>> thinking that has become extinct). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>> > >>>>>> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in Sydney was > >>>>>> not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I would have > >>>>>> liked it better if she had used those terms a little more > imprecisely, > >>>>>> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might > have > >>>>>> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was > >>>>>> contemplating. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a world > >>>>>> without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are > >>>>>> replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather > >>>>>> dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she called > the > >>>>>> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also human > >>>>>> identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the > conference > >>>>>> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time for > the > >>>>>> spiritual side of life. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the "object" > of > >>>>>> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working class > is > >>>>>> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex > workers > >>>>>> and atomized into the social position of housewives. Inequality is > now > >>>>>> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history tells > >>>>>> us that the result of this is not going to be individual > spirituality > >>>>>> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if > that > >>>>>> force is organized, social, and directed against social equality > >>>>>> rather than against fellow members of the working class. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> dk > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 5 October 2014 13:38, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie Nardi > I > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> had > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> the > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if she > has > >>>>>>> written something on "object" that is very good news. > >>>>>>> I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't think one > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> good > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> book > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long while I > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> have > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> been > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie" > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> without > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> an > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of > "substance" > >>>>>>> whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains > outstanding > >>>>>>> differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that almost all > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> bar > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> one > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is a > step > >>>>>>> forward, and people are aware of the differences in interpretation > and > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> they > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a while, > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> maybe > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> consistency > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> in > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> optimistic. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> ------------ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. > >>>>>>>> I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds that > go > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> U > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a shower of > >>>>>>>> interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> (Whatever > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on basics of > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> AT > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> is > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Mike > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were a > little > >>>>>>>> slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also iscar-ers > and > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> we > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. > >>>>>>>> Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger on a > >>>>>>>> Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and tablets > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> etc., > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were > >>>>>>>> oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> My impressions of CHAT research: > >>>>>>>> On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp and > >>>>>>>> critical in relation to the dominant political forces, and > still > >>>>>>>> way out in front in understanding the several developmental > >>>>>>>> processes which all contribute to our actions (phylogenesis, > >>>>>>>> historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, microgenesis), > and > >>>>>>>> not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great > >>>>>>>> community of research, relatively lacking in the > competitiveness > >>>>>>>> and jealousy which infects most research communities. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On the negative side: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" as > some > >>>>>>>> homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces problems > into > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> the > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., people > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> lack > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> a > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> viable social theory or the ability to use theory they > have > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> to > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated way. > >>>>>>>> * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. > Only a > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> small > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> minority know what it means and use the idea in their > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> research. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> confusion; > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> few researchers using the concept are clear on what the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> concept > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront and > >>>>>>>> attempt to > >>>>>>>> resolve the methodological differences (I refer to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> systematic > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) within > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the relatively > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> civil > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> relations between researchers - people prefer to let > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> differences > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> just fester without openly discussing them. The old Soviet > >>>>>>>> approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far the > other > >>>>>>>> way. :) > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> ------------ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response to > >>>>>>>> someone who > >>>>>>>> wrote backto xmca instead of me. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an > >>>>>>>> interesting and > >>>>>>>> unassuming guy. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca > discussion?? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> an > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Oct 8 15:00:17 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2014 07:00:17 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> Message-ID: Itzhak Perlman is also making gentle fun of Yo-yo Ma's little game of "six degrees of separation", whereby Ma insists on the direct face-to-face contact between us and the departed masters via a chain of aging masters. In this too, I am in sympathy with Ma: it is why I shelled out the huge registration fee to go to ISCAR, and also why I was a little disappointed not to see Mike there (although secretly relieved since I know he is an unbruised fruit that does not travel so well these days, and it was a gruelling flight even for a tough nut like me). It is also why last year at this time I forked over a similar fee to go and spend two weeks in Guangzhou in the company of Michael Halliday. Of course I know it is possible to communicate with some of these masters through the email (though not Halliday, who considers human speech to be the most developed form of human communications technology precisely because it is the oldest). But it turns out that when we reduce speech to nothing but vowels and consonants and nouns and verbs, we have to reconstruct for ourselves the immense good will and cheer that is transmitted effortlessly, iconically, and indexically in face-to-face encounters, and this greatly impedes (my) understanding. That is why Martin's proposal that we consider both tool-mediated activity and sign-mediated speech to be forms of semiotic mediation appeals. I think it might resolve the key problem that LSV leaves us with at the end of Chapter Two of HDHMF when he warns against those who consider signs to be "psychological tools" (pace Kozulin, Bordrova and Leong), and says that they are only "logically" (pace Huw) members of a common category; with the precise relationship between them (i.e. the historical relationship between them) to be worked out. Tools and signs are functionally quite different even where they appear to co-occur (like the blade of the axe and the decorations on the handle, as Volosinov says): one acts on the environment and mediates a subject-object relationship, while the other presupposes somehow empathetically reconstructing the mental state of another subject. Yet there must be some deep internal link or we could not have evolved the one out of the other. That internal link, it seems to me, is the physical presence of the other in the environment, in all of his or her smiling and grimacing, sweating and stinking glory, and the internal link is necessarily stronger in the case of "tema" than in the case of "znachenie". The idea that the latter is merely meaning potential and the former is actual, realized, materialized meaning comes straight from Halliday. But the (for me, linked) idea that the latter is the most stable pole of word value and the former the least so comes straight from Volosinov, who influenced Halliday via the Prague linguists. Volosinov derives it from a long analysis of the great schools of linguistics somewhat similar to Mike's recent ruminations on the great schools of psychological thought: there were centuries where linguistics was synonymous with the study of disembodied speech (vowels and consonants rather than intonation and stress, writing rather than speaking, and literature rather than everyday language), and there was a century--the nineteenth--where the opposite tendency held sway (von Humboldt, Potebnia, but above all the school of Kurt Vossler). We can also derive Volosinov's conclusion logically--"znachenie" is actually produced by abstraction and generalization from "tema", and both processes would lend it a self-similarity, a stability, which cannot obtain with "tema". I am now quite certain that Volosinov and Vygotsky were in direct, face-to-face contact during the last two years of LSV's life when he worked at the Herzen Pedagogical Institute in Leningrad. In any case, both of them pose exactly the same thought experiment (which is also posed in the work of Marr, who by some accounts took part in LSV's weekly meetings with Eisenstein). Both wondered what a language which consisted of a single word would sound like, and asked if it would even be a language at all. And both came up with the same answer. It would sound like an obscenity, tossed back and forth between drunken workmen on a street, as recorded in the diary of the great writer Fyodor Dostoevsky. That is, the meaning would be conveyed not referentially but indexically, not through articulation but through prosody, not through grammar but through revoicing. You can produce some of the same effect in English if you imagine the following conversation, slurring the initial and final consonants and assimilating the middle vowel to a kind of schwa sound (the vowel you make with your tongue in the exact middle of your mouth). A: (Wh)e(re)? B: (Th)e(re)! C: (Wh)e(n)?? D: (Th)e(n)!! E: (Wh)a(t)??? F: (Th)a(t)!!! Volosinov concludes that it would indeed be speech, because the essence of speech is "tema" and not "znachenie", its inner quality is precisely this kind of mutability and only its outer form is self-similarity. Speech is, essentially, grunts and groans and not grammar. But of course that means that both poles are present, and must be present, for speech to be language. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies PS: I think the reinterpretation of SSD as "context" is exactly what Andy was referring to: the hypostatization of "society" as a kind of enveloping cultural given from which the subject has no choice and over which the subject has no control. Those who use the Engstrom triangle as a kind of inventory of stuff to talk about are content to overcome this danger by sticking a two headed arrow between "subject" and "rules" or "subject" and "community" or "subject" and "division of labor". But this only poses the problem; it doesn't solve it. By the way, exactly the same problem occurs in Hallidayan linguistics when people talk about context. Halliday himself is quite clear that somethinig only becomes context when you attend to it and select it from the environment for the transformation into meaning, but people imagine that attending and transforming is something you actually do to context. dk On 8 October 2014 09:15, mike cole wrote: > Thanks for all the clarifying, David. I will go back and read the texts you > point to. > > The way you push forward the sense/meaning issue is totally new to me and > quite different from what I have been reading in arguments among > contemporary Russians, viz: > > So "smysl" is "tema"; it is something like > "realized, actual meaning" while "znachenie" is something like > "potential, possible meaning". Tema is what happens when we activate a > particular layer in the great palimpsest of possible meanings left in > each word by our contemporaries and ancestors. > > How do we connect this to the notion, from LSV, that znachenie (meaning) is > the most stable pole of smysl (sense)? The various > translations/interpretations of these terms are really confusing me. Where > does tema from and where is it taking us? > > mike > PS-- Any notion of who/where "social situation of development" is > reinterpreted as "context."? > > > On Tue, Oct 7, 2014 at 3:12 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Larry, Mike, Huw, Andy-- >> >> (and above all the real "objects" of broadening and enlivening the >> discussion, you by-standers and handwringers, perhaps intimidated by >> the pointing and handwaving, and unwilling to contribute lest the >> discussion become less sharpened and pointed....) >> >> There were several issues that seemed to pop up session after session >> at ISCAR, quite independently of who raised them. Yes, "the real >> Vygotsky" was certainly one of them, and Holbrook was not the only >> person to talk this way; I did too, and I do think that a world where >> the original Vygotsky is not recoverable is just as bad as a world >> where Vygotsky is completely forgotten. But in the context of ISCAR, >> the "real Vygotsky" was often a response to many speakers who would >> like to emphasize the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky. >> >> There were two ways of doing this. One was to simply say that of >> course Vygotsky was a Marxist, but then everybody was Marxist back >> then, and it was not much more important than being a liberal Democrat >> today. Interestingly, in the Making of Mind, Luria said that this is a >> description which could well apply to many psychologists of his time, >> including himself, but not to Vygotsky. A more sophisticated way of >> emphasizing the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky requires a "real >> Vygotsky" of a different kind. Writers like our good friend Nikolai >> Veresov have tried to do this by emphasizing the PRE-Marxist Vygotsky, >> especially Vygotsky the phenomenologist, student of Gustav Shpet who >> was a student of Husserl himself. >> >> I was formerly little puzzled by this move. Seth argued that it was >> valid, because of Vygotsky's ties to Lewin and Lewin's ideas about the >> force of objects and the fields of attractors created thereby. Lewin >> was certainly an attractor for Vygotsky, but Vygotsky actually uses >> Lewin to criticize phenomenological analysis in Chapter Three of HDHMF >> (see Vol. 4, p. 69). Elsewhere, Vygotsky is very critical of the >> founders of phenomenology, iincluding Husserl (p. 7). >> >> But now I think that Larry (and Martin, who has raised the same >> connection) is on to something. For it is also in HDHMF that Vygotsky >> bruits the idea that attention is a kind of gateway function, that the >> indicative is the primordial function of speech and thinking, and that >> there is nevertheless a qualitative difference between noticing >> something and internalizing it as a meaning--all of these are >> Husserlian ideas. Even the knotted handkerchief, which I myself have >> attributed to Vygotsky and to a peculiarly Russian practice, comes >> from the work of Husserl (Logical Investigations, Vol. I, pp. >> 269-333). I think that as a real historical materialist Vygotsky >> rejected Husserl's absolute opposition between symbol and index, but >> he didn't forget it when he set about trying to build a bridge between >> the two. >> >> Mike wonders about a text where Vygotsky rejects "activity" as a unit >> of analysis for everything but behavior. No such text exists, of >> course; if you read what I wrote carefully (I know, it's a trial >> sometimes, but at least I am a larger target then the minimalist Huw) >> you will see that I refer to a my OWN rejection, not Vygotsky's. What >> Vygotsky says in "Problem of the Environment" is that he wants to >> introduce "a number of different" units of analysis which are used in >> pedological analyses, of which "perezhivanie" is one, and >> "sense/signification" a very different one. (Andy is wrong to impute >> importance to the count noun form here; Vygotsky often uses it as a >> verb, I "live experience" something). I have always assumed that this >> means: >> >> a) Perezhivanie is quite specific to the problem Vygotsky raises in >> this lecture, which is how three different children can respond so >> differently to the one and the same form of child abuse. >> >> b) "Sense/signification" is also a unit of analysis, what Vygotsky >> refers to in Thinking and Speech as "the meaningful word". (This was >> also the object of textological attention in Holbrook's presentation). >> >> Mike also wonders about where Leontiev raises the possibility of >> applying Marxist theory directly to psychology. In many places, but >> perhaps most prominently in Problems of the Development of Mind (see >> pp. 236-237, 255). Holbrook had other quotations of this type, and I >> think there is a link between them and what Luria's remark that back >> then everybody in psychology was a "Marxist", but nobody except >> Vygotsky was much of a Marxist. Holbrook is right here. >> >> Mike asks if there is practical activity without thinking. I think >> that Vygotsky would say that there is thinking and there is verbal >> thinking (or, as Holbrook now insists, "thinking with words"). What >> monkeys do with sticks is called practical intelligence in Chapter >> Four of Thinking and Speech. It is practical activity, and it's >> thinking. But it's not a unit of thinking and speech, and therefore I >> think there is some light between what Vygotsky is willing to call >> "activity" and "praxis"; it's not the case that "praxis" is just a >> Greek word for "activity". I recognize, though, that for Andy what >> monkeys do with sticks does not count as activity (and I also >> recognize that I was muddling "activity" and "action"--sorry about >> that). >> >> Like Mike, I am paleo with regard to sense and meaning, and like Mike >> I recognize that it is hard to tell how deep the waters are here since >> they have been muddied. I think they were first muddied by Vygotsky >> himself, because he refers the distinction to Paulhan, where no such >> distinction is found (Paulhan just talks about connotation and >> denotation). But I think it's easy to unmuddy the waters and I think >> they are very deep indeed: Vygotsky uses Paulhan as a foil, taking the >> actual distinction from Volosinov, who was working at the Herzen >> Institute at exactly the same moment that Vygotsky was writing of this >> distinction. Zavershneva has said that Vygotsky cites Volosinov in his >> unpublished manuscripts, but that the citation is always removed by >> the editor in publication. So "smysl" is "tema"; it is something like >> "realized, actual meaning" while "znachenie" is something like >> "potential, possible meaning". Tema is what happens when we activate a >> particular layer in the great palimpsest of possible meanings left in >> each word by our contemporaries and ancestors. >> >> I'm currently writing the endnotes for our new volume of Vygotsky's >> lectures on pedology, so I am very aware of the issue that Huw appears >> to be raising (although Huw is so very gnomic in his lofty remarks on >> my supposed illogicality and my more systemic problems that it is hard >> to be sure). In Lecture Six, Vygotsky says in one paragraph that >> dividing off psychological from physiological development is >> methodologically impermissable, but in the very next paragraph, and >> indeed in the layout of the book, he says "dismemberment is >> nevertheless necessary". On the one hand, he says that there is no >> action, no motility, not even thinking without both the mind and the >> brain, and on the other he says that even within the body there are >> distinct lines of development and that physiology is "a summarizable >> concept". He is acutely aware of the contradiction, but by the end of >> the lecture he resolves it. We just have to keep in mind that things >> that we take apart for the purpose of analysis are inextricably joined >> in clinical practice. I suppose you can say it is a logical >> contradiction if you want, particularly if by that you mean it is a >> contradiction that only exists in the ideal world, that is, in logic >> and does not really pose a problem in life. >> >> The problem is with the word "text" is the same, Huw. For Hallidayans >> like me, a text is precisely a semantic object; it's not made of paper >> and ink. Viewed interpersonally, a text is a coherent and cohesive >> exchange. Viewed intra-mentally, it's a representation of thinking. It >> is objective, but it's objective the way that mathematics and language >> itself is objective, not the way that three actual apples or a >> physical book is objective. Dixit. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> (PS: I'm afraid I didn't get the systemic reproach at all. It's hard >> for a fish to see the density of water, much less to see the density >> of the fish!) >> >> dk >> >> >> >> On 7 October 2014 23:11, Larry Purss wrote: >> > The understanding of action and activity AS BOTH thinking and behaviour >> > contrasting with an appeal to differentiate the aspects thinking and >> > behaviour. >> > The notion *species* was introduced by David K as returning to Vygotsky's >> > words as he used them [paleo return] or we will loose this species as it >> > becomes extinct. >> > >> > Therefore Leontiev's theory could also be considered a separate *species* >> > with its own characteristics, features, and object of activity. >> > SO in my return to the species of Activity theory I turned to one of >> > Leontiev's students [Victor Kaptelinin] in his 2005 MCA article "The >> Object >> > of Activity: Making sense of the Sense Maker" >> > >> > Kaptelinin opens his article with this fragment from the *species* of >> > Leontiev's own specified object of activity [activity theory] >> > >> > "A basic or, as is sometimes said, a CONSTITUTING characteristic of >> > activity is its objectivity or, rather object relatedness. Properly the >> > CONCEPT of its object, gegenstand, is already IMPLICITLY contained in the >> > very concept of activity. The expression objectless activity is DEVOID of >> > any meaning. Objectivity may SEEM objectless, but SCIENTIFIC >> investigations >> > OF activity NECESSARILY REQUIRES discovering its object. >> > THUS the object of activity IS TWOFOLD: >> > First, in its INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE as SUBORDINATING TO ITSELF and >> > transforming the activity of the subject [The question arises if this >> > subordinating is the object's *motive* - LP] >> > AND >> > Second, as an IMAGE OF the object, as a product OF its property of >> > psychological reflection THAT IS realized AS AN ACTIVITY OF THE SUBJECT, >> > and cannot exist OTHERWISE." >> > >> > This paragraph which Kaptelian offers as a *specimen* of a particular and >> > unique *species* of expression seems to present a clear *case* to hold up >> > to Vygotsky's *species* . >> > I would add that Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative *species* that is >> also >> > looking at objects of activity from another *angle* of vision. >> > >> > Are Vygotsky, Leontiev, and Merleau-Ponty all gesturing at the same >> > phenomena and walking around this *object* [imagined? or real?] from >> > various vantage points. >> > >> > I will pause by returning to the second quality of the TWOFOLD quality of >> > the *object of activity* >> > >> > "SECOND as an IMAGE OF the object, AS a product OF its PSYCHOLOGICAL >> > REFLECTION that is REALIZED [brought into form -LP] AS an activity OF the >> > SUBJECT and cannot exist OTHERWISE. >> > >> > Is this a new *species*?? >> > >> > Larry >> > >> > >> > On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 4:55 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> > >> >> Mike, what I got out of Seth's intervention was just a plea for people >> to >> >> stop claiming to have the "real Vygotsky" and I thoroughly agreed with >> him. >> >> And so far as I know Marx uses the German word for Activity, viz., >> >> Taetigkeit, in "Theses on Feuerbach" - that word which pre-dates >> >> "behaviour" and "consciousness" by centuries, but which is sometimes >> >> referred to nowadays as a unity of these two abstractions, and it was >> only >> >> later interpreters that introduced the term "praxis", which being Greek >> >> sounds a lot cleverer. Action and Activity, in my view and >> etymologically, >> >> are both thinking and behaving. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> *Andy Blunden* >> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> mike cole wrote: >> >> >> >>> Thanks, David. I think i understand better what you mean by "LSV >> rejects >> >>> "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior,and most >> >>> certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Somehow I was expecting >> >>> text >> >>> from LSV where he says "activity is not a unit of analysis" because of >> all >> >>> the places in his text where he uses the term activity as a sort of >> "lay >> >>> term". >> >>> >> >>> ... >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Holbrook Mahn. >> >>>> Holbrook began by saying that: >> >>>> >> >>>> a) We do not "borrow" concepts made for one discipline and "apply" >> >>>> them to another. Not even dialectical materialism can be "applied" to >> >>>> psychology (or even sociology or economics--Marx didn't do applied >> >>>> philosophy!). Holbrook then produced a number of quotations from The >> >>>> Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology to show that Vygotsky >> >>>> knew this, and countered with other quotations from Problems of the >> >>>> Development of the Mind to show that Leontiev did not know this. >> >>>> >> >>>> I know places where LSV is clear on this score, in Historical meaning, >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> for example, but not the evidence of Leontiev's errors. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> b) The term "praxis" has been thus borrowed. It doesn't refer to >> >>>> practical activity: it refers to a unity of thinking and practice. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> Borrowed from Marx by ..??? by Leontiev? There is any form of practical >> >>> activity without human thinking? >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> c) The term "social situation of development" has been thus borrowed; >> >>>> it does not refer to a "context" but to the child's relationship to >> >>>> the environment. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> By whom? I am always in a puzzle about the use of this term. Isn't >> >>> perezhivanie the term that LSV uses to talk about relation of child to >> >>> environment? At least, there seems to be a lot of chatter about issue. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> d) The term "unit of analysis" does not refer to a God particle that >> >>>> is indifferent to the problem of analysis. ygotsky did not imagine a >> >>>> "unit of analysis" that fit any and all problems in psychology. Each >> >>>> unit of analysis is specific to a particular problem of unity (e.g. >> >>>> the problem of the unity of the child and his or her environment in >> >>>> Problem of the Environment and the problem of the unity of verbal >> >>>> thinking in Thinking and Speech). >> >>>> >> >>>> Amen to that. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> e) The term "verbal thinking" is a mistranslation: Vygotsky is talking >> >>>> about thinking by language, or thinking through word meanings, and not >> >>>> some kind of verbalizable inner speech (which does exist, but which is >> >>>> a distinct layer from thinking). >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> There is a lot of confusion around this issue and would probably need >> >>> somewhat separate discussion. I interpret in the former way. The role >> of >> >>> meaning in inner speech, and the usefulness or not of the sense/meaning >> >>> distinction has me confused. Dima Leontiev has put the distinction >> behind >> >>> him and now refers to "cultural meaning" (paleo meaning >> >>> >> >>> ) and >> >>> "personal meaning (paleo sense)." I am paleo in this regard. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Most of this has been said before, not least by Vygotsky himself. I >> >>>> know that Holbrook has been saying it at least since 2007 when I first >> >>>> heard him at the American Association for Applied Linguistics in Costa >> >>>> Mesa, and he develops it at some length in: >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> https://www.academia.edu/1803017/Vygotskys_Analysis_of_ >> >>>> Childrens_Meaning-Making_Processes >> >>>> >> >>>> Mahn, H. (2012). Vygotsky's Analysis of Children's Meaning-Making >> >>>> Processes, International Journal of Educational Psychology1(2):100-126 >> >>>> >> >>>> It's been said by others too: Mike Cole actually makes many of the >> >>>> same points in discussing how the Kharkov school deviated from the >> >>>> work of Vygotsk, >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> I did not know enough to make many of these points in 1978! They >> >>> certainly >> >>> distanced themselves from LSV and PI Zinchenko went after the >> >>> natural-cultural memory distinction, >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> and J.V. Wertsch is quite explicit in his revisionism >> >>>> when he presents "mediated activity" as a unit of analysis in >> >>>> opposition to "word meaning". >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> mediated ACTION and often as not, mediated action in context. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> But of course since a unit of analysis >> >>>> must preserve in some shape or form the essential properties of the >> >>>> whole, the use of "mediated activity" >> >>>> (action) >> >>>> cannot be a unit of analysis for >> >>>> the mind if we wish to retain the idea that the mind has a semantic >> >>>> structure (that is, if the "whole" is structured something like a text >> >>>> or a discourse rather than like driving a car, shooting a gun, or >> >>>> hunting animals). >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> When we get to semantic structure of consciousness, we know there was a >> >>> break between LSV and his buddies. It seems that it is in arriving at >> this >> >>> formulation that the charges of idealism and sign-o-centrism kick in. >> >>> >> >>> My difficulty is in making arguments about consciousness- -in-general, >> >>> perhaps a relic of my behaviorist past. Luria appears to have come >> around >> >>> on this issue. I have had a difficult time understanding the changes in >> >>> Leontiev's thought over the period of the 30's and 40's. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Now, in the discussion of Holbrook's presentation, this wild-haired >> >>>> guy who looked a little like Itzhak Perlman rose to argue that >> >>>> Leontiev's interpretation was really one fair interpretation, and that >> >>>> it really was addressed towards a specific problem, which is how to >> >>>> prevent dualism from arising (that is, how to explain how word meaning >> >>>> could arise historically).Through joint mediated activity? >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> He also said that Holbrook was juxtaposing >> >>>> quotations out of context: the quotes that showed Vygotsky arguing >> >>>> against a "Marxist psychology" were directed against a very specific >> >>>> group of vulgar Marxists (e.g. Zalkind) and that is why Vygotsky uses >> >>>> scare quotes around "Marxist". >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> Not so? >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> I then muddied the waters, first by addressing the wild-haired guy >> >>>> instead of Holbrook (a major breach of protocol) and then by arguing >> >>>> that speech really is sui generis, because it is a form of "activity" >> >>>> (if we must call it that) whose conditions of comprehension are no >> >>>> longer recoverable from the activity itself (and so the unit of >> >>>> analysis for verbal thinking cannot be sought in activity). There >> >>>> wasn't enough time to really develop what I wanted to say, so I went >> >>>> over to continue the discussion, and it turned out that the wild >> >>>> haired guy was none other than Seth Chaiklin, who is, we all know, one >> >>>> of the foremost paleo-Vygotskyans when it comes to the much >> >>>> misinterpreted concept of the ZPD. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> Speech is a form of activity or a means of activity? Or of action? >> >>> >> >>> I guess I do not understand. If its worthwhile, perhaps spell the idea >> >>> out >> >>> here? >> >>> >> >>> So far as I can tell, there are ONLY misinterpretations of the Zoped. >> Seth >> >>> was right on about it being used in Anglo-American discourse as >> something >> >>> akin to zone of proximal learning,fitting into the associationist view >> of >> >>> development as more learning. But the one right interpretation has >> escaped >> >>> my notice. >> >>> >> >>> Thanks again for taking the trouble to write that out. Perhaps it will >> be >> >>> generative for people. >> >>> mike >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> David Kellogg >> >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >>>> >> >>>> PS: Holbrook DID get one thing wrong. Stalin did not argue that >> >>>> language was purely ideal and superstructural; that was Marr's >> >>>> position. Stalin, or whoever ghost wrote his articles, argued that >> >>>> language was base, and therefore somehow material, whatever that >> >>>> means. But Stalin was not really interested in ideas; he was just out >> >>>> for Marr's blood. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> On 6 October 2014 22:21, mike cole wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> Hi David-- >> >>>>> >> >>>>> The specific example of your comments on originals and adaptations >> hits >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>> on >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> a point it would be helpful to hear more about: >> >>>>> >> >>>>> You wrote: >> >>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat >> >>>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging >> >>>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which >> actually >> >>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, >> >>>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's >> >>>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need >> >>>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument >> >>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants >> >>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no >> >>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts >> (and >> >>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least >> >>>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of >> >>>>> thinking that has become extinct). >> >>>>> >> >>>>> 1. Could you guide us to a text you recommend where this >> >>>>> interpretation >> >>>>> is laid out? >> >>>>> 2. What sort of revision was Seth suggesting and why? >> >>>>> >> >>>>> I have been reading Russian discussions around this issue. >> Clarification >> >>>>> would be helpful. >> >>>>> mike >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:37 AM, David Kellogg > > >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>> wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own bed and >> >>>>>> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, played, as >> >>>>>> Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) >> Stradivarius >> >>>>>> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very first time >> >>>>>> in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma >> has >> >>>>>> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has >> been >> >>>>>> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal >> interpretation. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if Mendelssohn >> >>>>>> himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, >> >>>>>> Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had >> occupied, >> >>>>>> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to >> >>>>>> Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period >> >>>>>> instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and starts >> >>>>>> to play. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat >> >>>>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging >> >>>>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which >> actually >> >>>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, >> >>>>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's >> >>>>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need >> >>>>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an >> argument >> >>>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account >> supplants >> >>>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is >> no >> >>>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts >> (and >> >>>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least >> >>>>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of >> >>>>>> thinking that has become extinct). >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> David Kellogg >> >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in Sydney was >> >>>>>> not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I would have >> >>>>>> liked it better if she had used those terms a little more >> imprecisely, >> >>>>>> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might >> have >> >>>>>> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was >> >>>>>> contemplating. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a world >> >>>>>> without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are >> >>>>>> replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather >> >>>>>> dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she called >> the >> >>>>>> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also human >> >>>>>> identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the >> conference >> >>>>>> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time for >> the >> >>>>>> spiritual side of life. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the "object" >> of >> >>>>>> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working class >> is >> >>>>>> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex >> workers >> >>>>>> and atomized into the social position of housewives. Inequality is >> now >> >>>>>> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history tells >> >>>>>> us that the result of this is not going to be individual >> spirituality >> >>>>>> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if >> that >> >>>>>> force is organized, social, and directed against social equality >> >>>>>> rather than against fellow members of the working class. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> dk >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> On 5 October 2014 13:38, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie Nardi >> I >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> had >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> the >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if she >> has >> >>>>>>> written something on "object" that is very good news. >> >>>>>>> I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't think one >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> good >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> book >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long while I >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> have >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> been >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie" >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> without >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> an >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of >> "substance" >> >>>>>>> whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains >> outstanding >> >>>>>>> differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that almost all >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> bar >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> one >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is a >> step >> >>>>>>> forward, and people are aware of the differences in interpretation >> and >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> they >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a while, >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> maybe >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> consistency >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> in >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> optimistic. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> Andy >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>>> ------------ >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. >> >>>>>>>> I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds that >> go >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> U >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a shower of >> >>>>>>>> interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> (Whatever >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on basics of >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> AT >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> is >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Mike >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>> > wrote: >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were a >> little >> >>>>>>>> slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also iscar-ers >> and >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> we >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. >> >>>>>>>> Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger on a >> >>>>>>>> Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and tablets >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> etc., >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were >> >>>>>>>> oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> My impressions of CHAT research: >> >>>>>>>> On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp and >> >>>>>>>> critical in relation to the dominant political forces, and >> still >> >>>>>>>> way out in front in understanding the several developmental >> >>>>>>>> processes which all contribute to our actions (phylogenesis, >> >>>>>>>> historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, microgenesis), >> and >> >>>>>>>> not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great >> >>>>>>>> community of research, relatively lacking in the >> competitiveness >> >>>>>>>> and jealousy which infects most research communities. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> On the negative side: >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" as >> some >> >>>>>>>> homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces problems >> into >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> the >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., people >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> lack >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> a >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> viable social theory or the ability to use theory they >> have >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> to >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated way. >> >>>>>>>> * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. >> Only a >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> small >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> minority know what it means and use the idea in their >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> research. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> confusion; >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> few researchers using the concept are clear on what the >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> concept >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront and >> >>>>>>>> attempt to >> >>>>>>>> resolve the methodological differences (I refer to >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> systematic >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) within >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> the >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the relatively >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> civil >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> relations between researchers - people prefer to let >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> differences >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> just fester without openly discussing them. The old Soviet >> >>>>>>>> approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far the >> other >> >>>>>>>> way. :) >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Andy >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>>> ------------ >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response to >> >>>>>>>> someone who >> >>>>>>>> wrote backto xmca instead of me. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an >> >>>>>>>> interesting and >> >>>>>>>> unassuming guy. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca >> discussion?? >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> mike >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> -- >> >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >> with >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> an >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>> -- >> >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >> an >> >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >> > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From ablunden@mira.net Wed Oct 8 17:35:43 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 09 Oct 2014 11:35:43 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] praxis/practice/activity In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> Message-ID: <5435D85F.1080802@mira.net> I am happy to continue the closer examination of LSV and ANL via "Problem of the Environment" and ANL's attack on it. As you know Mike, I have already written an article on just this topic which came down solidly in defence of Vygotsky. Firstly, I think David is right in this: that "ProbEnv" limits what it says about perezhivanie to showing how the developmental impact on the three siblings was different. However, implicit in this is (1) that each perezhivanija had a developmental impact and (2) only the eldest child developed. I accept that what these post-Vasilyuk Russians do with perezhivanie is an extension of LSV's work (such as in the problem of age), but one which I think is solidly based in LSV's legacy. Secondly, on the question of the meaning of "activity", "practice" and "praxis" in the Marxist tradition. I too am an autodidact, Mike, and not even that in Psychology and Linguistics, but in Philosophy and Social theory, an autodidact. But the question is not that difficult. Marx never used the word "praxis" so far as I know. I think the reason it was introduced by later Marxists is because of the everyday meaning of "activity" and "practice" which are both, as David indicates in his posts, regarded as meaning "behaviour". Rather than having a difficult argument about the "real meaning" of "practice" and "activity" writers adopted a new word which does not exist in everyday speech - "praxis." But the reasons for insisting that everyday usage notwithstanding, "activity" and "practice" for Marx and his careful student, Vygotsky, means the unity of consciousness and behaviour are two-fold. (1) Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach" (widely regarded as foundational to CHAT) makes no sense if "activity" and "practice" means behaviour. Also Vygotsky's work makes no sense if "behaviour" and "action" are equated. His wonderful 1924 immanent critique of behaviourism makes all the necessary points. (2) The word "action" is ancient. It comes from Latin and was in the English language from the 13th century. In Roman law people were guilty of crimes according to their actions. It is a much later - 17th century - idea to consider consciousness a something which can be studied and talked about separately from a person's actions, and a much later idea that behaviour can be an object of science by abstracting it from consciousness. And finally, "word meaning" is (to my mind, and to CHAT interpreters in the 1980s) an "artefact-medicated action" or if you prefer a "sign-mediated action" - if "action" is interpreted as "behaviour," i.e., abstracted from consciousness, "Thinking and Speech" collapses into total postmodern nonsense. The (in my view) correct understanding of "action" as a unity of behaviour and consciousness is the foundation stone of CHAT. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > ?Another thought that struck me as i thought about David's extension of > discussion of issues raised at ISCAR was the "activity" / "praxis" issue.? > > The thought was this: One significant impediment to mutual understanding of > each other sufficient to distinguish disagreements from misunderstandings, > is that we come from such varied backgrounds, both academically and in > terms of our life experiences and research foci. This struck me > particularly in the discussion that followed David's mention of activity > not equaling praxis. > > What struck me is the comments that started to elaborate on the issue by > going to Husserl and meanings of the terms in greek, and generally, what I > would call "high academic classical theory." But I am not equipped by > education to follow the discussion very far in that direction. I was > educated in the tradition of American learning theory and my philosophy > teachers in college and grad school were logical > positivists/behaviorist/experimentalists -- champions of the first > psychology. So what I know about classical European social theory is > auto-didactic and picked up from the writings of colleagues. > > What my education and early research experiences in Africa and Mexico did > equip me for was the need to ground analyses of cross-cultural differences > in (cognitive) development in the everyday activities of people, where by > "everyday activity" I meant activities like rice farming in Liberia, or > court cases, or house building or....... My background did not predispose > me to be happy with Vygotsky, Luria's cross-cultural work, and certainly > not into discussions of activity arising from Marxist theory by Leontiev. > (What was this connection between culturally mediated activity (as I > conceived of it) and labor?) Naive? Sure. > > But in that naivte, and finding a lot to like in reading the materials that > ended up in Mind in Society, I glommed onto the following statement by > Leontiev when I encountered it in about 1980: > > Human psychology is concerned with the activity of concrete individuals > that takes place either in conditions of open association, in the midst of > people, or eye to eye with the surrounding object world ? before the > potter?s wheel or behind the writing desk. Under whatever kind of > conditions and forms human activity takes place, whatever kind of structure > it assumes, it must not be considered as isolated from social relations, > from the life of society. > > Leontiev goes on to write some other stuff about production that did not > thrill me, but at least I had found a common point between the ideas of the > Vygotskian school our efforts to understand the role of culture in > development. They reinforced comments in Luria's autobio which were left > there on a quite general plane and not follow up upon -- Luria was > otherwise occupied at the time. > > Bottom line. I REALLY appreciate learning about the deep > historical/academic roots of the ideas we discuss, but often cannot follow > the them knowledgeably, so when those who work in this way argue that so > and so said such and such, I am let to take their word for it. And when > they disagree, I try to withhold judgment and fall back on my own history > of inquiry waiting for clarification. > > To me, the idea that the acid test of theory is in practice, is both paleo > Vygotskian and essential to my work. It leaves me in the odd position of > concluding that LSV did not, and his followers have not, found a general > science of development that resolves that old crisis in psychology. > > Sorry for the long winded note. Lets call it cathartic, a way of living > through my experience of reading XMCA mail yesterday and re-living > (pere-zhivanie) (overagain-living) it. > > mike > > > > On Tue, Oct 7, 2014 at 3:12 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > >> Larry, Mike, Huw, Andy-- >> >> (and above all the real "objects" of broadening and enlivening the >> discussion, you by-standers and handwringers, perhaps intimidated by >> the pointing and handwaving, and unwilling to contribute lest the >> discussion become less sharpened and pointed....) >> >> There were several issues that seemed to pop up session after session >> at ISCAR, quite independently of who raised them. Yes, "the real >> Vygotsky" was certainly one of them, and Holbrook was not the only >> person to talk this way; I did too, and I do think that a world where >> the original Vygotsky is not recoverable is just as bad as a world >> where Vygotsky is completely forgotten. But in the context of ISCAR, >> the "real Vygotsky" was often a response to many speakers who would >> like to emphasize the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky. >> >> There were two ways of doing this. One was to simply say that of >> course Vygotsky was a Marxist, but then everybody was Marxist back >> then, and it was not much more important than being a liberal Democrat >> today. Interestingly, in the Making of Mind, Luria said that this is a >> description which could well apply to many psychologists of his time, >> including himself, but not to Vygotsky. A more sophisticated way of >> emphasizing the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky requires a "real >> Vygotsky" of a different kind. Writers like our good friend Nikolai >> Veresov have tried to do this by emphasizing the PRE-Marxist Vygotsky, >> especially Vygotsky the phenomenologist, student of Gustav Shpet who >> was a student of Husserl himself. >> >> I was formerly little puzzled by this move. Seth argued that it was >> valid, because of Vygotsky's ties to Lewin and Lewin's ideas about the >> force of objects and the fields of attractors created thereby. Lewin >> was certainly an attractor for Vygotsky, but Vygotsky actually uses >> Lewin to criticize phenomenological analysis in Chapter Three of HDHMF >> (see Vol. 4, p. 69). Elsewhere, Vygotsky is very critical of the >> founders of phenomenology, iincluding Husserl (p. 7). >> >> But now I think that Larry (and Martin, who has raised the same >> connection) is on to something. For it is also in HDHMF that Vygotsky >> bruits the idea that attention is a kind of gateway function, that the >> indicative is the primordial function of speech and thinking, and that >> there is nevertheless a qualitative difference between noticing >> something and internalizing it as a meaning--all of these are >> Husserlian ideas. Even the knotted handkerchief, which I myself have >> attributed to Vygotsky and to a peculiarly Russian practice, comes >> from the work of Husserl (Logical Investigations, Vol. I, pp. >> 269-333). I think that as a real historical materialist Vygotsky >> rejected Husserl's absolute opposition between symbol and index, but >> he didn't forget it when he set about trying to build a bridge between >> the two. >> >> Mike wonders about a text where Vygotsky rejects "activity" as a unit >> of analysis for everything but behavior. No such text exists, of >> course; if you read what I wrote carefully (I know, it's a trial >> sometimes, but at least I am a larger target then the minimalist Huw) >> you will see that I refer to a my OWN rejection, not Vygotsky's. What >> Vygotsky says in "Problem of the Environment" is that he wants to >> introduce "a number of different" units of analysis which are used in >> pedological analyses, of which "perezhivanie" is one, and >> "sense/signification" a very different one. (Andy is wrong to impute >> importance to the count noun form here; Vygotsky often uses it as a >> verb, I "live experience" something). I have always assumed that this >> means: >> >> a) Perezhivanie is quite specific to the problem Vygotsky raises in >> this lecture, which is how three different children can respond so >> differently to the one and the same form of child abuse. >> >> b) "Sense/signification" is also a unit of analysis, what Vygotsky >> refers to in Thinking and Speech as "the meaningful word". (This was >> also the object of textological attention in Holbrook's presentation). >> >> Mike also wonders about where Leontiev raises the possibility of >> applying Marxist theory directly to psychology. In many places, but >> perhaps most prominently in Problems of the Development of Mind (see >> pp. 236-237, 255). Holbrook had other quotations of this type, and I >> think there is a link between them and what Luria's remark that back >> then everybody in psychology was a "Marxist", but nobody except >> Vygotsky was much of a Marxist. Holbrook is right here. >> >> Mike asks if there is practical activity without thinking. I think >> that Vygotsky would say that there is thinking and there is verbal >> thinking (or, as Holbrook now insists, "thinking with words"). What >> monkeys do with sticks is called practical intelligence in Chapter >> Four of Thinking and Speech. It is practical activity, and it's >> thinking. But it's not a unit of thinking and speech, and therefore I >> think there is some light between what Vygotsky is willing to call >> "activity" and "praxis"; it's not the case that "praxis" is just a >> Greek word for "activity". I recognize, though, that for Andy what >> monkeys do with sticks does not count as activity (and I also >> recognize that I was muddling "activity" and "action"--sorry about >> that). >> >> Like Mike, I am paleo with regard to sense and meaning, and like Mike >> I recognize that it is hard to tell how deep the waters are here since >> they have been muddied. I think they were first muddied by Vygotsky >> himself, because he refers the distinction to Paulhan, where no such >> distinction is found (Paulhan just talks about connotation and >> denotation). But I think it's easy to unmuddy the waters and I think >> they are very deep indeed: Vygotsky uses Paulhan as a foil, taking the >> actual distinction from Volosinov, who was working at the Herzen >> Institute at exactly the same moment that Vygotsky was writing of this >> distinction. Zavershneva has said that Vygotsky cites Volosinov in his >> unpublished manuscripts, but that the citation is always removed by >> the editor in publication. So "smysl" is "tema"; it is something like >> "realized, actual meaning" while "znachenie" is something like >> "potential, possible meaning". Tema is what happens when we activate a >> particular layer in the great palimpsest of possible meanings left in >> each word by our contemporaries and ancestors. >> >> I'm currently writing the endnotes for our new volume of Vygotsky's >> lectures on pedology, so I am very aware of the issue that Huw appears >> to be raising (although Huw is so very gnomic in his lofty remarks on >> my supposed illogicality and my more systemic problems that it is hard >> to be sure). In Lecture Six, Vygotsky says in one paragraph that >> dividing off psychological from physiological development is >> methodologically impermissable, but in the very next paragraph, and >> indeed in the layout of the book, he says "dismemberment is >> nevertheless necessary". On the one hand, he says that there is no >> action, no motility, not even thinking without both the mind and the >> brain, and on the other he says that even within the body there are >> distinct lines of development and that physiology is "a summarizable >> concept". He is acutely aware of the contradiction, but by the end of >> the lecture he resolves it. We just have to keep in mind that things >> that we take apart for the purpose of analysis are inextricably joined >> in clinical practice. I suppose you can say it is a logical >> contradiction if you want, particularly if by that you mean it is a >> contradiction that only exists in the ideal world, that is, in logic >> and does not really pose a problem in life. >> >> The problem is with the word "text" is the same, Huw. For Hallidayans >> like me, a text is precisely a semantic object; it's not made of paper >> and ink. Viewed interpersonally, a text is a coherent and cohesive >> exchange. Viewed intra-mentally, it's a representation of thinking. It >> is objective, but it's objective the way that mathematics and language >> itself is objective, not the way that three actual apples or a >> physical book is objective. Dixit. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> (PS: I'm afraid I didn't get the systemic reproach at all. It's hard >> for a fish to see the density of water, much less to see the density >> of the fish!) >> >> dk >> >> >> >> On 7 October 2014 23:11, Larry Purss wrote: >> >>> The understanding of action and activity AS BOTH thinking and behaviour >>> contrasting with an appeal to differentiate the aspects thinking and >>> behaviour. >>> The notion *species* was introduced by David K as returning to Vygotsky's >>> words as he used them [paleo return] or we will loose this species as it >>> becomes extinct. >>> >>> Therefore Leontiev's theory could also be considered a separate *species* >>> with its own characteristics, features, and object of activity. >>> SO in my return to the species of Activity theory I turned to one of >>> Leontiev's students [Victor Kaptelinin] in his 2005 MCA article "The >>> >> Object >> >>> of Activity: Making sense of the Sense Maker" >>> >>> Kaptelinin opens his article with this fragment from the *species* of >>> Leontiev's own specified object of activity [activity theory] >>> >>> "A basic or, as is sometimes said, a CONSTITUTING characteristic of >>> activity is its objectivity or, rather object relatedness. Properly the >>> CONCEPT of its object, gegenstand, is already IMPLICITLY contained in the >>> very concept of activity. The expression objectless activity is DEVOID of >>> any meaning. Objectivity may SEEM objectless, but SCIENTIFIC >>> >> investigations >> >>> OF activity NECESSARILY REQUIRES discovering its object. >>> THUS the object of activity IS TWOFOLD: >>> First, in its INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE as SUBORDINATING TO ITSELF and >>> transforming the activity of the subject [The question arises if this >>> subordinating is the object's *motive* - LP] >>> AND >>> Second, as an IMAGE OF the object, as a product OF its property of >>> psychological reflection THAT IS realized AS AN ACTIVITY OF THE SUBJECT, >>> and cannot exist OTHERWISE." >>> >>> This paragraph which Kaptelian offers as a *specimen* of a particular and >>> unique *species* of expression seems to present a clear *case* to hold up >>> to Vygotsky's *species* . >>> I would add that Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative *species* that is >>> >> also >> >>> looking at objects of activity from another *angle* of vision. >>> >>> Are Vygotsky, Leontiev, and Merleau-Ponty all gesturing at the same >>> phenomena and walking around this *object* [imagined? or real?] from >>> various vantage points. >>> >>> I will pause by returning to the second quality of the TWOFOLD quality of >>> the *object of activity* >>> >>> "SECOND as an IMAGE OF the object, AS a product OF its PSYCHOLOGICAL >>> REFLECTION that is REALIZED [brought into form -LP] AS an activity OF the >>> SUBJECT and cannot exist OTHERWISE. >>> >>> Is this a new *species*?? >>> >>> Larry >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 4:55 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Mike, what I got out of Seth's intervention was just a plea for people >>>> >> to >> >>>> stop claiming to have the "real Vygotsky" and I thoroughly agreed with >>>> >> him. >> >>>> And so far as I know Marx uses the German word for Activity, viz., >>>> Taetigkeit, in "Theses on Feuerbach" - that word which pre-dates >>>> "behaviour" and "consciousness" by centuries, but which is sometimes >>>> referred to nowadays as a unity of these two abstractions, and it was >>>> >> only >> >>>> later interpreters that introduced the term "praxis", which being Greek >>>> sounds a lot cleverer. Action and Activity, in my view and >>>> >> etymologically, >> >>>> are both thinking and behaving. >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Thanks, David. I think i understand better what you mean by "LSV >>>>> >> rejects >> >>>>> "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior,and most >>>>> certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Somehow I was expecting >>>>> text >>>>> from LSV where he says "activity is not a unit of analysis" because of >>>>> >> all >> >>>>> the places in his text where he uses the term activity as a sort of >>>>> >> "lay >> >>>>> term". >>>>> >>>>> ... >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Holbrook Mahn. >>>>>> Holbrook began by saying that: >>>>>> >>>>>> a) We do not "borrow" concepts made for one discipline and "apply" >>>>>> them to another. Not even dialectical materialism can be "applied" to >>>>>> psychology (or even sociology or economics--Marx didn't do applied >>>>>> philosophy!). Holbrook then produced a number of quotations from The >>>>>> Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology to show that Vygotsky >>>>>> knew this, and countered with other quotations from Problems of the >>>>>> Development of the Mind to show that Leontiev did not know this. >>>>>> >>>>>> I know places where LSV is clear on this score, in Historical meaning, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> for example, but not the evidence of Leontiev's errors. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> b) The term "praxis" has been thus borrowed. It doesn't refer to >>>>>> practical activity: it refers to a unity of thinking and practice. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> Borrowed from Marx by ..??? by Leontiev? There is any form of practical >>>>> activity without human thinking? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> c) The term "social situation of development" has been thus borrowed; >>>>>> it does not refer to a "context" but to the child's relationship to >>>>>> the environment. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> By whom? I am always in a puzzle about the use of this term. Isn't >>>>> perezhivanie the term that LSV uses to talk about relation of child to >>>>> environment? At least, there seems to be a lot of chatter about issue. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> d) The term "unit of analysis" does not refer to a God particle that >>>>>> is indifferent to the problem of analysis. ygotsky did not imagine a >>>>>> "unit of analysis" that fit any and all problems in psychology. Each >>>>>> unit of analysis is specific to a particular problem of unity (e.g. >>>>>> the problem of the unity of the child and his or her environment in >>>>>> Problem of the Environment and the problem of the unity of verbal >>>>>> thinking in Thinking and Speech). >>>>>> >>>>>> Amen to that. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> e) The term "verbal thinking" is a mistranslation: Vygotsky is talking >>>>>> about thinking by language, or thinking through word meanings, and not >>>>>> some kind of verbalizable inner speech (which does exist, but which is >>>>>> a distinct layer from thinking). >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> There is a lot of confusion around this issue and would probably need >>>>> somewhat separate discussion. I interpret in the former way. The role >>>>> >> of >> >>>>> meaning in inner speech, and the usefulness or not of the sense/meaning >>>>> distinction has me confused. Dima Leontiev has put the distinction >>>>> >> behind >> >>>>> him and now refers to "cultural meaning" (paleo meaning >>>>> >>>>> ) and >>>>> "personal meaning (paleo sense)." I am paleo in this regard. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Most of this has been said before, not least by Vygotsky himself. I >>>>>> know that Holbrook has been saying it at least since 2007 when I first >>>>>> heard him at the American Association for Applied Linguistics in Costa >>>>>> Mesa, and he develops it at some length in: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> https://www.academia.edu/1803017/Vygotskys_Analysis_of_ >>>>>> Childrens_Meaning-Making_Processes >>>>>> >>>>>> Mahn, H. (2012). Vygotsky's Analysis of Children's Meaning-Making >>>>>> Processes, International Journal of Educational Psychology1(2):100-126 >>>>>> >>>>>> It's been said by others too: Mike Cole actually makes many of the >>>>>> same points in discussing how the Kharkov school deviated from the >>>>>> work of Vygotsk, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> I did not know enough to make many of these points in 1978! They >>>>> certainly >>>>> distanced themselves from LSV and PI Zinchenko went after the >>>>> natural-cultural memory distinction, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> and J.V. Wertsch is quite explicit in his revisionism >>>>>> when he presents "mediated activity" as a unit of analysis in >>>>>> opposition to "word meaning". >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> mediated ACTION and often as not, mediated action in context. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> But of course since a unit of analysis >>>>>> must preserve in some shape or form the essential properties of the >>>>>> whole, the use of "mediated activity" >>>>>> (action) >>>>>> cannot be a unit of analysis for >>>>>> the mind if we wish to retain the idea that the mind has a semantic >>>>>> structure (that is, if the "whole" is structured something like a text >>>>>> or a discourse rather than like driving a car, shooting a gun, or >>>>>> hunting animals). >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> When we get to semantic structure of consciousness, we know there was a >>>>> break between LSV and his buddies. It seems that it is in arriving at >>>>> >> this >> >>>>> formulation that the charges of idealism and sign-o-centrism kick in. >>>>> >>>>> My difficulty is in making arguments about consciousness- -in-general, >>>>> perhaps a relic of my behaviorist past. Luria appears to have come >>>>> >> around >> >>>>> on this issue. I have had a difficult time understanding the changes in >>>>> Leontiev's thought over the period of the 30's and 40's. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Now, in the discussion of Holbrook's presentation, this wild-haired >>>>>> guy who looked a little like Itzhak Perlman rose to argue that >>>>>> Leontiev's interpretation was really one fair interpretation, and that >>>>>> it really was addressed towards a specific problem, which is how to >>>>>> prevent dualism from arising (that is, how to explain how word meaning >>>>>> could arise historically).Through joint mediated activity? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> He also said that Holbrook was juxtaposing >>>>>> quotations out of context: the quotes that showed Vygotsky arguing >>>>>> against a "Marxist psychology" were directed against a very specific >>>>>> group of vulgar Marxists (e.g. Zalkind) and that is why Vygotsky uses >>>>>> scare quotes around "Marxist". >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> Not so? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> I then muddied the waters, first by addressing the wild-haired guy >>>>>> instead of Holbrook (a major breach of protocol) and then by arguing >>>>>> that speech really is sui generis, because it is a form of "activity" >>>>>> (if we must call it that) whose conditions of comprehension are no >>>>>> longer recoverable from the activity itself (and so the unit of >>>>>> analysis for verbal thinking cannot be sought in activity). There >>>>>> wasn't enough time to really develop what I wanted to say, so I went >>>>>> over to continue the discussion, and it turned out that the wild >>>>>> haired guy was none other than Seth Chaiklin, who is, we all know, one >>>>>> of the foremost paleo-Vygotskyans when it comes to the much >>>>>> misinterpreted concept of the ZPD. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> Speech is a form of activity or a means of activity? Or of action? >>>>> >>>>> I guess I do not understand. If its worthwhile, perhaps spell the idea >>>>> out >>>>> here? >>>>> >>>>> So far as I can tell, there are ONLY misinterpretations of the Zoped. >>>>> >> Seth >> >>>>> was right on about it being used in Anglo-American discourse as >>>>> >> something >> >>>>> akin to zone of proximal learning,fitting into the associationist view >>>>> >> of >> >>>>> development as more learning. But the one right interpretation has >>>>> >> escaped >> >>>>> my notice. >>>>> >>>>> Thanks again for taking the trouble to write that out. Perhaps it will >>>>> >> be >> >>>>> generative for people. >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>> >>>>>> PS: Holbrook DID get one thing wrong. Stalin did not argue that >>>>>> language was purely ideal and superstructural; that was Marr's >>>>>> position. Stalin, or whoever ghost wrote his articles, argued that >>>>>> language was base, and therefore somehow material, whatever that >>>>>> means. But Stalin was not really interested in ideas; he was just out >>>>>> for Marr's blood. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 6 October 2014 22:21, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi David-- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The specific example of your comments on originals and adaptations >>>>>>> >> hits >> >>>>>>> >>>>>> on >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> a point it would be helpful to hear more about: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You wrote: >>>>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat >>>>>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging >>>>>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which >>>>>>> >> actually >> >>>>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, >>>>>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's >>>>>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need >>>>>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an argument >>>>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account supplants >>>>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no >>>>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts >>>>>>> >> (and >> >>>>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least >>>>>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of >>>>>>> thinking that has become extinct). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 1. Could you guide us to a text you recommend where this >>>>>>> interpretation >>>>>>> is laid out? >>>>>>> 2. What sort of revision was Seth suggesting and why? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I have been reading Russian discussions around this issue. >>>>>>> >> Clarification >> >>>>>>> would be helpful. >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:37 AM, David Kellogg >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own bed and >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, played, as >>>>>>>> Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) >>>>>>>> >> Stradivarius >> >>>>>>>> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very first time >>>>>>>> in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma >>>>>>>> >> has >> >>>>>>>> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has >>>>>>>> >> been >> >>>>>>>> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal >>>>>>>> >> interpretation. >> >>>>>>>> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if Mendelssohn >>>>>>>> himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, >>>>>>>> Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had >>>>>>>> >> occupied, >> >>>>>>>> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to >>>>>>>> Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period >>>>>>>> instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and starts >>>>>>>> to play. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat >>>>>>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging >>>>>>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which >>>>>>>> >> actually >> >>>>>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior, >>>>>>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's >>>>>>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we need >>>>>>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an >>>>>>>> >> argument >> >>>>>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account >>>>>>>> >> supplants >> >>>>>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is >>>>>>>> >> no >> >>>>>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts >>>>>>>> >> (and >> >>>>>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least >>>>>>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of >>>>>>>> thinking that has become extinct). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in Sydney was >>>>>>>> not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I would have >>>>>>>> liked it better if she had used those terms a little more >>>>>>>> >> imprecisely, >> >>>>>>>> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might >>>>>>>> >> have >> >>>>>>>> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was >>>>>>>> contemplating. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a world >>>>>>>> without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are >>>>>>>> replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather >>>>>>>> dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she called >>>>>>>> >> the >> >>>>>>>> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also human >>>>>>>> identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the >>>>>>>> >> conference >> >>>>>>>> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time for >>>>>>>> >> the >> >>>>>>>> spiritual side of life. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the "object" >>>>>>>> >> of >> >>>>>>>> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working class >>>>>>>> >> is >> >>>>>>>> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex >>>>>>>> >> workers >> >>>>>>>> and atomized into the social position of housewives. Inequality is >>>>>>>> >> now >> >>>>>>>> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history tells >>>>>>>> us that the result of this is not going to be individual >>>>>>>> >> spirituality >> >>>>>>>> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if >>>>>>>> >> that >> >>>>>>>> force is organized, social, and directed against social equality >>>>>>>> rather than against fellow members of the working class. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> dk >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 5 October 2014 13:38, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie Nardi >>>>>>>>> >> I >> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> had >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if she >>>>>>>>> >> has >> >>>>>>>>> written something on "object" that is very good news. >>>>>>>>> I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't think one >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> good >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> book >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long while I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> been >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie" >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> without >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> an >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of >>>>>>>>> >> "substance" >> >>>>>>>>> whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains >>>>>>>>> >> outstanding >> >>>>>>>>> differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that almost all >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> bar >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> one >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is a >>>>>>>>> >> step >> >>>>>>>>> forward, and people are aware of the differences in interpretation >>>>>>>>> >> and >> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> they >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a while, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> maybe >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> consistency >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> optimistic. >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> >>>>>> ------------ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. >>>>>>>>>> I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds that >>>>>>>>>> >> go >> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> U >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a shower of >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (Whatever >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on basics of >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> AT >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were a >>>>>>>>>> >> little >> >>>>>>>>>> slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also iscar-ers >>>>>>>>>> >> and >> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger on a >>>>>>>>>> Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and tablets >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> etc., >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> My impressions of CHAT research: >>>>>>>>>> On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp and >>>>>>>>>> critical in relation to the dominant political forces, and >>>>>>>>>> >> still >> >>>>>>>>>> way out in front in understanding the several developmental >>>>>>>>>> processes which all contribute to our actions (phylogenesis, >>>>>>>>>> historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, microgenesis), >>>>>>>>>> >> and >> >>>>>>>>>> not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great >>>>>>>>>> community of research, relatively lacking in the >>>>>>>>>> >> competitiveness >> >>>>>>>>>> and jealousy which infects most research communities. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On the negative side: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" as >>>>>>>>>> >> some >> >>>>>>>>>> homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces problems >>>>>>>>>> >> into >> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., people >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> lack >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> a >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> viable social theory or the ability to use theory they >>>>>>>>> >> have >> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated way. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. >>>>>>>>>> >> Only a >> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> small >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> minority know what it means and use the idea in their >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> research. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> confusion; >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> few researchers using the concept are clear on what the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> concept >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront and >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> attempt to >>>>>>>>>> resolve the methodological differences (I refer to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> systematic >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) within >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the relatively >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> civil >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> relations between researchers - people prefer to let >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> differences >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> just fester without openly discussing them. The old Soviet >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far the >>>>>>>>>> >> other >> >>>>>>>>>> way. :) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> ------------ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response to >>>>>>>>>> someone who >>>>>>>>>> wrote backto xmca instead of me. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an >>>>>>>>>> interesting and >>>>>>>>>> unassuming guy. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca >>>>>>>>>> >> discussion?? >> >>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>>>>>>>> >> with >> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>>> >> an >> >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Oct 8 18:18:35 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 09 Oct 2014 12:18:35 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: praxis/practice/activity In-Reply-To: <5435D85F.1080802@mira.net> References: <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> <5435D85F.1080802@mira.net> Message-ID: <5435E26B.1000205@mira.net> PS. The cluster of German words: tun, Der That, Die Taetigkeit, etc., and the Anglo-Saxon English word "do" are all prior unities of consciousness and behaviour, reinforcing the reading of "Theses on Feuerbach" and that the ancient understanding of "action" never abstracted behaviour and consciousness from actions. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Andy Blunden wrote: > I am happy to continue the closer examination of LSV and ANL via > "Problem of the Environment" and ANL's attack on it. As you know Mike, > I have already written an article on just this topic which came down > solidly in defence of Vygotsky. > > Firstly, I think David is right in this: that "ProbEnv" limits what it > says about perezhivanie to showing how the developmental impact on the > three siblings was different. However, implicit in this is (1) that > each perezhivanija had a developmental impact and (2) only the eldest > child developed. I accept that what these post-Vasilyuk Russians do > with perezhivanie is an extension of LSV's work (such as in the > problem of age), but one which I think is solidly based in LSV's legacy. > > Secondly, on the question of the meaning of "activity", "practice" and > "praxis" in the Marxist tradition. I too am an autodidact, Mike, and > not even that in Psychology and Linguistics, but in Philosophy and > Social theory, an autodidact. But the question is not that difficult. > > Marx never used the word "praxis" so far as I know. I think the reason > it was introduced by later Marxists is because of the everyday meaning > of "activity" and "practice" which are both, as David indicates in his > posts, regarded as meaning "behaviour". Rather than having a difficult > argument about the "real meaning" of "practice" and "activity" writers > adopted a new word which does not exist in everyday speech - "praxis." > > But the reasons for insisting that everyday usage notwithstanding, > "activity" and "practice" for Marx and his careful student, Vygotsky, > means the unity of consciousness and behaviour are two-fold. > > (1) Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach" (widely regarded as foundational to > CHAT) makes no sense if "activity" and "practice" means behaviour. > Also Vygotsky's work makes no sense if "behaviour" and "action" are > equated. His wonderful 1924 immanent critique of behaviourism makes > all the necessary points. > > (2) The word "action" is ancient. It comes from Latin and was in the > English language from the 13th century. In Roman law people were > guilty of crimes according to their actions. It is a much later - 17th > century - idea to consider consciousness a something which can be > studied and talked about separately from a person's actions, and a > much later idea that behaviour can be an object of science by > abstracting it from consciousness. > > And finally, "word meaning" is (to my mind, and to CHAT interpreters > in the 1980s) an "artefact-medicated action" or if you prefer a > "sign-mediated action" - if "action" is interpreted as "behaviour," > i.e., abstracted from consciousness, "Thinking and Speech" collapses > into total postmodern nonsense. > > The (in my view) correct understanding of "action" as a unity of > behaviour and consciousness is the foundation stone of CHAT. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: >> ?Another thought that struck me as i thought about David's extension of >> discussion of issues raised at ISCAR was the "activity" / "praxis" >> issue.? >> >> The thought was this: One significant impediment to mutual >> understanding of >> each other sufficient to distinguish disagreements from >> misunderstandings, >> is that we come from such varied backgrounds, both academically and in >> terms of our life experiences and research foci. This struck me >> particularly in the discussion that followed David's mention of activity >> not equaling praxis. >> >> What struck me is the comments that started to elaborate on the issue by >> going to Husserl and meanings of the terms in greek, and generally, >> what I >> would call "high academic classical theory." But I am not equipped by >> education to follow the discussion very far in that direction. I was >> educated in the tradition of American learning theory and my philosophy >> teachers in college and grad school were logical >> positivists/behaviorist/experimentalists -- champions of the first >> psychology. So what I know about classical European social theory is >> auto-didactic and picked up from the writings of colleagues. >> >> What my education and early research experiences in Africa and Mexico >> did >> equip me for was the need to ground analyses of cross-cultural >> differences >> in (cognitive) development in the everyday activities of people, >> where by >> "everyday activity" I meant activities like rice farming in Liberia, or >> court cases, or house building or....... My background did not >> predispose >> me to be happy with Vygotsky, Luria's cross-cultural work, and certainly >> not into discussions of activity arising from Marxist theory by >> Leontiev. >> (What was this connection between culturally mediated activity (as I >> conceived of it) and labor?) Naive? Sure. >> >> But in that naivte, and finding a lot to like in reading the >> materials that >> ended up in Mind in Society, I glommed onto the following statement by >> Leontiev when I encountered it in about 1980: >> >> Human psychology is concerned with the activity of concrete individuals >> that takes place either in conditions of open association, in the >> midst of >> people, or eye to eye with the surrounding object world ? before the >> potter?s wheel or behind the writing desk. Under whatever kind of >> conditions and forms human activity takes place, whatever kind of >> structure >> it assumes, it must not be considered as isolated from social relations, >> from the life of society. >> >> Leontiev goes on to write some other stuff about production that did not >> thrill me, but at least I had found a common point between the ideas >> of the >> Vygotskian school our efforts to understand the role of culture in >> development. They reinforced comments in Luria's autobio which were left >> there on a quite general plane and not follow up upon -- Luria was >> otherwise occupied at the time. >> >> Bottom line. I REALLY appreciate learning about the deep >> historical/academic roots of the ideas we discuss, but often cannot >> follow >> the them knowledgeably, so when those who work in this way argue that so >> and so said such and such, I am let to take their word for it. And when >> they disagree, I try to withhold judgment and fall back on my own >> history >> of inquiry waiting for clarification. >> >> To me, the idea that the acid test of theory is in practice, is both >> paleo >> Vygotskian and essential to my work. It leaves me in the odd >> position of >> concluding that LSV did not, and his followers have not, found a general >> science of development that resolves that old crisis in psychology. >> >> Sorry for the long winded note. Lets call it cathartic, a way of living >> through my experience of reading XMCA mail yesterday and re-living >> (pere-zhivanie) (overagain-living) it. >> >> mike >> >> >> >> On Tue, Oct 7, 2014 at 3:12 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >> >> >>> Larry, Mike, Huw, Andy-- >>> >>> (and above all the real "objects" of broadening and enlivening the >>> discussion, you by-standers and handwringers, perhaps intimidated by >>> the pointing and handwaving, and unwilling to contribute lest the >>> discussion become less sharpened and pointed....) >>> >>> There were several issues that seemed to pop up session after session >>> at ISCAR, quite independently of who raised them. Yes, "the real >>> Vygotsky" was certainly one of them, and Holbrook was not the only >>> person to talk this way; I did too, and I do think that a world where >>> the original Vygotsky is not recoverable is just as bad as a world >>> where Vygotsky is completely forgotten. But in the context of ISCAR, >>> the "real Vygotsky" was often a response to many speakers who would >>> like to emphasize the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky. >>> >>> There were two ways of doing this. One was to simply say that of >>> course Vygotsky was a Marxist, but then everybody was Marxist back >>> then, and it was not much more important than being a liberal Democrat >>> today. Interestingly, in the Making of Mind, Luria said that this is a >>> description which could well apply to many psychologists of his time, >>> including himself, but not to Vygotsky. A more sophisticated way of >>> emphasizing the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky requires a "real >>> Vygotsky" of a different kind. Writers like our good friend Nikolai >>> Veresov have tried to do this by emphasizing the PRE-Marxist Vygotsky, >>> especially Vygotsky the phenomenologist, student of Gustav Shpet who >>> was a student of Husserl himself. >>> >>> I was formerly little puzzled by this move. Seth argued that it was >>> valid, because of Vygotsky's ties to Lewin and Lewin's ideas about the >>> force of objects and the fields of attractors created thereby. Lewin >>> was certainly an attractor for Vygotsky, but Vygotsky actually uses >>> Lewin to criticize phenomenological analysis in Chapter Three of HDHMF >>> (see Vol. 4, p. 69). Elsewhere, Vygotsky is very critical of the >>> founders of phenomenology, iincluding Husserl (p. 7). >>> >>> But now I think that Larry (and Martin, who has raised the same >>> connection) is on to something. For it is also in HDHMF that Vygotsky >>> bruits the idea that attention is a kind of gateway function, that the >>> indicative is the primordial function of speech and thinking, and that >>> there is nevertheless a qualitative difference between noticing >>> something and internalizing it as a meaning--all of these are >>> Husserlian ideas. Even the knotted handkerchief, which I myself have >>> attributed to Vygotsky and to a peculiarly Russian practice, comes >>> from the work of Husserl (Logical Investigations, Vol. I, pp. >>> 269-333). I think that as a real historical materialist Vygotsky >>> rejected Husserl's absolute opposition between symbol and index, but >>> he didn't forget it when he set about trying to build a bridge between >>> the two. >>> >>> Mike wonders about a text where Vygotsky rejects "activity" as a unit >>> of analysis for everything but behavior. No such text exists, of >>> course; if you read what I wrote carefully (I know, it's a trial >>> sometimes, but at least I am a larger target then the minimalist Huw) >>> you will see that I refer to a my OWN rejection, not Vygotsky's. What >>> Vygotsky says in "Problem of the Environment" is that he wants to >>> introduce "a number of different" units of analysis which are used in >>> pedological analyses, of which "perezhivanie" is one, and >>> "sense/signification" a very different one. (Andy is wrong to impute >>> importance to the count noun form here; Vygotsky often uses it as a >>> verb, I "live experience" something). I have always assumed that this >>> means: >>> >>> a) Perezhivanie is quite specific to the problem Vygotsky raises in >>> this lecture, which is how three different children can respond so >>> differently to the one and the same form of child abuse. >>> >>> b) "Sense/signification" is also a unit of analysis, what Vygotsky >>> refers to in Thinking and Speech as "the meaningful word". (This was >>> also the object of textological attention in Holbrook's presentation). >>> >>> Mike also wonders about where Leontiev raises the possibility of >>> applying Marxist theory directly to psychology. In many places, but >>> perhaps most prominently in Problems of the Development of Mind (see >>> pp. 236-237, 255). Holbrook had other quotations of this type, and I >>> think there is a link between them and what Luria's remark that back >>> then everybody in psychology was a "Marxist", but nobody except >>> Vygotsky was much of a Marxist. Holbrook is right here. >>> >>> Mike asks if there is practical activity without thinking. I think >>> that Vygotsky would say that there is thinking and there is verbal >>> thinking (or, as Holbrook now insists, "thinking with words"). What >>> monkeys do with sticks is called practical intelligence in Chapter >>> Four of Thinking and Speech. It is practical activity, and it's >>> thinking. But it's not a unit of thinking and speech, and therefore I >>> think there is some light between what Vygotsky is willing to call >>> "activity" and "praxis"; it's not the case that "praxis" is just a >>> Greek word for "activity". I recognize, though, that for Andy what >>> monkeys do with sticks does not count as activity (and I also >>> recognize that I was muddling "activity" and "action"--sorry about >>> that). >>> >>> Like Mike, I am paleo with regard to sense and meaning, and like Mike >>> I recognize that it is hard to tell how deep the waters are here since >>> they have been muddied. I think they were first muddied by Vygotsky >>> himself, because he refers the distinction to Paulhan, where no such >>> distinction is found (Paulhan just talks about connotation and >>> denotation). But I think it's easy to unmuddy the waters and I think >>> they are very deep indeed: Vygotsky uses Paulhan as a foil, taking the >>> actual distinction from Volosinov, who was working at the Herzen >>> Institute at exactly the same moment that Vygotsky was writing of this >>> distinction. Zavershneva has said that Vygotsky cites Volosinov in his >>> unpublished manuscripts, but that the citation is always removed by >>> the editor in publication. So "smysl" is "tema"; it is something like >>> "realized, actual meaning" while "znachenie" is something like >>> "potential, possible meaning". Tema is what happens when we activate a >>> particular layer in the great palimpsest of possible meanings left in >>> each word by our contemporaries and ancestors. >>> >>> I'm currently writing the endnotes for our new volume of Vygotsky's >>> lectures on pedology, so I am very aware of the issue that Huw appears >>> to be raising (although Huw is so very gnomic in his lofty remarks on >>> my supposed illogicality and my more systemic problems that it is hard >>> to be sure). In Lecture Six, Vygotsky says in one paragraph that >>> dividing off psychological from physiological development is >>> methodologically impermissable, but in the very next paragraph, and >>> indeed in the layout of the book, he says "dismemberment is >>> nevertheless necessary". On the one hand, he says that there is no >>> action, no motility, not even thinking without both the mind and the >>> brain, and on the other he says that even within the body there are >>> distinct lines of development and that physiology is "a summarizable >>> concept". He is acutely aware of the contradiction, but by the end of >>> the lecture he resolves it. We just have to keep in mind that things >>> that we take apart for the purpose of analysis are inextricably joined >>> in clinical practice. I suppose you can say it is a logical >>> contradiction if you want, particularly if by that you mean it is a >>> contradiction that only exists in the ideal world, that is, in logic >>> and does not really pose a problem in life. >>> >>> The problem is with the word "text" is the same, Huw. For Hallidayans >>> like me, a text is precisely a semantic object; it's not made of paper >>> and ink. Viewed interpersonally, a text is a coherent and cohesive >>> exchange. Viewed intra-mentally, it's a representation of thinking. It >>> is objective, but it's objective the way that mathematics and language >>> itself is objective, not the way that three actual apples or a >>> physical book is objective. Dixit. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> (PS: I'm afraid I didn't get the systemic reproach at all. It's hard >>> for a fish to see the density of water, much less to see the density >>> of the fish!) >>> >>> dk >>> >>> >>> >>> On 7 October 2014 23:11, Larry Purss wrote: >>> >>>> The understanding of action and activity AS BOTH thinking and >>>> behaviour >>>> contrasting with an appeal to differentiate the aspects thinking and >>>> behaviour. >>>> The notion *species* was introduced by David K as returning to >>>> Vygotsky's >>>> words as he used them [paleo return] or we will loose this species >>>> as it >>>> becomes extinct. >>>> >>>> Therefore Leontiev's theory could also be considered a separate >>>> *species* >>>> with its own characteristics, features, and object of activity. >>>> SO in my return to the species of Activity theory I turned to one of >>>> Leontiev's students [Victor Kaptelinin] in his 2005 MCA article "The >>>> >>> Object >>> >>>> of Activity: Making sense of the Sense Maker" >>>> >>>> Kaptelinin opens his article with this fragment from the *species* of >>>> Leontiev's own specified object of activity [activity theory] >>>> >>>> "A basic or, as is sometimes said, a CONSTITUTING characteristic of >>>> activity is its objectivity or, rather object relatedness. Properly >>>> the >>>> CONCEPT of its object, gegenstand, is already IMPLICITLY contained >>>> in the >>>> very concept of activity. The expression objectless activity is >>>> DEVOID of >>>> any meaning. Objectivity may SEEM objectless, but SCIENTIFIC >>>> >>> investigations >>> >>>> OF activity NECESSARILY REQUIRES discovering its object. >>>> THUS the object of activity IS TWOFOLD: >>>> First, in its INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE as SUBORDINATING TO ITSELF and >>>> transforming the activity of the subject [The question arises if this >>>> subordinating is the object's *motive* - LP] >>>> AND >>>> Second, as an IMAGE OF the object, as a product OF its property of >>>> psychological reflection THAT IS realized AS AN ACTIVITY OF THE >>>> SUBJECT, >>>> and cannot exist OTHERWISE." >>>> >>>> This paragraph which Kaptelian offers as a *specimen* of a >>>> particular and >>>> unique *species* of expression seems to present a clear *case* to >>>> hold up >>>> to Vygotsky's *species* . >>>> I would add that Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative *species* that is >>>> >>> also >>> >>>> looking at objects of activity from another *angle* of vision. >>>> >>>> Are Vygotsky, Leontiev, and Merleau-Ponty all gesturing at the same >>>> phenomena and walking around this *object* [imagined? or real?] from >>>> various vantage points. >>>> >>>> I will pause by returning to the second quality of the TWOFOLD >>>> quality of >>>> the *object of activity* >>>> >>>> "SECOND as an IMAGE OF the object, AS a product OF its PSYCHOLOGICAL >>>> REFLECTION that is REALIZED [brought into form -LP] AS an activity >>>> OF the >>>> SUBJECT and cannot exist OTHERWISE. >>>> >>>> Is this a new *species*?? >>>> >>>> Larry >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 4:55 PM, Andy Blunden >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Mike, what I got out of Seth's intervention was just a plea for >>>>> people >>>>> >>> to >>> >>>>> stop claiming to have the "real Vygotsky" and I thoroughly agreed >>>>> with >>>>> >>> him. >>> >>>>> And so far as I know Marx uses the German word for Activity, viz., >>>>> Taetigkeit, in "Theses on Feuerbach" - that word which pre-dates >>>>> "behaviour" and "consciousness" by centuries, but which is sometimes >>>>> referred to nowadays as a unity of these two abstractions, and it was >>>>> >>> only >>> >>>>> later interpreters that introduced the term "praxis", which being >>>>> Greek >>>>> sounds a lot cleverer. Action and Activity, in my view and >>>>> >>> etymologically, >>> >>>>> are both thinking and behaving. >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Thanks, David. I think i understand better what you mean by "LSV >>>>>> >>> rejects >>> >>>>>> "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior,and most >>>>>> certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Somehow I was >>>>>> expecting >>>>>> text >>>>>> from LSV where he says "activity is not a unit of analysis" >>>>>> because of >>>>>> >>> all >>> >>>>>> the places in his text where he uses the term activity as a sort of >>>>>> >>> "lay >>> >>>>>> term". >>>>>> >>>>>> ... >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Holbrook Mahn. >>>>>>> Holbrook began by saying that: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> a) We do not "borrow" concepts made for one discipline and "apply" >>>>>>> them to another. Not even dialectical materialism can be >>>>>>> "applied" to >>>>>>> psychology (or even sociology or economics--Marx didn't do applied >>>>>>> philosophy!). Holbrook then produced a number of quotations from >>>>>>> The >>>>>>> Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology to show that >>>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>> knew this, and countered with other quotations from Problems of the >>>>>>> Development of the Mind to show that Leontiev did not know this. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I know places where LSV is clear on this score, in Historical >>>>>>> meaning, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> for example, but not the evidence of Leontiev's errors. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> b) The term "praxis" has been thus borrowed. It doesn't refer to >>>>>>> practical activity: it refers to a unity of thinking and practice. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Borrowed from Marx by ..??? by Leontiev? There is any form of >>>>>> practical >>>>>> activity without human thinking? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> c) The term "social situation of development" has been thus >>>>>>> borrowed; >>>>>>> it does not refer to a "context" but to the child's relationship to >>>>>>> the environment. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> By whom? I am always in a puzzle about the use of this term. Isn't >>>>>> perezhivanie the term that LSV uses to talk about relation of >>>>>> child to >>>>>> environment? At least, there seems to be a lot of chatter about >>>>>> issue. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> d) The term "unit of analysis" does not refer to a God particle >>>>>>> that >>>>>>> is indifferent to the problem of analysis. ygotsky did not >>>>>>> imagine a >>>>>>> "unit of analysis" that fit any and all problems in psychology. >>>>>>> Each >>>>>>> unit of analysis is specific to a particular problem of unity (e.g. >>>>>>> the problem of the unity of the child and his or her environment in >>>>>>> Problem of the Environment and the problem of the unity of verbal >>>>>>> thinking in Thinking and Speech). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Amen to that. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> e) The term "verbal thinking" is a mistranslation: Vygotsky is >>>>>>> talking >>>>>>> about thinking by language, or thinking through word meanings, >>>>>>> and not >>>>>>> some kind of verbalizable inner speech (which does exist, but >>>>>>> which is >>>>>>> a distinct layer from thinking). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> There is a lot of confusion around this issue and would probably >>>>>> need >>>>>> somewhat separate discussion. I interpret in the former way. The >>>>>> role >>>>>> >>> of >>> >>>>>> meaning in inner speech, and the usefulness or not of the >>>>>> sense/meaning >>>>>> distinction has me confused. Dima Leontiev has put the distinction >>>>>> >>> behind >>> >>>>>> him and now refers to "cultural meaning" (paleo meaning >>>>>> >>>>>> ) and >>>>>> "personal meaning (paleo sense)." I am paleo in this regard. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Most of this has been said before, not least by Vygotsky himself. I >>>>>>> know that Holbrook has been saying it at least since 2007 when I >>>>>>> first >>>>>>> heard him at the American Association for Applied Linguistics in >>>>>>> Costa >>>>>>> Mesa, and he develops it at some length in: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://www.academia.edu/1803017/Vygotskys_Analysis_of_ >>>>>>> Childrens_Meaning-Making_Processes >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Mahn, H. (2012). Vygotsky's Analysis of Children's Meaning-Making >>>>>>> Processes, International Journal of Educational >>>>>>> Psychology1(2):100-126 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It's been said by others too: Mike Cole actually makes many of the >>>>>>> same points in discussing how the Kharkov school deviated from the >>>>>>> work of Vygotsk, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> I did not know enough to make many of these points in 1978! They >>>>>> certainly >>>>>> distanced themselves from LSV and PI Zinchenko went after the >>>>>> natural-cultural memory distinction, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> and J.V. Wertsch is quite explicit in his revisionism >>>>>>> when he presents "mediated activity" as a unit of analysis in >>>>>>> opposition to "word meaning". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> mediated ACTION and often as not, mediated action in context. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> But of course since a unit of analysis >>>>>>> must preserve in some shape or form the essential properties of the >>>>>>> whole, the use of "mediated activity" >>>>>>> (action) >>>>>>> cannot be a unit of analysis for >>>>>>> the mind if we wish to retain the idea that the mind has a semantic >>>>>>> structure (that is, if the "whole" is structured something like >>>>>>> a text >>>>>>> or a discourse rather than like driving a car, shooting a gun, or >>>>>>> hunting animals). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> When we get to semantic structure of consciousness, we know there >>>>>> was a >>>>>> break between LSV and his buddies. It seems that it is in >>>>>> arriving at >>>>>> >>> this >>> >>>>>> formulation that the charges of idealism and sign-o-centrism kick >>>>>> in. >>>>>> >>>>>> My difficulty is in making arguments about consciousness- >>>>>> -in-general, >>>>>> perhaps a relic of my behaviorist past. Luria appears to have come >>>>>> >>> around >>> >>>>>> on this issue. I have had a difficult time understanding the >>>>>> changes in >>>>>> Leontiev's thought over the period of the 30's and 40's. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Now, in the discussion of Holbrook's presentation, this wild-haired >>>>>>> guy who looked a little like Itzhak Perlman rose to argue that >>>>>>> Leontiev's interpretation was really one fair interpretation, >>>>>>> and that >>>>>>> it really was addressed towards a specific problem, which is how to >>>>>>> prevent dualism from arising (that is, how to explain how word >>>>>>> meaning >>>>>>> could arise historically).Through joint mediated activity? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> He also said that Holbrook was juxtaposing >>>>>>> quotations out of context: the quotes that showed Vygotsky arguing >>>>>>> against a "Marxist psychology" were directed against a very >>>>>>> specific >>>>>>> group of vulgar Marxists (e.g. Zalkind) and that is why Vygotsky >>>>>>> uses >>>>>>> scare quotes around "Marxist". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Not so? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> I then muddied the waters, first by addressing the wild-haired guy >>>>>>> instead of Holbrook (a major breach of protocol) and then by >>>>>>> arguing >>>>>>> that speech really is sui generis, because it is a form of >>>>>>> "activity" >>>>>>> (if we must call it that) whose conditions of comprehension are no >>>>>>> longer recoverable from the activity itself (and so the unit of >>>>>>> analysis for verbal thinking cannot be sought in activity). There >>>>>>> wasn't enough time to really develop what I wanted to say, so I >>>>>>> went >>>>>>> over to continue the discussion, and it turned out that the wild >>>>>>> haired guy was none other than Seth Chaiklin, who is, we all >>>>>>> know, one >>>>>>> of the foremost paleo-Vygotskyans when it comes to the much >>>>>>> misinterpreted concept of the ZPD. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Speech is a form of activity or a means of activity? Or of action? >>>>>> >>>>>> I guess I do not understand. If its worthwhile, perhaps spell the >>>>>> idea >>>>>> out >>>>>> here? >>>>>> >>>>>> So far as I can tell, there are ONLY misinterpretations of the >>>>>> Zoped. >>>>>> >>> Seth >>> >>>>>> was right on about it being used in Anglo-American discourse as >>>>>> >>> something >>> >>>>>> akin to zone of proximal learning,fitting into the associationist >>>>>> view >>>>>> >>> of >>> >>>>>> development as more learning. But the one right interpretation has >>>>>> >>> escaped >>> >>>>>> my notice. >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks again for taking the trouble to write that out. Perhaps it >>>>>> will >>>>>> >>> be >>> >>>>>> generative for people. >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>> >>>>>>> PS: Holbrook DID get one thing wrong. Stalin did not argue that >>>>>>> language was purely ideal and superstructural; that was Marr's >>>>>>> position. Stalin, or whoever ghost wrote his articles, argued that >>>>>>> language was base, and therefore somehow material, whatever that >>>>>>> means. But Stalin was not really interested in ideas; he was >>>>>>> just out >>>>>>> for Marr's blood. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 6 October 2014 22:21, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hi David-- >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The specific example of your comments on originals and adaptations >>>>>>>> >>> hits >>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> on >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> a point it would be helpful to hear more about: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You wrote: >>>>>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat >>>>>>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging >>>>>>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which >>>>>>>> >>> actually >>> >>>>>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but >>>>>>>> behavior, >>>>>>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's >>>>>>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, we >>>>>>>> need >>>>>>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an >>>>>>>> argument >>>>>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account >>>>>>>> supplants >>>>>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument >>>>>>>> is no >>>>>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts >>>>>>>> >>> (and >>> >>>>>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at least >>>>>>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of >>>>>>>> thinking that has become extinct). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> 1. Could you guide us to a text you recommend where this >>>>>>>> interpretation >>>>>>>> is laid out? >>>>>>>> 2. What sort of revision was Seth suggesting and why? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I have been reading Russian discussions around this issue. >>>>>>>> >>> Clarification >>> >>>>>>>> would be helpful. >>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:37 AM, David Kellogg >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own >>>>>>>> bed and >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing >>>>>>>>> this: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, >>>>>>>>> played, as >>>>>>>>> Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT Davydov) >>>>>>>>> >>> Stradivarius >>> >>>>>>>>> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very >>>>>>>>> first time >>>>>>>>> in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout this concert, Ma >>>>>>>>> >>> has >>> >>>>>>>>> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman has >>>>>>>>> >>> been >>> >>>>>>>>> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal >>>>>>>>> >>> interpretation. >>> >>>>>>>>> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if >>>>>>>>> Mendelssohn >>>>>>>>> himself had heard the sonata played on that very cello, then he, >>>>>>>>> Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that Mendelssohn had >>>>>>>>> >>> occupied, >>> >>>>>>>>> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer to >>>>>>>>> Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with period >>>>>>>>> instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts them and >>>>>>>>> starts >>>>>>>>> to play. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a somewhat >>>>>>>>> similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and me clinging >>>>>>>>> rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan interpretation which >>>>>>>>> >>> actually >>> >>>>>>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but >>>>>>>>> behavior, >>>>>>>>> and most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Seth's >>>>>>>>> argument was pragmatist: for certain practical applications, >>>>>>>>> we need >>>>>>>>> new interpretations, including revisionist ones. Mine was an >>>>>>>>> >>> argument >>> >>>>>>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account >>>>>>>>> >>> supplants >>> >>>>>>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original >>>>>>>>> argument is >>>>>>>>> >>> no >>> >>>>>>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts >>>>>>>>> >>> (and >>> >>>>>>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at >>>>>>>>> least >>>>>>>>> recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole species of >>>>>>>>> thinking that has become extinct). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in >>>>>>>>> Sydney was >>>>>>>>> not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I think I >>>>>>>>> would have >>>>>>>>> liked it better if she had used those terms a little more >>>>>>>>> >>> imprecisely, >>> >>>>>>>>> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION might >>>>>>>>> >>> have >>> >>>>>>>>> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was >>>>>>>>> contemplating. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a >>>>>>>>> world >>>>>>>>> without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour jobs are >>>>>>>>> replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this was a rather >>>>>>>>> dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed us what she >>>>>>>>> called >>>>>>>>> >>> the >>> >>>>>>>>> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also >>>>>>>>> human >>>>>>>>> identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in the >>>>>>>>> >>> conference >>> >>>>>>>>> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time >>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>> >>> the >>> >>>>>>>>> spiritual side of life. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the >>>>>>>>> "object" >>>>>>>>> >>> of >>> >>>>>>>>> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working >>>>>>>>> class >>>>>>>>> >>> is >>> >>>>>>>>> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex >>>>>>>>> >>> workers >>> >>>>>>>>> and atomized into the social position of housewives. >>>>>>>>> Inequality is >>>>>>>>> >>> now >>> >>>>>>>>> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history >>>>>>>>> tells >>>>>>>>> us that the result of this is not going to be individual >>>>>>>>> >>> spirituality >>> >>>>>>>>> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is if >>>>>>>>> >>> that >>> >>>>>>>>> force is organized, social, and directed against social equality >>>>>>>>> rather than against fellow members of the working class. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> dk >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 5 October 2014 13:38, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie >>>>>>>>>> Nardi >>>>>>>>>> >>> I >>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> had >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if >>>>>>>>>> she >>>>>>>>>> >>> has >>> >>>>>>>>>> written something on "object" that is very good news. >>>>>>>>>> I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't >>>>>>>>>> think one >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> good >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> book >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long >>>>>>>>>> while I >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> been >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie" >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> without >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of >>>>>>>>>> >>> "substance" >>> >>>>>>>>>> whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains >>>>>>>>>> >>> outstanding >>> >>>>>>>>>> differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that >>>>>>>>>> almost all >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> bar >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> one >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is a >>>>>>>>>> >>> step >>> >>>>>>>>>> forward, and people are aware of the differences in >>>>>>>>>> interpretation >>>>>>>>>> >>> and >>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a >>>>>>>>>> while, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> maybe >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> consistency >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> optimistic. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. >>>>>>>>>>> I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds >>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> >>> go >>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> U >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a >>>>>>>> shower of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> (Whatever >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on >>>>>>>> basics of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> AT >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were a >>>>>>>>>>> >>> little >>> >>>>>>>>>>> slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also iscar-ers >>>>>>>>>>> >>> and >>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger >>>>>>>>>>> on a >>>>>>>>>>> Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and >>>>>>>>>>> tablets >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> etc., >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> My impressions of CHAT research: >>>>>>>>>>> On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, >>>>>>>>>>> sharp and >>>>>>>>>>> critical in relation to the dominant political forces, and >>>>>>>>>>> >>> still >>> >>>>>>>>>>> way out in front in understanding the several developmental >>>>>>>>>>> processes which all contribute to our actions >>>>>>>>>>> (phylogenesis, >>>>>>>>>>> historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, >>>>>>>>>>> microgenesis), >>>>>>>>>>> >>> and >>> >>>>>>>>>>> not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great >>>>>>>>>>> community of research, relatively lacking in the >>>>>>>>>>> >>> competitiveness >>> >>>>>>>>>>> and jealousy which infects most research communities. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On the negative side: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" as >>>>>>>>>>> >>> some >>> >>>>>>>>>>> homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces problems >>>>>>>>>>> >>> into >>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., people >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> lack >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> viable social theory or the ability to use theory they >>>>>>>>>> >>> have >>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated >>>>>>>> way. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. >>>>>>>>>>> >>> Only a >>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> small >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> minority know what it means and use the idea in their >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> research. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> confusion; >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> few researchers using the concept are clear on what the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> concept >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront and >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> attempt to >>>>>>>>>>> resolve the methodological differences (I refer to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> systematic >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) >>>>>>>> within >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the >>>>>>>>>> relatively >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> civil >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> relations between researchers - people prefer to let >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> differences >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> just fester without openly discussing them. The old >>>>>>>>>> Soviet >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far the >>>>>>>>>>> >>> other >>> >>>>>>>>>>> way. :) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous >>>>>>>>>>> response to >>>>>>>>>>> someone who >>>>>>>>>>> wrote backto xmca instead of me. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an >>>>>>>>>>> interesting and >>>>>>>>>>> unassuming guy. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca >>>>>>>>>>> >>> discussion?? >>> >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>>>>>>>>> >>> with >>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>> >>> an >>> >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >> >> >> >> > > > From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Thu Oct 9 01:42:42 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2014 08:42:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F4B2@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> David, I share what I take to be your emphasis on the distinction between 'words in their speaking' and 'already spoken words' (to borrow Shotter's terms). Communication surely predates language and your account of Volosinov's and Vygotsky's thought experiment about a one word language reminded me of Steven Mithen's (2005) book 'The singing Neanderthals' in which he argues for a pre-language mode of communication which he calls Hmmmm because it was holistic (not composed of segmented elements), manipulative (influencing emotional states and hence behaviour), multimodal (using both sound and gesture), musical (rhythmic, and melodic), and mimetic (using sound symbolism and mimetic gestures). As Vygotsky points out, babies are importantly unlike Neanderthals because they are surrounded by people who are fluent users of the fully developed form of communication which the baby will learn to use, but still their communication is non-linguistic and non-conceptual. I have to apologise for not reading back through this full thread (yet) but I am familiar with a distinction between znachenie and smysl - tema is not a term I have come across. I will read back to find explanations. Can Russian speakers also tell me whether the term obuchenie carries more of the sense of learning the person as well as the 'content matter' when teacher and learner engage each other in conversation? I was struck by the way Russians tend to list their pedagogical lineage in terms of who their teacher studied with. All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg Sent: 08 October 2014 23:00 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion Itzhak Perlman is also making gentle fun of Yo-yo Ma's little game of "six degrees of separation", whereby Ma insists on the direct face-to-face contact between us and the departed masters via a chain of aging masters. In this too, I am in sympathy with Ma: it is why I shelled out the huge registration fee to go to ISCAR, and also why I was a little disappointed not to see Mike there (although secretly relieved since I know he is an unbruised fruit that does not travel so well these days, and it was a gruelling flight even for a tough nut like me). It is also why last year at this time I forked over a similar fee to go and spend two weeks in Guangzhou in the company of Michael Halliday. Of course I know it is possible to communicate with some of these masters through the email (though not Halliday, who considers human speech to be the most developed form of human communications technology precisely because it is the oldest). But it turns out that when we reduce speech to nothing but vowels and consonants and nouns and verbs, we have to reconstruct for ourselves the immense good will and cheer that is transmitted effortlessly, iconically, and indexically in face-to-face encounters, and this greatly impedes (my) understanding. That is why Martin's proposal that we consider both tool-mediated activity and sign-mediated speech to be forms of semiotic mediation appeals. I think it might resolve the key problem that LSV leaves us with at the end of Chapter Two of HDHMF when he warns against those who consider signs to be "psychological tools" (pace Kozulin, Bordrova and Leong), and says that they are only "logically" (pace Huw) members of a common category; with the precise relationship between them (i.e. the historical relationship between them) to be worked out. Tools and signs are functionally quite different even where they appear to co-occur (like the blade of the axe and the decorations on the handle, as Volosinov says): one acts on the environment and mediates a subject-object relationship, while the other presupposes somehow empathetically reconstructing the mental state of another subject. Yet there must be some deep internal link or we could not have evolved the one out of the other. That internal link, it seems to me, is the physical presence of the other in the environment, in all of his or her smiling and grimacing, sweating and stinking glory, and the internal link is necessarily stronger in the case of "tema" than in the case of "znachenie". The idea that the latter is merely meaning potential and the former is actual, realized, materialized meaning comes straight from Halliday. But the (for me, linked) idea that the latter is the most stable pole of word value and the former the least so comes straight from Volosinov, who influenced Halliday via the Prague linguists. Volosinov derives it from a long analysis of the great schools of linguistics somewhat similar to Mike's recent ruminations on the great schools of psychological thought: there were centuries where linguistics was synonymous with the study of disembodied speech (vowels and consonants rather than intonation and stress, writing rather than speaking, and literature rather than everyday language), and there was a century--the nineteenth--where the opposite tendency held sway (von Humboldt, Potebnia, but above all the school of Kurt Vossler). We can also derive Volosinov's conclusion logically--"znachenie" is actually produced by abstraction and generalization from "tema", and both processes would lend it a self-similarity, a stability, which cannot obtain with "tema". I am now quite certain that Volosinov and Vygotsky were in direct, face-to-face contact during the last two years of LSV's life when he worked at the Herzen Pedagogical Institute in Leningrad. In any case, both of them pose exactly the same thought experiment (which is also posed in the work of Marr, who by some accounts took part in LSV's weekly meetings with Eisenstein). Both wondered what a language which consisted of a single word would sound like, and asked if it would even be a language at all. And both came up with the same answer. It would sound like an obscenity, tossed back and forth between drunken workmen on a street, as recorded in the diary of the great writer Fyodor Dostoevsky. That is, the meaning would be conveyed not referentially but indexically, not through articulation but through prosody, not through grammar but through revoicing. You can produce some of the same effect in English if you imagine the following conversation, slurring the initial and final consonants and assimilating the middle vowel to a kind of schwa sound (the vowel you make with your tongue in the exact middle of your mouth). A: (Wh)e(re)? B: (Th)e(re)! C: (Wh)e(n)?? D: (Th)e(n)!! E: (Wh)a(t)??? F: (Th)a(t)!!! Volosinov concludes that it would indeed be speech, because the essence of speech is "tema" and not "znachenie", its inner quality is precisely this kind of mutability and only its outer form is self-similarity. Speech is, essentially, grunts and groans and not grammar. But of course that means that both poles are present, and must be present, for speech to be language. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies PS: I think the reinterpretation of SSD as "context" is exactly what Andy was referring to: the hypostatization of "society" as a kind of enveloping cultural given from which the subject has no choice and over which the subject has no control. Those who use the Engstrom triangle as a kind of inventory of stuff to talk about are content to overcome this danger by sticking a two headed arrow between "subject" and "rules" or "subject" and "community" or "subject" and "division of labor". But this only poses the problem; it doesn't solve it. By the way, exactly the same problem occurs in Hallidayan linguistics when people talk about context. Halliday himself is quite clear that somethinig only becomes context when you attend to it and select it from the environment for the transformation into meaning, but people imagine that attending and transforming is something you actually do to context. dk On 8 October 2014 09:15, mike cole wrote: > Thanks for all the clarifying, David. I will go back and read the > texts you point to. > > The way you push forward the sense/meaning issue is totally new to me > and quite different from what I have been reading in arguments among > contemporary Russians, viz: > > So "smysl" is "tema"; it is something like "realized, actual meaning" > while "znachenie" is something like "potential, possible meaning". > Tema is what happens when we activate a particular layer in the great > palimpsest of possible meanings left in each word by our > contemporaries and ancestors. > > How do we connect this to the notion, from LSV, that znachenie > (meaning) is the most stable pole of smysl (sense)? The various > translations/interpretations of these terms are really confusing me. > Where does tema from and where is it taking us? > > mike > PS-- Any notion of who/where "social situation of development" is > reinterpreted as "context."? > > > On Tue, Oct 7, 2014 at 3:12 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Larry, Mike, Huw, Andy-- >> >> (and above all the real "objects" of broadening and enlivening the >> discussion, you by-standers and handwringers, perhaps intimidated by >> the pointing and handwaving, and unwilling to contribute lest the >> discussion become less sharpened and pointed....) >> >> There were several issues that seemed to pop up session after session >> at ISCAR, quite independently of who raised them. Yes, "the real >> Vygotsky" was certainly one of them, and Holbrook was not the only >> person to talk this way; I did too, and I do think that a world where >> the original Vygotsky is not recoverable is just as bad as a world >> where Vygotsky is completely forgotten. But in the context of ISCAR, >> the "real Vygotsky" was often a response to many speakers who would >> like to emphasize the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky. >> >> There were two ways of doing this. One was to simply say that of >> course Vygotsky was a Marxist, but then everybody was Marxist back >> then, and it was not much more important than being a liberal >> Democrat today. Interestingly, in the Making of Mind, Luria said that >> this is a description which could well apply to many psychologists of >> his time, including himself, but not to Vygotsky. A more >> sophisticated way of emphasizing the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky >> requires a "real Vygotsky" of a different kind. Writers like our good >> friend Nikolai Veresov have tried to do this by emphasizing the >> PRE-Marxist Vygotsky, especially Vygotsky the phenomenologist, >> student of Gustav Shpet who was a student of Husserl himself. >> >> I was formerly little puzzled by this move. Seth argued that it was >> valid, because of Vygotsky's ties to Lewin and Lewin's ideas about >> the force of objects and the fields of attractors created thereby. >> Lewin was certainly an attractor for Vygotsky, but Vygotsky actually >> uses Lewin to criticize phenomenological analysis in Chapter Three of >> HDHMF (see Vol. 4, p. 69). Elsewhere, Vygotsky is very critical of >> the founders of phenomenology, iincluding Husserl (p. 7). >> >> But now I think that Larry (and Martin, who has raised the same >> connection) is on to something. For it is also in HDHMF that Vygotsky >> bruits the idea that attention is a kind of gateway function, that >> the indicative is the primordial function of speech and thinking, and >> that there is nevertheless a qualitative difference between noticing >> something and internalizing it as a meaning--all of these are >> Husserlian ideas. Even the knotted handkerchief, which I myself have >> attributed to Vygotsky and to a peculiarly Russian practice, comes >> from the work of Husserl (Logical Investigations, Vol. I, pp. >> 269-333). I think that as a real historical materialist Vygotsky >> rejected Husserl's absolute opposition between symbol and index, but >> he didn't forget it when he set about trying to build a bridge >> between the two. >> >> Mike wonders about a text where Vygotsky rejects "activity" as a unit >> of analysis for everything but behavior. No such text exists, of >> course; if you read what I wrote carefully (I know, it's a trial >> sometimes, but at least I am a larger target then the minimalist Huw) >> you will see that I refer to a my OWN rejection, not Vygotsky's. What >> Vygotsky says in "Problem of the Environment" is that he wants to >> introduce "a number of different" units of analysis which are used in >> pedological analyses, of which "perezhivanie" is one, and >> "sense/signification" a very different one. (Andy is wrong to impute >> importance to the count noun form here; Vygotsky often uses it as a >> verb, I "live experience" something). I have always assumed that this >> means: >> >> a) Perezhivanie is quite specific to the problem Vygotsky raises in >> this lecture, which is how three different children can respond so >> differently to the one and the same form of child abuse. >> >> b) "Sense/signification" is also a unit of analysis, what Vygotsky >> refers to in Thinking and Speech as "the meaningful word". (This was >> also the object of textological attention in Holbrook's presentation). >> >> Mike also wonders about where Leontiev raises the possibility of >> applying Marxist theory directly to psychology. In many places, but >> perhaps most prominently in Problems of the Development of Mind (see >> pp. 236-237, 255). Holbrook had other quotations of this type, and I >> think there is a link between them and what Luria's remark that back >> then everybody in psychology was a "Marxist", but nobody except >> Vygotsky was much of a Marxist. Holbrook is right here. >> >> Mike asks if there is practical activity without thinking. I think >> that Vygotsky would say that there is thinking and there is verbal >> thinking (or, as Holbrook now insists, "thinking with words"). What >> monkeys do with sticks is called practical intelligence in Chapter >> Four of Thinking and Speech. It is practical activity, and it's >> thinking. But it's not a unit of thinking and speech, and therefore I >> think there is some light between what Vygotsky is willing to call >> "activity" and "praxis"; it's not the case that "praxis" is just a >> Greek word for "activity". I recognize, though, that for Andy what >> monkeys do with sticks does not count as activity (and I also >> recognize that I was muddling "activity" and "action"--sorry about >> that). >> >> Like Mike, I am paleo with regard to sense and meaning, and like Mike >> I recognize that it is hard to tell how deep the waters are here >> since they have been muddied. I think they were first muddied by >> Vygotsky himself, because he refers the distinction to Paulhan, where >> no such distinction is found (Paulhan just talks about connotation >> and denotation). But I think it's easy to unmuddy the waters and I >> think they are very deep indeed: Vygotsky uses Paulhan as a foil, >> taking the actual distinction from Volosinov, who was working at the >> Herzen Institute at exactly the same moment that Vygotsky was writing >> of this distinction. Zavershneva has said that Vygotsky cites >> Volosinov in his unpublished manuscripts, but that the citation is >> always removed by the editor in publication. So "smysl" is "tema"; >> it is something like "realized, actual meaning" while "znachenie" is >> something like "potential, possible meaning". Tema is what happens >> when we activate a particular layer in the great palimpsest of >> possible meanings left in each word by our contemporaries and ancestors. >> >> I'm currently writing the endnotes for our new volume of Vygotsky's >> lectures on pedology, so I am very aware of the issue that Huw >> appears to be raising (although Huw is so very gnomic in his lofty >> remarks on my supposed illogicality and my more systemic problems >> that it is hard to be sure). In Lecture Six, Vygotsky says in one >> paragraph that dividing off psychological from physiological >> development is methodologically impermissable, but in the very next >> paragraph, and indeed in the layout of the book, he says >> "dismemberment is nevertheless necessary". On the one hand, he says >> that there is no action, no motility, not even thinking without both >> the mind and the brain, and on the other he says that even within the >> body there are distinct lines of development and that physiology is >> "a summarizable concept". He is acutely aware of the contradiction, >> but by the end of the lecture he resolves it. We just have to keep in >> mind that things that we take apart for the purpose of analysis are >> inextricably joined in clinical practice. I suppose you can say it is >> a logical contradiction if you want, particularly if by that you mean >> it is a contradiction that only exists in the ideal world, that is, >> in logic and does not really pose a problem in life. >> >> The problem is with the word "text" is the same, Huw. For Hallidayans >> like me, a text is precisely a semantic object; it's not made of >> paper and ink. Viewed interpersonally, a text is a coherent and >> cohesive exchange. Viewed intra-mentally, it's a representation of >> thinking. It is objective, but it's objective the way that >> mathematics and language itself is objective, not the way that three >> actual apples or a physical book is objective. Dixit. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> (PS: I'm afraid I didn't get the systemic reproach at all. It's hard >> for a fish to see the density of water, much less to see the density >> of the fish!) >> >> dk >> >> >> >> On 7 October 2014 23:11, Larry Purss wrote: >> > The understanding of action and activity AS BOTH thinking and >> > behaviour contrasting with an appeal to differentiate the aspects >> > thinking and behaviour. >> > The notion *species* was introduced by David K as returning to >> > Vygotsky's words as he used them [paleo return] or we will loose >> > this species as it becomes extinct. >> > >> > Therefore Leontiev's theory could also be considered a separate >> > *species* with its own characteristics, features, and object of activity. >> > SO in my return to the species of Activity theory I turned to one >> > of Leontiev's students [Victor Kaptelinin] in his 2005 MCA article >> > "The >> Object >> > of Activity: Making sense of the Sense Maker" >> > >> > Kaptelinin opens his article with this fragment from the *species* >> > of Leontiev's own specified object of activity [activity theory] >> > >> > "A basic or, as is sometimes said, a CONSTITUTING characteristic of >> > activity is its objectivity or, rather object relatedness. Properly >> > the CONCEPT of its object, gegenstand, is already IMPLICITLY >> > contained in the very concept of activity. The expression >> > objectless activity is DEVOID of any meaning. Objectivity may SEEM >> > objectless, but SCIENTIFIC >> investigations >> > OF activity NECESSARILY REQUIRES discovering its object. >> > THUS the object of activity IS TWOFOLD: >> > First, in its INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE as SUBORDINATING TO ITSELF and >> > transforming the activity of the subject [The question arises if >> > this subordinating is the object's *motive* - LP] AND Second, as an >> > IMAGE OF the object, as a product OF its property of psychological >> > reflection THAT IS realized AS AN ACTIVITY OF THE SUBJECT, and >> > cannot exist OTHERWISE." >> > >> > This paragraph which Kaptelian offers as a *specimen* of a >> > particular and unique *species* of expression seems to present a >> > clear *case* to hold up to Vygotsky's *species* . >> > I would add that Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative *species* that >> > is >> also >> > looking at objects of activity from another *angle* of vision. >> > >> > Are Vygotsky, Leontiev, and Merleau-Ponty all gesturing at the same >> > phenomena and walking around this *object* [imagined? or real?] >> > from various vantage points. >> > >> > I will pause by returning to the second quality of the TWOFOLD >> > quality of the *object of activity* >> > >> > "SECOND as an IMAGE OF the object, AS a product OF its >> > PSYCHOLOGICAL REFLECTION that is REALIZED [brought into form -LP] >> > AS an activity OF the SUBJECT and cannot exist OTHERWISE. >> > >> > Is this a new *species*?? >> > >> > Larry >> > >> > >> > On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 4:55 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> > >> >> Mike, what I got out of Seth's intervention was just a plea for >> >> people >> to >> >> stop claiming to have the "real Vygotsky" and I thoroughly agreed >> >> with >> him. >> >> And so far as I know Marx uses the German word for Activity, viz., >> >> Taetigkeit, in "Theses on Feuerbach" - that word which pre-dates >> >> "behaviour" and "consciousness" by centuries, but which is >> >> sometimes referred to nowadays as a unity of these two >> >> abstractions, and it was >> only >> >> later interpreters that introduced the term "praxis", which being >> >> Greek sounds a lot cleverer. Action and Activity, in my view and >> etymologically, >> >> are both thinking and behaving. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> ------ >> >> *Andy Blunden* >> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> mike cole wrote: >> >> >> >>> Thanks, David. I think i understand better what you mean by "LSV >> rejects >> >>> "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior,and >> >>> most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Somehow I was >> >>> expecting text from LSV where he says "activity is not a unit of >> >>> analysis" because of >> all >> >>> the places in his text where he uses the term activity as a sort >> >>> of >> "lay >> >>> term". >> >>> >> >>> ... >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Holbrook Mahn. >> >>>> Holbrook began by saying that: >> >>>> >> >>>> a) We do not "borrow" concepts made for one discipline and "apply" >> >>>> them to another. Not even dialectical materialism can be >> >>>> "applied" to psychology (or even sociology or economics--Marx >> >>>> didn't do applied philosophy!). Holbrook then produced a number >> >>>> of quotations from The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in >> >>>> Psychology to show that Vygotsky knew this, and countered with >> >>>> other quotations from Problems of the Development of the Mind to show that Leontiev did not know this. >> >>>> >> >>>> I know places where LSV is clear on this score, in Historical >> >>>> meaning, >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> for example, but not the evidence of Leontiev's errors. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> b) The term "praxis" has been thus borrowed. It doesn't refer to >> >>>> practical activity: it refers to a unity of thinking and practice. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> Borrowed from Marx by ..??? by Leontiev? There is any form of >> >>> practical activity without human thinking? >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> c) The term "social situation of development" has been thus >> >>>> borrowed; it does not refer to a "context" but to the child's >> >>>> relationship to the environment. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> By whom? I am always in a puzzle about the use of this term. >> >>> Isn't perezhivanie the term that LSV uses to talk about relation >> >>> of child to environment? At least, there seems to be a lot of chatter about issue. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> d) The term "unit of analysis" does not refer to a God particle >> >>>> that is indifferent to the problem of analysis. ygotsky did not >> >>>> imagine a "unit of analysis" that fit any and all problems in >> >>>> psychology. Each unit of analysis is specific to a particular problem of unity (e.g. >> >>>> the problem of the unity of the child and his or her environment >> >>>> in Problem of the Environment and the problem of the unity of >> >>>> verbal thinking in Thinking and Speech). >> >>>> >> >>>> Amen to that. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> e) The term "verbal thinking" is a mistranslation: Vygotsky is >> >>>> talking about thinking by language, or thinking through word >> >>>> meanings, and not some kind of verbalizable inner speech (which >> >>>> does exist, but which is a distinct layer from thinking). >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> There is a lot of confusion around this issue and would probably >> >>> need somewhat separate discussion. I interpret in the former way. >> >>> The role >> of >> >>> meaning in inner speech, and the usefulness or not of the >> >>> sense/meaning distinction has me confused. Dima Leontiev has put >> >>> the distinction >> behind >> >>> him and now refers to "cultural meaning" (paleo meaning >> >>> >> >>> ) and >> >>> "personal meaning (paleo sense)." I am paleo in this regard. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Most of this has been said before, not least by Vygotsky >> >>>> himself. I know that Holbrook has been saying it at least since >> >>>> 2007 when I first heard him at the American Association for >> >>>> Applied Linguistics in Costa Mesa, and he develops it at some length in: >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> https://www.academia.edu/1803017/Vygotskys_Analysis_of_ >> >>>> Childrens_Meaning-Making_Processes >> >>>> >> >>>> Mahn, H. (2012). Vygotsky's Analysis of Children's >> >>>> Meaning-Making Processes, International Journal of Educational >> >>>> Psychology1(2):100-126 >> >>>> >> >>>> It's been said by others too: Mike Cole actually makes many of >> >>>> the same points in discussing how the Kharkov school deviated >> >>>> from the work of Vygotsk, >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> I did not know enough to make many of these points in 1978! They >> >>> certainly distanced themselves from LSV and PI Zinchenko went >> >>> after the natural-cultural memory distinction, >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> and J.V. Wertsch is quite explicit in his revisionism when he >> >>>> presents "mediated activity" as a unit of analysis in opposition >> >>>> to "word meaning". >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> mediated ACTION and often as not, mediated action in context. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> But of course since a unit of analysis must preserve in some >> >>>> shape or form the essential properties of the whole, the use of >> >>>> "mediated activity" >> >>>> (action) >> >>>> cannot be a unit of analysis for the mind if we wish to retain >> >>>> the idea that the mind has a semantic structure (that is, if the >> >>>> "whole" is structured something like a text or a discourse >> >>>> rather than like driving a car, shooting a gun, or hunting >> >>>> animals). >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> When we get to semantic structure of consciousness, we know there >> >>> was a break between LSV and his buddies. It seems that it is in >> >>> arriving at >> this >> >>> formulation that the charges of idealism and sign-o-centrism kick in. >> >>> >> >>> My difficulty is in making arguments about consciousness- >> >>> -in-general, perhaps a relic of my behaviorist past. Luria >> >>> appears to have come >> around >> >>> on this issue. I have had a difficult time understanding the >> >>> changes in Leontiev's thought over the period of the 30's and 40's. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> Now, in the discussion of Holbrook's presentation, this >> >>>> wild-haired guy who looked a little like Itzhak Perlman rose to >> >>>> argue that Leontiev's interpretation was really one fair >> >>>> interpretation, and that it really was addressed towards a >> >>>> specific problem, which is how to prevent dualism from arising >> >>>> (that is, how to explain how word meaning could arise historically).Through joint mediated activity? >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> He also said that Holbrook was juxtaposing quotations out of >> >>>> context: the quotes that showed Vygotsky arguing against a >> >>>> "Marxist psychology" were directed against a very specific group >> >>>> of vulgar Marxists (e.g. Zalkind) and that is why Vygotsky uses >> >>>> scare quotes around "Marxist". >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> Not so? >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> I then muddied the waters, first by addressing the wild-haired >> >>>> guy instead of Holbrook (a major breach of protocol) and then by >> >>>> arguing that speech really is sui generis, because it is a form of "activity" >> >>>> (if we must call it that) whose conditions of comprehension are >> >>>> no longer recoverable from the activity itself (and so the unit >> >>>> of analysis for verbal thinking cannot be sought in activity). >> >>>> There wasn't enough time to really develop what I wanted to say, >> >>>> so I went over to continue the discussion, and it turned out >> >>>> that the wild haired guy was none other than Seth Chaiklin, who >> >>>> is, we all know, one of the foremost paleo-Vygotskyans when it >> >>>> comes to the much misinterpreted concept of the ZPD. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> Speech is a form of activity or a means of activity? Or of action? >> >>> >> >>> I guess I do not understand. If its worthwhile, perhaps spell the >> >>> idea out here? >> >>> >> >>> So far as I can tell, there are ONLY misinterpretations of the Zoped. >> Seth >> >>> was right on about it being used in Anglo-American discourse as >> something >> >>> akin to zone of proximal learning,fitting into the associationist >> >>> view >> of >> >>> development as more learning. But the one right interpretation >> >>> has >> escaped >> >>> my notice. >> >>> >> >>> Thanks again for taking the trouble to write that out. Perhaps it >> >>> will >> be >> >>> generative for people. >> >>> mike >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>> David Kellogg >> >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >>>> >> >>>> PS: Holbrook DID get one thing wrong. Stalin did not argue that >> >>>> language was purely ideal and superstructural; that was Marr's >> >>>> position. Stalin, or whoever ghost wrote his articles, argued >> >>>> that language was base, and therefore somehow material, whatever >> >>>> that means. But Stalin was not really interested in ideas; he >> >>>> was just out for Marr's blood. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> On 6 October 2014 22:21, mike cole wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> Hi David-- >> >>>>> >> >>>>> The specific example of your comments on originals and >> >>>>> adaptations >> hits >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>> on >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> a point it would be helpful to hear more about: >> >>>>> >> >>>>> You wrote: >> >>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a >> >>>>> somewhat similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and >> >>>>> me clinging rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan >> >>>>> interpretation which >> actually >> >>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but >> >>>>> behavior, and most certainly as a unit of psychological >> >>>>> analysis. Seth's argument was pragmatist: for certain practical >> >>>>> applications, we need new interpretations, including >> >>>>> revisionist ones. Mine was an argument in favor of species >> >>>>> diversity: when the revisionist account supplants the original >> >>>>> to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no longer >> >>>>> accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts >> (and >> >>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at >> >>>>> least recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole >> >>>>> species of thinking that has become extinct). >> >>>>> >> >>>>> 1. Could you guide us to a text you recommend where this >> >>>>> interpretation >> >>>>> is laid out? >> >>>>> 2. What sort of revision was Seth suggesting and why? >> >>>>> >> >>>>> I have been reading Russian discussions around this issue. >> Clarification >> >>>>> would be helpful. >> >>>>> mike >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:37 AM, David Kellogg >> >>>>> > > >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>> wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own >> >>>>> bed and >> >>>>>> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing this: >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, >> >>>>>> played, as Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT >> >>>>>> Davydov) >> Stradivarius >> >>>>>> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very >> >>>>>> first time in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout >> >>>>>> this concert, Ma >> has >> >>>>>> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman >> >>>>>> has >> been >> >>>>>> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal >> interpretation. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if >> >>>>>> Mendelssohn himself had heard the sonata played on that very >> >>>>>> cello, then he, Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that >> >>>>>> Mendelssohn had >> occupied, >> >>>>>> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer >> >>>>>> to Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with >> >>>>>> period instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts >> >>>>>> them and starts to play. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a >> >>>>>> somewhat similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and >> >>>>>> me clinging rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan >> >>>>>> interpretation which >> actually >> >>>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but >> >>>>>> behavior, and most certainly as a unit of psychological >> >>>>>> analysis. Seth's argument was pragmatist: for certain >> >>>>>> practical applications, we need new interpretations, including >> >>>>>> revisionist ones. Mine was an >> argument >> >>>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account >> supplants >> >>>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original >> >>>>>> argument is >> no >> >>>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original >> >>>>>> texts >> (and >> >>>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at >> >>>>>> least recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole >> >>>>>> species of thinking that has become extinct). >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> David Kellogg >> >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in >> >>>>>> Sydney was not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I >> >>>>>> think I would have liked it better if she had used those terms >> >>>>>> a little more >> imprecisely, >> >>>>>> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION >> >>>>>> might >> have >> >>>>>> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was >> >>>>>> contemplating. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a >> >>>>>> world without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour >> >>>>>> jobs are replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this >> >>>>>> was a rather dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed >> >>>>>> us what she called >> the >> >>>>>> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also >> >>>>>> human identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in >> >>>>>> the >> conference >> >>>>>> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time >> >>>>>> for >> the >> >>>>>> spiritual side of life. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the "object" >> of >> >>>>>> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working >> >>>>>> class >> is >> >>>>>> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex >> workers >> >>>>>> and atomized into the social position of housewives. >> >>>>>> Inequality is >> now >> >>>>>> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history >> >>>>>> tells us that the result of this is not going to be individual >> spirituality >> >>>>>> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is >> >>>>>> if >> that >> >>>>>> force is organized, social, and directed against social >> >>>>>> equality rather than against fellow members of the working class. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> dk >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> On 5 October 2014 13:38, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie >> >>>>>>> Nardi >> I >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> had >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> the >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if >> >>>>>>> she >> has >> >>>>>>> written something on "object" that is very good news. >> >>>>>>> I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't >> >>>>>>> think one >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> good >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> book >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long >> >>>>>>> while I >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> have >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> been >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie" >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> without >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> an >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of >> "substance" >> >>>>>>> whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains >> outstanding >> >>>>>>> differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that >> >>>>>>> almost all >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> bar >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> one >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is >> >>>>>>> a >> step >> >>>>>>> forward, and people are aware of the differences in >> >>>>>>> interpretation >> and >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> they >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a >> >>>>>>> while, >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> maybe >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> consistency >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> in >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> optimistic. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> Andy >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>>> ------------ >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. >> >>>>>>>> I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds >> >>>>>>>> that >> go >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> U >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a >> >>>>> shower of >> >>>>>>>> interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> (Whatever >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on >> >>>>> basics of >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> AT >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> is >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Mike >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden >> >>>>>>>> > wrote: >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were >> >>>>>>>> a >> little >> >>>>>>>> slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also >> >>>>>>>> iscar-ers >> and >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> we >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. >> >>>>>>>> Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger on a >> >>>>>>>> Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and >> >>>>>>>> tablets >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> etc., >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were >> >>>>>>>> oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> My impressions of CHAT research: >> >>>>>>>> On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp and >> >>>>>>>> critical in relation to the dominant political forces, >> >>>>>>>> and >> still >> >>>>>>>> way out in front in understanding the several developmental >> >>>>>>>> processes which all contribute to our actions (phylogenesis, >> >>>>>>>> historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, >> >>>>>>>> microgenesis), >> and >> >>>>>>>> not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great >> >>>>>>>> community of research, relatively lacking in the >> competitiveness >> >>>>>>>> and jealousy which infects most research communities. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> On the negative side: >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" >> >>>>>>>> as >> some >> >>>>>>>> homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces >> >>>>>>>> problems >> into >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> the >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., >> >>>>> people >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> lack >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> a >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> viable social theory or the ability to use theory >> >>>>>>> they >> have >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> to >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated way. >> >>>>>>>> * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. >> Only a >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> small >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> minority know what it means and use the idea in >> >>>>>>> their >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> research. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> confusion; >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> few researchers using the concept are clear on what >> >>>>> the >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> concept >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront >> >>>>> and >> >>>>>>>> attempt to >> >>>>>>>> resolve the methodological differences (I refer to >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> systematic >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) >> >>>>> within >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> the >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the >> >>>>>>> relatively >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> civil >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> relations between researchers - people prefer to let >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> differences >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> just fester without openly discussing them. The old >> >>>>>>> Soviet >> >>>>>>>> approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far >> >>>>>>>> the >> other >> >>>>>>>> way. :) >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Andy >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>>> ------------ >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous response to >> >>>>>>>> someone who >> >>>>>>>> wrote backto xmca instead of me. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an >> >>>>>>>> interesting and >> >>>>>>>> unassuming guy. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca >> discussion?? >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> mike >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> -- >> >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >> >>>>>>>> science >> with >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> an >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>> -- >> >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >> >>>>> with >> an >> >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >> > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Oct 9 08:02:30 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2014 15:02:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> Message-ID: David, One could say, couldn't one, that a tool also has both a stable, customary pole of functionality and a broader range of potential, possible uses? A hammer, for example, is customarily used to drive nails, but it can potentially be used in a variety of other ways that are related, one might say metaphorically, to this core function. Martin On Oct 8, 2014, at 5:00 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > The idea that the latter is merely meaning potential and the former is > actual, realized, materialized meaning comes straight from Halliday. > But the (for me, linked) idea that the latter is the most stable pole > of word value and the former the least so comes straight from > Volosinov, who influenced Halliday via the Prague linguists. From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Oct 9 08:29:57 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2014 08:29:57 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: New AERA Open Access Journal Now Accepting Article Submissions In-Reply-To: <78.1167.381372.193940.68151642.922@aera.net> References: <78.1167.381372.193940.68151642.922@aera.net> Message-ID: Interesting new AERA initiative others may want to make use of. mike ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: AERA Communications Date: Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 8:12 AM Subject: New AERA Open Access Journal Now Accepting Article Submissions To: lchcmike@gmail.com * For Immediate Release:* October 9, 2014 *Contact:* Tony Pals, tpals@aera.net office: (202) 238-3235 cell: (202) 288-9333 Bridget Jameson, bjameson@aera.net office: (202) 238-3233 *New AERA Open Access Journal Now Accepting Article Submissions* *WASHINGTON, D.C., October 9, 2014 *? *AERA Open *, a new scholarly journal from the American Educational Research Association (AERA), is now accepting article submissions. The publication is the first open access journal in the field of education and learning to be published in the United States. It is also among the first open access journals to be launched by a scholarly social science society. *AERA Open *is edited by an inaugural team of leading scholars?Mark Warschauer, Greg Duncan, and Jacquelynne Eccles . The editors are joined by an accomplished associate editor team and editorial board . The editorial team is committed to upholding the highest standards of rigorous and rapid review. - WATCH: Video of *AERA Open* Editor in Chief Mark Warschauer discussing the purpose of the new journal - READ: Inaugural *AERA Open* editorial by Mark Warschauer, Greg Duncan, and Jacquelynne Eccles In the journal?s inaugural editorial , Warschauer, Duncan, and Eccles describe what a truly ?open? journal means. In addition to being open and accessible to a broad audience, *AERA Open* is open to diverse authors, disciplines, and contexts, and to inspection and replication studies. Through *AERA Open,* the editors note that they ?seek to promote strong education research; strengthen the ties between researchers, policy makers, and practitioners; and foster greater international communication and collaboration in education scholarship.? ?With the launch of *AERA Open, *AERA continues its leadership role in scholarly open access publishing,? said AERA Executive Director Felice J. Levine. ?We are eager to open the submission system for AERA?s newest journal, which we anticipate will become a venue for innovation, data sharing, and connections across interdisciplinary arenas of inquiry.? As with AERA?s other six journals, SAGE is publishing *AERA Open* on behalf of AERA?and is similarly committed to this effort as AERA?s publishing partner. ?*AERA Open* will cross disciplinary and geographical boundaries to make significant advances in global education research,? said Bob Howard, Vice President of Journals, SAGE. "We are confident in the exceptional editorial team put together by AERA and are delighted to be serving as the journal's publisher." The submission site for *AERA Open* is on the ScholarOne platform . *AERA Open*?s manuscript guidelines, list of author payment fees, and other important information can be viewed here . *About AERA* *The *American Educational Research Association (AERA) *is the largest national professional organization devoted to the scientific study of education. Founded in 1916, AERA advances knowledge about education, encourages scholarly inquiry related to education, and promotes the use of research to improve education and serve the public good. Find AERA on *Facebook *and *Twitter *.* This release is available online. *###* ------------------------------ This email was sent to lchcmike@gmail.com. You are receiving this email because of your association with AERA. Click the following link to change your preference or opt out of AERA emails: preferences American Educational Research Association 1430 K Street, NW, Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20005 www.aera.net -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Oct 9 09:17:06 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2014 09:17:06 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> Message-ID: Tools, like words, are polysemic, Martin, i take it. mike On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 8:02 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > David, > > One could say, couldn't one, that a tool also has both a stable, customary > pole of functionality and a broader range of potential, possible uses? A > hammer, for example, is customarily used to drive nails, but it can > potentially be used in a variety of other ways that are related, one might > say metaphorically, to this core function. > > Martin > > On Oct 8, 2014, at 5:00 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > The idea that the latter is merely meaning potential and the former is > > actual, realized, materialized meaning comes straight from Halliday. > > But the (for me, linked) idea that the latter is the most stable pole > > of word value and the former the least so comes straight from > > Volosinov, who influenced Halliday via the Prague linguists. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Oct 9 10:27:59 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2014 11:27:59 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F4B2@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F4B2@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: Rod, Hmmm.... -greg On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 2:42 AM, Rod Parker-Rees < R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > David, > > I share what I take to be your emphasis on the distinction between 'words > in their speaking' and 'already spoken words' (to borrow Shotter's terms). > Communication surely predates language and your account of Volosinov's and > Vygotsky's thought experiment about a one word language reminded me of > Steven Mithen's (2005) book 'The singing Neanderthals' in which he argues > for a pre-language mode of communication which he calls Hmmmm because it > was holistic (not composed of segmented elements), manipulative > (influencing emotional states and hence behaviour), multimodal (using both > sound and gesture), musical (rhythmic, and melodic), and mimetic (using > sound symbolism and mimetic gestures). As Vygotsky points out, babies are > importantly unlike Neanderthals because they are surrounded by people who > are fluent users of the fully developed form of communication which the > baby will learn to use, but still their communication is non-linguistic and > non-conceptual. > > I have to apologise for not reading back through this full thread (yet) > but I am familiar with a distinction between znachenie and smysl - tema > is not a term I have come across. I will read back to find explanations. > > Can Russian speakers also tell me whether the term obuchenie carries more > of the sense of learning the person as well as the 'content matter' when > teacher and learner engage each other in conversation? I was struck by the > way Russians tend to list their pedagogical lineage in terms of who their > teacher studied with. > > All the best, > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of David Kellogg > Sent: 08 October 2014 23:00 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > Itzhak Perlman is also making gentle fun of Yo-yo Ma's little game of "six > degrees of separation", whereby Ma insists on the direct face-to-face > contact between us and the departed masters via a chain of aging masters. > In this too, I am in sympathy with Ma: it is why I shelled out the huge > registration fee to go to ISCAR, and also why I was a little disappointed > not to see Mike there (although secretly relieved since I know he is an > unbruised fruit that does not travel so well these days, and it was a > gruelling flight even for a tough nut like me). It is also why last year at > this time I forked over a similar fee to go and spend two weeks in > Guangzhou in the company of Michael Halliday. > > Of course I know it is possible to communicate with some of these masters > through the email (though not Halliday, who considers human speech to be > the most developed form of human communications technology precisely > because it is the oldest). But it turns out that when we reduce speech to > nothing but vowels and consonants and nouns and verbs, we have to > reconstruct for ourselves the immense good will and cheer that is > transmitted effortlessly, iconically, and indexically in face-to-face > encounters, and this greatly impedes (my) understanding. > > That is why Martin's proposal that we consider both tool-mediated activity > and sign-mediated speech to be forms of semiotic mediation appeals. I think > it might resolve the key problem that LSV leaves us with at the end of > Chapter Two of HDHMF when he warns against those who consider signs to be > "psychological tools" (pace Kozulin, Bordrova and Leong), and says that > they are only "logically" (pace Huw) members of a common category; with the > precise relationship between them (i.e. > the historical relationship between them) to be worked out. Tools and > signs are functionally quite different even where they appear to co-occur > (like the blade of the axe and the decorations on the handle, as Volosinov > says): one acts on the environment and mediates a subject-object > relationship, while the other presupposes somehow empathetically > reconstructing the mental state of another subject. Yet there must be some > deep internal link or we could not have evolved the one out of the other. > That internal link, it seems to me, is the physical presence of the other > in the environment, in all of his or her smiling and grimacing, sweating > and stinking glory, and the internal link is necessarily stronger in the > case of "tema" than in the case of "znachenie". > > The idea that the latter is merely meaning potential and the former is > actual, realized, materialized meaning comes straight from Halliday. > But the (for me, linked) idea that the latter is the most stable pole of > word value and the former the least so comes straight from Volosinov, who > influenced Halliday via the Prague linguists. Volosinov derives it from a > long analysis of the great schools of linguistics somewhat similar to > Mike's recent ruminations on the great schools of psychological thought: > there were centuries where linguistics was synonymous with the study of > disembodied speech (vowels and consonants rather than intonation and > stress, writing rather than speaking, and literature rather than everyday > language), and there was a century--the nineteenth--where the opposite > tendency held sway (von Humboldt, Potebnia, but above all the school of > Kurt Vossler). We can also derive Volosinov's conclusion > logically--"znachenie" is actually produced by abstraction and > generalization from "tema", and both processes would lend it a > self-similarity, a stability, which cannot obtain with "tema". > > I am now quite certain that Volosinov and Vygotsky were in direct, > face-to-face contact during the last two years of LSV's life when he worked > at the Herzen Pedagogical Institute in Leningrad. In any case, both of them > pose exactly the same thought experiment (which is also posed in the work > of Marr, who by some accounts took part in LSV's weekly meetings with > Eisenstein). Both wondered what a language which consisted of a single word > would sound like, and asked if it would even be a language at all. And both > came up with the same answer. > > It would sound like an obscenity, tossed back and forth between drunken > workmen on a street, as recorded in the diary of the great writer Fyodor > Dostoevsky. That is, the meaning would be conveyed not referentially but > indexically, not through articulation but through prosody, not through > grammar but through revoicing. You can produce some of the same effect in > English if you imagine the following conversation, slurring the initial and > final consonants and assimilating the middle vowel to a kind of schwa sound > (the vowel you make with your tongue in the exact middle of your mouth). > > A: (Wh)e(re)? > B: (Th)e(re)! > C: (Wh)e(n)?? > D: (Th)e(n)!! > E: (Wh)a(t)??? > F: (Th)a(t)!!! > > Volosinov concludes that it would indeed be speech, because the essence of > speech is "tema" and not "znachenie", its inner quality is precisely this > kind of mutability and only its outer form is self-similarity. Speech is, > essentially, grunts and groans and not grammar. But of course that means > that both poles are present, and must be present, for speech to be language. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > PS: I think the reinterpretation of SSD as "context" is exactly what Andy > was referring to: the hypostatization of "society" as a kind of enveloping > cultural given from which the subject has no choice and over which the > subject has no control. Those who use the Engstrom triangle as a kind of > inventory of stuff to talk about are content to overcome this danger by > sticking a two headed arrow between "subject" > and "rules" or "subject" and "community" or "subject" and "division of > labor". But this only poses the problem; it doesn't solve it. By the way, > exactly the same problem occurs in Hallidayan linguistics when people talk > about context. Halliday himself is quite clear that somethinig only becomes > context when you attend to it and select it from the environment for the > transformation into meaning, but people imagine that attending and > transforming is something you actually do to context. > > dk > > > > > > > > On 8 October 2014 09:15, mike cole wrote: > > Thanks for all the clarifying, David. I will go back and read the > > texts you point to. > > > > The way you push forward the sense/meaning issue is totally new to me > > and quite different from what I have been reading in arguments among > > contemporary Russians, viz: > > > > So "smysl" is "tema"; it is something like "realized, actual meaning" > > while "znachenie" is something like "potential, possible meaning". > > Tema is what happens when we activate a particular layer in the great > > palimpsest of possible meanings left in each word by our > > contemporaries and ancestors. > > > > How do we connect this to the notion, from LSV, that znachenie > > (meaning) is the most stable pole of smysl (sense)? The various > > translations/interpretations of these terms are really confusing me. > > Where does tema from and where is it taking us? > > > > mike > > PS-- Any notion of who/where "social situation of development" is > > reinterpreted as "context."? > > > > > > On Tue, Oct 7, 2014 at 3:12 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > >> Larry, Mike, Huw, Andy-- > >> > >> (and above all the real "objects" of broadening and enlivening the > >> discussion, you by-standers and handwringers, perhaps intimidated by > >> the pointing and handwaving, and unwilling to contribute lest the > >> discussion become less sharpened and pointed....) > >> > >> There were several issues that seemed to pop up session after session > >> at ISCAR, quite independently of who raised them. Yes, "the real > >> Vygotsky" was certainly one of them, and Holbrook was not the only > >> person to talk this way; I did too, and I do think that a world where > >> the original Vygotsky is not recoverable is just as bad as a world > >> where Vygotsky is completely forgotten. But in the context of ISCAR, > >> the "real Vygotsky" was often a response to many speakers who would > >> like to emphasize the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky. > >> > >> There were two ways of doing this. One was to simply say that of > >> course Vygotsky was a Marxist, but then everybody was Marxist back > >> then, and it was not much more important than being a liberal > >> Democrat today. Interestingly, in the Making of Mind, Luria said that > >> this is a description which could well apply to many psychologists of > >> his time, including himself, but not to Vygotsky. A more > >> sophisticated way of emphasizing the NON-Marxist side of Vygotsky > >> requires a "real Vygotsky" of a different kind. Writers like our good > >> friend Nikolai Veresov have tried to do this by emphasizing the > >> PRE-Marxist Vygotsky, especially Vygotsky the phenomenologist, > >> student of Gustav Shpet who was a student of Husserl himself. > >> > >> I was formerly little puzzled by this move. Seth argued that it was > >> valid, because of Vygotsky's ties to Lewin and Lewin's ideas about > >> the force of objects and the fields of attractors created thereby. > >> Lewin was certainly an attractor for Vygotsky, but Vygotsky actually > >> uses Lewin to criticize phenomenological analysis in Chapter Three of > >> HDHMF (see Vol. 4, p. 69). Elsewhere, Vygotsky is very critical of > >> the founders of phenomenology, iincluding Husserl (p. 7). > >> > >> But now I think that Larry (and Martin, who has raised the same > >> connection) is on to something. For it is also in HDHMF that Vygotsky > >> bruits the idea that attention is a kind of gateway function, that > >> the indicative is the primordial function of speech and thinking, and > >> that there is nevertheless a qualitative difference between noticing > >> something and internalizing it as a meaning--all of these are > >> Husserlian ideas. Even the knotted handkerchief, which I myself have > >> attributed to Vygotsky and to a peculiarly Russian practice, comes > >> from the work of Husserl (Logical Investigations, Vol. I, pp. > >> 269-333). I think that as a real historical materialist Vygotsky > >> rejected Husserl's absolute opposition between symbol and index, but > >> he didn't forget it when he set about trying to build a bridge > >> between the two. > >> > >> Mike wonders about a text where Vygotsky rejects "activity" as a unit > >> of analysis for everything but behavior. No such text exists, of > >> course; if you read what I wrote carefully (I know, it's a trial > >> sometimes, but at least I am a larger target then the minimalist Huw) > >> you will see that I refer to a my OWN rejection, not Vygotsky's. What > >> Vygotsky says in "Problem of the Environment" is that he wants to > >> introduce "a number of different" units of analysis which are used in > >> pedological analyses, of which "perezhivanie" is one, and > >> "sense/signification" a very different one. (Andy is wrong to impute > >> importance to the count noun form here; Vygotsky often uses it as a > >> verb, I "live experience" something). I have always assumed that this > >> means: > >> > >> a) Perezhivanie is quite specific to the problem Vygotsky raises in > >> this lecture, which is how three different children can respond so > >> differently to the one and the same form of child abuse. > >> > >> b) "Sense/signification" is also a unit of analysis, what Vygotsky > >> refers to in Thinking and Speech as "the meaningful word". (This was > >> also the object of textological attention in Holbrook's presentation). > >> > >> Mike also wonders about where Leontiev raises the possibility of > >> applying Marxist theory directly to psychology. In many places, but > >> perhaps most prominently in Problems of the Development of Mind (see > >> pp. 236-237, 255). Holbrook had other quotations of this type, and I > >> think there is a link between them and what Luria's remark that back > >> then everybody in psychology was a "Marxist", but nobody except > >> Vygotsky was much of a Marxist. Holbrook is right here. > >> > >> Mike asks if there is practical activity without thinking. I think > >> that Vygotsky would say that there is thinking and there is verbal > >> thinking (or, as Holbrook now insists, "thinking with words"). What > >> monkeys do with sticks is called practical intelligence in Chapter > >> Four of Thinking and Speech. It is practical activity, and it's > >> thinking. But it's not a unit of thinking and speech, and therefore I > >> think there is some light between what Vygotsky is willing to call > >> "activity" and "praxis"; it's not the case that "praxis" is just a > >> Greek word for "activity". I recognize, though, that for Andy what > >> monkeys do with sticks does not count as activity (and I also > >> recognize that I was muddling "activity" and "action"--sorry about > >> that). > >> > >> Like Mike, I am paleo with regard to sense and meaning, and like Mike > >> I recognize that it is hard to tell how deep the waters are here > >> since they have been muddied. I think they were first muddied by > >> Vygotsky himself, because he refers the distinction to Paulhan, where > >> no such distinction is found (Paulhan just talks about connotation > >> and denotation). But I think it's easy to unmuddy the waters and I > >> think they are very deep indeed: Vygotsky uses Paulhan as a foil, > >> taking the actual distinction from Volosinov, who was working at the > >> Herzen Institute at exactly the same moment that Vygotsky was writing > >> of this distinction. Zavershneva has said that Vygotsky cites > >> Volosinov in his unpublished manuscripts, but that the citation is > >> always removed by the editor in publication. So "smysl" is "tema"; > >> it is something like "realized, actual meaning" while "znachenie" is > >> something like "potential, possible meaning". Tema is what happens > >> when we activate a particular layer in the great palimpsest of > >> possible meanings left in each word by our contemporaries and ancestors. > >> > >> I'm currently writing the endnotes for our new volume of Vygotsky's > >> lectures on pedology, so I am very aware of the issue that Huw > >> appears to be raising (although Huw is so very gnomic in his lofty > >> remarks on my supposed illogicality and my more systemic problems > >> that it is hard to be sure). In Lecture Six, Vygotsky says in one > >> paragraph that dividing off psychological from physiological > >> development is methodologically impermissable, but in the very next > >> paragraph, and indeed in the layout of the book, he says > >> "dismemberment is nevertheless necessary". On the one hand, he says > >> that there is no action, no motility, not even thinking without both > >> the mind and the brain, and on the other he says that even within the > >> body there are distinct lines of development and that physiology is > >> "a summarizable concept". He is acutely aware of the contradiction, > >> but by the end of the lecture he resolves it. We just have to keep in > >> mind that things that we take apart for the purpose of analysis are > >> inextricably joined in clinical practice. I suppose you can say it is > >> a logical contradiction if you want, particularly if by that you mean > >> it is a contradiction that only exists in the ideal world, that is, > >> in logic and does not really pose a problem in life. > >> > >> The problem is with the word "text" is the same, Huw. For Hallidayans > >> like me, a text is precisely a semantic object; it's not made of > >> paper and ink. Viewed interpersonally, a text is a coherent and > >> cohesive exchange. Viewed intra-mentally, it's a representation of > >> thinking. It is objective, but it's objective the way that > >> mathematics and language itself is objective, not the way that three > >> actual apples or a physical book is objective. Dixit. > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > >> (PS: I'm afraid I didn't get the systemic reproach at all. It's hard > >> for a fish to see the density of water, much less to see the density > >> of the fish!) > >> > >> dk > >> > >> > >> > >> On 7 October 2014 23:11, Larry Purss wrote: > >> > The understanding of action and activity AS BOTH thinking and > >> > behaviour contrasting with an appeal to differentiate the aspects > >> > thinking and behaviour. > >> > The notion *species* was introduced by David K as returning to > >> > Vygotsky's words as he used them [paleo return] or we will loose > >> > this species as it becomes extinct. > >> > > >> > Therefore Leontiev's theory could also be considered a separate > >> > *species* with its own characteristics, features, and object of > activity. > >> > SO in my return to the species of Activity theory I turned to one > >> > of Leontiev's students [Victor Kaptelinin] in his 2005 MCA article > >> > "The > >> Object > >> > of Activity: Making sense of the Sense Maker" > >> > > >> > Kaptelinin opens his article with this fragment from the *species* > >> > of Leontiev's own specified object of activity [activity theory] > >> > > >> > "A basic or, as is sometimes said, a CONSTITUTING characteristic of > >> > activity is its objectivity or, rather object relatedness. Properly > >> > the CONCEPT of its object, gegenstand, is already IMPLICITLY > >> > contained in the very concept of activity. The expression > >> > objectless activity is DEVOID of any meaning. Objectivity may SEEM > >> > objectless, but SCIENTIFIC > >> investigations > >> > OF activity NECESSARILY REQUIRES discovering its object. > >> > THUS the object of activity IS TWOFOLD: > >> > First, in its INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE as SUBORDINATING TO ITSELF and > >> > transforming the activity of the subject [The question arises if > >> > this subordinating is the object's *motive* - LP] AND Second, as an > >> > IMAGE OF the object, as a product OF its property of psychological > >> > reflection THAT IS realized AS AN ACTIVITY OF THE SUBJECT, and > >> > cannot exist OTHERWISE." > >> > > >> > This paragraph which Kaptelian offers as a *specimen* of a > >> > particular and unique *species* of expression seems to present a > >> > clear *case* to hold up to Vygotsky's *species* . > >> > I would add that Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative *species* that > >> > is > >> also > >> > looking at objects of activity from another *angle* of vision. > >> > > >> > Are Vygotsky, Leontiev, and Merleau-Ponty all gesturing at the same > >> > phenomena and walking around this *object* [imagined? or real?] > >> > from various vantage points. > >> > > >> > I will pause by returning to the second quality of the TWOFOLD > >> > quality of the *object of activity* > >> > > >> > "SECOND as an IMAGE OF the object, AS a product OF its > >> > PSYCHOLOGICAL REFLECTION that is REALIZED [brought into form -LP] > >> > AS an activity OF the SUBJECT and cannot exist OTHERWISE. > >> > > >> > Is this a new *species*?? > >> > > >> > Larry > >> > > >> > > >> > On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 4:55 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >> > > >> >> Mike, what I got out of Seth's intervention was just a plea for > >> >> people > >> to > >> >> stop claiming to have the "real Vygotsky" and I thoroughly agreed > >> >> with > >> him. > >> >> And so far as I know Marx uses the German word for Activity, viz., > >> >> Taetigkeit, in "Theses on Feuerbach" - that word which pre-dates > >> >> "behaviour" and "consciousness" by centuries, but which is > >> >> sometimes referred to nowadays as a unity of these two > >> >> abstractions, and it was > >> only > >> >> later interpreters that introduced the term "praxis", which being > >> >> Greek sounds a lot cleverer. Action and Activity, in my view and > >> etymologically, > >> >> are both thinking and behaving. > >> >> Andy > >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> >> ------ > >> >> *Andy Blunden* > >> >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> mike cole wrote: > >> >> > >> >>> Thanks, David. I think i understand better what you mean by "LSV > >> rejects > >> >>> "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but behavior,and > >> >>> most certainly as a unit of psychological analysis. Somehow I was > >> >>> expecting text from LSV where he says "activity is not a unit of > >> >>> analysis" because of > >> all > >> >>> the places in his text where he uses the term activity as a sort > >> >>> of > >> "lay > >> >>> term". > >> >>> > >> >>> ... > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>>> Holbrook Mahn. > >> >>>> Holbrook began by saying that: > >> >>>> > >> >>>> a) We do not "borrow" concepts made for one discipline and "apply" > >> >>>> them to another. Not even dialectical materialism can be > >> >>>> "applied" to psychology (or even sociology or economics--Marx > >> >>>> didn't do applied philosophy!). Holbrook then produced a number > >> >>>> of quotations from The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in > >> >>>> Psychology to show that Vygotsky knew this, and countered with > >> >>>> other quotations from Problems of the Development of the Mind to > show that Leontiev did not know this. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> I know places where LSV is clear on this score, in Historical > >> >>>> meaning, > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>> for example, but not the evidence of Leontiev's errors. > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>>> b) The term "praxis" has been thus borrowed. It doesn't refer to > >> >>>> practical activity: it refers to a unity of thinking and practice. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>> > >> >>> Borrowed from Marx by ..??? by Leontiev? There is any form of > >> >>> practical activity without human thinking? > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>>> c) The term "social situation of development" has been thus > >> >>>> borrowed; it does not refer to a "context" but to the child's > >> >>>> relationship to the environment. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>> > >> >>> By whom? I am always in a puzzle about the use of this term. > >> >>> Isn't perezhivanie the term that LSV uses to talk about relation > >> >>> of child to environment? At least, there seems to be a lot of > chatter about issue. > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>>> d) The term "unit of analysis" does not refer to a God particle > >> >>>> that is indifferent to the problem of analysis. ygotsky did not > >> >>>> imagine a "unit of analysis" that fit any and all problems in > >> >>>> psychology. Each unit of analysis is specific to a particular > problem of unity (e.g. > >> >>>> the problem of the unity of the child and his or her environment > >> >>>> in Problem of the Environment and the problem of the unity of > >> >>>> verbal thinking in Thinking and Speech). > >> >>>> > >> >>>> Amen to that. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>>> e) The term "verbal thinking" is a mistranslation: Vygotsky is > >> >>>> talking about thinking by language, or thinking through word > >> >>>> meanings, and not some kind of verbalizable inner speech (which > >> >>>> does exist, but which is a distinct layer from thinking). > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>> There is a lot of confusion around this issue and would probably > >> >>> need somewhat separate discussion. I interpret in the former way. > >> >>> The role > >> of > >> >>> meaning in inner speech, and the usefulness or not of the > >> >>> sense/meaning distinction has me confused. Dima Leontiev has put > >> >>> the distinction > >> behind > >> >>> him and now refers to "cultural meaning" (paleo meaning > >> >>> > >> >>> ) and > >> >>> "personal meaning (paleo sense)." I am paleo in this regard. > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>>> Most of this has been said before, not least by Vygotsky > >> >>>> himself. I know that Holbrook has been saying it at least since > >> >>>> 2007 when I first heard him at the American Association for > >> >>>> Applied Linguistics in Costa Mesa, and he develops it at some > length in: > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>> https://www.academia.edu/1803017/Vygotskys_Analysis_of_ > >> >>>> Childrens_Meaning-Making_Processes > >> >>>> > >> >>>> Mahn, H. (2012). Vygotsky's Analysis of Children's > >> >>>> Meaning-Making Processes, International Journal of Educational > >> >>>> Psychology1(2):100-126 > >> >>>> > >> >>>> It's been said by others too: Mike Cole actually makes many of > >> >>>> the same points in discussing how the Kharkov school deviated > >> >>>> from the work of Vygotsk, > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> I did not know enough to make many of these points in 1978! They > >> >>> certainly distanced themselves from LSV and PI Zinchenko went > >> >>> after the natural-cultural memory distinction, > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>>> and J.V. Wertsch is quite explicit in his revisionism when he > >> >>>> presents "mediated activity" as a unit of analysis in opposition > >> >>>> to "word meaning". > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> mediated ACTION and often as not, mediated action in context. > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>>> But of course since a unit of analysis must preserve in some > >> >>>> shape or form the essential properties of the whole, the use of > >> >>>> "mediated activity" > >> >>>> (action) > >> >>>> cannot be a unit of analysis for the mind if we wish to retain > >> >>>> the idea that the mind has a semantic structure (that is, if the > >> >>>> "whole" is structured something like a text or a discourse > >> >>>> rather than like driving a car, shooting a gun, or hunting > >> >>>> animals). > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>> > >> >>> When we get to semantic structure of consciousness, we know there > >> >>> was a break between LSV and his buddies. It seems that it is in > >> >>> arriving at > >> this > >> >>> formulation that the charges of idealism and sign-o-centrism kick > in. > >> >>> > >> >>> My difficulty is in making arguments about consciousness- > >> >>> -in-general, perhaps a relic of my behaviorist past. Luria > >> >>> appears to have come > >> around > >> >>> on this issue. I have had a difficult time understanding the > >> >>> changes in Leontiev's thought over the period of the 30's and 40's. > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>>> Now, in the discussion of Holbrook's presentation, this > >> >>>> wild-haired guy who looked a little like Itzhak Perlman rose to > >> >>>> argue that Leontiev's interpretation was really one fair > >> >>>> interpretation, and that it really was addressed towards a > >> >>>> specific problem, which is how to prevent dualism from arising > >> >>>> (that is, how to explain how word meaning could arise > historically).Through joint mediated activity? > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>>> He also said that Holbrook was juxtaposing quotations out of > >> >>>> context: the quotes that showed Vygotsky arguing against a > >> >>>> "Marxist psychology" were directed against a very specific group > >> >>>> of vulgar Marxists (e.g. Zalkind) and that is why Vygotsky uses > >> >>>> scare quotes around "Marxist". > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>> > >> >>> Not so? > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>>> I then muddied the waters, first by addressing the wild-haired > >> >>>> guy instead of Holbrook (a major breach of protocol) and then by > >> >>>> arguing that speech really is sui generis, because it is a form of > "activity" > >> >>>> (if we must call it that) whose conditions of comprehension are > >> >>>> no longer recoverable from the activity itself (and so the unit > >> >>>> of analysis for verbal thinking cannot be sought in activity). > >> >>>> There wasn't enough time to really develop what I wanted to say, > >> >>>> so I went over to continue the discussion, and it turned out > >> >>>> that the wild haired guy was none other than Seth Chaiklin, who > >> >>>> is, we all know, one of the foremost paleo-Vygotskyans when it > >> >>>> comes to the much misinterpreted concept of the ZPD. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>> > >> >>> Speech is a form of activity or a means of activity? Or of action? > >> >>> > >> >>> I guess I do not understand. If its worthwhile, perhaps spell the > >> >>> idea out here? > >> >>> > >> >>> So far as I can tell, there are ONLY misinterpretations of the > Zoped. > >> Seth > >> >>> was right on about it being used in Anglo-American discourse as > >> something > >> >>> akin to zone of proximal learning,fitting into the associationist > >> >>> view > >> of > >> >>> development as more learning. But the one right interpretation > >> >>> has > >> escaped > >> >>> my notice. > >> >>> > >> >>> Thanks again for taking the trouble to write that out. Perhaps it > >> >>> will > >> be > >> >>> generative for people. > >> >>> mike > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>>> David Kellogg > >> >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> >>>> > >> >>>> PS: Holbrook DID get one thing wrong. Stalin did not argue that > >> >>>> language was purely ideal and superstructural; that was Marr's > >> >>>> position. Stalin, or whoever ghost wrote his articles, argued > >> >>>> that language was base, and therefore somehow material, whatever > >> >>>> that means. But Stalin was not really interested in ideas; he > >> >>>> was just out for Marr's blood. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>> On 6 October 2014 22:21, mike cole wrote: > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> Hi David-- > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> The specific example of your comments on originals and > >> >>>>> adaptations > >> hits > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> > >> >>>> on > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> a point it would be helpful to hear more about: > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> You wrote: > >> >>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a > >> >>>>> somewhat similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and > >> >>>>> me clinging rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan > >> >>>>> interpretation which > >> actually > >> >>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but > >> >>>>> behavior, and most certainly as a unit of psychological > >> >>>>> analysis. Seth's argument was pragmatist: for certain practical > >> >>>>> applications, we need new interpretations, including > >> >>>>> revisionist ones. Mine was an argument in favor of species > >> >>>>> diversity: when the revisionist account supplants the original > >> >>>>> to such a degree that Vygotsky's original argument is no longer > >> >>>>> accessible to people, we need to go back to original texts > >> (and > >> >>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at > >> >>>>> least recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole > >> >>>>> species of thinking that has become extinct). > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> 1. Could you guide us to a text you recommend where this > >> >>>>> interpretation > >> >>>>> is laid out? > >> >>>>> 2. What sort of revision was Seth suggesting and why? > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> I have been reading Russian discussions around this issue. > >> Clarification > >> >>>>> would be helpful. > >> >>>>> mike > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> On Sun, Oct 5, 2014 at 12:37 AM, David Kellogg > >> >>>>> >> > > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> > >> >>>> wrote: > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> This morning I had the great pleasure of waking up in my own > >> >>>>> bed and > >> >>>>>> listening to Yo-yo Ma, Emanuel Ax and Itzhak Perlman playing > this: > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRkWCOTImOQ > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> It's the D Major Cello sonata number two by Mendelssohn, > >> >>>>>> played, as Yo-yo Ma tells us, on the Davydov (no, that THAT > >> >>>>>> Davydov) > >> Stradivarius > >> >>>>>> that was probably used to perform the sonata for the very > >> >>>>>> first time in front of Mendelssohn himself. Now, throughout > >> >>>>>> this concert, Ma > >> has > >> >>>>>> been something of a stickler for "the original", and Perelman > >> >>>>>> has > >> been > >> >>>>>> pulling politely but pointedly towards a more personal > >> interpretation. > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> So at around 6:45 on the clip, Perelman tells Ma that if > >> >>>>>> Mendelssohn himself had heard the sonata played on that very > >> >>>>>> cello, then he, Perelman, was sitting in the very seat that > >> >>>>>> Mendelssohn had > >> occupied, > >> >>>>>> and that therefore his freer interpretation was really closer > >> >>>>>> to Mendelssohn than any attempt to recreate the sonata with > >> >>>>>> period instruments. Mercifully, at this point, Ax interupts > >> >>>>>> them and starts to play. > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> Back in Sydney, Seth Chaiklin and I found ourselves in a > >> >>>>>> somewhat similar argument, with Seth in Perelman's chair, and > >> >>>>>> me clinging rather obstinately to a paleo-Vygotskyan > >> >>>>>> interpretation which > >> actually > >> >>>>>> rejects "activity" as a unit of analysis for anything but > >> >>>>>> behavior, and most certainly as a unit of psychological > >> >>>>>> analysis. Seth's argument was pragmatist: for certain > >> >>>>>> practical applications, we need new interpretations, including > >> >>>>>> revisionist ones. Mine was an > >> argument > >> >>>>>> in favor of species diversity: when the revisionist account > >> supplants > >> >>>>>> the original to such a degree that Vygotsky's original > >> >>>>>> argument is > >> no > >> >>>>>> longer accessible to people, we need to go back to original > >> >>>>>> texts > >> (and > >> >>>>>> this is why it is so important to make the original texts at > >> >>>>>> least recoverable--once they are gone, it is really a whole > >> >>>>>> species of thinking that has become extinct). > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> David Kellogg > >> >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> PS: Andy, what shocked me about Bonnie Nardi's plenum in > >> >>>>>> Sydney was not her use of "society" or "object": actually, I > >> >>>>>> think I would have liked it better if she had used those terms > >> >>>>>> a little more > >> imprecisely, > >> >>>>>> in their folk meanings. In fact, a little more IMPRECISION > >> >>>>>> might > >> have > >> >>>>>> made it even clearer to us the sheer horror of what she was > >> >>>>>> contemplating. > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> For those on the list who missed it, the plenary focused on a > >> >>>>>> world without jobs--that is, a world where five-day forty-hour > >> >>>>>> jobs are replaced by "micro-work". Nardi admitted that this > >> >>>>>> was a rather dystopian state of affairs--but she also showed > >> >>>>>> us what she called > >> the > >> >>>>>> "bright side": more leisure, less greenhouse gases, and also > >> >>>>>> human identities less narrowly tied to work. As one person in > >> >>>>>> the > >> conference > >> >>>>>> pointed out, and Nardi confirmed, it would also mean more time > >> >>>>>> for > >> the > >> >>>>>> spiritual side of life. > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> What was not pointed out was the effect of all this on the > "object" > >> of > >> >>>>>> "society", using both terms in their folk senses. The working > >> >>>>>> class > >> is > >> >>>>>> being ground down into the economic position of short term sex > >> workers > >> >>>>>> and atomized into the social position of housewives. > >> >>>>>> Inequality is > >> now > >> >>>>>> at levels not seen since 1820. Even a cursory study of history > >> >>>>>> tells us that the result of this is not going to be individual > >> spirituality > >> >>>>>> but rather more violence. The only "bright side" I can see is > >> >>>>>> if > >> that > >> >>>>>> force is organized, social, and directed against social > >> >>>>>> equality rather than against fellow members of the working class. > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> dk > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> On 5 October 2014 13:38, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> I found Kaptelinin's article in MCA invaluable, Mike. Bonnie > >> >>>>>>> Nardi > >> I > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>> had > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> the > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> great pleasure of meeting for the first time at ISCAR, and if > >> >>>>>>> she > >> has > >> >>>>>>> written something on "object" that is very good news. > >> >>>>>>> I don't think the problem is intractable, though I don't > >> >>>>>>> think one > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>> good > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> book > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> or one good article is enough. But for example, for a long > >> >>>>>>> while I > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>> have > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> been > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> jumping up and down about how people use the word "perezhivanie" > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>> without > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> an > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> article (the, a, an some, etc) implying it is some kind of > >> "substance" > >> >>>>>>> whereas in Russian it is a count noun. While there remains > >> outstanding > >> >>>>>>> differences about what perezhivanie means, I notice that > >> >>>>>>> almost all > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>> bar > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> one > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> now use it with an article. So, however that happened that is > >> >>>>>>> a > >> step > >> >>>>>>> forward, and people are aware of the differences in > >> >>>>>>> interpretation > >> and > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>> they > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> are being discussed. I think if we talk about "object" for a > >> >>>>>>> while, > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>> maybe > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> this can be straightened out. I know the task of conceptual > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>> consistency > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> in > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> our research community seems to be a hopeless task, but I am > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>> optimistic. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> Andy > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> >>>> ------------ > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >> >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> Those certainly seem like lively topics, Andy. > >> >>>>>>>> I had in mind specifically topics that are on peoples' minds > >> >>>>>>>> that > >> go > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> U > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> discussed. I hope that the time spent at ISCAR produces a > >> >>>>> shower of > >> >>>>>>>> interesting ideas. Isn't that the object of such gatherings? > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> (Whatever > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> object means!). :-). The Nardi and Kaptelinin chapter on > >> >>>>> basics of > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> AT > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> is > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> one good source, but it seems the problem is intractable! > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> Mike > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> On Saturday, October 4, 2014, Andy Blunden > >> >>>>>>>> > wrote: > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> I don't know, but it's hardly surprising if things were > >> >>>>>>>> a > >> little > >> >>>>>>>> slow this last week as a lot of xmca-ers are also > >> >>>>>>>> iscar-ers > >> and > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> we > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> were all chatting like crazy in Sydney at the ISCAR Congress. > >> >>>>>>>> Everyone (and I mean everyone, including every passenger > on a > >> >>>>>>>> Sydney suburban train as well) has their iPhones and > >> >>>>>>>> tablets > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> etc., > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> so they could read/write on xmca, but I guess they were > >> >>>>>>>> oversupplied with correspondents and protagonists. > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> My impressions of CHAT research: > >> >>>>>>>> On the positive side: very diverse, and at its best, sharp > and > >> >>>>>>>> critical in relation to the dominant political forces, > >> >>>>>>>> and > >> still > >> >>>>>>>> way out in front in understanding the several developmental > >> >>>>>>>> processes which all contribute to our actions > (phylogenesis, > >> >>>>>>>> historical genesis, mesogenesis, ontogenesis, > >> >>>>>>>> microgenesis), > >> and > >> >>>>>>>> not focussing on just one. And I have to say it is a great > >> >>>>>>>> community of research, relatively lacking in the > >> competitiveness > >> >>>>>>>> and jealousy which infects most research communities. > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> On the negative side: > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> * Most CHAT people still have a concept of "society" > >> >>>>>>>> as > >> some > >> >>>>>>>> homogeneous, abstract entity which introduces > >> >>>>>>>> problems > >> into > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> the > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> social situation on which they try to focus, i.e., > >> >>>>> people > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> lack > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> a > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> viable social theory or the ability to use theory > >> >>>>>>> they > >> have > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> to > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> analyse the wider social situation in a differentiated > way. > >> >>>>>>>> * The idea of "unit of analysis" is almost lost to us. > >> Only a > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> small > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> minority know what it means and use the idea in > >> >>>>>>> their > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> research. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> * The concept of "object" is at the centre of a lot of > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> confusion; > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> few researchers using the concept are clear on what > >> >>>>> the > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> concept > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> is. This is related to an unwillingness to confront > >> >>>>> and > >> >>>>>>>> attempt to > >> >>>>>>>> resolve the methodological differences (I refer to > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> systematic > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> difference, rather than accidental misunderstandings) > >> >>>>> within > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> the > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> CHAT community; perhaps it's fear of losing the > >> >>>>>>> relatively > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> civil > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> relations between researchers - people prefer to let > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> differences > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> just fester without openly discussing them. The old > >> >>>>>>> Soviet > >> >>>>>>>> approach is gone, but perhaps we have gone too far > >> >>>>>>>> the > >> other > >> >>>>>>>> way. :) > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> Andy > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> >>>> ------------ > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >> >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> Hi-- I assume you grabbed it from my erroneous > response to > >> >>>>>>>> someone who > >> >>>>>>>> wrote backto xmca instead of me. > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> Had dinner with tim ingold yesterday evening. Such an > >> >>>>>>>> interesting and > >> >>>>>>>> unassuming guy. > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> Any ideas about how to broaden/enliven the xmca > >> discussion?? > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> mike > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> -- > >> >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > >> >>>>>>>> science > >> with > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> an > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>> -- > >> >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > >> >>>>> with > >> an > >> >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >> > >> >> > >> > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Oct 9 12:20:52 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2014 19:20:52 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> Message-ID: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> Or words, like tools, are polyfunctional, I suppose. Though it's more the distinction between core & periphery, actual & potential, meaning and sense. that I want to suggest is parallel. For example, here is a recent study where toddlers seem to be drawing this kind of distinction: between the things one *can* do with an artifact (in this case a toy), and what *we* do with the artifact. (I'm kinda reading against the interpretation of the authors, I grant you.) Young children use pedagogical cues as a signal that others' actions are social or cultural conventions. Here we show that children selectively transmit (enact in a new social situation) causal functions demonstrated pedagogically, even when they have learned and can produce alternative functions as well. Two-year-olds saw two novel toys, each with two functions. One experimenter demonstrated one function using pedagogical cues (eye contact and child-directed speech) and a second experimenter demonstrated the alternative function using intentional actions towards the object, but without pedagogical cues. Children imitated both functions at equal rates initially, indicating equal causal learning from both types of demonstration. However, they were significantly more likely to enact the pedagogical function for a new adult not present during the initial demonstrations. These results indicate that pedagogical cues influence children's transmission of information, perhaps playing a role in the dissemination of cultural conventions from a young age. Pedagogical cues encourage toddlers' transmission of recently demonstrated functions to unfamiliar adults ? Christopher Vredenburgh, ? Tamar Kushnir*and ? Marianella Casasola Martin On Oct 9, 2014, at 11:17 AM, mike cole wrote: > Tools, like words, are polysemic, Martin, i take it. > mike > > On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 8:02 AM, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> David, >> >> One could say, couldn't one, that a tool also has both a stable, customary >> pole of functionality and a broader range of potential, possible uses? A >> hammer, for example, is customarily used to drive nails, but it can >> potentially be used in a variety of other ways that are related, one might >> say metaphorically, to this core function. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 8, 2014, at 5:00 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> The idea that the latter is merely meaning potential and the former is >>> actual, realized, materialized meaning comes straight from Halliday. >>> But the (for me, linked) idea that the latter is the most stable pole >>> of word value and the former the least so comes straight from >>> Volosinov, who influenced Halliday via the Prague linguists. >> >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Oct 9 13:42:47 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2014 13:42:47 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Russian-English Translation needed Message-ID: The Journal of Russian and East European Psychology is in need of a couple of translators. Russian--> English. They pay 10 cents a word. The articles are mostly of at least some interest to xmca participants. Interest parties should contact irina burns at M.E. Sharpe as soon as possible,. Her email is iburns@mesharpe.com. I hope some one(s) can take on the task so that translations can catch up with ready material. mike PS-- Suggestions for materials to translate always welcome. Just contact Pentti Hakkarainen who is cc'ed on this note -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu Oct 9 14:43:13 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 06:43:13 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Martin: Can you tell me the journal name, number, etc? >From the abstract, it does look like the kind of study that improves with reading against the grain. The obvious explanation for the result is that toddlers imitate--they are equally likely to imitate the actions, and faced with an adult to address they are much more likely to imitate the explanation that has imiitable addressivity than the one that does not. Of course what we really want to know here is not that children will imitate actions or that children will imitate the act of addressing--it's the extent to which children are able to EXAPT, that is, use something designed for one function in pursuit of some completely new function (e.g. exapting reaching for pointing, in LSV's famous example). Kids have to learn very quickly that you can exapt a question to realize a command ("Martin? Would you mind not chewing on Fluffy's tail? You're going to make her very angry."). The problem I am having with my teachers right now, to which I must turn very presently, is that being adults they are much more likely to do this than to use direct commands in class. Even questions are hardly ever direct ("Can anyone tell me what this is?"). This results in constructions that the children simply cannot imitate, and as a result Korean kids do not ask questions in class. I think that this is nothing to do with Confucian thinking: if we look at the data carefully we'll see that the kids ARE exapting--but they are exapting statements as questions ("This is tail?") and not questions as commands. Rod: Yes, I knew about the Singing Neanderthals. But in my view this is not really an archaeological dig; what we are really looking at is the latest chapter of the great eighteenth century debate between Rameau and Rousseau about whether language, and therefore rationality, came first or music, and therefore passion. This is why, in Strauss's great final opera Capriccio, the poet Olivier and the composer Flamand say: Flamand: Die Klange der Natur singen das Wiegenlied allen Kunsten! Olivier: Die sprache des Menschen allein ist der Boden dem si enspriessen! Flamand: Die Schmerzensschrei gin der sprache voraus! Olivier: Doch das Leid zu deuten, vermag sie allein! (F: The cries of nature are what sing the lullaby of every art! O: But in the speech of man alone is the soil from which they spring! F: The scream of pain comes to us long before speech! O: But only words can explain it.) All of which has to be sung with screams of pain (Strauss has, you see, stacked the deck in Rousseau's favor). But maybe both singing and speech are exaptations of something that is functionally neither and not specific to humans at all, which for want of a better name we can call activity WITHOUT thinking. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 10 October 2014 04:20, Martin John Packer wrote: > Or words, like tools, are polyfunctional, I suppose. > > Though it's more the distinction between core & periphery, actual & potential, meaning and sense. that I want to suggest is parallel. For example, here is a recent study where toddlers seem to be drawing this kind of distinction: between the things one *can* do with an artifact (in this case a toy), and what *we* do with the artifact. (I'm kinda reading against the interpretation of the authors, I grant you.) > > Young children use pedagogical cues as a signal that others' actions are social or cultural conventions. Here we show that children selectively transmit (enact in a new social situation) causal functions demonstrated pedagogically, even when they have learned and can produce alternative functions as well. Two-year-olds saw two novel toys, each with two functions. One experimenter demonstrated one function using pedagogical cues (eye contact and child-directed speech) and a second experimenter demonstrated the alternative function using intentional actions towards the object, but without pedagogical cues. Children imitated both functions at equal rates initially, indicating equal causal learning from both types of demonstration. However, they were significantly more likely to enact the pedagogical function for a new adult not present during the initial demonstrations. These results indicate that pedagogical cues influence children's transmission of information, perhaps playing a role in the dissemination of cultural conventions from a young age. > > Pedagogical cues encourage toddlers' transmission of recently demonstrated functions to unfamiliar adults > > ? Christopher Vredenburgh, > ? Tamar Kushnir*and > ? Marianella Casasola > > Martin > > On Oct 9, 2014, at 11:17 AM, mike cole wrote: > >> Tools, like words, are polysemic, Martin, i take it. >> mike >> >> On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 8:02 AM, Martin John Packer >> wrote: >> >>> David, >>> >>> One could say, couldn't one, that a tool also has both a stable, customary >>> pole of functionality and a broader range of potential, possible uses? A >>> hammer, for example, is customarily used to drive nails, but it can >>> potentially be used in a variety of other ways that are related, one might >>> say metaphorically, to this core function. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 8, 2014, at 5:00 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>>> The idea that the latter is merely meaning potential and the former is >>>> actual, realized, materialized meaning comes straight from Halliday. >>>> But the (for me, linked) idea that the latter is the most stable pole >>>> of word value and the former the least so comes straight from >>>> Volosinov, who influenced Halliday via the Prague linguists. >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Oct 9 16:14:34 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2014 23:14:34 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <5B45C304-F5D7-4472-88D4-72B4506B4310@uniandes.edu.co> David, Sorry, yes, it's a Developmental Science "early view" article: There is a growing literature indicating that toddlers come to recognize the normative use ('function') of various artifacts. What caught my attention about this study is that it suggests that they are distinguishing between two kinds of use, only one of which they pass along to a new person. I was suggesting that this is the 'core' use (the 'meaning' of the artifact), while the other falls into the periphery (the 'sense' of the artifact). Whether or not this article is of interest, it does seem to me likely that toddlers might be treating words as simply (!) another kind of artifact which has a customary, preferential use among its various affordances. Martin On Oct 9, 2014, at 4:43 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Martin: > > Can you tell me the journal name, number, etc? > >> From the abstract, it does look like the kind of study that improves > with reading against the grain. The obvious explanation for the result > is that toddlers imitate--they are equally likely to imitate the > actions, and faced with an adult to address they are much more likely > to imitate the explanation that has imiitable addressivity than the > one that does not. > > Of course what we really want to know here is not that children will > imitate actions or that children will imitate the act of > addressing--it's the extent to which children are able to EXAPT, that > is, use something designed for one function in pursuit of some > completely new function (e.g. exapting reaching for pointing, in LSV's > famous example). > > Kids have to learn very quickly that you can exapt a question to > realize a command ("Martin? Would you mind not chewing on Fluffy's > tail? You're going to make her very angry."). The problem I am having > with my teachers right now, to which I must turn very presently, is > that being adults they are much more likely to do this than to use > direct commands in class. Even questions are hardly ever direct ("Can > anyone tell me what this is?"). > > This results in constructions that the children simply cannot imitate, > and as a result Korean kids do not ask questions in class. I think > that this is nothing to do with Confucian thinking: if we look at the > data carefully we'll see that the kids ARE exapting--but they are > exapting statements as questions ("This is tail?") and not questions > as commands. > > Rod: > > Yes, I knew about the Singing Neanderthals. But in my view this is not > really an archaeological dig; what we are really looking at is the > latest chapter of the great eighteenth century debate between Rameau > and Rousseau about whether language, and therefore rationality, came > first or music, and therefore passion. This is why, in Strauss's great > final opera Capriccio, the poet Olivier and the composer Flamand say: > > Flamand: Die Klange der Natur singen das Wiegenlied allen Kunsten! > Olivier: Die sprache des Menschen allein ist der Boden dem si enspriessen! > Flamand: Die Schmerzensschrei gin der sprache voraus! > Olivier: Doch das Leid zu deuten, vermag sie allein! > > (F: The cries of nature are what sing the lullaby of every art! > O: But in the speech of man alone is the soil from which they spring! > F: The scream of pain comes to us long before speech! > O: But only words can explain it.) > > All of which has to be sung with screams of pain (Strauss has, you > see, stacked the deck in Rousseau's favor). But maybe both singing and > speech are exaptations of something that is functionally neither and > not specific to humans at all, which for want of a better name we can > call activity WITHOUT thinking. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 10 October 2014 04:20, Martin John Packer wrote: >> Or words, like tools, are polyfunctional, I suppose. >> >> Though it's more the distinction between core & periphery, actual & potential, meaning and sense. that I want to suggest is parallel. For example, here is a recent study where toddlers seem to be drawing this kind of distinction: between the things one *can* do with an artifact (in this case a toy), and what *we* do with the artifact. (I'm kinda reading against the interpretation of the authors, I grant you.) >> >> Young children use pedagogical cues as a signal that others' actions are social or cultural conventions. Here we show that children selectively transmit (enact in a new social situation) causal functions demonstrated pedagogically, even when they have learned and can produce alternative functions as well. Two-year-olds saw two novel toys, each with two functions. One experimenter demonstrated one function using pedagogical cues (eye contact and child-directed speech) and a second experimenter demonstrated the alternative function using intentional actions towards the object, but without pedagogical cues. Children imitated both functions at equal rates initially, indicating equal causal learning from both types of demonstration. However, they were significantly more likely to enact the pedagogical function for a new adult not present during the initial demonstrations. These results indicate that pedagogical cues influence children's transmission of information, perhaps playing a role in the dissemination of cultural conventions from a young age. >> >> Pedagogical cues encourage toddlers' transmission of recently demonstrated functions to unfamiliar adults >> >> ? Christopher Vredenburgh, >> ? Tamar Kushnir*and >> ? Marianella Casasola >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 9, 2014, at 11:17 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >>> Tools, like words, are polysemic, Martin, i take it. >>> mike >>> >>> On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 8:02 AM, Martin John Packer >>> wrote: >>> >>>> David, >>>> >>>> One could say, couldn't one, that a tool also has both a stable, customary >>>> pole of functionality and a broader range of potential, possible uses? A >>>> hammer, for example, is customarily used to drive nails, but it can >>>> potentially be used in a variety of other ways that are related, one might >>>> say metaphorically, to this core function. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Oct 8, 2014, at 5:00 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>>> The idea that the latter is merely meaning potential and the former is >>>>> actual, realized, materialized meaning comes straight from Halliday. >>>>> But the (for me, linked) idea that the latter is the most stable pole >>>>> of word value and the former the least so comes straight from >>>>> Volosinov, who influenced Halliday via the Prague linguists. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Oct 9 16:21:05 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 10:21:05 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <54371861.20108@mira.net> This discussion has sent me back to looking at A N Leontyev's "Development of Mind." For all his faults, ANL expended a lot of energy in tracing the phylogenetic evolution of activity (which for ANL is a broad category, inclusive of unconscious activity). He traces the evolution of behaviour (as in animals without a central nervous system operating on a reflex basis) through conditioned reflexes and habits to operations (scripts which can be moved from one situation to another and adapted to conditions without conscious awareness) to actions (consciously determined by their immediate goal) to activities (where the goal is remote from the immediate actions, and a whole series of actions are required to meet the goal). Then he is able to trace the movement back and forth between behaviour, operational activity, actions and activities in both ontogenesis and microgenesis. I have always been a bit impatient with this kind of move (reifying a theory of human activity into Nature and then importing it back), but I have to say it was a useful exercise. And clarifying. Here is a link to an excerpt from part of this work: http://www.marxists.org/archive/leontev/works/1981/evolution.htm Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David Kellogg wrote: > All of which has to be sung with screams of pain (Strauss has, you > see, stacked the deck in Rousseau's favor). But maybe both singing and > speech are exaptations of something that is functionally neither and > not specific to humans at all, which for want of a better name we can > call activity WITHOUT thinking. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Oct 9 16:41:19 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2014 16:41:19 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <54371861.20108@mira.net> References: <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> Message-ID: I, to, have returned to Leontiev's develoment book following David's suggestion. Still reading, but passages such as the following really dicombobulate me. "The coincidences of sense and meanings is the main feature of primitive consciousness." mike On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 4:21 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > This discussion has sent me back to looking at A N Leontyev's "Development > of Mind." For all his faults, ANL expended a lot of energy in tracing the > phylogenetic evolution of activity (which for ANL is a broad category, > inclusive of unconscious activity). He traces the evolution of behaviour > (as in animals without a central nervous system operating on a reflex > basis) through conditioned reflexes and habits to operations (scripts which > can be moved from one situation to another and adapted to conditions > without conscious awareness) to actions (consciously determined by their > immediate goal) to activities (where the goal is remote from the immediate > actions, and a whole series of actions are required to meet the goal). Then > he is able to trace the movement back and forth between behaviour, > operational activity, actions and activities in both ontogenesis and > microgenesis. I have always been a bit impatient with this kind of move > (reifying a theory of human activity into Nature and then importing it > back), but I have to say it was a useful exercise. And clarifying. > Here is a link to an excerpt from part of this work: > http://www.marxists.org/archive/leontev/works/1981/evolution.htm > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > David Kellogg wrote: > >> All of which has to be sung with screams of pain (Strauss has, you >> see, stacked the deck in Rousseau's favor). But maybe both singing and >> speech are exaptations of something that is functionally neither and >> not specific to humans at all, which for want of a better name we can >> call activity WITHOUT thinking. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Oct 9 16:47:28 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2014 16:47:28 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [commfac] Fwd: jobs at Northwestern In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Eszter Hargittai Date: Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 9:06 AM Subject: jobs at Northwestern To: MSRNE-SMC@lists.research.microsoft.com Hi, please circulate these announcements, we have some exciting jobs available that are very much linked to the types of work people on this list do. Thanks! -- Eszter The Department of Communication Studies at Northwestern University seeks to hire for three faculty members in the areas of Computation and Communication; Media Studies; and Organizations and Networks. Candidates should apply for only one of these positions. The appointments will begin on September 1, 2015. The successful candidates will be expected to publish innovative research, teach undergraduate and graduate courses, and perform professional service commensurate with rank. The successful candidates will also be expected to play a substantive role in the development of the recently launched Master of Science in Leadership for Creative Enterprises program ( https://www.communication.northwestern.edu/programs/ms_leadership_creative_enterprises ). Relevant work experience in the creative sector is preferred. a. Computation and Communication (Search No. 24144) Assistant or Associate Professor position for candidates with an interest in computation and communication. Areas of expertise include but are not limited to: human-computer interaction; social media; big data; collective intelligence; crowdsourcing; and collaboration and coordination online. b. Media Studies (Search No. 24153) Assistant, Associate or Full Professor position for candidates with an interest in media studies. Areas of expertise include but are not limited to: digital media uses; media institutions; social media; big data; the production, distribution, exhibition, and consumption of media arts and culture; advertising and marketing; music, podcasting and sound; gaming and entertainment; entrepreneurship and innovation; regulation and policy; and media history. c. Organizations and Networks (Search No. 24152) Assistant or Associate Professor position for candidates with an interest in organizations and networks. Areas of expertise include but are not limited to: team dynamics; social media and online networks; inter- and intra-organizational networks; entrepreneurship and innovation; leadership; collective action; and project management. The Department of Communication Studies supports a popular undergraduate major, and graduate programs in Media, Technology and Society, and Rhetoric and Public Culture, as well as an interdisciplinary graduate program in Technology and Social Behavior. Through special resources for research support and scholarly event programming, the department is able to offer rich opportunities for scholarly development. School of Communication faculty also can have opportunities during their career at Northwestern to teach and conduct research at the Northwestern University campus in Doha, Qatar. Candidates should send a letter of application, CV, publication samples, evidence of teaching effectiveness, and three letters of reference to Professor Pablo J. Boczkowski, at LCEFacultySearch@northwestern.edu. Review of applications will begin November 1, 2014. Northwestern University is an equal opportunity, affirmative action educator and employer. Hiring is contingent on eligibility to work in the United States. Search Chair: Pablo J. Boczkowski Department of Communication Studies 2240 Campus Drive Evanston, Il 60208 ------------------------------ You are currently subscribed to the MSRNE-SMC mailing list as christosims@GMAIL.COM. Subscribing: Send a blank message to: MSRNE-SMC-subscribe-request@LISTS.RESEARCH.MICROSOFT.COM Unsubscribing: Send a blank message to: MSRNE-SMC-signoff-request@LISTS.RESEARCH.MICROSOFT.COM Please see our Privacy Statement -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From ablunden@mira.net Thu Oct 9 18:08:29 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 12:08:29 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> Message-ID: <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> Dmitry Leontyev's main speech to ISCAR (at the pre-conference on Monday) was all about the dualism between sense and meaning, including the Russian terms (was it mysl and znachnie or something?) and the German Sinn and Bedeutung, and he preferred in ENglish to use "personal meaning" and "public meaning" to clarify the difference, because "sense" is so polysemic. A wonderful dualistic world, simply divided between internal, psychological sense and non-psychological, material/external meaning. The clearest explication of the fallacy of AN Leontyev's approach I have ever witnessed. Anyway, as I understand it, "meaning" is objectively fixed in words by the objective relations between words and words, words and things, and between things. "Sense" is the internal psychological reflection of this external world. So in the "Evolution of the Psyche" I read: "Meaning is the reflection of reality irrespective of man?s individual, personal relation to it. Man finds an already prepared, historically formed system of meanings and assimilates it just as he masters a tool, the material prototype of meaning. The psychological fact proper, the fact of my life, is this, (a) that I do or do not assimilate a given meaning, do or do not master it, and (b) what it becomes for me and for my personality in so far as I assimilate it; and that depends on what subjective, personal sense it has for me." So I guess "primitive consciousness" is sort of like these people who vote for George Bush because "he's my kind of guy," and don't reflect on it. :) Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > I, to, have returned to Leontiev's develoment book following David's > suggestion. Still reading, > but passages such as the following really dicombobulate me. > > "The coincidences of sense and meanings is the main feature of > primitive consciousness." > > mike > > On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 4:21 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > This discussion has sent me back to looking at A N Leontyev's > "Development of Mind." For all his faults, ANL expended a lot of > energy in tracing the phylogenetic evolution of activity (which > for ANL is a broad category, inclusive of unconscious activity). > He traces the evolution of behaviour (as in animals without a > central nervous system operating on a reflex basis) through > conditioned reflexes and habits to operations (scripts which can > be moved from one situation to another and adapted to conditions > without conscious awareness) to actions (consciously determined by > their immediate goal) to activities (where the goal is remote from > the immediate actions, and a whole series of actions are required > to meet the goal). Then he is able to trace the movement back and > forth between behaviour, operational activity, actions and > activities in both ontogenesis and microgenesis. I have always > been a bit impatient with this kind of move (reifying a theory of > human activity into Nature and then importing it back), but I have > to say it was a useful exercise. And clarifying. > Here is a link to an excerpt from part of this work: > http://www.marxists.org/archive/leontev/works/1981/evolution.htm > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > David Kellogg wrote: > > All of which has to be sung with screams of pain (Strauss has, you > see, stacked the deck in Rousseau's favor). But maybe both > singing and > speech are exaptations of something that is functionally > neither and > not specific to humans at all, which for want of a better name > we can > call activity WITHOUT thinking. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Oct 9 20:42:11 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2014 20:42:11 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> References: <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> Message-ID: Assimilate is a very unfortunate word choice. I wonder what the Russian was. mike On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 6:08 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Dmitry Leontyev's main speech to ISCAR (at the pre-conference on Monday) > was all about the dualism between sense and meaning, including the Russian > terms (was it mysl and znachnie or something?) and the German Sinn and > Bedeutung, and he preferred in ENglish to use "personal meaning" and > "public meaning" to clarify the difference, because "sense" is so > polysemic. A wonderful dualistic world, simply divided between internal, > psychological sense and non-psychological, material/external meaning. The > clearest explication of the fallacy of AN Leontyev's approach I have ever > witnessed. > > Anyway, as I understand it, "meaning" is objectively fixed in words by the > objective relations between words and words, words and things, and between > things. "Sense" is the internal psychological reflection of this external > world. So in the "Evolution of the Psyche" I read: > > "Meaning is the reflection of reality irrespective of man?s > individual, personal relation to it. Man finds an already prepared, > historically formed system of meanings and assimilates it just as he > masters a tool, the material prototype of meaning. The psychological > fact proper, the fact of my life, is this, (a) that I do or do not > assimilate a given meaning, do or do not master it, and (b) what it > becomes for me and for my personality in so far as I assimilate it; > and that depends on what subjective, personal sense it has for me." > > So I guess "primitive consciousness" is sort of like these people who vote > for George Bush because "he's my kind of guy," and don't reflect on it. :) > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: > >> I, to, have returned to Leontiev's develoment book following David's >> suggestion. Still reading, >> but passages such as the following really dicombobulate me. >> >> "The coincidences of sense and meanings is the main feature of primitive >> consciousness." >> >> mike >> >> On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 4:21 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> This discussion has sent me back to looking at A N Leontyev's >> "Development of Mind." For all his faults, ANL expended a lot of >> energy in tracing the phylogenetic evolution of activity (which >> for ANL is a broad category, inclusive of unconscious activity). >> He traces the evolution of behaviour (as in animals without a >> central nervous system operating on a reflex basis) through >> conditioned reflexes and habits to operations (scripts which can >> be moved from one situation to another and adapted to conditions >> without conscious awareness) to actions (consciously determined by >> their immediate goal) to activities (where the goal is remote from >> the immediate actions, and a whole series of actions are required >> to meet the goal). Then he is able to trace the movement back and >> forth between behaviour, operational activity, actions and >> activities in both ontogenesis and microgenesis. I have always >> been a bit impatient with this kind of move (reifying a theory of >> human activity into Nature and then importing it back), but I have >> to say it was a useful exercise. And clarifying. >> Here is a link to an excerpt from part of this work: >> http://www.marxists.org/archive/leontev/works/1981/evolution.htm >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> David Kellogg wrote: >> >> All of which has to be sung with screams of pain (Strauss has, you >> see, stacked the deck in Rousseau's favor). But maybe both >> singing and >> speech are exaptations of something that is functionally >> neither and >> not specific to humans at all, which for want of a better name >> we can >> call activity WITHOUT thinking. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >> > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From nataliag@sfu.ca Thu Oct 9 20:43:22 2014 From: nataliag@sfu.ca (Natalia Gajdamaschko) Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2014 20:43:22 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> Message-ID: <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> ?????????? (Mind you, I don't have a Russian text in hand but this is what comes to mind while reading this para). NG ----- Original Message ----- From: "mike cole" To: "Andy Blunden" , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Thursday, October 9, 2014 8:42:11 PM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion Assimilate is a very unfortunate word choice. I wonder what the Russian was. mike On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 6:08 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Dmitry Leontyev's main speech to ISCAR (at the pre-conference on Monday) > was all about the dualism between sense and meaning, including the Russian > terms (was it mysl and znachnie or something?) and the German Sinn and > Bedeutung, and he preferred in ENglish to use "personal meaning" and > "public meaning" to clarify the difference, because "sense" is so > polysemic. A wonderful dualistic world, simply divided between internal, > psychological sense and non-psychological, material/external meaning. The > clearest explication of the fallacy of AN Leontyev's approach I have ever > witnessed. > > Anyway, as I understand it, "meaning" is objectively fixed in words by the > objective relations between words and words, words and things, and between > things. "Sense" is the internal psychological reflection of this external > world. So in the "Evolution of the Psyche" I read: > > "Meaning is the reflection of reality irrespective of man?s > individual, personal relation to it. Man finds an already prepared, > historically formed system of meanings and assimilates it just as he > masters a tool, the material prototype of meaning. The psychological > fact proper, the fact of my life, is this, (a) that I do or do not > assimilate a given meaning, do or do not master it, and (b) what it > becomes for me and for my personality in so far as I assimilate it; > and that depends on what subjective, personal sense it has for me." > > So I guess "primitive consciousness" is sort of like these people who vote > for George Bush because "he's my kind of guy," and don't reflect on it. :) > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: > >> I, to, have returned to Leontiev's develoment book following David's >> suggestion. Still reading, >> but passages such as the following really dicombobulate me. >> >> "The coincidences of sense and meanings is the main feature of primitive >> consciousness." >> >> mike >> >> On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 4:21 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> This discussion has sent me back to looking at A N Leontyev's >> "Development of Mind." For all his faults, ANL expended a lot of >> energy in tracing the phylogenetic evolution of activity (which >> for ANL is a broad category, inclusive of unconscious activity). >> He traces the evolution of behaviour (as in animals without a >> central nervous system operating on a reflex basis) through >> conditioned reflexes and habits to operations (scripts which can >> be moved from one situation to another and adapted to conditions >> without conscious awareness) to actions (consciously determined by >> their immediate goal) to activities (where the goal is remote from >> the immediate actions, and a whole series of actions are required >> to meet the goal). Then he is able to trace the movement back and >> forth between behaviour, operational activity, actions and >> activities in both ontogenesis and microgenesis. I have always >> been a bit impatient with this kind of move (reifying a theory of >> human activity into Nature and then importing it back), but I have >> to say it was a useful exercise. And clarifying. >> Here is a link to an excerpt from part of this work: >> http://www.marxists.org/archive/leontev/works/1981/evolution.htm >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> David Kellogg wrote: >> >> All of which has to be sung with screams of pain (Strauss has, you >> see, stacked the deck in Rousseau's favor). But maybe both >> singing and >> speech are exaptations of something that is functionally >> neither and >> not specific to humans at all, which for want of a better name >> we can >> call activity WITHOUT thinking. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >> > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From ablunden@mira.net Thu Oct 9 21:25:21 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 15:25:21 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Message-ID: <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> Well the Russian words are whatever is usually translated as "sense" and "meaning". I think one was ?????? and the other was ????????. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > ?????????? (Mind you, I don't have a Russian text in hand but this is what comes to mind while reading this para). > NG > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "mike cole" > To: "Andy Blunden" , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Thursday, October 9, 2014 8:42:11 PM > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > Assimilate is a very unfortunate word choice. I wonder what the Russian was. > mike > > On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 6:08 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Dmitry Leontyev's main speech to ISCAR (at the pre-conference on Monday) >> was all about the dualism between sense and meaning, including the Russian >> terms (was it mysl and znachnie or something?) and the German Sinn and >> Bedeutung, and he preferred in ENglish to use "personal meaning" and >> "public meaning" to clarify the difference, because "sense" is so >> polysemic. A wonderful dualistic world, simply divided between internal, >> psychological sense and non-psychological, material/external meaning. The >> clearest explication of the fallacy of AN Leontyev's approach I have ever >> witnessed. >> >> Anyway, as I understand it, "meaning" is objectively fixed in words by the >> objective relations between words and words, words and things, and between >> things. "Sense" is the internal psychological reflection of this external >> world. So in the "Evolution of the Psyche" I read: >> >> "Meaning is the reflection of reality irrespective of man?s >> individual, personal relation to it. Man finds an already prepared, >> historically formed system of meanings and assimilates it just as he >> masters a tool, the material prototype of meaning. The psychological >> fact proper, the fact of my life, is this, (a) that I do or do not >> assimilate a given meaning, do or do not master it, and (b) what it >> becomes for me and for my personality in so far as I assimilate it; >> and that depends on what subjective, personal sense it has for me." >> >> So I guess "primitive consciousness" is sort of like these people who vote >> for George Bush because "he's my kind of guy," and don't reflect on it. :) >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> mike cole wrote: >> >> >>> I, to, have returned to Leontiev's develoment book following David's >>> suggestion. Still reading, >>> but passages such as the following really dicombobulate me. >>> >>> "The coincidences of sense and meanings is the main feature of primitive >>> consciousness." >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 4:21 PM, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>> >>> This discussion has sent me back to looking at A N Leontyev's >>> "Development of Mind." For all his faults, ANL expended a lot of >>> energy in tracing the phylogenetic evolution of activity (which >>> for ANL is a broad category, inclusive of unconscious activity). >>> He traces the evolution of behaviour (as in animals without a >>> central nervous system operating on a reflex basis) through >>> conditioned reflexes and habits to operations (scripts which can >>> be moved from one situation to another and adapted to conditions >>> without conscious awareness) to actions (consciously determined by >>> their immediate goal) to activities (where the goal is remote from >>> the immediate actions, and a whole series of actions are required >>> to meet the goal). Then he is able to trace the movement back and >>> forth between behaviour, operational activity, actions and >>> activities in both ontogenesis and microgenesis. I have always >>> been a bit impatient with this kind of move (reifying a theory of >>> human activity into Nature and then importing it back), but I have >>> to say it was a useful exercise. And clarifying. >>> Here is a link to an excerpt from part of this work: >>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/leontev/works/1981/evolution.htm >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> ------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> All of which has to be sung with screams of pain (Strauss has, you >>> see, stacked the deck in Rousseau's favor). But maybe both >>> singing and >>> speech are exaptations of something that is functionally >>> neither and >>> not specific to humans at all, which for want of a better name >>> we can >>> call activity WITHOUT thinking. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >>> >>> > > > From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Fri Oct 10 01:35:55 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 08:35:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca>, <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> I think the study Martin described highlights the important fact that children do NOT simply imitate what they see others doing - along with the 'hard' knowledge about 'what people do' they pick up on 'soft' knowledge about how people FEEL about what they do. So the knowing they have about the use of an object which has been actively SHOWN to them is importantly different from the knowing they have about the use of an object which they have 'eavesdropped on'. For me this is one of the key distinctions between the nature of knowing involved in knowledge about znachenie and the kind of knowing (imbued with body and vitality of personal experience) which is involved in smysl. In David's terms, znachenie is more the stuff of reason because it is generalised, communicable and cool whereas smysl is more the stuff of passion because it 'thick', personal and intricately tied to embodied knowing. I would challenge Martin's account of Dmitry Leontiev's argument that meaning is objectively fixed to 'what is' - 'irrespective of one's personal relation to it' - yes, znachenie - common sense or agreed meaning is more 'objective' than smysl but it is still socially constructed - meanings are agreed by dint of their common use (what people do 'as a rule') rather than because they reflect an absolute objectivity. Laws and statutes are 'fixed' but not 'true' and because they are generalised (like concepts) in order to be widely applicable, they always have to be interpreted (like concepts) by case law - stories about how they work in specific situations. I think it is easy to overlook the extent to which our actions and decisions are 'coloured' by feelings about what we know - We rarely recognize the extent in which our conscious estimates of what is worthwhile and what is not, are due to standards of which we are not conscious at all. But in general it may be said that the things which we take for granted without enquiry or reflection are just the things which determine our conscious thinking and decide our conclusions. And these habitudes which lie below the level of reflection are just those which have been formed in the constant give and take of relationship with others. Dewey, J. (1916) Democracy and Education. New York: Macmillan. p.22 All the best, Rod ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Andy Blunden [ablunden@mira.net] Sent: 10 October 2014 05:25 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion Well the Russian words are whatever is usually translated as "sense" and "meaning". I think one was ?????? and the other was ????????. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > ?????????? (Mind you, I don't have a Russian text in hand but this is what comes to mind while reading this para). > NG > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "mike cole" > To: "Andy Blunden" , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Thursday, October 9, 2014 8:42:11 PM > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > Assimilate is a very unfortunate word choice. I wonder what the Russian was. > mike > > On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 6:08 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Dmitry Leontyev's main speech to ISCAR (at the pre-conference on Monday) >> was all about the dualism between sense and meaning, including the Russian >> terms (was it mysl and znachnie or something?) and the German Sinn and >> Bedeutung, and he preferred in ENglish to use "personal meaning" and >> "public meaning" to clarify the difference, because "sense" is so >> polysemic. A wonderful dualistic world, simply divided between internal, >> psychological sense and non-psychological, material/external meaning. The >> clearest explication of the fallacy of AN Leontyev's approach I have ever >> witnessed. >> >> Anyway, as I understand it, "meaning" is objectively fixed in words by the >> objective relations between words and words, words and things, and between >> things. "Sense" is the internal psychological reflection of this external >> world. So in the "Evolution of the Psyche" I read: >> >> "Meaning is the reflection of reality irrespective of man?s >> individual, personal relation to it. Man finds an already prepared, >> historically formed system of meanings and assimilates it just as he >> masters a tool, the material prototype of meaning. The psychological >> fact proper, the fact of my life, is this, (a) that I do or do not >> assimilate a given meaning, do or do not master it, and (b) what it >> becomes for me and for my personality in so far as I assimilate it; >> and that depends on what subjective, personal sense it has for me." >> >> So I guess "primitive consciousness" is sort of like these people who vote >> for George Bush because "he's my kind of guy," and don't reflect on it. :) >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> mike cole wrote: >> >> >>> I, to, have returned to Leontiev's develoment book following David's >>> suggestion. Still reading, >>> but passages such as the following really dicombobulate me. >>> >>> "The coincidences of sense and meanings is the main feature of primitive >>> consciousness." >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 4:21 PM, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>> >>> This discussion has sent me back to looking at A N Leontyev's >>> "Development of Mind." For all his faults, ANL expended a lot of >>> energy in tracing the phylogenetic evolution of activity (which >>> for ANL is a broad category, inclusive of unconscious activity). >>> He traces the evolution of behaviour (as in animals without a >>> central nervous system operating on a reflex basis) through >>> conditioned reflexes and habits to operations (scripts which can >>> be moved from one situation to another and adapted to conditions >>> without conscious awareness) to actions (consciously determined by >>> their immediate goal) to activities (where the goal is remote from >>> the immediate actions, and a whole series of actions are required >>> to meet the goal). Then he is able to trace the movement back and >>> forth between behaviour, operational activity, actions and >>> activities in both ontogenesis and microgenesis. I have always >>> been a bit impatient with this kind of move (reifying a theory of >>> human activity into Nature and then importing it back), but I have >>> to say it was a useful exercise. And clarifying. >>> Here is a link to an excerpt from part of this work: >>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/leontev/works/1981/evolution.htm >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> ------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> All of which has to be sung with screams of pain (Strauss has, you >>> see, stacked the deck in Rousseau's favor). But maybe both >>> singing and >>> speech are exaptations of something that is functionally >>> neither and >>> not specific to humans at all, which for want of a better name >>> we can >>> call activity WITHOUT thinking. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >>> >>> > > > ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Oct 10 04:38:34 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 11:38:34 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca>, <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> Just to reduce confusion, I want to point out that it was Andy who provided this account of Dmitry Leontiev's presentation at ISCAR, not me. And I think Andy was rejecting the argument. In fact, if I understood correctly (there was a lot of irony in Andy's message!), D. Leontiev was both summarizing and criticizing a position that his father (A. N. Leontiev) had made. Martin On Oct 10, 2014, at 3:35 AM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > I would challenge Martin's account of Dmitry Leontiev's argument that meaning is objectively fixed to 'what is' - 'irrespective of one's personal relation to it' - yes, znachenie - common sense or agreed meaning is more 'objective' than smysl but it is still socially constructed - meanings are agreed by dint of their common use (what people do 'as a rule') rather than because they reflect an absolute objectivity. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Oct 10 04:39:21 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 11:39:21 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Message-ID: <3291E667-D053-484E-A5DE-2463B40614C4@uniandes.edu.co> Google translates this as 'assimilation.' Accurate, Natalia? Martin On Oct 9, 2014, at 10:43 PM, Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > ?????????? (Mind you, I don't have a Russian text in hand but this is what comes to mind while reading this para). > NG > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "mike cole" > To: "Andy Blunden" , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Thursday, October 9, 2014 8:42:11 PM > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > Assimilate is a very unfortunate word choice. I wonder what the Russian was. > mike > > On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 6:08 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Dmitry Leontyev's main speech to ISCAR (at the pre-conference on Monday) >> was all about the dualism between sense and meaning, including the Russian >> terms (was it mysl and znachnie or something?) and the German Sinn and >> Bedeutung, and he preferred in ENglish to use "personal meaning" and >> "public meaning" to clarify the difference, because "sense" is so >> polysemic. A wonderful dualistic world, simply divided between internal, >> psychological sense and non-psychological, material/external meaning. The >> clearest explication of the fallacy of AN Leontyev's approach I have ever >> witnessed. >> >> Anyway, as I understand it, "meaning" is objectively fixed in words by the >> objective relations between words and words, words and things, and between >> things. "Sense" is the internal psychological reflection of this external >> world. So in the "Evolution of the Psyche" I read: >> >> "Meaning is the reflection of reality irrespective of man?s >> individual, personal relation to it. Man finds an already prepared, >> historically formed system of meanings and assimilates it just as he >> masters a tool, the material prototype of meaning. The psychological >> fact proper, the fact of my life, is this, (a) that I do or do not >> assimilate a given meaning, do or do not master it, and (b) what it >> becomes for me and for my personality in so far as I assimilate it; >> and that depends on what subjective, personal sense it has for me." >> >> So I guess "primitive consciousness" is sort of like these people who vote >> for George Bush because "he's my kind of guy," and don't reflect on it. :) >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> mike cole wrote: >> >>> I, to, have returned to Leontiev's develoment book following David's >>> suggestion. Still reading, >>> but passages such as the following really dicombobulate me. >>> >>> "The coincidences of sense and meanings is the main feature of primitive >>> consciousness." >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 4:21 PM, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>> >>> This discussion has sent me back to looking at A N Leontyev's >>> "Development of Mind." For all his faults, ANL expended a lot of >>> energy in tracing the phylogenetic evolution of activity (which >>> for ANL is a broad category, inclusive of unconscious activity). >>> He traces the evolution of behaviour (as in animals without a >>> central nervous system operating on a reflex basis) through >>> conditioned reflexes and habits to operations (scripts which can >>> be moved from one situation to another and adapted to conditions >>> without conscious awareness) to actions (consciously determined by >>> their immediate goal) to activities (where the goal is remote from >>> the immediate actions, and a whole series of actions are required >>> to meet the goal). Then he is able to trace the movement back and >>> forth between behaviour, operational activity, actions and >>> activities in both ontogenesis and microgenesis. I have always >>> been a bit impatient with this kind of move (reifying a theory of >>> human activity into Nature and then importing it back), but I have >>> to say it was a useful exercise. And clarifying. >>> Here is a link to an excerpt from part of this work: >>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/leontev/works/1981/evolution.htm >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> ------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> All of which has to be sung with screams of pain (Strauss has, you >>> see, stacked the deck in Rousseau's favor). But maybe both >>> singing and >>> speech are exaptations of something that is functionally >>> neither and >>> not specific to humans at all, which for want of a better name >>> we can >>> call activity WITHOUT thinking. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >>> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Fri Oct 10 04:45:42 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 11:45:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca>, <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk>, <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222FB2D@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> My apologies, Martin - this is what comes of trying to catch up with a fascinating discussion without having enough time to read each post carefully (and sensitively) enough. Rod ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+rod.parker-rees=plymouth.ac.uk@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] Sent: 10 October 2014 12:38 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion Just to reduce confusion, I want to point out that it was Andy who provided this account of Dmitry Leontiev's presentation at ISCAR, not me. And I think Andy was rejecting the argument. In fact, if I understood correctly (there was a lot of irony in Andy's message!), D. Leontiev was both summarizing and criticizing a position that his father (A. N. Leontiev) had made. Martin On Oct 10, 2014, at 3:35 AM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > I would challenge Martin's account of Dmitry Leontiev's argument that meaning is objectively fixed to 'what is' - 'irrespective of one's personal relation to it' - yes, znachenie - common sense or agreed meaning is more 'objective' than smysl but it is still socially constructed - meanings are agreed by dint of their common use (what people do 'as a rule') rather than because they reflect an absolute objectivity. ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From ablunden@mira.net Fri Oct 10 05:26:20 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 23:26:20 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca>, <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> You are quite right Martin, that it was my report of Dmitry's speech that was being referred to and also correct to chide me for irony. Irony is really out of place in discussing such complex questions. However, Dmitry was not criticising his grandfather's theory; he was continuing it. When I said that I didn't think that such a stark dualism was a fruitful place from which to begin a discussion of meaning, he didn't really see the point of my remark, simply agreeing that there could be local or regional meanings which departed from the norm. So the irony, I admit, was all mine, and I apologise for inappropriate use of irony in this instance. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Just to reduce confusion, I want to point out that it was Andy who provided this account of Dmitry Leontiev's presentation at ISCAR, not me. And I think Andy was rejecting the argument. In fact, if I understood correctly (there was a lot of irony in Andy's message!), D. Leontiev was both summarizing and criticizing a position that his father (A. N. Leontiev) had made. > > Martin > > On Oct 10, 2014, at 3:35 AM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > > >> I would challenge Martin's account of Dmitry Leontiev's argument that meaning is objectively fixed to 'what is' - 'irrespective of one's personal relation to it' - yes, znachenie - common sense or agreed meaning is more 'objective' than smysl but it is still socially constructed - meanings are agreed by dint of their common use (what people do 'as a rule') rather than because they reflect an absolute objectivity. >> > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Oct 10 06:53:58 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 13:53:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca>, <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> Message-ID: Did Dmitry simply not recognize the dualism in the theory he was presenting, Andy? Martin On Oct 10, 2014, at 7:26 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > You are quite right Martin, that it was my report of Dmitry's speech that was being referred to and also correct to chide me for irony. Irony is really out of place in discussing such complex questions. However, Dmitry was not criticising his grandfather's theory; he was continuing it. When I said that I didn't think that such a stark dualism was a fruitful place from which to begin a discussion of meaning, he didn't really see the point of my remark, simply agreeing that there could be local or regional meanings which departed from the norm. So the irony, I admit, was all mine, and I apologise for inappropriate use of irony in this instance. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Just to reduce confusion, I want to point out that it was Andy who provided this account of Dmitry Leontiev's presentation at ISCAR, not me. And I think Andy was rejecting the argument. In fact, if I understood correctly (there was a lot of irony in Andy's message!), D. Leontiev was both summarizing and criticizing a position that his father (A. N. Leontiev) had made. >> Martin >> >> On Oct 10, 2014, at 3:35 AM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: >> >> >>> I would challenge Martin's account of Dmitry Leontiev's argument that meaning is objectively fixed to 'what is' - 'irrespective of one's personal relation to it' - yes, znachenie - common sense or agreed meaning is more 'objective' than smysl but it is still socially constructed - meanings are agreed by dint of their common use (what people do 'as a rule') rather than because they reflect an absolute objectivity. >>> >> >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Fri Oct 10 07:01:39 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 01:01:39 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca>, <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> Message-ID: <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> On the contrary. It was quite explicit. The first slide showed two columns. On the left were the were the Russian and German words for "personal meaning" and the inadequate English word, sense, on the right the Russian and German words for objective or public meaning and the inadequate English word, meaning. The next slide illustrated this dualism graphically with public and private domains represented. The whole point was the Cartesian problem of the relation between the two. It seems that the word "dualism" is not a "dirty word" where he comes from, and the idea of theorising social change, which was a theme of 2 of the 4 keynote speeches, was also not a priority for him. His Oral presentation (immediately after mine on the Thursday) was devoted to representation of the autoregulation processes of social and psychological systems. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Did Dmitry simply not recognize the dualism in the theory he was presenting, Andy? > > Martin > > On Oct 10, 2014, at 7:26 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> You are quite right Martin, that it was my report of Dmitry's speech that was being referred to and also correct to chide me for irony. Irony is really out of place in discussing such complex questions. However, Dmitry was not criticising his grandfather's theory; he was continuing it. When I said that I didn't think that such a stark dualism was a fruitful place from which to begin a discussion of meaning, he didn't really see the point of my remark, simply agreeing that there could be local or regional meanings which departed from the norm. So the irony, I admit, was all mine, and I apologise for inappropriate use of irony in this instance. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> Just to reduce confusion, I want to point out that it was Andy who provided this account of Dmitry Leontiev's presentation at ISCAR, not me. And I think Andy was rejecting the argument. In fact, if I understood correctly (there was a lot of irony in Andy's message!), D. Leontiev was both summarizing and criticizing a position that his father (A. N. Leontiev) had made. >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 10, 2014, at 3:35 AM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> I would challenge Martin's account of Dmitry Leontiev's argument that meaning is objectively fixed to 'what is' - 'irrespective of one's personal relation to it' - yes, znachenie - common sense or agreed meaning is more 'objective' than smysl but it is still socially constructed - meanings are agreed by dint of their common use (what people do 'as a rule') rather than because they reflect an absolute objectivity. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Oct 10 14:40:07 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 06:40:07 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> Message-ID: When we were translating "Thinking and Speech", one of our old Marxists, Mr. Bae Hicheol, pointed out that "znachenie" can also be translated as "value", and that "sense" and "signification" can easily be understood along the lines of Marx's analysis of the commodity into a use value and an exchange value. I think this is precisely Volosinov's model for "tema" and "znachenie": "tema" is the use value of a word in a concrete act of thinking and speech, while "znachenie" is an abstraction (thus more stable than "tema") created by the process of exchange itself. There are limits to the analogy, of course, but it is certainly not the case that use value is "private" while exchange value is "public". David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 10 October 2014 23:01, Andy Blunden wrote: > On the contrary. It was quite explicit. > The first slide showed two columns. On the left were the were the Russian > and German words for "personal meaning" and the inadequate English word, > sense, on the right the Russian and German words for objective or public > meaning and the inadequate English word, meaning. > The next slide illustrated this dualism graphically with public and private > domains represented. > The whole point was the Cartesian problem of the relation between the two. > It seems that the word "dualism" is not a "dirty word" where he comes from, > and the idea of theorising social change, which was a theme of 2 of the 4 > keynote speeches, was also not a priority for him. > > His Oral presentation (immediately after mine on the Thursday) was devoted > to representation of the autoregulation processes of social and > psychological systems. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> >> Did Dmitry simply not recognize the dualism in the theory he was >> presenting, Andy? >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 10, 2014, at 7:26 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> >>> You are quite right Martin, that it was my report of Dmitry's speech that >>> was being referred to and also correct to chide me for irony. Irony is >>> really out of place in discussing such complex questions. However, Dmitry >>> was not criticising his grandfather's theory; he was continuing it. When I >>> said that I didn't think that such a stark dualism was a fruitful place from >>> which to begin a discussion of meaning, he didn't really see the point of my >>> remark, simply agreeing that there could be local or regional meanings which >>> departed from the norm. So the irony, I admit, was all mine, and I apologise >>> for inappropriate use of irony in this instance. >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> Just to reduce confusion, I want to point out that it was Andy who >>>> provided this account of Dmitry Leontiev's presentation at ISCAR, not me. >>>> And I think Andy was rejecting the argument. In fact, if I understood >>>> correctly (there was a lot of irony in Andy's message!), D. Leontiev was >>>> both summarizing and criticizing a position that his father (A. N. Leontiev) >>>> had made. Martin >>>> >>>> On Oct 10, 2014, at 3:35 AM, Rod Parker-Rees >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> I would challenge Martin's account of Dmitry Leontiev's argument that >>>>> meaning is objectively fixed to 'what is' - 'irrespective of one's personal >>>>> relation to it' - yes, znachenie - common sense or agreed meaning is more >>>>> 'objective' than smysl but it is still socially constructed - meanings are >>>>> agreed by dint of their common use (what people do 'as a rule') rather than >>>>> because they reflect an absolute objectivity. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> >> >> > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Oct 10 15:05:53 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 15:05:53 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [commfac] TT Job: University of Michigan School of Information In-Reply-To: <12F36130-D1AC-452D-9AAB-4667BFDE83A7@ucsd.edu> References: <12F36130-D1AC-452D-9AAB-4667BFDE83A7@ucsd.edu> Message-ID: Please see https://www.si.umich.edu/prospective-faculty/position- call-commtech for information about a new search at UMSI. Here's our description: The School of Information at the University of Michigan (UMSI) invites applications for a tenure-track assistant professor who studies computer-mediated communication (CMC) and/or interpersonal, psychological, or social online communication processes. We are interested in a social scientist fluent in communication and/or social psychology theory who studies the implications of online and digital technologies such as social network sites and other forms of social media, using either quantitative or qualitative approaches. Possible focus areas might include: online self-presentation and/or social capital, interpersonal relationship formation and maintenance via online tools, online social support and information-seeking, mobile communication, or virtual collaboration practices and outcomes in organizational or interpersonal settings. -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Oct 10 15:50:26 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 22:50:26 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> Message-ID: <95FDDF2C-8E66-4A79-A776-D6BBA38FE61E@uniandes.edu.co> I have to point out that this fits very nicely with what the toddlers do in the experiment. On the one hand there is the function that they obtain knowledge about through a social exchange with an adult, and which they subsequently exchange with another new adult. On the other hand there is the function they learn about by observing an adult's personal use of the artifact, and which they employ for their own personal use but do not exchange. Martin On Oct 10, 2014, at 4:40 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > When we were translating "Thinking and Speech", one of our old > Marxists, Mr. Bae Hicheol, pointed out that "znachenie" can also be > translated as "value", and that "sense" and "signification" can easily > be understood along the lines of Marx's analysis of the commodity into > a use value and an exchange value. I think this is precisely > Volosinov's model for "tema" and "znachenie": "tema" is the use value > of a word in a concrete act of thinking and speech, while "znachenie" > is an abstraction (thus more stable than "tema") created by the > process of exchange itself. There are limits to the analogy, of > course, but it is certainly not the case that use value is "private" > while exchange value is "public". > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 10 October 2014 23:01, Andy Blunden wrote: >> On the contrary. It was quite explicit. >> The first slide showed two columns. On the left were the were the Russian >> and German words for "personal meaning" and the inadequate English word, >> sense, on the right the Russian and German words for objective or public >> meaning and the inadequate English word, meaning. >> The next slide illustrated this dualism graphically with public and private >> domains represented. >> The whole point was the Cartesian problem of the relation between the two. >> It seems that the word "dualism" is not a "dirty word" where he comes from, >> and the idea of theorising social change, which was a theme of 2 of the 4 >> keynote speeches, was also not a priority for him. >> >> His Oral presentation (immediately after mine on the Thursday) was devoted >> to representation of the autoregulation processes of social and >> psychological systems. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>> Did Dmitry simply not recognize the dualism in the theory he was >>> presenting, Andy? >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 10, 2014, at 7:26 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>>> >>>> You are quite right Martin, that it was my report of Dmitry's speech that >>>> was being referred to and also correct to chide me for irony. Irony is >>>> really out of place in discussing such complex questions. However, Dmitry >>>> was not criticising his grandfather's theory; he was continuing it. When I >>>> said that I didn't think that such a stark dualism was a fruitful place from >>>> which to begin a discussion of meaning, he didn't really see the point of my >>>> remark, simply agreeing that there could be local or regional meanings which >>>> departed from the norm. So the irony, I admit, was all mine, and I apologise >>>> for inappropriate use of irony in this instance. >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Just to reduce confusion, I want to point out that it was Andy who >>>>> provided this account of Dmitry Leontiev's presentation at ISCAR, not me. >>>>> And I think Andy was rejecting the argument. In fact, if I understood >>>>> correctly (there was a lot of irony in Andy's message!), D. Leontiev was >>>>> both summarizing and criticizing a position that his father (A. N. Leontiev) >>>>> had made. Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Oct 10, 2014, at 3:35 AM, Rod Parker-Rees >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I would challenge Martin's account of Dmitry Leontiev's argument that >>>>>> meaning is objectively fixed to 'what is' - 'irrespective of one's personal >>>>>> relation to it' - yes, znachenie - common sense or agreed meaning is more >>>>>> 'objective' than smysl but it is still socially constructed - meanings are >>>>>> agreed by dint of their common use (what people do 'as a rule') rather than >>>>>> because they reflect an absolute objectivity. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Oct 10 16:48:54 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 16:48:54 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <920FE8E7-F60A-4899-82D6-DAB960917575@uniandes.edu.co> <5430A706.2000402@mira.net> <5430CB31.8090303@mira.net> <54332BEC.1040400@mira.net> Message-ID: Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking about the conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with words, but i was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was all a jumble of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the belief that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? mike On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing that > both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting requires > ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the world. > Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking with > words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the form of > new signs. > > ? > > Martin > > On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by exploring > > *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT that word > > meaning is BEST understood - > > > > "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as operations, > > actions, and activities." > > > > This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Oct 10 16:59:06 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 16:59:06 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> Message-ID: I had never thought of the meaning/value connection, David. Thank Mr Hicheol for me! I need to read more about tema which is not a term I am familiar with being used in this context before. I gather that the idea of reading the two articles on the problem of the environment proved uninteresting. As a sign of my decriptude I had totally forgotten that Andy had written a whole essay about the contrast because I had it compartmentalized as part of a discussion among Russians that we have been poking our noses in to. I would not recommend starting with Andy's essay because it might discourage reading the two articles themselves. I have read the Vygotsky over a couple of times with special focus on question of units of analysis arising from one of David's earlier notes. Perhaps its only me, but when our conversations quickly spiral into three more heavy tomes to read just to get near what the note writer is suggesting, and when it involves Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (whose work, at least, i know a little about!), I get to feeling overwhelmed. I was hoping that maybe a sharp contrast and a discussion that focused right on it, might be useful. No stopping the racing train, i guess. mike On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 2:40 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > When we were translating "Thinking and Speech", one of our old > Marxists, Mr. Bae Hicheol, pointed out that "znachenie" can also be > translated as "value", and that "sense" and "signification" can easily > be understood along the lines of Marx's analysis of the commodity into > a use value and an exchange value. I think this is precisely > Volosinov's model for "tema" and "znachenie": "tema" is the use value > of a word in a concrete act of thinking and speech, while "znachenie" > is an abstraction (thus more stable than "tema") created by the > process of exchange itself. There are limits to the analogy, of > course, but it is certainly not the case that use value is "private" > while exchange value is "public". > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 10 October 2014 23:01, Andy Blunden wrote: > > On the contrary. It was quite explicit. > > The first slide showed two columns. On the left were the were the Russian > > and German words for "personal meaning" and the inadequate English word, > > sense, on the right the Russian and German words for objective or public > > meaning and the inadequate English word, meaning. > > The next slide illustrated this dualism graphically with public and > private > > domains represented. > > The whole point was the Cartesian problem of the relation between the > two. > > It seems that the word "dualism" is not a "dirty word" where he comes > from, > > and the idea of theorising social change, which was a theme of 2 of the 4 > > keynote speeches, was also not a priority for him. > > > > His Oral presentation (immediately after mine on the Thursday) was > devoted > > to representation of the autoregulation processes of social and > > psychological systems. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Martin John Packer wrote: > >> > >> Did Dmitry simply not recognize the dualism in the theory he was > >> presenting, Andy? > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Oct 10, 2014, at 7:26 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> > >> > >>> > >>> You are quite right Martin, that it was my report of Dmitry's speech > that > >>> was being referred to and also correct to chide me for irony. Irony is > >>> really out of place in discussing such complex questions. However, > Dmitry > >>> was not criticising his grandfather's theory; he was continuing it. > When I > >>> said that I didn't think that such a stark dualism was a fruitful > place from > >>> which to begin a discussion of meaning, he didn't really see the point > of my > >>> remark, simply agreeing that there could be local or regional meanings > which > >>> departed from the norm. So the irony, I admit, was all mine, and I > apologise > >>> for inappropriate use of irony in this instance. > >>> Andy > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> Martin John Packer wrote: > >>> > >>>> > >>>> Just to reduce confusion, I want to point out that it was Andy who > >>>> provided this account of Dmitry Leontiev's presentation at ISCAR, > not me. > >>>> And I think Andy was rejecting the argument. In fact, if I understood > >>>> correctly (there was a lot of irony in Andy's message!), D. Leontiev > was > >>>> both summarizing and criticizing a position that his father (A. N. > Leontiev) > >>>> had made. Martin > >>>> > >>>> On Oct 10, 2014, at 3:35 AM, Rod Parker-Rees > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> I would challenge Martin's account of Dmitry Leontiev's argument > that > >>>>> meaning is objectively fixed to 'what is' - 'irrespective of one's > personal > >>>>> relation to it' - yes, znachenie - common sense or agreed meaning is > more > >>>>> 'objective' than smysl but it is still socially constructed - > meanings are > >>>>> agreed by dint of their common use (what people do 'as a rule') > rather than > >>>>> because they reflect an absolute objectivity. > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Oct 10 17:26:50 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 09:26:50 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> Message-ID: Mike: (Just a quick note. I'm rushing off to our weekly Vygotsky seminar--we're finishing up the first volume of the Lectures on Pedology in which "The Problem of the Environment" appears in its natural environment!) I think another way in which Mr. Bae's analogy between Marx's treatment of the commodity and Vygotsky's treatment of the word meaning is helpful is that we linguists are prone to word fetishism in the same way that bourgeois economists are prone to commodity fetishism. That is, we tend to think of word meaning as a thing-for-itself rather than as a relation between real people or a relation between a person and a self. So--just think of yourself READING the conversation on XMCA. Of course you are thinking in word meanings; you can practically hear my voice as you are reading these words. But if you time how long it takes you to read these words, you will find that it takes far less time than it would for me to say them, much less write them. So you can't actually be hearing my voice or even mentally voicing my words. What exactly is going on? What is going on is actually what goes on in listening and speaking all the time without us really noticing it. We hit the high points of what people are saying (which are often indicated by indexical means, by intonation and by facial expression) and we absolutely ignore the rest. This is why it's so hard to recall the exact wording of what someone says in any accurate way. Thinking WITH word meanings is very different from thinking word-meaning-by-word-meaning; it's the difference between playing a piano with both your hands and playing it with two fingers. But thinking with word meanings is still very different from the way a toddler or even a preschooler thinks. When a parent takes a child to meet a preschool teacher, the child will forget the name of the preschool teacher but remember the color and texture of her clothes, and even the smell of her hands. With the parent, isn't it much more likely to be the other way around? David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies . On 11 October 2014 08:59, mike cole wrote: > I had never thought of the meaning/value connection, David. Thank Mr > Hicheol for me! > I need to read more about tema which is not a term I am familiar with being > used in this context before. > > I gather that the idea of reading the two articles on the problem of the > environment proved uninteresting. As a sign of my decriptude I had totally > forgotten that Andy had written a whole essay about the contrast because I > had it compartmentalized as part of a discussion among Russians that we > have been poking our noses in to. I would not recommend starting with > Andy's essay because it might discourage reading the two articles > themselves. I have read the Vygotsky over a couple of times with special > focus on question of units of analysis arising from one of David's earlier > notes. > > Perhaps its only me, but when our conversations quickly spiral into three > more heavy tomes to read just to get near what the note writer is > suggesting, and when it involves Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty > (whose work, at least, i know a little about!), I get to feeling > overwhelmed. I was hoping that maybe a sharp contrast and a discussion that > focused right on it, might be useful. > > No stopping the racing train, i guess. > mike > > On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 2:40 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> When we were translating "Thinking and Speech", one of our old >> Marxists, Mr. Bae Hicheol, pointed out that "znachenie" can also be >> translated as "value", and that "sense" and "signification" can easily >> be understood along the lines of Marx's analysis of the commodity into >> a use value and an exchange value. I think this is precisely >> Volosinov's model for "tema" and "znachenie": "tema" is the use value >> of a word in a concrete act of thinking and speech, while "znachenie" >> is an abstraction (thus more stable than "tema") created by the >> process of exchange itself. There are limits to the analogy, of >> course, but it is certainly not the case that use value is "private" >> while exchange value is "public". >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> On 10 October 2014 23:01, Andy Blunden wrote: >> > On the contrary. It was quite explicit. >> > The first slide showed two columns. On the left were the were the Russian >> > and German words for "personal meaning" and the inadequate English word, >> > sense, on the right the Russian and German words for objective or public >> > meaning and the inadequate English word, meaning. >> > The next slide illustrated this dualism graphically with public and >> private >> > domains represented. >> > The whole point was the Cartesian problem of the relation between the >> two. >> > It seems that the word "dualism" is not a "dirty word" where he comes >> from, >> > and the idea of theorising social change, which was a theme of 2 of the 4 >> > keynote speeches, was also not a priority for him. >> > >> > His Oral presentation (immediately after mine on the Thursday) was >> devoted >> > to representation of the autoregulation processes of social and >> > psychological systems. >> > >> > Andy >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> > *Andy Blunden* >> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> > >> > >> > Martin John Packer wrote: >> >> >> >> Did Dmitry simply not recognize the dualism in the theory he was >> >> presenting, Andy? >> >> >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> On Oct 10, 2014, at 7:26 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >>> You are quite right Martin, that it was my report of Dmitry's speech >> that >> >>> was being referred to and also correct to chide me for irony. Irony is >> >>> really out of place in discussing such complex questions. However, >> Dmitry >> >>> was not criticising his grandfather's theory; he was continuing it. >> When I >> >>> said that I didn't think that such a stark dualism was a fruitful >> place from >> >>> which to begin a discussion of meaning, he didn't really see the point >> of my >> >>> remark, simply agreeing that there could be local or regional meanings >> which >> >>> departed from the norm. So the irony, I admit, was all mine, and I >> apologise >> >>> for inappropriate use of irony in this instance. >> >>> Andy >> >>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> >> >>>> >> >>>> Just to reduce confusion, I want to point out that it was Andy who >> >>>> provided this account of Dmitry Leontiev's presentation at ISCAR, >> not me. >> >>>> And I think Andy was rejecting the argument. In fact, if I understood >> >>>> correctly (there was a lot of irony in Andy's message!), D. Leontiev >> was >> >>>> both summarizing and criticizing a position that his father (A. N. >> Leontiev) >> >>>> had made. Martin >> >>>> >> >>>> On Oct 10, 2014, at 3:35 AM, Rod Parker-Rees >> >>>> wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> I would challenge Martin's account of Dmitry Leontiev's argument >> that >> >>>>> meaning is objectively fixed to 'what is' - 'irrespective of one's >> personal >> >>>>> relation to it' - yes, znachenie - common sense or agreed meaning is >> more >> >>>>> 'objective' than smysl but it is still socially constructed - >> meanings are >> >>>>> agreed by dint of their common use (what people do 'as a rule') >> rather than >> >>>>> because they reflect an absolute objectivity. >> >>>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > >> > >> > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From ablunden@mira.net Fri Oct 10 17:29:29 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 11:29:29 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> Message-ID: <543879E9.6000100@mira.net> I was glad that I re-read "Problem of the environment." The discussion of the 3 siblings takes up a smaller proportion of the article than I had remembered. Vygotsky doesn't seem to say much about perezhivanie except that obvious fact that it represents a *relation* between the person and the environment, and he says this in a variety of ways. I had not well remembered what he said about the development of the 3 siblings - each suffered some kind of pathology as a result of the perezhivanie occasioned by the mother's drunkenness, but the pathology was *different* in each case. And he *does* say quite explicitly that perezhivanija are units of analysis, and I gather it is a unit for analysis of personality development, and therefore of personality (as ambiguous as that word is). But there is no elaboration of perezhivanie which allows us to understand how much of the cultural load carried by the word in the Russian language is intended to be incorporated in the scientific concept - this is left open. But the article also includes Vygotsky's important reflections about the presence of the "ideal form" in the environment and how this makes ontogenetic development unique among all forms of development. And he also includes a statement of the "law of cultural development" that all the higher psychological functions originally manifest themselves as forms of the child's collective behaviour. I still think it's a great article, though one would have loved Vygotsky to have elaborated more on some points. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > I had never thought of the meaning/value connection, David. Thank Mr > Hicheol for me! > I need to read more about tema which is not a term I am familiar with > being used in this context before. > > I gather that the idea of reading the two articles on the problem of > the environment proved uninteresting. As a sign of my decriptude I had > totally forgotten that Andy had written a whole essay about the > contrast because I had it compartmentalized as part of a discussion > among Russians that we have been poking our noses in to. I would not > recommend starting with Andy's essay because it might discourage > reading the two articles themselves. I have read the Vygotsky over a > couple of times with special focus on question of units of analysis > arising from one of David's earlier notes. > > Perhaps its only me, but when our conversations quickly spiral into > three more heavy tomes to read just to get near what the note writer > is suggesting, and when it involves Husserl, Heidegger and > Merleau-Ponty (whose work, at least, i know a little about!), I get to > feeling overwhelmed. I was hoping that maybe a sharp contrast and a > discussion that focused right on it, might be useful. > > No stopping the racing train, i guess. > mike > > On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 2:40 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > When we were translating "Thinking and Speech", one of our old > Marxists, Mr. Bae Hicheol, pointed out that "znachenie" can also be > translated as "value", and that "sense" and "signification" can easily > be understood along the lines of Marx's analysis of the commodity into > a use value and an exchange value. I think this is precisely > Volosinov's model for "tema" and "znachenie": "tema" is the use value > of a word in a concrete act of thinking and speech, while "znachenie" > is an abstraction (thus more stable than "tema") created by the > process of exchange itself. There are limits to the analogy, of > course, but it is certainly not the case that use value is "private" > while exchange value is "public". > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 10 October 2014 23:01, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > On the contrary. It was quite explicit. > > The first slide showed two columns. On the left were the were > the Russian > > and German words for "personal meaning" and the inadequate > English word, > > sense, on the right the Russian and German words for objective > or public > > meaning and the inadequate English word, meaning. > > The next slide illustrated this dualism graphically with public > and private > > domains represented. > > The whole point was the Cartesian problem of the relation > between the two. > > It seems that the word "dualism" is not a "dirty word" where he > comes from, > > and the idea of theorising social change, which was a theme of 2 > of the 4 > > keynote speeches, was also not a priority for him. > > > > His Oral presentation (immediately after mine on the Thursday) > was devoted > > to representation of the autoregulation processes of social and > > psychological systems. > > > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > Martin John Packer wrote: > >> > >> Did Dmitry simply not recognize the dualism in the theory he was > >> presenting, Andy? > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Oct 10, 2014, at 7:26 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >> > >> > >>> > >>> You are quite right Martin, that it was my report of Dmitry's > speech that > >>> was being referred to and also correct to chide me for irony. > Irony is > >>> really out of place in discussing such complex questions. > However, Dmitry > >>> was not criticising his grandfather's theory; he was > continuing it. When I > >>> said that I didn't think that such a stark dualism was a > fruitful place from > >>> which to begin a discussion of meaning, he didn't really see > the point of my > >>> remark, simply agreeing that there could be local or regional > meanings which > >>> departed from the norm. So the irony, I admit, was all mine, > and I apologise > >>> for inappropriate use of irony in this instance. > >>> Andy > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>> > >>> > >>> Martin John Packer wrote: > >>> > >>>> > >>>> Just to reduce confusion, I want to point out that it was > Andy who > >>>> provided this account of Dmitry Leontiev's presentation at > ISCAR, not me. > >>>> And I think Andy was rejecting the argument. In fact, if I > understood > >>>> correctly (there was a lot of irony in Andy's message!), D. > Leontiev was > >>>> both summarizing and criticizing a position that his father > (A. N. Leontiev) > >>>> had made. Martin > >>>> > >>>> On Oct 10, 2014, at 3:35 AM, Rod Parker-Rees > >>>> > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> I would challenge Martin's account of Dmitry Leontiev's > argument that > >>>>> meaning is objectively fixed to 'what is' - 'irrespective > of one's personal > >>>>> relation to it' - yes, znachenie - common sense or agreed > meaning is more > >>>>> 'objective' than smysl but it is still socially constructed > - meanings are > >>>>> agreed by dint of their common use (what people do 'as a > rule') rather than > >>>>> because they reflect an absolute objectivity. > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Fri Oct 10 18:49:43 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 21:49:43 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion Message-ID: Martin, I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of speech act, but not austin's. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole
Date:10/10/2014 7:48 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking about the conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with words, but i was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was all a jumble of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the belief that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? mike On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing that > both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting requires > ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the world. > Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking with > words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the form of > new signs. > > ? > > Martin > > On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by exploring > > *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT that word > > meaning is BEST understood - > > > > "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as operations, > > actions, and activities." > > > > This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Fri Oct 10 19:08:37 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 22:08:37 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion Message-ID: The message was in response to Mike not martin. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe"
Date:10/10/2014 9:49 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
Martin, I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of speech act, but not austin's. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole
Date:10/10/2014 7:48 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking about the conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with words, but i was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was all a jumble of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the belief that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? mike On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing that > both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting requires > ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the world. > Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking with > words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the form of > new signs. > > ? > > Martin > > On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by exploring > > *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT that word > > meaning is BEST understood - > > > > "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as operations, > > actions, and activities." > > > > This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From smago@uga.edu Sat Oct 11 02:39:05 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 09:39:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: DPJ Special Issue: Dialogue on Dialogic Pedagogy In-Reply-To: <2e99faba2804514b4a5a2be45cea2c4f@mail.gmail.com> References: <2e99faba2804514b4a5a2be45cea2c4f@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: From: Eugene Matusov [mailto:ematusov@udel.edu] Sent: Friday, October 10, 2014 5:35 PM Subject: DPJ Special Issue: Dialogue on Dialogic Pedagogy Dear members of DPJ community ? We are happy to inform you that a DPJ Special issue on Dialogue on Dialogic Pedagogy has been published: Dialogue on Dialogic Pedagogy Eugene Matusov, Kiyotaka Miyazaki PDF A paradigmatic disagreement in "Dialogue on Dialogic Pedagogy" by Eugene Matusov and Kiyotaka Miyazaki Ana Marjanovic-Shane PDF Commentary on Eugene and Kiyo?s dialogue on dialogic pedagogy Rupert Wegerif PDF Concluding Commentary: Response to Eugene and Kiyo E. Jayne White PDF A Response to Eugene and Kiyo?s Dialogue-Disagreement on Dialogic Pedagogy Beth Ferholt PDF Dialogue on Dialogue on Dialogic Pedagogy Paul Sullivan PDF http://dpj.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/dpj1/ Please feel free to read and comment on the articles. Eugene, Ana, and Jim DPJ Editors ---------------------------- Eugene Matusov, PhD Editor-in-Chief, Dialogic Pedagogy Journal Professor of Education School of Education 16 W Main st University of Delaware Newark, DE 19716, USA Publications: http://ematusov.soe.udel.edu/vita/publications.htm DiaPed: http://diaped.soe.udel.edu DPJ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/pages/Dialogic-Pedagogy-Journal/581685735176063 ---------------------------- From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Oct 11 10:10:44 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 10:10:44 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thanks Paul -- Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same question: How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation differ, Paul, such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them? And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, David Ke? What are the major implications of the differences?? mike On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > Martin, > > I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of speech > act, but not austin's. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/10/2014 7:48 PM (GMT-05:00) >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion >
>
Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking about the > conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with words, but i > was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was all a jumble > of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the belief > that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? > mike > > On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > wrote: > > > Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing that > > both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting requires > > ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the world. > > Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking with > > words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the form > of > > new signs. > > > > ? > > > > Martin > > > > On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > > I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by exploring > > > *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT that > word > > > meaning is BEST understood - > > > > > > "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as > operations, > > > actions, and activities." > > > > > > This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings. > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Sat Oct 11 11:59:29 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 14:59:29 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion Message-ID: Mike, My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about the xmca conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the speech act, comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing. ?It is simply background information for us the reader (I am not going to reiterate the debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue of background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the way based on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is correct on the argument). ? Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological and semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary categories. ?This psychological act of thinking is the element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking. ?However, in order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background, intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private language, for example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech act? Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing outside the text. ? ? Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole
Date:10/11/2014 1:10 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
Thanks Paul -- Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same question: How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation differ, Paul, such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them? And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, David Ke? What are the major implications of the differences?? mike On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > Martin, > > I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of speech > act, but not austin's. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/10/2014 7:48 PM (GMT-05:00) >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion >
>
Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking about the > conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with words, but i > was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was all a jumble > of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the belief > that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? > mike > > On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > wrote: > > > Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing that > > both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting requires > > ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the world. > > Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking with > > words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the form > of > > new signs. > > > > ? > > > > Martin > > > > On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > > I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by exploring > > > *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT that > word > > > meaning is BEST understood - > > > > > > "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as > operations, > > > actions, and activities." > > > > > > This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings. > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Sat Oct 11 12:25:26 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 15:25:26 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion Message-ID: Mike, The problem with modern psychology as I read through some of the writings in this group is this very act of intentionality and the rational subject. ?Derrida is correct to point out that Austin and Searle assume the aforementioned in their theory of speech act. ?Although I do not subscribe to derrida ' s decentered subject as the alternative to the rational subject that experiences the world. ?For me, as heidegger points out in his critique of husserl, the latter subject is an analytic, present-at-hand, of Dasein among its other analytics (very kantian), ready-to-hand and unready-to-hand. ?What psychology and speech act can not account for is the origins of consciousness itself...artifical intelligence is not consciousness! Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe"
Date:10/11/2014 2:59 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
Mike, My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about the xmca conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the speech act, comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing. It is simply background information for us the reader (I am not going to reiterate the debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue of background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the way based on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is correct on the argument). Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological and semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary categories. This psychological act of thinking is the element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking. However, in order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background, intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private language, for example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech act? Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing outside the text. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole
Date:10/11/2014 1:10 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
Thanks Paul -- Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same question: How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation differ, Paul, such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them? And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, David Ke? What are the major implications of the differences?? mike On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > Martin, > > I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of speech > act, but not austin's. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/10/2014 7:48 PM (GMT-05:00) >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion >
>
Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking about the > conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with words, but i > was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was all a jumble > of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the belief > that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? > mike > > On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > wrote: > > > Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing that > > both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting requires > > ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the world. > > Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking with > > words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the form > of > > new signs. > > > > ? > > > > Martin > > > > On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > > I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by exploring > > > *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT that > word > > > meaning is BEST understood - > > > > > > "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as > operations, > > > actions, and activities." > > > > > > This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings. > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat Oct 11 13:14:06 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 14:14:06 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Mike and Paul, Paul assumes your thinking about the XMCA dialog had nothing to do with your driving. I find that riding my bike to the university in the morning sets loose thinking about what's "on my plate" intellectually. The same thing happens when I am dancing to music with others (I do Nia, very popular in some places). Lakoff's claim that cognition is embodied is typically related to metaphor, but I am interested in how the phonological pole of language is iconic, not just with onomatopoeia, but with all forms of sound symbolism. And I assume that the phonological pole is a subset of the sematic pole. The indexical, iconic, symbolic aspects of language, would it be fair to say they are on a continuum, rather than discontinuous? Temporal aspects of language (including within speech and writing), wouldn't they figure in with the making (including comprehension) of meaning? I am sure David said as much back a while. Am I making sense that relates at all to the on-going dialog? Henry On Oct 11, 2014, at 12:59 PM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" wrote: > Mike, > > My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about the xmca conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the speech act, comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing. It is simply background information for us the reader (I am not going to reiterate the debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue of background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the way based on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is correct on the argument). > > Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological and semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary categories. This psychological act of thinking is the element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking. However, in order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background, intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private language, for example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech act? Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing outside the text. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole
Date:10/11/2014 1:10 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
>
Thanks Paul -- > > Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same question: > How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation differ, Paul, > such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them? > > And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, David Ke? > > What are the major implications of the differences?? > > mike > > On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > >> Martin, >> >> I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of speech >> act, but not austin's. >> >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < >> mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/10/2014 7:48 PM (GMT-05:00) >>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion >>
>>
Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking about the >> conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with words, but i >> was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was all a jumble >> of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the belief >> that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? >> mike >> >> On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >> wrote: >> >>> Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing that >>> both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting requires >>> ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the world. >>> Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking with >>> words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the form >> of >>> new signs. >>> >>> ? >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss wrote: >>> >>>> I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by exploring >>>> *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT that >> word >>>> meaning is BEST understood - >>>> >>>> "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as >> operations, >>>> actions, and activities." >>>> >>>> This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings. >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Oct 11 13:59:58 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 13:59:58 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Paul-- I see a second note but let me start with this first one. First of all THANKS! You are correct, I was thinking about my experience driving and thinking about xmca discourse. And you provided just the sort of concise identification of the issues that I would be totally incapable of achieving without a lot of time and effort. Viva the distributed expertise of those who participate in xmca! Second, I do not understand this part of your first paragraph:" I am assuming from the speech act, comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing." I was thinking about the xmca discourse and trying to figure out more about the thinking/acting distinction with respect to semiosis. Next..... Let me start with Martin's conjecture: "Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing that both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting requires ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the world. Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking with words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the form of new signs. ?"? Trying to push the boundaries involved in Martin's proposal by coming up with an example from my own experience that same day -- driving home, radio off, monitoring the road and thinking about the XMCA discussion. Is seemed to be verbal thinking, but was it action I was asking. You offered "I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of speech > act, but not austin's. ?" In those circumstances, in that context, I asked how Searle-Austin differences applied to the example of me driving home thinking about a topic that was known to anyone on xmca who is reading this thread.? You came up with a very clear answer. " your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological and semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary categories. ?"? ?On the shakey assumption that we are still on the same page, I offer the next thought that came to mind, this time when I am not in a moving isolation chamber!? I believe that your answer goes to Martin's proviso that verbal thinking "requires articulating that interpretation in the form of new signs." If having another person in the car to whom I was speaking, presumably the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary speech acts would come into play. I guess at that point we move from thought to action. I am far too poorly read in Derrida and phenomenology to follow your points relating to controversies that include Heidegger, Husserl. But I venture a possibility based on what I have learned so far in the conversation and my own background. I might characterize what I was doing in the car as preparing for, and simulating a next turn in an ongoing discussion with a number of colleagues, unsure of what my own conclusions regarding the issue of thought/action/semiosis are. In light of the discussion, I began to wonder about that term, articulation, in Martin's note. I take articulation to mean roughly "to say out loud to another as part of a conversation (text?). But, I have been asking myself, and ask you all for your thoughts, when I am engaged in verbal thinking aren't I engaged in a conversation with another, with an audience or my sense of an audience, as part of the process that generates what I say? It is often said that one does not stop being a sociocultural organism simply by virtue of being physically separate from others. Is there, in such "conversations with oneself" a form of articulation? And/or, might the fact that these thoughts were incorporated in my next communication as part of this conversation, not be considered a form of asychronous, semiotic, action? Thanks again for your concise answer. Sorry I cannot follow adequately some of the points you are making. mike On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 11:59 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > Mike, > > My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about the xmca > conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the speech act, > comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing. It is simply > background information for us the reader (I am not going to reiterate the > debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue of > background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the way based > on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is correct on > the argument). > > Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological and > semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary, and > perlocutionary categories. This psychological act of thinking is the > element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking. However, in > order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background, > intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private language, for > example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech act? > Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing outside the > text. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/11/2014 1:10 PM (GMT-05:00) >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion >
>
Thanks Paul -- > > Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same question: > How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation differ, Paul, > such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them? > > And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, David Ke? > > What are the major implications of the differences?? > > mike > > On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > Martin, > > > > I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of speech > > act, but not austin's. > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > President > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > www.mocombeian.com > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/10/2014 7:48 PM (GMT-05:00) > >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca > discussion > >
> >
Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking about the > > conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with words, but > i > > was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was all a > jumble > > of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the belief > > that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? > > mike > > > > On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > > > > > Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing that > > > both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting requires > > > ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the world. > > > Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking > with > > > words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the form > > of > > > new signs. > > > > > > ? > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > > > > I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by exploring > > > > *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT that > > word > > > > meaning is BEST understood - > > > > > > > > "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as > > operations, > > > > actions, and activities." > > > > > > > > This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Oct 11 14:01:04 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 15:01:04 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <543879E9.6000100@mira.net> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543879E9.6000100@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, Mike, et al, I think that the general form of the argument that Vygotsky presents in his "the Problem of the Environment" seems to me to speak very powerfully to the assumptions that underlie this kind of thinking: http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/scientists-bring-new-rigor-to-education-research/ The author assumes that all would be well in education if only educational researchers would do what the medical and economic researchers do and base all knowledge off of RCT's (Randomly Controlled Trials). I certainly feel that there is some value in RCT's, but there is more value in thinking about things like 'value' and 'context' as rich and polysemous. Check out the first example in the article and tell me: would you want to spend 8 hours a day, for 8 months in a classroom with bare walls? Seems like the experimenters are missing something... The *meaning* of life perhaps? -greg On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:29 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I was glad that I re-read "Problem of the environment." > The discussion of the 3 siblings takes up a smaller proportion of the > article than I had remembered. > Vygotsky doesn't seem to say much about perezhivanie except that obvious > fact that it represents a *relation* between the person and the > environment, and he says this in a variety of ways. I had not well > remembered what he said about the development of the 3 siblings - each > suffered some kind of pathology as a result of the perezhivanie occasioned > by the mother's drunkenness, but the pathology was *different* in each > case. And he *does* say quite explicitly that perezhivanija are units of > analysis, and I gather it is a unit for analysis of personality > development, and therefore of personality (as ambiguous as that word is). > But there is no elaboration of perezhivanie which allows us to understand > how much of the cultural load carried by the word in the Russian language > is intended to be incorporated in the scientific concept - this is left > open. > But the article also includes Vygotsky's important reflections about the > presence of the "ideal form" in the environment and how this makes > ontogenetic development unique among all forms of development. And he also > includes a statement of the "law of cultural development" that all the > higher psychological functions originally manifest themselves as forms of > the child's collective behaviour. > I still think it's a great article, though one would have loved Vygotsky > to have elaborated more on some points. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: > >> I had never thought of the meaning/value connection, David. Thank Mr >> Hicheol for me! >> I need to read more about tema which is not a term I am familiar with >> being used in this context before. >> >> I gather that the idea of reading the two articles on the problem of the >> environment proved uninteresting. As a sign of my decriptude I had totally >> forgotten that Andy had written a whole essay about the contrast because I >> had it compartmentalized as part of a discussion among Russians that we >> have been poking our noses in to. I would not recommend starting with >> Andy's essay because it might discourage reading the two articles >> themselves. I have read the Vygotsky over a couple of times with special >> focus on question of units of analysis arising from one of David's earlier >> notes. >> >> Perhaps its only me, but when our conversations quickly spiral into three >> more heavy tomes to read just to get near what the note writer is >> suggesting, and when it involves Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty >> (whose work, at least, i know a little about!), I get to feeling >> overwhelmed. I was hoping that maybe a sharp contrast and a discussion that >> focused right on it, might be useful. >> No stopping the racing train, i guess. >> mike >> >> On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 2:40 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: >> >> When we were translating "Thinking and Speech", one of our old >> Marxists, Mr. Bae Hicheol, pointed out that "znachenie" can also be >> translated as "value", and that "sense" and "signification" can easily >> be understood along the lines of Marx's analysis of the commodity into >> a use value and an exchange value. I think this is precisely >> Volosinov's model for "tema" and "znachenie": "tema" is the use value >> of a word in a concrete act of thinking and speech, while "znachenie" >> is an abstraction (thus more stable than "tema") created by the >> process of exchange itself. There are limits to the analogy, of >> course, but it is certainly not the case that use value is "private" >> while exchange value is "public". >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> On 10 October 2014 23:01, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> > On the contrary. It was quite explicit. >> > The first slide showed two columns. On the left were the were >> the Russian >> > and German words for "personal meaning" and the inadequate >> English word, >> > sense, on the right the Russian and German words for objective >> or public >> > meaning and the inadequate English word, meaning. >> > The next slide illustrated this dualism graphically with public >> and private >> > domains represented. >> > The whole point was the Cartesian problem of the relation >> between the two. >> > It seems that the word "dualism" is not a "dirty word" where he >> comes from, >> > and the idea of theorising social change, which was a theme of 2 >> of the 4 >> > keynote speeches, was also not a priority for him. >> > >> > His Oral presentation (immediately after mine on the Thursday) >> was devoted >> > to representation of the autoregulation processes of social and >> > psychological systems. >> > >> > Andy >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> > *Andy Blunden* >> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> > >> > >> > Martin John Packer wrote: >> >> >> >> Did Dmitry simply not recognize the dualism in the theory he was >> >> presenting, Andy? >> >> >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> On Oct 10, 2014, at 7:26 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >>> You are quite right Martin, that it was my report of Dmitry's >> speech that >> >>> was being referred to and also correct to chide me for irony. >> Irony is >> >>> really out of place in discussing such complex questions. >> However, Dmitry >> >>> was not criticising his grandfather's theory; he was >> continuing it. When I >> >>> said that I didn't think that such a stark dualism was a >> fruitful place from >> >>> which to begin a discussion of meaning, he didn't really see >> the point of my >> >>> remark, simply agreeing that there could be local or regional >> meanings which >> >>> departed from the norm. So the irony, I admit, was all mine, >> and I apologise >> >>> for inappropriate use of irony in this instance. >> >>> Andy >> >>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> >>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> >> >>>> >> >>>> Just to reduce confusion, I want to point out that it was >> Andy who >> >>>> provided this account of Dmitry Leontiev's presentation at >> ISCAR, not me. >> >>>> And I think Andy was rejecting the argument. In fact, if I >> understood >> >>>> correctly (there was a lot of irony in Andy's message!), D. >> Leontiev was >> >>>> both summarizing and criticizing a position that his father >> (A. N. Leontiev) >> >>>> had made. Martin >> >>>> >> >>>> On Oct 10, 2014, at 3:35 AM, Rod Parker-Rees >> >>>> > > wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> I would challenge Martin's account of Dmitry Leontiev's >> argument that >> >>>>> meaning is objectively fixed to 'what is' - 'irrespective >> of one's personal >> >>>>> relation to it' - yes, znachenie - common sense or agreed >> meaning is more >> >>>>> 'objective' than smysl but it is still socially constructed >> - meanings are >> >>>>> agreed by dint of their common use (what people do 'as a >> rule') rather than >> >>>>> because they reflect an absolute objectivity. >> >>>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > >> > >> >> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >> > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Oct 11 14:11:08 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 14:11:08 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi again, Paul. Briefly in response to this note. This time, I am stuck. Firstly, as I have said, I am too ignorant to follow you through the discussion of Derrida et al. That may explain why I also have trouble understanding the first sentence. "The problem with modern psychology as I read through some of the writings in this group is this very act of intentionality and the rational subject." Whose writing are you referring to? Which act of intentionality are you referring to? The problem may be one of terminology. I googled lchc for "rational subject" and came up with 5 references, the most recent of which in 2012 was in reference to Husserl. By contrast, the term mediation turns up in 45,000 places and "mediated action" in about 2100. Different discourse communities? mike On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 12:25 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > Mike, > > The problem with modern psychology as I read through some of the writings > in this group is this very act of intentionality and the rational subject. > Derrida is correct to point out that Austin and Searle assume the > aforementioned in their theory of speech act. Although I do not subscribe > to derrida ' s decentered subject as the alternative to the rational > subject that experiences the world. For me, as heidegger points out in his > critique of husserl, the latter subject is an analytic, present-at-hand, of > Dasein among its other analytics (very kantian), ready-to-hand and > unready-to-hand. What psychology and speech act can not account for is the > origins of consciousness itself...artifical intelligence is not > consciousness! > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Dr. Paul C. > Mocombe"
Date:10/11/2014 2:59 PM > (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to > broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
>
Mike, > > My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about the xmca > conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the speech act, > comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing. It is simply > background information for us the reader (I am not going to reiterate the > debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue of > background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the way based > on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is correct on > the argument). > > Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological and > semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary, and > perlocutionary categories. This psychological act of thinking is the > element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking. However, in > order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background, > intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private language, for > example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech act? > Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing outside the text. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/11/2014 1:10 PM (GMT-05:00) >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion >
>
Thanks Paul -- > > Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same question: > How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation differ, Paul, > such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them? > > And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, David Ke? > > What are the major implications of the differences?? > > mike > > On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > Martin, > > > > I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of speech > > act, but not austin's. > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > President > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > www.mocombeian.com > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/10/2014 7:48 PM (GMT-05:00) > >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca > discussion > >
> >
Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking about the > > conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with words, but > i > > was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was all a > jumble > > of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the belief > > that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? > > mike > > > > On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > > > > > Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing that > > > both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting requires > > > ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the world. > > > Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking > with > > > words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the form > > of > > > new signs. > > > > > > ? > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > > > > I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by exploring > > > > *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT that > > word > > > > meaning is BEST understood - > > > > > > > > "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as > > operations, > > > > actions, and activities." > > > > > > > > This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Sat Oct 11 14:21:18 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 17:21:18 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion Message-ID: Henry, Clearly, your bike riding belongs to the perlocutionary category. ?But what is the syntax and semantics that gave rise to it? ?The thinking that it leads to, or is there another declarative or imperative statement, I.e. You are an environmentalists? ?This is where the searle/derrida debate takes off. ?The issues of intentionality, continuity, ?discontinuity are that not also an aspect of language. ?Hence derrida ' s notion of the potentiality for the deferment of meaning and why ?jacques lacan posits the unconscious to be structured like language...to account for the discontinuity of both language and the unconscious, which although we can think them apart are not. ? Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: "Henry G. Shonerd III"
Date:10/11/2014 4:14 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
Mike and Paul, Paul assumes your thinking about the XMCA dialog had nothing to do with your driving. I find that riding my bike to the university in the morning sets loose thinking about what's "on my plate" intellectually. The same thing happens when I am dancing to music with others (I do Nia, very popular in some places). Lakoff's claim that cognition is embodied is typically related to metaphor, but I am interested in how the phonological pole of language is iconic, not just with onomatopoeia, but with all forms of sound symbolism. And I assume that the phonological pole is a subset of the sematic pole. The indexical, iconic, symbolic aspects of language, would it be fair to say they are on a continuum, rather than discontinuous? Temporal aspects of language (including within speech and writing), wouldn't they figure in with the making (including comprehension) of meaning? I am sure David said as much back a while. Am I making sense that relates at all to the on-going dialog? Henry On Oct 11, 2014, at 12:59 PM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" wrote: > Mike, > > My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about the xmca conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the speech act, comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing. It is simply background information for us the reader (I am not going to reiterate the debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue of background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the way based on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is correct on the argument). > > Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological and semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary categories. This psychological act of thinking is the element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking. However, in order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background, intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private language, for example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech act? Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing outside the text. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole
Date:10/11/2014 1:10 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
>
Thanks Paul -- > > Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same question: > How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation differ, Paul, > such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them? > > And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, David Ke? > > What are the major implications of the differences?? > > mike > > On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > >> Martin, >> >> I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of speech >> act, but not austin's. >> >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < >> mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/10/2014 7:48 PM (GMT-05:00) >>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion >>
>>
Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking about the >> conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with words, but i >> was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was all a jumble >> of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the belief >> that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? >> mike >> >> On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >> wrote: >> >>> Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing that >>> both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting requires >>> ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the world. >>> Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking with >>> words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the form >> of >>> new signs. >>> >>> ? >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss wrote: >>> >>>> I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by exploring >>>> *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT that >> word >>>> meaning is BEST understood - >>>> >>>> "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as >> operations, >>>> actions, and activities." >>>> >>>> This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings. >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Sat Oct 11 14:23:31 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 17:23:31 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion Message-ID: <1i578vi178xra5m5xwcn8owk.1413062611298@email.android.com> Mike, I hope Henry's post clarifies that paragraph for you. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole
Date:10/11/2014 4:59 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
Hi Paul-- I see a second note but let me start with this first one. First of all THANKS! You are correct, I was thinking about my experience driving and thinking about xmca discourse. And you provided just the sort of concise identification of the issues that I would be totally incapable of achieving without a lot of time and effort. Viva the distributed expertise of those who participate in xmca! Second, I do not understand this part of your first paragraph:" I am assuming from the speech act, comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing." I was thinking about the xmca discourse and trying to figure out more about the thinking/acting distinction with respect to semiosis. Next..... Let me start with Martin's conjecture: "Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing that both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting requires ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the world. Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking with words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the form of new signs. ?"? Trying to push the boundaries involved in Martin's proposal by coming up with an example from my own experience that same day -- driving home, radio off, monitoring the road and thinking about the XMCA discussion. Is seemed to be verbal thinking, but was it action I was asking. You offered "I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of speech > act, but not austin's. ?" In those circumstances, in that context, I asked how Searle-Austin differences applied to the example of me driving home thinking about a topic that was known to anyone on xmca who is reading this thread.? You came up with a very clear answer. " your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological and semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary categories. ?"? ?On the shakey assumption that we are still on the same page, I offer the next thought that came to mind, this time when I am not in a moving isolation chamber!? I believe that your answer goes to Martin's proviso that verbal thinking "requires articulating that interpretation in the form of new signs." If having another person in the car to whom I was speaking, presumably the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary speech acts would come into play. I guess at that point we move from thought to action. I am far too poorly read in Derrida and phenomenology to follow your points relating to controversies that include Heidegger, Husserl. But I venture a possibility based on what I have learned so far in the conversation and my own background. I might characterize what I was doing in the car as preparing for, and simulating a next turn in an ongoing discussion with a number of colleagues, unsure of what my own conclusions regarding the issue of thought/action/semiosis are. In light of the discussion, I began to wonder about that term, articulation, in Martin's note. I take articulation to mean roughly "to say out loud to another as part of a conversation (text?). But, I have been asking myself, and ask you all for your thoughts, when I am engaged in verbal thinking aren't I engaged in a conversation with another, with an audience or my sense of an audience, as part of the process that generates what I say? It is often said that one does not stop being a sociocultural organism simply by virtue of being physically separate from others. Is there, in such "conversations with oneself" a form of articulation? And/or, might the fact that these thoughts were incorporated in my next communication as part of this conversation, not be considered a form of asychronous, semiotic, action? Thanks again for your concise answer. Sorry I cannot follow adequately some of the points you are making. mike On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 11:59 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > Mike, > > My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about the xmca > conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the speech act, > comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing. It is simply > background information for us the reader (I am not going to reiterate the > debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue of > background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the way based > on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is correct on > the argument). > > Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological and > semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary, and > perlocutionary categories. This psychological act of thinking is the > element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking. However, in > order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background, > intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private language, for > example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech act? > Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing outside the > text. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/11/2014 1:10 PM (GMT-05:00) >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion >
>
Thanks Paul -- > > Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same question: > How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation differ, Paul, > such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them? > > And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, David Ke? > > What are the major implications of the differences?? > > mike > > On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > Martin, > > > > I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of speech > > act, but not austin's. > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > President > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > www.mocombeian.com > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/10/2014 7:48 PM (GMT-05:00) > >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca > discussion > >
> >
Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking about the > > conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with words, but > i > > was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was all a > jumble > > of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the belief > > that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? > > mike > > > > On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > > > > > Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing that > > > both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting requires > > > ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the world. > > > Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking > with > > > words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the form > > of > > > new signs. > > > > > > ? > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > > > > I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by exploring > > > > *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT that > > word > > > > meaning is BEST understood - > > > > > > > > "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as > > operations, > > > > actions, and activities." > > > > > > > > This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Sat Oct 11 14:34:35 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 17:34:35 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion Message-ID: <1kcayd00tfo6f5bwt853apr0.1413063019512@email.android.com> The statement speaks to this overemphasis in psychology between continuity, culture, and the agent of culture. ?I have not come across many writings in this group who celebrate and highlight the discontinuity as deleuze and guattari do. ?I may be mistaken...hopes this help. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole
Date:10/11/2014 5:11 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
Hi again, Paul. Briefly in response to this note. This time, I am stuck. Firstly, as I have said, I am too ignorant to follow you through the discussion of Derrida et al. That may explain why I also have trouble understanding the first sentence. "The problem with modern psychology as I read through some of the writings in this group is this very act of intentionality and the rational subject." Whose writing are you referring to? Which act of intentionality are you referring to? The problem may be one of terminology. I googled lchc for "rational subject" and came up with 5 references, the most recent of which in 2012 was in reference to Husserl. By contrast, the term mediation turns up in 45,000 places and "mediated action" in about 2100. Different discourse communities? mike On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 12:25 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > Mike, > > The problem with modern psychology as I read through some of the writings > in this group is this very act of intentionality and the rational subject. > Derrida is correct to point out that Austin and Searle assume the > aforementioned in their theory of speech act. Although I do not subscribe > to derrida ' s decentered subject as the alternative to the rational > subject that experiences the world. For me, as heidegger points out in his > critique of husserl, the latter subject is an analytic, present-at-hand, of > Dasein among its other analytics (very kantian), ready-to-hand and > unready-to-hand. What psychology and speech act can not account for is the > origins of consciousness itself...artifical intelligence is not > consciousness! > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Dr. Paul C. > Mocombe"
Date:10/11/2014 2:59 PM > (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to > broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
>
Mike, > > My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about the xmca > conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the speech act, > comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing. It is simply > background information for us the reader (I am not going to reiterate the > debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue of > background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the way based > on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is correct on > the argument). > > Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological and > semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary, and > perlocutionary categories. This psychological act of thinking is the > element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking. However, in > order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background, > intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private language, for > example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech act? > Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing outside the text. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/11/2014 1:10 PM (GMT-05:00) >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion >
>
Thanks Paul -- > > Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same question: > How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation differ, Paul, > such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them? > > And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, David Ke? > > What are the major implications of the differences?? > > mike > > On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > Martin, > > > > I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of speech > > act, but not austin's. > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > President > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > www.mocombeian.com > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/10/2014 7:48 PM (GMT-05:00) > >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca > discussion > >
> >
Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking about the > > conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with words, but > i > > was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was all a > jumble > > of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the belief > > that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? > > mike > > > > On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > > > > > Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing that > > > both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting requires > > > ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the world. > > > Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking > with > > > words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the form > > of > > > new signs. > > > > > > ? > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > > > > I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by exploring > > > > *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT that > > word > > > > meaning is BEST understood - > > > > > > > > "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as > > operations, > > > > actions, and activities." > > > > > > > > This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat Oct 11 14:38:12 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 15:38:12 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <76EF3C1C-DE83-42C7-A7CB-BC16DAF8B641@gmail.com> Paul, Let me think about it. I appreciate your reference to Derrida. I am reading like crazy to keep up with you guys! Henry P.S. I am pretty dedicated to reading the references, links on the XMCA. But I use Wikipedia constantly. Is this a bad thing? On Oct 11, 2014, at 3:21 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Henry, > > Clearly, your bike riding belongs to the perlocutionary category. But what is the syntax and semantics that gave rise to it? The thinking that it leads to, or is there another declarative or imperative statement, I.e. You are an environmentalists? This is where the searle/derrida debate takes off. The issues of intentionality, continuity, discontinuity are that not also an aspect of language. Hence derrida ' s notion of the potentiality for the deferment of meaning and why jacques lacan posits the unconscious to be structured like language...to account for the discontinuity of both language and the unconscious, which although we can think them apart are not. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Henry G. Shonerd III"
Date:10/11/2014 4:14 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
>
Mike and Paul, > Paul assumes your thinking about the XMCA dialog had nothing to do with your driving. I find that riding my bike to the university in the morning sets loose thinking about what's "on my plate" intellectually. The same thing happens when I am dancing to music with others (I do Nia, very popular in some places). Lakoff's claim that cognition is embodied is typically related to metaphor, but I am interested in how the phonological pole of language is iconic, not just with onomatopoeia, but with all forms of sound symbolism. And I assume that the phonological pole is a subset of the sematic pole. The indexical, iconic, symbolic aspects of language, would it be fair to say they are on a continuum, rather than discontinuous? Temporal aspects of language (including within speech and writing), wouldn't they figure in with the making (including comprehension) of meaning? I am sure David said as much back a while. Am I making sense that relates at all to the on-going dialog? > Henry > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 12:59 PM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" wrote: > >> Mike, >> >> My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about the xmca conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the speech act, comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing. It is simply background information for us the reader (I am not going to reiterate the debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue of background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the way based on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is correct on the argument). >> >> Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological and semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary categories. This psychological act of thinking is the element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking. However, in order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background, intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private language, for example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech act? Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing outside the text. >> >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole
Date:10/11/2014 1:10 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
>>
Thanks Paul -- >> >> Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same question: >> How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation differ, Paul, >> such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them? >> >> And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, David Ke? >> >> What are the major implications of the differences?? >> >> mike >> >> On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < >> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: >> >>> Martin, >>> >>> I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of speech >>> act, but not austin's. >>> >>> >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>> President >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>> www.mocombeian.com >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>> >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < >>> mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/10/2014 7:48 PM (GMT-05:00) >>>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion >>>
>>>
Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking about the >>> conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with words, but i >>> was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was all a jumble >>> of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the belief >>> that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? >>> mike >>> >>> On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer < >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing that >>>> both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting requires >>>> ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the world. >>>> Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking with >>>> words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the form >>> of >>>> new signs. >>>> >>>> ? >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss wrote: >>>> >>>>> I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by exploring >>>>> *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT that >>> word >>>>> meaning is BEST understood - >>>>> >>>>> "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as >>> operations, >>>>> actions, and activities." >>>>> >>>>> This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Oct 11 16:05:24 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 00:05:24 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <76EF3C1C-DE83-42C7-A7CB-BC16DAF8B641@gmail.com> References: <76EF3C1C-DE83-42C7-A7CB-BC16DAF8B641@gmail.com> Message-ID: My own excursion has been to explore writings relating to Dewey (simply something I had out off and found time to explore). Which, it turns out, are (to my reading) another pithy way to express the logical problems I was reading in David's narrative. But this might be because I already "understand" the problem. Anyway, the interesting writings were "A letter from Dewey" that is in the appendix of "Knowing and Known" and Ernest Nagel's introduction to Dewey's "Logic: The Theory of Inquiry". One of the rather interesting things about reading Nagel's introduction, is that he makes an ontological error that Dewey referred to in his letter (I believe). The error was that an "object" (not its referent) is existentially existent beyond and before its social construction. Something that we CHAT enthusiasts should be familiar with. Nevertheless (as a psychologist) I am interested in the truth of errors, and Nagel's introduction was certainly helpful in enlivening the prospect of the 500 page volume (vol. 12 of the later works). Of course, I could be naively wrong about it, but all the pieces line up for me here, including some passages that are remarkably aligned with DE / El'konin-Davydov theory. Best, Huw On 11 October 2014 22:38, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > Paul, > Let me think about it. I appreciate your reference to Derrida. I am > reading like crazy to keep up with you guys! > Henry > P.S. I am pretty dedicated to reading the references, links on the XMCA. > But I use Wikipedia constantly. Is this a bad thing? > > > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 3:21 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > wrote: > > > Henry, > > > > Clearly, your bike riding belongs to the perlocutionary category. But > what is the syntax and semantics that gave rise to it? The thinking that > it leads to, or is there another declarative or imperative statement, I.e. > You are an environmentalists? This is where the searle/derrida debate > takes off. The issues of intentionality, continuity, discontinuity are > that not also an aspect of language. Hence derrida ' s notion of the > potentiality for the deferment of meaning and why jacques lacan posits the > unconscious to be structured like language...to account for the > discontinuity of both language and the unconscious, which although we can > think them apart are not. > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > President > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > www.mocombeian.com > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Henry G. > Shonerd III"
Date:10/11/2014 4:14 PM > (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to > broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
> >
Mike and Paul, > > Paul assumes your thinking about the XMCA dialog had nothing to do with > your driving. I find that riding my bike to the university in the morning > sets loose thinking about what's "on my plate" intellectually. The same > thing happens when I am dancing to music with others (I do Nia, very > popular in some places). Lakoff's claim that cognition is embodied is > typically related to metaphor, but I am interested in how the phonological > pole of language is iconic, not just with onomatopoeia, but with all forms > of sound symbolism. And I assume that the phonological pole is a subset of > the sematic pole. The indexical, iconic, symbolic aspects of language, > would it be fair to say they are on a continuum, rather than discontinuous? > Temporal aspects of language (including within speech and writing), > wouldn't they figure in with the making (including comprehension) of > meaning? I am sure David said as much back a while. Am I making sense that > relates at all to the on-going dialog? > > Henry > > > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 12:59 PM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > >> Mike, > >> > >> My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about the xmca > conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the speech act, > comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing. It is simply > background information for us the reader (I am not going to reiterate the > debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue of > background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the way based > on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is correct on > the argument). > >> > >> Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological and > semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary, and > perlocutionary categories. This psychological act of thinking is the > element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking. However, in > order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background, > intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private language, for > example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech act? > Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing outside the text. > >> > >> > >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > >> President > >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > >> www.mocombeian.com > >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > >> www.paulcmocombe.info > >> > >>
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/11/2014 1:10 PM (GMT-05:00) >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion >
> >>
Thanks Paul -- > >> > >> Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same question: > >> How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation differ, Paul, > >> such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them? > >> > >> And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, David Ke? > >> > >> What are the major implications of the differences?? > >> > >> mike > >> > >> On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > >> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > >> > >>> Martin, > >>> > >>> I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of speech > >>> act, but not austin's. > >>> > >>> > >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > >>> President > >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > >>> www.mocombeian.com > >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > >>> www.paulcmocombe.info > >>> > >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > >>> mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/10/2014 7:48 PM (GMT-05:00) > >>>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >>>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca > discussion > >>>
> >>>
Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking about the > >>> conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with words, > but i > >>> was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was all a > jumble > >>> of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the belief > >>> that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? > >>> mike > >>> > >>> On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer < > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing that > >>>> both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting requires > >>>> ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the > world. > >>>> Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking > with > >>>> words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the > form > >>> of > >>>> new signs. > >>>> > >>>> ? > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by exploring > >>>>> *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT that > >>> word > >>>>> meaning is BEST understood - > >>>>> > >>>>> "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as > >>> operations, > >>>>> actions, and activities." > >>>>> > >>>>> This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> > > > > > > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Oct 11 16:09:04 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 00:09:04 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <1kcayd00tfo6f5bwt853apr0.1413063019512@email.android.com> References: <1kcayd00tfo6f5bwt853apr0.1413063019512@email.android.com> Message-ID: On 11 October 2014 22:34, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > The statement speaks to this overemphasis in psychology between > continuity, culture, and the agent of culture. I have not come across many > writings in this group who celebrate and highlight the discontinuity as > deleuze and guattari do. I may be mistaken...hopes this help. > Paul, Are you referring to a genetic discontinuity? If so, can you point me to paper/chapter? Sorry if the pointing has already been done. Best, Huw > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/11/2014 5:11 PM (GMT-05:00) >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion >
>
Hi again, Paul. Briefly in response to this note. This time, I am > stuck. > Firstly, as I have said, I am too ignorant to follow you through the > discussion of Derrida et al. That may explain why I also have trouble > understanding the first sentence. > > "The problem with modern psychology as I read through some of the writings > in this group is this very act of intentionality and the rational subject." > > Whose writing are you referring to? Which act of intentionality are you > referring to? The problem may be one of terminology. I googled lchc for > "rational subject" and came up with 5 references, the most recent of which > in 2012 was in reference to Husserl. By contrast, the term mediation turns > up in 45,000 places and "mediated action" in about 2100. Different > discourse communities? > > mike > > On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 12:25 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > Mike, > > > > The problem with modern psychology as I read through some of the writings > > in this group is this very act of intentionality and the rational > subject. > > Derrida is correct to point out that Austin and Searle assume the > > aforementioned in their theory of speech act. Although I do not > subscribe > > to derrida ' s decentered subject as the alternative to the rational > > subject that experiences the world. For me, as heidegger points out in > his > > critique of husserl, the latter subject is an analytic, present-at-hand, > of > > Dasein among its other analytics (very kantian), ready-to-hand and > > unready-to-hand. What psychology and speech act can not account for is > the > > origins of consciousness itself...artifical intelligence is not > > consciousness! > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > President > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > www.mocombeian.com > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Dr. Paul C. > > Mocombe"
Date:10/11/2014 2:59 PM > > (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to > > broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
> >
Mike, > > > > My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about the xmca > > conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the speech > act, > > comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing. It is simply > > background information for us the reader (I am not going to reiterate the > > debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue of > > background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the way > based > > on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is correct > on > > the argument). > > > > Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological and > > semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary, and > > perlocutionary categories. This psychological act of thinking is the > > element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking. However, in > > order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background, > > intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private language, for > > example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech act? > > Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing outside the > text. > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > President > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > www.mocombeian.com > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/11/2014 1:10 PM (GMT-05:00) > >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca > discussion > >
> >
Thanks Paul -- > > > > Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same question: > > How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation differ, Paul, > > such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them? > > > > And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, David Ke? > > > > What are the major implications of the differences?? > > > > mike > > > > On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > > > Martin, > > > > > > I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of speech > > > act, but not austin's. > > > > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > President > > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > www.mocombeian.com > > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > > > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/10/2014 7:48 PM (GMT-05:00) > > >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca > > discussion > > >
> > >
Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking about the > > > conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with words, > but > > i > > > was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was all a > > jumble > > > of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the belief > > > that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? > > > mike > > > > > > On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing > that > > > > both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting > requires > > > > ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the > world. > > > > Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking > > with > > > > words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the > form > > > of > > > > new signs. > > > > > > > > ? > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss > wrote: > > > > > > > > > I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by > exploring > > > > > *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT > that > > > word > > > > > meaning is BEST understood - > > > > > > > > > > "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as > > > operations, > > > > > actions, and activities." > > > > > > > > > > This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > From ablunden@mira.net Sat Oct 11 17:22:49 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 11:22:49 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5439C9D9.3060206@mira.net> Mike, in my view, your observations below, that your "private" reflections were connected to a future action is exactly the sense in which CHAT bases itself on *action* as the unity of consciousness and behaviour, i.e., genetically. When we simply confront the product (private thoughts) insoluble conundrums are presented. CHAT understands the relation of thinking and acting genetically. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > ... > I might characterize what I was doing in the car as preparing for, and > simulating a next turn in an ongoing discussion with a number of > colleagues, unsure of what my own conclusions regarding the issue of > thought/action/semiosis are. In light of the discussion, I began to wonder > about that term, articulation, in Martin's note. I take articulation to > mean roughly "to say out loud to another as part of a conversation (text?). > But, I have been asking myself, and ask you all for your thoughts, when I > am engaged in verbal thinking aren't I engaged in a conversation with > another, with an audience or my sense of an audience, as part of the > process that generates what I say? It is often said that one does not stop > being a sociocultural organism simply by virtue of being physically > separate from others. Is there, in such "conversations with oneself" a form > of articulation? > > And/or, might the fact that these thoughts were incorporated in my next > communication as part of this conversation, not be considered a form of > asychronous, semiotic, action? > > Thanks again for your concise answer. Sorry I cannot follow adequately some > of the points you are making. > mike > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Sat Oct 11 17:52:45 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 20:52:45 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion Message-ID: But Andy, the genetic argument, the unity of consciousness and behavior, sounds like Willard van Orman quine ' s behaviorism and structurationism in sociology, neither adequately resolve the old conundrum of behaviorism? ?Watch quine as he struggles to resolve the conundrum.... Watch "On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1" on YouTube On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1: http://youtu.be/1iZvycU3I9w ? Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Andy Blunden
Date:10/11/2014 8:22 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
Mike, in my view, your observations below, that your "private" reflections were connected to a future action is exactly the sense in which CHAT bases itself on *action* as the unity of consciousness and behaviour, i.e., genetically. When we simply confront the product (private thoughts) insoluble conundrums are presented. CHAT understands the relation of thinking and acting genetically. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > ... > I might characterize what I was doing in the car as preparing for, and > simulating a next turn in an ongoing discussion with a number of > colleagues, unsure of what my own conclusions regarding the issue of > thought/action/semiosis are. In light of the discussion, I began to wonder > about that term, articulation, in Martin's note. I take articulation to > mean roughly "to say out loud to another as part of a conversation (text?). > But, I have been asking myself, and ask you all for your thoughts, when I > am engaged in verbal thinking aren't I engaged in a conversation with > another, with an audience or my sense of an audience, as part of the > process that generates what I say? It is often said that one does not stop > being a sociocultural organism simply by virtue of being physically > separate from others. Is there, in such "conversations with oneself" a form > of articulation? > > And/or, might the fact that these thoughts were incorporated in my next > communication as part of this conversation, not be considered a form of > asychronous, semiotic, action? > > Thanks again for your concise answer. Sorry I cannot follow adequately some > of the points you are making. > mike > > From ablunden@mira.net Sat Oct 11 19:09:32 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 13:09:32 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5439E2DC.1090203@mira.net> Paul, I really don't care if Willard Quine has problems. My reply was in the tradition of Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky, not American analytical philosophy. Quine's difficulties shed no light on A N Leontyev's criticisms of Vygotsky. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > But Andy, the genetic argument, the unity of consciousness and > behavior, sounds like Willard van Orman quine ' s behaviorism and > structurationism in sociology, neither adequately resolve the old > conundrum of behaviorism? Watch quine as he struggles to resolve the > conundrum.... > > Watch "On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1" on YouTube > On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1: http://youtu.be/1iZvycU3I9w > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > -------- Original message -------- > From: Andy Blunden > Date:10/11/2014 8:22 PM (GMT-05:00) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > Mike, in my view, your observations below, that your "private" > reflections were connected to a future action is exactly the sense in > which CHAT bases itself on *action* as the unity of consciousness and > behaviour, i.e., genetically. When we simply confront the product > (private thoughts) insoluble conundrums are presented. CHAT understands > the relation of thinking and acting genetically. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: > > ... > > I might characterize what I was doing in the car as preparing for, and > > simulating a next turn in an ongoing discussion with a number of > > colleagues, unsure of what my own conclusions regarding the issue of > > thought/action/semiosis are. In light of the discussion, I began to > wonder > > about that term, articulation, in Martin's note. I take articulation to > > mean roughly "to say out loud to another as part of a conversation > (text?). > > But, I have been asking myself, and ask you all for your thoughts, > when I > > am engaged in verbal thinking aren't I engaged in a conversation with > > another, with an audience or my sense of an audience, as part of the > > process that generates what I say? It is often said that one does > not stop > > being a sociocultural organism simply by virtue of being physically > > separate from others. Is there, in such "conversations with oneself" > a form > > of articulation? > > > > And/or, might the fact that these thoughts were incorporated in my next > > communication as part of this conversation, not be considered a form of > > asychronous, semiotic, action? > > > > Thanks again for your concise answer. Sorry I cannot follow > adequately some > > of the points you are making. > > mike > > > > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Oct 11 19:40:05 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 20:40:05 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <76EF3C1C-DE83-42C7-A7CB-BC16DAF8B641@gmail.com> Message-ID: Huw, Can you give us a little more about the Nagel introduction? How does Nagel make that error? And if you happen to have an extra moment, I wonder if you could say a bit about HOW Dewey makes the case for objects not existing prior to being made-as-such? I've been chatting elsewhere with Jay Lemke and others about Bruno Latour's and Tim Ingold's separate uses of "correspondence" in ways that go against the classical notions of "correspondence" as in correspondence theory (i.e. the measure of the value of a science is the extent to which it corresponds to reality). I'm wondering how these views might be different from Dewey's take on the matter (in a lot of ways, I'm sure, but also similar in others). But I haven't read Dewey lately or with these ideas in mind and I could use a leg up... Thanks, -greg On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 5:05 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > My own excursion has been to explore writings relating to Dewey (simply > something I had out off and found time to explore). Which, it turns out, > are (to my reading) another pithy way to express the logical problems I was > reading in David's narrative. But this might be because I already > "understand" the problem. > > Anyway, the interesting writings were "A letter from Dewey" that is in the > appendix of "Knowing and Known" and Ernest Nagel's introduction to Dewey's > "Logic: The Theory of Inquiry". > > One of the rather interesting things about reading Nagel's introduction, is > that he makes an ontological error that Dewey referred to in his letter (I > believe). The error was that an "object" (not its referent) is > existentially existent beyond and before its social construction. > Something that we CHAT enthusiasts should be familiar with. > > Nevertheless (as a psychologist) I am interested in the truth of errors, > and Nagel's introduction was certainly helpful in enlivening the prospect > of the 500 page volume (vol. 12 of the later works). Of course, I could be > naively wrong about it, but all the pieces line up for me here, including > some passages that are remarkably aligned with DE / El'konin-Davydov > theory. > > Best, > Huw > > > > On 11 October 2014 22:38, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > > > Paul, > > Let me think about it. I appreciate your reference to Derrida. I am > > reading like crazy to keep up with you guys! > > Henry > > P.S. I am pretty dedicated to reading the references, links on the XMCA. > > But I use Wikipedia constantly. Is this a bad thing? > > > > > > > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 3:21 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> > > wrote: > > > > > Henry, > > > > > > Clearly, your bike riding belongs to the perlocutionary category. But > > what is the syntax and semantics that gave rise to it? The thinking that > > it leads to, or is there another declarative or imperative statement, > I.e. > > You are an environmentalists? This is where the searle/derrida debate > > takes off. The issues of intentionality, continuity, discontinuity are > > that not also an aspect of language. Hence derrida ' s notion of the > > potentiality for the deferment of meaning and why jacques lacan posits > the > > unconscious to be structured like language...to account for the > > discontinuity of both language and the unconscious, which although we can > > think them apart are not. > > > > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > President > > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > www.mocombeian.com > > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Henry G. > > Shonerd III"
Date:10/11/2014 4:14 PM > > (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to > > broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
> > >
Mike and Paul, > > > Paul assumes your thinking about the XMCA dialog had nothing to do with > > your driving. I find that riding my bike to the university in the morning > > sets loose thinking about what's "on my plate" intellectually. The same > > thing happens when I am dancing to music with others (I do Nia, very > > popular in some places). Lakoff's claim that cognition is embodied is > > typically related to metaphor, but I am interested in how the > phonological > > pole of language is iconic, not just with onomatopoeia, but with all > forms > > of sound symbolism. And I assume that the phonological pole is a subset > of > > the sematic pole. The indexical, iconic, symbolic aspects of language, > > would it be fair to say they are on a continuum, rather than > discontinuous? > > Temporal aspects of language (including within speech and writing), > > wouldn't they figure in with the making (including comprehension) of > > meaning? I am sure David said as much back a while. Am I making sense > that > > relates at all to the on-going dialog? > > > Henry > > > > > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 12:59 PM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" < > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > > > >> Mike, > > >> > > >> My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about the xmca > > conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the speech > act, > > comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing. It is simply > > background information for us the reader (I am not going to reiterate the > > debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue of > > background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the way > based > > on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is correct > on > > the argument). > > >> > > >> Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological and > > semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary, and > > perlocutionary categories. This psychological act of thinking is the > > element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking. However, in > > order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background, > > intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private language, for > > example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech act? > > Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing outside the > text. > > >> > > >> > > >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > >> President > > >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > >> www.mocombeian.com > > >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > >> www.paulcmocombe.info > > >> > > >>
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/11/2014 1:10 PM (GMT-05:00) > >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca > discussion > >
> > >>
Thanks Paul -- > > >> > > >> Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same > question: > > >> How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation differ, > Paul, > > >> such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them? > > >> > > >> And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, David Ke? > > >> > > >> What are the major implications of the differences?? > > >> > > >> mike > > >> > > >> On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > > >> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > >> > > >>> Martin, > > >>> > > >>> I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of > speech > > >>> act, but not austin's. > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > >>> President > > >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > >>> www.mocombeian.com > > >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > >>> www.paulcmocombe.info > > >>> > > >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > > >>> mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/10/2014 7:48 PM (GMT-05:00) > > >>>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > >>>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca > > discussion > > >>>
> > >>>
Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking about > the > > >>> conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with words, > > but i > > >>> was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was all a > > jumble > > >>> of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the > belief > > >>> that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? > > >>> mike > > >>> > > >>> On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer < > > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > >>> wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing > that > > >>>> both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting > requires > > >>>> ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the > > world. > > >>>> Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking (thinking > > with > > >>>> words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the > > form > > >>> of > > >>>> new signs. > > >>>> > > >>>> ? > > >>>> > > >>>> Martin > > >>>> > > >>>> On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss > wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>> I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by > exploring > > >>>>> *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT > that > > >>> word > > >>>>> meaning is BEST understood - > > >>>>> > > >>>>> "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as > > >>> operations, > > >>>>> actions, and activities." > > >>>>> > > >>>>> This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word meanings. > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> -- > > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > >> -- > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Sat Oct 11 19:42:02 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 22:42:02 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion Message-ID: Andy, It does not matter in what tradition you are arguing...analytical or continental... ?It still produces the same absurd logic and point. ?In sociology, immanuel wallerstein, anthony giddens, and a number of other structuration theorists building on hegel, marx, etc., encounter the same quineian problematic. ?Your response somehow implies that the problematic does not exist in the continental tradition...definitely not the case. ?The debate between Searle and Derrida speaks to this exact point. ?As the feminist theorists, theresa brennan, points out in her essay, "two forms of consciouseness," ?uniting consciousness and behavior introduces the old conundrum of behaviorism and structuralism in a new form, "how do you account for alternative practical consciousnesses and the praxis of the genius..." Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Andy Blunden
Date:10/11/2014 10:09 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe"
Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
Paul, I really don't care if Willard Quine has problems. My reply was in the tradition of Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky, not American analytical philosophy. Quine's difficulties shed no light on A N Leontyev's criticisms of Vygotsky. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > But Andy, the genetic argument, the unity of consciousness and > behavior, sounds like Willard van Orman quine ' s behaviorism and > structurationism in sociology, neither adequately resolve the old > conundrum of behaviorism? Watch quine as he struggles to resolve the > conundrum.... > > Watch "On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1" on YouTube > On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1: http://youtu.be/1iZvycU3I9w > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > -------- Original message -------- > From: Andy Blunden > Date:10/11/2014 8:22 PM (GMT-05:00) > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > Mike, in my view, your observations below, that your "private" > reflections were connected to a future action is exactly the sense in > which CHAT bases itself on *action* as the unity of consciousness and > behaviour, i.e., genetically. When we simply confront the product > (private thoughts) insoluble conundrums are presented. CHAT understands > the relation of thinking and acting genetically. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: > > ... > > I might characterize what I was doing in the car as preparing for, and > > simulating a next turn in an ongoing discussion with a number of > > colleagues, unsure of what my own conclusions regarding the issue of > > thought/action/semiosis are. In light of the discussion, I began to > wonder > > about that term, articulation, in Martin's note. I take articulation to > > mean roughly "to say out loud to another as part of a conversation > (text?). > > But, I have been asking myself, and ask you all for your thoughts, > when I > > am engaged in verbal thinking aren't I engaged in a conversation with > > another, with an audience or my sense of an audience, as part of the > > process that generates what I say? It is often said that one does > not stop > > being a sociocultural organism simply by virtue of being physically > > separate from others. Is there, in such "conversations with oneself" > a form > > of articulation? > > > > And/or, might the fact that these thoughts were incorporated in my next > > communication as part of this conversation, not be considered a form of > > asychronous, semiotic, action? > > > > Thanks again for your concise answer. Sorry I cannot follow > adequately some > > of the points you are making. > > mike > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sat Oct 11 20:02:07 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 14:02:07 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5439EF2F.2040505@mira.net> Well, I just don't agree, Paul. You want to draw my attention to a fault in the logic that I use, and Mike used, by pointing to problems that Willard Quine has. Why should that impress me? And quite honestly the same goes for Wallerstein, Giddens, Derrida and Searle. Any real connection between two processes takes time. There is no real relation between two simultaneous processes which is direct. Any attempt to discuss the relationship between behaviour and thinking which approaches that relation directly, that is, other than by means of how behaviour is transformed into thinking and thinking is transformed into behaviour, over time, is bound to end up in impossible conundrums. Of all these people you mention, Searle is one I have actually had the joy of debating this point with, and he is indeed a classic example of my point. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Andy, > > It does not matter in what tradition you are arguing...analytical or > continental... It still produces the same absurd logic and point. In > sociology, immanuel wallerstein, anthony giddens, and a number of > other structuration theorists building on hegel, marx, etc., encounter > the same quineian problematic. Your response somehow implies that the > problematic does not exist in the continental tradition...definitely > not the case. The debate between Searle and Derrida speaks to this > exact point. As the feminist theorists, theresa brennan, points out > in her essay, "two forms of consciouseness," uniting consciousness > and behavior introduces the old conundrum of behaviorism and > structuralism in a new form, "how do you account for alternative > practical consciousnesses and the praxis of the genius..." > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > -------- Original message -------- > From: Andy Blunden > Date:10/11/2014 10:09 PM (GMT-05:00) > To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > Paul, I really don't care if Willard Quine has problems. > My reply was in the tradition of Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky, not American > analytical philosophy. Quine's difficulties shed no light on A N > Leontyev's criticisms of Vygotsky. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > But Andy, the genetic argument, the unity of consciousness and > > behavior, sounds like Willard van Orman quine ' s behaviorism and > > structurationism in sociology, neither adequately resolve the old > > conundrum of behaviorism? Watch quine as he struggles to resolve the > > conundrum.... > > > > Watch "On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1" on YouTube > > On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1: http://youtu.be/1iZvycU3I9w > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > President > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > www.mocombeian.com > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > -------- Original message -------- > > From: Andy Blunden > > Date:10/11/2014 8:22 PM (GMT-05:00) > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > > > Mike, in my view, your observations below, that your "private" > > reflections were connected to a future action is exactly the sense in > > which CHAT bases itself on *action* as the unity of consciousness and > > behaviour, i.e., genetically. When we simply confront the product > > (private thoughts) insoluble conundrums are presented. CHAT understands > > the relation of thinking and acting genetically. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > mike cole wrote: > > > ... > > > I might characterize what I was doing in the car as preparing for, and > > > simulating a next turn in an ongoing discussion with a number of > > > colleagues, unsure of what my own conclusions regarding the issue of > > > thought/action/semiosis are. In light of the discussion, I began to > > wonder > > > about that term, articulation, in Martin's note. I take > articulation to > > > mean roughly "to say out loud to another as part of a conversation > > (text?). > > > But, I have been asking myself, and ask you all for your thoughts, > > when I > > > am engaged in verbal thinking aren't I engaged in a conversation with > > > another, with an audience or my sense of an audience, as part of the > > > process that generates what I say? It is often said that one does > > not stop > > > being a sociocultural organism simply by virtue of being physically > > > separate from others. Is there, in such "conversations with oneself" > > a form > > > of articulation? > > > > > > And/or, might the fact that these thoughts were incorporated in my > next > > > communication as part of this conversation, not be considered a > form of > > > asychronous, semiotic, action? > > > > > > Thanks again for your concise answer. Sorry I cannot follow > > adequately some > > > of the points you are making. > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Sat Oct 11 20:12:42 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 23:12:42 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion Message-ID: <53xrxp54hwbs4w3ex0gj0dfu.1413083562474@email.android.com> Andy, I have to make light of this...my speech acts were an attempt to impress you...how did you ascertain that (my behavior gave you access to my thinking)....Anyways. ?I simply side with Derrida on the issue. ? Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Andy Blunden
Date:10/11/2014 11:02 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe"
Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
Well, I just don't agree, Paul. You want to draw my attention to a fault in the logic that I use, and Mike used, by pointing to problems that Willard Quine has. Why should that impress me? And quite honestly the same goes for Wallerstein, Giddens, Derrida and Searle. Any real connection between two processes takes time. There is no real relation between two simultaneous processes which is direct. Any attempt to discuss the relationship between behaviour and thinking which approaches that relation directly, that is, other than by means of how behaviour is transformed into thinking and thinking is transformed into behaviour, over time, is bound to end up in impossible conundrums. Of all these people you mention, Searle is one I have actually had the joy of debating this point with, and he is indeed a classic example of my point. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Andy, > > It does not matter in what tradition you are arguing...analytical or > continental... It still produces the same absurd logic and point. In > sociology, immanuel wallerstein, anthony giddens, and a number of > other structuration theorists building on hegel, marx, etc., encounter > the same quineian problematic. Your response somehow implies that the > problematic does not exist in the continental tradition...definitely > not the case. The debate between Searle and Derrida speaks to this > exact point. As the feminist theorists, theresa brennan, points out > in her essay, "two forms of consciouseness," uniting consciousness > and behavior introduces the old conundrum of behaviorism and > structuralism in a new form, "how do you account for alternative > practical consciousnesses and the praxis of the genius..." > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > -------- Original message -------- > From: Andy Blunden > Date:10/11/2014 10:09 PM (GMT-05:00) > To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > Paul, I really don't care if Willard Quine has problems. > My reply was in the tradition of Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky, not American > analytical philosophy. Quine's difficulties shed no light on A N > Leontyev's criticisms of Vygotsky. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > But Andy, the genetic argument, the unity of consciousness and > > behavior, sounds like Willard van Orman quine ' s behaviorism and > > structurationism in sociology, neither adequately resolve the old > > conundrum of behaviorism? Watch quine as he struggles to resolve the > > conundrum.... > > > > Watch "On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1" on YouTube > > On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1: http://youtu.be/1iZvycU3I9w > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > President > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > www.mocombeian.com > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > -------- Original message -------- > > From: Andy Blunden > > Date:10/11/2014 8:22 PM (GMT-05:00) > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > > > Mike, in my view, your observations below, that your "private" > > reflections were connected to a future action is exactly the sense in > > which CHAT bases itself on *action* as the unity of consciousness and > > behaviour, i.e., genetically. When we simply confront the product > > (private thoughts) insoluble conundrums are presented. CHAT understands > > the relation of thinking and acting genetically. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > mike cole wrote: > > > ... > > > I might characterize what I was doing in the car as preparing for, and > > > simulating a next turn in an ongoing discussion with a number of > > > colleagues, unsure of what my own conclusions regarding the issue of > > > thought/action/semiosis are. In light of the discussion, I began to > > wonder > > > about that term, articulation, in Martin's note. I take > articulation to > > > mean roughly "to say out loud to another as part of a conversation > > (text?). > > > But, I have been asking myself, and ask you all for your thoughts, > > when I > > > am engaged in verbal thinking aren't I engaged in a conversation with > > > another, with an audience or my sense of an audience, as part of the > > > process that generates what I say? It is often said that one does > > not stop > > > being a sociocultural organism simply by virtue of being physically > > > separate from others. Is there, in such "conversations with oneself" > > a form > > > of articulation? > > > > > > And/or, might the fact that these thoughts were incorporated in my > next > > > communication as part of this conversation, not be considered a > form of > > > asychronous, semiotic, action? > > > > > > Thanks again for your concise answer. Sorry I cannot follow > > adequately some > > > of the points you are making. > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sat Oct 11 20:15:52 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 14:15:52 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <53xrxp54hwbs4w3ex0gj0dfu.1413083562474@email.android.com> References: <53xrxp54hwbs4w3ex0gj0dfu.1413083562474@email.android.com> Message-ID: <5439F268.4090000@mira.net> Paul, I used the word "impress" in the sense of "make an impression on me". I mean, how does it cause me to see the fallacy of genetic methodology in the CHAT tradition to hear that an American analytical philosopher gets tied in knots trying to do something you see as similar? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Andy, > > I have to make light of this...my speech acts were an attempt to > impress you...how did you ascertain that (my behavior gave you access > to my thinking)....Anyways. I simply side with Derrida on the issue. > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > -------- Original message -------- > From: Andy Blunden > Date:10/11/2014 11:02 PM (GMT-05:00) > To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > Well, I just don't agree, Paul. > You want to draw my attention to a fault in the logic that I use, and > Mike used, by pointing to problems that Willard Quine has. Why should > that impress me? And quite honestly the same goes for Wallerstein, > Giddens, Derrida and Searle. > > Any real connection between two processes takes time. There is no real > relation between two simultaneous processes which is direct. Any attempt > to discuss the relationship between behaviour and thinking which > approaches that relation directly, that is, other than by means of how > behaviour is transformed into thinking and thinking is transformed into > behaviour, over time, is bound to end up in impossible conundrums. > Of all these people you mention, Searle is one I have actually had the > joy of debating this point with, and he is indeed a classic example of > my point. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > Andy, > > > > It does not matter in what tradition you are arguing...analytical or > > continental... It still produces the same absurd logic and point. In > > sociology, immanuel wallerstein, anthony giddens, and a number of > > other structuration theorists building on hegel, marx, etc., encounter > > the same quineian problematic. Your response somehow implies that the > > problematic does not exist in the continental tradition...definitely > > not the case. The debate between Searle and Derrida speaks to this > > exact point. As the feminist theorists, theresa brennan, points out > > in her essay, "two forms of consciouseness," uniting consciousness > > and behavior introduces the old conundrum of behaviorism and > > structuralism in a new form, "how do you account for alternative > > practical consciousnesses and the praxis of the genius..." > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > President > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > www.mocombeian.com > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > -------- Original message -------- > > From: Andy Blunden > > Date:10/11/2014 10:09 PM (GMT-05:00) > > To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > > > Paul, I really don't care if Willard Quine has problems. > > My reply was in the tradition of Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky, not American > > analytical philosophy. Quine's difficulties shed no light on A N > > Leontyev's criticisms of Vygotsky. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > > But Andy, the genetic argument, the unity of consciousness and > > > behavior, sounds like Willard van Orman quine ' s behaviorism and > > > structurationism in sociology, neither adequately resolve the old > > > conundrum of behaviorism? Watch quine as he struggles to resolve the > > > conundrum.... > > > > > > Watch "On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1" on YouTube > > > On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1: http://youtu.be/1iZvycU3I9w > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > President > > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > www.mocombeian.com > > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > > > > -------- Original message -------- > > > From: Andy Blunden > > > Date:10/11/2014 8:22 PM (GMT-05:00) > > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > > > > > Mike, in my view, your observations below, that your "private" > > > reflections were connected to a future action is exactly the sense in > > > which CHAT bases itself on *action* as the unity of consciousness and > > > behaviour, i.e., genetically. When we simply confront the product > > > (private thoughts) insoluble conundrums are presented. CHAT > understands > > > the relation of thinking and acting genetically. > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > mike cole wrote: > > > > ... > > > > I might characterize what I was doing in the car as preparing > for, and > > > > simulating a next turn in an ongoing discussion with a number of > > > > colleagues, unsure of what my own conclusions regarding the issue of > > > > thought/action/semiosis are. In light of the discussion, I began to > > > wonder > > > > about that term, articulation, in Martin's note. I take > > articulation to > > > > mean roughly "to say out loud to another as part of a conversation > > > (text?). > > > > But, I have been asking myself, and ask you all for your thoughts, > > > when I > > > > am engaged in verbal thinking aren't I engaged in a conversation > with > > > > another, with an audience or my sense of an audience, as part of the > > > > process that generates what I say? It is often said that one does > > > not stop > > > > being a sociocultural organism simply by virtue of being physically > > > > separate from others. Is there, in such "conversations with oneself" > > > a form > > > > of articulation? > > > > > > > > And/or, might the fact that these thoughts were incorporated in my > > next > > > > communication as part of this conversation, not be considered a > > form of > > > > asychronous, semiotic, action? > > > > > > > > Thanks again for your concise answer. Sorry I cannot follow > > > adequately some > > > > of the points you are making. > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Sat Oct 11 20:21:08 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 23:21:08 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion Message-ID: Got you... Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Andy Blunden
Date:10/11/2014 11:15 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe"
Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
Paul, I used the word "impress" in the sense of "make an impression on me". I mean, how does it cause me to see the fallacy of genetic methodology in the CHAT tradition to hear that an American analytical philosopher gets tied in knots trying to do something you see as similar? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Andy, > > I have to make light of this...my speech acts were an attempt to > impress you...how did you ascertain that (my behavior gave you access > to my thinking)....Anyways. I simply side with Derrida on the issue. > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > -------- Original message -------- > From: Andy Blunden > Date:10/11/2014 11:02 PM (GMT-05:00) > To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > Well, I just don't agree, Paul. > You want to draw my attention to a fault in the logic that I use, and > Mike used, by pointing to problems that Willard Quine has. Why should > that impress me? And quite honestly the same goes for Wallerstein, > Giddens, Derrida and Searle. > > Any real connection between two processes takes time. There is no real > relation between two simultaneous processes which is direct. Any attempt > to discuss the relationship between behaviour and thinking which > approaches that relation directly, that is, other than by means of how > behaviour is transformed into thinking and thinking is transformed into > behaviour, over time, is bound to end up in impossible conundrums. > Of all these people you mention, Searle is one I have actually had the > joy of debating this point with, and he is indeed a classic example of > my point. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > Andy, > > > > It does not matter in what tradition you are arguing...analytical or > > continental... It still produces the same absurd logic and point. In > > sociology, immanuel wallerstein, anthony giddens, and a number of > > other structuration theorists building on hegel, marx, etc., encounter > > the same quineian problematic. Your response somehow implies that the > > problematic does not exist in the continental tradition...definitely > > not the case. The debate between Searle and Derrida speaks to this > > exact point. As the feminist theorists, theresa brennan, points out > > in her essay, "two forms of consciouseness," uniting consciousness > > and behavior introduces the old conundrum of behaviorism and > > structuralism in a new form, "how do you account for alternative > > practical consciousnesses and the praxis of the genius..." > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > President > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > www.mocombeian.com > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > -------- Original message -------- > > From: Andy Blunden > > Date:10/11/2014 10:09 PM (GMT-05:00) > > To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > > > Paul, I really don't care if Willard Quine has problems. > > My reply was in the tradition of Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky, not American > > analytical philosophy. Quine's difficulties shed no light on A N > > Leontyev's criticisms of Vygotsky. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > > But Andy, the genetic argument, the unity of consciousness and > > > behavior, sounds like Willard van Orman quine ' s behaviorism and > > > structurationism in sociology, neither adequately resolve the old > > > conundrum of behaviorism? Watch quine as he struggles to resolve the > > > conundrum.... > > > > > > Watch "On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1" on YouTube > > > On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1: http://youtu.be/1iZvycU3I9w > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > President > > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > www.mocombeian.com > > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > > > > -------- Original message -------- > > > From: Andy Blunden > > > Date:10/11/2014 8:22 PM (GMT-05:00) > > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > > > > > Mike, in my view, your observations below, that your "private" > > > reflections were connected to a future action is exactly the sense in > > > which CHAT bases itself on *action* as the unity of consciousness and > > > behaviour, i.e., genetically. When we simply confront the product > > > (private thoughts) insoluble conundrums are presented. CHAT > understands > > > the relation of thinking and acting genetically. > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > mike cole wrote: > > > > ... > > > > I might characterize what I was doing in the car as preparing > for, and > > > > simulating a next turn in an ongoing discussion with a number of > > > > colleagues, unsure of what my own conclusions regarding the issue of > > > > thought/action/semiosis are. In light of the discussion, I began to > > > wonder > > > > about that term, articulation, in Martin's note. I take > > articulation to > > > > mean roughly "to say out loud to another as part of a conversation > > > (text?). > > > > But, I have been asking myself, and ask you all for your thoughts, > > > when I > > > > am engaged in verbal thinking aren't I engaged in a conversation > with > > > > another, with an audience or my sense of an audience, as part of the > > > > process that generates what I say? It is often said that one does > > > not stop > > > > being a sociocultural organism simply by virtue of being physically > > > > separate from others. Is there, in such "conversations with oneself" > > > a form > > > > of articulation? > > > > > > > > And/or, might the fact that these thoughts were incorporated in my > > next > > > > communication as part of this conversation, not be considered a > > form of > > > > asychronous, semiotic, action? > > > > > > > > Thanks again for your concise answer. Sorry I cannot follow > > > adequately some > > > > of the points you are making. > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From vygotsky@unm.edu Sat Oct 11 20:46:37 2014 From: vygotsky@unm.edu (Vera John-Steiner) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 21:46:37 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <5439F268.4090000@mira.net> References: <53xrxp54hwbs4w3ex0gj0dfu.1413083562474@email.android.com> <5439F268.4090000@mira.net> Message-ID: <004101cfe5cf$226c5630$67450290$@edu> To the many silent readers as well as the frequent participants, When I first read the subject of our current stream "how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion" I had high hopes that we will find ways to touch on peoples' concerns and interests in an effective way. But the discussion has turned out to be limited to a few people and has become increasingly conceptual/definitional. Those are necessary parts of our joint endeavor, but they close off rather than encourage broad participation. We have done well when we chose a particular article or book or experience (I was grateful to get some glimpses of the recent ISCAR conference from Andy and David) as a shared focus. I was tempted to enter the discussion on private speech but I was worried that we will go over our disagreements only and will leave out what to some of us is a fertile topic for both research and theory. (Mike and Henry shared some of their experience of how they planned their thoughts with an xmca audience in mind. I hesitated when I wrote the colloquial expression "in mind.") Are we starting to inhibit each other when we touch contested ground? Perhaps we need to focus on our process as part of this theme. If I did not value deeply what xmca offers to me, now that I no longer have daily contact with colleagues and students, I would not have written this message. Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Saturday, October 11, 2014 9:16 PM To: Dr. Paul C. Mocombe Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion Paul, I used the word "impress" in the sense of "make an impression on me". I mean, how does it cause me to see the fallacy of genetic methodology in the CHAT tradition to hear that an American analytical philosopher gets tied in knots trying to do something you see as similar? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Andy, > > I have to make light of this...my speech acts were an attempt to > impress you...how did you ascertain that (my behavior gave you access > to my thinking)....Anyways. I simply side with Derrida on the issue. > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > -------- Original message -------- > From: Andy Blunden > Date:10/11/2014 11:02 PM (GMT-05:00) > To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > Well, I just don't agree, Paul. > You want to draw my attention to a fault in the logic that I use, and > Mike used, by pointing to problems that Willard Quine has. Why should > that impress me? And quite honestly the same goes for Wallerstein, > Giddens, Derrida and Searle. > > Any real connection between two processes takes time. There is no real > relation between two simultaneous processes which is direct. Any > attempt to discuss the relationship between behaviour and thinking > which approaches that relation directly, that is, other than by means > of how behaviour is transformed into thinking and thinking is > transformed into behaviour, over time, is bound to end up in impossible conundrums. > Of all these people you mention, Searle is one I have actually had the > joy of debating this point with, and he is indeed a classic example of > my point. > > Andy > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > Andy, > > > > It does not matter in what tradition you are arguing...analytical or > > continental... It still produces the same absurd logic and point. > > In sociology, immanuel wallerstein, anthony giddens, and a number of > > other structuration theorists building on hegel, marx, etc., > > encounter the same quineian problematic. Your response somehow > > implies that the problematic does not exist in the continental > > tradition...definitely not the case. The debate between Searle and > > Derrida speaks to this exact point. As the feminist theorists, > > theresa brennan, points out in her essay, "two forms of > > consciouseness," uniting consciousness and behavior introduces the > > old conundrum of behaviorism and structuralism in a new form, "how > > do you account for alternative practical consciousnesses and the praxis of the genius..." > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > President > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > www.mocombeian.com > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > -------- Original message -------- > > From: Andy Blunden > > Date:10/11/2014 10:09 PM (GMT-05:00) > > To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > > > Paul, I really don't care if Willard Quine has problems. > > My reply was in the tradition of Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky, not > > American analytical philosophy. Quine's difficulties shed no light > > on A N Leontyev's criticisms of Vygotsky. > > Andy > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > ---- > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > > But Andy, the genetic argument, the unity of consciousness and > > > behavior, sounds like Willard van Orman quine ' s behaviorism and > > > structurationism in sociology, neither adequately resolve the old > > > conundrum of behaviorism? Watch quine as he struggles to resolve > > > the conundrum.... > > > > > > Watch "On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1" on YouTube On the Ideas > > > of Quine: Section 1: http://youtu.be/1iZvycU3I9w > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > President > > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > www.mocombeian.com > > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > > > > -------- Original message -------- > > > From: Andy Blunden > > > Date:10/11/2014 8:22 PM (GMT-05:00) > > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > > > > > Mike, in my view, your observations below, that your "private" > > > reflections were connected to a future action is exactly the sense > > > in which CHAT bases itself on *action* as the unity of > > > consciousness and behaviour, i.e., genetically. When we simply > > > confront the product (private thoughts) insoluble conundrums are > > > presented. CHAT > understands > > > the relation of thinking and acting genetically. > > > Andy > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > mike cole wrote: > > > > ... > > > > I might characterize what I was doing in the car as preparing > for, and > > > > simulating a next turn in an ongoing discussion with a number of > > > > colleagues, unsure of what my own conclusions regarding the > > > > issue of thought/action/semiosis are. In light of the > > > > discussion, I began to > > > wonder > > > > about that term, articulation, in Martin's note. I take > > articulation to > > > > mean roughly "to say out loud to another as part of a > > > > conversation > > > (text?). > > > > But, I have been asking myself, and ask you all for your > > > > thoughts, > > > when I > > > > am engaged in verbal thinking aren't I engaged in a conversation > with > > > > another, with an audience or my sense of an audience, as part of > > > > the process that generates what I say? It is often said that one > > > > does > > > not stop > > > > being a sociocultural organism simply by virtue of being > > > > physically separate from others. Is there, in such "conversations with oneself" > > > a form > > > > of articulation? > > > > > > > > And/or, might the fact that these thoughts were incorporated in > > > > my > > next > > > > communication as part of this conversation, not be considered a > > form of > > > > asychronous, semiotic, action? > > > > > > > > Thanks again for your concise answer. Sorry I cannot follow > > > adequately some > > > > of the points you are making. > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From barowy@lesley.edu Sat Oct 11 20:50:32 2014 From: barowy@lesley.edu (Barowy, William) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 03:50:32 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ow to broaden/enliven the xmca discussionPh Message-ID: I just cannot believe the amount of B.S, that Is posted recently, in this place that once meant so much to me. Michael Cole, where are YOU? --- William Barowy, Associate Professor, Lesley University barowy@lesley.edu 978.349.8168 From ablunden@mira.net Sat Oct 11 20:53:11 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 14:53:11 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: <004101cfe5cf$226c5630$67450290$@edu> References: <53xrxp54hwbs4w3ex0gj0dfu.1413083562474@email.android.com> <5439F268.4090000@mira.net> <004101cfe5cf$226c5630$67450290$@edu> Message-ID: <5439FB27.6050305@mira.net> "Private speech" plays an important role, doesn't it Vera, on how we see the relation between thinking and doing. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Vera John-Steiner wrote: > To the many silent readers as well as the frequent participants, > > When I first read the subject of our current stream "how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion" I had high hopes that we will > find ways to touch on peoples' concerns and interests in an effective way. But the discussion has turned out to be limited > to a few people and has become increasingly conceptual/definitional. Those are necessary parts of our joint endeavor, but > they close off rather than encourage broad participation. We have done well when we chose a particular article or book or experience > (I was grateful to get some glimpses of the recent ISCAR conference from Andy and David) as a shared focus. I was tempted to enter > the discussion on private speech but I was worried that we will go over our disagreements only and will leave out what to some of > us is a fertile topic for both research and theory. (Mike and Henry shared some of their experience of how they planned their > thoughts with an xmca audience in mind. I hesitated when I wrote the colloquial expression "in mind.") Are we starting to inhibit > each other when we touch contested ground? Perhaps we need to focus on our process as part of this theme. > > If I did not value deeply what xmca offers to me, now that I no longer have daily contact with colleagues and students, I would not > have written this message. > > Vera > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Saturday, October 11, 2014 9:16 PM > To: Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > Paul, I used the word "impress" in the sense of "make an impression on me". I mean, how does it cause me to see the fallacy of genetic methodology in the CHAT tradition to hear that an American analytical philosopher gets tied in knots trying to do something you see as similar? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > >> Andy, >> >> I have to make light of this...my speech acts were an attempt to >> impress you...how did you ascertain that (my behavior gave you access >> to my thinking)....Anyways. I simply side with Derrida on the issue. >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info >> >> >> -------- Original message -------- >> From: Andy Blunden >> Date:10/11/2014 11:02 PM (GMT-05:00) >> To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >> Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion >> >> Well, I just don't agree, Paul. >> You want to draw my attention to a fault in the logic that I use, and >> Mike used, by pointing to problems that Willard Quine has. Why should >> that impress me? And quite honestly the same goes for Wallerstein, >> Giddens, Derrida and Searle. >> >> Any real connection between two processes takes time. There is no real >> relation between two simultaneous processes which is direct. Any >> attempt to discuss the relationship between behaviour and thinking >> which approaches that relation directly, that is, other than by means >> of how behaviour is transformed into thinking and thinking is >> transformed into behaviour, over time, is bound to end up in impossible conundrums. >> Of all these people you mention, Searle is one I have actually had the >> joy of debating this point with, and he is indeed a classic example of >> my point. >> >> Andy >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >>> Andy, >>> >>> It does not matter in what tradition you are arguing...analytical or >>> continental... It still produces the same absurd logic and point. >>> In sociology, immanuel wallerstein, anthony giddens, and a number of >>> other structuration theorists building on hegel, marx, etc., >>> encounter the same quineian problematic. Your response somehow >>> implies that the problematic does not exist in the continental >>> tradition...definitely not the case. The debate between Searle and >>> Derrida speaks to this exact point. As the feminist theorists, >>> theresa brennan, points out in her essay, "two forms of >>> consciouseness," uniting consciousness and behavior introduces the >>> old conundrum of behaviorism and structuralism in a new form, "how >>> do you account for alternative practical consciousnesses and the praxis of the genius..." >>> >>> >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>> President >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>> www.mocombeian.com >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>> >>> >>> -------- Original message -------- >>> From: Andy Blunden >>> Date:10/11/2014 10:09 PM (GMT-05:00) >>> To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" >>> Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion >>> >>> Paul, I really don't care if Willard Quine has problems. >>> My reply was in the tradition of Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky, not >>> American analytical philosophy. Quine's difficulties shed no light >>> on A N Leontyev's criticisms of Vygotsky. >>> Andy >>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> ---- >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>> >>>> But Andy, the genetic argument, the unity of consciousness and >>>> behavior, sounds like Willard van Orman quine ' s behaviorism and >>>> structurationism in sociology, neither adequately resolve the old >>>> conundrum of behaviorism? Watch quine as he struggles to resolve >>>> the conundrum.... >>>> >>>> Watch "On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1" on YouTube On the Ideas >>>> of Quine: Section 1: http://youtu.be/1iZvycU3I9w >>>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>> >>>> -------- Original message -------- >>>> From: Andy Blunden >>>> Date:10/11/2014 8:22 PM (GMT-05:00) >>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion >>>> >>>> Mike, in my view, your observations below, that your "private" >>>> reflections were connected to a future action is exactly the sense >>>> in which CHAT bases itself on *action* as the unity of >>>> consciousness and behaviour, i.e., genetically. When we simply >>>> confront the product (private thoughts) insoluble conundrums are >>>> presented. CHAT >>>> >> understands >> >>>> the relation of thinking and acting genetically. >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >> >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>>> ... >>>>> I might characterize what I was doing in the car as preparing >>>>> >> for, and >> >>>>> simulating a next turn in an ongoing discussion with a number of >>>>> colleagues, unsure of what my own conclusions regarding the >>>>> issue of thought/action/semiosis are. In light of the >>>>> discussion, I began to >>>>> >>>> wonder >>>> >>>>> about that term, articulation, in Martin's note. I take >>>>> >>> articulation to >>> >>>>> mean roughly "to say out loud to another as part of a >>>>> conversation >>>>> >>>> (text?). >>>> >>>>> But, I have been asking myself, and ask you all for your >>>>> thoughts, >>>>> >>>> when I >>>> >>>>> am engaged in verbal thinking aren't I engaged in a conversation >>>>> >> with >> >>>>> another, with an audience or my sense of an audience, as part of >>>>> the process that generates what I say? It is often said that one >>>>> does >>>>> >>>> not stop >>>> >>>>> being a sociocultural organism simply by virtue of being >>>>> physically separate from others. Is there, in such "conversations with oneself" >>>>> >>>> a form >>>> >>>>> of articulation? >>>>> >>>>> And/or, might the fact that these thoughts were incorporated in >>>>> my >>>>> >>> next >>> >>>>> communication as part of this conversation, not be considered a >>>>> >>> form of >>> >>>>> asychronous, semiotic, action? >>>>> >>>>> Thanks again for your concise answer. Sorry I cannot follow >>>>> >>>> adequately some >>>> >>>>> of the points you are making. >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Oct 11 21:18:51 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 21:18:51 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ow to broaden/enliven the xmca discussionPh In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Bill-- Where are you? Miss your voice. mike On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 8:50 PM, Barowy, William wrote: > I just cannot believe the amount of B.S, that Is posted recently, in this > place that once meant so much to me. Michael Cole, where are YOU? > --- > William Barowy, > Associate Professor, > Lesley University > barowy@lesley.edu > 978.349.8168 > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Oct 11 23:38:56 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 15:38:56 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Speech Acts as Grammatical Metaphors Message-ID: Of course, it goes without saying that some threads are more congenial to some readers and others to others. I certainly find a great deal in xmca that is not particularly apposite my tastes and proclivities, but when I do I just assume that it is addressed to someone else, and I am invariably proven right. For many years, I really couldn't understand why the two linguists I most admire on this planet, Henry Widdowson and Michael Halliday, don't get along very well. Or rather, they get along rather as Vygotsky and Piaget did: Widdowson never stops addressing Halliday and Halliday never replies (the relationship between Halliday and Chomsky is rather similar: according to Halliday they once shared a swimming pool at MIT, and got on famously as long as they restricted their conversation to politics: Halliday has written a good deal about Chomsky, almost all of it critical, and as far as I know Chomsky has not once mentioned Halliday in print). When I last remarked on this to Professor Widdowson, he replied that for Halliday pragmatics is part of semantics, whereas for him, semantics is part of pragmatics. This makes sense to me now. I know that Widdowson, like many linguists of his generation, was much influenced by speech act theory and the whole approach of notions and functions which followed from it. Even today, for Widdowson, text is a kind of footprint left by discourse, but for Halliday when you take discourse out of text, there is nothing left but paper and ink. Perlocutionary force--e.g., what my teachers are REALLY doing when they ask "Can anyone tell me what this is?"--is a central concern of pragmatics. But in semantics, we can simply treat it as an instance of nterpersonal metaphor. We use a yes/no question to stand for a wh-question in much the same way we use a question to stand for a command ("Would you mind not chewing on Fluffy's tail?") and for much the same reason: direct speech acts are often very face threatening, since when you give a command you are casting your hearer in a servile role, just as when you ask a question you are casting yourself in the role of an ignoramus (and this, rather than "BS", is probably one of the most important barriers to broadening and enlivening discussion on xmca). Because perlocutionary force is separable from locutionary force by metaphor it is possible to separate out these speech acts and give them some special status and even to derive a whole theory of pragmatics from them. But Halliday doesn't do that: he simply treats them as instances of grammatical metaphor, no different in principle from the lexical variety where we ask one word to stand in momentarily for another (e.g. "What walks on four legs in the morning, two legs at noon, and three legs at twilight?). In this case, however, we are asking one wording (e.g. a question) to stand in for another (a command), or in some cases to stand in for some legal or commercial transaction. It seems to me that one way to verify this approach is to imagine what remains of the speech act when we take away the underlying act (e.g. when we perform it on stage as part of a play). The answer is, nothing. On the other hand, we can easily imagine a world where speech acts are performed by gestures rather than by speaking (e.g. when a dying patient who has lost the ability to speak gets married). The speech is removed, and the act remains. It seems to me, therefore that in a speech act the speech is simply a metaphor for the act. If speech did not have another function, the function of networking minds and transforming one mind through another and even transforming itself through the minds of others, then I suppose it would be adequate to describe speech as a form of object-oriented activity, and even to describe semantics as a kind of brain trace left by pragmatics. But speech does, and so it isn't. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies From Holli.Tonyan@csun.edu Sat Oct 11 23:57:22 2014 From: Holli.Tonyan@csun.edu (Tonyan, Holli A) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 06:57:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi Mike, I really appreciated what you said in your previous post and I really appreciate that you are trying to start a thread focused on two specific articles that we could read together. The discussion has moved so fast (your comment about whether we can stop a moving train) that it's become hard for me to even find where you posted the original articles. I found it helpful that David Kellogg just started a new thread to continue a discussion that seems to be of interest to some readers. Perhaps, Mike, you could start a new thread for a discussion of the two articles you mentioned? I don't know that I can actually read those two articles right now (even two is a struggle these days of reports due and exams to grade), but I'd sure like to be able to try and to follow that thread. Like Vera, I was excited to see the subject line for this thread, and disappointed when the discussion quickly turned to so many articles and thinkers with whom I am not familiar. If it were it's own post and other people respected the goal of only posting in response to those specific articles, then we might be able to spark a different discussion? I can't speak for others, but I am with you - I have far too difficult a time understanding much less responding to articles that make references to concepts with which I am not familiar and don't have time to read. I would guess that others, like me, are interested, but just couldn't reply fast enough to keep up with the pace of new posts in that thread. I think others, like me, would be well served by specific references to parts of those articles rather than general references to the concepts and ideas. Any other takers for a new thread dedicated to comparing the Problem of the Environment and the article by Leontiev? Thanks! Holli Tonyan On Oct 10, 2014, at 4:59 PM, mike cole > wrote: I had never thought of the meaning/value connection, David. Thank Mr Hicheol for me! I need to read more about tema which is not a term I am familiar with being used in this context before. I gather that the idea of reading the two articles on the problem of the environment proved uninteresting. As a sign of my decriptude I had totally forgotten that Andy had written a whole essay about the contrast because I had it compartmentalized as part of a discussion among Russians that we have been poking our noses in to. I would not recommend starting with Andy's essay because it might discourage reading the two articles themselves. I have read the Vygotsky over a couple of times with special focus on question of units of analysis arising from one of David's earlier notes. Perhaps its only me, but when our conversations quickly spiral into three more heavy tomes to read just to get near what the note writer is suggesting, and when it involves Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (whose work, at least, i know a little about!), I get to feeling overwhelmed. I was hoping that maybe a sharp contrast and a discussion that focused right on it, might be useful. No stopping the racing train, i guess. mike On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 2:40 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: When we were translating "Thinking and Speech", one of our old Marxists, Mr. Bae Hicheol, pointed out that "znachenie" can also be translated as "value", and that "sense" and "signification" can easily be understood along the lines of Marx's analysis of the commodity into a use value and an exchange value. I think this is precisely Volosinov's model for "tema" and "znachenie": "tema" is the use value of a word in a concrete act of thinking and speech, while "znachenie" is an abstraction (thus more stable than "tema") created by the process of exchange itself. There are limits to the analogy, of course, but it is certainly not the case that use value is "private" while exchange value is "public". David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 10 October 2014 23:01, Andy Blunden > wrote: On the contrary. It was quite explicit. The first slide showed two columns. On the left were the were the Russian and German words for "personal meaning" and the inadequate English word, sense, on the right the Russian and German words for objective or public meaning and the inadequate English word, meaning. The next slide illustrated this dualism graphically with public and private domains represented. The whole point was the Cartesian problem of the relation between the two. It seems that the word "dualism" is not a "dirty word" where he comes from, and the idea of theorising social change, which was a theme of 2 of the 4 keynote speeches, was also not a priority for him. His Oral presentation (immediately after mine on the Thursday) was devoted to representation of the autoregulation processes of social and psychological systems. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAIBaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=XRDgxyMqJBwZ8A1nCnjij72JOYIYEq3FYAx_EhNc238&s=2heitYYyTq6QcHUXLa8wb020-IFUSed8lid9NRW98Lk&e= Martin John Packer wrote: Did Dmitry simply not recognize the dualism in the theory he was presenting, Andy? Martin On Oct 10, 2014, at 7:26 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: You are quite right Martin, that it was my report of Dmitry's speech that was being referred to and also correct to chide me for irony. Irony is really out of place in discussing such complex questions. However, Dmitry was not criticising his grandfather's theory; he was continuing it. When I said that I didn't think that such a stark dualism was a fruitful place from which to begin a discussion of meaning, he didn't really see the point of my remark, simply agreeing that there could be local or regional meanings which departed from the norm. So the irony, I admit, was all mine, and I apologise for inappropriate use of irony in this instance. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAIBaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=XRDgxyMqJBwZ8A1nCnjij72JOYIYEq3FYAx_EhNc238&s=2heitYYyTq6QcHUXLa8wb020-IFUSed8lid9NRW98Lk&e= Martin John Packer wrote: Just to reduce confusion, I want to point out that it was Andy who provided this account of Dmitry Leontiev's presentation at ISCAR, not me. And I think Andy was rejecting the argument. In fact, if I understood correctly (there was a lot of irony in Andy's message!), D. Leontiev was both summarizing and criticizing a position that his father (A. N. Leontiev) had made. Martin On Oct 10, 2014, at 3:35 AM, Rod Parker-Rees > wrote: I would challenge Martin's account of Dmitry Leontiev's argument that meaning is objectively fixed to 'what is' - 'irrespective of one's personal relation to it' - yes, znachenie - common sense or agreed meaning is more 'objective' than smysl but it is still socially constructed - meanings are agreed by dint of their common use (what people do 'as a rule') rather than because they reflect an absolute objectivity. -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. Holli A. Tonyan, Ph.D. ------------ Associate Professor | Department of Psychology | California State University, Northridge Postal Address: 18111 Nordhoff Street | Northridge, CA 91330-8255 Tel: (818) 677-4970 | Fax: (818) 677-2829 Office: ST322 http://www.csun.edu/~htonyan http://csun.academia.edu/HolliTonyan http://www.csun.edu/~ata20315/GE/general_experimental_psychology2.html **check out** Tonyan, H. A. (in press). Everyday routines: A window into the cultural organization of family child care. Journal of Early Childhood Research. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1476718X14523748 Tonyan, H. A., Nuttall, J. (2014). Connecting cultural models of home-based care and childminders? career paths: An Eco-cultural analysis. International Journal of Early Years Education, 22, 117-138, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09669760.2013.809654 Tonyan, H. A., Mamikonian, A., & Chien, D. (2013). Do they practice what they preach? An Ecocultural, multidimensional, group-based examination of the relationship between beliefs and behaviours among child care providers. Early Child Development and Care, 183:12, 1853-1877. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03004430.2012.759949 This message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged, confidential or exempt from disclosure under applicable federal or state law. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, please immediately notify the sender by telephone at (818)677-4970, and destroy all copies of this e-mail and all attachments. Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has. - Margaret Mead US anthropologist & popularizer of anthropology (1901 - 1978) From ablunden@mira.net Sun Oct 12 00:02:48 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 18:02:48 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> Message-ID: <543A2798.2070509@mira.net> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/environment.htm Leontiev attached. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Tonyan, Holli A wrote: > Hi Mike, > > I really appreciated what you said in your previous post and I really appreciate that you are trying to start a thread focused on two specific articles that we could read together. The discussion has moved so fast (your comment about whether we can stop a moving train) that it's become hard for me to even find where you posted the original articles. > > I found it helpful that David Kellogg just started a new thread to continue a discussion that seems to be of interest to some readers. > > Perhaps, Mike, you could start a new thread for a discussion of the two articles you mentioned? I don't know that I can actually read those two articles right now (even two is a struggle these days of reports due and exams to grade), but I'd sure like to be able to try and to follow that thread. Like Vera, I was excited to see the subject line for this thread, and disappointed when the discussion quickly turned to so many articles and thinkers with whom I am not familiar. If it were it's own post and other people respected the goal of only posting in response to those specific articles, then we might be able to spark a different discussion? > > I can't speak for others, but I am with you - I have far too difficult a time understanding much less responding to articles that make references to concepts with which I am not familiar and don't have time to read. I would guess that others, like me, are interested, but just couldn't reply fast enough to keep up with the pace of new posts in that thread. I think others, like me, would be well served by specific references to parts of those articles rather than general references to the concepts and ideas. > > Any other takers for a new thread dedicated to comparing the Problem of the Environment and the article by Leontiev? > > Thanks! > Holli Tonyan > > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: leontiev.lsv.env.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 230603 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141012/dc0b878d/attachment.pdf From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Sun Oct 12 02:32:53 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 09:32:53 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Speech Acts as Grammatical Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022301AC@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> David, I hope you and others will be able to help me to make some sense of the fascinatingly intricate interactions between what is going on when people use speech as a system of gestures for revealing/concealing and constructing relationships and identities - the richness referred to by Shotter as 'words in their speaking' but incorporating so much more than just the words (words in embodied/interactional contexts)- and what is going on when people pore over texts trying to identify the 'true' meaning of what an author may have intended - already spoken/written words. To me there appears to be a critical difference between meanings which inhere in context and those which depend on the 'fossilisation' of previous contexts into a grammar. We can argue about the use of concepts in ways we can't really argue about the personal significance of (often unnoticed) contextual details. But I am not so naive as to believe that the distinction is a clear one - our awareness of how words and other gestures have conventionally been used by others becomes an increasingly important part of our ability to use words to communicate nuanced meanings 'in their speaking' and it may take us some time to get to know another person well enough to be able to anticipate how they can be expected to respond to particular comments or whether they can be expected to notice particular references. I believe that, over time, we are able to build a sense of who another person is (and, indeed of who we are) out of our sense of how and where their use of 'common' concepts does and does not coincide with our own. I wonder, for example, whether the term 'speech acts' may be misleading. Might it not be more accurate (though also much more cumbersome) to talk of 'interactional processes which include speech'? Many thanks for your particularly lucid presentation of already spoken words. All the best, Rod ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of David Kellogg [dkellogg60@gmail.com] Sent: 12 October 2014 07:38 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Speech Acts as Grammatical Metaphors Of course, it goes without saying that some threads are more congenial to some readers and others to others. I certainly find a great deal in xmca that is not particularly apposite my tastes and proclivities, but when I do I just assume that it is addressed to someone else, and I am invariably proven right. For many years, I really couldn't understand why the two linguists I most admire on this planet, Henry Widdowson and Michael Halliday, don't get along very well. Or rather, they get along rather as Vygotsky and Piaget did: Widdowson never stops addressing Halliday and Halliday never replies (the relationship between Halliday and Chomsky is rather similar: according to Halliday they once shared a swimming pool at MIT, and got on famously as long as they restricted their conversation to politics: Halliday has written a good deal about Chomsky, almost all of it critical, and as far as I know Chomsky has not once mentioned Halliday in print). When I last remarked on this to Professor Widdowson, he replied that for Halliday pragmatics is part of semantics, whereas for him, semantics is part of pragmatics. This makes sense to me now. I know that Widdowson, like many linguists of his generation, was much influenced by speech act theory and the whole approach of notions and functions which followed from it. Even today, for Widdowson, text is a kind of footprint left by discourse, but for Halliday when you take discourse out of text, there is nothing left but paper and ink. Perlocutionary force--e.g., what my teachers are REALLY doing when they ask "Can anyone tell me what this is?"--is a central concern of pragmatics. But in semantics, we can simply treat it as an instance of nterpersonal metaphor. We use a yes/no question to stand for a wh-question in much the same way we use a question to stand for a command ("Would you mind not chewing on Fluffy's tail?") and for much the same reason: direct speech acts are often very face threatening, since when you give a command you are casting your hearer in a servile role, just as when you ask a question you are casting yourself in the role of an ignoramus (and this, rather than "BS", is probably one of the most important barriers to broadening and enlivening discussion on xmca). Because perlocutionary force is separable from locutionary force by metaphor it is possible to separate out these speech acts and give them some special status and even to derive a whole theory of pragmatics from them. But Halliday doesn't do that: he simply treats them as instances of grammatical metaphor, no different in principle from the lexical variety where we ask one word to stand in momentarily for another (e.g. "What walks on four legs in the morning, two legs at noon, and three legs at twilight?). In this case, however, we are asking one wording (e.g. a question) to stand in for another (a command), or in some cases to stand in for some legal or commercial transaction. It seems to me that one way to verify this approach is to imagine what remains of the speech act when we take away the underlying act (e.g. when we perform it on stage as part of a play). The answer is, nothing. On the other hand, we can easily imagine a world where speech acts are performed by gestures rather than by speaking (e.g. when a dying patient who has lost the ability to speak gets married). The speech is removed, and the act remains. It seems to me, therefore that in a speech act the speech is simply a metaphor for the act. If speech did not have another function, the function of networking minds and transforming one mind through another and even transforming itself through the minds of others, then I suppose it would be adequate to describe speech as a form of object-oriented activity, and even to describe semantics as a kind of brain trace left by pragmatics. But speech does, and so it isn't. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. 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From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Sun Oct 12 02:34:31 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 09:34:31 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> , Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022301B9@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> I agree! Mike - can you start a new thread for discussion of the Leontiev/Vygotsky articles? Rod ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Tonyan, Holli A [Holli.Tonyan@csun.edu] Sent: 12 October 2014 07:57 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion Hi Mike, I really appreciated what you said in your previous post and I really appreciate that you are trying to start a thread focused on two specific articles that we could read together. The discussion has moved so fast (your comment about whether we can stop a moving train) that it's become hard for me to even find where you posted the original articles. I found it helpful that David Kellogg just started a new thread to continue a discussion that seems to be of interest to some readers. Perhaps, Mike, you could start a new thread for a discussion of the two articles you mentioned? I don't know that I can actually read those two articles right now (even two is a struggle these days of reports due and exams to grade), but I'd sure like to be able to try and to follow that thread. Like Vera, I was excited to see the subject line for this thread, and disappointed when the discussion quickly turned to so many articles and thinkers with whom I am not familiar. If it were it's own post and other people respected the goal of only posting in response to those specific articles, then we might be able to spark a different discussion? I can't speak for others, but I am with you - I have far too difficult a time understanding much less responding to articles that make references to concepts with which I am not familiar and don't have time to read. I would guess that others, like me, are interested, but just couldn't reply fast enough to keep up with the pace of new posts in that thread. I think others, like me, would be well served by specific references to parts of those articles rather than general references to the concepts and ideas. Any other takers for a new thread dedicated to comparing the Problem of the Environment and the article by Leontiev? Thanks! Holli Tonyan On Oct 10, 2014, at 4:59 PM, mike cole > wrote: I had never thought of the meaning/value connection, David. Thank Mr Hicheol for me! I need to read more about tema which is not a term I am familiar with being used in this context before. I gather that the idea of reading the two articles on the problem of the environment proved uninteresting. As a sign of my decriptude I had totally forgotten that Andy had written a whole essay about the contrast because I had it compartmentalized as part of a discussion among Russians that we have been poking our noses in to. I would not recommend starting with Andy's essay because it might discourage reading the two articles themselves. I have read the Vygotsky over a couple of times with special focus on question of units of analysis arising from one of David's earlier notes. Perhaps its only me, but when our conversations quickly spiral into three more heavy tomes to read just to get near what the note writer is suggesting, and when it involves Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (whose work, at least, i know a little about!), I get to feeling overwhelmed. I was hoping that maybe a sharp contrast and a discussion that focused right on it, might be useful. No stopping the racing train, i guess. mike On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 2:40 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: When we were translating "Thinking and Speech", one of our old Marxists, Mr. Bae Hicheol, pointed out that "znachenie" can also be translated as "value", and that "sense" and "signification" can easily be understood along the lines of Marx's analysis of the commodity into a use value and an exchange value. I think this is precisely Volosinov's model for "tema" and "znachenie": "tema" is the use value of a word in a concrete act of thinking and speech, while "znachenie" is an abstraction (thus more stable than "tema") created by the process of exchange itself. There are limits to the analogy, of course, but it is certainly not the case that use value is "private" while exchange value is "public". David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 10 October 2014 23:01, Andy Blunden > wrote: On the contrary. It was quite explicit. The first slide showed two columns. On the left were the were the Russian and German words for "personal meaning" and the inadequate English word, sense, on the right the Russian and German words for objective or public meaning and the inadequate English word, meaning. The next slide illustrated this dualism graphically with public and private domains represented. The whole point was the Cartesian problem of the relation between the two. It seems that the word "dualism" is not a "dirty word" where he comes from, and the idea of theorising social change, which was a theme of 2 of the 4 keynote speeches, was also not a priority for him. His Oral presentation (immediately after mine on the Thursday) was devoted to representation of the autoregulation processes of social and psychological systems. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAIBaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=XRDgxyMqJBwZ8A1nCnjij72JOYIYEq3FYAx_EhNc238&s=2heitYYyTq6QcHUXLa8wb020-IFUSed8lid9NRW98Lk&e= Martin John Packer wrote: Did Dmitry simply not recognize the dualism in the theory he was presenting, Andy? Martin On Oct 10, 2014, at 7:26 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: You are quite right Martin, that it was my report of Dmitry's speech that was being referred to and also correct to chide me for irony. Irony is really out of place in discussing such complex questions. However, Dmitry was not criticising his grandfather's theory; he was continuing it. When I said that I didn't think that such a stark dualism was a fruitful place from which to begin a discussion of meaning, he didn't really see the point of my remark, simply agreeing that there could be local or regional meanings which departed from the norm. So the irony, I admit, was all mine, and I apologise for inappropriate use of irony in this instance. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAIBaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=XRDgxyMqJBwZ8A1nCnjij72JOYIYEq3FYAx_EhNc238&s=2heitYYyTq6QcHUXLa8wb020-IFUSed8lid9NRW98Lk&e= Martin John Packer wrote: Just to reduce confusion, I want to point out that it was Andy who provided this account of Dmitry Leontiev's presentation at ISCAR, not me. And I think Andy was rejecting the argument. In fact, if I understood correctly (there was a lot of irony in Andy's message!), D. Leontiev was both summarizing and criticizing a position that his father (A. N. Leontiev) had made. Martin On Oct 10, 2014, at 3:35 AM, Rod Parker-Rees > wrote: I would challenge Martin's account of Dmitry Leontiev's argument that meaning is objectively fixed to 'what is' - 'irrespective of one's personal relation to it' - yes, znachenie - common sense or agreed meaning is more 'objective' than smysl but it is still socially constructed - meanings are agreed by dint of their common use (what people do 'as a rule') rather than because they reflect an absolute objectivity. -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. Holli A. Tonyan, Ph.D. ------------ Associate Professor | Department of Psychology | California State University, Northridge Postal Address: 18111 Nordhoff Street | Northridge, CA 91330-8255 Tel: (818) 677-4970 | Fax: (818) 677-2829 Office: ST322 http://www.csun.edu/~htonyan http://csun.academia.edu/HolliTonyan http://www.csun.edu/~ata20315/GE/general_experimental_psychology2.html **check out** Tonyan, H. A. (in press). Everyday routines: A window into the cultural organization of family child care. Journal of Early Childhood Research. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1476718X14523748 Tonyan, H. A., Nuttall, J. (2014). Connecting cultural models of home-based care and childminders? career paths: An Eco-cultural analysis. International Journal of Early Years Education, 22, 117-138, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09669760.2013.809654 Tonyan, H. A., Mamikonian, A., & Chien, D. (2013). Do they practice what they preach? An Ecocultural, multidimensional, group-based examination of the relationship between beliefs and behaviours among child care providers. Early Child Development and Care, 183:12, 1853-1877. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03004430.2012.759949 This message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged, confidential or exempt from disclosure under applicable federal or state law. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, please immediately notify the sender by telephone at (818)677-4970, and destroy all copies of this e-mail and all attachments. Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has. - Margaret Mead US anthropologist & popularizer of anthropology (1901 - 1978) ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From wester@uga.edu Sun Oct 12 03:47:56 2014 From: wester@uga.edu (Katherine Wester Neal) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 10:47:56 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> , Message-ID: I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. But, as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that through to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just trying to keep up with reading! For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm interested in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how they fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people doing with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis being used? If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very interested to read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as basic as these. Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much more eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In Mike's example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the action is mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, are often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of much more than just Mike's behavior. Katie Katie Wester-Neal University of Georgia On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:59 AM, "Tonyan, Holli A" wrote: Hi Mike, I really appreciated what you said in your previous post and I really appreciate that you are trying to start a thread focused on two specific articles that we could read together. The discussion has moved so fast (your comment about whether we can stop a moving train) that it's become hard for me to even find where you posted the original articles. I found it helpful that David Kellogg just started a new thread to continue a discussion that seems to be of interest to some readers. Perhaps, Mike, you could start a new thread for a discussion of the two articles you mentioned? I don't know that I can actually read those two articles right now (even two is a struggle these days of reports due and exams to grade), but I'd sure like to be able to try and to follow that thread. Like Vera, I was excited to see the subject line for this thread, and disappointed when the discussion quickly turned to so many articles and thinkers with whom I am not familiar. If it were it's own post and other people respected the goal of only posting in response to those specific articles, then we might be able to spark a different discussion? I can't speak for others, but I am with you - I have far too difficult a time understanding much less responding to articles that make references to concepts with which I am not familiar and don't have time to read. I would guess that others, like me, are interested, but just couldn't reply fast enough to keep up with the pace of new posts in that thread. I think others, like me, would be well served by specific references to parts of those articles rather than general references to the concepts and ideas. Any other takers for a new thread dedicated to comparing the Problem of the Environment and the article by Leontiev? Thanks! Holli Tonyan On Oct 10, 2014, at 4:59 PM, mike cole > wrote: I had never thought of the meaning/value connection, David. Thank Mr Hicheol for me! I need to read more about tema which is not a term I am familiar with being used in this context before. I gather that the idea of reading the two articles on the problem of the environment proved uninteresting. As a sign of my decriptude I had totally forgotten that Andy had written a whole essay about the contrast because I had it compartmentalized as part of a discussion among Russians that we have been poking our noses in to. I would not recommend starting with Andy's essay because it might discourage reading the two articles themselves. I have read the Vygotsky over a couple of times with special focus on question of units of analysis arising from one of David's earlier notes. Perhaps its only me, but when our conversations quickly spiral into three more heavy tomes to read just to get near what the note writer is suggesting, and when it involves Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (whose work, at least, i know a little about!), I get to feeling overwhelmed. I was hoping that maybe a sharp contrast and a discussion that focused right on it, might be useful. No stopping the racing train, i guess. mike On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 2:40 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: When we were translating "Thinking and Speech", one of our old Marxists, Mr. Bae Hicheol, pointed out that "znachenie" can also be translated as "value", and that "sense" and "signification" can easily be understood along the lines of Marx's analysis of the commodity into a use value and an exchange value. I think this is precisely Volosinov's model for "tema" and "znachenie": "tema" is the use value of a word in a concrete act of thinking and speech, while "znachenie" is an abstraction (thus more stable than "tema") created by the process of exchange itself. There are limits to the analogy, of course, but it is certainly not the case that use value is "private" while exchange value is "public". David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 10 October 2014 23:01, Andy Blunden > wrote: On the contrary. It was quite explicit. The first slide showed two columns. On the left were the were the Russian and German words for "personal meaning" and the inadequate English word, sense, on the right the Russian and German words for objective or public meaning and the inadequate English word, meaning. The next slide illustrated this dualism graphically with public and private domains represented. The whole point was the Cartesian problem of the relation between the two. It seems that the word "dualism" is not a "dirty word" where he comes from, and the idea of theorising social change, which was a theme of 2 of the 4 keynote speeches, was also not a priority for him. His Oral presentation (immediately after mine on the Thursday) was devoted to representation of the autoregulation processes of social and psychological systems. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAIBaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=XRDgxyMqJBwZ8A1nCnjij72JOYIYEq3FYAx_EhNc238&s=2heitYYyTq6QcHUXLa8wb020-IFUSed8lid9NRW98Lk&e= Martin John Packer wrote: Did Dmitry simply not recognize the dualism in the theory he was presenting, Andy? Martin On Oct 10, 2014, at 7:26 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: You are quite right Martin, that it was my report of Dmitry's speech that was being referred to and also correct to chide me for irony. Irony is really out of place in discussing such complex questions. However, Dmitry was not criticising his grandfather's theory; he was continuing it. When I said that I didn't think that such a stark dualism was a fruitful place from which to begin a discussion of meaning, he didn't really see the point of my remark, simply agreeing that there could be local or regional meanings which departed from the norm. So the irony, I admit, was all mine, and I apologise for inappropriate use of irony in this instance. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAIBaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=XRDgxyMqJBwZ8A1nCnjij72JOYIYEq3FYAx_EhNc238&s=2heitYYyTq6QcHUXLa8wb020-IFUSed8lid9NRW98Lk&e= Martin John Packer wrote: Just to reduce confusion, I want to point out that it was Andy who provided this account of Dmitry Leontiev's presentation at ISCAR, not me. And I think Andy was rejecting the argument. In fact, if I understood correctly (there was a lot of irony in Andy's message!), D. Leontiev was both summarizing and criticizing a position that his father (A. N. Leontiev) had made. Martin On Oct 10, 2014, at 3:35 AM, Rod Parker-Rees > wrote: I would challenge Martin's account of Dmitry Leontiev's argument that meaning is objectively fixed to 'what is' - 'irrespective of one's personal relation to it' - yes, znachenie - common sense or agreed meaning is more 'objective' than smysl but it is still socially constructed - meanings are agreed by dint of their common use (what people do 'as a rule') rather than because they reflect an absolute objectivity. -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. Holli A. Tonyan, Ph.D. ------------ Associate Professor | Department of Psychology | California State University, Northridge Postal Address: 18111 Nordhoff Street | Northridge, CA 91330-8255 Tel: (818) 677-4970 | Fax: (818) 677-2829 Office: ST322 http://www.csun.edu/~htonyan http://csun.academia.edu/HolliTonyan http://www.csun.edu/~ata20315/GE/general_experimental_psychology2.html **check out** Tonyan, H. A. (in press). Everyday routines: A window into the cultural organization of family child care. Journal of Early Childhood Research. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1476718X14523748 Tonyan, H. A., Nuttall, J. (2014). Connecting cultural models of home-based care and childminders? career paths: An Eco-cultural analysis. International Journal of Early Years Education, 22, 117-138, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09669760.2013.809654 Tonyan, H. A., Mamikonian, A., & Chien, D. (2013). Do they practice what they preach? An Ecocultural, multidimensional, group-based examination of the relationship between beliefs and behaviours among child care providers. Early Child Development and Care, 183:12, 1853-1877. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03004430.2012.759949 This message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged, confidential or exempt from disclosure under applicable federal or state law. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, please immediately notify the sender by telephone at (818)677-4970, and destroy all copies of this e-mail and all attachments. Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has. - Margaret Mead US anthropologist & popularizer of anthropology (1901 - 1978) From ablunden@mira.net Sun Oct 12 04:50:24 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 22:50:24 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> , Message-ID: <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was one of the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept was almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for me, was "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this expression, I'd be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to was a "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology whilst keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, often depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their supervisor. I don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this point in their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data they now know they need. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. But, as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that through to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just trying to keep up with reading! > > For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm interested in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how they fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people doing with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis being used? If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very interested to read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as basic as these. > > Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much more eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In Mike's example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the action is mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, are often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of much more than just Mike's behavior. > > Katie > > Katie Wester-Neal > University of Georgia > > From wester@uga.edu Sun Oct 12 06:21:30 2014 From: wester@uga.edu (Katherine Wester Neal) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 13:21:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> , , <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> Message-ID: <88EA2BB0-152D-4C1B-899F-18A9374AF304@uga.edu> Andy, Very interesting. As in the article from Scientific American that Greg sent yesterday, people clearly see data in very different ways. I'm wondering if the terms have to do with different orientations to data. In the example of the grad students you mentioned, I'm not sure why they find that they need different data? It would always be nice to have something that gives a different look at what's being studied, but maybe the data they have is trying to tell them something that's unexpected? And did the grad students purposefully come to the thesis without any unit of analysis in mind? Katie Katie Wester-Neal University of Georgia On Oct 12, 2014, at 7:51 AM, "Andy Blunden" wrote: Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was one of the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept was almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for me, was "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this expression, I'd be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to was a "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology whilst keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, often depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their supervisor. I don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this point in their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data they now know they need. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. But, as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that through to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just trying to keep up with reading! > > For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm interested in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how they fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people doing with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis being used? If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very interested to read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as basic as these. > > Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much more eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In Mike's example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the action is mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, are often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of much more than just Mike's behavior. > Katie > > Katie Wester-Neal > University of Georgia From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Sun Oct 12 06:34:31 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 09:34:31 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion Message-ID: <4295dqqbo68cfst31qjfk829.1413119344659@email.android.com> Some of you people in this group are worse than fascists. ?Had this xmca chat republic had any serious impact on the ontological security of some of its members i believe they would be swinging on trees right about now. ?References to BS etc. ?Should be reserved for Facebook and other non-academic chat rooms. ?I think most of this stuff is BS as they were written by a bunch of racist white men. ?However, i have to engage with them, ?critically, in order to understand and analyze some of the BS. ?I make some intellectual assumptions based on my interest not to take the group down the road already paved with BS. ?For example, in reading the lecture andy provided i could not help notice that the following statement reflects martin heidegger's chapter on the analytics of dasein, How can one explain why exactly the same environmental conditions exert three different types of influence on these three different children? It can be explained because each of the children has a different attitude to the situation. Or, as we might put it, each of the children experienced the situation in a different way. One of them experienced it as an inexplicable, incomprehensible horror which has left him in a state of defencelessness. The second was experiencing it consciously, as a clash between his strong attachment, and his no less strong feeling of fear, hate and hostility. And the third child experienced it, to some extent, as far as it is possible for a 10-11 year old boy, as a misfortune which has befallen the family and which required him to put all other things aside, to try somehow to mitigate the misfortune and to help both the sick mother and the children. So it appears that, depending on the fact that the same situation had been experienced by the three children in three different ways, the influence which this situation exerted on their development also turns out to be different. If some of us choose to explore that avenue within the chat room, which requires the introduction of other thinkers, merleau ponty, gadamer, karl jasper,within the field of phenomenology etc. ?How is that bs? ?Paradoxically, for me to suggests how we should address each other in this room would itself be fascists...so i will say this, i try to keep my academic decorum when i post in this chat room. ?Please let me know when i have to take my speech act to the level of the streets of newark, new jersey...if i digress in my postings, please suggest to me to get back on topic or relate it to the articles or clarify. Thank you, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info? Race and Class Distinctions within Black Communities? www.routledge.com/9780415714372 -------- Original message -------- From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" Date: 10/11/2014 11:21 PM (GMT-05:00) To: ablunden@mira.net Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion Got you... Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info
-------- Original message --------
From: Andy Blunden
Date:10/11/2014 11:15 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe"
Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
Paul, I used the word "impress" in the sense of "make an impression on me". I mean, how does it cause me to see the fallacy of genetic methodology in the CHAT tradition to hear that an American analytical philosopher gets tied in knots trying to do something you see as similar? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Andy, > > I have to make light of this...my speech acts were an attempt to > impress you...how did you ascertain that (my behavior gave you access > to my thinking)....Anyways. I simply side with Derrida on the issue. > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > -------- Original message -------- > From: Andy Blunden > Date:10/11/2014 11:02 PM (GMT-05:00) > To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > Well, I just don't agree, Paul. > You want to draw my attention to a fault in the logic that I use, and > Mike used, by pointing to problems that Willard Quine has. Why should > that impress me? And quite honestly the same goes for Wallerstein, > Giddens, Derrida and Searle. > > Any real connection between two processes takes time. There is no real > relation between two simultaneous processes which is direct. Any attempt > to discuss the relationship between behaviour and thinking which > approaches that relation directly, that is, other than by means of how > behaviour is transformed into thinking and thinking is transformed into > behaviour, over time, is bound to end up in impossible conundrums. > Of all these people you mention, Searle is one I have actually had the > joy of debating this point with, and he is indeed a classic example of > my point. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > Andy, > > > > It does not matter in what tradition you are arguing...analytical or > > continental... It still produces the same absurd logic and point. In > > sociology, immanuel wallerstein, anthony giddens, and a number of > > other structuration theorists building on hegel, marx, etc., encounter > > the same quineian problematic. Your response somehow implies that the > > problematic does not exist in the continental tradition...definitely > > not the case. The debate between Searle and Derrida speaks to this > > exact point. As the feminist theorists, theresa brennan, points out > > in her essay, "two forms of consciouseness," uniting consciousness > > and behavior introduces the old conundrum of behaviorism and > > structuralism in a new form, "how do you account for alternative > > practical consciousnesses and the praxis of the genius..." > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > President > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > www.mocombeian.com > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > -------- Original message -------- > > From: Andy Blunden > > Date:10/11/2014 10:09 PM (GMT-05:00) > > To: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" > > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > > > Paul, I really don't care if Willard Quine has problems. > > My reply was in the tradition of Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky, not American > > analytical philosophy. Quine's difficulties shed no light on A N > > Leontyev's criticisms of Vygotsky. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > > But Andy, the genetic argument, the unity of consciousness and > > > behavior, sounds like Willard van Orman quine ' s behaviorism and > > > structurationism in sociology, neither adequately resolve the old > > > conundrum of behaviorism? Watch quine as he struggles to resolve the > > > conundrum.... > > > > > > Watch "On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1" on YouTube > > > On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1: http://youtu.be/1iZvycU3I9w > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > President > > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > www.mocombeian.com > > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > > > > -------- Original message -------- > > > From: Andy Blunden > > > Date:10/11/2014 8:22 PM (GMT-05:00) > > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion > > > > > > Mike, in my view, your observations below, that your "private" > > > reflections were connected to a future action is exactly the sense in > > > which CHAT bases itself on *action* as the unity of consciousness and > > > behaviour, i.e., genetically. When we simply confront the product > > > (private thoughts) insoluble conundrums are presented. CHAT > understands > > > the relation of thinking and acting genetically. > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > mike cole wrote: > > > > ... > > > > I might characterize what I was doing in the car as preparing > for, and > > > > simulating a next turn in an ongoing discussion with a number of > > > > colleagues, unsure of what my own conclusions regarding the issue of > > > > thought/action/semiosis are. In light of the discussion, I began to > > > wonder > > > > about that term, articulation, in Martin's note. I take > > articulation to > > > > mean roughly "to say out loud to another as part of a conversation > > > (text?). > > > > But, I have been asking myself, and ask you all for your thoughts, > > > when I > > > > am engaged in verbal thinking aren't I engaged in a conversation > with > > > > another, with an audience or my sense of an audience, as part of the > > > > process that generates what I say? It is often said that one does > > > not stop > > > > being a sociocultural organism simply by virtue of being physically > > > > separate from others. Is there, in such "conversations with oneself" > > > a form > > > > of articulation? > > > > > > > > And/or, might the fact that these thoughts were incorporated in my > > next > > > > communication as part of this conversation, not be considered a > > form of > > > > asychronous, semiotic, action? > > > > > > > > Thanks again for your concise answer. Sorry I cannot follow > > > adequately some > > > > of the points you are making. > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Oct 12 07:08:51 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 01:08:51 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <88EA2BB0-152D-4C1B-899F-18A9374AF304@uga.edu> References: <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> , , <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <88EA2BB0-152D-4C1B-899F-18A9374AF304@uga.edu> Message-ID: <543A8B73.1080706@mira.net> At the beginning one has a certain conception of the problem and you make observations accordingly. The field is infinite however. Once people have a familiarity with the data and have done their "theory" they often have completely different questions in mind. Often the concept of "unit of analysis" only comes when people get into the theory stage of their project. I really can't go into specifics, Katie. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > Andy, > > Very interesting. As in the article from Scientific American that Greg sent yesterday, people clearly see data in very different ways. I'm wondering if the terms have to do with different orientations to data. In the example of the grad students you mentioned, I'm not sure why they find that they need different data? It would always be nice to have something that gives a different look at what's being studied, but maybe the data they have is trying to tell them something that's unexpected? And did the grad students purposefully come to the thesis without any unit of analysis in mind? > > Katie > > Katie Wester-Neal > University of Georgia > > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 7:51 AM, "Andy Blunden" wrote: > > Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was one of the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept was almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for me, was "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this expression, I'd be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to was a "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology whilst keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. > > The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, often depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their supervisor. I don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this point in their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data they now know they need. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > >> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. But, as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that through to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just trying to keep up with reading! >> >> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm interested in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how they fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people doing with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis being used? If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very interested to read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as basic as these. >> >> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much more eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In Mike's example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the action is mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, are often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of much more than just Mike's behavior. >> Katie >> >> Katie Wester-Neal >> University of Georgia >> > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Oct 12 09:15:06 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 09:15:06 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] XMCA discourse Message-ID: Dear Colleagues- For some time now, I have been uncertain about how best, or even whether to continue, xmca discussions. -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com Sun Oct 12 09:23:52 2014 From: leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com (Leif Strandberg) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 18:23:52 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1AD72590-EC64-4516-91D5-50BCCA68FCA7@telia.com> continue :-) Leif Sweden 12 okt 2014 kl. 18:15 skrev mike cole : > Dear Colleagues- > > For some time now, I have been uncertain about how best, or even whether to > continue, xmca discussions. > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Oct 12 09:40:58 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 09:40:58 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: :-) typical of me to type as sloppily as I think. To continue, for the moment. As my recent posts have indicated, i have been concerned that the conversations were becoming so difficult to follow that it was becoming very difficult for me to follow what people were trying to say. The discussion with Paul is exemplary in this regard. We were drawing on such different domains of scholarship, with such very different experiences and personal projects, that I struggled to find a common object to focus on. with not much success. I suggested that perhaps we were simply confused because we were drawing upon disjunct (for our group, at least) discourses and could not translate usefully across them for each other. Where XMCA discussions have recently been most interesting to me is when we pick a common article that is published in MCA to discuss *and the author(s) engage in discussion about the article with us readers. * That was the original idea of XMCA -- to allow authors to get lots of feedback quickly so that we did not end up with 3 year delays in next turns in a discussion that is supposed to be relevant to current professional concerns and be relevant to our actions. By picking the two articles that I suggested for conversation -- 1. LSV on perezhivanie as a unit of analysis for understanding the role of the environment with respect to development of persons (I really think it helps to substitute person or personhood for personality as the Russian term, lichnost, is used in these conversations) 2. AN Leontiev's (ANL) 1936(?) critique of LSV's views on perezhivanie. I selected these two article for several reasons. 1. There is an ongoing discussion with Russian psychologists on Facebook about key concepts and their confusions, with perezhivanie a topic for some 6 months. 2. From this discussion, I have learned about divergences between LSV and ANL that have a strong bearing on the degree on the overall relationship between the cultural-historical (LSV) and AT (ANL) halves of CHAT. 3. David Ke's note about this article talks about units of analysis not only for emotion/cognition but thought/word/meaning (as i recall, I cannot find that message either!), so i thought it would amp our understanding of how the term is being used and why and to what effect. This is an unsupervised discussion forum. Anyone can join and in a long history, there are very occasions when one gets the feeling that someone is there simply to make life miserable for others.... to the contrary... people try to be helpful if/when they can. I personally have no interest in sifting through notes as gatekeeper for the group. So, I will follow the lead of Holly, Katie, Rod, Andy and others overnight and suggest that we try out a close reading of the two, competing, article on perezhivanie. Everyone has downloadable access to the articles. In addition, I am going to attach a cut and paste summary of some highlights I gleaned from the LSV article. It reflects my own reading and concerns and the formatting in not consistent. But at least for those who have not read the article and have too many papers to grade or lessons to prepare, it might be a help "leg up" in following the conversation, if there is one. I would welcome others taking my half-baked summary-cum-cut/paste/comment and filling it out, but keeping it brief. We could post those on the xmca page for future reference. I have some doubts of my own about some of LSV's ideas here, before taking on ANL's critique and later Andy's essay about all of this and other comments. But enough for this morning. Now back to my local life world. mike On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:15 AM, mike cole wrote: > Dear Colleagues- > > For some time now, I have been uncertain about how best, or even whether > to continue, xmca discussions. > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: lsv.envir.mike.doc Type: application/msword Size: 36352 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141012/a0054594/attachment-0001.doc From djpotts7@hotmail.com Sun Oct 12 09:44:14 2014 From: djpotts7@hotmail.com (Diane Potts) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 09:44:14 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse In-Reply-To: <1AD72590-EC64-4516-91D5-50BCCA68FCA7@telia.com> References: , <1AD72590-EC64-4516-91D5-50BCCA68FCA7@telia.com> Message-ID: >From one of the many lurkers... As a new academic and one who shares David Kellogg's interests in SFL, language education and socio-historical theory, I benefit tremendously from this listserv. I recommend it regularly to PhD students and hold it up as a model of an online community that has managed to continue to engage in lively discussions about current research with the participation of senior scholars. Centering those discussions on readings, at least to me, seems to be an effective means of carrying out the community's boundary work - not always pleasant work, I'll admit, but one that gives coherence to who we are. Diane Potts Lancaster University > From: leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com > Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 18:23:52 +0200 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse > > continue :-) > > Leif > Sweden From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Oct 12 09:46:45 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 16:46:45 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> Message-ID: <6610916C-B39B-4964-8CED-15665BB5F6B3@uniandes.edu.co> Jean Lave once told me about a convention that developed among faculty at UC Irvine, where there were many interdisciplinary programs. It was this: that one could not, or should not, make reference to a text or its author unless one could at the same time offer a summary of the argument of that text. Over the years I've found that very sage. Martin On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:57 AM, Tonyan, Holli A wrote: > I can't speak for others, but I am with you - I have far too difficult a time understanding much less responding to articles that make references to concepts with which I am not familiar and don't have time to read. I would guess that others, like me, are interested, but just couldn't reply fast enough to keep up with the pace of new posts in that thread. I think others, like me, would be well served by specific references to parts of those articles rather than general references to the concepts and ideas. From helenaworthen@gmail.com Sun Oct 12 09:47:31 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 09:47:31 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2B93B18B-31D8-4735-8370-05F8363F330F@gmail.com> Thank you, Mike. Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Oct 12, 2014, at 9:40 AM, mike cole wrote: > :-) > > typical of me to type as sloppily as I think. To continue, for the moment. > > As my recent posts have indicated, i have been concerned that the > conversations were > becoming so difficult to follow that it was becoming very difficult for me > to follow what people were trying to say. The discussion with Paul is > exemplary in this regard. We were drawing on such different domains of > scholarship, with such very different experiences and personal projects, > that I struggled to find a common object to focus on. with not much > success. I suggested that perhaps we were simply confused because we were > drawing upon disjunct (for our group, at least) discourses and could not > translate usefully across them for each other. > > Where XMCA discussions have recently been most interesting to me is when we > pick a common article that is published in MCA to discuss *and the > author(s) engage in discussion about the article with us readers. * That > was the original idea of XMCA -- to allow authors to get lots of feedback > quickly so that we did not end up with 3 year delays in next turns in a > discussion that is supposed to be relevant to current professional concerns > and be relevant to our actions. > > By picking the two articles that I suggested for conversation -- > 1. LSV on perezhivanie as a unit of analysis for understanding the role of > the environment with respect to development of persons (I really think it > helps to substitute person or personhood for personality as the Russian > term, lichnost, is used in these conversations) > 2. AN Leontiev's (ANL) 1936(?) critique of LSV's views on perezhivanie. > > I selected these two article for several reasons. > > 1. There is an ongoing discussion with Russian psychologists on Facebook > about key concepts and their confusions, with perezhivanie a topic for some > 6 months. > 2. From this discussion, I have learned about divergences between LSV and > ANL that have a strong bearing on the degree on the overall relationship > between the cultural-historical (LSV) and AT (ANL) halves of CHAT. > 3. David Ke's note about this article talks about units of analysis not > only for emotion/cognition but thought/word/meaning (as i recall, I cannot > find that message either!), so i thought it would amp our understanding of > how the term is being used and why and to what effect. > > This is an unsupervised discussion forum. Anyone can join and in a long > history, there are very occasions when one gets the feeling that someone is > there simply to make life miserable for others.... to the contrary... > people try to be helpful if/when they can. I personally have no interest in > sifting through notes as gatekeeper for the group. > > So, I will follow the lead of Holly, Katie, Rod, Andy and others overnight > and suggest that we try out a close reading of the two, competing, article > on perezhivanie. Everyone has downloadable access to the articles. > > In addition, I am going to attach a cut and paste summary of some > highlights I gleaned from the LSV article. It reflects my own reading and > concerns and the formatting in not consistent. But at least for those who > have not read the article and have too many papers to grade or lessons to > prepare, it might be a help "leg up" in following the conversation, if > there is one. > > I would welcome others taking my half-baked summary-cum-cut/paste/comment > and filling it out, but keeping it brief. We could post those on the xmca > page for future reference. > > I have some doubts of my own about some of LSV's ideas here, before taking > on ANL's critique and later Andy's essay about all of this and other > comments. But enough for this morning. Now back to my local life world. > > mike > > > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:15 AM, mike cole wrote: > >> Dear Colleagues- >> >> For some time now, I have been uncertain about how best, or even whether >> to continue, xmca discussions. >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Oct 12 09:55:19 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 09:55:19 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse In-Reply-To: References: <1AD72590-EC64-4516-91D5-50BCCA68FCA7@telia.com> Message-ID: Diane- (I neglected to turn off my computer!). There are now more that 800 people signed up for XMCA. If every started typing at once, we might crash the ucsd server it sits on. And if it is just brownian motion in alphabetic characters, what's the point? It WOULD be good to hear from more people. At earlier times, i have tried to work out an arrangements where a dozen partricipants each volunteered to organize a discussion on a topic of potential interest for a month as a means of increasing breadth of participation and points of view. It has never worked. Perhaps it could be tried again..... if someone other than me would like to organize it! Like henry, I use wikipedia a lot as a starting point. For the disucssion of the LSV article on the environment I would recommend that people google *senghas nicaraguan sign language. *My conjecture is the the evidence of what happens if a lot of deaf kids are brought together without access to an appropriate "ideal form" (see the LSV paper for significance of that term) contradicts LSV's argument and has implications for general aspects of theory. But first there has to be that co-reading so we are not simply tangling each other up in a new way. mike On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:44 AM, Diane Potts wrote: > >From one of the many lurkers... > > As a new academic and one who shares David Kellogg's interests in SFL, > language education and socio-historical theory, I benefit tremendously from > this listserv. I recommend it regularly to PhD students and hold it up as > a model of an online community that has managed to continue to engage in > lively discussions about current research with the participation of senior > scholars. Centering those discussions on readings, at least to me, seems to > be an effective means of carrying out the community's boundary work - not > always pleasant work, I'll admit, but one that gives coherence to who we > are. > > Diane Potts > Lancaster University > > > From: leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com > > Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 18:23:52 +0200 > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse > > > > continue :-) > > > > Leif > > Sweden > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Sun Oct 12 10:13:00 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 13:13:00 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse Message-ID: I apologize for the confusion mike...the group has been beneficial to me in clarifying my own work and ideas. ?Sometimes I assume it is a philosophical group and simply inject concepts and ideas from different theorists without elaborating. ?I apologize for the confusion. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Helena Worthen
Date:10/12/2014 12:47 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse
Thank you, Mike. Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Oct 12, 2014, at 9:40 AM, mike cole wrote: > :-) > > typical of me to type as sloppily as I think. To continue, for the moment. > > As my recent posts have indicated, i have been concerned that the > conversations were > becoming so difficult to follow that it was becoming very difficult for me > to follow what people were trying to say. The discussion with Paul is > exemplary in this regard. We were drawing on such different domains of > scholarship, with such very different experiences and personal projects, > that I struggled to find a common object to focus on. with not much > success. I suggested that perhaps we were simply confused because we were > drawing upon disjunct (for our group, at least) discourses and could not > translate usefully across them for each other. > > Where XMCA discussions have recently been most interesting to me is when we > pick a common article that is published in MCA to discuss *and the > author(s) engage in discussion about the article with us readers. * That > was the original idea of XMCA -- to allow authors to get lots of feedback > quickly so that we did not end up with 3 year delays in next turns in a > discussion that is supposed to be relevant to current professional concerns > and be relevant to our actions. > > By picking the two articles that I suggested for conversation -- > 1. LSV on perezhivanie as a unit of analysis for understanding the role of > the environment with respect to development of persons (I really think it > helps to substitute person or personhood for personality as the Russian > term, lichnost, is used in these conversations) > 2. AN Leontiev's (ANL) 1936(?) critique of LSV's views on perezhivanie. > > I selected these two article for several reasons. > > 1. There is an ongoing discussion with Russian psychologists on Facebook > about key concepts and their confusions, with perezhivanie a topic for some > 6 months. > 2. From this discussion, I have learned about divergences between LSV and > ANL that have a strong bearing on the degree on the overall relationship > between the cultural-historical (LSV) and AT (ANL) halves of CHAT. > 3. David Ke's note about this article talks about units of analysis not > only for emotion/cognition but thought/word/meaning (as i recall, I cannot > find that message either!), so i thought it would amp our understanding of > how the term is being used and why and to what effect. > > This is an unsupervised discussion forum. Anyone can join and in a long > history, there are very occasions when one gets the feeling that someone is > there simply to make life miserable for others.... to the contrary... > people try to be helpful if/when they can. I personally have no interest in > sifting through notes as gatekeeper for the group. > > So, I will follow the lead of Holly, Katie, Rod, Andy and others overnight > and suggest that we try out a close reading of the two, competing, article > on perezhivanie. Everyone has downloadable access to the articles. > > In addition, I am going to attach a cut and paste summary of some > highlights I gleaned from the LSV article. It reflects my own reading and > concerns and the formatting in not consistent. But at least for those who > have not read the article and have too many papers to grade or lessons to > prepare, it might be a help "leg up" in following the conversation, if > there is one. > > I would welcome others taking my half-baked summary-cum-cut/paste/comment > and filling it out, but keeping it brief. We could post those on the xmca > page for future reference. > > I have some doubts of my own about some of LSV's ideas here, before taking > on ANL's critique and later Andy's essay about all of this and other > comments. But enough for this morning. Now back to my local life world. > > mike > > > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:15 AM, mike cole wrote: > >> Dear Colleagues- >> >> For some time now, I have been uncertain about how best, or even whether >> to continue, xmca discussions. >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From kplakits@gmail.com Sun Oct 12 10:20:19 2014 From: kplakits@gmail.com (Katerina Plakitsi) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 20:20:19 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> Message-ID: This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I supervise three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of them on early childhood science education and one on primary science. They have collected log files, children discourses consisted of scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of labor. They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they decided to analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context mainly modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the " unit of analysis". ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden ??????: > Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was one of > the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept was > almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for me, was > "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this expression, I'd > be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to was a > "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology whilst > keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. > > The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It > is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the > breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes > *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other > unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new > paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for > graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, often > depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their supervisor. I > don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this point in > their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data they now > know they need. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > >> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. But, >> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I >> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that through >> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just >> trying to keep up with reading! >> >> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm interested >> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how they >> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people doing >> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis being used? >> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very interested to >> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as basic as >> these. >> >> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much more >> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In Mike's >> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the action is >> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that >> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, are >> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of much >> more than just Mike's behavior. >> Katie >> >> Katie Wester-Neal >> University of Georgia >> >> >> > > -- ............................................................ Katerina Plakitsi Associate Professor of Science Education School of Education University of Ioannina University Campus Dourouti 45110 Ioannina Greece tel. +302651005771 fax. +302651005842 mobile.phone +306972898463 http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp From helenaworthen@gmail.com Sun Oct 12 11:31:42 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 11:31:42 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> Message-ID: <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: > The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It > is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the > breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes > *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other > unit of analysis. First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" The unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to accomplish. Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be late to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're talking about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were often away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out buying more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of the union and other others about how to respond collectively to something that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the whole Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, a matter of solving puzzles. >From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about activity system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict with each other, which adds to the drama. Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of children) and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: > This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I supervise > three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of them on > early childhood science education and one on primary science. They have > collected log files, children discourses consisted of > scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of labor. > They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they decided to > analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context mainly > modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the " unit > of analysis". > > ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden > ??????: > >> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was one of >> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept was >> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for me, was >> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this expression, I'd >> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to was a >> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology whilst >> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. >> >> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It >> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes >> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new >> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for >> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, often >> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their supervisor. I >> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this point in >> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data they now >> know they need. >> >> Andy >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >> >>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. But, >>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I >>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that through >>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just >>> trying to keep up with reading! >>> >>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm interested >>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how they >>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people doing >>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis being used? >>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very interested to >>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as basic as >>> these. >>> >>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much more >>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In Mike's >>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the action is >>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that >>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, are >>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of much >>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>> Katie >>> >>> Katie Wester-Neal >>> University of Georgia >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > -- > ............................................................ > Katerina Plakitsi > Associate Professor of Science Education > School of Education > University of Ioannina > University Campus Dourouti 45110 > Ioannina > Greece > tel. +302651005771 > fax. +302651005842 > mobile.phone +306972898463 > > http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits > http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr > http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Sun Oct 12 12:09:16 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 19:09:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse In-Reply-To: References: <1AD72590-EC64-4516-91D5-50BCCA68FCA7@telia.com> , Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223039C@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Many thanks for your digest of the LSV article, Mike. It is a while since I last read it so this was a valuable refresher and meant I felt I could go straight to the ANL article which I have not seen before. Reading the ANL article I was acutely aware of the gulf between my environment and that in which ANL was writing. Perhaps the fact that I feel this rather less when reading LSV is evidence of a closer fit between my bourgeois environmenn and his. As I understand it, and I am far from confident in this, ANL's main issue is with LSV's suggestion that 'experiencing' or perezhivanie should be used as a unit of activity, representing the indissoluble relationship between the environment and the individual. ANL appears to object to this because he sees experiencing as an abstraction from activity which should be recognised as the true core of what makes us human. The argument that an environment is only an environment FOR an active subject reminded me of Uetzkull's 'umwelt' the unique world of experience constructed by an organism in the course of its activity (including its sensing activity) but I am not sure that ANL justifies his insistence on not acknowleding experiencING as a form of activity ('experience is a secondary and derivative fact' - p.22). ANL appears to be driven by a preference for 'putting the question in its completely clear and bare form' (p.17) but this involves a series of assertions and rhetorical strong-arm tactics which I find difficult to accept. For example, he chooses to 'set aside the complicated idea of the different course of development of the "spontaneous" and "scientific" concepts' (p.18) - an idea which I have always found particularly helpful and he insists that 'meaning always takes the form of the meaning of a word' (p.18) - denying the possibility that a smile, a raised eyebrow, rolled eyes or a raised fist could carry meaning. I am not sure that the creation of a sign language among Nicaraguan deaf children can be taken as a counter example to LSV's argument that children are able to benefit from an environment which includes the 'ideal form' of abilities they are just beginning to develop. The children who were brought together from isolated families and then co-constructed a sophisticated sign language may not have been surrounded by an 'ideal form' of language which they could fully experience (I believe most were children of hearing parents and so experienced only a rudimentary, home-made form of home-sign) but they WERE surrounded by people who showed them that people communicate with each other so they were exposed to the 'ideal form' of communication-mediated cooperative activity even if they were not able to pick out the finer details of how it was achieved. As in other situations where children grow up among people who use a simplified ('pidgin') form of communication, their sensitivity to patterns, rules and regularities allowed them to refine it into a coherent, flexible language (a 'creole'). I am uncomfortable with the use of 'final form' as an alternative to 'ideal form' because every generation does similar things with the language it inherits - adjusting and refining it to achieve a better fit with changing social practices. Indeed this (as well as the socio-political distance between us) may explain some of the difficulties I have with ANL's way of asserting his arguments. LSV acknowledged the important role of 'spontaneous concepts' - the often unacknowledged intuitions which arise out of our unique patterns of experience and which give 'body and vitality' to the more abstract, 'clear and bare' concepts which allow us to communicate with others - while ANL would appear to prefer a tidier view of things. I look forward to hearing what others make of the comparison between the two papers. All the best, Rod ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] Sent: 12 October 2014 17:55 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse Diane- (I neglected to turn off my computer!). There are now more that 800 people signed up for XMCA. If every started typing at once, we might crash the ucsd server it sits on. And if it is just brownian motion in alphabetic characters, what's the point? It WOULD be good to hear from more people. At earlier times, i have tried to work out an arrangements where a dozen partricipants each volunteered to organize a discussion on a topic of potential interest for a month as a means of increasing breadth of participation and points of view. It has never worked. Perhaps it could be tried again..... if someone other than me would like to organize it! Like henry, I use wikipedia a lot as a starting point. For the disucssion of the LSV article on the environment I would recommend that people google *senghas nicaraguan sign language. *My conjecture is the the evidence of what happens if a lot of deaf kids are brought together without access to an appropriate "ideal form" (see the LSV paper for significance of that term) contradicts LSV's argument and has implications for general aspects of theory. But first there has to be that co-reading so we are not simply tangling each other up in a new way. mike On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:44 AM, Diane Potts wrote: > >From one of the many lurkers... > > As a new academic and one who shares David Kellogg's interests in SFL, > language education and socio-historical theory, I benefit tremendously from > this listserv. I recommend it regularly to PhD students and hold it up as > a model of an online community that has managed to continue to engage in > lively discussions about current research with the participation of senior > scholars. Centering those discussions on readings, at least to me, seems to > be an effective means of carrying out the community's boundary work - not > always pleasant work, I'll admit, but one that gives coherence to who we > are. > > Diane Potts > Lancaster University > > > From: leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com > > Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 18:23:52 +0200 > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse > > > > continue :-) > > > > Leif > > Sweden > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Oct 12 12:34:22 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 19:34:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> Message-ID: <25F42623-13FA-4590-B430-7D4478E8BB20@uniandes.edu.co> I don't know, Helena! I had a different reaction to Andy's statement. Let's not forget that in Thought & language LSV discusses the criteria by means of which to determine the unit of analysis. Martin On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: > >> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It >> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes >> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >> unit of analysis. > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Oct 12 12:40:51 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 12:40:51 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223039C@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <1AD72590-EC64-4516-91D5-50BCCA68FCA7@telia.com> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223039C@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: Glad the summary cuts and pastes were helpful, Rod. My idea was that they might serve as a kind of "cliff notes" intro, which in your case was a reminder. I have done the same for the Shotter article on "withness" that you sent around, but have not had time to recover that part of the discussion and introduce it in a productive way. I can't at present go on to the ANL article, but will briefly comment on the Nicaraguan sign language example. I agree with your analysis. But I wanted to address my concern with the way the notion of the "ideal form" as the "end in the beginning" is that it seems to preclude any form of change that is not in the thrall of that ideal form to count as anything but deviation from the ideal, no room for transformation. I say "seems" because I know and value LSV's work on imagination and creativity at lot. Still, as formulated here, in the land where Comrade Stalin shaped what counted as the ideal form, it arose for me as an issue when I was re-reading it. I also want to inquire into the relationship between word meaning as a unit of analysis for the relation between thought and language, and perezhivanie as a unit of analysis for the thought and emotion. The pairing links language, thought, and emotion as constituents of experience (perezhivanie). I look forward to re-reading the ANL critique of LSV... later. mike On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 12:09 PM, Rod Parker-Rees < R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > Many thanks for your digest of the LSV article, Mike. It is a while since > I last read it so this was a valuable refresher and meant I felt I could go > straight to the ANL article which I have not seen before. > > Reading the ANL article I was acutely aware of the gulf between my > environment and that in which ANL was writing. Perhaps the fact that I feel > this rather less when reading LSV is evidence of a closer fit between my > bourgeois environmenn and his. As I understand it, and I am far from > confident in this, ANL's main issue is with LSV's suggestion that > 'experiencing' or perezhivanie should be used as a unit of activity, > representing the indissoluble relationship between the environment and the > individual. ANL appears to object to this because he sees experiencing as > an abstraction from activity which should be recognised as the true core of > what makes us human. The argument that an environment is only an > environment FOR an active subject reminded me of Uetzkull's 'umwelt' the > unique world of experience constructed by an organism in the course of its > activity (including its sensing activity) but I am not sure that ANL > justifies his insistence on not acknowleding experiencING as a form of > activity ('experience is a secondary and derivative fact' - p.22). > > ANL appears to be driven by a preference for 'putting the question in its > completely clear and bare form' (p.17) but this involves a series of > assertions and rhetorical strong-arm tactics which I find difficult to > accept. For example, he chooses to 'set aside the complicated idea of the > different course of development of the "spontaneous" and "scientific" > concepts' (p.18) - an idea which I have always found particularly helpful > and he insists that 'meaning always takes the form of the meaning of a > word' (p.18) - denying the possibility that a smile, a raised eyebrow, > rolled eyes or a raised fist could carry meaning. > > I am not sure that the creation of a sign language among Nicaraguan deaf > children can be taken as a counter example to LSV's argument that children > are able to benefit from an environment which includes the 'ideal form' of > abilities they are just beginning to develop. The children who were brought > together from isolated families and then co-constructed a sophisticated > sign language may not have been surrounded by an 'ideal form' of language > which they could fully experience (I believe most were children of hearing > parents and so experienced only a rudimentary, home-made form of home-sign) > but they WERE surrounded by people who showed them that people communicate > with each other so they were exposed to the 'ideal form' of > communication-mediated cooperative activity even if they were not able to > pick out the finer details of how it was achieved. As in other situations > where children grow up among people who use a simplified ('pidgin') form of > communication, their sensitivity to patterns, rules and regularities > allowed them to refine it into a coherent, flexible language (a 'creole'). > I am uncomfortable with the use of 'final form' as an alternative to 'ideal > form' because every generation does similar things with the language it > inherits - adjusting and refining it to achieve a better fit with changing > social practices. Indeed this (as well as the socio-political distance > between us) may explain some of the difficulties I have with ANL's way of > asserting his arguments. > > LSV acknowledged the important role of 'spontaneous concepts' - the often > unacknowledged intuitions which arise out of our unique patterns of > experience and which give 'body and vitality' to the more abstract, 'clear > and bare' concepts which allow us to communicate with others - while ANL > would appear to prefer a tidier view of things. > > I look forward to hearing what others make of the comparison between the > two papers. > > All the best, > > Rod > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > Sent: 12 October 2014 17:55 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse > > Diane- (I neglected to turn off my computer!). There are now more that 800 > people signed up for XMCA. If every started typing at once, we might crash > the ucsd server it sits on. And if it is just brownian motion in alphabetic > characters, what's the point? It WOULD be good to hear from more people. At > earlier times, i have tried to work out an arrangements where a dozen > partricipants each volunteered to organize a discussion on a topic of > potential interest for a month as a means of increasing breadth of > participation and points of view. It has never worked. > > Perhaps it could be tried again..... if someone other than me would like to > organize it! > > Like henry, I use wikipedia a lot as a starting point. For the disucssion > of the LSV article on the environment I would recommend that people > google *senghas > nicaraguan sign language. *My conjecture is the the evidence of what > happens if a lot of deaf kids are brought together without access to an > appropriate "ideal form" (see the LSV paper for significance of that term) > contradicts LSV's argument and has implications for general aspects of > theory. But first there has to be that co-reading so we are not simply > tangling each other up in a new way. > mike > > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:44 AM, Diane Potts wrote: > > > >From one of the many lurkers... > > > > As a new academic and one who shares David Kellogg's interests in SFL, > > language education and socio-historical theory, I benefit tremendously > from > > this listserv. I recommend it regularly to PhD students and hold it up > as > > a model of an online community that has managed to continue to engage in > > lively discussions about current research with the participation of > senior > > scholars. Centering those discussions on readings, at least to me, seems > to > > be an effective means of carrying out the community's boundary work - not > > always pleasant work, I'll admit, but one that gives coherence to who we > > are. > > > > Diane Potts > > Lancaster University > > > > > From: leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com > > > Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 18:23:52 +0200 > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse > > > > > > continue :-) > > > > > > Leif > > > Sweden > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From vygotsky@unm.edu Sun Oct 12 12:42:32 2014 From: vygotsky@unm.edu (Vera John-Steiner) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 13:42:32 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223039C@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <1AD72590-EC64-4516-91D5-50BCCA68FCA7@telia.com> , <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223039C@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <000a01cfe654$acdc3df0$0694b9d0$@edu> Hi, I am delighted that we are discussing the two articles and find Mike's summary and the points made by Rod enlightening. I was also struck as was Rod by ANL's need to simplify Vygotsky's argument which is quite clear. As far as unit of analysis is concerned, it is well explained when applied to word meaning by Vygotsky, it will be hard to achieve an equally clear definition for perezhivanie as we are dealing with more contested processes like temperament, personality, etc. (Though I do not believe that any of them are spiritual as suggested by ANL.) Good beginning on enlivening the discussion, Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Rod Parker-Rees Sent: Sunday, October 12, 2014 1:09 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse Many thanks for your digest of the LSV article, Mike. It is a while since I last read it so this was a valuable refresher and meant I felt I could go straight to the ANL article which I have not seen before. Reading the ANL article I was acutely aware of the gulf between my environment and that in which ANL was writing. Perhaps the fact that I feel this rather less when reading LSV is evidence of a closer fit between my bourgeois environmenn and his. As I understand it, and I am far from confident in this, ANL's main issue is with LSV's suggestion that 'experiencing' or perezhivanie should be used as a unit of activity, representing the indissoluble relationship between the environment and the individual. ANL appears to object to this because he sees experiencing as an abstraction from activity which should be recognised as the true core of what makes us human. The argument that an environment is only an environment FOR an active subject reminded me of Uetzkull's 'umwelt' the unique world of experience constructed by an organism in the course of its activity (including its sensing activity) but I am not sure that ANL justifies his insistence on not acknowleding experiencING as a form of activity ('experience is a secondary and derivative fact' - p.22). ANL appears to be driven by a preference for 'putting the question in its completely clear and bare form' (p.17) but this involves a series of assertions and rhetorical strong-arm tactics which I find difficult to accept. For example, he chooses to 'set aside the complicated idea of the different course of development of the "spontaneous" and "scientific" concepts' (p.18) - an idea which I have always found particularly helpful and he insists that 'meaning always takes the form of the meaning of a word' (p.18) - denying the possibility that a smile, a raised eyebrow, rolled eyes or a raised fist could carry meaning. I am not sure that the creation of a sign language among Nicaraguan deaf children can be taken as a counter example to LSV's argument that children are able to benefit from an environment which includes the 'ideal form' of abilities they are just beginning to develop. The children who were brought together from isolated families and then co-constructed a sophisticated sign language may not have been surrounded by an 'ideal form' of language which they could fully experience (I believe most were children of hearing parents and so experienced only a rudimentary, home-made form of home-sign) but they WERE surrounded by people who showed them that people communicate with each other so they were exposed to the 'ideal form' of communication-mediated cooperative activity even if they were not able to pick out the finer details of how it was achieved. As in other situations where children grow up among people who use a simplified ('pidgin') form of communication, their sensitivity to patterns, rules and regularities allowed them to refine it into a coherent, flexible language (a 'creole'). I am uncomfortable with the use of 'final form' as an alternative to 'ideal form' because every generation does similar things with the language it inherits - adjusting and refining it to achieve a better fit with changing social practices. Indeed this (as well as the socio-political distance between us) may explain some of the difficulties I have with ANL's way of asserting his arguments. LSV acknowledged the important role of 'spontaneous concepts' - the often unacknowledged intuitions which arise out of our unique patterns of experience and which give 'body and vitality' to the more abstract, 'clear and bare' concepts which allow us to communicate with others - while ANL would appear to prefer a tidier view of things. I look forward to hearing what others make of the comparison between the two papers. All the best, Rod ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] Sent: 12 October 2014 17:55 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse Diane- (I neglected to turn off my computer!). There are now more that 800 people signed up for XMCA. If every started typing at once, we might crash the ucsd server it sits on. And if it is just brownian motion in alphabetic characters, what's the point? It WOULD be good to hear from more people. At earlier times, i have tried to work out an arrangements where a dozen partricipants each volunteered to organize a discussion on a topic of potential interest for a month as a means of increasing breadth of participation and points of view. It has never worked. Perhaps it could be tried again..... if someone other than me would like to organize it! Like henry, I use wikipedia a lot as a starting point. For the disucssion of the LSV article on the environment I would recommend that people google *senghas nicaraguan sign language. *My conjecture is the the evidence of what happens if a lot of deaf kids are brought together without access to an appropriate "ideal form" (see the LSV paper for significance of that term) contradicts LSV's argument and has implications for general aspects of theory. But first there has to be that co-reading so we are not simply tangling each other up in a new way. mike On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:44 AM, Diane Potts wrote: > >From one of the many lurkers... > > As a new academic and one who shares David Kellogg's interests in SFL, > language education and socio-historical theory, I benefit tremendously > from this listserv. I recommend it regularly to PhD students and hold > it up as a model of an online community that has managed to continue > to engage in lively discussions about current research with the > participation of senior scholars. Centering those discussions on > readings, at least to me, seems to be an effective means of carrying > out the community's boundary work - not always pleasant work, I'll > admit, but one that gives coherence to who we are. > > Diane Potts > Lancaster University > > > From: leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com > > Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 18:23:52 +0200 > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse > > > > continue :-) > > > > Leif > > Sweden > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Oct 12 12:43:52 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 19:43:52 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> Message-ID: Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the question is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method of analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components in a complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, which is often how students frame their research interest. And this means that the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. Martin On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: > >> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It >> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes >> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >> unit of analysis. > > First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" The unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to accomplish. Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be late to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're talking about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were often away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out buying more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. > > So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of the union and other others about how to respond collectively to something that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the whole Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, a matter of solving puzzles. > >> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about activity system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict with each other, which adds to the drama. > > Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of children) and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. > > > Helena > > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: > >> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I supervise >> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of them on >> early childhood science education and one on primary science. They have >> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of labor. >> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they decided to >> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context mainly >> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the " unit >> of analysis". >> >> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden >> ??????: >> >>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was one of >>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept was >>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for me, was >>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this expression, I'd >>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to was a >>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology whilst >>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. >>> >>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It >>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes >>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new >>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for >>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, often >>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their supervisor. I >>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this point in >>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data they now >>> know they need. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>> >>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. But, >>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I >>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that through >>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just >>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>> >>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm interested >>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how they >>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people doing >>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis being used? >>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very interested to >>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as basic as >>>> these. >>>> >>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much more >>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In Mike's >>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the action is >>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that >>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, are >>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of much >>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>> Katie >>>> >>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>> University of Georgia >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> ............................................................ >> Katerina Plakitsi >> Associate Professor of Science Education >> School of Education >> University of Ioannina >> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >> Ioannina >> Greece >> tel. +302651005771 >> fax. +302651005842 >> mobile.phone +306972898463 >> >> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp > > From wester@uga.edu Sun Oct 12 13:10:12 2014 From: wester@uga.edu (Katherine Wester Neal) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 20:10:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com>, Message-ID: Thanks to you all! I have some excellent food for thought on units of analysis. It's very useful to know that it's not a problem that only I wrestle with. On Oct 12, 2014, at 3:45 PM, "Martin John Packer" wrote: Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the question is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method of analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components in a complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, which is often how students frame their research interest. And this means that the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. Martin > On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > > As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: > >> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It >> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes >> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >> unit of analysis. > > First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" The unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to accomplish. Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be late to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're talking about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were often away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out buying more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. > > So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of the union and other others about how to respond collectively to something that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the whole Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, a matter of solving puzzles. > >> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about activity system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict with each other, which adds to the drama. > > Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of children) and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. > > > Helena > > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >> >> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I supervise >> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of them on >> early childhood science education and one on primary science. They have >> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of labor. >> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they decided to >> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context mainly >> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the " unit >> of analysis". >> >> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden >> ??????: >> >>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was one of >>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept was >>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for me, was >>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this expression, I'd >>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to was a >>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology whilst >>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. >>> >>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It >>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes >>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new >>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for >>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, often >>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their supervisor. I >>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this point in >>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data they now >>> know they need. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>> >>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. But, >>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I >>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that through >>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just >>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>> >>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm interested >>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how they >>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people doing >>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis being used? >>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very interested to >>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as basic as >>>> these. >>>> >>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much more >>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In Mike's >>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the action is >>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that >>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, are >>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of much >>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>> Katie >>>> >>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>> University of Georgia >> >> -- >> ............................................................ >> Katerina Plakitsi >> Associate Professor of Science Education >> School of Education >> University of Ioannina >> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >> Ioannina >> Greece >> tel. +302651005771 >> fax. +302651005842 >> mobile.phone +306972898463 >> >> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp From juanma.duarte@gmail.com Sun Oct 12 13:15:42 2014 From: juanma.duarte@gmail.com (Juan Duarte) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 17:15:42 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> Message-ID: I wonder if it is possible to refer to the vigotskyan "units of an?lisis" without say a word of the marxist framework in which he developed that concept. For me, in going so, we lost great part of the richness of his psychology: his method. Thanks a lot for the interchange. Juan Duarte 2014-10-12 15:31 GMT-03:00 Helena Worthen : > As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very > down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses > to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule > changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: > > > The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. > It > > is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the > > breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually > comes > > *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other > > unit of analysis. > > First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question lying > behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" The unit > of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to accomplish. Are we > trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying get the > rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, clerical > workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be late to work > today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss work" > message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're talking about > a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged minority > women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be responsible for. > Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but being required to > actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then keep a record of > the call, was a problem because supervisors were often away from their > desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a lot of workers > didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening (2004) and pay > phones are few and far between, so if someone it out buying more asthma > inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. > > So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, here? > To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of the > union and other others about how to respond collectively to something that > only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so that > middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended family? > Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can carry out) > you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the whole Engestrom > triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, a matter of > solving puzzles. > > >From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to a > live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about activity > system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict > with each other, which adds to the drama. > > Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? Is the > purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or the > purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting would > be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of children) and > unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. > > > Helena > > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: > > > This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I supervise > > three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of them on > > early childhood science education and one on primary science. They have > > collected log files, children discourses consisted of > > scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of > labor. > > They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they decided > to > > analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context mainly > > modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the " > unit > > of analysis". > > > > ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < > ablunden@mira.net> > > ??????: > > > >> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was one of > >> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept was > >> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for me, was > >> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this expression, > I'd > >> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to was a > >> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology > whilst > >> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. > >> > >> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. > It > >> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the > >> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually > comes > >> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other > >> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new > >> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for > >> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, often > >> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their supervisor. I > >> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this point in > >> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data they > now > >> know they need. > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > >> > >>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. > But, > >>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I > >>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that > through > >>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just > >>> trying to keep up with reading! > >>> > >>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm > interested > >>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how > they > >>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people doing > >>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis being > used? > >>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very > interested to > >>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as > basic as > >>> these. > >>> > >>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much > more > >>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In > Mike's > >>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the > action is > >>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that > >>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, are > >>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of much > >>> more than just Mike's behavior. > >>> Katie > >>> > >>> Katie Wester-Neal > >>> University of Georgia > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > > -- > > ............................................................ > > Katerina Plakitsi > > Associate Professor of Science Education > > School of Education > > University of Ioannina > > University Campus Dourouti 45110 > > Ioannina > > Greece > > tel. +302651005771 > > fax. +302651005842 > > mobile.phone +306972898463 > > > > http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits > > http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr > > http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp > > > -- Juan From Holli.Tonyan@csun.edu Sun Oct 12 14:12:35 2014 From: Holli.Tonyan@csun.edu (Tonyan, Holli A) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 21:12:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com>, Message-ID: <47447E73-F80E-454E-BA6A-530CCC43D6F0@csun.edu> Juan, Can you say more of what you mean? Part if the issue of late has been that the discussion veers very quickly deep into the framework and then many get lost. Part of what we are trying to do is to keep the discussion grounded in specifics of some sort. For me, the goal is to use a method directed at a unit of analysis the allows me to understand the unity, the point past which it becomes deceptive to break down into further parts beyond thought experiments. I like Rogoff's example of the heart as part of the body: we can imagine the heart functioning on its own, but the heart cannot function without the circulatory system. The LSV paper uses a child's emotional experience (perezhevanie) because each child understands an experience differently, but not just understands. Isn't that ANL's big critique that "experience" is still too individual and not social enough? Sorry, simple but the best I can do on my phone. I am fascinated by this thread and discussion, but can't contribute as I would like when I am on the go. Sent from my iPhone > On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:18 PM, "Juan Duarte" wrote: > > > I wonder if it is possible to refer to the vigotskyan "units of an?lisis" > without say a word of the marxist framework in which he developed that > concept. For me, in going so, we lost great part of the richness of his > psychology: his method. > > Thanks a lot for the interchange. > Juan Duarte > > 2014-10-12 15:31 GMT-03:00 Helena Worthen : > >> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses >> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule >> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >> >>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. >> It >>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually >> comes >>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >>> unit of analysis. >> >> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question lying >> behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" The unit >> of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to accomplish. Are we >> trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying get the >> rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, clerical >> workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be late to work >> today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss work" >> message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're talking about >> a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged minority >> women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be responsible for. >> Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but being required to >> actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then keep a record of >> the call, was a problem because supervisors were often away from their >> desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a lot of workers >> didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening (2004) and pay >> phones are few and far between, so if someone it out buying more asthma >> inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. >> >> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, here? >> To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of the >> union and other others about how to respond collectively to something that >> only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so that >> middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended family? >> Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can carry out) >> you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the whole Engestrom >> triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, a matter of >> solving puzzles. >> >>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to a >> live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about activity >> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict >> with each other, which adds to the drama. >> >> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? Is the >> purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or the >> purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting would >> be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of children) and >> unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. >> >> >> Helena >> >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> >>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>> >>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I supervise >>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of them on >>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. They have >>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of >> labor. >>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they decided >> to >>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context mainly >>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the " >> unit >>> of analysis". >>> >>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < >> ablunden@mira.net> >>> ??????: >>> >>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was one of >>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept was >>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for me, was >>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this expression, >> I'd >>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to was a >>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology >> whilst >>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. >>>> >>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. >> It >>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually >> comes >>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new >>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for >>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, often >>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their supervisor. I >>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this point in >>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data they >> now >>>> know they need. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAIFaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=16FfApl1f5E7VYPyK5I0gy-pAWG8266Fy1MMjz86JnA&s=uDlMvMB3Fzu1MSZ0FcG3QyfXFkfKMgGD_TraR68Xoh4&e= >>>> >>>> >>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>> >>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. >> But, >>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I >>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that >> through >>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just >>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>> >>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm >> interested >>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how >> they >>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people doing >>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis being >> used? >>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >> interested to >>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as >> basic as >>>>> these. >>>>> >>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much >> more >>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In >> Mike's >>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the >> action is >>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that >>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, are >>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of much >>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>> Katie >>>>> >>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>> University of Georgia >>> >>> -- >>> ............................................................ >>> Katerina Plakitsi >>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>> School of Education >>> University of Ioannina >>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>> Ioannina >>> Greece >>> tel. +302651005771 >>> fax. +302651005842 >>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>> >>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__users.uoi.gr_kplakits&d=AAIFaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=16FfApl1f5E7VYPyK5I0gy-pAWG8266Fy1MMjz86JnA&s=hWaKcSHx4FXJI724_Gda4_nBcPgoSsmpb8jTtxCwCoI&e= >>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__erasmus-2Dip.uoi.gr_&d=AAIFaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=16FfApl1f5E7VYPyK5I0gy-pAWG8266Fy1MMjz86JnA&s=2juSbVE8U8pWsD5dUN0kXTi2SpE8KxXAJWfpXs3BmAs&e= >>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.lib.uoi.gr_serp&d=AAIFaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=16FfApl1f5E7VYPyK5I0gy-pAWG8266Fy1MMjz86JnA&s=NNtgPFaVNetiZFsDR3tzVat_lmLuDx5fUW5OeO-YmZc&e= > > > -- > Juan From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Oct 12 14:13:00 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 14:13:00 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> Message-ID: Juan-- David Kellogg's earlier message in which he discussed the ways in which the russian word for meaning, znachenie, can also mean value (and maybe, behind our backs, always means both?) and brought this insight from a Marxist colleague to bear on the possibility that the distinction between meaning and sense could usefully thought of in terms of the exchange value of meaning and the use value of sense. (If i remember correctly!). Marxism is infused in the disagreements between LSV and ANL in the two articles under consideration, at this moment playing out with respect to the concept of activity and how perezhivanie is or is not a unit of analysis for understanding the relation between cognition and emotion as core constituents of experience. mike On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 1:15 PM, Juan Duarte wrote: > I wonder if it is possible to refer to the vigotskyan "units of an?lisis" > without say a word of the marxist framework in which he developed that > concept. For me, in going so, we lost great part of the richness of his > psychology: his method. > > Thanks a lot for the interchange. > Juan Duarte > > 2014-10-12 15:31 GMT-03:00 Helena Worthen : > > > As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very > > down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses > > to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule > > changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: > > > > > The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. > > It > > > is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is > the > > > breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually > > comes > > > *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some > other > > > unit of analysis. > > > > First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question lying > > behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" The unit > > of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to accomplish. Are > we > > trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying get the > > rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, clerical > > workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be late to work > > today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss work" > > message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're talking > about > > a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged minority > > women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be responsible for. > > Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but being required to > > actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then keep a record of > > the call, was a problem because supervisors were often away from their > > desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a lot of workers > > didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening (2004) and pay > > phones are few and far between, so if someone it out buying more asthma > > inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. > > > > So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, here? > > To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of the > > union and other others about how to respond collectively to something > that > > only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so that > > middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended family? > > Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can carry out) > > you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the whole > Engestrom > > triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, a matter of > > solving puzzles. > > > > >From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to a > > live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about activity > > system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict > > with each other, which adds to the drama. > > > > Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? Is > the > > purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or the > > purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting would > > be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of children) and > > unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. > > > > > > Helena > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: > > > > > This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I supervise > > > three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of them > on > > > early childhood science education and one on primary science. They have > > > collected log files, children discourses consisted of > > > scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of > > labor. > > > They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they > decided > > to > > > analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context mainly > > > modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the " > > unit > > > of analysis". > > > > > > ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < > > ablunden@mira.net> > > > ??????: > > > > > >> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was one > of > > >> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept > was > > >> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for me, > was > > >> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this expression, > > I'd > > >> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to > was a > > >> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology > > whilst > > >> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. > > >> > > >> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > *insight*. > > It > > >> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is > the > > >> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually > > comes > > >> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some > other > > >> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new > > >> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for > > >> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, often > > >> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their > supervisor. I > > >> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this point > in > > >> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data they > > now > > >> know they need. > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> > > >> > > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >> > > >> > > >> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > > >> > > >>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. > > But, > > >>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I > > >>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that > > through > > >>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just > > >>> trying to keep up with reading! > > >>> > > >>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm > > interested > > >>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how > > they > > >>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people > doing > > >>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis being > > used? > > >>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very > > interested to > > >>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as > > basic as > > >>> these. > > >>> > > >>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much > > more > > >>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In > > Mike's > > >>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the > > action is > > >>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that > > >>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, > are > > >>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of > much > > >>> more than just Mike's behavior. > > >>> Katie > > >>> > > >>> Katie Wester-Neal > > >>> University of Georgia > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > -- > > > ............................................................ > > > Katerina Plakitsi > > > Associate Professor of Science Education > > > School of Education > > > University of Ioannina > > > University Campus Dourouti 45110 > > > Ioannina > > > Greece > > > tel. +302651005771 > > > fax. +302651005842 > > > mobile.phone +306972898463 > > > > > > http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits > > > http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr > > > http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp > > > > > > > > > -- > Juan > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Oct 12 14:54:54 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 21:54:54 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> Message-ID: And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies that, once one understands the relationships among the components, one can bring about changes in one component in the totality by acting on *another* component of the totality. The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent elements that are only accidentally brought together. Martin On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the question is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method of analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components in a complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, which is often how students frame their research interest. And this means that the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. > > Martin > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > >> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >> >>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It >>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes >>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >>> unit of analysis. >> >> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" The unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to accomplish. Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be late to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're talking about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were often away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out buying more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. >> >> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of the union and other others about how to respond collectively to something that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the whole Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, a matter of solving puzzles. >> >>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about activity system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict with each other, which adds to the drama. >> >> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of children) and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. >> >> >> Helena >> >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >> >>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I supervise >>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of them on >>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. They have >>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of labor. >>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they decided to >>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context mainly >>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the " unit >>> of analysis". >>> >>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden >>> ??????: >>> >>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was one of >>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept was >>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for me, was >>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this expression, I'd >>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to was a >>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology whilst >>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. >>>> >>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It >>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes >>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new >>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for >>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, often >>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their supervisor. I >>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this point in >>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data they now >>>> know they need. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>> >>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. But, >>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I >>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that through >>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just >>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>> >>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm interested >>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how they >>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people doing >>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis being used? >>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very interested to >>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as basic as >>>>> these. >>>>> >>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much more >>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In Mike's >>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the action is >>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that >>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, are >>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of much >>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>> Katie >>>>> >>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>> University of Georgia >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> ............................................................ >>> Katerina Plakitsi >>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>> School of Education >>> University of Ioannina >>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>> Ioannina >>> Greece >>> tel. +302651005771 >>> fax. +302651005842 >>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>> >>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >> >> > > From julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk Sun Oct 12 14:56:23 2014 From: julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk (Julian Williams) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 21:56:23 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <47447E73-F80E-454E-BA6A-530CCC43D6F0@csun.edu> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com>, , <47447E73-F80E-454E-BA6A-530CCC43D6F0@csun.edu> Message-ID: <1D3F2A8A-259B-4C0A-9B55-A015DB10A6C8@manchester.ac.uk> Tonyan I think the model of 'unit' for LSV after KM is the commodity, which captures the essential contradiction within capitalism, ... between use and exchange, producer and consumer (mediated by capital)... Marx thought that this unit could provide the source of the whole system, and it's demise. The demise/sublation of the contradiction inherent in the commodity is the disappearance of capital/money. Which we all await... But don't hold your breath... Anyway the point is the unit holds the essential contradiction, without which nothing transpires... So .. perezhivanije captures in a unit the contradiction between the (objectivity of the) environment (the abusive mother) and the child's subjectivity of this experience (emotional experience, crisis) mediating and mediated by the child's development, 'among other things' ... The child's development has to be understood as moving, the contradiction between their understanding and their emotional experience is the dialectic of development. The objective content of the abuse is as relevant to perezhivanije as the child's development (they are in contradiction?) in explaining/understanding the dynamics of 'experience' and development. The sublation/resolution of the contradiction - if it occurs- perhaps involves a development in which the emotional crisis becomes understood by the abused child in a new way that relieves the guilt, stress etc. Is that the connection? Julian Sent from my iPad On 12 Oct 2014, at 22:14, "Tonyan, Holli A" wrote: > Juan, > > Can you say more of what you mean? Part if the issue of late has been that the discussion veers very quickly deep into the framework and then many get lost. Part of what we are trying to do is to keep the discussion grounded in specifics of some sort. > > For me, the goal is to use a method directed at a unit of analysis the allows me to understand the unity, the point past which it becomes deceptive to break down into further parts beyond thought experiments. I like Rogoff's example of the heart as part of the body: we can imagine the heart functioning on its own, but the heart cannot function without the circulatory system. > > The LSV paper uses a child's emotional experience (perezhevanie) because each child understands an experience differently, but not just understands. Isn't that ANL's big critique that "experience" is still too individual and not social enough? Sorry, simple but the best I can do on my phone. > > I am fascinated by this thread and discussion, but can't contribute as I would like when I am on the go. > > > > Sent from my iPhone > >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:18 PM, "Juan Duarte" wrote: >> >> >> I wonder if it is possible to refer to the vigotskyan "units of an?lisis" >> without say a word of the marxist framework in which he developed that >> concept. For me, in going so, we lost great part of the richness of his >> psychology: his method. >> >> Thanks a lot for the interchange. >> Juan Duarte >> >> 2014-10-12 15:31 GMT-03:00 Helena Worthen : >> >>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses >>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule >>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>> >>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. >>> It >>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually >>> comes >>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >>>> unit of analysis. >>> >>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question lying >>> behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" The unit >>> of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to accomplish. Are we >>> trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying get the >>> rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, clerical >>> workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be late to work >>> today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss work" >>> message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're talking about >>> a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged minority >>> women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be responsible for. >>> Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but being required to >>> actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then keep a record of >>> the call, was a problem because supervisors were often away from their >>> desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a lot of workers >>> didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening (2004) and pay >>> phones are few and far between, so if someone it out buying more asthma >>> inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. >>> >>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, here? >>> To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of the >>> union and other others about how to respond collectively to something that >>> only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so that >>> middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended family? >>> Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can carry out) >>> you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the whole Engestrom >>> triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, a matter of >>> solving puzzles. >>> >>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to a >>> live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about activity >>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict >>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>> >>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? Is the >>> purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or the >>> purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting would >>> be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of children) and >>> unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. >>> >>> >>> Helena >>> >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> >>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>> >>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I supervise >>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of them on >>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. They have >>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of >>> labor. >>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they decided >>> to >>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context mainly >>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the " >>> unit >>>> of analysis". >>>> >>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < >>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>> ??????: >>>> >>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was one of >>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept was >>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for me, was >>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this expression, >>> I'd >>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to was a >>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology >>> whilst >>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. >>>>> >>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. >>> It >>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually >>> comes >>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new >>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for >>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, often >>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their supervisor. I >>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this point in >>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data they >>> now >>>>> know they need. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAIFaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=16FfApl1f5E7VYPyK5I0gy-pAWG8266Fy1MMjz86JnA&s=uDlMvMB3Fzu1MSZ0FcG3QyfXFkfKMgGD_TraR68Xoh4&e= >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. >>> But, >>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I >>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that >>> through >>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just >>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>> >>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm >>> interested >>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how >>> they >>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people doing >>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis being >>> used? >>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >>> interested to >>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as >>> basic as >>>>>> these. >>>>>> >>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much >>> more >>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In >>> Mike's >>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the >>> action is >>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that >>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, are >>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of much >>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>> Katie >>>>>> >>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>> University of Georgia >>>> >>>> -- >>>> ............................................................ >>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>> School of Education >>>> University of Ioannina >>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>> Ioannina >>>> Greece >>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>> >>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__users.uoi.gr_kplakits&d=AAIFaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=16FfApl1f5E7VYPyK5I0gy-pAWG8266Fy1MMjz86JnA&s=hWaKcSHx4FXJI724_Gda4_nBcPgoSsmpb8jTtxCwCoI&e= >>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__erasmus-2Dip.uoi.gr_&d=AAIFaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=16FfApl1f5E7VYPyK5I0gy-pAWG8266Fy1MMjz86JnA&s=2juSbVE8U8pWsD5dUN0kXTi2SpE8KxXAJWfpXs3BmAs&e= >>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.lib.uoi.gr_serp&d=AAIFaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=16FfApl1f5E7VYPyK5I0gy-pAWG8266Fy1MMjz86JnA&s=NNtgPFaVNetiZFsDR3tzVat_lmLuDx5fUW5OeO-YmZc&e= >> >> >> -- >> Juan > From julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk Sun Oct 12 15:01:46 2014 From: julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk (Julian Williams) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 22:01:46 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <1D3F2A8A-259B-4C0A-9B55-A015DB10A6C8@manchester.ac.uk> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com>, , <47447E73-F80E-454E-BA6A-530CCC43D6F0@csun.edu>, <1D3F2A8A-259B-4C0A-9B55-A015DB10A6C8@manchester.ac.uk> Message-ID: <3A53C8DC-9E39-41C3-B5F0-164A18A20262@manchester.ac.uk> Sorry additionally I meant to say the dialectical contradiction in the unit of word-meaning is likewise designed to explain development/change.... Sent from my iPad On 12 Oct 2014, at 22:57, "Julian Williams" wrote: > Tonyan > > I think the model of 'unit' for LSV after KM is the commodity, which captures the essential contradiction within capitalism, ... between use and exchange, producer and consumer (mediated by capital)... Marx thought that this unit could provide the source of the whole system, and it's demise. The demise/sublation > of the contradiction inherent in the commodity is the disappearance of capital/money. Which we all await... But don't hold your breath... > > Anyway the point is the unit holds the essential contradiction, without which nothing transpires... > > So .. perezhivanije captures in a unit the contradiction between the (objectivity of the) environment (the abusive mother) and the child's subjectivity of this experience (emotional experience, crisis) mediating and mediated by the child's development, 'among other things' ... The child's development has to be understood as moving, the contradiction between their understanding and their emotional experience is the dialectic of development. > > The objective content of the abuse is as relevant to perezhivanije as the child's development (they are in contradiction?) in explaining/understanding the dynamics of 'experience' and development. The sublation/resolution of the contradiction - if it occurs- perhaps involves a development in which the emotional crisis becomes understood by the abused child in a new way that relieves the guilt, stress etc. > > Is that the connection? > > Julian > > > > Sent from my iPad > > On 12 Oct 2014, at 22:14, "Tonyan, Holli A" wrote: > >> Juan, >> >> Can you say more of what you mean? Part if the issue of late has been that the discussion veers very quickly deep into the framework and then many get lost. Part of what we are trying to do is to keep the discussion grounded in specifics of some sort. >> >> For me, the goal is to use a method directed at a unit of analysis the allows me to understand the unity, the point past which it becomes deceptive to break down into further parts beyond thought experiments. I like Rogoff's example of the heart as part of the body: we can imagine the heart functioning on its own, but the heart cannot function without the circulatory system. >> >> The LSV paper uses a child's emotional experience (perezhevanie) because each child understands an experience differently, but not just understands. Isn't that ANL's big critique that "experience" is still too individual and not social enough? Sorry, simple but the best I can do on my phone. >> >> I am fascinated by this thread and discussion, but can't contribute as I would like when I am on the go. >> >> >> >> Sent from my iPhone >> >>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:18 PM, "Juan Duarte" wrote: >>> >>> >>> I wonder if it is possible to refer to the vigotskyan "units of an?lisis" >>> without say a word of the marxist framework in which he developed that >>> concept. For me, in going so, we lost great part of the richness of his >>> psychology: his method. >>> >>> Thanks a lot for the interchange. >>> Juan Duarte >>> >>> 2014-10-12 15:31 GMT-03:00 Helena Worthen : >>> >>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses >>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule >>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>> >>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. >>>> It >>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually >>>> comes >>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >>>>> unit of analysis. >>>> >>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question lying >>>> behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" The unit >>>> of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to accomplish. Are we >>>> trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying get the >>>> rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, clerical >>>> workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be late to work >>>> today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss work" >>>> message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're talking about >>>> a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged minority >>>> women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be responsible for. >>>> Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but being required to >>>> actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then keep a record of >>>> the call, was a problem because supervisors were often away from their >>>> desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a lot of workers >>>> didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening (2004) and pay >>>> phones are few and far between, so if someone it out buying more asthma >>>> inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. >>>> >>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, here? >>>> To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of the >>>> union and other others about how to respond collectively to something that >>>> only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so that >>>> middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended family? >>>> Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can carry out) >>>> you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the whole Engestrom >>>> triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, a matter of >>>> solving puzzles. >>>> >>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to a >>>> live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about activity >>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict >>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>> >>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? Is the >>>> purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or the >>>> purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting would >>>> be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of children) and >>>> unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. >>>> >>>> >>>> Helena >>>> >>>> >>>> Helena Worthen >>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>> >>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>> >>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I supervise >>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of them on >>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. They have >>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of >>>> labor. >>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they decided >>>> to >>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context mainly >>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the " >>>> unit >>>>> of analysis". >>>>> >>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < >>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>> ??????: >>>>> >>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was one of >>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept was >>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for me, was >>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this expression, >>>> I'd >>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to was a >>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology >>>> whilst >>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. >>>>>> >>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. >>>> It >>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually >>>> comes >>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new >>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for >>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, often >>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their supervisor. I >>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this point in >>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data they >>>> now >>>>>> know they need. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAIFaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=16FfApl1f5E7VYPyK5I0gy-pAWG8266Fy1MMjz86JnA&s=uDlMvMB3Fzu1MSZ0FcG3QyfXFkfKMgGD_TraR68Xoh4&e= >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. >>>> But, >>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I >>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that >>>> through >>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just >>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm >>>> interested >>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how >>>> they >>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people doing >>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis being >>>> used? >>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >>>> interested to >>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as >>>> basic as >>>>>>> these. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much >>>> more >>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In >>>> Mike's >>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the >>>> action is >>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that >>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, are >>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of much >>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> ............................................................ >>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>> School of Education >>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>> Ioannina >>>>> Greece >>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>> >>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__users.uoi.gr_kplakits&d=AAIFaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=16FfApl1f5E7VYPyK5I0gy-pAWG8266Fy1MMjz86JnA&s=hWaKcSHx4FXJI724_Gda4_nBcPgoSsmpb8jTtxCwCoI&e= >>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__erasmus-2Dip.uoi.gr_&d=AAIFaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=16FfApl1f5E7VYPyK5I0gy-pAWG8266Fy1MMjz86JnA&s=2juSbVE8U8pWsD5dUN0kXTi2SpE8KxXAJWfpXs3BmAs&e= >>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.lib.uoi.gr_serp&d=AAIFaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=16FfApl1f5E7VYPyK5I0gy-pAWG8266Fy1MMjz86JnA&s=NNtgPFaVNetiZFsDR3tzVat_lmLuDx5fUW5OeO-YmZc&e= >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Juan >> > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Oct 12 15:05:25 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 22:05:25 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <47447E73-F80E-454E-BA6A-530CCC43D6F0@csun.edu> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com>, <47447E73-F80E-454E-BA6A-530CCC43D6F0@csun.edu> Message-ID: <8BC9F478-2E79-44E0-841F-E89535676669@uniandes.edu.co> Holli, It's true that the English translation has "experience," and I don't know what the original Russian was, but it seems to me that the point that Vygotsky is making is that children of different ages will not only "experience" a drunken parent, they will also interact differently with that parent, have different needs in their relationship with that parent, and interpret differently the way the parent is behaving. If it were only "experience" then yes, that could sound very individual. I can't believe that LSV wasn't writing about the *interaction* between child and parent, and how that interaction changes qualitatively with the child's stage of development. I don't know how best to translate perezhivanie, but I have come to see emotion not as a private, subjective experience, but as a way of relating to the world that is fundamentally prereflective, evaluative, and active. Perezhivanie ought to contain all of this! :) Martin On Oct 12, 2014, at 4:12 PM, Tonyan, Holli A wrote: > The LSV paper uses a child's emotional experience (perezhevanie) because each child understands an experience differently, but not just understands. Isn't that ANL's big critique that "experience" is still too individual and not social enough? Sorry, simple but the best I can do on my phone. From vygotsky@unm.edu Sun Oct 12 15:39:27 2014 From: vygotsky@unm.edu (Vera John-Steiner) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 16:39:27 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <1D3F2A8A-259B-4C0A-9B55-A015DB10A6C8@manchester.ac.uk> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com>, , <47447E73-F80E-454E-BA6A-530CCC43D6F0@csun.edu> <1D3F2A8A-259B-4C0A-9B55-A015DB10A6C8@manchester.ac.uk> Message-ID: <003101cfe66d$6409c7a0$2c1d56e0$@edu> Julian, I like your analysis, it makes perezhivanje more accessible in this framework, Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Julian Williams Sent: Sunday, October 12, 2014 3:56 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? Tonyan I think the model of 'unit' for LSV after KM is the commodity, which captures the essential contradiction within capitalism, ... between use and exchange, producer and consumer (mediated by capital)... Marx thought that this unit could provide the source of the whole system, and it's demise. The demise/sublation of the contradiction inherent in the commodity is the disappearance of capital/money. Which we all await... But don't hold your breath... Anyway the point is the unit holds the essential contradiction, without which nothing transpires... So .. perezhivanije captures in a unit the contradiction between the (objectivity of the) environment (the abusive mother) and the child's subjectivity of this experience (emotional experience, crisis) mediating and mediated by the child's development, 'among other things' ... The child's development has to be understood as moving, the contradiction between their understanding and their emotional experience is the dialectic of development. The objective content of the abuse is as relevant to perezhivanije as the child's development (they are in contradiction?) in explaining/understanding the dynamics of 'experience' and development. The sublation/resolution of the contradiction - if it occurs- perhaps involves a development in which the emotional crisis becomes understood by the abused child in a new way that relieves the guilt, stress etc. Is that the connection? Julian Sent from my iPad On 12 Oct 2014, at 22:14, "Tonyan, Holli A" wrote: > Juan, > > Can you say more of what you mean? Part if the issue of late has been that the discussion veers very quickly deep into the framework and then many get lost. Part of what we are trying to do is to keep the discussion grounded in specifics of some sort. > > For me, the goal is to use a method directed at a unit of analysis the allows me to understand the unity, the point past which it becomes deceptive to break down into further parts beyond thought experiments. I like Rogoff's example of the heart as part of the body: we can imagine the heart functioning on its own, but the heart cannot function without the circulatory system. > > The LSV paper uses a child's emotional experience (perezhevanie) because each child understands an experience differently, but not just understands. Isn't that ANL's big critique that "experience" is still too individual and not social enough? Sorry, simple but the best I can do on my phone. > > I am fascinated by this thread and discussion, but can't contribute as I would like when I am on the go. > > > > Sent from my iPhone > >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:18 PM, "Juan Duarte" wrote: >> >> >> I wonder if it is possible to refer to the vigotskyan "units of an?lisis" >> without say a word of the marxist framework in which he developed >> that concept. For me, in going so, we lost great part of the richness >> of his >> psychology: his method. >> >> Thanks a lot for the interchange. >> Juan Duarte >> >> 2014-10-12 15:31 GMT-03:00 Helena Worthen : >> >>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective >>> responses to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, >>> when a rule changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>> >>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. >>> It >>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it >>>> is the breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. >>>> It usually >>> comes >>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some >>>> other unit of analysis. >>> >>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question >>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to >>> do?" The unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying >>> to accomplish. Are we trying to get the employer to back off >>> temporarily? Are we trying get the rule changed? Example: In a big >>> hospital system in Chicago, clerical workers were no longer allowed >>> to leave an "I'm going to be late to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss work" >>> message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're >>> talking about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them >>> middle aged minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be responsible for. >>> Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but being >>> required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then >>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were >>> often away from their desks and the whole phone system was >>> unreliable. Also, a lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the >>> time this was happening (2004) and pay phones are few and far >>> between, so if someone it out buying more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. >>> >>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, here? >>> To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of >>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to >>> something that only affects some of them? To make a profound change >>> in society so that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended family? >>> Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can carry >>> out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the >>> whole Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as >>> Andy says, a matter of solving puzzles. >>> >>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak >>>> to a >>> live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about >>> activity system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often >>> in conflict with each other, which adds to the drama. >>> >>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? >>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the >>> class, or the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be >>> most interesting would be a comparison between the unit of analysis >>> (purposes of children) and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. >>> >>> >>> Helena >>> >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> >>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>> >>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I >>>> supervise three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT >>>> context. Two of them on early childhood science education and one >>>> on primary science. They have collected log files, children >>>> discourses consisted of scientific justifications, accepted rules, >>>> and forms of division of >>> labor. >>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they >>>> decided >>> to >>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context >>>> mainly modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the " >>> unit >>>> of analysis". >>>> >>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < >>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>> ??????: >>>> >>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was >>>>> one of the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this >>>>> concept was almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which >>>>> was new for me, was "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the >>>>> origin of this expression, >>> I'd >>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to >>>>> was a "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT >>>>> methodology >>> whilst >>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. >>>>> >>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. >>> It >>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it >>>>> is the breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. >>>>> It usually >>> comes >>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some >>>>> other unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is >>>>> the new paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving >>>>> puzzles. So for graduate students to use the concept of unit in >>>>> their research, often depends on the wisdom of teh direction they >>>>> get from their supervisor. I don't know how many PhD students I've >>>>> met who have got to this point in their thesis and discover that >>>>> the data they have is not the data they >>> now >>>>> know they need. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> ------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.n >>>>> et.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAIFaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh >>>>> 71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=16FfApl1f5E7VY >>>>> PyK5I0gy-pAWG8266Fy1MMjz86JnA&s=uDlMvMB3Fzu1MSZ0FcG3QyfXFkfKMgGD_T >>>>> raR68Xoh4&e= >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. >>> But, >>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in >>>>>> posts. I usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't >>>>>> follow that >>> through >>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually >>>>>> just trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>> >>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm >>> interested >>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and >>>>>> how >>> they >>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people >>>>>> doing with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of >>>>>> analysis being >>> used? >>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >>> interested to >>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as >>> basic as >>>>>> these. >>>>>> >>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a >>>>>> much >>> more >>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In >>> Mike's >>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the >>> action is >>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that >>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here >>>>>> before, are often difficult to get a look at), the actions create >>>>>> a picture of much more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>> Katie >>>>>> >>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>> University of Georgia >>>> >>>> -- >>>> ............................................................ >>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>> Associate Professor of Science Education School of Education >>>> University of Ioannina University Campus Dourouti 45110 Ioannina >>>> Greece tel. +302651005771 fax. +302651005842 mobile.phone >>>> +306972898463 >>>> >>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__users.uoi.gr_kp >>>> lakits&d=AAIFaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0 >>>> IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=16FfApl1f5E7VYPyK5I0gy-p >>>> AWG8266Fy1MMjz86JnA&s=hWaKcSHx4FXJI724_Gda4_nBcPgoSsmpb8jTtxCwCoI&e >>>> = >>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__erasmus-2Dip.uo >>>> i.gr_&d=AAIFaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0I >>>> zcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=16FfApl1f5E7VYPyK5I0gy-pA >>>> WG8266Fy1MMjz86JnA&s=2juSbVE8U8pWsD5dUN0kXTi2SpE8KxXAJWfpXs3BmAs&e= >>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.lib.uoi.gr_ >>>> serp&d=AAIFaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0Iz >>>> cQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=16FfApl1f5E7VYPyK5I0gy-pAW >>>> G8266Fy1MMjz86JnA&s=NNtgPFaVNetiZFsDR3tzVat_lmLuDx5fUW5OeO-YmZc&e= >> >> >> -- >> Juan > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Oct 12 15:56:27 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 22:56:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <003101cfe66d$6409c7a0$2c1d56e0$@edu> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com>, , <47447E73-F80E-454E-BA6A-530CCC43D6F0@csun.edu> <1D3F2A8A-259B-4C0A-9B55-A015DB10A6C8@manchester.ac.uk> <003101cfe66d$6409c7a0$2c1d56e0$@edu> Message-ID: <835DA0D4-E674-4B4A-B6EC-04E6B16C3497@uniandes.edu.co> I would think that the contradiction here is between the child's dependence on his or her parents, and the drunken mother's harmful treatment of her children. This contradiction is more intense for the youngest child, and less so for the eldest, who has become more independent. But it's certainly true that the units that Vygotsky worked with were units of contradiction, like the commodity. In chapter 7 of T&L he wrote: "Thus, the thought and the word are from the very beginning not cut from one pattern. In a sense we can say that between them there is contradiction rather than harmony...." He continues: "Speech [????] in its structure does not constitute a simple mirror image of the structure of thought. Therefore, it cannot be placed on the thought, like a ready-made dress. Thought, turning into speech, is reorganized and modified. Thought is not expressed, but completed in the word. Consequently, the opposing processes of development of the semantic and acoustic aspects of speech form a genuine unity precisely because of their opposite direction. is a dynamic relationship between the components that can become a contradiction, rather than a contradiction always being involved." Whatever perezhivanje is, it must contain such a contradiction. Martin On Oct 12, 2014, at 5:39 PM, Vera John-Steiner wrote: > So .. perezhivanije captures in a unit the contradiction between the (objectivity of the) environment (the abusive mother) and the child's subjectivity of this experience (emotional experience, crisis) mediating and mediated by the child's development, 'among other things' ... The child's development has to be understood as moving, the contradiction between their understanding and their emotional experience is the dialectic of development. From Holli.Tonyan@csun.edu Sun Oct 12 16:25:01 2014 From: Holli.Tonyan@csun.edu (Tonyan, Holli A) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 23:25:01 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <3A53C8DC-9E39-41C3-B5F0-164A18A20262@manchester.ac.uk> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com>, , <47447E73-F80E-454E-BA6A-530CCC43D6F0@csun.edu>, <1D3F2A8A-259B-4C0A-9B55-A015DB10A6C8@manchester.ac.uk>, <3A53C8DC-9E39-41C3-B5F0-164A18A20262@manchester.ac.uk> Message-ID: Thank you! Sent from my iPhone > On Oct 12, 2014, at 3:02 PM, "Julian Williams" wrote: > > Sorry additionally I meant to say the dialectical contradiction in the unit of word-meaning is likewise designed to explain development/change.... > > Sent from my iPad > >> On 12 Oct 2014, at 22:57, "Julian Williams" wrote: >> >> Tonyan >> >> I think the model of 'unit' for LSV after KM is the commodity, which captures the essential contradiction within capitalism, ... between use and exchange, producer and consumer (mediated by capital)... Marx thought that this unit could provide the source of the whole system, and it's demise. The demise/sublation >> of the contradiction inherent in the commodity is the disappearance of capital/money. Which we all await... But don't hold your breath... >> >> Anyway the point is the unit holds the essential contradiction, without which nothing transpires... >> >> So .. perezhivanije captures in a unit the contradiction between the (objectivity of the) environment (the abusive mother) and the child's subjectivity of this experience (emotional experience, crisis) mediating and mediated by the child's development, 'among other things' ... The child's development has to be understood as moving, the contradiction between their understanding and their emotional experience is the dialectic of development. >> >> The objective content of the abuse is as relevant to perezhivanije as the child's development (they are in contradiction?) in explaining/understanding the dynamics of 'experience' and development. The sublation/resolution of the contradiction - if it occurs- perhaps involves a development in which the emotional crisis becomes understood by the abused child in a new way that relieves the guilt, stress etc. >> >> Is that the connection? >> >> Julian >> >> >> >> Sent from my iPad >> >>> On 12 Oct 2014, at 22:14, "Tonyan, Holli A" wrote: >>> >>> Juan, >>> >>> Can you say more of what you mean? Part if the issue of late has been that the discussion veers very quickly deep into the framework and then many get lost. Part of what we are trying to do is to keep the discussion grounded in specifics of some sort. >>> >>> For me, the goal is to use a method directed at a unit of analysis the allows me to understand the unity, the point past which it becomes deceptive to break down into further parts beyond thought experiments. I like Rogoff's example of the heart as part of the body: we can imagine the heart functioning on its own, but the heart cannot function without the circulatory system. >>> >>> The LSV paper uses a child's emotional experience (perezhevanie) because each child understands an experience differently, but not just understands. Isn't that ANL's big critique that "experience" is still too individual and not social enough? Sorry, simple but the best I can do on my phone. >>> >>> I am fascinated by this thread and discussion, but can't contribute as I would like when I am on the go. >>> >>> >>> >>> Sent from my iPhone >>> >>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:18 PM, "Juan Duarte" wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> I wonder if it is possible to refer to the vigotskyan "units of an?lisis" >>>> without say a word of the marxist framework in which he developed that >>>> concept. For me, in going so, we lost great part of the richness of his >>>> psychology: his method. >>>> >>>> Thanks a lot for the interchange. >>>> Juan Duarte >>>> >>>> 2014-10-12 15:31 GMT-03:00 Helena Worthen : >>>> >>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses >>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule >>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>>> >>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. >>>>> It >>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually >>>>> comes >>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >>>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>> >>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question lying >>>>> behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" The unit >>>>> of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to accomplish. Are we >>>>> trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying get the >>>>> rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, clerical >>>>> workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be late to work >>>>> today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss work" >>>>> message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're talking about >>>>> a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged minority >>>>> women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be responsible for. >>>>> Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but being required to >>>>> actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then keep a record of >>>>> the call, was a problem because supervisors were often away from their >>>>> desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a lot of workers >>>>> didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening (2004) and pay >>>>> phones are few and far between, so if someone it out buying more asthma >>>>> inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. >>>>> >>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, here? >>>>> To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of the >>>>> union and other others about how to respond collectively to something that >>>>> only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so that >>>>> middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended family? >>>>> Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can carry out) >>>>> you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the whole Engestrom >>>>> triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, a matter of >>>>> solving puzzles. >>>>> >>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to a >>>>> live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about activity >>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict >>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>>> >>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? Is the >>>>> purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or the >>>>> purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting would >>>>> be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of children) and >>>>> unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Helena >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I supervise >>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of them on >>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. They have >>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of >>>>> labor. >>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they decided >>>>> to >>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context mainly >>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the " >>>>> unit >>>>>> of analysis". >>>>>> >>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < >>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>> ??????: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was one of >>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept was >>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for me, was >>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this expression, >>>>> I'd >>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to was a >>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology >>>>> whilst >>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. >>>>> It >>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually >>>>> comes >>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new >>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for >>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, often >>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their supervisor. I >>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this point in >>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data they >>>>> now >>>>>>> know they need. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAIFaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=16FfApl1f5E7VYPyK5I0gy-pAWG8266Fy1MMjz86JnA&s=uDlMvMB3Fzu1MSZ0FcG3QyfXFkfKMgGD_TraR68Xoh4&e= >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. >>>>> But, >>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I >>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that >>>>> through >>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just >>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm >>>>> interested >>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how >>>>> they >>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people doing >>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis being >>>>> used? >>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >>>>> interested to >>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as >>>>> basic as >>>>>>>> these. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much >>>>> more >>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In >>>>> Mike's >>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the >>>>> action is >>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that >>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, are >>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of much >>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>>> School of Education >>>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>>> Ioannina >>>>>> Greece >>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>> >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__users.uoi.gr_kplakits&d=AAIFaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=16FfApl1f5E7VYPyK5I0gy-pAWG8266Fy1MMjz86JnA&s=hWaKcSHx4FXJI724_Gda4_nBcPgoSsmpb8jTtxCwCoI&e= >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__erasmus-2Dip.uoi.gr_&d=AAIFaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=16FfApl1f5E7VYPyK5I0gy-pAWG8266Fy1MMjz86JnA&s=2juSbVE8U8pWsD5dUN0kXTi2SpE8KxXAJWfpXs3BmAs&e= >>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.lib.uoi.gr_serp&d=AAIFaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=16FfApl1f5E7VYPyK5I0gy-pAWG8266Fy1MMjz86JnA&s=NNtgPFaVNetiZFsDR3tzVat_lmLuDx5fUW5OeO-YmZc&e= >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Juan > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Oct 12 16:26:35 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 08:26:35 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <835DA0D4-E674-4B4A-B6EC-04E6B16C3497@uniandes.edu.co> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <47447E73-F80E-454E-BA6A-530CCC43D6F0@csun.edu> <1D3F2A8A-259B-4C0A-9B55-A015DB10A6C8@manchester.ac.uk> <003101cfe66d$6409c7a0$2c1d56e0$@edu> <835DA0D4-E674-4B4A-B6EC-04E6B16C3497@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Martin: The chapter on the environment is one of a pendant (that is, a pair of chapters). The other chapter, to which is pendant, is "The Problem of Heredity and the Environment in Pedology". David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 13 October 2014 07:56, Martin John Packer wrote: > I would think that the contradiction here is between the child's dependence on his or her parents, and the drunken mother's harmful treatment of her children. This contradiction is more intense for the youngest child, and less so for the eldest, who has become more independent. > > But it's certainly true that the units that Vygotsky worked with were units of contradiction, like the commodity. In chapter 7 of T&L he wrote: > > "Thus, the thought and the word are from the very beginning not cut from one pattern. In a sense we can say that between them there is contradiction rather than harmony...." > > He continues: "Speech [????] in its structure does not constitute a simple mirror image of the structure of thought. Therefore, it cannot be placed on the thought, like a ready-made dress. Thought, turning into speech, is reorganized and modified. Thought is not expressed, but completed in the word. Consequently, the opposing processes of development of the semantic and acoustic aspects of speech form a genuine unity precisely because of their opposite direction. is a dynamic relationship between the components that can become a contradiction, rather than a contradiction always being involved." > > Whatever perezhivanje is, it must contain such a contradiction. > > Martin > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 5:39 PM, Vera John-Steiner wrote: > >> So .. perezhivanije captures in a unit the contradiction between the (objectivity of the) environment (the abusive mother) and the child's subjectivity of this experience (emotional experience, crisis) mediating and mediated by the child's development, 'among other things' ... The child's development has to be understood as moving, the contradiction between their understanding and their emotional experience is the dialectic of development. > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Oct 12 16:33:53 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 23:33:53 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <47447E73-F80E-454E-BA6A-530CCC43D6F0@csun.edu> <1D3F2A8A-259B-4C0A-9B55-A015DB10A6C8@manchester.ac.uk> <003101cfe66d$6409c7a0$2c1d56e0$@edu> <835DA0D4-E674-4B4A-B6EC-04E6B16C3497@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <98A1A3FF-AF98-444B-ABEF-DE21D4AF13A5@uniandes.edu.co> Hmmm. Where one might find a copy, David? Martin On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:26 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Martin: > > The chapter on the environment is one of a pendant (that is, a pair of > chapters). The other chapter, to which is pendant, is "The Problem of > Heredity and the Environment in Pedology". > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 13 October 2014 07:56, Martin John Packer wrote: >> I would think that the contradiction here is between the child's dependence on his or her parents, and the drunken mother's harmful treatment of her children. This contradiction is more intense for the youngest child, and less so for the eldest, who has become more independent. >> >> But it's certainly true that the units that Vygotsky worked with were units of contradiction, like the commodity. In chapter 7 of T&L he wrote: >> >> "Thus, the thought and the word are from the very beginning not cut from one pattern. In a sense we can say that between them there is contradiction rather than harmony...." >> >> He continues: "Speech [????] in its structure does not constitute a simple mirror image of the structure of thought. Therefore, it cannot be placed on the thought, like a ready-made dress. Thought, turning into speech, is reorganized and modified. Thought is not expressed, but completed in the word. Consequently, the opposing processes of development of the semantic and acoustic aspects of speech form a genuine unity precisely because of their opposite direction. is a dynamic relationship between the components that can become a contradiction, rather than a contradiction always being involved." >> >> Whatever perezhivanje is, it must contain such a contradiction. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 5:39 PM, Vera John-Steiner wrote: >> >>> So .. perezhivanije captures in a unit the contradiction between the (objectivity of the) environment (the abusive mother) and the child's subjectivity of this experience (emotional experience, crisis) mediating and mediated by the child's development, 'among other things' ... The child's development has to be understood as moving, the contradiction between their understanding and their emotional experience is the dialectic of development. >> >> > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Oct 12 17:09:39 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 17:09:39 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> Message-ID: Hi Martin-- I believe that it helps a lot to understand the genesis of that "expanded triangle." All of *Learning by Expanding* is on the xmca server (remember the google function on the lchc home page!). The immediately relevant section is here, under the heading of "the evolution of activity." http://lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Paper/Engestrom/expanding/ch2.htm mike On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies that, once > one understands the relationships among the components, one can bring about > changes in one component in the totality by acting on *another* component > of the totality. > > The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of > relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent elements that > are only accidentally brought together. > > Martin > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer > wrote: > > > Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the question > is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method of > analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components in a > complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, which > is often how students frame their research interest. And this means that > the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. > > > > Martin > > > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen > wrote: > > > >> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very > down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses > to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule > changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: > >> > >>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > *insight*. It > >>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is > the > >>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually > comes > >>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some > other > >>> unit of analysis. > >> > >> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question lying > behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" The unit > of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to accomplish. Are we > trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying get the > rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, clerical > workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be late to work > today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss work" > message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're talking about > a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged minority > women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be responsible for. > Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but being required to > actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then keep a record of > the call, was a problem because supervisors were often away from their > desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a lot of workers > didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening (2004) and pay > phones are few and far between, so if someone it out buying more asthma > inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. > >> > >> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, here? > To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of the > union and other others about how to respond collectively to something that > only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so that > middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended family? > Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can carry out) > you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the whole Engestrom > triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, a matter of > solving puzzles. > >> > >>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to a > live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about activity > system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict > with each other, which adds to the drama. > >> > >> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? Is > the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or the > purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting would > be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of children) and > unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. > >> > >> > >> Helena > >> > >> > >> Helena Worthen > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >> > >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: > >> > >>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I supervise > >>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of them > on > >>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. They have > >>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of > >>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of > labor. > >>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they > decided to > >>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context mainly > >>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the " > unit > >>> of analysis". > >>> > >>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < > ablunden@mira.net> > >>> ??????: > >>> > >>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was one > of > >>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept > was > >>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for me, > was > >>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this expression, > I'd > >>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to > was a > >>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology > whilst > >>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. > >>>> > >>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > *insight*. It > >>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is > the > >>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually > comes > >>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some > other > >>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new > >>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for > >>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, often > >>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their > supervisor. I > >>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this point > in > >>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data > they now > >>>> know they need. > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. > But, > >>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I > >>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that > through > >>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just > >>>>> trying to keep up with reading! > >>>>> > >>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm > interested > >>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how > they > >>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people > doing > >>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis > being used? > >>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very > interested to > >>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as > basic as > >>>>> these. > >>>>> > >>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much > more > >>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In > Mike's > >>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the > action is > >>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that > >>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, > are > >>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of > much > >>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. > >>>>> Katie > >>>>> > >>>>> Katie Wester-Neal > >>>>> University of Georgia > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> ............................................................ > >>> Katerina Plakitsi > >>> Associate Professor of Science Education > >>> School of Education > >>> University of Ioannina > >>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 > >>> Ioannina > >>> Greece > >>> tel. +302651005771 > >>> fax. +302651005842 > >>> mobile.phone +306972898463 > >>> > >>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits > >>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr > >>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp > >> > >> > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Oct 12 17:20:28 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 01:20:28 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] LSV & ANL on the problem of the environment Message-ID: I've formulated some thoughts on first readings but need to do some cross checking. I've some other commitments too, so probably won't be posting these impressions till Tuesday. I suggest folk who would very much like to read these interesting (and challenging) papers (but for whatever reason can't do so straightaway) push out some dates in the near so that we hold off for you. In the mean-time, we can simply post up our impressions etc, and then do a second stage exchange once everyone has had an opportunity to participate in their initial sense-making / rumination / critiques. You can access the papers from Andy's earlier email here: http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/Current.Mail/msg00114.html Best, Huw On 12 October 2014 20:40, mike cole wrote: > Glad the summary cuts and pastes were helpful, Rod. My idea was that they > might serve as a kind of "cliff notes" intro, which in your case was a > reminder. I have done the same for the Shotter article on "withness" that > you sent around, but have not had time to recover that part of the > discussion and introduce it in a productive way. > > I can't at present go on to the ANL article, but will briefly comment on > the Nicaraguan sign language example. I agree with your analysis. But I > wanted to address my concern with the way the notion of the "ideal form" as > the "end in the beginning" is that it seems to preclude any form of change > that is not in the thrall of that ideal form to count as anything but > deviation from the ideal, no room for transformation. I say "seems" because > I know and value LSV's work on imagination and creativity at lot. Still, as > formulated here, in the land where Comrade Stalin shaped what counted as > the ideal form, it arose for me as an issue when I was re-reading it. > > I also want to inquire into the relationship between word meaning as a unit > of analysis for the relation between thought and language, and perezhivanie > as a unit of analysis for the thought and emotion. The pairing links > language, thought, and emotion as constituents of experience > (perezhivanie). > > I look forward to re-reading the ANL critique of LSV... later. > mike > > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 12:09 PM, Rod Parker-Rees < > R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > > > Many thanks for your digest of the LSV article, Mike. It is a while since > > I last read it so this was a valuable refresher and meant I felt I could > go > > straight to the ANL article which I have not seen before. > > > > Reading the ANL article I was acutely aware of the gulf between my > > environment and that in which ANL was writing. Perhaps the fact that I > feel > > this rather less when reading LSV is evidence of a closer fit between my > > bourgeois environmenn and his. As I understand it, and I am far from > > confident in this, ANL's main issue is with LSV's suggestion that > > 'experiencing' or perezhivanie should be used as a unit of activity, > > representing the indissoluble relationship between the environment and > the > > individual. ANL appears to object to this because he sees experiencing as > > an abstraction from activity which should be recognised as the true core > of > > what makes us human. The argument that an environment is only an > > environment FOR an active subject reminded me of Uetzkull's 'umwelt' the > > unique world of experience constructed by an organism in the course of > its > > activity (including its sensing activity) but I am not sure that ANL > > justifies his insistence on not acknowleding experiencING as a form of > > activity ('experience is a secondary and derivative fact' - p.22). > > > > ANL appears to be driven by a preference for 'putting the question in its > > completely clear and bare form' (p.17) but this involves a series of > > assertions and rhetorical strong-arm tactics which I find difficult to > > accept. For example, he chooses to 'set aside the complicated idea of the > > different course of development of the "spontaneous" and "scientific" > > concepts' (p.18) - an idea which I have always found particularly helpful > > and he insists that 'meaning always takes the form of the meaning of a > > word' (p.18) - denying the possibility that a smile, a raised eyebrow, > > rolled eyes or a raised fist could carry meaning. > > > > I am not sure that the creation of a sign language among Nicaraguan deaf > > children can be taken as a counter example to LSV's argument that > children > > are able to benefit from an environment which includes the 'ideal form' > of > > abilities they are just beginning to develop. The children who were > brought > > together from isolated families and then co-constructed a sophisticated > > sign language may not have been surrounded by an 'ideal form' of language > > which they could fully experience (I believe most were children of > hearing > > parents and so experienced only a rudimentary, home-made form of > home-sign) > > but they WERE surrounded by people who showed them that people > communicate > > with each other so they were exposed to the 'ideal form' of > > communication-mediated cooperative activity even if they were not able to > > pick out the finer details of how it was achieved. As in other situations > > where children grow up among people who use a simplified ('pidgin') form > of > > communication, their sensitivity to patterns, rules and regularities > > allowed them to refine it into a coherent, flexible language (a > 'creole'). > > I am uncomfortable with the use of 'final form' as an alternative to > 'ideal > > form' because every generation does similar things with the language it > > inherits - adjusting and refining it to achieve a better fit with > changing > > social practices. Indeed this (as well as the socio-political distance > > between us) may explain some of the difficulties I have with ANL's way of > > asserting his arguments. > > > > LSV acknowledged the important role of 'spontaneous concepts' - the often > > unacknowledged intuitions which arise out of our unique patterns of > > experience and which give 'body and vitality' to the more abstract, > 'clear > > and bare' concepts which allow us to communicate with others - while ANL > > would appear to prefer a tidier view of things. > > > > I look forward to hearing what others make of the comparison between the > > two papers. > > > > All the best, > > > > Rod > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > Sent: 12 October 2014 17:55 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse > > > > Diane- (I neglected to turn off my computer!). There are now more that > 800 > > people signed up for XMCA. If every started typing at once, we might > crash > > the ucsd server it sits on. And if it is just brownian motion in > alphabetic > > characters, what's the point? It WOULD be good to hear from more people. > At > > earlier times, i have tried to work out an arrangements where a dozen > > partricipants each volunteered to organize a discussion on a topic of > > potential interest for a month as a means of increasing breadth of > > participation and points of view. It has never worked. > > > > Perhaps it could be tried again..... if someone other than me would like > to > > organize it! > > > > Like henry, I use wikipedia a lot as a starting point. For the disucssion > > of the LSV article on the environment I would recommend that people > > google *senghas > > nicaraguan sign language. *My conjecture is the the evidence of what > > happens if a lot of deaf kids are brought together without access to an > > appropriate "ideal form" (see the LSV paper for significance of that > term) > > contradicts LSV's argument and has implications for general aspects of > > theory. But first there has to be that co-reading so we are not simply > > tangling each other up in a new way. > > mike > > > > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:44 AM, Diane Potts > wrote: > > > > > >From one of the many lurkers... > > > > > > As a new academic and one who shares David Kellogg's interests in SFL, > > > language education and socio-historical theory, I benefit tremendously > > from > > > this listserv. I recommend it regularly to PhD students and hold it up > > as > > > a model of an online community that has managed to continue to engage > in > > > lively discussions about current research with the participation of > > senior > > > scholars. Centering those discussions on readings, at least to me, > seems > > to > > > be an effective means of carrying out the community's boundary work - > not > > > always pleasant work, I'll admit, but one that gives coherence to who > we > > > are. > > > > > > Diane Potts > > > Lancaster University > > > > > > > From: leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com > > > > Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 18:23:52 +0200 > > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse > > > > > > > > continue :-) > > > > > > > > Leif > > > > Sweden > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > ________________________________ > > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on > it. > > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan > emails > > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > > by an official order form. > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Sun Oct 12 16:10:10 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 16:10:10 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> Message-ID: <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> On the contrary. To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about activity theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple example is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history corner of the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger footing in bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing new members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which division of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a leadership team that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which in turn will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky and quick, change your history. Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies that, once one understands the relationships among the components, one can bring about changes in one component in the totality by acting on *another* component of the totality. > > The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent elements that are only accidentally brought together. > > Martin > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the question is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method of analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components in a complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, which is often how students frame their research interest. And this means that the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: >> >>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>> >>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It >>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes >>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >>>> unit of analysis. >>> >>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" The unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to accomplish. Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be late to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're talking about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were often away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out buying more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. >>> >>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of the union and other others about how to respond collectively to something that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the whole Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, a matter of solving puzzles. >>> >>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about activity system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict with each other, which adds to the drama. >>> >>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of children) and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. >>> >>> >>> Helena >>> >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> >>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>> >>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I supervise >>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of them on >>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. They have >>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of labor. >>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they decided to >>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context mainly >>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the " unit >>>> of analysis". >>>> >>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden >>>> ??????: >>>> >>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was one of >>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept was >>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for me, was >>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this expression, I'd >>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to was a >>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology whilst >>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. >>>>> >>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It >>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes >>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new >>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for >>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, often >>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their supervisor. I >>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this point in >>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data they now >>>>> know they need. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. But, >>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I >>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that through >>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just >>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>> >>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm interested >>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how they >>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people doing >>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis being used? >>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very interested to >>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as basic as >>>>>> these. >>>>>> >>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much more >>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In Mike's >>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the action is >>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that >>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, are >>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of much >>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>> Katie >>>>>> >>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> ............................................................ >>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>> School of Education >>>> University of Ioannina >>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>> Ioannina >>>> Greece >>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>> >>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>> >>> >> >> > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Oct 12 18:16:40 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 02:16:40 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <76EF3C1C-DE83-42C7-A7CB-BC16DAF8B641@gmail.com> Message-ID: On 12 October 2014 03:40, Greg Thompson wrote: > Huw, > Can you give us a little more about the Nagel introduction? How does Nagel > make that error? > He critiques the predicate of the change (or difference) that Dewey asserts in the process of investigation/inquiry. Nagel's consideration of this change was merely the instrumental imposition rather than recognising the construal of the object as a construction and a difference. From his writing it was apparent to me that he misses this. The peculiarity is that this is the introduction to Dewey's volume on logic as inquiry. > > And if you happen to have an extra moment, I wonder if you could say a bit > about HOW Dewey makes the case for objects not existing prior to being > made-as-such? Well, I haven't dug very far. But its fairly clear from his letter that it is part of the process of inquiry, i.e. that one proposes the objects that one studies in the process of addressing a real problem upon which the inquiry is based. > I've been chatting elsewhere with Jay Lemke and others about > Bruno Latour's and Tim Ingold's separate uses of "correspondence" in ways > that go against the classical notions of "correspondence" as in > correspondence theory (i.e. the measure of the value of a science is the > extent to which it corresponds to reality). > Well, in the little I've read Dewey argued that social science exceeds natural science in certain dimensions of concreteness (if I remember correctly). But I think he was writing of a pre-quantum physics. As a mode of inquiry coherence would, I am surmising, be more valued than "correspondence" -- afterall, correspondence with what? > > I'm wondering how these views might be different from Dewey's take on the > matter (in a lot of ways, I'm sure, but also similar in others). But I > haven't read Dewey lately or with these ideas in mind and I could use a leg > up... > I don't know how they relate to your other theorists on correspondence. But I do know you won't get very far by orientation alone. By orientation, all you get to do is shake and feel the parcel (paraphrasing Hector from "The History Boys"). From what I can tell, Dewey would advocate getting technical with your authentic problem (which you would absolutely have to do to use it productively) and recognise that the problem of interest is part of the root of your inquiry. Perhaps not the "leg up" you were hoping for! Best, Huw > > Thanks, > -greg > > > > > > > On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 5:05 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > My own excursion has been to explore writings relating to Dewey (simply > > something I had out off and found time to explore). Which, it turns out, > > are (to my reading) another pithy way to express the logical problems I > was > > reading in David's narrative. But this might be because I already > > "understand" the problem. > > > > Anyway, the interesting writings were "A letter from Dewey" that is in > the > > appendix of "Knowing and Known" and Ernest Nagel's introduction to > Dewey's > > "Logic: The Theory of Inquiry". > > > > One of the rather interesting things about reading Nagel's introduction, > is > > that he makes an ontological error that Dewey referred to in his letter > (I > > believe). The error was that an "object" (not its referent) is > > existentially existent beyond and before its social construction. > > Something that we CHAT enthusiasts should be familiar with. > > > > Nevertheless (as a psychologist) I am interested in the truth of errors, > > and Nagel's introduction was certainly helpful in enlivening the prospect > > of the 500 page volume (vol. 12 of the later works). Of course, I could > be > > naively wrong about it, but all the pieces line up for me here, including > > some passages that are remarkably aligned with DE / El'konin-Davydov > > theory. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > On 11 October 2014 22:38, Henry G. Shonerd III > wrote: > > > > > Paul, > > > Let me think about it. I appreciate your reference to Derrida. I am > > > reading like crazy to keep up with you guys! > > > Henry > > > P.S. I am pretty dedicated to reading the references, links on the > XMCA. > > > But I use Wikipedia constantly. Is this a bad thing? > > > > > > > > > > > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 3:21 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Henry, > > > > > > > > Clearly, your bike riding belongs to the perlocutionary category. > But > > > what is the syntax and semantics that gave rise to it? The thinking > that > > > it leads to, or is there another declarative or imperative statement, > > I.e. > > > You are an environmentalists? This is where the searle/derrida debate > > > takes off. The issues of intentionality, continuity, discontinuity > are > > > that not also an aspect of language. Hence derrida ' s notion of the > > > potentiality for the deferment of meaning and why jacques lacan posits > > the > > > unconscious to be structured like language...to account for the > > > discontinuity of both language and the unconscious, which although we > can > > > think them apart are not. > > > > > > > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > > President > > > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > > www.mocombeian.com > > > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Henry G. > > > Shonerd III"
Date:10/11/2014 4:14 PM > > > (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to > > > broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
> > > >
Mike and Paul, > > > > Paul assumes your thinking about the XMCA dialog had nothing to do > with > > > your driving. I find that riding my bike to the university in the > morning > > > sets loose thinking about what's "on my plate" intellectually. The same > > > thing happens when I am dancing to music with others (I do Nia, very > > > popular in some places). Lakoff's claim that cognition is embodied is > > > typically related to metaphor, but I am interested in how the > > phonological > > > pole of language is iconic, not just with onomatopoeia, but with all > > forms > > > of sound symbolism. And I assume that the phonological pole is a subset > > of > > > the sematic pole. The indexical, iconic, symbolic aspects of language, > > > would it be fair to say they are on a continuum, rather than > > discontinuous? > > > Temporal aspects of language (including within speech and writing), > > > wouldn't they figure in with the making (including comprehension) of > > > meaning? I am sure David said as much back a while. Am I making sense > > that > > > relates at all to the on-going dialog? > > > > Henry > > > > > > > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 12:59 PM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" < > > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > > > > > >> Mike, > > > >> > > > >> My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about the > xmca > > > conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the speech > > act, > > > comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing. It is simply > > > background information for us the reader (I am not going to reiterate > the > > > debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue of > > > background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the way > > based > > > on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is correct > > on > > > the argument). > > > >> > > > >> Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological and > > > semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary, and > > > perlocutionary categories. This psychological act of thinking is the > > > element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking. However, > in > > > order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background, > > > intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private language, > for > > > example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech act? > > > Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing outside the > > text. > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > >> President > > > >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > >> www.mocombeian.com > > > >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > >> www.paulcmocombe.info > > > >> > > > >>
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > > > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/11/2014 1:10 PM (GMT-05:00) > > >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca > > discussion > > >
> > > >>
Thanks Paul -- > > > >> > > > >> Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same > > question: > > > >> How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation differ, > > Paul, > > > >> such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them? > > > >> > > > >> And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, David > Ke? > > > >> > > > >> What are the major implications of the differences?? > > > >> > > > >> mike > > > >> > > > >> On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > > > >> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > >> > > > >>> Martin, > > > >>> > > > >>> I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of > > speech > > > >>> act, but not austin's. > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > >>> President > > > >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > >>> www.mocombeian.com > > > >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > >>> www.paulcmocombe.info > > > >>> > > > >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole < > > > >>> mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/10/2014 7:48 PM (GMT-05:00) > > > >>>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > >>>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca > > > discussion > > > >>>
> > > >>>
Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking about > > the > > > >>> conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with > words, > > > but i > > > >>> was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was all a > > > jumble > > > >>> of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the > > belief > > > >>> that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? > > > >>> mike > > > >>> > > > >>> On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > > >>> wrote: > > > >>> > > > >>>> Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by recognizing > > that > > > >>>> both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting > > requires > > > >>>> ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the > > > world. > > > >>>> Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking > (thinking > > > with > > > >>>> words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in the > > > form > > > >>> of > > > >>>> new signs. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> ? > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Martin > > > >>>> > > > >>>> On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss > > wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by > > exploring > > > >>>>> *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT > > that > > > >>> word > > > >>>>> meaning is BEST understood - > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as > > > >>> operations, > > > >>>>> actions, and activities." > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word > meanings. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> -- > > > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > > an > > > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> -- > > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Oct 12 18:20:32 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 12:20:32 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV & ANL on the problem of the environment In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <543B28E0.7040003@mira.net> Mike, LSV *nowhere* says that perezhivanie is "a unit of analysis for the thought and emotion". I think what Julian said is quite precise: perezhivanie expresses a relation between, or a unity of, the person and their environment. LSV remarks in "Thinking and Speech" that word-meaning is a unity of speaking and thinking, but *also* a "unity of generalization and social interaction, a unity of thinking and communication." A good unit is specifically a unit of this and that, but it will almost always turn out to be a unity of a lot of other abstractions as well. I think it is important to stick to Julian's point: a unity - that is, a very specific relationship, between the person and their surroundings, one that involves characteristics of the person and characteristics of the environment, not the whole of both. To interpret "unity" as "union" or "sum" and take it to mean adding the whole person to the entire world crisis is an absurdity. LSV expresses the specificity of this relationship by (among several formulations) talking of the *significance* of the environment (or features of it) for the child or how the child *understands* the constellation of relations surrounding them. When we reflect on the relationship, we see that certain characteristics of the child and of the environment were active in the given perezhivanie. I think phrases like "unity of cognition and emotion" have arisen in Anglophone discussion in attempts to convey the content of perezhivanie in Russian culture. I think the point is that a perezhivanie (i.e., an event) is a whole, that is, like Dewey explains, it has its own unity, by which it stands out from the background of experience, it has a beginning and an end. In that sense, it involves the entire psyche - attention, will, intellect, affect - and it is misleading really to emphasise any or all of these psychological functions because it is only thanks to reflection and analysis that they are distinguished from what is whole and integral in a perezhivanie. A perezhivanie is as much about attention and will as it is about emotion and cognition. The point is that it arises from the relation between the person and their surroundings. Unfortunately, there are meanings implicit in the Russian word perezhivanie which are not spelt out by Vygotsky because they are obvious to his listeners. The translators have tried to help us out here by translating it as "emotional experience." It is "an experience" in the sense, as Dewey said, of an experience which stands out from the general background of experience; it is memorable/unforgettable; it is meaningful and significant. Etc. But Vygotysky doesn't discuss any of this. Andy http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/environment.htm ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Huw Lloyd wrote: > I've formulated some thoughts on first readings but need to do some cross > checking. I've some other commitments too, so probably won't be posting > these impressions till Tuesday. > > I suggest folk who would very much like to read these interesting (and > challenging) papers (but for whatever reason can't do so straightaway) push > out some dates in the near so that we hold off for you. > > In the mean-time, we can simply post up our impressions etc, and then do a > second stage exchange once everyone has had an opportunity to participate > in their initial sense-making / rumination / critiques. > > You can access the papers from Andy's earlier email here: > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/Current.Mail/msg00114.html > > Best, > Huw > > On 12 October 2014 20:40, mike cole wrote: > > >> Glad the summary cuts and pastes were helpful, Rod. My idea was that they >> might serve as a kind of "cliff notes" intro, which in your case was a >> reminder. I have done the same for the Shotter article on "withness" that >> you sent around, but have not had time to recover that part of the >> discussion and introduce it in a productive way. >> >> I can't at present go on to the ANL article, but will briefly comment on >> the Nicaraguan sign language example. I agree with your analysis. But I >> wanted to address my concern with the way the notion of the "ideal form" as >> the "end in the beginning" is that it seems to preclude any form of change >> that is not in the thrall of that ideal form to count as anything but >> deviation from the ideal, no room for transformation. I say "seems" because >> I know and value LSV's work on imagination and creativity at lot. Still, as >> formulated here, in the land where Comrade Stalin shaped what counted as >> the ideal form, it arose for me as an issue when I was re-reading it. >> >> I also want to inquire into the relationship between word meaning as a unit >> of analysis for the relation between thought and language, and perezhivanie >> as a unit of analysis for the thought and emotion. The pairing links >> language, thought, and emotion as constituents of experience >> (perezhivanie). >> >> I look forward to re-reading the ANL critique of LSV... later. >> mike >> >> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 12:09 PM, Rod Parker-Rees < >> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: >> >> >>> Many thanks for your digest of the LSV article, Mike. It is a while since >>> I last read it so this was a valuable refresher and meant I felt I could >>> >> go >> >>> straight to the ANL article which I have not seen before. >>> >>> Reading the ANL article I was acutely aware of the gulf between my >>> environment and that in which ANL was writing. Perhaps the fact that I >>> >> feel >> >>> this rather less when reading LSV is evidence of a closer fit between my >>> bourgeois environmenn and his. As I understand it, and I am far from >>> confident in this, ANL's main issue is with LSV's suggestion that >>> 'experiencing' or perezhivanie should be used as a unit of activity, >>> representing the indissoluble relationship between the environment and >>> >> the >> >>> individual. ANL appears to object to this because he sees experiencing as >>> an abstraction from activity which should be recognised as the true core >>> >> of >> >>> what makes us human. The argument that an environment is only an >>> environment FOR an active subject reminded me of Uetzkull's 'umwelt' the >>> unique world of experience constructed by an organism in the course of >>> >> its >> >>> activity (including its sensing activity) but I am not sure that ANL >>> justifies his insistence on not acknowleding experiencING as a form of >>> activity ('experience is a secondary and derivative fact' - p.22). >>> >>> ANL appears to be driven by a preference for 'putting the question in its >>> completely clear and bare form' (p.17) but this involves a series of >>> assertions and rhetorical strong-arm tactics which I find difficult to >>> accept. For example, he chooses to 'set aside the complicated idea of the >>> different course of development of the "spontaneous" and "scientific" >>> concepts' (p.18) - an idea which I have always found particularly helpful >>> and he insists that 'meaning always takes the form of the meaning of a >>> word' (p.18) - denying the possibility that a smile, a raised eyebrow, >>> rolled eyes or a raised fist could carry meaning. >>> >>> I am not sure that the creation of a sign language among Nicaraguan deaf >>> children can be taken as a counter example to LSV's argument that >>> >> children >> >>> are able to benefit from an environment which includes the 'ideal form' >>> >> of >> >>> abilities they are just beginning to develop. The children who were >>> >> brought >> >>> together from isolated families and then co-constructed a sophisticated >>> sign language may not have been surrounded by an 'ideal form' of language >>> which they could fully experience (I believe most were children of >>> >> hearing >> >>> parents and so experienced only a rudimentary, home-made form of >>> >> home-sign) >> >>> but they WERE surrounded by people who showed them that people >>> >> communicate >> >>> with each other so they were exposed to the 'ideal form' of >>> communication-mediated cooperative activity even if they were not able to >>> pick out the finer details of how it was achieved. As in other situations >>> where children grow up among people who use a simplified ('pidgin') form >>> >> of >> >>> communication, their sensitivity to patterns, rules and regularities >>> allowed them to refine it into a coherent, flexible language (a >>> >> 'creole'). >> >>> I am uncomfortable with the use of 'final form' as an alternative to >>> >> 'ideal >> >>> form' because every generation does similar things with the language it >>> inherits - adjusting and refining it to achieve a better fit with >>> >> changing >> >>> social practices. Indeed this (as well as the socio-political distance >>> between us) may explain some of the difficulties I have with ANL's way of >>> asserting his arguments. >>> >>> LSV acknowledged the important role of 'spontaneous concepts' - the often >>> unacknowledged intuitions which arise out of our unique patterns of >>> experience and which give 'body and vitality' to the more abstract, >>> >> 'clear >> >>> and bare' concepts which allow us to communicate with others - while ANL >>> would appear to prefer a tidier view of things. >>> >>> I look forward to hearing what others make of the comparison between the >>> two papers. >>> >>> All the best, >>> >>> Rod >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>> Sent: 12 October 2014 17:55 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse >>> >>> Diane- (I neglected to turn off my computer!). There are now more that >>> >> 800 >> >>> people signed up for XMCA. If every started typing at once, we might >>> >> crash >> >>> the ucsd server it sits on. And if it is just brownian motion in >>> >> alphabetic >> >>> characters, what's the point? It WOULD be good to hear from more people. >>> >> At >> >>> earlier times, i have tried to work out an arrangements where a dozen >>> partricipants each volunteered to organize a discussion on a topic of >>> potential interest for a month as a means of increasing breadth of >>> participation and points of view. It has never worked. >>> >>> Perhaps it could be tried again..... if someone other than me would like >>> >> to >> >>> organize it! >>> >>> Like henry, I use wikipedia a lot as a starting point. For the disucssion >>> of the LSV article on the environment I would recommend that people >>> google *senghas >>> nicaraguan sign language. *My conjecture is the the evidence of what >>> happens if a lot of deaf kids are brought together without access to an >>> appropriate "ideal form" (see the LSV paper for significance of that >>> >> term) >> >>> contradicts LSV's argument and has implications for general aspects of >>> theory. But first there has to be that co-reading so we are not simply >>> tangling each other up in a new way. >>> mike >>> >>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:44 AM, Diane Potts >>> >> wrote: >> >>>> >From one of the many lurkers... >>>> >>>> As a new academic and one who shares David Kellogg's interests in SFL, >>>> language education and socio-historical theory, I benefit tremendously >>>> >>> from >>> >>>> this listserv. I recommend it regularly to PhD students and hold it up >>>> >>> as >>> >>>> a model of an online community that has managed to continue to engage >>>> >> in >> >>>> lively discussions about current research with the participation of >>>> >>> senior >>> >>>> scholars. Centering those discussions on readings, at least to me, >>>> >> seems >> >>> to >>> >>>> be an effective means of carrying out the community's boundary work - >>>> >> not >> >>>> always pleasant work, I'll admit, but one that gives coherence to who >>>> >> we >> >>>> are. >>>> >>>> Diane Potts >>>> Lancaster University >>>> >>>> >>>>> From: leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com >>>>> Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 18:23:52 +0200 >>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse >>>>> >>>>> continue :-) >>>>> >>>>> Leif >>>>> Sweden >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> ________________________________ >>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >>> >>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for >>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on >>> >> it. >> >>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts >>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan >>> >> emails >> >>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility >>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied >>> by an official order form. >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Oct 12 18:22:40 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 18:22:40 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: NYTimes.com: Is E-Reading to Your Toddler Story Time, or Simply Screen Time? In-Reply-To: <543b28f2.094be50a.56fd.329fSMTPIN_ADDED_MISSING@mx.google.com> References: <543b28f2.094be50a.56fd.329fSMTPIN_ADDED_MISSING@mx.google.com> Message-ID: The medium appears to matter. mike Date: Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:20 PM Subject: NYTimes.com: Is E-Reading to Your Toddler Story Time, or Simply Screen Time? To: lchcmike@gmail.com Sent by sashacole510@gmail.com: Is E-Reading to Your Toddler Story Time, or Simply Screen Time? By DOUGLAS QUENQUA As children?s books, just like all the other ones, migrate to digital media, parents, pediatricians and researchers are struggling to find out if reading an e-book should be considered story time. Or, copy and paste this URL into your browser: http://nyti.ms/1xDQkux To get unlimited access to all New York Times articles, subscribe today. See Subscription Options. To ensure delivery to your inbox, please add nytdirect@nytimes.com to your address book. Advertisement Copyright 2014 | The New York Times Company | NYTimes.com 620 Eighth Avenue New York, NY 10018 -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Oct 12 18:43:53 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 01:43:53 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> Message-ID: <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic system with contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, and I already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before posting. Martin On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > On the contrary. > > To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about activity theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple example is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history corner of the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger footing in bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing new members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which division of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a leadership team that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which in turn will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky and quick, change your history. > > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies that, once one understands the relationships among the components, one can bring about changes in one component in the totality by acting on *another* component of the totality. >> >> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent elements that are only accidentally brought together. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the question is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method of analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components in a complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, which is often how students frame their research interest. And this means that the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: >>> >>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>> >>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It >>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes >>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >>>>> unit of analysis. >>>> >>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" The unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to accomplish. Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be late to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're talking about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were often away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out buying more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. >>>> >>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of the union and other others about how to respond collectively to something that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the whole Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, a matter of solving puzzles. >>>> >>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about activity system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>> >>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of children) and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. >>>> >>>> >>>> Helena >>>> >>>> >>>> Helena Worthen >>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>> >>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>> >>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I supervise >>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of them on >>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. They have >>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of labor. >>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they decided to >>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context mainly >>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the " unit >>>>> of analysis". >>>>> >>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden >>>>> ??????: >>>>> >>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was one of >>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept was >>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for me, was >>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this expression, I'd >>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to was a >>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology whilst >>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. >>>>>> >>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It >>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes >>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new >>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for >>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, often >>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their supervisor. I >>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this point in >>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data they now >>>>>> know they need. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. But, >>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I >>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that through >>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just >>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm interested >>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how they >>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people doing >>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis being used? >>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very interested to >>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as basic as >>>>>>> these. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much more >>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In Mike's >>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the action is >>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that >>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, are >>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of much >>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> ............................................................ >>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>> School of Education >>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>> Ioannina >>>>> Greece >>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>> >>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Oct 12 18:58:22 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 12:58:22 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> References: <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <543B31BE.3080804@mira.net> The interesting thing about that chapter, I think, Martin, is that after a protracted discussion of "unit of analysis" and a derivation of the triangle of triangles , he doesn't call the triangles a "unit of analysis" - he calls it a "root model". And I think is an apt characterisation of what it is. Andy http://lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Paper/Engestrom/expanding/ch2.htm ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) > > Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic system with contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, and I already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before posting. > > Martin > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > > >> On the contrary. >> >> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about activity theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple example is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history corner of the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger footing in bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing new members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which division of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a leadership team that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which in turn will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky and quick, change your history. >> >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >> >> >>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies that, once one understands the relationships among the components, one can bring about changes in one component in the totality by acting on *another* component of the totality. >>> >>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent elements that are only accidentally brought together. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the question is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method of analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components in a complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, which is often how students frame their research interest. And this means that the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It >>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes >>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >>>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>>> >>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" The unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to accomplish. Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be late to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're talking about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were often away from their desks and the whole phone syste >>>>> > m was unreliable. Also, a lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out buying more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. > >>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of the union and other others about how to respond collectively to something that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the whole Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, a matter of solving puzzles. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about activity system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>>>> >>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of children) and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Helena >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I supervise >>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of them on >>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. They have >>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of labor. >>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they decided to >>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context mainly >>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the " unit >>>>>> of analysis". >>>>>> >>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden >>>>>> ??????: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was one of >>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept was >>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for me, was >>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this expression, I'd >>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to was a >>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology whilst >>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It >>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes >>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new >>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for >>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, often >>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their supervisor. I >>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this point in >>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data they now >>>>>>> know they need. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. But, >>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I >>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that through >>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just >>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm interested >>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how they >>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people doing >>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis being used? >>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very interested to >>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as basic as >>>>>>>> these. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much more >>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In Mike's >>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the action is >>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that >>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, are >>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of much >>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>>> School of Education >>>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>>> Ioannina >>>>>> Greece >>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>> >>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Oct 12 20:19:03 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 20:19:03 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <76EF3C1C-DE83-42C7-A7CB-BC16DAF8B641@gmail.com> Message-ID: Huw and Greg et al-- Greg: And if you happen to have an extra moment, I wonder if you could say a bit > about HOW Dewey makes the case for objects not existing prior to being > made-as-such? Huw: Well, I haven't dug very far. But its fairly clear from his letter that it is part of the process of inquiry, i.e. that one proposes the objects that one studies in the process of addressing a real problem upon which the inquiry is based. Here is Mike's guess: In the process of inquiry, one is always imagining next moments. The object arises out of imagination, or the imagined turns out to be unembodied and returns to the hall of shadows. Quicker than a wink. mike On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:16 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > On 12 October 2014 03:40, Greg Thompson wrote: > > > Huw, > > Can you give us a little more about the Nagel introduction? How does > Nagel > > make that error? > > > > He critiques the predicate of the change (or difference) that Dewey asserts > in the process of investigation/inquiry. Nagel's consideration of this > change was merely the instrumental imposition rather than recognising the > construal of the object as a construction and a difference. From his > writing it was apparent to me that he misses this. The peculiarity is that > this is the introduction to Dewey's volume on logic as inquiry. > > > > > > And if you happen to have an extra moment, I wonder if you could say a > bit > > about HOW Dewey makes the case for objects not existing prior to being > > made-as-such? > > > Well, I haven't dug very far. But its fairly clear from his letter that it > is part of the process of inquiry, i.e. that one proposes the objects that > one studies in the process of addressing a real problem upon which the > inquiry is based. > > > > I've been chatting elsewhere with Jay Lemke and others about > > Bruno Latour's and Tim Ingold's separate uses of "correspondence" in ways > > that go against the classical notions of "correspondence" as in > > correspondence theory (i.e. the measure of the value of a science is the > > extent to which it corresponds to reality). > > > > Well, in the little I've read Dewey argued that social science exceeds > natural science in certain dimensions of concreteness (if I remember > correctly). But I think he was writing of a pre-quantum physics. As a > mode of inquiry coherence would, I am surmising, be more valued than > "correspondence" -- afterall, correspondence with what? > > > > > > I'm wondering how these views might be different from Dewey's take on the > > matter (in a lot of ways, I'm sure, but also similar in others). But I > > haven't read Dewey lately or with these ideas in mind and I could use a > leg > > up... > > > > I don't know how they relate to your other theorists on correspondence. > But I do know you won't get very far by orientation alone. By orientation, > all you get to do is shake and feel the parcel (paraphrasing Hector from > "The History Boys"). From what I can tell, Dewey would advocate getting > technical with your authentic problem (which you would absolutely have to > do to use it productively) and recognise that the problem of interest is > part of the root of your inquiry. Perhaps not the "leg up" you were hoping > for! > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > Thanks, > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 5:05 PM, Huw Lloyd > > wrote: > > > > > My own excursion has been to explore writings relating to Dewey (simply > > > something I had out off and found time to explore). Which, it turns > out, > > > are (to my reading) another pithy way to express the logical problems I > > was > > > reading in David's narrative. But this might be because I already > > > "understand" the problem. > > > > > > Anyway, the interesting writings were "A letter from Dewey" that is in > > the > > > appendix of "Knowing and Known" and Ernest Nagel's introduction to > > Dewey's > > > "Logic: The Theory of Inquiry". > > > > > > One of the rather interesting things about reading Nagel's > introduction, > > is > > > that he makes an ontological error that Dewey referred to in his letter > > (I > > > believe). The error was that an "object" (not its referent) is > > > existentially existent beyond and before its social construction. > > > Something that we CHAT enthusiasts should be familiar with. > > > > > > Nevertheless (as a psychologist) I am interested in the truth of > errors, > > > and Nagel's introduction was certainly helpful in enlivening the > prospect > > > of the 500 page volume (vol. 12 of the later works). Of course, I > could > > be > > > naively wrong about it, but all the pieces line up for me here, > including > > > some passages that are remarkably aligned with DE / El'konin-Davydov > > > theory. > > > > > > Best, > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 October 2014 22:38, Henry G. Shonerd III > > wrote: > > > > > > > Paul, > > > > Let me think about it. I appreciate your reference to Derrida. I am > > > > reading like crazy to keep up with you guys! > > > > Henry > > > > P.S. I am pretty dedicated to reading the references, links on the > > XMCA. > > > > But I use Wikipedia constantly. Is this a bad thing? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 3:21 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Henry, > > > > > > > > > > Clearly, your bike riding belongs to the perlocutionary category. > > But > > > > what is the syntax and semantics that gave rise to it? The thinking > > that > > > > it leads to, or is there another declarative or imperative statement, > > > I.e. > > > > You are an environmentalists? This is where the searle/derrida > debate > > > > takes off. The issues of intentionality, continuity, discontinuity > > are > > > > that not also an aspect of language. Hence derrida ' s notion of the > > > > potentiality for the deferment of meaning and why jacques lacan > posits > > > the > > > > unconscious to be structured like language...to account for the > > > > discontinuity of both language and the unconscious, which although we > > can > > > > think them apart are not. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > > > President > > > > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > > > www.mocombeian.com > > > > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Henry G. > > > > Shonerd III"
Date:10/11/2014 4:14 > PM > > > > (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to > > > > broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
> > > > >
Mike and Paul, > > > > > Paul assumes your thinking about the XMCA dialog had nothing to do > > with > > > > your driving. I find that riding my bike to the university in the > > morning > > > > sets loose thinking about what's "on my plate" intellectually. The > same > > > > thing happens when I am dancing to music with others (I do Nia, very > > > > popular in some places). Lakoff's claim that cognition is embodied is > > > > typically related to metaphor, but I am interested in how the > > > phonological > > > > pole of language is iconic, not just with onomatopoeia, but with all > > > forms > > > > of sound symbolism. And I assume that the phonological pole is a > subset > > > of > > > > the sematic pole. The indexical, iconic, symbolic aspects of > language, > > > > would it be fair to say they are on a continuum, rather than > > > discontinuous? > > > > Temporal aspects of language (including within speech and writing), > > > > wouldn't they figure in with the making (including comprehension) of > > > > meaning? I am sure David said as much back a while. Am I making sense > > > that > > > > relates at all to the on-going dialog? > > > > > Henry > > > > > > > > > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 12:59 PM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" < > > > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > >> Mike, > > > > >> > > > > >> My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about the > > xmca > > > > conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the speech > > > act, > > > > comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing. It is simply > > > > background information for us the reader (I am not going to reiterate > > the > > > > debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue of > > > > background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the way > > > based > > > > on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is > correct > > > on > > > > the argument). > > > > >> > > > > >> Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological > and > > > > semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary, > and > > > > perlocutionary categories. This psychological act of thinking is the > > > > element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking. > However, > > in > > > > order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background, > > > > intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private language, > > for > > > > example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech act? > > > > Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing outside > the > > > text. > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > > >> President > > > > >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > > >> www.mocombeian.com > > > > >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > > >> www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > >> > > > > >>
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole > < > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/11/2014 1:10 PM (GMT-05:00) > > > >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca > > > discussion > > > >
> > > > >>
Thanks Paul -- > > > > >> > > > > >> Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same > > > question: > > > > >> How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation differ, > > > Paul, > > > > >> such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them? > > > > >> > > > > >> And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, David > > Ke? > > > > >> > > > > >> What are the major implications of the differences?? > > > > >> > > > > >> mike > > > > >> > > > > >> On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > > > > >> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>> Martin, > > > > >>> > > > > >>> I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory of > > > speech > > > > >>> act, but not austin's. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > > >>> President > > > > >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > > >>> www.mocombeian.com > > > > >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > > >>> www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > >>> > > > > >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: mike > cole < > > > > >>> mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/10/2014 7:48 PM (GMT-05:00) > > > > >>>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > > >>>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca > > > > discussion > > > > >>>
> > > > >>>
Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking > about > > > the > > > > >>> conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with > > words, > > > > but i > > > > >>> was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was > all a > > > > jumble > > > > >>> of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with the > > > belief > > > > >>> that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? > > > > >>> mike > > > > >>> > > > > >>> On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > >>> > > > > >>>> Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by > recognizing > > > that > > > > >>>> both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting > > > requires > > > > >>>> ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in the > > > > world. > > > > >>>> Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking > > (thinking > > > > with > > > > >>>> words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in > the > > > > form > > > > >>> of > > > > >>>> new signs. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> ? > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> Martin > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss > > > wrote: > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by > > > exploring > > > > >>>>> *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY INSIGHT > > > that > > > > >>> word > > > > >>>>> meaning is BEST understood - > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as > > > > >>> operations, > > > > >>>>> actions, and activities." > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word > > meanings. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> -- > > > > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with > > > an > > > > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> -- > > > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with > > an > > > > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Oct 12 20:26:44 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 20:26:44 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such that two atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to water with its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise to the concrete for their own cases. mike On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) > > Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic system with > contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, and I > already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before posting. > > Martin > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen > wrote: > > > On the contrary. > > > > To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about activity > theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple example > is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history corner of > the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger footing in > bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing new > members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which division > of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a leadership team > that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which in turn > will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky and > quick, change your history. > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > > >> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies that, > once one understands the relationships among the components, one can bring > about changes in one component in the totality by acting on *another* > component of the totality. > >> > >> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of > relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent elements that > are only accidentally brought together. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >> > >>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the question > is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method of > analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components in a > complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, which > is often how students frame their research interest. And this means that > the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. > >>> > >>> Martin > >>> > >>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen > wrote: > >>> > >>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very > down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses > to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule > changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: > >>>> > >>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > *insight*. It > >>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is > the > >>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It > usually comes > >>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some > other > >>>>> unit of analysis. > >>>> > >>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question > lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" The > unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to accomplish. > Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying > get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, > clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be late > to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss > work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're talking > about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged > minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be > responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but > being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then > keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were often > away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a > lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening > (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out buying > more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. > >>>> > >>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, > here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of > the union and other others about how to respond collectively to something > that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so > that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended > family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can > carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the whole > Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, a > matter of solving puzzles. > >>>> > >>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to > a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about activity > system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict > with each other, which adds to the drama. > >>>> > >>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? > Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or > the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting > would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of children) > and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Helena > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Helena Worthen > >>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>>> > >>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I > supervise > >>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of > them on > >>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. They > have > >>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of > >>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of > labor. > >>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they > decided to > >>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context > mainly > >>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the > " unit > >>>>> of analysis". > >>>>> > >>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < > ablunden@mira.net> > >>>>> ??????: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was > one of > >>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept > was > >>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for > me, was > >>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this > expression, I'd > >>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to > was a > >>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology > whilst > >>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > *insight*. It > >>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it > is the > >>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It > usually comes > >>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some > other > >>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new > >>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for > >>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, > often > >>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their > supervisor. I > >>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this > point in > >>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data > they now > >>>>>> know they need. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two > articles. But, > >>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. > I > >>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that > through > >>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually > just > >>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm > interested > >>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and > how they > >>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people > doing > >>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis > being used? > >>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very > interested to > >>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as > basic as > >>>>>>> these. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a > much more > >>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In > Mike's > >>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the > action is > >>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that > >>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, > are > >>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of > much > >>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. > >>>>>>> Katie > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal > >>>>>>> University of Georgia > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> ............................................................ > >>>>> Katerina Plakitsi > >>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education > >>>>> School of Education > >>>>> University of Ioannina > >>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 > >>>>> Ioannina > >>>>> Greece > >>>>> tel. +302651005771 > >>>>> fax. +302651005842 > >>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 > >>>>> > >>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits > >>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr > >>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Oct 12 20:28:30 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 03:28:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <543B31BE.3080804@mira.net> References: <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B31BE.3080804@mira.net> Message-ID: <8BF84990-236B-4ED7-BDBF-55E76E8972A5@uniandes.edu.co> Yes, I don't take it to be a unit of analysis, Andy. It's intended as a model of the entire system, within which an analysis would focus on a component. Marin On Oct 12, 2014, at 8:58 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > The interesting thing about that chapter, I think, Martin, is that after a protracted discussion of "unit of analysis" and a derivation of the triangle of triangles , he doesn't call the triangles a "unit of analysis" - he calls it a "root model". And I think is an apt characterisation of what it is. > Andy > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Paper/Engestrom/expanding/ch2.htm > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >> >> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic system with contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, and I already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before posting. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: >> >> >>> On the contrary. >>> >>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about activity theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple example is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history corner of the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger footing in bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing new members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which division of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a leadership team that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which in turn will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky and quick, change your history. >>> >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> >>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>> >>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies that, once one understands the relationships among the components, one can bring about changes in one component in the totality by acting on *another* component of the totality. >>>> >>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent elements that are only accidentally brought together. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the question is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method of analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components in a complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, which is often how students frame their research interest. And this means that the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It >>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes >>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >>>>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>>>> >>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" The unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to accomplish. Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be late to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're talking about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were often away from their desks and the whole phone syste >>>>>> >> m was unreliable. Also, a lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out buying more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. >> >>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of the union and other others about how to respond collectively to something that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the whole Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, a matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>> >>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about activity system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>>>>> >>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of children) and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Helena >>>>>> >>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>> >>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I supervise >>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of them on >>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. They have >>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of labor. >>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they decided to >>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context mainly >>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the " unit >>>>>>> of analysis". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden >>>>>>> ??????: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was one of >>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept was >>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for me, was >>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this expression, I'd >>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to was a >>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology whilst >>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It >>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the >>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes >>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other >>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new >>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for >>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, often >>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their supervisor. I >>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this point in >>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data they now >>>>>>>> know they need. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. But, >>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I >>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that through >>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just >>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm interested >>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how they >>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people doing >>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis being used? >>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very interested to >>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as basic as >>>>>>>>> these. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much more >>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In Mike's >>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the action is >>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that >>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, are >>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of much >>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>>>> School of Education >>>>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>>>> Ioannina >>>>>>> Greece >>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun Oct 12 21:10:06 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 22:10:06 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <76EF3C1C-DE83-42C7-A7CB-BC16DAF8B641@gmail.com> Message-ID: Mike and Huw, I have some fear that this will be a distraction from the main thread but briefly, Huw, that is helpful as I inch toward an understanding of how we might get out of coherence vs. correspondence dualism. Latour (sorry for introducing outsiders here! He is an important social theorist, esp. in anthropology, and has published in MCA, so there's that...) says that the "real" is that which "pushes back." I feel like he is in some ways paraphrasing Dewey here, but I haven't quite been able to find where we might find something like that in Dewey. Perhaps you can keep an eye out as you read? Mike, I'm still processing/imagining your comments. Unknown whether they will return to the hall of shadows or become a real object for me. -greg On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:19 PM, mike cole wrote: > Huw and Greg et al-- > > Greg: And if you happen to have an extra moment, I wonder if you could say > a bit > > about HOW Dewey makes the case for objects not existing prior to being > > made-as-such? > > > Huw: Well, I haven't dug very far. But its fairly clear from his letter > that it > is part of the process of inquiry, i.e. that one proposes the objects that > one studies in the process of addressing a real problem upon which the > inquiry is based. > > Here is Mike's guess: > In the process of inquiry, one is always imagining next moments. The object > arises out of imagination, or the imagined turns out to be unembodied and > returns to the hall of shadows. > > Quicker than a wink. > mike > > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:16 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > On 12 October 2014 03:40, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > > > Huw, > > > Can you give us a little more about the Nagel introduction? How does > > Nagel > > > make that error? > > > > > > > He critiques the predicate of the change (or difference) that Dewey > asserts > > in the process of investigation/inquiry. Nagel's consideration of this > > change was merely the instrumental imposition rather than recognising the > > construal of the object as a construction and a difference. From his > > writing it was apparent to me that he misses this. The peculiarity is > that > > this is the introduction to Dewey's volume on logic as inquiry. > > > > > > > > > > And if you happen to have an extra moment, I wonder if you could say a > > bit > > > about HOW Dewey makes the case for objects not existing prior to being > > > made-as-such? > > > > > > Well, I haven't dug very far. But its fairly clear from his letter that > it > > is part of the process of inquiry, i.e. that one proposes the objects > that > > one studies in the process of addressing a real problem upon which the > > inquiry is based. > > > > > > > I've been chatting elsewhere with Jay Lemke and others about > > > Bruno Latour's and Tim Ingold's separate uses of "correspondence" in > ways > > > that go against the classical notions of "correspondence" as in > > > correspondence theory (i.e. the measure of the value of a science is > the > > > extent to which it corresponds to reality). > > > > > > > Well, in the little I've read Dewey argued that social science exceeds > > natural science in certain dimensions of concreteness (if I remember > > correctly). But I think he was writing of a pre-quantum physics. As a > > mode of inquiry coherence would, I am surmising, be more valued than > > "correspondence" -- afterall, correspondence with what? > > > > > > > > > > I'm wondering how these views might be different from Dewey's take on > the > > > matter (in a lot of ways, I'm sure, but also similar in others). But I > > > haven't read Dewey lately or with these ideas in mind and I could use a > > leg > > > up... > > > > > > > I don't know how they relate to your other theorists on correspondence. > > But I do know you won't get very far by orientation alone. By > orientation, > > all you get to do is shake and feel the parcel (paraphrasing Hector from > > "The History Boys"). From what I can tell, Dewey would advocate getting > > technical with your authentic problem (which you would absolutely have to > > do to use it productively) and recognise that the problem of interest is > > part of the root of your inquiry. Perhaps not the "leg up" you were > hoping > > for! > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > Thanks, > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 5:05 PM, Huw Lloyd > > > wrote: > > > > > > > My own excursion has been to explore writings relating to Dewey > (simply > > > > something I had out off and found time to explore). Which, it turns > > out, > > > > are (to my reading) another pithy way to express the logical > problems I > > > was > > > > reading in David's narrative. But this might be because I already > > > > "understand" the problem. > > > > > > > > Anyway, the interesting writings were "A letter from Dewey" that is > in > > > the > > > > appendix of "Knowing and Known" and Ernest Nagel's introduction to > > > Dewey's > > > > "Logic: The Theory of Inquiry". > > > > > > > > One of the rather interesting things about reading Nagel's > > introduction, > > > is > > > > that he makes an ontological error that Dewey referred to in his > letter > > > (I > > > > believe). The error was that an "object" (not its referent) is > > > > existentially existent beyond and before its social construction. > > > > Something that we CHAT enthusiasts should be familiar with. > > > > > > > > Nevertheless (as a psychologist) I am interested in the truth of > > errors, > > > > and Nagel's introduction was certainly helpful in enlivening the > > prospect > > > > of the 500 page volume (vol. 12 of the later works). Of course, I > > could > > > be > > > > naively wrong about it, but all the pieces line up for me here, > > including > > > > some passages that are remarkably aligned with DE / El'konin-Davydov > > > > theory. > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 October 2014 22:38, Henry G. Shonerd III > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Paul, > > > > > Let me think about it. I appreciate your reference to Derrida. I am > > > > > reading like crazy to keep up with you guys! > > > > > Henry > > > > > P.S. I am pretty dedicated to reading the references, links on the > > > XMCA. > > > > > But I use Wikipedia constantly. Is this a bad thing? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 3:21 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > > > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Henry, > > > > > > > > > > > > Clearly, your bike riding belongs to the perlocutionary category. > > > But > > > > > what is the syntax and semantics that gave rise to it? The > thinking > > > that > > > > > it leads to, or is there another declarative or imperative > statement, > > > > I.e. > > > > > You are an environmentalists? This is where the searle/derrida > > debate > > > > > takes off. The issues of intentionality, continuity, > discontinuity > > > are > > > > > that not also an aspect of language. Hence derrida ' s notion of > the > > > > > potentiality for the deferment of meaning and why jacques lacan > > posits > > > > the > > > > > unconscious to be structured like language...to account for the > > > > > discontinuity of both language and the unconscious, which although > we > > > can > > > > > think them apart are not. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > > > > President > > > > > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > > > > www.mocombeian.com > > > > > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > > > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > > > > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Henry G. > > > > > Shonerd III"
Date:10/11/2014 4:14 > > PM > > > > > (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to > > > > > broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
> > > > > >
Mike and Paul, > > > > > > Paul assumes your thinking about the XMCA dialog had nothing to > do > > > with > > > > > your driving. I find that riding my bike to the university in the > > > morning > > > > > sets loose thinking about what's "on my plate" intellectually. The > > same > > > > > thing happens when I am dancing to music with others (I do Nia, > very > > > > > popular in some places). Lakoff's claim that cognition is embodied > is > > > > > typically related to metaphor, but I am interested in how the > > > > phonological > > > > > pole of language is iconic, not just with onomatopoeia, but with > all > > > > forms > > > > > of sound symbolism. And I assume that the phonological pole is a > > subset > > > > of > > > > > the sematic pole. The indexical, iconic, symbolic aspects of > > language, > > > > > would it be fair to say they are on a continuum, rather than > > > > discontinuous? > > > > > Temporal aspects of language (including within speech and writing), > > > > > wouldn't they figure in with the making (including comprehension) > of > > > > > meaning? I am sure David said as much back a while. Am I making > sense > > > > that > > > > > relates at all to the on-going dialog? > > > > > > Henry > > > > > > > > > > > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 12:59 PM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" < > > > > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > >> Mike, > > > > > >> > > > > > >> My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about > the > > > xmca > > > > > conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the > speech > > > > act, > > > > > comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing. It is > simply > > > > > background information for us the reader (I am not going to > reiterate > > > the > > > > > debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue > of > > > > > background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the > way > > > > based > > > > > on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is > > correct > > > > on > > > > > the argument). > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely psychological > > and > > > > > semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, illocutionary, > > and > > > > > perlocutionary categories. This psychological act of thinking is > the > > > > > element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking. > > However, > > > in > > > > > order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background, > > > > > intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private > language, > > > for > > > > > example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech act? > > > > > Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing outside > > the > > > > text. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > > > >> President > > > > > >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > > > >> www.mocombeian.com > > > > > >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > > > >> www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > >> > > > > > >>
-------- Original message --------
From: mike > cole > > < > > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/11/2014 1:10 PM (GMT-05:00) > > > > >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > > >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca > > > > discussion > > > > >
> > > > > >>
Thanks Paul -- > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same > > > > question: > > > > > >> How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation > differ, > > > > Paul, > > > > > >> such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them? > > > > > >> > > > > > >> And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, > David > > > Ke? > > > > > >> > > > > > >> What are the major implications of the differences?? > > > > > >> > > > > > >> mike > > > > > >> > > > > > >> On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > > > > > >> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >>> Martin, > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory > of > > > > speech > > > > > >>> act, but not austin's. > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > > > >>> President > > > > > >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > > > >>> www.mocombeian.com > > > > > >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > > > >>> www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: mike > > cole < > > > > > >>> mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/10/2014 7:48 PM > (GMT-05:00) > > > > > >>>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > > > >>>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the > xmca > > > > > discussion > > > > > >>>
> > > > > >>>
Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking > > about > > > > the > > > > > >>> conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with > > > words, > > > > > but i > > > > > >>> was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was > > all a > > > > > jumble > > > > > >>> of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with > the > > > > belief > > > > > >>> that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? > > > > > >>> mike > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > > > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>>> Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by > > recognizing > > > > that > > > > > >>>> both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? Acting > > > > requires > > > > > >>>> ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in > the > > > > > world. > > > > > >>>> Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking > > > (thinking > > > > > with > > > > > >>>> words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation in > > the > > > > > form > > > > > >>> of > > > > > >>>> new signs. > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> ? > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> Martin > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by > > > > exploring > > > > > >>>>> *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY > INSIGHT > > > > that > > > > > >>> word > > > > > >>>>> meaning is BEST understood - > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN as > > > > > >>> operations, > > > > > >>>>> actions, and activities." > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word > > > meanings. > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> -- > > > > > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > > with > > > > an > > > > > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> -- > > > > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > > with > > > an > > > > > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Oct 12 21:36:34 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 04:36:34 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not a dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: water is a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an internal tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) Martin On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: > Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such that two > atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to water with > its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise to the > concrete for their own cases. > mike > > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >> >> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic system with >> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, and I >> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before posting. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen >> wrote: >> >>> On the contrary. >>> >>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about activity >> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple example >> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history corner of >> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger footing in >> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing new >> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which division >> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a leadership team >> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which in turn >> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky and >> quick, change your history. >>> >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> >>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies that, >> once one understands the relationships among the components, one can bring >> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on *another* >> component of the totality. >>>> >>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of >> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent elements that >> are only accidentally brought together. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the question >> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method of >> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components in a >> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, which >> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means that >> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen >> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses >> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule >> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>>>> >>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >> *insight*. It >>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is >> the >>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >> usually comes >>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some >> other >>>>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>>> >>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question >> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" The >> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to accomplish. >> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying >> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, >> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be late >> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss >> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're talking >> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged >> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be >> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but >> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then >> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were often >> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a >> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening >> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out buying >> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. >>>>>> >>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, >> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of >> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to something >> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so >> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended >> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can >> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the whole >> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, a >> matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>> >>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to >> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about activity >> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict >> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>>>> >>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? >> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or >> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting >> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of children) >> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Helena >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>> >>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I >> supervise >>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of >> them on >>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. They >> have >>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of >> labor. >>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they >> decided to >>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context >> mainly >>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the >> " unit >>>>>>> of analysis". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < >> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>> ??????: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was >> one of >>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept >> was >>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for >> me, was >>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this >> expression, I'd >>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to >> was a >>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology >> whilst >>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >> *insight*. It >>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it >> is the >>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >> usually comes >>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some >> other >>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new >>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for >>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, >> often >>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their >> supervisor. I >>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this >> point in >>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data >> they now >>>>>>>> know they need. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two >> articles. But, >>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. >> I >>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that >> through >>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually >> just >>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm >> interested >>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and >> how they >>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people >> doing >>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis >> being used? >>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >> interested to >>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as >> basic as >>>>>>>>> these. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a >> much more >>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In >> Mike's >>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the >> action is >>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that >>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, >> are >>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of >> much >>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>>>> School of Education >>>>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>>>> Ioannina >>>>>>> Greece >>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Oct 12 21:37:32 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 21:37:32 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <76EF3C1C-DE83-42C7-A7CB-BC16DAF8B641@gmail.com> Message-ID: Keep pushing ahead and time will tell, Greg. If there is no pushback you have achieved perpetual free motion! :-)) mike On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:10 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Mike and Huw, > I have some fear that this will be a distraction from the main thread but > briefly, Huw, that is helpful as I inch toward an understanding of how we > might get out of coherence vs. correspondence dualism. Latour (sorry for > introducing outsiders here! He is an important social theorist, esp. in > anthropology, and has published in MCA, so there's that...) says that the > "real" is that which "pushes back." I feel like he is in some ways > paraphrasing Dewey here, but I haven't quite been able to find where we > might find something like that in Dewey. Perhaps you can keep an eye out as > you read? > > Mike, I'm still processing/imagining your comments. Unknown whether they > will return to the hall of shadows or become a real object for me. > > -greg > > > > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:19 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Huw and Greg et al-- > > > > Greg: And if you happen to have an extra moment, I wonder if you could > say > > a bit > > > about HOW Dewey makes the case for objects not existing prior to being > > > made-as-such? > > > > > > Huw: Well, I haven't dug very far. But its fairly clear from his letter > > that it > > is part of the process of inquiry, i.e. that one proposes the objects > that > > one studies in the process of addressing a real problem upon which the > > inquiry is based. > > > > Here is Mike's guess: > > In the process of inquiry, one is always imagining next moments. The > object > > arises out of imagination, or the imagined turns out to be unembodied and > > returns to the hall of shadows. > > > > Quicker than a wink. > > mike > > > > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:16 PM, Huw Lloyd > > wrote: > > > > > On 12 October 2014 03:40, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > > > > > Huw, > > > > Can you give us a little more about the Nagel introduction? How does > > > Nagel > > > > make that error? > > > > > > > > > > He critiques the predicate of the change (or difference) that Dewey > > asserts > > > in the process of investigation/inquiry. Nagel's consideration of this > > > change was merely the instrumental imposition rather than recognising > the > > > construal of the object as a construction and a difference. From his > > > writing it was apparent to me that he misses this. The peculiarity is > > that > > > this is the introduction to Dewey's volume on logic as inquiry. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > And if you happen to have an extra moment, I wonder if you could say > a > > > bit > > > > about HOW Dewey makes the case for objects not existing prior to > being > > > > made-as-such? > > > > > > > > > Well, I haven't dug very far. But its fairly clear from his letter > that > > it > > > is part of the process of inquiry, i.e. that one proposes the objects > > that > > > one studies in the process of addressing a real problem upon which the > > > inquiry is based. > > > > > > > > > > I've been chatting elsewhere with Jay Lemke and others about > > > > Bruno Latour's and Tim Ingold's separate uses of "correspondence" in > > ways > > > > that go against the classical notions of "correspondence" as in > > > > correspondence theory (i.e. the measure of the value of a science is > > the > > > > extent to which it corresponds to reality). > > > > > > > > > > Well, in the little I've read Dewey argued that social science exceeds > > > natural science in certain dimensions of concreteness (if I remember > > > correctly). But I think he was writing of a pre-quantum physics. As a > > > mode of inquiry coherence would, I am surmising, be more valued than > > > "correspondence" -- afterall, correspondence with what? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I'm wondering how these views might be different from Dewey's take on > > the > > > > matter (in a lot of ways, I'm sure, but also similar in others). But > I > > > > haven't read Dewey lately or with these ideas in mind and I could > use a > > > leg > > > > up... > > > > > > > > > > I don't know how they relate to your other theorists on correspondence. > > > But I do know you won't get very far by orientation alone. By > > orientation, > > > all you get to do is shake and feel the parcel (paraphrasing Hector > from > > > "The History Boys"). From what I can tell, Dewey would advocate > getting > > > technical with your authentic problem (which you would absolutely have > to > > > do to use it productively) and recognise that the problem of interest > is > > > part of the root of your inquiry. Perhaps not the "leg up" you were > > hoping > > > for! > > > > > > Best, > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks, > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 5:05 PM, Huw Lloyd < > huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > My own excursion has been to explore writings relating to Dewey > > (simply > > > > > something I had out off and found time to explore). Which, it > turns > > > out, > > > > > are (to my reading) another pithy way to express the logical > > problems I > > > > was > > > > > reading in David's narrative. But this might be because I already > > > > > "understand" the problem. > > > > > > > > > > Anyway, the interesting writings were "A letter from Dewey" that is > > in > > > > the > > > > > appendix of "Knowing and Known" and Ernest Nagel's introduction to > > > > Dewey's > > > > > "Logic: The Theory of Inquiry". > > > > > > > > > > One of the rather interesting things about reading Nagel's > > > introduction, > > > > is > > > > > that he makes an ontological error that Dewey referred to in his > > letter > > > > (I > > > > > believe). The error was that an "object" (not its referent) is > > > > > existentially existent beyond and before its social construction. > > > > > Something that we CHAT enthusiasts should be familiar with. > > > > > > > > > > Nevertheless (as a psychologist) I am interested in the truth of > > > errors, > > > > > and Nagel's introduction was certainly helpful in enlivening the > > > prospect > > > > > of the 500 page volume (vol. 12 of the later works). Of course, I > > > could > > > > be > > > > > naively wrong about it, but all the pieces line up for me here, > > > including > > > > > some passages that are remarkably aligned with DE / > El'konin-Davydov > > > > > theory. > > > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 October 2014 22:38, Henry G. Shonerd III > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Paul, > > > > > > Let me think about it. I appreciate your reference to Derrida. I > am > > > > > > reading like crazy to keep up with you guys! > > > > > > Henry > > > > > > P.S. I am pretty dedicated to reading the references, links on > the > > > > XMCA. > > > > > > But I use Wikipedia constantly. Is this a bad thing? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 3:21 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > > > > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > Henry, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Clearly, your bike riding belongs to the perlocutionary > category. > > > > But > > > > > > what is the syntax and semantics that gave rise to it? The > > thinking > > > > that > > > > > > it leads to, or is there another declarative or imperative > > statement, > > > > > I.e. > > > > > > You are an environmentalists? This is where the searle/derrida > > > debate > > > > > > takes off. The issues of intentionality, continuity, > > discontinuity > > > > are > > > > > > that not also an aspect of language. Hence derrida ' s notion of > > the > > > > > > potentiality for the deferment of meaning and why jacques lacan > > > posits > > > > > the > > > > > > unconscious to be structured like language...to account for the > > > > > > discontinuity of both language and the unconscious, which > although > > we > > > > can > > > > > > think them apart are not. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > > > > > President > > > > > > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > > > > > www.mocombeian.com > > > > > > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > > > > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Henry > G. > > > > > > Shonerd III"
Date:10/11/2014 > 4:14 > > > PM > > > > > > (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > > > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to > > > > > > broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
> > > > > > >
Mike and Paul, > > > > > > > Paul assumes your thinking about the XMCA dialog had nothing to > > do > > > > with > > > > > > your driving. I find that riding my bike to the university in the > > > > morning > > > > > > sets loose thinking about what's "on my plate" intellectually. > The > > > same > > > > > > thing happens when I am dancing to music with others (I do Nia, > > very > > > > > > popular in some places). Lakoff's claim that cognition is > embodied > > is > > > > > > typically related to metaphor, but I am interested in how the > > > > > phonological > > > > > > pole of language is iconic, not just with onomatopoeia, but with > > all > > > > > forms > > > > > > of sound symbolism. And I assume that the phonological pole is a > > > subset > > > > > of > > > > > > the sematic pole. The indexical, iconic, symbolic aspects of > > > language, > > > > > > would it be fair to say they are on a continuum, rather than > > > > > discontinuous? > > > > > > Temporal aspects of language (including within speech and > writing), > > > > > > wouldn't they figure in with the making (including comprehension) > > of > > > > > > meaning? I am sure David said as much back a while. Am I making > > sense > > > > > that > > > > > > relates at all to the on-going dialog? > > > > > > > Henry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 12:59 PM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" < > > > > > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> Mike, > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about > > the > > > > xmca > > > > > > conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the > > speech > > > > > act, > > > > > > comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing. It is > > simply > > > > > > background information for us the reader (I am not going to > > reiterate > > > > the > > > > > > debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue > > of > > > > > > background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the > > way > > > > > based > > > > > > on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is > > > correct > > > > > on > > > > > > the argument). > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely > psychological > > > and > > > > > > semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, > illocutionary, > > > and > > > > > > perlocutionary categories. This psychological act of thinking is > > the > > > > > > element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking. > > > However, > > > > in > > > > > > order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background, > > > > > > intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private > > language, > > > > for > > > > > > example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech > act? > > > > > > Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing > outside > > > the > > > > > text. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > > > > >> President > > > > > > >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > > > > >> www.mocombeian.com > > > > > > >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > > > > >> www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >>
-------- Original message --------
From: mike > > cole > > > < > > > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/11/2014 1:10 PM (GMT-05:00) > > > > > >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > > > >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca > > > > > discussion > > > > > >
> > > > > > >>
Thanks Paul -- > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same > > > > > question: > > > > > > >> How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation > > differ, > > > > > Paul, > > > > > > >> such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them? > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, > > David > > > > Ke? > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> What are the major implications of the differences?? > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> mike > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > > > > > > >> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >>> Martin, > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory > > of > > > > > speech > > > > > > >>> act, but not austin's. > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > > > > >>> President > > > > > > >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > > > > >>> www.mocombeian.com > > > > > > >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > > > > >>> www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: mike > > > cole < > > > > > > >>> mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/10/2014 7:48 PM > > (GMT-05:00) > > > > > > >>>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > > > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > > > > >>>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the > > xmca > > > > > > discussion > > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>>
Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking > > > about > > > > > the > > > > > > >>> conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with > > > > words, > > > > > > but i > > > > > > >>> was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was > > > all a > > > > > > jumble > > > > > > >>> of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with > > the > > > > > belief > > > > > > >>> that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? > > > > > > >>> mike > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > > > > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>>> Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by > > > recognizing > > > > > that > > > > > > >>>> both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? > Acting > > > > > requires > > > > > > >>>> ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in > > the > > > > > > world. > > > > > > >>>> Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking > > > > (thinking > > > > > > with > > > > > > >>>> words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation > in > > > the > > > > > > form > > > > > > >>> of > > > > > > >>>> new signs. > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> ? > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> Martin > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss < > lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>>> I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by > > > > > exploring > > > > > > >>>>> *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY > > INSIGHT > > > > > that > > > > > > >>> word > > > > > > >>>>> meaning is BEST understood - > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>>> "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN > as > > > > > > >>> operations, > > > > > > >>>>> actions, and activities." > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>>> This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word > > > > meanings. > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> -- > > > > > > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > science > > > with > > > > > an > > > > > > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> -- > > > > > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > > > with > > > > an > > > > > > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > Assistant Professor > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From ablunden@mira.net Sun Oct 12 21:51:45 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 15:51:45 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor - it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is simply saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of water. You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and OH together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge and OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and therefore neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions and transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of life. :) Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not a dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: water is a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an internal tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. > > In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) > > Martin > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such that two >> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to water with >> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise to the >> concrete for their own cases. >> mike >> >> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer > >>> wrote: >>> >>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >>> >>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic system with >>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, and I >>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before posting. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> On the contrary. >>>> >>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about activity >>>> >>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple example >>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history corner of >>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger footing in >>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing new >>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which division >>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a leadership team >>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which in turn >>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky and >>> quick, change your history. >>> >>>> Helena Worthen >>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>> >>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies that, >>>>> >>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one can bring >>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on *another* >>> component of the totality. >>> >>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of >>>>> >>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent elements that >>> are only accidentally brought together. >>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>> >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>> >>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the question >>>>>> >>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method of >>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components in a >>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, which >>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means that >>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. >>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen >>>>>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >>>>>>> >>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses >>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule >>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>> >>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>> >>> *insight*. It >>> >>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is >>>>>>>> >>> the >>> >>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>> >>> usually comes >>> >>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some >>>>>>>> >>> other >>> >>>>>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question >>>>>>> >>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" The >>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to accomplish. >>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying >>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, >>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be late >>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss >>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're talking >>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged >>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be >>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but >>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then >>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were often >>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a >>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening >>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out buying >>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. >>> >>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, >>>>>>> >>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of >>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to something >>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so >>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended >>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can >>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the whole >>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, a >>> matter of solving puzzles. >>> >>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to >>>>>>>> >>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about activity >>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict >>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>> >>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? >>>>>>> >>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or >>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting >>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of children) >>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. >>> >>>>>>> Helena >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I >>>>>>>> >>> supervise >>> >>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of >>>>>>>> >>> them on >>> >>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. They >>>>>>>> >>> have >>> >>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of >>>>>>>> >>> labor. >>> >>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they >>>>>>>> >>> decided to >>> >>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context >>>>>>>> >>> mainly >>> >>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the >>>>>>>> >>> " unit >>> >>>>>>>> of analysis". >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>> >>> ablunden@mira.net> >>> >>>>>>>> ??????: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was >>>>>>>>> >>> one of >>> >>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept >>>>>>>>> >>> was >>> >>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for >>>>>>>>> >>> me, was >>> >>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this >>>>>>>>> >>> expression, I'd >>> >>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to >>>>>>>>> >>> was a >>> >>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology >>>>>>>>> >>> whilst >>> >>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>> >>> *insight*. It >>> >>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it >>>>>>>>> >>> is the >>> >>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>> >>> usually comes >>> >>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some >>>>>>>>> >>> other >>> >>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new >>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for >>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, >>>>>>>>> >>> often >>> >>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their >>>>>>>>> >>> supervisor. I >>> >>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this >>>>>>>>> >>> point in >>> >>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data >>>>>>>>> >>> they now >>> >>>>>>>>> know they need. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two >>>>>>>>>> >>> articles. But, >>> >>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. >>>>>>>>>> >>> I >>> >>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that >>>>>>>>>> >>> through >>> >>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually >>>>>>>>>> >>> just >>> >>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm >>>>>>>>>> >>> interested >>> >>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and >>>>>>>>>> >>> how they >>> >>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people >>>>>>>>>> >>> doing >>> >>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis >>>>>>>>>> >>> being used? >>> >>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >>>>>>>>>> >>> interested to >>> >>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as >>>>>>>>>> >>> basic as >>> >>>>>>>>>> these. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a >>>>>>>>>> >>> much more >>> >>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In >>>>>>>>>> >>> Mike's >>> >>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the >>>>>>>>>> >>> action is >>> >>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that >>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, >>>>>>>>>> >>> are >>> >>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of >>>>>>>>>> >>> much >>> >>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>>>>> School of Education >>>>>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>>>>> Ioannina >>>>>>>> Greece >>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Oct 12 22:04:02 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 22:04:02 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: I wasn't pointing out, I was asking, Martin. I am having trouble seeing contradiction in perezhivanie as well. more like a mashup. mike On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:36 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own example > doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not a dynamic > system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: water is a > stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an internal > tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. > > In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is > dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) > > Martin > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such that > two > > atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to water > with > > its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise to the > > concrete for their own cases. > > mike > > > > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > >> wrote: > > > >> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) > >> > >> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic system > with > >> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, and I > >> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before > posting. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen > >> wrote: > >> > >>> On the contrary. > >>> > >>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about activity > >> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple > example > >> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history > corner of > >> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger footing in > >> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing new > >> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which > division > >> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a leadership > team > >> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which in > turn > >> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky and > >> quick, change your history. > >>> > >>> > >>> Helena Worthen > >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>> > >>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >>> > >>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies that, > >> once one understands the relationships among the components, one can > bring > >> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on *another* > >> component of the totality. > >>>> > >>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of > >> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent elements > that > >> are only accidentally brought together. > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the > question > >> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method of > >> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components in a > >> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, > which > >> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means that > >> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin > >>>>> > >>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen > > >> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very > >> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective > responses > >> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule > >> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > >> *insight*. It > >>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it > is > >> the > >>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It > >> usually comes > >>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some > >> other > >>>>>>> unit of analysis. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question > >> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" > The > >> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to > accomplish. > >> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying > >> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, > >> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be > late > >> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will > miss > >> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're > talking > >> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged > >> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be > >> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but > >> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would > then > >> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were often > >> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a > >> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening > >> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out > buying > >> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, > >> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members > of > >> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to > something > >> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so > >> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended > >> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can > >> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the > whole > >> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, > a > >> matter of solving puzzles. > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak > to > >> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about > activity > >> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict > >> with each other, which adds to the drama. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? > >> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or > >> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting > >> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of > children) > >> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not > identical. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Helena > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Helena Worthen > >>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I > >> supervise > >>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of > >> them on > >>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. They > >> have > >>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of > >>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of > >> labor. > >>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they > >> decided to > >>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context > >> mainly > >>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about > the > >> " unit > >>>>>>> of analysis". > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < > >> ablunden@mira.net> > >>>>>>> ??????: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was > >> one of > >>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this > concept > >> was > >>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for > >> me, was > >>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this > >> expression, I'd > >>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to > >> was a > >>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology > >> whilst > >>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > >> *insight*. It > >>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it > >> is the > >>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It > >> usually comes > >>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some > >> other > >>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the > new > >>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So > for > >>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, > >> often > >>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their > >> supervisor. I > >>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this > >> point in > >>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data > >> they now > >>>>>>>> know they need. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two > >> articles. But, > >>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in > posts. > >> I > >>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow > that > >> through > >>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually > >> just > >>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm > >> interested > >>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and > >> how they > >>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people > >> doing > >>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis > >> being used? > >>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very > >> interested to > >>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as > >> basic as > >>>>>>>>> these. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a > >> much more > >>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In > >> Mike's > >>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the > >> action is > >>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that > >>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here > before, > >> are > >>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture > of > >> much > >>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. > >>>>>>>>> Katie > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal > >>>>>>>>> University of Georgia > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> ............................................................ > >>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi > >>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education > >>>>>>> School of Education > >>>>>>> University of Ioannina > >>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 > >>>>>>> Ioannina > >>>>>>> Greece > >>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 > >>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 > >>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits > >>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr > >>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Oct 12 22:16:00 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 22:16:00 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> Message-ID: Fascinating Andy. And for perezhivanie how does it work? mike On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor - it > can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is simply > saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and > nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of > water. > > You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and OH > together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge and > OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative > contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals > with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and therefore > neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions and > transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of > life. :) > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: > >> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own example >> doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not a dynamic >> system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: water is a >> stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an internal >> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. >> >> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is >> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) >> >> Martin >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> >> >>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such that >>> two >>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to water >>> with >>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise to the >>> concrete for their own cases. >>> mike >>> >>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>> >>> >>>> wrote: >>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >>>> >>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic system >>>> with >>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, and I >>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before >>>> posting. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On the contrary. >>>>> >>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about activity >>>>> >>>>> >>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple >>>> example >>>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history >>>> corner of >>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger footing in >>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing new >>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which >>>> division >>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a leadership >>>> team >>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which in >>>> turn >>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky and >>>> quick, change your history. >>>> >>>> >>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies that, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one can >>>> bring >>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on *another* >>>> component of the totality. >>>> >>>> >>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent elements >>>> that >>>> are only accidentally brought together. >>>> >>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the question >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method of >>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components in a >>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, >>>> which >>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means that >>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. >>>> >>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen >>>>>> > >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective >>>> responses >>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule >>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>> >>>> >>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>> >>>> >>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>> >>>> >>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> usually comes >>>> >>>> >>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> other >>>> >>>> >>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to >>>> do?" The >>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to >>>> accomplish. >>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying >>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, >>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be >>>> late >>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will >>>> miss >>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're >>>> talking >>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged >>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be >>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but >>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would >>>> then >>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were often >>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a >>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening >>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out >>>> buying >>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. >>>> >>>> >>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate >>>> members of >>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to >>>> something >>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so >>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended >>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can >>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the >>>> whole >>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, >>>> a >>>> matter of solving puzzles. >>>> >>>> >>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about >>>> activity >>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict >>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>> >>>> >>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the >>>> class, or >>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting >>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of >>>> children) >>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not >>>> identical. >>>> >>>> >>>>> Helena >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> supervise >>>> >>>> >>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> them on >>>> >>>> >>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. They >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> have >>>> >>>> >>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> labor. >>>> >>>> >>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> decided to >>>> >>>> >>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mainly >>>> >>>> >>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> " unit >>>> >>>> >>>>> of analysis". >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>> >>>> >>>>> ??????: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> one of >>>> >>>> >>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> was >>>> >>>> >>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> me, was >>>> >>>> >>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> expression, I'd >>>> >>>> >>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> was a >>>> >>>> >>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> whilst >>>> >>>> >>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>> >>>> >>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> is the >>>> >>>> >>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>> >>>> >>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> other >>>> >>>> >>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new >>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So >>>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> often >>>> >>>> >>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> supervisor. I >>>> >>>> >>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> point in >>>> >>>> >>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> they now >>>> >>>> >>>>> know they need. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> ------------ >>>> >>>> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> articles. But, >>>> >>>> >>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I >>>> >>>> >>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> through >>>> >>>> >>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> just >>>> >>>> >>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> interested >>>> >>>> >>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> how they >>>> >>>> >>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> doing >>>> >>>> >>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> being used? >>>> >>>> >>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> interested to >>>> >>>> >>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> basic as >>>> >>>> >>>>> these. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> much more >>>> >>>> >>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Mike's >>>> >>>> >>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> action is >>>> >>>> >>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that >>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here >>>>>>>>>>> before, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> are >>>> >>>> >>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> much >>>> >>>> >>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>>>>>> School of Education >>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>>>>>> Ioannina >>>>>>>>> Greece >>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From ablunden@mira.net Sun Oct 12 22:42:31 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 16:42:31 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> Message-ID: <543B6647.30109@mira.net> As Julian said, a perezhivanie is a "unity of the person and their environment," that is, a unity (or relation) between a mind (for it is not the soma we are talking about, but the personality) and the material world outside the skin, between internal and external, mind and matter, objective and subjective. To say "relation" makes it sound a lot less like a contradiction. To say "unity" brings out the contradiction, because subjective and objective, mind and matter, are opposites and supposedly cannot be united. But united they are, in the formation of the personality and in experiences. "United" because it is a real process, not just a relation. "Unity" is the right term, but those of us who have been raised on Set Theory and Formal Logic, to ensure that it is not too offensive to our common sense, it is best to say "relation". The contradiction is also in what I said before: it entails the whole of the person and the whole of the environment/world (5thD and the Iraq War), and yet it is a quite specific and finite relation (it didn't involve the War in Rwanda). It involves the whole world because it could involve *anything* in the world; the environment is unbounded. It involves the whole person because it is an experience of a person, not of an emotion or any other post facto abstraction. And yet, its impact is quite specific. It involves the whole person, and yet it is wrong to say that it is a unity of cognition and affect, because it is a whole, and only as a result of reflection (auto- or hetero-) can moments of cognition, affect, attention, be isolated. Is that enough "contradictions" for you, Mike? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > Fascinating Andy. > > And for perezhivanie how does it work? > > mike > > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:51 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a > metaphor - it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In > this case it is simply saying that a quantity of water is just > thousands H2O molecules, and nothing else. No addition is required > to manifest all the properties of water. > > You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H > and OH together and how they can be separated, H containing a > positive charge and OH containing a negative charge - a good old > positive/negative contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are > acids and all chemicals with the OH ion are alkali, but water is > both acid and base and therefore neither. *If you want* the water > molecule is a tangle of contradictions and transformations, along > with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of life. :) > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Martin John Packer wrote: > > Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's > own example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. > Water is not a dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen > the process stops: water is a stable molecule. He should have > picked an example in which an internal tension or clash of > some kind provides a continual motor for change. > > In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a > triangle is dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric > shapes. :) > > Martin > On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole > wrote: > > > > Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and > oxygen such that two > atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give > rise to water with > its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people > to rise to the > concrete for their own cases. > mike > > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer > > > > wrote: > Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) > > Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a > dynamic system with > contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that > Mike linked to, and I > already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it > all before posting. > > Martin > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen > > > wrote: > > > > On the contrary. > > To me, that very affordance is one of the great > things about activity > > > theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. > A very simple example > is that if you change something in the > norms/customs/laws/history corner of > the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a > stronger footing in > bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if > by bringing new > members into the community (the base of the triangle) > out of which division > of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself > with a leadership team > that is not all white, or not all primarily > English-speaking, which in turn > will change what tools/resources you have and may, if > you're lucky and > quick, change your history. > > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > > > And what's neat about this way of thinking is > that it implies that, > > > once one understands the relationships among the > components, one can bring > about changes in one component in the totality by > acting on *another* > component of the totality. > > > The activity system triangle does not suggest > to me this type of > > > relationship among components. Instead, it seems to > represent elements that > are only accidentally brought together. > > > Martin > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > wrote: > > > Seems to me the problem in many research > projects is that the question > > > is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was > exploring a method of > analysis that seeks to understand the relationship > among components in a > complex totality. Not the causal influence of one > factor on another, which > is often how students frame their research interest. > And this means that > the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this > relationship. > > > Martin > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena > Worthen > > > > wrote: > > > As someone who uses the concept of > "unit of analysis" in a very > > > down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape > collective responses > to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships > (like, when a rule > changes creates difficulties for workers), I would > agree with Andy: > > > The other thing is that > discovering a unit of analysis is an > > > *insight*. It > > > is not something that can be > achieved by following a template, > it is > > > the > > > breakthrough in your research into > some problem, the leap. It > > > usually comes > > > *after* you've collected all the > data for your research using some > > > other > > > unit of analysis. > > > First comes the story, the details, > the experiences. The question > > > lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are > we going to do?" The > unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are > trying to accomplish. > Are we trying to get the employer to back off > temporarily? Are we trying > get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital > system in Chicago, > clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an > "I'm going to be late > to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick > kid today and will miss > work" message on the answering machines of their > supervisors. We're talking > about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of > them middle aged > minority women -- with grandchildren and extended > families to be > responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message > on a machine, but > being required to actually speak to a supervisor in > person who would then > keep a record of the call, was a problem because > supervisors were often > away from their desks and the whole phone system was > unreliable. Also, a > lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time > this was happening > (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if > someone it out buying > more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone > call is not easy. > > > So, exactly what is the purpose that > we're trying to accomplish, > > > here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? > To educate members of > the union and other others about how to respond > collectively to something > that only affects some of them? To make a profound > change in society so > that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers > of an extended > family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, > one that you can > carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and > then reviewing the whole > Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy > becomes, as Andy says, a > matter of solving puzzles. > > > >From the employer point of view, > asking workers to actually speak to > > > a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we > talk about activity > system(s), not just one activity system. But they are > often in conflict > with each other, which adds to the drama. > > > Is the data in your study being > gathered with some purpose in mind? > > > Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the > purpose of the class, or > the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be > most interesting > would be a comparison between the unit of analysis > (purposes of children) > and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet > they're not identical. > > > Helena > > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina > Plakitsi wrote: > > > > This problem of the ' unit of > analysis' is my concern too. I > > > supervise > > > three PHD students on Science > Education in a CHAT context. Two of > > > them on > > > early childhood science education > and one on primary science. They > > > have > > > collected log files, children > discourses consisted of > scientific justifications, > accepted rules, and forms of > division of > > > labor. > > > They have collected children > narratives, and drawings. When they > > > decided to > > > analyze their data they follow > different paths into CHAT context > > > mainly > > > modeling them using Engestrom's > triangle. They still doubt about the > > > " unit > > > of analysis". > > ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? > ??????? Andy Blunden < > > > ablunden@mira.net > > > > ??????: > > > > Katie, picking up on your > concern about units of > analysis, it was > > > one of > > > the points I mentioned in my > "report" from ISCAR, that this > concept > > > was > > > almost lost to us. A phrase I > heard a lot, and which was new for > > > me, was > > > "unit to be analysed." If > anyone knows the origin of this > > > expression, I'd > > > be interested in hearing. It > seemed to me that what it > referred to > > > was a > > > "closed system" for analysis, > that is, abandoning CHAT > methodology > > > whilst > > > keeping the word. If I am > mistaken about this, please > let me know. > > The other thing is that > discovering a unit of analysis > is an > > > *insight*. It > > > is not something that can be > achieved by following a > template, it > > > is the > > > breakthrough in your research > into some problem, the leap. It > > > usually comes > > > *after* you've collected all > the data for your research > using some > > > other > > > unit of analysis. In Kuhn's > terms, discovery of the unit > is the new > paradigm, after which it is > just a matter of solving > puzzles. So for > graduate students to use the > concept of unit in their research, > > > often > > > depends on the wisdom of teh > direction they get from their > > > supervisor. I > > > don't know how many PhD > students I've met who have got > to this > > > point in > > > their thesis and discover that > the data they have is not the data > > > they now > > > know they need. > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > > > > I like Holli's plan to > commit some time to > reading the two > > > articles. But, > > > as usual, I don't know > that I'll have much to > contribute in posts. > > > I > > > usually get deep in > thinking about the posts > and don't follow that > > > through > > > to write something. The > writing is much harder, > and I am usually > > > just > > > trying to keep up with > reading! > > For me, the thread has > been fascinating, probably > because I'm > > > interested > > > in different units of > analysis, what they might > be used for, and > > > how they > > > fit together with theory > and conducting research. > What are people > > > doing > > > with units of analysis and > why? Or why aren't units > of analysis > > > being used? > > > If anyone wants to write > more in that direction, > I'd be very > > > interested to > > > read, and I'll try to > respond, although the > questions might be as > > > basic as > > > these. > > Lastly, Andy has basically > been articulating my > thoughts (in a > > > much more > > > eloquent way than I would) > about action as a unit of > analysis. In > > > Mike's > > > example about driving and > thinking and writing, I'd > add that the > > > action is > > > mediated. Together with > sociocultural and > historical factors that > influenced those actions > (and which, as has been > said here before, > > > are > > > often difficult to get a > look at), the actions > create a picture of > > > much > > > more than just Mike's > behavior. > Katie > > Katie Wester-Neal > University of Georgia > > > > > > > > -- > ............................................................ > Katerina Plakitsi > Associate Professor of Science > Education > School of Education > University of Ioannina > University Campus Dourouti 45110 > Ioannina > Greece > tel. +302651005771 > fax. +302651005842 > mobile.phone +306972898463 > > http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits > http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr > http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Mon Oct 13 00:18:19 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 07:18:19 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <65E5D326-D9DD-48EF-8980-8A6C938F8370@uniandes.edu.co> <54371861.20108@mira.net> <5437318D.7020807@mira.net> <96291003.30217021.1412912602186.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <54375FB1.4080507@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110222F8D4@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> , Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223065D@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> I'm glad I am not the only one who struggles with the emphasis on contradiction in perezhivanie. As I understand this it is more like a bond of tension - two distinct elements which, in the interaction/tension between them generate something else. I have asked on this forum before whether we have to understand perezhivanie ONLY in terms of crises (I think it is clear why LSV chose to focus on the role of crises inn development)? Is perezhivanie not appropriate, in other words, for analysing the ways in which a person's identity is shaped by POSITIVE as well as NEGATIVE interactions with the person's environment (specifically in interactions with other people)? Or am I just oversimplifying my understanding of crisis? Rod ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] Sent: 13 October 2014 06:04 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? I wasn't pointing out, I was asking, Martin. I am having trouble seeing contradiction in perezhivanie as well. more like a mashup. mike On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:36 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own example > doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not a dynamic > system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: water is a > stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an internal > tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. > > In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is > dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) > > Martin > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such that > two > > atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to water > with > > its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise to the > > concrete for their own cases. > > mike > > > > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > >> wrote: > > > >> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) > >> > >> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic system > with > >> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, and I > >> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before > posting. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen > >> wrote: > >> > >>> On the contrary. > >>> > >>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about activity > >> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple > example > >> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history > corner of > >> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger footing in > >> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing new > >> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which > division > >> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a leadership > team > >> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which in > turn > >> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky and > >> quick, change your history. > >>> > >>> > >>> Helena Worthen > >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>> > >>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >>> > >>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies that, > >> once one understands the relationships among the components, one can > bring > >> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on *another* > >> component of the totality. > >>>> > >>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of > >> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent elements > that > >> are only accidentally brought together. > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the > question > >> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method of > >> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components in a > >> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, > which > >> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means that > >> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin > >>>>> > >>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen > > >> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very > >> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective > responses > >> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule > >> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > >> *insight*. It > >>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it > is > >> the > >>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It > >> usually comes > >>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some > >> other > >>>>>>> unit of analysis. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question > >> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" > The > >> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to > accomplish. > >> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying > >> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, > >> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be > late > >> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will > miss > >> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're > talking > >> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged > >> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be > >> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but > >> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would > then > >> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were often > >> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a > >> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening > >> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out > buying > >> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, > >> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members > of > >> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to > something > >> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so > >> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended > >> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can > >> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the > whole > >> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, > a > >> matter of solving puzzles. > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak > to > >> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about > activity > >> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict > >> with each other, which adds to the drama. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? > >> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or > >> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting > >> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of > children) > >> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not > identical. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Helena > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Helena Worthen > >>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I > >> supervise > >>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of > >> them on > >>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. They > >> have > >>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of > >>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of > >> labor. > >>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they > >> decided to > >>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context > >> mainly > >>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about > the > >> " unit > >>>>>>> of analysis". > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < > >> ablunden@mira.net> > >>>>>>> ??????: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was > >> one of > >>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this > concept > >> was > >>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for > >> me, was > >>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this > >> expression, I'd > >>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to > >> was a > >>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology > >> whilst > >>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > >> *insight*. It > >>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it > >> is the > >>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It > >> usually comes > >>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some > >> other > >>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the > new > >>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So > for > >>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, > >> often > >>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their > >> supervisor. I > >>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this > >> point in > >>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data > >> they now > >>>>>>>> know they need. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two > >> articles. But, > >>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in > posts. > >> I > >>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow > that > >> through > >>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually > >> just > >>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm > >> interested > >>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and > >> how they > >>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people > >> doing > >>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis > >> being used? > >>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very > >> interested to > >>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as > >> basic as > >>>>>>>>> these. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a > >> much more > >>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In > >> Mike's > >>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the > >> action is > >>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that > >>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here > before, > >> are > >>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture > of > >> much > >>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. > >>>>>>>>> Katie > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal > >>>>>>>>> University of Georgia > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> ............................................................ > >>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi > >>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education > >>>>>>> School of Education > >>>>>>> University of Ioannina > >>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 > >>>>>>> Ioannina > >>>>>>> Greece > >>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 > >>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 > >>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits > >>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr > >>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From ablunden@mira.net Mon Oct 13 00:27:12 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 18:27:12 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223065D@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> , <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223065D@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <543B7ED0.4030102@mira.net> Yes Rod, perezhivanie includes positive, life-affirming experiences as well as negative challenges. Bring a Russian word, it carries heavy connotations of suffering and survival, but perezhivanija can also be those kind of breakthroughs and surprising victories which can also contribute to the formation of a personality. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > I'm glad I am not the only one who struggles with the emphasis on contradiction in perezhivanie. As I understand this it is more like a bond of tension - two distinct elements which, in the interaction/tension between them generate something else. I have asked on this forum before whether we have to understand perezhivanie ONLY in terms of crises (I think it is clear why LSV chose to focus on the role of crises inn development)? Is perezhivanie not appropriate, in other words, for analysing the ways in which a person's identity is shaped by POSITIVE as well as NEGATIVE interactions with the person's environment (specifically in interactions with other people)? Or am I just oversimplifying my understanding of crisis? > > Rod > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > Sent: 13 October 2014 06:04 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? > > I wasn't pointing out, I was asking, Martin. > I am having trouble seeing contradiction in perezhivanie as well. more like > a mashup. > mike > > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:36 PM, Martin John Packer >> wrote: >> > > >> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own example >> doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not a dynamic >> system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: water is a >> stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an internal >> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. >> >> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is >> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> >>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such that >>> >> two >> >>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to water >>> >> with >> >>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise to the >>> concrete for their own cases. >>> mike >>> >>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>> >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >>>> >>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic system >>>> >> with >> >>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, and I >>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before >>>> >> posting. >> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> On the contrary. >>>>> >>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about activity >>>>> >>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple >>>> >> example >> >>>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history >>>> >> corner of >> >>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger footing in >>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing new >>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which >>>> >> division >> >>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a leadership >>>> >> team >> >>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which in >>>> >> turn >> >>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky and >>>> quick, change your history. >>>> >>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies that, >>>>>> >>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one can >>>> >> bring >> >>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on *another* >>>> component of the totality. >>>> >>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of >>>>>> >>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent elements >>>> >> that >> >>>> are only accidentally brought together. >>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>> >>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>> >>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the >>>>>>> >> question >> >>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method of >>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components in a >>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, >>>> >> which >> >>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means that >>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. >>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen >>>>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >>>>>>>> >>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective >>>> >> responses >> >>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule >>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>> >>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>> >>>> *insight*. It >>>> >>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it >>>>>>>>> >> is >> >>>> the >>>> >>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>> >>>> usually comes >>>> >>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some >>>>>>>>> >>>> other >>>> >>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question >>>>>>>> >>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" >>>> >> The >> >>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to >>>> >> accomplish. >> >>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying >>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, >>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be >>>> >> late >> >>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will >>>> >> miss >> >>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're >>>> >> talking >> >>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged >>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be >>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but >>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would >>>> >> then >> >>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were often >>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a >>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening >>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out >>>> >> buying >> >>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. >>>> >>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, >>>>>>>> >>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members >>>> >> of >> >>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to >>>> >> something >> >>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so >>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended >>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can >>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the >>>> >> whole >> >>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, >>>> >> a >> >>>> matter of solving puzzles. >>>> >>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak >>>>>>>>> >> to >> >>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about >>>> >> activity >> >>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict >>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>> >>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? >>>>>>>> >>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or >>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting >>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of >>>> >> children) >> >>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not >>>> >> identical. >> >>>>>>>> Helena >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I >>>>>>>>> >>>> supervise >>>> >>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of >>>>>>>>> >>>> them on >>>> >>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. They >>>>>>>>> >>>> have >>>> >>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of >>>>>>>>> >>>> labor. >>>> >>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they >>>>>>>>> >>>> decided to >>>> >>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context >>>>>>>>> >>>> mainly >>>> >>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about >>>>>>>>> >> the >> >>>> " unit >>>> >>>>>>>>> of analysis". >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>>> >>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>> >>>>>>>>> ??????: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was >>>>>>>>>> >>>> one of >>>> >>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this >>>>>>>>>> >> concept >> >>>> was >>>> >>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for >>>>>>>>>> >>>> me, was >>>> >>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this >>>>>>>>>> >>>> expression, I'd >>>> >>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to >>>>>>>>>> >>>> was a >>>> >>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology >>>>>>>>>> >>>> whilst >>>> >>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>> >>>> *insight*. It >>>> >>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it >>>>>>>>>> >>>> is the >>>> >>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>> >>>> usually comes >>>> >>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some >>>>>>>>>> >>>> other >>>> >>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the >>>>>>>>>> >> new >> >>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So >>>>>>>>>> >> for >> >>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, >>>>>>>>>> >>>> often >>>> >>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their >>>>>>>>>> >>>> supervisor. I >>>> >>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this >>>>>>>>>> >>>> point in >>>> >>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data >>>>>>>>>> >>>> they now >>>> >>>>>>>>>> know they need. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> articles. But, >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in >>>>>>>>>>> >> posts. >> >>>> I >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow >>>>>>>>>>> >> that >> >>>> through >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> just >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> interested >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> how they >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> doing >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> being used? >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> interested to >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> basic as >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> these. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> much more >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> Mike's >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> action is >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that >>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here >>>>>>>>>>> >> before, >> >>>> are >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture >>>>>>>>>>> >> of >> >>>> much >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>>>>>> School of Education >>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>>>>>> Ioannina >>>>>>>>> Greece >>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Oct 13 01:57:47 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 08:57:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture everything. But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because that would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is strongly electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements that are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions driving further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is actually in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and dissociating and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't develop further. Martin On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor - it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is simply saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of water. > > You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and OH together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge and OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and therefore neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions and transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of life. :) > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not a dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: water is a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an internal tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. >> >> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) >> >> Martin >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> >>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such that two >>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to water with >>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise to the >>> concrete for their own cases. >>> mike >>> >>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer >> >>>> wrote: >>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >>>> >>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic system with >>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, and I >>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before posting. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> On the contrary. >>>>> >>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about activity >>>>> >>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple example >>>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history corner of >>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger footing in >>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing new >>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which division >>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a leadership team >>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which in turn >>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky and >>>> quick, change your history. >>>> >>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies that, >>>>>> >>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one can bring >>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on *another* >>>> component of the totality. >>>> >>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of >>>>>> >>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent elements that >>>> are only accidentally brought together. >>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>> >>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>> >>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the question >>>>>>> >>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method of >>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components in a >>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, which >>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means that >>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. >>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen >>>>>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >>>>>>>> >>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses >>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule >>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>> >>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>> >>>> *insight*. It >>>> >>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is >>>>>>>>> >>>> the >>>> >>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>> >>>> usually comes >>>> >>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some >>>>>>>>> >>>> other >>>> >>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question >>>>>>>> >>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" The >>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to accomplish. >>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying >>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, >>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be late >>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss >>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're talking >>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged >>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be >>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but >>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then >>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were often >>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a >>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening >>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out buying >>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. >>>> >>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, >>>>>>>> >>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of >>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to something >>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so >>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended >>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can >>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the whole >>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, a >>>> matter of solving puzzles. >>>> >>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to >>>>>>>>> >>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about activity >>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict >>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>> >>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? >>>>>>>> >>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or >>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting >>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of children) >>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. >>>> >>>>>>>> Helena >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I >>>>>>>>> >>>> supervise >>>> >>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of >>>>>>>>> >>>> them on >>>> >>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. They >>>>>>>>> >>>> have >>>> >>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of >>>>>>>>> >>>> labor. >>>> >>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they >>>>>>>>> >>>> decided to >>>> >>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context >>>>>>>>> >>>> mainly >>>> >>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the >>>>>>>>> >>>> " unit >>>> >>>>>>>>> of analysis". >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>>> >>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>> >>>>>>>>> ??????: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was >>>>>>>>>> >>>> one of >>>> >>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept >>>>>>>>>> >>>> was >>>> >>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for >>>>>>>>>> >>>> me, was >>>> >>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this >>>>>>>>>> >>>> expression, I'd >>>> >>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to >>>>>>>>>> >>>> was a >>>> >>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology >>>>>>>>>> >>>> whilst >>>> >>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>> >>>> *insight*. It >>>> >>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it >>>>>>>>>> >>>> is the >>>> >>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>> >>>> usually comes >>>> >>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some >>>>>>>>>> >>>> other >>>> >>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new >>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for >>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, >>>>>>>>>> >>>> often >>>> >>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their >>>>>>>>>> >>>> supervisor. I >>>> >>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this >>>>>>>>>> >>>> point in >>>> >>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data >>>>>>>>>> >>>> they now >>>> >>>>>>>>>> know they need. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> articles. But, >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> I >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> through >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> just >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> interested >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> how they >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> doing >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> being used? >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> interested to >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> basic as >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> these. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> much more >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> Mike's >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> action is >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that >>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> are >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> much >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>>>>>> School of Education >>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>>>>>> Ioannina >>>>>>>>> Greece >>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >> >> >> >> >> > From patrick.jaki@gmail.com Mon Oct 13 04:00:28 2014 From: patrick.jaki@gmail.com (Patrick Jaki) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 13:00:28 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> Message-ID: Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is this not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this case Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer wrote: > Andy, > > I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture > everything. > > But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college > chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because that > would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is strongly > electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, > leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the > consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen > bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a > liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements that > are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. > > So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of > water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions driving > further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially > dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is actually > in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and dissociating > and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't develop > further. > > Martin > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor - > it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is simply > saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and > nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of > water. > > > > You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and OH > together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge and > OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative > contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals > with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and therefore > neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions and > transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of > life. :) > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Martin John Packer wrote: > >> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own > example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not a > dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: water is > a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an internal > tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. > >> > >> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is > dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) > >> > >> Martin > >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> > >>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such > that two > >>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to water > with > >>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise to > the > >>> concrete for their own cases. > >>> mike > >>> > >>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > >>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) > >>>> > >>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic system > with > >>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, > and I > >>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before > posting. > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> On the contrary. > >>>>> > >>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about activity > >>>>> > >>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple > example > >>>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history > corner of > >>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger footing > in > >>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing new > >>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which > division > >>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a leadership > team > >>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which > in turn > >>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky and > >>>> quick, change your history. > >>>> > >>>>> Helena Worthen > >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>>>> > >>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies that, > >>>>>> > >>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one can > bring > >>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on *another* > >>>> component of the totality. > >>>> > >>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of > >>>>>> > >>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent > elements that > >>>> are only accidentally brought together. > >>>> > >>>>>> Martin > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > >>>>>> > >>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the > question > >>>>>>> > >>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method of > >>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components > in a > >>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, > which > >>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means > that > >>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. > >>>> > >>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < > helenaworthen@gmail.com> > >>>>>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very > >>>>>>>> > >>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective > responses > >>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule > >>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> *insight*. It > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, > it is > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> the > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> usually comes > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using > some > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> other > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question > >>>>>>>> > >>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to > do?" The > >>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to > accomplish. > >>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we > trying > >>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, > >>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be > late > >>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and > will miss > >>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're > talking > >>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged > >>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be > >>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, > but > >>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would > then > >>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were > often > >>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. > Also, a > >>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening > >>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out > buying > >>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. > >>>> > >>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, > >>>>>>>> > >>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate > members of > >>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to > something > >>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society > so > >>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended > >>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can > >>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the > whole > >>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy > says, a > >>>> matter of solving puzzles. > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually > speak to > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about > activity > >>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in > conflict > >>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. > >>>> > >>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in > mind? > >>>>>>>> > >>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, > or > >>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most > interesting > >>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of > children) > >>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not > identical. > >>>> > >>>>>>>> Helena > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Helena Worthen > >>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> supervise > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> them on > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. > They > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> have > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of > >>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division > of > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> labor. > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> decided to > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> mainly > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about > the > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> " unit > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> of analysis". > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> ablunden@mira.net> > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> ??????: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it > was > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> one of > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this > concept > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> was > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> me, was > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> expression, I'd > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred > to > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> was a > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT > methodology > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> whilst > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me > know. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> *insight*. It > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, > it > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> is the > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> usually comes > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using > some > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> other > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the > new > >>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. > So for > >>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> often > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> supervisor. I > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> point in > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the > data > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> they now > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> know they need. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> articles. But, > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in > posts. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> I > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow > that > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> through > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am > usually > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> just > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> interested > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, > and > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> how they > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are > people > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> doing > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> being used? > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> interested to > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be > as > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> basic as > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> these. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> much more > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. > In > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> Mike's > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that > the > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> action is > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors > that > >>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here > before, > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> are > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a > picture of > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> much > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. > >>>>>>>>>>> Katie > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal > >>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>> ............................................................ > >>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi > >>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education > >>>>>>>>> School of Education > >>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina > >>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 > >>>>>>>>> Ioannina > >>>>>>>>> Greece > >>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 > >>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 > >>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits > >>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr > >>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> -- > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > -- *Patrick Jaki* *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Oct 13 04:00:54 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 12:00:54 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <76EF3C1C-DE83-42C7-A7CB-BC16DAF8B641@gmail.com> Message-ID: Greg, The "push back" is the problem being dealt with. Hence if you don't have a problem you don't have any "push back". Donald Schon, who studied Dewey's theory of inquiry, wrote extensively on "talk back / push back". See, also, Mark Smith's summary and the areas of criticism: http://infed.org/mobi/donald-schon-learning-reflection-change/ Best, Huw On 13 October 2014 05:10, Greg Thompson wrote: > Mike and Huw, > I have some fear that this will be a distraction from the main thread but > briefly, Huw, that is helpful as I inch toward an understanding of how we > might get out of coherence vs. correspondence dualism. Latour (sorry for > introducing outsiders here! He is an important social theorist, esp. in > anthropology, and has published in MCA, so there's that...) says that the > "real" is that which "pushes back." I feel like he is in some ways > paraphrasing Dewey here, but I haven't quite been able to find where we > might find something like that in Dewey. Perhaps you can keep an eye out as > you read? > > Mike, I'm still processing/imagining your comments. Unknown whether they > will return to the hall of shadows or become a real object for me. > > -greg > > > > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:19 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Huw and Greg et al-- > > > > Greg: And if you happen to have an extra moment, I wonder if you could > say > > a bit > > > about HOW Dewey makes the case for objects not existing prior to being > > > made-as-such? > > > > > > Huw: Well, I haven't dug very far. But its fairly clear from his letter > > that it > > is part of the process of inquiry, i.e. that one proposes the objects > that > > one studies in the process of addressing a real problem upon which the > > inquiry is based. > > > > Here is Mike's guess: > > In the process of inquiry, one is always imagining next moments. The > object > > arises out of imagination, or the imagined turns out to be unembodied and > > returns to the hall of shadows. > > > > Quicker than a wink. > > mike > > > > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:16 PM, Huw Lloyd > > wrote: > > > > > On 12 October 2014 03:40, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > > > > > Huw, > > > > Can you give us a little more about the Nagel introduction? How does > > > Nagel > > > > make that error? > > > > > > > > > > He critiques the predicate of the change (or difference) that Dewey > > asserts > > > in the process of investigation/inquiry. Nagel's consideration of this > > > change was merely the instrumental imposition rather than recognising > the > > > construal of the object as a construction and a difference. From his > > > writing it was apparent to me that he misses this. The peculiarity is > > that > > > this is the introduction to Dewey's volume on logic as inquiry. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > And if you happen to have an extra moment, I wonder if you could say > a > > > bit > > > > about HOW Dewey makes the case for objects not existing prior to > being > > > > made-as-such? > > > > > > > > > Well, I haven't dug very far. But its fairly clear from his letter > that > > it > > > is part of the process of inquiry, i.e. that one proposes the objects > > that > > > one studies in the process of addressing a real problem upon which the > > > inquiry is based. > > > > > > > > > > I've been chatting elsewhere with Jay Lemke and others about > > > > Bruno Latour's and Tim Ingold's separate uses of "correspondence" in > > ways > > > > that go against the classical notions of "correspondence" as in > > > > correspondence theory (i.e. the measure of the value of a science is > > the > > > > extent to which it corresponds to reality). > > > > > > > > > > Well, in the little I've read Dewey argued that social science exceeds > > > natural science in certain dimensions of concreteness (if I remember > > > correctly). But I think he was writing of a pre-quantum physics. As a > > > mode of inquiry coherence would, I am surmising, be more valued than > > > "correspondence" -- afterall, correspondence with what? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I'm wondering how these views might be different from Dewey's take on > > the > > > > matter (in a lot of ways, I'm sure, but also similar in others). But > I > > > > haven't read Dewey lately or with these ideas in mind and I could > use a > > > leg > > > > up... > > > > > > > > > > I don't know how they relate to your other theorists on correspondence. > > > But I do know you won't get very far by orientation alone. By > > orientation, > > > all you get to do is shake and feel the parcel (paraphrasing Hector > from > > > "The History Boys"). From what I can tell, Dewey would advocate > getting > > > technical with your authentic problem (which you would absolutely have > to > > > do to use it productively) and recognise that the problem of interest > is > > > part of the root of your inquiry. Perhaps not the "leg up" you were > > hoping > > > for! > > > > > > Best, > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks, > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 5:05 PM, Huw Lloyd < > huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > My own excursion has been to explore writings relating to Dewey > > (simply > > > > > something I had out off and found time to explore). Which, it > turns > > > out, > > > > > are (to my reading) another pithy way to express the logical > > problems I > > > > was > > > > > reading in David's narrative. But this might be because I already > > > > > "understand" the problem. > > > > > > > > > > Anyway, the interesting writings were "A letter from Dewey" that is > > in > > > > the > > > > > appendix of "Knowing and Known" and Ernest Nagel's introduction to > > > > Dewey's > > > > > "Logic: The Theory of Inquiry". > > > > > > > > > > One of the rather interesting things about reading Nagel's > > > introduction, > > > > is > > > > > that he makes an ontological error that Dewey referred to in his > > letter > > > > (I > > > > > believe). The error was that an "object" (not its referent) is > > > > > existentially existent beyond and before its social construction. > > > > > Something that we CHAT enthusiasts should be familiar with. > > > > > > > > > > Nevertheless (as a psychologist) I am interested in the truth of > > > errors, > > > > > and Nagel's introduction was certainly helpful in enlivening the > > > prospect > > > > > of the 500 page volume (vol. 12 of the later works). Of course, I > > > could > > > > be > > > > > naively wrong about it, but all the pieces line up for me here, > > > including > > > > > some passages that are remarkably aligned with DE / > El'konin-Davydov > > > > > theory. > > > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 October 2014 22:38, Henry G. Shonerd III > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Paul, > > > > > > Let me think about it. I appreciate your reference to Derrida. I > am > > > > > > reading like crazy to keep up with you guys! > > > > > > Henry > > > > > > P.S. I am pretty dedicated to reading the references, links on > the > > > > XMCA. > > > > > > But I use Wikipedia constantly. Is this a bad thing? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 3:21 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > > > > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > Henry, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Clearly, your bike riding belongs to the perlocutionary > category. > > > > But > > > > > > what is the syntax and semantics that gave rise to it? The > > thinking > > > > that > > > > > > it leads to, or is there another declarative or imperative > > statement, > > > > > I.e. > > > > > > You are an environmentalists? This is where the searle/derrida > > > debate > > > > > > takes off. The issues of intentionality, continuity, > > discontinuity > > > > are > > > > > > that not also an aspect of language. Hence derrida ' s notion of > > the > > > > > > potentiality for the deferment of meaning and why jacques lacan > > > posits > > > > > the > > > > > > unconscious to be structured like language...to account for the > > > > > > discontinuity of both language and the unconscious, which > although > > we > > > > can > > > > > > think them apart are not. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > > > > > President > > > > > > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > > > > > www.mocombeian.com > > > > > > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > > > > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Henry > G. > > > > > > Shonerd III"
Date:10/11/2014 > 4:14 > > > PM > > > > > > (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > > > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to > > > > > > broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
> > > > > > >
Mike and Paul, > > > > > > > Paul assumes your thinking about the XMCA dialog had nothing to > > do > > > > with > > > > > > your driving. I find that riding my bike to the university in the > > > > morning > > > > > > sets loose thinking about what's "on my plate" intellectually. > The > > > same > > > > > > thing happens when I am dancing to music with others (I do Nia, > > very > > > > > > popular in some places). Lakoff's claim that cognition is > embodied > > is > > > > > > typically related to metaphor, but I am interested in how the > > > > > phonological > > > > > > pole of language is iconic, not just with onomatopoeia, but with > > all > > > > > forms > > > > > > of sound symbolism. And I assume that the phonological pole is a > > > subset > > > > > of > > > > > > the sematic pole. The indexical, iconic, symbolic aspects of > > > language, > > > > > > would it be fair to say they are on a continuum, rather than > > > > > discontinuous? > > > > > > Temporal aspects of language (including within speech and > writing), > > > > > > wouldn't they figure in with the making (including comprehension) > > of > > > > > > meaning? I am sure David said as much back a while. Am I making > > sense > > > > > that > > > > > > relates at all to the on-going dialog? > > > > > > > Henry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 12:59 PM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" < > > > > > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> Mike, > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> My comment was in reference to your process of thinking about > > the > > > > xmca > > > > > > conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the > > speech > > > > > act, > > > > > > comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing. It is > > simply > > > > > > background information for us the reader (I am not going to > > reiterate > > > > the > > > > > > debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological issue > > of > > > > > > background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by the > > way > > > > > based > > > > > > on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is > > > correct > > > > > on > > > > > > the argument). > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely > psychological > > > and > > > > > > semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, > illocutionary, > > > and > > > > > > perlocutionary categories. This psychological act of thinking is > > the > > > > > > element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking. > > > However, > > > > in > > > > > > order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background, > > > > > > intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private > > language, > > > > for > > > > > > example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech > act? > > > > > > Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing > outside > > > the > > > > > text. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > > > > >> President > > > > > > >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > > > > >> www.mocombeian.com > > > > > > >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > > > > >> www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >>
-------- Original message --------
From: mike > > cole > > > < > > > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/11/2014 1:10 PM (GMT-05:00) > > > > > >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > > > >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca > > > > > discussion > > > > > >
> > > > > > >>
Thanks Paul -- > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Could you take me a little further? Others might have the same > > > > > question: > > > > > > >> How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation > > differ, > > > > > Paul, > > > > > > >> such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them? > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, > > David > > > > Ke? > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> What are the major implications of the differences?? > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> mike > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > > > > > > >> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >>> Martin, > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles theory > > of > > > > > speech > > > > > > >>> act, but not austin's. > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > > > > >>> President > > > > > > >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > > > > >>> www.mocombeian.com > > > > > > >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > > > > >>> www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: mike > > > cole < > > > > > > >>> mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/10/2014 7:48 PM > > (GMT-05:00) > > > > > > >>>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > > > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > > > > >>>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the > > xmca > > > > > > discussion > > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > >>>
Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and thinking > > > about > > > > > the > > > > > > >>> conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking with > > > > words, > > > > > > but i > > > > > > >>> was not articulating and someone might even claim that it was > > > all a > > > > > > jumble > > > > > > >>> of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent with > > the > > > > > belief > > > > > > >>> that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? > > > > > > >>> mike > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > > > > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>>> Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by > > > recognizing > > > > > that > > > > > > >>>> both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? > Acting > > > > > requires > > > > > > >>>> ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) in > > the > > > > > > world. > > > > > > >>>> Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking > > > > (thinking > > > > > > with > > > > > > >>>> words), at least, requires articulating that interpretation > in > > > the > > > > > > form > > > > > > >>> of > > > > > > >>>> new signs. > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> ? > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> Martin > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss < > lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>>> I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* by > > > > > exploring > > > > > > >>>>> *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY > > INSIGHT > > > > > that > > > > > > >>> word > > > > > > >>>>> meaning is BEST understood - > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>>> "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization THAN > as > > > > > > >>> operations, > > > > > > >>>>> actions, and activities." > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>>> This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word > > > > meanings. > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> -- > > > > > > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > science > > > with > > > > > an > > > > > > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> -- > > > > > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > > > with > > > > an > > > > > > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > Assistant Professor > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Mon Oct 13 04:12:00 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 11:12:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> , Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every word, but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating with the same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like this discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it because we each have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be expected to use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some people, etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be negotiated in discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer to understanding how a particular person uses particular words when we get to know that person as a person and that involves much more than just batting words to and fro! Rod ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is this not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this case Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer wrote: > Andy, > > I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture > everything. > > But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college > chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because that > would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is strongly > electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, > leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the > consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen > bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a > liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements that > are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. > > So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of > water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions driving > further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially > dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is actually > in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and dissociating > and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't develop > further. > > Martin > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor - > it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is simply > saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and > nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of > water. > > > > You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and OH > together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge and > OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative > contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals > with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and therefore > neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions and > transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of > life. :) > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Martin John Packer wrote: > >> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own > example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not a > dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: water is > a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an internal > tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. > >> > >> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is > dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) > >> > >> Martin > >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> > >>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such > that two > >>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to water > with > >>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise to > the > >>> concrete for their own cases. > >>> mike > >>> > >>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > >>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) > >>>> > >>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic system > with > >>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, > and I > >>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before > posting. > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> On the contrary. > >>>>> > >>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about activity > >>>>> > >>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple > example > >>>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history > corner of > >>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger footing > in > >>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing new > >>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which > division > >>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a leadership > team > >>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which > in turn > >>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky and > >>>> quick, change your history. > >>>> > >>>>> Helena Worthen > >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>>>> > >>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies that, > >>>>>> > >>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one can > bring > >>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on *another* > >>>> component of the totality. > >>>> > >>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of > >>>>>> > >>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent > elements that > >>>> are only accidentally brought together. > >>>> > >>>>>> Martin > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > >>>>>> > >>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the > question > >>>>>>> > >>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method of > >>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components > in a > >>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, > which > >>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means > that > >>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. > >>>> > >>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < > helenaworthen@gmail.com> > >>>>>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very > >>>>>>>> > >>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective > responses > >>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule > >>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> *insight*. It > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, > it is > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> the > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> usually comes > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using > some > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> other > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question > >>>>>>>> > >>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to > do?" The > >>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to > accomplish. > >>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we > trying > >>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, > >>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be > late > >>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and > will miss > >>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're > talking > >>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged > >>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be > >>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, > but > >>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would > then > >>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were > often > >>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. > Also, a > >>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening > >>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out > buying > >>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. > >>>> > >>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, > >>>>>>>> > >>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate > members of > >>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to > something > >>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society > so > >>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended > >>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can > >>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the > whole > >>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy > says, a > >>>> matter of solving puzzles. > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually > speak to > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about > activity > >>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in > conflict > >>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. > >>>> > >>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in > mind? > >>>>>>>> > >>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, > or > >>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most > interesting > >>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of > children) > >>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not > identical. > >>>> > >>>>>>>> Helena > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Helena Worthen > >>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> supervise > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> them on > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. > They > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> have > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of > >>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division > of > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> labor. > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> decided to > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> mainly > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about > the > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> " unit > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> of analysis". > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < > >>>>>>>>> > >>>> ablunden@mira.net> > >>>> > >>>>>>>>> ??????: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it > was > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> one of > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this > concept > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> was > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> me, was > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> expression, I'd > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred > to > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> was a > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT > methodology > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> whilst > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me > know. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> *insight*. It > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, > it > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> is the > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> usually comes > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using > some > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> other > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the > new > >>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. > So for > >>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> often > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> supervisor. I > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> point in > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the > data > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> they now > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> know they need. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> articles. But, > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in > posts. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> I > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow > that > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> through > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am > usually > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> just > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> interested > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, > and > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> how they > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are > people > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> doing > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> being used? > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> interested to > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be > as > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> basic as > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> these. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> much more > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. > In > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> Mike's > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that > the > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> action is > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors > that > >>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here > before, > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> are > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a > picture of > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>> much > >>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. > >>>>>>>>>>> Katie > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal > >>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>> ............................................................ > >>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi > >>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education > >>>>>>>>> School of Education > >>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina > >>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 > >>>>>>>>> Ioannina > >>>>>>>>> Greece > >>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 > >>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 > >>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits > >>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr > >>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> -- > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > -- *Patrick Jaki* *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From robyn.babaeff@monash.edu Mon Oct 13 04:41:13 2014 From: robyn.babaeff@monash.edu (Robyn Babaeff) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 22:41:13 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive connection? As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a different realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective position of the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where there is emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then as the cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs from the internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the connectedness takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every word, > but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating with the > same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like this > discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it because we each > have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our > awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be expected to > use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some people, > etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an > approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be negotiated in > discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer to > understanding how a particular person uses particular words when we get to > know that person as a person and that involves much more than just batting > words to and fro! > > Rod > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] > Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? > > Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is this > not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this case > Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds > onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. > > On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer > wrote: > > > Andy, > > > > I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture > > everything. > > > > But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college > > chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because that > > would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is strongly > > electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, > > leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the > > consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen > > bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a > > liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements that > > are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. > > > > So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of > > water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions driving > > further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially > > dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is > actually > > in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and > dissociating > > and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't develop > > further. > > > > Martin > > > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor - > > it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is > simply > > saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and > > nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of > > water. > > > > > > You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and > OH > > together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge > and > > OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative > > contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals > > with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and therefore > > neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions > and > > transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of > > life. :) > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > Martin John Packer wrote: > > >> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own > > example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not a > > dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: water > is > > a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an internal > > tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. > > >> > > >> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is > > dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) > > >> > > >> Martin > > >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >> > > >> > > >>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such > > that two > > >>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to water > > with > > >>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise to > > the > > >>> concrete for their own cases. > > >>> mike > > >>> > > >>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > >>> > > >>>> wrote: > > >>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) > > >>>> > > >>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic > system > > with > > >>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, > > and I > > >>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before > > posting. > > >>>> > > >>>> Martin > > >>>> > > >>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < > helenaworthen@gmail.com> > > >>>> wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>>> On the contrary. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about > activity > > >>>>> > > >>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple > > example > > >>>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history > > corner of > > >>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger > footing > > in > > >>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing > new > > >>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which > > division > > >>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a > leadership > > team > > >>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which > > in turn > > >>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky > and > > >>>> quick, change your history. > > >>>> > > >>>>> Helena Worthen > > >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > >>>>> > > >>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies > that, > > >>>>>> > > >>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one can > > bring > > >>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on > *another* > > >>>> component of the totality. > > >>>> > > >>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of > > >>>>>> > > >>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent > > elements that > > >>>> are only accidentally brought together. > > >>>> > > >>>>>> Martin > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > > >>>>>> > > >>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the > > question > > >>>>>>> > > >>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method > of > > >>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components > > in a > > >>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, > > which > > >>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means > > that > > >>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. > > >>>> > > >>>>>>> Martin > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < > > helenaworthen@gmail.com> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>> wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective > > responses > > >>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a > rule > > >>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>> *insight*. It > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, > > it is > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>> the > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>> usually comes > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using > > some > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>> other > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The > question > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to > > do?" The > > >>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to > > accomplish. > > >>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we > > trying > > >>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, > > >>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be > > late > > >>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and > > will miss > > >>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're > > talking > > >>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle > aged > > >>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be > > >>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, > > but > > >>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would > > then > > >>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were > > often > > >>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. > > Also, a > > >>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was > happening > > >>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out > > buying > > >>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not > easy. > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate > > members of > > >>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to > > something > > >>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society > > so > > >>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended > > >>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you > can > > >>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing > the > > whole > > >>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy > > says, a > > >>>> matter of solving puzzles. > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually > > speak to > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about > > activity > > >>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in > > conflict > > >>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in > > mind? > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the > class, > > or > > >>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most > > interesting > > >>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of > > children) > > >>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not > > identical. > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>> Helena > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> Helena Worthen > > >>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>> supervise > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two > of > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>> them on > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. > > They > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>> have > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of > > >>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of > division > > of > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>> labor. > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When > they > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>> decided to > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT > context > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>> mainly > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt > about > > the > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>> " unit > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>> of analysis". > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>> ablunden@mira.net> > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>> ??????: > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it > > was > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> one of > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this > > concept > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> was > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new > for > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> me, was > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> expression, I'd > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it > referred > > to > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> was a > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT > > methodology > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> whilst > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me > > know. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> *insight*. It > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, > > it > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> is the > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> usually comes > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using > > some > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> other > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is > the > > new > > >>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. > > So for > > >>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their > research, > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> often > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> supervisor. I > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> point in > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the > > data > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> they now > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> know they need. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Andy > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> articles. But, > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in > > posts. > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> I > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow > > that > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> through > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am > > usually > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> just > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> interested > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, > > and > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> how they > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are > > people > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> doing > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of > analysis > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> being used? > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> interested to > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might > be > > as > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> basic as > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> these. > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in > a > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> much more > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of > analysis. > > In > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> Mike's > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that > > the > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> action is > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors > > that > > >>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here > > before, > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> are > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a > > picture of > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>> much > > >>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. > > >>>>>>>>>>> Katie > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal > > >>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> -- > > >>>>>>>>> ............................................................ > > >>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi > > >>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education > > >>>>>>>>> School of Education > > >>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina > > >>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 > > >>>>>>>>> Ioannina > > >>>>>>>>> Greece > > >>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 > > >>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 > > >>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits > > >>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr > > >>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>> -- > > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > *Patrick Jaki* > > > > > > > > *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > -- *Robyn Babaeff* From ablunden@mira.net Mon Oct 13 04:49:17 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 22:49:17 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> Message-ID: <543BBC3D.4040005@mira.net> Patrick, there is no word in any other language for perezhivanie. The word has a lot of connotations arising from its use in Russian culture. See http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/perezhivanie.htm for a collection of excerpts on perezhivanie. In German Ein Erlebnis and in Spanish el vivencia I am told have similar meanings. But sticking to English, "an experience" captures some of the meaning of perezhivanie (NB, not "experience"), but the Russian word also has the meaning of catharsis or working over/through or surviving which are certainly not present in "an experience" (I don't know about the German and Spanish translations). That is why we have to use the Russian word, because there is no near English equivalent. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Patrick Jaki wrote: > Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is this > not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this case > Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds > onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. > > On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer > wrote: > > >> Andy, >> >> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture >> everything. >> >> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college >> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because that >> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is strongly >> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, >> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the >> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen >> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a >> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements that >> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. >> >> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of >> water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions driving >> further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially >> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is actually >> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and dissociating >> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't develop >> further. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor - >>> >> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is simply >> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and >> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of >> water. >> >>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and OH >>> >> together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge and >> OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative >> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals >> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and therefore >> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions and >> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of >> life. :) >> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own >>>> >> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not a >> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: water is >> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an internal >> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. >> >>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is >>>> >> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) >> >>>> Martin >>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such >>>>> >> that two >> >>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to water >>>>> >> with >> >>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise to >>>>> >> the >> >>>>> concrete for their own cases. >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>> >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >>>>>> >>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic system >>>>>> >> with >> >>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, >>>>>> >> and I >> >>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before >>>>>> >> posting. >> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On the contrary. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about activity >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple >>>>>> >> example >> >>>>>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history >>>>>> >> corner of >> >>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger footing >>>>>> >> in >> >>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing new >>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which >>>>>> >> division >> >>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a leadership >>>>>> >> team >> >>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which >>>>>> >> in turn >> >>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky and >>>>>> quick, change your history. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies that, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one can >>>>>> >> bring >> >>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on *another* >>>>>> component of the totality. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent >>>>>> >> elements that >> >>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the >>>>>>>>> >> question >> >>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method of >>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components >>>>>> >> in a >> >>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, >>>>>> >> which >> >>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means >>>>>> >> that >> >>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>>>>>> >> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective >>>>>> >> responses >> >>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule >>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, >>>>>>>>>>> >> it is >> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> usually comes >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>>>>>>>> >> some >> >>>>>> other >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to >>>>>> >> do?" The >> >>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to >>>>>> >> accomplish. >> >>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we >>>>>> >> trying >> >>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, >>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be >>>>>> >> late >> >>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and >>>>>> >> will miss >> >>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're >>>>>> >> talking >> >>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged >>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be >>>>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, >>>>>> >> but >> >>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would >>>>>> >> then >> >>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were >>>>>> >> often >> >>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. >>>>>> >> Also, a >> >>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening >>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out >>>>>> >> buying >> >>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate >>>>>> >> members of >> >>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to >>>>>> >> something >> >>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society >>>>>> >> so >> >>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended >>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can >>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the >>>>>> >> whole >> >>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy >>>>>> >> says, a >> >>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually >>>>>>>>>>> >> speak to >> >>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about >>>>>> >> activity >> >>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in >>>>>> >> conflict >> >>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in >>>>>>>>>> >> mind? >> >>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, >>>>>> >> or >> >>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most >>>>>> >> interesting >> >>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of >>>>>> >> children) >> >>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not >>>>>> >> identical. >> >>>>>>>>>> Helena >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> supervise >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> them on >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. >>>>>>>>>>> >> They >> >>>>>> have >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division >>>>>>>>>>> >> of >> >>>>>> labor. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> decided to >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> mainly >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about >>>>>>>>>>> >> the >> >>>>>> " unit >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> ??????: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it >>>>>>>>>>>> >> was >> >>>>>> one of >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this >>>>>>>>>>>> >> concept >> >>>>>> was >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> me, was >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> expression, I'd >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred >>>>>>>>>>>> >> to >> >>>>>> was a >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT >>>>>>>>>>>> >> methodology >> >>>>>> whilst >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me >>>>>>>>>>>> >> know. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, >>>>>>>>>>>> >> it >> >>>>>> is the >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> usually comes >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>>>>>>>>> >> some >> >>>>>> other >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the >>>>>>>>>>>> >> new >> >>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>>>>>>> >> So for >> >>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> often >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> supervisor. I >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> point in >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the >>>>>>>>>>>> >> data >> >>>>>> they now >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> articles. But, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> posts. >> >>>>>> I >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> that >> >>>>>> through >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> usually >> >>>>>> just >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> interested >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> and >> >>>>>> how they >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> people >> >>>>>> doing >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> being used? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> interested to >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> as >> >>>>>> basic as >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> these. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> much more >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> In >> >>>>>> Mike's >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> the >> >>>>>> action is >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> that >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> before, >> >>>>>> are >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> picture of >> >>>>>> much >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>>>>>>>> School of Education >>>>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>>>>>>>> Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>> Greece >>>>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Oct 13 05:21:43 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 12:21:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: > Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving > perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive connection? It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their mother's drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the dynamic development of perezhivanie. In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from emotion, in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and interpreting the circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, the child is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction is one of extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates involuntarily and stammers. He loses control of his own body. LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the horror of what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of terror, enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to speak at all as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction amounts to a state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of this situation." The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. The contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an alternation between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion towards the mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the breakdown seen in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily emotional, but it is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The child's love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, directed towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as bad. It is, however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions that is so difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of approach-avoidance. The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the mother; her failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal conflict for the child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates between two different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she is a mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than that of his younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely agonizing condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a condition frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional attitudes towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we have previously been able to observe among one of our children and which, you may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, from the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful attachment, and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of terrors and terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The German authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is experiencing a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for the mother and terror of the witch coexist. "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply pronounced conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction expressed in a simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the mother, a terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, combined with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going home was brought up." In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with more detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of pity: of sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion can coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother not as a bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, or weak. She acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. This, then, means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a "duty" to take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest child has a single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. His emotions follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was ill and he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his mother down, make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones and comfort them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the family, the only one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and cognition in each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship changes with age. Martin The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a preschooler, and the oldest a school-aged child. On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff wrote: > Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving > perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive connection? > As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a different > realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective position of > the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where there is > emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then as the > cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs from the > internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the connectedness > takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn > motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. > > On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees > wrote: > >> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every word, >> but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating with the >> same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like this >> discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it because we each >> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our >> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be expected to >> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some people, >> etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an >> approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be negotiated in >> discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer to >> understanding how a particular person uses particular words when we get to >> know that person as a person and that involves much more than just batting >> words to and fro! >> >> Rod >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] >> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? >> >> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is this >> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this case >> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds >> onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. >> >> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer >> wrote: >> >>> Andy, >>> >>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture >>> everything. >>> >>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college >>> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because that >>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is strongly >>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, >>> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the >>> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen >>> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a >>> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements that >>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. >>> >>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of >>> water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions driving >>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially >>> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is >> actually >>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and >> dissociating >>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't develop >>> further. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor - >>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is >> simply >>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and >>> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of >>> water. >>>> >>>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and >> OH >>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge >> and >>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative >>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals >>> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and therefore >>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions >> and >>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of >>> life. :) >>>> Andy >>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own >>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not a >>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: water >> is >>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an internal >>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. >>>>> >>>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is >>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such >>> that two >>>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to water >>> with >>>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise to >>> the >>>>>> concrete for their own cases. >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic >> system >>> with >>>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, >>> and I >>>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before >>> posting. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < >> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On the contrary. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about >> activity >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple >>> example >>>>>>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history >>> corner of >>>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger >> footing >>> in >>>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing >> new >>>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which >>> division >>>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a >> leadership >>> team >>>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which >>> in turn >>>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky >> and >>>>>>> quick, change your history. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies >> that, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one can >>> bring >>>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on >> *another* >>>>>>> component of the totality. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent >>> elements that >>>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the >>> question >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method >> of >>>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components >>> in a >>>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, >>> which >>>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means >>> that >>>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective >>> responses >>>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a >> rule >>>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, >>> it is >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>> some >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> other >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The >> question >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to >>> do?" The >>>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to >>> accomplish. >>>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we >>> trying >>>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, >>>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be >>> late >>>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and >>> will miss >>>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're >>> talking >>>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle >> aged >>>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be >>>>>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, >>> but >>>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would >>> then >>>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were >>> often >>>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. >>> Also, a >>>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was >> happening >>>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out >>> buying >>>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not >> easy. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate >>> members of >>>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to >>> something >>>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society >>> so >>>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended >>>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you >> can >>>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing >> the >>> whole >>>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy >>> says, a >>>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually >>> speak to >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about >>> activity >>>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in >>> conflict >>>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in >>> mind? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the >> class, >>> or >>>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most >>> interesting >>>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of >>> children) >>>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not >>> identical. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Helena >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> supervise >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two >> of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> them on >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. >>> They >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> have >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of >> division >>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> labor. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When >> they >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> decided to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT >> context >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> mainly >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt >> about >>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> " unit >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> ??????: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it >>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> one of >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this >>> concept >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> was >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new >> for >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> me, was >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> expression, I'd >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it >> referred >>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> was a >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT >>> methodology >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> whilst >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me >>> know. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, >>> it >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> is the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> other >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is >> the >>> new >>>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. >>> So for >>>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their >> research, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> often >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> supervisor. I >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> point in >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the >>> data >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> they now >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> articles. But, >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in >>> posts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> I >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow >>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> through >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am >>> usually >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> just >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> interested >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, >>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> how they >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are >>> people >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> doing >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of >> analysis >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> being used? >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> interested to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might >> be >>> as >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> basic as >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> these. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in >> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> much more >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of >> analysis. >>> In >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Mike's >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that >>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> action is >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors >>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here >>> before, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> are >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a >>> picture of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> much >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>>>>>>>>> School of Education >>>>>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>>>>>>>>> Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>> Greece >>>>>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >> an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> *Patrick Jaki* >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >> ________________________________ >> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >> >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for >> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. >> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts >> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails >> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility >> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied >> by an official order form. >> >> > > > -- > *Robyn Babaeff* From robyn.babaeff@monash.edu Mon Oct 13 05:45:27 2014 From: robyn.babaeff@monash.edu (Robyn Babaeff) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 23:45:27 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: Much appreciated Martin - this is feeling more visual, and now I am wondering is it possible to interpret that the older child's emotive drive/action of care for his mother and younger sibling in its moment is also connected a socially mediated aspect of cognition from somewhere/time in his earlier years of perezhivanie for the 'how to' in his choosing/drive for duty of care? On 13 October 2014 23:21, Martin John Packer wrote: > > Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving > > perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive > connection? > > > It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their mother's > drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the dynamic > development of perezhivanie. > > In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from emotion, > in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and interpreting the > circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, the child > is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction is one of > extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates involuntarily and > stammers. He loses control of his own body. > > LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the horror of > what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of terror, > enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to speak at all > as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction amounts to a > state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of this > situation." > > The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. The > contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an alternation > between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion towards the > mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the breakdown seen > in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily emotional, but it > is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The child's > love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, directed > towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as bad. It is, > however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions that is so > difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of approach-avoidance. > The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the mother; her > failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal conflict for the > child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates between two > different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she is a > mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than that of his > younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. > > LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely agonizing > condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a condition > frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional attitudes > towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we have > previously been able to observe among one of our children and which, you > may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, from > the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful attachment, > and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of terrors and > terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The German > authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is experiencing > a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for the mother > and terror of the witch coexist. > > "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply pronounced > conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction expressed in a > simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the mother, a > terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, combined > with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home > immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going home was > brought up." > > In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with more > detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of pity: of > sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion can > coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother not as a > bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, or weak. She > acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. This, then, > means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a "duty" to > take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. > > Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest child has a > single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. His emotions > follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. > > LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was ill and > he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his mother down, > make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones and comfort > them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the family, the only > one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". > > In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and cognition in > each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship changes > with age. > > Martin > > The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a preschooler, and > the oldest a school-aged child. > On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff > wrote: > > > Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving > > perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive > connection? > > As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a > different > > realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective position of > > the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where there is > > emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then as the > > cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs from the > > internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the > connectedness > > takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn > > motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. > > > > On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees > > wrote: > > > >> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every word, > >> but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating with the > >> same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like this > >> discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it because we > each > >> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our > >> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be expected > to > >> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some people, > >> etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an > >> approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be negotiated in > >> discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer to > >> understanding how a particular person uses particular words when we get > to > >> know that person as a person and that involves much more than just > batting > >> words to and fro! > >> > >> Rod > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >> on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] > >> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? > >> > >> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is > this > >> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this > case > >> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds > >> onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. > >> > >> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer > >> wrote: > >> > >>> Andy, > >>> > >>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture > >>> everything. > >>> > >>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college > >>> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because > that > >>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is > strongly > >>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, > >>> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the > >>> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen > >>> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a > >>> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements > that > >>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. > >>> > >>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of > >>> water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions > driving > >>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially > >>> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is > >> actually > >>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and > >> dissociating > >>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't > develop > >>> further. > >>> > >>> Martin > >>> > >>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>> > >>>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor > - > >>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is > >> simply > >>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and > >>> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of > >>> water. > >>>> > >>>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and > >> OH > >>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge > >> and > >>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative > >>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals > >>> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and > therefore > >>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions > >> and > >>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of > >>> life. :) > >>>> Andy > >>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: > >>>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own > >>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not > a > >>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: > water > >> is > >>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an > internal > >>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. > >>>>> > >>>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is > >>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin > >>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such > >>> that two > >>>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to > water > >>> with > >>>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise > to > >>> the > >>>>>> concrete for their own cases. > >>>>>> mike > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic > >> system > >>> with > >>>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, > >>> and I > >>>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before > >>> posting. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On the contrary. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about > >> activity > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple > >>> example > >>>>>>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history > >>> corner of > >>>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger > >> footing > >>> in > >>>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing > >> new > >>>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which > >>> division > >>>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a > >> leadership > >>> team > >>>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which > >>> in turn > >>>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky > >> and > >>>>>>> quick, change your history. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Helena Worthen > >>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies > >> that, > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one > can > >>> bring > >>>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on > >> *another* > >>>>>>> component of the totality. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent > >>> elements that > >>>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the > >>> question > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method > >> of > >>>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components > >>> in a > >>>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on > another, > >>> which > >>>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means > >>> that > >>>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this > relationship. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < > >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective > >>> responses > >>>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a > >> rule > >>>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> *insight*. It > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, > >>> it is > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> usually comes > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using > >>> some > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> other > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The > >> question > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to > >>> do?" The > >>>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to > >>> accomplish. > >>>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we > >>> trying > >>>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in > Chicago, > >>>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to > be > >>> late > >>>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and > >>> will miss > >>>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're > >>> talking > >>>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle > >> aged > >>>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be > >>>>>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a > machine, > >>> but > >>>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who > would > >>> then > >>>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were > >>> often > >>>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. > >>> Also, a > >>>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was > >> happening > >>>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out > >>> buying > >>>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not > >> easy. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to > accomplish, > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate > >>> members of > >>>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to > >>> something > >>>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in > society > >>> so > >>>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an > extended > >>>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you > >> can > >>>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing > >> the > >>> whole > >>>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy > >>> says, a > >>>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually > >>> speak to > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about > >>> activity > >>>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in > >>> conflict > >>>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in > >>> mind? > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the > >> class, > >>> or > >>>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most > >>> interesting > >>>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of > >>> children) > >>>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not > >>> identical. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Helena > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen > >>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> supervise > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two > >> of > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> them on > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. > >>> They > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> have > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of > >>>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of > >> division > >>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> labor. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When > >> they > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> decided to > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT > >> context > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> mainly > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt > >> about > >>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> " unit > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> ??????: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it > >>> was > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> one of > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this > >>> concept > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> was > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new > >> for > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> me, was > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> expression, I'd > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it > >> referred > >>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> was a > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT > >>> methodology > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> whilst > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me > >>> know. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> *insight*. It > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a > template, > >>> it > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> is the > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> usually comes > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using > >>> some > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> other > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is > >> the > >>> new > >>>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. > >>> So for > >>>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their > >> research, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> often > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> supervisor. I > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to > this > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> point in > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the > >>> data > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> they now > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> articles. But, > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in > >>> posts. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't > follow > >>> that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> through > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am > >>> usually > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> just > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because > I'm > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> interested > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, > >>> and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> how they > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are > >>> people > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of > >> analysis > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> being used? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> interested to > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might > >> be > >>> as > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> basic as > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> these. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in > >> a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> much more > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of > >> analysis. > >>> In > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Mike's > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that > >>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> action is > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors > >>> that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here > >>> before, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> are > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a > >>> picture of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> much > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>> ............................................................ > >>>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi > >>>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education > >>>>>>>>>>>> School of Education > >>>>>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina > >>>>>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ioannina > >>>>>>>>>>>> Greece > >>>>>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 > >>>>>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 > >>>>>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits > >>>>>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr > >>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > >> an > >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> *Patrick Jaki* > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* > >> ________________________________ > >> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > >> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > >> > >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely > for > >> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > >> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > >> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on > it. > >> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > >> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > >> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University > accepts > >> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan > emails > >> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept > responsibility > >> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > >> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless > accompanied > >> by an official order form. > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > *Robyn Babaeff* > > > -- *Robyn Babaeff* From ablunden@mira.net Mon Oct 13 06:25:14 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 00:25:14 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <543BD2BA.8050504@mira.net> Robyn, Martin, could we avoid mimicking the Russian habit of using the word perezhivanie without an article. In English count nouns need an article. We can have "a perezhivanie" or "that perezhivanie" or "each perezhivanie" etc., or "a number of perezhivanija". Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Robyn Babaeff wrote: > Much appreciated Martin - this is feeling more visual, and now I am > wondering is it possible to interpret that the older child's emotive > drive/action of care for his mother and younger sibling in its moment is > also connected a socially mediated aspect of cognition from somewhere/time > in his earlier years of perezhivanie for the 'how to' in his choosing/drive > for duty of care? > > On 13 October 2014 23:21, Martin John Packer > wrote: > > >>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >>> >> connection? >> >> >> It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their mother's >> drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the dynamic >> development of perezhivanie. >> >> In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from emotion, >> in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and interpreting the >> circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, the child >> is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction is one of >> extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates involuntarily and >> stammers. He loses control of his own body. >> >> LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the horror of >> what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of terror, >> enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to speak at all >> as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction amounts to a >> state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of this >> situation." >> >> The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. The >> contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an alternation >> between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion towards the >> mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the breakdown seen >> in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily emotional, but it >> is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The child's >> love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, directed >> towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as bad. It is, >> however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions that is so >> difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of approach-avoidance. >> The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the mother; her >> failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal conflict for the >> child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates between two >> different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she is a >> mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than that of his >> younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. >> >> LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely agonizing >> condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a condition >> frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional attitudes >> towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we have >> previously been able to observe among one of our children and which, you >> may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, from >> the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful attachment, >> and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of terrors and >> terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The German >> authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is experiencing >> a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for the mother >> and terror of the witch coexist. >> >> "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply pronounced >> conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction expressed in a >> simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the mother, a >> terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, combined >> with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home >> immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going home was >> brought up." >> >> In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with more >> detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of pity: of >> sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion can >> coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother not as a >> bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, or weak. She >> acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. This, then, >> means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a "duty" to >> take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. >> >> Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest child has a >> single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. His emotions >> follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. >> >> LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was ill and >> he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his mother down, >> make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones and comfort >> them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the family, the only >> one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". >> >> In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and cognition in >> each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship changes >> with age. >> >> Martin >> >> The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a preschooler, and >> the oldest a school-aged child. >> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff >> wrote: >> >> >>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >>> >> connection? >> >>> As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a >>> >> different >> >>> realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective position of >>> the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where there is >>> emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then as the >>> cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs from the >>> internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the >>> >> connectedness >> >>> takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn >>> motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. >>> >>> On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every word, >>>> but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating with the >>>> same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like this >>>> discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it because we >>>> >> each >> >>>> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our >>>> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be expected >>>> >> to >> >>>> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some people, >>>> etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an >>>> approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be negotiated in >>>> discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer to >>>> understanding how a particular person uses particular words when we get >>>> >> to >> >>>> know that person as a person and that involves much more than just >>>> >> batting >> >>>> words to and fro! >>>> >>>> Rod >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>> on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] >>>> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? >>>> >>>> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is >>>> >> this >> >>>> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this >>>> >> case >> >>>> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds >>>> onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. >>>> >>>> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Andy, >>>>> >>>>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture >>>>> everything. >>>>> >>>>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college >>>>> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because >>>>> >> that >> >>>>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is >>>>> >> strongly >> >>>>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, >>>>> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the >>>>> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen >>>>> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a >>>>> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements >>>>> >> that >> >>>>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. >>>>> >>>>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of >>>>> water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions >>>>> >> driving >> >>>>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially >>>>> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is >>>>> >>>> actually >>>> >>>>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and >>>>> >>>> dissociating >>>> >>>>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't >>>>> >> develop >> >>>>> further. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor >>>>>> >> - >> >>>>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is >>>>> >>>> simply >>>> >>>>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and >>>>> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of >>>>> water. >>>>> >>>>>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and >>>>>> >>>> OH >>>> >>>>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge >>>>> >>>> and >>>> >>>>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative >>>>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals >>>>> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and >>>>> >> therefore >> >>>>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions >>>>> >>>> and >>>> >>>>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of >>>>> life. :) >>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own >>>>>>> >>>>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not >>>>> >> a >> >>>>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: >>>>> >> water >> >>>> is >>>> >>>>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an >>>>> >> internal >> >>>>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. >>>>> >>>>>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is >>>>>>> >>>>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) >>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such >>>>>>>> >>>>> that two >>>>> >>>>>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to >>>>>>>> >> water >> >>>>> with >>>>> >>>>>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise >>>>>>>> >> to >> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>>>>> concrete for their own cases. >>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>>> >>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic >>>>>>>>> >>>> system >>>> >>>>> with >>>>> >>>>>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, >>>>>>>>> >>>>> and I >>>>> >>>>>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before >>>>>>>>> >>>>> posting. >>>>> >>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>>>>>> >>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On the contrary. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about >>>>>>>>>> >>>> activity >>>> >>>>>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple >>>>>>>>> >>>>> example >>>>> >>>>>>>>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history >>>>>>>>> >>>>> corner of >>>>> >>>>>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger >>>>>>>>> >>>> footing >>>> >>>>> in >>>>> >>>>>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing >>>>>>>>> >>>> new >>>> >>>>>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which >>>>>>>>> >>>>> division >>>>> >>>>>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a >>>>>>>>> >>>> leadership >>>> >>>>> team >>>>> >>>>>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which >>>>>>>>> >>>>> in turn >>>>> >>>>>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky >>>>>>>>> >>>> and >>>> >>>>>>>>> quick, change your history. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> that, >>>> >>>>>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one >>>>>>>>> >> can >> >>>>> bring >>>>> >>>>>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on >>>>>>>>> >>>> *another* >>>> >>>>>>>>> component of the totality. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent >>>>>>>>> >>>>> elements that >>>>> >>>>>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> question >>>>> >>>>>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method >>>>>>>>> >>>> of >>>> >>>>>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components >>>>>>>>> >>>>> in a >>>>> >>>>>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on >>>>>>>>> >> another, >> >>>>> which >>>>> >>>>>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means >>>>>>>>> >>>>> that >>>>> >>>>>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this >>>>>>>>> >> relationship. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective >>>>>>>>> >>>>> responses >>>>> >>>>>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a >>>>>>>>> >>>> rule >>>> >>>>>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> it is >>>>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> some >>>>> >>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> question >>>> >>>>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to >>>>>>>>> >>>>> do?" The >>>>> >>>>>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to >>>>>>>>> >>>>> accomplish. >>>>> >>>>>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we >>>>>>>>> >>>>> trying >>>>> >>>>>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in >>>>>>>>> >> Chicago, >> >>>>>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to >>>>>>>>> >> be >> >>>>> late >>>>> >>>>>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and >>>>>>>>> >>>>> will miss >>>>> >>>>>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're >>>>>>>>> >>>>> talking >>>>> >>>>>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle >>>>>>>>> >>>> aged >>>> >>>>>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be >>>>>>>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a >>>>>>>>> >> machine, >> >>>>> but >>>>> >>>>>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who >>>>>>>>> >> would >> >>>>> then >>>>> >>>>>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were >>>>>>>>> >>>>> often >>>>> >>>>>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. >>>>>>>>> >>>>> Also, a >>>>> >>>>>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was >>>>>>>>> >>>> happening >>>> >>>>>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out >>>>>>>>> >>>>> buying >>>>> >>>>>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not >>>>>>>>> >>>> easy. >>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> accomplish, >> >>>>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate >>>>>>>>> >>>>> members of >>>>> >>>>>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to >>>>>>>>> >>>>> something >>>>> >>>>>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in >>>>>>>>> >> society >> >>>>> so >>>>> >>>>>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an >>>>>>>>> >> extended >> >>>>>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you >>>>>>>>> >>>> can >>>> >>>>>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing >>>>>>>>> >>>> the >>>> >>>>> whole >>>>> >>>>>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>> says, a >>>>> >>>>>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> speak to >>>>> >>>>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about >>>>>>>>> >>>>> activity >>>>> >>>>>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in >>>>>>>>> >>>>> conflict >>>>> >>>>>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> mind? >>>>> >>>>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the >>>>>>>>> >>>> class, >>>> >>>>> or >>>>> >>>>>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most >>>>>>>>> >>>>> interesting >>>>> >>>>>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of >>>>>>>>> >>>>> children) >>>>> >>>>>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not >>>>>>>>> >>>>> identical. >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> supervise >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> of >>>> >>>>>>>>> them on >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> They >>>>> >>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> division >>>> >>>>> of >>>>> >>>>>>>>> labor. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> they >>>> >>>>>>>>> decided to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> context >>>> >>>>>>>>> mainly >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> about >>>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>>>>>> " unit >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ??????: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> was >>>>> >>>>>>>>> one of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> concept >>>>> >>>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> for >>>> >>>>>>>>> me, was >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> expression, I'd >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> referred >>>> >>>>> to >>>>> >>>>>>>>> was a >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> methodology >>>>> >>>>>>>>> whilst >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> know. >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> template, >> >>>>> it >>>>> >>>>>>>>> is the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> some >>>>> >>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> the >>>> >>>>> new >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> So for >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> research, >>>> >>>>>>>>> often >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> supervisor. I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> this >> >>>>>>>>> point in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> data >>>>> >>>>>>>>> they now >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> articles. But, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> posts. >>>>> >>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> follow >> >>>>> that >>>>> >>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> usually >>>>> >>>>>>>>> just >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> I'm >> >>>>>>>>> interested >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>>>>>> how they >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> people >>>>> >>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> analysis >>>> >>>>>>>>> being used? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> interested to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> be >>>> >>>>> as >>>>> >>>>>>>>> basic as >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> a >>>> >>>>>>>>> much more >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> analysis. >>>> >>>>> In >>>>> >>>>>>>>> Mike's >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>>>>>> action is >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> that >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> before, >>>>> >>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> picture of >>>>> >>>>>>>>> much >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>>>>>>>>>>> School of Education >>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Greece >>>>>>>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>>>>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>>>> >>>> an >>>> >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> *Patrick Jaki* >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >>>> ________________________________ >>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >>>> >>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely >>>> >> for >> >>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >>>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >>>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on >>>> >> it. >> >>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >>>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University >>>> >> accepts >> >>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan >>>> >> emails >> >>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept >>>> >> responsibility >> >>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >>>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless >>>> >> accompanied >> >>>> by an official order form. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> *Robyn Babaeff* >>> >> >> > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Oct 13 06:51:41 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 13:51:41 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: Hi Robyn, I think it's important to recognize that the oldest child's understanding of the need to take care of his mother and siblings is not a drive or an impulse, it is, LSV tells us, a "duty" that follows from adopting a specific "role" in the family. Understanding the situation in terms of roles and duties is certainly socially mediated - after all, roles and duties are social, or societal, matters (ontological and deontological respectively, if we want to get technical). The oldest child - presumably attending school - is able to understand that he lives in a world of social institutions, one of which is his family. In this chapter LSV does not explore or explain how each kind of perezhivanie transforms into the next, but in his lectures on child development you can find a more detailed account. But here, in what is effectively a cross-sectional comparison of children at different ages (albeit only one at each age), he certainly means to suggest that earlier forms provide the basis for later forms. Martin On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:45 AM, Robyn Babaeff wrote: > Much appreciated Martin - this is feeling more visual, and now I am > wondering is it possible to interpret that the older child's emotive > drive/action of care for his mother and younger sibling in its moment is > also connected a socially mediated aspect of cognition from somewhere/time > in his earlier years of perezhivanie for the 'how to' in his choosing/drive > for duty of care? > > On 13 October 2014 23:21, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >> connection? >> >> >> It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their mother's >> drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the dynamic >> development of perezhivanie. >> >> In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from emotion, >> in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and interpreting the >> circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, the child >> is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction is one of >> extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates involuntarily and >> stammers. He loses control of his own body. >> >> LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the horror of >> what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of terror, >> enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to speak at all >> as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction amounts to a >> state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of this >> situation." >> >> The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. The >> contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an alternation >> between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion towards the >> mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the breakdown seen >> in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily emotional, but it >> is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The child's >> love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, directed >> towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as bad. It is, >> however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions that is so >> difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of approach-avoidance. >> The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the mother; her >> failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal conflict for the >> child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates between two >> different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she is a >> mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than that of his >> younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. >> >> LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely agonizing >> condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a condition >> frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional attitudes >> towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we have >> previously been able to observe among one of our children and which, you >> may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, from >> the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful attachment, >> and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of terrors and >> terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The German >> authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is experiencing >> a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for the mother >> and terror of the witch coexist. >> >> "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply pronounced >> conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction expressed in a >> simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the mother, a >> terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, combined >> with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home >> immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going home was >> brought up." >> >> In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with more >> detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of pity: of >> sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion can >> coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother not as a >> bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, or weak. She >> acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. This, then, >> means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a "duty" to >> take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. >> >> Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest child has a >> single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. His emotions >> follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. >> >> LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was ill and >> he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his mother down, >> make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones and comfort >> them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the family, the only >> one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". >> >> In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and cognition in >> each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship changes >> with age. >> >> Martin >> >> The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a preschooler, and >> the oldest a school-aged child. >> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff >> wrote: >> >>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >> connection? >>> As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a >> different >>> realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective position of >>> the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where there is >>> emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then as the >>> cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs from the >>> internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the >> connectedness >>> takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn >>> motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. >>> >>> On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every word, >>>> but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating with the >>>> same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like this >>>> discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it because we >> each >>>> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our >>>> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be expected >> to >>>> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some people, >>>> etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an >>>> approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be negotiated in >>>> discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer to >>>> understanding how a particular person uses particular words when we get >> to >>>> know that person as a person and that involves much more than just >> batting >>>> words to and fro! >>>> >>>> Rod >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>> on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] >>>> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? >>>> >>>> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is >> this >>>> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this >> case >>>> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds >>>> onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. >>>> >>>> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Andy, >>>>> >>>>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture >>>>> everything. >>>>> >>>>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college >>>>> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because >> that >>>>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is >> strongly >>>>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, >>>>> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the >>>>> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen >>>>> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a >>>>> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements >> that >>>>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. >>>>> >>>>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of >>>>> water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions >> driving >>>>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially >>>>> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is >>>> actually >>>>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and >>>> dissociating >>>>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't >> develop >>>>> further. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor >> - >>>>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is >>>> simply >>>>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and >>>>> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of >>>>> water. >>>>>> >>>>>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and >>>> OH >>>>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge >>>> and >>>>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative >>>>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals >>>>> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and >> therefore >>>>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions >>>> and >>>>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of >>>>> life. :) >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own >>>>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not >> a >>>>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: >> water >>>> is >>>>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an >> internal >>>>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is >>>>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such >>>>> that two >>>>>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to >> water >>>>> with >>>>>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise >> to >>>>> the >>>>>>>> concrete for their own cases. >>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic >>>> system >>>>> with >>>>>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, >>>>> and I >>>>>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before >>>>> posting. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On the contrary. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about >>>> activity >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple >>>>> example >>>>>>>>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history >>>>> corner of >>>>>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger >>>> footing >>>>> in >>>>>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing >>>> new >>>>>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which >>>>> division >>>>>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a >>>> leadership >>>>> team >>>>>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which >>>>> in turn >>>>>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky >>>> and >>>>>>>>> quick, change your history. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies >>>> that, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one >> can >>>>> bring >>>>>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on >>>> *another* >>>>>>>>> component of the totality. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent >>>>> elements that >>>>>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the >>>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method >>>> of >>>>>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components >>>>> in a >>>>>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on >> another, >>>>> which >>>>>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means >>>>> that >>>>>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this >> relationship. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective >>>>> responses >>>>>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a >>>> rule >>>>>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, >>>>> it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The >>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to >>>>> do?" The >>>>>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to >>>>> accomplish. >>>>>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we >>>>> trying >>>>>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in >> Chicago, >>>>>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to >> be >>>>> late >>>>>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and >>>>> will miss >>>>>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're >>>>> talking >>>>>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle >>>> aged >>>>>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be >>>>>>>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a >> machine, >>>>> but >>>>>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who >> would >>>>> then >>>>>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were >>>>> often >>>>>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. >>>>> Also, a >>>>>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was >>>> happening >>>>>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out >>>>> buying >>>>>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not >>>> easy. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to >> accomplish, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate >>>>> members of >>>>>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to >>>>> something >>>>>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in >> society >>>>> so >>>>>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an >> extended >>>>>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you >>>> can >>>>>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing >>>> the >>>>> whole >>>>>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy >>>>> says, a >>>>>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually >>>>> speak to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about >>>>> activity >>>>>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in >>>>> conflict >>>>>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in >>>>> mind? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the >>>> class, >>>>> or >>>>>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most >>>>> interesting >>>>>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of >>>>> children) >>>>>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not >>>>> identical. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> supervise >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two >>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> them on >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. >>>>> They >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of >>>> division >>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> labor. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When >>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> decided to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT >>>> context >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> mainly >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt >>>> about >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> " unit >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ??????: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it >>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> one of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this >>>>> concept >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new >>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> me, was >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> expression, I'd >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it >>>> referred >>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> was a >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT >>>>> methodology >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> whilst >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me >>>>> know. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a >> template, >>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> is the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is >>>> the >>>>> new >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. >>>>> So for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their >>>> research, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> often >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> supervisor. I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to >> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> point in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the >>>>> data >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> they now >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> articles. But, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in >>>>> posts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't >> follow >>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am >>>>> usually >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> just >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because >> I'm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> interested >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, >>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> how they >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are >>>>> people >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of >>>> analysis >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> being used? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> interested to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might >>>> be >>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> basic as >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in >>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> much more >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of >>>> analysis. >>>>> In >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Mike's >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> action is >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors >>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here >>>>> before, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a >>>>> picture of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> much >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>>>>>>>>>>> School of Education >>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Greece >>>>>>>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>>>>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>> an >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> *Patrick Jaki* >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >>>> ________________________________ >>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >>>> >>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely >> for >>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >>>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >>>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on >> it. >>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >>>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University >> accepts >>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan >> emails >>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept >> responsibility >>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >>>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless >> accompanied >>>> by an official order form. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> *Robyn Babaeff* >> >> >> > > > -- > *Robyn Babaeff* From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Oct 13 07:11:12 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 08:11:12 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the xmca discussion In-Reply-To: References: <76EF3C1C-DE83-42C7-A7CB-BC16DAF8B641@gmail.com> Message-ID: Hu(w)gely helpful. Thanks, greg On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 5:00 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Greg, > > The "push back" is the problem being dealt with. Hence if you don't have a > problem you don't have any "push back". > > Donald Schon, who studied Dewey's theory of inquiry, wrote extensively on > "talk back / push back". > > See, also, Mark Smith's summary and the areas of criticism: > http://infed.org/mobi/donald-schon-learning-reflection-change/ > > Best, > Huw > > > > On 13 October 2014 05:10, Greg Thompson wrote: > > > Mike and Huw, > > I have some fear that this will be a distraction from the main thread but > > briefly, Huw, that is helpful as I inch toward an understanding of how we > > might get out of coherence vs. correspondence dualism. Latour (sorry for > > introducing outsiders here! He is an important social theorist, esp. in > > anthropology, and has published in MCA, so there's that...) says that the > > "real" is that which "pushes back." I feel like he is in some ways > > paraphrasing Dewey here, but I haven't quite been able to find where we > > might find something like that in Dewey. Perhaps you can keep an eye out > as > > you read? > > > > Mike, I'm still processing/imagining your comments. Unknown whether they > > will return to the hall of shadows or become a real object for me. > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:19 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > Huw and Greg et al-- > > > > > > Greg: And if you happen to have an extra moment, I wonder if you could > > say > > > a bit > > > > about HOW Dewey makes the case for objects not existing prior to > being > > > > made-as-such? > > > > > > > > > Huw: Well, I haven't dug very far. But its fairly clear from his > letter > > > that it > > > is part of the process of inquiry, i.e. that one proposes the objects > > that > > > one studies in the process of addressing a real problem upon which the > > > inquiry is based. > > > > > > Here is Mike's guess: > > > In the process of inquiry, one is always imagining next moments. The > > object > > > arises out of imagination, or the imagined turns out to be unembodied > and > > > returns to the hall of shadows. > > > > > > Quicker than a wink. > > > mike > > > > > > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:16 PM, Huw Lloyd > > > wrote: > > > > > > > On 12 October 2014 03:40, Greg Thompson > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Huw, > > > > > Can you give us a little more about the Nagel introduction? How > does > > > > Nagel > > > > > make that error? > > > > > > > > > > > > > He critiques the predicate of the change (or difference) that Dewey > > > asserts > > > > in the process of investigation/inquiry. Nagel's consideration of > this > > > > change was merely the instrumental imposition rather than recognising > > the > > > > construal of the object as a construction and a difference. From his > > > > writing it was apparent to me that he misses this. The peculiarity > is > > > that > > > > this is the introduction to Dewey's volume on logic as inquiry. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > And if you happen to have an extra moment, I wonder if you could > say > > a > > > > bit > > > > > about HOW Dewey makes the case for objects not existing prior to > > being > > > > > made-as-such? > > > > > > > > > > > > Well, I haven't dug very far. But its fairly clear from his letter > > that > > > it > > > > is part of the process of inquiry, i.e. that one proposes the objects > > > that > > > > one studies in the process of addressing a real problem upon which > the > > > > inquiry is based. > > > > > > > > > > > > > I've been chatting elsewhere with Jay Lemke and others about > > > > > Bruno Latour's and Tim Ingold's separate uses of "correspondence" > in > > > ways > > > > > that go against the classical notions of "correspondence" as in > > > > > correspondence theory (i.e. the measure of the value of a science > is > > > the > > > > > extent to which it corresponds to reality). > > > > > > > > > > > > > Well, in the little I've read Dewey argued that social science > exceeds > > > > natural science in certain dimensions of concreteness (if I remember > > > > correctly). But I think he was writing of a pre-quantum physics. > As a > > > > mode of inquiry coherence would, I am surmising, be more valued than > > > > "correspondence" -- afterall, correspondence with what? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I'm wondering how these views might be different from Dewey's take > on > > > the > > > > > matter (in a lot of ways, I'm sure, but also similar in others). > But > > I > > > > > haven't read Dewey lately or with these ideas in mind and I could > > use a > > > > leg > > > > > up... > > > > > > > > > > > > > I don't know how they relate to your other theorists on > correspondence. > > > > But I do know you won't get very far by orientation alone. By > > > orientation, > > > > all you get to do is shake and feel the parcel (paraphrasing Hector > > from > > > > "The History Boys"). From what I can tell, Dewey would advocate > > getting > > > > technical with your authentic problem (which you would absolutely > have > > to > > > > do to use it productively) and recognise that the problem of interest > > is > > > > part of the root of your inquiry. Perhaps not the "leg up" you were > > > hoping > > > > for! > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks, > > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 5:05 PM, Huw Lloyd < > > huw.softdesigns@gmail.com> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > My own excursion has been to explore writings relating to Dewey > > > (simply > > > > > > something I had out off and found time to explore). Which, it > > turns > > > > out, > > > > > > are (to my reading) another pithy way to express the logical > > > problems I > > > > > was > > > > > > reading in David's narrative. But this might be because I > already > > > > > > "understand" the problem. > > > > > > > > > > > > Anyway, the interesting writings were "A letter from Dewey" that > is > > > in > > > > > the > > > > > > appendix of "Knowing and Known" and Ernest Nagel's introduction > to > > > > > Dewey's > > > > > > "Logic: The Theory of Inquiry". > > > > > > > > > > > > One of the rather interesting things about reading Nagel's > > > > introduction, > > > > > is > > > > > > that he makes an ontological error that Dewey referred to in his > > > letter > > > > > (I > > > > > > believe). The error was that an "object" (not its referent) is > > > > > > existentially existent beyond and before its social construction. > > > > > > Something that we CHAT enthusiasts should be familiar with. > > > > > > > > > > > > Nevertheless (as a psychologist) I am interested in the truth of > > > > errors, > > > > > > and Nagel's introduction was certainly helpful in enlivening the > > > > prospect > > > > > > of the 500 page volume (vol. 12 of the later works). Of course, > I > > > > could > > > > > be > > > > > > naively wrong about it, but all the pieces line up for me here, > > > > including > > > > > > some passages that are remarkably aligned with DE / > > El'konin-Davydov > > > > > > theory. > > > > > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 11 October 2014 22:38, Henry G. Shonerd III < > hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > Paul, > > > > > > > Let me think about it. I appreciate your reference to Derrida. > I > > am > > > > > > > reading like crazy to keep up with you guys! > > > > > > > Henry > > > > > > > P.S. I am pretty dedicated to reading the references, links on > > the > > > > > XMCA. > > > > > > > But I use Wikipedia constantly. Is this a bad thing? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 3:21 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > > > > > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Henry, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Clearly, your bike riding belongs to the perlocutionary > > category. > > > > > But > > > > > > > what is the syntax and semantics that gave rise to it? The > > > thinking > > > > > that > > > > > > > it leads to, or is there another declarative or imperative > > > statement, > > > > > > I.e. > > > > > > > You are an environmentalists? This is where the searle/derrida > > > > debate > > > > > > > takes off. The issues of intentionality, continuity, > > > discontinuity > > > > > are > > > > > > > that not also an aspect of language. Hence derrida ' s notion > of > > > the > > > > > > > potentiality for the deferment of meaning and why jacques > lacan > > > > posits > > > > > > the > > > > > > > unconscious to be structured like language...to account for the > > > > > > > discontinuity of both language and the unconscious, which > > although > > > we > > > > > can > > > > > > > think them apart are not. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > > > > > > President > > > > > > > > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > > > > > > www.mocombeian.com > > > > > > > > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > > > > > > www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
-------- Original message --------
From: > "Henry > > G. > > > > > > > Shonerd III"
Date:10/11/2014 > > 4:14 > > > > PM > > > > > > > (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > > > > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how > to > > > > > > > broaden/enliven the xmca discussion
> > > > > > > >
Mike and Paul, > > > > > > > > Paul assumes your thinking about the XMCA dialog had nothing > to > > > do > > > > > with > > > > > > > your driving. I find that riding my bike to the university in > the > > > > > morning > > > > > > > sets loose thinking about what's "on my plate" intellectually. > > The > > > > same > > > > > > > thing happens when I am dancing to music with others (I do Nia, > > > very > > > > > > > popular in some places). Lakoff's claim that cognition is > > embodied > > > is > > > > > > > typically related to metaphor, but I am interested in how the > > > > > > phonological > > > > > > > pole of language is iconic, not just with onomatopoeia, but > with > > > all > > > > > > forms > > > > > > > of sound symbolism. And I assume that the phonological pole is > a > > > > subset > > > > > > of > > > > > > > the sematic pole. The indexical, iconic, symbolic aspects of > > > > language, > > > > > > > would it be fair to say they are on a continuum, rather than > > > > > > discontinuous? > > > > > > > Temporal aspects of language (including within speech and > > writing), > > > > > > > wouldn't they figure in with the making (including > comprehension) > > > of > > > > > > > meaning? I am sure David said as much back a while. Am I making > > > sense > > > > > > that > > > > > > > relates at all to the on-going dialog? > > > > > > > > Henry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Oct 11, 2014, at 12:59 PM, "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe" < > > > > > > > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> Mike, > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> My comment was in reference to your process of thinking > about > > > the > > > > > xmca > > > > > > > conversation, and not your drive, which I am assuming from the > > > speech > > > > > > act, > > > > > > > comment has no relation to the thinking you was doing. It is > > > simply > > > > > > > background information for us the reader (I am not going to > > > reiterate > > > > > the > > > > > > > debate between derrida and Searle over the phenomenological > issue > > > of > > > > > > > background, which derrida assumes Searle misunderstands...by > the > > > way > > > > > > based > > > > > > > on you including it in your post it would imply that derrida is > > > > correct > > > > > > on > > > > > > > the argument). > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Anyways, your act of thinking in the car is purely > > psychological > > > > and > > > > > > > semiotic, and falls outside of austin's locutionary, > > illocutionary, > > > > and > > > > > > > perlocutionary categories. This psychological act of thinking > is > > > the > > > > > > > element Searle attempts to account for in Austin's thinking. > > > > However, > > > > > in > > > > > > > order to do so he has to deal with three issues, background, > > > > > > > intentionality, and the wittgensteinian issue of a private > > > language, > > > > > for > > > > > > > example, was your act of thinking in the car a private speech > > act? > > > > > > > Obviously it was not and Derrida is right their is nothing > > outside > > > > the > > > > > > text. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > > > > > >> President > > > > > > > >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > > > > > >> www.mocombeian.com > > > > > > > >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > > > > > >> www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >>
-------- Original message --------
From: mike > > > cole > > > > < > > > > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/11/2014 1:10 PM > (GMT-05:00) > > > > > > >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > > > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > > > > >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the > xmca > > > > > > discussion > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >>
Thanks Paul -- > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Could you take me a little further? Others might have the > same > > > > > > question: > > > > > > > >> How do the Searles and Austin views of semiotic mediation > > > differ, > > > > > > Paul, > > > > > > > >> such that Martin's formulation only works for one of them? > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> And how do they coincide, or differ, from Halliday's views, > > > David > > > > > Ke? > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> What are the major implications of the differences?? > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> mike > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> On Fri, Oct 10, 2014 at 6:49 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > > > > > > > >> pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >>> Martin, > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>> I would suggest that they are semiotic in John Searles > theory > > > of > > > > > > speech > > > > > > > >>> act, but not austin's. > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > > > > > > > >>> President > > > > > > > >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > > > > > > > >>> www.mocombeian.com > > > > > > > >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com > > > > > > > >>> www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: > mike > > > > cole < > > > > > > > >>> mcole@ucsd.edu>
Date:10/10/2014 7:48 PM > > > (GMT-05:00) > > > > > > > >>>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > > > > > > > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > > > > > >>>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: how to broaden/enliven the > > > xmca > > > > > > > discussion > > > > > > > >>>
> > > > > > > >>>
Martin-- When I was driving home by myself and > thinking > > > > about > > > > > > the > > > > > > > >>> conversation on xmca, it seemed like I might be thinking > with > > > > > words, > > > > > > > but i > > > > > > > >>> was not articulating and someone might even claim that it > was > > > > all a > > > > > > > jumble > > > > > > > >>> of sense and meaning anyway. Would this be inconsistent > with > > > the > > > > > > belief > > > > > > > >>> that both acting and thinking are semiotic in character? > > > > > > > >>> mike > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>> On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 9:28 AM, Martin John Packer < > > > > > > > >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > > > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>>> Might some kind of reconciliation be possible here by > > > > recognizing > > > > > > that > > > > > > > >>>> both acting and thinking are *semiotic* in character? > > Acting > > > > > > requires > > > > > > > >>>> ongoing interpretation of signs (icons, indices, symbols) > in > > > the > > > > > > > world. > > > > > > > >>>> Thinking ditto, the difference being that verbal thinking > > > > > (thinking > > > > > > > with > > > > > > > >>>> words), at least, requires articulating that > interpretation > > in > > > > the > > > > > > > form > > > > > > > >>> of > > > > > > > >>>> new signs. > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> ? > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> Martin > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:09 AM, Larry Purss < > > lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> I am asking if Andy and David will follow David's *lead* > by > > > > > > exploring > > > > > > > >>>>> *mind* through what David *indicates* is Vygotsky's KEY > > > INSIGHT > > > > > > that > > > > > > > >>> word > > > > > > > >>>>> meaning is BEST understood - > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> "as MODES of semantic abstraction and generalization > THAN > > as > > > > > > > >>> operations, > > > > > > > >>>>> actions, and activities." > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> This notion of BEST ways to *indicate* the sense of word > > > > > meanings. > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>> -- > > > > > > > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > science > > > > with > > > > > > an > > > > > > > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> -- > > > > > > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > science > > > > with > > > > > an > > > > > > > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > > Assistant Professor > > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From m_ianeva@hotmail.com Mon Oct 13 08:18:15 2014 From: m_ianeva@hotmail.com (maria ianeva) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 15:18:15 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: , <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co>, <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net>, , <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net>, , , , <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net>, , <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com>, , , <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com>, <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co>, , , <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net>, , , <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk>, , , , Message-ID: Za detskite pesnichki : Nezabravimi detski pesnichki (Stefkos Music) 38 zlatni pesnichki za nai malkite (Kanev Music, http://www.kanevmusic.com/ bkanev@abv.bg) > From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 13:51:41 +0000 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? > > Hi Robyn, > > I think it's important to recognize that the oldest child's understanding of the need to take care of his mother and siblings is not a drive or an impulse, it is, LSV tells us, a "duty" that follows from adopting a specific "role" in the family. Understanding the situation in terms of roles and duties is certainly socially mediated - after all, roles and duties are social, or societal, matters (ontological and deontological respectively, if we want to get technical). The oldest child - presumably attending school - is able to understand that he lives in a world of social institutions, one of which is his family. > > In this chapter LSV does not explore or explain how each kind of perezhivanie transforms into the next, but in his lectures on child development you can find a more detailed account. But here, in what is effectively a cross-sectional comparison of children at different ages (albeit only one at each age), he certainly means to suggest that earlier forms provide the basis for later forms. > > Martin > > On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:45 AM, Robyn Babaeff wrote: > > > Much appreciated Martin - this is feeling more visual, and now I am > > wondering is it possible to interpret that the older child's emotive > > drive/action of care for his mother and younger sibling in its moment is > > also connected a socially mediated aspect of cognition from somewhere/time > > in his earlier years of perezhivanie for the 'how to' in his choosing/drive > > for duty of care? > > > > On 13 October 2014 23:21, Martin John Packer > > wrote: > > > >>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving > >>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive > >> connection? > >> > >> > >> It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their mother's > >> drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the dynamic > >> development of perezhivanie. > >> > >> In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from emotion, > >> in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and interpreting the > >> circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, the child > >> is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction is one of > >> extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates involuntarily and > >> stammers. He loses control of his own body. > >> > >> LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the horror of > >> what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of terror, > >> enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to speak at all > >> as he loses his voice. In other words, the child's reaction amounts to a > >> state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of this > >> situation." > >> > >> The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. The > >> contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an alternation > >> between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion towards the > >> mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the breakdown seen > >> in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily emotional, but it > >> is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The child's > >> love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, directed > >> towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as bad. It is, > >> however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions that is so > >> difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of approach-avoidance. > >> The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the mother; her > >> failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal conflict for the > >> child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates between two > >> different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she is a > >> mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than that of his > >> younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. > >> > >> LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely agonizing > >> condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a condition > >> frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional attitudes > >> towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we have > >> previously been able to observe among one of our children and which, you > >> may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, from > >> the child's point of view, the mother is an object of painful attachment, > >> and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of terrors and > >> terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The German > >> authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is experiencing > >> a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or 'a mother-witch complex', when love for the mother > >> and terror of the witch coexist. > >> > >> "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply pronounced > >> conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction expressed in a > >> simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the mother, a > >> terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, combined > >> with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home > >> immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going home was > >> brought up." > >> > >> In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with more > >> detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of pity: of > >> sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion can > >> coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother not as a > >> bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, or weak. She > >> acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. This, then, > >> means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a "duty" to > >> take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. > >> > >> Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest child has a > >> single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. His emotions > >> follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. > >> > >> LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was ill and > >> he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his mother down, > >> make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones and comfort > >> them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the family, the only > >> one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". > >> > >> In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and cognition in > >> each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship changes > >> with age. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a preschooler, and > >> the oldest a school-aged child. > >> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff > >> wrote: > >> > >>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving > >>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive > >> connection? > >>> As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a > >> different > >>> realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective position of > >>> the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where there is > >>> emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then as the > >>> cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs from the > >>> internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the > >> connectedness > >>> takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn > >>> motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. > >>> > >>> On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every word, > >>>> but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating with the > >>>> same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like this > >>>> discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it because we > >> each > >>>> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our > >>>> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be expected > >> to > >>>> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some people, > >>>> etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an > >>>> approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be negotiated in > >>>> discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer to > >>>> understanding how a particular person uses particular words when we get > >> to > >>>> know that person as a person and that involves much more than just > >> batting > >>>> words to and fro! > >>>> > >>>> Rod > >>>> ________________________________________ > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >>>> on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] > >>>> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 > >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? > >>>> > >>>> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is > >> this > >>>> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this > >> case > >>>> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds > >>>> onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. > >>>> > >>>> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Andy, > >>>>> > >>>>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture > >>>>> everything. > >>>>> > >>>>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college > >>>>> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because > >> that > >>>>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is > >> strongly > >>>>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, > >>>>> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the > >>>>> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen > >>>>> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a > >>>>> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements > >> that > >>>>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. > >>>>> > >>>>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of > >>>>> water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions > >> driving > >>>>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially > >>>>> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is > >>>> actually > >>>>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and > >>>> dissociating > >>>>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't > >> develop > >>>>> further. > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin > >>>>> > >>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor > >> - > >>>>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is > >>>> simply > >>>>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and > >>>>> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of > >>>>> water. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and > >>>> OH > >>>>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge > >>>> and > >>>>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative > >>>>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals > >>>>> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and > >> therefore > >>>>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions > >>>> and > >>>>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of > >>>>> life. :) > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: > >>>>>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own > >>>>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not > >> a > >>>>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: > >> water > >>>> is > >>>>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an > >> internal > >>>>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is > >>>>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such > >>>>> that two > >>>>>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to > >> water > >>>>> with > >>>>>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise > >> to > >>>>> the > >>>>>>>> concrete for their own cases. > >>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > >>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic > >>>> system > >>>>> with > >>>>>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, > >>>>> and I > >>>>>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before > >>>>> posting. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < > >>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On the contrary. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about > >>>> activity > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple > >>>>> example > >>>>>>>>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history > >>>>> corner of > >>>>>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger > >>>> footing > >>>>> in > >>>>>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing > >>>> new > >>>>>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which > >>>>> division > >>>>>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a > >>>> leadership > >>>>> team > >>>>>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which > >>>>> in turn > >>>>>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky > >>>> and > >>>>>>>>> quick, change your history. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen > >>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies > >>>> that, > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one > >> can > >>>>> bring > >>>>>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on > >>>> *another* > >>>>>>>>> component of the totality. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent > >>>>> elements that > >>>>>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the > >>>>> question > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method > >>>> of > >>>>>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components > >>>>> in a > >>>>>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on > >> another, > >>>>> which > >>>>>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means > >>>>> that > >>>>>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this > >> relationship. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < > >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective > >>>>> responses > >>>>>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a > >>>> rule > >>>>>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> *insight*. It > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, > >>>>> it is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> usually comes > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using > >>>>> some > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> other > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The > >>>> question > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to > >>>>> do?" The > >>>>>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to > >>>>> accomplish. > >>>>>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we > >>>>> trying > >>>>>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in > >> Chicago, > >>>>>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to > >> be > >>>>> late > >>>>>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and > >>>>> will miss > >>>>>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're > >>>>> talking > >>>>>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle > >>>> aged > >>>>>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be > >>>>>>>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a > >> machine, > >>>>> but > >>>>>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who > >> would > >>>>> then > >>>>>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were > >>>>> often > >>>>>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. > >>>>> Also, a > >>>>>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was > >>>> happening > >>>>>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out > >>>>> buying > >>>>>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not > >>>> easy. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to > >> accomplish, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate > >>>>> members of > >>>>>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to > >>>>> something > >>>>>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in > >> society > >>>>> so > >>>>>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an > >> extended > >>>>>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you > >>>> can > >>>>>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing > >>>> the > >>>>> whole > >>>>>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy > >>>>> says, a > >>>>>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually > >>>>> speak to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about > >>>>> activity > >>>>>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in > >>>>> conflict > >>>>>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in > >>>>> mind? > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the > >>>> class, > >>>>> or > >>>>>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most > >>>>> interesting > >>>>>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of > >>>>> children) > >>>>>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not > >>>>> identical. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen > >>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> supervise > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two > >>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> them on > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. > >>>>> They > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> have > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of > >>>> division > >>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> labor. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When > >>>> they > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> decided to > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT > >>>> context > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> mainly > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt > >>>> about > >>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> " unit > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ??????: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it > >>>>> was > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> one of > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this > >>>>> concept > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> was > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new > >>>> for > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> me, was > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> expression, I'd > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it > >>>> referred > >>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> was a > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT > >>>>> methodology > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> whilst > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me > >>>>> know. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> *insight*. It > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a > >> template, > >>>>> it > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> is the > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> usually comes > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using > >>>>> some > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> other > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is > >>>> the > >>>>> new > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. > >>>>> So for > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their > >>>> research, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> often > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> supervisor. I > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to > >> this > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> point in > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the > >>>>> data > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> they now > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> articles. But, > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in > >>>>> posts. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't > >> follow > >>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> through > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am > >>>>> usually > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> just > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because > >> I'm > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> interested > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, > >>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> how they > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are > >>>>> people > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of > >>>> analysis > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> being used? > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> interested to > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might > >>>> be > >>>>> as > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> basic as > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in > >>>> a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> much more > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of > >>>> analysis. > >>>>> In > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Mike's > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that > >>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> action is > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors > >>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here > >>>>> before, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> are > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a > >>>>> picture of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> much > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ............................................................ > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> School of Education > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ioannina > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Greece > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > >>>> an > >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> *Patrick Jaki* > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* > >>>> ________________________________ > >>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > >>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > >>>> > >>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely > >> for > >>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > >>>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > >>>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on > >> it. > >>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > >>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > >>>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University > >> accepts > >>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan > >> emails > >>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept > >> responsibility > >>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > >>>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless > >> accompanied > >>>> by an official order form. > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> *Robyn Babaeff* > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > *Robyn Babaeff* > > From m_ianeva@hotmail.com Mon Oct 13 08:31:31 2014 From: m_ianeva@hotmail.com (maria ianeva) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 15:31:31 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: , , <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co>, , <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net>, , , , <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net>, , , , , , , , , <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net>, , , , <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com>, , , , , , <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com>, , <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co>, , , , , , <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net>, , , , , , <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk>, , , , , , , , , Message-ID: Please excuse me for this mail. Obviously, it wasn't intended to list... Best regards Maria > From: m_ianeva@hotmail.com > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 15:18:15 +0000 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? > > Za detskite pesnichki : > > Nezabravimi detski pesnichki (Stefkos Music) > 38 zlatni pesnichki za nai malkite (Kanev Music, http://www.kanevmusic.com/ bkanev@abv.bg) > > > From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 13:51:41 +0000 > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? > > > > Hi Robyn, > > > > I think it's important to recognize that the oldest child's understanding of the need to take care of his mother and siblings is not a drive or an impulse, it is, LSV tells us, a "duty" that follows from adopting a specific "role" in the family. Understanding the situation in terms of roles and duties is certainly socially mediated - after all, roles and duties are social, or societal, matters (ontological and deontological respectively, if we want to get technical). The oldest child - presumably attending school - is able to understand that he lives in a world of social institutions, one of which is his family. > > > > In this chapter LSV does not explore or explain how each kind of perezhivanie transforms into the next, but in his lectures on child development you can find a more detailed account. But here, in what is effectively a cross-sectional comparison of children at different ages (albeit only one at each age), he certainly means to suggest that earlier forms provide the basis for later forms. > > > > Martin > > > > On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:45 AM, Robyn Babaeff wrote: > > > > > Much appreciated Martin - this is feeling more visual, and now I am > > > wondering is it possible to interpret that the older child's emotive > > > drive/action of care for his mother and younger sibling in its moment is > > > also connected a socially mediated aspect of cognition from somewhere/time > > > in his earlier years of perezhivanie for the 'how to' in his choosing/drive > > > for duty of care? > > > > > > On 13 October 2014 23:21, Martin John Packer > > > wrote: > > > > > >>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving > > >>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive > > >> connection? > > >> > > >> > > >> It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their mother's > > >> drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the dynamic > > >> development of perezhivanie. > > >> > > >> In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from emotion, > > >> in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and interpreting the > > >> circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, the child > > >> is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction is one of > > >> extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates involuntarily and > > >> stammers. He loses control of his own body. > > >> > > >> LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the horror of > > >> what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of terror, > > >> enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to speak at all > > >> as he loses his voice. In other words, the child's reaction amounts to a > > >> state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of this > > >> situation." > > >> > > >> The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. The > > >> contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an alternation > > >> between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion towards the > > >> mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the breakdown seen > > >> in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily emotional, but it > > >> is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The child's > > >> love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, directed > > >> towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as bad. It is, > > >> however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions that is so > > >> difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of approach-avoidance. > > >> The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the mother; her > > >> failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal conflict for the > > >> child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates between two > > >> different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she is a > > >> mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than that of his > > >> younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. > > >> > > >> LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely agonizing > > >> condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a condition > > >> frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional attitudes > > >> towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we have > > >> previously been able to observe among one of our children and which, you > > >> may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, from > > >> the child's point of view, the mother is an object of painful attachment, > > >> and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of terrors and > > >> terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The German > > >> authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is experiencing > > >> a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or 'a mother-witch complex', when love for the mother > > >> and terror of the witch coexist. > > >> > > >> "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply pronounced > > >> conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction expressed in a > > >> simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the mother, a > > >> terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, combined > > >> with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home > > >> immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going home was > > >> brought up." > > >> > > >> In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with more > > >> detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of pity: of > > >> sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion can > > >> coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother not as a > > >> bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, or weak. She > > >> acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. This, then, > > >> means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a "duty" to > > >> take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. > > >> > > >> Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest child has a > > >> single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. His emotions > > >> follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. > > >> > > >> LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was ill and > > >> he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his mother down, > > >> make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones and comfort > > >> them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the family, the only > > >> one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". > > >> > > >> In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and cognition in > > >> each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship changes > > >> with age. > > >> > > >> Martin > > >> > > >> The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a preschooler, and > > >> the oldest a school-aged child. > > >> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving > > >>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive > > >> connection? > > >>> As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a > > >> different > > >>> realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective position of > > >>> the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where there is > > >>> emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then as the > > >>> cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs from the > > >>> internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the > > >> connectedness > > >>> takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn > > >>> motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. > > >>> > > >>> On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees > > >>> wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every word, > > >>>> but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating with the > > >>>> same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like this > > >>>> discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it because we > > >> each > > >>>> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our > > >>>> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be expected > > >> to > > >>>> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some people, > > >>>> etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an > > >>>> approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be negotiated in > > >>>> discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer to > > >>>> understanding how a particular person uses particular words when we get > > >> to > > >>>> know that person as a person and that involves much more than just > > >> batting > > >>>> words to and fro! > > >>>> > > >>>> Rod > > >>>> ________________________________________ > > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > >>>> on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] > > >>>> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 > > >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? > > >>>> > > >>>> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is > > >> this > > >>>> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this > > >> case > > >>>> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds > > >>>> onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. > > >>>> > > >>>> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer > > >>>> wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>> Andy, > > >>>>> > > >>>>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture > > >>>>> everything. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college > > >>>>> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because > > >> that > > >>>>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is > > >> strongly > > >>>>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, > > >>>>> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the > > >>>>> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen > > >>>>> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a > > >>>>> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements > > >> that > > >>>>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of > > >>>>> water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions > > >> driving > > >>>>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially > > >>>>> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is > > >>>> actually > > >>>>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and > > >>>> dissociating > > >>>>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't > > >> develop > > >>>>> further. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Martin > > >>>>> > > >>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor > > >> - > > >>>>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is > > >>>> simply > > >>>>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and > > >>>>> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of > > >>>>> water. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and > > >>>> OH > > >>>>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge > > >>>> and > > >>>>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative > > >>>>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals > > >>>>> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and > > >> therefore > > >>>>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions > > >>>> and > > >>>>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of > > >>>>> life. :) > > >>>>>> Andy > > >>>>>> > > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: > > >>>>>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own > > >>>>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not > > >> a > > >>>>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: > > >> water > > >>>> is > > >>>>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an > > >> internal > > >>>>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is > > >>>>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Martin > > >>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such > > >>>>> that two > > >>>>>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to > > >> water > > >>>>> with > > >>>>>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise > > >> to > > >>>>> the > > >>>>>>>> concrete for their own cases. > > >>>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > > >>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic > > >>>> system > > >>>>> with > > >>>>>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, > > >>>>> and I > > >>>>>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before > > >>>>> posting. > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> Martin > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < > > >>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> > > >>>>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> On the contrary. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about > > >>>> activity > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple > > >>>>> example > > >>>>>>>>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history > > >>>>> corner of > > >>>>>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger > > >>>> footing > > >>>>> in > > >>>>>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing > > >>>> new > > >>>>>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which > > >>>>> division > > >>>>>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a > > >>>> leadership > > >>>>> team > > >>>>>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which > > >>>>> in turn > > >>>>>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky > > >>>> and > > >>>>>>>>> quick, change your history. > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen > > >>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies > > >>>> that, > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one > > >> can > > >>>>> bring > > >>>>>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on > > >>>> *another* > > >>>>>>>>> component of the totality. > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent > > >>>>> elements that > > >>>>>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> Martin > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the > > >>>>> question > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method > > >>>> of > > >>>>>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components > > >>>>> in a > > >>>>>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on > > >> another, > > >>>>> which > > >>>>>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means > > >>>>> that > > >>>>>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this > > >> relationship. > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Martin > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < > > >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective > > >>>>> responses > > >>>>>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a > > >>>> rule > > >>>>>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> *insight*. It > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, > > >>>>> it is > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> usually comes > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using > > >>>>> some > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> other > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The > > >>>> question > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to > > >>>>> do?" The > > >>>>>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to > > >>>>> accomplish. > > >>>>>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we > > >>>>> trying > > >>>>>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in > > >> Chicago, > > >>>>>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to > > >> be > > >>>>> late > > >>>>>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and > > >>>>> will miss > > >>>>>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're > > >>>>> talking > > >>>>>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle > > >>>> aged > > >>>>>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be > > >>>>>>>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a > > >> machine, > > >>>>> but > > >>>>>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who > > >> would > > >>>>> then > > >>>>>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were > > >>>>> often > > >>>>>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. > > >>>>> Also, a > > >>>>>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was > > >>>> happening > > >>>>>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out > > >>>>> buying > > >>>>>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not > > >>>> easy. > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to > > >> accomplish, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate > > >>>>> members of > > >>>>>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to > > >>>>> something > > >>>>>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in > > >> society > > >>>>> so > > >>>>>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an > > >> extended > > >>>>>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you > > >>>> can > > >>>>>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing > > >>>> the > > >>>>> whole > > >>>>>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy > > >>>>> says, a > > >>>>>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually > > >>>>> speak to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about > > >>>>> activity > > >>>>>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in > > >>>>> conflict > > >>>>>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in > > >>>>> mind? > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the > > >>>> class, > > >>>>> or > > >>>>>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most > > >>>>> interesting > > >>>>>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of > > >>>>> children) > > >>>>>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not > > >>>>> identical. > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> supervise > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two > > >>>> of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> them on > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. > > >>>>> They > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> have > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of > > >>>> division > > >>>>> of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> labor. > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When > > >>>> they > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> decided to > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT > > >>>> context > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> mainly > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt > > >>>> about > > >>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> " unit > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ??????: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it > > >>>>> was > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> one of > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this > > >>>>> concept > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> was > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new > > >>>> for > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> me, was > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> expression, I'd > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it > > >>>> referred > > >>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> was a > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT > > >>>>> methodology > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> whilst > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me > > >>>>> know. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> *insight*. It > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a > > >> template, > > >>>>> it > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> is the > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> usually comes > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using > > >>>>> some > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> other > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is > > >>>> the > > >>>>> new > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. > > >>>>> So for > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their > > >>>> research, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> often > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> supervisor. I > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to > > >> this > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> point in > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the > > >>>>> data > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> they now > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> articles. But, > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in > > >>>>> posts. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> I > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't > > >> follow > > >>>>> that > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> through > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am > > >>>>> usually > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> just > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because > > >> I'm > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> interested > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, > > >>>>> and > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> how they > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are > > >>>>> people > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> doing > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of > > >>>> analysis > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> being used? > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> interested to > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might > > >>>> be > > >>>>> as > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> basic as > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in > > >>>> a > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> much more > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of > > >>>> analysis. > > >>>>> In > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> Mike's > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that > > >>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> action is > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors > > >>>>> that > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here > > >>>>> before, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> are > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a > > >>>>> picture of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> much > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ............................................................ > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> School of Education > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ioannina > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Greece > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> -- > > >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > > >>>> an > > >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> -- > > >>>> *Patrick Jaki* > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* > > >>>> ________________________________ > > >>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > > >>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > >>>> > > >>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely > > >> for > > >>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > > >>>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > > >>>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on > > >> it. > > >>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > > >>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > > >>>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University > > >> accepts > > >>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan > > >> emails > > >>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept > > >> responsibility > > >>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > > >>>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless > > >> accompanied > > >>>> by an official order form. > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> -- > > >>> *Robyn Babaeff* > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- > > > *Robyn Babaeff* > > > > > From julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk Mon Oct 13 09:14:24 2014 From: julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk (Julian Williams) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 16:14:24 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> , Message-ID: Dear Martin, and all I dont see the dialectic as 'internal' to the child, but as the child-in-the-environment. But I think maybe there is a problem with the current drift in the discussion. The problem I see arising now is that we are beginning to take the environment here as something fixed or taken for granted, with the difference in the three Perezhivanie being totally about the subjects/childs different stages of development. I'm not sure this does justice to the dialectic Vygotsky had in mind (though I see it might appear so in the text). I think one has to consider the objective fact of the environment as something from which different strands may be apprehended, or if you like, or from which certain aspects can be 'refracted'. At the cost of perhaps causing confusion, I wonder if the notion of Zone of Proximal Development can help here for those who use this idea ... A particular social plane (environment, classroom interaction etc) can offer a ZPD for some but be entirely useless to others, because of their different stages of development, yes, yes. But also, different learners at different stages can help create their own ZPDs within the same social space and even plane, (drawing from the same social interactions in different ways). So they may shape the very environment which provides for their own ZPD and hence development. I think this is a more adequate way to think of the dialectic, so the subject is not seen as passive in their own development. Julian (Maybe this passivity is what Mike had in mind when he expressed reservations about Vygotsky's use of the 'final ideal form' , eg of arithmetic, have I remembered this right? Anyway I DO have reservations about that notion in Vygotsky's chapter but maybe that's another story for later.) On 13 Oct 2014, at 14:53, "Martin John Packer" wrote: > Hi Robyn, > > I think it's important to recognize that the oldest child's understanding of the need to take care of his mother and siblings is not a drive or an impulse, it is, LSV tells us, a "duty" that follows from adopting a specific "role" in the family. Understanding the situation in terms of roles and duties is certainly socially mediated - after all, roles and duties are social, or societal, matters (ontological and deontological respectively, if we want to get technical). The oldest child - presumably attending school - is able to understand that he lives in a world of social institutions, one of which is his family. > > In this chapter LSV does not explore or explain how each kind of perezhivanie transforms into the next, but in his lectures on child development you can find a more detailed account. But here, in what is effectively a cross-sectional comparison of children at different ages (albeit only one at each age), he certainly means to suggest that earlier forms provide the basis for later forms. > > Martin > > On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:45 AM, Robyn Babaeff wrote: > >> Much appreciated Martin - this is feeling more visual, and now I am >> wondering is it possible to interpret that the older child's emotive >> drive/action of care for his mother and younger sibling in its moment is >> also connected a socially mediated aspect of cognition from somewhere/time >> in his earlier years of perezhivanie for the 'how to' in his choosing/drive >> for duty of care? >> >> On 13 October 2014 23:21, Martin John Packer >> wrote: >> >>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >>> connection? >>> >>> >>> It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their mother's >>> drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the dynamic >>> development of perezhivanie. >>> >>> In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from emotion, >>> in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and interpreting the >>> circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, the child >>> is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction is one of >>> extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates involuntarily and >>> stammers. He loses control of his own body. >>> >>> LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the horror of >>> what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of terror, >>> enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to speak at all >>> as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction amounts to a >>> state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of this >>> situation." >>> >>> The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. The >>> contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an alternation >>> between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion towards the >>> mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the breakdown seen >>> in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily emotional, but it >>> is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The child's >>> love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, directed >>> towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as bad. It is, >>> however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions that is so >>> difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of approach-avoidance. >>> The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the mother; her >>> failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal conflict for the >>> child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates between two >>> different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she is a >>> mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than that of his >>> younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. >>> >>> LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely agonizing >>> condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a condition >>> frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional attitudes >>> towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we have >>> previously been able to observe among one of our children and which, you >>> may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, from >>> the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful attachment, >>> and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of terrors and >>> terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The German >>> authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is experiencing >>> a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for the mother >>> and terror of the witch coexist. >>> >>> "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply pronounced >>> conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction expressed in a >>> simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the mother, a >>> terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, combined >>> with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home >>> immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going home was >>> brought up." >>> >>> In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with more >>> detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of pity: of >>> sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion can >>> coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother not as a >>> bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, or weak. She >>> acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. This, then, >>> means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a "duty" to >>> take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. >>> >>> Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest child has a >>> single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. His emotions >>> follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. >>> >>> LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was ill and >>> he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his mother down, >>> make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones and comfort >>> them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the family, the only >>> one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". >>> >>> In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and cognition in >>> each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship changes >>> with age. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a preschooler, and >>> the oldest a school-aged child. >>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >>> connection? >>>> As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a >>> different >>>> realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective position of >>>> the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where there is >>>> emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then as the >>>> cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs from the >>>> internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the >>> connectedness >>>> takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn >>>> motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. >>>> >>>> On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every word, >>>>> but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating with the >>>>> same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like this >>>>> discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it because we >>> each >>>>> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our >>>>> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be expected >>> to >>>>> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some people, >>>>> etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an >>>>> approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be negotiated in >>>>> discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer to >>>>> understanding how a particular person uses particular words when we get >>> to >>>>> know that person as a person and that involves much more than just >>> batting >>>>> words to and fro! >>>>> >>>>> Rod >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>> on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] >>>>> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? >>>>> >>>>> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is >>> this >>>>> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this >>> case >>>>> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds >>>>> onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. >>>>> >>>>> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Andy, >>>>>> >>>>>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture >>>>>> everything. >>>>>> >>>>>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college >>>>>> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because >>> that >>>>>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is >>> strongly >>>>>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, >>>>>> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the >>>>>> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen >>>>>> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a >>>>>> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements >>> that >>>>>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. >>>>>> >>>>>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of >>>>>> water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions >>> driving >>>>>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially >>>>>> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is >>>>> actually >>>>>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and >>>>> dissociating >>>>>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't >>> develop >>>>>> further. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor >>> - >>>>>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is >>>>> simply >>>>>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and >>>>>> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of >>>>>> water. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and >>>>> OH >>>>>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge >>>>> and >>>>>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative >>>>>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals >>>>>> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and >>> therefore >>>>>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions >>>>> and >>>>>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of >>>>>> life. :) >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own >>>>>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not >>> a >>>>>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: >>> water >>>>> is >>>>>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an >>> internal >>>>>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is >>>>>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such >>>>>> that two >>>>>>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to >>> water >>>>>> with >>>>>>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise >>> to >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> concrete for their own cases. >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic >>>>> system >>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, >>>>>> and I >>>>>>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before >>>>>> posting. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On the contrary. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about >>>>> activity >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple >>>>>> example >>>>>>>>>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history >>>>>> corner of >>>>>>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger >>>>> footing >>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing >>>>> new >>>>>>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which >>>>>> division >>>>>>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a >>>>> leadership >>>>>> team >>>>>>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which >>>>>> in turn >>>>>>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky >>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> quick, change your history. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies >>>>> that, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one >>> can >>>>>> bring >>>>>>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on >>>>> *another* >>>>>>>>>> component of the totality. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent >>>>>> elements that >>>>>>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the >>>>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method >>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components >>>>>> in a >>>>>>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on >>> another, >>>>>> which >>>>>>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this >>> relationship. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective >>>>>> responses >>>>>>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a >>>>> rule >>>>>>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, >>>>>> it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The >>>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to >>>>>> do?" The >>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to >>>>>> accomplish. >>>>>>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we >>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in >>> Chicago, >>>>>>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to >>> be >>>>>> late >>>>>>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and >>>>>> will miss >>>>>>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're >>>>>> talking >>>>>>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle >>>>> aged >>>>>>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be >>>>>>>>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a >>> machine, >>>>>> but >>>>>>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who >>> would >>>>>> then >>>>>>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were >>>>>> often >>>>>>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. >>>>>> Also, a >>>>>>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was >>>>> happening >>>>>>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out >>>>>> buying >>>>>>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not >>>>> easy. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to >>> accomplish, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate >>>>>> members of >>>>>>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to >>>>>> something >>>>>>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in >>> society >>>>>> so >>>>>>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an >>> extended >>>>>>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you >>>>> can >>>>>>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing >>>>> the >>>>>> whole >>>>>>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy >>>>>> says, a >>>>>>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually >>>>>> speak to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about >>>>>> activity >>>>>>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in >>>>>> conflict >>>>>>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in >>>>>> mind? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the >>>>> class, >>>>>> or >>>>>>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most >>>>>> interesting >>>>>>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of >>>>>> children) >>>>>>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not >>>>>> identical. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> supervise >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two >>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> them on >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. >>>>>> They >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of >>>>> division >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> labor. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When >>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> decided to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT >>>>> context >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> mainly >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt >>>>> about >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> " unit >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> St?? ????a??, 12 ??t?????? 2014, ? ???st?? Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ???a?e: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it >>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> one of >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this >>>>>> concept >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new >>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> me, was >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> expression, I'd >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it >>>>> referred >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> was a >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT >>>>>> methodology >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> whilst >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me >>>>>> know. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a >>> template, >>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> is the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is >>>>> the >>>>>> new >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>> So for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their >>>>> research, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> often >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> supervisor. I >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to >>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> point in >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the >>>>>> data >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> they now >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> articles. But, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in >>>>>> posts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't >>> follow >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am >>>>>> usually >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> just >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because >>> I'm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> interested >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, >>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> how they >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are >>>>>> people >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of >>>>> analysis >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> being used? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> interested to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might >>>>> be >>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> basic as >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in >>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> much more >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of >>>>> analysis. >>>>>> In >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Mike's >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> action is >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here >>>>>> before, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a >>>>>> picture of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> much >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> School of Education >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Greece >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>> an >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> *Patrick Jaki* >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >>>>> ________________________________ >>>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >>>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >>>>> >>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely >>> for >>>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >>>>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >>>>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on >>> it. >>>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >>>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >>>>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University >>> accepts >>>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan >>> emails >>>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept >>> responsibility >>>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >>>>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless >>> accompanied >>>>> by an official order form. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> *Robyn Babaeff* >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> *Robyn Babaeff* > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Oct 13 09:52:26 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 16:52:26 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> , Message-ID: <7595A167-FAC9-4D7D-A78E-D3A637B0F883@uniandes.edu.co> Hi Julian, I've been trying to suggest that the dialectic is in the child's relationship to the environment. Or, as you say, as an aspect of child-in-the-environment (with-others). Generally I try to avoid dualistic terminology such as 'in the child' versus 'in the world' or 'subjective' versus 'objective' - I think I'm following LSV's lead here, though certainly he uses the term "internal" a lot. Generally in children's development the environment does indeed change as they grow - parents make new arrangements for them. But in the case study that LSV describes, we have three children of different ages all dealing at the same time with the same adult. In this sense the environment is fixed, in this particular case. And surely you're right to suggest that the children are contributing to the environment in which they live. One can only imagine how a drunken mother responds to her youngest son wetting the bed, for example. Martin On Oct 13, 2014, at 11:14 AM, Julian Williams wrote: > Dear Martin, and all > > I dont see the dialectic as 'internal' to the child, but as the child-in-the-environment. But I think maybe there is a problem with the current drift in the discussion. > > The problem I see arising now is that we are beginning to take the environment here as something fixed or taken for granted, with the difference in the three Perezhivanie being totally about the subjects/childs different stages of development. I'm not sure this does justice to the dialectic Vygotsky had in mind (though I see it might appear so in the text). I think one has to consider the objective fact of the environment as something from which different strands may be apprehended, or if you like, or from which certain aspects can be 'refracted'. > > At the cost of perhaps causing confusion, I wonder if the notion of Zone of Proximal Development can help here for those who use this idea ... A particular social plane (environment, classroom interaction etc) can offer a ZPD for some but be entirely useless to others, because of their different stages of development, yes, yes. But also, different learners at different stages can help create their own ZPDs within the same social space and even plane, (drawing from the same social interactions in different ways). So they may shape the very environment which provides for their own ZPD and hence development. I think this is a more adequate way to think of the dialectic, so the subject is not seen as passive in their own development. > > Julian > > (Maybe this passivity is what Mike had in mind when he expressed reservations about Vygotsky's use of the 'final ideal form' , eg of arithmetic, have I remembered this right? Anyway I DO have reservations about that notion in Vygotsky's chapter but maybe that's another story for later.) > > > On 13 Oct 2014, at 14:53, "Martin John Packer" wrote: > >> Hi Robyn, >> >> I think it's important to recognize that the oldest child's understanding of the need to take care of his mother and siblings is not a drive or an impulse, it is, LSV tells us, a "duty" that follows from adopting a specific "role" in the family. Understanding the situation in terms of roles and duties is certainly socially mediated - after all, roles and duties are social, or societal, matters (ontological and deontological respectively, if we want to get technical). The oldest child - presumably attending school - is able to understand that he lives in a world of social institutions, one of which is his family. >> >> In this chapter LSV does not explore or explain how each kind of perezhivanie transforms into the next, but in his lectures on child development you can find a more detailed account. But here, in what is effectively a cross-sectional comparison of children at different ages (albeit only one at each age), he certainly means to suggest that earlier forms provide the basis for later forms. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:45 AM, Robyn Babaeff wrote: >> >>> Much appreciated Martin - this is feeling more visual, and now I am >>> wondering is it possible to interpret that the older child's emotive >>> drive/action of care for his mother and younger sibling in its moment is >>> also connected a socially mediated aspect of cognition from somewhere/time >>> in his earlier years of perezhivanie for the 'how to' in his choosing/drive >>> for duty of care? >>> >>> On 13 October 2014 23:21, Martin John Packer >>> wrote: >>> >>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >>>> connection? >>>> >>>> >>>> It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their mother's >>>> drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the dynamic >>>> development of perezhivanie. >>>> >>>> In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from emotion, >>>> in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and interpreting the >>>> circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, the child >>>> is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction is one of >>>> extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates involuntarily and >>>> stammers. He loses control of his own body. >>>> >>>> LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the horror of >>>> what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of terror, >>>> enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to speak at all >>>> as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction amounts to a >>>> state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of this >>>> situation." >>>> >>>> The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. The >>>> contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an alternation >>>> between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion towards the >>>> mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the breakdown seen >>>> in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily emotional, but it >>>> is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The child's >>>> love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, directed >>>> towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as bad. It is, >>>> however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions that is so >>>> difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of approach-avoidance. >>>> The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the mother; her >>>> failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal conflict for the >>>> child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates between two >>>> different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she is a >>>> mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than that of his >>>> younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. >>>> >>>> LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely agonizing >>>> condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a condition >>>> frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional attitudes >>>> towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we have >>>> previously been able to observe among one of our children and which, you >>>> may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, from >>>> the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful attachment, >>>> and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of terrors and >>>> terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The German >>>> authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is experiencing >>>> a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for the mother >>>> and terror of the witch coexist. >>>> >>>> "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply pronounced >>>> conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction expressed in a >>>> simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the mother, a >>>> terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, combined >>>> with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home >>>> immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going home was >>>> brought up." >>>> >>>> In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with more >>>> detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of pity: of >>>> sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion can >>>> coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother not as a >>>> bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, or weak. She >>>> acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. This, then, >>>> means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a "duty" to >>>> take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. >>>> >>>> Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest child has a >>>> single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. His emotions >>>> follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. >>>> >>>> LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was ill and >>>> he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his mother down, >>>> make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones and comfort >>>> them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the family, the only >>>> one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". >>>> >>>> In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and cognition in >>>> each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship changes >>>> with age. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a preschooler, and >>>> the oldest a school-aged child. >>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >>>> connection? >>>>> As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a >>>> different >>>>> realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective position of >>>>> the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where there is >>>>> emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then as the >>>>> cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs from the >>>>> internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the >>>> connectedness >>>>> takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn >>>>> motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. >>>>> >>>>> On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every word, >>>>>> but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating with the >>>>>> same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like this >>>>>> discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it because we >>>> each >>>>>> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our >>>>>> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be expected >>>> to >>>>>> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some people, >>>>>> etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an >>>>>> approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be negotiated in >>>>>> discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer to >>>>>> understanding how a particular person uses particular words when we get >>>> to >>>>>> know that person as a person and that involves much more than just >>>> batting >>>>>> words to and fro! >>>>>> >>>>>> Rod >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>>> on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] >>>>>> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? >>>>>> >>>>>> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is >>>> this >>>>>> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this >>>> case >>>>>> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds >>>>>> onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. >>>>>> >>>>>> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture >>>>>>> everything. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college >>>>>>> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because >>>> that >>>>>>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is >>>> strongly >>>>>>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, >>>>>>> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the >>>>>>> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen >>>>>>> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a >>>>>>> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements >>>> that >>>>>>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of >>>>>>> water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions >>>> driving >>>>>>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially >>>>>>> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is >>>>>> actually >>>>>>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and >>>>>> dissociating >>>>>>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't >>>> develop >>>>>>> further. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor >>>> - >>>>>>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is >>>>>> simply >>>>>>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and >>>>>>> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of >>>>>>> water. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and >>>>>> OH >>>>>>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge >>>>>> and >>>>>>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative >>>>>>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals >>>>>>> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and >>>> therefore >>>>>>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions >>>>>> and >>>>>>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of >>>>>>> life. :) >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own >>>>>>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not >>>> a >>>>>>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: >>>> water >>>>>> is >>>>>>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an >>>> internal >>>>>>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is >>>>>>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such >>>>>>> that two >>>>>>>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to >>>> water >>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise >>>> to >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> concrete for their own cases. >>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic >>>>>> system >>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, >>>>>>> and I >>>>>>>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before >>>>>>> posting. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On the contrary. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about >>>>>> activity >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple >>>>>>> example >>>>>>>>>>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history >>>>>>> corner of >>>>>>>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger >>>>>> footing >>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing >>>>>> new >>>>>>>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which >>>>>>> division >>>>>>>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a >>>>>> leadership >>>>>>> team >>>>>>>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which >>>>>>> in turn >>>>>>>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky >>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> quick, change your history. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies >>>>>> that, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one >>>> can >>>>>>> bring >>>>>>>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on >>>>>> *another* >>>>>>>>>>> component of the totality. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent >>>>>>> elements that >>>>>>>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the >>>>>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components >>>>>>> in a >>>>>>>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on >>>> another, >>>>>>> which >>>>>>>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this >>>> relationship. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective >>>>>>> responses >>>>>>>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a >>>>>> rule >>>>>>>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, >>>>>>> it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The >>>>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to >>>>>>> do?" The >>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to >>>>>>> accomplish. >>>>>>>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we >>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in >>>> Chicago, >>>>>>>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to >>>> be >>>>>>> late >>>>>>>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and >>>>>>> will miss >>>>>>>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're >>>>>>> talking >>>>>>>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle >>>>>> aged >>>>>>>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be >>>>>>>>>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a >>>> machine, >>>>>>> but >>>>>>>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who >>>> would >>>>>>> then >>>>>>>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were >>>>>>> often >>>>>>>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. >>>>>>> Also, a >>>>>>>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was >>>>>> happening >>>>>>>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out >>>>>>> buying >>>>>>>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not >>>>>> easy. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to >>>> accomplish, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate >>>>>>> members of >>>>>>>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to >>>>>>> something >>>>>>>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in >>>> society >>>>>>> so >>>>>>>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an >>>> extended >>>>>>>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you >>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing >>>>>> the >>>>>>> whole >>>>>>>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy >>>>>>> says, a >>>>>>>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually >>>>>>> speak to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about >>>>>>> activity >>>>>>>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in >>>>>>> conflict >>>>>>>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in >>>>>>> mind? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the >>>>>> class, >>>>>>> or >>>>>>>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most >>>>>>> interesting >>>>>>>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of >>>>>>> children) >>>>>>>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not >>>>>>> identical. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> supervise >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> them on >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. >>>>>>> They >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of >>>>>> division >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> labor. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When >>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> decided to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT >>>>>> context >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> mainly >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt >>>>>> about >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> " unit >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> St?? ????a??, 12 ??t?????? 2014, ? ???st?? Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ???a?e: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it >>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> one of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this >>>>>>> concept >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new >>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> me, was >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> expression, I'd >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it >>>>>> referred >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> was a >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT >>>>>>> methodology >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> whilst >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me >>>>>>> know. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a >>>> template, >>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> is the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is >>>>>> the >>>>>>> new >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>> So for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their >>>>>> research, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> often >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> supervisor. I >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to >>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> point in >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the >>>>>>> data >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> they now >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> articles. But, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in >>>>>>> posts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't >>>> follow >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am >>>>>>> usually >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> just >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because >>>> I'm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> interested >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> how they >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are >>>>>>> people >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of >>>>>> analysis >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> being used? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> interested to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might >>>>>> be >>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> basic as >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in >>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> much more >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of >>>>>> analysis. >>>>>>> In >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Mike's >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> action is >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here >>>>>>> before, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a >>>>>>> picture of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> much >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> School of Education >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Greece >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> *Patrick Jaki* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >>>>>> ________________________________ >>>>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >>>>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >>>>>> >>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely >>>> for >>>>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >>>>>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >>>>>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on >>>> it. >>>>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >>>>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >>>>>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University >>>> accepts >>>>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan >>>> emails >>>>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept >>>> responsibility >>>>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >>>>>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless >>>> accompanied >>>>>> by an official order form. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> *Robyn Babaeff* >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> *Robyn Babaeff* >> >> > From julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk Mon Oct 13 10:45:00 2014 From: julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk (Julian Williams) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 17:45:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <7595A167-FAC9-4D7D-A78E-D3A637B0F883@uniandes.edu.co> References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> , , <7595A167-FAC9-4D7D-A78E-D3A637B0F883@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <1F27D40F-7D96-4C8A-AF78-1FB6D9F164AB@manchester.ac.uk> Martin Ok we are on the same page, if you agree the environment may not be the same for the three children... It is not just that they are developmentally at a different stage, but "mother" is actually a different environment for each of them. Julian Sent from my iPad On 13 Oct 2014, at 17:54, "Martin John Packer" wrote: > Hi Julian, > > I've been trying to suggest that the dialectic is in the child's relationship to the environment. Or, as you say, as an aspect of child-in-the-environment (with-others). Generally I try to avoid dualistic terminology such as 'in the child' versus 'in the world' or 'subjective' versus 'objective' - I think I'm following LSV's lead here, though certainly he uses the term "internal" a lot. > > Generally in children's development the environment does indeed change as they grow - parents make new arrangements for them. But in the case study that LSV describes, we have three children of different ages all dealing at the same time with the same adult. In this sense the environment is fixed, in this particular case. > > And surely you're right to suggest that the children are contributing to the environment in which they live. One can only imagine how a drunken mother responds to her youngest son wetting the bed, for example. > > Martin > > On Oct 13, 2014, at 11:14 AM, Julian Williams wrote: > >> Dear Martin, and all >> >> I dont see the dialectic as 'internal' to the child, but as the child-in-the-environment. But I think maybe there is a problem with the current drift in the discussion. >> >> The problem I see arising now is that we are beginning to take the environment here as something fixed or taken for granted, with the difference in the three Perezhivanie being totally about the subjects/childs different stages of development. I'm not sure this does justice to the dialectic Vygotsky had in mind (though I see it might appear so in the text). I think one has to consider the objective fact of the environment as something from which different strands may be apprehended, or if you like, or from which certain aspects can be 'refracted'. >> >> At the cost of perhaps causing confusion, I wonder if the notion of Zone of Proximal Development can help here for those who use this idea ... A particular social plane (environment, classroom interaction etc) can offer a ZPD for some but be entirely useless to others, because of their different stages of development, yes, yes. But also, different learners at different stages can help create their own ZPDs within the same social space and even plane, (drawing from the same social interactions in different ways). So they may shape the very environment which provides for their own ZPD and hence development. I think this is a more adequate way to think of the dialectic, so the subject is not seen as passive in their own development. >> >> Julian >> >> (Maybe this passivity is what Mike had in mind when he expressed reservations about Vygotsky's use of the 'final ideal form' , eg of arithmetic, have I remembered this right? Anyway I DO have reservations about that notion in Vygotsky's chapter but maybe that's another story for later.) >> >> >> On 13 Oct 2014, at 14:53, "Martin John Packer" wrote: >> >>> Hi Robyn, >>> >>> I think it's important to recognize that the oldest child's understanding of the need to take care of his mother and siblings is not a drive or an impulse, it is, LSV tells us, a "duty" that follows from adopting a specific "role" in the family. Understanding the situation in terms of roles and duties is certainly socially mediated - after all, roles and duties are social, or societal, matters (ontological and deontological respectively, if we want to get technical). The oldest child - presumably attending school - is able to understand that he lives in a world of social institutions, one of which is his family. >>> >>> In this chapter LSV does not explore or explain how each kind of perezhivanie transforms into the next, but in his lectures on child development you can find a more detailed account. But here, in what is effectively a cross-sectional comparison of children at different ages (albeit only one at each age), he certainly means to suggest that earlier forms provide the basis for later forms. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:45 AM, Robyn Babaeff wrote: >>> >>>> Much appreciated Martin - this is feeling more visual, and now I am >>>> wondering is it possible to interpret that the older child's emotive >>>> drive/action of care for his mother and younger sibling in its moment is >>>> also connected a socially mediated aspect of cognition from somewhere/time >>>> in his earlier years of perezhivanie for the 'how to' in his choosing/drive >>>> for duty of care? >>>> >>>> On 13 October 2014 23:21, Martin John Packer >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >>>>> connection? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their mother's >>>>> drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the dynamic >>>>> development of perezhivanie. >>>>> >>>>> In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from emotion, >>>>> in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and interpreting the >>>>> circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, the child >>>>> is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction is one of >>>>> extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates involuntarily and >>>>> stammers. He loses control of his own body. >>>>> >>>>> LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the horror of >>>>> what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of terror, >>>>> enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to speak at all >>>>> as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction amounts to a >>>>> state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of this >>>>> situation." >>>>> >>>>> The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. The >>>>> contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an alternation >>>>> between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion towards the >>>>> mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the breakdown seen >>>>> in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily emotional, but it >>>>> is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The child's >>>>> love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, directed >>>>> towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as bad. It is, >>>>> however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions that is so >>>>> difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of approach-avoidance. >>>>> The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the mother; her >>>>> failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal conflict for the >>>>> child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates between two >>>>> different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she is a >>>>> mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than that of his >>>>> younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. >>>>> >>>>> LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely agonizing >>>>> condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a condition >>>>> frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional attitudes >>>>> towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we have >>>>> previously been able to observe among one of our children and which, you >>>>> may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, from >>>>> the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful attachment, >>>>> and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of terrors and >>>>> terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The German >>>>> authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is experiencing >>>>> a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for the mother >>>>> and terror of the witch coexist. >>>>> >>>>> "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply pronounced >>>>> conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction expressed in a >>>>> simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the mother, a >>>>> terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, combined >>>>> with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home >>>>> immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going home was >>>>> brought up." >>>>> >>>>> In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with more >>>>> detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of pity: of >>>>> sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion can >>>>> coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother not as a >>>>> bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, or weak. She >>>>> acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. This, then, >>>>> means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a "duty" to >>>>> take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. >>>>> >>>>> Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest child has a >>>>> single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. His emotions >>>>> follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. >>>>> >>>>> LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was ill and >>>>> he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his mother down, >>>>> make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones and comfort >>>>> them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the family, the only >>>>> one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". >>>>> >>>>> In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and cognition in >>>>> each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship changes >>>>> with age. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a preschooler, and >>>>> the oldest a school-aged child. >>>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >>>>> connection? >>>>>> As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a >>>>> different >>>>>> realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective position of >>>>>> the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where there is >>>>>> emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then as the >>>>>> cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs from the >>>>>> internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the >>>>> connectedness >>>>>> takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn >>>>>> motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. >>>>>> >>>>>> On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every word, >>>>>>> but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating with the >>>>>>> same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like this >>>>>>> discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it because we >>>>> each >>>>>>> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our >>>>>>> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be expected >>>>> to >>>>>>> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some people, >>>>>>> etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an >>>>>>> approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be negotiated in >>>>>>> discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer to >>>>>>> understanding how a particular person uses particular words when we get >>>>> to >>>>>>> know that person as a person and that involves much more than just >>>>> batting >>>>>>> words to and fro! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Rod >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>>>> on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] >>>>>>> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is >>>>> this >>>>>>> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this >>>>> case >>>>>>> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds >>>>>>> onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture >>>>>>>> everything. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college >>>>>>>> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because >>>>> that >>>>>>>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is >>>>> strongly >>>>>>>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, >>>>>>>> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the >>>>>>>> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen >>>>>>>> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a >>>>>>>> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements >>>>> that >>>>>>>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of >>>>>>>> water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions >>>>> driving >>>>>>>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially >>>>>>>> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is >>>>>>> actually >>>>>>>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and >>>>>>> dissociating >>>>>>>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't >>>>> develop >>>>>>>> further. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor >>>>> - >>>>>>>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is >>>>>>> simply >>>>>>>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and >>>>>>>> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of >>>>>>>> water. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and >>>>>>> OH >>>>>>>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative >>>>>>>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals >>>>>>>> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and >>>>> therefore >>>>>>>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of >>>>>>>> life. :) >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own >>>>>>>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not >>>>> a >>>>>>>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: >>>>> water >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an >>>>> internal >>>>>>>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is >>>>>>>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such >>>>>>>> that two >>>>>>>>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to >>>>> water >>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise >>>>> to >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> concrete for their own cases. >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic >>>>>>> system >>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, >>>>>>>> and I >>>>>>>>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before >>>>>>>> posting. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On the contrary. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about >>>>>>> activity >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple >>>>>>>> example >>>>>>>>>>>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history >>>>>>>> corner of >>>>>>>>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger >>>>>>> footing >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing >>>>>>> new >>>>>>>>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which >>>>>>>> division >>>>>>>>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a >>>>>>> leadership >>>>>>>> team >>>>>>>>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which >>>>>>>> in turn >>>>>>>>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> quick, change your history. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies >>>>>>> that, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one >>>>> can >>>>>>>> bring >>>>>>>>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on >>>>>>> *another* >>>>>>>>>>>> component of the totality. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent >>>>>>>> elements that >>>>>>>>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the >>>>>>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components >>>>>>>> in a >>>>>>>>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on >>>>> another, >>>>>>>> which >>>>>>>>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this >>>>> relationship. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective >>>>>>>> responses >>>>>>>>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a >>>>>>> rule >>>>>>>>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, >>>>>>>> it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The >>>>>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to >>>>>>>> do?" The >>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to >>>>>>>> accomplish. >>>>>>>>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we >>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in >>>>> Chicago, >>>>>>>>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to >>>>> be >>>>>>>> late >>>>>>>>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and >>>>>>>> will miss >>>>>>>>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're >>>>>>>> talking >>>>>>>>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle >>>>>>> aged >>>>>>>>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be >>>>>>>>>>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a >>>>> machine, >>>>>>>> but >>>>>>>>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who >>>>> would >>>>>>>> then >>>>>>>>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were >>>>>>>> often >>>>>>>>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. >>>>>>>> Also, a >>>>>>>>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was >>>>>>> happening >>>>>>>>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out >>>>>>>> buying >>>>>>>>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not >>>>>>> easy. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to >>>>> accomplish, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate >>>>>>>> members of >>>>>>>>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to >>>>>>>> something >>>>>>>>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in >>>>> society >>>>>>>> so >>>>>>>>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an >>>>> extended >>>>>>>>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you >>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> whole >>>>>>>>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy >>>>>>>> says, a >>>>>>>>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually >>>>>>>> speak to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about >>>>>>>> activity >>>>>>>>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in >>>>>>>> conflict >>>>>>>>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in >>>>>>>> mind? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the >>>>>>> class, >>>>>>>> or >>>>>>>>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most >>>>>>>> interesting >>>>>>>>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of >>>>>>>> children) >>>>>>>>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not >>>>>>>> identical. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> supervise >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> them on >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. >>>>>>>> They >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of >>>>>>> division >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> labor. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When >>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> decided to >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT >>>>>>> context >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> mainly >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt >>>>>>> about >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> " unit >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> St?? ????a??, 12 ??t?????? 2014, ? ???st?? Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ???a?e: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it >>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> one of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this >>>>>>>> concept >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new >>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> me, was >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> expression, I'd >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it >>>>>>> referred >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> was a >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT >>>>>>>> methodology >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> whilst >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me >>>>>>>> know. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a >>>>> template, >>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> is the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> new >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>>> So for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their >>>>>>> research, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> often >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> supervisor. I >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to >>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> point in >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the >>>>>>>> data >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> they now >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> articles. But, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in >>>>>>>> posts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't >>>>> follow >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am >>>>>>>> usually >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> just >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because >>>>> I'm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> interested >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> how they >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are >>>>>>>> people >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of >>>>>>> analysis >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> being used? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> interested to >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might >>>>>>> be >>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> basic as >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in >>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> much more >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of >>>>>>> analysis. >>>>>>>> In >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Mike's >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> action is >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here >>>>>>>> before, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a >>>>>>>> picture of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> much >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> School of Education >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Greece >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> *Patrick Jaki* >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >>>>>>> ________________________________ >>>>>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >>>>>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely >>>>> for >>>>>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >>>>>>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >>>>>>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on >>>>> it. >>>>>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >>>>>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >>>>>>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University >>>>> accepts >>>>>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan >>>>> emails >>>>>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept >>>>> responsibility >>>>>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >>>>>>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless >>>>> accompanied >>>>>>> by an official order form. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> *Robyn Babaeff* >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> *Robyn Babaeff* >>> >>> >> > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Oct 13 10:59:42 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 17:59:42 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <1F27D40F-7D96-4C8A-AF78-1FB6D9F164AB@manchester.ac.uk> References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> , , <7595A167-FAC9-4D7D-A78E-D3A637B0F883@uniandes.edu.co> <1F27D40F-7D96-4C8A-AF78-1FB6D9F164AB@manchester.ac.uk> Message-ID: Julian, I would prefer to say that they all have the same mother, but they relate to her and interact with her in specific ways, depending largely on their stage of development. She presumably relates to each of them somewhat differently, but undoubtedly each of them witnesses how she treats the others. So I'm saying that the environment is the same - they all live in a house with a drunken mother - but the ways they live in that environment, and the ways they make sense of it, differ. Martin On Oct 13, 2014, at 12:45 PM, Julian Williams wrote: > Martin > > Ok we are on the same page, if you agree the environment may not be the same for the three children... It is not just that they are developmentally at a different stage, but "mother" is actually a different environment for each of them. > > Julian > > Sent from my iPad > > On 13 Oct 2014, at 17:54, "Martin John Packer" wrote: > >> Hi Julian, >> >> I've been trying to suggest that the dialectic is in the child's relationship to the environment. Or, as you say, as an aspect of child-in-the-environment (with-others). Generally I try to avoid dualistic terminology such as 'in the child' versus 'in the world' or 'subjective' versus 'objective' - I think I'm following LSV's lead here, though certainly he uses the term "internal" a lot. >> >> Generally in children's development the environment does indeed change as they grow - parents make new arrangements for them. But in the case study that LSV describes, we have three children of different ages all dealing at the same time with the same adult. In this sense the environment is fixed, in this particular case. >> >> And surely you're right to suggest that the children are contributing to the environment in which they live. One can only imagine how a drunken mother responds to her youngest son wetting the bed, for example. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 13, 2014, at 11:14 AM, Julian Williams wrote: >> >>> Dear Martin, and all >>> >>> I dont see the dialectic as 'internal' to the child, but as the child-in-the-environment. But I think maybe there is a problem with the current drift in the discussion. >>> >>> The problem I see arising now is that we are beginning to take the environment here as something fixed or taken for granted, with the difference in the three Perezhivanie being totally about the subjects/childs different stages of development. I'm not sure this does justice to the dialectic Vygotsky had in mind (though I see it might appear so in the text). I think one has to consider the objective fact of the environment as something from which different strands may be apprehended, or if you like, or from which certain aspects can be 'refracted'. >>> >>> At the cost of perhaps causing confusion, I wonder if the notion of Zone of Proximal Development can help here for those who use this idea ... A particular social plane (environment, classroom interaction etc) can offer a ZPD for some but be entirely useless to others, because of their different stages of development, yes, yes. But also, different learners at different stages can help create their own ZPDs within the same social space and even plane, (drawing from the same social interactions in different ways). So they may shape the very environment which provides for their own ZPD and hence development. I think this is a more adequate way to think of the dialectic, so the subject is not seen as passive in their own development. >>> >>> Julian >>> >>> (Maybe this passivity is what Mike had in mind when he expressed reservations about Vygotsky's use of the 'final ideal form' , eg of arithmetic, have I remembered this right? Anyway I DO have reservations about that notion in Vygotsky's chapter but maybe that's another story for later.) >>> >>> >>> On 13 Oct 2014, at 14:53, "Martin John Packer" wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Robyn, >>>> >>>> I think it's important to recognize that the oldest child's understanding of the need to take care of his mother and siblings is not a drive or an impulse, it is, LSV tells us, a "duty" that follows from adopting a specific "role" in the family. Understanding the situation in terms of roles and duties is certainly socially mediated - after all, roles and duties are social, or societal, matters (ontological and deontological respectively, if we want to get technical). The oldest child - presumably attending school - is able to understand that he lives in a world of social institutions, one of which is his family. >>>> >>>> In this chapter LSV does not explore or explain how each kind of perezhivanie transforms into the next, but in his lectures on child development you can find a more detailed account. But here, in what is effectively a cross-sectional comparison of children at different ages (albeit only one at each age), he certainly means to suggest that earlier forms provide the basis for later forms. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:45 AM, Robyn Babaeff wrote: >>>> >>>>> Much appreciated Martin - this is feeling more visual, and now I am >>>>> wondering is it possible to interpret that the older child's emotive >>>>> drive/action of care for his mother and younger sibling in its moment is >>>>> also connected a socially mediated aspect of cognition from somewhere/time >>>>> in his earlier years of perezhivanie for the 'how to' in his choosing/drive >>>>> for duty of care? >>>>> >>>>> On 13 October 2014 23:21, Martin John Packer >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>>>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >>>>>> connection? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their mother's >>>>>> drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the dynamic >>>>>> development of perezhivanie. >>>>>> >>>>>> In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from emotion, >>>>>> in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and interpreting the >>>>>> circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, the child >>>>>> is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction is one of >>>>>> extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates involuntarily and >>>>>> stammers. He loses control of his own body. >>>>>> >>>>>> LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the horror of >>>>>> what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of terror, >>>>>> enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to speak at all >>>>>> as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction amounts to a >>>>>> state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of this >>>>>> situation." >>>>>> >>>>>> The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. The >>>>>> contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an alternation >>>>>> between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion towards the >>>>>> mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the breakdown seen >>>>>> in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily emotional, but it >>>>>> is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The child's >>>>>> love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, directed >>>>>> towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as bad. It is, >>>>>> however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions that is so >>>>>> difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of approach-avoidance. >>>>>> The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the mother; her >>>>>> failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal conflict for the >>>>>> child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates between two >>>>>> different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she is a >>>>>> mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than that of his >>>>>> younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. >>>>>> >>>>>> LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely agonizing >>>>>> condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a condition >>>>>> frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional attitudes >>>>>> towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we have >>>>>> previously been able to observe among one of our children and which, you >>>>>> may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, from >>>>>> the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful attachment, >>>>>> and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of terrors and >>>>>> terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The German >>>>>> authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is experiencing >>>>>> a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for the mother >>>>>> and terror of the witch coexist. >>>>>> >>>>>> "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply pronounced >>>>>> conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction expressed in a >>>>>> simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the mother, a >>>>>> terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, combined >>>>>> with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home >>>>>> immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going home was >>>>>> brought up." >>>>>> >>>>>> In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with more >>>>>> detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of pity: of >>>>>> sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion can >>>>>> coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother not as a >>>>>> bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, or weak. She >>>>>> acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. This, then, >>>>>> means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a "duty" to >>>>>> take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. >>>>>> >>>>>> Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest child has a >>>>>> single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. His emotions >>>>>> follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. >>>>>> >>>>>> LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was ill and >>>>>> he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his mother down, >>>>>> make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones and comfort >>>>>> them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the family, the only >>>>>> one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". >>>>>> >>>>>> In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and cognition in >>>>>> each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship changes >>>>>> with age. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a preschooler, and >>>>>> the oldest a school-aged child. >>>>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>>>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >>>>>> connection? >>>>>>> As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a >>>>>> different >>>>>>> realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective position of >>>>>>> the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where there is >>>>>>> emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then as the >>>>>>> cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs from the >>>>>>> internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the >>>>>> connectedness >>>>>>> takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn >>>>>>> motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every word, >>>>>>>> but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating with the >>>>>>>> same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like this >>>>>>>> discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it because we >>>>>> each >>>>>>>> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our >>>>>>>> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be expected >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some people, >>>>>>>> etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an >>>>>>>> approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be negotiated in >>>>>>>> discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer to >>>>>>>> understanding how a particular person uses particular words when we get >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> know that person as a person and that involves much more than just >>>>>> batting >>>>>>>> words to and fro! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Rod >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>>>>> on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] >>>>>>>> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is >>>>>> this >>>>>>>> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this >>>>>> case >>>>>>>> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds >>>>>>>> onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture >>>>>>>>> everything. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college >>>>>>>>> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is >>>>>> strongly >>>>>>>>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, >>>>>>>>> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the >>>>>>>>> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen >>>>>>>>> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a >>>>>>>>> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of >>>>>>>>> water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions >>>>>> driving >>>>>>>>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially >>>>>>>>> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is >>>>>>>> actually >>>>>>>>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and >>>>>>>> dissociating >>>>>>>>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't >>>>>> develop >>>>>>>>> further. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor >>>>>> - >>>>>>>>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is >>>>>>>> simply >>>>>>>>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and >>>>>>>>> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of >>>>>>>>> water. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and >>>>>>>> OH >>>>>>>>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative >>>>>>>>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals >>>>>>>>> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and >>>>>> therefore >>>>>>>>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of >>>>>>>>> life. :) >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own >>>>>>>>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not >>>>>> a >>>>>>>>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: >>>>>> water >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an >>>>>> internal >>>>>>>>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is >>>>>>>>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such >>>>>>>>> that two >>>>>>>>>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to >>>>>> water >>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> concrete for their own cases. >>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic >>>>>>>> system >>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, >>>>>>>>> and I >>>>>>>>>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before >>>>>>>>> posting. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On the contrary. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about >>>>>>>> activity >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple >>>>>>>>> example >>>>>>>>>>>>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history >>>>>>>>> corner of >>>>>>>>>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger >>>>>>>> footing >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing >>>>>>>> new >>>>>>>>>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which >>>>>>>>> division >>>>>>>>>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a >>>>>>>> leadership >>>>>>>>> team >>>>>>>>>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which >>>>>>>>> in turn >>>>>>>>>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>> quick, change your history. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies >>>>>>>> that, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one >>>>>> can >>>>>>>>> bring >>>>>>>>>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on >>>>>>>> *another* >>>>>>>>>>>>> component of the totality. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent >>>>>>>>> elements that >>>>>>>>>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the >>>>>>>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components >>>>>>>>> in a >>>>>>>>>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on >>>>>> another, >>>>>>>>> which >>>>>>>>>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this >>>>>> relationship. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective >>>>>>>>> responses >>>>>>>>>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a >>>>>>>> rule >>>>>>>>>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, >>>>>>>>> it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The >>>>>>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to >>>>>>>>> do?" The >>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to >>>>>>>>> accomplish. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we >>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in >>>>>> Chicago, >>>>>>>>>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to >>>>>> be >>>>>>>>> late >>>>>>>>>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and >>>>>>>>> will miss >>>>>>>>>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're >>>>>>>>> talking >>>>>>>>>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle >>>>>>>> aged >>>>>>>>>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be >>>>>>>>>>>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a >>>>>> machine, >>>>>>>>> but >>>>>>>>>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who >>>>>> would >>>>>>>>> then >>>>>>>>>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were >>>>>>>>> often >>>>>>>>>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. >>>>>>>>> Also, a >>>>>>>>>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was >>>>>>>> happening >>>>>>>>>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out >>>>>>>>> buying >>>>>>>>>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not >>>>>>>> easy. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to >>>>>> accomplish, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate >>>>>>>>> members of >>>>>>>>>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to >>>>>>>>> something >>>>>>>>>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in >>>>>> society >>>>>>>>> so >>>>>>>>>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an >>>>>> extended >>>>>>>>>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you >>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> whole >>>>>>>>>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy >>>>>>>>> says, a >>>>>>>>>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually >>>>>>>>> speak to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about >>>>>>>>> activity >>>>>>>>>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in >>>>>>>>> conflict >>>>>>>>>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in >>>>>>>>> mind? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the >>>>>>>> class, >>>>>>>>> or >>>>>>>>>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most >>>>>>>>> interesting >>>>>>>>>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of >>>>>>>>> children) >>>>>>>>>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not >>>>>>>>> identical. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> supervise >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> them on >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. >>>>>>>>> They >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of >>>>>>>> division >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> labor. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When >>>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> decided to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT >>>>>>>> context >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> mainly >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt >>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> " unit >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> St?? ????a??, 12 ??t?????? 2014, ? ???st?? Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ???a?e: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it >>>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> one of >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this >>>>>>>>> concept >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new >>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> me, was >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> expression, I'd >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it >>>>>>>> referred >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> was a >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT >>>>>>>>> methodology >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> whilst >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me >>>>>>>>> know. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a >>>>>> template, >>>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> is the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> new >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>>>> So for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their >>>>>>>> research, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> often >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> supervisor. I >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to >>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> point in >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the >>>>>>>>> data >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> they now >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> articles. But, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in >>>>>>>>> posts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't >>>>>> follow >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am >>>>>>>>> usually >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> just >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because >>>>>> I'm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> interested >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> how they >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are >>>>>>>>> people >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of >>>>>>>> analysis >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> being used? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> interested to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might >>>>>>>> be >>>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> basic as >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> much more >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of >>>>>>>> analysis. >>>>>>>>> In >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike's >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> action is >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here >>>>>>>>> before, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a >>>>>>>>> picture of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> much >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> School of Education >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Greece >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> *Patrick Jaki* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >>>>>>>> ________________________________ >>>>>>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >>>>>>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely >>>>>> for >>>>>>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >>>>>>>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >>>>>>>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on >>>>>> it. >>>>>>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >>>>>>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >>>>>>>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University >>>>>> accepts >>>>>>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan >>>>>> emails >>>>>>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept >>>>>> responsibility >>>>>>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >>>>>>>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless >>>>>> accompanied >>>>>>>> by an official order form. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> *Robyn Babaeff* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> *Robyn Babaeff* >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> > From a.g.jornet@iped.uio.no Mon Oct 13 11:19:10 2014 From: a.g.jornet@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Gil Jornet) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 18:19:10 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> , , <7595A167-FAC9-4D7D-A78E-D3A637B0F883@uniandes.edu.co> <1F27D40F-7D96-4C8A-AF78-1FB6D9F164AB@manchester.ac.uk>, Message-ID: <78d08ffe83b940b3a1e3772fee046168@mail-ex02.exprod.uio.no> Julian, Martin, Perhaps a way out of the dilemma of whether we should be talking about the same mother/environment or about different mothers/environments is provided by Dewey's notion of *situation*, which always implies both organism and environment. We can then talk of different situations, yet the same environment. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer Sent: 13 October 2014 19:59 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? Julian, I would prefer to say that they all have the same mother, but they relate to her and interact with her in specific ways, depending largely on their stage of development. She presumably relates to each of them somewhat differently, but undoubtedly each of them witnesses how she treats the others. So I'm saying that the environment is the same - they all live in a house with a drunken mother - but the ways they live in that environment, and the ways they make sense of it, differ. Martin On Oct 13, 2014, at 12:45 PM, Julian Williams wrote: > Martin > > Ok we are on the same page, if you agree the environment may not be the same for the three children... It is not just that they are developmentally at a different stage, but "mother" is actually a different environment for each of them. > > Julian > > Sent from my iPad > > On 13 Oct 2014, at 17:54, "Martin John Packer" wrote: > >> Hi Julian, >> >> I've been trying to suggest that the dialectic is in the child's relationship to the environment. Or, as you say, as an aspect of child-in-the-environment (with-others). Generally I try to avoid dualistic terminology such as 'in the child' versus 'in the world' or 'subjective' versus 'objective' - I think I'm following LSV's lead here, though certainly he uses the term "internal" a lot. >> >> Generally in children's development the environment does indeed change as they grow - parents make new arrangements for them. But in the case study that LSV describes, we have three children of different ages all dealing at the same time with the same adult. In this sense the environment is fixed, in this particular case. >> >> And surely you're right to suggest that the children are contributing to the environment in which they live. One can only imagine how a drunken mother responds to her youngest son wetting the bed, for example. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 13, 2014, at 11:14 AM, Julian Williams wrote: >> >>> Dear Martin, and all >>> >>> I dont see the dialectic as 'internal' to the child, but as the child-in-the-environment. But I think maybe there is a problem with the current drift in the discussion. >>> >>> The problem I see arising now is that we are beginning to take the environment here as something fixed or taken for granted, with the difference in the three Perezhivanie being totally about the subjects/childs different stages of development. I'm not sure this does justice to the dialectic Vygotsky had in mind (though I see it might appear so in the text). I think one has to consider the objective fact of the environment as something from which different strands may be apprehended, or if you like, or from which certain aspects can be 'refracted'. >>> >>> At the cost of perhaps causing confusion, I wonder if the notion of Zone of Proximal Development can help here for those who use this idea ... A particular social plane (environment, classroom interaction etc) can offer a ZPD for some but be entirely useless to others, because of their different stages of development, yes, yes. But also, different learners at different stages can help create their own ZPDs within the same social space and even plane, (drawing from the same social interactions in different ways). So they may shape the very environment which provides for their own ZPD and hence development. I think this is a more adequate way to think of the dialectic, so the subject is not seen as passive in their own development. >>> >>> Julian >>> >>> (Maybe this passivity is what Mike had in mind when he expressed reservations about Vygotsky's use of the 'final ideal form' , eg of arithmetic, have I remembered this right? Anyway I DO have reservations about that notion in Vygotsky's chapter but maybe that's another story for later.) >>> >>> >>> On 13 Oct 2014, at 14:53, "Martin John Packer" wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Robyn, >>>> >>>> I think it's important to recognize that the oldest child's understanding of the need to take care of his mother and siblings is not a drive or an impulse, it is, LSV tells us, a "duty" that follows from adopting a specific "role" in the family. Understanding the situation in terms of roles and duties is certainly socially mediated - after all, roles and duties are social, or societal, matters (ontological and deontological respectively, if we want to get technical). The oldest child - presumably attending school - is able to understand that he lives in a world of social institutions, one of which is his family. >>>> >>>> In this chapter LSV does not explore or explain how each kind of perezhivanie transforms into the next, but in his lectures on child development you can find a more detailed account. But here, in what is effectively a cross-sectional comparison of children at different ages (albeit only one at each age), he certainly means to suggest that earlier forms provide the basis for later forms. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:45 AM, Robyn Babaeff wrote: >>>> >>>>> Much appreciated Martin - this is feeling more visual, and now I am >>>>> wondering is it possible to interpret that the older child's emotive >>>>> drive/action of care for his mother and younger sibling in its moment is >>>>> also connected a socially mediated aspect of cognition from somewhere/time >>>>> in his earlier years of perezhivanie for the 'how to' in his choosing/drive >>>>> for duty of care? >>>>> >>>>> On 13 October 2014 23:21, Martin John Packer >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>>>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >>>>>> connection? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their mother's >>>>>> drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the dynamic >>>>>> development of perezhivanie. >>>>>> >>>>>> In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from emotion, >>>>>> in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and interpreting the >>>>>> circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, the child >>>>>> is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction is one of >>>>>> extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates involuntarily and >>>>>> stammers. He loses control of his own body. >>>>>> >>>>>> LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the horror of >>>>>> what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of terror, >>>>>> enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to speak at all >>>>>> as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction amounts to a >>>>>> state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of this >>>>>> situation." >>>>>> >>>>>> The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. The >>>>>> contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an alternation >>>>>> between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion towards the >>>>>> mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the breakdown seen >>>>>> in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily emotional, but it >>>>>> is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The child's >>>>>> love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, directed >>>>>> towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as bad. It is, >>>>>> however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions that is so >>>>>> difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of approach-avoidance. >>>>>> The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the mother; her >>>>>> failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal conflict for the >>>>>> child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates between two >>>>>> different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she is a >>>>>> mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than that of his >>>>>> younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. >>>>>> >>>>>> LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely agonizing >>>>>> condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a condition >>>>>> frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional attitudes >>>>>> towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we have >>>>>> previously been able to observe among one of our children and which, you >>>>>> may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, from >>>>>> the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful attachment, >>>>>> and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of terrors and >>>>>> terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The German >>>>>> authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is experiencing >>>>>> a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for the mother >>>>>> and terror of the witch coexist. >>>>>> >>>>>> "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply pronounced >>>>>> conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction expressed in a >>>>>> simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the mother, a >>>>>> terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, combined >>>>>> with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home >>>>>> immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going home was >>>>>> brought up." >>>>>> >>>>>> In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with more >>>>>> detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of pity: of >>>>>> sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion can >>>>>> coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother not as a >>>>>> bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, or weak. She >>>>>> acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. This, then, >>>>>> means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a "duty" to >>>>>> take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. >>>>>> >>>>>> Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest child has a >>>>>> single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. His emotions >>>>>> follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. >>>>>> >>>>>> LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was ill and >>>>>> he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his mother down, >>>>>> make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones and comfort >>>>>> them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the family, the only >>>>>> one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". >>>>>> >>>>>> In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and cognition in >>>>>> each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship changes >>>>>> with age. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a preschooler, and >>>>>> the oldest a school-aged child. >>>>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>>>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >>>>>> connection? >>>>>>> As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a >>>>>> different >>>>>>> realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective position of >>>>>>> the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where there is >>>>>>> emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then as the >>>>>>> cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs from the >>>>>>> internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the >>>>>> connectedness >>>>>>> takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn >>>>>>> motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every word, >>>>>>>> but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating with the >>>>>>>> same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like this >>>>>>>> discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it because we >>>>>> each >>>>>>>> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our >>>>>>>> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be expected >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some people, >>>>>>>> etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an >>>>>>>> approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be negotiated in >>>>>>>> discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer to >>>>>>>> understanding how a particular person uses particular words when we get >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> know that person as a person and that involves much more than just >>>>>> batting >>>>>>>> words to and fro! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Rod >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>>>>> on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] >>>>>>>> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is >>>>>> this >>>>>>>> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this >>>>>> case >>>>>>>> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds >>>>>>>> onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture >>>>>>>>> everything. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college >>>>>>>>> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is >>>>>> strongly >>>>>>>>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, >>>>>>>>> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the >>>>>>>>> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen >>>>>>>>> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a >>>>>>>>> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of >>>>>>>>> water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions >>>>>> driving >>>>>>>>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially >>>>>>>>> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is >>>>>>>> actually >>>>>>>>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and >>>>>>>> dissociating >>>>>>>>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't >>>>>> develop >>>>>>>>> further. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor >>>>>> - >>>>>>>>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is >>>>>>>> simply >>>>>>>>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and >>>>>>>>> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of >>>>>>>>> water. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and >>>>>>>> OH >>>>>>>>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative >>>>>>>>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals >>>>>>>>> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and >>>>>> therefore >>>>>>>>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of >>>>>>>>> life. :) >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own >>>>>>>>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not >>>>>> a >>>>>>>>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: >>>>>> water >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an >>>>>> internal >>>>>>>>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is >>>>>>>>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such >>>>>>>>> that two >>>>>>>>>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to >>>>>> water >>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> concrete for their own cases. >>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic >>>>>>>> system >>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, >>>>>>>>> and I >>>>>>>>>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before >>>>>>>>> posting. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On the contrary. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about >>>>>>>> activity >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple >>>>>>>>> example >>>>>>>>>>>>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history >>>>>>>>> corner of >>>>>>>>>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger >>>>>>>> footing >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing >>>>>>>> new >>>>>>>>>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which >>>>>>>>> division >>>>>>>>>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a >>>>>>>> leadership >>>>>>>>> team >>>>>>>>>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which >>>>>>>>> in turn >>>>>>>>>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>> quick, change your history. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies >>>>>>>> that, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one >>>>>> can >>>>>>>>> bring >>>>>>>>>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on >>>>>>>> *another* >>>>>>>>>>>>> component of the totality. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent >>>>>>>>> elements that >>>>>>>>>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the >>>>>>>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components >>>>>>>>> in a >>>>>>>>>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on >>>>>> another, >>>>>>>>> which >>>>>>>>>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this >>>>>> relationship. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective >>>>>>>>> responses >>>>>>>>>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a >>>>>>>> rule >>>>>>>>>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, >>>>>>>>> it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The >>>>>>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to >>>>>>>>> do?" The >>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to >>>>>>>>> accomplish. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we >>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in >>>>>> Chicago, >>>>>>>>>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to >>>>>> be >>>>>>>>> late >>>>>>>>>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and >>>>>>>>> will miss >>>>>>>>>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're >>>>>>>>> talking >>>>>>>>>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle >>>>>>>> aged >>>>>>>>>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be >>>>>>>>>>>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a >>>>>> machine, >>>>>>>>> but >>>>>>>>>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who >>>>>> would >>>>>>>>> then >>>>>>>>>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were >>>>>>>>> often >>>>>>>>>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. >>>>>>>>> Also, a >>>>>>>>>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was >>>>>>>> happening >>>>>>>>>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out >>>>>>>>> buying >>>>>>>>>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not >>>>>>>> easy. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to >>>>>> accomplish, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate >>>>>>>>> members of >>>>>>>>>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to >>>>>>>>> something >>>>>>>>>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in >>>>>> society >>>>>>>>> so >>>>>>>>>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an >>>>>> extended >>>>>>>>>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you >>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> whole >>>>>>>>>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy >>>>>>>>> says, a >>>>>>>>>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually >>>>>>>>> speak to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about >>>>>>>>> activity >>>>>>>>>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in >>>>>>>>> conflict >>>>>>>>>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in >>>>>>>>> mind? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the >>>>>>>> class, >>>>>>>>> or >>>>>>>>>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most >>>>>>>>> interesting >>>>>>>>>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of >>>>>>>>> children) >>>>>>>>>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not >>>>>>>>> identical. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> supervise >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> them on >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. >>>>>>>>> They >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of >>>>>>>> division >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> labor. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When >>>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> decided to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT >>>>>>>> context >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> mainly >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt >>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> " unit >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> St?? ????a??, 12 ??t?????? 2014, ? ???st?? Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ???a?e: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it >>>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> one of >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this >>>>>>>>> concept >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new >>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> me, was >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> expression, I'd >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it >>>>>>>> referred >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> was a >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT >>>>>>>>> methodology >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> whilst >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me >>>>>>>>> know. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a >>>>>> template, >>>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> is the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> new >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>>>> So for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their >>>>>>>> research, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> often >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> supervisor. I >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to >>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> point in >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the >>>>>>>>> data >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> they now >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> articles. But, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in >>>>>>>>> posts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't >>>>>> follow >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am >>>>>>>>> usually >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> just >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because >>>>>> I'm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> interested >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> how they >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are >>>>>>>>> people >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of >>>>>>>> analysis >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> being used? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> interested to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might >>>>>>>> be >>>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> basic as >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> much more >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of >>>>>>>> analysis. >>>>>>>>> In >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike's >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> action is >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here >>>>>>>>> before, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a >>>>>>>>> picture of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> much >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> School of Education >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Greece >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> *Patrick Jaki* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >>>>>>>> ________________________________ >>>>>>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >>>>>>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely >>>>>> for >>>>>>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >>>>>>>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >>>>>>>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on >>>>>> it. >>>>>>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >>>>>>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >>>>>>>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University >>>>>> accepts >>>>>>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan >>>>>> emails >>>>>>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept >>>>>> responsibility >>>>>>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >>>>>>>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless >>>>>> accompanied >>>>>>>> by an official order form. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> *Robyn Babaeff* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> *Robyn Babaeff* >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Oct 13 11:47:12 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 18:47:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <78d08ffe83b940b3a1e3772fee046168@mail-ex02.exprod.uio.no> References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> , , <7595A167-FAC9-4D7D-A78E-D3A637B0F883@uniandes.edu.co> <1F27D40F-7D96-4C8A-AF78-1FB6D9F164AB@manchester.ac.uk>, <78d08ffe83b940b3a1e3772fee046168@mail-ex02.exprod.uio.no> Message-ID: Hi Alfredo, I don't really see a dilemma... and I think LSV is pretty clear: "How can one explain why exactly the same environmental conditions exert three different types of influence on these three different children? It can be explained because each of the children has a different attitude to the situation. Or, as we might put it, each of the children experienced the situation in a different way. .... So it appears that, depending on the fact that the same situation had been experienced by the three children in three different ways, the influence which this situation exerted on their development also turns out to be different." Martin On Oct 13, 2014, at 1:19 PM, Alfredo Gil Jornet wrote: > Julian, Martin, > > Perhaps a way out of the dilemma of whether we should be talking about the same mother/environment or about different mothers/environments is provided by Dewey's notion of *situation*, which always implies both organism and environment. We can then talk of different situations, yet the same environment. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer > Sent: 13 October 2014 19:59 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? > > Julian, > > I would prefer to say that they all have the same mother, but they relate to her and interact with her in specific ways, depending largely on their stage of development. She presumably relates to each of them somewhat differently, but undoubtedly each of them witnesses how she treats the others. > > So I'm saying that the environment is the same - they all live in a house with a drunken mother - but the ways they live in that environment, and the ways they make sense of it, differ. > > Martin > > On Oct 13, 2014, at 12:45 PM, Julian Williams wrote: > >> Martin >> >> Ok we are on the same page, if you agree the environment may not be the same for the three children... It is not just that they are developmentally at a different stage, but "mother" is actually a different environment for each of them. >> >> Julian >> >> Sent from my iPad >> >> On 13 Oct 2014, at 17:54, "Martin John Packer" wrote: >> >>> Hi Julian, >>> >>> I've been trying to suggest that the dialectic is in the child's relationship to the environment. Or, as you say, as an aspect of child-in-the-environment (with-others). Generally I try to avoid dualistic terminology such as 'in the child' versus 'in the world' or 'subjective' versus 'objective' - I think I'm following LSV's lead here, though certainly he uses the term "internal" a lot. >>> >>> Generally in children's development the environment does indeed change as they grow - parents make new arrangements for them. But in the case study that LSV describes, we have three children of different ages all dealing at the same time with the same adult. In this sense the environment is fixed, in this particular case. >>> >>> And surely you're right to suggest that the children are contributing to the environment in which they live. One can only imagine how a drunken mother responds to her youngest son wetting the bed, for example. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 11:14 AM, Julian Williams wrote: >>> >>>> Dear Martin, and all >>>> >>>> I dont see the dialectic as 'internal' to the child, but as the child-in-the-environment. But I think maybe there is a problem with the current drift in the discussion. >>>> >>>> The problem I see arising now is that we are beginning to take the environment here as something fixed or taken for granted, with the difference in the three Perezhivanie being totally about the subjects/childs different stages of development. I'm not sure this does justice to the dialectic Vygotsky had in mind (though I see it might appear so in the text). I think one has to consider the objective fact of the environment as something from which different strands may be apprehended, or if you like, or from which certain aspects can be 'refracted'. >>>> >>>> At the cost of perhaps causing confusion, I wonder if the notion of Zone of Proximal Development can help here for those who use this idea ... A particular social plane (environment, classroom interaction etc) can offer a ZPD for some but be entirely useless to others, because of their different stages of development, yes, yes. But also, different learners at different stages can help create their own ZPDs within the same social space and even plane, (drawing from the same social interactions in different ways). So they may shape the very environment which provides for their own ZPD and hence development. I think this is a more adequate way to think of the dialectic, so the subject is not seen as passive in their own development. >>>> >>>> Julian >>>> >>>> (Maybe this passivity is what Mike had in mind when he expressed reservations about Vygotsky's use of the 'final ideal form' , eg of arithmetic, have I remembered this right? Anyway I DO have reservations about that notion in Vygotsky's chapter but maybe that's another story for later.) >>>> >>>> >>>> On 13 Oct 2014, at 14:53, "Martin John Packer" wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Robyn, >>>>> >>>>> I think it's important to recognize that the oldest child's understanding of the need to take care of his mother and siblings is not a drive or an impulse, it is, LSV tells us, a "duty" that follows from adopting a specific "role" in the family. Understanding the situation in terms of roles and duties is certainly socially mediated - after all, roles and duties are social, or societal, matters (ontological and deontological respectively, if we want to get technical). The oldest child - presumably attending school - is able to understand that he lives in a world of social institutions, one of which is his family. >>>>> >>>>> In this chapter LSV does not explore or explain how each kind of perezhivanie transforms into the next, but in his lectures on child development you can find a more detailed account. But here, in what is effectively a cross-sectional comparison of children at different ages (albeit only one at each age), he certainly means to suggest that earlier forms provide the basis for later forms. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:45 AM, Robyn Babaeff wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Much appreciated Martin - this is feeling more visual, and now I am >>>>>> wondering is it possible to interpret that the older child's emotive >>>>>> drive/action of care for his mother and younger sibling in its moment is >>>>>> also connected a socially mediated aspect of cognition from somewhere/time >>>>>> in his earlier years of perezhivanie for the 'how to' in his choosing/drive >>>>>> for duty of care? >>>>>> >>>>>> On 13 October 2014 23:21, Martin John Packer >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>>>>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >>>>>>> connection? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their mother's >>>>>>> drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the dynamic >>>>>>> development of perezhivanie. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from emotion, >>>>>>> in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and interpreting the >>>>>>> circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, the child >>>>>>> is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction is one of >>>>>>> extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates involuntarily and >>>>>>> stammers. He loses control of his own body. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the horror of >>>>>>> what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of terror, >>>>>>> enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to speak at all >>>>>>> as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction amounts to a >>>>>>> state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of this >>>>>>> situation." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. The >>>>>>> contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an alternation >>>>>>> between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion towards the >>>>>>> mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the breakdown seen >>>>>>> in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily emotional, but it >>>>>>> is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The child's >>>>>>> love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, directed >>>>>>> towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as bad. It is, >>>>>>> however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions that is so >>>>>>> difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of approach-avoidance. >>>>>>> The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the mother; her >>>>>>> failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal conflict for the >>>>>>> child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates between two >>>>>>> different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she is a >>>>>>> mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than that of his >>>>>>> younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely agonizing >>>>>>> condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a condition >>>>>>> frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional attitudes >>>>>>> towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we have >>>>>>> previously been able to observe among one of our children and which, you >>>>>>> may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, from >>>>>>> the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful attachment, >>>>>>> and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of terrors and >>>>>>> terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The German >>>>>>> authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is experiencing >>>>>>> a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for the mother >>>>>>> and terror of the witch coexist. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply pronounced >>>>>>> conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction expressed in a >>>>>>> simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the mother, a >>>>>>> terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, combined >>>>>>> with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home >>>>>>> immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going home was >>>>>>> brought up." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with more >>>>>>> detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of pity: of >>>>>>> sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion can >>>>>>> coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother not as a >>>>>>> bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, or weak. She >>>>>>> acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. This, then, >>>>>>> means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a "duty" to >>>>>>> take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest child has a >>>>>>> single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. His emotions >>>>>>> follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was ill and >>>>>>> he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his mother down, >>>>>>> make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones and comfort >>>>>>> them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the family, the only >>>>>>> one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and cognition in >>>>>>> each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship changes >>>>>>> with age. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a preschooler, and >>>>>>> the oldest a school-aged child. >>>>>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>>>>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >>>>>>> connection? >>>>>>>> As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a >>>>>>> different >>>>>>>> realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective position of >>>>>>>> the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where there is >>>>>>>> emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then as the >>>>>>>> cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs from the >>>>>>>> internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the >>>>>>> connectedness >>>>>>>> takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn >>>>>>>> motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every word, >>>>>>>>> but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating with the >>>>>>>>> same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like this >>>>>>>>> discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it because we >>>>>>> each >>>>>>>>> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our >>>>>>>>> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be expected >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some people, >>>>>>>>> etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an >>>>>>>>> approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be negotiated in >>>>>>>>> discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer to >>>>>>>>> understanding how a particular person uses particular words when we get >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> know that person as a person and that involves much more than just >>>>>>> batting >>>>>>>>> words to and fro! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Rod >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>>>>>> on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] >>>>>>>>> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is >>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this >>>>>>> case >>>>>>>>> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds >>>>>>>>> onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture >>>>>>>>>> everything. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college >>>>>>>>>> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is >>>>>>> strongly >>>>>>>>>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, >>>>>>>>>> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the >>>>>>>>>> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen >>>>>>>>>> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a >>>>>>>>>> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of >>>>>>>>>> water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions >>>>>>> driving >>>>>>>>>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially >>>>>>>>>> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is >>>>>>>>> actually >>>>>>>>>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and >>>>>>>>> dissociating >>>>>>>>>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't >>>>>>> develop >>>>>>>>>> further. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor >>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is >>>>>>>>> simply >>>>>>>>>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and >>>>>>>>>> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of >>>>>>>>>> water. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and >>>>>>>>> OH >>>>>>>>>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative >>>>>>>>>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals >>>>>>>>>> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and >>>>>>> therefore >>>>>>>>>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of >>>>>>>>>> life. :) >>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own >>>>>>>>>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not >>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: >>>>>>> water >>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an >>>>>>> internal >>>>>>>>>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is >>>>>>>>>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such >>>>>>>>>> that two >>>>>>>>>>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to >>>>>>> water >>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> concrete for their own cases. >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic >>>>>>>>> system >>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, >>>>>>>>>> and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before >>>>>>>>>> posting. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On the contrary. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about >>>>>>>>> activity >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple >>>>>>>>>> example >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history >>>>>>>>>> corner of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger >>>>>>>>> footing >>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing >>>>>>>>> new >>>>>>>>>>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which >>>>>>>>>> division >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a >>>>>>>>> leadership >>>>>>>>>> team >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which >>>>>>>>>> in turn >>>>>>>>>>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> quick, change your history. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies >>>>>>>>> that, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one >>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>> bring >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on >>>>>>>>> *another* >>>>>>>>>>>>>> component of the totality. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent >>>>>>>>>> elements that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the >>>>>>>>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components >>>>>>>>>> in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on >>>>>>> another, >>>>>>>>>> which >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this >>>>>>> relationship. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective >>>>>>>>>> responses >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a >>>>>>>>> rule >>>>>>>>>>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, >>>>>>>>>> it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The >>>>>>>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to >>>>>>>>>> do?" The >>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to >>>>>>>>>> accomplish. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we >>>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in >>>>>>> Chicago, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to >>>>>>> be >>>>>>>>>> late >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and >>>>>>>>>> will miss >>>>>>>>>>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're >>>>>>>>>> talking >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle >>>>>>>>> aged >>>>>>>>>>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a >>>>>>> machine, >>>>>>>>>> but >>>>>>>>>>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who >>>>>>> would >>>>>>>>>> then >>>>>>>>>>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were >>>>>>>>>> often >>>>>>>>>>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. >>>>>>>>>> Also, a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was >>>>>>>>> happening >>>>>>>>>>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out >>>>>>>>>> buying >>>>>>>>>>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not >>>>>>>>> easy. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to >>>>>>> accomplish, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate >>>>>>>>>> members of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to >>>>>>>>>> something >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in >>>>>>> society >>>>>>>>>> so >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an >>>>>>> extended >>>>>>>>>>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you >>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> whole >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy >>>>>>>>>> says, a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually >>>>>>>>>> speak to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about >>>>>>>>>> activity >>>>>>>>>>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in >>>>>>>>>> conflict >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in >>>>>>>>>> mind? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the >>>>>>>>> class, >>>>>>>>>> or >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most >>>>>>>>>> interesting >>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of >>>>>>>>>> children) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not >>>>>>>>>> identical. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> supervise >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> them on >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. >>>>>>>>>> They >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of >>>>>>>>> division >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> labor. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When >>>>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> decided to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT >>>>>>>>> context >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mainly >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt >>>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> " unit >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> St?? ????a??, 12 ??t?????? 2014, ? ???st?? Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ???a?e: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it >>>>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> one of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this >>>>>>>>>> concept >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new >>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> me, was >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression, I'd >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it >>>>>>>>> referred >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> was a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT >>>>>>>>>> methodology >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> whilst >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me >>>>>>>>>> know. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a >>>>>>> template, >>>>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> new >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>>>>> So for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their >>>>>>>>> research, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> often >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> supervisor. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to >>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> point in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the >>>>>>>>>> data >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> they now >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles. But, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in >>>>>>>>>> posts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't >>>>>>> follow >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am >>>>>>>>>> usually >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> just >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because >>>>>>> I'm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> interested >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> how they >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are >>>>>>>>>> people >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of >>>>>>>>> analysis >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> being used? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> interested to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might >>>>>>>>> be >>>>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> basic as >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in >>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> much more >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of >>>>>>>>> analysis. >>>>>>>>>> In >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike's >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> action is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here >>>>>>>>>> before, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a >>>>>>>>>> picture of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> much >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> School of Education >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Greece >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> *Patrick Jaki* >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >>>>>>>>> ________________________________ >>>>>>>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >>>>>>>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely >>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >>>>>>>>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >>>>>>>>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on >>>>>>> it. >>>>>>>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >>>>>>>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >>>>>>>>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University >>>>>>> accepts >>>>>>>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan >>>>>>> emails >>>>>>>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept >>>>>>> responsibility >>>>>>>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >>>>>>>>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless >>>>>>> accompanied >>>>>>>>> by an official order form. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> *Robyn Babaeff* >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> *Robyn Babaeff* >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> > > > From a.g.jornet@iped.uio.no Mon Oct 13 12:25:55 2014 From: a.g.jornet@iped.uio.no (Alfredo Gil Jornet) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 19:25:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> , , <7595A167-FAC9-4D7D-A78E-D3A637B0F883@uniandes.edu.co> <1F27D40F-7D96-4C8A-AF78-1FB6D9F164AB@manchester.ac.uk>, <78d08ffe83b940b3a1e3772fee046168@mail-ex02.exprod.uio.no>, Message-ID: <31c7a08dc16d4a88ace8b7240d66cbfd@mail-ex02.exprod.uio.no> Martin, thanks, I agree. Vygotsky is very clear in the quote that you provide, and in the rest of the text, I believe. Yet, I still think that Dewey's explicit articulation of the specific use of the term *situation*, which is consistent with the way Vygotsky uses it, is not just redundant here but helps to clarify how a word (*situation*) that can be loosely used in everyday talk may have a quite determinate sense when we talk about the problem of the environment; and be of help when two people disagree on whether we can talk of "the same" environment or not. Alfredo ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer Sent: 13 October 2014 20:47 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? Hi Alfredo, I don't really see a dilemma... and I think LSV is pretty clear: "How can one explain why exactly the same environmental conditions exert three different types of influence on these three different children? It can be explained because each of the children has a different attitude to the situation. Or, as we might put it, each of the children experienced the situation in a different way. .... So it appears that, depending on the fact that the same situation had been experienced by the three children in three different ways, the influence which this situation exerted on their development also turns out to be different." Martin On Oct 13, 2014, at 1:19 PM, Alfredo Gil Jornet wrote: > Julian, Martin, > > Perhaps a way out of the dilemma of whether we should be talking about the same mother/environment or about different mothers/environments is provided by Dewey's notion of *situation*, which always implies both organism and environment. We can then talk of different situations, yet the same environment. > > Alfredo > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer > Sent: 13 October 2014 19:59 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? > > Julian, > > I would prefer to say that they all have the same mother, but they relate to her and interact with her in specific ways, depending largely on their stage of development. She presumably relates to each of them somewhat differently, but undoubtedly each of them witnesses how she treats the others. > > So I'm saying that the environment is the same - they all live in a house with a drunken mother - but the ways they live in that environment, and the ways they make sense of it, differ. > > Martin > > On Oct 13, 2014, at 12:45 PM, Julian Williams wrote: > >> Martin >> >> Ok we are on the same page, if you agree the environment may not be the same for the three children... It is not just that they are developmentally at a different stage, but "mother" is actually a different environment for each of them. >> >> Julian >> >> Sent from my iPad >> >> On 13 Oct 2014, at 17:54, "Martin John Packer" wrote: >> >>> Hi Julian, >>> >>> I've been trying to suggest that the dialectic is in the child's relationship to the environment. Or, as you say, as an aspect of child-in-the-environment (with-others). Generally I try to avoid dualistic terminology such as 'in the child' versus 'in the world' or 'subjective' versus 'objective' - I think I'm following LSV's lead here, though certainly he uses the term "internal" a lot. >>> >>> Generally in children's development the environment does indeed change as they grow - parents make new arrangements for them. But in the case study that LSV describes, we have three children of different ages all dealing at the same time with the same adult. In this sense the environment is fixed, in this particular case. >>> >>> And surely you're right to suggest that the children are contributing to the environment in which they live. One can only imagine how a drunken mother responds to her youngest son wetting the bed, for example. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 11:14 AM, Julian Williams wrote: >>> >>>> Dear Martin, and all >>>> >>>> I dont see the dialectic as 'internal' to the child, but as the child-in-the-environment. But I think maybe there is a problem with the current drift in the discussion. >>>> >>>> The problem I see arising now is that we are beginning to take the environment here as something fixed or taken for granted, with the difference in the three Perezhivanie being totally about the subjects/childs different stages of development. I'm not sure this does justice to the dialectic Vygotsky had in mind (though I see it might appear so in the text). I think one has to consider the objective fact of the environment as something from which different strands may be apprehended, or if you like, or from which certain aspects can be 'refracted'. >>>> >>>> At the cost of perhaps causing confusion, I wonder if the notion of Zone of Proximal Development can help here for those who use this idea ... A particular social plane (environment, classroom interaction etc) can offer a ZPD for some but be entirely useless to others, because of their different stages of development, yes, yes. But also, different learners at different stages can help create their own ZPDs within the same social space and even plane, (drawing from the same social interactions in different ways). So they may shape the very environment which provides for their own ZPD and hence development. I think this is a more adequate way to think of the dialectic, so the subject is not seen as passive in their own development. >>>> >>>> Julian >>>> >>>> (Maybe this passivity is what Mike had in mind when he expressed reservations about Vygotsky's use of the 'final ideal form' , eg of arithmetic, have I remembered this right? Anyway I DO have reservations about that notion in Vygotsky's chapter but maybe that's another story for later.) >>>> >>>> >>>> On 13 Oct 2014, at 14:53, "Martin John Packer" wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Robyn, >>>>> >>>>> I think it's important to recognize that the oldest child's understanding of the need to take care of his mother and siblings is not a drive or an impulse, it is, LSV tells us, a "duty" that follows from adopting a specific "role" in the family. Understanding the situation in terms of roles and duties is certainly socially mediated - after all, roles and duties are social, or societal, matters (ontological and deontological respectively, if we want to get technical). The oldest child - presumably attending school - is able to understand that he lives in a world of social institutions, one of which is his family. >>>>> >>>>> In this chapter LSV does not explore or explain how each kind of perezhivanie transforms into the next, but in his lectures on child development you can find a more detailed account. But here, in what is effectively a cross-sectional comparison of children at different ages (albeit only one at each age), he certainly means to suggest that earlier forms provide the basis for later forms. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:45 AM, Robyn Babaeff wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Much appreciated Martin - this is feeling more visual, and now I am >>>>>> wondering is it possible to interpret that the older child's emotive >>>>>> drive/action of care for his mother and younger sibling in its moment is >>>>>> also connected a socially mediated aspect of cognition from somewhere/time >>>>>> in his earlier years of perezhivanie for the 'how to' in his choosing/drive >>>>>> for duty of care? >>>>>> >>>>>> On 13 October 2014 23:21, Martin John Packer >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>>>>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >>>>>>> connection? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their mother's >>>>>>> drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the dynamic >>>>>>> development of perezhivanie. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from emotion, >>>>>>> in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and interpreting the >>>>>>> circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, the child >>>>>>> is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction is one of >>>>>>> extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates involuntarily and >>>>>>> stammers. He loses control of his own body. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the horror of >>>>>>> what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of terror, >>>>>>> enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to speak at all >>>>>>> as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction amounts to a >>>>>>> state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of this >>>>>>> situation." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. The >>>>>>> contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an alternation >>>>>>> between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion towards the >>>>>>> mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the breakdown seen >>>>>>> in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily emotional, but it >>>>>>> is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The child's >>>>>>> love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, directed >>>>>>> towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as bad. It is, >>>>>>> however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions that is so >>>>>>> difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of approach-avoidance. >>>>>>> The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the mother; her >>>>>>> failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal conflict for the >>>>>>> child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates between two >>>>>>> different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she is a >>>>>>> mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than that of his >>>>>>> younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely agonizing >>>>>>> condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a condition >>>>>>> frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional attitudes >>>>>>> towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we have >>>>>>> previously been able to observe among one of our children and which, you >>>>>>> may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, from >>>>>>> the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful attachment, >>>>>>> and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of terrors and >>>>>>> terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The German >>>>>>> authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is experiencing >>>>>>> a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for the mother >>>>>>> and terror of the witch coexist. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply pronounced >>>>>>> conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction expressed in a >>>>>>> simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the mother, a >>>>>>> terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, combined >>>>>>> with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home >>>>>>> immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going home was >>>>>>> brought up." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with more >>>>>>> detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of pity: of >>>>>>> sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion can >>>>>>> coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother not as a >>>>>>> bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, or weak. She >>>>>>> acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. This, then, >>>>>>> means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a "duty" to >>>>>>> take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest child has a >>>>>>> single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. His emotions >>>>>>> follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was ill and >>>>>>> he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his mother down, >>>>>>> make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones and comfort >>>>>>> them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the family, the only >>>>>>> one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and cognition in >>>>>>> each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship changes >>>>>>> with age. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a preschooler, and >>>>>>> the oldest a school-aged child. >>>>>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>>>>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >>>>>>> connection? >>>>>>>> As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a >>>>>>> different >>>>>>>> realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective position of >>>>>>>> the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where there is >>>>>>>> emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then as the >>>>>>>> cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs from the >>>>>>>> internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the >>>>>>> connectedness >>>>>>>> takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn >>>>>>>> motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every word, >>>>>>>>> but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating with the >>>>>>>>> same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like this >>>>>>>>> discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it because we >>>>>>> each >>>>>>>>> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our >>>>>>>>> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be expected >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some people, >>>>>>>>> etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an >>>>>>>>> approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be negotiated in >>>>>>>>> discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer to >>>>>>>>> understanding how a particular person uses particular words when we get >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> know that person as a person and that involves much more than just >>>>>>> batting >>>>>>>>> words to and fro! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Rod >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>>>>>> on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] >>>>>>>>> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is >>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this >>>>>>> case >>>>>>>>> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds >>>>>>>>> onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture >>>>>>>>>> everything. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college >>>>>>>>>> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is >>>>>>> strongly >>>>>>>>>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, >>>>>>>>>> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the >>>>>>>>>> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen >>>>>>>>>> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a >>>>>>>>>> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of >>>>>>>>>> water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions >>>>>>> driving >>>>>>>>>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially >>>>>>>>>> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is >>>>>>>>> actually >>>>>>>>>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and >>>>>>>>> dissociating >>>>>>>>>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't >>>>>>> develop >>>>>>>>>> further. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor >>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is >>>>>>>>> simply >>>>>>>>>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and >>>>>>>>>> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of >>>>>>>>>> water. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and >>>>>>>>> OH >>>>>>>>>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative >>>>>>>>>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals >>>>>>>>>> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and >>>>>>> therefore >>>>>>>>>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of >>>>>>>>>> life. :) >>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own >>>>>>>>>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not >>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: >>>>>>> water >>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an >>>>>>> internal >>>>>>>>>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is >>>>>>>>>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such >>>>>>>>>> that two >>>>>>>>>>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to >>>>>>> water >>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> concrete for their own cases. >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic >>>>>>>>> system >>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, >>>>>>>>>> and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before >>>>>>>>>> posting. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On the contrary. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about >>>>>>>>> activity >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple >>>>>>>>>> example >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history >>>>>>>>>> corner of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger >>>>>>>>> footing >>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing >>>>>>>>> new >>>>>>>>>>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which >>>>>>>>>> division >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a >>>>>>>>> leadership >>>>>>>>>> team >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which >>>>>>>>>> in turn >>>>>>>>>>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> quick, change your history. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies >>>>>>>>> that, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one >>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>> bring >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on >>>>>>>>> *another* >>>>>>>>>>>>>> component of the totality. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent >>>>>>>>>> elements that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the >>>>>>>>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components >>>>>>>>>> in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on >>>>>>> another, >>>>>>>>>> which >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this >>>>>>> relationship. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective >>>>>>>>>> responses >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a >>>>>>>>> rule >>>>>>>>>>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, >>>>>>>>>> it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The >>>>>>>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to >>>>>>>>>> do?" The >>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to >>>>>>>>>> accomplish. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we >>>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in >>>>>>> Chicago, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to >>>>>>> be >>>>>>>>>> late >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and >>>>>>>>>> will miss >>>>>>>>>>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're >>>>>>>>>> talking >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle >>>>>>>>> aged >>>>>>>>>>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a >>>>>>> machine, >>>>>>>>>> but >>>>>>>>>>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who >>>>>>> would >>>>>>>>>> then >>>>>>>>>>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were >>>>>>>>>> often >>>>>>>>>>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. >>>>>>>>>> Also, a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was >>>>>>>>> happening >>>>>>>>>>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out >>>>>>>>>> buying >>>>>>>>>>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not >>>>>>>>> easy. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to >>>>>>> accomplish, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate >>>>>>>>>> members of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to >>>>>>>>>> something >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in >>>>>>> society >>>>>>>>>> so >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an >>>>>>> extended >>>>>>>>>>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you >>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> whole >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy >>>>>>>>>> says, a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually >>>>>>>>>> speak to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about >>>>>>>>>> activity >>>>>>>>>>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in >>>>>>>>>> conflict >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in >>>>>>>>>> mind? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the >>>>>>>>> class, >>>>>>>>>> or >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most >>>>>>>>>> interesting >>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of >>>>>>>>>> children) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not >>>>>>>>>> identical. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> supervise >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> them on >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. >>>>>>>>>> They >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of >>>>>>>>> division >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> labor. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When >>>>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> decided to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT >>>>>>>>> context >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mainly >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt >>>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> " unit >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> St?? ????a??, 12 ??t?????? 2014, ? ???st?? Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ???a?e: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it >>>>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> one of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this >>>>>>>>>> concept >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new >>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> me, was >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression, I'd >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it >>>>>>>>> referred >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> was a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT >>>>>>>>>> methodology >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> whilst >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me >>>>>>>>>> know. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a >>>>>>> template, >>>>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> new >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>>>>> So for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their >>>>>>>>> research, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> often >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> supervisor. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to >>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> point in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the >>>>>>>>>> data >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> they now >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles. But, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in >>>>>>>>>> posts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't >>>>>>> follow >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am >>>>>>>>>> usually >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> just >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because >>>>>>> I'm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> interested >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> how they >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are >>>>>>>>>> people >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of >>>>>>>>> analysis >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> being used? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> interested to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might >>>>>>>>> be >>>>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> basic as >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in >>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> much more >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of >>>>>>>>> analysis. >>>>>>>>>> In >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike's >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> action is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here >>>>>>>>>> before, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a >>>>>>>>>> picture of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> much >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> School of Education >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Greece >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> *Patrick Jaki* >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >>>>>>>>> ________________________________ >>>>>>>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >>>>>>>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely >>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >>>>>>>>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >>>>>>>>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on >>>>>>> it. >>>>>>>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >>>>>>>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >>>>>>>>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University >>>>>>> accepts >>>>>>>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan >>>>>>> emails >>>>>>>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept >>>>>>> responsibility >>>>>>>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >>>>>>>>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless >>>>>>> accompanied >>>>>>>>> by an official order form. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> *Robyn Babaeff* >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> *Robyn Babaeff* >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Oct 13 12:53:58 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 12:53:58 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <7595A167-FAC9-4D7D-A78E-D3A637B0F883@uniandes.edu.co> <1F27D40F-7D96-4C8A-AF78-1FB6D9F164AB@manchester.ac.uk> <78d08ffe83b940b3a1e3772fee046168@mail-ex02.exprod.uio.no> Message-ID: To return to Leontiev's article on the environment. On page 19 Leontiev says Vygotsky uses the word *communication* with the narrow meaning of *spiritual sense* or *spiritual relationships* to signify the way we use words and language. Leontiev suggests this is a limited meaning of communication which excludes a BROADER meaning [BEYOND LANGUAGE USE] to *signify* the GENERAL FACT of people's relationships which ENCOMPASS their material dealings. Is this way of presenting the difference in *communication* the SAME [equal] difference that *divides* materialism and idealism? Leontiev goes on to say: When Vygotsky views the person AS *the subject of communication* the child INEVITABLY IS transformed through THIS SIGNIFICATION of *communication* into an IDEAL PSYCHOLOGICAL subject AND the environment is transformed into an IDEAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT. Leontiev then goes on to say that Vygotsky's thinking IS moving along THESE *ideal* lines of development and it is THIS conceptual starting point which is transforming Vygotsky's theory into a *spiritual* theory. For Vygotsky, *discovering* the ROLE of *communication* [contact with people] AS A DRIVING FORCE of development Vygotsky INTRODUCES *the* understanding [in Peirce's term an *interpretant*] of a *FINAL IDEAL FORM* This ideal form IS an existing phenomena [form] in the environment from the beginning when the new born infant is thrown into THIS world. In the process of development the child acquires THIS *ideal form* [which already exists in the environment in IDEAL form] BE-comes the *model* that results at the end of development. IDEAL in *this* sense IS A MODEL of what results at the end of development. The beginning form EXISTS in relation [in unity??] with the *ideal form* [with the model] which pre-exists the beginning form of the infant AND TRULY INTERACTS WITH the infant's development. Leontiev goes on to claim that this specific example is characteristic, for Vygotsky, of ALL OTHER MEANING development. MODELS *truly exist* in the world [which emerged historically in previous social historical situations] Leontiev then goes on to make a STRONG claim that these models actually *determine* and *direct* the infant's first steps. I wonder if a weaker claim that models *influence* the infants first step is what Vygotsky *meant* SO -the environment [and models] *appear* [or seem] TO BE the *vehicle* [carrier[ of development of THESE forms/models and these forms *determine* the development of shared *meaning* Now from this criticism of pre-existing *models* Leontiev claims Vygotsky IS LOCKED in a vicious circle. However, if *models* as various multiple [interpretants - Peirce] ACTUALLY EXIST THEN Vygotsky's theory is *true* in actual fact. This leads into the *loose* thread of the place of the *imaginal* in the *real* and I would point to Raymond William's book "Marxism and Literature" to explore the imaginal within Marxian *cultural theory*. Also on another thread a discussion of Umberto Eco's notion of *primary indexicality* prior to subjects and objects but that leads beyond the focus of Leontiev's revisioning Vygotsky Larry On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 11:47 AM, Martin John Packer < mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > Hi Alfredo, > > I don't really see a dilemma... and I think LSV is pretty clear: > > "How can one explain why exactly the same environmental conditions exert > three different types of influence on these three different children? It > can be explained because each of the children has a different attitude to > the situation. Or, as we might put it, each of the children experienced the > situation in a different way. .... So it appears that, depending on the > fact that the same situation had been experienced by the three children in > three different ways, the influence which this situation exerted on their > development also turns out to be different." > > Martin > > On Oct 13, 2014, at 1:19 PM, Alfredo Gil Jornet > wrote: > > > Julian, Martin, > > > > Perhaps a way out of the dilemma of whether we should be talking about > the same mother/environment or about different mothers/environments is > provided by Dewey's notion of *situation*, which always implies both > organism and environment. We can then talk of different situations, yet the > same environment. > > > > Alfredo > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John Packer > > Sent: 13 October 2014 19:59 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? > > > > Julian, > > > > I would prefer to say that they all have the same mother, but they > relate to her and interact with her in specific ways, depending largely on > their stage of development. She presumably relates to each of them > somewhat differently, but undoubtedly each of them witnesses how she treats > the others. > > > > So I'm saying that the environment is the same - they all live in a > house with a drunken mother - but the ways they live in that environment, > and the ways they make sense of it, differ. > > > > Martin > > > > On Oct 13, 2014, at 12:45 PM, Julian Williams < > julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote: > > > >> Martin > >> > >> Ok we are on the same page, if you agree the environment may not be the > same for the three children... It is not just that they are developmentally > at a different stage, but "mother" is actually a different environment for > each of them. > >> > >> Julian > >> > >> Sent from my iPad > >> > >> On 13 Oct 2014, at 17:54, "Martin John Packer" > wrote: > >> > >>> Hi Julian, > >>> > >>> I've been trying to suggest that the dialectic is in the child's > relationship to the environment. Or, as you say, as an aspect of > child-in-the-environment (with-others). Generally I try to avoid dualistic > terminology such as 'in the child' versus 'in the world' or 'subjective' > versus 'objective' - I think I'm following LSV's lead here, though > certainly he uses the term "internal" a lot. > >>> > >>> Generally in children's development the environment does indeed change > as they grow - parents make new arrangements for them. But in the case > study that LSV describes, we have three children of different ages all > dealing at the same time with the same adult. In this sense the environment > is fixed, in this particular case. > >>> > >>> And surely you're right to suggest that the children are contributing > to the environment in which they live. One can only imagine how a drunken > mother responds to her youngest son wetting the bed, for example. > >>> > >>> Martin > >>> > >>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 11:14 AM, Julian Williams < > julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Dear Martin, and all > >>>> > >>>> I dont see the dialectic as 'internal' to the child, but as the > child-in-the-environment. But I think maybe there is a problem with the > current drift in the discussion. > >>>> > >>>> The problem I see arising now is that we are beginning to take the > environment here as something fixed or taken for granted, with the > difference in the three Perezhivanie being totally about the > subjects/childs different stages of development. I'm not sure this does > justice to the dialectic Vygotsky had in mind (though I see it might appear > so in the text). I think one has to consider the objective fact of the > environment as something from which different strands may be apprehended, > or if you like, or from which certain aspects can be 'refracted'. > >>>> > >>>> At the cost of perhaps causing confusion, I wonder if the notion of > Zone of Proximal Development can help here for those who use this idea ... > A particular social plane (environment, classroom interaction etc) can > offer a ZPD for some but be entirely useless to others, because of their > different stages of development, yes, yes. But also, different learners at > different stages can help create their own ZPDs within the same social > space and even plane, (drawing from the same social interactions in > different ways). So they may shape the very environment which provides for > their own ZPD and hence development. I think this is a more adequate way to > think of the dialectic, so the subject is not seen as passive in their own > development. > >>>> > >>>> Julian > >>>> > >>>> (Maybe this passivity is what Mike had in mind when he expressed > reservations about Vygotsky's use of the 'final ideal form' , eg of > arithmetic, have I remembered this right? Anyway I DO have reservations > about that notion in Vygotsky's chapter but maybe that's another story for > later.) > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On 13 Oct 2014, at 14:53, "Martin John Packer" < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi Robyn, > >>>>> > >>>>> I think it's important to recognize that the oldest child's > understanding of the need to take care of his mother and siblings is not a > drive or an impulse, it is, LSV tells us, a "duty" that follows from > adopting a specific "role" in the family. Understanding the situation in > terms of roles and duties is certainly socially mediated - after all, roles > and duties are social, or societal, matters (ontological and deontological > respectively, if we want to get technical). The oldest child - presumably > attending school - is able to understand that he lives in a world of social > institutions, one of which is his family. > >>>>> > >>>>> In this chapter LSV does not explore or explain how each kind of > perezhivanie transforms into the next, but in his lectures on child > development you can find a more detailed account. But here, in what is > effectively a cross-sectional comparison of children at different ages > (albeit only one at each age), he certainly means to suggest that earlier > forms provide the basis for later forms. > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin > >>>>> > >>>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:45 AM, Robyn Babaeff > wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Much appreciated Martin - this is feeling more visual, and now I am > >>>>>> wondering is it possible to interpret that the older child's emotive > >>>>>> drive/action of care for his mother and younger sibling in its > moment is > >>>>>> also connected a socially mediated aspect of cognition from > somewhere/time > >>>>>> in his earlier years of perezhivanie for the 'how to' in his > choosing/drive > >>>>>> for duty of care? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 13 October 2014 23:21, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving > >>>>>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive > >>>>>>> connection? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their > mother's > >>>>>>> drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the > dynamic > >>>>>>> development of perezhivanie. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from > emotion, > >>>>>>> in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and > interpreting the > >>>>>>> circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, > the child > >>>>>>> is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction is > one of > >>>>>>> extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates > involuntarily and > >>>>>>> stammers. He loses control of his own body. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the > horror of > >>>>>>> what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of > terror, > >>>>>>> enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to > speak at all > >>>>>>> as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction > amounts to a > >>>>>>> state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of this > >>>>>>> situation." > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. > The > >>>>>>> contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an > alternation > >>>>>>> between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion > towards the > >>>>>>> mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the > breakdown seen > >>>>>>> in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily emotional, > but it > >>>>>>> is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The > child's > >>>>>>> love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, > directed > >>>>>>> towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as > bad. It is, > >>>>>>> however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions > that is so > >>>>>>> difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of > approach-avoidance. > >>>>>>> The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the > mother; her > >>>>>>> failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal conflict > for the > >>>>>>> child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates > between two > >>>>>>> different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she > is a > >>>>>>> mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than > that of his > >>>>>>> younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely > agonizing > >>>>>>> condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a > condition > >>>>>>> frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional > attitudes > >>>>>>> towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we have > >>>>>>> previously been able to observe among one of our children and > which, you > >>>>>>> may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one > hand, from > >>>>>>> the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful > attachment, > >>>>>>> and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of terrors > and > >>>>>>> terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The > German > >>>>>>> authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is > experiencing > >>>>>>> a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for > the mother > >>>>>>> and terror of the witch coexist. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply > pronounced > >>>>>>> conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction expressed > in a > >>>>>>> simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the mother, a > >>>>>>> terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, > combined > >>>>>>> with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home > >>>>>>> immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going > home was > >>>>>>> brought up." > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with > more > >>>>>>> detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of > pity: of > >>>>>>> sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion > can > >>>>>>> coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother > not as a > >>>>>>> bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, or > weak. She > >>>>>>> acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. This, > then, > >>>>>>> means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a > "duty" to > >>>>>>> take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest > child has a > >>>>>>> single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. His > emotions > >>>>>>> follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was > ill and > >>>>>>> he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his > mother down, > >>>>>>> make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones > and comfort > >>>>>>> them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the family, > the only > >>>>>>> one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and > cognition in > >>>>>>> each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship > changes > >>>>>>> with age. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a > preschooler, and > >>>>>>> the oldest a school-aged child. > >>>>>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff < > robyn.babaeff@monash.edu> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving > >>>>>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive > >>>>>>> connection? > >>>>>>>> As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a > >>>>>>> different > >>>>>>>> realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective > position of > >>>>>>>> the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where there > is > >>>>>>>> emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then > as the > >>>>>>>> cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs from > the > >>>>>>>> internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the > >>>>>>> connectedness > >>>>>>>> takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn > >>>>>>>> motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees < > R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> > >>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and > every word, > >>>>>>>>> but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating > with the > >>>>>>>>> same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like > this > >>>>>>>>> discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it > because we > >>>>>>> each > >>>>>>>>> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes > our > >>>>>>>>> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be > expected > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some > people, > >>>>>>>>> etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an > >>>>>>>>> approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be > negotiated in > >>>>>>>>> discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer > to > >>>>>>>>> understanding how a particular person uses particular words when > we get > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>> know that person as a person and that involves much more than > just > >>>>>>> batting > >>>>>>>>> words to and fro! > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Rod > >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >>>>>>>>> on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] > >>>>>>>>> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 > >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in > English? Is > >>>>>>> this > >>>>>>>>> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in > this > >>>>>>> case > >>>>>>>>> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, > which adds > >>>>>>>>> onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Andy, > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot > capture > >>>>>>>>>> everything. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my > college > >>>>>>>>>> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, > because > >>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is > >>>>>>> strongly > >>>>>>>>>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen > atoms, > >>>>>>>>>> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has > the > >>>>>>>>>> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to > hydrogen > >>>>>>>>>> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that > water is a > >>>>>>>>>> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from > elements > >>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the > *formation* of > >>>>>>>>>> water. My point was that once formed, there are no > contradictions > >>>>>>> driving > >>>>>>>>>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does > partially > >>>>>>>>>> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water > is > >>>>>>>>> actually > >>>>>>>>>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and > >>>>>>>>> dissociating > >>>>>>>>>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't > >>>>>>> develop > >>>>>>>>>> further. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a > metaphor > >>>>>>> - > >>>>>>>>>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case > it is > >>>>>>>>> simply > >>>>>>>>>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O > molecules, and > >>>>>>>>>> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the > properties of > >>>>>>>>>> water. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind > the H and > >>>>>>>>> OH > >>>>>>>>>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive > charge > >>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative > >>>>>>>>>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all > chemicals > >>>>>>>>>> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and > >>>>>>> therefore > >>>>>>>>>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of > contradictions > >>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the > chemistry of > >>>>>>>>>> life. :) > >>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's > own > >>>>>>>>>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water > is not > >>>>>>> a > >>>>>>>>>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process > stops: > >>>>>>> water > >>>>>>>>> is > >>>>>>>>>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an > >>>>>>> internal > >>>>>>>>>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for > change. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a > triangle is > >>>>>>>>>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and > oxygen such > >>>>>>>>>> that two > >>>>>>>>>>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise > to > >>>>>>> water > >>>>>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>>>>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people > to rise > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> concrete for their own cases. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > >>>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a > dynamic > >>>>>>>>> system > >>>>>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike > linked to, > >>>>>>>>>> and I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all > before > >>>>>>>>>> posting. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < > >>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On the contrary. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things > about > >>>>>>>>> activity > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A > very simple > >>>>>>>>>> example > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is that if you change something in the > norms/customs/laws/history > >>>>>>>>>> corner of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a > stronger > >>>>>>>>> footing > >>>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by > bringing > >>>>>>>>> new > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out > of which > >>>>>>>>>> division > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a > >>>>>>>>> leadership > >>>>>>>>>> team > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily > English-speaking, which > >>>>>>>>>> in turn > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if > you're lucky > >>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> quick, change your history. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it > implies > >>>>>>>>> that, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the > components, one > >>>>>>> can > >>>>>>>>>> bring > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on > >>>>>>>>> *another* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> component of the totality. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this > type of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to > represent > >>>>>>>>>> elements that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is > that the > >>>>>>>>>> question > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring > a method > >>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among > components > >>>>>>>>>> in a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on > >>>>>>> another, > >>>>>>>>>> which > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And > this means > >>>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this > >>>>>>> relationship. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < > >>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" > in a very > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape > collective > >>>>>>>>>> responses > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, > when a > >>>>>>>>> rule > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree > with Andy: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis > is an > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a > template, > >>>>>>>>>> it is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the > leap. It > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually comes > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your > research using > >>>>>>>>>> some > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> other > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The > >>>>>>>>> question > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we > going to > >>>>>>>>>> do?" The > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying > to > >>>>>>>>>> accomplish. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? > Are we > >>>>>>>>>> trying > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in > >>>>>>> Chicago, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm > going to > >>>>>>> be > >>>>>>>>>> late > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid > today and > >>>>>>>>>> will miss > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their > supervisors. We're > >>>>>>>>>> talking > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them > middle > >>>>>>>>> aged > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families > to be > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a > >>>>>>> machine, > >>>>>>>>>> but > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person > who > >>>>>>> would > >>>>>>>>>> then > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because > supervisors were > >>>>>>>>>> often > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was > unreliable. > >>>>>>>>>> Also, a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was > >>>>>>>>> happening > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if > someone it out > >>>>>>>>>> buying > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is > not > >>>>>>>>> easy. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to > >>>>>>> accomplish, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To > educate > >>>>>>>>>> members of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond > collectively to > >>>>>>>>>> something > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in > >>>>>>> society > >>>>>>>>>> so > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an > >>>>>>> extended > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one > that you > >>>>>>>>> can > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then > reviewing > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> whole > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as > Andy > >>>>>>>>>> says, a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to > actually > >>>>>>>>>> speak to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk > about > >>>>>>>>>> activity > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often > in > >>>>>>>>>> conflict > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some > purpose in > >>>>>>>>>> mind? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of > the > >>>>>>>>> class, > >>>>>>>>>> or > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most > >>>>>>>>>> interesting > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis > (purposes of > >>>>>>>>>> children) > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet > they're not > >>>>>>>>>> identical. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern > too. I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> supervise > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT > context. Two > >>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> them on > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary > science. > >>>>>>>>>> They > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> have > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of > >>>>>>>>> division > >>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> labor. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. > When > >>>>>>>>> they > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> decided to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into > CHAT > >>>>>>>>> context > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mainly > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still > doubt > >>>>>>>>> about > >>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> " unit > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> St?? ????a??, 12 ??t?????? 2014, ? ???st?? Andy > Blunden < > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ???a?e: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of > analysis, it > >>>>>>>>>> was > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> one of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, > that this > >>>>>>>>>> concept > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> was > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which > was new > >>>>>>>>> for > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> me, was > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of > this > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression, I'd > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it > >>>>>>>>> referred > >>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> was a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT > >>>>>>>>>> methodology > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> whilst > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please > let me > >>>>>>>>>> know. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of > analysis is an > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a > >>>>>>> template, > >>>>>>>>>> it > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the > leap. It > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually comes > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your > research using > >>>>>>>>>> some > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> other > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the > unit is > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> new > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving > puzzles. > >>>>>>>>>> So for > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their > >>>>>>>>> research, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> often > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from > their > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> supervisor. I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have > got to > >>>>>>> this > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> point in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is > not the > >>>>>>>>>> data > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> they now > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading > the two > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles. But, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to > contribute in > >>>>>>>>>> posts. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and > don't > >>>>>>> follow > >>>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> through > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and > I am > >>>>>>>>>> usually > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> just > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably > because > >>>>>>> I'm > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> interested > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be > used for, > >>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> how they > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. > What are > >>>>>>>>>> people > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units > of > >>>>>>>>> analysis > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> being used? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd > be very > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> interested to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the > questions might > >>>>>>>>> be > >>>>>>>>>> as > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> basic as > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my > thoughts (in > >>>>>>>>> a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> much more > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of > >>>>>>>>> analysis. > >>>>>>>>>> In > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike's > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd > add that > >>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> action is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical > factors > >>>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been > said here > >>>>>>>>>> before, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions > create a > >>>>>>>>>> picture of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> much > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > ............................................................ > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> School of Education > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ioannina > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Greece > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > science with > >>>>>>>>> an > >>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>> *Patrick Jaki* > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* > >>>>>>>>> ________________________________ > >>>>>>>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > >>>>>>>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended > solely > >>>>>>> for > >>>>>>>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not > the > >>>>>>>>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > >>>>>>>>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not > rely on > >>>>>>> it. > >>>>>>>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender > know > >>>>>>>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails > are not > >>>>>>>>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University > >>>>>>> accepts > >>>>>>>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to > scan > >>>>>>> emails > >>>>>>>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept > >>>>>>> responsibility > >>>>>>>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or > its > >>>>>>>>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless > >>>>>>> accompanied > >>>>>>>>> by an official order form. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> *Robyn Babaeff* > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> *Robyn Babaeff* > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > > > > > > > > > From Holli.Tonyan@csun.edu Mon Oct 13 13:38:10 2014 From: Holli.Tonyan@csun.edu (Tonyan, Holli A) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 20:38:10 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <984FAF8B-059E-4DA4-B4B8-324C4C26125B@csun.edu> Martin and others, What Martin wrote here reminds me of important work by Nim Tottenham (http://www.columbia.edu/cu/psychology/fac-bios/TottenhamN/faculty.html). Unfortunately, I saw a presentation and have not read her work so I cannot include a reference here. Nim has studied the development of the amygdala and it's role in processing early emotional experiences and trauma. Her work shows that anatomically, the amygdala of children who were exposed to trauma/deprivation very early in life is larger than other children who have not experienced trauma/deprivation. What I remember from the presentation was that the strength of the amygdala before the development of the prefrontal cortex with increasing capacity for the regulation of the amygdala meant that children had a very hard time learning to regulate the amygdala - it is as though they have to develop together or one overpowers the other. Here is a very physical representation of the connection between the emotion and the cognition. She referred to the amygdala not as the "threat detector" as is common, but as the "relevance detector" but in an emotional sense. Not exactly perezhevanie, but NOT cognitive or processed in the same way. What you called "detachment" could be increased capacity to "override" the amygdala's functioning with pre-frontal cortex capacity - a biological component of what LSV saw as higher mental functions, perhaps. OK - back to report preparation and writing for me... All these interesting posts are such seductive distraction... On Oct 13, 2014, at 5:21 AM, Martin John Packer > wrote: Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive connection? It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their mother's drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the dynamic development of perezhivanie. In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from emotion, in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and interpreting the circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, the child is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction is one of extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates involuntarily and stammers. He loses control of his own body. LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the horror of what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of terror, enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to speak at all as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction amounts to a state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of this situation." The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. The contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an alternation between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion towards the mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the breakdown seen in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily emotional, but it is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The child's love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, directed towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as bad. It is, however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions that is so difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of approach-avoidance. The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the mother; her failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal conflict for the child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates between two different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she is a mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than that of his younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely agonizing condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a condition frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional attitudes towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we have previously been able to observe among one of our children and which, you may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, from the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful attachment, and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of terrors and terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The German authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is experiencing a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for the mother and terror of the witch coexist. "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply pronounced conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction expressed in a simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the mother, a terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, combined with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going home was brought up." In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with more detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of pity: of sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion can coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother not as a bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, or weak. She acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. This, then, means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a "duty" to take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest child has a single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. His emotions follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was ill and he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his mother down, make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones and comfort them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the family, the only one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and cognition in each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship changes with age. Martin The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a preschooler, and the oldest a school-aged child. On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff > wrote: Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive connection? As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a different realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective position of the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where there is emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then as the cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs from the internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the connectedness takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees > wrote: Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every word, but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating with the same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like this discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it because we each have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be expected to use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some people, etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be negotiated in discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer to understanding how a particular person uses particular words when we get to know that person as a person and that involves much more than just batting words to and fro! Rod ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is this not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this case Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer > wrote: Andy, I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture everything. But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because that would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is strongly electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements that are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions driving further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is actually in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and dissociating and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't develop further. Martin On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor - it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is simply saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of water. You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and OH together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge and OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and therefore neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions and transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of life. :) Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=3rveoQhoPSPbCSnfZzk4AbReuqBPUZxNB40ISNTLCXw&e= Martin John Packer wrote: Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not a dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: water is a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an internal tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) Martin On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole > wrote: Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such that two atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to water with its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise to the concrete for their own cases. mike On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < mpacker@uniandes.edu.co wrote: Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic system with contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, and I already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before posting. Martin On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < helenaworthen@gmail.com> wrote: On the contrary. To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about activity theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple example is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history corner of the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger footing in bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing new members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which division of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a leadership team that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which in turn will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky and quick, change your history. Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies that, once one understands the relationships among the components, one can bring about changes in one component in the totality by acting on *another* component of the totality. The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent elements that are only accidentally brought together. Martin On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the question is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method of analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components in a complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, which is often how students frame their research interest. And this means that the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. Martin On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < helenaworthen@gmail.com> wrote: As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other unit of analysis. First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" The unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to accomplish. Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be late to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're talking about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were often away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out buying more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of the union and other others about how to respond collectively to something that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the whole Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, a matter of solving puzzles. From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about activity system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict with each other, which adds to the drama. Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of children) and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I supervise three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of them on early childhood science education and one on primary science. They have collected log files, children discourses consisted of scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of labor. They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they decided to analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context mainly modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the " unit of analysis". ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < ablunden@mira.net> ??????: Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was one of the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept was almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for me, was "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this expression, I'd be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to was a "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology whilst keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, often depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their supervisor. I don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this point in their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data they now know they need. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=3rveoQhoPSPbCSnfZzk4AbReuqBPUZxNB40ISNTLCXw&e= Katherine Wester Neal wrote: I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. But, as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that through to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just trying to keep up with reading! For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm interested in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how they fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people doing with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis being used? If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very interested to read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as basic as these. Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much more eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In Mike's example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the action is mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, are often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of much more than just Mike's behavior. Katie Katie Wester-Neal University of Georgia -- ............................................................ Katerina Plakitsi Associate Professor of Science Education School of Education University of Ioannina University Campus Dourouti 45110 Ioannina Greece tel. +302651005771 fax. +302651005842 mobile.phone +306972898463 https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__users.uoi.gr_kplakits&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=efoIjdDk3jJPjstsnAWWLdeIxhiX2xuo9tpkz5vPuVQ&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__erasmus-2Dip.uoi.gr_&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=EHxDmy94dcMDH7DjaNERyWA8najtdG0AixBFr6FWcVw&e= https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.lib.uoi.gr_serp&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=64STTL4tfW0mDzqSW2DtIY3RA4JTIvXOxP6shhGZojE&e= -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. 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Everyday routines: A window into the cultural organization of family child care. Journal of Early Childhood Research. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1476718X14523748 Tonyan, H. A., Nuttall, J. (2014). Connecting cultural models of home-based care and childminders? career paths: An Eco-cultural analysis. International Journal of Early Years Education, 22, 117-138, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09669760.2013.809654 Tonyan, H. A., Mamikonian, A., & Chien, D. (2013). Do they practice what they preach? An Ecocultural, multidimensional, group-based examination of the relationship between beliefs and behaviours among child care providers. Early Child Development and Care, 183:12, 1853-1877. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03004430.2012.759949 This message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged, confidential or exempt from disclosure under applicable federal or state law. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, please immediately notify the sender by telephone at (818)677-4970, and destroy all copies of this e-mail and all attachments. Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has. - Margaret Mead US anthropologist & popularizer of anthropology (1901 - 1978) From vygotsky@unm.edu Mon Oct 13 13:52:25 2014 From: vygotsky@unm.edu (Vera John-Steiner) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 14:52:25 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <000f01cfe727$9a81c390$cf854ab0$@edu> Martin, I think it is an excellent analysis of the development of perezhivanie. The oldest child's way of combining emotion and cognition reminds me of the playwright, Arthur Miller's term "felt knowledge." Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Monday, October 13, 2014 7:52 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? Hi Robyn, I think it's important to recognize that the oldest child's understanding of the need to take care of his mother and siblings is not a drive or an impulse, it is, LSV tells us, a "duty" that follows from adopting a specific "role" in the family. Understanding the situation in terms of roles and duties is certainly socially mediated - after all, roles and duties are social, or societal, matters (ontological and deontological respectively, if we want to get technical). The oldest child - presumably attending school - is able to understand that he lives in a world of social institutions, one of which is his family. In this chapter LSV does not explore or explain how each kind of perezhivanie transforms into the next, but in his lectures on child development you can find a more detailed account. But here, in what is effectively a cross-sectional comparison of children at different ages (albeit only one at each age), he certainly means to suggest that earlier forms provide the basis for later forms. Martin On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:45 AM, Robyn Babaeff wrote: > Much appreciated Martin - this is feeling more visual, and now I am > wondering is it possible to interpret that the older child's emotive > drive/action of care for his mother and younger sibling in its moment > is also connected a socially mediated aspect of cognition from > somewhere/time in his earlier years of perezhivanie for the 'how to' > in his choosing/drive for duty of care? > > On 13 October 2014 23:21, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >> connection? >> >> >> It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their >> mother's drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching >> the dynamic development of perezhivanie. >> >> In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from >> emotion, in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and >> interpreting the circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother >> for all needs, the child is overcome by the enormity of what is >> happening. His reaction is one of extreme emotion - terror - and >> somatization - he urinates involuntarily and stammers. He loses control of his own body. >> >> LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the >> horror of what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks >> of terror, enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable >> to speak at all as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s >> reaction amounts to a state of complete depression and helplessness >> in the face of this situation." >> >> The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. The >> contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an >> alternation between, and combination of, a positive and a negative >> emotion towards the mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized >> than the breakdown seen in the youngest child. Each attitude is still >> primarily emotional, but it is an organized and focused emotion, not >> a somatic collapse. The child's love and fear is each a coherent way >> of grasping the situation, directed towards the mother who is >> understood first as good, and then as bad. It is, however, the >> combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions that is so difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of approach-avoidance. >> The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the mother; >> her failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal >> conflict for the child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition >> alternates between two different and incompatible ways of >> interpreting his mother - she is a mother; no, she is a witch. His >> cognition is more capable than that of his younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. >> >> LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely >> agonizing condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which >> is a condition frequently found in certain cases when contrasting >> emotional attitudes towards the mother make their appearance, >> examples of which we have previously been able to observe among one >> of our children and which, you may remember, we have called an >> ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, from the child?s point of view, >> the mother is an object of painful attachment, and on the other, she >> represents a source of all kinds of terrors and terrible emotional >> experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The German authors call >> this kind of emotional complex which the child is experiencing a >> Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for the mother and terror of the witch coexist. >> >> "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply >> pronounced conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction >> expressed in a simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards >> the mother, a terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate >> for her, combined with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to >> be sent home immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of >> his going home was brought up." >> >> In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with more >> detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of pity: >> of sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion >> can coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother >> not as a bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is >> ill, or weak. She acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a >> bad person. This, then, means that he knows what to do: he has "a >> special role," with a "duty" to take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. >> >> Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest child >> has a single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. >> His emotions follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. >> >> LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was >> ill and he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his >> mother down, make certain that she is prevented from harming the >> little ones and comfort them. Quite simply, he has become the senior >> member of the family, the only one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". >> >> In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and >> cognition in each of these three children, and so shows how that >> relationship changes with age. >> >> Martin >> >> The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a preschooler, >> and the oldest a school-aged child. >> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff >> wrote: >> >>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >> connection? >>> As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a >> different >>> realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective >>> position of the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa >>> where there is emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the >>> feeling. Then as the cognitive-affective sync - the overall >>> transformation occurs from the internal crisis of disconnected >>> affective-cognitive. As the >> connectedness >>> takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn >>> motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. >>> >>> On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every >>>> word, but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all >>>> operating with the same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a >>>> context like this discussion but each of us 'means' something >>>> different by it because we >> each >>>> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our >>>> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be >>>> expected >> to >>>> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some >>>> people, etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be >>>> an approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be >>>> negotiated in discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we >>>> get closer to understanding how a particular person uses particular >>>> words when we get >> to >>>> know that person as a person and that involves much more than just >> batting >>>> words to and fro! >>>> >>>> Rod >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Patrick Jaki >>>> [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] >>>> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? >>>> >>>> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? >>>> Is >> this >>>> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in >>>> this >> case >>>> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which >>>> adds onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. >>>> >>>> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Andy, >>>>> >>>>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture >>>>> everything. >>>>> >>>>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my >>>>> college chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and >>>>> OH-, because >> that >>>>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is >> strongly >>>>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen >>>>> atoms, leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This >>>>> has the consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads >>>>> to hydrogen bonding between water molecules, the result of which >>>>> is that water is a liquid at room temperature while other hydrides >>>>> formed from elements >> that >>>>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. >>>>> >>>>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* >>>>> of water. My point was that once formed, there are no >>>>> contradictions >> driving >>>>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does >>>>> partially dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of >>>>> water is >>>> actually >>>>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and >>>> dissociating >>>>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't >> develop >>>>> further. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a >>>>>> metaphor >> - >>>>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it >>>>> is >>>> simply >>>>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, >>>>> and nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the >>>>> properties of water. >>>>>> >>>>>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H >>>>>> and >>>> OH >>>>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive >>>>> charge >>>> and >>>>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative >>>>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all >>>>> chemicals with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and >>>>> base and >> therefore >>>>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of >>>>> contradictions >>>> and >>>>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the >>>>> chemistry of life. :) >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> ----- >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own >>>>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is >>>>> not >> a >>>>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: >> water >>>> is >>>>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an >> internal >>>>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a >>>>>>> triangle is >>>>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen >>>>>>>> such >>>>> that two >>>>>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to >> water >>>>> with >>>>>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to >>>>>>>> rise >> to >>>>> the >>>>>>>> concrete for their own cases. >>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic >>>> system >>>>> with >>>>>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked >>>>>>>>> to, >>>>> and I >>>>>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all >>>>>>>>> before >>>>> posting. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On the contrary. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about >>>> activity >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very >>>>>>>>> simple >>>>> example >>>>>>>>> is that if you change something in the >>>>>>>>> norms/customs/laws/history >>>>> corner of >>>>>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger >>>> footing >>>>> in >>>>>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by >>>>>>>>> bringing >>>> new >>>>>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of >>>>>>>>> which >>>>> division >>>>>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a >>>> leadership >>>>> team >>>>>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, >>>>>>>>> which >>>>> in turn >>>>>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're >>>>>>>>> lucky >>>> and >>>>>>>>> quick, change your history. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it >>>>>>>>>>> implies >>>> that, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, >>>>>>>>> one >> can >>>>> bring >>>>>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on >>>> *another* >>>>>>>>> component of the totality. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this >>>>>>>>>>> type of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent >>>>> elements that >>>>>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a >>>>>>>>> method >>>> of >>>>>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among >>>>>>>>> components >>>>> in a >>>>>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on >> another, >>>>> which >>>>>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this >>>>>>>>> means >>>>> that >>>>>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this >> relationship. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a >>>>>>>>>>>>> very >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape >>>>>>>>> collective >>>>> responses >>>>>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, >>>>>>>>> when a >>>> rule >>>>>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> template, >>>>> it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research >>>>>>>>>>>>>> using >>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The >>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going >>>>>>>>> to >>>>> do?" The >>>>>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to >>>>> accomplish. >>>>>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are >>>>>>>>> we >>>>> trying >>>>>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in >> Chicago, >>>>>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going >>>>>>>>> to >> be >>>>> late >>>>>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today >>>>>>>>> and >>>>> will miss >>>>>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. >>>>>>>>> We're >>>>> talking >>>>>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them >>>>>>>>> middle >>>> aged >>>>>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to >>>>>>>>> be responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a >> machine, >>>>> but >>>>>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who >> would >>>>> then >>>>>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors >>>>>>>>> were >>>>> often >>>>>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. >>>>> Also, a >>>>>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was >>>> happening >>>>>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone >>>>>>>>> it out >>>>> buying >>>>>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is >>>>>>>>> not >>>> easy. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to >> accomplish, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To >>>>>>>>> educate >>>>> members of >>>>>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively >>>>>>>>> to >>>>> something >>>>>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in >> society >>>>> so >>>>>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an >> extended >>>>>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that >>>>>>>>> you >>>> can >>>>>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then >>>>>>>>> reviewing >>>> the >>>>> whole >>>>>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>> says, a >>>>>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> actually >>>>> speak to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk >>>>>>>>> about >>>>> activity >>>>>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in >>>>> conflict >>>>>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose >>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>> mind? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the >>>> class, >>>>> or >>>>>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most >>>>> interesting >>>>>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes >>>>>>>>> of >>>>> children) >>>>>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're >>>>>>>>> not >>>>> identical. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern >>>>>>>>>>>>>> too. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> supervise >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT >>>>>>>>>>>>>> context. Two >>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> them on >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. >>>>> They >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of >>>> division >>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> labor. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> When >>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> decided to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT >>>> context >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> mainly >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still >>>>>>>>>>>>>> doubt >>>> about >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> " unit >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ??????: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analysis, it >>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> one of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this >>>>> concept >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> new >>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> me, was >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> expression, I'd >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it >>>> referred >>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> was a >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT >>>>> methodology >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> whilst >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> let me >>>>> know. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a >> template, >>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> is the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> using >>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is >>>> the >>>>> new >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. >>>>> So for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their >>>> research, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> often >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> supervisor. I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> point in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>> data >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> they now >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> --- >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> articles. But, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contribute in >>>>> posts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't >> follow >>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am >>>>> usually >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> just >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because >> I'm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> interested >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for, >>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> how they >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>> people >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of >>>> analysis >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> being used? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> interested to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> might >>>> be >>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> basic as >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thoughts (in >>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> much more >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of >>>> analysis. >>>>> In >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Mike's >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> action is >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> factors >>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here >>>>> before, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a >>>>> picture of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> much >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education School of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Education University of Ioannina University Campus >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Dourouti 45110 Ioannina Greece tel. +302651005771 fax. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> +302651005842 mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>>>>>> with >>>> an >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> *Patrick Jaki* >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >>>> ________________________________ >>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >>>> >>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended >>>> solely >> for >>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not >>>> the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of >>>> the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not >>>> rely on >> it. >>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are >>>> not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth >>>> University >> accepts >>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan >> emails >>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept >> responsibility >>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or >>>> its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless >> accompanied >>>> by an official order form. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> *Robyn Babaeff* >> >> >> > > > -- > *Robyn Babaeff* From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Oct 13 13:53:23 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 20:53:23 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <984FAF8B-059E-4DA4-B4B8-324C4C26125B@csun.edu> References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <984FAF8B-059E-4DA4-B4B8-324C4C26125B@csun.edu> Message-ID: <8540F7A9-EC6C-4A68-9436-B642FE7DCE19@uniandes.edu.co> Hi Holli, Certainly there is a neurological component to emotion in young children, and to the regulation of emotion in later childhood and adulthood. What I think this leaves out, however, is the important role of adults in regulating emotion *for* their children. Remember that the higher mental functions are first social, and later personal. Precisely what a drunken parent cannot do is help a young child regulate his or her emotions; on the contrary, they are likely to stir up even stronger emotion. Martin On Oct 13, 2014, at 3:38 PM, Tonyan, Holli A wrote: > Martin and others, > > What Martin wrote here reminds me of important work by Nim Tottenham (http://www.columbia.edu/cu/psychology/fac-bios/TottenhamN/faculty.html). Unfortunately, I saw a presentation and have not read her work so I cannot include a reference here. Nim has studied the development of the amygdala and it's role in processing early emotional experiences and trauma. Her work shows that anatomically, the amygdala of children who were exposed to trauma/deprivation very early in life is larger than other children who have not experienced trauma/deprivation. What I remember from the presentation was that the strength of the amygdala before the development of the prefrontal cortex with increasing capacity for the regulation of the amygdala meant that children had a very hard time learning to regulate the amygdala - it is as though they have to develop together or one overpowers the other. Here is a very physical representation of the connection between the emotion and the cognition. She referred to the amygdala not as the "threat detector" as is common, but as the "relevance detector" but in an emotional sense. Not exactly perezhevanie, but NOT cognitive or processed in the same way. What you called "detachment" could be increased capacity to "override" the amygdala's functioning with pre-frontal cortex capacity - a biological component of what LSV saw as higher mental functions, perhaps. > > OK - back to report preparation and writing for me... > > All these interesting posts are such seductive distraction... > > On Oct 13, 2014, at 5:21 AM, Martin John Packer > wrote: > > > Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving > perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive connection? > > > It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their mother's drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the dynamic development of perezhivanie. > > In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from emotion, in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and interpreting the circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, the child is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction is one of extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates involuntarily and stammers. He loses control of his own body. > > LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the horror of what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of terror, enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to speak at all as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction amounts to a state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of this situation." > > The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. The contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an alternation between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion towards the mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the breakdown seen in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily emotional, but it is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The child's love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, directed towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as bad. It is, however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions that is so difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of approach-avoidance. The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the mother; her failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal conflict for the child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates between two different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she is a mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than that of his younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. > > LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely agonizing condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a condition frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional attitudes towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we have previously been able to observe among one of our children and which, you may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, from the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful attachment, and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of terrors and terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The German authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is experiencing a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for the mother and terror of the witch coexist. > > "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply pronounced conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction expressed in a simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the mother, a terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, combined with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going home was brought up." > > In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with more detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of pity: of sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion can coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother not as a bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, or weak. She acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. This, then, means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a "duty" to take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. > > Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest child has a single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. His emotions follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. > > LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was ill and he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his mother down, make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones and comfort them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the family, the only one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". > > In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and cognition in each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship changes with age. > > Martin > > The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a preschooler, and the oldest a school-aged child. > On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff > wrote: > > Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving > perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive connection? > As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a different > realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective position of > the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where there is > emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then as the > cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs from the > internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the connectedness > takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn > motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. > > On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees > > wrote: > > Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every word, > but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating with the > same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like this > discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it because we each > have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our > awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be expected to > use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some people, > etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an > approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be negotiated in > discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer to > understanding how a particular person uses particular words when we get to > know that person as a person and that involves much more than just batting > words to and fro! > > Rod > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] > Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? > > Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is this > not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this case > Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds > onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. > > On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer > > wrote: > > Andy, > > I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture > everything. > > But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college > chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because that > would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is strongly > electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, > leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the > consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen > bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a > liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements that > are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. > > So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of > water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions driving > further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially > dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is > actually > in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and > dissociating > and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't develop > further. > > Martin > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor - > it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is > simply > saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and > nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of > water. > > You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and > OH > together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge > and > OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative > contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals > with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and therefore > neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions > and > transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of > life. :) > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=3rveoQhoPSPbCSnfZzk4AbReuqBPUZxNB40ISNTLCXw&e= > > > Martin John Packer wrote: > Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own > example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not a > dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: water > is > a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an internal > tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. > > In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is > dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) > > Martin > On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole > wrote: > > > Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such > that two > atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to water > with > its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise to > the > concrete for their own cases. > mike > > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > wrote: > Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) > > Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic > system > with > contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, > and I > already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before > posting. > > Martin > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < > helenaworthen@gmail.com> > wrote: > > > On the contrary. > > To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about > activity > > theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple > example > is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history > corner of > the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger > footing > in > bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing > new > members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which > division > of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a > leadership > team > that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which > in turn > will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky > and > quick, change your history. > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > > And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies > that, > > once one understands the relationships among the components, one can > bring > about changes in one component in the totality by acting on > *another* > component of the totality. > > The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of > > relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent > elements that > are only accidentally brought together. > > Martin > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > > Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the > question > > is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method > of > analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components > in a > complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, > which > is often how students frame their research interest. And this means > that > the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. > > Martin > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < > helenaworthen@gmail.com> > > wrote: > > As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very > > down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective > responses > to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a > rule > changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: > > The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > > *insight*. It > > is not something that can be achieved by following a template, > it is > > the > > breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It > > usually comes > > *after* you've collected all the data for your research using > some > > other > > unit of analysis. > > First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The > question > > lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to > do?" The > unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to > accomplish. > Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we > trying > get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, > clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be > late > to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and > will miss > work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're > talking > about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle > aged > minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be > responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, > but > being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would > then > keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were > often > away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. > Also, a > lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was > happening > (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out > buying > more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not > easy. > > So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, > > here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate > members of > the union and other others about how to respond collectively to > something > that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society > so > that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended > family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you > can > carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing > the > whole > Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy > says, a > matter of solving puzzles. > > From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually > speak to > > a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about > activity > system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in > conflict > with each other, which adds to the drama. > > Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in > mind? > > Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the > class, > or > the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most > interesting > would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of > children) > and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not > identical. > > Helena > > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: > > > This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I > > supervise > > three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two > of > > them on > > early childhood science education and one on primary science. > They > > have > > collected log files, children discourses consisted of > scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of > division > of > > labor. > > They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When > they > > decided to > > analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT > context > > mainly > > modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt > about > the > > " unit > > of analysis". > > ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < > > ablunden@mira.net> > > ??????: > > > Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it > was > > one of > > the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this > concept > > was > > almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new > for > > me, was > > "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this > > expression, I'd > > be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it > referred > to > > was a > > "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT > methodology > > whilst > > keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me > know. > > The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an > > *insight*. It > > is not something that can be achieved by following a template, > it > > is the > > breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It > > usually comes > > *after* you've collected all the data for your research using > some > > other > > unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is > the > new > paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. > So for > graduate students to use the concept of unit in their > research, > > often > > depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their > > supervisor. I > > don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this > > point in > > their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the > data > > they now > > know they need. > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=3rveoQhoPSPbCSnfZzk4AbReuqBPUZxNB40ISNTLCXw&e= > > > Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > > > I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two > > articles. But, > > as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in > posts. > > I > > usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow > that > > through > > to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am > usually > > just > > trying to keep up with reading! > > For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm > > interested > > in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, > and > > how they > > fit together with theory and conducting research. What are > people > > doing > > with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of > analysis > > being used? > > If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very > > interested to > > read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might > be > as > > basic as > > these. > > Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in > a > > much more > > eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of > analysis. > In > > Mike's > > example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that > the > > action is > > mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors > that > influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here > before, > > are > > often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a > picture of > > much > > more than just Mike's behavior. > Katie > > Katie Wester-Neal > University of Georgia > > > > > > -- > ............................................................ > Katerina Plakitsi > Associate Professor of Science Education > School of Education > University of Ioannina > University Campus Dourouti 45110 > Ioannina > Greece > tel. +302651005771 > fax. +302651005842 > mobile.phone +306972898463 > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__users.uoi.gr_kplakits&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=efoIjdDk3jJPjstsnAWWLdeIxhiX2xuo9tpkz5vPuVQ&e= > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__erasmus-2Dip.uoi.gr_&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=EHxDmy94dcMDH7DjaNERyWA8najtdG0AixBFr6FWcVw&e= > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.lib.uoi.gr_serp&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=64STTL4tfW0mDzqSW2DtIY3RA4JTIvXOxP6shhGZojE&e= > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > *Patrick Jaki* > > > > > > > > *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* > ________________________________ > [https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.plymouth.ac.uk_images_email-5Ffooter.gif&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=iG_47fsNGlv4trjCw-8sMc3vXde0Gfd-flhzBSx_7-I&e= ]< > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.plymouth.ac.uk_worldclass&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=8RYajE24gomKXKgASDgieRrIkZpgR8E3fCn1_2Q3esY&e= > > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > > > > -- > *Robyn Babaeff* > > > > Holli A. Tonyan, Ph.D. > ------------ > Associate Professor | Department of Psychology | California State University, Northridge > Postal Address: 18111 Nordhoff Street | Northridge, CA 91330-8255 > > Tel: (818) 677-4970 | Fax: (818) 677-2829 > Office: ST322 > > http://www.csun.edu/~htonyan > http://csun.academia.edu/HolliTonyan > http://www.csun.edu/~ata20315/GE/general_experimental_psychology2.html > > **check out** > > Tonyan, H. A. (in press). Everyday routines: A window into the cultural organization of family child care. Journal of Early Childhood Research. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1476718X14523748 > > Tonyan, H. A., Nuttall, J. (2014). Connecting cultural models of home-based care and childminders? career paths: An Eco-cultural analysis. International Journal of Early Years Education, 22, 117-138, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09669760.2013.809654 > > Tonyan, H. A., Mamikonian, A., & Chien, D. (2013). Do they practice what they preach? An Ecocultural, multidimensional, group-based examination of the relationship between beliefs and behaviours among child care providers. Early Child Development and Care, 183:12, 1853-1877. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03004430.2012.759949 > > This message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged, confidential or exempt from disclosure under applicable federal or state law. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, please immediately notify the sender by telephone at (818)677-4970, and destroy all copies of this e-mail and all attachments. > > Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has. - Margaret Mead US anthropologist & popularizer of anthropology (1901 - 1978) > > > From Holli.Tonyan@csun.edu Mon Oct 13 14:02:04 2014 From: Holli.Tonyan@csun.edu (Tonyan, Holli A) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 21:02:04 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <8540F7A9-EC6C-4A68-9436-B642FE7DCE19@uniandes.edu.co> References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <984FAF8B-059E-4DA4-B4B8-324C4C26125B@csun.edu> <8540F7A9-EC6C-4A68-9436-B642FE7DCE19@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <1F08DBAB-495A-46BC-B14A-B6BD5F7887AA@csun.edu> Hi Martin, That is one of many things I think my post leaves out. Not enough time... Elizabeth "Betty" Carlson has done some great research on this topic - not biological, but aligns nicely with the biological. Megan Gunnar's work on the biological as related to attachment figures would also be very relevant. So... yes - not in my post, but in my mind... On Oct 13, 2014, at 1:53 PM, Martin John Packer > wrote: Hi Holli, Certainly there is a neurological component to emotion in young children, and to the regulation of emotion in later childhood and adulthood. What I think this leaves out, however, is the important role of adults in regulating emotion *for* their children. Remember that the higher mental functions are first social, and later personal. Precisely what a drunken parent cannot do is help a young child regulate his or her emotions; on the contrary, they are likely to stir up even stronger emotion. Martin On Oct 13, 2014, at 3:38 PM, Tonyan, Holli A > wrote: Martin and others, What Martin wrote here reminds me of important work by Nim Tottenham (https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.columbia.edu_cu_psychology_fac-2Dbios_TottenhamN_faculty.html&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=TVUOcqEbEsLXHKA2ooNjojxiG95v0LxXoPPVcNt8wdo&s=bnRKdYnYsInHt8FBvSgg37omNGEZ8sBKSEylqdj33KM&e= ). Unfortunately, I saw a presentation and have not read her work so I cannot include a reference here. Nim has studied the development of the amygdala and it's role in processing early emotional experiences and trauma. Her work shows that anatomically, the amygdala of children who were exposed to trauma/deprivation very early in life is larger than other children who have not experienced trauma/deprivation. What I remember from the presentation was that the strength of the amygdala before the development of the prefrontal cortex with increasing capacity for the regulation of the amygdala meant that children had a very hard time learning to regulate the amygdala - it is as though they have to develop together or one overpowers the other. Here is a very physical representation of the connection between the emotion and the cognition. She referred to the amygdala not as the "threat detector" as is common, but as the "relevance detector" but in an emotional sense. Not exactly perezhevanie, but NOT cognitive or processed in the same way. What you called "detachment" could be increased capacity to "override" the amygdala's functioning with pre-frontal cortex capacity - a biological component of what LSV saw as higher mental functions, perhaps. OK - back to report preparation and writing for me... All these interesting posts are such seductive distraction... On Oct 13, 2014, at 5:21 AM, Martin John Packer > wrote: Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive connection? It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their mother's drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the dynamic development of perezhivanie. In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from emotion, in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and interpreting the circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, the child is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction is one of extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates involuntarily and stammers. He loses control of his own body. LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the horror of what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of terror, enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to speak at all as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction amounts to a state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of this situation." The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. The contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an alternation between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion towards the mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the breakdown seen in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily emotional, but it is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The child's love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, directed towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as bad. It is, however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions that is so difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of approach-avoidance. The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the mother; her failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal conflict for the child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates between two different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she is a mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than that of his younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely agonizing condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a condition frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional attitudes towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we have previously been able to observe among one of our children and which, you may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, from the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful attachment, and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of terrors and terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The German authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is experiencing a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for the mother and terror of the witch coexist. "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply pronounced conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction expressed in a simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the mother, a terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, combined with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going home was brought up." In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with more detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of pity: of sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion can coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother not as a bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, or weak. She acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. This, then, means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a "duty" to take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest child has a single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. His emotions follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was ill and he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his mother down, make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones and comfort them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the family, the only one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and cognition in each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship changes with age. Martin The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a preschooler, and the oldest a school-aged child. On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff > wrote: Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive connection? As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a different realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective position of the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where there is emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then as the cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs from the internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the connectedness takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees > wrote: Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every word, but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating with the same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like this discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it because we each have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be expected to use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some people, etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be negotiated in discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer to understanding how a particular person uses particular words when we get to know that person as a person and that involves much more than just batting words to and fro! Rod ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is this not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this case Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer > wrote: Andy, I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture everything. But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because that would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is strongly electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements that are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions driving further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is actually in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and dissociating and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't develop further. Martin On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor - it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is simply saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of water. You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and OH together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge and OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and therefore neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions and transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of life. :) Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=3rveoQhoPSPbCSnfZzk4AbReuqBPUZxNB40ISNTLCXw&e= Martin John Packer wrote: Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not a dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: water is a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an internal tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) Martin On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole > wrote: Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such that two atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to water with its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise to the concrete for their own cases. mike On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < mpacker@uniandes.edu.co wrote: Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic system with contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, and I already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before posting. Martin On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < helenaworthen@gmail.com> wrote: On the contrary. To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about activity theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple example is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history corner of the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger footing in bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing new members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which division of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a leadership team that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which in turn will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky and quick, change your history. Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies that, once one understands the relationships among the components, one can bring about changes in one component in the totality by acting on *another* component of the totality. The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent elements that are only accidentally brought together. Martin On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the question is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method of analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components in a complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, which is often how students frame their research interest. And this means that the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. Martin On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < helenaworthen@gmail.com> wrote: As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective responses to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a rule changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other unit of analysis. First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The question lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to do?" The unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to accomplish. Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we trying get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be late to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and will miss work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're talking about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle aged minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, but being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would then keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were often away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. Also, a lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was happening (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out buying more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not easy. So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate members of the union and other others about how to respond collectively to something that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society so that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you can carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing the whole Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy says, a matter of solving puzzles. From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually speak to a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about activity system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in conflict with each other, which adds to the drama. Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in mind? Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the class, or the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most interesting would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of children) and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not identical. Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I supervise three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two of them on early childhood science education and one on primary science. They have collected log files, children discourses consisted of scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of division of labor. They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When they decided to analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT context mainly modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt about the " unit of analysis". ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < ablunden@mira.net> ??????: Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it was one of the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this concept was almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new for me, was "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this expression, I'd be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it referred to was a "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT methodology whilst keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me know. The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an *insight*. It is not something that can be achieved by following a template, it is the breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It usually comes *after* you've collected all the data for your research using some other unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is the new paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. So for graduate students to use the concept of unit in their research, often depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their supervisor. I don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this point in their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the data they now know they need. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=3rveoQhoPSPbCSnfZzk4AbReuqBPUZxNB40ISNTLCXw&e= Katherine Wester Neal wrote: I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two articles. But, as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in posts. I usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow that through to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am usually just trying to keep up with reading! For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm interested in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, and how they fit together with theory and conducting research. What are people doing with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of analysis being used? If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very interested to read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might be as basic as these. Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in a much more eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of analysis. In Mike's example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that the action is mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors that influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here before, are often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a picture of much more than just Mike's behavior. Katie Katie Wester-Neal University of Georgia -- ............................................................ 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Tonyan, Ph.D. ------------ Associate Professor | Department of Psychology | California State University, Northridge Postal Address: 18111 Nordhoff Street | Northridge, CA 91330-8255 Tel: (818) 677-4970 | Fax: (818) 677-2829 Office: ST322 http://www.csun.edu/~htonyan https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__csun.academia.edu_HolliTonyan&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=TVUOcqEbEsLXHKA2ooNjojxiG95v0LxXoPPVcNt8wdo&s=0m1pc5Qcq5PbWCbOalt4M3k7_MkrC1uSSK-oVQZ8-iI&e= http://www.csun.edu/~ata20315/GE/general_experimental_psychology2.html **check out** Tonyan, H. A. (in press). Everyday routines: A window into the cultural organization of family child care. 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Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has. - Margaret Mead US anthropologist & popularizer of anthropology (1901 - 1978) Holli A. Tonyan, Ph.D. ------------ Associate Professor | Department of Psychology | California State University, Northridge Postal Address: 18111 Nordhoff Street | Northridge, CA 91330-8255 Tel: (818) 677-4970 | Fax: (818) 677-2829 Office: ST322 http://www.csun.edu/~htonyan http://csun.academia.edu/HolliTonyan http://www.csun.edu/~ata20315/GE/general_experimental_psychology2.html **check out** Tonyan, H. A. (in press). Everyday routines: A window into the cultural organization of family child care. Journal of Early Childhood Research. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1476718X14523748 Tonyan, H. A., Nuttall, J. (2014). Connecting cultural models of home-based care and childminders? career paths: An Eco-cultural analysis. International Journal of Early Years Education, 22, 117-138, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09669760.2013.809654 Tonyan, H. A., Mamikonian, A., & Chien, D. (2013). Do they practice what they preach? An Ecocultural, multidimensional, group-based examination of the relationship between beliefs and behaviours among child care providers. Early Child Development and Care, 183:12, 1853-1877. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03004430.2012.759949 This message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged, confidential or exempt from disclosure under applicable federal or state law. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, please immediately notify the sender by telephone at (818)677-4970, and destroy all copies of this e-mail and all attachments. Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has. - Margaret Mead US anthropologist & popularizer of anthropology (1901 - 1978) From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Oct 13 14:14:55 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 15:14:55 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> , Message-ID: <7BCBECC8-28FE-4270-AE9F-0543B7C18401@gmail.com> Julian, I definitely like your inclusion of the ZPD in this discussion! Henry On Oct 13, 2014, at 10:14 AM, Julian Williams wrote: > Dear Martin, and all > > I dont see the dialectic as 'internal' to the child, but as the child-in-the-environment. But I think maybe there is a problem with the current drift in the discussion. > > The problem I see arising now is that we are beginning to take the environment here as something fixed or taken for granted, with the difference in the three Perezhivanie being totally about the subjects/childs different stages of development. I'm not sure this does justice to the dialectic Vygotsky had in mind (though I see it might appear so in the text). I think one has to consider the objective fact of the environment as something from which different strands may be apprehended, or if you like, or from which certain aspects can be 'refracted'. > > At the cost of perhaps causing confusion, I wonder if the notion of Zone of Proximal Development can help here for those who use this idea ... A particular social plane (environment, classroom interaction etc) can offer a ZPD for some but be entirely useless to others, because of their different stages of development, yes, yes. But also, different learners at different stages can help create their own ZPDs within the same social space and even plane, (drawing from the same social interactions in different ways). So they may shape the very environment which provides for their own ZPD and hence development. I think this is a more adequate way to think of the dialectic, so the subject is not seen as passive in their own development. > > Julian > > (Maybe this passivity is what Mike had in mind when he expressed reservations about Vygotsky's use of the 'final ideal form' , eg of arithmetic, have I remembered this right? Anyway I DO have reservations about that notion in Vygotsky's chapter but maybe that's another story for later.) > > > On 13 Oct 2014, at 14:53, "Martin John Packer" wrote: > >> Hi Robyn, >> >> I think it's important to recognize that the oldest child's understanding of the need to take care of his mother and siblings is not a drive or an impulse, it is, LSV tells us, a "duty" that follows from adopting a specific "role" in the family. Understanding the situation in terms of roles and duties is certainly socially mediated - after all, roles and duties are social, or societal, matters (ontological and deontological respectively, if we want to get technical). The oldest child - presumably attending school - is able to understand that he lives in a world of social institutions, one of which is his family. >> >> In this chapter LSV does not explore or explain how each kind of perezhivanie transforms into the next, but in his lectures on child development you can find a more detailed account. But here, in what is effectively a cross-sectional comparison of children at different ages (albeit only one at each age), he certainly means to suggest that earlier forms provide the basis for later forms. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:45 AM, Robyn Babaeff wrote: >> >>> Much appreciated Martin - this is feeling more visual, and now I am >>> wondering is it possible to interpret that the older child's emotive >>> drive/action of care for his mother and younger sibling in its moment is >>> also connected a socially mediated aspect of cognition from somewhere/time >>> in his earlier years of perezhivanie for the 'how to' in his choosing/drive >>> for duty of care? >>> >>> On 13 October 2014 23:21, Martin John Packer >>> wrote: >>> >>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >>>> connection? >>>> >>>> >>>> It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their mother's >>>> drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the dynamic >>>> development of perezhivanie. >>>> >>>> In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from emotion, >>>> in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and interpreting the >>>> circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, the child >>>> is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction is one of >>>> extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates involuntarily and >>>> stammers. He loses control of his own body. >>>> >>>> LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the horror of >>>> what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of terror, >>>> enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to speak at all >>>> as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction amounts to a >>>> state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of this >>>> situation." >>>> >>>> The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. The >>>> contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an alternation >>>> between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion towards the >>>> mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the breakdown seen >>>> in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily emotional, but it >>>> is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The child's >>>> love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, directed >>>> towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as bad. It is, >>>> however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions that is so >>>> difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of approach-avoidance. >>>> The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the mother; her >>>> failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal conflict for the >>>> child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates between two >>>> different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she is a >>>> mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than that of his >>>> younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. >>>> >>>> LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely agonizing >>>> condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a condition >>>> frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional attitudes >>>> towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we have >>>> previously been able to observe among one of our children and which, you >>>> may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, from >>>> the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful attachment, >>>> and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of terrors and >>>> terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The German >>>> authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is experiencing >>>> a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for the mother >>>> and terror of the witch coexist. >>>> >>>> "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply pronounced >>>> conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction expressed in a >>>> simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the mother, a >>>> terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, combined >>>> with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home >>>> immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going home was >>>> brought up." >>>> >>>> In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with more >>>> detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of pity: of >>>> sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion can >>>> coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother not as a >>>> bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, or weak. She >>>> acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. This, then, >>>> means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a "duty" to >>>> take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. >>>> >>>> Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest child has a >>>> single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. His emotions >>>> follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. >>>> >>>> LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was ill and >>>> he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his mother down, >>>> make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones and comfort >>>> them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the family, the only >>>> one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". >>>> >>>> In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and cognition in >>>> each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship changes >>>> with age. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a preschooler, and >>>> the oldest a school-aged child. >>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >>>> connection? >>>>> As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a >>>> different >>>>> realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective position of >>>>> the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where there is >>>>> emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then as the >>>>> cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs from the >>>>> internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the >>>> connectedness >>>>> takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn >>>>> motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. >>>>> >>>>> On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every word, >>>>>> but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating with the >>>>>> same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like this >>>>>> discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it because we >>>> each >>>>>> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our >>>>>> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be expected >>>> to >>>>>> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some people, >>>>>> etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an >>>>>> approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be negotiated in >>>>>> discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer to >>>>>> understanding how a particular person uses particular words when we get >>>> to >>>>>> know that person as a person and that involves much more than just >>>> batting >>>>>> words to and fro! >>>>>> >>>>>> Rod >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>>> on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] >>>>>> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? >>>>>> >>>>>> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is >>>> this >>>>>> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this >>>> case >>>>>> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds >>>>>> onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. >>>>>> >>>>>> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture >>>>>>> everything. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college >>>>>>> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because >>>> that >>>>>>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is >>>> strongly >>>>>>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, >>>>>>> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the >>>>>>> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen >>>>>>> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a >>>>>>> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements >>>> that >>>>>>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of >>>>>>> water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions >>>> driving >>>>>>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially >>>>>>> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is >>>>>> actually >>>>>>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and >>>>>> dissociating >>>>>>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't >>>> develop >>>>>>> further. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor >>>> - >>>>>>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is >>>>>> simply >>>>>>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and >>>>>>> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of >>>>>>> water. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and >>>>>> OH >>>>>>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge >>>>>> and >>>>>>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative >>>>>>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals >>>>>>> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and >>>> therefore >>>>>>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions >>>>>> and >>>>>>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of >>>>>>> life. :) >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own >>>>>>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not >>>> a >>>>>>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: >>>> water >>>>>> is >>>>>>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an >>>> internal >>>>>>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is >>>>>>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such >>>>>>> that two >>>>>>>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to >>>> water >>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise >>>> to >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> concrete for their own cases. >>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic >>>>>> system >>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, >>>>>>> and I >>>>>>>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before >>>>>>> posting. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On the contrary. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about >>>>>> activity >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple >>>>>>> example >>>>>>>>>>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history >>>>>>> corner of >>>>>>>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger >>>>>> footing >>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing >>>>>> new >>>>>>>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which >>>>>>> division >>>>>>>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a >>>>>> leadership >>>>>>> team >>>>>>>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which >>>>>>> in turn >>>>>>>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky >>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> quick, change your history. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies >>>>>> that, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one >>>> can >>>>>>> bring >>>>>>>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on >>>>>> *another* >>>>>>>>>>> component of the totality. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent >>>>>>> elements that >>>>>>>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the >>>>>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components >>>>>>> in a >>>>>>>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on >>>> another, >>>>>>> which >>>>>>>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this >>>> relationship. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective >>>>>>> responses >>>>>>>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a >>>>>> rule >>>>>>>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, >>>>>>> it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The >>>>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to >>>>>>> do?" The >>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to >>>>>>> accomplish. >>>>>>>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we >>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in >>>> Chicago, >>>>>>>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to >>>> be >>>>>>> late >>>>>>>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and >>>>>>> will miss >>>>>>>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're >>>>>>> talking >>>>>>>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle >>>>>> aged >>>>>>>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be >>>>>>>>>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a >>>> machine, >>>>>>> but >>>>>>>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who >>>> would >>>>>>> then >>>>>>>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were >>>>>>> often >>>>>>>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. >>>>>>> Also, a >>>>>>>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was >>>>>> happening >>>>>>>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out >>>>>>> buying >>>>>>>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not >>>>>> easy. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to >>>> accomplish, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate >>>>>>> members of >>>>>>>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to >>>>>>> something >>>>>>>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in >>>> society >>>>>>> so >>>>>>>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an >>>> extended >>>>>>>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you >>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing >>>>>> the >>>>>>> whole >>>>>>>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy >>>>>>> says, a >>>>>>>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually >>>>>>> speak to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about >>>>>>> activity >>>>>>>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in >>>>>>> conflict >>>>>>>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in >>>>>>> mind? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the >>>>>> class, >>>>>>> or >>>>>>>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most >>>>>>> interesting >>>>>>>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of >>>>>>> children) >>>>>>>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not >>>>>>> identical. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> supervise >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> them on >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. >>>>>>> They >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of >>>>>> division >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> labor. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When >>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> decided to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT >>>>>> context >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> mainly >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt >>>>>> about >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> " unit >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> St?? ????a??, 12 ??t?????? 2014, ? ???st?? Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ???a?e: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it >>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> one of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this >>>>>>> concept >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new >>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> me, was >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> expression, I'd >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it >>>>>> referred >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> was a >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT >>>>>>> methodology >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> whilst >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me >>>>>>> know. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a >>>> template, >>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> is the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is >>>>>> the >>>>>>> new >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>> So for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their >>>>>> research, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> often >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> supervisor. I >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to >>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> point in >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the >>>>>>> data >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> they now >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> articles. But, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in >>>>>>> posts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't >>>> follow >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am >>>>>>> usually >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> just >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because >>>> I'm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> interested >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> how they >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are >>>>>>> people >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of >>>>>> analysis >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> being used? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> interested to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might >>>>>> be >>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> basic as >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in >>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> much more >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of >>>>>> analysis. >>>>>>> In >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Mike's >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> action is >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here >>>>>>> before, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a >>>>>>> picture of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> much >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> School of Education >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ioannina >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Greece >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> *Patrick Jaki* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >>>>>> ________________________________ >>>>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >>>>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >>>>>> >>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely >>>> for >>>>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >>>>>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >>>>>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on >>>> it. >>>>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >>>>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >>>>>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University >>>> accepts >>>>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan >>>> emails >>>>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept >>>> responsibility >>>>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >>>>>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless >>>> accompanied >>>>>> by an official order form. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> *Robyn Babaeff* >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> *Robyn Babaeff* >> >> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Oct 13 14:55:06 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 15:55:06 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <000f01cfe727$9a81c390$cf854ab0$@edu> References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <000f01cfe727$9a81c390$cf854ab0$@edu> Message-ID: Vera, I just read from an interview with Arthur Miller wherein the term "felt knowledge" appears. In that text, it seems close to "authenticity". In teaching you can't build trust without authenticity, or so I feel. Grounding. And how can you get that without lived experience, which, for me, in English (American?), seems to come closest to perzhvanie, with all due respect to all the insightful semantic analysis on the problems of translation. Henry On Oct 13, 2014, at 2:52 PM, Vera John-Steiner wrote: > Martin, > > I think it is an excellent analysis of the development of perezhivanie. The oldest child's way of combining > emotion and cognition reminds me of the playwright, Arthur Miller's term "felt knowledge." > Vera > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > Sent: Monday, October 13, 2014 7:52 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? > > Hi Robyn, > > I think it's important to recognize that the oldest child's understanding of the need to take care of his mother and siblings is not a drive or an impulse, it is, LSV tells us, a "duty" that follows from adopting a specific "role" in the family. Understanding the situation in terms of roles and duties is certainly socially mediated - after all, roles and duties are social, or societal, matters (ontological and deontological respectively, if we want to get technical). The oldest child - presumably attending school - is able to understand that he lives in a world of social institutions, one of which is his family. > > In this chapter LSV does not explore or explain how each kind of perezhivanie transforms into the next, but in his lectures on child development you can find a more detailed account. But here, in what is effectively a cross-sectional comparison of children at different ages (albeit only one at each age), he certainly means to suggest that earlier forms provide the basis for later forms. > > Martin > > On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:45 AM, Robyn Babaeff wrote: > >> Much appreciated Martin - this is feeling more visual, and now I am >> wondering is it possible to interpret that the older child's emotive >> drive/action of care for his mother and younger sibling in its moment >> is also connected a socially mediated aspect of cognition from >> somewhere/time in his earlier years of perezhivanie for the 'how to' >> in his choosing/drive for duty of care? >> >> On 13 October 2014 23:21, Martin John Packer >> wrote: >> >>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >>> connection? >>> >>> >>> It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their >>> mother's drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching >>> the dynamic development of perezhivanie. >>> >>> In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from >>> emotion, in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and >>> interpreting the circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother >>> for all needs, the child is overcome by the enormity of what is >>> happening. His reaction is one of extreme emotion - terror - and >>> somatization - he urinates involuntarily and stammers. He loses control of his own body. >>> >>> LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the >>> horror of what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks >>> of terror, enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable >>> to speak at all as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s >>> reaction amounts to a state of complete depression and helplessness >>> in the face of this situation." >>> >>> The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. The >>> contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an >>> alternation between, and combination of, a positive and a negative >>> emotion towards the mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized >>> than the breakdown seen in the youngest child. Each attitude is still >>> primarily emotional, but it is an organized and focused emotion, not >>> a somatic collapse. The child's love and fear is each a coherent way >>> of grasping the situation, directed towards the mother who is >>> understood first as good, and then as bad. It is, however, the >>> combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions that is so difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of approach-avoidance. >>> The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the mother; >>> her failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal >>> conflict for the child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition >>> alternates between two different and incompatible ways of >>> interpreting his mother - she is a mother; no, she is a witch. His >>> cognition is more capable than that of his younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. >>> >>> LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely >>> agonizing condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which >>> is a condition frequently found in certain cases when contrasting >>> emotional attitudes towards the mother make their appearance, >>> examples of which we have previously been able to observe among one >>> of our children and which, you may remember, we have called an >>> ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, from the child?s point of view, >>> the mother is an object of painful attachment, and on the other, she >>> represents a source of all kinds of terrors and terrible emotional >>> experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The German authors call >>> this kind of emotional complex which the child is experiencing a >>> Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for the mother and terror of the witch coexist. >>> >>> "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply >>> pronounced conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction >>> expressed in a simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards >>> the mother, a terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate >>> for her, combined with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to >>> be sent home immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of >>> his going home was brought up." >>> >>> In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with more >>> detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of pity: >>> of sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion >>> can coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother >>> not as a bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is >>> ill, or weak. She acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a >>> bad person. This, then, means that he knows what to do: he has "a >>> special role," with a "duty" to take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. >>> >>> Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest child >>> has a single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. >>> His emotions follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. >>> >>> LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was >>> ill and he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his >>> mother down, make certain that she is prevented from harming the >>> little ones and comfort them. Quite simply, he has become the senior >>> member of the family, the only one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". >>> >>> In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and >>> cognition in each of these three children, and so shows how that >>> relationship changes with age. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a preschooler, >>> and the oldest a school-aged child. >>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >>> connection? >>>> As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a >>> different >>>> realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective >>>> position of the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa >>>> where there is emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the >>>> feeling. Then as the cognitive-affective sync - the overall >>>> transformation occurs from the internal crisis of disconnected >>>> affective-cognitive. As the >>> connectedness >>>> takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn >>>> motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. >>>> >>>> On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every >>>>> word, but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all >>>>> operating with the same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a >>>>> context like this discussion but each of us 'means' something >>>>> different by it because we >>> each >>>>> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our >>>>> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be >>>>> expected >>> to >>>>> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some >>>>> people, etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be >>>>> an approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be >>>>> negotiated in discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we >>>>> get closer to understanding how a particular person uses particular >>>>> words when we get >>> to >>>>> know that person as a person and that involves much more than just >>> batting >>>>> words to and fro! >>>>> >>>>> Rod >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Patrick Jaki >>>>> [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] >>>>> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? >>>>> >>>>> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? >>>>> Is >>> this >>>>> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in >>>>> this >>> case >>>>> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which >>>>> adds onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. >>>>> >>>>> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer >>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Andy, >>>>>> >>>>>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture >>>>>> everything. >>>>>> >>>>>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my >>>>>> college chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and >>>>>> OH-, because >>> that >>>>>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is >>> strongly >>>>>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen >>>>>> atoms, leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This >>>>>> has the consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads >>>>>> to hydrogen bonding between water molecules, the result of which >>>>>> is that water is a liquid at room temperature while other hydrides >>>>>> formed from elements >>> that >>>>>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. >>>>>> >>>>>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* >>>>>> of water. My point was that once formed, there are no >>>>>> contradictions >>> driving >>>>>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does >>>>>> partially dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of >>>>>> water is >>>>> actually >>>>>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and >>>>> dissociating >>>>>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't >>> develop >>>>>> further. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a >>>>>>> metaphor >>> - >>>>>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it >>>>>> is >>>>> simply >>>>>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, >>>>>> and nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the >>>>>> properties of water. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H >>>>>>> and >>>>> OH >>>>>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive >>>>>> charge >>>>> and >>>>>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative >>>>>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all >>>>>> chemicals with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and >>>>>> base and >>> therefore >>>>>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of >>>>>> contradictions >>>>> and >>>>>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the >>>>>> chemistry of life. :) >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> ----- >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own >>>>>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is >>>>>> not >>> a >>>>>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: >>> water >>>>> is >>>>>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an >>> internal >>>>>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a >>>>>>>> triangle is >>>>>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen >>>>>>>>> such >>>>>> that two >>>>>>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to >>> water >>>>>> with >>>>>>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to >>>>>>>>> rise >>> to >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> concrete for their own cases. >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic >>>>> system >>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked >>>>>>>>>> to, >>>>>> and I >>>>>>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all >>>>>>>>>> before >>>>>> posting. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On the contrary. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about >>>>> activity >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very >>>>>>>>>> simple >>>>>> example >>>>>>>>>> is that if you change something in the >>>>>>>>>> norms/customs/laws/history >>>>>> corner of >>>>>>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger >>>>> footing >>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by >>>>>>>>>> bringing >>>>> new >>>>>>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of >>>>>>>>>> which >>>>>> division >>>>>>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a >>>>> leadership >>>>>> team >>>>>>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, >>>>>>>>>> which >>>>>> in turn >>>>>>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're >>>>>>>>>> lucky >>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> quick, change your history. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it >>>>>>>>>>>> implies >>>>> that, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the components, >>>>>>>>>> one >>> can >>>>>> bring >>>>>>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on >>>>> *another* >>>>>>>>>> component of the totality. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this >>>>>>>>>>>> type of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent >>>>>> elements that >>>>>>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that >>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a >>>>>>>>>> method >>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among >>>>>>>>>> components >>>>>> in a >>>>>>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on >>> another, >>>>>> which >>>>>>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this >>>>>>>>>> means >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this >>> relationship. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < >>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> very >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape >>>>>>>>>> collective >>>>>> responses >>>>>>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, >>>>>>>>>> when a >>>>> rule >>>>>>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> template, >>>>>> it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> using >>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The >>>>> question >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>> do?" The >>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to >>>>>> accomplish. >>>>>>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are >>>>>>>>>> we >>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in >>> Chicago, >>>>>>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going >>>>>>>>>> to >>> be >>>>>> late >>>>>>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>> will miss >>>>>>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. >>>>>>>>>> We're >>>>>> talking >>>>>>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them >>>>>>>>>> middle >>>>> aged >>>>>>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to >>>>>>>>>> be responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a >>> machine, >>>>>> but >>>>>>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who >>> would >>>>>> then >>>>>>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors >>>>>>>>>> were >>>>>> often >>>>>>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. >>>>>> Also, a >>>>>>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was >>>>> happening >>>>>>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone >>>>>>>>>> it out >>>>>> buying >>>>>>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is >>>>>>>>>> not >>>>> easy. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to >>> accomplish, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To >>>>>>>>>> educate >>>>>> members of >>>>>>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>> something >>>>>>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in >>> society >>>>>> so >>>>>>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an >>> extended >>>>>>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that >>>>>>>>>> you >>>>> can >>>>>>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then >>>>>>>>>> reviewing >>>>> the >>>>>> whole >>>>>>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>> says, a >>>>>>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actually >>>>>> speak to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk >>>>>>>>>> about >>>>>> activity >>>>>>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in >>>>>> conflict >>>>>>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>> mind? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the >>>>> class, >>>>>> or >>>>>>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most >>>>>> interesting >>>>>>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>> children) >>>>>>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're >>>>>>>>>> not >>>>>> identical. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> too. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> supervise >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> context. Two >>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> them on >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. >>>>>> They >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of >>>>> division >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> labor. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When >>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> decided to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT >>>>> context >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> mainly >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doubt >>>>> about >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> " unit >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ??????: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analysis, it >>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> one of >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this >>>>>> concept >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> new >>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> me, was >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> expression, I'd >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it >>>>> referred >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> was a >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT >>>>>> methodology >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> whilst >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> let me >>>>>> know. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a >>> template, >>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> is the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leap. It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> usually comes >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> using >>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is >>>>> the >>>>>> new >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. >>>>>> So for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their >>>>> research, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> often >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> supervisor. I >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> point in >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>> data >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> they now >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> --- >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> articles. But, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contribute in >>>>>> posts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't >>> follow >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>> usually >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> just >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because >>> I'm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> interested >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for, >>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> how they >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>> people >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of >>>>> analysis >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> being used? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> interested to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> might >>>>> be >>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> basic as >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thoughts (in >>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> much more >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of >>>>> analysis. >>>>>> In >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Mike's >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> action is >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> factors >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here >>>>>> before, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a >>>>>> picture of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> much >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ............................................................ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education School of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Education University of Ioannina University Campus >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Dourouti 45110 Ioannina Greece tel. +302651005771 fax. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> +302651005842 mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>>>>>>> with >>>>> an >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> *Patrick Jaki* >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >>>>> ________________________________ >>>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >>>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >>>>> >>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended >>>>> solely >>> for >>>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not >>>>> the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of >>>>> the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not >>>>> rely on >>> it. >>>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >>>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are >>>>> not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth >>>>> University >>> accepts >>>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan >>> emails >>>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept >>> responsibility >>>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or >>>>> its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless >>> accompanied >>>>> by an official order form. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> *Robyn Babaeff* >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> *Robyn Babaeff* > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Oct 13 14:57:11 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 06:57:11 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <8540F7A9-EC6C-4A68-9436-B642FE7DCE19@uniandes.edu.co> References: <4CAC65E4-55A3-4BA4-B944-DE377CE4362E@uniandes.edu.co> <5437D06C.5030309@mira.net> <5437E6C3.8000205@mira.net> <543A6B00.3050603@mira.net> <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <984FAF8B-059E-4DA4-B4B8-324C4C26125B@csun.edu> <8540F7A9-EC6C-4A68-9436-B642FE7DCE19@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: The discussion has been well and truly enlivened and broadened since I left it yesterday morning! Let me just add four little leavenings: a) The word "attitude" is a mistranslation, I think. When we look at the Russian original Lecture Four we see that everytime Prout (the Vygotsky Reader translator) uses "attitude", what is in fact meant is "relation" or "relationship" (?????????). b) Here's the pendant lecture, entitled "The Role of Environment and Heredity" in pedology. I did circulate this earlier, and Andy correctly remarked that it was poorly edited; what we try to do is not create a smooth English translation but instead create something quite awkward and literal which can then be fashioned into a good Korean translation by our Korean speakers and Russian speakers. I'm afraid I just don't have time to create a good English version. c) As you can see, Vygotsky's method is to take TWO inter-related topics at once, expand the first into a complete lecture which nevertheless refers to the second topic throughout, and then handle the second topic in a subsequent lecture referring back to the first. So: Lecture One: The general topic (the problem and the approach) Lecture Two: The methodological approach (with reference to the problem and the approach) Lecture Three: The role of the environment and heredity (mostly heredity) Lecture Four: The role of the environment (with reference to the child's individual contribution) Lecture Five: Psychological Development (and physiological development) Lecture Six: Physiological Development (the endocrine system with reference to the nervous system) Lecture Seven: Physiological Development (the nervous system with reference to the endocrine system) d) I'm also attaching the "Summarizing Endnotes" that we are planning for our edited Korean volume. The idea is to have a kind of "executive summary" for busy teachers who find the original kind of impenetrable. I'm assuming that there are people on the list who fall into this category--I know that I am one. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 14 October 2014 05:53, Martin John Packer wrote: > Hi Holli, > > Certainly there is a neurological component to emotion in young children, and to the regulation of emotion in later childhood and adulthood. What I think this leaves out, however, is the important role of adults in regulating emotion *for* their children. Remember that the higher mental functions are first social, and later personal. Precisely what a drunken parent cannot do is help a young child regulate his or her emotions; on the contrary, they are likely to stir up even stronger emotion. > > Martin > > On Oct 13, 2014, at 3:38 PM, Tonyan, Holli A wrote: > >> Martin and others, >> >> What Martin wrote here reminds me of important work by Nim Tottenham (http://www.columbia.edu/cu/psychology/fac-bios/TottenhamN/faculty.html). Unfortunately, I saw a presentation and have not read her work so I cannot include a reference here. Nim has studied the development of the amygdala and it's role in processing early emotional experiences and trauma. Her work shows that anatomically, the amygdala of children who were exposed to trauma/deprivation very early in life is larger than other children who have not experienced trauma/deprivation. What I remember from the presentation was that the strength of the amygdala before the development of the prefrontal cortex with increasing capacity for the regulation of the amygdala meant that children had a very hard time learning to regulate the amygdala - it is as though they have to develop together or one overpowers the other. Here is a very physical representation of the connection between the emotion and the cognition. She referred to the amygdala not as the "threat detector" as is common, but as the "relevance detector" but in an emotional sense. Not exactly perezhevanie, but NOT cognitive or processed in the same way. What you called "detachment" could be increased capacity to "override" the amygdala's functioning with pre-frontal cortex capacity - a biological component of what LSV saw as higher mental functions, perhaps. >> >> OK - back to report preparation and writing for me... >> >> All these interesting posts are such seductive distraction... >> >> On Oct 13, 2014, at 5:21 AM, Martin John Packer > wrote: >> >> >> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive connection? >> >> >> It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their mother's drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the dynamic development of perezhivanie. >> >> In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from emotion, in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and interpreting the circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, the child is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction is one of extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates involuntarily and stammers. He loses control of his own body. >> >> LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the horror of what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of terror, enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to speak at all as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction amounts to a state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of this situation." >> >> The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. The contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an alternation between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion towards the mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the breakdown seen in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily emotional, but it is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The child's love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, directed towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as bad. It is, however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions that is so difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of approach-avoidance. The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the mother; her failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal conflict for the child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates between two different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she is a mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than that of his younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. >> >> LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely agonizing condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a condition frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional attitudes towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we have previously been able to observe among one of our children and which, you may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, from the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful attachment, and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of terrors and terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The German authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is experiencing a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for the mother and terror of the witch coexist. >> >> "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply pronounced conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction expressed in a simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the mother, a terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, combined with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going home was brought up." >> >> In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with more detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of pity: of sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion can coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother not as a bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, or weak. She acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. This, then, means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a "duty" to take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. >> >> Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest child has a single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. His emotions follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. >> >> LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was ill and he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his mother down, make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones and comfort them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the family, the only one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". >> >> In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and cognition in each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship changes with age. >> >> Martin >> >> The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a preschooler, and the oldest a school-aged child. >> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff > wrote: >> >> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive connection? >> As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a different >> realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective position of >> the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where there is >> emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then as the >> cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs from the >> internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the connectedness >> takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn >> motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. >> >> On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees > >> wrote: >> >> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every word, >> but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating with the >> same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like this >> discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it because we each >> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our >> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be expected to >> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some people, >> etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an >> approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be negotiated in >> discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer to >> understanding how a particular person uses particular words when we get to >> know that person as a person and that involves much more than just batting >> words to and fro! >> >> Rod >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] >> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? >> >> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is this >> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this case >> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds >> onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. >> >> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer > >> wrote: >> >> Andy, >> >> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture >> everything. >> >> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college >> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because that >> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is strongly >> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, >> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the >> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen >> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a >> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements that >> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. >> >> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of >> water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions driving >> further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially >> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is >> actually >> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and >> dissociating >> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't develop >> further. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >> >> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor - >> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is >> simply >> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and >> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of >> water. >> >> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and >> OH >> together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge >> and >> OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative >> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals >> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and therefore >> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions >> and >> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of >> life. :) >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=3rveoQhoPSPbCSnfZzk4AbReuqBPUZxNB40ISNTLCXw&e= >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own >> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not a >> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: water >> is >> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an internal >> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. >> >> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is >> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) >> >> Martin >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole > wrote: >> >> >> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such >> that two >> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to water >> with >> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise to >> the >> concrete for their own cases. >> mike >> >> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >> >> wrote: >> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >> >> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic >> system >> with >> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, >> and I >> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before >> posting. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < >> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> >> On the contrary. >> >> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about >> activity >> >> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple >> example >> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history >> corner of >> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger >> footing >> in >> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing >> new >> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which >> division >> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a >> leadership >> team >> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which >> in turn >> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky >> and >> quick, change your history. >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >> >> >> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies >> that, >> >> once one understands the relationships among the components, one can >> bring >> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on >> *another* >> component of the totality. >> >> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of >> >> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent >> elements that >> are only accidentally brought together. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >> >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >> >> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the >> question >> >> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method >> of >> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components >> in a >> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, >> which >> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means >> that >> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < >> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >> >> wrote: >> >> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >> >> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective >> responses >> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a >> rule >> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >> >> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >> >> *insight*. It >> >> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, >> it is >> >> the >> >> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >> >> usually comes >> >> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >> some >> >> other >> >> unit of analysis. >> >> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The >> question >> >> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to >> do?" The >> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to >> accomplish. >> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we >> trying >> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, >> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be >> late >> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and >> will miss >> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're >> talking >> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle >> aged >> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be >> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, >> but >> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would >> then >> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were >> often >> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. >> Also, a >> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was >> happening >> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out >> buying >> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not >> easy. >> >> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, >> >> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate >> members of >> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to >> something >> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society >> so >> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended >> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you >> can >> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing >> the >> whole >> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy >> says, a >> matter of solving puzzles. >> >> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually >> speak to >> >> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about >> activity >> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in >> conflict >> with each other, which adds to the drama. >> >> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in >> mind? >> >> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the >> class, >> or >> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most >> interesting >> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of >> children) >> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not >> identical. >> >> Helena >> >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> >> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >> >> >> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I >> >> supervise >> >> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two >> of >> >> them on >> >> early childhood science education and one on primary science. >> They >> >> have >> >> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of >> division >> of >> >> labor. >> >> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When >> they >> >> decided to >> >> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT >> context >> >> mainly >> >> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt >> about >> the >> >> " unit >> >> of analysis". >> >> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < >> >> ablunden@mira.net> >> >> ??????: >> >> >> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it >> was >> >> one of >> >> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this >> concept >> >> was >> >> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new >> for >> >> me, was >> >> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this >> >> expression, I'd >> >> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it >> referred >> to >> >> was a >> >> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT >> methodology >> >> whilst >> >> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me >> know. >> >> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >> >> *insight*. It >> >> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, >> it >> >> is the >> >> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >> >> usually comes >> >> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >> some >> >> other >> >> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is >> the >> new >> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. >> So for >> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their >> research, >> >> often >> >> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their >> >> supervisor. I >> >> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this >> >> point in >> >> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the >> data >> >> they now >> >> know they need. >> >> Andy >> >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> *Andy Blunden* >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=3rveoQhoPSPbCSnfZzk4AbReuqBPUZxNB40ISNTLCXw&e= >> >> >> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >> >> >> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two >> >> articles. But, >> >> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in >> posts. >> >> I >> >> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow >> that >> >> through >> >> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am >> usually >> >> just >> >> trying to keep up with reading! >> >> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm >> >> interested >> >> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, >> and >> >> how they >> >> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are >> people >> >> doing >> >> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of >> analysis >> >> being used? >> >> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >> >> interested to >> >> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might >> be >> as >> >> basic as >> >> these. >> >> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in >> a >> >> much more >> >> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of >> analysis. >> In >> >> Mike's >> >> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that >> the >> >> action is >> >> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors >> that >> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here >> before, >> >> are >> >> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a >> picture of >> >> much >> >> more than just Mike's behavior. >> Katie >> >> Katie Wester-Neal >> University of Georgia >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> ............................................................ >> Katerina Plakitsi >> Associate Professor of Science Education >> School of Education >> University of Ioannina >> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >> Ioannina >> Greece >> tel. +302651005771 >> fax. +302651005842 >> mobile.phone +306972898463 >> >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__users.uoi.gr_kplakits&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=efoIjdDk3jJPjstsnAWWLdeIxhiX2xuo9tpkz5vPuVQ&e= >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__erasmus-2Dip.uoi.gr_&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=EHxDmy94dcMDH7DjaNERyWA8najtdG0AixBFr6FWcVw&e= >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.lib.uoi.gr_serp&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=64STTL4tfW0mDzqSW2DtIY3RA4JTIvXOxP6shhGZojE&e= >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >> an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> *Patrick Jaki* >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >> ________________________________ >> [https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.plymouth.ac.uk_images_email-5Ffooter.gif&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=iG_47fsNGlv4trjCw-8sMc3vXde0Gfd-flhzBSx_7-I&e= ]< >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.plymouth.ac.uk_worldclass&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=8RYajE24gomKXKgASDgieRrIkZpgR8E3fCn1_2Q3esY&e= > >> >> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for >> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. >> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts >> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails >> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility >> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied >> by an official order form. >> >> >> >> >> -- >> *Robyn Babaeff* >> >> >> >> Holli A. Tonyan, Ph.D. >> ------------ >> Associate Professor | Department of Psychology | California State University, Northridge >> Postal Address: 18111 Nordhoff Street | Northridge, CA 91330-8255 >> >> Tel: (818) 677-4970 | Fax: (818) 677-2829 >> Office: ST322 >> >> http://www.csun.edu/~htonyan >> http://csun.academia.edu/HolliTonyan >> http://www.csun.edu/~ata20315/GE/general_experimental_psychology2.html >> >> **check out** >> >> Tonyan, H. A. (in press). Everyday routines: A window into the cultural organization of family child care. Journal of Early Childhood Research. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1476718X14523748 >> >> Tonyan, H. A., Nuttall, J. (2014). Connecting cultural models of home-based care and childminders? career paths: An Eco-cultural analysis. International Journal of Early Years Education, 22, 117-138, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09669760.2013.809654 >> >> Tonyan, H. A., Mamikonian, A., & Chien, D. (2013). Do they practice what they preach? An Ecocultural, multidimensional, group-based examination of the relationship between beliefs and behaviours among child care providers. Early Child Development and Care, 183:12, 1853-1877. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03004430.2012.759949 >> >> This message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged, confidential or exempt from disclosure under applicable federal or state law. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, please immediately notify the sender by telephone at (818)677-4970, and destroy all copies of this e-mail and all attachments. >> >> Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has. - Margaret Mead US anthropologist & popularizer of anthropology (1901 - 1978) >> >> >> > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Role of Environment and Heredity.docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 315263 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141014/c41d097c/attachment-0001.bin -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Summarizing Endnote 3.doc Type: application/msword Size: 55296 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141014/c41d097c/attachment-0002.doc -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Summarizing Endnote 4.doc Type: application/msword Size: 56320 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141014/c41d097c/attachment-0003.doc From ablunden@mira.net Mon Oct 13 16:28:28 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 10:28:28 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <984FAF8B-059E-4DA4-B4B8-324C4C26125B@csun.edu> <8540F7A9-EC6C-4A68-9436-B642FE7DCE19@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <543C601C.50407@mira.net> I also went to check on the Russian word at that point, too, David. I was expecting to find ????????? but I found something different which was not problematic, but I must have got confused in my decoding of a language I don't read. I will bow to your greater experience in this. ????????? is the word Vasilyuk uses as a key part of his system. It is usually translated as "life relation", but dictionaries also use "life orientation" as well as "attitude" and Kozulin suggests translating it as "life-intention" or "life-work". I just take it as "project" where Vasilyuk uses it. However, these kind of translations are quite unsuitable for characterising the position of a child. They are relevant only to the adult world. In the context of child-and-carers, I think "attitude" is just as good as "interpretation", "significance", etc., the various words Vygotsky uses to indicate the relation relevant at the child's stage of development. Vygotsky is here coming to the brink of an Activity Theory. I agree with Alfred, that the word "situation" precisely capture what Vygotsky here calls "the unity of the person and the environment" and various other formulations. "Situation", or more precisely "social situation of development" is the term used in "The Problem of Age," http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/problem-age.htm and in my view exactly the same standpoint is being expressed in both works. I think however that Julian is raising an issue which Vygotsky did *not* tackle, but Leontyev *did*, albeit imperfectly. Vygotsky approached the cultural formation of the psyche by means of a study of the collaborative use of artifacts which originate in a wider culture, in some social situation, also the product of the wider culture. He observed that ?the concept arises and is formed in a complex operation that is directed toward the resolution of some task,? (CW v. 1, p. 123) ?tasks that are posed for the maturing adolescent by the social environment ? tasks that are associated with his entry into the cultural, professional, and social life of the adult world? (/ibid./, p. 132). But he did *not* investigate the processes of formation of the social environment itself. Like all psychologists, Vygotsky took the social formation as given for the purposes of Psychology. Of course, he lived through a revolution; he did not think it *was* static, but his psychology was not also a social theory. I think we need to accept this; finding a good place for your deckchair on the Titanic is not a substitute for keeping the Titanic afloat. :) Leontyev tried to extend Psychology into social theory and I think it can be done, but I think Activity Theory needs some work yet. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David Kellogg wrote: > The discussion has been well and truly enlivened and broadened since I > left it yesterday morning! Let me just add four little leavenings: > > a) The word "attitude" is a mistranslation, I think. When we look at > the Russian original Lecture Four we see that everytime Prout (the > Vygotsky Reader translator) uses "attitude", what is in fact meant is > "relation" or "relationship" (?????????). > > b) Here's the pendant lecture, entitled "The Role of Environment and > Heredity" in pedology. I did circulate this earlier, and Andy > correctly remarked that it was poorly edited; what we try to do is not > create a smooth English translation but instead create something quite > awkward and literal which can then be fashioned into a good Korean > translation by our Korean speakers and Russian speakers. I'm afraid I > just don't have time to create a good English version. > > c) As you can see, Vygotsky's method is to take TWO inter-related > topics at once, expand the first into a complete lecture which > nevertheless refers to the second topic throughout, and then handle > the second topic in a subsequent lecture referring back to the first. > So: > > Lecture One: The general topic (the problem and the approach) > Lecture Two: The methodological approach (with reference to the > problem and the approach) > > Lecture Three: The role of the environment and heredity (mostly heredity) > Lecture Four: The role of the environment (with reference to the > child's individual contribution) > > Lecture Five: Psychological Development (and physiological development) > Lecture Six: Physiological Development (the endocrine system with > reference to the nervous system) > Lecture Seven: Physiological Development (the nervous system with > reference to the endocrine system) > > d) I'm also attaching the "Summarizing Endnotes" that we are planning > for our edited Korean volume. The idea is to have a kind of "executive > summary" for busy teachers who find the original kind of impenetrable. > I'm assuming that there are people on the list who fall into this > category--I know that I am one. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > On 14 October 2014 05:53, Martin John Packer wrote: > >> Hi Holli, >> >> Certainly there is a neurological component to emotion in young children, and to the regulation of emotion in later childhood and adulthood. What I think this leaves out, however, is the important role of adults in regulating emotion *for* their children. Remember that the higher mental functions are first social, and later personal. Precisely what a drunken parent cannot do is help a young child regulate his or her emotions; on the contrary, they are likely to stir up even stronger emotion. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 13, 2014, at 3:38 PM, Tonyan, Holli A wrote: >> >> >>> Martin and others, >>> >>> What Martin wrote here reminds me of important work by Nim Tottenham (http://www.columbia.edu/cu/psychology/fac-bios/TottenhamN/faculty.html). Unfortunately, I saw a presentation and have not read her work so I cannot include a reference here. Nim has studied the development of the amygdala and it's role in processing early emotional experiences and trauma. Her work shows that anatomically, the amygdala of children who were exposed to trauma/deprivation very early in life is larger than other children who have not experienced trauma/deprivation. What I remember from the presentation was that the strength of the amygdala before the development of the prefrontal cortex with increasing capacity for the regulation of the amygdala meant that children had a very hard time learning to regulate the amygdala - it is as though they have to develop together or one overpowers the other. Here is a very physical representation of the connection between the emotion and the cognition. She referred to the amygdala not as the "threat detector" as is common, but as the "relevance detector" but in an emotional sense. Not exactly perezhevanie, but NOT cognitive or processed in the same way. What you called "detachment" could be increased capacity to "override" the amygdala's functioning with pre-frontal cortex capacity - a biological component of what LSV saw as higher mental functions, perhaps. >>> >>> OK - back to report preparation and writing for me... >>> >>> All these interesting posts are such seductive distraction... >>> >>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 5:21 AM, Martin John Packer > wrote: >>> >>> >>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive connection? >>> >>> >>> It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their mother's drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the dynamic development of perezhivanie. >>> >>> In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from emotion, in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and interpreting the circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, the child is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction is one of extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates involuntarily and stammers. He loses control of his own body. >>> >>> LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the horror of what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of terror, enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to speak at all as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction amounts to a state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of this situation." >>> >>> The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more developed. The contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an alternation between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion towards the mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the breakdown seen in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily emotional, but it is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The child's love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, directed towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as bad. It is, however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions that is so difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of approach-avoidance. The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the mother; her failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal conflict for the child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates between two different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she is a mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than that of his younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. >>> >>> LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely agonizing condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a condition frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional attitudes towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we have previously been able to observe among one of our children and which, you may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, from the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful attachment, and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of terrors and terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. The German authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is experiencing a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for the mother and terror of the witch coexist. >>> >>> "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply pronounced conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction expressed in a simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the mother, a terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, combined with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going home was brought up." >>> >>> In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with more detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of pity: of sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and compassion can coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother not as a bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, or weak. She acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. This, then, means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a "duty" to take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. >>> >>> Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest child has a single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. His emotions follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. >>> >>> LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother was ill and he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his mother down, make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones and comfort them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the family, the only one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". >>> >>> In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and cognition in each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship changes with age. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a preschooler, and the oldest a school-aged child. >>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff > wrote: >>> >>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic involving >>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive connection? >>> As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves into a different >>> realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective position of >>> the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where there is >>> emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then as the >>> cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs from the >>> internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the connectedness >>> takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn >>> motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. >>> >>> On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees > >>> wrote: >>> >>> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and every word, >>> but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all operating with the >>> same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like this >>> discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it because we each >>> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which includes our >>> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be expected to >>> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead some people, >>> etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an >>> approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be negotiated in >>> discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get closer to >>> understanding how a particular person uses particular words when we get to >>> know that person as a person and that involves much more than just batting >>> words to and fro! >>> >>> Rod >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>> on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] >>> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? >>> >>> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in English? Is this >>> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, in this case >>> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, which adds >>> onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. >>> >>> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer > >>> wrote: >>> >>> Andy, >>> >>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot capture >>> everything. >>> >>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my college >>> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, because that >>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen is strongly >>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen atoms, >>> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This has the >>> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to hydrogen >>> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that water is a >>> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from elements that >>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. >>> >>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the *formation* of >>> water. My point was that once formed, there are no contradictions driving >>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does partially >>> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of water is >>> actually >>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and >>> dissociating >>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it doesn't develop >>> further. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>> >>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a metaphor - >>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case it is >>> simply >>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O molecules, and >>> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the properties of >>> water. >>> >>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind the H and >>> OH >>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a positive charge >>> and >>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old positive/negative >>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all chemicals >>> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base and therefore >>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of contradictions >>> and >>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the chemistry of >>> life. :) >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=3rveoQhoPSPbCSnfZzk4AbReuqBPUZxNB40ISNTLCXw&e= >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that LSV's own >>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. Water is not a >>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process stops: water >>> is >>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which an internal >>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for change. >>> >>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a triangle is >>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) >>> >>> Martin >>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole > wrote: >>> >>> >>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and oxygen such >>> that two >>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give rise to water >>> with >>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people to rise to >>> the >>> concrete for their own cases. >>> mike >>> >>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >>> >>> wrote: >>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >>> >>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a dynamic >>> system >>> with >>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike linked to, >>> and I >>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all before >>> posting. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On the contrary. >>> >>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things about >>> activity >>> >>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A very simple >>> example >>> is that if you change something in the norms/customs/laws/history >>> corner of >>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a stronger >>> footing >>> in >>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by bringing >>> new >>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out of which >>> division >>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with a >>> leadership >>> team >>> that is not all white, or not all primarily English-speaking, which >>> in turn >>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if you're lucky >>> and >>> quick, change your history. >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> >>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>> >>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it implies >>> that, >>> >>> once one understands the relationships among the components, one can >>> bring >>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting on >>> *another* >>> component of the totality. >>> >>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me this type of >>> >>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to represent >>> elements that >>> are only accidentally brought together. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >>> >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>> >>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is that the >>> question >>> >>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was exploring a method >>> of >>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among components >>> in a >>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor on another, >>> which >>> is often how students frame their research interest. And this means >>> that >>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this relationship. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" in a very >>> >>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape collective >>> responses >>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships (like, when a >>> rule >>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree with Andy: >>> >>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>> >>> *insight*. It >>> >>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, >>> it is >>> >>> the >>> >>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>> >>> usually comes >>> >>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>> some >>> >>> other >>> >>> unit of analysis. >>> >>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. The >>> question >>> >>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we going to >>> do?" The >>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are trying to >>> accomplish. >>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off temporarily? Are we >>> trying >>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system in Chicago, >>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm going to be >>> late >>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid today and >>> will miss >>> work" message on the answering machines of their supervisors. We're >>> talking >>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of them middle >>> aged >>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended families to be >>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message on a machine, >>> but >>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in person who would >>> then >>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because supervisors were >>> often >>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was unreliable. >>> Also, a >>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this was >>> happening >>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if someone it out >>> buying >>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call is not >>> easy. >>> >>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to accomplish, >>> >>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To educate >>> members of >>> the union and other others about how to respond collectively to >>> something >>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound change in society >>> so >>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of an extended >>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one that you >>> can >>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then reviewing >>> the >>> whole >>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, as Andy >>> says, a >>> matter of solving puzzles. >>> >>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to actually >>> speak to >>> >>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we talk about >>> activity >>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are often in >>> conflict >>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >>> >>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some purpose in >>> mind? >>> >>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose of the >>> class, >>> or >>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be most >>> interesting >>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis (purposes of >>> children) >>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet they're not >>> identical. >>> >>> Helena >>> >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> >>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>> >>> >>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my concern too. I >>> >>> supervise >>> >>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT context. Two >>> of >>> >>> them on >>> >>> early childhood science education and one on primary science. >>> They >>> >>> have >>> >>> collected log files, children discourses consisted of >>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and forms of >>> division >>> of >>> >>> labor. >>> >>> They have collected children narratives, and drawings. When >>> they >>> >>> decided to >>> >>> analyze their data they follow different paths into CHAT >>> context >>> >>> mainly >>> >>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still doubt >>> about >>> the >>> >>> " unit >>> >>> of analysis". >>> >>> ???? ???????, 12 ????????? 2014, ? ??????? Andy Blunden < >>> >>> ablunden@mira.net> >>> >>> ??????: >>> >>> >>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of analysis, it >>> was >>> >>> one of >>> >>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, that this >>> concept >>> >>> was >>> >>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and which was new >>> for >>> >>> me, was >>> >>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin of this >>> >>> expression, I'd >>> >>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that what it >>> referred >>> to >>> >>> was a >>> >>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning CHAT >>> methodology >>> >>> whilst >>> >>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, please let me >>> know. >>> >>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of analysis is an >>> >>> *insight*. It >>> >>> is not something that can be achieved by following a template, >>> it >>> >>> is the >>> >>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the leap. It >>> >>> usually comes >>> >>> *after* you've collected all the data for your research using >>> some >>> >>> other >>> >>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the unit is >>> the >>> new >>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of solving puzzles. >>> So for >>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in their >>> research, >>> >>> often >>> >>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get from their >>> >>> supervisor. I >>> >>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have got to this >>> >>> point in >>> >>> their thesis and discover that the data they have is not the >>> data >>> >>> they now >>> >>> know they need. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=3rveoQhoPSPbCSnfZzk4AbReuqBPUZxNB40ISNTLCXw&e= >>> >>> >>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >>> >>> >>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading the two >>> >>> articles. But, >>> >>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to contribute in >>> posts. >>> >>> I >>> >>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and don't follow >>> that >>> >>> through >>> >>> to write something. The writing is much harder, and I am >>> usually >>> >>> just >>> >>> trying to keep up with reading! >>> >>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably because I'm >>> >>> interested >>> >>> in different units of analysis, what they might be used for, >>> and >>> >>> how they >>> >>> fit together with theory and conducting research. What are >>> people >>> >>> doing >>> >>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't units of >>> analysis >>> >>> being used? >>> >>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, I'd be very >>> >>> interested to >>> >>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the questions might >>> be >>> as >>> >>> basic as >>> >>> these. >>> >>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my thoughts (in >>> a >>> >>> much more >>> >>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit of >>> analysis. >>> In >>> >>> Mike's >>> >>> example about driving and thinking and writing, I'd add that >>> the >>> >>> action is >>> >>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and historical factors >>> that >>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been said here >>> before, >>> >>> are >>> >>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions create a >>> picture of >>> >>> much >>> >>> more than just Mike's behavior. >>> Katie >>> >>> Katie Wester-Neal >>> University of Georgia >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> ............................................................ >>> Katerina Plakitsi >>> Associate Professor of Science Education >>> School of Education >>> University of Ioannina >>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>> Ioannina >>> Greece >>> tel. +302651005771 >>> fax. +302651005842 >>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>> >>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__users.uoi.gr_kplakits&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=efoIjdDk3jJPjstsnAWWLdeIxhiX2xuo9tpkz5vPuVQ&e= >>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__erasmus-2Dip.uoi.gr_&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=EHxDmy94dcMDH7DjaNERyWA8najtdG0AixBFr6FWcVw&e= >>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.lib.uoi.gr_serp&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=64STTL4tfW0mDzqSW2DtIY3RA4JTIvXOxP6shhGZojE&e= >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>> an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> *Patrick Jaki* >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >>> ________________________________ >>> [https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.plymouth.ac.uk_images_email-5Ffooter.gif&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=iG_47fsNGlv4trjCw-8sMc3vXde0Gfd-flhzBSx_7-I&e= ]< >>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.plymouth.ac.uk_worldclass&d=AAIDaQ&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=Yia3UbO1efIfsUrY8dLFKhSrL3J5uiI0Xe8pVr_ITwo&s=8RYajE24gomKXKgASDgieRrIkZpgR8E3fCn1_2Q3esY&e= > >>> >>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for >>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. >>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts >>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails >>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility >>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied >>> by an official order form. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> *Robyn Babaeff* >>> >>> >>> >>> Holli A. Tonyan, Ph.D. >>> ------------ >>> Associate Professor | Department of Psychology | California State University, Northridge >>> Postal Address: 18111 Nordhoff Street | Northridge, CA 91330-8255 >>> >>> Tel: (818) 677-4970 | Fax: (818) 677-2829 >>> Office: ST322 >>> >>> http://www.csun.edu/~htonyan >>> http://csun.academia.edu/HolliTonyan >>> http://www.csun.edu/~ata20315/GE/general_experimental_psychology2.html >>> >>> **check out** >>> >>> Tonyan, H. A. (in press). Everyday routines: A window into the cultural organization of family child care. Journal of Early Childhood Research. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1476718X14523748 >>> >>> Tonyan, H. A., Nuttall, J. (2014). Connecting cultural models of home-based care and childminders? career paths: An Eco-cultural analysis. International Journal of Early Years Education, 22, 117-138, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09669760.2013.809654 >>> >>> Tonyan, H. A., Mamikonian, A., & Chien, D. (2013). Do they practice what they preach? An Ecocultural, multidimensional, group-based examination of the relationship between beliefs and behaviours among child care providers. Early Child Development and Care, 183:12, 1853-1877. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03004430.2012.759949 >>> >>> This message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged, confidential or exempt from disclosure under applicable federal or state law. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, please immediately notify the sender by telephone at (818)677-4970, and destroy all copies of this e-mail and all attachments. >>> >>> Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has. - Margaret Mead US anthropologist & popularizer of anthropology (1901 - 1978) >>> >>> >>> >>> >> From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Oct 13 17:35:13 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 00:35:13 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <543C601C.50407@mira.net> References: <4CDD3120-F097-49C3-A8F2-5A10371AC88A@gmail.com> <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <984FAF8B-059E-4DA4-B4B8-324C4C26125B@csun.edu> <8540F7A9-EC6C-4A68-9436-B642FE7DCE19@uniandes.edu.co> <543C601C.50407@mira.net> Message-ID: Oh come, on Andy! Where is this "adult world" that apparently children do not live in? Do they live, then, in a separate "child world"? If so, in which of these worlds do parents become alcoholics? Here in Bogot? there are children living in the streets. In Western Africa there are children dying of ebola. Which world do they live in, exactly? Martin On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > However, these kind of translations are quite unsuitable for characterising the position of a child. They are relevant only to the adult world. In the context of child-and-carers, I think "attitude" is just as good as "interpretation", "significance", etc., the various words Vygotsky uses to indicate the relation relevant at the child's stage of development. From ablunden@mira.net Mon Oct 13 17:46:15 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 11:46:15 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] The Ideal and Nicaraguan Sign Language Message-ID: <543C7257.5070300@mira.net> Mike has drawn our attention to the Nicaraguan Sign Language http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaraguan_Sign_Language as a counter-example to Vygostsky's claim: "that if no appropriate ideal form can be found in the environment, and the development of the child, for whatever reasons, has to take place outside these specific conditions (described earlier), i.e. without any interaction with the final form, then this proper form will fail to develop properly in the child." In my opinion, this once-in-human-history event does not invalidate the principle Vygotsky was elaborating. Just like every attempt to say what distinguishes the human being from the animal seems to be faulted by the latest clip from YouTube, all such absolute claims are almost bound to fail at some point. But the principle, illustrated by the fact that children growing up in Russia speak Russian and understand the meaning of perezhivanie whereas we don't, etc., is hardly faulted by NSL. The other thing that Mike suggests is that the principle of the ideal being present in the environment carries with it the negation of the idea of the social formation itself being subject to continuous change. Again, I think Vygotsky just takes this as outside the concerns of Psychology. His essay on Socialist Man http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1930/socialism.htm shows that in fact he saw the psychology of people as primarily determined by the social formation of which they were a part and he saw that social formation as evolving. He was of course a modern, albeit I suspect a modern with a considerable capacity for irony. Now, this raises the difficult question of what Vygotsky may have meant by "ideal." Or, what he thought is a mystery, but what should *we* understand by ideality? It is well known that Vygotsky was surrounded by a number of fellows who were aficionados of Hegelianism, even if Vygotsky himself had never studied Hegel, so it is fair to suggest that the Hegelian concept of the Ideal is relevant in this context, of reconciling "ideal" as the norm in a given social formation and "ideal" as the notion of infinite, historical perfectability. For Hegel, "ideality" expresses both these principles; that is, that any relation contains within it a "gap" which makes it open to perfectability, and that "gap" is ever present, and its existence expresses what Hegel calls The Idea, that is to say, the ever-unfolding spirit of human freedom. Etc. It only requires that the Idea is present for any relation to be mutable. This is deep and challenging philosophical stuff which we don't really need, if we can just accept that "the ideal" does not mean something fixed and final, just an evolving norm: ever-shifting goal posts. Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From ablunden@mira.net Mon Oct 13 17:51:09 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 11:51:09 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <984FAF8B-059E-4DA4-B4B8-324C4C26125B@csun.edu> <8540F7A9-EC6C-4A68-9436-B642FE7DCE19@uniandes.edu.co> <543C601C.50407@mira.net> Message-ID: <543C737D.90905@mira.net> I think that street kids and child soldiers, etc., like the oldest child in Vygotsky's case study, are kids who have been thrust into the adult world developmentally before their time. To accept that there is no fixed and firm line between the child's world and the wider world in which adults make a living, marry, raise children, vote and fight wars is not to deny the existence of the distinction. In any case, whatever you or I think, Vygotsky (who knew plenty of street kids) used this distinction. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Oh come, on Andy! Where is this "adult world" that apparently children do not live in? Do they live, then, in a separate "child world"? If so, in which of these worlds do parents become alcoholics? Here in Bogot? there are children living in the streets. In Western Africa there are children dying of ebola. Which world do they live in, exactly? > > Martin > > > On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> However, these kind of translations are quite unsuitable for characterising the position of a child. They are relevant only to the adult world. In the context of child-and-carers, I think "attitude" is just as good as "interpretation", "significance", etc., the various words Vygotsky uses to indicate the relation relevant at the child's stage of development. >> > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Oct 13 18:01:06 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 01:01:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <543C737D.90905@mira.net> References: <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <984FAF8B-059E-4DA4-B4B8-324C4C26125B@csun.edu> <8540F7A9-EC6C-4A68-9436-B642FE7DCE19@uniandes.edu.co> <543C601C.50407@mira.net> <543C737D.90905@mira.net> Message-ID: Where did LSV draw a distinction between the child's world and the wider world, Andy? So adults raise children in the wider world, but those children live somewhere else? Martin On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I think that street kids and child soldiers, etc., like the oldest child in Vygotsky's case study, are kids who have been thrust into the adult world developmentally before their time. To accept that there is no fixed and firm line between the child's world and the wider world in which adults make a living, marry, raise children, vote and fight wars is not to deny the existence of the distinction. > In any case, whatever you or I think, Vygotsky (who knew plenty of street kids) used this distinction. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Oh come, on Andy! Where is this "adult world" that apparently children do not live in? Do they live, then, in a separate "child world"? If so, in which of these worlds do parents become alcoholics? Here in Bogot? there are children living in the streets. In Western Africa there are children dying of ebola. Which world do they live in, exactly? >> >> Martin >> >> >> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> However, these kind of translations are quite unsuitable for characterising the position of a child. They are relevant only to the adult world. In the context of child-and-carers, I think "attitude" is just as good as "interpretation", "significance", etc., the various words Vygotsky uses to indicate the relation relevant at the child's stage of development. >>> >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Oct 13 18:13:32 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 12:13:32 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <984FAF8B-059E-4DA4-B4B8-324C4C26125B@csun.edu> <8540F7A9-EC6C-4A68-9436-B642FE7DCE19@uniandes.edu.co> <543C601C.50407@mira.net> <543C737D.90905@mira.net> Message-ID: <543C78BC.2000308@mira.net> Martin, 5 minutes ago you were lecturing Robyn Babaeff on the distinction between the 1st, 2nd and 3rd child. I presume you could also tell us about the difference between the psychology of an adult and a child of this or that age. I thought that we had established that the point Vygotsky is expressing in a dozen different ways (in the hope of not being misconstrued) is that it is not the world as such but the relation between the person and the world, the significance of the world for the child, the child's orientation to the world, the child's situation, and I think you threw in the *duties* of the child/man, as something distinct from the expectations placed upon a child. To talk about "the world a person lives in" is just another one of the hundred different ways of formulating the same relation. OK? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Where did LSV draw a distinction between the child's world and the wider world, Andy? > > So adults raise children in the wider world, but those children live somewhere else? > > Martin > > On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> I think that street kids and child soldiers, etc., like the oldest child in Vygotsky's case study, are kids who have been thrust into the adult world developmentally before their time. To accept that there is no fixed and firm line between the child's world and the wider world in which adults make a living, marry, raise children, vote and fight wars is not to deny the existence of the distinction. >> In any case, whatever you or I think, Vygotsky (who knew plenty of street kids) used this distinction. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> Oh come, on Andy! Where is this "adult world" that apparently children do not live in? Do they live, then, in a separate "child world"? If so, in which of these worlds do parents become alcoholics? Here in Bogot? there are children living in the streets. In Western Africa there are children dying of ebola. Which world do they live in, exactly? >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> >>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> However, these kind of translations are quite unsuitable for characterising the position of a child. They are relevant only to the adult world. In the context of child-and-carers, I think "attitude" is just as good as "interpretation", "significance", etc., the various words Vygotsky uses to indicate the relation relevant at the child's stage of development. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Oct 13 18:25:36 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 01:25:36 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <543C78BC.2000308@mira.net> References: <3345E6E3-1544-4E28-8356-7B48E0D91EE3@gmail.com> <17D6D33A-B58C-451A-8392-A3725583E348@uniandes.edu.co> <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <984FAF8B-059E-4DA4-B4B8-324C4C26125B@csun.edu> <8540F7A9-EC6C-4A68-9436-B642FE7DCE19@uniandes.edu.co> <543C601C.50407@mira.net> <543C737D.90905@mira.net> <543C78BC.2000308@mira.net> Message-ID: No, Andy, that's not OK. What I was saying, and what LSV said, was that the three children live in "exactly the same environmental conditions," "the same situation." I think it is a grave error - though a common one - to think that talk of "the world a person lives in" suggests that each person lives in a different world. That is very evidently *not* what LSV was saying. He is *not* saying that each child lives in a different world. He's *not* even saying that each child lives in a different situation. He says explicitly the opposite: they are all living in the *same* situation, the *same* environment. The *same* world. I would be willing to grant that different cultures amount to different worlds, or at least different worldviews (there is a debate in anthropology right now about this), but you seem to be talking about adults and children in the same culture. Of course there are differences between the psychology of an adult and the psychology of a child. From that you infer that they live in two different worlds? No - they have different ways of *relating* to the *same* world. Martin On Oct 13, 2014, at 8:13 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Martin, > 5 minutes ago you were lecturing Robyn Babaeff on the distinction between the 1st, 2nd and 3rd child. I presume you could also tell us about the difference between the psychology of an adult and a child of this or that age. I thought that we had established that the point Vygotsky is expressing in a dozen different ways (in the hope of not being misconstrued) is that it is not the world as such but the relation between the person and the world, the significance of the world for the child, the child's orientation to the world, the child's situation, and I think you threw in the *duties* of the child/man, as something distinct from the expectations placed upon a child. To talk about "the world a person lives in" is just another one of the hundred different ways of formulating the same relation. OK? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Where did LSV draw a distinction between the child's world and the wider world, Andy? >> >> So adults raise children in the wider world, but those children live somewhere else? >> Martin >> >> On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> I think that street kids and child soldiers, etc., like the oldest child in Vygotsky's case study, are kids who have been thrust into the adult world developmentally before their time. To accept that there is no fixed and firm line between the child's world and the wider world in which adults make a living, marry, raise children, vote and fight wars is not to deny the existence of the distinction. >>> In any case, whatever you or I think, Vygotsky (who knew plenty of street kids) used this distinction. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>>> Oh come, on Andy! Where is this "adult world" that apparently children do not live in? Do they live, then, in a separate "child world"? If so, in which of these worlds do parents become alcoholics? Here in Bogot? there are children living in the streets. In Western Africa there are children dying of ebola. Which world do they live in, exactly? >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> However, these kind of translations are quite unsuitable for characterising the position of a child. They are relevant only to the adult world. In the context of child-and-carers, I think "attitude" is just as good as "interpretation", "significance", etc., the various words Vygotsky uses to indicate the relation relevant at the child's stage of development. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Oct 13 18:36:52 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 12:36:52 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: References: <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <984FAF8B-059E-4DA4-B4B8-324C4C26125B@csun.edu> <8540F7A9-EC6C-4A68-9436-B642FE7DCE19@uniandes.edu.co> <543C601C.50407@mira.net> <543C737D.90905@mira.net> <543C78BC.2000308@mira.net> Message-ID: <543C7E34.9000805@mira.net> This is my last post on this question, Martin, just to clarify that "situation" is not the same as "environment," in that is specifically refers to the relation between the environment and the subject. OK, I was speaking loosely in using a colloquial expression. I should know better. But "situation" is a precise word, and "social situation of development" is even more precise. Not the same as "environment." See "Problem of Age" on this. But nonetheless, Martin, our exchange does highlight how easy it is to misconstrue someone's word on this topic. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > No, Andy, that's not OK. What I was saying, and what LSV said, was that the three children live in "exactly the same environmental conditions," "the same situation." I think it is a grave error - though a common one - to think that talk of "the world a person lives in" suggests that each person lives in a different world. That is very evidently *not* what LSV was saying. He is *not* saying that each child lives in a different world. He's *not* even saying that each child lives in a different situation. He says explicitly the opposite: they are all living in the *same* situation, the *same* environment. The *same* world. I would be willing to grant that different cultures amount to different worlds, or at least different worldviews (there is a debate in anthropology right now about this), but you seem to be talking about adults and children in the same culture. Of course there are differences between the psychology of an adult and the psychology of a child. From that you infer that they live in two different worlds? No - they have different ways of *relating* to the *same* world. > > Martin > > On Oct 13, 2014, at 8:13 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Martin, >> 5 minutes ago you were lecturing Robyn Babaeff on the distinction between the 1st, 2nd and 3rd child. I presume you could also tell us about the difference between the psychology of an adult and a child of this or that age. I thought that we had established that the point Vygotsky is expressing in a dozen different ways (in the hope of not being misconstrued) is that it is not the world as such but the relation between the person and the world, the significance of the world for the child, the child's orientation to the world, the child's situation, and I think you threw in the *duties* of the child/man, as something distinct from the expectations placed upon a child. To talk about "the world a person lives in" is just another one of the hundred different ways of formulating the same relation. OK? >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> Where did LSV draw a distinction between the child's world and the wider world, Andy? >>> >>> So adults raise children in the wider world, but those children live somewhere else? >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> I think that street kids and child soldiers, etc., like the oldest child in Vygotsky's case study, are kids who have been thrust into the adult world developmentally before their time. To accept that there is no fixed and firm line between the child's world and the wider world in which adults make a living, marry, raise children, vote and fight wars is not to deny the existence of the distinction. >>>> In any case, whatever you or I think, Vygotsky (who knew plenty of street kids) used this distinction. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Oh come, on Andy! Where is this "adult world" that apparently children do not live in? Do they live, then, in a separate "child world"? If so, in which of these worlds do parents become alcoholics? Here in Bogot? there are children living in the streets. In Western Africa there are children dying of ebola. Which world do they live in, exactly? >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> However, these kind of translations are quite unsuitable for characterising the position of a child. They are relevant only to the adult world. In the context of child-and-carers, I think "attitude" is just as good as "interpretation", "significance", etc., the various words Vygotsky uses to indicate the relation relevant at the child's stage of development. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >>> > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Oct 13 18:50:53 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 01:50:53 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? In-Reply-To: <543C7E34.9000805@mira.net> References: <543B5A61.3000200@mira.net> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC3110223093F@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <984FAF8B-059E-4DA4-B4B8-324C4C26125B@csun.edu> <8540F7A9-EC6C-4A68-9436-B642FE7DCE19@uniandes.edu.co> <543C601C.50407@mira.net> <543C737D.90905@mira.net> <543C78BC.2000308@mira.net> <543C7E34.9000805@mira.net> Message-ID: <5FDFAC12-6567-40A6-9B5E-C89223460722@uniandes.edu.co> I think you need to be careful to distinguish between "situation" and "social situation of development," Andy. LSV is very consistent in proposing that adult and child live in the same world, but relate to it differently. To repeat the excerpt I quoted earlier: LSV writes of "the same environmental conditions" and "the same situation"... "How can one explain why exactly the same environmental conditions exert three different types of influence on these three different children? It can be explained because each of the children has a different attitude to the situation. Or, as we might put it, each of the children experienced the situation in a different way. .... So it appears that, depending on the fact that the same situation had been experienced by the three children in three different ways, the influence which this situation exerted on their development also turns out to be different." While in the Problem of Age he writes... "We must admit that at the beginning of each age period, there develops a completely original, exclusive, single, and unique relation, specific to the given age, between the child and reality, mainly the social reality, that surrounds him. We call this relation the social situation of development at the given age." .. and that "the social situation of development is nothing other than a system of relations between the child of a given age and social reality." He is consistent: there is *one* social reality, one world. But different ways of relating to that reality. Martin On Oct 13, 2014, at 8:36 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > This is my last post on this question, Martin, just to clarify that "situation" is not the same as "environment," in that is specifically refers to the relation between the environment and the subject. OK, I was speaking loosely in using a colloquial expression. I should know better. But "situation" is a precise word, and "social situation of development" is even more precise. Not the same as "environment." See "Problem of Age" on this. > > But nonetheless, Martin, our exchange does highlight how easy it is to misconstrue someone's word on this topic. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> No, Andy, that's not OK. What I was saying, and what LSV said, was that the three children live in "exactly the same environmental conditions," "the same situation." I think it is a grave error - though a common one - to think that talk of "the world a person lives in" suggests that each person lives in a different world. That is very evidently *not* what LSV was saying. He is *not* saying that each child lives in a different world. He's *not* even saying that each child lives in a different situation. He says explicitly the opposite: they are all living in the *same* situation, the *same* environment. The *same* world. I would be willing to grant that different cultures amount to different worlds, or at least different worldviews (there is a debate in anthropology right now about this), but you seem to be talking about adults and children in the same culture. Of course there are differences between the psychology of an adult and the psychology of a child. From that you infer that they live in two different worlds? No - they have different ways of *relating* to the *same* world. >> Martin >> >> On Oct 13, 2014, at 8:13 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> Martin, >>> 5 minutes ago you were lecturing Robyn Babaeff on the distinction between the 1st, 2nd and 3rd child. I presume you could also tell us about the difference between the psychology of an adult and a child of this or that age. I thought that we had established that the point Vygotsky is expressing in a dozen different ways (in the hope of not being misconstrued) is that it is not the world as such but the relation between the person and the world, the significance of the world for the child, the child's orientation to the world, the child's situation, and I think you threw in the *duties* of the child/man, as something distinct from the expectations placed upon a child. To talk about "the world a person lives in" is just another one of the hundred different ways of formulating the same relation. OK? >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>>> Where did LSV draw a distinction between the child's world and the wider world, Andy? >>>> >>>> So adults raise children in the wider world, but those children live somewhere else? Martin >>>> >>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> I think that street kids and child soldiers, etc., like the oldest child in Vygotsky's case study, are kids who have been thrust into the adult world developmentally before their time. To accept that there is no fixed and firm line between the child's world and the wider world in which adults make a living, marry, raise children, vote and fight wars is not to deny the existence of the distinction. >>>>> In any case, whatever you or I think, Vygotsky (who knew plenty of street kids) used this distinction. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Oh come, on Andy! Where is this "adult world" that apparently children do not live in? Do they live, then, in a separate "child world"? If so, in which of these worlds do parents become alcoholics? Here in Bogot? there are children living in the streets. In Western Africa there are children dying of ebola. Which world do they live in, exactly? >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:28 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> However, these kind of translations are quite unsuitable for characterising the position of a child. They are relevant only to the adult world. In the context of child-and-carers, I think "attitude" is just as good as "interpretation", "significance", etc., the various words Vygotsky uses to indicate the relation relevant at the child's stage of development. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> >> > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Oct 13 20:18:32 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 21:18:32 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Ideal and Nicaraguan Sign Language In-Reply-To: <543C7257.5070300@mira.net> References: <543C7257.5070300@mira.net> Message-ID: It hardly seems that Vygotsky could have meant what Mike is taking him to mean or else we would have the logical impossibility (if we accept evolution as I assume V did) that the ideal form has always already been "there" all the way back to the first instance of human existence. "In the beginning was the word (and it contained all later ideal forms)"? That seems improbable that someone concerned with "development" like Vygotsky would have thought that way. For Vygotsky does development only happen in ontogeny but never in phylogeny? Andy, I'm wondering why you would call this a "once-in-human-history event"? Seems like this event captures perhaps the WHOLE of human history, no? From iconicity and indexicality to the symbolic function? But the symbolic function only develops as a coordinated project between people large numbers of people who develop conventional but arbitrary relations between signs and things. I assume I'm missing something glaring here. Very confused. -greg On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 6:46 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Mike has drawn our attention to the Nicaraguan Sign Language > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaraguan_Sign_Language > as a counter-example to Vygostsky's claim: > > "that if no appropriate ideal form can be found in the environment, > and the development of the child, for whatever reasons, has to take > place outside these specific conditions (described earlier), i.e. > without any interaction with the final form, then this proper form > will fail to develop properly in the child." > > In my opinion, this once-in-human-history event does not invalidate the > principle Vygotsky was elaborating. Just like every attempt to say what > distinguishes the human being from the animal seems to be faulted by the > latest clip from YouTube, all such absolute claims are almost bound to fail > at some point. But the principle, illustrated by the fact that children > growing up in Russia speak Russian and understand the meaning of > perezhivanie whereas we don't, etc., is hardly faulted by NSL. > > The other thing that Mike suggests is that the principle of the ideal > being present in the environment carries with it the negation of the idea > of the social formation itself being subject to continuous change. Again, I > think Vygotsky just takes this as outside the concerns of Psychology. His > essay on Socialist Man http://www.marxists.org/ > archive/vygotsky/works/1930/socialism.htm shows that in fact he saw the > psychology of people as primarily determined by the social formation of > which they were a part and he saw that social formation as evolving. He was > of course a modern, albeit I suspect a modern with a considerable capacity > for irony. > > Now, this raises the difficult question of what Vygotsky may have meant by > "ideal." Or, what he thought is a mystery, but what should *we* understand > by ideality? It is well known that Vygotsky was surrounded by a number of > fellows who were aficionados of Hegelianism, even if Vygotsky himself had > never studied Hegel, so it is fair to suggest that the Hegelian concept of > the Ideal is relevant in this context, of reconciling "ideal" as the norm > in a given social formation and "ideal" as the notion of infinite, > historical perfectability. For Hegel, "ideality" expresses both these > principles; that is, that any relation contains within it a "gap" which > makes it open to perfectability, and that "gap" is ever present, and its > existence expresses what Hegel calls The Idea, that is to say, the > ever-unfolding spirit of human freedom. Etc. It only requires that the Idea > is present for any relation to be mutable. This is deep and challenging > philosophical stuff which we don't really need, if we can just accept that > "the ideal" does not mean something fixed and final, just an evolving norm: > ever-shifting goal posts. > > Andy > > > > > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From carolmacdon@gmail.com Tue Oct 14 00:46:26 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 09:46:26 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Ideal and Nicaraguan Sign Language In-Reply-To: References: <543C7257.5070300@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy I am also confused. Sign language is a dinkum language. It has all the features of a human language, and can, because it is based in time and space, express even more in the verb than spoken language does. If a child has no access to the local sign language, then their gestural expression will still have symbolic meaning for their caretaker. Of course I may have missed the point. Carol On 14 October 2014 05:18, Greg Thompson wrote: > It hardly seems that Vygotsky could have meant what Mike is taking him to > mean or else we would have the logical impossibility (if we accept > evolution as I assume V did) that the ideal form has always already been > "there" all the way back to the first instance of human existence. "In the > beginning was the word (and it contained all later ideal forms)"? That > seems improbable that someone concerned with "development" like Vygotsky > would have thought that way. For Vygotsky does development only happen in > ontogeny but never in phylogeny? > > Andy, I'm wondering why you would call this a "once-in-human-history > event"? Seems like this event captures perhaps the WHOLE of human history, > no? From iconicity and indexicality to the symbolic function? But the > symbolic function only develops as a coordinated project between people > large numbers of people who develop conventional but arbitrary relations > between signs and things. > > I assume I'm missing something glaring here. > > Very confused. > -greg > > On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 6:46 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Mike has drawn our attention to the Nicaraguan Sign Language > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaraguan_Sign_Language > > as a counter-example to Vygostsky's claim: > > > > "that if no appropriate ideal form can be found in the environment, > > and the development of the child, for whatever reasons, has to take > > place outside these specific conditions (described earlier), i.e. > > without any interaction with the final form, then this proper form > > will fail to develop properly in the child." > > > > In my opinion, this once-in-human-history event does not invalidate the > > principle Vygotsky was elaborating. Just like every attempt to say what > > distinguishes the human being from the animal seems to be faulted by the > > latest clip from YouTube, all such absolute claims are almost bound to > fail > > at some point. But the principle, illustrated by the fact that children > > growing up in Russia speak Russian and understand the meaning of > > perezhivanie whereas we don't, etc., is hardly faulted by NSL. > > > > The other thing that Mike suggests is that the principle of the ideal > > being present in the environment carries with it the negation of the idea > > of the social formation itself being subject to continuous change. > Again, I > > think Vygotsky just takes this as outside the concerns of Psychology. His > > essay on Socialist Man http://www.marxists.org/ > > archive/vygotsky/works/1930/socialism.htm shows that in fact he saw the > > psychology of people as primarily determined by the social formation of > > which they were a part and he saw that social formation as evolving. He > was > > of course a modern, albeit I suspect a modern with a considerable > capacity > > for irony. > > > > Now, this raises the difficult question of what Vygotsky may have meant > by > > "ideal." Or, what he thought is a mystery, but what should *we* > understand > > by ideality? It is well known that Vygotsky was surrounded by a number of > > fellows who were aficionados of Hegelianism, even if Vygotsky himself had > > never studied Hegel, so it is fair to suggest that the Hegelian concept > of > > the Ideal is relevant in this context, of reconciling "ideal" as the norm > > in a given social formation and "ideal" as the notion of infinite, > > historical perfectability. For Hegel, "ideality" expresses both these > > principles; that is, that any relation contains within it a "gap" which > > makes it open to perfectability, and that "gap" is ever present, and its > > existence expresses what Hegel calls The Idea, that is to say, the > > ever-unfolding spirit of human freedom. Etc. It only requires that the > Idea > > is present for any relation to be mutable. This is deep and challenging > > philosophical stuff which we don't really need, if we can just accept > that > > "the ideal" does not mean something fixed and final, just an evolving > norm: > > ever-shifting goal posts. > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From ablunden@mira.net Tue Oct 14 00:48:51 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 18:48:51 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Ideal and Nicaraguan Sign Language In-Reply-To: References: <543C7257.5070300@mira.net> Message-ID: <543CD563.5030806@mira.net> I think I need to rest and let Mike explain what the issue is with Nicaraguan Sign Language. Does it prove Vygotsky was mistaken? If so how? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Carol Macdonald wrote: > Andy > > I am also confused. Sign language is a dinkum language. It has all > the features of a human language, and can, because it is based in time > and space, express even more in the verb than spoken language does. > > If a child has no access to the local sign language, then their > gestural expression will still have symbolic meaning for their caretaker. > > Of course I may have missed the point. > Carol > > On 14 October 2014 05:18, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > It hardly seems that Vygotsky could have meant what Mike is taking > him to > mean or else we would have the logical impossibility (if we accept > evolution as I assume V did) that the ideal form has always > already been > "there" all the way back to the first instance of human existence. > "In the > beginning was the word (and it contained all later ideal forms)"? That > seems improbable that someone concerned with "development" like > Vygotsky > would have thought that way. For Vygotsky does development only > happen in > ontogeny but never in phylogeny? > > Andy, I'm wondering why you would call this a "once-in-human-history > event"? Seems like this event captures perhaps the WHOLE of human > history, > no? From iconicity and indexicality to the symbolic function? But the > symbolic function only develops as a coordinated project between > people > large numbers of people who develop conventional but arbitrary > relations > between signs and things. > > I assume I'm missing something glaring here. > > Very confused. > -greg > > On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 6:46 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > Mike has drawn our attention to the Nicaraguan Sign Language > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaraguan_Sign_Language > > as a counter-example to Vygostsky's claim: > > > > "that if no appropriate ideal form can be found in the > environment, > > and the development of the child, for whatever reasons, has > to take > > place outside these specific conditions (described earlier), i.e. > > without any interaction with the final form, then this proper > form > > will fail to develop properly in the child." > > > > In my opinion, this once-in-human-history event does not > invalidate the > > principle Vygotsky was elaborating. Just like every attempt to > say what > > distinguishes the human being from the animal seems to be > faulted by the > > latest clip from YouTube, all such absolute claims are almost > bound to fail > > at some point. But the principle, illustrated by the fact that > children > > growing up in Russia speak Russian and understand the meaning of > > perezhivanie whereas we don't, etc., is hardly faulted by NSL. > > > > The other thing that Mike suggests is that the principle of the > ideal > > being present in the environment carries with it the negation of > the idea > > of the social formation itself being subject to continuous > change. Again, I > > think Vygotsky just takes this as outside the concerns of > Psychology. His > > essay on Socialist Man http://www.marxists.org/ > > archive/vygotsky/works/1930/socialism.htm shows that in fact he > saw the > > psychology of people as primarily determined by the social > formation of > > which they were a part and he saw that social formation as > evolving. He was > > of course a modern, albeit I suspect a modern with a > considerable capacity > > for irony. > > > > Now, this raises the difficult question of what Vygotsky may > have meant by > > "ideal." Or, what he thought is a mystery, but what should *we* > understand > > by ideality? It is well known that Vygotsky was surrounded by a > number of > > fellows who were aficionados of Hegelianism, even if Vygotsky > himself had > > never studied Hegel, so it is fair to suggest that the Hegelian > concept of > > the Ideal is relevant in this context, of reconciling "ideal" as > the norm > > in a given social formation and "ideal" as the notion of infinite, > > historical perfectability. For Hegel, "ideality" expresses both > these > > principles; that is, that any relation contains within it a > "gap" which > > makes it open to perfectability, and that "gap" is ever present, > and its > > existence expresses what Hegel calls The Idea, that is to say, the > > ever-unfolding spirit of human freedom. Etc. It only requires > that the Idea > > is present for any relation to be mutable. This is deep and > challenging > > philosophical stuff which we don't really need, if we can just > accept that > > "the ideal" does not mean something fixed and final, just an > evolving norm: > > ever-shifting goal posts. > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Tue Oct 14 04:40:13 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 13:40:13 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Ideal and Nicaraguan Sign Language In-Reply-To: <543C7257.5070300@mira.net> References: <543C7257.5070300@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi I am sorry it took me so long to read the post - I am with Tomasello on this. I don't think this is evidence for LAD. The LAD has very specific reference to universal parameters, and the history of theoretical linguistics in the last 55 years or so has had to step back and back to parameter setting so the "universals" are more and more abstract. Perhaps a linguist on the site could resolve what they are now. Phonology has the most developed set. And how does this relate to communication per se? Can anybody help? Even the notion of verb-ness and noun-ness as universals are contested. Pidgins arise when people have a need to communicate; then they become creoles. The children and their caretakers had such a need. We have no idea how abstract, or signified, when this first began. In South Africa this happened when mineworkers from all over South Africa needed to have a common form of communication. It has never developed to a creole, because the speakers have their own Bantu languages, and the need underground is so specific and restricted that there has been no further development. ISN has had a very strong motivation to develop. Creoles do become languages - Jamaican is a case in point. In my situation, Afrikaans can be regarded as creoloid, where the mother language - Dutch has been simplified. The Afrikaners historically has access to the Bible in High Dutch, but we know the Bible deals with a wide range of concepts, so Afrikaans has had to take on board scientific concepts. There is generally a "correct" Afrikaans term, and a related word which can be regarded as closer to English. Both are included in their lexicon. The latter characteristic is part of language planning/development per se. Perhaps I have seen so much in a multi-linguistic environment, that I see this as more fluid. I think this is enough for me now - can someone respond? Carol On 14 October 2014 02:46, Andy Blunden wrote: > Mike has drawn our attention to the Nicaraguan Sign Language > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaraguan_Sign_Language > as a counter-example to Vygostsky's claim: > > "that if no appropriate ideal form can be found in the environment, > and the development of the child, for whatever reasons, has to take > place outside these specific conditions (described earlier), i.e. > without any interaction with the final form, then this proper form > will fail to develop properly in the child." > > In my opinion, this once-in-human-history event does not invalidate the > principle Vygotsky was elaborating. Just like every attempt to say what > distinguishes the human being from the animal seems to be faulted by the > latest clip from YouTube, all such absolute claims are almost bound to fail > at some point. But the principle, illustrated by the fact that children > growing up in Russia speak Russian and understand the meaning of > perezhivanie whereas we don't, etc., is hardly faulted by NSL. > > The other thing that Mike suggests is that the principle of the ideal > being present in the environment carries with it the negation of the idea > of the social formation itself being subject to continuous change. Again, I > think Vygotsky just takes this as outside the concerns of Psychology. His > essay on Socialist Man http://www.marxists.org/ > archive/vygotsky/works/1930/socialism.htm shows that in fact he saw the > psychology of people as primarily determined by the social formation of > which they were a part and he saw that social formation as evolving. He was > of course a modern, albeit I suspect a modern with a considerable capacity > for irony. > > Now, this raises the difficult question of what Vygotsky may have meant by > "ideal." Or, what he thought is a mystery, but what should *we* understand > by ideality? It is well known that Vygotsky was surrounded by a number of > fellows who were aficionados of Hegelianism, even if Vygotsky himself had > never studied Hegel, so it is fair to suggest that the Hegelian concept of > the Ideal is relevant in this context, of reconciling "ideal" as the norm > in a given social formation and "ideal" as the notion of infinite, > historical perfectability. For Hegel, "ideality" expresses both these > principles; that is, that any relation contains within it a "gap" which > makes it open to perfectability, and that "gap" is ever present, and its > existence expresses what Hegel calls The Idea, that is to say, the > ever-unfolding spirit of human freedom. Etc. It only requires that the Idea > is present for any relation to be mutable. This is deep and challenging > philosophical stuff which we don't really need, if we can just accept that > "the ideal" does not mean something fixed and final, just an evolving norm: > ever-shifting goal posts. > > Andy > > > > > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From ablunden@mira.net Tue Oct 14 07:08:04 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 01:08:04 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Ideal and Nicaraguan Sign Language In-Reply-To: References: <543C7257.5070300@mira.net> Message-ID: <543D2E44.7070709@mira.net> How would you explain then, Carol, how the Nicaraguan children managed to acquire such a sophisticated language in a couple of generations? Are elements of language implicit in social practices? How does it happen? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Carol Macdonald wrote: > Hi > > I am sorry it took me so long to read the post - I am with Tomasello > on this. I don't think this is evidence for LAD. The LAD has very > specific reference to universal parameters, and the history of > theoretical linguistics in the last 55 years or so has had to step > back and back to parameter setting so the "universals" are more and > more abstract. Perhaps a linguist on the site could resolve what they > are now. Phonology has the most developed set. And how does this > relate to communication per se? Can anybody help? Even the notion of > verb-ness and noun-ness as universals are contested. > > Pidgins arise when people have a need to communicate; then they become > creoles. The children and their caretakers had such a need. We have > no idea how abstract, or signified, when this first began. > > In South Africa this happened when mineworkers from all over South > Africa needed to have a common form of communication. It has never > developed to a creole, because the speakers have their own Bantu > languages, and the need underground is so specific and restricted that > there has been no further development. > > ISN has had a very strong motivation to develop. Creoles do become > languages - Jamaican is a case in point. In my situation, Afrikaans > can be regarded as creoloid, where the mother language - Dutch has > been simplified. The Afrikaners historically has access to the Bible > in High Dutch, but we know the Bible deals with a wide range of > concepts, so Afrikaans has had to take on board scientific concepts. > There is generally a "correct" Afrikaans term, and a related word > which can be regarded as closer to English. Both are included in > their lexicon. The latter characteristic is part of language > planning/development per se. > > Perhaps I have seen so much in a multi-linguistic environment, that I > see this as more fluid. I think this is enough for me now - can > someone respond? > > Carol > > On 14 October 2014 02:46, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > Mike has drawn our attention to the Nicaraguan Sign Language > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaraguan_Sign_Language > as a counter-example to Vygostsky's claim: > > "that if no appropriate ideal form can be found in the environment, > and the development of the child, for whatever reasons, has to take > place outside these specific conditions (described earlier), i.e. > without any interaction with the final form, then this proper form > will fail to develop properly in the child." > > In my opinion, this once-in-human-history event does not > invalidate the principle Vygotsky was elaborating. Just like every > attempt to say what distinguishes the human being from the animal > seems to be faulted by the latest clip from YouTube, all such > absolute claims are almost bound to fail at some point. But the > principle, illustrated by the fact that children growing up in > Russia speak Russian and understand the meaning of perezhivanie > whereas we don't, etc., is hardly faulted by NSL. > > The other thing that Mike suggests is that the principle of the > ideal being present in the environment carries with it the > negation of the idea of the social formation itself being subject > to continuous change. Again, I think Vygotsky just takes this as > outside the concerns of Psychology. His essay on Socialist Man > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1930/socialism.htm > shows that in fact he saw the psychology of people as primarily > determined by the social formation of which they were a part and > he saw that social formation as evolving. He was of course a > modern, albeit I suspect a modern with a considerable capacity for > irony. > > Now, this raises the difficult question of what Vygotsky may have > meant by "ideal." Or, what he thought is a mystery, but what > should *we* understand by ideality? It is well known that Vygotsky > was surrounded by a number of fellows who were aficionados of > Hegelianism, even if Vygotsky himself had never studied Hegel, so > it is fair to suggest that the Hegelian concept of the Ideal is > relevant in this context, of reconciling "ideal" as the norm in a > given social formation and "ideal" as the notion of infinite, > historical perfectability. For Hegel, "ideality" expresses both > these principles; that is, that any relation contains within it a > "gap" which makes it open to perfectability, and that "gap" is > ever present, and its existence expresses what Hegel calls The > Idea, that is to say, the ever-unfolding spirit of human freedom. > Etc. It only requires that the Idea is present for any relation to > be mutable. This is deep and challenging philosophical stuff which > we don't really need, if we can just accept that "the ideal" does > not mean something fixed and final, just an evolving norm: > ever-shifting goal posts. > > Andy > > > > > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Oct 14 07:45:12 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 07:45:12 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Ideal and Nicaraguan Sign Language In-Reply-To: <543D2E44.7070709@mira.net> References: <543C7257.5070300@mira.net> <543D2E44.7070709@mira.net> Message-ID: I suggest that people pause to check out the phenomenon of Nicaraguan Sign, and that someone with linguistic sophistication and knowledge of the case join the discussion. The basic facts can be found at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaraguan_Sign_Language. Googling Senghas Nicaraguan Sign Language will turn up a lot. Vygotsy seemed to be saying that left to themselves, a group of deaf kids would not invent a language. These kids do. BUT, as Julian (?) pointed out, these kids, while cut off from the language of the adults who brought them together (LSV did not specify the conditions of such a gathering), even the sign language which was Spanish/finger-spelled, literacy derived, they do, OVER GENERATIONSj of kids coming to the center, form a more and more complex communication system that now,. several generations later, looks a whole lot like a normal language. Where is the ideal form that is the end in the beginning? That is the question. I do not know the answer. However, from other evidence collected by Goldin-Meadow and others, I believe that the "ideal form" a culturally organized form of life IS there at the beginning for the kids in their social environment, including the organization of their own joint activities together outside of the purview of adults. This latter interpretation is discussed in a textbook by wife and I wrote and elsewhere. I can send the summary of that bit of amateur speculation/inference if the topic of the centrality of the end being in the beginning, and LSV's analysis of that topic in the article we are reading, is of interest. LSV is not "proven wrong" by this case. The complexity of the issue, however, is certainly easier to grasp. mike PS-- There is fascinating work by my colleague, Carol Padden, on another such case in the Negev desert that is a few generations old and for which the entire genetic mapping from the initial deaf originator as the language grows and spreads in the community is part of the research. The grammar of the language is unlike either Hebrew or Arabic, the two languages that exist in the environment of these people. On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 7:08 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > How would you explain then, Carol, how the Nicaraguan children managed to > acquire such a sophisticated language in a couple of generations? > Are elements of language implicit in social practices? How does it happen? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Carol Macdonald wrote: > >> Hi >> >> I am sorry it took me so long to read the post - I am with Tomasello on >> this. I don't think this is evidence for LAD. The LAD has very specific >> reference to universal parameters, and the history of theoretical >> linguistics in the last 55 years or so has had to step back and back to >> parameter setting so the "universals" are more and more abstract. Perhaps a >> linguist on the site could resolve what they are now. Phonology has the >> most developed set. And how does this relate to communication per se? Can >> anybody help? Even the notion of verb-ness and noun-ness as universals are >> contested. >> >> Pidgins arise when people have a need to communicate; then they become >> creoles. The children and their caretakers had such a need. We have no >> idea how abstract, or signified, when this first began. >> >> In South Africa this happened when mineworkers from all over South Africa >> needed to have a common form of communication. It has never developed to a >> creole, because the speakers have their own Bantu languages, and the need >> underground is so specific and restricted that there has been no further >> development. >> >> ISN has had a very strong motivation to develop. Creoles do become >> languages - Jamaican is a case in point. In my situation, Afrikaans can be >> regarded as creoloid, where the mother language - Dutch has been >> simplified. The Afrikaners historically has access to the Bible in High >> Dutch, but we know the Bible deals with a wide range of concepts, so >> Afrikaans has had to take on board scientific concepts. There is generally >> a "correct" Afrikaans term, and a related word which can be regarded as >> closer to English. Both are included in their lexicon. The latter >> characteristic is part of language planning/development per se. >> >> Perhaps I have seen so much in a multi-linguistic environment, that I see >> this as more fluid. I think this is enough for me now - can someone respond? >> >> Carol >> >> On 14 October 2014 02:46, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Mike has drawn our attention to the Nicaraguan Sign Language >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaraguan_Sign_Language >> as a counter-example to Vygostsky's claim: >> >> "that if no appropriate ideal form can be found in the environment, >> and the development of the child, for whatever reasons, has to take >> place outside these specific conditions (described earlier), i.e. >> without any interaction with the final form, then this proper form >> will fail to develop properly in the child." >> >> In my opinion, this once-in-human-history event does not >> invalidate the principle Vygotsky was elaborating. Just like every >> attempt to say what distinguishes the human being from the animal >> seems to be faulted by the latest clip from YouTube, all such >> absolute claims are almost bound to fail at some point. But the >> principle, illustrated by the fact that children growing up in >> Russia speak Russian and understand the meaning of perezhivanie >> whereas we don't, etc., is hardly faulted by NSL. >> >> The other thing that Mike suggests is that the principle of the >> ideal being present in the environment carries with it the >> negation of the idea of the social formation itself being subject >> to continuous change. Again, I think Vygotsky just takes this as >> outside the concerns of Psychology. His essay on Socialist Man >> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1930/socialism.htm >> shows that in fact he saw the psychology of people as primarily >> determined by the social formation of which they were a part and >> he saw that social formation as evolving. He was of course a >> modern, albeit I suspect a modern with a considerable capacity for >> irony. >> >> Now, this raises the difficult question of what Vygotsky may have >> meant by "ideal." Or, what he thought is a mystery, but what >> should *we* understand by ideality? It is well known that Vygotsky >> was surrounded by a number of fellows who were aficionados of >> Hegelianism, even if Vygotsky himself had never studied Hegel, so >> it is fair to suggest that the Hegelian concept of the Ideal is >> relevant in this context, of reconciling "ideal" as the norm in a >> given social formation and "ideal" as the notion of infinite, >> historical perfectability. For Hegel, "ideality" expresses both >> these principles; that is, that any relation contains within it a >> "gap" which makes it open to perfectability, and that "gap" is >> ever present, and its existence expresses what Hegel calls The >> Idea, that is to say, the ever-unfolding spirit of human freedom. >> Etc. It only requires that the Idea is present for any relation to >> be mutable. This is deep and challenging philosophical stuff which >> we don't really need, if we can just accept that "the ideal" does >> not mean something fixed and final, just an evolving norm: >> ever-shifting goal posts. >> >> Andy >> >> >> >> >> >> -- ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> Developmental psycholinguist >> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of >> Linguistics, Unisa >> >> >> >> > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Oct 14 08:40:29 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 16:40:29 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV & ANL on the problem of the environment In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Ok, here are some of my impressions. ANL's criticisms of LSV appear to be mostly correct to the degree that they are not made explicit, but the absence of LSV's explicitness does not, of itself, indicate disagreement. However, I am happy to give ANL the benefit of the doubt with respect to his more intimate knowledge of these tendencies presented by LSV. I simply read both LSV and ANL as (inevitably) presenting a simplified picture. For LSV, perhaps my sharpest point of divergence is with respect to his "It is quite impossible to imagine such a thing" when regarding biological and socio-political processes being prefigured. He pays scant regard to the dynamics of genetic assimilation here. True, the child is learning to participate in a means of production which are already manifest (but not to the child). But the conditions for the means of production exist in other forms too. Hence ANL's pointing to alternative modes of action and activity which are not copies of the original. By identifying experience as the "still point" in the exposition, LSV is effectively designating aspects of the child's conduct (attitudes) as "environmental". This does not seem to be his intention and therefore it is more likely an oversight. It would be more agreeable to consider LSV's notion of experience here to encompass the activity orientation of the child, whereby deviations in experience of situations can point in both directions -- both to activity and its environmental situation. Simply, one may say that the child's experience of their environment is mediated by their activity, and hence understand why ANL's refers to it as a derivative or secondary psychological fact. I am not sure ANL conveys the broader sense of communication particularly well. The argument is that every aspect of activity contributes to communication. Hence ANL's pointing to the import of non-verbal aspects of communication as a broader basis for the meanings evoked by words. Best, Huw On 13 October 2014 01:20, Huw Lloyd wrote: > I've formulated some thoughts on first readings but need to do some cross > checking. I've some other commitments too, so probably won't be posting > these impressions till Tuesday. > > I suggest folk who would very much like to read these interesting (and > challenging) papers (but for whatever reason can't do so straightaway) push > out some dates in the near so that we hold off for you. > > In the mean-time, we can simply post up our impressions etc, and then do a > second stage exchange once everyone has had an opportunity to participate > in their initial sense-making / rumination / critiques. > > You can access the papers from Andy's earlier email here: > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/Current.Mail/msg00114.html > > Best, > Huw > > On 12 October 2014 20:40, mike cole wrote: > >> Glad the summary cuts and pastes were helpful, Rod. My idea was that they >> might serve as a kind of "cliff notes" intro, which in your case was a >> reminder. I have done the same for the Shotter article on "withness" that >> you sent around, but have not had time to recover that part of the >> discussion and introduce it in a productive way. >> >> I can't at present go on to the ANL article, but will briefly comment on >> the Nicaraguan sign language example. I agree with your analysis. But I >> wanted to address my concern with the way the notion of the "ideal form" >> as >> the "end in the beginning" is that it seems to preclude any form of change >> that is not in the thrall of that ideal form to count as anything but >> deviation from the ideal, no room for transformation. I say "seems" >> because >> I know and value LSV's work on imagination and creativity at lot. Still, >> as >> formulated here, in the land where Comrade Stalin shaped what counted as >> the ideal form, it arose for me as an issue when I was re-reading it. >> >> I also want to inquire into the relationship between word meaning as a >> unit >> of analysis for the relation between thought and language, and >> perezhivanie >> as a unit of analysis for the thought and emotion. The pairing links >> language, thought, and emotion as constituents of experience >> (perezhivanie). >> >> I look forward to re-reading the ANL critique of LSV... later. >> mike >> >> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 12:09 PM, Rod Parker-Rees < >> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: >> >> > Many thanks for your digest of the LSV article, Mike. It is a while >> since >> > I last read it so this was a valuable refresher and meant I felt I >> could go >> > straight to the ANL article which I have not seen before. >> > >> > Reading the ANL article I was acutely aware of the gulf between my >> > environment and that in which ANL was writing. Perhaps the fact that I >> feel >> > this rather less when reading LSV is evidence of a closer fit between my >> > bourgeois environmenn and his. As I understand it, and I am far from >> > confident in this, ANL's main issue is with LSV's suggestion that >> > 'experiencing' or perezhivanie should be used as a unit of activity, >> > representing the indissoluble relationship between the environment and >> the >> > individual. ANL appears to object to this because he sees experiencing >> as >> > an abstraction from activity which should be recognised as the true >> core of >> > what makes us human. The argument that an environment is only an >> > environment FOR an active subject reminded me of Uetzkull's 'umwelt' the >> > unique world of experience constructed by an organism in the course of >> its >> > activity (including its sensing activity) but I am not sure that ANL >> > justifies his insistence on not acknowleding experiencING as a form of >> > activity ('experience is a secondary and derivative fact' - p.22). >> > >> > ANL appears to be driven by a preference for 'putting the question in >> its >> > completely clear and bare form' (p.17) but this involves a series of >> > assertions and rhetorical strong-arm tactics which I find difficult to >> > accept. For example, he chooses to 'set aside the complicated idea of >> the >> > different course of development of the "spontaneous" and "scientific" >> > concepts' (p.18) - an idea which I have always found particularly >> helpful >> > and he insists that 'meaning always takes the form of the meaning of a >> > word' (p.18) - denying the possibility that a smile, a raised eyebrow, >> > rolled eyes or a raised fist could carry meaning. >> > >> > I am not sure that the creation of a sign language among Nicaraguan deaf >> > children can be taken as a counter example to LSV's argument that >> children >> > are able to benefit from an environment which includes the 'ideal form' >> of >> > abilities they are just beginning to develop. The children who were >> brought >> > together from isolated families and then co-constructed a sophisticated >> > sign language may not have been surrounded by an 'ideal form' of >> language >> > which they could fully experience (I believe most were children of >> hearing >> > parents and so experienced only a rudimentary, home-made form of >> home-sign) >> > but they WERE surrounded by people who showed them that people >> communicate >> > with each other so they were exposed to the 'ideal form' of >> > communication-mediated cooperative activity even if they were not able >> to >> > pick out the finer details of how it was achieved. As in other >> situations >> > where children grow up among people who use a simplified ('pidgin') >> form of >> > communication, their sensitivity to patterns, rules and regularities >> > allowed them to refine it into a coherent, flexible language (a >> 'creole'). >> > I am uncomfortable with the use of 'final form' as an alternative to >> 'ideal >> > form' because every generation does similar things with the language it >> > inherits - adjusting and refining it to achieve a better fit with >> changing >> > social practices. Indeed this (as well as the socio-political distance >> > between us) may explain some of the difficulties I have with ANL's way >> of >> > asserting his arguments. >> > >> > LSV acknowledged the important role of 'spontaneous concepts' - the >> often >> > unacknowledged intuitions which arise out of our unique patterns of >> > experience and which give 'body and vitality' to the more abstract, >> 'clear >> > and bare' concepts which allow us to communicate with others - while ANL >> > would appear to prefer a tidier view of things. >> > >> > I look forward to hearing what others make of the comparison between the >> > two papers. >> > >> > All the best, >> > >> > Rod >> > >> > >> > ________________________________________ >> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >> > Sent: 12 October 2014 17:55 >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse >> > >> > Diane- (I neglected to turn off my computer!). There are now more that >> 800 >> > people signed up for XMCA. If every started typing at once, we might >> crash >> > the ucsd server it sits on. And if it is just brownian motion in >> alphabetic >> > characters, what's the point? It WOULD be good to hear from more >> people. At >> > earlier times, i have tried to work out an arrangements where a dozen >> > partricipants each volunteered to organize a discussion on a topic of >> > potential interest for a month as a means of increasing breadth of >> > participation and points of view. It has never worked. >> > >> > Perhaps it could be tried again..... if someone other than me would >> like to >> > organize it! >> > >> > Like henry, I use wikipedia a lot as a starting point. For the >> disucssion >> > of the LSV article on the environment I would recommend that people >> > google *senghas >> > nicaraguan sign language. *My conjecture is the the evidence of what >> > happens if a lot of deaf kids are brought together without access to an >> > appropriate "ideal form" (see the LSV paper for significance of that >> term) >> > contradicts LSV's argument and has implications for general aspects of >> > theory. But first there has to be that co-reading so we are not simply >> > tangling each other up in a new way. >> > mike >> > >> > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 9:44 AM, Diane Potts >> wrote: >> > >> > > >From one of the many lurkers... >> > > >> > > As a new academic and one who shares David Kellogg's interests in SFL, >> > > language education and socio-historical theory, I benefit tremendously >> > from >> > > this listserv. I recommend it regularly to PhD students and hold it >> up >> > as >> > > a model of an online community that has managed to continue to engage >> in >> > > lively discussions about current research with the participation of >> > senior >> > > scholars. Centering those discussions on readings, at least to me, >> seems >> > to >> > > be an effective means of carrying out the community's boundary work - >> not >> > > always pleasant work, I'll admit, but one that gives coherence to who >> we >> > > are. >> > > >> > > Diane Potts >> > > Lancaster University >> > > >> > > > From: leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com >> > > > Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2014 18:23:52 +0200 >> > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XMCA discourse >> > > > >> > > > continue :-) >> > > > >> > > > Leif >> > > > Sweden >> > > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > -- >> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > ________________________________ >> > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >> > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >> > >> > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely >> for >> > the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the >> > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the >> > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on >> it. >> > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know >> > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not >> > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University >> accepts >> > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan >> emails >> > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept >> responsibility >> > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its >> > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless >> accompanied >> > by an official order form. >> > >> > >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue Oct 14 15:14:15 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 07:14:15 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Ideal and Nicaraguan Sign Language In-Reply-To: References: <543C7257.5070300@mira.net> <543D2E44.7070709@mira.net> Message-ID: Vygotsky says: 4-49] ?????????? ????, ??? ? ??????? ? ????? ??????????? ??? ????????? ?????, ?.?. ???????? ??????? ?? ??????????? ???? ??????, ? ??????? ? ??????? ?????? ???, ??????, ??? ???????? ????? ???????????, ?? ??????????????? ? ????????? ??????, ?? ??????? ??????????? ????? ?????? ?????, ?.?. ???? ????? ??? ??????????? ? ??????, ????????? ??????. ????? ?? ????? ??????????? ??????????????? ????????????, ??????????????? ???????? ? ???????? ???????????? ??????????, ??? ?????, ?? ??????????? ???????????, ?.?. ??? ????? ?????? ??????????? ????? ????????, ????? ??????????? ? ??????? ?? ????????? ???? ??????, ???????? ??? ?????????, ????? ???? ? ????? ??????????????? ????????? ?????. (Imagine a child in this environment where there is no ideal form, i.e. that the development of the child is not subject to the law of which I just spoke, namely, that the final form is not available and does not interact with the beginning form, but that the child develops in an environment with other children, i.e. there is an environment of his peers and the lower, beginning form. Will the child develop appropriate activities, appropriate properties? Studies show that he will, but it in a very peculiar way, i.e. they will always develop very slowly, very peculiarly and at no moment will they reach the level which they achieve when there is in the environment the appropriate ideal form.) Three things that are worth keeping in mind here about the context of this statement. a) Vygotsky is talking to a group of students in a teacher training course--he is trying to build on what they already know and believe (about which more below). b) Vygotsky is interspersing his lectures with visits to his clinic, and in his clinic there are a number of victims of child abuse. One common forms of child abuse, often quite inadvertant but nevertheless severe in its developmental results, is when hearing parents try to raise a deaf child by themselves, without the presence of the deaf community to which the child belongs by right. This results in "home sign", the form of mimicry which Vygotsky--quite correctly--is denouncing when he appears to be denouncing sign language in general in his defectological work. "Home sign" is not sign--it really is a set of gestures with only very limited grammar, and the terrible plight of deaf children who, deprived of contact with the deaf community, have had to re-invent language by themselves, is well documented (as Mike points out) in the work of Susan Goldin-Meadow. See especially "The Resilience of Language" and "Hearing Gesture". c) Vygotsky's argument agains the Language Acquisition Device is not made in this lecture; it belongs to the previous lecture on heredity which I sent around earlier. It is indeed a theoretical argument (although Vygotsky DOES support it with a "monozygotic/dizygotic" comparative twin study). The argument is not, however, an "environmentalist" argument: Vygotsky simply says that heredity and environment are BOTH elements and therefore no analysis which reduces speech acquisition to the one or to the other is an analysis into units. The unit we are looking for has to include both (and in fact word meaning does include both, because "sense" represents the contribution of the senses and "signification" the contribution of social contact). Interestingly, what we argued about when we translated this passage was not whether Vygotsky was correct to say that a language which evolves without the presence of the ideal form would be peculiar and slow (actually, it seems to me that the Nicaraguan example, which we did know about, is also a confirmation of this, even though it rightly belongs to sociogenesis rather than ontogenesis). What we argued about was whether Vygotsky's statement that such a situation NEVER occurs in socogenesis can really be said to be correct. Vygotsky lived in a country where hunter-gatherers, herdsmen, subsistence farmers, industrial capitalism and the rudiments of socialism existed side by side. The problem, of course, was that the interaction between these very differently developed forms (for so Vygotsky saw them) was not always one of guidance! In addition, it was by no means clear to people which form represented the ideal. Consider a slightly different case, the reanimation of a language without a final, complete (or "ideal") form. In the late eighteenth century, King Kamehameha the Great united the Hawaiian Islands into a single nation. With the help of missionaries, he developed a script for the Hawaiian language (it had only twelve letters, so that it would be easy to learn) and began to create a literature. The Kingdom of Hawaii was probably the very first country on earth to have universal, compulsory education--the WRITTEN constitution declared that anywhere in the kingdom where fifteen children lived in one village there had to be a Hawaiian language school. Within only two decades of the creation of a Hawaiian script, nearly half the population of Hawaii was literate, and texts were being developed that were so aesthetically advanced that people find them very hard to read today. In 1893, a group of American sugar and pineapple planters launched a coup against Queen Liliuokalani, the last of the Kamehameha line, in order to try to join the USA and get around the tariffs that growers in California were imposing on Hawaiian produce. They eventually succeeded, although it took some years to get it (Grover Cleveland was a personal friend of Liliuokalani!). During the short-lived "republic" they declared, Hawaiian was banned in schooling, and the ban actually lasted until 1986 (I remember, as a child, being taught to dance the hula, but not sing the words). Even before the ban was lifted, some Hawaiian parents started private preschools in Hawaiian (a handful of native Hawaiian speakers survived on the island of Ni'ihau, where they played a minor role in the first act of World War II, by capturing and killing a pilot who crash-landed on the island after Pearl Harbor). The problem is that the people of Ni'ihau were sheep farmers, not school teachers. When immersion programmes in Hawaiian were started in a desperate attempt to save the language from extinction, there were almost no materials for math and science (and in fact even old Hawaiian, having developed in a pre-modern society, was quite poor in words for things, and lacked, for example, a general, abstract word for "container"). When the teachers translated materials from the English (and borrowed words) Hawaiian parents, objected--some of them thought it was more important that their language should live than that their children should be able to make a living. The problem is that the two really go together. The first cohort of immersion children emerging from the Hawaiian immersion programmes was not an unqualified success. About a third of the children were well behind grade level in English, because the kind of English they acquired outside school ("da kine tok" which I remember from growing up in Hawaii) was a Creole Pidgin, also not adapted to academic concepts. During the NCBA years, immersion kids were given tests translated from English--and the results were not promising. I think it's for this reason that Hawaiian immersion is still limited to only twenty schools. Interestingly, the children also seem to "level off" in Hawaiian around junior high, and none of the children appear to have really taken to the advanced literary texts left behind by the generation of Kamehameha the Great. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 14 October 2014 23:45, mike cole wrote: > I suggest that people pause to check out the phenomenon of Nicaraguan > Sign, and that someone with linguistic sophistication and knowledge of the > case join the discussion. The > basic facts can be found at > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaraguan_Sign_Language. > > Googling Senghas Nicaraguan Sign Language will turn up a lot. Vygotsy > seemed to be saying that left to themselves, a group of deaf kids would not > invent a language. These kids do. > > BUT, as Julian (?) pointed out, these kids, while cut off from the language > of the adults who brought them together (LSV did not specify the conditions > of such a gathering), even the sign language which was > Spanish/finger-spelled, literacy derived, they do, OVER GENERATIONSj of > kids coming to the center, form a more and more complex communication > system that now,. several generations later, looks a whole lot like a > normal language. > > Where is the ideal form that is the end in the beginning? That is the > question. > > I do not know the answer. However, from other evidence collected by > Goldin-Meadow and others, I believe that the "ideal form" a culturally > organized form of life IS there at the beginning for the kids in their > social environment, including the organization of their own joint > activities together outside of the purview of adults. This latter > interpretation is discussed in a textbook by wife and I wrote and > elsewhere. I can send the summary of that bit of amateur > speculation/inference if the topic of the centrality of the end being in > the beginning, and LSV's analysis of that topic in the article we are > reading, is of interest. > > LSV is not "proven wrong" by this case. The complexity of the issue, > however, is certainly easier to grasp. > mike > PS-- There is fascinating work by my colleague, Carol Padden, on another > such case in the Negev desert that is a few generations old and for which > the entire genetic mapping from the initial deaf originator as the language > grows and spreads in the community is part of the research. The grammar of > the language is unlike either Hebrew or Arabic, the two languages that > exist in the environment of these people. > > On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 7:08 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> How would you explain then, Carol, how the Nicaraguan children managed to >> acquire such a sophisticated language in a couple of generations? >> Are elements of language implicit in social practices? How does it happen? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Carol Macdonald wrote: >> >>> Hi >>> >>> I am sorry it took me so long to read the post - I am with Tomasello on >>> this. I don't think this is evidence for LAD. The LAD has very specific >>> reference to universal parameters, and the history of theoretical >>> linguistics in the last 55 years or so has had to step back and back to >>> parameter setting so the "universals" are more and more abstract. Perhaps a >>> linguist on the site could resolve what they are now. Phonology has the >>> most developed set. And how does this relate to communication per se? Can >>> anybody help? Even the notion of verb-ness and noun-ness as universals are >>> contested. >>> >>> Pidgins arise when people have a need to communicate; then they become >>> creoles. The children and their caretakers had such a need. We have no >>> idea how abstract, or signified, when this first began. >>> >>> In South Africa this happened when mineworkers from all over South Africa >>> needed to have a common form of communication. It has never developed to a >>> creole, because the speakers have their own Bantu languages, and the need >>> underground is so specific and restricted that there has been no further >>> development. >>> >>> ISN has had a very strong motivation to develop. Creoles do become >>> languages - Jamaican is a case in point. In my situation, Afrikaans can be >>> regarded as creoloid, where the mother language - Dutch has been >>> simplified. The Afrikaners historically has access to the Bible in High >>> Dutch, but we know the Bible deals with a wide range of concepts, so >>> Afrikaans has had to take on board scientific concepts. There is generally >>> a "correct" Afrikaans term, and a related word which can be regarded as >>> closer to English. Both are included in their lexicon. The latter >>> characteristic is part of language planning/development per se. >>> >>> Perhaps I have seen so much in a multi-linguistic environment, that I see >>> this as more fluid. I think this is enough for me now - can someone respond? >>> >>> Carol >>> >>> On 14 October 2014 02:46, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>> >>> Mike has drawn our attention to the Nicaraguan Sign Language >>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaraguan_Sign_Language >>> as a counter-example to Vygostsky's claim: >>> >>> "that if no appropriate ideal form can be found in the environment, >>> and the development of the child, for whatever reasons, has to take >>> place outside these specific conditions (described earlier), i.e. >>> without any interaction with the final form, then this proper form >>> will fail to develop properly in the child." >>> >>> In my opinion, this once-in-human-history event does not >>> invalidate the principle Vygotsky was elaborating. Just like every >>> attempt to say what distinguishes the human being from the animal >>> seems to be faulted by the latest clip from YouTube, all such >>> absolute claims are almost bound to fail at some point. But the >>> principle, illustrated by the fact that children growing up in >>> Russia speak Russian and understand the meaning of perezhivanie >>> whereas we don't, etc., is hardly faulted by NSL. >>> >>> The other thing that Mike suggests is that the principle of the >>> ideal being present in the environment carries with it the >>> negation of the idea of the social formation itself being subject >>> to continuous change. Again, I think Vygotsky just takes this as >>> outside the concerns of Psychology. His essay on Socialist Man >>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1930/socialism.htm >>> shows that in fact he saw the psychology of people as primarily >>> determined by the social formation of which they were a part and >>> he saw that social formation as evolving. He was of course a >>> modern, albeit I suspect a modern with a considerable capacity for >>> irony. >>> >>> Now, this raises the difficult question of what Vygotsky may have >>> meant by "ideal." Or, what he thought is a mystery, but what >>> should *we* understand by ideality? It is well known that Vygotsky >>> was surrounded by a number of fellows who were aficionados of >>> Hegelianism, even if Vygotsky himself had never studied Hegel, so >>> it is fair to suggest that the Hegelian concept of the Ideal is >>> relevant in this context, of reconciling "ideal" as the norm in a >>> given social formation and "ideal" as the notion of infinite, >>> historical perfectability. For Hegel, "ideality" expresses both >>> these principles; that is, that any relation contains within it a >>> "gap" which makes it open to perfectability, and that "gap" is >>> ever present, and its existence expresses what Hegel calls The >>> Idea, that is to say, the ever-unfolding spirit of human freedom. >>> Etc. It only requires that the Idea is present for any relation to >>> be mutable. This is deep and challenging philosophical stuff which >>> we don't really need, if we can just accept that "the ideal" does >>> not mean something fixed and final, just an evolving norm: >>> ever-shifting goal posts. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> ------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>> Developmental psycholinguist >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of >>> Linguistics, Unisa >>> >>> >>> >>> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Oct 14 16:16:40 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 23:16:40 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV & ANL on the problem of the environment In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <12BF4E45-028B-4E91-851A-542938817A8C@uniandes.edu.co> Huy, isn't the phrase "genetic accommodation"? Genes accommodating to new behaviors, rather than the other way around. Or does evo-devo posit genetic assimilation too? Martin On Oct 14, 2014, at 10:40 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > He pays scant regard to the > dynamics of genetic assimilation here From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Oct 14 16:23:43 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 16:23:43 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Ideal and Nicaraguan Sign Language In-Reply-To: References: <543C7257.5070300@mira.net> <543D2E44.7070709@mira.net> Message-ID: Thanks for all that extra enrichment of the topic, David. ANL next on my re-reading list. mike On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 3:14 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Vygotsky says: > > 4-49] ?????????? ????, ??? ? ??????? ? ????? ??????????? ??? > ????????? ?????, ?.?. ???????? ??????? ?? ??????????? ???? ??????, ? > ??????? ? ??????? ?????? ???, ??????, ??? ???????? ????? ???????????, > ?? ??????????????? ? ????????? ??????, ?? ??????? ??????????? ????? > ?????? ?????, ?.?. ???? ????? ??? ??????????? ? ??????, ????????? > ??????. ????? ?? ????? ??????????? ??????????????? ????????????, > ??????????????? ???????? ? ???????? ???????????? ??????????, ??? > ?????, ?? ??????????? ???????????, ?.?. ??? ????? ?????? ??????????? > ????? ????????, ????? ??????????? ? ??????? ?? ????????? ???? ??????, > ???????? ??? ?????????, ????? ???? ? ????? ??????????????? ????????? > ?????. (Imagine a child in this environment where there is no ideal > form, i.e. that the development of the child is not subject to the law > of which I just spoke, namely, that the final form is not available > and does not interact with the beginning form, but that the child > develops in an environment with other children, i.e. there is an > environment of his peers and the lower, beginning form. Will the child > develop appropriate activities, appropriate properties? Studies show > that he will, but it in a very peculiar way, i.e. they will always > develop very slowly, very peculiarly and at no moment will they reach > the level which they achieve when there is in the environment the > appropriate ideal form.) > > Three things that are worth keeping in mind here about the context of > this statement. > > a) Vygotsky is talking to a group of students in a teacher training > course--he is trying to build on what they already know and believe > (about which more below). > > b) Vygotsky is interspersing his lectures with visits to his clinic, > and in his clinic there are a number of victims of child abuse. One > common forms of child abuse, often quite inadvertant but nevertheless > severe in its developmental results, is when hearing parents try to > raise a deaf child by themselves, without the presence of the deaf > community to which the child belongs by right. This results in "home > sign", the form of mimicry which Vygotsky--quite correctly--is > denouncing when he appears to be denouncing sign language in general > in his defectological work. "Home sign" is not sign--it really is a > set of gestures with only very limited grammar, and the terrible > plight of deaf children who, deprived of contact with the deaf > community, have had to re-invent language by themselves, is well > documented (as Mike points out) in the work of Susan Goldin-Meadow. > See especially "The Resilience of Language" and "Hearing Gesture". > > c) Vygotsky's argument agains the Language Acquisition Device is not > made in this lecture; it belongs to the previous lecture on heredity > which I sent around earlier. It is indeed a theoretical argument > (although Vygotsky DOES support it with a "monozygotic/dizygotic" > comparative twin study). The argument is not, however, an > "environmentalist" argument: Vygotsky simply says that heredity and > environment are BOTH elements and therefore no analysis which reduces > speech acquisition to the one or to the other is an analysis into > units. The unit we are looking for has to include both (and in fact > word meaning does include both, because "sense" represents the > contribution of the senses and "signification" the contribution of > social contact). > > Interestingly, what we argued about when we translated this passage > was not whether Vygotsky was correct to say that a language which > evolves without the presence of the ideal form would be peculiar and > slow (actually, it seems to me that the Nicaraguan example, which we > did know about, is also a confirmation of this, even though it rightly > belongs to sociogenesis rather than ontogenesis). What we argued about > was whether Vygotsky's statement that such a situation NEVER occurs in > socogenesis can really be said to be correct. > > Vygotsky lived in a country where hunter-gatherers, herdsmen, > subsistence farmers, industrial capitalism and the rudiments of > socialism existed side by side. The problem, of course, was that the > interaction between these very differently developed forms (for so > Vygotsky saw them) was not always one of guidance! In addition, it was > by no means clear to people which form represented the ideal. > > Consider a slightly different case, the reanimation of a language > without a final, complete (or "ideal") form. In the late eighteenth > century, King Kamehameha the Great united the Hawaiian Islands into a > single nation. With the help of missionaries, he developed a script > for the Hawaiian language (it had only twelve letters, so that it > would be easy to learn) and began to create a literature. The Kingdom > of Hawaii was probably the very first country on earth to have > universal, compulsory education--the WRITTEN constitution declared > that anywhere in the kingdom where fifteen children lived in one > village there had to be a Hawaiian language school. Within only two > decades of the creation of a Hawaiian script, nearly half the > population of Hawaii was literate, and texts were being developed that > were so aesthetically advanced that people find them very hard to read > today. > > In 1893, a group of American sugar and pineapple planters launched a > coup against Queen Liliuokalani, the last of the Kamehameha line, in > order to try to join the USA and get around the tariffs that growers > in California were imposing on Hawaiian produce. They eventually > succeeded, although it took some years to get it (Grover Cleveland was > a personal friend of Liliuokalani!). During the short-lived "republic" > they declared, Hawaiian was banned in schooling, and the ban actually > lasted until 1986 (I remember, as a child, being taught to dance the > hula, but not sing the words). > > Even before the ban was lifted, some Hawaiian parents started private > preschools in Hawaiian (a handful of native Hawaiian speakers survived > on the island of Ni'ihau, where they played a minor role in the first > act of World War II, by capturing and killing a pilot who crash-landed > on the island after Pearl Harbor). The problem is that the people of > Ni'ihau were sheep farmers, not school teachers. When immersion > programmes in Hawaiian were started in a desperate attempt to save the > language from extinction, there were almost no materials for math and > science (and in fact even old Hawaiian, having developed in a > pre-modern society, was quite poor in words for things, and lacked, > for example, a general, abstract word for "container"). When the > teachers translated materials from the English (and borrowed words) > Hawaiian parents, objected--some of them thought it was more important > that their language should live than that their children should be > able to make a living. > > The problem is that the two really go together. The first cohort of > immersion children emerging from the Hawaiian immersion programmes was > not an unqualified success. About a third of the children were well > behind grade level in English, because the kind of English they > acquired outside school ("da kine tok" which I remember from growing > up in Hawaii) was a Creole Pidgin, also not adapted to academic > concepts. During the NCBA years, immersion kids were given tests > translated from English--and the results were not promising. I think > it's for this reason that Hawaiian immersion is still limited to only > twenty schools. Interestingly, the children also seem to "level off" > in Hawaiian around junior high, and none of the children appear to > have really taken to the advanced literary texts left behind by the > generation of Kamehameha the Great. > > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 14 October 2014 23:45, mike cole wrote: > > I suggest that people pause to check out the phenomenon of Nicaraguan > > Sign, and that someone with linguistic sophistication and knowledge of > the > > case join the discussion. The > > basic facts can be found at > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaraguan_Sign_Language. > > > > Googling Senghas Nicaraguan Sign Language will turn up a lot. Vygotsy > > seemed to be saying that left to themselves, a group of deaf kids would > not > > invent a language. These kids do. > > > > BUT, as Julian (?) pointed out, these kids, while cut off from the > language > > of the adults who brought them together (LSV did not specify the > conditions > > of such a gathering), even the sign language which was > > Spanish/finger-spelled, literacy derived, they do, OVER GENERATIONSj of > > kids coming to the center, form a more and more complex communication > > system that now,. several generations later, looks a whole lot like a > > normal language. > > > > Where is the ideal form that is the end in the beginning? That is the > > question. > > > > I do not know the answer. However, from other evidence collected by > > Goldin-Meadow and others, I believe that the "ideal form" a culturally > > organized form of life IS there at the beginning for the kids in their > > social environment, including the organization of their own joint > > activities together outside of the purview of adults. This latter > > interpretation is discussed in a textbook by wife and I wrote and > > elsewhere. I can send the summary of that bit of amateur > > speculation/inference if the topic of the centrality of the end being in > > the beginning, and LSV's analysis of that topic in the article we are > > reading, is of interest. > > > > LSV is not "proven wrong" by this case. The complexity of the issue, > > however, is certainly easier to grasp. > > mike > > PS-- There is fascinating work by my colleague, Carol Padden, on another > > such case in the Negev desert that is a few generations old and for which > > the entire genetic mapping from the initial deaf originator as the > language > > grows and spreads in the community is part of the research. The grammar > of > > the language is unlike either Hebrew or Arabic, the two languages that > > exist in the environment of these people. > > > > On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 7:08 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >> How would you explain then, Carol, how the Nicaraguan children managed > to > >> acquire such a sophisticated language in a couple of generations? > >> Are elements of language implicit in social practices? How does it > happen? > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> Carol Macdonald wrote: > >> > >>> Hi > >>> > >>> I am sorry it took me so long to read the post - I am with Tomasello on > >>> this. I don't think this is evidence for LAD. The LAD has very specific > >>> reference to universal parameters, and the history of theoretical > >>> linguistics in the last 55 years or so has had to step back and back > to > >>> parameter setting so the "universals" are more and more abstract. > Perhaps a > >>> linguist on the site could resolve what they are now. Phonology has > the > >>> most developed set. And how does this relate to communication per se? > Can > >>> anybody help? Even the notion of verb-ness and noun-ness as universals > are > >>> contested. > >>> > >>> Pidgins arise when people have a need to communicate; then they become > >>> creoles. The children and their caretakers had such a need. We have > no > >>> idea how abstract, or signified, when this first began. > >>> > >>> In South Africa this happened when mineworkers from all over South > Africa > >>> needed to have a common form of communication. It has never developed > to a > >>> creole, because the speakers have their own Bantu languages, and the > need > >>> underground is so specific and restricted that there has been no > further > >>> development. > >>> > >>> ISN has had a very strong motivation to develop. Creoles do become > >>> languages - Jamaican is a case in point. In my situation, Afrikaans > can be > >>> regarded as creoloid, where the mother language - Dutch has been > >>> simplified. The Afrikaners historically has access to the Bible in > High > >>> Dutch, but we know the Bible deals with a wide range of concepts, so > >>> Afrikaans has had to take on board scientific concepts. There is > generally > >>> a "correct" Afrikaans term, and a related word which can be regarded as > >>> closer to English. Both are included in their lexicon. The latter > >>> characteristic is part of language planning/development per se. > >>> > >>> Perhaps I have seen so much in a multi-linguistic environment, that I > see > >>> this as more fluid. I think this is enough for me now - can someone > respond? > >>> > >>> Carol > >>> > >>> On 14 October 2014 02:46, Andy Blunden >>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >>> > >>> Mike has drawn our attention to the Nicaraguan Sign Language > >>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaraguan_Sign_Language > >>> as a counter-example to Vygostsky's claim: > >>> > >>> "that if no appropriate ideal form can be found in the > environment, > >>> and the development of the child, for whatever reasons, has to > take > >>> place outside these specific conditions (described earlier), > i.e. > >>> without any interaction with the final form, then this proper > form > >>> will fail to develop properly in the child." > >>> > >>> In my opinion, this once-in-human-history event does not > >>> invalidate the principle Vygotsky was elaborating. Just like every > >>> attempt to say what distinguishes the human being from the animal > >>> seems to be faulted by the latest clip from YouTube, all such > >>> absolute claims are almost bound to fail at some point. But the > >>> principle, illustrated by the fact that children growing up in > >>> Russia speak Russian and understand the meaning of perezhivanie > >>> whereas we don't, etc., is hardly faulted by NSL. > >>> > >>> The other thing that Mike suggests is that the principle of the > >>> ideal being present in the environment carries with it the > >>> negation of the idea of the social formation itself being subject > >>> to continuous change. Again, I think Vygotsky just takes this as > >>> outside the concerns of Psychology. His essay on Socialist Man > >>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1930/socialism.htm > >>> shows that in fact he saw the psychology of people as primarily > >>> determined by the social formation of which they were a part and > >>> he saw that social formation as evolving. He was of course a > >>> modern, albeit I suspect a modern with a considerable capacity for > >>> irony. > >>> > >>> Now, this raises the difficult question of what Vygotsky may have > >>> meant by "ideal." Or, what he thought is a mystery, but what > >>> should *we* understand by ideality? It is well known that Vygotsky > >>> was surrounded by a number of fellows who were aficionados of > >>> Hegelianism, even if Vygotsky himself had never studied Hegel, so > >>> it is fair to suggest that the Hegelian concept of the Ideal is > >>> relevant in this context, of reconciling "ideal" as the norm in a > >>> given social formation and "ideal" as the notion of infinite, > >>> historical perfectability. For Hegel, "ideality" expresses both > >>> these principles; that is, that any relation contains within it a > >>> "gap" which makes it open to perfectability, and that "gap" is > >>> ever present, and its existence expresses what Hegel calls The > >>> Idea, that is to say, the ever-unfolding spirit of human freedom. > >>> Etc. It only requires that the Idea is present for any relation to > >>> be mutable. This is deep and challenging philosophical stuff which > >>> we don't really need, if we can just accept that "the ideal" does > >>> not mean something fixed and final, just an evolving norm: > >>> ever-shifting goal posts. > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> ------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department > of > >>> Linguistics, Unisa > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From ablunden@mira.net Tue Oct 14 16:39:13 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 10:39:13 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Ideal and Nicaraguan Sign Language In-Reply-To: References: <543C7257.5070300@mira.net> <543D2E44.7070709@mira.net> Message-ID: <543DB421.7040104@mira.net> Mike, yes, I would like to see your and Sheila's speculations on the case of Nicaraguan Sign Language. Two things. * I think that when a positive developmental principle (e.g. sign- and tool- use is the essential feature of human development) is transformed into an absolute "ontological" claim: only humans, not animals, can use/create signs/tools, it inevitably fails. But the principle which the claim expresses is not destroyed thereby. It just turns out to be relative not absolute. * Nonetheless, it is always enlightening to study in detail the surprising exceptions to the absolute "ontological" claim, i.e., exactly how and under what conditions chimps create/use signs/tools. So, although I don't believe that NSL disproves the principle Vygotsky was arguing for, I am sure that an understanding of what took place in Nicaragua will enlighten us about how language develops normally. It seems that the "ideal" is not just the language-use itself! Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > I suggest that people pause to check out the phenomenon of Nicaraguan > Sign, and that someone with linguistic sophistication and knowledge of > the case join the discussion. The > basic facts can be found > at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaraguan_Sign_Language. > > Googling Senghas Nicaraguan Sign Language will turn up a lot. Vygotsy > seemed to be saying that left to themselves, a group of deaf kids > would not invent a language. These kids do. > > BUT, as Julian (?) pointed out, these kids, while cut off from the > language of the adults who brought them together (LSV did not specify > the conditions of such a gathering), even the sign language which was > Spanish/finger-spelled, literacy derived, they do, OVER GENERATIONSj > of kids coming to the center, form a more and more complex > communication system that now,. several generations later, looks a > whole lot like a normal language. > > Where is the ideal form that is the end in the beginning? That is the > question. > > I do not know the answer. However, from other evidence collected by > Goldin-Meadow and others, I believe that the "ideal form" a culturally > organized form of life IS there at the beginning for the kids in their > social environment, including the organization of their own joint > activities together outside of the purview of adults. This latter > interpretation is discussed in a textbook by wife and I wrote and > elsewhere. I can send the summary of that bit of amateur > speculation/inference if the topic of the centrality of the end being > in the beginning, and LSV's analysis of that topic in the article we > are reading, is of interest. > > LSV is not "proven wrong" by this case. The complexity of the issue, > however, is certainly easier to grasp. > mike > PS-- There is fascinating work by my colleague, Carol Padden, on > another such case in the Negev desert that is a few generations old > and for which the entire genetic mapping from the initial deaf > originator as the language grows and spreads in the community is part > of the research. The grammar of the language is unlike either Hebrew > or Arabic, the two languages that exist in the environment of these > people. > > On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 7:08 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > How would you explain then, Carol, how the Nicaraguan children > managed to acquire such a sophisticated language in a couple of > generations? > Are elements of language implicit in social practices? How does it > happen? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Carol Macdonald wrote: > > Hi > > I am sorry it took me so long to read the post - I am with > Tomasello on this. I don't think this is evidence for LAD. The > LAD has very specific reference to universal parameters, and > the history of theoretical linguistics in the last 55 years > or so has had to step back and back to parameter setting so > the "universals" are more and more abstract. Perhaps a > linguist on the site could resolve what they are now. > Phonology has the most developed set. And how does this > relate to communication per se? Can anybody help? Even the > notion of verb-ness and noun-ness as universals are contested. > > Pidgins arise when people have a need to communicate; then > they become creoles. The children and their caretakers had > such a need. We have no idea how abstract, or signified, when > this first began. > > In South Africa this happened when mineworkers from all over > South Africa needed to have a common form of communication. > It has never developed to a creole, because the speakers have > their own Bantu languages, and the need underground is so > specific and restricted that there has been no further > development. > > ISN has had a very strong motivation to develop. Creoles do > become languages - Jamaican is a case in point. In my > situation, Afrikaans can be regarded as creoloid, where the > mother language - Dutch has been simplified. The Afrikaners > historically has access to the Bible in High Dutch, but we > know the Bible deals with a wide range of concepts, so > Afrikaans has had to take on board scientific concepts. There > is generally a "correct" Afrikaans term, and a related word > which can be regarded as closer to English. Both are included > in their lexicon. The latter characteristic is part of > language planning/development per se. > > Perhaps I have seen so much in a multi-linguistic environment, > that I see this as more fluid. I think this is enough for me > now - can someone respond? > > Carol > > On 14 October 2014 02:46, Andy Blunden >> wrote: > > Mike has drawn our attention to the Nicaraguan Sign Language > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaraguan_Sign_Language > as a counter-example to Vygostsky's claim: > > "that if no appropriate ideal form can be found in the > environment, > and the development of the child, for whatever reasons, > has to take > place outside these specific conditions (described > earlier), i.e. > without any interaction with the final form, then this > proper form > will fail to develop properly in the child." > > In my opinion, this once-in-human-history event does not > invalidate the principle Vygotsky was elaborating. Just > like every > attempt to say what distinguishes the human being from the > animal > seems to be faulted by the latest clip from YouTube, all such > absolute claims are almost bound to fail at some point. > But the > principle, illustrated by the fact that children growing up in > Russia speak Russian and understand the meaning of > perezhivanie > whereas we don't, etc., is hardly faulted by NSL. > > The other thing that Mike suggests is that the principle > of the > ideal being present in the environment carries with it the > negation of the idea of the social formation itself being > subject > to continuous change. Again, I think Vygotsky just takes > this as > outside the concerns of Psychology. His essay on Socialist Man > > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1930/socialism.htm > shows that in fact he saw the psychology of people as > primarily > determined by the social formation of which they were a > part and > he saw that social formation as evolving. He was of course a > modern, albeit I suspect a modern with a considerable > capacity for > irony. > > Now, this raises the difficult question of what Vygotsky > may have > meant by "ideal." Or, what he thought is a mystery, but what > should *we* understand by ideality? It is well known that > Vygotsky > was surrounded by a number of fellows who were aficionados of > Hegelianism, even if Vygotsky himself had never studied > Hegel, so > it is fair to suggest that the Hegelian concept of the > Ideal is > relevant in this context, of reconciling "ideal" as the > norm in a > given social formation and "ideal" as the notion of infinite, > historical perfectability. For Hegel, "ideality" expresses > both > these principles; that is, that any relation contains > within it a > "gap" which makes it open to perfectability, and that "gap" is > ever present, and its existence expresses what Hegel calls The > Idea, that is to say, the ever-unfolding spirit of human > freedom. > Etc. It only requires that the Idea is present for any > relation to > be mutable. This is deep and challenging philosophical > stuff which > we don't really need, if we can just accept that "the > ideal" does > not mean something fixed and final, just an evolving norm: > ever-shifting goal posts. > > Andy > > > > > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: > Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > From ablunden@mira.net Tue Oct 14 16:56:17 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 10:56:17 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] The Ideal Message-ID: <543DB821.3010303@mira.net> Although I am sure that 99.9% (or thereabouts) of people who read what Vygotsky said about the presence of the ideal in the child's environment, interpreted this to mean simply that adult speech provided a model on which children could model their own language-use, nonetheless, this is not ultimately what the presence of the ideal means in the Marxist/Hegelian tradition of which Vygotsky and many of his colleagues were a part. It would be true to say for example that the ideal of democracy exists with US political life, even though I doubt there is a single electoral process which is not corrupted by money and degraded by ignorance, prejudice and narrow self-interest. Nonetheless, in all the rhetoric and legislation around the broader political life, and what peoplpe tell their kids and what young people cry out for in their political interventions, that ideal exists, it exists as an immanent tendency present in the very foundation of the Republic. Cynicism aside this is not a fiction. So while something like a model is the most obvious and powerful manifestation of the Ideal, it is not the beginning and end of the Ideal. In the absence of such a model, the Ideal is still present in any living community. The NSL case is a case where we can learn more deeply what an Ideal can be. Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From tvmathdude@aol.com Tue Oct 14 19:40:00 2014 From: tvmathdude@aol.com (Tvmathdude) Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 22:40:00 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Ideal In-Reply-To: <543DB821.3010303@mira.net> References: <543DB821.3010303@mira.net> Message-ID: <8D1B638735A1B93-13A8-1A030@webmail-va069.sysops.aol.com> The USA is the only lace our style of democracy "works". To assume that our style of democracy can be exported is absurd. Our ignorance of other cultures is overwhelming. Yet, the ideal may exist, but be beyond our view. Did Vygotsky feel that he could only define an ideal within his own cultural limitations? -----Original Message----- From: Andy Blunden To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Sent: Tue, Oct 14, 2014 7:58 pm Subject: [Xmca-l] The Ideal Although I am sure that 99.9% (or thereabouts) of people who read what Vygotsky said about the presence of the ideal in the child's environment, interpreted this to mean simply that adult speech provided a model on which children could model their own language-use, nonetheless, this is not ultimately what the presence of the ideal means in the Marxist/Hegelian tradition of which Vygotsky and many of his colleagues were a part. It would be true to say for example that the ideal of democracy exists with US political life, even though I doubt there is a single electoral process which is not corrupted by money and degraded by ignorance, prejudice and narrow self-interest. Nonetheless, in all the rhetoric and legislation around the broader political life, and what peoplpe tell their kids and what young people cry out for in their political interventions, that ideal exists, it exists as an immanent tendency present in the very foundation of the Republic. Cynicism aside this is not a fiction. So while something like a model is the most obvious and powerful manifestation of the Ideal, it is not the beginning and end of the Ideal. In the absence of such a model, the Ideal is still present in any living community. The NSL case is a case where we can learn more deeply what an Ideal can be. Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From ablunden@mira.net Tue Oct 14 20:02:56 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 14:02:56 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Ideal In-Reply-To: <8D1B638735A1B93-13A8-1A030@webmail-va069.sysops.aol.com> References: <543DB821.3010303@mira.net> <8D1B638735A1B93-13A8-1A030@webmail-va069.sysops.aol.com> Message-ID: <543DE3E0.7080409@mira.net> To keep up the metaphor, Dude, exporting US democracy is like expecting everyone in the world to worship Jesus, and equally likely to succeed. No, an ideal, if it exists, exists implicitly in the practices of a community and cannot be "exported". I think Vygotsky was simply talking of the Ideal as something like that, which exists within the life of a community, and is acquired by anyone raised in that community. I am not talking about a "universal ideal," and I don't think that that is what Vygotsky had in mind. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Tvmathdude wrote: > The USA is the only lace our style of democracy "works". To assume > that our style of democracy can be exported is absurd. Our ignorance > of other cultures is overwhelming. Yet, the ideal may exist, but be > beyond our view. > > Did Vygotsky feel that he could only define an ideal within his own > cultural limitations? > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Andy Blunden > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Sent: Tue, Oct 14, 2014 7:58 pm > Subject: [Xmca-l] The Ideal > > Although I am sure that 99.9% (or thereabouts) of people who read what > Vygotsky said about the presence of the ideal in the child's > environment, interpreted this to mean simply that adult speech provided > a model on which children could model their own language-use, > nonetheless, this is not ultimately what the presence of the ideal means > in the Marxist/Hegelian tradition of which Vygotsky and many of his > colleagues were a part. > It would be true to say for example that the ideal of democracy exists > with US political life, even though I doubt there is a single electoral > process which is not corrupted by money and degraded by ignorance, > prejudice and narrow self-interest. Nonetheless, in all the rhetoric and > legislation around the broader political life, and what peoplpe tell > their kids and what young people cry out for in their political > interventions, that ideal exists, it exists as an immanent tendency > present in the very foundation of the Republic. Cynicism aside this is > not a fiction. > So while something like a model is the most obvious and powerful > manifestation of the Ideal, it is not the beginning and end of the > Ideal. In the absence of such a model, the Ideal is still present in any > living community. > The NSL case is a case where we can learn more deeply what an Ideal can be. > > Andy > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Oct 14 20:19:25 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 04:19:25 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV & ANL on the problem of the environment In-Reply-To: <12BF4E45-028B-4E91-851A-542938817A8C@uniandes.edu.co> References: <12BF4E45-028B-4E91-851A-542938817A8C@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Hi Martin, Assimilation is the simpler circumstance. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genetic_assimilation Best, Huw On 15 October 2014 00:16, Martin John Packer wrote: > Huy, isn't the phrase "genetic accommodation"? Genes accommodating to new > behaviors, rather than the other way around. Or does evo-devo posit genetic > assimilation too? > > Martin > > > On Oct 14, 2014, at 10:40 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > He pays scant regard to the > > dynamics of genetic assimilation here > > > From dkirsh@lsu.edu Tue Oct 14 20:30:05 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 03:30:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Ideal In-Reply-To: <543DE3E0.7080409@mira.net> References: <543DB821.3010303@mira.net> <8D1B638735A1B93-13A8-1A030@webmail-va069.sysops.aol.com> <543DE3E0.7080409@mira.net> Message-ID: <333f0648a74e4ef79ffc523cff10c90d@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Ideals can't be exported, but they can be imported, as when a member of a culture straddles a second culture, and brings ideals and practices from the latter to the former. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Tuesday, October 14, 2014 10:03 PM To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Ideal To keep up the metaphor, Dude, exporting US democracy is like expecting everyone in the world to worship Jesus, and equally likely to succeed. No, an ideal, if it exists, exists implicitly in the practices of a community and cannot be "exported". I think Vygotsky was simply talking of the Ideal as something like that, which exists within the life of a community, and is acquired by anyone raised in that community. I am not talking about a "universal ideal," and I don't think that that is what Vygotsky had in mind. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Tvmathdude wrote: > The USA is the only lace our style of democracy "works". To assume > that our style of democracy can be exported is absurd. Our ignorance > of other cultures is overwhelming. Yet, the ideal may exist, but be > beyond our view. > > Did Vygotsky feel that he could only define an ideal within his own > cultural limitations? > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Andy Blunden > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Sent: Tue, Oct 14, 2014 7:58 pm > Subject: [Xmca-l] The Ideal > > Although I am sure that 99.9% (or thereabouts) of people who read what > Vygotsky said about the presence of the ideal in the child's > environment, interpreted this to mean simply that adult speech > provided a model on which children could model their own language-use, > nonetheless, this is not ultimately what the presence of the ideal > means in the Marxist/Hegelian tradition of which Vygotsky and many of > his colleagues were a part. > It would be true to say for example that the ideal of democracy exists > with US political life, even though I doubt there is a single > electoral process which is not corrupted by money and degraded by > ignorance, prejudice and narrow self-interest. Nonetheless, in all the > rhetoric and legislation around the broader political life, and what > peoplpe tell their kids and what young people cry out for in their > political interventions, that ideal exists, it exists as an immanent > tendency present in the very foundation of the Republic. Cynicism > aside this is not a fiction. > So while something like a model is the most obvious and powerful > manifestation of the Ideal, it is not the beginning and end of the > Ideal. In the absence of such a model, the Ideal is still present in > any living community. > The NSL case is a case where we can learn more deeply what an Ideal can be. > > Andy > -- > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Oct 15 05:59:16 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 12:59:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Ideal In-Reply-To: <333f0648a74e4ef79ffc523cff10c90d@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> References: <543DB821.3010303@mira.net> <8D1B638735A1B93-13A8-1A030@webmail-va069.sysops.aol.com> <543DE3E0.7080409@mira.net> <333f0648a74e4ef79ffc523cff10c90d@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <36439474-D3D8-4E44-9D92-F4F3B8DD0C72@uniandes.edu.co> Of course ideals can be exported - there have been many moves to impose the language of one community on another community, as David Ke just described! That's not to say the recipients enjoy it. Martin On Oct 14, 2014, at 10:30 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > Ideals can't be exported, but they can be imported, as when a member of a culture straddles a second culture, and brings ideals and practices from the latter to the former. > David > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Tuesday, October 14, 2014 10:03 PM > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Ideal > > To keep up the metaphor, Dude, exporting US democracy is like expecting everyone in the world to worship Jesus, and equally likely to succeed. > No, an ideal, if it exists, exists implicitly in the practices of a community and cannot be "exported". > I think Vygotsky was simply talking of the Ideal as something like that, which exists within the life of a community, and is acquired by anyone raised in that community. I am not talking about a "universal ideal," > and I don't think that that is what Vygotsky had in mind. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Tvmathdude wrote: >> The USA is the only lace our style of democracy "works". To assume >> that our style of democracy can be exported is absurd. Our ignorance >> of other cultures is overwhelming. Yet, the ideal may exist, but be >> beyond our view. >> >> Did Vygotsky feel that he could only define an ideal within his own >> cultural limitations? >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Andy Blunden >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Sent: Tue, Oct 14, 2014 7:58 pm >> Subject: [Xmca-l] The Ideal >> >> Although I am sure that 99.9% (or thereabouts) of people who read what >> Vygotsky said about the presence of the ideal in the child's >> environment, interpreted this to mean simply that adult speech >> provided a model on which children could model their own language-use, >> nonetheless, this is not ultimately what the presence of the ideal >> means in the Marxist/Hegelian tradition of which Vygotsky and many of >> his colleagues were a part. >> It would be true to say for example that the ideal of democracy exists >> with US political life, even though I doubt there is a single >> electoral process which is not corrupted by money and degraded by >> ignorance, prejudice and narrow self-interest. Nonetheless, in all the >> rhetoric and legislation around the broader political life, and what >> peoplpe tell their kids and what young people cry out for in their >> political interventions, that ideal exists, it exists as an immanent >> tendency present in the very foundation of the Republic. Cynicism >> aside this is not a fiction. >> So while something like a model is the most obvious and powerful >> manifestation of the Ideal, it is not the beginning and end of the >> Ideal. In the absence of such a model, the Ideal is still present in >> any living community. >> The NSL case is a case where we can learn more deeply what an Ideal can be. >> >> Andy >> -- >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Oct 15 06:10:38 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 13:10:38 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?q?The_Ideal?= In-Reply-To: <543DB821.3010303@mira.net> References: <543DB821.3010303@mira.net> Message-ID: <543e7caf.421b450a.40a5.ffffe90c@mx.google.com> Andy, thanks for your clarification of the existing of the ideal AS exchanged [ex -expression / change -transformation] WITHIN a particular tradition. The Marxist and Hegelian tradition . THIS tradition was also present in the vygotskian tradition. I want to respond [as part of THIS expression/transformation exchange] with my ex-tensions [expressive tensions]. IN Peirce's tradition I would say my interpretants. I am playing with being [is] AND resemblance [as] The ideal AS presence EXISTING. WHERE IS the ideal EXISTING as presence? IN the Marxist-Hegelian TRADITION. In this TYPE of ex-change [interpretants AS existing] It would be TRUE to SAY [exchange] THE [indexical] *ideal of democracy* EXISTS within US political LIFE [as living presence] WHERE does THIS ideal exist? IN all the RHETORIC. IN all the LEGISLATION. THIS ideal IS present IN the surroundings. [Gadamer would say IN the horizons] THAT [indexical] ideal EXISTS *AS* an immanent TENDENCY [movement direction *sens* ] WHERE? IN the *foundations* of THE republic [AS ANOTHER ideal or interpreting] This ideal is NOT a *fiction*. I intuitively want to explore this opposition and explore ex-tensions of the meaning [and presence/absence] of *fiction* in relation to THE *true*] - through OTHER traditions. SO something [existing] LIKE a MODEL [something RESEMBLING a model but NOT identical to *A* model] IS the most powerful EXISTING [and the most obvious EXISTING] 8*manifestation* [coming into being] of THE [indexical] *ideal* [AS truth not fiction] THE model is NOT identical [equal] to THE [indexical] ideal AS existing. [as an EXISTING interpretant . THE model is NOT the beginning and end of THE ideal. THE model EXISTS in *relation* TO the ideal as interpretant.[BOTH the model AND the ideal EXIST. IN the ABSENCE of a model [which is derived or abstracted from the ideal] the ideal STILL EXISTS. [is true] The ideal IS present in its presence. BUT WHERE is THIS [indexical] ideal existent as an interpreting. ANSWER: IN [or within] any LIVING community. THE community [as cases] ex-press [exchange AS expression transformation] LIVING formations THROUGH ideals [interpretants that EXIST] ARE the WAY living exchanges are manifest AS *extensions* [exchanging tensions] THIS exchanging presence through dialectic AND dialogue [not either/or but BOTH/and possibly other ex-tensions] My impressions as I was *reading* ANDY?S ex-change deepening the exploration of Leontiev's re-visioning Vygotsky's exploration of *experience* as a possible unity of subject and object WITHIN THIS particular tradition Larry Sent from Windows Mail From: Andy Blunden Sent: ?Tuesday?, ?October? ?14?, ?2014 ?4?:?56? ?PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Although I am sure that 99.9% (or thereabouts) of people who read what Vygotsky said about the presence of the ideal in the child's environment, interpreted this to mean simply that adult speech provided a model on which children could model their own language-use, nonetheless, this is not ultimately what the presence of the ideal means in the Marxist/Hegelian tradition of which Vygotsky and many of his colleagues were a part. It would be true to say for example that the ideal of democracy exists with US political life, even though I doubt there is a single electoral process which is not corrupted by money and degraded by ignorance, prejudice and narrow self-interest. Nonetheless, in all the rhetoric and legislation around the broader political life, and what peoplpe tell their kids and what young people cry out for in their political interventions, that ideal exists, it exists as an immanent tendency present in the very foundation of the Republic. Cynicism aside this is not a fiction. So while something like a model is the most obvious and powerful manifestation of the Ideal, it is not the beginning and end of the Ideal. In the absence of such a model, the Ideal is still present in any living community. The NSL case is a case where we can learn more deeply what an Ideal can be. Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From smago@uga.edu Wed Oct 15 02:45:01 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 09:45:01 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Assistant Prof. New Literacies/Learning Sciences University at Buffalo/SUNY Message-ID: <876e85bc76224934b123094713fc57e1@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> THIS IS A FORWARDED MESSAGE. PLEASE READ ITS CONTENTS CAREFULLY AND REPLY TO THE ORIGINAL SENDER RATHER THAN TO ME From: Boyd, Fenice > Date: Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 2:13 PM Subject: [LRA] FW: Assistant Prof. New Literacies/Learning Sciences University at Buffalo/SUNY To: "members@list.literacyresearchassociation.org" > Hello Literacy Colleagues: University at Buffalo/SUNY announces a job opening for tenure track Assistant Professor: New Literacies/Learning Sciences For questions, please contact: Search Committee Chair, Mary McVee EMAIL: mcvee@buffalo.edu; TEL: 716.645.1059 or 716.645.2458 We encourage our literacy colleagues to apply. Flyer also attached. The University at Buffalo/SUNY is seeking a vibrant new literacies scholar focusing on the science of learning to join our distinguished community of professors and students in the Department of Learning and Instruction in the Graduate School of Education. Buffalo has been named as a top city for quality of life, affordability, and as an arts destination. Buffalo?s downtown and harbor front are in the middle of a vibrant resurgence. (Links below). The University at Buffalo is SUNY?s largest research institution. Join us at UB during this exciting, dynamic time! For this Assistant Professor of New Literacies position, the successful applicant with a specialty in one or more disciplinary areas will ? Have expertise in some of the following areas: o Research methods and practices in new literacies and the learning sciences o Integrating new literacies to engage students while addressing local, state and national standards o Research-based practices to assist professional development of new literacies to enhance learning o Practical applications of learning science theories to disciplinary education ? Develop a distinguished body of research ? Develop courses for online delivery in addition to the "face-to-face" format ? Teach 2 courses per semester to EdM and PhD students (e.g., Learning theories, Research Methods, Teaching Methods for new literacies and/or a discipline; ? Advise and supervise Ed.M. and Ph.D. students Classification Title: Assistant Professor 10 Position Title: Assistant Professor of New Literacies/Learning Sciences Posting Number: 1400612 Quicklink for Posting: Buffalo Links: 5th Overall Quality of Life: http://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/cities/best-cities-quality-of-life/ 1st Overall affordability: http://www.forbes.com/sites/erincarlyle/2014/03/11/americas-most-affordable-cities/ Downtown resurgence, spotlight on Larkinville: http://www.buffalonews.com/columns/donn-esmonde/larkinville-moment-captures-the-new-buffalo-20140920 Elmwood Village declared one of 10 Great Neighborhoods in the US: https://www.planning.orgBu/greatplaces/neighborhoods/2007/elmwoodvillage.htm Thank you! -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 2014.New Literacies Assistant Prof University Buffalo SUNY.compressed.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 57201 bytes Desc: 2014.New Literacies Assistant Prof University Buffalo SUNY.compressed.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141015/fdd93989/attachment.pdf From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Oct 15 14:51:56 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 06:51:56 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Ernst Boesch Message-ID: Mike: I'm writing the foreword for our new Vygotsky volume (number SIX!), and I was struck by the quote from Ernst Boesch that you lately use in your e-mails. "It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history." It's an epigraph I've read several times--I think you cite it in Cultural Psych, and also in something you wrote in the CUP volume that Luis Moll edited, Vygotsky and Education. I remember reading a marvelous article by him on the history of the violin in the CUP volume that MCA did in the twilight years of the last century; he knew about, and fully appreciated, the Chinese contribution to the instrument. When I googled the name, I discovered that he had died in July of this year. Can you tell us something about him? For starters, where exactly does that epigraph come from? Thanks, David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Oct 15 16:28:27 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 16:28:27 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ernst Boesch In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi David-- I did not hear of Ernst's death. He was a wonderful scholar. The Wikipedia entry on him has several references. I know best the essays edited by Walt Lonner which includes the violin piece, I believe. I obtained that quotation from Lutz Eckensberger, a cross-cultural psychologist who was active in the 1970's and 1980's. I have been trying to locate Lutz for many reasons, one of which is that I myself wanted to find the origins of that quote. He gave it to me once a long time ago-- I believe in German. And I, in typical fashion, lost it. Let me try to track this down. There is a good deal of more recent Boesch work available in English and its always interesting. Sorry not to be more help, but I'll see what i can do to make amends. mike On Wed, Oct 15, 2014 at 2:51 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Mike: > > I'm writing the foreword for our new Vygotsky volume (number SIX!), > and I was struck by the quote from Ernst Boesch that you lately use in > your e-mails. > > "It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an object that creates history." > > It's an epigraph I've read several times--I think you cite it in > Cultural Psych, and also in something you wrote in the CUP volume that > Luis Moll edited, Vygotsky and Education. I remember reading a > marvelous article by him on the history of the violin in the CUP > volume that MCA did in the twilight years of the last century; he knew > about, and fully appreciated, the Chinese contribution to the > instrument. When I googled the name, I discovered that he had died in > July of this year. > > Can you tell us something about him? For starters, where exactly does > that epigraph come from? > > Thanks, > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Oct 15 16:39:43 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 16:39:43 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Ernst Boesch In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: David--- I found the source, and it is indeed in German. Check the Oxford Handbook of Culture and Psychology on Amazon and type in Boesch (1971). Its all German to me! I have a quest out for the reference. mike On Wed, Oct 15, 2014 at 2:51 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Mike: > > I'm writing the foreword for our new Vygotsky volume (number SIX!), > and I was struck by the quote from Ernst Boesch that you lately use in > your e-mails. > > "It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an object that creates history." > > It's an epigraph I've read several times--I think you cite it in > Cultural Psych, and also in something you wrote in the CUP volume that > Luis Moll edited, Vygotsky and Education. I remember reading a > marvelous article by him on the history of the violin in the CUP > volume that MCA did in the twilight years of the last century; he knew > about, and fully appreciated, the Chinese contribution to the > instrument. When I googled the name, I discovered that he had died in > July of this year. > > Can you tell us something about him? For starters, where exactly does > that epigraph come from? > > Thanks, > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk Thu Oct 16 08:26:26 2014 From: julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk (Julian Williams) Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 15:26:26 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL Message-ID: Dear Larry and all interested in Leontiev's critique of Vygotsky This discussion seems to have cooled off, unless I missed some posts: a pity? I was hoping we would get at the nub of Leontiev's critique of Vygotsky's 'idealism'. Im not normally on Leontiev's side in these debates, but here goes: I don?t think it would have taken much to persuade Vygotsky (had he been alive to the critique) that the 'ideal form' that already exists from the start of development only 'exists' (if it does) objectively in social practices/activity, and that hence that a ZPD for development (the example given in the paper is arithmetic) then has to authentically embed these ideal forms in practices (in the classroom in simulated shopping, or whatever) that make good sense for the child? so the perezhivanie is itself embedded/situated in the child's being/relations in social activity and the material objects, motives and emotions and discourses etc that come with that. (I take this to be ANL's point). Leontiev's reading of Vygotsky's text is not exactly unfair: I can imagine readings of this 'final form' of the ideal 'already existing' leading to distortions in activity theory (and it is a real problem Im writing about this just now). I argue that in fact the idea that 'arithmetic' already exists in an ideal final form and the task of development is to engage the child with this ideal form is a dangerous formulation: rather I argue that arithmetic has to appear in practice, in 'real social practice with all the emotional baggage that it should have, i.e. as a solution to a meaningful problem in practice, rather than an alienating bundle of formulae to be internalised, as a punishment for being a child forced into schooling. And this social context of the 'ideal form' is of course absolutely part of what makes the perezhivanie, it is not just the stage of the child's development but their engagement in the activity/social practice and its motives too?. To arithmetic: if you can bear with me! There is in practice no 'final form' of arithmetic anyway. Each generation learns and experiences it differently, and its done differently in different micro cultures, and long may this be the case (e.g. In subtraction do you add to the bottom or take from the top, or what...; in practice, do you use a pencil to do sums or use your your phone as a calculator? etc etc?) So: Leontiev maybe has an axe to grind about the material, object-oriented base of (semiotic etc etc mediated) activity, but I think also here he has a point. In defence of Vygotsky anyone? julian On 13/10/2014 20:53, "Larry Purss" wrote: >To return to Leontiev's article on the environment. >On page 19 Leontiev says Vygotsky uses the word *communication* with the >narrow meaning of *spiritual sense* or *spiritual relationships* to >signify >the way we use words and language. >Leontiev suggests this is a limited meaning of communication which >excludes >a BROADER meaning [BEYOND LANGUAGE USE] to *signify* the GENERAL FACT of >people's relationships which ENCOMPASS their material dealings. > >Is this way of presenting the difference in *communication* the SAME >[equal] difference that *divides* materialism and idealism? >Leontiev goes on to say: >When Vygotsky views the person AS *the subject of communication* the child >INEVITABLY IS transformed through THIS SIGNIFICATION of *communication* >into an IDEAL PSYCHOLOGICAL subject AND the environment is transformed >into >an IDEAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT. > >Leontiev then goes on to say that Vygotsky's thinking IS moving along >THESE >*ideal* lines of development and it is THIS conceptual starting point >which >is transforming Vygotsky's theory into a *spiritual* theory. >For Vygotsky, *discovering* the ROLE of *communication* [contact with >people] AS A DRIVING FORCE of development Vygotsky INTRODUCES *the* >understanding [in Peirce's term an *interpretant*] of a *FINAL IDEAL FORM* >This ideal form IS an existing phenomena [form] in the environment from >the >beginning when the new born infant is thrown into THIS world. >In the process of development the child acquires THIS *ideal form* [which >already exists in the environment in IDEAL form] BE-comes the *model* that >results at the end of development. >IDEAL in *this* sense IS A MODEL of what results at the end of >development. >The beginning form EXISTS in relation [in unity??] with the *ideal form* >[with the model] which pre-exists the beginning form of the infant AND >TRULY INTERACTS WITH the infant's development. > >Leontiev goes on to claim that this specific example is characteristic, >for >Vygotsky, of ALL OTHER MEANING development. >MODELS *truly exist* in the world [which emerged historically in previous >social historical situations] > >Leontiev then goes on to make a STRONG claim that these models actually >*determine* and *direct* the infant's first steps. >I wonder if a weaker claim that models *influence* the infants first step >is what Vygotsky *meant* >SO -the environment [and models] *appear* [or seem] TO BE the >*vehicle* [carrier[ of development of THESE forms/models and these forms >*determine* the development of shared *meaning* > >Now from this criticism of pre-existing *models* Leontiev claims Vygotsky >IS LOCKED in a vicious circle. >However, if *models* as various multiple [interpretants - Peirce] ACTUALLY >EXIST THEN Vygotsky's theory is *true* in actual fact. > >This leads into the *loose* thread of the place of the *imaginal* in the >*real* and I would point to Raymond William's book "Marxism and >Literature" >to explore the imaginal within Marxian *cultural theory*. >Also on another thread a discussion of Umberto Eco's notion of *primary >indexicality* prior to subjects and objects but that leads beyond the >focus >of Leontiev's revisioning Vygotsky > >Larry > >On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 11:47 AM, Martin John Packer < >mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >> Hi Alfredo, >> >> I don't really see a dilemma... and I think LSV is pretty clear: >> >> "How can one explain why exactly the same environmental conditions exert >> three different types of influence on these three different children? It >> can be explained because each of the children has a different attitude >>to >> the situation. Or, as we might put it, each of the children experienced >>the >> situation in a different way. .... So it appears that, depending on the >> fact that the same situation had been experienced by the three children >>in >> three different ways, the influence which this situation exerted on >>their >> development also turns out to be different." >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 13, 2014, at 1:19 PM, Alfredo Gil Jornet >> wrote: >> >> > Julian, Martin, >> > >> > Perhaps a way out of the dilemma of whether we should be talking about >> the same mother/environment or about different mothers/environments is >> provided by Dewey's notion of *situation*, which always implies both >> organism and environment. We can then talk of different situations, yet >>the >> same environment. >> > >> > Alfredo >> > ________________________________________ >> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> on behalf of Martin John Packer >> > Sent: 13 October 2014 19:59 >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? >> > >> > Julian, >> > >> > I would prefer to say that they all have the same mother, but they >> relate to her and interact with her in specific ways, depending largely >>on >> their stage of development. She presumably relates to each of them >> somewhat differently, but undoubtedly each of them witnesses how she >>treats >> the others. >> > >> > So I'm saying that the environment is the same - they all live in a >> house with a drunken mother - but the ways they live in that >>environment, >> and the ways they make sense of it, differ. >> > >> > Martin >> > >> > On Oct 13, 2014, at 12:45 PM, Julian Williams < >> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote: >> > >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> Ok we are on the same page, if you agree the environment may not be >>the >> same for the three children... It is not just that they are >>developmentally >> at a different stage, but "mother" is actually a different environment >>for >> each of them. >> >> >> >> Julian >> >> >> >> Sent from my iPad >> >> >> >> On 13 Oct 2014, at 17:54, "Martin John Packer" >> >> wrote: >> >> >> >>> Hi Julian, >> >>> >> >>> I've been trying to suggest that the dialectic is in the child's >> relationship to the environment. Or, as you say, as an aspect of >> child-in-the-environment (with-others). Generally I try to avoid >>dualistic >> terminology such as 'in the child' versus 'in the world' or 'subjective' >> versus 'objective' - I think I'm following LSV's lead here, though >> certainly he uses the term "internal" a lot. >> >>> >> >>> Generally in children's development the environment does indeed >>change >> as they grow - parents make new arrangements for them. But in the case >> study that LSV describes, we have three children of different ages all >> dealing at the same time with the same adult. In this sense the >>environment >> is fixed, in this particular case. >> >>> >> >>> And surely you're right to suggest that the children are >>contributing >> to the environment in which they live. One can only imagine how a >>drunken >> mother responds to her youngest son wetting the bed, for example. >> >>> >> >>> Martin >> >>> >> >>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 11:14 AM, Julian Williams < >> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote: >> >>> >> >>>> Dear Martin, and all >> >>>> >> >>>> I dont see the dialectic as 'internal' to the child, but as the >> child-in-the-environment. But I think maybe there is a problem with the >> current drift in the discussion. >> >>>> >> >>>> The problem I see arising now is that we are beginning to take the >> environment here as something fixed or taken for granted, with the >> difference in the three Perezhivanie being totally about the >> subjects/childs different stages of development. I'm not sure this does >> justice to the dialectic Vygotsky had in mind (though I see it might >>appear >> so in the text). I think one has to consider the objective fact of the >> environment as something from which different strands may be >>apprehended, >> or if you like, or from which certain aspects can be 'refracted'. >> >>>> >> >>>> At the cost of perhaps causing confusion, I wonder if the notion of >> Zone of Proximal Development can help here for those who use this idea >>... >> A particular social plane (environment, classroom interaction etc) can >> offer a ZPD for some but be entirely useless to others, because of their >> different stages of development, yes, yes. But also, different learners >>at >> different stages can help create their own ZPDs within the same social >> space and even plane, (drawing from the same social interactions in >> different ways). So they may shape the very environment which provides >>for >> their own ZPD and hence development. I think this is a more adequate >>way to >> think of the dialectic, so the subject is not seen as passive in their >>own >> development. >> >>>> >> >>>> Julian >> >>>> >> >>>> (Maybe this passivity is what Mike had in mind when he expressed >> reservations about Vygotsky's use of the 'final ideal form' , eg of >> arithmetic, have I remembered this right? Anyway I DO have reservations >> about that notion in Vygotsky's chapter but maybe that's another story >>for >> later.) >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> On 13 Oct 2014, at 14:53, "Martin John Packer" < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>>> Hi Robyn, >> >>>>> >> >>>>> I think it's important to recognize that the oldest child's >> understanding of the need to take care of his mother and siblings is >>not a >> drive or an impulse, it is, LSV tells us, a "duty" that follows from >> adopting a specific "role" in the family. Understanding the situation in >> terms of roles and duties is certainly socially mediated - after all, >>roles >> and duties are social, or societal, matters (ontological and >>deontological >> respectively, if we want to get technical). The oldest child - >>presumably >> attending school - is able to understand that he lives in a world of >>social >> institutions, one of which is his family. >> >>>>> >> >>>>> In this chapter LSV does not explore or explain how each kind of >> perezhivanie transforms into the next, but in his lectures on child >> development you can find a more detailed account. But here, in what is >> effectively a cross-sectional comparison of children at different ages >> (albeit only one at each age), he certainly means to suggest that >>earlier >> forms provide the basis for later forms. >> >>>>> >> >>>>> Martin >> >>>>> >> >>>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:45 AM, Robyn Babaeff >> >> wrote: >> >>>>> >> >>>>>> Much appreciated Martin - this is feeling more visual, and now I >>am >> >>>>>> wondering is it possible to interpret that the older child's >>emotive >> >>>>>> drive/action of care for his mother and younger sibling in its >> moment is >> >>>>>> also connected a socially mediated aspect of cognition from >> somewhere/time >> >>>>>> in his earlier years of perezhivanie for the 'how to' in his >> choosing/drive >> >>>>>> for duty of care? >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> On 13 October 2014 23:21, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >> >>>>>> wrote: >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic >>involving >> >>>>>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >> >>>>>>> connection? >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their >> mother's >> >>>>>>> drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the >> dynamic >> >>>>>>> development of perezhivanie. >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from >> emotion, >> >>>>>>> in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and >> interpreting the >> >>>>>>> circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, >> the child >> >>>>>>> is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction >>is >> one of >> >>>>>>> extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates >> involuntarily and >> >>>>>>> stammers. He loses control of his own body. >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the >> horror of >> >>>>>>> what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of >> terror, >> >>>>>>> enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to >> speak at all >> >>>>>>> as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction >> amounts to a >> >>>>>>> state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of >>this >> >>>>>>> situation." >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more >>developed. >> The >> >>>>>>> contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an >> alternation >> >>>>>>> between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion >> towards the >> >>>>>>> mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the >> breakdown seen >> >>>>>>> in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily >>emotional, >> but it >> >>>>>>> is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The >> child's >> >>>>>>> love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, >> directed >> >>>>>>> towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as >> bad. It is, >> >>>>>>> however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions >> that is so >> >>>>>>> difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of >> approach-avoidance. >> >>>>>>> The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the >> mother; her >> >>>>>>> failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal >>conflict >> for the >> >>>>>>> child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates >> between two >> >>>>>>> different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she >> is a >> >>>>>>> mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than >> that of his >> >>>>>>> younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely >> agonizing >> >>>>>>> condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a >> condition >> >>>>>>> frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional >> attitudes >> >>>>>>> towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we >>have >> >>>>>>> previously been able to observe among one of our children and >> which, you >> >>>>>>> may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one >> hand, from >> >>>>>>> the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful >> attachment, >> >>>>>>> and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of >>terrors >> and >> >>>>>>> terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. >>The >> German >> >>>>>>> authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is >> experiencing >> >>>>>>> a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for >> the mother >> >>>>>>> and terror of the witch coexist. >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply >> pronounced >> >>>>>>> conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction >>expressed >> in a >> >>>>>>> simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the >>mother, a >> >>>>>>> terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, >> combined >> >>>>>>> with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home >> >>>>>>> immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going >> home was >> >>>>>>> brought up." >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with >> more >> >>>>>>> detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of >> pity: of >> >>>>>>> sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and >>compassion >> can >> >>>>>>> coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother >> not as a >> >>>>>>> bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, >>or >> weak. She >> >>>>>>> acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. >>This, >> then, >> >>>>>>> means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a >> "duty" to >> >>>>>>> take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest >> child has a >> >>>>>>> single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. >>His >> emotions >> >>>>>>> follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother >>was >> ill and >> >>>>>>> he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his >> mother down, >> >>>>>>> make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones >> and comfort >> >>>>>>> them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the >>family, >> the only >> >>>>>>> one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and >> cognition in >> >>>>>>> each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship >> changes >> >>>>>>> with age. >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Martin >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a >> preschooler, and >> >>>>>>> the oldest a school-aged child. >> >>>>>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff < >> robyn.babaeff@monash.edu> >> >>>>>>> wrote: >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic >>involving >> >>>>>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >> >>>>>>> connection? >> >>>>>>>> As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves >>into a >> >>>>>>> different >> >>>>>>>> realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective >> position of >> >>>>>>>> the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where >>there >> is >> >>>>>>>> emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then >> as the >> >>>>>>>> cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs >>from >> the >> >>>>>>>> internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the >> >>>>>>> connectedness >> >>>>>>>> takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn >> >>>>>>>> motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees < >> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> >> >>>>>>>> wrote: >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and >> every word, >> >>>>>>>>> but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all >>operating >> with the >> >>>>>>>>> same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like >> this >> >>>>>>>>> discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it >> because we >> >>>>>>> each >> >>>>>>>>> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which >>includes >> our >> >>>>>>>>> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be >> expected >> >>>>>>> to >> >>>>>>>>> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead >>some >> people, >> >>>>>>>>> etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an >> >>>>>>>>> approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be >> negotiated in >> >>>>>>>>> discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get >>closer >> to >> >>>>>>>>> understanding how a particular person uses particular words >>when >> we get >> >>>>>>> to >> >>>>>>>>> know that person as a person and that involves much more than >> just >> >>>>>>> batting >> >>>>>>>>> words to and fro! >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> Rod >> >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >> >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> >>>>>>>>> on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] >> >>>>>>>>> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 >> >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in >> English? Is >> >>>>>>> this >> >>>>>>>>> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, >>in >> this >> >>>>>>> case >> >>>>>>>>> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, >> which adds >> >>>>>>>>> onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> Andy, >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot >> capture >> >>>>>>>>>> everything. >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my >> college >> >>>>>>>>>> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, >> because >> >>>>>>> that >> >>>>>>>>>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen >>is >> >>>>>>> strongly >> >>>>>>>>>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen >> atoms, >> >>>>>>>>>> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This >>has >> the >> >>>>>>>>>> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to >> hydrogen >> >>>>>>>>>> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that >> water is a >> >>>>>>>>>> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from >> elements >> >>>>>>> that >> >>>>>>>>>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the >> *formation* of >> >>>>>>>>>> water. My point was that once formed, there are no >> contradictions >> >>>>>>> driving >> >>>>>>>>>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does >> partially >> >>>>>>>>>> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of >>water >> is >> >>>>>>>>> actually >> >>>>>>>>>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and >> >>>>>>>>> dissociating >> >>>>>>>>>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it >>doesn't >> >>>>>>> develop >> >>>>>>>>>> further. >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> Martin >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden >> >> wrote: >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a >> metaphor >> >>>>>>> - >> >>>>>>>>>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case >> it is >> >>>>>>>>> simply >> >>>>>>>>>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O >> molecules, and >> >>>>>>>>>> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the >> properties of >> >>>>>>>>>> water. >> >>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind >> the H and >> >>>>>>>>> OH >> >>>>>>>>>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a >>positive >> charge >> >>>>>>>>> and >> >>>>>>>>>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old >>positive/negative >> >>>>>>>>>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all >> chemicals >> >>>>>>>>>> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base >>and >> >>>>>>> therefore >> >>>>>>>>>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of >> contradictions >> >>>>>>>>> and >> >>>>>>>>>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the >> chemistry of >> >>>>>>>>>> life. :) >> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy >> >>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that >>LSV's >> own >> >>>>>>>>>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. >>Water >> is not >> >>>>>>> a >> >>>>>>>>>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process >> stops: >> >>>>>>> water >> >>>>>>>>> is >> >>>>>>>>>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which >>an >> >>>>>>> internal >> >>>>>>>>>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for >> change. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a >> triangle is >> >>>>>>>>>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole >> wrote: >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and >> oxygen such >> >>>>>>>>>> that two >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give >>rise >> to >> >>>>>>> water >> >>>>>>>>>> with >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people >> to rise >> >>>>>>> to >> >>>>>>>>>> the >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> concrete for their own cases. >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >> >>>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a >> dynamic >> >>>>>>>>> system >> >>>>>>>>>> with >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike >> linked to, >> >>>>>>>>>> and I >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all >> before >> >>>>>>>>>> posting. >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < >> >>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On the contrary. >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things >> about >> >>>>>>>>> activity >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A >> very simple >> >>>>>>>>>> example >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is that if you change something in the >> norms/customs/laws/history >> >>>>>>>>>> corner of >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a >> stronger >> >>>>>>>>> footing >> >>>>>>>>>> in >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by >> bringing >> >>>>>>>>> new >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out >> of which >> >>>>>>>>>> division >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with >>a >> >>>>>>>>> leadership >> >>>>>>>>>> team >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily >> English-speaking, which >> >>>>>>>>>> in turn >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if >> you're lucky >> >>>>>>>>> and >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> quick, change your history. >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it >> implies >> >>>>>>>>> that, >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the >> components, one >> >>>>>>> can >> >>>>>>>>>> bring >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting >>on >> >>>>>>>>> *another* >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> component of the totality. >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me >>this >> type of >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to >> represent >> >>>>>>>>>> elements that >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is >> that the >> >>>>>>>>>> question >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was >>exploring >> a method >> >>>>>>>>> of >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among >> components >> >>>>>>>>>> in a >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor >>on >> >>>>>>> another, >> >>>>>>>>>> which >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And >> this means >> >>>>>>>>>> that >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this >> >>>>>>> relationship. >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < >> >>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" >> in a very >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape >> collective >> >>>>>>>>>> responses >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships >>(like, >> when a >> >>>>>>>>> rule >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree >> with Andy: >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of >>analysis >> is an >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a >> template, >> >>>>>>>>>> it is >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the >> leap. It >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually comes >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your >> research using >> >>>>>>>>>> some >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> other >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. >>The >> >>>>>>>>> question >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we >> going to >> >>>>>>>>>> do?" The >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are >>trying >> to >> >>>>>>>>>> accomplish. >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off >>temporarily? >> Are we >> >>>>>>>>>> trying >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system >>in >> >>>>>>> Chicago, >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm >> going to >> >>>>>>> be >> >>>>>>>>>> late >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid >> today and >> >>>>>>>>>> will miss >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their >> supervisors. We're >> >>>>>>>>>> talking >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of >>them >> middle >> >>>>>>>>> aged >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended >>families >> to be >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message >>on a >> >>>>>>> machine, >> >>>>>>>>>> but >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in >>person >> who >> >>>>>>> would >> >>>>>>>>>> then >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because >> supervisors were >> >>>>>>>>>> often >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was >> unreliable. >> >>>>>>>>>> Also, a >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this >>was >> >>>>>>>>> happening >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if >> someone it out >> >>>>>>>>>> buying >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call >>is >> not >> >>>>>>>>> easy. >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to >> >>>>>>> accomplish, >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To >> educate >> >>>>>>>>>> members of >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond >> collectively to >> >>>>>>>>>> something >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound >>change in >> >>>>>>> society >> >>>>>>>>>> so >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of >>an >> >>>>>>> extended >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one >> that you >> >>>>>>>>> can >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then >> reviewing >> >>>>>>>>> the >> >>>>>>>>>> whole >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, >>as >> Andy >> >>>>>>>>>> says, a >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to >> actually >> >>>>>>>>>> speak to >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we >>talk >> about >> >>>>>>>>>> activity >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are >>often >> in >> >>>>>>>>>> conflict >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some >> purpose in >> >>>>>>>>>> mind? >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose >>of >> the >> >>>>>>>>> class, >> >>>>>>>>>> or >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be >>most >> >>>>>>>>>> interesting >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis >> (purposes of >> >>>>>>>>>> children) >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet >> they're not >> >>>>>>>>>> identical. >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi >>wrote: >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my >>concern >> too. I >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> supervise >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT >> context. Two >> >>>>>>>>> of >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> them on >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary >> science. >> >>>>>>>>>> They >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> have >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted >>of >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and >>forms of >> >>>>>>>>> division >> >>>>>>>>>> of >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> labor. >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and >>drawings. >> When >> >>>>>>>>> they >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> decided to >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into >> CHAT >> >>>>>>>>> context >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mainly >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still >> doubt >> >>>>>>>>> about >> >>>>>>>>>> the >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> " unit >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> St?? ????a??, 12 ??t?????? 2014, ? ???st?? Andy >> Blunden < >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ???a?e: >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of >> analysis, it >> >>>>>>>>>> was >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> one of >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, >> that this >> >>>>>>>>>> concept >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> was >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and >>which >> was new >> >>>>>>>>> for >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> me, was >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin >>of >> this >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression, I'd >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that >>what it >> >>>>>>>>> referred >> >>>>>>>>>> to >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> was a >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning >>CHAT >> >>>>>>>>>> methodology >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> whilst >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, >>please >> let me >> >>>>>>>>>> know. >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of >> analysis is an >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following >>a >> >>>>>>> template, >> >>>>>>>>>> it >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, >>the >> leap. It >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually comes >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your >> research using >> >>>>>>>>>> some >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> other >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the >> unit is >> >>>>>>>>> the >> >>>>>>>>>> new >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of >>solving >> puzzles. >> >>>>>>>>>> So for >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in >>their >> >>>>>>>>> research, >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> often >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get >>from >> their >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> supervisor. I >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have >> got to >> >>>>>>> this >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> point in >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have >>is >> not the >> >>>>>>>>>> data >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> they now >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading >> the two >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles. But, >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to >> contribute in >> >>>>>>>>>> posts. >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and >> don't >> >>>>>>> follow >> >>>>>>>>>> that >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> through >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, >>and >> I am >> >>>>>>>>>> usually >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> just >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably >> because >> >>>>>>> I'm >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> interested >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be >> used for, >> >>>>>>>>>> and >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> how they >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. >> What are >> >>>>>>>>>> people >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't >>units >> of >> >>>>>>>>> analysis >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> being used? >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, >>I'd >> be very >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> interested to >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the >> questions might >> >>>>>>>>> be >> >>>>>>>>>> as >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> basic as >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these. >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my >> thoughts (in >> >>>>>>>>> a >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> much more >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit >>of >> >>>>>>>>> analysis. >> >>>>>>>>>> In >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike's >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, >>I'd >> add that >> >>>>>>>>>> the >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> action is >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and >>historical >> factors >> >>>>>>>>>> that >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been >> said here >> >>>>>>>>>> before, >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions >> create a >> >>>>>>>>>> picture of >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> much >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> ............................................................ >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> School of Education >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ioannina >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Greece >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >> science with >> >>>>>>>>> an >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> -- >> >>>>>>>>> *Patrick Jaki* >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >> >>>>>>>>> ________________________________ >> >>>>>>>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >> >>>>>>>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended >> solely >> >>>>>>> for >> >>>>>>>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are >>not >> the >> >>>>>>>>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of >>the >> >>>>>>>>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should >>not >> rely on >> >>>>>>> it. >> >>>>>>>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender >> know >> >>>>>>>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails >> are not >> >>>>>>>>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth >>University >> >>>>>>> accepts >> >>>>>>>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to >> scan >> >>>>>>> emails >> >>>>>>>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept >> >>>>>>> responsibility >> >>>>>>>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email >>or >> its >> >>>>>>>>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless >> >>>>>>> accompanied >> >>>>>>>>> by an official order form. >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> -- >> >>>>>>>> *Robyn Babaeff* >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> -- >> >>>>>> *Robyn Babaeff* >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >> >> > >> > >> > >> >> >> From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Oct 16 13:05:17 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 13:05:17 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Multi-site Postdoctoral Opportunity in Interactive Cognition In-Reply-To: <42096349.47357893.1413486653103.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> References: <368914821.47356998.1413486639163.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <42096349.47357893.1413486653103.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Elina Birmingham Date: Thu, Oct 16, 2014 at 12:10 PM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Multi-site Postdoctoral Opportunity in Interactive Cognition To: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org Applications are invited for a unique postdoctoral opportunity in helping to foster a network of experts in human cognition and social cognition. The fellow will collaborate and extend existing projects at Simon Fraser University (E. Birmingham) and McGill University (J. Ristic) aimed at understanding social cognitive processes in laboratory, naturalistic, and interactive settings. The ideal candidate should have research expertise in social and interactive cognition, a PhD in Psychology, excellent technical skills, proven leadership record, strong communication and interpersonal skills, and passion for novel endeavors. The initial appointment will be made for 1 year with a possibility of extension. Note that this position will require semi-regular travel between sites. To apply please send a letter of intent, current CV, and contact information of 3 referees to interactivecognitionnetwork@gmail.com. Review of applications will begin on Dec 1, 2014 and will continue until suitable candidate has been identified. _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Oct 16 15:40:05 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2014 15:40:05 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Julian I was not sure how to *read* the cooling off of this theme. I read Andy's very clear and distinct explanation of the Hegelian/Marxist interpretation of the concept of *the* ideal as a wonderfully clear placing of THIS concept in front of us in order to "open" a continuing dialogue on the understanding of *the* ideal* in relation to the artifactual material things *in themselves.* I felt it was central to focus in on what Andy referred to AS *the living* aspects of the relation [UNITY?] of the ideal and material. To highlight the *living forming AND formations* also brings into focus the absence of the living when life becomes experienced as *without living vitality* as another possible aspect of phenomena. I thought it was central to Andy's point that he indicated *the* ideal is a *something* actual [an existant or an interpretant] IN THE *WORLD* BUT ONLY EXISTS IMMANENTLY within THE MATERIAL EXISTANTS. I READ THIS AS SUGGESTING EVERY ARTIFACT is AN INTERPRETANT. For an artifact to have been formulated materially is to have been formulated ideally/thoughtfully. Not one or the other, not either/or, but rather ASPECTS OF the SAME artifact.. These are not separate existing phenomena then brought into relationship as two external somethings. There is only the one something with two aspects. Now I am interpreting THIS way of *reading* Andy's description of the Hegelian-Marxist tradition AS *a model*. IS this way the only *true* way to *read* this *interpretant* or can the same *something* be *interpreted* differently and continue to be *true* within another tradition?? The key then becomes if these alternative *models* [which are approximations and always possibly existing -only IF continuing to be manifest WITHIN living phenomena] are further *developed* by tracing the multiple existing *interpretants* expressed AS models AND in THIS PROCESS of "interpreting the models"the models THEN become EX-tended through LIVING PROCESSES [EX INDICATING BOTH exchange and expression]. To return to a point David K's insight that he made suggesting different *styles* or *dispositions* which focus on either on the *pragmatics* or the *cognitive semantics* creating alternative *genres* and noticing the evolving play within the dialogue of the alternative dialogues. I am reading David as interpreting Vygotsky'primarily through semantic perceptions and activity theory reading Vygotsky through pragmatic perceptions. I chose the term *perception* to indicate perception also is *coded* and participating in being interpreted. I have no idea if my speculations are merely *private* thoughts* with no relation to the ongoing discussion on the ideal and the material but I find Raymond Williams book "Marxism and Literature* as a *transitional object* that also plays in these realms. Julian, I think I have been making a *case* for supporting the centrality of the *ideal* in this dialogue but it is all very TENTATIVE and risky to put out this [EX] as an ex-tension as I am always grasping just to hang on to the turn taking. Larry On Thu, Oct 16, 2014 at 8:26 AM, Julian Williams < julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote: > Dear Larry and all interested in Leontiev's critique of Vygotsky > > This discussion seems to have cooled off, unless I missed some posts: a > pity? I was hoping we would get at the nub of Leontiev's critique of > Vygotsky's 'idealism'. Im not normally on Leontiev's side in these > debates, but here goes: > > I don?t think it would have taken much to persuade Vygotsky (had he been > alive to the critique) that the 'ideal form' that already exists from the > start of development > only 'exists' (if it does) objectively in social practices/activity, and > that hence that a ZPD for development (the example given in the paper is > arithmetic) then has to authentically embed these ideal forms in practices > (in the classroom in simulated shopping, or whatever) that make good sense > for the child? so the perezhivanie is itself embedded/situated in the > child's being/relations in social activity and the material objects, > motives and emotions and discourses etc that come with that. (I take this > to be ANL's point). > > Leontiev's reading of Vygotsky's text is not exactly unfair: I can imagine > readings of this 'final form' of the ideal 'already existing' leading to > distortions in activity theory (and it is a real problem Im writing about > this just now). I argue that in fact the idea that 'arithmetic' already > exists in an ideal final form and the task of development is to engage the > child with this ideal form is a dangerous formulation: rather I argue that > arithmetic has to appear in practice, in 'real social practice with all > the emotional baggage that it should have, i.e. as a solution to a > meaningful problem in practice, rather than an alienating bundle of > formulae to be internalised, as a punishment for being a child forced into > schooling. > > And this social context of the 'ideal form' is of course absolutely part > of what makes the perezhivanie, it is not just the stage of the child's > development but their engagement in the activity/social practice and its > motives too?. To arithmetic: if you can bear with me! There is in practice > no 'final form' of arithmetic anyway. Each generation learns and > experiences it differently, and its done differently in different micro > cultures, and long may this be the case (e.g. In subtraction do you add to > the bottom or take from the top, or what...; in practice, do you use a > pencil to do sums or use your your phone as a calculator? etc etc?) > > So: Leontiev maybe has an axe to grind about the material, object-oriented > base of (semiotic etc etc mediated) activity, but I think also here he has > a point. > > In defence of Vygotsky anyone? > > julian > > > > On 13/10/2014 20:53, "Larry Purss" wrote: > > >To return to Leontiev's article on the environment. > >On page 19 Leontiev says Vygotsky uses the word *communication* with the > >narrow meaning of *spiritual sense* or *spiritual relationships* to > >signify > >the way we use words and language. > >Leontiev suggests this is a limited meaning of communication which > >excludes > >a BROADER meaning [BEYOND LANGUAGE USE] to *signify* the GENERAL FACT of > >people's relationships which ENCOMPASS their material dealings. > > > >Is this way of presenting the difference in *communication* the SAME > >[equal] difference that *divides* materialism and idealism? > >Leontiev goes on to say: > >When Vygotsky views the person AS *the subject of communication* the child > >INEVITABLY IS transformed through THIS SIGNIFICATION of *communication* > >into an IDEAL PSYCHOLOGICAL subject AND the environment is transformed > >into > >an IDEAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT. > > > >Leontiev then goes on to say that Vygotsky's thinking IS moving along > >THESE > >*ideal* lines of development and it is THIS conceptual starting point > >which > >is transforming Vygotsky's theory into a *spiritual* theory. > >For Vygotsky, *discovering* the ROLE of *communication* [contact with > >people] AS A DRIVING FORCE of development Vygotsky INTRODUCES *the* > >understanding [in Peirce's term an *interpretant*] of a *FINAL IDEAL FORM* > >This ideal form IS an existing phenomena [form] in the environment from > >the > >beginning when the new born infant is thrown into THIS world. > >In the process of development the child acquires THIS *ideal form* [which > >already exists in the environment in IDEAL form] BE-comes the *model* that > >results at the end of development. > >IDEAL in *this* sense IS A MODEL of what results at the end of > >development. > >The beginning form EXISTS in relation [in unity??] with the *ideal form* > >[with the model] which pre-exists the beginning form of the infant AND > >TRULY INTERACTS WITH the infant's development. > > > >Leontiev goes on to claim that this specific example is characteristic, > >for > >Vygotsky, of ALL OTHER MEANING development. > >MODELS *truly exist* in the world [which emerged historically in previous > >social historical situations] > > > >Leontiev then goes on to make a STRONG claim that these models actually > >*determine* and *direct* the infant's first steps. > >I wonder if a weaker claim that models *influence* the infants first step > >is what Vygotsky *meant* > >SO -the environment [and models] *appear* [or seem] TO BE the > >*vehicle* [carrier[ of development of THESE forms/models and these forms > >*determine* the development of shared *meaning* > > > >Now from this criticism of pre-existing *models* Leontiev claims Vygotsky > >IS LOCKED in a vicious circle. > >However, if *models* as various multiple [interpretants - Peirce] ACTUALLY > >EXIST THEN Vygotsky's theory is *true* in actual fact. > > > >This leads into the *loose* thread of the place of the *imaginal* in the > >*real* and I would point to Raymond William's book "Marxism and > >Literature" > >to explore the imaginal within Marxian *cultural theory*. > >Also on another thread a discussion of Umberto Eco's notion of *primary > >indexicality* prior to subjects and objects but that leads beyond the > >focus > >of Leontiev's revisioning Vygotsky > > > >Larry > > > >On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 11:47 AM, Martin John Packer < > >mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > > > >> Hi Alfredo, > >> > >> I don't really see a dilemma... and I think LSV is pretty clear: > >> > >> "How can one explain why exactly the same environmental conditions exert > >> three different types of influence on these three different children? It > >> can be explained because each of the children has a different attitude > >>to > >> the situation. Or, as we might put it, each of the children experienced > >>the > >> situation in a different way. .... So it appears that, depending on the > >> fact that the same situation had been experienced by the three children > >>in > >> three different ways, the influence which this situation exerted on > >>their > >> development also turns out to be different." > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Oct 13, 2014, at 1:19 PM, Alfredo Gil Jornet > > >> wrote: > >> > >> > Julian, Martin, > >> > > >> > Perhaps a way out of the dilemma of whether we should be talking about > >> the same mother/environment or about different mothers/environments is > >> provided by Dewey's notion of *situation*, which always implies both > >> organism and environment. We can then talk of different situations, yet > >>the > >> same environment. > >> > > >> > Alfredo > >> > ________________________________________ > >> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> > >> on behalf of Martin John Packer > >> > Sent: 13 October 2014 19:59 > >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? > >> > > >> > Julian, > >> > > >> > I would prefer to say that they all have the same mother, but they > >> relate to her and interact with her in specific ways, depending largely > >>on > >> their stage of development. She presumably relates to each of them > >> somewhat differently, but undoubtedly each of them witnesses how she > >>treats > >> the others. > >> > > >> > So I'm saying that the environment is the same - they all live in a > >> house with a drunken mother - but the ways they live in that > >>environment, > >> and the ways they make sense of it, differ. > >> > > >> > Martin > >> > > >> > On Oct 13, 2014, at 12:45 PM, Julian Williams < > >> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote: > >> > > >> >> Martin > >> >> > >> >> Ok we are on the same page, if you agree the environment may not be > >>the > >> same for the three children... It is not just that they are > >>developmentally > >> at a different stage, but "mother" is actually a different environment > >>for > >> each of them. > >> >> > >> >> Julian > >> >> > >> >> Sent from my iPad > >> >> > >> >> On 13 Oct 2014, at 17:54, "Martin John Packer" > >> > >> wrote: > >> >> > >> >>> Hi Julian, > >> >>> > >> >>> I've been trying to suggest that the dialectic is in the child's > >> relationship to the environment. Or, as you say, as an aspect of > >> child-in-the-environment (with-others). Generally I try to avoid > >>dualistic > >> terminology such as 'in the child' versus 'in the world' or 'subjective' > >> versus 'objective' - I think I'm following LSV's lead here, though > >> certainly he uses the term "internal" a lot. > >> >>> > >> >>> Generally in children's development the environment does indeed > >>change > >> as they grow - parents make new arrangements for them. But in the case > >> study that LSV describes, we have three children of different ages all > >> dealing at the same time with the same adult. In this sense the > >>environment > >> is fixed, in this particular case. > >> >>> > >> >>> And surely you're right to suggest that the children are > >>contributing > >> to the environment in which they live. One can only imagine how a > >>drunken > >> mother responds to her youngest son wetting the bed, for example. > >> >>> > >> >>> Martin > >> >>> > >> >>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 11:14 AM, Julian Williams < > >> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote: > >> >>> > >> >>>> Dear Martin, and all > >> >>>> > >> >>>> I dont see the dialectic as 'internal' to the child, but as the > >> child-in-the-environment. But I think maybe there is a problem with the > >> current drift in the discussion. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> The problem I see arising now is that we are beginning to take the > >> environment here as something fixed or taken for granted, with the > >> difference in the three Perezhivanie being totally about the > >> subjects/childs different stages of development. I'm not sure this does > >> justice to the dialectic Vygotsky had in mind (though I see it might > >>appear > >> so in the text). I think one has to consider the objective fact of the > >> environment as something from which different strands may be > >>apprehended, > >> or if you like, or from which certain aspects can be 'refracted'. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> At the cost of perhaps causing confusion, I wonder if the notion of > >> Zone of Proximal Development can help here for those who use this idea > >>... > >> A particular social plane (environment, classroom interaction etc) can > >> offer a ZPD for some but be entirely useless to others, because of their > >> different stages of development, yes, yes. But also, different learners > >>at > >> different stages can help create their own ZPDs within the same social > >> space and even plane, (drawing from the same social interactions in > >> different ways). So they may shape the very environment which provides > >>for > >> their own ZPD and hence development. I think this is a more adequate > >>way to > >> think of the dialectic, so the subject is not seen as passive in their > >>own > >> development. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> Julian > >> >>>> > >> >>>> (Maybe this passivity is what Mike had in mind when he expressed > >> reservations about Vygotsky's use of the 'final ideal form' , eg of > >> arithmetic, have I remembered this right? Anyway I DO have reservations > >> about that notion in Vygotsky's chapter but maybe that's another story > >>for > >> later.) > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>> On 13 Oct 2014, at 14:53, "Martin John Packer" < > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> Hi Robyn, > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> I think it's important to recognize that the oldest child's > >> understanding of the need to take care of his mother and siblings is > >>not a > >> drive or an impulse, it is, LSV tells us, a "duty" that follows from > >> adopting a specific "role" in the family. Understanding the situation in > >> terms of roles and duties is certainly socially mediated - after all, > >>roles > >> and duties are social, or societal, matters (ontological and > >>deontological > >> respectively, if we want to get technical). The oldest child - > >>presumably > >> attending school - is able to understand that he lives in a world of > >>social > >> institutions, one of which is his family. > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> In this chapter LSV does not explore or explain how each kind of > >> perezhivanie transforms into the next, but in his lectures on child > >> development you can find a more detailed account. But here, in what is > >> effectively a cross-sectional comparison of children at different ages > >> (albeit only one at each age), he certainly means to suggest that > >>earlier > >> forms provide the basis for later forms. > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> Martin > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:45 AM, Robyn Babaeff > >> > >> wrote: > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>>> Much appreciated Martin - this is feeling more visual, and now I > >>am > >> >>>>>> wondering is it possible to interpret that the older child's > >>emotive > >> >>>>>> drive/action of care for his mother and younger sibling in its > >> moment is > >> >>>>>> also connected a socially mediated aspect of cognition from > >> somewhere/time > >> >>>>>> in his earlier years of perezhivanie for the 'how to' in his > >> choosing/drive > >> >>>>>> for duty of care? > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> On 13 October 2014 23:21, Martin John Packer < > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >> >>>>>> wrote: > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic > >>involving > >> >>>>>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive > >> >>>>>>> connection? > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their > >> mother's > >> >>>>>>> drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the > >> dynamic > >> >>>>>>> development of perezhivanie. > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from > >> emotion, > >> >>>>>>> in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and > >> interpreting the > >> >>>>>>> circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, > >> the child > >> >>>>>>> is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction > >>is > >> one of > >> >>>>>>> extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates > >> involuntarily and > >> >>>>>>> stammers. He loses control of his own body. > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the > >> horror of > >> >>>>>>> what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of > >> terror, > >> >>>>>>> enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to > >> speak at all > >> >>>>>>> as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction > >> amounts to a > >> >>>>>>> state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of > >>this > >> >>>>>>> situation." > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more > >>developed. > >> The > >> >>>>>>> contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an > >> alternation > >> >>>>>>> between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion > >> towards the > >> >>>>>>> mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the > >> breakdown seen > >> >>>>>>> in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily > >>emotional, > >> but it > >> >>>>>>> is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The > >> child's > >> >>>>>>> love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, > >> directed > >> >>>>>>> towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as > >> bad. It is, > >> >>>>>>> however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions > >> that is so > >> >>>>>>> difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of > >> approach-avoidance. > >> >>>>>>> The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the > >> mother; her > >> >>>>>>> failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal > >>conflict > >> for the > >> >>>>>>> child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates > >> between two > >> >>>>>>> different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she > >> is a > >> >>>>>>> mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than > >> that of his > >> >>>>>>> younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely > >> agonizing > >> >>>>>>> condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a > >> condition > >> >>>>>>> frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional > >> attitudes > >> >>>>>>> towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we > >>have > >> >>>>>>> previously been able to observe among one of our children and > >> which, you > >> >>>>>>> may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one > >> hand, from > >> >>>>>>> the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful > >> attachment, > >> >>>>>>> and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of > >>terrors > >> and > >> >>>>>>> terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. > >>The > >> German > >> >>>>>>> authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is > >> experiencing > >> >>>>>>> a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for > >> the mother > >> >>>>>>> and terror of the witch coexist. > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply > >> pronounced > >> >>>>>>> conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction > >>expressed > >> in a > >> >>>>>>> simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the > >>mother, a > >> >>>>>>> terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, > >> combined > >> >>>>>>> with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home > >> >>>>>>> immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going > >> home was > >> >>>>>>> brought up." > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with > >> more > >> >>>>>>> detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of > >> pity: of > >> >>>>>>> sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and > >>compassion > >> can > >> >>>>>>> coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother > >> not as a > >> >>>>>>> bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, > >>or > >> weak. She > >> >>>>>>> acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. > >>This, > >> then, > >> >>>>>>> means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a > >> "duty" to > >> >>>>>>> take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest > >> child has a > >> >>>>>>> single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. > >>His > >> emotions > >> >>>>>>> follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother > >>was > >> ill and > >> >>>>>>> he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his > >> mother down, > >> >>>>>>> make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones > >> and comfort > >> >>>>>>> them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the > >>family, > >> the only > >> >>>>>>> one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and > >> cognition in > >> >>>>>>> each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship > >> changes > >> >>>>>>> with age. > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> Martin > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a > >> preschooler, and > >> >>>>>>> the oldest a school-aged child. > >> >>>>>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff < > >> robyn.babaeff@monash.edu> > >> >>>>>>> wrote: > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic > >>involving > >> >>>>>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive > >> >>>>>>> connection? > >> >>>>>>>> As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves > >>into a > >> >>>>>>> different > >> >>>>>>>> realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective > >> position of > >> >>>>>>>> the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where > >>there > >> is > >> >>>>>>>> emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then > >> as the > >> >>>>>>>> cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs > >>from > >> the > >> >>>>>>>> internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the > >> >>>>>>> connectedness > >> >>>>>>>> takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn > >> >>>>>>>> motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees < > >> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> > >> >>>>>>>> wrote: > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and > >> every word, > >> >>>>>>>>> but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all > >>operating > >> with the > >> >>>>>>>>> same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like > >> this > >> >>>>>>>>> discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it > >> because we > >> >>>>>>> each > >> >>>>>>>>> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which > >>includes > >> our > >> >>>>>>>>> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be > >> expected > >> >>>>>>> to > >> >>>>>>>>> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead > >>some > >> people, > >> >>>>>>>>> etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an > >> >>>>>>>>> approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be > >> negotiated in > >> >>>>>>>>> discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get > >>closer > >> to > >> >>>>>>>>> understanding how a particular person uses particular words > >>when > >> we get > >> >>>>>>> to > >> >>>>>>>>> know that person as a person and that involves much more than > >> just > >> >>>>>>> batting > >> >>>>>>>>> words to and fro! > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> Rod > >> >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >> >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >> >>>>>>>>> on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] > >> >>>>>>>>> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 > >> >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in > >> English? Is > >> >>>>>>> this > >> >>>>>>>>> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, > >>in > >> this > >> >>>>>>> case > >> >>>>>>>>> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, > >> which adds > >> >>>>>>>>> onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer < > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >> >>>>>>>>> wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>> Andy, > >> >>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot > >> capture > >> >>>>>>>>>> everything. > >> >>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my > >> college > >> >>>>>>>>>> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, > >> because > >> >>>>>>> that > >> >>>>>>>>>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen > >>is > >> >>>>>>> strongly > >> >>>>>>>>>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen > >> atoms, > >> >>>>>>>>>> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This > >>has > >> the > >> >>>>>>>>>> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to > >> hydrogen > >> >>>>>>>>>> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that > >> water is a > >> >>>>>>>>>> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from > >> elements > >> >>>>>>> that > >> >>>>>>>>>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. > >> >>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the > >> *formation* of > >> >>>>>>>>>> water. My point was that once formed, there are no > >> contradictions > >> >>>>>>> driving > >> >>>>>>>>>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does > >> partially > >> >>>>>>>>>> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of > >>water > >> is > >> >>>>>>>>> actually > >> >>>>>>>>>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and > >> >>>>>>>>> dissociating > >> >>>>>>>>>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it > >>doesn't > >> >>>>>>> develop > >> >>>>>>>>>> further. > >> >>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>> Martin > >> >>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden > >> > >> wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a > >> metaphor > >> >>>>>>> - > >> >>>>>>>>>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case > >> it is > >> >>>>>>>>> simply > >> >>>>>>>>>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O > >> molecules, and > >> >>>>>>>>>> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the > >> properties of > >> >>>>>>>>>> water. > >> >>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind > >> the H and > >> >>>>>>>>> OH > >> >>>>>>>>>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a > >>positive > >> charge > >> >>>>>>>>> and > >> >>>>>>>>>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old > >>positive/negative > >> >>>>>>>>>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all > >> chemicals > >> >>>>>>>>>> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base > >>and > >> >>>>>>> therefore > >> >>>>>>>>>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of > >> contradictions > >> >>>>>>>>> and > >> >>>>>>>>>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the > >> chemistry of > >> >>>>>>>>>> life. :) > >> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >> >>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> >>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >> >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> >>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that > >>LSV's > >> own > >> >>>>>>>>>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. > >>Water > >> is not > >> >>>>>>> a > >> >>>>>>>>>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process > >> stops: > >> >>>>>>> water > >> >>>>>>>>> is > >> >>>>>>>>>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which > >>an > >> >>>>>>> internal > >> >>>>>>>>>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for > >> change. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a > >> triangle is > >> >>>>>>>>>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Martin > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole > >> wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and > >> oxygen such > >> >>>>>>>>>> that two > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give > >>rise > >> to > >> >>>>>>> water > >> >>>>>>>>>> with > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people > >> to rise > >> >>>>>>> to > >> >>>>>>>>>> the > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> concrete for their own cases. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > >> >>>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a > >> dynamic > >> >>>>>>>>> system > >> >>>>>>>>>> with > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike > >> linked to, > >> >>>>>>>>>> and I > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all > >> before > >> >>>>>>>>>> posting. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < > >> >>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On the contrary. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things > >> about > >> >>>>>>>>> activity > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A > >> very simple > >> >>>>>>>>>> example > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is that if you change something in the > >> norms/customs/laws/history > >> >>>>>>>>>> corner of > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a > >> stronger > >> >>>>>>>>> footing > >> >>>>>>>>>> in > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by > >> bringing > >> >>>>>>>>> new > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out > >> of which > >> >>>>>>>>>> division > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with > >>a > >> >>>>>>>>> leadership > >> >>>>>>>>>> team > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily > >> English-speaking, which > >> >>>>>>>>>> in turn > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if > >> you're lucky > >> >>>>>>>>> and > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> quick, change your history. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it > >> implies > >> >>>>>>>>> that, > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the > >> components, one > >> >>>>>>> can > >> >>>>>>>>>> bring > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting > >>on > >> >>>>>>>>> *another* > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> component of the totality. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me > >>this > >> type of > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to > >> represent > >> >>>>>>>>>> elements that > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is > >> that the > >> >>>>>>>>>> question > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was > >>exploring > >> a method > >> >>>>>>>>> of > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among > >> components > >> >>>>>>>>>> in a > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor > >>on > >> >>>>>>> another, > >> >>>>>>>>>> which > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And > >> this means > >> >>>>>>>>>> that > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this > >> >>>>>>> relationship. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < > >> >>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" > >> in a very > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape > >> collective > >> >>>>>>>>>> responses > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships > >>(like, > >> when a > >> >>>>>>>>> rule > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree > >> with Andy: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of > >>analysis > >> is an > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a > >> template, > >> >>>>>>>>>> it is > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the > >> leap. It > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually comes > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your > >> research using > >> >>>>>>>>>> some > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> other > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. > >>The > >> >>>>>>>>> question > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we > >> going to > >> >>>>>>>>>> do?" The > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are > >>trying > >> to > >> >>>>>>>>>> accomplish. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off > >>temporarily? > >> Are we > >> >>>>>>>>>> trying > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system > >>in > >> >>>>>>> Chicago, > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm > >> going to > >> >>>>>>> be > >> >>>>>>>>>> late > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid > >> today and > >> >>>>>>>>>> will miss > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their > >> supervisors. We're > >> >>>>>>>>>> talking > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of > >>them > >> middle > >> >>>>>>>>> aged > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended > >>families > >> to be > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message > >>on a > >> >>>>>>> machine, > >> >>>>>>>>>> but > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in > >>person > >> who > >> >>>>>>> would > >> >>>>>>>>>> then > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because > >> supervisors were > >> >>>>>>>>>> often > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was > >> unreliable. > >> >>>>>>>>>> Also, a > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this > >>was > >> >>>>>>>>> happening > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if > >> someone it out > >> >>>>>>>>>> buying > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call > >>is > >> not > >> >>>>>>>>> easy. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to > >> >>>>>>> accomplish, > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To > >> educate > >> >>>>>>>>>> members of > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond > >> collectively to > >> >>>>>>>>>> something > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound > >>change in > >> >>>>>>> society > >> >>>>>>>>>> so > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of > >>an > >> >>>>>>> extended > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one > >> that you > >> >>>>>>>>> can > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then > >> reviewing > >> >>>>>>>>> the > >> >>>>>>>>>> whole > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, > >>as > >> Andy > >> >>>>>>>>>> says, a > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to > >> actually > >> >>>>>>>>>> speak to > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we > >>talk > >> about > >> >>>>>>>>>> activity > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are > >>often > >> in > >> >>>>>>>>>> conflict > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some > >> purpose in > >> >>>>>>>>>> mind? > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose > >>of > >> the > >> >>>>>>>>> class, > >> >>>>>>>>>> or > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be > >>most > >> >>>>>>>>>> interesting > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis > >> (purposes of > >> >>>>>>>>>> children) > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet > >> they're not > >> >>>>>>>>>> identical. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi > >>wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my > >>concern > >> too. I > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> supervise > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT > >> context. Two > >> >>>>>>>>> of > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> them on > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary > >> science. > >> >>>>>>>>>> They > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> have > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted > >>of > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and > >>forms of > >> >>>>>>>>> division > >> >>>>>>>>>> of > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> labor. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and > >>drawings. > >> When > >> >>>>>>>>> they > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> decided to > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into > >> CHAT > >> >>>>>>>>> context > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mainly > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still > >> doubt > >> >>>>>>>>> about > >> >>>>>>>>>> the > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> " unit > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> St?? ????a??, 12 ??t?????? 2014, ? ???st?? Andy > >> Blunden < > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ???a?e: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of > >> analysis, it > >> >>>>>>>>>> was > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> one of > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, > >> that this > >> >>>>>>>>>> concept > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> was > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and > >>which > >> was new > >> >>>>>>>>> for > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> me, was > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin > >>of > >> this > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression, I'd > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that > >>what it > >> >>>>>>>>> referred > >> >>>>>>>>>> to > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> was a > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning > >>CHAT > >> >>>>>>>>>> methodology > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> whilst > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, > >>please > >> let me > >> >>>>>>>>>> know. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of > >> analysis is an > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following > >>a > >> >>>>>>> template, > >> >>>>>>>>>> it > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, > >>the > >> leap. It > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually comes > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your > >> research using > >> >>>>>>>>>> some > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> other > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the > >> unit is > >> >>>>>>>>> the > >> >>>>>>>>>> new > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of > >>solving > >> puzzles. > >> >>>>>>>>>> So for > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in > >>their > >> >>>>>>>>> research, > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> often > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get > >>from > >> their > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> supervisor. I > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have > >> got to > >> >>>>>>> this > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> point in > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have > >>is > >> not the > >> >>>>>>>>>> data > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> they now > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading > >> the two > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles. But, > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to > >> contribute in > >> >>>>>>>>>> posts. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and > >> don't > >> >>>>>>> follow > >> >>>>>>>>>> that > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> through > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, > >>and > >> I am > >> >>>>>>>>>> usually > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> just > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably > >> because > >> >>>>>>> I'm > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> interested > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be > >> used for, > >> >>>>>>>>>> and > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> how they > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. > >> What are > >> >>>>>>>>>> people > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't > >>units > >> of > >> >>>>>>>>> analysis > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> being used? > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, > >>I'd > >> be very > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> interested to > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the > >> questions might > >> >>>>>>>>> be > >> >>>>>>>>>> as > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> basic as > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my > >> thoughts (in > >> >>>>>>>>> a > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> much more > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit > >>of > >> >>>>>>>>> analysis. > >> >>>>>>>>>> In > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike's > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, > >>I'd > >> add that > >> >>>>>>>>>> the > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> action is > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and > >>historical > >> factors > >> >>>>>>>>>> that > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been > >> said here > >> >>>>>>>>>> before, > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions > >> create a > >> >>>>>>>>>> picture of > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> much > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> ............................................................ > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> School of Education > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ioannina > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Greece > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > >> science with > >> >>>>>>>>> an > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> -- > >> >>>>>>>>> *Patrick Jaki* > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* > >> >>>>>>>>> ________________________________ > >> >>>>>>>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > >> >>>>>>>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended > >> solely > >> >>>>>>> for > >> >>>>>>>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are > >>not > >> the > >> >>>>>>>>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of > >>the > >> >>>>>>>>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should > >>not > >> rely on > >> >>>>>>> it. > >> >>>>>>>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender > >> know > >> >>>>>>>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails > >> are not > >> >>>>>>>>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth > >>University > >> >>>>>>> accepts > >> >>>>>>>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to > >> scan > >> >>>>>>> emails > >> >>>>>>>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept > >> >>>>>>> responsibility > >> >>>>>>>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email > >>or > >> its > >> >>>>>>>>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless > >> >>>>>>> accompanied > >> >>>>>>>>> by an official order form. > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> -- > >> >>>>>>>> *Robyn Babaeff* > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> -- > >> >>>>>> *Robyn Babaeff* > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >> > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > >> > >> > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Oct 17 01:05:55 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 17:05:55 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Larry: I too found "Marxism and Literature" germane to this discussion, simply because Williams' "Structure of Feeling" is so clearly the kind of unit of analysis we've been talking about. On the one hand, there is the author's contribution (the child's contribution to "perizhivanie", if you like). And on the other hand, there is the genre in which the author activates certain potentials. So, to take the example Williams uses in his work on the novel. The "industrial novels" of the 1840s and 1850s (Fanny Trollope, Charlotte Tonna, Benjamin Disraeli, Elizabeth Gaskell, Charlotte Bronte and Charles Dickens) are all characterized by a "structure of feeling" where the author's contribution (the precise balance between sympathy for the oppressed and terror of their rage) is up against the balance of sympathy and terror of other writers and of the genre as a whole (see "The English Novel"). I am not sure to what extent it is realistic to say that the potentials "pre-exist" in sociogenesis (that is, in the history of the novel); it seems to me that in the way I use the word "exist" that they do not. And it seems to me that to say that the potential of the child pre-exists in the form of the adults in the surrounding environment is a much more plausible statement. The problem I have defending Vygotsky, Julian, is taking Leontiev's tripe seriously; it is so patently a piece of cringing, whinging Stalinoid apologetics, with its babble about idealism and pedagogical distortions and its slander of brave men like Vygotsky, Basov, and Blonsky (followed by wholsale theft of their ideas!). I remember my boss talking like that in China on Wednesday afternoons; the only real response a thinking mind could have to it was "Wake me up when this is all over". David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 17 October 2014 07:40, Larry Purss wrote: > Julian > > I was not sure how to *read* the cooling off of this theme. > I read Andy's very clear and distinct explanation of the Hegelian/Marxist > interpretation of the concept of *the* ideal as a wonderfully clear placing > of THIS concept in front of us in order to "open" a continuing dialogue on > the understanding of *the* ideal* in relation to the artifactual material > things *in themselves.* > > I felt it was central to focus in on what Andy referred to AS *the living* > aspects of the relation [UNITY?] of the ideal and material. > To highlight the *living forming AND formations* also brings into focus the > absence of the living when life becomes experienced as *without living > vitality* as another possible aspect of phenomena. > I thought it was central to Andy's point that he indicated *the* ideal is a > *something* actual [an existant or an interpretant] IN THE *WORLD* BUT ONLY > EXISTS IMMANENTLY within THE MATERIAL EXISTANTS. > I READ THIS AS SUGGESTING EVERY ARTIFACT is AN INTERPRETANT. For an > artifact to have been formulated materially is to have been formulated > ideally/thoughtfully. > Not one or the other, not either/or, but rather ASPECTS OF the SAME > artifact.. These are not separate existing phenomena then brought into > relationship as two external somethings. There is only the one something > with two aspects. > Now I am interpreting THIS way of *reading* Andy's description of the > Hegelian-Marxist tradition AS *a model*. > IS this way the only *true* way to *read* this *interpretant* or can the > same *something* be *interpreted* differently and continue to be *true* > within another tradition?? > > The key then becomes if these alternative *models* [which are > approximations and always possibly existing -only IF continuing to be > manifest WITHIN living phenomena] are further *developed* by tracing the > multiple existing *interpretants* expressed AS models AND in THIS PROCESS > of "interpreting the models"the models THEN become EX-tended through > LIVING PROCESSES [EX INDICATING BOTH exchange and expression]. > > To return to a point David K's insight that he made suggesting different > *styles* or *dispositions* which focus on either on the *pragmatics* or the > *cognitive semantics* creating alternative *genres* and noticing > the evolving play within the dialogue of the alternative dialogues. > I am reading David as interpreting Vygotsky'primarily through semantic > perceptions and activity theory reading Vygotsky through pragmatic > perceptions. > I chose the term *perception* to indicate perception also is *coded* and > participating in being interpreted. > > I have no idea if my speculations are merely *private* thoughts* with no > relation to the ongoing discussion on the ideal and the material but I find > Raymond Williams book "Marxism and Literature* as a *transitional object* > that also plays in these realms. > > Julian, I think I have been making a *case* for supporting the centrality > of the *ideal* in this dialogue but it is all very TENTATIVE and risky to > put out this [EX] as an ex-tension as I am always grasping just to hang on > to the turn taking. > > Larry > On Thu, Oct 16, 2014 at 8:26 AM, Julian Williams < > julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote: > >> Dear Larry and all interested in Leontiev's critique of Vygotsky >> >> This discussion seems to have cooled off, unless I missed some posts: a >> pity? I was hoping we would get at the nub of Leontiev's critique of >> Vygotsky's 'idealism'. Im not normally on Leontiev's side in these >> debates, but here goes: >> >> I don?t think it would have taken much to persuade Vygotsky (had he been >> alive to the critique) that the 'ideal form' that already exists from the >> start of development >> only 'exists' (if it does) objectively in social practices/activity, and >> that hence that a ZPD for development (the example given in the paper is >> arithmetic) then has to authentically embed these ideal forms in practices >> (in the classroom in simulated shopping, or whatever) that make good sense >> for the child? so the perezhivanie is itself embedded/situated in the >> child's being/relations in social activity and the material objects, >> motives and emotions and discourses etc that come with that. (I take this >> to be ANL's point). >> >> Leontiev's reading of Vygotsky's text is not exactly unfair: I can imagine >> readings of this 'final form' of the ideal 'already existing' leading to >> distortions in activity theory (and it is a real problem Im writing about >> this just now). I argue that in fact the idea that 'arithmetic' already >> exists in an ideal final form and the task of development is to engage the >> child with this ideal form is a dangerous formulation: rather I argue that >> arithmetic has to appear in practice, in 'real social practice with all >> the emotional baggage that it should have, i.e. as a solution to a >> meaningful problem in practice, rather than an alienating bundle of >> formulae to be internalised, as a punishment for being a child forced into >> schooling. >> >> And this social context of the 'ideal form' is of course absolutely part >> of what makes the perezhivanie, it is not just the stage of the child's >> development but their engagement in the activity/social practice and its >> motives too?. To arithmetic: if you can bear with me! There is in practice >> no 'final form' of arithmetic anyway. Each generation learns and >> experiences it differently, and its done differently in different micro >> cultures, and long may this be the case (e.g. In subtraction do you add to >> the bottom or take from the top, or what...; in practice, do you use a >> pencil to do sums or use your your phone as a calculator? etc etc?) >> >> So: Leontiev maybe has an axe to grind about the material, object-oriented >> base of (semiotic etc etc mediated) activity, but I think also here he has >> a point. >> >> In defence of Vygotsky anyone? >> >> julian >> >> >> >> On 13/10/2014 20:53, "Larry Purss" wrote: >> >> >To return to Leontiev's article on the environment. >> >On page 19 Leontiev says Vygotsky uses the word *communication* with the >> >narrow meaning of *spiritual sense* or *spiritual relationships* to >> >signify >> >the way we use words and language. >> >Leontiev suggests this is a limited meaning of communication which >> >excludes >> >a BROADER meaning [BEYOND LANGUAGE USE] to *signify* the GENERAL FACT of >> >people's relationships which ENCOMPASS their material dealings. >> > >> >Is this way of presenting the difference in *communication* the SAME >> >[equal] difference that *divides* materialism and idealism? >> >Leontiev goes on to say: >> >When Vygotsky views the person AS *the subject of communication* the child >> >INEVITABLY IS transformed through THIS SIGNIFICATION of *communication* >> >into an IDEAL PSYCHOLOGICAL subject AND the environment is transformed >> >into >> >an IDEAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT. >> > >> >Leontiev then goes on to say that Vygotsky's thinking IS moving along >> >THESE >> >*ideal* lines of development and it is THIS conceptual starting point >> >which >> >is transforming Vygotsky's theory into a *spiritual* theory. >> >For Vygotsky, *discovering* the ROLE of *communication* [contact with >> >people] AS A DRIVING FORCE of development Vygotsky INTRODUCES *the* >> >understanding [in Peirce's term an *interpretant*] of a *FINAL IDEAL FORM* >> >This ideal form IS an existing phenomena [form] in the environment from >> >the >> >beginning when the new born infant is thrown into THIS world. >> >In the process of development the child acquires THIS *ideal form* [which >> >already exists in the environment in IDEAL form] BE-comes the *model* that >> >results at the end of development. >> >IDEAL in *this* sense IS A MODEL of what results at the end of >> >development. >> >The beginning form EXISTS in relation [in unity??] with the *ideal form* >> >[with the model] which pre-exists the beginning form of the infant AND >> >TRULY INTERACTS WITH the infant's development. >> > >> >Leontiev goes on to claim that this specific example is characteristic, >> >for >> >Vygotsky, of ALL OTHER MEANING development. >> >MODELS *truly exist* in the world [which emerged historically in previous >> >social historical situations] >> > >> >Leontiev then goes on to make a STRONG claim that these models actually >> >*determine* and *direct* the infant's first steps. >> >I wonder if a weaker claim that models *influence* the infants first step >> >is what Vygotsky *meant* >> >SO -the environment [and models] *appear* [or seem] TO BE the >> >*vehicle* [carrier[ of development of THESE forms/models and these forms >> >*determine* the development of shared *meaning* >> > >> >Now from this criticism of pre-existing *models* Leontiev claims Vygotsky >> >IS LOCKED in a vicious circle. >> >However, if *models* as various multiple [interpretants - Peirce] ACTUALLY >> >EXIST THEN Vygotsky's theory is *true* in actual fact. >> > >> >This leads into the *loose* thread of the place of the *imaginal* in the >> >*real* and I would point to Raymond William's book "Marxism and >> >Literature" >> >to explore the imaginal within Marxian *cultural theory*. >> >Also on another thread a discussion of Umberto Eco's notion of *primary >> >indexicality* prior to subjects and objects but that leads beyond the >> >focus >> >of Leontiev's revisioning Vygotsky >> > >> >Larry >> > >> >On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 11:47 AM, Martin John Packer < >> >mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >> > >> >> Hi Alfredo, >> >> >> >> I don't really see a dilemma... and I think LSV is pretty clear: >> >> >> >> "How can one explain why exactly the same environmental conditions exert >> >> three different types of influence on these three different children? It >> >> can be explained because each of the children has a different attitude >> >>to >> >> the situation. Or, as we might put it, each of the children experienced >> >>the >> >> situation in a different way. .... So it appears that, depending on the >> >> fact that the same situation had been experienced by the three children >> >>in >> >> three different ways, the influence which this situation exerted on >> >>their >> >> development also turns out to be different." >> >> >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> On Oct 13, 2014, at 1:19 PM, Alfredo Gil Jornet > > >> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> > Julian, Martin, >> >> > >> >> > Perhaps a way out of the dilemma of whether we should be talking about >> >> the same mother/environment or about different mothers/environments is >> >> provided by Dewey's notion of *situation*, which always implies both >> >> organism and environment. We can then talk of different situations, yet >> >>the >> >> same environment. >> >> > >> >> > Alfredo >> >> > ________________________________________ >> >> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >> >> >> on behalf of Martin John Packer >> >> > Sent: 13 October 2014 19:59 >> >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? >> >> > >> >> > Julian, >> >> > >> >> > I would prefer to say that they all have the same mother, but they >> >> relate to her and interact with her in specific ways, depending largely >> >>on >> >> their stage of development. She presumably relates to each of them >> >> somewhat differently, but undoubtedly each of them witnesses how she >> >>treats >> >> the others. >> >> > >> >> > So I'm saying that the environment is the same - they all live in a >> >> house with a drunken mother - but the ways they live in that >> >>environment, >> >> and the ways they make sense of it, differ. >> >> > >> >> > Martin >> >> > >> >> > On Oct 13, 2014, at 12:45 PM, Julian Williams < >> >> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote: >> >> > >> >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> >> >> Ok we are on the same page, if you agree the environment may not be >> >>the >> >> same for the three children... It is not just that they are >> >>developmentally >> >> at a different stage, but "mother" is actually a different environment >> >>for >> >> each of them. >> >> >> >> >> >> Julian >> >> >> >> >> >> Sent from my iPad >> >> >> >> >> >> On 13 Oct 2014, at 17:54, "Martin John Packer" >> >> >> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >>> Hi Julian, >> >> >>> >> >> >>> I've been trying to suggest that the dialectic is in the child's >> >> relationship to the environment. Or, as you say, as an aspect of >> >> child-in-the-environment (with-others). Generally I try to avoid >> >>dualistic >> >> terminology such as 'in the child' versus 'in the world' or 'subjective' >> >> versus 'objective' - I think I'm following LSV's lead here, though >> >> certainly he uses the term "internal" a lot. >> >> >>> >> >> >>> Generally in children's development the environment does indeed >> >>change >> >> as they grow - parents make new arrangements for them. But in the case >> >> study that LSV describes, we have three children of different ages all >> >> dealing at the same time with the same adult. In this sense the >> >>environment >> >> is fixed, in this particular case. >> >> >>> >> >> >>> And surely you're right to suggest that the children are >> >>contributing >> >> to the environment in which they live. One can only imagine how a >> >>drunken >> >> mother responds to her youngest son wetting the bed, for example. >> >> >>> >> >> >>> Martin >> >> >>> >> >> >>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 11:14 AM, Julian Williams < >> >> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote: >> >> >>> >> >> >>>> Dear Martin, and all >> >> >>>> >> >> >>>> I dont see the dialectic as 'internal' to the child, but as the >> >> child-in-the-environment. But I think maybe there is a problem with the >> >> current drift in the discussion. >> >> >>>> >> >> >>>> The problem I see arising now is that we are beginning to take the >> >> environment here as something fixed or taken for granted, with the >> >> difference in the three Perezhivanie being totally about the >> >> subjects/childs different stages of development. I'm not sure this does >> >> justice to the dialectic Vygotsky had in mind (though I see it might >> >>appear >> >> so in the text). I think one has to consider the objective fact of the >> >> environment as something from which different strands may be >> >>apprehended, >> >> or if you like, or from which certain aspects can be 'refracted'. >> >> >>>> >> >> >>>> At the cost of perhaps causing confusion, I wonder if the notion of >> >> Zone of Proximal Development can help here for those who use this idea >> >>... >> >> A particular social plane (environment, classroom interaction etc) can >> >> offer a ZPD for some but be entirely useless to others, because of their >> >> different stages of development, yes, yes. But also, different learners >> >>at >> >> different stages can help create their own ZPDs within the same social >> >> space and even plane, (drawing from the same social interactions in >> >> different ways). So they may shape the very environment which provides >> >>for >> >> their own ZPD and hence development. I think this is a more adequate >> >>way to >> >> think of the dialectic, so the subject is not seen as passive in their >> >>own >> >> development. >> >> >>>> >> >> >>>> Julian >> >> >>>> >> >> >>>> (Maybe this passivity is what Mike had in mind when he expressed >> >> reservations about Vygotsky's use of the 'final ideal form' , eg of >> >> arithmetic, have I remembered this right? Anyway I DO have reservations >> >> about that notion in Vygotsky's chapter but maybe that's another story >> >>for >> >> later.) >> >> >>>> >> >> >>>> >> >> >>>> On 13 Oct 2014, at 14:53, "Martin John Packer" < >> >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >> >> >>>> >> >> >>>>> Hi Robyn, >> >> >>>>> >> >> >>>>> I think it's important to recognize that the oldest child's >> >> understanding of the need to take care of his mother and siblings is >> >>not a >> >> drive or an impulse, it is, LSV tells us, a "duty" that follows from >> >> adopting a specific "role" in the family. Understanding the situation in >> >> terms of roles and duties is certainly socially mediated - after all, >> >>roles >> >> and duties are social, or societal, matters (ontological and >> >>deontological >> >> respectively, if we want to get technical). The oldest child - >> >>presumably >> >> attending school - is able to understand that he lives in a world of >> >>social >> >> institutions, one of which is his family. >> >> >>>>> >> >> >>>>> In this chapter LSV does not explore or explain how each kind of >> >> perezhivanie transforms into the next, but in his lectures on child >> >> development you can find a more detailed account. But here, in what is >> >> effectively a cross-sectional comparison of children at different ages >> >> (albeit only one at each age), he certainly means to suggest that >> >>earlier >> >> forms provide the basis for later forms. >> >> >>>>> >> >> >>>>> Martin >> >> >>>>> >> >> >>>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:45 AM, Robyn Babaeff >> >> >> >> wrote: >> >> >>>>> >> >> >>>>>> Much appreciated Martin - this is feeling more visual, and now I >> >>am >> >> >>>>>> wondering is it possible to interpret that the older child's >> >>emotive >> >> >>>>>> drive/action of care for his mother and younger sibling in its >> >> moment is >> >> >>>>>> also connected a socially mediated aspect of cognition from >> >> somewhere/time >> >> >>>>>> in his earlier years of perezhivanie for the 'how to' in his >> >> choosing/drive >> >> >>>>>> for duty of care? >> >> >>>>>> >> >> >>>>>> On 13 October 2014 23:21, Martin John Packer < >> >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >> >> >>>>>> wrote: >> >> >>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic >> >>involving >> >> >>>>>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >> >> >>>>>>> connection? >> >> >>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>> It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their >> >> mother's >> >> >>>>>>> drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the >> >> dynamic >> >> >>>>>>> development of perezhivanie. >> >> >>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>> In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from >> >> emotion, >> >> >>>>>>> in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and >> >> interpreting the >> >> >>>>>>> circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, >> >> the child >> >> >>>>>>> is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction >> >>is >> >> one of >> >> >>>>>>> extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates >> >> involuntarily and >> >> >>>>>>> stammers. He loses control of his own body. >> >> >>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>> LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the >> >> horror of >> >> >>>>>>> what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of >> >> terror, >> >> >>>>>>> enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to >> >> speak at all >> >> >>>>>>> as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction >> >> amounts to a >> >> >>>>>>> state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of >> >>this >> >> >>>>>>> situation." >> >> >>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>> The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more >> >>developed. >> >> The >> >> >>>>>>> contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an >> >> alternation >> >> >>>>>>> between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion >> >> towards the >> >> >>>>>>> mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the >> >> breakdown seen >> >> >>>>>>> in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily >> >>emotional, >> >> but it >> >> >>>>>>> is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The >> >> child's >> >> >>>>>>> love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, >> >> directed >> >> >>>>>>> towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as >> >> bad. It is, >> >> >>>>>>> however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions >> >> that is so >> >> >>>>>>> difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of >> >> approach-avoidance. >> >> >>>>>>> The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the >> >> mother; her >> >> >>>>>>> failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal >> >>conflict >> >> for the >> >> >>>>>>> child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates >> >> between two >> >> >>>>>>> different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she >> >> is a >> >> >>>>>>> mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than >> >> that of his >> >> >>>>>>> younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. >> >> >>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>> LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely >> >> agonizing >> >> >>>>>>> condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a >> >> condition >> >> >>>>>>> frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional >> >> attitudes >> >> >>>>>>> towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we >> >>have >> >> >>>>>>> previously been able to observe among one of our children and >> >> which, you >> >> >>>>>>> may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one >> >> hand, from >> >> >>>>>>> the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful >> >> attachment, >> >> >>>>>>> and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of >> >>terrors >> >> and >> >> >>>>>>> terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. >> >>The >> >> German >> >> >>>>>>> authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is >> >> experiencing >> >> >>>>>>> a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for >> >> the mother >> >> >>>>>>> and terror of the witch coexist. >> >> >>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>> "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply >> >> pronounced >> >> >>>>>>> conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction >> >>expressed >> >> in a >> >> >>>>>>> simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the >> >>mother, a >> >> >>>>>>> terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, >> >> combined >> >> >>>>>>> with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home >> >> >>>>>>> immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going >> >> home was >> >> >>>>>>> brought up." >> >> >>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>> In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with >> >> more >> >> >>>>>>> detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of >> >> pity: of >> >> >>>>>>> sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and >> >>compassion >> >> can >> >> >>>>>>> coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother >> >> not as a >> >> >>>>>>> bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, >> >>or >> >> weak. She >> >> >>>>>>> acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. >> >>This, >> >> then, >> >> >>>>>>> means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a >> >> "duty" to >> >> >>>>>>> take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. >> >> >>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>> Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest >> >> child has a >> >> >>>>>>> single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. >> >>His >> >> emotions >> >> >>>>>>> follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. >> >> >>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>> LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother >> >>was >> >> ill and >> >> >>>>>>> he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his >> >> mother down, >> >> >>>>>>> make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones >> >> and comfort >> >> >>>>>>> them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the >> >>family, >> >> the only >> >> >>>>>>> one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". >> >> >>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>> In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and >> >> cognition in >> >> >>>>>>> each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship >> >> changes >> >> >>>>>>> with age. >> >> >>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>> Martin >> >> >>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>> The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a >> >> preschooler, and >> >> >>>>>>> the oldest a school-aged child. >> >> >>>>>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff < >> >> robyn.babaeff@monash.edu> >> >> >>>>>>> wrote: >> >> >>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic >> >>involving >> >> >>>>>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive >> >> >>>>>>> connection? >> >> >>>>>>>> As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves >> >>into a >> >> >>>>>>> different >> >> >>>>>>>> realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective >> >> position of >> >> >>>>>>>> the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where >> >>there >> >> is >> >> >>>>>>>> emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then >> >> as the >> >> >>>>>>>> cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs >> >>from >> >> the >> >> >>>>>>>> internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the >> >> >>>>>>> connectedness >> >> >>>>>>>> takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn >> >> >>>>>>>> motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. >> >> >>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>> On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees < >> >> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> >> >> >>>>>>>> wrote: >> >> >>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and >> >> every word, >> >> >>>>>>>>> but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all >> >>operating >> >> with the >> >> >>>>>>>>> same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like >> >> this >> >> >>>>>>>>> discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it >> >> because we >> >> >>>>>>> each >> >> >>>>>>>>> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which >> >>includes >> >> our >> >> >>>>>>>>> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be >> >> expected >> >> >>>>>>> to >> >> >>>>>>>>> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead >> >>some >> >> people, >> >> >>>>>>>>> etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an >> >> >>>>>>>>> approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be >> >> negotiated in >> >> >>>>>>>>> discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get >> >>closer >> >> to >> >> >>>>>>>>> understanding how a particular person uses particular words >> >>when >> >> we get >> >> >>>>>>> to >> >> >>>>>>>>> know that person as a person and that involves much more than >> >> just >> >> >>>>>>> batting >> >> >>>>>>>>> words to and fro! >> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>> Rod >> >> >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >> >> >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >> >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> >> >>>>>>>>> on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] >> >> >>>>>>>>> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 >> >> >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >> >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? >> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in >> >> English? Is >> >> >>>>>>> this >> >> >>>>>>>>> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, >> >>in >> >> this >> >> >>>>>>> case >> >> >>>>>>>>> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, >> >> which adds >> >> >>>>>>>>> onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. >> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer < >> >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >> >> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>> Andy, >> >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot >> >> capture >> >> >>>>>>>>>> everything. >> >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my >> >> college >> >> >>>>>>>>>> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, >> >> because >> >> >>>>>>> that >> >> >>>>>>>>>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen >> >>is >> >> >>>>>>> strongly >> >> >>>>>>>>>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen >> >> atoms, >> >> >>>>>>>>>> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This >> >>has >> >> the >> >> >>>>>>>>>> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to >> >> hydrogen >> >> >>>>>>>>>> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that >> >> water is a >> >> >>>>>>>>>> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from >> >> elements >> >> >>>>>>> that >> >> >>>>>>>>>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. >> >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the >> >> *formation* of >> >> >>>>>>>>>> water. My point was that once formed, there are no >> >> contradictions >> >> >>>>>>> driving >> >> >>>>>>>>>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does >> >> partially >> >> >>>>>>>>>> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of >> >>water >> >> is >> >> >>>>>>>>> actually >> >> >>>>>>>>>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and >> >> >>>>>>>>> dissociating >> >> >>>>>>>>>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it >> >>doesn't >> >> >>>>>>> develop >> >> >>>>>>>>>> further. >> >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>> Martin >> >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden >> >> >> >> wrote: >> >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a >> >> metaphor >> >> >>>>>>> - >> >> >>>>>>>>>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case >> >> it is >> >> >>>>>>>>> simply >> >> >>>>>>>>>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O >> >> molecules, and >> >> >>>>>>>>>> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the >> >> properties of >> >> >>>>>>>>>> water. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind >> >> the H and >> >> >>>>>>>>> OH >> >> >>>>>>>>>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a >> >>positive >> >> charge >> >> >>>>>>>>> and >> >> >>>>>>>>>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old >> >>positive/negative >> >> >>>>>>>>>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all >> >> chemicals >> >> >>>>>>>>>> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base >> >>and >> >> >>>>>>> therefore >> >> >>>>>>>>>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of >> >> contradictions >> >> >>>>>>>>> and >> >> >>>>>>>>>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the >> >> chemistry of >> >> >>>>>>>>>> life. :) >> >> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy >> >> >>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> >>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >> >> >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that >> >>LSV's >> >> own >> >> >>>>>>>>>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. >> >>Water >> >> is not >> >> >>>>>>> a >> >> >>>>>>>>>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process >> >> stops: >> >> >>>>>>> water >> >> >>>>>>>>> is >> >> >>>>>>>>>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which >> >>an >> >> >>>>>>> internal >> >> >>>>>>>>>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for >> >> change. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a >> >> triangle is >> >> >>>>>>>>>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole >> >> wrote: >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and >> >> oxygen such >> >> >>>>>>>>>> that two >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give >> >>rise >> >> to >> >> >>>>>>> water >> >> >>>>>>>>>> with >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people >> >> to rise >> >> >>>>>>> to >> >> >>>>>>>>>> the >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> concrete for their own cases. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >> >> >>>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a >> >> dynamic >> >> >>>>>>>>> system >> >> >>>>>>>>>> with >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike >> >> linked to, >> >> >>>>>>>>>> and I >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all >> >> before >> >> >>>>>>>>>> posting. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < >> >> >>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On the contrary. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things >> >> about >> >> >>>>>>>>> activity >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A >> >> very simple >> >> >>>>>>>>>> example >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is that if you change something in the >> >> norms/customs/laws/history >> >> >>>>>>>>>> corner of >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a >> >> stronger >> >> >>>>>>>>> footing >> >> >>>>>>>>>> in >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by >> >> bringing >> >> >>>>>>>>> new >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out >> >> of which >> >> >>>>>>>>>> division >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with >> >>a >> >> >>>>>>>>> leadership >> >> >>>>>>>>>> team >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily >> >> English-speaking, which >> >> >>>>>>>>>> in turn >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if >> >> you're lucky >> >> >>>>>>>>> and >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> quick, change your history. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it >> >> implies >> >> >>>>>>>>> that, >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the >> >> components, one >> >> >>>>>>> can >> >> >>>>>>>>>> bring >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting >> >>on >> >> >>>>>>>>> *another* >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> component of the totality. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me >> >>this >> >> type of >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to >> >> represent >> >> >>>>>>>>>> elements that >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is >> >> that the >> >> >>>>>>>>>> question >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was >> >>exploring >> >> a method >> >> >>>>>>>>> of >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among >> >> components >> >> >>>>>>>>>> in a >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor >> >>on >> >> >>>>>>> another, >> >> >>>>>>>>>> which >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And >> >> this means >> >> >>>>>>>>>> that >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this >> >> >>>>>>> relationship. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < >> >> >>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" >> >> in a very >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape >> >> collective >> >> >>>>>>>>>> responses >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships >> >>(like, >> >> when a >> >> >>>>>>>>> rule >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree >> >> with Andy: >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of >> >>analysis >> >> is an >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a >> >> template, >> >> >>>>>>>>>> it is >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the >> >> leap. It >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually comes >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your >> >> research using >> >> >>>>>>>>>> some >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> other >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. >> >>The >> >> >>>>>>>>> question >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we >> >> going to >> >> >>>>>>>>>> do?" The >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are >> >>trying >> >> to >> >> >>>>>>>>>> accomplish. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off >> >>temporarily? >> >> Are we >> >> >>>>>>>>>> trying >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system >> >>in >> >> >>>>>>> Chicago, >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm >> >> going to >> >> >>>>>>> be >> >> >>>>>>>>>> late >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid >> >> today and >> >> >>>>>>>>>> will miss >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their >> >> supervisors. We're >> >> >>>>>>>>>> talking >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of >> >>them >> >> middle >> >> >>>>>>>>> aged >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended >> >>families >> >> to be >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message >> >>on a >> >> >>>>>>> machine, >> >> >>>>>>>>>> but >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in >> >>person >> >> who >> >> >>>>>>> would >> >> >>>>>>>>>> then >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because >> >> supervisors were >> >> >>>>>>>>>> often >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was >> >> unreliable. >> >> >>>>>>>>>> Also, a >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this >> >>was >> >> >>>>>>>>> happening >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if >> >> someone it out >> >> >>>>>>>>>> buying >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call >> >>is >> >> not >> >> >>>>>>>>> easy. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to >> >> >>>>>>> accomplish, >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To >> >> educate >> >> >>>>>>>>>> members of >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond >> >> collectively to >> >> >>>>>>>>>> something >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound >> >>change in >> >> >>>>>>> society >> >> >>>>>>>>>> so >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of >> >>an >> >> >>>>>>> extended >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one >> >> that you >> >> >>>>>>>>> can >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then >> >> reviewing >> >> >>>>>>>>> the >> >> >>>>>>>>>> whole >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, >> >>as >> >> Andy >> >> >>>>>>>>>> says, a >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to >> >> actually >> >> >>>>>>>>>> speak to >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we >> >>talk >> >> about >> >> >>>>>>>>>> activity >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are >> >>often >> >> in >> >> >>>>>>>>>> conflict >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some >> >> purpose in >> >> >>>>>>>>>> mind? >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose >> >>of >> >> the >> >> >>>>>>>>> class, >> >> >>>>>>>>>> or >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be >> >>most >> >> >>>>>>>>>> interesting >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis >> >> (purposes of >> >> >>>>>>>>>> children) >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet >> >> they're not >> >> >>>>>>>>>> identical. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi >> >>wrote: >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my >> >>concern >> >> too. I >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> supervise >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT >> >> context. Two >> >> >>>>>>>>> of >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> them on >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary >> >> science. >> >> >>>>>>>>>> They >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> have >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted >> >>of >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and >> >>forms of >> >> >>>>>>>>> division >> >> >>>>>>>>>> of >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> labor. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and >> >>drawings. >> >> When >> >> >>>>>>>>> they >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> decided to >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into >> >> CHAT >> >> >>>>>>>>> context >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mainly >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still >> >> doubt >> >> >>>>>>>>> about >> >> >>>>>>>>>> the >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> " unit >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> St?? ????a??, 12 ??t?????? 2014, ? ???st?? Andy >> >> Blunden < >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ???a?e: >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of >> >> analysis, it >> >> >>>>>>>>>> was >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> one of >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, >> >> that this >> >> >>>>>>>>>> concept >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> was >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and >> >>which >> >> was new >> >> >>>>>>>>> for >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> me, was >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin >> >>of >> >> this >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression, I'd >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that >> >>what it >> >> >>>>>>>>> referred >> >> >>>>>>>>>> to >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> was a >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning >> >>CHAT >> >> >>>>>>>>>> methodology >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> whilst >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, >> >>please >> >> let me >> >> >>>>>>>>>> know. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of >> >> analysis is an >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following >> >>a >> >> >>>>>>> template, >> >> >>>>>>>>>> it >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, >> >>the >> >> leap. It >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually comes >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your >> >> research using >> >> >>>>>>>>>> some >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> other >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the >> >> unit is >> >> >>>>>>>>> the >> >> >>>>>>>>>> new >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of >> >>solving >> >> puzzles. >> >> >>>>>>>>>> So for >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in >> >>their >> >> >>>>>>>>> research, >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> often >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get >> >>from >> >> their >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> supervisor. I >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have >> >> got to >> >> >>>>>>> this >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> point in >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have >> >>is >> >> not the >> >> >>>>>>>>>> data >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> they now >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading >> >> the two >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles. But, >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to >> >> contribute in >> >> >>>>>>>>>> posts. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and >> >> don't >> >> >>>>>>> follow >> >> >>>>>>>>>> that >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> through >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, >> >>and >> >> I am >> >> >>>>>>>>>> usually >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> just >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably >> >> because >> >> >>>>>>> I'm >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> interested >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be >> >> used for, >> >> >>>>>>>>>> and >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> how they >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. >> >> What are >> >> >>>>>>>>>> people >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't >> >>units >> >> of >> >> >>>>>>>>> analysis >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> being used? >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, >> >>I'd >> >> be very >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> interested to >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the >> >> questions might >> >> >>>>>>>>> be >> >> >>>>>>>>>> as >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> basic as >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my >> >> thoughts (in >> >> >>>>>>>>> a >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> much more >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit >> >>of >> >> >>>>>>>>> analysis. >> >> >>>>>>>>>> In >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike's >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, >> >>I'd >> >> add that >> >> >>>>>>>>>> the >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> action is >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and >> >>historical >> >> factors >> >> >>>>>>>>>> that >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been >> >> said here >> >> >>>>>>>>>> before, >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions >> >> create a >> >> >>>>>>>>>> picture of >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> much >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> ............................................................ >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> School of Education >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ioannina >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Greece >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >> >> science with >> >> >>>>>>>>> an >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>> -- >> >> >>>>>>>>> *Patrick Jaki* >> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* >> >> >>>>>>>>> ________________________________ >> >> >>>>>>>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< >> >> >>>>>>>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> >> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended >> >> solely >> >> >>>>>>> for >> >> >>>>>>>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are >> >>not >> >> the >> >> >>>>>>>>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of >> >>the >> >> >>>>>>>>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should >> >>not >> >> rely on >> >> >>>>>>> it. >> >> >>>>>>>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender >> >> know >> >> >>>>>>>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails >> >> are not >> >> >>>>>>>>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth >> >>University >> >> >>>>>>> accepts >> >> >>>>>>>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to >> >> scan >> >> >>>>>>> emails >> >> >>>>>>>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept >> >> >>>>>>> responsibility >> >> >>>>>>>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email >> >>or >> >> its >> >> >>>>>>>>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless >> >> >>>>>>> accompanied >> >> >>>>>>>>> by an official order form. >> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>> -- >> >> >>>>>>>> *Robyn Babaeff* >> >> >>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>> >> >> >>>>>> >> >> >>>>>> -- >> >> >>>>>> *Robyn Babaeff* >> >> >>>>> >> >> >>>>> >> >> >>>> >> >> >>> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Oct 17 08:44:06 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 08:44:06 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Developmental Psychology Position at Bilkent University In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Jedediah Allen* Date: Friday, October 17, 2014 Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Developmental Psychology Position at Bilkent University To: "cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org" Dear Colleagues, I am writing to draw your attention to a faculty position in developmental psychology at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey. The position is described below. Thank you, Jed *Bilkent University, Department of Psychology* Bilkent University invites faculty applications (rank open) in the Department of Psychology. The university?s strategic plan includes an expansion of the psychology department. Accordingly, we seek applications from promising or established scholars who study cognitive development, social-cognitive development, developmental cognitive science or developmental neuroscience. Bilkent was recently ranked #31 in the world by the Times Higher Education among universities under 50 years. For 5 consecutive years, every entering Psychology major has scored in the top 5% or higher on the national university entrance exam. The language of instruction is English. The Department and the new Interdisciplinary Graduate Program in Neuroscience offer Master?s and PhD programs. The Department has newly renovated research laboratories, as well as access to the university?s state-of-the-art facilities, which include the National Magnetic Resonance Research Center (UMRAM), the National Nanotechnology Center (UNAM), and an animal research center. Bilkent is located in Ankara, Turkey?s metropolitan capital with daily direct flights to Istanbul and other major European cities. Bilkent University also provides faculty members and their families with free housing and access to private health insurance. *Qualifications and Responsibilities* Applicants should have a PhD in psychology or related discipline, and should have an excellent publication record (requirements vary with rank). A demonstrated ability or the potential to secure external research funding will be a strong advantage. Faculty members are expected to maintain productive research programs. Successful applicants will teach 2 courses per semester (no teaching requirement during summer), and supervise PhD, Master?s, and senior thesis students. *Appointment* This full-time appointment will begin in September 2015. Salary will be internationally competitive and commensurate with qualifications and experience. *Application Procedure* Applicants should submit 1) a cover letter; 2) CV; 3) research statement; 4) teaching statement; and 5) contact information for 3 professional references to Associate Professor Michelle Adams, Chair of the Search Committee, at michelle@bilkent.edu.tr . Review of applications will commence on November 1, 2014 and continue until the position is filled. For more information regarding the Psychology Department and Bilkent University, please visit the following websites: psy.bilkent.edu.tr/ neuro.bilkent.edu.tr/ feass.bilkent.edu.tr/ bilkent.edu.tr/ -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Oct 17 10:58:40 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 10:58:40 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi et al. Perhaps one of the things that held up the discussion of the two articles about perezhivanie (LSV and critique by ANL) (Vygotsky and Leontiev) is my failure to write a precis of the ANL critique. Several factors interfered, but most germane here is that, like David, I was repulsed by the entire rhetorical approach ANL used. These men were close colleagues. That ANL starts off the article positioning himself in support of the Central Committee decree banning pedology (& effectively psychology as a whole) puts us right in the thick of the purges... So this is not an academic debating society we are witnessing. People on the wrong side were sent to the gulag or killed outright. And it did not get better any time soon. ANL was right there in 1948-49 pushing Stalin's support of Lysenko in a pedagogical journal. Second, once I got past the long section doing a hatchet job on Blonskii and others and got to to the discussion of LSV's work, I could not outline the argument. It seems to twist and turn and double back on itself. Finally, last night, I decided that maybe the following passage is as close as we can get to a short summary of the paper (p. 25): Thus, Vygotsky?s proposition that consciousness is a product of the child?s verbal communication under conditions of his activity and in relation to the material reality that surrounds him must be turned around: the consciousness of a child is a product of his human activity in relation to objective reality, taking place under conditions of language and under conditions of verbal communication. It is specifically this proposition that is decisive. Decisive? I think not. Reading this in the context of the surrounding argument, it appears that ANL is doing everything he can to paint LSV as an bourgeois idealist. This applies for the topic that has been taken up here, the notion of the ideal as present in the culturally organized environment of the human child from the moment of birth (if not before). In this regard, I agree with the direction that Julian points us in locating the ideal in cultural practices: I don?t think it would have taken much to persuade Vygotsky (had he been alive to the critique) that the 'ideal form' that already exists from the start of development only 'exists' (if it does) objectively in social practices/activity, Perhaps I erred is suggesting that we read these two pieces to straighten out our own ideas about the LSV-ANL split. I was (am) motivated by the fact that in the past several months of discussions with Russian psychologists who participate in a self-identified cultural-historical psychology forum, LSV's focus toward the end of his life on perezhivanie was picked out as the "proposition that is decisive." Since I have long championed emphasis on the reasons for rejecting that split as a consequence of the terror under which people were working, and the need to consider both mediation and activity as mutually constitutive, the need to focus on the presumed intellectual justification for considering the two positions to be principally different seemed important to address. I am in no way inclined to abandon my view that joint, mediated, activity is a proper unit of analysis for understanding the role of culture in development. But I am also much more aware than I was a year ago of the susceptibility of ANL's version of activity theory to become a tool of oppressive state power -- which makes me more attentive to arguments by people like Anna Stetsenko concerning the transformative potential of these same ideas. For better and for worse. Regarding a defense of LSV that you call for Julian: At this point in the discussion, if people have not read Andy's paper defending LSV's view, which is on academia.edu and which i am sure he is happy to send around, do so. As Larry's note indicates. The linking of artifact mediation to Pierce's notion of interpretant is one of many indications of the usefulness of bringing together Pierce and CHAT. This is a suggestion that can be traced in xmca history back to the work of Arne Raeithel, which can be found in MCA and the xmca archives. I also liked the invocation of Raymond Williams' notion of "structure of feeling" in this connection. Anyone who has not done so will gain a lot of pleasure, not to mention historical and human understanding, by reading Elizabeth Gaskell. Wonderful. mike On Thu, Oct 16, 2014 at 8:26 AM, Julian Williams < julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote: > Dear Larry and all interested in Leontiev's critique of Vygotsky > > This discussion seems to have cooled off, unless I missed some posts: a > pity? I was hoping we would get at the nub of Leontiev's critique of > Vygotsky's 'idealism'. Im not normally on Leontiev's side in these > debates, but here goes: > > I don?t think it would have taken much to persuade Vygotsky (had he been > alive to the critique) that the 'ideal form' that already exists from the > start of development > only 'exists' (if it does) objectively in social practices/activity, and > that hence that a ZPD for development (the example given in the paper is > arithmetic) then has to authentically embed these ideal forms in practices > (in the classroom in simulated shopping, or whatever) that make good sense > for the child? so the perezhivanie is itself embedded/situated in the > child's being/relations in social activity and the material objects, > motives and emotions and discourses etc that come with that. (I take this > to be ANL's point). > > Leontiev's reading of Vygotsky's text is not exactly unfair: I can imagine > readings of this 'final form' of the ideal 'already existing' leading to > distortions in activity theory (and it is a real problem Im writing about > this just now). I argue that in fact the idea that 'arithmetic' already > exists in an ideal final form and the task of development is to engage the > child with this ideal form is a dangerous formulation: rather I argue that > arithmetic has to appear in practice, in 'real social practice with all > the emotional baggage that it should have, i.e. as a solution to a > meaningful problem in practice, rather than an alienating bundle of > formulae to be internalised, as a punishment for being a child forced into > schooling. > > And this social context of the 'ideal form' is of course absolutely part > of what makes the perezhivanie, it is not just the stage of the child's > development but their engagement in the activity/social practice and its > motives too?. To arithmetic: if you can bear with me! There is in practice > no 'final form' of arithmetic anyway. Each generation learns and > experiences it differently, and its done differently in different micro > cultures, and long may this be the case (e.g. In subtraction do you add to > the bottom or take from the top, or what...; in practice, do you use a > pencil to do sums or use your your phone as a calculator? etc etc?) > > So: Leontiev maybe has an axe to grind about the material, object-oriented > base of (semiotic etc etc mediated) activity, but I think also here he has > a point. > > In defence of Vygotsky anyone? > > julian > > > > On 13/10/2014 20:53, "Larry Purss" wrote: > > >To return to Leontiev's article on the environment. > >On page 19 Leontiev says Vygotsky uses the word *communication* with the > >narrow meaning of *spiritual sense* or *spiritual relationships* to > >signify > >the way we use words and language. > >Leontiev suggests this is a limited meaning of communication which > >excludes > >a BROADER meaning [BEYOND LANGUAGE USE] to *signify* the GENERAL FACT of > >people's relationships which ENCOMPASS their material dealings. > > > >Is this way of presenting the difference in *communication* the SAME > >[equal] difference that *divides* materialism and idealism? > >Leontiev goes on to say: > >When Vygotsky views the person AS *the subject of communication* the child > >INEVITABLY IS transformed through THIS SIGNIFICATION of *communication* > >into an IDEAL PSYCHOLOGICAL subject AND the environment is transformed > >into > >an IDEAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT. > > > >Leontiev then goes on to say that Vygotsky's thinking IS moving along > >THESE > >*ideal* lines of development and it is THIS conceptual starting point > >which > >is transforming Vygotsky's theory into a *spiritual* theory. > >For Vygotsky, *discovering* the ROLE of *communication* [contact with > >people] AS A DRIVING FORCE of development Vygotsky INTRODUCES *the* > >understanding [in Peirce's term an *interpretant*] of a *FINAL IDEAL FORM* > >This ideal form IS an existing phenomena [form] in the environment from > >the > >beginning when the new born infant is thrown into THIS world. > >In the process of development the child acquires THIS *ideal form* [which > >already exists in the environment in IDEAL form] BE-comes the *model* that > >results at the end of development. > >IDEAL in *this* sense IS A MODEL of what results at the end of > >development. > >The beginning form EXISTS in relation [in unity??] with the *ideal form* > >[with the model] which pre-exists the beginning form of the infant AND > >TRULY INTERACTS WITH the infant's development. > > > >Leontiev goes on to claim that this specific example is characteristic, > >for > >Vygotsky, of ALL OTHER MEANING development. > >MODELS *truly exist* in the world [which emerged historically in previous > >social historical situations] > > > >Leontiev then goes on to make a STRONG claim that these models actually > >*determine* and *direct* the infant's first steps. > >I wonder if a weaker claim that models *influence* the infants first step > >is what Vygotsky *meant* > >SO -the environment [and models] *appear* [or seem] TO BE the > >*vehicle* [carrier[ of development of THESE forms/models and these forms > >*determine* the development of shared *meaning* > > > >Now from this criticism of pre-existing *models* Leontiev claims Vygotsky > >IS LOCKED in a vicious circle. > >However, if *models* as various multiple [interpretants - Peirce] ACTUALLY > >EXIST THEN Vygotsky's theory is *true* in actual fact. > > > >This leads into the *loose* thread of the place of the *imaginal* in the > >*real* and I would point to Raymond William's book "Marxism and > >Literature" > >to explore the imaginal within Marxian *cultural theory*. > >Also on another thread a discussion of Umberto Eco's notion of *primary > >indexicality* prior to subjects and objects but that leads beyond the > >focus > >of Leontiev's revisioning Vygotsky > > > >Larry > > > >On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 11:47 AM, Martin John Packer < > >mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > > > >> Hi Alfredo, > >> > >> I don't really see a dilemma... and I think LSV is pretty clear: > >> > >> "How can one explain why exactly the same environmental conditions exert > >> three different types of influence on these three different children? It > >> can be explained because each of the children has a different attitude > >>to > >> the situation. Or, as we might put it, each of the children experienced > >>the > >> situation in a different way. .... So it appears that, depending on the > >> fact that the same situation had been experienced by the three children > >>in > >> three different ways, the influence which this situation exerted on > >>their > >> development also turns out to be different." > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Oct 13, 2014, at 1:19 PM, Alfredo Gil Jornet > > >> wrote: > >> > >> > Julian, Martin, > >> > > >> > Perhaps a way out of the dilemma of whether we should be talking about > >> the same mother/environment or about different mothers/environments is > >> provided by Dewey's notion of *situation*, which always implies both > >> organism and environment. We can then talk of different situations, yet > >>the > >> same environment. > >> > > >> > Alfredo > >> > ________________________________________ > >> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> > >> on behalf of Martin John Packer > >> > Sent: 13 October 2014 19:59 > >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? > >> > > >> > Julian, > >> > > >> > I would prefer to say that they all have the same mother, but they > >> relate to her and interact with her in specific ways, depending largely > >>on > >> their stage of development. She presumably relates to each of them > >> somewhat differently, but undoubtedly each of them witnesses how she > >>treats > >> the others. > >> > > >> > So I'm saying that the environment is the same - they all live in a > >> house with a drunken mother - but the ways they live in that > >>environment, > >> and the ways they make sense of it, differ. > >> > > >> > Martin > >> > > >> > On Oct 13, 2014, at 12:45 PM, Julian Williams < > >> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote: > >> > > >> >> Martin > >> >> > >> >> Ok we are on the same page, if you agree the environment may not be > >>the > >> same for the three children... It is not just that they are > >>developmentally > >> at a different stage, but "mother" is actually a different environment > >>for > >> each of them. > >> >> > >> >> Julian > >> >> > >> >> Sent from my iPad > >> >> > >> >> On 13 Oct 2014, at 17:54, "Martin John Packer" > >> > >> wrote: > >> >> > >> >>> Hi Julian, > >> >>> > >> >>> I've been trying to suggest that the dialectic is in the child's > >> relationship to the environment. Or, as you say, as an aspect of > >> child-in-the-environment (with-others). Generally I try to avoid > >>dualistic > >> terminology such as 'in the child' versus 'in the world' or 'subjective' > >> versus 'objective' - I think I'm following LSV's lead here, though > >> certainly he uses the term "internal" a lot. > >> >>> > >> >>> Generally in children's development the environment does indeed > >>change > >> as they grow - parents make new arrangements for them. But in the case > >> study that LSV describes, we have three children of different ages all > >> dealing at the same time with the same adult. In this sense the > >>environment > >> is fixed, in this particular case. > >> >>> > >> >>> And surely you're right to suggest that the children are > >>contributing > >> to the environment in which they live. One can only imagine how a > >>drunken > >> mother responds to her youngest son wetting the bed, for example. > >> >>> > >> >>> Martin > >> >>> > >> >>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 11:14 AM, Julian Williams < > >> julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote: > >> >>> > >> >>>> Dear Martin, and all > >> >>>> > >> >>>> I dont see the dialectic as 'internal' to the child, but as the > >> child-in-the-environment. But I think maybe there is a problem with the > >> current drift in the discussion. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> The problem I see arising now is that we are beginning to take the > >> environment here as something fixed or taken for granted, with the > >> difference in the three Perezhivanie being totally about the > >> subjects/childs different stages of development. I'm not sure this does > >> justice to the dialectic Vygotsky had in mind (though I see it might > >>appear > >> so in the text). I think one has to consider the objective fact of the > >> environment as something from which different strands may be > >>apprehended, > >> or if you like, or from which certain aspects can be 'refracted'. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> At the cost of perhaps causing confusion, I wonder if the notion of > >> Zone of Proximal Development can help here for those who use this idea > >>... > >> A particular social plane (environment, classroom interaction etc) can > >> offer a ZPD for some but be entirely useless to others, because of their > >> different stages of development, yes, yes. But also, different learners > >>at > >> different stages can help create their own ZPDs within the same social > >> space and even plane, (drawing from the same social interactions in > >> different ways). So they may shape the very environment which provides > >>for > >> their own ZPD and hence development. I think this is a more adequate > >>way to > >> think of the dialectic, so the subject is not seen as passive in their > >>own > >> development. > >> >>>> > >> >>>> Julian > >> >>>> > >> >>>> (Maybe this passivity is what Mike had in mind when he expressed > >> reservations about Vygotsky's use of the 'final ideal form' , eg of > >> arithmetic, have I remembered this right? Anyway I DO have reservations > >> about that notion in Vygotsky's chapter but maybe that's another story > >>for > >> later.) > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>> On 13 Oct 2014, at 14:53, "Martin John Packer" < > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> Hi Robyn, > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> I think it's important to recognize that the oldest child's > >> understanding of the need to take care of his mother and siblings is > >>not a > >> drive or an impulse, it is, LSV tells us, a "duty" that follows from > >> adopting a specific "role" in the family. Understanding the situation in > >> terms of roles and duties is certainly socially mediated - after all, > >>roles > >> and duties are social, or societal, matters (ontological and > >>deontological > >> respectively, if we want to get technical). The oldest child - > >>presumably > >> attending school - is able to understand that he lives in a world of > >>social > >> institutions, one of which is his family. > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> In this chapter LSV does not explore or explain how each kind of > >> perezhivanie transforms into the next, but in his lectures on child > >> development you can find a more detailed account. But here, in what is > >> effectively a cross-sectional comparison of children at different ages > >> (albeit only one at each age), he certainly means to suggest that > >>earlier > >> forms provide the basis for later forms. > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> Martin > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 7:45 AM, Robyn Babaeff > >> > >> wrote: > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>>> Much appreciated Martin - this is feeling more visual, and now I > >>am > >> >>>>>> wondering is it possible to interpret that the older child's > >>emotive > >> >>>>>> drive/action of care for his mother and younger sibling in its > >> moment is > >> >>>>>> also connected a socially mediated aspect of cognition from > >> somewhere/time > >> >>>>>> in his earlier years of perezhivanie for the 'how to' in his > >> choosing/drive > >> >>>>>> for duty of care? > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> On 13 October 2014 23:21, Martin John Packer < > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >> >>>>>> wrote: > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic > >>involving > >> >>>>>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive > >> >>>>>>> connection? > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> It seems to me that when LSV contrasts the consequence of their > >> mother's > >> >>>>>>> drinking for the three children, he is precisely sketching the > >> dynamic > >> >>>>>>> development of perezhivanie. > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> In the youngest child, cognition is not yet differentiated from > >> emotion, > >> >>>>>>> in fact emotion *is* the child's way of understanding and > >> interpreting the > >> >>>>>>> circumstances. Completely dependent on the mother for all needs, > >> the child > >> >>>>>>> is overcome by the enormity of what is happening. His reaction > >>is > >> one of > >> >>>>>>> extreme emotion - terror - and somatization - he urinates > >> involuntarily and > >> >>>>>>> stammers. He loses control of his own body. > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> LSV writes that the youngest child is "simply overwhelmed by the > >> horror of > >> >>>>>>> what is happening to him. As a result, he develops attacks of > >> terror, > >> >>>>>>> enuresis and he develops a stammer, sometimes being unable to > >> speak at all > >> >>>>>>> as he loses his voice. In other words, the child?s reaction > >> amounts to a > >> >>>>>>> state of complete depression and helplessness in the face of > >>this > >> >>>>>>> situation." > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> The second child illustrates perezhivanie that is more > >>developed. > >> The > >> >>>>>>> contradiction of the situation becomes an "inner" conflict - an > >> alternation > >> >>>>>>> between, and combination of, a positive and a negative emotion > >> towards the > >> >>>>>>> mother. Each of these attitudes is more organized than the > >> breakdown seen > >> >>>>>>> in the youngest child. Each attitude is still primarily > >>emotional, > >> but it > >> >>>>>>> is an organized and focused emotion, not a somatic collapse. The > >> child's > >> >>>>>>> love and fear is each a coherent way of grasping the situation, > >> directed > >> >>>>>>> towards the mother who is understood first as good, and then as > >> bad. It is, > >> >>>>>>> however, the combination, the coexistence, of these two emotions > >> that is so > >> >>>>>>> difficult for the child. He is trapped in a dilemma of > >> approach-avoidance. > >> >>>>>>> The contradiction in the situation - again, dependence on the > >> mother; her > >> >>>>>>> failure to meet her children's needs - becomes a personal > >>conflict > >> for the > >> >>>>>>> child, who cannot yet reconcile it. His cognition alternates > >> between two > >> >>>>>>> different and incompatible ways of interpreting his mother - she > >> is a > >> >>>>>>> mother; no, she is a witch. His cognition is more capable than > >> that of his > >> >>>>>>> younger brother, but it is still secondary to his emotion. > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> LSV writes that "The second child is developing an extremely > >> agonizing > >> >>>>>>> condition, what is called a state of inner conflict, which is a > >> condition > >> >>>>>>> frequently found in certain cases when contrasting emotional > >> attitudes > >> >>>>>>> towards the mother make their appearance, examples of which we > >>have > >> >>>>>>> previously been able to observe among one of our children and > >> which, you > >> >>>>>>> may remember, we have called an ambivalent attitude. On the one > >> hand, from > >> >>>>>>> the child?s point of view, the mother is an object of painful > >> attachment, > >> >>>>>>> and on the other, she represents a source of all kinds of > >>terrors > >> and > >> >>>>>>> terrible emotional experiences [perezhivanija] for the child. > >>The > >> German > >> >>>>>>> authors call this kind of emotional complex which the child is > >> experiencing > >> >>>>>>> a Mutter-Hexekomplex, or ?a mother-witch complex?, when love for > >> the mother > >> >>>>>>> and terror of the witch coexist. > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> "The second child was brought to us with this kind of deeply > >> pronounced > >> >>>>>>> conflict and a sharply colliding internal contradiction > >>expressed > >> in a > >> >>>>>>> simultaneously positive and negative attitude towards the > >>mother, a > >> >>>>>>> terrible attachment to her and an equally terrible hate for her, > >> combined > >> >>>>>>> with terribly contradictory behaviour. He asked to be sent home > >> >>>>>>> immediately, but expressed terror when the subject of his going > >> home was > >> >>>>>>> brought up." > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> In contrast, the oldest child is able to view the situation with > >> more > >> >>>>>>> detachment, because he is less dependent. His emotion of one of > >> pity: of > >> >>>>>>> sorrow and compassion, not of love and fear. Sorrow and > >>compassion > >> can > >> >>>>>>> coexist; they do not contradict one another. He views his mother > >> not as a > >> >>>>>>> bad person, a witch, but as a sick person, someone who is ill, > >>or > >> weak. She > >> >>>>>>> acts badly, but this does not mean that she is a bad person. > >>This, > >> then, > >> >>>>>>> means that he knows what to do: he has "a special role," with a > >> "duty" to > >> >>>>>>> take care of both his mother and his younger sibling. > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> Here, emotion has become subordinated to cognition. The oldest > >> child has a > >> >>>>>>> single, coherent way of interpreting his mother - she is ill. > >>His > >> emotions > >> >>>>>>> follow from that cognition, rather than the other way round. > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> LSV writes that the oldest child "understood that their mother > >>was > >> ill and > >> >>>>>>> he pitied her.... And he had a special role. He must calm his > >> mother down, > >> >>>>>>> make certain that she is prevented from harming the little ones > >> and comfort > >> >>>>>>> them. Quite simply, he has become the senior member of the > >>family, > >> the only > >> >>>>>>> one whose duty it was to look after everyone else". > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> In short, LV illustrates the relationship between emotion and > >> cognition in > >> >>>>>>> each of these three children, and so shows how that relationship > >> changes > >> >>>>>>> with age. > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> Martin > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> The youngest child is probably a toddler, the second a > >> preschooler, and > >> >>>>>>> the oldest a school-aged child. > >> >>>>>>> On Oct 13, 2014, at 6:41 AM, Robyn Babaeff < > >> robyn.babaeff@monash.edu> > >> >>>>>>> wrote: > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> Just thinking out loud here!!!!, but could the dialectic > >>involving > >> >>>>>>>> perezhivanie be an internal one between the affective-cognitive > >> >>>>>>> connection? > >> >>>>>>>> As social mediation occurs cognitive conceptualising moves > >>into a > >> >>>>>>> different > >> >>>>>>>> realm, but perhaps does not sync with the internal affective > >> position of > >> >>>>>>>> the moment in time. This could also occur vice-versa where > >>there > >> is > >> >>>>>>>> emotive movement but the thinking is opposing the feeling. Then > >> as the > >> >>>>>>>> cognitive-affective sync - the overall transformation occurs > >>from > >> the > >> >>>>>>>> internal crisis of disconnected affective-cognitive. As the > >> >>>>>>> connectedness > >> >>>>>>>> takes place the growth/change develops???? And in turn > >> >>>>>>>> motive/action/subjective situating is in transforming motion. > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> On 13 October 2014 22:12, Rod Parker-Rees < > >> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> > >> >>>>>>>> wrote: > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> Which is a useful reminder that the same is true of any and > >> every word, > >> >>>>>>>>> but to differing degrees. We may feel that we are all > >>operating > >> with the > >> >>>>>>>>> same meaning (znachenie) when we use a word in a context like > >> this > >> >>>>>>>>> discussion but each of us 'means' something different by it > >> because we > >> >>>>>>> each > >> >>>>>>>>> have our own sense (smysl) of its significance (which > >>includes > >> our > >> >>>>>>>>> awareness of how it is fought over, what sort of people can be > >> expected > >> >>>>>>> to > >> >>>>>>>>> use it more or less as we do, how it may annoy or mislead > >>some > >> people, > >> >>>>>>>>> etc.). To say we speak the 'same' language can only ever be an > >> >>>>>>>>> approximation. As I see it, this is why meaning must be > >> negotiated in > >> >>>>>>>>> discussion rather than asserted by proclamation - we get > >>closer > >> to > >> >>>>>>>>> understanding how a particular person uses particular words > >>when > >> we get > >> >>>>>>> to > >> >>>>>>>>> know that person as a person and that involves much more than > >> just > >> >>>>>>> batting > >> >>>>>>>>> words to and fro! > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> Rod > >> >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >> >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >> >>>>>>>>> on behalf of Patrick Jaki [patrick.jaki@gmail.com] > >> >>>>>>>>> Sent: 13 October 2014 12:00 > >> >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> Does perezhivanie have a direct equivalent translation in > >> English? Is > >> >>>>>>> this > >> >>>>>>>>> not part of the problem that a word in its original language, > >>in > >> this > >> >>>>>>> case > >> >>>>>>>>> Russian, cannot be translated directly into other languages, > >> which adds > >> >>>>>>>>> onto our problem of making sense and meaning of it. > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> On 13 October 2014 10:57, Martin John Packer < > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >> >>>>>>>>> wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>> Andy, > >> >>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>> I agree that it's an example and illustration that cannot > >> capture > >> >>>>>>>>>> everything. > >> >>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>> But I think you've got the chemistry wrong! If I remember my > >> college > >> >>>>>>>>>> chemistry correctly, H2O isn't a combination of H+ and OH-, > >> because > >> >>>>>>> that > >> >>>>>>>>>> would imply an asymmetry that does not in fact exist. Oxygen > >>is > >> >>>>>>> strongly > >> >>>>>>>>>> electronegative, meaning it draws electrons from the hydrogen > >> atoms, > >> >>>>>>>>>> leading to a bond between an O+ ion and two H- ions. This > >>has > >> the > >> >>>>>>>>>> consequence that the water molecule a dipole, which leads to > >> hydrogen > >> >>>>>>>>>> bonding between water molecules, the result of which is that > >> water is a > >> >>>>>>>>>> liquid at room temperature while other hydrides formed from > >> elements > >> >>>>>>> that > >> >>>>>>>>>> are close to oxygen in the periodic table are gases. > >> >>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>> So, yes, there are tensions and contradictions in the > >> *formation* of > >> >>>>>>>>>> water. My point was that once formed, there are no > >> contradictions > >> >>>>>>> driving > >> >>>>>>>>>> further development. That's not entirely true; water does > >> partially > >> >>>>>>>>>> dissociate, into H3O+ and OH-. This means that a body of > >>water > >> is > >> >>>>>>>>> actually > >> >>>>>>>>>> in constant change, creating and breaking hydrogen bonds, and > >> >>>>>>>>> dissociating > >> >>>>>>>>>> and reassociating. A dynamic stasis, if you like. But it > >>doesn't > >> >>>>>>> develop > >> >>>>>>>>>> further. > >> >>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>> Martin > >> >>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 11:51 PM, Andy Blunden > >> > >> wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin, I think it is nothing more than the limitations of a > >> metaphor > >> >>>>>>> - > >> >>>>>>>>>> it can only illustrate one aspect of the target. In this case > >> it is > >> >>>>>>>>> simply > >> >>>>>>>>>> saying that a quantity of water is just thousands H2O > >> molecules, and > >> >>>>>>>>>> nothing else. No addition is required to manifest all the > >> properties of > >> >>>>>>>>>> water. > >> >>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>> You would have to be a chemist to know the forces that bind > >> the H and > >> >>>>>>>>> OH > >> >>>>>>>>>> together and how they can be separated, H containing a > >>positive > >> charge > >> >>>>>>>>> and > >> >>>>>>>>>> OH containing a negative charge - a good old > >>positive/negative > >> >>>>>>>>>> contradiction. All chemicals with the H ion are acids and all > >> chemicals > >> >>>>>>>>>> with the OH ion are alkali, but water is both acid and base > >>and > >> >>>>>>> therefore > >> >>>>>>>>>> neither. *If you want* the water molecule is a tangle of > >> contradictions > >> >>>>>>>>> and > >> >>>>>>>>>> transformations, along with Carbon, the foundation of the > >> chemistry of > >> >>>>>>>>>> life. :) > >> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >> >>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> >>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >> >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> >>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Good question, Mike! What you're pointing out is that > >>LSV's > >> own > >> >>>>>>>>>> example doesn't quite do justice to his analysis in T&L. > >>Water > >> is not > >> >>>>>>> a > >> >>>>>>>>>> dynamic system: once hydrogen bonds with oxygen the process > >> stops: > >> >>>>>>> water > >> >>>>>>>>> is > >> >>>>>>>>>> a stable molecule. He should have picked an example in which > >>an > >> >>>>>>> internal > >> >>>>>>>>>> tension or clash of some kind provides a continual motor for > >> change. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> In somewhat the same way, I'm trying to figure out how a > >> triangle is > >> >>>>>>>>>> dynamic. It's one of the most stable geometric shapes. :) > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Martin > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:26 PM, mike cole > >> wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin. What is the contradiction between hydrogen and > >> oxygen such > >> >>>>>>>>>> that two > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen give > >>rise > >> to > >> >>>>>>> water > >> >>>>>>>>>> with > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> its distinctive qualities? Knowing that should help people > >> to rise > >> >>>>>>> to > >> >>>>>>>>>> the > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> concrete for their own cases. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 6:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > >> >>>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Well, if it works for you, Helena..! :) > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Clearly Yrjo does claim that the triangle represents a > >> dynamic > >> >>>>>>>>> system > >> >>>>>>>>>> with > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> contradictions. I'm still reading the chapter that Mike > >> linked to, > >> >>>>>>>>>> and I > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> already some questions. But I'll wait until I read it all > >> before > >> >>>>>>>>>> posting. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 6:10 PM, Helena Worthen < > >> >>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On the contrary. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To me, that very affordance is one of the great things > >> about > >> >>>>>>>>> activity > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory and the activity system as a unit of analysis. A > >> very simple > >> >>>>>>>>>> example > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is that if you change something in the > >> norms/customs/laws/history > >> >>>>>>>>>> corner of > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the triangle (like win a court case that gives you a > >> stronger > >> >>>>>>>>> footing > >> >>>>>>>>>> in > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> bargaining), then your tools also change. Another: if by > >> bringing > >> >>>>>>>>> new > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> members into the community (the base of the triangle) out > >> of which > >> >>>>>>>>>> division > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of labor raises the subjects, you may find yourself with > >>a > >> >>>>>>>>> leadership > >> >>>>>>>>>> team > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that is not all white, or not all primarily > >> English-speaking, which > >> >>>>>>>>>> in turn > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> will change what tools/resources you have and may, if > >> you're lucky > >> >>>>>>>>> and > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> quick, change your history. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And what's neat about this way of thinking is that it > >> implies > >> >>>>>>>>> that, > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> once one understands the relationships among the > >> components, one > >> >>>>>>> can > >> >>>>>>>>>> bring > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about changes in one component in the totality by acting > >>on > >> >>>>>>>>> *another* > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> component of the totality. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The activity system triangle does not suggest to me > >>this > >> type of > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> relationship among components. Instead, it seems to > >> represent > >> >>>>>>>>>> elements that > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are only accidentally brought together. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Martin John Packer < > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Seems to me the problem in many research projects is > >> that the > >> >>>>>>>>>> question > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not formulated in an appropriate way. LSV was > >>exploring > >> a method > >> >>>>>>>>> of > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> analysis that seeks to understand the relationship among > >> components > >> >>>>>>>>>> in a > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> complex totality. Not the causal influence of one factor > >>on > >> >>>>>>> another, > >> >>>>>>>>>> which > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is often how students frame their research interest. And > >> this means > >> >>>>>>>>>> that > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the unit of analysis has to represent, exemplify, this > >> >>>>>>> relationship. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Martin > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 1:31 PM, Helena Worthen < > >> >>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As someone who uses the concept of "unit of analysis" > >> in a very > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> down-to-earth, quick and dirty, applied way to shape > >> collective > >> >>>>>>>>>> responses > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a crisis in a labor and employment relationships > >>(like, > >> when a > >> >>>>>>>>> rule > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> changes creates difficulties for workers), I would agree > >> with Andy: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of > >>analysis > >> is an > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following a > >> template, > >> >>>>>>>>>> it is > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, the > >> leap. It > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually comes > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your > >> research using > >> >>>>>>>>>> some > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> other > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> First comes the story, the details, the experiences. > >>The > >> >>>>>>>>> question > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lying behind the telling of the stories is, "What are we > >> going to > >> >>>>>>>>>> do?" The > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis gets defined by the purpose we are > >>trying > >> to > >> >>>>>>>>>> accomplish. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Are we trying to get the employer to back off > >>temporarily? > >> Are we > >> >>>>>>>>>> trying > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> get the rule changed? Example: In a big hospital system > >>in > >> >>>>>>> Chicago, > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> clerical workers were no longer allowed to leave an "I'm > >> going to > >> >>>>>>> be > >> >>>>>>>>>> late > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to work today" or "I have to stay home with my sick kid > >> today and > >> >>>>>>>>>> will miss > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> work" message on the answering machines of their > >> supervisors. We're > >> >>>>>>>>>> talking > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about a workforce with hundreds of employees, most of > >>them > >> middle > >> >>>>>>>>> aged > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> minority women -- with grandchildren and extended > >>families > >> to be > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> responsible for. Not being allowed to leave a message > >>on a > >> >>>>>>> machine, > >> >>>>>>>>>> but > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> being required to actually speak to a supervisor in > >>person > >> who > >> >>>>>>> would > >> >>>>>>>>>> then > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> keep a record of the call, was a problem because > >> supervisors were > >> >>>>>>>>>> often > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> away from their desks and the whole phone system was > >> unreliable. > >> >>>>>>>>>> Also, a > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lot of workers didn't have cell phones at the time this > >>was > >> >>>>>>>>> happening > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> (2004) and pay phones are few and far between, so if > >> someone it out > >> >>>>>>>>>> buying > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> more asthma inhalers for a grandkid, making a phone call > >>is > >> not > >> >>>>>>>>> easy. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, exactly what is the purpose that we're trying to > >> >>>>>>> accomplish, > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> here? To repeal the rule? To fix the phone system? To > >> educate > >> >>>>>>>>>> members of > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the union and other others about how to respond > >> collectively to > >> >>>>>>>>>> something > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that only affects some of them? To make a profound > >>change in > >> >>>>>>> society > >> >>>>>>>>>> so > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that middle-aged women are not the primary caretakers of > >>an > >> >>>>>>> extended > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> family? Pick one. Once you've picked one (hopefully, one > >> that you > >> >>>>>>>>> can > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> carry out) you can define the unit of analysis and then > >> reviewing > >> >>>>>>>>> the > >> >>>>>>>>>> whole > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Engestrom triangle and evaluating your strategy becomes, > >>as > >> Andy > >> >>>>>>>>>> says, a > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> matter of solving puzzles. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> From the employer point of view, asking workers to > >> actually > >> >>>>>>>>>> speak to > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a live supervisor makes a certain sense. That's why we > >>talk > >> about > >> >>>>>>>>>> activity > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> system(s), not just one activity system. But they are > >>often > >> in > >> >>>>>>>>>> conflict > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with each other, which adds to the drama. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the data in your study being gathered with some > >> purpose in > >> >>>>>>>>>> mind? > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is the purpose the purpose of the children, the purpose > >>of > >> the > >> >>>>>>>>> class, > >> >>>>>>>>>> or > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the purpose of the PhdD program? To me, what would be > >>most > >> >>>>>>>>>> interesting > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be a comparison between the unit of analysis > >> (purposes of > >> >>>>>>>>>> children) > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and unit of analysis (purpose of classroom). I'll bet > >> they're not > >> >>>>>>>>>> identical. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Helena Worthen > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Oct 12, 2014, at 10:20 AM, Katerina Plakitsi > >>wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This problem of the ' unit of analysis' is my > >>concern > >> too. I > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> supervise > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> three PHD students on Science Education in a CHAT > >> context. Two > >> >>>>>>>>> of > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> them on > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> early childhood science education and one on primary > >> science. > >> >>>>>>>>>> They > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> have > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> collected log files, children discourses consisted > >>of > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific justifications, accepted rules, and > >>forms of > >> >>>>>>>>> division > >> >>>>>>>>>> of > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> labor. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They have collected children narratives, and > >>drawings. > >> When > >> >>>>>>>>> they > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> decided to > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analyze their data they follow different paths into > >> CHAT > >> >>>>>>>>> context > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mainly > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modeling them using Engestrom's triangle. They still > >> doubt > >> >>>>>>>>> about > >> >>>>>>>>>> the > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> " unit > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of analysis". > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> St?? ????a??, 12 ??t?????? 2014, ? ???st?? Andy > >> Blunden < > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ???a?e: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie, picking up on your concern about units of > >> analysis, it > >> >>>>>>>>>> was > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> one of > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the points I mentioned in my "report" from ISCAR, > >> that this > >> >>>>>>>>>> concept > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> was > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> almost lost to us. A phrase I heard a lot, and > >>which > >> was new > >> >>>>>>>>> for > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> me, was > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "unit to be analysed." If anyone knows the origin > >>of > >> this > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression, I'd > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be interested in hearing. It seemed to me that > >>what it > >> >>>>>>>>> referred > >> >>>>>>>>>> to > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> was a > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "closed system" for analysis, that is, abandoning > >>CHAT > >> >>>>>>>>>> methodology > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> whilst > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keeping the word. If I am mistaken about this, > >>please > >> let me > >> >>>>>>>>>> know. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that discovering a unit of > >> analysis is an > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *insight*. It > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not something that can be achieved by following > >>a > >> >>>>>>> template, > >> >>>>>>>>>> it > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakthrough in your research into some problem, > >>the > >> leap. It > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually comes > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *after* you've collected all the data for your > >> research using > >> >>>>>>>>>> some > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> other > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unit of analysis. In Kuhn's terms, discovery of the > >> unit is > >> >>>>>>>>> the > >> >>>>>>>>>> new > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paradigm, after which it is just a matter of > >>solving > >> puzzles. > >> >>>>>>>>>> So for > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> graduate students to use the concept of unit in > >>their > >> >>>>>>>>> research, > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> often > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> depends on the wisdom of teh direction they get > >>from > >> their > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> supervisor. I > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know how many PhD students I've met who have > >> got to > >> >>>>>>> this > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> point in > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their thesis and discover that the data they have > >>is > >> not the > >> >>>>>>>>>> data > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> they now > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know they need. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katherine Wester Neal wrote: > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I like Holli's plan to commit some time to reading > >> the two > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles. But, > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as usual, I don't know that I'll have much to > >> contribute in > >> >>>>>>>>>> posts. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> usually get deep in thinking about the posts and > >> don't > >> >>>>>>> follow > >> >>>>>>>>>> that > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> through > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to write something. The writing is much harder, > >>and > >> I am > >> >>>>>>>>>> usually > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> just > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying to keep up with reading! > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For me, the thread has been fascinating, probably > >> because > >> >>>>>>> I'm > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> interested > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in different units of analysis, what they might be > >> used for, > >> >>>>>>>>>> and > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> how they > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fit together with theory and conducting research. > >> What are > >> >>>>>>>>>> people > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with units of analysis and why? Or why aren't > >>units > >> of > >> >>>>>>>>> analysis > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> being used? > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If anyone wants to write more in that direction, > >>I'd > >> be very > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> interested to > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> read, and I'll try to respond, although the > >> questions might > >> >>>>>>>>> be > >> >>>>>>>>>> as > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> basic as > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lastly, Andy has basically been articulating my > >> thoughts (in > >> >>>>>>>>> a > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> much more > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eloquent way than I would) about action as a unit > >>of > >> >>>>>>>>> analysis. > >> >>>>>>>>>> In > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike's > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example about driving and thinking and writing, > >>I'd > >> add that > >> >>>>>>>>>> the > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> action is > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mediated. Together with sociocultural and > >>historical > >> factors > >> >>>>>>>>>> that > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced those actions (and which, as has been > >> said here > >> >>>>>>>>>> before, > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> often difficult to get a look at), the actions > >> create a > >> >>>>>>>>>> picture of > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> much > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more than just Mike's behavior. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katie Wester-Neal > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Georgia > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> ............................................................ > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associate Professor of Science Education > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> School of Education > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University of Ioannina > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ioannina > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Greece > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > >> science with > >> >>>>>>>>> an > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> -- > >> >>>>>>>>> *Patrick Jaki* > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* > >> >>>>>>>>> ________________________________ > >> >>>>>>>>> [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > >> >>>>>>>>> http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> This email and any files with it are confidential and intended > >> solely > >> >>>>>>> for > >> >>>>>>>>> the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are > >>not > >> the > >> >>>>>>>>> intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of > >>the > >> >>>>>>>>> information contained is strictly prohibited and you should > >>not > >> rely on > >> >>>>>>> it. > >> >>>>>>>>> If you have received this email in error please let the sender > >> know > >> >>>>>>>>> immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails > >> are not > >> >>>>>>>>> necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth > >>University > >> >>>>>>> accepts > >> >>>>>>>>> no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to > >> scan > >> >>>>>>> emails > >> >>>>>>>>> and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept > >> >>>>>>> responsibility > >> >>>>>>>>> for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email > >>or > >> its > >> >>>>>>>>> attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless > >> >>>>>>> accompanied > >> >>>>>>>>> by an official order form. > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>> -- > >> >>>>>>>> *Robyn Babaeff* > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> -- > >> >>>>>> *Robyn Babaeff* > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >> > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > >> > >> > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Oct 17 11:43:14 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 18:43:14 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> Mike, Am I reading correctly this extract that you have highlighted ? ANL says that LSV saw verbal communication occurring under conditions of activity, whereas ANL himself proposes that activity occurs under conditions of language and communication. Put this way, both formulations seem incorrect. First, speech is a form of activity; second, (nonverbal) activity can circumscribe speech, and speech can circumscribe activity. That is to say, there is a relation of mutuality between the two. What am I missing? Martin On Oct 17, 2014, at 12:58 PM, mike cole wrote: > Thus, Vygotsky?s proposition that consciousness is a product of the child?s > verbal communication under conditions of his activity and in relation to > the material reality that surrounds him must be turned around: the > consciousness of a child is a product of his human activity in relation to > objective reality, taking place under conditions of language and under > conditions of verbal communication. From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Oct 17 13:09:27 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 13:09:27 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: I would go for mutual constitution, Martin. Is speech a form of action or a form of activity? A lot of Russian arguments on that score that I find difficult to sort out. Mike (Who is certainly missing a lot!) On Friday, October 17, 2014, Martin John Packer wrote: > Mike, > > Am I reading correctly this extract that you have highlighted ? ANL says > that LSV saw verbal communication occurring under conditions of activity, > whereas ANL himself proposes that activity occurs under conditions of > language and communication. Put this way, both formulations seem incorrect. > First, speech is a form of activity; second, (nonverbal) activity can > circumscribe speech, and speech can circumscribe activity. That is to say, > there is a relation of mutuality between the two. What am I missing? > > Martin > > On Oct 17, 2014, at 12:58 PM, mike cole > > wrote: > > > Thus, Vygotsky?s proposition that consciousness is a product of the > child?s > > verbal communication under conditions of his activity and in relation to > > the material reality that surrounds him must be turned around: the > > consciousness of a child is a product of his human activity in relation > to > > objective reality, taking place under conditions of language and under > > conditions of verbal communication. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri Oct 17 13:09:57 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 21:09:57 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: On 17 October 2014 19:43, Martin John Packer wrote: > Mike, > > Am I reading correctly this extract that you have highlighted ? ANL says > that LSV saw verbal communication occurring under conditions of activity, > whereas ANL himself proposes that activity occurs under conditions of > language and communication. Put this way, both formulations seem incorrect. > First, speech is a form of activity; second, (nonverbal) activity can > circumscribe speech, and speech can circumscribe activity. That is to say, > there is a relation of mutuality between the two. > What am I missing? > That ANL is using activity in a special sense and not simply as a synonym for behaviour. Hence "speech is a form of activity" does not fit in this sense. You have to think about what activity means here to make sense of the difference. ANL says that experience is a 2nd order psychological fact (because the feeling-experience arising out of activity is contingent upon it). The half-paragraph that Mike repeats is also one that I highlighted in my read-through. One has to think logically to see the difference. Specifically, ANL is pointing to drivers and necessary conditions. He is saying that LSV considers language-ing the driver for consciousness, whereas ANL points to activity. This to my reading and thinking is justifiably presented as a decisive difference. It is the same as stating that the deed precedes the word, and that the genetic precursor is different to products derived from it. Is it me, or there a league of clumsy posting being formed to promote more traffic? Best, Huw > > Martin > > On Oct 17, 2014, at 12:58 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Thus, Vygotsky?s proposition that consciousness is a product of the > child?s > > verbal communication under conditions of his activity and in relation to > > the material reality that surrounds him must be turned around: the > > consciousness of a child is a product of his human activity in relation > to > > objective reality, taking place under conditions of language and under > > conditions of verbal communication. > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Oct 17 14:08:41 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 21:08:41 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <7E9C56F5-1522-4EC3-BAC2-8009AC0977A4@uniandes.edu.co> Yes, some time back we formed the League of Clumsy Posters. Didn't you receive the invitation? Check out our page on Facebook! Martin On Oct 17, 2014, at 3:09 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Is it me, or there a league of clumsy posting being formed to promote more > traffic? > > Best, > Huw From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Oct 17 14:11:49 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 21:11:49 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> I see a difference, Huw. I just don't see the difference that the difference makes. And ANL cannot be correct: for one thing, in various texts LSV writes about the character of consciousness in preverbal children, and of how consciousness is transformed by the acquisition of language. This would hardly be possible if language were a necessary condition for consciousness. Martin On Oct 17, 2014, at 3:09 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Specifically, ANL is pointing to drivers and necessary conditions. He is > saying that LSV considers language-ing the driver for consciousness, > whereas ANL points to activity. This to my reading and thinking is > justifiably presented as a decisive difference. It is the same as stating > that the deed precedes the word, and that the genetic precursor is > different to products derived from it. > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri Oct 17 14:23:12 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 22:23:12 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <7E9C56F5-1522-4EC3-BAC2-8009AC0977A4@uniandes.edu.co> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <7E9C56F5-1522-4EC3-BAC2-8009AC0977A4@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: On 17 October 2014 22:08, Martin John Packer wrote: > Yes, some time back we formed the League of Clumsy Posters. Didn't you > receive the invitation? Check out our page on Facebook! > It's a Deweyian conspiracy to prompt others to think. :) > Martin > > On Oct 17, 2014, at 3:09 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > Is it me, or there a league of clumsy posting being formed to promote > more > > traffic? > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri Oct 17 14:29:58 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 22:29:58 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: On 17 October 2014 22:11, Martin John Packer wrote: > I see a difference, Huw. I just don't see the difference that the > difference makes. And ANL cannot be correct: for one thing, in various > texts LSV writes about the character of consciousness in preverbal > children, and of how consciousness is transformed by the acquisition of > language. This would hardly be possible if language were a necessary > condition for consciousness. > Do you mean unnecessary, Martin? This isn't the statement. Best, Huw > > Martin > > On Oct 17, 2014, at 3:09 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > Specifically, ANL is pointing to drivers and necessary conditions. He is > > saying that LSV considers language-ing the driver for consciousness, > > whereas ANL points to activity. This to my reading and thinking is > > justifiably presented as a decisive difference. It is the same as > stating > > that the deed precedes the word, and that the genetic precursor is > > different to products derived from it. > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Oct 17 14:39:00 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 21:39:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> Eh? No, I mean "necessary." What isn't what statement? No more clumsy posting, please, Huw :) Martin On Oct 17, 2014, at 4:29 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> > Do you mean unnecessary, Martin? This isn't the statement. > > Best, > Huw > > >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 17, 2014, at 3:09 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >>> Specifically, ANL is pointing to drivers and necessary conditions. He is >>> saying that LSV considers language-ing the driver for consciousness, >>> whereas ANL points to activity. This to my reading and thinking is >>> justifiably presented as a decisive difference. It is the same as >> stating >>> that the deed precedes the word, and that the genetic precursor is >>> different to products derived from it. >>> >> >> >> From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri Oct 17 15:24:02 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 23:24:02 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: The ANL's translation was: "The child, therefore, appears before us primarily as a subject of the mate- rial process of life. In the process of his development, he encounters ready- made, historically established conditions that determine his existence as a social being. Among these conditions, he encounters the fact of language, which is the medium of the ?spiritual relations? established with it and con- stitutes an essential condition for the development of his social and intellec- tual consciousness. Thus, Vygotsky?s proposition that consciousness is a product of the child?s verbal communication under conditions of his activity and in relation to the material reality that surrounds him must be turned around: the consciousness of a child is a product of his human activity in relation to objective reality, taking place *under conditions of language* and under conditions of verbal communication." You (Martin) wrote: > I see a difference, Huw. I just don't see the difference that the > difference makes. And ANL cannot be correct: for one thing, in various > texts LSV writes about the character of consciousness in preverbal > children, and of how consciousness is transformed by the acquisition of > language. This would hardly be possible if language were a necessary > condition for consciousness. So you're saying: That transformation of consciousness would not be possible if language were a necessary condition for consciousness. ANL is asserting that LSV is not being coherent in this paper with respect to materialist formulations. He is saying that it is weak. He is also saying that the word is not the source of consciousness. So what are saying that ANL cannot be right about? Best, Huw From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Oct 17 15:44:19 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 07:44:19 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Attached is some small proof that Vygotsky believes in consciousness before language: a summarizing endnote that I wrote for the lecture immediately after the Problem of the Environment, which is called "The General Laws of Psychological Development in the Child". Easily half the lecture is devoted to consciousness before language. So ANL is under a lot of pressure. But I find it really hard to believe that his criticism is some kind of subterfuge, that actually Leontiev wanted to preserve Vygotsky's ideas in some form and saw that the only way he could do that is by criticizing them. There are always ways of handling pressure that do not involve murdering the work of your dead and dying colleagues and friends. After the massacres in Beijing and Chengdu in 1989, we were all herded into little rooms every Wednesday afternoon to "ren-ding fang-geming bao-luan de zhenxiang", that is, to "correctly characterize the counter-revolutionary turmoil" in Beijing. One of my graduate students, a young doctor, would sit in the corner with her face in a newspaper and her big beautiful deer-like eyes firmly shut. Once, after repeated demands from our party commissar (who had himself supported the demonstrations before the shooting started), she opened her suddenly rather baleful eyes and replied, "Didn't you correctly characterize it? Counter-revolutionary means counter-revoutionary, la!" >From the way she added "la" in Cantonese dialect, we all knew exactly what she meant. But nobody laughed. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 18 October 2014 06:39, Martin John Packer wrote: > Eh? No, I mean "necessary." What isn't what statement? > > No more clumsy posting, please, Huw > > :) > > Martin > > On Oct 17, 2014, at 4:29 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >>> >> Do you mean unnecessary, Martin? This isn't the statement. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 17, 2014, at 3:09 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> >>>> Specifically, ANL is pointing to drivers and necessary conditions. He is >>>> saying that LSV considers language-ing the driver for consciousness, >>>> whereas ANL points to activity. This to my reading and thinking is >>>> justifiably presented as a decisive difference. It is the same as >>> stating >>>> that the deed precedes the word, and that the genetic precursor is >>>> different to products derived from it. >>>> >>> >>> >>> > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Summarizing Endnote 5.doc Type: application/msword Size: 43008 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141018/8aeb31c8/attachment.doc From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Oct 17 16:13:21 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 23:13:21 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> Thanks for the clarification, Huw. I am pointing out that in his texts LSV writes of consciousness prior to language (that is, in the preverbal infant), and of changes in consciousness when the child starts to speak. Presumably he would not have written such things if he believed that language is a necessary condition (ontogenetically) for consciousness. If ANL attributed such a view to LSV, he was incorrect, it seems to me. Martin On Oct 17, 2014, at 5:24 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > The ANL's translation was: > > "The child, therefore, appears before us primarily as a subject of the > mate- rial process of life. In the process of his development, he > encounters ready- made, historically established conditions that determine > his existence as a social being. Among these conditions, he encounters the > fact of language, which is the medium of the ?spiritual relations? > established with it and con- stitutes an essential condition for the > development of his social and intellec- tual consciousness. Thus, > Vygotsky?s proposition that consciousness is a product of the child?s > verbal communication under conditions of his activity and in relation to > the material reality that surrounds him must be turned around: the > consciousness of a child is a product of his human activity in relation to > objective reality, taking place *under conditions of language* and under > conditions of verbal communication." > > You (Martin) wrote: > >> I see a difference, Huw. I just don't see the difference that the >> difference makes. And ANL cannot be correct: for one thing, in various >> texts LSV writes about the character of consciousness in preverbal >> children, and of how consciousness is transformed by the acquisition of >> language. This would hardly be possible if language were a necessary >> condition for consciousness. > > > So you're saying: That transformation of consciousness would not be > possible if language were a necessary condition for consciousness. > > ANL is asserting that LSV is not being coherent in this paper with respect > to materialist formulations. He is saying that it is weak. He is also > saying that the word is not the source of consciousness. So what are > saying that ANL cannot be right about? > > Best, > Huw From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Oct 17 17:13:56 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 00:13:56 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <49B78F35-D6D9-4D67-B328-9517476A7B43@uniandes.edu.co> Very interesting, David! I don't know this lecture. Martin On Oct 17, 2014, at 5:44 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Attached is some small proof that Vygotsky believes in consciousness > before language: a summarizing endnote that I wrote for the lecture > immediately after the Problem of the Environment, which is called "The > General Laws of Psychological Development in the Child". Easily half > the lecture is devoted to consciousness before language. > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri Oct 17 17:19:07 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 01:19:07 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Neither paper are particularly clear throughout, but they do make some salient verifiable points that one can sift out from whatever political maelstroms they were written from within. LSV says that the forms of "activity" (I assume he has no special meaning of activity here) that we develop originate from our environment. LSV says that the "emotional experience [*perezhivanie*] arising from any situation or from any aspect of his environment, determines what kind of influence this situation or this environment will have on the child". ANL says that experience is secondary to activity (activity with a special meaning). ANL says that activity is the source of consciousness. LSV simply said there is a psychological and sociological "form". The means by which LSV relates these forms is through experience. He says that "the essential factors which explain the influence of environment on the psychological development of children, and on the development of their conscious personalities, are made up of their emotional experiences". Hence ANL is right to impute (metaphysical) idealistic tendencies to this paper of LSV's. Because to base the development on subjective emotional experience is idealistic. ANL, conversely, refers to the relativity of experience upon activity. It does not help that LSV refers to his norms as ideals and that all of the examples he provides are about speech communication. It is ripe for misinterpretation as an idealistic paper. Best, Huw On 18 October 2014 00:13, Martin John Packer wrote: > Thanks for the clarification, Huw. > > I am pointing out that in his texts LSV writes of consciousness prior to > language (that is, in the preverbal infant), and of changes in > consciousness when the child starts to speak. Presumably he would not have > written such things if he believed that language is a necessary condition > (ontogenetically) for consciousness. If ANL attributed such a view to LSV, > he was incorrect, it seems to me. > > Martin > > On Oct 17, 2014, at 5:24 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > The ANL's translation was: > > > > "The child, therefore, appears before us primarily as a subject of the > > mate- rial process of life. In the process of his development, he > > encounters ready- made, historically established conditions that > determine > > his existence as a social being. Among these conditions, he encounters > the > > fact of language, which is the medium of the ?spiritual relations? > > established with it and con- stitutes an essential condition for the > > development of his social and intellec- tual consciousness. Thus, > > Vygotsky?s proposition that consciousness is a product of the child?s > > verbal communication under conditions of his activity and in relation to > > the material reality that surrounds him must be turned around: the > > consciousness of a child is a product of his human activity in relation > to > > objective reality, taking place *under conditions of language* and under > > conditions of verbal communication." > > > > You (Martin) wrote: > > > >> I see a difference, Huw. I just don't see the difference that the > >> difference makes. And ANL cannot be correct: for one thing, in various > >> texts LSV writes about the character of consciousness in preverbal > >> children, and of how consciousness is transformed by the acquisition of > >> language. This would hardly be possible if language were a necessary > >> condition for consciousness. > > > > > > So you're saying: That transformation of consciousness would not be > > possible if language were a necessary condition for consciousness. > > > > ANL is asserting that LSV is not being coherent in this paper with > respect > > to materialist formulations. He is saying that it is weak. He is also > > saying that the word is not the source of consciousness. So what are > > saying that ANL cannot be right about? > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Oct 17 17:22:20 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 17:22:20 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: David-- Since you have the Russian text, could you send a note with the Russian for this passage?: *Among these conditions, he encounters the fact of language, which is the medium of the ?spiritual relations? established with it and constitutes an essential condition for the development of his social and intellectual consciousness. * Its as if culture is being turned into spirit and then called idealism and used as a very material hammer. mike On Fri, Oct 17, 2014 at 4:13 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Thanks for the clarification, Huw. > > I am pointing out that in his texts LSV writes of consciousness prior to > language (that is, in the preverbal infant), and of changes in > consciousness when the child starts to speak. Presumably he would not have > written such things if he believed that language is a necessary condition > (ontogenetically) for consciousness. If ANL attributed such a view to LSV, > he was incorrect, it seems to me. > > Martin > > On Oct 17, 2014, at 5:24 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > The ANL's translation was: > > > > "The child, therefore, appears before us primarily as a subject of the > > mate- rial process of life. In the process of his development, he > > encounters ready- made, historically established conditions that > determine > > his existence as a social being. Among these conditions, he encounters > the > > fact of language, which is the medium of the ?spiritual relations? > > established with it and con- stitutes an essential condition for the > > development of his social and intellec- tual consciousness. Thus, > > Vygotsky?s proposition that consciousness is a product of the child?s > > verbal communication under conditions of his activity and in relation to > > the material reality that surrounds him must be turned around: the > > consciousness of a child is a product of his human activity in relation > to > > objective reality, taking place *under conditions of language* and under > > conditions of verbal communication." > > > > You (Martin) wrote: > > > >> I see a difference, Huw. I just don't see the difference that the > >> difference makes. And ANL cannot be correct: for one thing, in various > >> texts LSV writes about the character of consciousness in preverbal > >> children, and of how consciousness is transformed by the acquisition of > >> language. This would hardly be possible if language were a necessary > >> condition for consciousness. > > > > > > So you're saying: That transformation of consciousness would not be > > possible if language were a necessary condition for consciousness. > > > > ANL is asserting that LSV is not being coherent in this paper with > respect > > to materialist formulations. He is saying that it is weak. He is also > > saying that the word is not the source of consciousness. So what are > > saying that ANL cannot be right about? > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Oct 17 17:40:36 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 00:40:36 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Who says that emotional experience is "subjective," Huw? LSV writes throughout The Problem of the Environment that perezhivanie is the child's relationship to social reality. In my book that makes it personal, not subjective. The word "subjective" doesn't occur once in the text. It is certainly a common assumption in today's dualistic psychology that experience is subjective, a mental state.That would indeed be idealist. But since LSV is avoiding dualism... Martin On Oct 17, 2014, at 7:19 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Because to base the development on subjective emotional > experience is idealistic. From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri Oct 17 17:41:11 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 01:41:11 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: On 18 October 2014 00:13, Martin John Packer wrote: > Thanks for the clarification, Huw. > > I am pointing out that in his texts LSV writes of consciousness prior to > language (that is, in the preverbal infant), and of changes in > consciousness when the child starts to speak. Presumably he would not have > written such things if he believed that language is a necessary condition > (ontogenetically) for consciousness. If ANL attributed such a view to LSV, > he was incorrect, it seems to me. > ANL says that LSV makes inconsistent propositions. If ANL is saying LSV says both at different times, then he isn't incorrect by your measure. "L.S. Vygotsky?s studies of the environment are made up of a number of sepa- rate propositions that have been connected to a unified system, but are far from equivalent, and that we must subject to careful critical analysis before evaluating them as a whole." Best, Huw > > Martin > > On Oct 17, 2014, at 5:24 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > The ANL's translation was: > > > > "The child, therefore, appears before us primarily as a subject of the > > mate- rial process of life. In the process of his development, he > > encounters ready- made, historically established conditions that > determine > > his existence as a social being. Among these conditions, he encounters > the > > fact of language, which is the medium of the ?spiritual relations? > > established with it and con- stitutes an essential condition for the > > development of his social and intellec- tual consciousness. Thus, > > Vygotsky?s proposition that consciousness is a product of the child?s > > verbal communication under conditions of his activity and in relation to > > the material reality that surrounds him must be turned around: the > > consciousness of a child is a product of his human activity in relation > to > > objective reality, taking place *under conditions of language* and under > > conditions of verbal communication." > > > > You (Martin) wrote: > > > >> I see a difference, Huw. I just don't see the difference that the > >> difference makes. And ANL cannot be correct: for one thing, in various > >> texts LSV writes about the character of consciousness in preverbal > >> children, and of how consciousness is transformed by the acquisition of > >> language. This would hardly be possible if language were a necessary > >> condition for consciousness. > > > > > > So you're saying: That transformation of consciousness would not be > > possible if language were a necessary condition for consciousness. > > > > ANL is asserting that LSV is not being coherent in this paper with > respect > > to materialist formulations. He is saying that it is weak. He is also > > saying that the word is not the source of consciousness. So what are > > saying that ANL cannot be right about? > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > From ablunden@mira.net Fri Oct 17 17:48:22 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 11:48:22 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <5441B8D6.7070009@mira.net> No, LSV is quite right, Huw. You and I can go through the same sequence of events, but if, for example, the events really get under your skin, and perhaps due to past experiences, or to some sensitivity or another, it really shakes you up and causes you to dwell on the experience, work over it and reflect on it, then most likely you will make a personal development. If perhaps on other hand, maybe because of some prejudice I had, the same experience just went like water off a duck's back for me and I didn't care tuppence about the experience and just simply turned to next business, then I will not make a development. It is *only* the "subjective" side of experience and the *reflection* of "objective" relations/events that forms personal development. Only. And that is LSV's point. And can I just echo Martin and David's observation that consciousness before language was well-known and foundational to Vygotsky, and consequently consciousness other than language. And Julian and Mike's observation that "the ideal" lies ultimately in social practices, the doing-side of which give content and meaning to speech which speech would lack outside its being part of those activities. Vygotsky knew this, and this was why he introduced a range artifacts derived from the wider culture, as mediating elements, into social interaction. So ANL is going along with the still widely held prejudice that Vygotsky was *just* all about language. Not true. Andy https://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Huw Lloyd wrote: > .... > > Hence ANL is right to impute (metaphysical) idealistic tendencies to this > paper of LSV's. Because to base the development on subjective emotional > experience is idealistic. ANL, conversely, refers to the relativity of > experience upon activity. It does not help that LSV refers to his norms as > ideals and that all of the examples he provides are about speech > communication. It is ripe for misinterpretation as an idealistic paper. > > Best, > Huw > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri Oct 17 17:52:17 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 01:52:17 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: On 18 October 2014 01:40, Martin John Packer wrote: > Who says that emotional experience is "subjective," Huw? LSV writes > throughout The Problem of the Environment that perezhivanie is the child's > relationship to social reality. In my book that makes it personal, not > subjective. The word "subjective" doesn't occur once in the text. It is > certainly a common assumption in today's dualistic psychology that > experience is subjective, a mental state.That would indeed be idealist. > But since LSV is avoiding dualism... > True. But if you make experience the causal link between forms of social practice and psychological forms and you then locate experience within the individual (no matter how objective) you are on the same problematic path. If you state that experience and the environment are "one" and unmediated by anything else the person contributes AND you state that there is a single world you have a dualistic problem. Huw > Martin > > On Oct 17, 2014, at 7:19 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > Because to base the development on subjective emotional > > experience is idealistic. > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri Oct 17 18:10:03 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 02:10:03 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <5441B8D6.7070009@mira.net> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441B8D6.7070009@mira.net> Message-ID: On 18 October 2014 01:48, Andy Blunden wrote: > No, LSV is quite right, Huw. You and I can go through the same sequence of > events, but if, for example, the events really get under your skin, and > perhaps due to past experiences, or to some sensitivity or another, it > really shakes you up and causes you to dwell on the experience, work over > it and reflect on it, then most likely you will make a personal > development. If perhaps on other hand, maybe because of some prejudice I > had, the same experience just went like water off a duck's back for me and > I didn't care tuppence about the experience and just simply turned to next > business, then I will not make a development. > > But does ANL refute this? He is simply asserting that experience is derivative to activity, not that meaningful things don't follow from experience. > It is *only* the "subjective" side of experience and the *reflection* of > "objective" relations/events that forms personal development. Only. And > that is LSV's point. > And it is ANL's point that these experiences arise in activity. Note that LSV doesn't provide a medium for their formation, he simply refers to them as forms. > > And can I just echo Martin and David's observation that consciousness > before language was well-known and foundational to Vygotsky, and > consequently consciousness other than language. And Julian and Mike's > observation that "the ideal" lies ultimately in social practices, the > doing-side of which give content and meaning to speech which speech would > lack outside its being part of those activities. Vygotsky knew this, and > this was why he introduced a range artifacts derived from the wider > culture, as mediating elements, into social interaction. > > So ANL is going along with the still widely held prejudice that Vygotsky > was *just* all about language. Not true. > I would read these in terms of the opening paragraph ("propositions that have been connected to a unified system, but are far from equivalent") and then there is the politics of survival. Best, Huw > > Andy > https://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_ > Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> .... >> >> Hence ANL is right to impute (metaphysical) idealistic tendencies to this >> paper of LSV's. Because to base the development on subjective emotional >> experience is idealistic. ANL, conversely, refers to the relativity of >> experience upon activity. It does not help that LSV refers to his norms >> as >> ideals and that all of the examples he provides are about speech >> communication. It is ripe for misinterpretation as an idealistic paper. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> > > From ablunden@mira.net Fri Oct 17 18:14:42 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 12:14:42 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Doctoral Theses and autobiography Message-ID: <5441BF02.5090902@mira.net> Recently I read an interesting paper. By one Rumen Petrov, it is an autobiographical essay on doing his PhD. It was fascinating. In the course of this he says "many Doctoral theses are various forms of working through." Petrov is a Bulgarian Freudian with an interest in Vygotsky, so "working over" means catharsis, or perezhivanie. I thought this was a nice observation. Are all you PhD students going through this? Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From ablunden@mira.net Fri Oct 17 18:20:57 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 12:20:57 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441B8D6.7070009@mira.net> Message-ID: <5441C079.7060104@mira.net> Which only means that Vygotsky did not attempt to create a Social Theory, only a Psychology. But in creating a General Psychology, he left us a paradigm for the human sciences. ANL attempted to carry that through to create a Psychology which was equally a Social Theory, but in my view he was largely unsuccessful. But to have created a Psychology rather than a Theory of Everything does not make one an Idealist, just a specialist. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > On 18 October 2014 01:48, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > No, LSV is quite right, Huw. You and I can go through the same > sequence of events, but if, for example, the events really get > under your skin, and perhaps due to past experiences, or to some > sensitivity or another, it really shakes you up and causes you to > dwell on the experience, work over it and reflect on it, then most > likely you will make a personal development. If perhaps on other > hand, maybe because of some prejudice I had, the same experience > just went like water off a duck's back for me and I didn't care > tuppence about the experience and just simply turned to next > business, then I will not make a development. > > > But does ANL refute this? He is simply asserting that experience is > derivative to activity, not that meaningful things don't follow from > experience. > > > It is *only* the "subjective" side of experience and the > *reflection* of "objective" relations/events that forms personal > development. Only. And that is LSV's point. > > > And it is ANL's point that these experiences arise in activity. Note > that LSV doesn't provide a medium for their formation, he simply > refers to them as forms. > > > > And can I just echo Martin and David's observation that > consciousness before language was well-known and foundational to > Vygotsky, and consequently consciousness other than language. And > Julian and Mike's observation that "the ideal" lies ultimately in > social practices, the doing-side of which give content and meaning > to speech which speech would lack outside its being part of those > activities. Vygotsky knew this, and this was why he introduced a > range artifacts derived from the wider culture, as mediating > elements, into social interaction. > > So ANL is going along with the still widely held prejudice that > Vygotsky was *just* all about language. Not true. > > > I would read these in terms of the opening paragraph ("propositions > that have been connected to a unified system, but are far from > equivalent") and then there is the politics of survival. > > Best, > Huw > > > > Andy > https://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > .... > > Hence ANL is right to impute (metaphysical) idealistic > tendencies to this > paper of LSV's. Because to base the development on subjective > emotional > experience is idealistic. ANL, conversely, refers to the > relativity of > experience upon activity. It does not help that LSV refers to > his norms as > ideals and that all of the examples he provides are about speech > communication. It is ripe for misinterpretation as an > idealistic paper. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri Oct 17 18:23:18 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 02:23:18 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Doctoral Theses and autobiography In-Reply-To: <5441BF02.5090902@mira.net> References: <5441BF02.5090902@mira.net> Message-ID: If you're studying Vygotsky or any significant theory pertaining to the social sciences (in the UK), then you'll more like be fighting through. Because so much of PhD social science is streamlined through "qualitative" and "quantitative" "methods" that skirt anything troublesome like theory. Best, Huw On 18 October 2014 02:14, Andy Blunden wrote: > Recently I read an interesting paper. By one Rumen Petrov, it is an > autobiographical essay on doing his PhD. It was fascinating. > In the course of this he says "many Doctoral theses are various forms of > working through." Petrov is a Bulgarian Freudian with an interest in > Vygotsky, so "working over" means catharsis, or perezhivanie. > I thought this was a nice observation. > Are all you PhD students going through this? > Andy > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Fri Oct 17 18:26:39 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 01:26:39 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Doctoral Theses and autobiography In-Reply-To: <5441BF02.5090902@mira.net> References: <5441BF02.5090902@mira.net> Message-ID: <3A07B1D2-477B-4652-B025-E6BD4F06EA46@uniandes.edu.co> Andy, I think you probably didn't intend to post this to the whole list. But "working through" is a term in Freudian psychoanalysis. It is related to Freud's use of the ancient notion of "catharsis," but not identical. (Compare "abreaction.") Martin On Oct 17, 2014, at 8:14 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Recently I read an interesting paper. By one Rumen Petrov, it is an autobiographical essay on doing his PhD. It was fascinating. > In the course of this he says "many Doctoral theses are various forms of working through." Petrov is a Bulgarian Freudian with an interest in Vygotsky, so "working over" means catharsis, or perezhivanie. > I thought this was a nice observation. > Are all you PhD students going through this? > Andy > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > From ablunden@mira.net Fri Oct 17 18:32:20 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 12:32:20 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Doctoral Theses and autobiography In-Reply-To: <3A07B1D2-477B-4652-B025-E6BD4F06EA46@uniandes.edu.co> References: <5441BF02.5090902@mira.net> <3A07B1D2-477B-4652-B025-E6BD4F06EA46@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <5441C324.8020707@mira.net> No, I meant it for the whole list. Agreed "related but not identical." I know about these terms. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Andy, > > I think you probably didn't intend to post this to the whole list. But "working through" is a term in Freudian psychoanalysis. It is related to Freud's use of the ancient notion of "catharsis," but not identical. (Compare "abreaction.") > > > > > > > > Martin > > On Oct 17, 2014, at 8:14 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Recently I read an interesting paper. By one Rumen Petrov, it is an autobiographical essay on doing his PhD. It was fascinating. >> In the course of this he says "many Doctoral theses are various forms of working through." Petrov is a Bulgarian Freudian with an interest in Vygotsky, so "working over" means catharsis, or perezhivanie. >> I thought this was a nice observation. >> Are all you PhD students going through this? >> Andy >> -- >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri Oct 17 18:52:35 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 02:52:35 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <5441C079.7060104@mira.net> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441B8D6.7070009@mira.net> <5441C079.7060104@mira.net> Message-ID: On 18 October 2014 02:20, Andy Blunden wrote: > Which only means that Vygotsky did not attempt to create a Social Theory, > only a Psychology. > But in creating a General Psychology, he left us a paradigm for the human > sciences. ANL attempted to carry that through to create a Psychology which > was equally a Social Theory, but in my view he was largely unsuccessful. > But to have created a Psychology rather than a Theory of Everything does > not make one an Idealist, just a specialist. > > Does he state this aim somewhere? That might be interesting to look at. Best, Huw > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> >> >> On 18 October 2014 01:48, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> No, LSV is quite right, Huw. You and I can go through the same >> sequence of events, but if, for example, the events really get >> under your skin, and perhaps due to past experiences, or to some >> sensitivity or another, it really shakes you up and causes you to >> dwell on the experience, work over it and reflect on it, then most >> likely you will make a personal development. If perhaps on other >> hand, maybe because of some prejudice I had, the same experience >> just went like water off a duck's back for me and I didn't care >> tuppence about the experience and just simply turned to next >> business, then I will not make a development. >> >> >> But does ANL refute this? He is simply asserting that experience is >> derivative to activity, not that meaningful things don't follow from >> experience. >> >> It is *only* the "subjective" side of experience and the >> *reflection* of "objective" relations/events that forms personal >> development. Only. And that is LSV's point. >> >> >> And it is ANL's point that these experiences arise in activity. Note >> that LSV doesn't provide a medium for their formation, he simply refers to >> them as forms. >> >> >> And can I just echo Martin and David's observation that >> consciousness before language was well-known and foundational to >> Vygotsky, and consequently consciousness other than language. And >> Julian and Mike's observation that "the ideal" lies ultimately in >> social practices, the doing-side of which give content and meaning >> to speech which speech would lack outside its being part of those >> activities. Vygotsky knew this, and this was why he introduced a >> range artifacts derived from the wider culture, as mediating >> elements, into social interaction. >> >> So ANL is going along with the still widely held prejudice that >> Vygotsky was *just* all about language. Not true. >> >> >> I would read these in terms of the opening paragraph ("propositions that >> have been connected to a unified system, but are far from equivalent") and >> then there is the politics of survival. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> Andy >> https://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_ >> Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> .... >> >> Hence ANL is right to impute (metaphysical) idealistic >> tendencies to this >> paper of LSV's. Because to base the development on subjective >> emotional >> experience is idealistic. ANL, conversely, refers to the >> relativity of >> experience upon activity. It does not help that LSV refers to >> his norms as >> ideals and that all of the examples he provides are about speech >> communication. It is ripe for misinterpretation as an >> idealistic paper. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Fri Oct 17 18:56:42 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 12:56:42 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441B8D6.7070009@mira.net> <5441C079.7060104@mira.net> Message-ID: <5441C8DA.4090900@mira.net> He? ANL or LSV. LSV states his aim to create a General Psychology in "Historical Crisis" http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm ANL, I think the aim of a creating general theory of human activity was always meant to be interdisciplinary. Although for very good reasons it has only ever been taken up by Psychologists, I think it is very obviously interdisciplinary. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > On 18 October 2014 02:20, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > Which only means that Vygotsky did not attempt to create a Social > Theory, only a Psychology. > But in creating a General Psychology, he left us a paradigm for > the human sciences. ANL attempted to carry that through to create > a Psychology which was equally a Social Theory, but in my view he > was largely unsuccessful. But to have created a Psychology rather > than a Theory of Everything does not make one an Idealist, just a > specialist. > > > Does he state this aim somewhere? That might be interesting to look at. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > On 18 October 2014 01:48, Andy Blunden >> wrote: > > No, LSV is quite right, Huw. You and I can go through the same > sequence of events, but if, for example, the events really get > under your skin, and perhaps due to past experiences, or > to some > sensitivity or another, it really shakes you up and causes > you to > dwell on the experience, work over it and reflect on it, > then most > likely you will make a personal development. If perhaps on > other > hand, maybe because of some prejudice I had, the same > experience > just went like water off a duck's back for me and I didn't > care > tuppence about the experience and just simply turned to next > business, then I will not make a development. > > > But does ANL refute this? He is simply asserting that > experience is derivative to activity, not that meaningful > things don't follow from experience. > > It is *only* the "subjective" side of experience and the > *reflection* of "objective" relations/events that forms > personal > development. Only. And that is LSV's point. > > > And it is ANL's point that these experiences arise in > activity. Note that LSV doesn't provide a medium for their > formation, he simply refers to them as forms. > > > And can I just echo Martin and David's observation that > consciousness before language was well-known and > foundational to > Vygotsky, and consequently consciousness other than > language. And > Julian and Mike's observation that "the ideal" lies > ultimately in > social practices, the doing-side of which give content and > meaning > to speech which speech would lack outside its being part > of those > activities. Vygotsky knew this, and this was why he > introduced a > range artifacts derived from the wider culture, as mediating > elements, into social interaction. > > So ANL is going along with the still widely held prejudice > that > Vygotsky was *just* all about language. Not true. > > > I would read these in terms of the opening paragraph > ("propositions that have been connected to a unified system, > but are far from equivalent") and then there is the politics > of survival. > > Best, > Huw > > > Andy > > https://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > .... > > Hence ANL is right to impute (metaphysical) idealistic > tendencies to this > paper of LSV's. Because to base the development on > subjective > emotional > experience is idealistic. ANL, conversely, refers to the > relativity of > experience upon activity. It does not help that LSV > refers to > his norms as > ideals and that all of the examples he provides are > about speech > communication. It is ripe for misinterpretation as an > idealistic paper. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Fri Oct 17 19:05:36 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 13:05:36 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <5441C8DA.4090900@mira.net> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441B8D6.7070009@mira.net> <5441C079.7060104@mira.net> <5441C8DA.4090900@mira.net> Message-ID: <5441CAF0.8090406@mira.net> Also https://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri01.htm A ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Andy Blunden wrote: > He? ANL or LSV. > LSV states his aim to create a General Psychology in "Historical Crisis" > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm > > ANL, I think the aim of a creating general theory of human activity > was always meant to be interdisciplinary. Although for very good > reasons it has only ever been taken up by Psychologists, I think it is > very obviously interdisciplinary. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> >> Does he state this aim somewhere? That might be interesting to look at. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri Oct 17 19:06:35 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 03:06:35 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <5441C8DA.4090900@mira.net> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441B8D6.7070009@mira.net> <5441C079.7060104@mira.net> <5441C8DA.4090900@mira.net> Message-ID: On 18 October 2014 02:56, Andy Blunden wrote: > He? ANL or LSV. > LSV states his aim to create a General Psychology in "Historical Crisis" > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm > > ANL, I think the aim of a creating general theory of human activity was > always meant to be interdisciplinary. Although for very good reasons it has > only ever been taken up by Psychologists, I think it is very obviously > interdisciplinary. > > Yes, ANL. Did he state an attempt to provide a social theory. Seems not? Best, Huw > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> >> >> On 18 October 2014 02:20, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Which only means that Vygotsky did not attempt to create a Social >> Theory, only a Psychology. >> But in creating a General Psychology, he left us a paradigm for >> the human sciences. ANL attempted to carry that through to create >> a Psychology which was equally a Social Theory, but in my view he >> was largely unsuccessful. But to have created a Psychology rather >> than a Theory of Everything does not make one an Idealist, just a >> specialist. >> >> >> Does he state this aim somewhere? That might be interesting to look at. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> >> >> On 18 October 2014 01:48, Andy Blunden > > >> >> wrote: >> >> No, LSV is quite right, Huw. You and I can go through the same >> sequence of events, but if, for example, the events really get >> under your skin, and perhaps due to past experiences, or >> to some >> sensitivity or another, it really shakes you up and causes >> you to >> dwell on the experience, work over it and reflect on it, >> then most >> likely you will make a personal development. If perhaps on >> other >> hand, maybe because of some prejudice I had, the same >> experience >> just went like water off a duck's back for me and I didn't >> care >> tuppence about the experience and just simply turned to next >> business, then I will not make a development. >> >> >> But does ANL refute this? He is simply asserting that >> experience is derivative to activity, not that meaningful >> things don't follow from experience. >> It is *only* the "subjective" side of experience and >> the >> *reflection* of "objective" relations/events that forms >> personal >> development. Only. And that is LSV's point. >> >> >> And it is ANL's point that these experiences arise in >> activity. Note that LSV doesn't provide a medium for their >> formation, he simply refers to them as forms. >> >> And can I just echo Martin and David's observation that >> consciousness before language was well-known and >> foundational to >> Vygotsky, and consequently consciousness other than >> language. And >> Julian and Mike's observation that "the ideal" lies >> ultimately in >> social practices, the doing-side of which give content and >> meaning >> to speech which speech would lack outside its being part >> of those >> activities. Vygotsky knew this, and this was why he >> introduced a >> range artifacts derived from the wider culture, as mediating >> elements, into social interaction. >> >> So ANL is going along with the still widely held prejudice >> that >> Vygotsky was *just* all about language. Not true. >> >> >> I would read these in terms of the opening paragraph >> ("propositions that have been connected to a unified system, >> but are far from equivalent") and then there is the politics >> of survival. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> Andy >> https://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_ >> Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky >> ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> .... >> >> Hence ANL is right to impute (metaphysical) idealistic >> tendencies to this >> paper of LSV's. Because to base the development on >> subjective >> emotional >> experience is idealistic. ANL, conversely, refers to the >> relativity of >> experience upon activity. It does not help that LSV >> refers to >> his norms as >> ideals and that all of the examples he provides are >> about speech >> communication. It is ripe for misinterpretation as an >> idealistic paper. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Fri Oct 17 19:31:10 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 13:31:10 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441B8D6.7070009@mira.net> <5441C079.7060104@mira.net> <5441C8DA.4090900@mira.net> Message-ID: <5441D0EE.7070405@mira.net> Here's an excerpt from http://www.marxists.org/archive/leontev/works/1947/historical-development-consciousness.pdf in which social theory is taken up under the heading of the historical development of consciousness. He could not loudly proclaim a new social theory of course because the USSR already had a social theory, viz "historical materialism." This is a chapter from "The Development of Mind" which begins with amoeba and works it way up to Soviet Man. The same process that led to separation of the producers led on the other hand to a separation as well of the conditions themselves, which appeared as the property of capitalists in the form of capital. The capitalist now also personifies these conditions, which, as far as the worker is concerned, are opposed to him, the worker. But the capitalist?s capital also has its own existence separate from the capi?talist, which takes possession of his own life and subordinates it to itself. These objective conditions, engendered by the development of private property, also determine the features of man?s consciousness in the conditions of class society. The traditional psychologist, of course, refuses to consider them, seeing in them only a relation of things. He demands that psychology should, come what may, remain within the context of the ?psychological?, which he understands purely as subjective. He even reduces psychological study of man?s industrial activity to investigation of its ?psychological components?, i.e. of those psychic features for which engineering presents a demand. He is unable to see that industrial activity itself is inseparable from people?s social relations, which are engendered by it and determine their consciousness. But let us return to our analysis of these relations. A consequence of the ?alienation? of human life that has occurred is the emergent disparity between the objective result of man?s activity on the one hand, and its motive on the other. In other words, the objective content of the activity is becoming discrepant with its subjective content, with what it is for man himself. That also imparts special psychological features to his consciousness. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > On 18 October 2014 02:56, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > He? ANL or LSV. > LSV states his aim to create a General Psychology in "Historical > Crisis" > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm > > ANL, I think the aim of a creating general theory of human > activity was always meant to be interdisciplinary. Although for > very good reasons it has only ever been taken up by Psychologists, > I think it is very obviously interdisciplinary. > > > Yes, ANL. Did he state an attempt to provide a social theory. Seems not? > > Best, > Huw > > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > On 18 October 2014 02:20, Andy Blunden >> wrote: > > Which only means that Vygotsky did not attempt to create a > Social > Theory, only a Psychology. > But in creating a General Psychology, he left us a > paradigm for > the human sciences. ANL attempted to carry that through to > create > a Psychology which was equally a Social Theory, but in my > view he > was largely unsuccessful. But to have created a Psychology > rather > than a Theory of Everything does not make one an Idealist, > just a > specialist. > > > Does he state this aim somewhere? That might be interesting > to look at. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > On 18 October 2014 01:48, Andy Blunden > > > > > > >>> wrote: > > No, LSV is quite right, Huw. You and I can go > through the same > sequence of events, but if, for example, the > events really get > under your skin, and perhaps due to past > experiences, or > to some > sensitivity or another, it really shakes you up > and causes > you to > dwell on the experience, work over it and reflect > on it, > then most > likely you will make a personal development. If > perhaps on > other > hand, maybe because of some prejudice I had, the same > experience > just went like water off a duck's back for me and > I didn't > care > tuppence about the experience and just simply > turned to next > business, then I will not make a development. > > > But does ANL refute this? He is simply asserting that > experience is derivative to activity, not that meaningful > things don't follow from experience. > It is *only* the "subjective" side of > experience and the > *reflection* of "objective" relations/events that > forms > personal > development. Only. And that is LSV's point. > > > And it is ANL's point that these experiences arise in > activity. Note that LSV doesn't provide a medium for > their > formation, he simply refers to them as forms. > > And can I just echo Martin and David's observation > that > consciousness before language was well-known and > foundational to > Vygotsky, and consequently consciousness other than > language. And > Julian and Mike's observation that "the ideal" lies > ultimately in > social practices, the doing-side of which give > content and > meaning > to speech which speech would lack outside its > being part > of those > activities. Vygotsky knew this, and this was why he > introduced a > range artifacts derived from the wider culture, as > mediating > elements, into social interaction. > > So ANL is going along with the still widely held > prejudice > that > Vygotsky was *just* all about language. Not true. > > > I would read these in terms of the opening paragraph > ("propositions that have been connected to a unified > system, > but are far from equivalent") and then there is the > politics > of survival. > > Best, > Huw > > Andy > > https://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > .... > > Hence ANL is right to impute (metaphysical) > idealistic > tendencies to this > paper of LSV's. Because to base the > development on > subjective > emotional > experience is idealistic. ANL, conversely, > refers to the > relativity of > experience upon activity. It does not help > that LSV > refers to > his norms as > ideals and that all of the examples he > provides are > about speech > communication. It is ripe for > misinterpretation as an > idealistic paper. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri Oct 17 19:58:41 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 03:58:41 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <5441D0EE.7070405@mira.net> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441B8D6.7070009@mira.net> <5441C079.7060104@mira.net> <5441C8DA.4090900@mira.net> <5441D0EE.7070405@mira.net> Message-ID: Seems to me to be about locating psychology within social conditions. Delineating how important social tensions manifest psychologically. Best, Huw On 18 October 2014 03:31, Andy Blunden wrote: > Here's an excerpt from http://www.marxists.org/archive/leontev/works/1947/ > historical-development-consciousness.pdf in which social theory is taken > up under the heading of the historical development of consciousness. He > could not loudly proclaim a new social theory of course because the USSR > already had a social theory, viz "historical materialism." This is a > chapter from "The Development of Mind" which begins with amoeba and works > it way up to Soviet Man. > > The same process that led to separation of the producers led on the > other hand to a separation as well of the conditions themselves, > which appeared as the property of capitalists in the form of > capital. The capitalist now also personifies these conditions, > which, as far as the worker is concerned, are opposed to him, the > worker. But the capitalist?s capital also has its own existence > separate from the capi?talist, which takes possession of his own > life and subordinates it to itself. > > These objective conditions, engendered by the development of private > property, also determine the features of man?s consciousness in the > conditions of class society. > > The traditional psychologist, of course, refuses to consider them, > seeing in them only a relation of things. He demands that psychology > should, come what may, remain within the context of the > ?psychological?, which he understands purely as subjective. He even > reduces psychological study of man?s industrial activity to > investigation of its ?psychological components?, i.e. of those > psychic features for which engineering presents a demand. He is > unable to see that industrial activity itself is inseparable from > people?s social relations, which are engendered by it and determine > their consciousness. > > But let us return to our analysis of these relations. > > A consequence of the ?alienation? of human life that has occurred is > the emergent disparity between the objective result of man?s > activity on the one hand, and its motive on the other. In other > words, the objective content of the activity is becoming discrepant > with its subjective content, with what it is for man himself. That > also imparts special psychological features to his consciousness. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> >> >> On 18 October 2014 02:56, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> He? ANL or LSV. >> LSV states his aim to create a General Psychology in "Historical >> Crisis" >> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm >> >> ANL, I think the aim of a creating general theory of human >> activity was always meant to be interdisciplinary. Although for >> very good reasons it has only ever been taken up by Psychologists, >> I think it is very obviously interdisciplinary. >> >> >> Yes, ANL. Did he state an attempt to provide a social theory. Seems not? >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> >> >> On 18 October 2014 02:20, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: >> >> Which only means that Vygotsky did not attempt to create a >> Social >> Theory, only a Psychology. >> But in creating a General Psychology, he left us a >> paradigm for >> the human sciences. ANL attempted to carry that through to >> create >> a Psychology which was equally a Social Theory, but in my >> view he >> was largely unsuccessful. But to have created a Psychology >> rather >> than a Theory of Everything does not make one an Idealist, >> just a >> specialist. >> >> >> Does he state this aim somewhere? That might be interesting >> to look at. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> >> >> On 18 October 2014 01:48, Andy Blunden >> >> > >> >> >> > >>> wrote: >> >> No, LSV is quite right, Huw. You and I can go >> through the same >> sequence of events, but if, for example, the >> events really get >> under your skin, and perhaps due to past >> experiences, or >> to some >> sensitivity or another, it really shakes you up >> and causes >> you to >> dwell on the experience, work over it and reflect >> on it, >> then most >> likely you will make a personal development. If >> perhaps on >> other >> hand, maybe because of some prejudice I had, the same >> experience >> just went like water off a duck's back for me and >> I didn't >> care >> tuppence about the experience and just simply >> turned to next >> business, then I will not make a development. >> >> >> But does ANL refute this? He is simply asserting that >> experience is derivative to activity, not that meaningful >> things don't follow from experience. >> It is *only* the "subjective" side of >> experience and the >> *reflection* of "objective" relations/events that >> forms >> personal >> development. Only. And that is LSV's point. >> >> >> And it is ANL's point that these experiences arise in >> activity. Note that LSV doesn't provide a medium for >> their >> formation, he simply refers to them as forms. >> And can I just echo Martin and >> David's observation >> that >> consciousness before language was well-known and >> foundational to >> Vygotsky, and consequently consciousness other than >> language. And >> Julian and Mike's observation that "the ideal" lies >> ultimately in >> social practices, the doing-side of which give >> content and >> meaning >> to speech which speech would lack outside its >> being part >> of those >> activities. Vygotsky knew this, and this was why he >> introduced a >> range artifacts derived from the wider culture, as >> mediating >> elements, into social interaction. >> >> So ANL is going along with the still widely held >> prejudice >> that >> Vygotsky was *just* all about language. Not true. >> >> >> I would read these in terms of the opening paragraph >> ("propositions that have been connected to a unified >> system, >> but are far from equivalent") and then there is the >> politics >> of survival. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> Andy >> https://www.academia.edu/ >> 7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky >> ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> .... >> >> Hence ANL is right to impute (metaphysical) >> idealistic >> tendencies to this >> paper of LSV's. Because to base the >> development on >> subjective >> emotional >> experience is idealistic. ANL, conversely, >> refers to the >> relativity of >> experience upon activity. It does not help >> that LSV >> refers to >> his norms as >> ideals and that all of the examples he >> provides are >> about speech >> communication. It is ripe for >> misinterpretation as an >> idealistic paper. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri Oct 17 20:16:40 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 04:16:40 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441B8D6.7070009@mira.net> <5441C079.7060104@mira.net> <5441C8DA.4090900@mira.net> <5441D0EE.7070405@mira.net> Message-ID: BTW, community is something I find lacking within AT's explicit formulations. But that doesn't mean to say it doesn't align with formulations of motive. Best, Huw On 18 October 2014 03:58, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Seems to me to be about locating psychology within social conditions. > Delineating how important social tensions manifest psychologically. > > Best, > Huw > > On 18 October 2014 03:31, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Here's an excerpt from http://www.marxists.org/ >> archive/leontev/works/1947/historical-development-consciousness.pdf in >> which social theory is taken up under the heading of the historical >> development of consciousness. He could not loudly proclaim a new social >> theory of course because the USSR already had a social theory, viz >> "historical materialism." This is a chapter from "The Development of Mind" >> which begins with amoeba and works it way up to Soviet Man. >> >> The same process that led to separation of the producers led on the >> other hand to a separation as well of the conditions themselves, >> which appeared as the property of capitalists in the form of >> capital. The capitalist now also personifies these conditions, >> which, as far as the worker is concerned, are opposed to him, the >> worker. But the capitalist?s capital also has its own existence >> separate from the capi?talist, which takes possession of his own >> life and subordinates it to itself. >> >> These objective conditions, engendered by the development of private >> property, also determine the features of man?s consciousness in the >> conditions of class society. >> >> The traditional psychologist, of course, refuses to consider them, >> seeing in them only a relation of things. He demands that psychology >> should, come what may, remain within the context of the >> ?psychological?, which he understands purely as subjective. He even >> reduces psychological study of man?s industrial activity to >> investigation of its ?psychological components?, i.e. of those >> psychic features for which engineering presents a demand. He is >> unable to see that industrial activity itself is inseparable from >> people?s social relations, which are engendered by it and determine >> their consciousness. >> >> But let us return to our analysis of these relations. >> >> A consequence of the ?alienation? of human life that has occurred is >> the emergent disparity between the objective result of man?s >> activity on the one hand, and its motive on the other. In other >> words, the objective content of the activity is becoming discrepant >> with its subjective content, with what it is for man himself. That >> also imparts special psychological features to his consciousness. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 18 October 2014 02:56, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>> >>> He? ANL or LSV. >>> LSV states his aim to create a General Psychology in "Historical >>> Crisis" >>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm >>> >>> ANL, I think the aim of a creating general theory of human >>> activity was always meant to be interdisciplinary. Although for >>> very good reasons it has only ever been taken up by Psychologists, >>> I think it is very obviously interdisciplinary. >>> >>> >>> Yes, ANL. Did he state an attempt to provide a social theory. Seems >>> not? >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> ------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 18 October 2014 02:20, Andy Blunden >> >> >> wrote: >>> >>> Which only means that Vygotsky did not attempt to create a >>> Social >>> Theory, only a Psychology. >>> But in creating a General Psychology, he left us a >>> paradigm for >>> the human sciences. ANL attempted to carry that through to >>> create >>> a Psychology which was equally a Social Theory, but in my >>> view he >>> was largely unsuccessful. But to have created a Psychology >>> rather >>> than a Theory of Everything does not make one an Idealist, >>> just a >>> specialist. >>> >>> >>> Does he state this aim somewhere? That might be interesting >>> to look at. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------ >>> ------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 18 October 2014 01:48, Andy Blunden >>> >>> > >>> >>> >>> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>> No, LSV is quite right, Huw. You and I can go >>> through the same >>> sequence of events, but if, for example, the >>> events really get >>> under your skin, and perhaps due to past >>> experiences, or >>> to some >>> sensitivity or another, it really shakes you up >>> and causes >>> you to >>> dwell on the experience, work over it and reflect >>> on it, >>> then most >>> likely you will make a personal development. If >>> perhaps on >>> other >>> hand, maybe because of some prejudice I had, the same >>> experience >>> just went like water off a duck's back for me and >>> I didn't >>> care >>> tuppence about the experience and just simply >>> turned to next >>> business, then I will not make a development. >>> >>> >>> But does ANL refute this? He is simply asserting that >>> experience is derivative to activity, not that meaningful >>> things don't follow from experience. >>> It is *only* the "subjective" side of >>> experience and the >>> *reflection* of "objective" relations/events that >>> forms >>> personal >>> development. Only. And that is LSV's point. >>> >>> >>> And it is ANL's point that these experiences arise in >>> activity. Note that LSV doesn't provide a medium for >>> their >>> formation, he simply refers to them as forms. >>> And can I just echo Martin and >>> David's observation >>> that >>> consciousness before language was well-known and >>> foundational to >>> Vygotsky, and consequently consciousness other than >>> language. And >>> Julian and Mike's observation that "the ideal" lies >>> ultimately in >>> social practices, the doing-side of which give >>> content and >>> meaning >>> to speech which speech would lack outside its >>> being part >>> of those >>> activities. Vygotsky knew this, and this was why he >>> introduced a >>> range artifacts derived from the wider culture, as >>> mediating >>> elements, into social interaction. >>> >>> So ANL is going along with the still widely held >>> prejudice >>> that >>> Vygotsky was *just* all about language. Not true. >>> >>> >>> I would read these in terms of the opening paragraph >>> ("propositions that have been connected to a unified >>> system, >>> but are far from equivalent") and then there is the >>> politics >>> of survival. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> Andy >>> https://www.academia.edu/ >>> 7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky >>> ------------------------------ >>> ------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> >>> .... >>> >>> Hence ANL is right to impute (metaphysical) >>> idealistic >>> tendencies to this >>> paper of LSV's. Because to base the >>> development on >>> subjective >>> emotional >>> experience is idealistic. ANL, conversely, >>> refers to the >>> relativity of >>> experience upon activity. It does not help >>> that LSV >>> refers to >>> his norms as >>> ideals and that all of the examples he >>> provides are >>> about speech >>> communication. It is ripe for >>> misinterpretation as an >>> idealistic paper. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Fri Oct 17 21:33:48 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 15:33:48 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> Martin, I think the issue is that we have certain concepts which are intrinsically both subjective and objective (action, activity, meaning, experience for example) but we also have other concepts which are intrinsically either objective or subjective (behaviour, weight, thinking, consciousness, mood for example). Of course, because subject and object are mutually constituted, any of these domain-specific concepts also entails relations to the other domain. Otherwise we have nonsense. If I say "The Stock Market crashed in 1929" I am not talking about a state of mind, though obviously states of mind were entailed in this event. Likewise "I'm in a bad mood today" is not a statement about events in my life, even though these may be the cause. What Vygotsky has done which allows him to develop a nondualistic psychology is that he took as his *most fundamental* concept "action". His other key concepts, his units of analysis for the various investigations, are also concepts which are intrinsically subjective/objective. E.g., word meaning, defect-compensation, perezhivanie. This is it: choose as your unit of analysis a concept which is a unity of objective and subjective. ANL would agree with his, but in his critique he is trying to muddy the water by claiming that Vygosky takes as his fundamental concept, "consciousness". Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Who says that emotional experience is "subjective," Huw? LSV writes throughout The Problem of the Environment that perezhivanie is the child's relationship to social reality. In my book that makes it personal, not subjective. The word "subjective" doesn't occur once in the text. It is certainly a common assumption in today's dualistic psychology that experience is subjective, a mental state.That would indeed be idealist. But since LSV is avoiding dualism... > > Martin > > > From Holli.Tonyan@csun.edu Fri Oct 17 21:41:57 2014 From: Holli.Tonyan@csun.edu (Tonyan, Holli A) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 04:41:57 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> , <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> Message-ID: <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> Can you explain more about "action" versus "activity"? These two terms get used a lot in nuanced ways and I get confused. If there is a place where this is already delineated, could you please point me in that direction? Also, I am not familiar with defect-compensation. Sent from my iPad > On Oct 17, 2014, at 9:35 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Martin, I think the issue is that we have certain concepts which are intrinsically both subjective and objective (action, activity, meaning, experience for example) but we also have other concepts which are intrinsically either objective or subjective (behaviour, weight, thinking, consciousness, mood for example). Of course, because subject and object are mutually constituted, any of these domain-specific concepts also entails relations to the other domain. Otherwise we have nonsense. If I say "The Stock Market crashed in 1929" I am not talking about a state of mind, though obviously states of mind were entailed in this event. Likewise "I'm in a bad mood today" is not a statement about events in my life, even though these may be the cause. > > What Vygotsky has done which allows him to develop a nondualistic psychology is that he took as his *most fundamental* concept "action". His other key concepts, his units of analysis for the various investigations, are also concepts which are intrinsically subjective/objective. E.g., word meaning, defect-compensation, perezhivanie. This is it: choose as your unit of analysis a concept which is a unity of objective and subjective. > > ANL would agree with his, but in his critique he is trying to muddy the water by claiming that Vygosky takes as his fundamental concept, "consciousness". > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAICAw&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=gKMMa479BWWTMz0UJqBIkjS5I75PRZR54MHJbhn8NCY&s=lsnDPs27Ct58Y8MBNnCw3hdGxQkaKKMS-MEISlsP3JM&e= > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Who says that emotional experience is "subjective," Huw? LSV writes throughout The Problem of the Environment that perezhivanie is the child's relationship to social reality. In my book that makes it personal, not subjective. The word "subjective" doesn't occur once in the text. It is certainly a common assumption in today's dualistic psychology that experience is subjective, a mental state.That would indeed be idealist. But since LSV is avoiding dualism... >> >> Martin > From ablunden@mira.net Fri Oct 17 22:05:37 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 16:05:37 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> , <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> Message-ID: <5441F521.9010507@mira.net> Holli, "The basic 'components' of separate human activities are the actions that realize them. We regard action as the process that corresponds to the notion of the result which must be achieved, that is, the process which obeys a conscious goal. Just as the concept of motive is correlative with the concept of activity, so the concept of goal is correlative with that of action." (Leontyev, 1978) An *Action* differs from "an activity" because is order to satisfy its motive, people act according to "partial" goals, which taken together realise the motive of the whole activity. But in general the motive of the activity is not guiding everything a person does along the way. It is in the background so to speak. An action differs from an *operation* because even though an action is completed only thanks to a series of operations (lift left foot, move weight to right, move weight forward, straighten leg, ...), these operations are not done with conscious control but are determined by the conditions. An operation changes into an action and comes under conscious control if we trip for example, and an action changes into an operation when for example we learn to tie out shoelaces without thinking about every twist and turn of tying the knot. Actions are inclusive of all the psychological processes entailed in their execution (like Mike rehearsing what he going to say on xmca while driving). A *Defect-compensation* is the psychological development a person makes to compensate for the social deficit entailed in norms of interaction which are not adapted to the person's "disability." "Defect" does not refer to a person "having a defect"; the defect is in the relation between the person and their social environment. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Tonyan, Holli A wrote: > Can you explain more about "action" versus "activity"? These two terms get used a lot in nuanced ways and I get confused. If there is a place where this is already delineated, could you please point me in that direction? > > Also, I am not familiar with defect-compensation. > > Sent from my iPad > > >> On Oct 17, 2014, at 9:35 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >> Martin, I think the issue is that we have certain concepts which are intrinsically both subjective and objective (action, activity, meaning, experience for example) but we also have other concepts which are intrinsically either objective or subjective (behaviour, weight, thinking, consciousness, mood for example). Of course, because subject and object are mutually constituted, any of these domain-specific concepts also entails relations to the other domain. Otherwise we have nonsense. If I say "The Stock Market crashed in 1929" I am not talking about a state of mind, though obviously states of mind were entailed in this event. Likewise "I'm in a bad mood today" is not a statement about events in my life, even though these may be the cause. >> >> What Vygotsky has done which allows him to develop a nondualistic psychology is that he took as his *most fundamental* concept "action". His other key concepts, his units of analysis for the various investigations, are also concepts which are intrinsically subjective/objective. E.g., word meaning, defect-compensation, perezhivanie. This is it: choose as your unit of analysis a concept which is a unity of objective and subjective. >> >> ANL would agree with his, but in his critique he is trying to muddy the water by claiming that Vygosky takes as his fundamental concept, "consciousness". >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAICAw&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=gKMMa479BWWTMz0UJqBIkjS5I75PRZR54MHJbhn8NCY&s=lsnDPs27Ct58Y8MBNnCw3hdGxQkaKKMS-MEISlsP3JM&e= >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> Who says that emotional experience is "subjective," Huw? LSV writes throughout The Problem of the Environment that perezhivanie is the child's relationship to social reality. In my book that makes it personal, not subjective. The word "subjective" doesn't occur once in the text. It is certainly a common assumption in today's dualistic psychology that experience is subjective, a mental state.That would indeed be idealist. But since LSV is avoiding dualism... >>> >>> Martin >>> > > > From Holli.Tonyan@csun.edu Fri Oct 17 22:33:00 2014 From: Holli.Tonyan@csun.edu (Tonyan, Holli A) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 05:33:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <5441F521.9010507@mira.net> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> , <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu>, <5441F521.9010507@mira.net> Message-ID: So helpful. Sent from my iPhone > On Oct 17, 2014, at 10:07 PM, "Andy Blunden" wrote: > > > Holli, > > "The basic 'components' of separate human activities are the actions > that realize them. We regard action as the process that corresponds > to the notion of the result which must be achieved, that is, the > process which obeys a conscious goal. Just as the concept of motive > is correlative with the concept of activity, so the concept of goal > is correlative with that of action." (Leontyev, 1978) > > An *Action* differs from "an activity" because is order to satisfy its motive, people act according to "partial" goals, which taken together realise the motive of the whole activity. But in general the motive of the activity is not guiding everything a person does along the way. It is in the background so to speak. > > An action differs from an *operation* because even though an action is completed only thanks to a series of operations (lift left foot, move weight to right, move weight forward, straighten leg, ...), these operations are not done with conscious control but are determined by the conditions. An operation changes into an action and comes under conscious control if we trip for example, and an action changes into an operation when for example we learn to tie out shoelaces without thinking about every twist and turn of tying the knot. > > Actions are inclusive of all the psychological processes entailed in their execution (like Mike rehearsing what he going to say on xmca while driving). > > A *Defect-compensation* is the psychological development a person makes to compensate for the social deficit entailed in norms of interaction which are not adapted to the person's "disability." "Defect" does not refer to a person "having a defect"; the defect is in the relation between the person and their social environment. > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAICAw&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=rQBfI0CZ63CS6npGFRAfVC4P7RLPoTpbzjYzEgdKP0Y&s=U6fcRJfRKCvBhb2Yb1CPEJHQiMHzvJsqM3X3FEHutFk&e= > > Tonyan, Holli A wrote: >> Can you explain more about "action" versus "activity"? These two terms get used a lot in nuanced ways and I get confused. If there is a place where this is already delineated, could you please point me in that direction? >> >> Also, I am not familiar with defect-compensation. >> >> Sent from my iPad >> >> >>> On Oct 17, 2014, at 9:35 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>> Martin, I think the issue is that we have certain concepts which are intrinsically both subjective and objective (action, activity, meaning, experience for example) but we also have other concepts which are intrinsically either objective or subjective (behaviour, weight, thinking, consciousness, mood for example). Of course, because subject and object are mutually constituted, any of these domain-specific concepts also entails relations to the other domain. Otherwise we have nonsense. If I say "The Stock Market crashed in 1929" I am not talking about a state of mind, though obviously states of mind were entailed in this event. Likewise "I'm in a bad mood today" is not a statement about events in my life, even though these may be the cause. >>> >>> What Vygotsky has done which allows him to develop a nondualistic psychology is that he took as his *most fundamental* concept "action". His other key concepts, his units of analysis for the various investigations, are also concepts which are intrinsically subjective/objective. E.g., word meaning, defect-compensation, perezhivanie. This is it: choose as your unit of analysis a concept which is a unity of objective and subjective. >>> >>> ANL would agree with his, but in his critique he is trying to muddy the water by claiming that Vygosky takes as his fundamental concept, "consciousness". >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAICAw&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=gKMMa479BWWTMz0UJqBIkjS5I75PRZR54MHJbhn8NCY&s=lsnDPs27Ct58Y8MBNnCw3hdGxQkaKKMS-MEISlsP3JM&e= >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>>> Who says that emotional experience is "subjective," Huw? LSV writes throughout The Problem of the Environment that perezhivanie is the child's relationship to social reality. In my book that makes it personal, not subjective. The word "subjective" doesn't occur once in the text. It is certainly a common assumption in today's dualistic psychology that experience is subjective, a mental state.That would indeed be idealist. But since LSV is avoiding dualism... >>>> >>>> Martin > From goncu@uic.edu Fri Oct 17 23:13:57 2014 From: goncu@uic.edu (Goncu, Artin) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 01:13:57 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> , <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> Message-ID: <9f4449ac337bfd15a08d0cf01f364940.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> Hello Holli, You can find a discussion of them in my edited volume by Cambridge (1999). Best, ag On Fri, October 17, 2014 11:41 pm, Tonyan, Holli A wrote: > Can you explain more about "action" versus "activity"? These two terms > get used a lot in nuanced ways and I get confused. If there is a place > where this is already delineated, could you please point me in that > direction? > > Also, I am not familiar with defect-compensation. > > Sent from my iPad > >> On Oct 17, 2014, at 9:35 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >> Martin, I think the issue is that we have certain concepts which are >> intrinsically both subjective and objective (action, activity, meaning, >> experience for example) but we also have other concepts which are >> intrinsically either objective or subjective (behaviour, weight, >> thinking, consciousness, mood for example). Of course, because subject >> and object are mutually constituted, any of these domain-specific >> concepts also entails relations to the other domain. Otherwise we have >> nonsense. If I say "The Stock Market crashed in 1929" I am not talking >> about a state of mind, though obviously states of mind were entailed in >> this event. Likewise "I'm in a bad mood today" is not a statement about >> events in my life, even though these may be the cause. >> >> What Vygotsky has done which allows him to develop a nondualistic >> psychology is that he took as his *most fundamental* concept "action". >> His other key concepts, his units of analysis for the various >> investigations, are also concepts which are intrinsically >> subjective/objective. E.g., word meaning, defect-compensation, >> perezhivanie. This is it: choose as your unit of analysis a concept >> which is a unity of objective and subjective. >> >> ANL would agree with his, but in his critique he is trying to muddy the >> water by claiming that Vygosky takes as his fundamental concept, >> "consciousness". >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAICAw&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=gKMMa479BWWTMz0UJqBIkjS5I75PRZR54MHJbhn8NCY&s=lsnDPs27Ct58Y8MBNnCw3hdGxQkaKKMS-MEISlsP3JM&e= >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> Who says that emotional experience is "subjective," Huw? LSV writes >>> throughout The Problem of the Environment that perezhivanie is the >>> child's relationship to social reality. In my book that makes it >>> personal, not subjective. The word "subjective" doesn't occur once in >>> the text. It is certainly a common assumption in today's dualistic >>> psychology that experience is subjective, a mental state.That would >>> indeed be idealist. But since LSV is avoiding dualism... >>> >>> Martin >> > > Artin Goncu, Ph.D Co-editor, Mind, Culture, and Activity:An International Journal Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois at Chicago College of Education M/C 147 1040 W. Harrison St. Chicago, IL 60607 From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sat Oct 18 04:34:26 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 11:34:26 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> Message-ID: <4C3DCC98-A2D4-43B0-9205-14E2648AD6CE@uniandes.edu.co> Andy, I'm a little saddened to see that you are still stuck in talk of two "domains," and of concepts within which things are treated as "intrinsically" of one ontological kind or another. And then in addition an odd category of things that are conceptualized as "both." One day, I feel sure, we will be able to rescue you from your dualism. Martin On Oct 17, 2014, at 11:33 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Martin, I think the issue is that we have certain concepts which are intrinsically both subjective and objective (action, activity, meaning, experience for example) but we also have other concepts which are intrinsically either objective or subjective (behaviour, weight, thinking, consciousness, mood for example). Of course, because subject and object are mutually constituted, any of these domain-specific concepts also entails relations to the other domain. Otherwise we have nonsense. If I say "The Stock Market crashed in 1929" I am not talking about a state of mind, though obviously states of mind were entailed in this event. Likewise "I'm in a bad mood today" is not a statement about events in my life, even though these may be the cause. > > What Vygotsky has done which allows him to develop a nondualistic psychology is that he took as his *most fundamental* concept "action". His other key concepts, his units of analysis for the various investigations, are also concepts which are intrinsically subjective/objective. E.g., word meaning, defect-compensation, perezhivanie. This is it: choose as your unit of analysis a concept which is a unity of objective and subjective. > > ANL would agree with his, but in his critique he is trying to muddy the water by claiming that Vygosky takes as his fundamental concept, "consciousness". > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Who says that emotional experience is "subjective," Huw? LSV writes throughout The Problem of the Environment that perezhivanie is the child's relationship to social reality. In my book that makes it personal, not subjective. The word "subjective" doesn't occur once in the text. It is certainly a common assumption in today's dualistic psychology that experience is subjective, a mental state.That would indeed be idealist. But since LSV is avoiding dualism... >> >> Martin >> > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sat Oct 18 04:57:07 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 11:57:07 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> Message-ID: <3EFEA9B7-3037-4A46-852F-D8BE20B21EE0@uniandes.edu.co> I don't agree with you here, Andy. I read Crisis, and T&L, as aspects of LSV's science of *consciousness*. ANL's mistake was that he equated consciousness with the mental, and so concluded that LSV is an idealist. However, LSV takes consciousness to be *relational*, an aspect of how human beings live in the world. *This* is his escape from dualism. For LSV, consciousness is not simply subjective, a mental 'reflection' of an external material world, a realm of mere 'appearances.' Consciousness is an aspect of human being, which is embodied and social. Martin On Oct 17, 2014, at 11:33 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > What Vygotsky has done which allows him to develop a nondualistic psychology is that he took as his *most fundamental* concept "action". His other key concepts, his units of analysis for the various investigations, are also concepts which are intrinsically subjective/objective. E.g., word meaning, defect-compensation, perezhivanie. This is it: choose as your unit of analysis a concept which is a unity of objective and subjective. > > ANL would agree with his, but in his critique he is trying to muddy the water by claiming that Vygosky takes as his fundamental concept, "consciousness". From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Sat Oct 18 05:06:12 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 13:06:12 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <1413633972.3523.YahooMailNeo@web173205.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Hi John If there's any talk of activity , it's a joint goal-oriented activity ; then what you think of 'speech' being an activity might be where 'speech itself' is in the focus with motives , goals , conditions . You want to sacrifice some innocents into a war ; you need a strong adept lecturer to excite them , stimulate them , propagate them through speech though other things are also available . In this circumstance , speech could be called "an activity proper" . But there's a time you want to reach and conquest a mountain top as the motive for an activity . There might be lots of speech and speech acts in this enterprise but the motive and goal are different from what we had in the first instance . Here speech asts just as a vector , means of communication , ignoring its organizational and cognitive capabilities . And two more points : 1. I think at least in one place in 'thinking and speech' , Vygotsky analyzes speech as something which comes into being through the process of labour and with the assistance of tools and paralinguistics primarily bound to it . 2. In the last lines of 'thinking and speech' , Vygotsky holds that he's traversed a reverse path ; he should have begun with "motive" other than words and concepts . And we may find many things in Luria's "Language and Cognition" in this regard . I think what might be fault with ANL besides his acts of espionage and conspiracies is that he did not waver in his belief to attach his theory to that of the labour theory of Marx . In fact all of them , at least , wished and hoped to make a society other than what the America now is . I remember Anna Stetsenko having said this many times while she was still here . And I very much like to know what dear Luria taught his friends and disciples about the whole deeds of his close friend , A.N.Leontiev . A.A.Leontiev's , Dimitri Leontiev's and especially Evald Ilyenko's and the Kharkov members in this respect . Best Regards Haydi Zulfei ________________________________ From: ?Martin John Packer? ?? To: ?"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"? ?? Sent: Saturday, 18 October 2014, 0:41:49 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL I see a difference, Huw. I just don't see the difference that the difference makes. And ANL cannot be correct: for one thing, in various texts LSV writes about the character of consciousness in preverbal children, and of how consciousness is transformed by the acquisition of language. This would hardly be possible if language were a necessary condition for consciousness. Martin On Oct 17, 2014, at 3:09 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Specifically, ANL is pointing to drivers and necessary conditions. He is > saying that LSV considers language-ing the driver for consciousness, > whereas ANL points to activity. This to my reading and thinking is > justifiably presented as a decisive difference. It is the same as stating > that the deed precedes the word, and that the genetic precursor is > different to products derived from it. > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sat Oct 18 05:45:22 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 12:45:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <4C3DCC98-A2D4-43B0-9205-14E2648AD6CE@uniandes.edu.co> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <4C3DCC98-A2D4-43B0-9205-14E2648AD6CE@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <2CECB734-2F04-479A-BF60-55AE334A6E18@uniandes.edu.co> What I'm thinking is this, Andy. LSV could hardly be clearer that his interest was the scientific study of consciousness. Whole sections of Crisis are about the importance of not abandoning the study of consciousness to the phenomenologists, precisely because they were idealist in their assumptions. The summary that David just sent us of one of LSV's lectures is about the ontogenesis of consciousness: the differentiation and reorganization of psychological functions such as emotion, perception, memory, and thinking, which LSV insists are aspects, components, of consciousness. Why, then, do you feel a need to 'rescue' LSV from ANL's claim that his focus was consciousness? Why do you need to insist, against all the evidence, that LSV's focus was action? (Do we find a detailed analysis of action in any of LSV's texts? No.) It must be because you view consciousness as "inside the head," as subjective. And this means that, ironically, you have accepted ANL's key assumption. No, for LSV the mind is material. What goes on "inside the head" are neurophysiological processes, and while these are a component of psychological processes they are not the whole story. As LSV wrote, "Either mental phenomena exist, and then they are material and objective, or they do not exist, and then they do not exist and cannot be studied." That sentence is worth reading carefully. Mental phenomena are material, and they are objective. Martin On Oct 18, 2014, at 7:13 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Don't be sad, Martin. You still think the second world war is being fought inside your head and your last night's dream is going to be broadcast on the nightly news, but I know there's nothing I can do to help. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Andy, I'm a little saddened to see that you are still stuck in talk of two "domains," and of concepts within which things are treated as "intrinsically" of one ontological kind or another. And then in addition an odd category of things that are conceptualized as "both." One day, I feel sure, we will be able to rescue you from your dualism. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 17, 2014, at 11:33 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> Martin, I think the issue is that we have certain concepts which are intrinsically both subjective and objective (action, activity, meaning, experience for example) but we also have other concepts which are intrinsically either objective or subjective (behaviour, weight, thinking, consciousness, mood for example). Of course, because subject and object are mutually constituted, any of these domain-specific concepts also entails relations to the other domain. Otherwise we have nonsense. If I say "The Stock Market crashed in 1929" I am not talking about a state of mind, though obviously states of mind were entailed in this event. Likewise "I'm in a bad mood today" is not a statement about events in my life, even though these may be the cause. >>> >>> What Vygotsky has done which allows him to develop a nondualistic psychology is that he took as his *most fundamental* concept "action". His other key concepts, his units of analysis for the various investigations, are also concepts which are intrinsically subjective/objective. E.g., word meaning, defect-compensation, perezhivanie. This is it: choose as your unit of analysis a concept which is a unity of objective and subjective. >>> >>> ANL would agree with his, but in his critique he is trying to muddy the water by claiming that Vygosky takes as his fundamental concept, "consciousness". >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>>> Who says that emotional experience is "subjective," Huw? LSV writes throughout The Problem of the Environment that perezhivanie is the child's relationship to social reality. In my book that makes it personal, not subjective. The word "subjective" doesn't occur once in the text. It is certainly a common assumption in today's dualistic psychology that experience is subjective, a mental state.That would indeed be idealist. But since LSV is avoiding dualism... >>>> >>>> Martin From glassman.13@osu.edu Sat Oct 18 06:11:45 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 13:11:45 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> References: , <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052B5E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> It seems to me the question is which is primary (although perhaps Leontiev wasn't that upfront about it for the political reasons Mike suggests). Are we driven to be part of a community driven by our natural inclination towards sociability (a word I have been struggling a lot with lately, coming from communications research but also in a different way from the Russian socio-biologists such as Kropotkin) and derive out activities from our roles in these communities (theoretically I guess so we can stay part of the community)? Or do we engage in goal oriented activity, and develop our social interconnections out of and through these collaborative activities (sociability by design perhaps). A double edge sword both it seems to me no matter which of these positions you choose. For instance is we make cultural mediating systems, including language, primary, do we trap individuals within the demands of the cultural system - which may not always be in the best interests of all its members (yes, I know the argument that somebody from outside the cultural system really can't make judgments about those functioning well within that system). But if we take goal oriented action as primary are we giving over too much to demagogues or those who believe they are exceptional and therefore should force others into subjugation. There are no right answers, simply choices, and many times those choices are historically and/or context dependent. I think the same thing is true concerning the issue of consciousness. I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up for being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't think he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I think you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what develops if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops (remember I am suggesting individual development here). Vygotsky didn't solve the dualism puzzle, I'm pretty convinced nobody has to this point. He made a choice. The fact that ANL criticized him for this choice isn't that surprising. Pierce, who many want to connect to some of Vygotsky's ideas - for good reason I might add - would I believe have mocked Vygotsky mercilessly for his ideas on consciousness. He mocked Dewey - and by extension Mead - for much less. So much so that Dewey refused to refer to Pragmatism as Pragmatism for a number of years because Pierce named it. But Pierce and the Pragmatists made their own choices, including giving up individual development which has played hell in trying to implement these ideas in education. Again choices - sometimes incredibly difficult to make, and sometimes we go back and forth on them, which I think is okay. As somebody who thinks individuals develop but it also a tremendous fan of Pragmatism this can be incredibly frustrating. Anyway, my choice to make this post. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] Sent: Friday, October 17, 2014 2:43 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL Mike, Am I reading correctly this extract that you have highlighted ? ANL says that LSV saw verbal communication occurring under conditions of activity, whereas ANL himself proposes that activity occurs under conditions of language and communication. Put this way, both formulations seem incorrect. First, speech is a form of activity; second, (nonverbal) activity can circumscribe speech, and speech can circumscribe activity. That is to say, there is a relation of mutuality between the two. What am I missing? Martin On Oct 17, 2014, at 12:58 PM, mike cole wrote: > Thus, Vygotsky?s proposition that consciousness is a product of the child?s > verbal communication under conditions of his activity and in relation to > the material reality that surrounds him must be turned around: the > consciousness of a child is a product of his human activity in relation to > objective reality, taking place under conditions of language and under > conditions of verbal communication. From ablunden@mira.net Sat Oct 18 06:40:36 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 00:40:36 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <6098D9A6-93CF-4031-9FA5-A25E9EA8FEFF@uniandes.edu.co> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <4C3DCC98-A2D4-43B0-9205-14E2648AD6CE@uniandes.edu.co> <5442595E.40008@mira.net> <6098D9A6-93CF-4031-9FA5-A25E9EA8FEFF@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <54426DD4.506@mira.net> This is my first and last post on this question, Martin. I don't believe for a moment I will change your mind, oops, brain. If "mind is material" and "mental phenomena are material" what on earth do you mean by "material". The dumb solution to the difficult problem of dualism is to simply declare that it does not exist. This is the pre-Cartesian position against which the scientific revolution of the 17th century was waged. Vygotsky is quite clear in http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm#p1387 Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > What I'm thinking is this, Andy. LSV could hardly be clearer that his interest was the scientific study of consciousness. Whole sections of Crisis are about the importance of not abandoning the study of consciousness to the phenomenologists, precisely because they were idealist in their assumptions. The summary that David just sent us of one of LSV's lectures is about the ontogenesis of consciousness: the differentiation and reorganization of psychological functions such as emotion, perception, memory, and thinking, which LSV insists are aspects, components, of consciousness. > > Why, then, do you feel a need to 'rescue' LSV from ANL's claim that his focus was consciousness? Why do you need to insist, against all the evidence, that LSV's focus was action? (Do we find a detailed analysis of action in any of LSV's texts? No.) It must be because you view consciousness as "inside the head," as subjective. And this means that, ironically, you have accepted ANL's key assumption. > > No, for LSV the mind is material. What goes on "inside the head" are neurophysiological processes, and while these are a component of psychological processes they are not the whole story. As LSV wrote, "Either mental phenomena exist, and then they are material and objective, or they do not exist, and then they do not exist and cannot be studied." That sentence is worth reading carefully. Mental phenomena are material, and they are objective. > > Martin > > > On Oct 18, 2014, at 7:13 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Don't be sad, Martin. You still think the second world war is being fought inside your head and your last night's dream is going to be broadcast on the nightly news, but I know there's nothing I can do to help. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> Andy, I'm a little saddened to see that you are still stuck in talk of two "domains," and of concepts within which things are treated as "intrinsically" of one ontological kind or another. And then in addition an odd category of things that are conceptualized as "both." One day, I feel sure, we will be able to rescue you from your dualism. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 17, 2014, at 11:33 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Martin, I think the issue is that we have certain concepts which are intrinsically both subjective and objective (action, activity, meaning, experience for example) but we also have other concepts which are intrinsically either objective or subjective (behaviour, weight, thinking, consciousness, mood for example). Of course, because subject and object are mutually constituted, any of these domain-specific concepts also entails relations to the other domain. Otherwise we have nonsense. If I say "The Stock Market crashed in 1929" I am not talking about a state of mind, though obviously states of mind were entailed in this event. Likewise "I'm in a bad mood today" is not a statement about events in my life, even though these may be the cause. >>>> >>>> What Vygotsky has done which allows him to develop a nondualistic psychology is that he took as his *most fundamental* concept "action". His other key concepts, his units of analysis for the various investigations, are also concepts which are intrinsically subjective/objective. E.g., word meaning, defect-compensation, perezhivanie. This is it: choose as your unit of analysis a concept which is a unity of objective and subjective. >>>> >>>> ANL would agree with his, but in his critique he is trying to muddy the water by claiming that Vygosky takes as his fundamental concept, "consciousness". >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Who says that emotional experience is "subjective," Huw? LSV writes throughout The Problem of the Environment that perezhivanie is the child's relationship to social reality. In my book that makes it personal, not subjective. The word "subjective" doesn't occur once in the text. It is certainly a common assumption in today's dualistic psychology that experience is subjective, a mental state.That would indeed be idealist. But since LSV is avoiding dualism... >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >>> > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sat Oct 18 06:48:58 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 13:48:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <2CECB734-2F04-479A-BF60-55AE334A6E18@uniandes.edu.co> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <4C3DCC98-A2D4-43B0-9205-14E2648AD6CE@uniandes.edu.co> <2CECB734-2F04-479A-BF60-55AE334A6E18@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Well, it's certainly not your first post on this matter, Andy. And I doubt it will be your last. I'm not sure why you are asking what *I* mean by material; the words are LSV's, not mine. But yes, it is important to ask, and explore, what LSV must have meant by material if the mental is also material. Presumably that these are not two distinct "domains." And I don't think you mean to suggest that LSV's solution to dualism was dumb. LSV is indeed exploring these issues in the portion of Crisis that you link to. That is precisely where he writes the words I quoted. It is where he writes that "any scientific system will be torn apart if it binds itself to two different trunks." Two different domains. Part of the problem here, I think, is that you are switching between colloquial speech and technical - psychological and philosophical - terminology as though the two are interchangeable. I don't believe that you truly think that your dreams are literally occurring inside your head. If this were the case presumably if we were to insert a probe in your skull we would be able to witness them. Martin On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:20 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > This is my first amd last post on this question, Martin. I don't believe for a moment I will change your mind, oops, brain. > If "mind is material" and "mental phenomena are material" what on earth do you mean by "material". > The dumb solution to the difficult problem of dualism is to simply declare that it does not exist. This is the pre-Cartesian position against which the scientific revolution of the 17th century was waged. > Vygotsky is quite clear inhttp://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri13.htm#p1387 > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> What I'm thinking is this, Andy. LSV could hardly be clearer that his interest was the scientific study of consciousness. Whole sections of Crisis are about the importance of not abandoning the study of consciousness to the phenomenologists, precisely because they were idealist in their assumptions. The summary that David just sent us of one of LSV's lectures is about the ontogenesis of consciousness: the differentiation and reorganization of psychological functions such as emotion, perception, memory, and thinking, which LSV insists are aspects, components, of consciousness. >> >> Why, then, do you feel a need to 'rescue' LSV from ANL's claim that his focus was consciousness? Why do you need to insist, against all the evidence, that LSV's focus was action? (Do we find a detailed analysis of action in any of LSV's texts? No.) It must be because you view consciousness as "inside the head," as subjective. And this means that, ironically, you have accepted ANL's key assumption. >> >> No, for LSV the mind is material. What goes on "inside the head" are neurophysiological processes, and while these are a component of psychological processes they are not the whole story. As LSV wrote, "Either mental phenomena exist, and then they are material and objective, or they do not exist, and then they do not exist and cannot be studied." That sentence is worth reading carefully. Mental phenomena are material, and they are objective. >> Martin >> >> >> On Oct 18, 2014, at 7:13 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> Don't be sad, Martin. You still think the second world war is being fought inside your head and your last night's dream is going to be broadcast on the nightly news, but I know there's nothing I can do to help. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>>> Andy, I'm a little saddened to see that you are still stuck in talk of two "domains," and of concepts within which things are treated as "intrinsically" of one ontological kind or another. And then in addition an odd category of things that are conceptualized as "both." One day, I feel sure, we will be able to rescue you from your dualism. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Oct 17, 2014, at 11:33 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Martin, I think the issue is that we have certain concepts which are intrinsically both subjective and objective (action, activity, meaning, experience for example) but we also have other concepts which are intrinsically either objective or subjective (behaviour, weight, thinking, consciousness, mood for example). Of course, because subject and object are mutually constituted, any of these domain-specific concepts also entails relations to the other domain. Otherwise we have nonsense. If I say "The Stock Market crashed in 1929" I am not talking about a state of mind, though obviously states of mind were entailed in this event. Likewise "I'm in a bad mood today" is not a statement about events in my life, even though these may be the cause. >>>>> >>>>> What Vygotsky has done which allows him to develop a nondualistic psychology is that he took as his *most fundamental* concept "action". His other key concepts, his units of analysis for the various investigations, are also concepts which are intrinsically subjective/objective. E.g., word meaning, defect-compensation, perezhivanie. This is it: choose as your unit of analysis a concept which is a unity of objective and subjective. >>>>> >>>>> ANL would agree with his, but in his critique he is trying to muddy the water by claiming that Vygosky takes as his fundamental concept, "consciousness". >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Who says that emotional experience is "subjective," Huw? LSV writes throughout The Problem of the Environment that perezhivanie is the child's relationship to social reality. In my book that makes it personal, not subjective. The word "subjective" doesn't occur once in the text. It is certainly a common assumption in today's dualistic psychology that experience is subjective, a mental state.That would indeed be idealist. But since LSV is avoiding dualism... >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sat Oct 18 07:46:32 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 14:46:32 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <1413633972.3523.YahooMailNeo@web173205.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1413633972.3523.YahooMailNeo@web173205.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <78B5481A-E5D5-4E81-AC1E-D8DF83D4315E@uniandes.edu.co> Hi Haydi, In the first chapter of Thought & Language, LSV points out that traditional psych had separated the intellectual, volitional, and affective aspects of human life, so that "thinking itself became the thinker of thoughts." In my view this has remained true for much of the history of psychology since LSV was writing. Cognition has been studied as though it is disconnected from the motives, interests, and inclinations of the person who thinks. LSV set out to avoid this false separation, and there are constant references throughout T&L to the ways that verbal thinking is linked to what people desire and what they do. In this sense, yes, activity (in the general sense) was important to LSV. To repeat myself, my interpretation is that for him consciousness was *an aspect* of activity. It is in activity that we perceive, we feel emotion, we remember, and we think. I suggested earlier that thinking is an *articulation* of action; we also think when we *pause* from action; but we even then I would say that we think in order to act. In this regard it seems to me LSV also tied his work to the labor theory of Marx. He certainly highlighted the central importance of Marx's work as a model of methodology. But at the same time he was very critical of the ways so-called Marxist psychologists in Russia at that time had made use of Marx's theory. I imagine he might have said the same of ANL. Martin On Oct 18, 2014, at 7:06 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: > Hi John > If there's any talk of activity , it's a joint goal-oriented activity ; then what you think of 'speech' being an activity might be where 'speech itself' is in the focus with motives , goals , conditions . > You want to sacrifice some innocents into a war ; you need a strong adept lecturer to excite them , stimulate them , propagate them through speech though other things are also available . In this circumstance , speech could be called "an activity proper" . > But there's a time you want to reach and conquest a mountain top as the motive for an activity . There might be lots of speech and speech acts in this enterprise but the motive and goal are different from what we had in the first instance . Here speech asts just as a vector , means of communication , ignoring its organizational and cognitive capabilities . > And two more points : > 1. I think at least in one place in 'thinking and speech' , Vygotsky analyzes speech as something which comes into being through the process of labour and with the assistance of tools and paralinguistics primarily bound to it . > 2. In the last lines of 'thinking and speech' , Vygotsky holds that he's traversed a reverse path ; he should have begun with "motive" other than words and concepts . And we may find many things in Luria's "Language and Cognition" in this regard . I think what might be fault with ANL besides his acts of espionage and conspiracies is that he did not waver in his belief to attach his theory to that of the labour theory of Marx . In fact all of them , at least , wished and hoped to make a society other than what the America now is . I remember Anna Stetsenko having said this many times while she was still here . And I very much like to know what dear Luria taught his friends and disciples about the whole deeds of his close friend , A.N.Leontiev . A.A.Leontiev's , Dimitri Leontiev's and especially Evald Ilyenko's and the Kharkov members in this respect . > Best Regards > Haydi Zulfei > > > > > ________________________________ > From: ?Martin John Packer? ?? > To: ?"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"? ?? > Sent: Saturday, 18 October 2014, 0:41:49 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL > > > > I see a difference, Huw. I just don't see the difference that the difference makes. And ANL cannot be correct: for one thing, in various texts LSV writes about the character of consciousness in preverbal children, and of how consciousness is transformed by the acquisition of language. This would hardly be possible if language were a necessary condition for consciousness. > > Martin > > On Oct 17, 2014, at 3:09 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > >> Specifically, ANL is pointing to drivers and necessary conditions. He is >> saying that LSV considers language-ing the driver for consciousness, >> whereas ANL points to activity. This to my reading and thinking is >> justifiably presented as a decisive difference. It is the same as stating >> that the deed precedes the word, and that the genetic precursor is >> > different to products derived from it. >> From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Sat Oct 18 13:40:21 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 17:40:21 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Call for Applications 5th Latin American School for Education, Cognition and Neural Sciences / March 9-19, 2015. References: Message-ID: <2FD038D5-E082-4BDC-A6B1-5C573C65C968@gmail.com> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > CALL FOR APPLICATIONS > 5th Latin American School for Education, Cognition and Neural Sciences, March 9-19, 2015, San Pedro de Atacama, Chile. > LASchool is a meeting that gather Students and Faculties from all over the world in Latin America to build new bridges between Education, Cognitive and Neural Sciences. Each year, LASchool?s participants work together for two weeks to generate project proposals potentially relevant for the development, design and implementation of effective science-based educational practices. LASchool series have been inspired by the ideas raised in The Santiago Declaration, in 2007. > Previous LASchools took place in Atacama, Chile (2011), Patagonia, Argentina (2012), Bahia, Brazil (2013), and Punta del Este, Uruguay (2014). All these experiences have brought together more than 120 faculty and 200 students in a continuing effort to promote the scientific work at the interface between Education and Science. > This 5th version of the LASchool is organized by the Laboratorio de Ciencias Cognitivas at Pontificia Universidad Cat?lica de Chile, and will take place in San Pedro de Atacama, Hotel Cumbres. The LASchool will develop several issues such as the transition from informal to formal education, how brain systems change through development and education, and how social programs may impact education. The beauty and tranquility of San Pedro de Atacama offer perfect conditions to share time for interaction, feedback, cross-inspiration, and collaborations. > The applications can be done in http://2015.laschool4education.com/ and will be received until November 9, 2014. > You are kindly invited to apply. > Please, feel free to share this call with any person you may want. > > Sincerely > LASchool team From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Oct 18 14:07:23 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 14:07:23 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> Message-ID: Hi Holli-- As you can see from the discussion, agreement is not easy to come by when trying to nail down some key distinctions in the CHAT tradition (including whether or not it is a good idea to combine CH and AT!). Re you question about action/activity I am attaching a paper by Jim Wertsch that focuses on action. He has an interesting discussion of his views vis a vis Leontiev in his book on LSV and the Social Foundations of Mind. But sending people off to read books tends to produce an infinite regress in the local conversation, so maybe an article at your fingertips will help. Both Jim and Vladmir Zinchenko have argued, as Jim puts it in the title of this article, for "the primacy of mediated action" (adding action "in context") to the formulation. Others, such as Yrjo Engestrom have argued that "the activity is the context"). Whichever way you go, I think a common thread is the need to take a relation stance -- action-in-relation to (activity/context). Thinking relationally is tough (relatively)[?] I hope this is useful. mike On Fri, Oct 17, 2014 at 9:41 PM, Tonyan, Holli A wrote: > Can you explain more about "action" versus "activity"? These two terms > get used a lot in nuanced ways and I get confused. If there is a place > where this is already delineated, could you please point me in that > direction? > > Also, I am not familiar with defect-compensation. > > Sent from my iPad > > > On Oct 17, 2014, at 9:35 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > > Martin, I think the issue is that we have certain concepts which are > intrinsically both subjective and objective (action, activity, meaning, > experience for example) but we also have other concepts which are > intrinsically either objective or subjective (behaviour, weight, thinking, > consciousness, mood for example). Of course, because subject and object are > mutually constituted, any of these domain-specific concepts also entails > relations to the other domain. Otherwise we have nonsense. If I say "The > Stock Market crashed in 1929" I am not talking about a state of mind, > though obviously states of mind were entailed in this event. Likewise "I'm > in a bad mood today" is not a statement about events in my life, even > though these may be the cause. > > > > What Vygotsky has done which allows him to develop a nondualistic > psychology is that he took as his *most fundamental* concept "action". His > other key concepts, his units of analysis for the various investigations, > are also concepts which are intrinsically subjective/objective. E.g., word > meaning, defect-compensation, perezhivanie. This is it: choose as your unit > of analysis a concept which is a unity of objective and subjective. > > > > ANL would agree with his, but in his critique he is trying to muddy the > water by claiming that Vygosky takes as his fundamental concept, > "consciousness". > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__home.pacific.net.au_-7Eandy_&d=AAICAw&c=Oo8bPJf7k7r_cPTz1JF7vEiFxvFRfQtp-j14fFwh71U&r=nc0IzcQ7AJuG1zNoaB3azX4jLwOThkgntuk4nvTAto4&m=gKMMa479BWWTMz0UJqBIkjS5I75PRZR54MHJbhn8NCY&s=lsnDPs27Ct58Y8MBNnCw3hdGxQkaKKMS-MEISlsP3JM&e= > > > > Martin John Packer wrote: > >> Who says that emotional experience is "subjective," Huw? LSV writes > throughout The Problem of the Environment that perezhivanie is the child's > relationship to social reality. In my book that makes it personal, not > subjective. The word "subjective" doesn't occur once in the text. It is > certainly a common assumption in today's dualistic psychology that > experience is subjective, a mental state.That would indeed be idealist. > But since LSV is avoiding dualism... > >> > >> Martin > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 330.gif Type: image/gif Size: 96 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141018/d9316565/attachment-0001.gif -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: WertschThePrimaryofMediatedAction.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 516372 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141018/d9316565/attachment-0001.pdf From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Sat Oct 18 14:11:00 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 22:11:00 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <78B5481A-E5D5-4E81-AC1E-D8DF83D4315E@uniandes.edu.co> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1413633972.3523.YahooMailNeo@web173205.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <78B5481A-E5D5-4E81-AC1E-D8DF83D4315E@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <1413666660.69807.YahooMailNeo@web173201.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Dear Martin 1. It's Vygotsky who has analyzed the "genesis" and "development" of thinking and speech . You say speech is an activity ; Vygotsky says up to a point we don't have such a thing as 'speech' . You say thinking is activity ; Vygotsky says up to a point we don't have such a thing as 'human thinking' . Then your presupposition is the existence of a full thinking man which could be no means be true . 2. This is what you say : "Cognition has been studied as though it is disconnected from the motives, interests, and inclinations of the person who thinks." a. When Vygotsky begins with 'practical intellect' or even before that with some thing like a cloudy morphless mass , are we right to talk about 'cognition' as such ? b. But motives , interests and inclinations , with some negligence , could be said to exist in newborns , babies , children , etc. For Vygotsky , these are primary needs , say , instincts . And you know Meshcheryakov succeeded in bringing all the preliminaries into existence through especial training and working with and taking care of some creatures he or others preferred to name 'animals' rather than thinking conscious creatures . He created a 'mind' through his activities with those creatures . c. Again you end your sentence with 'the person who thinks' . It is as though you cannot detach yourself from the accompaniment of a thinking man . Won't you think you might believe in such things being all innate ? If so , Vygotsky won't support . 3. "... and there are constant references throughout T&L to the ways that verbal thinking is linked to what people desire and what they do. In this sense, yes, activity (in the general sense) was important to LSV." What we know of Vygotsky is that he , while explicating his idea of 'internalization' , begins with expanded utterances , continues with the egocentric speech , still continues with the inner speech and ends in 'pure thinking' . As I said before , when he reaches the end of the book , he poses the question of 'motive' quoting Gothe as glorifying deed but concluding himself as believing in an 'ultimate' word . And you , dear , in your philosophical thoughts (as against colloquial ones) , are absolutely and definitely in this phase of what Vygotsky believes in . That is when and where a thought has been completed in a 'word' , say , as symbol for a full discourse . We should be careful with this idea that Vygotsky on the first round , that is from birth to grown-up does not use 'pure thinking' but on the reverse track , that is , the internalization from an expanded utterance to the last phase , he uses 'pure thinking' and this means a lot . 4. And I'd like to repeat you : What and which consciousness , then , is an aspect of the so-called general activity ? Once Andy put the question : What is consciousness? Then what is consciousness ? Where does it come from ? Is it something fixed or liable to change and accumulation ? If it changes , what are the variables ? Could one be born a personality ? Could one have a consciousness without having a personality ? Does Vygotsky say a baby is conscious to what he does ? In Vygotsky's 'genesis' initially there's no speech , no thinking ; at one point they meet . Then in the absence of these two important factors , of what consciousness could we speak ? 5. I personally see no great gulf between Vygotsky and all his disciples up to Davydov , etc. Let's respect CHAT in its entirety and full sense . Creating chasms to such an extent is , I'd like to think , a sin ! High Regards Haydi ________________________________ From: ?Martin John Packer? ?? To: ?Haydi Zulfei? ??; ?"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"? ?? Sent: Saturday, 18 October 2014, 18:16:32 Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] units of analysis? LSV versus ANL Hi Haydi, In the first chapter of Thought & Language, LSV points out that traditional psych had separated the intellectual, volitional, and affective aspects of human life, so that "thinking itself became the thinker of thoughts." In my view this has remained true for much of the history of psychology since LSV was writing. Cognition has been studied as though it is disconnected from the motives, interests, and inclinations of the person who thinks. LSV set out to avoid this false separation, and there are constant references throughout T&L to the ways that verbal thinking is linked to what people desire and what they do. In this sense, yes, activity (in the general sense) was important to LSV. To repeat myself, my interpretation is that for him consciousness was *an aspect* of activity. It is in activity that we perceive, we feel emotion, we remember, and we think. I suggested earlier that thinking is an *articulation* of action; we also think when we *pause* from action; but we even then I would say that we think in order to act. In this regard it seems to me LSV also tied his work to the labor theory of Marx. He certainly highlighted the central importance of Marx's work as a model of methodology. But at the same time he was very critical of the ways so-called Marxist psychologists in Russia at that time had made use of Marx's theory. I imagine he might have said the same of ANL. Martin On Oct 18, 2014, at 7:06 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: > Hi John > If there's any talk of activity , it's a joint goal-oriented activity ; then what you think of 'speech' being an activity might be where 'speech itself' is in the focus with motives , goals , conditions . > You want to sacrifice some innocents into a war ; you need a strong adept lecturer to excite them , stimulate them , propagate them through speech though other things are also available . In this circumstance , speech could be called "an activity proper" . > But there's a time you want to reach and conquest a mountain top as the motive for an activity . There might be lots of speech and speech acts in this enterprise but the motive and goal are different from what we had in the first instance . Here speech asts just as a vector , means of communication , ignoring its organizational and cognitive capabilities . > And two more points : > 1. I think at least in one place in 'thinking and speech' , Vygotsky analyzes speech as something which comes into being through the process of labour and with the assistance of tools and paralinguistics primarily bound to it . > 2. In the last lines of 'thinking and speech' , Vygotsky holds that he's traversed a reverse path ; he should have begun with "motive" other than words and concepts . And we may find many things in Luria's "Language and Cognition" in this regard . I think what might be fault with ANL besides his acts of espionage and conspiracies is that he did not waver in his belief to attach his theory to that of the labour theory of Marx . In fact all of them , at least , wished and hoped to make a society other than what the America now is . I remember Anna Stetsenko having said this many times while she was still here . And I very much like to know what dear Luria taught his friends and disciples about the whole deeds of his close friend , A.N.Leontiev . A.A.Leontiev's , Dimitri Leontiev's and especially Evald Ilyenko's and the Kharkov members in this respect . > Best Regards > Haydi Zulfei > > > > > ________________________________ > From: ?Martin John Packer? ?? > To: ?"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"? ?? > Sent: Saturday, 18 October 2014, 0:41:49 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL > > > > I see a difference, Huw. I just don't see the difference that the difference makes. And ANL cannot be correct: for one thing, in various texts LSV writes about the character of consciousness in preverbal children, and of how consciousness is transformed by the acquisition of language. This would hardly be possible if language were a necessary condition for consciousness. > > Martin > > On Oct 17, 2014, at 3:09 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > >> Specifically, ANL is pointing to drivers and necessary conditions. He is >> saying that LSV considers language-ing the driver for consciousness, >> whereas ANL points to activity. This to my reading and thinking is >> justifiably presented as a decisive difference. It is the same as stating >> that the deed precedes the word, and that the genetic precursor is >> > different to products derived from it. >> From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Oct 18 14:27:59 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 06:27:59 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Mike, Martin.... I'm afraid I don't have the Russian text of the Leontiev article. I just read the one that Andy send round, from the JREEP. (I also read his reply to Leontiev, and I can only say that he has a lot more patience with this sort of thing than I do--I really couldn't get past the part about "fatalistic determinism".) Martin expressed interest in the other lectures in the series, which we are translating. I enclose two--first of all the Russian and rough English translation of the one whose summary I sent round (Lecture Five on Psychological Devleopment). But secondly the Russian and rough English translation of his final lecture on neurological development, along with the summarizing endnote I wrote. Notice that Vygotsky says that psychology can be thought of as the function of the nervous system! David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (MIke--many thanks for bearding the Boesch quote for me!) dk On 18 October 2014 09:22, mike cole wrote: > David-- Since you have the Russian text, could you send a note with the > Russian for this passage?: > > > *Among these conditions, he encounters the fact of language, which is the > medium of the ?spiritual relations? established with it and constitutes an > essential condition for the development of his social and intellectual > consciousness. * > > Its as if culture is being turned into spirit and then called idealism and > used as a very material hammer. > > mike > > On Fri, Oct 17, 2014 at 4:13 PM, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> Thanks for the clarification, Huw. >> >> I am pointing out that in his texts LSV writes of consciousness prior to >> language (that is, in the preverbal infant), and of changes in >> consciousness when the child starts to speak. Presumably he would not have >> written such things if he believed that language is a necessary condition >> (ontogenetically) for consciousness. If ANL attributed such a view to LSV, >> he was incorrect, it seems to me. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 17, 2014, at 5:24 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> > The ANL's translation was: >> > >> > "The child, therefore, appears before us primarily as a subject of the >> > mate- rial process of life. In the process of his development, he >> > encounters ready- made, historically established conditions that >> determine >> > his existence as a social being. Among these conditions, he encounters >> the >> > fact of language, which is the medium of the ?spiritual relations? >> > established with it and con- stitutes an essential condition for the >> > development of his social and intellec- tual consciousness. Thus, >> > Vygotsky?s proposition that consciousness is a product of the child?s >> > verbal communication under conditions of his activity and in relation to >> > the material reality that surrounds him must be turned around: the >> > consciousness of a child is a product of his human activity in relation >> to >> > objective reality, taking place *under conditions of language* and under >> > conditions of verbal communication." >> > >> > You (Martin) wrote: >> > >> >> I see a difference, Huw. I just don't see the difference that the >> >> difference makes. And ANL cannot be correct: for one thing, in various >> >> texts LSV writes about the character of consciousness in preverbal >> >> children, and of how consciousness is transformed by the acquisition of >> >> language. This would hardly be possible if language were a necessary >> >> condition for consciousness. >> > >> > >> > So you're saying: That transformation of consciousness would not be >> > possible if language were a necessary condition for consciousness. >> > >> > ANL is asserting that LSV is not being coherent in this paper with >> respect >> > to materialist formulations. He is saying that it is weak. He is also >> > saying that the word is not the source of consciousness. So what are >> > saying that ANL cannot be right about? >> > >> > Best, >> > Huw >> >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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Name: Summarizing Endnote 7.doc Type: application/msword Size: 49152 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141019/ce6e1ccb/attachment-0001.doc From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sat Oct 18 15:38:11 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 22:38:11 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052B5E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: , <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052B5E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Hi Michael, LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. Every science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* appearance. One of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a burning candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle burning behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study that second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the mirror, in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' of a second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of us raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and feelings exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call "the mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how that appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we can use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk* psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try to make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot study the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, however, set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. Martin On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up for being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't think he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I think you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what develops if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops (remember I am suggesting individual development here). From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Oct 18 16:18:28 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (greg.a.thompson@gmail.com) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 16:18:28 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052B5E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <9FE73B38-AA98-41C6-AD43-871C1D9516F2@gmail.com> Martin, I wonder whether you think the notions of "inside" and "outside run into similar trouble of mental/material dualism? I was thinking in particular of the notion of the "inside" of a system (this was how Jay Lemke once described the notion of "stance" as the insides if the system). I can see trouble if we think of "Inside" solely in terms of "inside my head" as you mention. But I wonder if there isn't some possibility of working with this way of speaking that doesn't necessarily call in a mental/physical dualism? (I mean, "inside" and "outside are both ways of describing physical spaces, so it seems like as long as they aren't applied to a pre existing dualist if concept, then this shouldn't be a problem.) And though I'm not fond of the brain-as-computer metaphor, it might be instructive as a way to think about this inside/outside distinction as the difference between watching the processor at work (outside) and watching the screens as a program runs (inside). In principle the one can be reduced to the other, but in practice it can't anymore (I assume this is true with today's computers). The degree of complexity can make it seem like the program running is an autonomous explanatory level of its own, but that doesn't mean that it is. Just that it is the "inside" of the system. What do you think? -Greg Ps, apologies for not making more direct ties to lsv vs anl discussion. If this is too much of a sidetrack, I'm happy to take this up offline. But Martin, I find your position to be a very provocative one and would like to hear more about how it makes sense for you. It is a way of thinking that is very difficult to wrap one's Western language/mind/brain around! Sent from my iPhone > On Oct 18, 2014, at 3:38 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > Hi Michael, > > LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. Every science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* appearance. One of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a burning candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle burning behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study that second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the mirror, in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' of a second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. > > It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of us raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and feelings exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call "the mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how that appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we can use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk* psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try to make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot study the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, however, set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. > > Martin > >> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >> I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up for being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't think he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I think you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what develops if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops (remember I am suggesting individual development here). > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Sat Oct 18 17:18:36 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 00:18:36 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: , <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052B5E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052C39@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Hi Martin, That's a very interesting metaphor, but let me see if I can take it a step further. Basically you seem to be saying that Vygotsky is making a mechanistic argument - I'm not talking about the more colloquial expression of mechanistic but the one that Pepper talks about in World Hypothesis. You are looking into the mirror and seeing the reflection of a candle - but you are making the assumption that there must be a mechanism that is causing the reflection of the candle. You cannot know this mechanism itself - it is too difficult to reach - but you can build models that bring us closer to understanding. This I think is almost exactly how Pepper discusses this root metaphor. Our goal as scientists is to find the mediate description of the underlying mechanism. This Pragmatists/Conextualists would say this is dualism - not the dualism you get from Formism where you depend on your mind to bring you closer to a known but unreachable ideal, but in the sense that there is this mechanism that exists that is somehow separate from and causing the reflection in the mirror. So the Contextualist asks, if all you can see is what is in the mirror how do you know there is a mirror. That is the only information you have and you have to base all interpretation of the world on that information - to suggest you are looking at a reflection is an assumption based on a belief system that there must be causing what you are seeing. I think you are right, Vygotsky wants to assume the mirror, but in the end doesn't that suggest a dualism to his thinking. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 6:38 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL Hi Michael, LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. Every science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* appearance. One of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a burning candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle burning behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study that second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the mirror, in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' of a second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of us raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and feelings exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call "the mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how that appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we can use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk* psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try to make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot study the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, however, set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. Martin On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up for being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't think he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I think you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what develops if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops (remember I am suggesting individual development here). From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sat Oct 18 17:49:19 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 00:49:19 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <9FE73B38-AA98-41C6-AD43-871C1D9516F2@gmail.com> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052B5E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <9FE73B38-AA98-41C6-AD43-871C1D9516F2@gmail.com> Message-ID: <534AF524-E3D7-4D77-B8BA-5A2EA8609F03@uniandes.edu.co> Hi Greg, I'm certainly not suggesting we stop using the terms inside and outside. Material entities - including complex systems - can be inside other entities, including other systems. But "mind" can't be inside anything, because it occupies no space. At least that how the classical enlightenment philosophers defined mental entities - they have no extension, no spatial dimensions. Remember how Descartes tried to link mind to the pineal gland, because that was the smallest structure he could find in the brain? One of the indications that psychology is not, in fact, a study of the mind is that we are completely inconsistent in how we talk about it. I ask my students where their mind is. Most of them point at their heads. So I ask them what I asked Andy - "you mean if I look inside you skull I'll see your thoughts?" They tell me no. So I ask them again where their mind is, and they can't answer. I ask them how we can study something when we don't even know where it is. Your right, important stuff is inside the head. I have no trouble at all with the proposal that we study what is inside the head. I used to be a computer programmer, so I know something about the important stuff inside the machine. I think it's important to understand the human brain; I would not like to try to think without mine. But we won't find the mind by looking at the brain; in both cases there are material processes going on in material entities - physical in one case, biological in the other. In the case of a human being, the brain is a necessary basis for psychological processes to occur. But also necessary are the rest of the body, and a culture to live in. Just because the brain is inside the skull doesn't mean that the mind is inside the brain. There are now many powerful arguments against the assumption central to Cog Sci, that psychological processes are like computational processes, which operate on non-semantic formal representations (look at Clark, Barsalou, Glenberg, Ingold). And what sense would it make to say that consciousness is *in* the brain? Consciousness is a process; it is an aspect of our ongoing involvement in the material world. Where is it? It is where that involvement is. Martin On Oct 18, 2014, at 6:18 PM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: > Martin, I wonder whether you think the notions of "inside" and "outside run into similar trouble of mental/material dualism? > I was thinking in particular of the notion of the "inside" of a system (this was how Jay Lemke once described the notion of "stance" as the insides if the system). > I can see trouble if we think of "Inside" solely in terms of "inside my head" as you mention. But I wonder if there isn't some possibility of working with this way of speaking that doesn't necessarily call in a mental/physical dualism? (I mean, "inside" and "outside are both ways of describing physical spaces, so it seems like as long as they aren't applied to a pre existing dualist if concept, then this shouldn't be a problem.) > And though I'm not fond of the brain-as-computer metaphor, it might be instructive as a way to think about this inside/outside distinction as the difference between watching the processor at work (outside) and watching the screens as a program runs (inside). > In principle the one can be reduced to the other, but in practice it can't anymore (I assume this is true with today's computers). > The degree of complexity can make it seem like the program running is an autonomous explanatory level of its own, but that doesn't mean that it is. Just that it is the "inside" of the system. > What do you think? > -Greg > Ps, apologies for not making more direct ties to lsv vs anl discussion. If this is too much of a sidetrack, I'm happy to take this up offline. But Martin, I find your position to be a very provocative one and would like to hear more about how it makes sense for you. It is a way of thinking that is very difficult to wrap one's Western language/mind/brain around! > > > Sent from my iPhone > >> On Oct 18, 2014, at 3:38 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >> >> Hi Michael, >> >> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. Every science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* appearance. One of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a burning candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle burning behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study that second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the mirror, in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' of a second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. >> >> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of us raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and feelings exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call "the mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how that appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we can use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk* psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try to make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot study the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, however, set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. >> >> Martin >> >>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>> >>> I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up for being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't think he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I think you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what develops if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops (remember I am suggesting individual development here). >> >> > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Oct 18 18:06:42 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 02:06:42 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <534AF524-E3D7-4D77-B8BA-5A2EA8609F03@uniandes.edu.co> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052B5E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <9FE73B38-AA98-41C6-AD43-871C1D9516F2@gmail.com> <534AF524-E3D7-4D77-B8BA-5A2EA8609F03@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: If one is going to attend to the notion of consciousness as attentiveness, an "inner eye" etc, then it is germane to distinguish the genetic source from the derived means. The means for reflexivity is memory. It so happens that most of our memory is located in our heads, which is how we're able to imagine doing something without concurrently doing it -- or, what might be more accurate, only partially doing it. Best, Huw On 19 October 2014 01:49, Martin John Packer wrote: > Hi Greg, > > I'm certainly not suggesting we stop using the terms inside and outside. > Material entities - including complex systems - can be inside other > entities, including other systems. But "mind" can't be inside anything, > because it occupies no space. At least that how the classical enlightenment > philosophers defined mental entities - they have no extension, no spatial > dimensions. Remember how Descartes tried to link mind to the pineal gland, > because that was the smallest structure he could find in the brain? > > One of the indications that psychology is not, in fact, a study of the > mind is that we are completely inconsistent in how we talk about it. I ask > my students where their mind is. Most of them point at their heads. So I > ask them what I asked Andy - "you mean if I look inside you skull I'll see > your thoughts?" They tell me no. So I ask them again where their mind is, > and they can't answer. I ask them how we can study something when we don't > even know where it is. > > Your right, important stuff is inside the head. I have no trouble at all > with the proposal that we study what is inside the head. I used to be a > computer programmer, so I know something about the important stuff inside > the machine. I think it's important to understand the human brain; I would > not like to try to think without mine. But we won't find the mind by > looking at the brain; in both cases there are material processes going on > in material entities - physical in one case, biological in the other. In > the case of a human being, the brain is a necessary basis for psychological > processes to occur. But also necessary are the rest of the body, and a > culture to live in. Just because the brain is inside the skull doesn't mean > that the mind is inside the brain. There are now many powerful arguments > against the assumption central to Cog Sci, that psychological processes are > like computational processes, which operate on non-semantic formal > representations (look at Clark, Barsalou, Glenberg, Ingold). And what sense > would it make to say that consciousness is *in* the brain? Consciousness is > a process; it is an aspect of our ongoing involvement in the material > world. Where is it? It is where that involvement is. > > Martin > > On Oct 18, 2014, at 6:18 PM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: > > > Martin, I wonder whether you think the notions of "inside" and "outside > run into similar trouble of mental/material dualism? > > I was thinking in particular of the notion of the "inside" of a system > (this was how Jay Lemke once described the notion of "stance" as the > insides if the system). > > I can see trouble if we think of "Inside" solely in terms of "inside my > head" as you mention. But I wonder if there isn't some possibility of > working with this way of speaking that doesn't necessarily call in a > mental/physical dualism? (I mean, "inside" and "outside are both ways of > describing physical spaces, so it seems like as long as they aren't applied > to a pre existing dualist if concept, then this shouldn't be a problem.) > > And though I'm not fond of the brain-as-computer metaphor, it might be > instructive as a way to think about this inside/outside distinction as the > difference between watching the processor at work (outside) and watching > the screens as a program runs (inside). > > In principle the one can be reduced to the other, but in practice it > can't anymore (I assume this is true with today's computers). > > The degree of complexity can make it seem like the program running is an > autonomous explanatory level of its own, but that doesn't mean that it is. > Just that it is the "inside" of the system. > > What do you think? > > -Greg > > Ps, apologies for not making more direct ties to lsv vs anl discussion. > If this is too much of a sidetrack, I'm happy to take this up offline. But > Martin, I find your position to be a very provocative one and would like to > hear more about how it makes sense for you. It is a way of thinking that is > very difficult to wrap one's Western language/mind/brain around! > > > > > > Sent from my iPhone > > > >> On Oct 18, 2014, at 3:38 PM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >> > >> Hi Michael, > >> > >> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. > Every science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* > appearance. One of his examples is from the science of optics. When we > place a burning candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second > candle burning behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't > study that second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and > the mirror, in order to discover principles by which to explain why an > 'image' of a second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. > >> > >> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of > us raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and feelings > exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call "the > mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how that > appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal > thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we can > use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre > bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and > Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and > neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk* > psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try to > make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own > psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot study > the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, however, > set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > >>> > >>> I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up for > being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't think > he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I think > you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what develops > if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops (remember > I am suggesting individual development here). > >> > >> > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sat Oct 18 18:38:44 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 01:38:44 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052B5E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <9FE73B38-AA98-41C6-AD43-871C1D9516F2@gmail.com> <534AF524-E3D7-4D77-B8BA-5A2EA8609F03@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <517C8AC7-154D-48C2-B4DA-381B94796BA3@uniandes.edu.co> So many assumptions here that I don't share, Huw. Martin On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:06 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > If one is going to attend to the notion of consciousness as attentiveness, > an "inner eye" etc, then it is germane to distinguish the genetic source > from the derived means. The means for reflexivity is memory. It so > happens that most of our memory is located in our heads, which is how we're > able to imagine doing something without concurrently doing it -- or, what > might be more accurate, only partially doing it. > > Best, > Huw > > On 19 October 2014 01:49, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> Hi Greg, >> >> I'm certainly not suggesting we stop using the terms inside and outside. >> Material entities - including complex systems - can be inside other >> entities, including other systems. But "mind" can't be inside anything, >> because it occupies no space. At least that how the classical enlightenment >> philosophers defined mental entities - they have no extension, no spatial >> dimensions. Remember how Descartes tried to link mind to the pineal gland, >> because that was the smallest structure he could find in the brain? >> >> One of the indications that psychology is not, in fact, a study of the >> mind is that we are completely inconsistent in how we talk about it. I ask >> my students where their mind is. Most of them point at their heads. So I >> ask them what I asked Andy - "you mean if I look inside you skull I'll see >> your thoughts?" They tell me no. So I ask them again where their mind is, >> and they can't answer. I ask them how we can study something when we don't >> even know where it is. >> >> Your right, important stuff is inside the head. I have no trouble at all >> with the proposal that we study what is inside the head. I used to be a >> computer programmer, so I know something about the important stuff inside >> the machine. I think it's important to understand the human brain; I would >> not like to try to think without mine. But we won't find the mind by >> looking at the brain; in both cases there are material processes going on >> in material entities - physical in one case, biological in the other. In >> the case of a human being, the brain is a necessary basis for psychological >> processes to occur. But also necessary are the rest of the body, and a >> culture to live in. Just because the brain is inside the skull doesn't mean >> that the mind is inside the brain. There are now many powerful arguments >> against the assumption central to Cog Sci, that psychological processes are >> like computational processes, which operate on non-semantic formal >> representations (look at Clark, Barsalou, Glenberg, Ingold). And what sense >> would it make to say that consciousness is *in* the brain? Consciousness is >> a process; it is an aspect of our ongoing involvement in the material >> world. Where is it? It is where that involvement is. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 18, 2014, at 6:18 PM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >> >>> Martin, I wonder whether you think the notions of "inside" and "outside >> run into similar trouble of mental/material dualism? >>> I was thinking in particular of the notion of the "inside" of a system >> (this was how Jay Lemke once described the notion of "stance" as the >> insides if the system). >>> I can see trouble if we think of "Inside" solely in terms of "inside my >> head" as you mention. But I wonder if there isn't some possibility of >> working with this way of speaking that doesn't necessarily call in a >> mental/physical dualism? (I mean, "inside" and "outside are both ways of >> describing physical spaces, so it seems like as long as they aren't applied >> to a pre existing dualist if concept, then this shouldn't be a problem.) >>> And though I'm not fond of the brain-as-computer metaphor, it might be >> instructive as a way to think about this inside/outside distinction as the >> difference between watching the processor at work (outside) and watching >> the screens as a program runs (inside). >>> In principle the one can be reduced to the other, but in practice it >> can't anymore (I assume this is true with today's computers). >>> The degree of complexity can make it seem like the program running is an >> autonomous explanatory level of its own, but that doesn't mean that it is. >> Just that it is the "inside" of the system. >>> What do you think? >>> -Greg >>> Ps, apologies for not making more direct ties to lsv vs anl discussion. >> If this is too much of a sidetrack, I'm happy to take this up offline. But >> Martin, I find your position to be a very provocative one and would like to >> hear more about how it makes sense for you. It is a way of thinking that is >> very difficult to wrap one's Western language/mind/brain around! >>> >>> >>> Sent from my iPhone >>> >>>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 3:38 PM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Michael, >>>> >>>> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. >> Every science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* >> appearance. One of his examples is from the science of optics. When we >> place a burning candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second >> candle burning behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't >> study that second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and >> the mirror, in order to discover principles by which to explain why an >> 'image' of a second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. >>>> >>>> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of >> us raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and feelings >> exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call "the >> mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how that >> appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal >> thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we can >> use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre >> bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and >> Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and >> neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk* >> psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try to >> make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own >> psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot study >> the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, however, >> set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael >> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up for >> being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't think >> he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I think >> you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what develops >> if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops (remember >> I am suggesting individual development here). >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Oct 18 19:06:57 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 03:06:57 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <517C8AC7-154D-48C2-B4DA-381B94796BA3@uniandes.edu.co> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052B5E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <9FE73B38-AA98-41C6-AD43-871C1D9516F2@gmail.com> <534AF524-E3D7-4D77-B8BA-5A2EA8609F03@uniandes.edu.co> <517C8AC7-154D-48C2-B4DA-381B94796BA3@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: On 19 October 2014 02:38, Martin John Packer wrote: > So many assumptions here that I don't share, Huw. > Quite so! Why don't you share them? Best, Huw > > Martin > > On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:06 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > If one is going to attend to the notion of consciousness as > attentiveness, > > an "inner eye" etc, then it is germane to distinguish the genetic source > > from the derived means. The means for reflexivity is memory. It so > > happens that most of our memory is located in our heads, which is how > we're > > able to imagine doing something without concurrently doing it -- or, > what > > might be more accurate, only partially doing it. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > On 19 October 2014 01:49, Martin John Packer > > wrote: > > > >> Hi Greg, > >> > >> I'm certainly not suggesting we stop using the terms inside and outside. > >> Material entities - including complex systems - can be inside other > >> entities, including other systems. But "mind" can't be inside anything, > >> because it occupies no space. At least that how the classical > enlightenment > >> philosophers defined mental entities - they have no extension, no > spatial > >> dimensions. Remember how Descartes tried to link mind to the pineal > gland, > >> because that was the smallest structure he could find in the brain? > >> > >> One of the indications that psychology is not, in fact, a study of the > >> mind is that we are completely inconsistent in how we talk about it. I > ask > >> my students where their mind is. Most of them point at their heads. So I > >> ask them what I asked Andy - "you mean if I look inside you skull I'll > see > >> your thoughts?" They tell me no. So I ask them again where their mind > is, > >> and they can't answer. I ask them how we can study something when we > don't > >> even know where it is. > >> > >> Your right, important stuff is inside the head. I have no trouble at all > >> with the proposal that we study what is inside the head. I used to be a > >> computer programmer, so I know something about the important stuff > inside > >> the machine. I think it's important to understand the human brain; I > would > >> not like to try to think without mine. But we won't find the mind by > >> looking at the brain; in both cases there are material processes going > on > >> in material entities - physical in one case, biological in the other. In > >> the case of a human being, the brain is a necessary basis for > psychological > >> processes to occur. But also necessary are the rest of the body, and a > >> culture to live in. Just because the brain is inside the skull doesn't > mean > >> that the mind is inside the brain. There are now many powerful arguments > >> against the assumption central to Cog Sci, that psychological processes > are > >> like computational processes, which operate on non-semantic formal > >> representations (look at Clark, Barsalou, Glenberg, Ingold). And what > sense > >> would it make to say that consciousness is *in* the brain? > Consciousness is > >> a process; it is an aspect of our ongoing involvement in the material > >> world. Where is it? It is where that involvement is. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Oct 18, 2014, at 6:18 PM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: > >> > >>> Martin, I wonder whether you think the notions of "inside" and "outside > >> run into similar trouble of mental/material dualism? > >>> I was thinking in particular of the notion of the "inside" of a system > >> (this was how Jay Lemke once described the notion of "stance" as the > >> insides if the system). > >>> I can see trouble if we think of "Inside" solely in terms of "inside my > >> head" as you mention. But I wonder if there isn't some possibility of > >> working with this way of speaking that doesn't necessarily call in a > >> mental/physical dualism? (I mean, "inside" and "outside are both ways of > >> describing physical spaces, so it seems like as long as they aren't > applied > >> to a pre existing dualist if concept, then this shouldn't be a problem.) > >>> And though I'm not fond of the brain-as-computer metaphor, it might be > >> instructive as a way to think about this inside/outside distinction as > the > >> difference between watching the processor at work (outside) and watching > >> the screens as a program runs (inside). > >>> In principle the one can be reduced to the other, but in practice it > >> can't anymore (I assume this is true with today's computers). > >>> The degree of complexity can make it seem like the program running is > an > >> autonomous explanatory level of its own, but that doesn't mean that it > is. > >> Just that it is the "inside" of the system. > >>> What do you think? > >>> -Greg > >>> Ps, apologies for not making more direct ties to lsv vs anl discussion. > >> If this is too much of a sidetrack, I'm happy to take this up offline. > But > >> Martin, I find your position to be a very provocative one and would > like to > >> hear more about how it makes sense for you. It is a way of thinking > that is > >> very difficult to wrap one's Western language/mind/brain around! > >>> > >>> > >>> Sent from my iPhone > >>> > >>>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 3:38 PM, Martin John Packer < > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Hi Michael, > >>>> > >>>> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. > >> Every science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* > >> appearance. One of his examples is from the science of optics. When we > >> place a burning candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a > second > >> candle burning behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist > doesn't > >> study that second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, > and > >> the mirror, in order to discover principles by which to explain why an > >> 'image' of a second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. > >>>> > >>>> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of > >> us raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and > feelings > >> exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call "the > >> mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how > that > >> appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal > >> thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we > can > >> use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre > >> bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and > >> Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and > >> neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk* > >> psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try to > >> make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own > >> psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot > study > >> the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, however, > >> set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael > >> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up for > >> being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't > think > >> he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I > think > >> you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what > develops > >> if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops > (remember > >> I am suggesting individual development here). > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Oct 18 20:14:35 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (greg.a.thompson@gmail.com) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 20:14:35 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <534AF524-E3D7-4D77-B8BA-5A2EA8609F03@uniandes.edu.co> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052B5E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <9FE73B38-AA98-41C6-AD43-871C1D9516F2@gmail.com> <534AF524-E3D7-4D77-B8BA-5A2EA8609F03@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <8C020D9E-83BF-436A-8B72-B2221C718A62@gmail.com> Yes, I'm with you on 1) the fact that we don't want to suggest that the mind is "inside" the brain and 2) that the brain-as-computer argument fails on many formal counts. Agreed and agreed. All that I was proposing was simply the idea that the system/process/bundle of relations that we shorthand with the term "mind/brain" can be observed from two different perspective that offer radically different takes on that system/process/bundle of relations. It is in this sense that I was suggesting the computer metaphor might be useful. From "inside" (e.g., as a user interacting with a program), it looks radically different from what it looks like if you observe it from the "outside" - e. g. watch the processor and hard drive spinning and things getting accessed. Depending on whether you are "inside" or "outside", you will see something radically different - and with the complexity of computers today, this radical difference gets to the point that one is increasingly tempted to become a dualist about computers. And perhaps this is the real threshold for what we call "artificial intelligence" - I. e. The point at which we become definitively dualistic about computers - when we can no longer sufficiently explain the "insides" (the program) with the outsides (the spinning drive). Who knows? Greg Sent from my iPhone > On Oct 18, 2014, at 5:49 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > Hi Greg, > > I'm certainly not suggesting we stop using the terms inside and outside. Material entities - including complex systems - can be inside other entities, including other systems. But "mind" can't be inside anything, because it occupies no space. At least that how the classical enlightenment philosophers defined mental entities - they have no extension, no spatial dimensions. Remember how Descartes tried to link mind to the pineal gland, because that was the smallest structure he could find in the brain? > > One of the indications that psychology is not, in fact, a study of the mind is that we are completely inconsistent in how we talk about it. I ask my students where their mind is. Most of them point at their heads. So I ask them what I asked Andy - "you mean if I look inside you skull I'll see your thoughts?" They tell me no. So I ask them again where their mind is, and they can't answer. I ask them how we can study something when we don't even know where it is. > > Your right, important stuff is inside the head. I have no trouble at all with the proposal that we study what is inside the head. I used to be a computer programmer, so I know something about the important stuff inside the machine. I think it's important to understand the human brain; I would not like to try to think without mine. But we won't find the mind by looking at the brain; in both cases there are material processes going on in material entities - physical in one case, biological in the other. In the case of a human being, the brain is a necessary basis for psychological processes to occur. But also necessary are the rest of the body, and a culture to live in. Just because the brain is inside the skull doesn't mean that the mind is inside the brain. There are now many powerful arguments against the assumption central to Cog Sci, that psychological processes are like computational processes, which operate on non-semantic formal representations (look at Clark, Barsalou, Glenberg, Ingold). And what sense would it make to say that consciousness is *in* the brain? Consciousness is a process; it is an aspect of our ongoing involvement in the material world. Where is it? It is where that involvement is. > > Martin > >> On Oct 18, 2014, at 6:18 PM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >> >> Martin, I wonder whether you think the notions of "inside" and "outside run into similar trouble of mental/material dualism? >> I was thinking in particular of the notion of the "inside" of a system (this was how Jay Lemke once described the notion of "stance" as the insides if the system). >> I can see trouble if we think of "Inside" solely in terms of "inside my head" as you mention. But I wonder if there isn't some possibility of working with this way of speaking that doesn't necessarily call in a mental/physical dualism? (I mean, "inside" and "outside are both ways of describing physical spaces, so it seems like as long as they aren't applied to a pre existing dualist if concept, then this shouldn't be a problem.) >> And though I'm not fond of the brain-as-computer metaphor, it might be instructive as a way to think about this inside/outside distinction as the difference between watching the processor at work (outside) and watching the screens as a program runs (inside). >> In principle the one can be reduced to the other, but in practice it can't anymore (I assume this is true with today's computers). >> The degree of complexity can make it seem like the program running is an autonomous explanatory level of its own, but that doesn't mean that it is. Just that it is the "inside" of the system. >> What do you think? >> -Greg >> Ps, apologies for not making more direct ties to lsv vs anl discussion. If this is too much of a sidetrack, I'm happy to take this up offline. But Martin, I find your position to be a very provocative one and would like to hear more about how it makes sense for you. It is a way of thinking that is very difficult to wrap one's Western language/mind/brain around! >> >> >> Sent from my iPhone >> >>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 3:38 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>> Hi Michael, >>> >>> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. Every science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* appearance. One of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a burning candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle burning behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study that second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the mirror, in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' of a second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. >>> >>> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of us raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and feelings exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call "the mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how that appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we can use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk* psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try to make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot study the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, however, set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>> >>>> I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up for being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't think he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I think you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what develops if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops (remember I am suggesting individual development here). > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Oct 18 20:23:07 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (greg.a.thompson@gmail.com) Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 20:23:07 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052B5E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <9FE73B38-AA98-41C6-AD43-871C1D9516F2@gmail.com> <534AF524-E3D7-4D77-B8BA-5A2EA8609F03@uniandes.edu.co> <517C8AC7-154D-48C2-B4DA-381B94796BA3@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <7543C040-CBF8-4BC1-B534-65120F606904@gmail.com> Huw, have you ever been unable to remember a phone number until you reach for a phone and as soon as your fingers touch the keys you remember it? Seems like the number was in your head/fingers/phone, not just your brain. No? Greg Sent from my iPhone > On Oct 18, 2014, at 7:06 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > On 19 October 2014 02:38, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> So many assumptions here that I don't share, Huw. > > Quite so! Why don't you share them? > > Best, > Huw > > >> >> Martin >> >>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:06 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> >>> If one is going to attend to the notion of consciousness as >> attentiveness, >>> an "inner eye" etc, then it is germane to distinguish the genetic source >>> from the derived means. The means for reflexivity is memory. It so >>> happens that most of our memory is located in our heads, which is how >> we're >>> able to imagine doing something without concurrently doing it -- or, >> what >>> might be more accurate, only partially doing it. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> On 19 October 2014 01:49, Martin John Packer >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Greg, >>>> >>>> I'm certainly not suggesting we stop using the terms inside and outside. >>>> Material entities - including complex systems - can be inside other >>>> entities, including other systems. But "mind" can't be inside anything, >>>> because it occupies no space. At least that how the classical >> enlightenment >>>> philosophers defined mental entities - they have no extension, no >> spatial >>>> dimensions. Remember how Descartes tried to link mind to the pineal >> gland, >>>> because that was the smallest structure he could find in the brain? >>>> >>>> One of the indications that psychology is not, in fact, a study of the >>>> mind is that we are completely inconsistent in how we talk about it. I >> ask >>>> my students where their mind is. Most of them point at their heads. So I >>>> ask them what I asked Andy - "you mean if I look inside you skull I'll >> see >>>> your thoughts?" They tell me no. So I ask them again where their mind >> is, >>>> and they can't answer. I ask them how we can study something when we >> don't >>>> even know where it is. >>>> >>>> Your right, important stuff is inside the head. I have no trouble at all >>>> with the proposal that we study what is inside the head. I used to be a >>>> computer programmer, so I know something about the important stuff >> inside >>>> the machine. I think it's important to understand the human brain; I >> would >>>> not like to try to think without mine. But we won't find the mind by >>>> looking at the brain; in both cases there are material processes going >> on >>>> in material entities - physical in one case, biological in the other. In >>>> the case of a human being, the brain is a necessary basis for >> psychological >>>> processes to occur. But also necessary are the rest of the body, and a >>>> culture to live in. Just because the brain is inside the skull doesn't >> mean >>>> that the mind is inside the brain. There are now many powerful arguments >>>> against the assumption central to Cog Sci, that psychological processes >> are >>>> like computational processes, which operate on non-semantic formal >>>> representations (look at Clark, Barsalou, Glenberg, Ingold). And what >> sense >>>> would it make to say that consciousness is *in* the brain? >> Consciousness is >>>> a process; it is an aspect of our ongoing involvement in the material >>>> world. Where is it? It is where that involvement is. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 6:18 PM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Martin, I wonder whether you think the notions of "inside" and "outside >>>> run into similar trouble of mental/material dualism? >>>>> I was thinking in particular of the notion of the "inside" of a system >>>> (this was how Jay Lemke once described the notion of "stance" as the >>>> insides if the system). >>>>> I can see trouble if we think of "Inside" solely in terms of "inside my >>>> head" as you mention. But I wonder if there isn't some possibility of >>>> working with this way of speaking that doesn't necessarily call in a >>>> mental/physical dualism? (I mean, "inside" and "outside are both ways of >>>> describing physical spaces, so it seems like as long as they aren't >> applied >>>> to a pre existing dualist if concept, then this shouldn't be a problem.) >>>>> And though I'm not fond of the brain-as-computer metaphor, it might be >>>> instructive as a way to think about this inside/outside distinction as >> the >>>> difference between watching the processor at work (outside) and watching >>>> the screens as a program runs (inside). >>>>> In principle the one can be reduced to the other, but in practice it >>>> can't anymore (I assume this is true with today's computers). >>>>> The degree of complexity can make it seem like the program running is >> an >>>> autonomous explanatory level of its own, but that doesn't mean that it >> is. >>>> Just that it is the "inside" of the system. >>>>> What do you think? >>>>> -Greg >>>>> Ps, apologies for not making more direct ties to lsv vs anl discussion. >>>> If this is too much of a sidetrack, I'm happy to take this up offline. >> But >>>> Martin, I find your position to be a very provocative one and would >> like to >>>> hear more about how it makes sense for you. It is a way of thinking >> that is >>>> very difficult to wrap one's Western language/mind/brain around! >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>> >>>>>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 3:38 PM, Martin John Packer < >>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Michael, >>>>>> >>>>>> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. >>>> Every science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* >>>> appearance. One of his examples is from the science of optics. When we >>>> place a burning candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a >> second >>>> candle burning behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist >> doesn't >>>> study that second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, >> and >>>> the mirror, in order to discover principles by which to explain why an >>>> 'image' of a second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. >>>>>> >>>>>> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of >>>> us raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and >> feelings >>>> exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call "the >>>> mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how >> that >>>> appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal >>>> thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we >> can >>>> use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre >>>> bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and >>>> Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and >>>> neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk* >>>> psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try to >>>> make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own >>>> psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot >> study >>>> the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, however, >>>> set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael >>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up for >>>> being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't >> think >>>> he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I >> think >>>> you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what >> develops >>>> if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops >> (remember >>>> I am suggesting individual development here). >> >> >> From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Oct 19 02:31:44 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 10:31:44 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <7543C040-CBF8-4BC1-B534-65120F606904@gmail.com> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052B5E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <9FE73B38-AA98-41C6-AD43-871C1D9516F2@gmail.com> <534AF524-E3D7-4D77-B8BA-5A2EA8609F03@uniandes.edu.co> <517C8AC7-154D-48C2-B4DA-381B94796BA3@uniandes.edu.co> <7543C040-CBF8-4BC1-B534-65120F606904@gmail.com> Message-ID: On 19 October 2014 04:23, wrote: > Huw, > have you ever been unable to remember a phone number until you reach for a > phone and as soon as your fingers touch the keys you remember it? > Seems like the number was in your head/fingers/phone, not just your brain. > No? > The ability to reach is a memory too, Greg. Huw > Greg > > Sent from my iPhone > > > On Oct 18, 2014, at 7:06 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > > On 19 October 2014 02:38, Martin John Packer > > wrote: > > > >> So many assumptions here that I don't share, Huw. > > > > Quite so! Why don't you share them? > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > >> > >> Martin > >> > >>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:06 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > >>> > >>> If one is going to attend to the notion of consciousness as > >> attentiveness, > >>> an "inner eye" etc, then it is germane to distinguish the genetic > source > >>> from the derived means. The means for reflexivity is memory. It so > >>> happens that most of our memory is located in our heads, which is how > >> we're > >>> able to imagine doing something without concurrently doing it -- or, > >> what > >>> might be more accurate, only partially doing it. > >>> > >>> Best, > >>> Huw > >>> > >>> On 19 October 2014 01:49, Martin John Packer > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Hi Greg, > >>>> > >>>> I'm certainly not suggesting we stop using the terms inside and > outside. > >>>> Material entities - including complex systems - can be inside other > >>>> entities, including other systems. But "mind" can't be inside > anything, > >>>> because it occupies no space. At least that how the classical > >> enlightenment > >>>> philosophers defined mental entities - they have no extension, no > >> spatial > >>>> dimensions. Remember how Descartes tried to link mind to the pineal > >> gland, > >>>> because that was the smallest structure he could find in the brain? > >>>> > >>>> One of the indications that psychology is not, in fact, a study of the > >>>> mind is that we are completely inconsistent in how we talk about it. I > >> ask > >>>> my students where their mind is. Most of them point at their heads. > So I > >>>> ask them what I asked Andy - "you mean if I look inside you skull I'll > >> see > >>>> your thoughts?" They tell me no. So I ask them again where their mind > >> is, > >>>> and they can't answer. I ask them how we can study something when we > >> don't > >>>> even know where it is. > >>>> > >>>> Your right, important stuff is inside the head. I have no trouble at > all > >>>> with the proposal that we study what is inside the head. I used to > be a > >>>> computer programmer, so I know something about the important stuff > >> inside > >>>> the machine. I think it's important to understand the human brain; I > >> would > >>>> not like to try to think without mine. But we won't find the mind by > >>>> looking at the brain; in both cases there are material processes going > >> on > >>>> in material entities - physical in one case, biological in the other. > In > >>>> the case of a human being, the brain is a necessary basis for > >> psychological > >>>> processes to occur. But also necessary are the rest of the body, and a > >>>> culture to live in. Just because the brain is inside the skull doesn't > >> mean > >>>> that the mind is inside the brain. There are now many powerful > arguments > >>>> against the assumption central to Cog Sci, that psychological > processes > >> are > >>>> like computational processes, which operate on non-semantic formal > >>>> representations (look at Clark, Barsalou, Glenberg, Ingold). And what > >> sense > >>>> would it make to say that consciousness is *in* the brain? > >> Consciousness is > >>>> a process; it is an aspect of our ongoing involvement in the material > >>>> world. Where is it? It is where that involvement is. > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 6:18 PM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin, I wonder whether you think the notions of "inside" and > "outside > >>>> run into similar trouble of mental/material dualism? > >>>>> I was thinking in particular of the notion of the "inside" of a > system > >>>> (this was how Jay Lemke once described the notion of "stance" as the > >>>> insides if the system). > >>>>> I can see trouble if we think of "Inside" solely in terms of "inside > my > >>>> head" as you mention. But I wonder if there isn't some possibility of > >>>> working with this way of speaking that doesn't necessarily call in a > >>>> mental/physical dualism? (I mean, "inside" and "outside are both ways > of > >>>> describing physical spaces, so it seems like as long as they aren't > >> applied > >>>> to a pre existing dualist if concept, then this shouldn't be a > problem.) > >>>>> And though I'm not fond of the brain-as-computer metaphor, it might > be > >>>> instructive as a way to think about this inside/outside distinction as > >> the > >>>> difference between watching the processor at work (outside) and > watching > >>>> the screens as a program runs (inside). > >>>>> In principle the one can be reduced to the other, but in practice it > >>>> can't anymore (I assume this is true with today's computers). > >>>>> The degree of complexity can make it seem like the program running is > >> an > >>>> autonomous explanatory level of its own, but that doesn't mean that it > >> is. > >>>> Just that it is the "inside" of the system. > >>>>> What do you think? > >>>>> -Greg > >>>>> Ps, apologies for not making more direct ties to lsv vs anl > discussion. > >>>> If this is too much of a sidetrack, I'm happy to take this up offline. > >> But > >>>> Martin, I find your position to be a very provocative one and would > >> like to > >>>> hear more about how it makes sense for you. It is a way of thinking > >> that is > >>>> very difficult to wrap one's Western language/mind/brain around! > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Sent from my iPhone > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 3:38 PM, Martin John Packer < > >>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Hi Michael, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. > >>>> Every science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* > >>>> appearance. One of his examples is from the science of optics. When we > >>>> place a burning candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a > >> second > >>>> candle burning behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist > >> doesn't > >>>> study that second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, > >> and > >>>> the mirror, in order to discover principles by which to explain why an > >>>> 'image' of a second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the > mirror. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those > of > >>>> us raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and > >> feelings > >>>> exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call > "the > >>>> mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how > >> that > >>>> appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal > >>>> thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we > >> can > >>>> use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre > >>>> bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and > >>>> Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and > >>>> neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk* > >>>> psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try > to > >>>> make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own > >>>> psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot > >> study > >>>> the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, > however, > >>>> set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Martin > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael < > glassman.13@osu.edu> > >>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up > for > >>>> being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't > >> think > >>>> he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I > >> think > >>>> you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what > >> develops > >>>> if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops > >> (remember > >>>> I am suggesting individual development here). > >> > >> > >> > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Oct 19 03:40:05 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 10:40:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?q?units_of_analysis=3F_LSV_versus_ANL?= In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052C39@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: , <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052B5E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052C39@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <54439b7a.055f460a.0ae6.0d62@mx.google.com> Michael Glassman and Martin and How I want to ex-tend the exploration of *models* and *memories* and *contextualism* as linked in Michael?s rejoinder to Martin. Michael wrote ?if ALL you can *see* [perceive] is what is IN the mirror [metaphor of reflection AS mirroring] how do you ?know? there IS a mirror The IF IMPLIED is the ?ALL? . However, is that ?all there IS? in *seeing*? IS ?memory* also existent as an existent IN seeing? In other words, do *interpretants* ACTUALLY exist IN FACT? [as such] Umberto Eco suggests there is both ORPHIC knowing/seeing [when Picasso paints THAT PARTICULAR yellow shoe in a painting the SINGULARITY of THAT experience IS ?orphic? POETS and artists are ?biased? to privilege THIS WAY of knowing [Peirce's secondness as orphic and possibly orphaned] HOWEVER, Umberto Eco suggests that this orphic ?knowing* is also *indicative* [indexical] of further *interpreting* AND THIS TYPE of *knowing* EX-TENDS Orphic knowing. [Peirce's tiredness] Now in Peirce's metaphysics THIS interpreting creating interpretants also is EXISTING as facts. Is this transforming orphic [what IS present] TO forming *interpretants* AS *something* that actually exists {through the interpreting process} INCLUDE memory but that IS NOT ALL. IS creative imagining potentially existent? that goes BEYOND memory? I believe Umberto Eco?s question of a deeper knowing than orphic/orphan knowing *things-in-themselves* EX-tending BEYOND the orphic [secondness] to INCLUDE interpreting and forming actual *interpretants* [tiredness] must be considered within the memory process. This returns to *models* that are necessary but NOT ALL there *is*. The *relation* between *orphic* knowing and *interpreting* knowing seems a KEY question [and may ex-tend back into metaphysics? Larry Sent from Windows Mail From: Glassman, Michael Sent: ?Saturday?, ?October? ?18?, ?2014 ?5?:?18? ?PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Hi Martin, That's a very interesting metaphor, but let me see if I can take it a step further. Basically you seem to be saying that Vygotsky is making a mechanistic argument - I'm not talking about the more colloquial expression of mechanistic but the one that Pepper talks about in World Hypothesis. You are looking into the mirror and seeing the reflection of a candle - but you are making the assumption that there must be a mechanism that is causing the reflection of the candle. You cannot know this mechanism itself - it is too difficult to reach - but you can build models that bring us closer to understanding. This I think is almost exactly how Pepper discusses this root metaphor. Our goal as scientists is to find the mediate description of the underlying mechanism. This Pragmatists/Conextualists would say this is dualism - not the dualism you get from Formism where you depend on your mind to bring you closer to a known but unreachable ideal, but in the sense that there is this mechanism that exists that is somehow separate from and causing the reflection in the mirror. So the Contextualist asks, if all you can see is what is in the mirror how do you know there is a mirror. That is the only information you have and you have to base all interpretation of the world on that information - to suggest you are looking at a reflection is an assumption based on a belief system that there must be causing what you are seeing. I think you are right, Vygotsky wants to assume the mirror, but in the end doesn't that suggest a dualism to his thinking. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 6:38 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL Hi Michael, LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. Every science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* appearance. One of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a burning candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle burning behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study that second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the mirror, in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' of a second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of us raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and feelings exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call "the mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how that appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we can use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk* psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try to make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot study the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, however, set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. Martin On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up for being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't think he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I think you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what develops if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops (remember I am suggesting individual development here). From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Oct 19 07:16:39 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 14:16:39 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <8C020D9E-83BF-436A-8B72-B2221C718A62@gmail.com> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052B5E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <9FE73B38-AA98-41C6-AD43-871C1D9516F2@gmail.com> <534AF524-E3D7-4D77-B8BA-5A2EA8609F03@uniandes.edu.co> <8C020D9E-83BF-436A-8B72-B2221C718A62@gmail.com> Message-ID: Greg, There are many phenomena that can be looked at from more than one perspective. Indeed, to understand a complex system (and a computer is a complex mechanical system) one really needs to look at it from several perspectives. Think of LSV looking at consciousness from the perspective of the relation between thinking and speaking, but emphasizing that other viewpoints are possible. However, the dualism that LSV was concerned to avoid is *ontological* dualism: the assumption that there two fundamental *kinds* of entity: mental entities, and material entities. There are many entities in a computer - hard drives, integrated circuits, processes with threads, users with privileges. But they are all have a material basis. Let me drivel on a little, since I know that you and others have been reading Latour's book "modes of existence." Latour explores the distinct modes of existence in different social institutions - science, religion, law... It might seem that he is even worse than dualist, because he recognizes not only 2 kinds of entity but multiple kinds. To figure out why this is not the case one needs to go back into the history of this a bit, as Latour does. The Moderns (enlightenment philosophers and scientists, and their many followers, including most of psychology) rejected a religious view of the world that saw it as full with meaning and value. They "disenchanted" the world, insisting that the physical universe is simply matter in motion. Value, meaning, were all in the mind. In short, they had a very shriveled view of the material, a very 'strict materialism.' A very 'idealized' view of matter, one might say. To 'preserve' value and meaning - and even causation, which many of them considered a judgment not a real process - they tried to situate these in another place, as another *kind* of entity. This brought them into all sorts of problems (some of which LSV catalogs in Crisis). But as Andy asked, what can "material" mean when mind is material? Latour describes the problem: "It would not be wrong to define the Moderns as those who believe they are materialists and are driven to despair by this belief. To reassure them, it would not make much sense to turn toward the mind, that is, toward all the efforts they have deployed as a last resort, all the lost causes (and causes are indeed at issue here!) in order to situate their values in 'other dimensions,' as they say?dimensions other than that of 'strict materialism' since matter, as we are beginning to understand, is the most idealist of the products of the mind" (p. 105) ,,,and then sketches the solution: "To become materialists for real, we are going to have to instill in materialism a bit of ontological *realism*, counting on *many* beings, well-nourished, fattened up, plump-cheeked" (p. 177) We need, Latour says, to learn how to become "authentic materialists." For Latour this means getting rid of the notions of 'mind' and of 'mental representations.' LSV's approach is a little different, it is to redefine mind as itself a material entity... Martin On Oct 18, 2014, at 10:14 PM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: > Yes, I'm with you on 1) the fact that we don't want to suggest that the mind is "inside" the brain and 2) that the brain-as-computer argument fails on many formal counts. Agreed and agreed. > All that I was proposing was simply the idea that the system/process/bundle of relations that we shorthand with the term "mind/brain" can be observed from two different perspective that offer radically different takes on that system/process/bundle of relations. It is in this sense that I was suggesting the computer metaphor might be useful. From "inside" (e.g., as a user interacting with a program), it looks radically different from what it looks like if you observe it from the "outside" - e. g. watch the processor and hard drive spinning and things getting accessed. Depending on whether you are "inside" or "outside", you will see something radically different - and with the complexity of computers today, this radical difference gets to the point that one is increasingly tempted to become a dualist about computers. > > And perhaps this is the real threshold for what we call "artificial intelligence" - I. e. The point at which we become definitively dualistic about computers - when we can no longer sufficiently explain the "insides" (the program) with the outsides (the spinning drive). > > Who knows? > > Greg > > Sent from my iPhone > >> On Oct 18, 2014, at 5:49 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >> >> Hi Greg, >> >> I'm certainly not suggesting we stop using the terms inside and outside. Material entities - including complex systems - can be inside other entities, including other systems. But "mind" can't be inside anything, because it occupies no space. At least that how the classical enlightenment philosophers defined mental entities - they have no extension, no spatial dimensions. Remember how Descartes tried to link mind to the pineal gland, because that was the smallest structure he could find in the brain? >> >> One of the indications that psychology is not, in fact, a study of the mind is that we are completely inconsistent in how we talk about it. I ask my students where their mind is. Most of them point at their heads. So I ask them what I asked Andy - "you mean if I look inside you skull I'll see your thoughts?" They tell me no. So I ask them again where their mind is, and they can't answer. I ask them how we can study something when we don't even know where it is. >> >> Your right, important stuff is inside the head. I have no trouble at all with the proposal that we study what is inside the head. I used to be a computer programmer, so I know something about the important stuff inside the machine. I think it's important to understand the human brain; I would not like to try to think without mine. But we won't find the mind by looking at the brain; in both cases there are material processes going on in material entities - physical in one case, biological in the other. In the case of a human being, the brain is a necessary basis for psychological processes to occur. But also necessary are the rest of the body, and a culture to live in. Just because the brain is inside the skull doesn't mean that the mind is inside the brain. There are now many powerful arguments against the assumption central to Cog Sci, that psychological processes are like computational processes, which operate on non-semantic formal representations (look at Clark, Barsalou, Glenberg, Ingold). And what sense would it make to say that consciousness is *in* the brain? Consciousness is a process; it is an aspect of our ongoing involvement in the material world. Where is it? It is where that involvement is. >> >> Martin >> >>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 6:18 PM, greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: >>> >>> Martin, I wonder whether you think the notions of "inside" and "outside run into similar trouble of mental/material dualism? >>> I was thinking in particular of the notion of the "inside" of a system (this was how Jay Lemke once described the notion of "stance" as the insides if the system). >>> I can see trouble if we think of "Inside" solely in terms of "inside my head" as you mention. But I wonder if there isn't some possibility of working with this way of speaking that doesn't necessarily call in a mental/physical dualism? (I mean, "inside" and "outside are both ways of describing physical spaces, so it seems like as long as they aren't applied to a pre existing dualist if concept, then this shouldn't be a problem.) >>> And though I'm not fond of the brain-as-computer metaphor, it might be instructive as a way to think about this inside/outside distinction as the difference between watching the processor at work (outside) and watching the screens as a program runs (inside). >>> In principle the one can be reduced to the other, but in practice it can't anymore (I assume this is true with today's computers). >>> The degree of complexity can make it seem like the program running is an autonomous explanatory level of its own, but that doesn't mean that it is. Just that it is the "inside" of the system. >>> What do you think? >>> -Greg >>> Ps, apologies for not making more direct ties to lsv vs anl discussion. If this is too much of a sidetrack, I'm happy to take this up offline. But Martin, I find your position to be a very provocative one and would like to hear more about how it makes sense for you. It is a way of thinking that is very difficult to wrap one's Western language/mind/brain around! >>> >>> >>> Sent from my iPhone >>> >>>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 3:38 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Michael, >>>> >>>> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. Every science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* appearance. One of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a burning candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle burning behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study that second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the mirror, in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' of a second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. >>>> >>>> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of us raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and feelings exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call "the mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how that appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we can use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk* psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try to make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot study the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, however, set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up for being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't think he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I think you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what develops if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops (remember I am suggesting individual development here). >> >> > From glassman.13@osu.edu Sun Oct 19 07:20:24 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 14:20:24 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] The mirror has two candles Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052CB1@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Hi Larry, I renamed this thread because it seems to be taking a tangent from the very rich discussion on LSV and ANL, but perhaps it might circle back. Anyway, I thought Martin's very interesting illustration deserves a moment of fame. I wonder if memory is the right word in current circumstance. In U.S. psychology memory is very often viewed as a storehouse of information where you send your messages back to retrieve information when needed to apply to the current situation. Do you think Pierce would see the overall process this way (did he actually talk about memory?) For him it seems it would be part of a more active process of establishing relationships of that which came before with that which is currently being explored. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com [lpscholar2@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, October 19, 2014 6:40 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL Michael Glassman and Martin and How I want to ex-tend the exploration of *models* and *memories* and *contextualism* as linked in Michael?s rejoinder to Martin. Michael wrote ?if ALL you can *see* [perceive] is what is IN the mirror [metaphor of reflection AS mirroring] how do you ?know? there IS a mirror The IF IMPLIED is the ?ALL? . However, is that ?all there IS? in *seeing*? IS ?memory* also existent as an existent IN seeing? In other words, do *interpretants* ACTUALLY exist IN FACT? [as such] Umberto Eco suggests there is both ORPHIC knowing/seeing [when Picasso paints THAT PARTICULAR yellow shoe in a painting the SINGULARITY of THAT experience IS ?orphic? POETS and artists are ?biased? to privilege THIS WAY of knowing [Peirce's secondness as orphic and possibly orphaned] HOWEVER, Umberto Eco suggests that this orphic ?knowing* is also *indicative* [indexical] of further *interpreting* AND THIS TYPE of *knowing* EX-TENDS Orphic knowing. [Peirce's tiredness] Now in Peirce's metaphysics THIS interpreting creating interpretants also is EXISTING as facts. Is this transforming orphic [what IS present] TO forming *interpretants* AS *something* that actually exists {through the interpreting process} INCLUDE memory but that IS NOT ALL. IS creative imagining potentially existent? that goes BEYOND memory? I believe Umberto Eco?s question of a deeper knowing than orphic/orphan knowing *things-in-themselves* EX-tending BEYOND the orphic [secondness] to INCLUDE interpreting and forming actual *interpretants* [tiredness] must be considered within the memory process. This returns to *models* that are necessary but NOT ALL there *is*. The *relation* between *orphic* knowing and *interpreting* knowing seems a KEY question [and may ex-tend back into metaphysics? Larry Sent from Windows Mail From: Glassman, Michael Sent: ?Saturday?, ?October? ?18?, ?2014 ?5?:?18? ?PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Hi Martin, That's a very interesting metaphor, but let me see if I can take it a step further. Basically you seem to be saying that Vygotsky is making a mechanistic argument - I'm not talking about the more colloquial expression of mechanistic but the one that Pepper talks about in World Hypothesis. You are looking into the mirror and seeing the reflection of a candle - but you are making the assumption that there must be a mechanism that is causing the reflection of the candle. You cannot know this mechanism itself - it is too difficult to reach - but you can build models that bring us closer to understanding. This I think is almost exactly how Pepper discusses this root metaphor. Our goal as scientists is to find the mediate description of the underlying mechanism. This Pragmatists/Conextualists would say this is dualism - not the dualism you get from Formism where you depend on your mind to bring you closer to a known but unreachable ideal, but in the sense that there is this mechanism that exists that is somehow separate from and causing the reflection in the mirror. So the Contextualist asks, if all you can see is what is in the mirror how do you know there is a mirror. That is the only information you have and you have to base all interpretation of the world on that information - to suggest you are looking at a reflection is an assumption based on a belief system that there must be causing what you are seeing. I think you are right, Vygotsky wants to assume the mirror, but in the end doesn't that suggest a dualism to his thinking. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 6:38 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL Hi Michael, LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. Every science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* appearance. One of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a burning candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle burning behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study that second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the mirror, in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' of a second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of us raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and feelings exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call "the mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how that appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we can use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk* psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try to make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot study the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, however, set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. Martin On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up for being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't think he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I think you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what develops if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops (remember I am suggesting individual development here). From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Oct 19 07:32:33 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 14:32:33 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The mirror has two candles In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052CB1@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052CB1@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Hi Michael, Our discussion has *not* gone off on a tangent! On the contrary, it's right on target: The central question has been, was ANL correct to charge LSV with being an idealist? Was LSV an idealist because he was studying consciousness? To me the answer is clear: No! LSV was not an idealist; he was a Plump Materialist. I, too, aim to be a Plump Materialist. As well as a Clumsy Poster. Martin On Oct 19, 2014, at 9:20 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Larry, > > I renamed this thread because it seems to be taking a tangent from the very rich discussion on LSV and ANL, but perhaps it might circle back. Anyway, I thought Martin's very interesting illustration deserves a moment of fame. I wonder if memory is the right word in current circumstance. In U.S. psychology memory is very often viewed as a storehouse of information where you send your messages back to retrieve information when needed to apply to the current situation. Do you think Pierce would see the overall process this way (did he actually talk about memory?) For him it seems it would be part of a more active process of establishing relationships of that which came before with that which is currently being explored. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com [lpscholar2@gmail.com] > Sent: Sunday, October 19, 2014 6:40 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL > > Michael Glassman and Martin and How > > > I want to ex-tend the exploration of *models* and *memories* and *contextualism* as linked in Michael?s rejoinder to Martin. > > > Michael wrote ?if ALL you can *see* [perceive] is what is IN the mirror [metaphor of reflection AS mirroring] how do you ?know? there IS a mirror > > The IF IMPLIED is the ?ALL? . > > > However, is that ?all there IS? in *seeing*? > > > IS ?memory* also existent as an existent IN seeing? > > In other words, do *interpretants* ACTUALLY exist IN FACT? [as such] > > > Umberto Eco suggests there is both ORPHIC knowing/seeing [when Picasso paints THAT PARTICULAR yellow shoe in a painting the SINGULARITY of THAT experience IS ?orphic? > > POETS and artists are ?biased? to privilege THIS WAY of knowing [Peirce's secondness as orphic and possibly orphaned] > > > HOWEVER, Umberto Eco suggests that this orphic ?knowing* is also *indicative* [indexical] of further *interpreting* AND THIS TYPE of *knowing* EX-TENDS Orphic knowing. [Peirce's tiredness] > > Now in Peirce's metaphysics THIS interpreting creating interpretants also is EXISTING as facts. > > Is this transforming orphic [what IS present] TO forming *interpretants* AS *something* that actually exists {through the interpreting process} INCLUDE memory but that IS NOT ALL. > > > IS creative imagining potentially existent? that goes BEYOND memory? > > > I believe Umberto Eco?s question of a deeper knowing than orphic/orphan knowing *things-in-themselves* EX-tending BEYOND the orphic [secondness] to INCLUDE interpreting and forming actual *interpretants* [tiredness] must be considered within the memory process. > > This returns to *models* that are necessary but NOT ALL there *is*. > > > The *relation* between *orphic* knowing and *interpreting* knowing seems a KEY question [and may ex-tend back into metaphysics? > > > Larry > > > > > > > Sent from Windows Mail > > > > > > From: Glassman, Michael > Sent: ?Saturday?, ?October? ?18?, ?2014 ?5?:?18? ?PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > > Hi Martin, > > That's a very interesting metaphor, but let me see if I can take it a step further. Basically you seem to be saying that Vygotsky is making a mechanistic argument - I'm not talking about the more colloquial expression of mechanistic but the one that Pepper talks about in World Hypothesis. You are looking into the mirror and seeing the reflection of a candle - but you are making the assumption that there must be a mechanism that is causing the reflection of the candle. You cannot know this mechanism itself - it is too difficult to reach - but you can build models that bring us closer to understanding. This I think is almost exactly how Pepper discusses this root metaphor. Our goal as scientists is to find the mediate description of the underlying mechanism. This Pragmatists/Conextualists would say this is dualism - not the dualism you get from Formism where you depend on your mind to bring you closer to a known but unreachable ideal, but in the sense that there is this mechanism that exists that is somehow separate from and causing the reflection in the mirror. So the Contextualist asks, if all you can see is what is in the mirror how do you know there is a mirror. That is the only information you have and you have to base all interpretation of the world on that information - to suggest you are looking at a reflection is an assumption based on a belief system that there must be causing what you are seeing. I think you are right, Vygotsky wants to assume the mirror, but in the end doesn't that suggest a dualism to his thinking. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 6:38 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL > > Hi Michael, > > LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. Every science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* appearance. One of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a burning candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle burning behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study that second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the mirror, in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' of a second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. > > It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of us raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and feelings exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call "the mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how that appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we can use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk* psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try to make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot study the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, however, set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. > > Martin > > On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up for being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't think he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I think you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what develops if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops (remember I am suggesting individual development here). > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Oct 19 08:15:34 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 16:15:34 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The mirror has two candles In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052CB1@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052CB1@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Here's an example memory paper abstract by Sereda (2011), titled "A Theoretical Model of Memory as a Mechanism for Systematically Organizing Individual Experience" "In order to improve the explanatory potential of activity theory, this article proposes a theoretical model of human memory as a mechanism for the systematic organization of individual experience, organization that is an essential condition for performing future activity. The model rests on the idea that the main factor in human memory is the motivational and semantic sets of personality and thus orientation toward the future (prospective orientation)." The storehouse metaphor as used in psychology merely reflects a rather poor approach. Best, Huw On 19 October 2014 15:20, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Larry, > > I renamed this thread because it seems to be taking a tangent from the > very rich discussion on LSV and ANL, but perhaps it might circle back. > Anyway, I thought Martin's very interesting illustration deserves a moment > of fame. I wonder if memory is the right word in current circumstance. In > U.S. psychology memory is very often viewed as a storehouse of information > where you send your messages back to retrieve information when needed to > apply to the current situation. Do you think Pierce would see the overall > process this way (did he actually talk about memory?) For him it seems it > would be part of a more active process of establishing relationships of > that which came before with that which is currently being explored. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com [lpscholar2@gmail.com] > Sent: Sunday, October 19, 2014 6:40 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL > > Michael Glassman and Martin and How > > > I want to ex-tend the exploration of *models* and *memories* and > *contextualism* as linked in Michael?s rejoinder to Martin. > > > Michael wrote ?if ALL you can *see* [perceive] is what is IN the mirror > [metaphor of reflection AS mirroring] how do you ?know? there IS a mirror > > The IF IMPLIED is the ?ALL? . > > > However, is that ?all there IS? in *seeing*? > > > IS ?memory* also existent as an existent IN seeing? > > In other words, do *interpretants* ACTUALLY exist IN FACT? [as such] > > > Umberto Eco suggests there is both ORPHIC knowing/seeing [when Picasso > paints THAT PARTICULAR yellow shoe in a painting the SINGULARITY of THAT > experience IS ?orphic? > > POETS and artists are ?biased? to privilege THIS WAY of knowing [Peirce's > secondness as orphic and possibly orphaned] > > > HOWEVER, Umberto Eco suggests that this orphic ?knowing* is also > *indicative* [indexical] of further *interpreting* AND THIS TYPE of > *knowing* EX-TENDS Orphic knowing. [Peirce's tiredness] > > Now in Peirce's metaphysics THIS interpreting creating interpretants also > is EXISTING as facts. > > Is this transforming orphic [what IS present] TO forming *interpretants* > AS *something* that actually exists {through the interpreting process} > INCLUDE memory but that IS NOT ALL. > > > IS creative imagining potentially existent? that goes BEYOND memory? > > > I believe Umberto Eco?s question of a deeper knowing than orphic/orphan > knowing *things-in-themselves* EX-tending BEYOND the orphic [secondness] to > INCLUDE interpreting and forming actual *interpretants* [tiredness] must be > considered within the memory process. > > This returns to *models* that are necessary but NOT ALL there *is*. > > > The *relation* between *orphic* knowing and *interpreting* knowing seems a > KEY question [and may ex-tend back into metaphysics? > > > Larry > > > > > > > Sent from Windows Mail > > > > > > From: Glassman, Michael > Sent: ?Saturday?, ?October? ?18?, ?2014 ?5?:?18? ?PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > > Hi Martin, > > That's a very interesting metaphor, but let me see if I can take it a step > further. Basically you seem to be saying that Vygotsky is making a > mechanistic argument - I'm not talking about the more colloquial expression > of mechanistic but the one that Pepper talks about in World Hypothesis. > You are looking into the mirror and seeing the reflection of a candle - but > you are making the assumption that there must be a mechanism that is > causing the reflection of the candle. You cannot know this mechanism > itself - it is too difficult to reach - but you can build models that bring > us closer to understanding. This I think is almost exactly how Pepper > discusses this root metaphor. Our goal as scientists is to find the > mediate description of the underlying mechanism. This > Pragmatists/Conextualists would say this is dualism - not the dualism you > get from Formism where you depend on your mind to bring you closer to a > known but unreachable ideal, but in the sense that there is this mechanism > that exists that is somehow separate from and causing the reflection in the > mirror. So the Contextualist asks, if all you can see is what is in the > mirror how do you know there is a mirror. That is the only information you > have and you have to base all interpretation of the world on that > information - to suggest you are looking at a reflection is an assumption > based on a belief system that there must be causing what you are seeing. I > think you are right, Vygotsky wants to assume the mirror, but in the end > doesn't that suggest a dualism to his thinking. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 6:38 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL > > Hi Michael, > > LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. Every > science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* appearance. One > of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a burning > candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle burning > behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study that > second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the mirror, > in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' of a > second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. > > It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of us > raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and feelings > exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call "the > mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how that > appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal > thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we can > use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre > bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and > Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and > neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk* > psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try to > make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own > psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot study > the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, however, > set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. > > Martin > > On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > > I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up for > being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't think > he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I think > you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what develops > if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops (remember > I am suggesting individual development here). > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Oct 19 09:25:26 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 17:25:26 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> Message-ID: >From volume 1 no less. If psychology were included it could be embellished as the primacy of mediated re-action, which is another way that the situation/norm has a bearing. Best, Huw On 18 October 2014 22:07, mike cole wrote: > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Oct 19 09:27:16 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 17:27:16 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> Message-ID: On 19 October 2014 17:25, Huw Lloyd wrote: > From volume 1 no less. > > If psychology were included it could be embellished as the primacy of > mediated re-action, which is another way that the situation/norm has a > bearing. > > Best, > Huw > > Pertaining to the Wertsch paper Mike sent. Huw > On 18 October 2014 22:07, mike cole wrote: > >> > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Oct 19 15:38:51 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2014 07:38:51 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The mirror has two candles In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052CB1@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: First of all, a word of appreciation to Martin for his candle in the mirror and his delightful formulation of "Plump Materialism", and also to Michael for recognizing the beauty of the image and using it to revitalize a thread that was growing somewhat tiresome to me: no fault of the participants; it was my own inability to see past "fatalistic determinism", "captive to bourgeois theories", and ANL's other fatuous formulae. As Mike points out, this is not just name calling: these are blood libels. Secondly, let me put in a word for Andy's counter-blast. For those of you who have not read it; it is available on Andy's academia.edu page, and it's well worth a look: http://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky Thirdly--can I draw attention to the top of page fourteen of ANL's dishonest and dishonorable hatchet job? Here he rounds on Basov for non-Marxist, idealist notion that humans in some way "double" the natural environment. ANL returns to this theme at the bottom of the page where he says: "To the animal, however, any ?artificial? object created by humans is simply a natural object, it is nature because the animal?s relation toward it will always be an instinctive relation. Thus, of course, in reality there is no doubling of the environment. The environment as a whole is transformed into a human environment, that is, for the human being, into a social environment, based on the fact that humans themselves relate to it in human terms, that is, as social humans." Note the use of "Thus"; it marks a shameless non sequitur. First of all, it is a non sequitur to say that because animals and very small children treat i-phones as natural objects, THEREFORE there is no doubling of the environment Secondly, it is a non sequitur to say that the environment "as a whole" becomes a human environment (because animals and infants do NOT see it that way??) without any trace of the natural environment. But the biggest non-sequitur is the least explicit: it is the insinuation that the process of social idealization of nature that we call enculturation is prima facie subversive of Marxism. Consider the following, from a great subversive of Marxism and primal plump materialist: "We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement." (Capital, Vol 1, Chapter III, Part 7) What is THIS if not a doubling of reality--a mirror with two candles? David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies have a look: On 20 October 2014 00:15, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Here's an example memory paper abstract by Sereda (2011), titled "A > Theoretical Model of Memory > as a Mechanism for Systematically Organizing Individual Experience" > > "In order to improve the explanatory potential of activity theory, this > article > proposes a theoretical model of human memory as a mechanism for > the systematic organization of individual experience, organization that > is an essential condition for performing future activity. The model rests > on the idea that the main factor in human memory is the motivational > and semantic sets of personality and thus orientation toward the future > (prospective orientation)." > > The storehouse metaphor as used in psychology merely reflects a rather poor > approach. > > Best, > Huw > > On 19 October 2014 15:20, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> Hi Larry, >> >> I renamed this thread because it seems to be taking a tangent from the >> very rich discussion on LSV and ANL, but perhaps it might circle back. >> Anyway, I thought Martin's very interesting illustration deserves a moment >> of fame. I wonder if memory is the right word in current circumstance. In >> U.S. psychology memory is very often viewed as a storehouse of information >> where you send your messages back to retrieve information when needed to >> apply to the current situation. Do you think Pierce would see the overall >> process this way (did he actually talk about memory?) For him it seems it >> would be part of a more active process of establishing relationships of >> that which came before with that which is currently being explored. >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com [lpscholar2@gmail.com] >> Sent: Sunday, October 19, 2014 6:40 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL >> >> Michael Glassman and Martin and How >> >> >> I want to ex-tend the exploration of *models* and *memories* and >> *contextualism* as linked in Michael?s rejoinder to Martin. >> >> >> Michael wrote ?if ALL you can *see* [perceive] is what is IN the mirror >> [metaphor of reflection AS mirroring] how do you ?know? there IS a mirror >> >> The IF IMPLIED is the ?ALL? . >> >> >> However, is that ?all there IS? in *seeing*? >> >> >> IS ?memory* also existent as an existent IN seeing? >> >> In other words, do *interpretants* ACTUALLY exist IN FACT? [as such] >> >> >> Umberto Eco suggests there is both ORPHIC knowing/seeing [when Picasso >> paints THAT PARTICULAR yellow shoe in a painting the SINGULARITY of THAT >> experience IS ?orphic? >> >> POETS and artists are ?biased? to privilege THIS WAY of knowing [Peirce's >> secondness as orphic and possibly orphaned] >> >> >> HOWEVER, Umberto Eco suggests that this orphic ?knowing* is also >> *indicative* [indexical] of further *interpreting* AND THIS TYPE of >> *knowing* EX-TENDS Orphic knowing. [Peirce's tiredness] >> >> Now in Peirce's metaphysics THIS interpreting creating interpretants also >> is EXISTING as facts. >> >> Is this transforming orphic [what IS present] TO forming *interpretants* >> AS *something* that actually exists {through the interpreting process} >> INCLUDE memory but that IS NOT ALL. >> >> >> IS creative imagining potentially existent? that goes BEYOND memory? >> >> >> I believe Umberto Eco?s question of a deeper knowing than orphic/orphan >> knowing *things-in-themselves* EX-tending BEYOND the orphic [secondness] to >> INCLUDE interpreting and forming actual *interpretants* [tiredness] must be >> considered within the memory process. >> >> This returns to *models* that are necessary but NOT ALL there *is*. >> >> >> The *relation* between *orphic* knowing and *interpreting* knowing seems a >> KEY question [and may ex-tend back into metaphysics? >> >> >> Larry >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Sent from Windows Mail >> >> >> >> >> >> From: Glassman, Michael >> Sent: ?Saturday?, ?October? ?18?, ?2014 ?5?:?18? ?PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >> >> >> >> >> Hi Martin, >> >> That's a very interesting metaphor, but let me see if I can take it a step >> further. Basically you seem to be saying that Vygotsky is making a >> mechanistic argument - I'm not talking about the more colloquial expression >> of mechanistic but the one that Pepper talks about in World Hypothesis. >> You are looking into the mirror and seeing the reflection of a candle - but >> you are making the assumption that there must be a mechanism that is >> causing the reflection of the candle. You cannot know this mechanism >> itself - it is too difficult to reach - but you can build models that bring >> us closer to understanding. This I think is almost exactly how Pepper >> discusses this root metaphor. Our goal as scientists is to find the >> mediate description of the underlying mechanism. This >> Pragmatists/Conextualists would say this is dualism - not the dualism you >> get from Formism where you depend on your mind to bring you closer to a >> known but unreachable ideal, but in the sense that there is this mechanism >> that exists that is somehow separate from and causing the reflection in the >> mirror. So the Contextualist asks, if all you can see is what is in the >> mirror how do you know there is a mirror. That is the only information you >> have and you have to base all interpretation of the world on that >> information - to suggest you are looking at a reflection is an assumption >> based on a belief system that there must be causing what you are seeing. I >> think you are right, Vygotsky wants to assume the mirror, but in the end >> doesn't that suggest a dualism to his thinking. >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >> Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 6:38 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL >> >> Hi Michael, >> >> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. Every >> science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* appearance. One >> of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a burning >> candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle burning >> behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study that >> second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the mirror, >> in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' of a >> second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. >> >> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of us >> raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and feelings >> exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call "the >> mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how that >> appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal >> thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we can >> use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre >> bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and >> Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and >> neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk* >> psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try to >> make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own >> psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot study >> the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, however, >> set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael >> wrote: >> >> > I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up for >> being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't think >> he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I think >> you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what develops >> if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops (remember >> I am suggesting individual development here). >> >> From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Oct 19 16:00:56 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2014 00:00:56 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The mirror has two candles In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052CB1@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Hi David, I don't think anyone is going to argue against the paper's defamatory quality. Everything he says against LSV can be taken with a pinch of salt if we assume he was trying to protect his colleagues. What remains is therefore what is countered and proposed with respect to the subject of the environment. Best, Huw On 19 October 2014 23:38, David Kellogg wrote: > First of all, a word of appreciation to Martin for his candle in the > mirror and his delightful formulation of "Plump Materialism", and also > to Michael for recognizing the beauty of the image and using it to > revitalize a thread that was growing somewhat tiresome to me: no fault > of the participants; it was my own inability to see past "fatalistic > determinism", "captive to bourgeois theories", and ANL's other fatuous > formulae. As Mike points out, this is not just name calling: these are > blood libels. > > Secondly, let me put in a word for Andy's counter-blast. For those of > you who have not read it; it is available on Andy's academia.edu page, > and it's well worth a look: > > > http://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky > > Thirdly--can I draw attention to the top of page fourteen of ANL's > dishonest and dishonorable hatchet job? Here he rounds on Basov for > non-Marxist, idealist notion that humans in some way "double" the > natural environment. ANL returns to this theme at the bottom of the > page where he says: > > "To the animal, however, any ?artificial? object created by humans is > simply > a natural object, it is nature because the animal?s relation toward it > will always > be an instinctive relation. Thus, of course, in reality there is no > doubling of the > environment. The environment as a whole is transformed into a human > environment, > that is, for the human being, into a social environment, based on the > fact that humans themselves relate to it in human terms, that is, as > social humans." > > Note the use of "Thus"; it marks a shameless non sequitur. First of > all, it is a non sequitur to say that because animals and very small > children treat i-phones as natural objects, THEREFORE there is no > doubling of the environment Secondly, it is a non sequitur to say that > the environment "as a whole" becomes a human environment (because > animals and infants do NOT see it that way??) without any trace of the > natural environment. But the biggest non-sequitur is the least > explicit: it is the insinuation that the process of social > idealization of nature that we call enculturation is prima facie > subversive of Marxism. > > Consider the following, from a great subversive of Marxism and primal > plump materialist: > > "We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. > A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a > bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. > But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is > this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he > erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a > result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its > commencement." (Capital, Vol 1, Chapter III, Part 7) > > What is THIS if not a doubling of reality--a mirror with two candles? > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > have a look: > > > > On 20 October 2014 00:15, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > Here's an example memory paper abstract by Sereda (2011), titled "A > > Theoretical Model of Memory > > as a Mechanism for Systematically Organizing Individual Experience" > > > > "In order to improve the explanatory potential of activity theory, this > > article > > proposes a theoretical model of human memory as a mechanism for > > the systematic organization of individual experience, organization that > > is an essential condition for performing future activity. The model rests > > on the idea that the main factor in human memory is the motivational > > and semantic sets of personality and thus orientation toward the future > > (prospective orientation)." > > > > The storehouse metaphor as used in psychology merely reflects a rather > poor > > approach. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > On 19 October 2014 15:20, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > > >> Hi Larry, > >> > >> I renamed this thread because it seems to be taking a tangent from the > >> very rich discussion on LSV and ANL, but perhaps it might circle back. > >> Anyway, I thought Martin's very interesting illustration deserves a > moment > >> of fame. I wonder if memory is the right word in current > circumstance. In > >> U.S. psychology memory is very often viewed as a storehouse of > information > >> where you send your messages back to retrieve information when needed to > >> apply to the current situation. Do you think Pierce would see the > overall > >> process this way (did he actually talk about memory?) For him it seems > it > >> would be part of a more active process of establishing relationships of > >> that which came before with that which is currently being explored. > >> > >> Michael > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >> on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com [lpscholar2@gmail.com] > >> Sent: Sunday, October 19, 2014 6:40 AM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL > >> > >> Michael Glassman and Martin and How > >> > >> > >> I want to ex-tend the exploration of *models* and *memories* and > >> *contextualism* as linked in Michael?s rejoinder to Martin. > >> > >> > >> Michael wrote ?if ALL you can *see* [perceive] is what is IN the mirror > >> [metaphor of reflection AS mirroring] how do you ?know? there IS a > mirror > >> > >> The IF IMPLIED is the ?ALL? . > >> > >> > >> However, is that ?all there IS? in *seeing*? > >> > >> > >> IS ?memory* also existent as an existent IN seeing? > >> > >> In other words, do *interpretants* ACTUALLY exist IN FACT? [as such] > >> > >> > >> Umberto Eco suggests there is both ORPHIC knowing/seeing [when Picasso > >> paints THAT PARTICULAR yellow shoe in a painting the SINGULARITY of THAT > >> experience IS ?orphic? > >> > >> POETS and artists are ?biased? to privilege THIS WAY of knowing > [Peirce's > >> secondness as orphic and possibly orphaned] > >> > >> > >> HOWEVER, Umberto Eco suggests that this orphic ?knowing* is also > >> *indicative* [indexical] of further *interpreting* AND THIS TYPE of > >> *knowing* EX-TENDS Orphic knowing. [Peirce's tiredness] > >> > >> Now in Peirce's metaphysics THIS interpreting creating interpretants > also > >> is EXISTING as facts. > >> > >> Is this transforming orphic [what IS present] TO forming *interpretants* > >> AS *something* that actually exists {through the interpreting process} > >> INCLUDE memory but that IS NOT ALL. > >> > >> > >> IS creative imagining potentially existent? that goes BEYOND memory? > >> > >> > >> I believe Umberto Eco?s question of a deeper knowing than orphic/orphan > >> knowing *things-in-themselves* EX-tending BEYOND the orphic > [secondness] to > >> INCLUDE interpreting and forming actual *interpretants* [tiredness] > must be > >> considered within the memory process. > >> > >> This returns to *models* that are necessary but NOT ALL there *is*. > >> > >> > >> The *relation* between *orphic* knowing and *interpreting* knowing > seems a > >> KEY question [and may ex-tend back into metaphysics? > >> > >> > >> Larry > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Sent from Windows Mail > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> From: Glassman, Michael > >> Sent: ?Saturday?, ?October? ?18?, ?2014 ?5?:?18? ?PM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Hi Martin, > >> > >> That's a very interesting metaphor, but let me see if I can take it a > step > >> further. Basically you seem to be saying that Vygotsky is making a > >> mechanistic argument - I'm not talking about the more colloquial > expression > >> of mechanistic but the one that Pepper talks about in World Hypothesis. > >> You are looking into the mirror and seeing the reflection of a candle - > but > >> you are making the assumption that there must be a mechanism that is > >> causing the reflection of the candle. You cannot know this mechanism > >> itself - it is too difficult to reach - but you can build models that > bring > >> us closer to understanding. This I think is almost exactly how Pepper > >> discusses this root metaphor. Our goal as scientists is to find the > >> mediate description of the underlying mechanism. This > >> Pragmatists/Conextualists would say this is dualism - not the dualism > you > >> get from Formism where you depend on your mind to bring you closer to a > >> known but unreachable ideal, but in the sense that there is this > mechanism > >> that exists that is somehow separate from and causing the reflection in > the > >> mirror. So the Contextualist asks, if all you can see is what is in the > >> mirror how do you know there is a mirror. That is the only information > you > >> have and you have to base all interpretation of the world on that > >> information - to suggest you are looking at a reflection is an > assumption > >> based on a belief system that there must be causing what you are > seeing. I > >> think you are right, Vygotsky wants to assume the mirror, but in the end > >> doesn't that suggest a dualism to his thinking. > >> > >> Michael > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >> on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > >> Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 6:38 PM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL > >> > >> Hi Michael, > >> > >> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. > Every > >> science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* appearance. > One > >> of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a burning > >> candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle > burning > >> behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study that > >> second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the > mirror, > >> in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' of a > >> second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. > >> > >> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of us > >> raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and feelings > >> exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call "the > >> mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how > that > >> appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal > >> thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we > can > >> use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre > >> bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and > >> Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and > >> neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk* > >> psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try to > >> make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own > >> psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot > study > >> the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, however, > >> set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael > >> wrote: > >> > >> > I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up for > >> being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't > think > >> he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I > think > >> you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what > develops > >> if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops > (remember > >> I am suggesting individual development here). > >> > >> > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Oct 20 06:44:23 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2014 06:44:23 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The mirror has two candles In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052CB1@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: I want to respond to this theme by bringing in the notion of *mediated action* AS the best *unit of analysis*. Wertsch weaved together Vygotsky and Bakhtin and showed utterances AS *mediated actions* The place of the *ideal* in relation to *objects* is the theme. Now I want to weave in Anna Sfard's exploration of mathematical *entities* AS having a dual *nature*. This extension is from an article she just posted on the web [On the Dual Nature of Mathematical Conceptions] Page 4 is her elaborating this dual nature as follows. [is] Treating mathematical conceptions AS IF they referred to some abstract OBJECTS the only possibility of relating to mathematical concepts? THIS KIND of conception [interpretation] Anna labels *structural*. THIS TYPE of utterance [mediated action] prevails in mathematical discourse situations as mediational means However, there ARE different KINDS of mathematical definitions that *reveal* quite a different approach to these same concepts. Functions can be defined not only AS *a set of ordered pairs* BUT ALSO AS a process of *getting from one system to another* [skemp referenced] Symmetry can BE conceived [interpreted] AS a static property of geometric forms BUT ALSO AS a *kind* of transformation. This latter TYPE of description [genre] SPEAKS AS IF the mathematical notion is about processes, algorithms, ACTIONS, [rather than speaking of these mathematical notions AS IF they ARE *objects* THIS TYPE OF GENRE *reflects* an Operational interpretation [rather than structural interpretation] of mathematical conceptions. Seeing a mathematical *entity* AS *an object* *means* being capable of gesturing [referring] to the mathematical concept AS IF the mathematical concept were A REAL THING [a static structure actually existing somewhere in time and space but timeless] It also *means* being able to *recognize* the *idea* at a glance AND to manipulate this mathematical conception AS IF the structure existed AS A WHOLE [without going into details or analysis] AS AN EXISTING OBJECT. Using Hadamard's *metaphor* we can SAY that *structural genres* endows a concept with a KIND of *physiognomy* which ALLOWS a person to think of this concept AS a unique, THING [entity] however complicated this concept may BE. JUST AS WE SEE A FACE OF A MAN. In contrast, interpreting A concept AS A PROCESS implies regarding THIS PARTICULAR mathematical concept AS A POTENTIAL [existant] rather than an ACTUAL EXISTING ENTITY. In operational kinds of genres the *entity* COMES INTO EXISTENCE upon request in a sequence of actions. THUS whereas the structural genre IS timeless [static] instantaneous, and integrative, the operational genre is dynamic, sequential, and detailed. In other words different mediational means within *mediated action* produce radically different notions of the place of concepts as interpretants that exist [in actuality or in potential] THEREFORE the play involves different TYPES of *seeing* and different TYPES of *saying*. BOTH are equally *true* I have been exploring *objects of activity* *units of analysis* and *mediated action* through Anna Sfard's exploration of mathematical conceptions which do not appear through the 5 senses but DO EXIST. Larry On Sun, Oct 19, 2014 at 4:00 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Hi David, > > I don't think anyone is going to argue against the paper's defamatory > quality. Everything he says against LSV can be taken with a pinch of salt > if we assume he was trying to protect his colleagues. > > What remains is therefore what is countered and proposed with respect to > the subject of the environment. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > On 19 October 2014 23:38, David Kellogg wrote: > > > First of all, a word of appreciation to Martin for his candle in the > > mirror and his delightful formulation of "Plump Materialism", and also > > to Michael for recognizing the beauty of the image and using it to > > revitalize a thread that was growing somewhat tiresome to me: no fault > > of the participants; it was my own inability to see past "fatalistic > > determinism", "captive to bourgeois theories", and ANL's other fatuous > > formulae. As Mike points out, this is not just name calling: these are > > blood libels. > > > > Secondly, let me put in a word for Andy's counter-blast. For those of > > you who have not read it; it is available on Andy's academia.edu page, > > and it's well worth a look: > > > > > > > http://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky > > > > Thirdly--can I draw attention to the top of page fourteen of ANL's > > dishonest and dishonorable hatchet job? Here he rounds on Basov for > > non-Marxist, idealist notion that humans in some way "double" the > > natural environment. ANL returns to this theme at the bottom of the > > page where he says: > > > > "To the animal, however, any ?artificial? object created by humans is > > simply > > a natural object, it is nature because the animal?s relation toward it > > will always > > be an instinctive relation. Thus, of course, in reality there is no > > doubling of the > > environment. The environment as a whole is transformed into a human > > environment, > > that is, for the human being, into a social environment, based on the > > fact that humans themselves relate to it in human terms, that is, as > > social humans." > > > > Note the use of "Thus"; it marks a shameless non sequitur. First of > > all, it is a non sequitur to say that because animals and very small > > children treat i-phones as natural objects, THEREFORE there is no > > doubling of the environment Secondly, it is a non sequitur to say that > > the environment "as a whole" becomes a human environment (because > > animals and infants do NOT see it that way??) without any trace of the > > natural environment. But the biggest non-sequitur is the least > > explicit: it is the insinuation that the process of social > > idealization of nature that we call enculturation is prima facie > > subversive of Marxism. > > > > Consider the following, from a great subversive of Marxism and primal > > plump materialist: > > > > "We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. > > A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a > > bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. > > But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is > > this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he > > erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a > > result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its > > commencement." (Capital, Vol 1, Chapter III, Part 7) > > > > What is THIS if not a doubling of reality--a mirror with two candles? > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > have a look: > > > > > > > > On 20 October 2014 00:15, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > Here's an example memory paper abstract by Sereda (2011), titled "A > > > Theoretical Model of Memory > > > as a Mechanism for Systematically Organizing Individual Experience" > > > > > > "In order to improve the explanatory potential of activity theory, this > > > article > > > proposes a theoretical model of human memory as a mechanism for > > > the systematic organization of individual experience, organization that > > > is an essential condition for performing future activity. The model > rests > > > on the idea that the main factor in human memory is the motivational > > > and semantic sets of personality and thus orientation toward the future > > > (prospective orientation)." > > > > > > The storehouse metaphor as used in psychology merely reflects a rather > > poor > > > approach. > > > > > > Best, > > > Huw > > > > > > On 19 October 2014 15:20, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > > > > >> Hi Larry, > > >> > > >> I renamed this thread because it seems to be taking a tangent from the > > >> very rich discussion on LSV and ANL, but perhaps it might circle back. > > >> Anyway, I thought Martin's very interesting illustration deserves a > > moment > > >> of fame. I wonder if memory is the right word in current > > circumstance. In > > >> U.S. psychology memory is very often viewed as a storehouse of > > information > > >> where you send your messages back to retrieve information when needed > to > > >> apply to the current situation. Do you think Pierce would see the > > overall > > >> process this way (did he actually talk about memory?) For him it > seems > > it > > >> would be part of a more active process of establishing relationships > of > > >> that which came before with that which is currently being explored. > > >> > > >> Michael > > >> ________________________________________ > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > >> on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com [lpscholar2@gmail.com] > > >> Sent: Sunday, October 19, 2014 6:40 AM > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL > > >> > > >> Michael Glassman and Martin and How > > >> > > >> > > >> I want to ex-tend the exploration of *models* and *memories* and > > >> *contextualism* as linked in Michael?s rejoinder to Martin. > > >> > > >> > > >> Michael wrote ?if ALL you can *see* [perceive] is what is IN the > mirror > > >> [metaphor of reflection AS mirroring] how do you ?know? there IS a > > mirror > > >> > > >> The IF IMPLIED is the ?ALL? . > > >> > > >> > > >> However, is that ?all there IS? in *seeing*? > > >> > > >> > > >> IS ?memory* also existent as an existent IN seeing? > > >> > > >> In other words, do *interpretants* ACTUALLY exist IN FACT? [as such] > > >> > > >> > > >> Umberto Eco suggests there is both ORPHIC knowing/seeing [when Picasso > > >> paints THAT PARTICULAR yellow shoe in a painting the SINGULARITY of > THAT > > >> experience IS ?orphic? > > >> > > >> POETS and artists are ?biased? to privilege THIS WAY of knowing > > [Peirce's > > >> secondness as orphic and possibly orphaned] > > >> > > >> > > >> HOWEVER, Umberto Eco suggests that this orphic ?knowing* is also > > >> *indicative* [indexical] of further *interpreting* AND THIS TYPE of > > >> *knowing* EX-TENDS Orphic knowing. [Peirce's tiredness] > > >> > > >> Now in Peirce's metaphysics THIS interpreting creating interpretants > > also > > >> is EXISTING as facts. > > >> > > >> Is this transforming orphic [what IS present] TO forming > *interpretants* > > >> AS *something* that actually exists {through the interpreting process} > > >> INCLUDE memory but that IS NOT ALL. > > >> > > >> > > >> IS creative imagining potentially existent? that goes BEYOND memory? > > >> > > >> > > >> I believe Umberto Eco?s question of a deeper knowing than > orphic/orphan > > >> knowing *things-in-themselves* EX-tending BEYOND the orphic > > [secondness] to > > >> INCLUDE interpreting and forming actual *interpretants* [tiredness] > > must be > > >> considered within the memory process. > > >> > > >> This returns to *models* that are necessary but NOT ALL there *is*. > > >> > > >> > > >> The *relation* between *orphic* knowing and *interpreting* knowing > > seems a > > >> KEY question [and may ex-tend back into metaphysics? > > >> > > >> > > >> Larry > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> Sent from Windows Mail > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> From: Glassman, Michael > > >> Sent: ?Saturday?, ?October? ?18?, ?2014 ?5?:?18? ?PM > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> Hi Martin, > > >> > > >> That's a very interesting metaphor, but let me see if I can take it a > > step > > >> further. Basically you seem to be saying that Vygotsky is making a > > >> mechanistic argument - I'm not talking about the more colloquial > > expression > > >> of mechanistic but the one that Pepper talks about in World > Hypothesis. > > >> You are looking into the mirror and seeing the reflection of a candle > - > > but > > >> you are making the assumption that there must be a mechanism that is > > >> causing the reflection of the candle. You cannot know this mechanism > > >> itself - it is too difficult to reach - but you can build models that > > bring > > >> us closer to understanding. This I think is almost exactly how Pepper > > >> discusses this root metaphor. Our goal as scientists is to find the > > >> mediate description of the underlying mechanism. This > > >> Pragmatists/Conextualists would say this is dualism - not the dualism > > you > > >> get from Formism where you depend on your mind to bring you closer to > a > > >> known but unreachable ideal, but in the sense that there is this > > mechanism > > >> that exists that is somehow separate from and causing the reflection > in > > the > > >> mirror. So the Contextualist asks, if all you can see is what is in > the > > >> mirror how do you know there is a mirror. That is the only > information > > you > > >> have and you have to base all interpretation of the world on that > > >> information - to suggest you are looking at a reflection is an > > assumption > > >> based on a belief system that there must be causing what you are > > seeing. I > > >> think you are right, Vygotsky wants to assume the mirror, but in the > end > > >> doesn't that suggest a dualism to his thinking. > > >> > > >> Michael > > >> ________________________________________ > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > >> on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > > >> Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 6:38 PM > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL > > >> > > >> Hi Michael, > > >> > > >> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. > > Every > > >> science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* > appearance. > > One > > >> of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a burning > > >> candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle > > burning > > >> behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study > that > > >> second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the > > mirror, > > >> in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' of > a > > >> second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. > > >> > > >> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of > us > > >> raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and feelings > > >> exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call > "the > > >> mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how > > that > > >> appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal > > >> thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we > > can > > >> use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre > > >> bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and > > >> Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and > > >> neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk* > > >> psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try > to > > >> make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own > > >> psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot > > study > > >> the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, > however, > > >> set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. > > >> > > >> Martin > > >> > > >> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >> > I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up > for > > >> being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't > > think > > >> he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I > > think > > >> you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what > > develops > > >> if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops > > (remember > > >> I am suggesting individual development here). > > >> > > >> > > > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Oct 20 10:57:58 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2014 11:57:58 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The mirror has two candles In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052CB1@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Larry, Can you help me to think through this: Are Acheulean hand axes the same as the concept of "symmetry"? It seems the critical point about "symmetry" (or any other mathematical concept) is that it takes on meaning when it is seen in process within some system of relations. Just as an Acheulean hand axe lying there isn't of much use - symmetry becomes useful only when it is taken up as a part of a process, and hence as part of a system of relations (why are we engaging in making something "symmetrical"?). Again here I'm wondering if the metaphor of inside/outside of a system of relations might be useful for re-thinking the ideal/material in such a way that avoids seeing this distinction as a matter of ontological dualism. I could use some help as to whether or not this would jibe with Vygotsky's formulation of the problem. (and extending to some related names in Russia at the time of Vygotsky, I'd be curious if anyone would have any thoughts on Volosinov's and Bakhtin's metaphor of inside/outside - does it necessarily have to be based on an ontological dualism?) Just trying to get my head around how we might conceive of the plump doubles that Martin has pointed us to... -greg On Mon, Oct 20, 2014 at 7:44 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > I want to respond to this theme by bringing in the notion of *mediated > action* AS the best *unit of analysis*. Wertsch weaved together Vygotsky > and Bakhtin and showed utterances AS *mediated actions* > The place of the *ideal* in relation to *objects* is the theme. > > Now I want to weave in Anna Sfard's exploration of mathematical *entities* > AS having a dual *nature*. This extension is from an article she just > posted on the web [On the Dual Nature of Mathematical Conceptions] > > Page 4 is her elaborating this dual nature as follows. > > [is] Treating mathematical conceptions AS IF they referred to some abstract > OBJECTS the only possibility of relating to mathematical concepts? THIS > KIND of conception [interpretation] Anna labels *structural*. THIS TYPE of > utterance [mediated action] prevails in mathematical discourse situations > as mediational means > However, there ARE different KINDS of mathematical definitions that > *reveal* quite a different approach to these same concepts. > Functions can be defined not only AS *a set of ordered pairs* BUT ALSO AS a > process of *getting from one system to another* [skemp referenced] > > Symmetry can BE conceived [interpreted] AS a static property of geometric > forms BUT ALSO AS a *kind* of transformation. This latter TYPE of > description [genre] SPEAKS AS IF the mathematical notion is about > processes, algorithms, ACTIONS, [rather than speaking of these mathematical > notions AS IF they ARE *objects* > THIS TYPE OF GENRE *reflects* an Operational interpretation [rather than > structural interpretation] of mathematical conceptions. > > Seeing a mathematical *entity* AS *an object* *means* being capable of > gesturing [referring] to the mathematical concept AS IF the mathematical > concept were A REAL THING [a static structure actually existing somewhere > in time and space but timeless] It also *means* being able to *recognize* > the *idea* at a glance AND to manipulate this mathematical conception AS IF > the structure existed AS A WHOLE [without going into details or analysis] > AS AN EXISTING OBJECT. > > Using Hadamard's *metaphor* we can SAY that *structural genres* endows a > concept with a KIND of *physiognomy* which ALLOWS a person to think of this > concept AS a unique, THING [entity] however complicated this concept may > BE. > > JUST AS WE SEE A FACE OF A MAN. > > In contrast, interpreting A concept AS A PROCESS implies regarding THIS > PARTICULAR mathematical concept AS A POTENTIAL [existant] rather than an > ACTUAL EXISTING ENTITY. In operational kinds of genres the *entity* COMES > INTO EXISTENCE upon request in a sequence of actions. > THUS > whereas the structural genre IS timeless [static] instantaneous, and > integrative, the operational genre is dynamic, sequential, and detailed. In > other words different mediational means within *mediated action* produce > radically different notions of the place of concepts as interpretants that > exist [in actuality or in potential] > > THEREFORE the play involves different TYPES of *seeing* and different TYPES > of *saying*. > > BOTH are equally *true* > > I have been exploring *objects of activity* *units of analysis* and > *mediated action* through Anna Sfard's exploration of mathematical > conceptions which do not appear through the 5 senses but DO EXIST. > > Larry > > On Sun, Oct 19, 2014 at 4:00 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > Hi David, > > > > I don't think anyone is going to argue against the paper's defamatory > > quality. Everything he says against LSV can be taken with a pinch of > salt > > if we assume he was trying to protect his colleagues. > > > > What remains is therefore what is countered and proposed with respect to > > the subject of the environment. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > On 19 October 2014 23:38, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > First of all, a word of appreciation to Martin for his candle in the > > > mirror and his delightful formulation of "Plump Materialism", and also > > > to Michael for recognizing the beauty of the image and using it to > > > revitalize a thread that was growing somewhat tiresome to me: no fault > > > of the participants; it was my own inability to see past "fatalistic > > > determinism", "captive to bourgeois theories", and ANL's other fatuous > > > formulae. As Mike points out, this is not just name calling: these are > > > blood libels. > > > > > > Secondly, let me put in a word for Andy's counter-blast. For those of > > > you who have not read it; it is available on Andy's academia.edu page, > > > and it's well worth a look: > > > > > > > > > > > > http://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky > > > > > > Thirdly--can I draw attention to the top of page fourteen of ANL's > > > dishonest and dishonorable hatchet job? Here he rounds on Basov for > > > non-Marxist, idealist notion that humans in some way "double" the > > > natural environment. ANL returns to this theme at the bottom of the > > > page where he says: > > > > > > "To the animal, however, any ?artificial? object created by humans is > > > simply > > > a natural object, it is nature because the animal?s relation toward it > > > will always > > > be an instinctive relation. Thus, of course, in reality there is no > > > doubling of the > > > environment. The environment as a whole is transformed into a human > > > environment, > > > that is, for the human being, into a social environment, based on the > > > fact that humans themselves relate to it in human terms, that is, as > > > social humans." > > > > > > Note the use of "Thus"; it marks a shameless non sequitur. First of > > > all, it is a non sequitur to say that because animals and very small > > > children treat i-phones as natural objects, THEREFORE there is no > > > doubling of the environment Secondly, it is a non sequitur to say that > > > the environment "as a whole" becomes a human environment (because > > > animals and infants do NOT see it that way??) without any trace of the > > > natural environment. But the biggest non-sequitur is the least > > > explicit: it is the insinuation that the process of social > > > idealization of nature that we call enculturation is prima facie > > > subversive of Marxism. > > > > > > Consider the following, from a great subversive of Marxism and primal > > > plump materialist: > > > > > > "We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. > > > A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a > > > bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. > > > But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is > > > this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he > > > erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a > > > result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its > > > commencement." (Capital, Vol 1, Chapter III, Part 7) > > > > > > What is THIS if not a doubling of reality--a mirror with two candles? > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > have a look: > > > > > > > > > > > > On 20 October 2014 00:15, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > Here's an example memory paper abstract by Sereda (2011), titled "A > > > > Theoretical Model of Memory > > > > as a Mechanism for Systematically Organizing Individual Experience" > > > > > > > > "In order to improve the explanatory potential of activity theory, > this > > > > article > > > > proposes a theoretical model of human memory as a mechanism for > > > > the systematic organization of individual experience, organization > that > > > > is an essential condition for performing future activity. The model > > rests > > > > on the idea that the main factor in human memory is the motivational > > > > and semantic sets of personality and thus orientation toward the > future > > > > (prospective orientation)." > > > > > > > > The storehouse metaphor as used in psychology merely reflects a > rather > > > poor > > > > approach. > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > On 19 October 2014 15:20, Glassman, Michael > > wrote: > > > > > > > >> Hi Larry, > > > >> > > > >> I renamed this thread because it seems to be taking a tangent from > the > > > >> very rich discussion on LSV and ANL, but perhaps it might circle > back. > > > >> Anyway, I thought Martin's very interesting illustration deserves a > > > moment > > > >> of fame. I wonder if memory is the right word in current > > > circumstance. In > > > >> U.S. psychology memory is very often viewed as a storehouse of > > > information > > > >> where you send your messages back to retrieve information when > needed > > to > > > >> apply to the current situation. Do you think Pierce would see the > > > overall > > > >> process this way (did he actually talk about memory?) For him it > > seems > > > it > > > >> would be part of a more active process of establishing relationships > > of > > > >> that which came before with that which is currently being explored. > > > >> > > > >> Michael > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > > >> on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com [lpscholar2@gmail.com] > > > >> Sent: Sunday, October 19, 2014 6:40 AM > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL > > > >> > > > >> Michael Glassman and Martin and How > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> I want to ex-tend the exploration of *models* and *memories* and > > > >> *contextualism* as linked in Michael?s rejoinder to Martin. > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> Michael wrote ?if ALL you can *see* [perceive] is what is IN the > > mirror > > > >> [metaphor of reflection AS mirroring] how do you ?know? there IS a > > > mirror > > > >> > > > >> The IF IMPLIED is the ?ALL? . > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> However, is that ?all there IS? in *seeing*? > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> IS ?memory* also existent as an existent IN seeing? > > > >> > > > >> In other words, do *interpretants* ACTUALLY exist IN FACT? [as such] > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> Umberto Eco suggests there is both ORPHIC knowing/seeing [when > Picasso > > > >> paints THAT PARTICULAR yellow shoe in a painting the SINGULARITY of > > THAT > > > >> experience IS ?orphic? > > > >> > > > >> POETS and artists are ?biased? to privilege THIS WAY of knowing > > > [Peirce's > > > >> secondness as orphic and possibly orphaned] > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> HOWEVER, Umberto Eco suggests that this orphic ?knowing* is also > > > >> *indicative* [indexical] of further *interpreting* AND THIS TYPE of > > > >> *knowing* EX-TENDS Orphic knowing. [Peirce's tiredness] > > > >> > > > >> Now in Peirce's metaphysics THIS interpreting creating interpretants > > > also > > > >> is EXISTING as facts. > > > >> > > > >> Is this transforming orphic [what IS present] TO forming > > *interpretants* > > > >> AS *something* that actually exists {through the interpreting > process} > > > >> INCLUDE memory but that IS NOT ALL. > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> IS creative imagining potentially existent? that goes BEYOND > memory? > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> I believe Umberto Eco?s question of a deeper knowing than > > orphic/orphan > > > >> knowing *things-in-themselves* EX-tending BEYOND the orphic > > > [secondness] to > > > >> INCLUDE interpreting and forming actual *interpretants* [tiredness] > > > must be > > > >> considered within the memory process. > > > >> > > > >> This returns to *models* that are necessary but NOT ALL there *is*. > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> The *relation* between *orphic* knowing and *interpreting* knowing > > > seems a > > > >> KEY question [and may ex-tend back into metaphysics? > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> Larry > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> Sent from Windows Mail > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> From: Glassman, Michael > > > >> Sent: ?Saturday?, ?October? ?18?, ?2014 ?5?:?18? ?PM > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> Hi Martin, > > > >> > > > >> That's a very interesting metaphor, but let me see if I can take it > a > > > step > > > >> further. Basically you seem to be saying that Vygotsky is making a > > > >> mechanistic argument - I'm not talking about the more colloquial > > > expression > > > >> of mechanistic but the one that Pepper talks about in World > > Hypothesis. > > > >> You are looking into the mirror and seeing the reflection of a > candle > > - > > > but > > > >> you are making the assumption that there must be a mechanism that is > > > >> causing the reflection of the candle. You cannot know this > mechanism > > > >> itself - it is too difficult to reach - but you can build models > that > > > bring > > > >> us closer to understanding. This I think is almost exactly how > Pepper > > > >> discusses this root metaphor. Our goal as scientists is to find the > > > >> mediate description of the underlying mechanism. This > > > >> Pragmatists/Conextualists would say this is dualism - not the > dualism > > > you > > > >> get from Formism where you depend on your mind to bring you closer > to > > a > > > >> known but unreachable ideal, but in the sense that there is this > > > mechanism > > > >> that exists that is somehow separate from and causing the reflection > > in > > > the > > > >> mirror. So the Contextualist asks, if all you can see is what is in > > the > > > >> mirror how do you know there is a mirror. That is the only > > information > > > you > > > >> have and you have to base all interpretation of the world on that > > > >> information - to suggest you are looking at a reflection is an > > > assumption > > > >> based on a belief system that there must be causing what you are > > > seeing. I > > > >> think you are right, Vygotsky wants to assume the mirror, but in the > > end > > > >> doesn't that suggest a dualism to his thinking. > > > >> > > > >> Michael > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > > >> on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > > > >> Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 6:38 PM > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL > > > >> > > > >> Hi Michael, > > > >> > > > >> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. > > > Every > > > >> science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* > > appearance. > > > One > > > >> of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a > burning > > > >> candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle > > > burning > > > >> behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study > > that > > > >> second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the > > > mirror, > > > >> in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' > of > > a > > > >> second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. > > > >> > > > >> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those > of > > us > > > >> raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and > feelings > > > >> exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call > > "the > > > >> mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain > how > > > that > > > >> appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal > > > >> thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because > we > > > can > > > >> use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a > fibre > > > >> bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and > > > >> Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and > > > >> neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a > *folk* > > > >> psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try > > to > > > >> make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own > > > >> psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot > > > study > > > >> the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, > > however, > > > >> set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. > > > >> > > > >> Martin > > > >> > > > >> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael > > > > >> wrote: > > > >> > > > >> > I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up > > for > > > >> being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't > > > think > > > >> he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which > I > > > think > > > >> you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what > > > develops > > > >> if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops > > > (remember > > > >> I am suggesting individual development here). > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Oct 20 12:06:20 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:06:20 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The mirror has two candles In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052CB1@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Larry, Time shows up in the senses... and memory. It might be an opportune moment to peek at Bateson's process-from diagrams (pp. 194, 196): http://philosophyofinformationandcommunication.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/bateson-gregory-mind-and-nature.pdf Sfard (and others) also refer to history of reification of mathematical concepts. Best, Huw On 20 October 2014 14:44, Larry Purss wrote: > I want to respond to this theme by bringing in the notion of *mediated > action* AS the best *unit of analysis*. Wertsch weaved together Vygotsky > and Bakhtin and showed utterances AS *mediated actions* > The place of the *ideal* in relation to *objects* is the theme. > > Now I want to weave in Anna Sfard's exploration of mathematical *entities* > AS having a dual *nature*. This extension is from an article she just > posted on the web [On the Dual Nature of Mathematical Conceptions] > > Page 4 is her elaborating this dual nature as follows. > > [is] Treating mathematical conceptions AS IF they referred to some abstract > OBJECTS the only possibility of relating to mathematical concepts? THIS > KIND of conception [interpretation] Anna labels *structural*. THIS TYPE of > utterance [mediated action] prevails in mathematical discourse situations > as mediational means > However, there ARE different KINDS of mathematical definitions that > *reveal* quite a different approach to these same concepts. > Functions can be defined not only AS *a set of ordered pairs* BUT ALSO AS a > process of *getting from one system to another* [skemp referenced] > > Symmetry can BE conceived [interpreted] AS a static property of geometric > forms BUT ALSO AS a *kind* of transformation. This latter TYPE of > description [genre] SPEAKS AS IF the mathematical notion is about > processes, algorithms, ACTIONS, [rather than speaking of these mathematical > notions AS IF they ARE *objects* > THIS TYPE OF GENRE *reflects* an Operational interpretation [rather than > structural interpretation] of mathematical conceptions. > > Seeing a mathematical *entity* AS *an object* *means* being capable of > gesturing [referring] to the mathematical concept AS IF the mathematical > concept were A REAL THING [a static structure actually existing somewhere > in time and space but timeless] It also *means* being able to *recognize* > the *idea* at a glance AND to manipulate this mathematical conception AS IF > the structure existed AS A WHOLE [without going into details or analysis] > AS AN EXISTING OBJECT. > > Using Hadamard's *metaphor* we can SAY that *structural genres* endows a > concept with a KIND of *physiognomy* which ALLOWS a person to think of this > concept AS a unique, THING [entity] however complicated this concept may > BE. > > JUST AS WE SEE A FACE OF A MAN. > > In contrast, interpreting A concept AS A PROCESS implies regarding THIS > PARTICULAR mathematical concept AS A POTENTIAL [existant] rather than an > ACTUAL EXISTING ENTITY. In operational kinds of genres the *entity* COMES > INTO EXISTENCE upon request in a sequence of actions. > THUS > whereas the structural genre IS timeless [static] instantaneous, and > integrative, the operational genre is dynamic, sequential, and detailed. In > other words different mediational means within *mediated action* produce > radically different notions of the place of concepts as interpretants that > exist [in actuality or in potential] > > THEREFORE the play involves different TYPES of *seeing* and different TYPES > of *saying*. > > BOTH are equally *true* > > I have been exploring *objects of activity* *units of analysis* and > *mediated action* through Anna Sfard's exploration of mathematical > conceptions which do not appear through the 5 senses but DO EXIST. > > Larry > > On Sun, Oct 19, 2014 at 4:00 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > Hi David, > > > > I don't think anyone is going to argue against the paper's defamatory > > quality. Everything he says against LSV can be taken with a pinch of > salt > > if we assume he was trying to protect his colleagues. > > > > What remains is therefore what is countered and proposed with respect to > > the subject of the environment. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > On 19 October 2014 23:38, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > First of all, a word of appreciation to Martin for his candle in the > > > mirror and his delightful formulation of "Plump Materialism", and also > > > to Michael for recognizing the beauty of the image and using it to > > > revitalize a thread that was growing somewhat tiresome to me: no fault > > > of the participants; it was my own inability to see past "fatalistic > > > determinism", "captive to bourgeois theories", and ANL's other fatuous > > > formulae. As Mike points out, this is not just name calling: these are > > > blood libels. > > > > > > Secondly, let me put in a word for Andy's counter-blast. For those of > > > you who have not read it; it is available on Andy's academia.edu page, > > > and it's well worth a look: > > > > > > > > > > > > http://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky > > > > > > Thirdly--can I draw attention to the top of page fourteen of ANL's > > > dishonest and dishonorable hatchet job? Here he rounds on Basov for > > > non-Marxist, idealist notion that humans in some way "double" the > > > natural environment. ANL returns to this theme at the bottom of the > > > page where he says: > > > > > > "To the animal, however, any ?artificial? object created by humans is > > > simply > > > a natural object, it is nature because the animal?s relation toward it > > > will always > > > be an instinctive relation. Thus, of course, in reality there is no > > > doubling of the > > > environment. The environment as a whole is transformed into a human > > > environment, > > > that is, for the human being, into a social environment, based on the > > > fact that humans themselves relate to it in human terms, that is, as > > > social humans." > > > > > > Note the use of "Thus"; it marks a shameless non sequitur. First of > > > all, it is a non sequitur to say that because animals and very small > > > children treat i-phones as natural objects, THEREFORE there is no > > > doubling of the environment Secondly, it is a non sequitur to say that > > > the environment "as a whole" becomes a human environment (because > > > animals and infants do NOT see it that way??) without any trace of the > > > natural environment. But the biggest non-sequitur is the least > > > explicit: it is the insinuation that the process of social > > > idealization of nature that we call enculturation is prima facie > > > subversive of Marxism. > > > > > > Consider the following, from a great subversive of Marxism and primal > > > plump materialist: > > > > > > "We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. > > > A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a > > > bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. > > > But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is > > > this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he > > > erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a > > > result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its > > > commencement." (Capital, Vol 1, Chapter III, Part 7) > > > > > > What is THIS if not a doubling of reality--a mirror with two candles? > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > have a look: > > > > > > > > > > > > On 20 October 2014 00:15, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > Here's an example memory paper abstract by Sereda (2011), titled "A > > > > Theoretical Model of Memory > > > > as a Mechanism for Systematically Organizing Individual Experience" > > > > > > > > "In order to improve the explanatory potential of activity theory, > this > > > > article > > > > proposes a theoretical model of human memory as a mechanism for > > > > the systematic organization of individual experience, organization > that > > > > is an essential condition for performing future activity. The model > > rests > > > > on the idea that the main factor in human memory is the motivational > > > > and semantic sets of personality and thus orientation toward the > future > > > > (prospective orientation)." > > > > > > > > The storehouse metaphor as used in psychology merely reflects a > rather > > > poor > > > > approach. > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > On 19 October 2014 15:20, Glassman, Michael > > wrote: > > > > > > > >> Hi Larry, > > > >> > > > >> I renamed this thread because it seems to be taking a tangent from > the > > > >> very rich discussion on LSV and ANL, but perhaps it might circle > back. > > > >> Anyway, I thought Martin's very interesting illustration deserves a > > > moment > > > >> of fame. I wonder if memory is the right word in current > > > circumstance. In > > > >> U.S. psychology memory is very often viewed as a storehouse of > > > information > > > >> where you send your messages back to retrieve information when > needed > > to > > > >> apply to the current situation. Do you think Pierce would see the > > > overall > > > >> process this way (did he actually talk about memory?) For him it > > seems > > > it > > > >> would be part of a more active process of establishing relationships > > of > > > >> that which came before with that which is currently being explored. > > > >> > > > >> Michael > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > > >> on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com [lpscholar2@gmail.com] > > > >> Sent: Sunday, October 19, 2014 6:40 AM > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL > > > >> > > > >> Michael Glassman and Martin and How > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> I want to ex-tend the exploration of *models* and *memories* and > > > >> *contextualism* as linked in Michael?s rejoinder to Martin. > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> Michael wrote ?if ALL you can *see* [perceive] is what is IN the > > mirror > > > >> [metaphor of reflection AS mirroring] how do you ?know? there IS a > > > mirror > > > >> > > > >> The IF IMPLIED is the ?ALL? . > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> However, is that ?all there IS? in *seeing*? > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> IS ?memory* also existent as an existent IN seeing? > > > >> > > > >> In other words, do *interpretants* ACTUALLY exist IN FACT? [as such] > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> Umberto Eco suggests there is both ORPHIC knowing/seeing [when > Picasso > > > >> paints THAT PARTICULAR yellow shoe in a painting the SINGULARITY of > > THAT > > > >> experience IS ?orphic? > > > >> > > > >> POETS and artists are ?biased? to privilege THIS WAY of knowing > > > [Peirce's > > > >> secondness as orphic and possibly orphaned] > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> HOWEVER, Umberto Eco suggests that this orphic ?knowing* is also > > > >> *indicative* [indexical] of further *interpreting* AND THIS TYPE of > > > >> *knowing* EX-TENDS Orphic knowing. [Peirce's tiredness] > > > >> > > > >> Now in Peirce's metaphysics THIS interpreting creating interpretants > > > also > > > >> is EXISTING as facts. > > > >> > > > >> Is this transforming orphic [what IS present] TO forming > > *interpretants* > > > >> AS *something* that actually exists {through the interpreting > process} > > > >> INCLUDE memory but that IS NOT ALL. > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> IS creative imagining potentially existent? that goes BEYOND > memory? > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> I believe Umberto Eco?s question of a deeper knowing than > > orphic/orphan > > > >> knowing *things-in-themselves* EX-tending BEYOND the orphic > > > [secondness] to > > > >> INCLUDE interpreting and forming actual *interpretants* [tiredness] > > > must be > > > >> considered within the memory process. > > > >> > > > >> This returns to *models* that are necessary but NOT ALL there *is*. > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> The *relation* between *orphic* knowing and *interpreting* knowing > > > seems a > > > >> KEY question [and may ex-tend back into metaphysics? > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> Larry > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> Sent from Windows Mail > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> From: Glassman, Michael > > > >> Sent: ?Saturday?, ?October? ?18?, ?2014 ?5?:?18? ?PM > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> Hi Martin, > > > >> > > > >> That's a very interesting metaphor, but let me see if I can take it > a > > > step > > > >> further. Basically you seem to be saying that Vygotsky is making a > > > >> mechanistic argument - I'm not talking about the more colloquial > > > expression > > > >> of mechanistic but the one that Pepper talks about in World > > Hypothesis. > > > >> You are looking into the mirror and seeing the reflection of a > candle > > - > > > but > > > >> you are making the assumption that there must be a mechanism that is > > > >> causing the reflection of the candle. You cannot know this > mechanism > > > >> itself - it is too difficult to reach - but you can build models > that > > > bring > > > >> us closer to understanding. This I think is almost exactly how > Pepper > > > >> discusses this root metaphor. Our goal as scientists is to find the > > > >> mediate description of the underlying mechanism. This > > > >> Pragmatists/Conextualists would say this is dualism - not the > dualism > > > you > > > >> get from Formism where you depend on your mind to bring you closer > to > > a > > > >> known but unreachable ideal, but in the sense that there is this > > > mechanism > > > >> that exists that is somehow separate from and causing the reflection > > in > > > the > > > >> mirror. So the Contextualist asks, if all you can see is what is in > > the > > > >> mirror how do you know there is a mirror. That is the only > > information > > > you > > > >> have and you have to base all interpretation of the world on that > > > >> information - to suggest you are looking at a reflection is an > > > assumption > > > >> based on a belief system that there must be causing what you are > > > seeing. I > > > >> think you are right, Vygotsky wants to assume the mirror, but in the > > end > > > >> doesn't that suggest a dualism to his thinking. > > > >> > > > >> Michael > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > > >> on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > > > >> Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 6:38 PM > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL > > > >> > > > >> Hi Michael, > > > >> > > > >> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. > > > Every > > > >> science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* > > appearance. > > > One > > > >> of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a > burning > > > >> candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle > > > burning > > > >> behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study > > that > > > >> second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the > > > mirror, > > > >> in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' > of > > a > > > >> second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. > > > >> > > > >> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those > of > > us > > > >> raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and > feelings > > > >> exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call > > "the > > > >> mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain > how > > > that > > > >> appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal > > > >> thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because > we > > > can > > > >> use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a > fibre > > > >> bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and > > > >> Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and > > > >> neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a > *folk* > > > >> psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try > > to > > > >> make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own > > > >> psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot > > > study > > > >> the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, > > however, > > > >> set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. > > > >> > > > >> Martin > > > >> > > > >> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael > > > > >> wrote: > > > >> > > > >> > I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up > > for > > > >> being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't > > > think > > > >> he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which > I > > > think > > > >> you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what > > > develops > > > >> if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops > > > (remember > > > >> I am suggesting individual development here). > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Oct 20 12:27:48 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2014 19:27:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The mirror has two candles In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052CB1@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Larry, David, Greg: I think this "seeing as" is central to understanding the psychological process of imagination that Plump Materialist Karl Marx described, as David Ke pointed out. I have in the past thought a lot about this passage from Kapital, precisely because it seems to imply a "doubling": there is the real world, plus there is the world in the mind of the archiect. In short, it sounds like the standard cognitivist model of mental representation. But I think in fact not. I think there is a three-part analysis of the *imagination* that Marx was describing. First, the structure that the architect "raises in imagination" is often raised in the form of sketches, drawings, plans, and blueprints. That is, using *material* representations of the to-be-constructed building, not mental representations. We don't need to invoke "mind" to explain this. Second, the architect has developed a specific skill of "seeing as" (cf, Wittgenstein for an analysis). He walks around the site, seeing it *as* it will be once the construction is completed. In addition, he can see the plans *as* the building. Ed Hutchins has said, ?When humans engage in symbolic processes, they are engaging in cultural practices for seeing as.? No need to invoke "mind" to explain this. Third, we develop brains capable of forming "simulations" of past and future events and objects (cf. Larry Barsalou's work). These simulations are "modal," that is to say, they have sensory qualities, of sound, sight, and touch. And, of course, we are conscious of them. They are*not* the unconscious, syntactic, and amodal representations of a computer. The architect *imagines* the building by creating a simulation of it. Does that sound odd? On xmca we have often discussed one kind of simulation: inner speech. The silent kind. When I hear myself talking, that is my brain's simulation of a sensory experience. Where does it take place? In the brain, of course, not in the mind! Inner speech is a material phenomenon. Barselou says this: "Grounded cognition rejects traditional views that cognition is computation on amodal symbols in a modular system, independent of the brain?s modal systems for perception, action, and introspection. Instead, grounded cognition proposes that modal simulations, bodily states, and situated action underlie cognition." In short, a Plump Materialist can give a detailed account of imagination without locating it "inside a mind." Martin p.s., Greg, to be a Plump Materialist is to *avoid* doubles, at least of the ontological kind On Oct 20, 2014, at 8:44 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > I want to respond to this theme by bringing in the notion of *mediated > action* AS the best *unit of analysis*. Wertsch weaved together Vygotsky > and Bakhtin and showed utterances AS *mediated actions* > The place of the *ideal* in relation to *objects* is the theme. > > Now I want to weave in Anna Sfard's exploration of mathematical *entities* > AS having a dual *nature*. This extension is from an article she just > posted on the web [On the Dual Nature of Mathematical Conceptions] > > Page 4 is her elaborating this dual nature as follows. > > [is] Treating mathematical conceptions AS IF they referred to some abstract > OBJECTS the only possibility of relating to mathematical concepts? THIS > KIND of conception [interpretation] Anna labels *structural*. THIS TYPE of > utterance [mediated action] prevails in mathematical discourse situations > as mediational means > However, there ARE different KINDS of mathematical definitions that > *reveal* quite a different approach to these same concepts. > Functions can be defined not only AS *a set of ordered pairs* BUT ALSO AS a > process of *getting from one system to another* [skemp referenced] > > Symmetry can BE conceived [interpreted] AS a static property of geometric > forms BUT ALSO AS a *kind* of transformation. This latter TYPE of > description [genre] SPEAKS AS IF the mathematical notion is about > processes, algorithms, ACTIONS, [rather than speaking of these mathematical > notions AS IF they ARE *objects* > THIS TYPE OF GENRE *reflects* an Operational interpretation [rather than > structural interpretation] of mathematical conceptions. > > Seeing a mathematical *entity* AS *an object* *means* being capable of > gesturing [referring] to the mathematical concept AS IF the mathematical > concept were A REAL THING [a static structure actually existing somewhere > in time and space but timeless] It also *means* being able to *recognize* > the *idea* at a glance AND to manipulate this mathematical conception AS IF > the structure existed AS A WHOLE [without going into details or analysis] > AS AN EXISTING OBJECT. > > Using Hadamard's *metaphor* we can SAY that *structural genres* endows a > concept with a KIND of *physiognomy* which ALLOWS a person to think of this > concept AS a unique, THING [entity] however complicated this concept may BE. > > JUST AS WE SEE A FACE OF A MAN. > > In contrast, interpreting A concept AS A PROCESS implies regarding THIS > PARTICULAR mathematical concept AS A POTENTIAL [existant] rather than an > ACTUAL EXISTING ENTITY. In operational kinds of genres the *entity* COMES > INTO EXISTENCE upon request in a sequence of actions. > THUS > whereas the structural genre IS timeless [static] instantaneous, and > integrative, the operational genre is dynamic, sequential, and detailed. In > other words different mediational means within *mediated action* produce > radically different notions of the place of concepts as interpretants that > exist [in actuality or in potential] > > THEREFORE the play involves different TYPES of *seeing* and different TYPES > of *saying*. > > BOTH are equally *true* > > I have been exploring *objects of activity* *units of analysis* and > *mediated action* through Anna Sfard's exploration of mathematical > conceptions which do not appear through the 5 senses but DO EXIST. > > Larry > > On Sun, Oct 19, 2014 at 4:00 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > >> Hi David, >> >> I don't think anyone is going to argue against the paper's defamatory >> quality. Everything he says against LSV can be taken with a pinch of salt >> if we assume he was trying to protect his colleagues. >> >> What remains is therefore what is countered and proposed with respect to >> the subject of the environment. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> On 19 October 2014 23:38, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> First of all, a word of appreciation to Martin for his candle in the >>> mirror and his delightful formulation of "Plump Materialism", and also >>> to Michael for recognizing the beauty of the image and using it to >>> revitalize a thread that was growing somewhat tiresome to me: no fault >>> of the participants; it was my own inability to see past "fatalistic >>> determinism", "captive to bourgeois theories", and ANL's other fatuous >>> formulae. As Mike points out, this is not just name calling: these are >>> blood libels. >>> >>> Secondly, let me put in a word for Andy's counter-blast. For those of >>> you who have not read it; it is available on Andy's academia.edu page, >>> and it's well worth a look: >>> >>> >>> >> http://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky >>> >>> Thirdly--can I draw attention to the top of page fourteen of ANL's >>> dishonest and dishonorable hatchet job? Here he rounds on Basov for >>> non-Marxist, idealist notion that humans in some way "double" the >>> natural environment. ANL returns to this theme at the bottom of the >>> page where he says: >>> >>> "To the animal, however, any ?artificial? object created by humans is >>> simply >>> a natural object, it is nature because the animal?s relation toward it >>> will always >>> be an instinctive relation. Thus, of course, in reality there is no >>> doubling of the >>> environment. The environment as a whole is transformed into a human >>> environment, >>> that is, for the human being, into a social environment, based on the >>> fact that humans themselves relate to it in human terms, that is, as >>> social humans." >>> >>> Note the use of "Thus"; it marks a shameless non sequitur. First of >>> all, it is a non sequitur to say that because animals and very small >>> children treat i-phones as natural objects, THEREFORE there is no >>> doubling of the environment Secondly, it is a non sequitur to say that >>> the environment "as a whole" becomes a human environment (because >>> animals and infants do NOT see it that way??) without any trace of the >>> natural environment. But the biggest non-sequitur is the least >>> explicit: it is the insinuation that the process of social >>> idealization of nature that we call enculturation is prima facie >>> subversive of Marxism. >>> >>> Consider the following, from a great subversive of Marxism and primal >>> plump materialist: >>> >>> "We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. >>> A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a >>> bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. >>> But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is >>> this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he >>> erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a >>> result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its >>> commencement." (Capital, Vol 1, Chapter III, Part 7) >>> >>> What is THIS if not a doubling of reality--a mirror with two candles? >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> >>> have a look: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 20 October 2014 00:15, Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>> Here's an example memory paper abstract by Sereda (2011), titled "A >>>> Theoretical Model of Memory >>>> as a Mechanism for Systematically Organizing Individual Experience" >>>> >>>> "In order to improve the explanatory potential of activity theory, this >>>> article >>>> proposes a theoretical model of human memory as a mechanism for >>>> the systematic organization of individual experience, organization that >>>> is an essential condition for performing future activity. The model >> rests >>>> on the idea that the main factor in human memory is the motivational >>>> and semantic sets of personality and thus orientation toward the future >>>> (prospective orientation)." >>>> >>>> The storehouse metaphor as used in psychology merely reflects a rather >>> poor >>>> approach. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> On 19 October 2014 15:20, Glassman, Michael >> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Larry, >>>>> >>>>> I renamed this thread because it seems to be taking a tangent from the >>>>> very rich discussion on LSV and ANL, but perhaps it might circle back. >>>>> Anyway, I thought Martin's very interesting illustration deserves a >>> moment >>>>> of fame. I wonder if memory is the right word in current >>> circumstance. In >>>>> U.S. psychology memory is very often viewed as a storehouse of >>> information >>>>> where you send your messages back to retrieve information when needed >> to >>>>> apply to the current situation. Do you think Pierce would see the >>> overall >>>>> process this way (did he actually talk about memory?) For him it >> seems >>> it >>>>> would be part of a more active process of establishing relationships >> of >>>>> that which came before with that which is currently being explored. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>> on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com [lpscholar2@gmail.com] >>>>> Sent: Sunday, October 19, 2014 6:40 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL >>>>> >>>>> Michael Glassman and Martin and How >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I want to ex-tend the exploration of *models* and *memories* and >>>>> *contextualism* as linked in Michael?s rejoinder to Martin. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Michael wrote ?if ALL you can *see* [perceive] is what is IN the >> mirror >>>>> [metaphor of reflection AS mirroring] how do you ?know? there IS a >>> mirror >>>>> >>>>> The IF IMPLIED is the ?ALL? . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> However, is that ?all there IS? in *seeing*? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> IS ?memory* also existent as an existent IN seeing? >>>>> >>>>> In other words, do *interpretants* ACTUALLY exist IN FACT? [as such] >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Umberto Eco suggests there is both ORPHIC knowing/seeing [when Picasso >>>>> paints THAT PARTICULAR yellow shoe in a painting the SINGULARITY of >> THAT >>>>> experience IS ?orphic? >>>>> >>>>> POETS and artists are ?biased? to privilege THIS WAY of knowing >>> [Peirce's >>>>> secondness as orphic and possibly orphaned] >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> HOWEVER, Umberto Eco suggests that this orphic ?knowing* is also >>>>> *indicative* [indexical] of further *interpreting* AND THIS TYPE of >>>>> *knowing* EX-TENDS Orphic knowing. [Peirce's tiredness] >>>>> >>>>> Now in Peirce's metaphysics THIS interpreting creating interpretants >>> also >>>>> is EXISTING as facts. >>>>> >>>>> Is this transforming orphic [what IS present] TO forming >> *interpretants* >>>>> AS *something* that actually exists {through the interpreting process} >>>>> INCLUDE memory but that IS NOT ALL. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> IS creative imagining potentially existent? that goes BEYOND memory? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I believe Umberto Eco?s question of a deeper knowing than >> orphic/orphan >>>>> knowing *things-in-themselves* EX-tending BEYOND the orphic >>> [secondness] to >>>>> INCLUDE interpreting and forming actual *interpretants* [tiredness] >>> must be >>>>> considered within the memory process. >>>>> >>>>> This returns to *models* that are necessary but NOT ALL there *is*. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The *relation* between *orphic* knowing and *interpreting* knowing >>> seems a >>>>> KEY question [and may ex-tend back into metaphysics? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Larry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Sent from Windows Mail >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> From: Glassman, Michael >>>>> Sent: ?Saturday?, ?October? ?18?, ?2014 ?5?:?18? ?PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Hi Martin, >>>>> >>>>> That's a very interesting metaphor, but let me see if I can take it a >>> step >>>>> further. Basically you seem to be saying that Vygotsky is making a >>>>> mechanistic argument - I'm not talking about the more colloquial >>> expression >>>>> of mechanistic but the one that Pepper talks about in World >> Hypothesis. >>>>> You are looking into the mirror and seeing the reflection of a candle >> - >>> but >>>>> you are making the assumption that there must be a mechanism that is >>>>> causing the reflection of the candle. You cannot know this mechanism >>>>> itself - it is too difficult to reach - but you can build models that >>> bring >>>>> us closer to understanding. This I think is almost exactly how Pepper >>>>> discusses this root metaphor. Our goal as scientists is to find the >>>>> mediate description of the underlying mechanism. This >>>>> Pragmatists/Conextualists would say this is dualism - not the dualism >>> you >>>>> get from Formism where you depend on your mind to bring you closer to >> a >>>>> known but unreachable ideal, but in the sense that there is this >>> mechanism >>>>> that exists that is somehow separate from and causing the reflection >> in >>> the >>>>> mirror. So the Contextualist asks, if all you can see is what is in >> the >>>>> mirror how do you know there is a mirror. That is the only >> information >>> you >>>>> have and you have to base all interpretation of the world on that >>>>> information - to suggest you are looking at a reflection is an >>> assumption >>>>> based on a belief system that there must be causing what you are >>> seeing. I >>>>> think you are right, Vygotsky wants to assume the mirror, but in the >> end >>>>> doesn't that suggest a dualism to his thinking. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>> on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >>>>> Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 6:38 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL >>>>> >>>>> Hi Michael, >>>>> >>>>> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. >>> Every >>>>> science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* >> appearance. >>> One >>>>> of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a burning >>>>> candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle >>> burning >>>>> behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study >> that >>>>> second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the >>> mirror, >>>>> in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' of >> a >>>>> second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. >>>>> >>>>> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of >> us >>>>> raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and feelings >>>>> exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call >> "the >>>>> mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how >>> that >>>>> appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal >>>>> thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we >>> can >>>>> use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre >>>>> bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and >>>>> Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and >>>>> neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk* >>>>> psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try >> to >>>>> make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own >>>>> psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot >>> study >>>>> the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, >> however, >>>>> set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up >> for >>>>> being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't >>> think >>>>> he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I >>> think >>>>> you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what >>> develops >>>>> if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops >>> (remember >>>>> I am suggesting individual development here). >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >> From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Mon Oct 20 12:43:12 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:43:12 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The mirror has two candles In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052CB1@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <1413834192.73086.YahooMailNeo@web173203.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Dear Martin et al Excuse me because everybody is tired with the old thread but to keep to my word as posing the idea of 'pure thinkg' as the last phase of the 'internalization process' , I'd like to paste the two last paragraphs of Vygosky's "The problem of the environment" here as a parenthetical notion : "With the help of speech [as one component of the environment] a child can converse with other people around him and they, in turn, can talk to him. But now take each of us. You know that each of us possesses so called inner speech and that this inner speech, i.e. the fact that we are able to formulate in silence for ourselves ideas embodied in words, plays a major role in our thinking. This role is so great, that some researchers have (even), albeit incorrectly, identified the process of speech with the process of thinking. But, in actual fact, for every one of us, this inner speech is one of the most important functions we have at our disposal. When this inner speech in human beings becomes disturbed due to some disorder, (it can result in the most severe disruption of the entire thinking process.) How did this process of inner speech in each of us come about? Research has revealed that the emergence of inner speech is based on external speech. Originally, for a child, speech represents a means of communication between people, it manifests itself as a social function, in its social role. But gradually a child learns how to use speech to serve himself, his internal processes. Now speech becomes not just a means of communication with other people, but also a means for the child?s (own inner thinking processes). Then it no longer represents that speech which we use aloud when we communicate with one another, but it becomes an inner, silent, tacit speech. But where did speech as a means of thinking come from? From speech as a means of communication. From the external activity which the child was involved in with the people around him, appeared one of the most important inner functions without which man?s (very thinking process) could not exist." If you are not still convinced , I'll try to find 'pure thinking' as well . And please note the idea of 'mastering' the consciousness a few paragraphs above . One might think mastering the consciousness how and by what ? Emphases through parentheses are mine . Best Haydi ________________________________ From: ?Greg Thompson? ?? To: ?"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"? ?? Sent: Monday, 20 October 2014, 10:57:58 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The mirror has two candles Larry, Can you help me to think through this: Are Acheulean hand axes the same as the concept of "symmetry"? It seems the critical point about "symmetry" (or any other mathematical concept) is that it takes on meaning when it is seen in process within some system of relations. Just as an Acheulean hand axe lying there isn't of much use - symmetry becomes useful only when it is taken up as a part of a process, and hence as part of a system of relations (why are we engaging in making something "symmetrical"?). Again here I'm wondering if the metaphor of inside/outside of a system of relations might be useful for re-thinking the ideal/material in such a way that avoids seeing this distinction as a matter of ontological dualism. I could use some help as to whether or not this would jibe with Vygotsky's formulation of the problem. (and extending to some related names in Russia at the time of Vygotsky, I'd be curious if anyone would have any thoughts on Volosinov's and Bakhtin's metaphor of inside/outside - does it necessarily have to be based on an ontological dualism?) Just trying to get my head around how we might conceive of the plump doubles that Martin has pointed us to... -greg On Mon, Oct 20, 2014 at 7:44 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > I want to respond to this theme by bringing in the notion of *mediated > action* AS the best *unit of analysis*. Wertsch weaved together Vygotsky > and Bakhtin and showed utterances AS *mediated actions* > The place of the *ideal* in relation to *objects* is the theme. > > Now I want to weave in Anna Sfard's exploration of mathematical *entities* > AS having a dual *nature*. This extension is from an article she just > posted on the web [On the Dual Nature of Mathematical Conceptions] > > Page 4 is her elaborating this dual nature as follows. > > [is] Treating mathematical conceptions AS IF they referred to some abstract > OBJECTS the only possibility of relating to mathematical concepts? THIS > KIND of conception [interpretation] Anna labels *structural*. THIS TYPE of > utterance [mediated action] prevails in mathematical discourse situations > as mediational means > However, there ARE different KINDS of mathematical definitions that > *reveal* quite a different approach to these same concepts. > Functions can be defined not only AS *a set of ordered pairs* BUT ALSO AS a > process of *getting from one system to another* [skemp referenced] > > Symmetry can BE conceived [interpreted] AS a static property of geometric > forms BUT ALSO AS a *kind* of transformation. This latter TYPE of > description [genre] SPEAKS AS IF the mathematical notion is about > processes, algorithms, ACTIONS, [rather than speaking of these mathematical > notions AS IF they ARE *objects* > THIS TYPE OF GENRE *reflects* an Operational interpretation [rather than > structural interpretation] of mathematical conceptions. > > Seeing a mathematical *entity* AS *an object* *means* being capable of > gesturing [referring] to the mathematical concept AS IF the mathematical > concept were A REAL THING [a static structure actually existing somewhere > in time and space but timeless] It also *means* being able to *recognize* > the *idea* at a glance AND to manipulate this mathematical conception AS IF > the structure existed AS A WHOLE [without going into details or analysis] > AS AN EXISTING OBJECT. > > Using Hadamard's *metaphor* we can SAY that *structural genres* endows a > concept with a KIND of *physiognomy* which ALLOWS a person to think of this > concept AS a unique, THING [entity] however complicated this concept may > BE. > > JUST AS WE SEE A FACE OF A MAN. > > In contrast, interpreting A concept AS A PROCESS implies regarding THIS > PARTICULAR mathematical concept AS A POTENTIAL [existant] rather than an > ACTUAL EXISTING ENTITY. In operational kinds of genres the *entity* COMES > INTO EXISTENCE upon request in a sequence of actions. > THUS > whereas the structural genre IS timeless [static] instantaneous, and > integrative, the operational genre is dynamic, sequential, and detailed. In > other words different mediational means within *mediated action* produce > radically different notions of the place of concepts as interpretants that > exist [in actuality or in potential] > > THEREFORE the play involves different TYPES of *seeing* and different TYPES > of *saying*. > > BOTH are equally *true* > > I have been exploring *objects of activity* *units of analysis* and > *mediated action* through Anna Sfard's exploration of mathematical > conceptions which do not appear through the 5 senses but DO EXIST. > > Larry > > On Sun, Oct 19, 2014 at 4:00 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > Hi David, > > > > I don't think anyone is going to argue against the paper's defamatory > > quality. Everything he says against LSV can be taken with a pinch of > salt > > if we assume he was trying to protect his colleagues. > > > > What remains is therefore what is countered and proposed with respect to > > the subject of the environment. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > On 19 October 2014 23:38, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > First of all, a word of appreciation to Martin for his candle in the > > > mirror and his delightful formulation of "Plump Materialism", and also > > > to Michael for recognizing the beauty of the image and using it to > > > revitalize a thread that was growing somewhat tiresome to me: no fault > > > of the participants; it was my own inability to see past "fatalistic > > > determinism", "captive to bourgeois theories", and ANL's other fatuous > > > formulae. As Mike points out, this is not just name calling: these are > > > blood libels. > > > > > > Secondly, let me put in a word for Andy's counter-blast. For those of > > > you who have not read it; it is available on Andy's academia.edu page, > > > and it's well worth a look: > > > > > > > > > > > > http://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky > > > > > > Thirdly--can I draw attention to the top of page fourteen of ANL's > > > dishonest and dishonorable hatchet job? Here he rounds on Basov for > > > non-Marxist, idealist notion that humans in some way "double" the > > > natural environment. ANL returns to this theme at the bottom of the > > > page where he says: > > > > > > "To the animal, however, any ?artificial? object created by humans is > > > simply > > > a natural object, it is nature because the animal?s relation toward it > > > will always > > > be an instinctive relation. Thus, of course, in reality there is no > > > doubling of the > > > environment. The environment as a whole is transformed into a human > > > environment, > > > that is, for the human being, into a social environment, based on the > > > fact that humans themselves relate to it in human terms, that is, as > > > social humans." > > > > > > Note the use of "Thus"; it marks a shameless non sequitur. First of > > > all, it is a non sequitur to say that because animals and very small > > > children treat i-phones as natural objects, THEREFORE there is no > > > doubling of the environment Secondly, it is a non sequitur to say that > > > the environment "as a whole" becomes a human environment (because > > > animals and infants do NOT see it that way??) without any trace of the > > > natural environment. But the biggest non-sequitur is the least > > > explicit: it is the insinuation that the process of social > > > idealization of nature that we call enculturation is prima facie > > > subversive of Marxism. > > > > > > Consider the following, from a great subversive of Marxism and primal > > > plump materialist: > > > > > > "We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. > > > A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a > > > bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. > > > But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is > > > this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he > > > erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a > > > result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its > > > commencement." (Capital, Vol 1, Chapter III, Part 7) > > > > > > What is THIS if not a doubling of reality--a mirror with two candles? > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > have a look: > > > > > > > > > > > > On 20 October 2014 00:15, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > Here's an example memory paper abstract by Sereda (2011), titled "A > > > > Theoretical Model of Memory > > > > as a Mechanism for Systematically Organizing Individual Experience" > > > > > > > > "In order to improve the explanatory potential of activity theory, > this > > > > article > > > > proposes a theoretical model of human memory as a mechanism for > > > > the systematic organization of individual experience, organization > that > > > > is an essential condition for performing future activity. The model > > rests > > > > on the idea that the main factor in human memory is the motivational > > > > and semantic sets of personality and thus orientation toward the > future > > > > (prospective orientation)." > > > > > > > > The storehouse metaphor as used in psychology merely reflects a > rather > > > poor > > > > approach. > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > On 19 October 2014 15:20, Glassman, Michael > > wrote: > > > > > > > >> Hi Larry, > > > >> > > > >> I renamed this thread because it seems to be taking a tangent from > the > > > >> very rich discussion on LSV and ANL, but perhaps it might circle > back. > > > >> Anyway, I thought Martin's very interesting illustration deserves a > > > moment > > > >> of fame. I wonder if memory is the right word in current > > > circumstance. In > > > >> U.S. psychology memory is very often viewed as a storehouse of > > > information > > > >> where you send your messages back to retrieve information when > needed > > to > > > >> apply to the current situation. Do you think Pierce would see the > > > overall > > > >> process this way (did he actually talk about memory?) For him it > > seems > > > it > > > >> would be part of a more active process of establishing relationships > > of > > > >> that which came before with that which is currently being explored. > > > >> > > > >> Michael > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > > >> on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com [lpscholar2@gmail.com] > > > >> Sent: Sunday, October 19, 2014 6:40 AM > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL > > > >> > > > >> Michael Glassman and Martin and How > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> I want to ex-tend the exploration of *models* and *memories* and > > > >> *contextualism* as linked in Michael?s rejoinder to Martin. > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> Michael wrote ?if ALL you can *see* [perceive] is what is IN the > > mirror > > > >> [metaphor of reflection AS mirroring] how do you ?know? there IS a > > > mirror > > > >> > > > >> The IF IMPLIED is the ?ALL? . > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> However, is that ?all there IS? in *seeing*? > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> IS ?memory* also existent as an existent IN seeing? > > > >> > > > >> In other words, do *interpretants* ACTUALLY exist IN FACT? [as such] > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> Umberto Eco suggests there is both ORPHIC knowing/seeing [when > Picasso > > > >> paints THAT PARTICULAR yellow shoe in a painting the SINGULARITY of > > THAT > > > >> experience IS ?orphic? > > > >> > > > >> POETS and artists are ?biased? to privilege THIS WAY of knowing > > > [Peirce's > > > >> secondness as orphic and possibly orphaned] > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> HOWEVER, Umberto Eco suggests that this orphic ?knowing* is also > > > >> *indicative* [indexical] of further *interpreting* AND THIS TYPE of > > > >> *knowing* EX-TENDS Orphic knowing. [Peirce's tiredness] > > > >> > > > >> Now in Peirce's metaphysics THIS interpreting creating interpretants > > > also > > > >> is EXISTING as facts. > > > >> > > > >> Is this transforming orphic [what IS present] TO forming > > *interpretants* > > > >> AS *something* that actually exists {through the interpreting > process} > > > >> INCLUDE memory but that IS NOT ALL. > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> IS creative imagining potentially existent? that goes BEYOND > memory? > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> I believe Umberto Eco?s question of a deeper knowing than > > orphic/orphan > > > >> knowing *things-in-themselves* EX-tending BEYOND the orphic > > > [secondness] to > > > >> INCLUDE interpreting and forming actual *interpretants* [tiredness] > > > must be > > > >> considered within the memory process. > > > >> > > > >> This returns to *models* that are necessary but NOT ALL there *is*. > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> The *relation* between *orphic* knowing and *interpreting* knowing > > > seems a > > > >> KEY question [and may ex-tend back into metaphysics? > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> Larry > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> Sent from Windows Mail > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> From: Glassman, Michael > > > >> Sent: ?Saturday?, ?October? ?18?, ?2014 ?5?:?18? ?PM > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> Hi Martin, > > > >> > > > >> That's a very interesting metaphor, but let me see if I can take it > a > > > step > > > >> further. Basically you seem to be saying that Vygotsky is making a > > > >> mechanistic argument - I'm not talking about the more colloquial > > > expression > > > >> of mechanistic but the one that Pepper talks about in World > > Hypothesis. > > > >> You are looking into the mirror and seeing the reflection of a > candle > > - > > > but > > > >> you are making the assumption that there must be a mechanism that is > > > >> causing the reflection of the candle. You cannot know this > mechanism > > > >> itself - it is too difficult to reach - but you can build models > that > > > bring > > > >> us closer to understanding. This I think is almost exactly how > Pepper > > > >> discusses this root metaphor. Our goal as scientists is to find the > > > >> mediate description of the underlying mechanism. This > > > >> Pragmatists/Conextualists would say this is dualism - not the > dualism > > > you > > > >> get from Formism where you depend on your mind to bring you closer > to > > a > > > >> known but unreachable ideal, but in the sense that there is this > > > mechanism > > > >> that exists that is somehow separate from and causing the reflection > > in > > > the > > > >> mirror. So the Contextualist asks, if all you can see is what is in > > the > > > >> mirror how do you know there is a mirror. That is the only > > information > > > you > > > >> have and you have to base all interpretation of the world on that > > > >> information - to suggest you are looking at a reflection is an > > > assumption > > > >> based on a belief system that there must be causing what you are > > > seeing. I > > > >> think you are right, Vygotsky wants to assume the mirror, but in the > > end > > > >> doesn't that suggest a dualism to his thinking. > > > >> > > > >> Michael > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > > >> on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > > > >> Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 6:38 PM > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL > > > >> > > > >> Hi Michael, > > > >> > > > >> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. > > > Every > > > >> science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* > > appearance. > > > One > > > >> of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a > burning > > > >> candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle > > > burning > > > >> behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study > > that > > > >> second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the > > > mirror, > > > >> in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' > of > > a > > > >> second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. > > > >> > > > >> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those > of > > us > > > >> raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and > feelings > > > >> exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call > > "the > > > >> mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain > how > > > that > > > >> appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal > > > >> thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because > we > > > can > > > >> use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a > fibre > > > >> bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and > > > >> Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and > > > >> neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a > *folk* > > > >> psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try > > to > > > >> make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own > > > >> psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot > > > study > > > >> the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, > > however, > > > >> set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. > > > >> > > > >> Martin > > > >> > > > >> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael > > > > >> wrote: > > > >> > > > >> > I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up > > for > > > >> being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't > > > think > > > >> he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which > I > > > think > > > >> you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what > > > develops > > > >> if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops > > > (remember > > > >> I am suggesting individual development here). > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Oct 20 13:28:39 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2014 13:28:39 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The mirror has two candles In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052CB1@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Martin [and others] exploring this theme. I was raising questions of the phenomena of *seeing as* that I noticed being explored within Pierce's notion of *abduction* which is a phenomenon of *seeing as* which Pierce viewed as outside the logical processes of *analysis* This phenomena of *seeing as* which Pierce viewed as an existant developed through imaginative musings. Analysis then was *derived* from this earlier abductive process. I sensed Anna Sfard exploring this SAME realm in her notion of more than one approach to *seeing as* mathematical concepts and the transformations between *figurative* gestalt developmental *knowings* AND speech developed sequential TYPE *knowings*. Martin's pointing us towards *modal simulations* as central to *seeing as* deepens my understanding of this phenomena of *seeing as* that moves between *potential* and concrete actual existants. I believe this is a KEY topic. Larry On Mon, Oct 20, 2014 at 12:27 PM, Martin John Packer < mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> wrote: > Larry, David, Greg: > > I think this "seeing as" is central to understanding the psychological > process of imagination that Plump Materialist Karl Marx described, as David > Ke pointed out. > > I have in the past thought a lot about this passage from Kapital, > precisely because it seems to imply a "doubling": there is the real world, > plus there is the world in the mind of the archiect. In short, it sounds > like the standard cognitivist model of mental representation. > > But I think in fact not. I think there is a three-part analysis of the > *imagination* that Marx was describing. > > First, the structure that the architect "raises in imagination" is often > raised in the form of sketches, drawings, plans, and blueprints. That is, > using *material* representations of the to-be-constructed building, not > mental representations. We don't need to invoke "mind" to explain this. > > Second, the architect has developed a specific skill of "seeing as" (cf, > Wittgenstein for an analysis). He walks around the site, seeing it *as* it > will be once the construction is completed. In addition, he can see the > plans *as* the building. Ed Hutchins has said, ?When humans engage in > symbolic processes, they are engaging in cultural practices for seeing > as.? No need to invoke "mind" to explain this. > > Third, we develop brains capable of forming "simulations" of past and > future events and objects (cf. Larry Barsalou's work). These simulations > are "modal," that is to say, they have sensory qualities, of sound, sight, > and touch. And, of course, we are conscious of them. They are*not* the > unconscious, syntactic, and amodal representations of a computer. The > architect *imagines* the building by creating a simulation of it. > > Does that sound odd? On xmca we have often discussed one kind of > simulation: inner speech. The silent kind. When I hear myself talking, that > is my brain's simulation of a sensory experience. Where does it take place? > In the brain, of course, not in the mind! Inner speech is a material > phenomenon. > > Barselou says this: "Grounded cognition rejects traditional views that > cognition is computation on amodal symbols in a modular system, independent > of the brain?s modal systems for perception, action, and introspection. > Instead, grounded cognition proposes that modal simulations, bodily states, > and situated action underlie cognition." > > In short, a Plump Materialist can give a detailed account of imagination > without locating it "inside a mind." > > Martin > > p.s., Greg, to be a Plump Materialist is to *avoid* doubles, at least of > the ontological kind > > > > On Oct 20, 2014, at 8:44 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > I want to respond to this theme by bringing in the notion of *mediated > > action* AS the best *unit of analysis*. Wertsch weaved together Vygotsky > > and Bakhtin and showed utterances AS *mediated actions* > > The place of the *ideal* in relation to *objects* is the theme. > > > > Now I want to weave in Anna Sfard's exploration of mathematical > *entities* > > AS having a dual *nature*. This extension is from an article she just > > posted on the web [On the Dual Nature of Mathematical Conceptions] > > > > Page 4 is her elaborating this dual nature as follows. > > > > [is] Treating mathematical conceptions AS IF they referred to some > abstract > > OBJECTS the only possibility of relating to mathematical concepts? THIS > > KIND of conception [interpretation] Anna labels *structural*. THIS TYPE > of > > utterance [mediated action] prevails in mathematical discourse situations > > as mediational means > > However, there ARE different KINDS of mathematical definitions that > > *reveal* quite a different approach to these same concepts. > > Functions can be defined not only AS *a set of ordered pairs* BUT ALSO > AS a > > process of *getting from one system to another* [skemp referenced] > > > > Symmetry can BE conceived [interpreted] AS a static property of geometric > > forms BUT ALSO AS a *kind* of transformation. This latter TYPE of > > description [genre] SPEAKS AS IF the mathematical notion is about > > processes, algorithms, ACTIONS, [rather than speaking of these > mathematical > > notions AS IF they ARE *objects* > > THIS TYPE OF GENRE *reflects* an Operational interpretation [rather than > > structural interpretation] of mathematical conceptions. > > > > Seeing a mathematical *entity* AS *an object* *means* being capable of > > gesturing [referring] to the mathematical concept AS IF the mathematical > > concept were A REAL THING [a static structure actually existing somewhere > > in time and space but timeless] It also *means* being able to *recognize* > > the *idea* at a glance AND to manipulate this mathematical conception AS > IF > > the structure existed AS A WHOLE [without going into details or analysis] > > AS AN EXISTING OBJECT. > > > > Using Hadamard's *metaphor* we can SAY that *structural genres* endows a > > concept with a KIND of *physiognomy* which ALLOWS a person to think of > this > > concept AS a unique, THING [entity] however complicated this concept may > BE. > > > > JUST AS WE SEE A FACE OF A MAN. > > > > In contrast, interpreting A concept AS A PROCESS implies regarding THIS > > PARTICULAR mathematical concept AS A POTENTIAL [existant] rather than an > > ACTUAL EXISTING ENTITY. In operational kinds of genres the *entity* COMES > > INTO EXISTENCE upon request in a sequence of actions. > > THUS > > whereas the structural genre IS timeless [static] instantaneous, and > > integrative, the operational genre is dynamic, sequential, and detailed. > In > > other words different mediational means within *mediated action* produce > > radically different notions of the place of concepts as interpretants > that > > exist [in actuality or in potential] > > > > THEREFORE the play involves different TYPES of *seeing* and different > TYPES > > of *saying*. > > > > BOTH are equally *true* > > > > I have been exploring *objects of activity* *units of analysis* and > > *mediated action* through Anna Sfard's exploration of mathematical > > conceptions which do not appear through the 5 senses but DO EXIST. > > > > Larry > > > > On Sun, Oct 19, 2014 at 4:00 PM, Huw Lloyd > > wrote: > > > >> Hi David, > >> > >> I don't think anyone is going to argue against the paper's defamatory > >> quality. Everything he says against LSV can be taken with a pinch of > salt > >> if we assume he was trying to protect his colleagues. > >> > >> What remains is therefore what is countered and proposed with respect to > >> the subject of the environment. > >> > >> Best, > >> Huw > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On 19 October 2014 23:38, David Kellogg wrote: > >> > >>> First of all, a word of appreciation to Martin for his candle in the > >>> mirror and his delightful formulation of "Plump Materialism", and also > >>> to Michael for recognizing the beauty of the image and using it to > >>> revitalize a thread that was growing somewhat tiresome to me: no fault > >>> of the participants; it was my own inability to see past "fatalistic > >>> determinism", "captive to bourgeois theories", and ANL's other fatuous > >>> formulae. As Mike points out, this is not just name calling: these are > >>> blood libels. > >>> > >>> Secondly, let me put in a word for Andy's counter-blast. For those of > >>> you who have not read it; it is available on Andy's academia.edu page, > >>> and it's well worth a look: > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > http://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky > >>> > >>> Thirdly--can I draw attention to the top of page fourteen of ANL's > >>> dishonest and dishonorable hatchet job? Here he rounds on Basov for > >>> non-Marxist, idealist notion that humans in some way "double" the > >>> natural environment. ANL returns to this theme at the bottom of the > >>> page where he says: > >>> > >>> "To the animal, however, any ?artificial? object created by humans is > >>> simply > >>> a natural object, it is nature because the animal?s relation toward it > >>> will always > >>> be an instinctive relation. Thus, of course, in reality there is no > >>> doubling of the > >>> environment. The environment as a whole is transformed into a human > >>> environment, > >>> that is, for the human being, into a social environment, based on the > >>> fact that humans themselves relate to it in human terms, that is, as > >>> social humans." > >>> > >>> Note the use of "Thus"; it marks a shameless non sequitur. First of > >>> all, it is a non sequitur to say that because animals and very small > >>> children treat i-phones as natural objects, THEREFORE there is no > >>> doubling of the environment Secondly, it is a non sequitur to say that > >>> the environment "as a whole" becomes a human environment (because > >>> animals and infants do NOT see it that way??) without any trace of the > >>> natural environment. But the biggest non-sequitur is the least > >>> explicit: it is the insinuation that the process of social > >>> idealization of nature that we call enculturation is prima facie > >>> subversive of Marxism. > >>> > >>> Consider the following, from a great subversive of Marxism and primal > >>> plump materialist: > >>> > >>> "We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. > >>> A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a > >>> bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. > >>> But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is > >>> this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he > >>> erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a > >>> result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its > >>> commencement." (Capital, Vol 1, Chapter III, Part 7) > >>> > >>> What is THIS if not a doubling of reality--a mirror with two candles? > >>> > >>> David Kellogg > >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>> > >>> > >>> have a look: > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On 20 October 2014 00:15, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >>>> Here's an example memory paper abstract by Sereda (2011), titled "A > >>>> Theoretical Model of Memory > >>>> as a Mechanism for Systematically Organizing Individual Experience" > >>>> > >>>> "In order to improve the explanatory potential of activity theory, > this > >>>> article > >>>> proposes a theoretical model of human memory as a mechanism for > >>>> the systematic organization of individual experience, organization > that > >>>> is an essential condition for performing future activity. The model > >> rests > >>>> on the idea that the main factor in human memory is the motivational > >>>> and semantic sets of personality and thus orientation toward the > future > >>>> (prospective orientation)." > >>>> > >>>> The storehouse metaphor as used in psychology merely reflects a rather > >>> poor > >>>> approach. > >>>> > >>>> Best, > >>>> Huw > >>>> > >>>> On 19 October 2014 15:20, Glassman, Michael > >> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi Larry, > >>>>> > >>>>> I renamed this thread because it seems to be taking a tangent from > the > >>>>> very rich discussion on LSV and ANL, but perhaps it might circle > back. > >>>>> Anyway, I thought Martin's very interesting illustration deserves a > >>> moment > >>>>> of fame. I wonder if memory is the right word in current > >>> circumstance. In > >>>>> U.S. psychology memory is very often viewed as a storehouse of > >>> information > >>>>> where you send your messages back to retrieve information when needed > >> to > >>>>> apply to the current situation. Do you think Pierce would see the > >>> overall > >>>>> process this way (did he actually talk about memory?) For him it > >> seems > >>> it > >>>>> would be part of a more active process of establishing relationships > >> of > >>>>> that which came before with that which is currently being explored. > >>>>> > >>>>> Michael > >>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >>>>> on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com [lpscholar2@gmail.com] > >>>>> Sent: Sunday, October 19, 2014 6:40 AM > >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL > >>>>> > >>>>> Michael Glassman and Martin and How > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> I want to ex-tend the exploration of *models* and *memories* and > >>>>> *contextualism* as linked in Michael?s rejoinder to Martin. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Michael wrote ?if ALL you can *see* [perceive] is what is IN the > >> mirror > >>>>> [metaphor of reflection AS mirroring] how do you ?know? there IS a > >>> mirror > >>>>> > >>>>> The IF IMPLIED is the ?ALL? . > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> However, is that ?all there IS? in *seeing*? > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> IS ?memory* also existent as an existent IN seeing? > >>>>> > >>>>> In other words, do *interpretants* ACTUALLY exist IN FACT? [as such] > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Umberto Eco suggests there is both ORPHIC knowing/seeing [when > Picasso > >>>>> paints THAT PARTICULAR yellow shoe in a painting the SINGULARITY of > >> THAT > >>>>> experience IS ?orphic? > >>>>> > >>>>> POETS and artists are ?biased? to privilege THIS WAY of knowing > >>> [Peirce's > >>>>> secondness as orphic and possibly orphaned] > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> HOWEVER, Umberto Eco suggests that this orphic ?knowing* is also > >>>>> *indicative* [indexical] of further *interpreting* AND THIS TYPE of > >>>>> *knowing* EX-TENDS Orphic knowing. [Peirce's tiredness] > >>>>> > >>>>> Now in Peirce's metaphysics THIS interpreting creating interpretants > >>> also > >>>>> is EXISTING as facts. > >>>>> > >>>>> Is this transforming orphic [what IS present] TO forming > >> *interpretants* > >>>>> AS *something* that actually exists {through the interpreting > process} > >>>>> INCLUDE memory but that IS NOT ALL. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> IS creative imagining potentially existent? that goes BEYOND memory? > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> I believe Umberto Eco?s question of a deeper knowing than > >> orphic/orphan > >>>>> knowing *things-in-themselves* EX-tending BEYOND the orphic > >>> [secondness] to > >>>>> INCLUDE interpreting and forming actual *interpretants* [tiredness] > >>> must be > >>>>> considered within the memory process. > >>>>> > >>>>> This returns to *models* that are necessary but NOT ALL there *is*. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> The *relation* between *orphic* knowing and *interpreting* knowing > >>> seems a > >>>>> KEY question [and may ex-tend back into metaphysics? > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Larry > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Sent from Windows Mail > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> From: Glassman, Michael > >>>>> Sent: ?Saturday?, ?October? ?18?, ?2014 ?5?:?18? ?PM > >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Hi Martin, > >>>>> > >>>>> That's a very interesting metaphor, but let me see if I can take it a > >>> step > >>>>> further. Basically you seem to be saying that Vygotsky is making a > >>>>> mechanistic argument - I'm not talking about the more colloquial > >>> expression > >>>>> of mechanistic but the one that Pepper talks about in World > >> Hypothesis. > >>>>> You are looking into the mirror and seeing the reflection of a candle > >> - > >>> but > >>>>> you are making the assumption that there must be a mechanism that is > >>>>> causing the reflection of the candle. You cannot know this mechanism > >>>>> itself - it is too difficult to reach - but you can build models that > >>> bring > >>>>> us closer to understanding. This I think is almost exactly how Pepper > >>>>> discusses this root metaphor. Our goal as scientists is to find the > >>>>> mediate description of the underlying mechanism. This > >>>>> Pragmatists/Conextualists would say this is dualism - not the dualism > >>> you > >>>>> get from Formism where you depend on your mind to bring you closer to > >> a > >>>>> known but unreachable ideal, but in the sense that there is this > >>> mechanism > >>>>> that exists that is somehow separate from and causing the reflection > >> in > >>> the > >>>>> mirror. So the Contextualist asks, if all you can see is what is in > >> the > >>>>> mirror how do you know there is a mirror. That is the only > >> information > >>> you > >>>>> have and you have to base all interpretation of the world on that > >>>>> information - to suggest you are looking at a reflection is an > >>> assumption > >>>>> based on a belief system that there must be causing what you are > >>> seeing. I > >>>>> think you are right, Vygotsky wants to assume the mirror, but in the > >> end > >>>>> doesn't that suggest a dualism to his thinking. > >>>>> > >>>>> Michael > >>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >>>>> on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > >>>>> Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 6:38 PM > >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL > >>>>> > >>>>> Hi Michael, > >>>>> > >>>>> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. > >>> Every > >>>>> science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* > >> appearance. > >>> One > >>>>> of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a > burning > >>>>> candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle > >>> burning > >>>>> behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study > >> that > >>>>> second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the > >>> mirror, > >>>>> in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' of > >> a > >>>>> second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. > >>>>> > >>>>> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of > >> us > >>>>> raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and > feelings > >>>>> exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call > >> "the > >>>>> mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain > how > >>> that > >>>>> appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal > >>>>> thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we > >>> can > >>>>> use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a > fibre > >>>>> bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and > >>>>> Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and > >>>>> neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a > *folk* > >>>>> psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try > >> to > >>>>> make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own > >>>>> psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot > >>> study > >>>>> the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, > >> however, > >>>>> set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. > >>>>> > >>>>> Martin > >>>>> > >>>>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up > >> for > >>>>> being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't > >>> think > >>>>> he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I > >>> think > >>>>> you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what > >>> develops > >>>>> if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops > >>> (remember > >>>>> I am suggesting individual development here). > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Oct 20 15:50:12 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 07:50:12 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The mirror has two candles In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052CB1@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Huw: Different people are engaged in this thread for different reasons. Martin, for example, wants to establish that consciousness is something we do, not someplace we are. Larry wants to establish that there are hidden links joining up almost everything he reads. Haydi wants to know what the precise borderline between inner speech and "pure thinking" is. Gary wants to know whether the Acheluan hand axe is somehow a doubling of the symmetry we notice in human faces. I think that you are interested in a rather functionalist reading of Leontiev that would allow him to be applied to AI concerns. But my concern is different. With the help of my very hard working graduate students, I bring out translations of Vygotsky's work in Korean. A lot of these works have been edited with a very heavy hand, and some of the annotations are innaccurate, speculative, and even revisionist. This means that interpretations based on these works tend to be partial, one-sided, and in places the very opposite of what I think Vygotsky intended. It's important for me to distinguish between problems of omission and sins of commission. For example, when I read "The Psychology of Preschool Children", edited by Zaporozhets and Elkonin in the early sixties, I notice that Vygotsky is defended. But there are certain glaring omissions: there are careful descriptions of the age periods (sometimes disguised as 'leading activities") but no mention of the Crises that divide them, there is a meticulous distinction between instinctive and cultural practices, but no discussion of the higher and lower psychological functions, there is a good deal of discussion of mediation, but nothing much on the distinctive role of speech (the example of a mediated activity is a prelinguistic child learning to use a spoon). This, along with their very respectful and appreciative reading of Vygotsky, does suggest to me that Zaporozhets and Elkonin are treading gingerly, trying their best to preserve Vygotsky in an early "instrumentalist" form, in the hope that the full-blown theory can someday be added before it is all lost to poor editing and annotation. And that is, in fact, what has happened; if you read Elkonin's writings from the seventies and especially Elkonin's work published in the post-Soviet period, you can read about the crisis, about the higher psychic functions, and even about the unique role of word meanings. Leontiev is a very different case. First of all, as we read in the essay, he does not present even the early Vygotsky in an accurate or even recognizable form; on the contrary, he is doing his very best to distort and even falsify the Vygotsky of "Consciousness as a Problem of the Structure of Behavior". Secondly, he is trying to supplant this pseudo-Vygotsky with recognizable Stalinist ideas: instead of the Crisis, the crisis-free assimilation of children to a contradiction-free socialist society; instead of linked but distinct lower and psychological functions, labor free of all 'idealist' alienation, and instead of word meaning, tool use. (I might add, instead of Marxist dialectics, a vulgar materialism, but I think that Andy has that covered.) Thirdly, and most important for me on an emotional level, Leontiev is not trying to protect his colleagues; he is vilifying them. As I said, I have seen this kind of behavior up close in 1989 and in the aftermath. It's not something I like to talk about (for one thing it is one of those unpleasant experiences that is almost impossible to describe without producing either admiration or incredulity in the hearer, and neither response is really to the point). But some day I should like to write about it, for in addition to the ugly, indecent falsehoods of people like our old Party Secretary and the understandable rage and violence of the relatives of the victims, there was (and it was far more common) the beautiful silence of decent ordinary people who simply refused to listen and waited (and are waiting still). It's not simply on an emotional level that this is important. Like Zaporozhets and Elkonin, Leontiev did outlive Lysenkoism and he did have the chance to put right some of the wrong that he does us in this essay, to once again place in our hands the slender reed of Vygotsky's thought that he almost broke. But he didn't do that. Why not? I think that in the case of Zaporozhets and Elkonin, it was easy--all they had to do was fill in some of the gaps they had left in the early sixties. But in the case of Leontiev, it would have involved self-reflection of which he was no longer capable and an about-face that he could not longer perform. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 20 October 2014 08:00, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Hi David, > > I don't think anyone is going to argue against the paper's defamatory > quality. Everything he says against LSV can be taken with a pinch of salt > if we assume he was trying to protect his colleagues. > > What remains is therefore what is countered and proposed with respect to > the subject of the environment. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > On 19 October 2014 23:38, David Kellogg wrote: > >> First of all, a word of appreciation to Martin for his candle in the >> mirror and his delightful formulation of "Plump Materialism", and also >> to Michael for recognizing the beauty of the image and using it to >> revitalize a thread that was growing somewhat tiresome to me: no fault >> of the participants; it was my own inability to see past "fatalistic >> determinism", "captive to bourgeois theories", and ANL's other fatuous >> formulae. As Mike points out, this is not just name calling: these are >> blood libels. >> >> Secondly, let me put in a word for Andy's counter-blast. For those of >> you who have not read it; it is available on Andy's academia.edu page, >> and it's well worth a look: >> >> >> http://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky >> >> Thirdly--can I draw attention to the top of page fourteen of ANL's >> dishonest and dishonorable hatchet job? Here he rounds on Basov for >> non-Marxist, idealist notion that humans in some way "double" the >> natural environment. ANL returns to this theme at the bottom of the >> page where he says: >> >> "To the animal, however, any ?artificial? object created by humans is >> simply >> a natural object, it is nature because the animal?s relation toward it >> will always >> be an instinctive relation. Thus, of course, in reality there is no >> doubling of the >> environment. The environment as a whole is transformed into a human >> environment, >> that is, for the human being, into a social environment, based on the >> fact that humans themselves relate to it in human terms, that is, as >> social humans." >> >> Note the use of "Thus"; it marks a shameless non sequitur. First of >> all, it is a non sequitur to say that because animals and very small >> children treat i-phones as natural objects, THEREFORE there is no >> doubling of the environment Secondly, it is a non sequitur to say that >> the environment "as a whole" becomes a human environment (because >> animals and infants do NOT see it that way??) without any trace of the >> natural environment. But the biggest non-sequitur is the least >> explicit: it is the insinuation that the process of social >> idealization of nature that we call enculturation is prima facie >> subversive of Marxism. >> >> Consider the following, from a great subversive of Marxism and primal >> plump materialist: >> >> "We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. >> A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a >> bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. >> But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is >> this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he >> erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a >> result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its >> commencement." (Capital, Vol 1, Chapter III, Part 7) >> >> What is THIS if not a doubling of reality--a mirror with two candles? >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> have a look: >> >> >> >> On 20 October 2014 00:15, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> > Here's an example memory paper abstract by Sereda (2011), titled "A >> > Theoretical Model of Memory >> > as a Mechanism for Systematically Organizing Individual Experience" >> > >> > "In order to improve the explanatory potential of activity theory, this >> > article >> > proposes a theoretical model of human memory as a mechanism for >> > the systematic organization of individual experience, organization that >> > is an essential condition for performing future activity. The model rests >> > on the idea that the main factor in human memory is the motivational >> > and semantic sets of personality and thus orientation toward the future >> > (prospective orientation)." >> > >> > The storehouse metaphor as used in psychology merely reflects a rather >> poor >> > approach. >> > >> > Best, >> > Huw >> > >> > On 19 October 2014 15:20, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> > >> >> Hi Larry, >> >> >> >> I renamed this thread because it seems to be taking a tangent from the >> >> very rich discussion on LSV and ANL, but perhaps it might circle back. >> >> Anyway, I thought Martin's very interesting illustration deserves a >> moment >> >> of fame. I wonder if memory is the right word in current >> circumstance. In >> >> U.S. psychology memory is very often viewed as a storehouse of >> information >> >> where you send your messages back to retrieve information when needed to >> >> apply to the current situation. Do you think Pierce would see the >> overall >> >> process this way (did he actually talk about memory?) For him it seems >> it >> >> would be part of a more active process of establishing relationships of >> >> that which came before with that which is currently being explored. >> >> >> >> Michael >> >> ________________________________________ >> >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> >> on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com [lpscholar2@gmail.com] >> >> Sent: Sunday, October 19, 2014 6:40 AM >> >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL >> >> >> >> Michael Glassman and Martin and How >> >> >> >> >> >> I want to ex-tend the exploration of *models* and *memories* and >> >> *contextualism* as linked in Michael?s rejoinder to Martin. >> >> >> >> >> >> Michael wrote ?if ALL you can *see* [perceive] is what is IN the mirror >> >> [metaphor of reflection AS mirroring] how do you ?know? there IS a >> mirror >> >> >> >> The IF IMPLIED is the ?ALL? . >> >> >> >> >> >> However, is that ?all there IS? in *seeing*? >> >> >> >> >> >> IS ?memory* also existent as an existent IN seeing? >> >> >> >> In other words, do *interpretants* ACTUALLY exist IN FACT? [as such] >> >> >> >> >> >> Umberto Eco suggests there is both ORPHIC knowing/seeing [when Picasso >> >> paints THAT PARTICULAR yellow shoe in a painting the SINGULARITY of THAT >> >> experience IS ?orphic? >> >> >> >> POETS and artists are ?biased? to privilege THIS WAY of knowing >> [Peirce's >> >> secondness as orphic and possibly orphaned] >> >> >> >> >> >> HOWEVER, Umberto Eco suggests that this orphic ?knowing* is also >> >> *indicative* [indexical] of further *interpreting* AND THIS TYPE of >> >> *knowing* EX-TENDS Orphic knowing. [Peirce's tiredness] >> >> >> >> Now in Peirce's metaphysics THIS interpreting creating interpretants >> also >> >> is EXISTING as facts. >> >> >> >> Is this transforming orphic [what IS present] TO forming *interpretants* >> >> AS *something* that actually exists {through the interpreting process} >> >> INCLUDE memory but that IS NOT ALL. >> >> >> >> >> >> IS creative imagining potentially existent? that goes BEYOND memory? >> >> >> >> >> >> I believe Umberto Eco?s question of a deeper knowing than orphic/orphan >> >> knowing *things-in-themselves* EX-tending BEYOND the orphic >> [secondness] to >> >> INCLUDE interpreting and forming actual *interpretants* [tiredness] >> must be >> >> considered within the memory process. >> >> >> >> This returns to *models* that are necessary but NOT ALL there *is*. >> >> >> >> >> >> The *relation* between *orphic* knowing and *interpreting* knowing >> seems a >> >> KEY question [and may ex-tend back into metaphysics? >> >> >> >> >> >> Larry >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Sent from Windows Mail >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> From: Glassman, Michael >> >> Sent: ?Saturday?, ?October? ?18?, ?2014 ?5?:?18? ?PM >> >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Hi Martin, >> >> >> >> That's a very interesting metaphor, but let me see if I can take it a >> step >> >> further. Basically you seem to be saying that Vygotsky is making a >> >> mechanistic argument - I'm not talking about the more colloquial >> expression >> >> of mechanistic but the one that Pepper talks about in World Hypothesis. >> >> You are looking into the mirror and seeing the reflection of a candle - >> but >> >> you are making the assumption that there must be a mechanism that is >> >> causing the reflection of the candle. You cannot know this mechanism >> >> itself - it is too difficult to reach - but you can build models that >> bring >> >> us closer to understanding. This I think is almost exactly how Pepper >> >> discusses this root metaphor. Our goal as scientists is to find the >> >> mediate description of the underlying mechanism. This >> >> Pragmatists/Conextualists would say this is dualism - not the dualism >> you >> >> get from Formism where you depend on your mind to bring you closer to a >> >> known but unreachable ideal, but in the sense that there is this >> mechanism >> >> that exists that is somehow separate from and causing the reflection in >> the >> >> mirror. So the Contextualist asks, if all you can see is what is in the >> >> mirror how do you know there is a mirror. That is the only information >> you >> >> have and you have to base all interpretation of the world on that >> >> information - to suggest you are looking at a reflection is an >> assumption >> >> based on a belief system that there must be causing what you are >> seeing. I >> >> think you are right, Vygotsky wants to assume the mirror, but in the end >> >> doesn't that suggest a dualism to his thinking. >> >> >> >> Michael >> >> ________________________________________ >> >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> >> on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >> >> Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 6:38 PM >> >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL >> >> >> >> Hi Michael, >> >> >> >> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. >> Every >> >> science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* appearance. >> One >> >> of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a burning >> >> candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle >> burning >> >> behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study that >> >> second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the >> mirror, >> >> in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' of a >> >> second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. >> >> >> >> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of us >> >> raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and feelings >> >> exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call "the >> >> mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how >> that >> >> appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal >> >> thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we >> can >> >> use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre >> >> bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and >> >> Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and >> >> neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk* >> >> psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try to >> >> make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own >> >> psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot >> study >> >> the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, however, >> >> set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. >> >> >> >> Martin >> >> >> >> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael >> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> > I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up for >> >> being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't >> think >> >> he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I >> think >> >> you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what >> develops >> >> if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops >> (remember >> >> I am suggesting individual development here). >> >> >> >> >> >> From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Oct 20 16:26:19 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2014 17:26:19 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The mirror has two candles In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052CB1@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <4CD1ABF9-79BD-4343-9C34-7881452BD15D@gmail.com> David, Translation. I have been translating a text from Spanish to English. Child's play compared to Russian to Korean, but it is amazingly complex, even so. Henry On Oct 20, 2014, at 4:50 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Huw: > > Different people are engaged in this thread for different reasons. > Martin, for example, wants to establish that consciousness is > something we do, not someplace we are. Larry wants to establish that > there are hidden links joining up almost everything he reads. Haydi > wants to know what the precise borderline between inner speech and > "pure thinking" is. Gary wants to know whether the Acheluan hand axe > is somehow a doubling of the symmetry we notice in human faces. I > think that you are interested in a rather functionalist reading of > Leontiev that would allow him to be applied to AI concerns. > > But my concern is different. With the help of my very hard working > graduate students, I bring out translations of Vygotsky's work in > Korean. A lot of these works have been edited with a very heavy hand, > and some of the annotations are innaccurate, speculative, and even > revisionist. This means that interpretations based on these works tend > to be partial, one-sided, and in places the very opposite of what I > think Vygotsky intended. > > It's important for me to distinguish between problems of omission and > sins of commission. For example, when I read "The Psychology of > Preschool Children", edited by Zaporozhets and Elkonin in the early > sixties, I notice that Vygotsky is defended. But there are certain > glaring omissions: there are careful descriptions of the age periods > (sometimes disguised as 'leading activities") but no mention of the > Crises that divide them, there is a meticulous distinction between > instinctive and cultural practices, but no discussion of the higher > and lower psychological functions, there is a good deal of discussion > of mediation, but nothing much on the distinctive role of speech (the > example of a mediated activity is a prelinguistic child learning to > use a spoon). > > This, along with their very respectful and appreciative reading of > Vygotsky, does suggest to me that Zaporozhets and Elkonin are treading > gingerly, trying their best to preserve Vygotsky in an early > "instrumentalist" form, in the hope that the full-blown theory can > someday be added before it is all lost to poor editing and annotation. > And that is, in fact, what has happened; if you read Elkonin's > writings from the seventies and especially Elkonin's work published in > the post-Soviet period, you can read about the crisis, about the > higher psychic functions, and even about the unique role of word > meanings. > > Leontiev is a very different case. First of all, as we read in the > essay, he does not present even the early Vygotsky in an accurate or > even recognizable form; on the contrary, he is doing his very best to > distort and even falsify the Vygotsky of "Consciousness as a Problem > of the Structure of Behavior". Secondly, he is trying to supplant this > pseudo-Vygotsky with recognizable Stalinist ideas: instead of the > Crisis, the crisis-free assimilation of children to a > contradiction-free socialist society; instead of linked but distinct > lower and psychological functions, labor free of all 'idealist' > alienation, and instead of word meaning, tool use. (I might add, > instead of Marxist dialectics, a vulgar materialism, but I think that > Andy has that covered.) > > Thirdly, and most important for me on an emotional level, Leontiev is > not trying to protect his colleagues; he is vilifying them. As I said, > I have seen this kind of behavior up close in 1989 and in the > aftermath. It's not something I like to talk about (for one thing it > is one of those unpleasant experiences that is almost impossible to > describe without producing either admiration or incredulity in the > hearer, and neither response is really to the point). But some day I > should like to write about it, for in addition to the ugly, indecent > falsehoods of people like our old Party Secretary and the > understandable rage and violence of the relatives of the victims, > there was (and it was far more common) the beautiful silence of decent > ordinary people who simply refused to listen and waited (and are > waiting still). > > It's not simply on an emotional level that this is important. Like > Zaporozhets and Elkonin, Leontiev did outlive Lysenkoism and he did > have the chance to put right some of the wrong that he does us in this > essay, to once again place in our hands the slender reed of Vygotsky's > thought that he almost broke. But he didn't do that. Why not? I think > that in the case of Zaporozhets and Elkonin, it was easy--all they had > to do was fill in some of the gaps they had left in the early sixties. > But in the case of Leontiev, it would have involved self-reflection of > which he was no longer capable and an about-face that he could not > longer perform. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > On 20 October 2014 08:00, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> Hi David, >> >> I don't think anyone is going to argue against the paper's defamatory >> quality. Everything he says against LSV can be taken with a pinch of salt >> if we assume he was trying to protect his colleagues. >> >> What remains is therefore what is countered and proposed with respect to >> the subject of the environment. >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> On 19 October 2014 23:38, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> First of all, a word of appreciation to Martin for his candle in the >>> mirror and his delightful formulation of "Plump Materialism", and also >>> to Michael for recognizing the beauty of the image and using it to >>> revitalize a thread that was growing somewhat tiresome to me: no fault >>> of the participants; it was my own inability to see past "fatalistic >>> determinism", "captive to bourgeois theories", and ANL's other fatuous >>> formulae. As Mike points out, this is not just name calling: these are >>> blood libels. >>> >>> Secondly, let me put in a word for Andy's counter-blast. For those of >>> you who have not read it; it is available on Andy's academia.edu page, >>> and it's well worth a look: >>> >>> >>> http://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky >>> >>> Thirdly--can I draw attention to the top of page fourteen of ANL's >>> dishonest and dishonorable hatchet job? Here he rounds on Basov for >>> non-Marxist, idealist notion that humans in some way "double" the >>> natural environment. ANL returns to this theme at the bottom of the >>> page where he says: >>> >>> "To the animal, however, any ?artificial? object created by humans is >>> simply >>> a natural object, it is nature because the animal?s relation toward it >>> will always >>> be an instinctive relation. Thus, of course, in reality there is no >>> doubling of the >>> environment. The environment as a whole is transformed into a human >>> environment, >>> that is, for the human being, into a social environment, based on the >>> fact that humans themselves relate to it in human terms, that is, as >>> social humans." >>> >>> Note the use of "Thus"; it marks a shameless non sequitur. First of >>> all, it is a non sequitur to say that because animals and very small >>> children treat i-phones as natural objects, THEREFORE there is no >>> doubling of the environment Secondly, it is a non sequitur to say that >>> the environment "as a whole" becomes a human environment (because >>> animals and infants do NOT see it that way??) without any trace of the >>> natural environment. But the biggest non-sequitur is the least >>> explicit: it is the insinuation that the process of social >>> idealization of nature that we call enculturation is prima facie >>> subversive of Marxism. >>> >>> Consider the following, from a great subversive of Marxism and primal >>> plump materialist: >>> >>> "We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. >>> A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a >>> bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. >>> But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is >>> this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he >>> erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a >>> result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its >>> commencement." (Capital, Vol 1, Chapter III, Part 7) >>> >>> What is THIS if not a doubling of reality--a mirror with two candles? >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> >>> have a look: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 20 October 2014 00:15, Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>> Here's an example memory paper abstract by Sereda (2011), titled "A >>>> Theoretical Model of Memory >>>> as a Mechanism for Systematically Organizing Individual Experience" >>>> >>>> "In order to improve the explanatory potential of activity theory, this >>>> article >>>> proposes a theoretical model of human memory as a mechanism for >>>> the systematic organization of individual experience, organization that >>>> is an essential condition for performing future activity. The model rests >>>> on the idea that the main factor in human memory is the motivational >>>> and semantic sets of personality and thus orientation toward the future >>>> (prospective orientation)." >>>> >>>> The storehouse metaphor as used in psychology merely reflects a rather >>> poor >>>> approach. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> On 19 October 2014 15:20, Glassman, Michael wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Larry, >>>>> >>>>> I renamed this thread because it seems to be taking a tangent from the >>>>> very rich discussion on LSV and ANL, but perhaps it might circle back. >>>>> Anyway, I thought Martin's very interesting illustration deserves a >>> moment >>>>> of fame. I wonder if memory is the right word in current >>> circumstance. In >>>>> U.S. psychology memory is very often viewed as a storehouse of >>> information >>>>> where you send your messages back to retrieve information when needed to >>>>> apply to the current situation. Do you think Pierce would see the >>> overall >>>>> process this way (did he actually talk about memory?) For him it seems >>> it >>>>> would be part of a more active process of establishing relationships of >>>>> that which came before with that which is currently being explored. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>> on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com [lpscholar2@gmail.com] >>>>> Sent: Sunday, October 19, 2014 6:40 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL >>>>> >>>>> Michael Glassman and Martin and How >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I want to ex-tend the exploration of *models* and *memories* and >>>>> *contextualism* as linked in Michael?s rejoinder to Martin. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Michael wrote ?if ALL you can *see* [perceive] is what is IN the mirror >>>>> [metaphor of reflection AS mirroring] how do you ?know? there IS a >>> mirror >>>>> >>>>> The IF IMPLIED is the ?ALL? . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> However, is that ?all there IS? in *seeing*? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> IS ?memory* also existent as an existent IN seeing? >>>>> >>>>> In other words, do *interpretants* ACTUALLY exist IN FACT? [as such] >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Umberto Eco suggests there is both ORPHIC knowing/seeing [when Picasso >>>>> paints THAT PARTICULAR yellow shoe in a painting the SINGULARITY of THAT >>>>> experience IS ?orphic? >>>>> >>>>> POETS and artists are ?biased? to privilege THIS WAY of knowing >>> [Peirce's >>>>> secondness as orphic and possibly orphaned] >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> HOWEVER, Umberto Eco suggests that this orphic ?knowing* is also >>>>> *indicative* [indexical] of further *interpreting* AND THIS TYPE of >>>>> *knowing* EX-TENDS Orphic knowing. [Peirce's tiredness] >>>>> >>>>> Now in Peirce's metaphysics THIS interpreting creating interpretants >>> also >>>>> is EXISTING as facts. >>>>> >>>>> Is this transforming orphic [what IS present] TO forming *interpretants* >>>>> AS *something* that actually exists {through the interpreting process} >>>>> INCLUDE memory but that IS NOT ALL. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> IS creative imagining potentially existent? that goes BEYOND memory? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I believe Umberto Eco?s question of a deeper knowing than orphic/orphan >>>>> knowing *things-in-themselves* EX-tending BEYOND the orphic >>> [secondness] to >>>>> INCLUDE interpreting and forming actual *interpretants* [tiredness] >>> must be >>>>> considered within the memory process. >>>>> >>>>> This returns to *models* that are necessary but NOT ALL there *is*. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The *relation* between *orphic* knowing and *interpreting* knowing >>> seems a >>>>> KEY question [and may ex-tend back into metaphysics? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Larry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Sent from Windows Mail >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> From: Glassman, Michael >>>>> Sent: ?Saturday?, ?October? ?18?, ?2014 ?5?:?18? ?PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Hi Martin, >>>>> >>>>> That's a very interesting metaphor, but let me see if I can take it a >>> step >>>>> further. Basically you seem to be saying that Vygotsky is making a >>>>> mechanistic argument - I'm not talking about the more colloquial >>> expression >>>>> of mechanistic but the one that Pepper talks about in World Hypothesis. >>>>> You are looking into the mirror and seeing the reflection of a candle - >>> but >>>>> you are making the assumption that there must be a mechanism that is >>>>> causing the reflection of the candle. You cannot know this mechanism >>>>> itself - it is too difficult to reach - but you can build models that >>> bring >>>>> us closer to understanding. This I think is almost exactly how Pepper >>>>> discusses this root metaphor. Our goal as scientists is to find the >>>>> mediate description of the underlying mechanism. This >>>>> Pragmatists/Conextualists would say this is dualism - not the dualism >>> you >>>>> get from Formism where you depend on your mind to bring you closer to a >>>>> known but unreachable ideal, but in the sense that there is this >>> mechanism >>>>> that exists that is somehow separate from and causing the reflection in >>> the >>>>> mirror. So the Contextualist asks, if all you can see is what is in the >>>>> mirror how do you know there is a mirror. That is the only information >>> you >>>>> have and you have to base all interpretation of the world on that >>>>> information - to suggest you are looking at a reflection is an >>> assumption >>>>> based on a belief system that there must be causing what you are >>> seeing. I >>>>> think you are right, Vygotsky wants to assume the mirror, but in the end >>>>> doesn't that suggest a dualism to his thinking. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>> on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >>>>> Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 6:38 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL >>>>> >>>>> Hi Michael, >>>>> >>>>> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. >>> Every >>>>> science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* appearance. >>> One >>>>> of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a burning >>>>> candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle >>> burning >>>>> behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study that >>>>> second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the >>> mirror, >>>>> in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' of a >>>>> second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. >>>>> >>>>> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those of us >>>>> raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and feelings >>>>> exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call "the >>>>> mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain how >>> that >>>>> appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal >>>>> thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we >>> can >>>>> use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a fibre >>>>> bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and >>>>> Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and >>>>> neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a *folk* >>>>> psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try to >>>>> make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own >>>>> psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot >>> study >>>>> the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, however, >>>>> set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up for >>>>> being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't >>> think >>>>> he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I >>> think >>>>> you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what >>> develops >>>>> if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops >>> (remember >>>>> I am suggesting individual development here). >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Oct 20 17:08:35 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 11:08:35 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> Message-ID: <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. But it seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by units allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. If a complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its analysis is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis by units allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis begins from a concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, not the whole, but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be seen as being made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's method of analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Oct 20 20:40:20 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 03:40:20 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> , <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> Message-ID: <1413862822335.60795@unm.edu> Hello Andy (and esteemed society of XCMA)! This is my first post to the list. I hope the waves will be gentle as I wade in. Over the past week or so I've been lurking and I've witnessed some titanic exchanges and I'd prefer to steer around iceburgs, if possible. As you will learn, I like to use metaphors in my writing, so if that is problematic for anyone, I hope you will try to enlist the poet within. About me: I am a former student of Vera's and a graduate of UNM's OLIT MA program. I am interested in technology design, philosophy of mind, distributed cognition, embodied thinking, ecological mind, JJ Gibson's affordances, metaphorical reasoning (a l? Lakoff & Johnson), Late Wittgenstein, and Advaita Vedanta, among many other things! Vygotsky directly inspires me to consider how computer tools aid in thinking tasks and how these tools reflect in our society and how, in turn, our society is reflected in these tools and how they influence our cognition (as a two-directional process). I am also interested in patterns and how they might be used to transfer knowledge between disciplines. My BFA is in Photography from the San Francisco Art Institute, and so I am likely to be more artist than scientist, and more likely to view Vygotsky through a lens of affect AND cognition, combined (perezhivanie!!). It is this reason Vygotsky is so important to me and why I believe his work is unique from other experienced thinkers. So here goes: As I've explained to Andy in previous emails off-list, I like to read papers at least twice to best understand rhetoric as well as content. I am however feeling overwhelmed by the ANL paper mostly because it is so harsh in its representations of LSV's work. It is almost impossible for me to complete a second reading for this reason! As a rule, I am very suspicious of intellectual bullying because typically one who is an authentic seeker of truth does one's best to communicate in simple, useful, and redolent language, which is one reason LSV is appealing to me and Leontiev is not. Vygotsky succeeds most times this way, which I believe is what makes him so engaging. Although he himself could wrestle with concepts and puzzles and write about them cryptically, this isn't the same. When he was first encountering a problem, a solution, or a description of a phenomenon the writing is going to be rough, sketchy, and incomplete. It's almost like attempting to read Vygotsky by radio transmission with a faint signal that goes in and out of reception. But ANL, in form of the critique paper, doesn't seem to deal with truth but with slander (I understand: the more violent he could do it, the more he would be likely to save his own skin in Stalinist Russia). It seems everyone is in agreement on this. Still, it's hard to accept that this slight of hand inherent in the Activity Theory itself is not detected by others who were not in danger to refute Activity Theory. It seems so obvious to me. It seems so obvious to me that I wonder if I should doubt my own thinking about it! Perhaps my grasp of the points here are tentative and sophomoric, however what I do not like about Activity Theory is the idea of activity being the unit of analysis. Activity as UOA might be appropriate when dealing with how to divide labor on the shop floor of an automobile plant, and the _meaning_ of that division to its workers and managers, but I don't equate this in terms of understanding how we as humans think from the formative stage of childhood, and how we deliberate and develop our selves (as the individual self) in society (many selves) to our fullest potentials. Are we incorrect to take a theory that discusses the formation of children's minds in their formative environments and conflate that with adult interactions in activity in the world? It seems that that is a huge leap, because children, firstly, do not have to deal with politics, jobs, and life-and-death situations as we must as adults. (Children can, but it is an exception rather than a rule. Think: Malala). Children are, if anything, professionals in _play_. Then, the concept of THE WORLD is completely different from childhood to adulthood. But perhaps this is too philosophical for the environment of the list. As if I haven't emphasized this enough: I'm not sure in myself if I have intuited this correctly, and whether what I have intuited from my reading can line up with what the others on the list are addressing. I believe perhaps I am thinking about this in a different way, as a process, than the others. And that is fine. :) As I considered it, I suppose I'm having trouble with the *activity* of sterile analysis of the texts (Please don't misplace my irony). Vygotsky was a person who wanted to liberate people to live fuller lives. He cared about people, not ideas in themselves. He wasn't motivated to win prizes or acquire world fame for making discoveries. The theories were to support a larger cause, and this cause seems to get lost in the noise. To my dismay, the affect of the work has been completely removed from the discussion. It is hard for me to separate the man and his wider motivations from the work, which may not be wise on my part. What do you think? Am I wrong in this? Thinking out loud... Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: Monday, October 20, 2014 6:08 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] LSV versus ANL Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. But it seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by units allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. If a complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its analysis is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis by units allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis begins from a concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, not the whole, but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be seen as being made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's method of analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From ablunden@mira.net Mon Oct 20 21:11:02 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 15:11:02 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <1413862822335.60795@unm.edu> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> , <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413862822335.60795@unm.edu> Message-ID: <5445DCD6.7080902@mira.net> Even though we all recognise that the motivation behind ANL's critique is foul, we still have to deal with the critique. The more so because many of the criticisms he makes are made by others at other times. And also, like Haydi said earlier, we need to be able to rebut ANL's critique, and still retain what is good and useful in the theory ANL created. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello Andy (and esteemed society of XCMA)! > > This is my first post to the list. I hope the waves will be gentle as I wade in. Over the past week or so I've been lurking and I've witnessed some titanic exchanges and I'd prefer to steer around iceburgs, if possible. As you will learn, I like to use metaphors in my writing, so if that is problematic for anyone, I hope you will try to enlist the poet within. > > About me: I am a former student of Vera's and a graduate of UNM's OLIT MA program. I am interested in technology design, philosophy of mind, distributed cognition, embodied thinking, ecological mind, JJ Gibson's affordances, metaphorical reasoning (a l? Lakoff & Johnson), Late Wittgenstein, and Advaita Vedanta, among many other things! > > Vygotsky directly inspires me to consider how computer tools aid in thinking tasks and how these tools reflect in our society and how, in turn, our society is reflected in these tools and how they influence our cognition (as a two-directional process). I am also interested in patterns and how they might be used to transfer knowledge between disciplines. My BFA is in Photography from the San Francisco Art Institute, and so I am likely to be more artist than scientist, and more likely to view Vygotsky through a lens of affect AND cognition, combined (perezhivanie!!). It is this reason Vygotsky is so important to me and why I believe his work is unique from other experienced thinkers. > > So here goes: > > As I've explained to Andy in previous emails off-list, I like to read papers at least twice to best understand rhetoric as well as content. I am however feeling overwhelmed by the ANL paper mostly because it is so harsh in its representations of LSV's work. It is almost impossible for me to complete a second reading for this reason! As a rule, I am very suspicious of intellectual bullying because typically one who is an authentic seeker of truth does one's best to communicate in simple, useful, and redolent language, which is one reason LSV is appealing to me and Leontiev is not. > > Vygotsky succeeds most times this way, which I believe is what makes him so engaging. Although he himself could wrestle with concepts and puzzles and write about them cryptically, this isn't the same. When he was first encountering a problem, a solution, or a description of a phenomenon the writing is going to be rough, sketchy, and incomplete. It's almost like attempting to read Vygotsky by radio transmission with a faint signal that goes in and out of reception. > > But ANL, in form of the critique paper, doesn't seem to deal with truth but with slander (I understand: the more violent he could do it, the more he would be likely to save his own skin in Stalinist Russia). It seems everyone is in agreement on this. Still, it's hard to accept that this slight of hand inherent in the Activity Theory itself is not detected by others who were not in danger to refute Activity Theory. It seems so obvious to me. It seems so obvious to me that I wonder if I should doubt my own thinking about it! > > Perhaps my grasp of the points here are tentative and sophomoric, however what I do not like about Activity Theory is the idea of activity being the unit of analysis. Activity as UOA might be appropriate when dealing with how to divide labor on the shop floor of an automobile plant, and the _meaning_ of that division to its workers and managers, but I don't equate this in terms of understanding how we as humans think from the formative stage of childhood, and how we deliberate and develop our selves (as the individual self) in society (many selves) to our fullest potentials. > > Are we incorrect to take a theory that discusses the formation of children's minds in their formative environments and conflate that with adult interactions in activity in the world? It seems that that is a huge leap, because children, firstly, do not have to deal with politics, jobs, and life-and-death situations as we must as adults. (Children can, but it is an exception rather than a rule. Think: Malala). Children are, if anything, professionals in _play_. Then, the concept of THE WORLD is completely different from childhood to adulthood. But perhaps this is too philosophical for the environment of the list. > > As if I haven't emphasized this enough: I'm not sure in myself if I have intuited this correctly, and whether what I have intuited from my reading can line up with what the others on the list are addressing. I believe perhaps I am thinking about this in a different way, as a process, than the others. And that is fine. :) > > As I considered it, I suppose I'm having trouble with the *activity* of sterile analysis of the texts (Please don't misplace my irony). > > Vygotsky was a person who wanted to liberate people to live fuller lives. He cared about people, not ideas in themselves. He wasn't motivated to win prizes or acquire world fame for making discoveries. The theories were to support a larger cause, and this cause seems to get lost in the noise. To my dismay, the affect of the work has been completely removed from the discussion. It is hard for me to separate the man and his wider motivations from the work, which may not be wise on my part. > > What do you think? Am I wrong in this? > > Thinking out loud... > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, October 20, 2014 6:08 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] LSV versus ANL > > Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that > perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be the > determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. But > it seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by > units allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. > If a complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its > analysis is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis > by units allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis > begins from a concept of the whole complex process represented in a > unit, not the whole, but a small fragment of the whole, such that the > whole can be seen as being made up of very many such fragments only. > Absent Vygotsky's method of analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity > Theory is in danger of collapsing to a reductionism that actually > explains nothing. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Oct 20 21:47:56 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 04:47:56 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The mirror has two candles In-Reply-To: <1413834192.73086.YahooMailNeo@web173203.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052CB1@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <1413834192.73086.YahooMailNeo@web173203.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <43C977F3-584D-4C36-BB25-6C00BF7FE120@uniandes.edu.co> Hi Haydi, I'm sorry, but I'm not sure what you want to convince us of. All that I am saying about LSV's account here, and elsewhere, is that "inner" doesn't mean "in the mind." For example, in Chapter 7 of T&L there are seven planes, each more "inner" than the last. What could this mean - that each plane is more "mindy"? And earlier in the book, self-directed speech out loud is already "inner speech." No, inner means "personal." Each of us masters our consciousness using the resources made available by our culture. Martin On Oct 20, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: > Dear Martin et al > Excuse me because everybody is tired with the old thread but to keep to my word as posing the idea of 'pure thinkg' as the last phase of the 'internalization process' , I'd like to paste the two last paragraphs of Vygosky's "The problem of the environment" here as a parenthetical notion : > > "With the help of speech [as one component of the environment] a child can converse with other people around him and they, in turn, can talk to him. But now take each of us. You know that each of us possesses so called inner speech and that this inner speech, i.e. the fact that we are able to formulate in silence for ourselves ideas embodied in words, plays a major role in our thinking. This role is so great, that some researchers have (even), albeit incorrectly, identified the process of speech with the process of thinking. But, in actual fact, for every one of us, this inner speech is one of the most important functions we have at our disposal. When this inner speech in human beings becomes disturbed due to some disorder, (it can result in the most severe disruption of the entire thinking process.) > How did this process of inner speech in each of us come about? Research has revealed that the emergence of inner speech is based on external speech. Originally, for a child, speech represents a means of communication between people, it manifests itself as a social function, in its social role. But gradually a child learns how to use speech to serve himself, his internal processes. Now speech becomes not just a means of communication with other people, but also a means for the child?s (own inner thinking processes). Then it no longer represents that speech which we use aloud when we communicate with one another, but it becomes an inner, silent, tacit speech. But where did speech as a means of thinking come from? From speech as a means of communication. From the external activity which the child was involved in with the people around him, appeared one of the most important inner functions without which man?s (very thinking process) could not exist." > > If you are not still convinced , I'll try to find 'pure thinking' as well . > And please note the idea of 'mastering' the consciousness a few paragraphs above . One might think mastering the consciousness how and by what ? > Emphases through parentheses are mine . > Best > Haydi > > > > ________________________________ > From: ?Greg Thompson? ?? > To: ?"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"? ?? > Sent: Monday, 20 October 2014, 10:57:58 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The mirror has two candles > > > > Larry, > Can you help me to think through this: > Are Acheulean hand axes the same as the concept of "symmetry"? > > It seems the critical point about "symmetry" (or any other mathematical > concept) is that it takes on meaning when it is seen in process within some > system of relations. Just as an Acheulean hand axe lying there isn't of > much use - symmetry becomes useful only when it is taken up as a part of a > process, and hence as part of a system of relations (why are we engaging in > making something "symmetrical"?). > > Again here I'm wondering if the metaphor of inside/outside of a system of > relations might be useful for re-thinking the ideal/material in such a way > that avoids seeing this distinction as a matter of ontological dualism. > > I could use some help as to whether or not this would jibe with Vygotsky's > formulation of the problem. (and extending to some related names in Russia > at the time of Vygotsky, I'd be curious if anyone would have any thoughts > on Volosinov's and Bakhtin's metaphor of inside/outside - does it > necessarily have to be based on an ontological dualism?) > > Just trying to get my head around how we might conceive of the plump > doubles that Martin has pointed us to... > > -greg > > > > On Mon, Oct 20, 2014 at 7:44 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > >> I want to respond to this theme by bringing in the notion of *mediated >> action* AS the best *unit of analysis*. Wertsch weaved together Vygotsky >> and Bakhtin and showed utterances AS *mediated actions* >> The place of the *ideal* in relation to *objects* is the theme. >> >> Now I want to weave in Anna Sfard's exploration of mathematical *entities* >> AS having a dual *nature*. This extension is from an article she just >> posted on the web [On the Dual Nature of Mathematical Conceptions] >> >> Page 4 is her elaborating this dual nature as follows. >> >> [is] Treating mathematical conceptions AS IF they referred to some abstract >> OBJECTS the only possibility of relating to mathematical concepts? THIS >> KIND of conception [interpretation] Anna labels *structural*. THIS TYPE of >> utterance [mediated action] prevails in mathematical discourse situations >> as mediational means >> However, there ARE different KINDS of mathematical definitions that >> *reveal* quite a different approach to these same concepts. >> Functions can be defined not only AS *a set of ordered pairs* BUT ALSO AS a >> process of *getting from one system to another* [skemp referenced] >> >> Symmetry can BE conceived [interpreted] AS a static property of geometric >> forms BUT ALSO AS a *kind* of transformation. This latter TYPE of >> description [genre] SPEAKS AS IF the mathematical notion is about >> processes, algorithms, ACTIONS, [rather than speaking of these mathematical >> notions AS IF they ARE *objects* >> THIS TYPE OF GENRE *reflects* an Operational interpretation [rather than >> structural interpretation] of mathematical conceptions. >> >> Seeing a mathematical *entity* AS *an object* *means* being capable of >> gesturing [referring] to the mathematical concept AS IF the mathematical >> concept were A REAL THING [a static structure actually existing somewhere >> in time and space but timeless] It also *means* being able to *recognize* >> the *idea* at a glance AND to manipulate this mathematical conception AS IF >> the structure existed AS A WHOLE [without going into details or analysis] >> AS AN EXISTING OBJECT. >> >> Using Hadamard's *metaphor* we can SAY that *structural genres* endows a >> concept with a KIND of *physiognomy* which ALLOWS a person to think of this >> concept AS a unique, THING [entity] however complicated this concept may >> BE. >> >> JUST AS WE SEE A FACE OF A MAN. >> >> In contrast, interpreting A concept AS A PROCESS implies regarding THIS >> PARTICULAR mathematical concept AS A POTENTIAL [existant] rather than an >> ACTUAL EXISTING ENTITY. In operational kinds of genres the *entity* COMES >> INTO EXISTENCE upon request in a sequence of actions. >> THUS >> whereas the structural genre IS timeless [static] instantaneous, and >> integrative, the operational genre is dynamic, sequential, and detailed. In >> other words different mediational means within *mediated action* produce >> radically different notions of the place of concepts as interpretants that >> exist [in actuality or in potential] >> >> THEREFORE the play involves different TYPES of *seeing* and different TYPES >> of *saying*. >> >> BOTH are equally *true* >> >> I have been exploring *objects of activity* *units of analysis* and >> *mediated action* through Anna Sfard's exploration of mathematical >> conceptions which do not appear through the 5 senses but DO EXIST. >> >> Larry >> >> On Sun, Oct 19, 2014 at 4:00 PM, Huw Lloyd >> wrote: >> >>> Hi David, >>> >>> I don't think anyone is going to argue against the paper's defamatory >>> quality. Everything he says against LSV can be taken with a pinch of >> salt >>> if we assume he was trying to protect his colleagues. >>> >>> What remains is therefore what is countered and proposed with respect to >>> the subject of the environment. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 19 October 2014 23:38, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>>> First of all, a word of appreciation to Martin for his candle in the >>>> mirror and his delightful formulation of "Plump Materialism", and also >>>> to Michael for recognizing the beauty of the image and using it to >>>> revitalize a thread that was growing somewhat tiresome to me: no fault >>>> of the participants; it was my own inability to see past "fatalistic >>>> determinism", "captive to bourgeois theories", and ANL's other fatuous >>>> formulae. As Mike points out, this is not just name calling: these are >>>> blood libels. >>>> >>>> Secondly, let me put in a word for Andy's counter-blast. For those of >>>> you who have not read it; it is available on Andy's academia.edu page, >>>> and it's well worth a look: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> http://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky >>>> >>>> Thirdly--can I draw attention to the top of page fourteen of ANL's >>>> dishonest and dishonorable hatchet job? Here he rounds on Basov for >>>> non-Marxist, idealist notion that humans in some way "double" the >>>> natural environment. ANL returns to this theme at the bottom of the >>>> page where he says: >>>> >>>> "To the animal, however, any ?artificial? object created by humans is >>>> simply >>>> a natural object, it is nature because the animal?s relation toward it >>>> will always >>>> be an instinctive relation. Thus, of course, in reality there is no >>>> doubling of the >>>> environment. The environment as a whole is transformed into a human >>>> environment, >>>> that is, for the human being, into a social environment, based on the >>>> fact that humans themselves relate to it in human terms, that is, as >>>> social humans." >>>> >>>> Note the use of "Thus"; it marks a shameless non sequitur. First of >>>> all, it is a non sequitur to say that because animals and very small >>>> children treat i-phones as natural objects, THEREFORE there is no >>>> doubling of the environment Secondly, it is a non sequitur to say that >>>> the environment "as a whole" becomes a human environment (because >>>> animals and infants do NOT see it that way??) without any trace of the >>>> natural environment. But the biggest non-sequitur is the least >>>> explicit: it is the insinuation that the process of social >>>> idealization of nature that we call enculturation is prima facie >>>> subversive of Marxism. >>>> >>>> Consider the following, from a great subversive of Marxism and primal >>>> plump materialist: >>>> >>>> "We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. >>>> A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a >>>> bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. >>>> But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is >>>> this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he >>>> erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a >>>> result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its >>>> commencement." (Capital, Vol 1, Chapter III, Part 7) >>>> >>>> What is THIS if not a doubling of reality--a mirror with two candles? >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> >>>> have a look: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 20 October 2014 00:15, Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>> Here's an example memory paper abstract by Sereda (2011), titled "A >>>>> Theoretical Model of Memory >>>>> as a Mechanism for Systematically Organizing Individual Experience" >>>>> >>>>> "In order to improve the explanatory potential of activity theory, >> this >>>>> article >>>>> proposes a theoretical model of human memory as a mechanism for >>>>> the systematic organization of individual experience, organization >> that >>>>> is an essential condition for performing future activity. The model >>> rests >>>>> on the idea that the main factor in human memory is the motivational >>>>> and semantic sets of personality and thus orientation toward the >> future >>>>> (prospective orientation)." >>>>> >>>>> The storehouse metaphor as used in psychology merely reflects a >> rather >>>> poor >>>>> approach. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> On 19 October 2014 15:20, Glassman, Michael >>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hi Larry, >>>>>> >>>>>> I renamed this thread because it seems to be taking a tangent from >> the >>>>>> very rich discussion on LSV and ANL, but perhaps it might circle >> back. >>>>>> Anyway, I thought Martin's very interesting illustration deserves a >>>> moment >>>>>> of fame. I wonder if memory is the right word in current >>>> circumstance. In >>>>>> U.S. psychology memory is very often viewed as a storehouse of >>>> information >>>>>> where you send your messages back to retrieve information when >> needed >>> to >>>>>> apply to the current situation. Do you think Pierce would see the >>>> overall >>>>>> process this way (did he actually talk about memory?) For him it >>> seems >>>> it >>>>>> would be part of a more active process of establishing relationships >>> of >>>>>> that which came before with that which is currently being explored. >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>>> on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com [lpscholar2@gmail.com] >>>>>> Sent: Sunday, October 19, 2014 6:40 AM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael Glassman and Martin and How >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I want to ex-tend the exploration of *models* and *memories* and >>>>>> *contextualism* as linked in Michael?s rejoinder to Martin. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael wrote ?if ALL you can *see* [perceive] is what is IN the >>> mirror >>>>>> [metaphor of reflection AS mirroring] how do you ?know? there IS a >>>> mirror >>>>>> >>>>>> The IF IMPLIED is the ?ALL? . >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> However, is that ?all there IS? in *seeing*? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> IS ?memory* also existent as an existent IN seeing? >>>>>> >>>>>> In other words, do *interpretants* ACTUALLY exist IN FACT? [as such] >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Umberto Eco suggests there is both ORPHIC knowing/seeing [when >> Picasso >>>>>> paints THAT PARTICULAR yellow shoe in a painting the SINGULARITY of >>> THAT >>>>>> experience IS ?orphic? >>>>>> >>>>>> POETS and artists are ?biased? to privilege THIS WAY of knowing >>>> [Peirce's >>>>>> secondness as orphic and possibly orphaned] >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> HOWEVER, Umberto Eco suggests that this orphic ?knowing* is also >>>>>> *indicative* [indexical] of further *interpreting* AND THIS TYPE of >>>>>> *knowing* EX-TENDS Orphic knowing. [Peirce's tiredness] >>>>>> >>>>>> Now in Peirce's metaphysics THIS interpreting creating interpretants >>>> also >>>>>> is EXISTING as facts. >>>>>> >>>>>> Is this transforming orphic [what IS present] TO forming >>> *interpretants* >>>>>> AS *something* that actually exists {through the interpreting >> process} >>>>>> INCLUDE memory but that IS NOT ALL. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> IS creative imagining potentially existent? that goes BEYOND >> memory? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I believe Umberto Eco?s question of a deeper knowing than >>> orphic/orphan >>>>>> knowing *things-in-themselves* EX-tending BEYOND the orphic >>>> [secondness] to >>>>>> INCLUDE interpreting and forming actual *interpretants* [tiredness] >>>> must be >>>>>> considered within the memory process. >>>>>> >>>>>> This returns to *models* that are necessary but NOT ALL there *is*. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> The *relation* between *orphic* knowing and *interpreting* knowing >>>> seems a >>>>>> KEY question [and may ex-tend back into metaphysics? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Larry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Sent from Windows Mail >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> From: Glassman, Michael >>>>>> Sent: ?Saturday?, ?October? ?18?, ?2014 ?5?:?18? ?PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Martin, >>>>>> >>>>>> That's a very interesting metaphor, but let me see if I can take it >> a >>>> step >>>>>> further. Basically you seem to be saying that Vygotsky is making a >>>>>> mechanistic argument - I'm not talking about the more colloquial >>>> expression >>>>>> of mechanistic but the one that Pepper talks about in World >>> Hypothesis. >>>>>> You are looking into the mirror and seeing the reflection of a >> candle >>> - >>>> but >>>>>> you are making the assumption that there must be a mechanism that is >>>>>> causing the reflection of the candle. You cannot know this >> mechanism >>>>>> itself - it is too difficult to reach - but you can build models >> that >>>> bring >>>>>> us closer to understanding. This I think is almost exactly how >> Pepper >>>>>> discusses this root metaphor. Our goal as scientists is to find the >>>>>> mediate description of the underlying mechanism. This >>>>>> Pragmatists/Conextualists would say this is dualism - not the >> dualism >>>> you >>>>>> get from Formism where you depend on your mind to bring you closer >> to >>> a >>>>>> known but unreachable ideal, but in the sense that there is this >>>> mechanism >>>>>> that exists that is somehow separate from and causing the reflection >>> in >>>> the >>>>>> mirror. So the Contextualist asks, if all you can see is what is in >>> the >>>>>> mirror how do you know there is a mirror. That is the only >>> information >>>> you >>>>>> have and you have to base all interpretation of the world on that >>>>>> information - to suggest you are looking at a reflection is an >>>> assumption >>>>>> based on a belief system that there must be causing what you are >>>> seeing. I >>>>>> think you are right, Vygotsky wants to assume the mirror, but in the >>> end >>>>>> doesn't that suggest a dualism to his thinking. >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>>> on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >>>>>> Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 6:38 PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Michael, >>>>>> >>>>>> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. >>>> Every >>>>>> science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* >>> appearance. >>>> One >>>>>> of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a >> burning >>>>>> candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle >>>> burning >>>>>> behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study >>> that >>>>>> second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the >>>> mirror, >>>>>> in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' >> of >>> a >>>>>> second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. >>>>>> >>>>>> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those >> of >>> us >>>>>> raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and >> feelings >>>>>> exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call >>> "the >>>>>> mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain >> how >>>> that >>>>>> appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal >>>>>> thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because >> we >>>> can >>>>>> use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a >> fibre >>>>>> bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and >>>>>> Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and >>>>>> neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a >> *folk* >>>>>> psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try >>> to >>>>>> make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own >>>>>> psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot >>>> study >>>>>> the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, >>> however, >>>>>> set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael >> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up >>> for >>>>>> being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't >>>> think >>>>>> he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which >> I >>>> think >>>>>> you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what >>>> develops >>>>>> if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops >>>> (remember >>>>>> I am suggesting individual development here). >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Oct 20 21:52:37 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 04:52:37 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <5445DCD6.7080902@mira.net> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> , <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413862822335.60795@unm.edu>,<5445DCD6.7080902@mira.net> Message-ID: <1413867156880.88790@unm.edu> Granted, and I have not yet read your paper on Defense of Vygotsky, and so I will do that after I send this. But the questions in me that rise immediately are: 1. What exactly is the critique? (filtering out the political issues, if that is germane). 2. What is "good and useful" in the Activity Theory in relation to Sociocultural Theory? They seem to have different applications. Or is this the point? Or, was this a philosophical difference of what _should be_ THE unit of analysis? Arguing over UOA (in terms of which unit to pick, not the method) seems silly, unless I suppose, one is subject to Stalin's whims. As they say in Monty Python, "No one expects the Spanish Inquisition." 3. If the UOA is different, should that difference be controversial? The UOA depends upon what is to be analyzed as a whole. So if ANL has a different objective (of the whole) from LSV, which seems to be the case, the UOAs will of course differ. Respectfully, I am ignorant about the nuanced politics of the time and only know a little, so I hope I am not inadvertently trivializing the matter. 4. I do understand UOA is difficult to conceive if one's method is to reduce things to the smallest parts (Thank you, Descartes). However I don't think ANL was attempting to do this by choosing activity as his UOA, so I'm a little lost when you say: "Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing." 5. Further, I am interested in the way intellectual freedom (or rather, the lack of intellectual freedom) shaped these theories. It seems that if we can separate out the forces that encourage or restrict intellectual freedom, we can be left to see what value is there. Like David Kellogg described, the slender reed of Vygotsky's theories seem to be what we are attempting to retrieve. However, it seems you are saying ANL has his own slender reed, as well. (I can't help thinking about Spinoza right about now and the way he was marked an atheist. I wonder if it might be worthwhile to compare LSV and ANL with Spinoza and Leibniz. More thinking out loud...) Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: Monday, October 20, 2014 10:11 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky Even though we all recognise that the motivation behind ANL's critique is foul, we still have to deal with the critique. The more so because many of the criticisms he makes are made by others at other times. And also, like Haydi said earlier, we need to be able to rebut ANL's critique, and still retain what is good and useful in the theory ANL created. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello Andy (and esteemed society of XCMA)! > > This is my first post to the list. I hope the waves will be gentle as I wade in. Over the past week or so I've been lurking and I've witnessed some titanic exchanges and I'd prefer to steer around iceburgs, if possible. As you will learn, I like to use metaphors in my writing, so if that is problematic for anyone, I hope you will try to enlist the poet within. > > About me: I am a former student of Vera's and a graduate of UNM's OLIT MA program. I am interested in technology design, philosophy of mind, distributed cognition, embodied thinking, ecological mind, JJ Gibson's affordances, metaphorical reasoning (a l? Lakoff & Johnson), Late Wittgenstein, and Advaita Vedanta, among many other things! > > Vygotsky directly inspires me to consider how computer tools aid in thinking tasks and how these tools reflect in our society and how, in turn, our society is reflected in these tools and how they influence our cognition (as a two-directional process). I am also interested in patterns and how they might be used to transfer knowledge between disciplines. My BFA is in Photography from the San Francisco Art Institute, and so I am likely to be more artist than scientist, and more likely to view Vygotsky through a lens of affect AND cognition, combined (perezhivanie!!). It is this reason Vygotsky is so important to me and why I believe his work is unique from other experienced thinkers. > > So here goes: > > As I've explained to Andy in previous emails off-list, I like to read papers at least twice to best understand rhetoric as well as content. I am however feeling overwhelmed by the ANL paper mostly because it is so harsh in its representations of LSV's work. It is almost impossible for me to complete a second reading for this reason! As a rule, I am very suspicious of intellectual bullying because typically one who is an authentic seeker of truth does one's best to communicate in simple, useful, and redolent language, which is one reason LSV is appealing to me and Leontiev is not. > > Vygotsky succeeds most times this way, which I believe is what makes him so engaging. Although he himself could wrestle with concepts and puzzles and write about them cryptically, this isn't the same. When he was first encountering a problem, a solution, or a description of a phenomenon the writing is going to be rough, sketchy, and incomplete. It's almost like attempting to read Vygotsky by radio transmission with a faint signal that goes in and out of reception. > > But ANL, in form of the critique paper, doesn't seem to deal with truth but with slander (I understand: the more violent he could do it, the more he would be likely to save his own skin in Stalinist Russia). It seems everyone is in agreement on this. Still, it's hard to accept that this slight of hand inherent in the Activity Theory itself is not detected by others who were not in danger to refute Activity Theory. It seems so obvious to me. It seems so obvious to me that I wonder if I should doubt my own thinking about it! > > Perhaps my grasp of the points here are tentative and sophomoric, however what I do not like about Activity Theory is the idea of activity being the unit of analysis. Activity as UOA might be appropriate when dealing with how to divide labor on the shop floor of an automobile plant, and the _meaning_ of that division to its workers and managers, but I don't equate this in terms of understanding how we as humans think from the formative stage of childhood, and how we deliberate and develop our selves (as the individual self) in society (many selves) to our fullest potentials. > > Are we incorrect to take a theory that discusses the formation of children's minds in their formative environments and conflate that with adult interactions in activity in the world? It seems that that is a huge leap, because children, firstly, do not have to deal with politics, jobs, and life-and-death situations as we must as adults. (Children can, but it is an exception rather than a rule. Think: Malala). Children are, if anything, professionals in _play_. Then, the concept of THE WORLD is completely different from childhood to adulthood. But perhaps this is too philosophical for the environment of the list. > > As if I haven't emphasized this enough: I'm not sure in myself if I have intuited this correctly, and whether what I have intuited from my reading can line up with what the others on the list are addressing. I believe perhaps I am thinking about this in a different way, as a process, than the others. And that is fine. :) > > As I considered it, I suppose I'm having trouble with the *activity* of sterile analysis of the texts (Please don't misplace my irony). > > Vygotsky was a person who wanted to liberate people to live fuller lives. He cared about people, not ideas in themselves. He wasn't motivated to win prizes or acquire world fame for making discoveries. The theories were to support a larger cause, and this cause seems to get lost in the noise. To my dismay, the affect of the work has been completely removed from the discussion. It is hard for me to separate the man and his wider motivations from the work, which may not be wise on my part. > > What do you think? Am I wrong in this? > > Thinking out loud... > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, October 20, 2014 6:08 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] LSV versus ANL > > Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that > perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be the > determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. But > it seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by > units allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. > If a complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its > analysis is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis > by units allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis > begins from a concept of the whole complex process represented in a > unit, not the whole, but a small fragment of the whole, such that the > whole can be seen as being made up of very many such fragments only. > Absent Vygotsky's method of analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity > Theory is in danger of collapsing to a reductionism that actually > explains nothing. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Oct 20 23:01:21 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 17:01:21 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <1413867156880.88790@unm.edu> References: <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> , <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413862822335.60795@unm.edu>, <5445DCD6.7080902@mira.net> <1413867156880.88790@unm.edu> Message-ID: <5445F6B1.4010402@mira.net> Annalisa, a "unit of analysis" is relative to what you are analysing. So "word meaning" is a unit of verbal thought. Every problem you tackle means discovering the appropriate unit of analysis for *that* problem. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Granted, and I have not yet read your paper on Defense of Vygotsky, and so I will do that after I send this. > > But the questions in me that rise immediately are: > > 1. What exactly is the critique? (filtering out the political issues, if that is germane). > > 2. What is "good and useful" in the Activity Theory in relation to Sociocultural Theory? They seem to have different applications. Or is this the point? Or, was this a philosophical difference of what _should be_ THE unit of analysis? Arguing over UOA (in terms of which unit to pick, not the method) seems silly, unless I suppose, one is subject to Stalin's whims. > > As they say in Monty Python, "No one expects the Spanish Inquisition." > > 3. If the UOA is different, should that difference be controversial? The UOA depends upon what is to be analyzed as a whole. So if ANL has a different objective (of the whole) from LSV, which seems to be the case, the UOAs will of course differ. > > Respectfully, I am ignorant about the nuanced politics of the time and only know a little, so I hope I am not inadvertently trivializing the matter. > > 4. I do understand UOA is difficult to conceive if one's method is to reduce things to the smallest parts (Thank you, Descartes). However I don't think ANL was attempting to do this by choosing activity as his UOA, so I'm a little lost when you say: > > "Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing." > > 5. Further, I am interested in the way intellectual freedom (or rather, the lack of intellectual freedom) shaped these theories. It seems that if we can separate out the forces that encourage or restrict intellectual freedom, we can be left to see what value is there. Like David Kellogg described, the slender reed of Vygotsky's theories seem to be what we are attempting to retrieve. However, it seems you are saying ANL has his own slender reed, as well. > > (I can't help thinking about Spinoza right about now and the way he was marked an atheist. I wonder if it might be worthwhile to compare LSV and ANL with Spinoza and Leibniz. More thinking out loud...) > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, October 20, 2014 10:11 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky > > Even though we all recognise that the motivation behind ANL's critique > is foul, we still have to deal with the critique. The more so because > many of the criticisms he makes are made by others at other times. And > also, like Haydi said earlier, we need to be able to rebut ANL's > critique, and still retain what is good and useful in the theory ANL > created. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Hello Andy (and esteemed society of XCMA)! >> >> This is my first post to the list. I hope the waves will be gentle as I wade in. Over the past week or so I've been lurking and I've witnessed some titanic exchanges and I'd prefer to steer around iceburgs, if possible. As you will learn, I like to use metaphors in my writing, so if that is problematic for anyone, I hope you will try to enlist the poet within. >> >> About me: I am a former student of Vera's and a graduate of UNM's OLIT MA program. I am interested in technology design, philosophy of mind, distributed cognition, embodied thinking, ecological mind, JJ Gibson's affordances, metaphorical reasoning (a l? Lakoff & Johnson), Late Wittgenstein, and Advaita Vedanta, among many other things! >> >> Vygotsky directly inspires me to consider how computer tools aid in thinking tasks and how these tools reflect in our society and how, in turn, our society is reflected in these tools and how they influence our cognition (as a two-directional process). I am also interested in patterns and how they might be used to transfer knowledge between disciplines. My BFA is in Photography from the San Francisco Art Institute, and so I am likely to be more artist than scientist, and more likely to view Vygotsky through a lens of affect AND cognition, combined (perezhivanie!!). It is this reason Vygotsky is so important to me and why I believe his work is unique from other experienced thinkers. >> >> So here goes: >> >> As I've explained to Andy in previous emails off-list, I like to read papers at least twice to best understand rhetoric as well as content. I am however feeling overwhelmed by the ANL paper mostly because it is so harsh in its representations of LSV's work. It is almost impossible for me to complete a second reading for this reason! As a rule, I am very suspicious of intellectual bullying because typically one who is an authentic seeker of truth does one's best to communicate in simple, useful, and redolent language, which is one reason LSV is appealing to me and Leontiev is not. >> >> Vygotsky succeeds most times this way, which I believe is what makes him so engaging. Although he himself could wrestle with concepts and puzzles and write about them cryptically, this isn't the same. When he was first encountering a problem, a solution, or a description of a phenomenon the writing is going to be rough, sketchy, and incomplete. It's almost like attempting to read Vygotsky by radio transmission with a faint signal that goes in and out of reception. >> >> But ANL, in form of the critique paper, doesn't seem to deal with truth but with slander (I understand: the more violent he could do it, the more he would be likely to save his own skin in Stalinist Russia). It seems everyone is in agreement on this. Still, it's hard to accept that this slight of hand inherent in the Activity Theory itself is not detected by others who were not in danger to refute Activity Theory. It seems so obvious to me. It seems so obvious to me that I wonder if I should doubt my own thinking about it! >> >> Perhaps my grasp of the points here are tentative and sophomoric, however what I do not like about Activity Theory is the idea of activity being the unit of analysis. Activity as UOA might be appropriate when dealing with how to divide labor on the shop floor of an automobile plant, and the _meaning_ of that division to its workers and managers, but I don't equate this in terms of understanding how we as humans think from the formative stage of childhood, and how we deliberate and develop our selves (as the individual self) in society (many selves) to our fullest potentials. >> >> Are we incorrect to take a theory that discusses the formation of children's minds in their formative environments and conflate that with adult interactions in activity in the world? It seems that that is a huge leap, because children, firstly, do not have to deal with politics, jobs, and life-and-death situations as we must as adults. (Children can, but it is an exception rather than a rule. Think: Malala). Children are, if anything, professionals in _play_. Then, the concept of THE WORLD is completely different from childhood to adulthood. But perhaps this is too philosophical for the environment of the list. >> >> As if I haven't emphasized this enough: I'm not sure in myself if I have intuited this correctly, and whether what I have intuited from my reading can line up with what the others on the list are addressing. I believe perhaps I am thinking about this in a different way, as a process, than the others. And that is fine. :) >> >> As I considered it, I suppose I'm having trouble with the *activity* of sterile analysis of the texts (Please don't misplace my irony). >> >> Vygotsky was a person who wanted to liberate people to live fuller lives. He cared about people, not ideas in themselves. He wasn't motivated to win prizes or acquire world fame for making discoveries. The theories were to support a larger cause, and this cause seems to get lost in the noise. To my dismay, the affect of the work has been completely removed from the discussion. It is hard for me to separate the man and his wider motivations from the work, which may not be wise on my part. >> >> What do you think? Am I wrong in this? >> >> Thinking out loud... >> >> Annalisa >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Monday, October 20, 2014 6:08 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] LSV versus ANL >> >> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that >> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be the >> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. But >> it seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by >> units allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. >> If a complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its >> analysis is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis >> by units allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis >> begins from a concept of the whole complex process represented in a >> unit, not the whole, but a small fragment of the whole, such that the >> whole can be seen as being made up of very many such fragments only. >> Absent Vygotsky's method of analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity >> Theory is in danger of collapsing to a reductionism that actually >> explains nothing. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Tue Oct 21 01:13:02 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 19:13:02 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <5445F6B1.4010402@mira.net> References: <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> , <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413862822335.60795@unm.edu>, <5445DCD6.7080902@mira.net> <1413867156880.88790@unm.edu> <5445F6B1.4010402@mira.net> Message-ID: <5446158E.5010608@mira.net> On closer reading of your message, Annalisa, I see that in (3), you do write on the understanding that the difference in UoA relates to a difference in what is to be analysed. As David pointed out, LSV's paper is a pair with one on heredity, tackling the problem of the development of the personality, is it environment or heredity. He says that perezhivanija are the units for this problem. I think ANL says contrariwise that it is activity that is the appopriate unit, but honestly, he doesn't really confront the idea of unit here, I think. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Andy Blunden wrote: > Annalisa, a "unit of analysis" is relative to what you are analysing. > So "word meaning" is a unit of verbal thought. Every problem you > tackle means discovering the appropriate unit of analysis for *that* > problem. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> Granted, and I have not yet read your paper on Defense of Vygotsky, >> and so I will do that after I send this. >> >> But the questions in me that rise immediately are: >> >> 1. What exactly is the critique? (filtering out the political issues, >> if that is germane). >> >> 2. What is "good and useful" in the Activity Theory in relation to >> Sociocultural Theory? They seem to have different applications. Or is >> this the point? Or, was this a philosophical difference of what >> _should be_ THE unit of analysis? Arguing over UOA (in terms of which >> unit to pick, not the method) seems silly, unless I suppose, one is >> subject to Stalin's whims. >> As they say in Monty Python, "No one expects the Spanish Inquisition." >> >> 3. If the UOA is different, should that difference be controversial? >> The UOA depends upon what is to be analyzed as a whole. So if ANL has >> a different objective (of the whole) from LSV, which seems to be the >> case, the UOAs will of course differ. >> Respectfully, I am ignorant about the nuanced politics of the time >> and only know a little, so I hope I am not inadvertently trivializing >> the matter. >> >> 4. I do understand UOA is difficult to conceive if one's method is to >> reduce things to the smallest parts (Thank you, Descartes). However I >> don't think ANL was attempting to do this by choosing activity as his >> UOA, so I'm a little lost when you say: >> >> "Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of collapsing to a >> reductionism that actually explains nothing." >> 5. Further, I am interested in the way intellectual freedom (or >> rather, the lack of intellectual freedom) shaped these theories. It >> seems that if we can separate out the forces that encourage or >> restrict intellectual freedom, we can be left to see what value is >> there. Like David Kellogg described, the slender reed of Vygotsky's >> theories seem to be what we are attempting to retrieve. However, it >> seems you are saying ANL has his own slender reed, as well. >> >> (I can't help thinking about Spinoza right about now and the way he >> was marked an atheist. I wonder if it might be worthwhile to compare >> LSV and ANL with Spinoza and Leibniz. More thinking out loud...) >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of Andy Blunden >> >> Sent: Monday, October 20, 2014 10:11 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky >> >> Even though we all recognise that the motivation behind ANL's critique >> is foul, we still have to deal with the critique. The more so because >> many of the criticisms he makes are made by others at other times. And >> also, like Haydi said earlier, we need to be able to rebut ANL's >> critique, and still retain what is good and useful in the theory ANL >> created. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >>> Hello Andy (and esteemed society of XCMA)! >>> >>> This is my first post to the list. I hope the waves will be gentle >>> as I wade in. Over the past week or so I've been lurking and I've >>> witnessed some titanic exchanges and I'd prefer to steer around >>> iceburgs, if possible. As you will learn, I like to use metaphors in >>> my writing, so if that is problematic for anyone, I hope you will >>> try to enlist the poet within. >>> >>> About me: I am a former student of Vera's and a graduate of UNM's >>> OLIT MA program. I am interested in technology design, philosophy of >>> mind, distributed cognition, embodied thinking, ecological mind, JJ >>> Gibson's affordances, metaphorical reasoning (a l? Lakoff & >>> Johnson), Late Wittgenstein, and Advaita Vedanta, among many other >>> things! >>> >>> Vygotsky directly inspires me to consider how computer tools aid in >>> thinking tasks and how these tools reflect in our society and how, >>> in turn, our society is reflected in these tools and how they >>> influence our cognition (as a two-directional process). I am also >>> interested in patterns and how they might be used to transfer >>> knowledge between disciplines. My BFA is in Photography from the San >>> Francisco Art Institute, and so I am likely to be more artist than >>> scientist, and more likely to view Vygotsky through a lens of affect >>> AND cognition, combined (perezhivanie!!). It is this reason Vygotsky >>> is so important to me and why I believe his work is unique from >>> other experienced thinkers. >>> >>> So here goes: >>> >>> As I've explained to Andy in previous emails off-list, I like to >>> read papers at least twice to best understand rhetoric as well as >>> content. I am however feeling overwhelmed by the ANL paper mostly >>> because it is so harsh in its representations of LSV's work. It is >>> almost impossible for me to complete a second reading for this >>> reason! As a rule, I am very suspicious of intellectual bullying >>> because typically one who is an authentic seeker of truth does one's >>> best to communicate in simple, useful, and redolent language, which >>> is one reason LSV is appealing to me and Leontiev is not. >>> >>> Vygotsky succeeds most times this way, which I believe is what makes >>> him so engaging. Although he himself could wrestle with concepts and >>> puzzles and write about them cryptically, this isn't the same. When >>> he was first encountering a problem, a solution, or a description of >>> a phenomenon the writing is going to be rough, sketchy, and >>> incomplete. It's almost like attempting to read Vygotsky by radio >>> transmission with a faint signal that goes in and out of reception. >>> >>> But ANL, in form of the critique paper, doesn't seem to deal with >>> truth but with slander (I understand: the more violent he could do >>> it, the more he would be likely to save his own skin in Stalinist >>> Russia). It seems everyone is in agreement on this. Still, it's hard >>> to accept that this slight of hand inherent in the Activity Theory >>> itself is not detected by others who were not in danger to refute >>> Activity Theory. It seems so obvious to me. It seems so obvious to >>> me that I wonder if I should doubt my own thinking about it! >>> >>> Perhaps my grasp of the points here are tentative and sophomoric, >>> however what I do not like about Activity Theory is the idea of >>> activity being the unit of analysis. Activity as UOA might be >>> appropriate when dealing with how to divide labor on the shop floor >>> of an automobile plant, and the _meaning_ of that division to its >>> workers and managers, but I don't equate this in terms of >>> understanding how we as humans think from the formative stage of >>> childhood, and how we deliberate and develop our selves (as the >>> individual self) in society (many selves) to our fullest potentials. >>> >>> Are we incorrect to take a theory that discusses the formation of >>> children's minds in their formative environments and conflate that >>> with adult interactions in activity in the world? It seems that that >>> is a huge leap, because children, firstly, do not have to deal with >>> politics, jobs, and life-and-death situations as we must as adults. >>> (Children can, but it is an exception rather than a rule. Think: >>> Malala). Children are, if anything, professionals in _play_. Then, >>> the concept of THE WORLD is completely different from childhood to >>> adulthood. But perhaps this is too philosophical for the environment >>> of the list. >>> >>> As if I haven't emphasized this enough: I'm not sure in myself if I >>> have intuited this correctly, and whether what I have intuited from >>> my reading can line up with what the others on the list are >>> addressing. I believe perhaps I am thinking about this in a >>> different way, as a process, than the others. And that is fine. :) >>> >>> As I considered it, I suppose I'm having trouble with the >>> *activity* of sterile analysis of the texts (Please don't misplace >>> my irony). >>> >>> Vygotsky was a person who wanted to liberate people to live fuller >>> lives. He cared about people, not ideas in themselves. He wasn't >>> motivated to win prizes or acquire world fame for making >>> discoveries. The theories were to support a larger cause, and this >>> cause seems to get lost in the noise. To my dismay, the affect of >>> the work has been completely removed from the discussion. It is hard >>> for me to separate the man and his wider motivations from the work, >>> which may not be wise on my part. >>> >>> What do you think? Am I wrong in this? >>> >>> Thinking out loud... >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> on behalf of Andy >>> Blunden >>> Sent: Monday, October 20, 2014 6:08 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] LSV versus ANL >>> >>> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that >>> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be >>> the >>> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. But >>> it seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by >>> units allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then >>> ventures. >>> If a complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its >>> analysis is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis >>> by units allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis >>> begins from a concept of the whole complex process represented in a >>> unit, not the whole, but a small fragment of the whole, such that the >>> whole can be seen as being made up of very many such fragments only. >>> Absent Vygotsky's method of analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity >>> Theory is in danger of collapsing to a reductionism that actually >>> explains nothing. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> > > > From juanma.duarte@gmail.com Tue Oct 21 04:39:51 2014 From: juanma.duarte@gmail.com (Juan Duarte) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 08:39:51 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> Message-ID: I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- previously. But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit of analysis" in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and Engels method, as Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The historical meaning of the chrisis in psychology. There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the units of analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for me, at least- surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and preciselly about method, and very few comments about the fact he was marxist. To understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for example, the method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, unit of diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot be separated without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of though and language), for example. Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake this point of view. Andy, for example. Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the marxism in LV (in spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo Baquero have worked through this line, in a very interesting work. Juan Duarte (Argentina). 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden : > Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that > perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be the > determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. But it > seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by units > allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. If a > complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its analysis > is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis by units > allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis begins from a > concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, not the whole, > but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be seen as being > made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's method of > analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of > collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > -- Juan -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 36_38_Duarte.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 286477 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141021/0ecdd871/attachment.pdf From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Oct 21 08:27:23 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 15:27:23 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net>, Message-ID: <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> Hello Juan, I agree with you that one must understand Marxism to understand Vygotsky clearly. Darwin's theory too. My grasp upon these topics is tenuous and I would benefit to know more. In my past, it has been difficult to enjoy dispassionate conversations about Marxism in my circles without the distractions of how much I don't know about Marxism, or how much Marx didn't know about capitalism; neither position is helpful. Perhaps Marxism is a hot potato still. Certainly there are claims that even the Soviets did not understood Marxism properly and that that may be why Vygotsky had such a hard time. If Marxism has been so difficult a topic, why should it be different for us who have come late to the table? We do have the power of hindsight, but has this helped? For any thinker's work, it is highly relevant to understand the contemporary milieu in which that person worked. That is why I look to historical context to unlock Vygotsky's work, not just his texts. However, I find a political specter rises from the grave when discussing Marxism and kills all prospects before understanding can begin. It is perplexing. I wonder if it is why Vygotsky will remain elusive to us post-moderns. I wish I could read the Castorina & Baquero paper, but I cannot read Spanish very well. Would it be asking too much of you to list the relevant points made in that paper? I would very much be interested! Regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Juan Duarte Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:39 AM To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- previously. But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit of analysis" in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and Engels method, as Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The historical meaning of the chrisis in psychology. There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the units of analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for me, at least- surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and preciselly about method, and very few comments about the fact he was marxist. To understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for example, the method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, unit of diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot be separated without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of though and language), for example. Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake this point of view. Andy, for example. Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the marxism in LV (in spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo Baquero have worked through this line, in a very interesting work. Juan Duarte (Argentina). 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden : > Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that > perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be the > determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. But it > seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by units > allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. If a > complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its analysis > is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis by units > allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis begins from a > concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, not the whole, > but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be seen as being > made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's method of > analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of > collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Oct 21 08:57:14 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 15:57:14 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net>, <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> Message-ID: <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> Hi Juan, Annalisa, The relationship between LSV and Marx is certainly something that we have discussed here on xmca. My own contribution includes a paper published a few years ago, which I would be happy to send to you: Packer, M. J. (2008). Is Vygotsky relevant? Vygotsky?s Marxist psychology. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 15(1), 8-31. Martin On Oct 21, 2014, at 10:27 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello Juan, > > I agree with you that one must understand Marxism to understand Vygotsky clearly. Darwin's theory too. My grasp upon these topics is tenuous and I would benefit to know more. > > In my past, it has been difficult to enjoy dispassionate conversations about Marxism in my circles without the distractions of how much I don't know about Marxism, or how much Marx didn't know about capitalism; neither position is helpful. Perhaps Marxism is a hot potato still. > > Certainly there are claims that even the Soviets did not understood Marxism properly and that that may be why Vygotsky had such a hard time. If Marxism has been so difficult a topic, why should it be different for us who have come late to the table? We do have the power of hindsight, but has this helped? > > For any thinker's work, it is highly relevant to understand the contemporary milieu in which that person worked. That is why I look to historical context to unlock Vygotsky's work, not just his texts. However, I find a political specter rises from the grave when discussing Marxism and kills all prospects before understanding can begin. It is perplexing. I wonder if it is why Vygotsky will remain elusive to us post-moderns. > > I wish I could read the Castorina & Baquero paper, but I cannot read Spanish very well. Would it be asking too much of you to list the relevant points made in that paper? I would very much be interested! > > Regards, > > Annalisa > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Juan Duarte > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:39 AM > To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- previously. > But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit of analysis" > in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and Engels method, as > Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The historical > meaning of the chrisis in psychology. > There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the units of > analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for me, at least- > surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and preciselly > about method, and very few comments about the fact he was marxist. To > understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for example, the > method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, unit of > diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot be separated > without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of though and > language), for example. > > > Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake this point > of view. Andy, for example. > > Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. > I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the marxism in LV (in > spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo Baquero have > worked through this line, in a very interesting work. > Juan Duarte (Argentina). > > 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden : > >> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that >> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be the >> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. But it >> seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by units >> allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. If a >> complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its analysis >> is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis by units >> allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis begins from a >> concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, not the whole, >> but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be seen as being >> made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's method of >> analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of >> collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Oct 21 09:09:06 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 17:09:06 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The mirror has two candles In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052CB1@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Hi David, I suppose we are all bemused and amused by "our" appearance in your puppet shows. If you wanted to include yourself in the show, I would offer a character who scrupulously attends to what people have written but does not think about what they mean. Each character can have their own form of ridiculousness or folly, yes? Really, I am not overly concerned with what each participant said. I am interested in the proximity of ideas to practical truth in psychology. Both Vygotsky and many of the contributors to activity theoretic research have helped me to understand psychology as a single discipline. There are some fundamental questions at play in question of the role of the environment, such as the relation between feeling and thinking. This is why I find some of the things Leontiev writes about interesting and worthwhile critiquing. The whole business of omissions etc is also tied up with the difficult problems being faced in the work. Even if the theory was delivered on a plate it would not help. It has to be thought about to be made sense of. In that sense all of the gaps and inconsistencies actually help to understand the subject because they are prompts to think more carefully about them. Can my puppet have Toccata and Fugue in D Minor accompanying, please? Best, Huw On 20 October 2014 23:50, David Kellogg wrote: > Huw: > > Different people are engaged in this thread for different reasons. > Martin, for example, wants to establish that consciousness is > something we do, not someplace we are. Larry wants to establish that > there are hidden links joining up almost everything he reads. Haydi > wants to know what the precise borderline between inner speech and > "pure thinking" is. Gary wants to know whether the Acheluan hand axe > is somehow a doubling of the symmetry we notice in human faces. I > think that you are interested in a rather functionalist reading of > Leontiev that would allow him to be applied to AI concerns. > > But my concern is different. With the help of my very hard working > graduate students, I bring out translations of Vygotsky's work in > Korean. A lot of these works have been edited with a very heavy hand, > and some of the annotations are innaccurate, speculative, and even > revisionist. This means that interpretations based on these works tend > to be partial, one-sided, and in places the very opposite of what I > think Vygotsky intended. > > It's important for me to distinguish between problems of omission and > sins of commission. For example, when I read "The Psychology of > Preschool Children", edited by Zaporozhets and Elkonin in the early > sixties, I notice that Vygotsky is defended. But there are certain > glaring omissions: there are careful descriptions of the age periods > (sometimes disguised as 'leading activities") but no mention of the > Crises that divide them, there is a meticulous distinction between > instinctive and cultural practices, but no discussion of the higher > and lower psychological functions, there is a good deal of discussion > of mediation, but nothing much on the distinctive role of speech (the > example of a mediated activity is a prelinguistic child learning to > use a spoon). > > This, along with their very respectful and appreciative reading of > Vygotsky, does suggest to me that Zaporozhets and Elkonin are treading > gingerly, trying their best to preserve Vygotsky in an early > "instrumentalist" form, in the hope that the full-blown theory can > someday be added before it is all lost to poor editing and annotation. > And that is, in fact, what has happened; if you read Elkonin's > writings from the seventies and especially Elkonin's work published in > the post-Soviet period, you can read about the crisis, about the > higher psychic functions, and even about the unique role of word > meanings. > > Leontiev is a very different case. First of all, as we read in the > essay, he does not present even the early Vygotsky in an accurate or > even recognizable form; on the contrary, he is doing his very best to > distort and even falsify the Vygotsky of "Consciousness as a Problem > of the Structure of Behavior". Secondly, he is trying to supplant this > pseudo-Vygotsky with recognizable Stalinist ideas: instead of the > Crisis, the crisis-free assimilation of children to a > contradiction-free socialist society; instead of linked but distinct > lower and psychological functions, labor free of all 'idealist' > alienation, and instead of word meaning, tool use. (I might add, > instead of Marxist dialectics, a vulgar materialism, but I think that > Andy has that covered.) > > Thirdly, and most important for me on an emotional level, Leontiev is > not trying to protect his colleagues; he is vilifying them. As I said, > I have seen this kind of behavior up close in 1989 and in the > aftermath. It's not something I like to talk about (for one thing it > is one of those unpleasant experiences that is almost impossible to > describe without producing either admiration or incredulity in the > hearer, and neither response is really to the point). But some day I > should like to write about it, for in addition to the ugly, indecent > falsehoods of people like our old Party Secretary and the > understandable rage and violence of the relatives of the victims, > there was (and it was far more common) the beautiful silence of decent > ordinary people who simply refused to listen and waited (and are > waiting still). > > It's not simply on an emotional level that this is important. Like > Zaporozhets and Elkonin, Leontiev did outlive Lysenkoism and he did > have the chance to put right some of the wrong that he does us in this > essay, to once again place in our hands the slender reed of Vygotsky's > thought that he almost broke. But he didn't do that. Why not? I think > that in the case of Zaporozhets and Elkonin, it was easy--all they had > to do was fill in some of the gaps they had left in the early sixties. > But in the case of Leontiev, it would have involved self-reflection of > which he was no longer capable and an about-face that he could not > longer perform. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > On 20 October 2014 08:00, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > Hi David, > > > > I don't think anyone is going to argue against the paper's defamatory > > quality. Everything he says against LSV can be taken with a pinch of > salt > > if we assume he was trying to protect his colleagues. > > > > What remains is therefore what is countered and proposed with respect to > > the subject of the environment. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > On 19 October 2014 23:38, David Kellogg wrote: > > > >> First of all, a word of appreciation to Martin for his candle in the > >> mirror and his delightful formulation of "Plump Materialism", and also > >> to Michael for recognizing the beauty of the image and using it to > >> revitalize a thread that was growing somewhat tiresome to me: no fault > >> of the participants; it was my own inability to see past "fatalistic > >> determinism", "captive to bourgeois theories", and ANL's other fatuous > >> formulae. As Mike points out, this is not just name calling: these are > >> blood libels. > >> > >> Secondly, let me put in a word for Andy's counter-blast. For those of > >> you who have not read it; it is available on Andy's academia.edu page, > >> and it's well worth a look: > >> > >> > >> > http://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky > >> > >> Thirdly--can I draw attention to the top of page fourteen of ANL's > >> dishonest and dishonorable hatchet job? Here he rounds on Basov for > >> non-Marxist, idealist notion that humans in some way "double" the > >> natural environment. ANL returns to this theme at the bottom of the > >> page where he says: > >> > >> "To the animal, however, any ?artificial? object created by humans is > >> simply > >> a natural object, it is nature because the animal?s relation toward it > >> will always > >> be an instinctive relation. Thus, of course, in reality there is no > >> doubling of the > >> environment. The environment as a whole is transformed into a human > >> environment, > >> that is, for the human being, into a social environment, based on the > >> fact that humans themselves relate to it in human terms, that is, as > >> social humans." > >> > >> Note the use of "Thus"; it marks a shameless non sequitur. First of > >> all, it is a non sequitur to say that because animals and very small > >> children treat i-phones as natural objects, THEREFORE there is no > >> doubling of the environment Secondly, it is a non sequitur to say that > >> the environment "as a whole" becomes a human environment (because > >> animals and infants do NOT see it that way??) without any trace of the > >> natural environment. But the biggest non-sequitur is the least > >> explicit: it is the insinuation that the process of social > >> idealization of nature that we call enculturation is prima facie > >> subversive of Marxism. > >> > >> Consider the following, from a great subversive of Marxism and primal > >> plump materialist: > >> > >> "We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. > >> A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a > >> bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. > >> But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is > >> this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he > >> erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a > >> result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its > >> commencement." (Capital, Vol 1, Chapter III, Part 7) > >> > >> What is THIS if not a doubling of reality--a mirror with two candles? > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > >> > >> have a look: > >> > >> > >> > >> On 20 October 2014 00:15, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> > Here's an example memory paper abstract by Sereda (2011), titled "A > >> > Theoretical Model of Memory > >> > as a Mechanism for Systematically Organizing Individual Experience" > >> > > >> > "In order to improve the explanatory potential of activity theory, > this > >> > article > >> > proposes a theoretical model of human memory as a mechanism for > >> > the systematic organization of individual experience, organization > that > >> > is an essential condition for performing future activity. The model > rests > >> > on the idea that the main factor in human memory is the motivational > >> > and semantic sets of personality and thus orientation toward the > future > >> > (prospective orientation)." > >> > > >> > The storehouse metaphor as used in psychology merely reflects a rather > >> poor > >> > approach. > >> > > >> > Best, > >> > Huw > >> > > >> > On 19 October 2014 15:20, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > >> > > >> >> Hi Larry, > >> >> > >> >> I renamed this thread because it seems to be taking a tangent from > the > >> >> very rich discussion on LSV and ANL, but perhaps it might circle > back. > >> >> Anyway, I thought Martin's very interesting illustration deserves a > >> moment > >> >> of fame. I wonder if memory is the right word in current > >> circumstance. In > >> >> U.S. psychology memory is very often viewed as a storehouse of > >> information > >> >> where you send your messages back to retrieve information when > needed to > >> >> apply to the current situation. Do you think Pierce would see the > >> overall > >> >> process this way (did he actually talk about memory?) For him it > seems > >> it > >> >> would be part of a more active process of establishing relationships > of > >> >> that which came before with that which is currently being explored. > >> >> > >> >> Michael > >> >> ________________________________________ > >> >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >> >> on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com [lpscholar2@gmail.com] > >> >> Sent: Sunday, October 19, 2014 6:40 AM > >> >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL > >> >> > >> >> Michael Glassman and Martin and How > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> I want to ex-tend the exploration of *models* and *memories* and > >> >> *contextualism* as linked in Michael?s rejoinder to Martin. > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> Michael wrote ?if ALL you can *see* [perceive] is what is IN the > mirror > >> >> [metaphor of reflection AS mirroring] how do you ?know? there IS a > >> mirror > >> >> > >> >> The IF IMPLIED is the ?ALL? . > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> However, is that ?all there IS? in *seeing*? > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> IS ?memory* also existent as an existent IN seeing? > >> >> > >> >> In other words, do *interpretants* ACTUALLY exist IN FACT? [as such] > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> Umberto Eco suggests there is both ORPHIC knowing/seeing [when > Picasso > >> >> paints THAT PARTICULAR yellow shoe in a painting the SINGULARITY of > THAT > >> >> experience IS ?orphic? > >> >> > >> >> POETS and artists are ?biased? to privilege THIS WAY of knowing > >> [Peirce's > >> >> secondness as orphic and possibly orphaned] > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> HOWEVER, Umberto Eco suggests that this orphic ?knowing* is also > >> >> *indicative* [indexical] of further *interpreting* AND THIS TYPE of > >> >> *knowing* EX-TENDS Orphic knowing. [Peirce's tiredness] > >> >> > >> >> Now in Peirce's metaphysics THIS interpreting creating interpretants > >> also > >> >> is EXISTING as facts. > >> >> > >> >> Is this transforming orphic [what IS present] TO forming > *interpretants* > >> >> AS *something* that actually exists {through the interpreting > process} > >> >> INCLUDE memory but that IS NOT ALL. > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> IS creative imagining potentially existent? that goes BEYOND > memory? > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> I believe Umberto Eco?s question of a deeper knowing than > orphic/orphan > >> >> knowing *things-in-themselves* EX-tending BEYOND the orphic > >> [secondness] to > >> >> INCLUDE interpreting and forming actual *interpretants* [tiredness] > >> must be > >> >> considered within the memory process. > >> >> > >> >> This returns to *models* that are necessary but NOT ALL there *is*. > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> The *relation* between *orphic* knowing and *interpreting* knowing > >> seems a > >> >> KEY question [and may ex-tend back into metaphysics? > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> Larry > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> Sent from Windows Mail > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> From: Glassman, Michael > >> >> Sent: ?Saturday?, ?October? ?18?, ?2014 ?5?:?18? ?PM > >> >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> Hi Martin, > >> >> > >> >> That's a very interesting metaphor, but let me see if I can take it a > >> step > >> >> further. Basically you seem to be saying that Vygotsky is making a > >> >> mechanistic argument - I'm not talking about the more colloquial > >> expression > >> >> of mechanistic but the one that Pepper talks about in World > Hypothesis. > >> >> You are looking into the mirror and seeing the reflection of a > candle - > >> but > >> >> you are making the assumption that there must be a mechanism that is > >> >> causing the reflection of the candle. You cannot know this mechanism > >> >> itself - it is too difficult to reach - but you can build models that > >> bring > >> >> us closer to understanding. This I think is almost exactly how Pepper > >> >> discusses this root metaphor. Our goal as scientists is to find the > >> >> mediate description of the underlying mechanism. This > >> >> Pragmatists/Conextualists would say this is dualism - not the dualism > >> you > >> >> get from Formism where you depend on your mind to bring you closer > to a > >> >> known but unreachable ideal, but in the sense that there is this > >> mechanism > >> >> that exists that is somehow separate from and causing the reflection > in > >> the > >> >> mirror. So the Contextualist asks, if all you can see is what is in > the > >> >> mirror how do you know there is a mirror. That is the only > information > >> you > >> >> have and you have to base all interpretation of the world on that > >> >> information - to suggest you are looking at a reflection is an > >> assumption > >> >> based on a belief system that there must be causing what you are > >> seeing. I > >> >> think you are right, Vygotsky wants to assume the mirror, but in the > end > >> >> doesn't that suggest a dualism to his thinking. > >> >> > >> >> Michael > >> >> ________________________________________ > >> >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >> >> on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] > >> >> Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 6:38 PM > >> >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL > >> >> > >> >> Hi Michael, > >> >> > >> >> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. > >> Every > >> >> science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* > appearance. > >> One > >> >> of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a > burning > >> >> candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle > >> burning > >> >> behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study > that > >> >> second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the > >> mirror, > >> >> in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' > of a > >> >> second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. > >> >> > >> >> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those > of us > >> >> raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and > feelings > >> >> exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call > "the > >> >> mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain > how > >> that > >> >> appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal > >> >> thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because we > >> can > >> >> use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a > fibre > >> >> bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and > >> >> Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and > >> >> neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a > *folk* > >> >> psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try > to > >> >> make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own > >> >> psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot > >> study > >> >> the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, > however, > >> >> set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. > >> >> > >> >> Martin > >> >> > >> >> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael > >> >> wrote: > >> >> > >> >> > I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up > for > >> >> being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't > >> think > >> >> he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which I > >> think > >> >> you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what > >> develops > >> >> if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops > >> (remember > >> >> I am suggesting individual development here). > >> >> > >> >> > >> > >> > > From shirinvossoughi@gmail.com Tue Oct 21 09:38:33 2014 From: shirinvossoughi@gmail.com (Shirin Vossoughi) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 09:38:33 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Hi Martin, I would love to see that paper too. Thank you Shirin On Oct 21, 2014, at 8:57 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Hi Juan, Annalisa, > > The relationship between LSV and Marx is certainly something that we have discussed here on xmca. My own contribution includes a paper published a few years ago, which I would be happy to send to you: > > Packer, M. J. (2008). Is Vygotsky relevant? Vygotsky?s Marxist psychology. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 15(1), 8-31. > > Martin > > On Oct 21, 2014, at 10:27 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Hello Juan, >> >> I agree with you that one must understand Marxism to understand Vygotsky clearly. Darwin's theory too. My grasp upon these topics is tenuous and I would benefit to know more. >> >> In my past, it has been difficult to enjoy dispassionate conversations about Marxism in my circles without the distractions of how much I don't know about Marxism, or how much Marx didn't know about capitalism; neither position is helpful. Perhaps Marxism is a hot potato still. >> >> Certainly there are claims that even the Soviets did not understood Marxism properly and that that may be why Vygotsky had such a hard time. If Marxism has been so difficult a topic, why should it be different for us who have come late to the table? We do have the power of hindsight, but has this helped? >> >> For any thinker's work, it is highly relevant to understand the contemporary milieu in which that person worked. That is why I look to historical context to unlock Vygotsky's work, not just his texts. However, I find a political specter rises from the grave when discussing Marxism and kills all prospects before understanding can begin. It is perplexing. I wonder if it is why Vygotsky will remain elusive to us post-moderns. >> >> I wish I could read the Castorina & Baquero paper, but I cannot read Spanish very well. Would it be asking too much of you to list the relevant points made in that paper? I would very much be interested! >> >> Regards, >> >> Annalisa >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Juan Duarte >> Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:39 AM >> To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL >> >> I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- previously. >> But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit of analysis" >> in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and Engels method, as >> Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The historical >> meaning of the chrisis in psychology. >> There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the units of >> analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for me, at least- >> surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and preciselly >> about method, and very few comments about the fact he was marxist. To >> understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for example, the >> method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, unit of >> diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot be separated >> without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of though and >> language), for example. >> >> >> Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake this point >> of view. Andy, for example. >> >> Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. >> I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the marxism in LV (in >> spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo Baquero have >> worked through this line, in a very interesting work. >> Juan Duarte (Argentina). >> >> 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden : >> >>> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that >>> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be the >>> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. But it >>> seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by units >>> allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. If a >>> complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its analysis >>> is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis by units >>> allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis begins from a >>> concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, not the whole, >>> but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be seen as being >>> made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's method of >>> analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of >>> collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Oct 21 10:04:11 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 17:04:11 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net>, <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Actually, Juan, I have a paper in press written in Spanish with a student of mine. It only touches on the connection with Marx, but it might be of interest. Duque Serna, M. P., & Packer, M. J. Pensamiento y Lenguaje, y el proyecto de Vygotsky para resolver la crisis de la psicolog?a. Tesis Psicologica, in press. Martin On Oct 21, 2014, at 10:57 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Hi Juan, Annalisa, > > The relationship between LSV and Marx is certainly something that we have discussed here on xmca. My own contribution includes a paper published a few years ago, which I would be happy to send to you: > > Packer, M. J. (2008). Is Vygotsky relevant? Vygotsky?s Marxist psychology. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 15(1), 8-31. > > Martin > > On Oct 21, 2014, at 10:27 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Hello Juan, >> >> I agree with you that one must understand Marxism to understand Vygotsky clearly. Darwin's theory too. My grasp upon these topics is tenuous and I would benefit to know more. >> >> In my past, it has been difficult to enjoy dispassionate conversations about Marxism in my circles without the distractions of how much I don't know about Marxism, or how much Marx didn't know about capitalism; neither position is helpful. Perhaps Marxism is a hot potato still. >> >> Certainly there are claims that even the Soviets did not understood Marxism properly and that that may be why Vygotsky had such a hard time. If Marxism has been so difficult a topic, why should it be different for us who have come late to the table? We do have the power of hindsight, but has this helped? >> >> For any thinker's work, it is highly relevant to understand the contemporary milieu in which that person worked. That is why I look to historical context to unlock Vygotsky's work, not just his texts. However, I find a political specter rises from the grave when discussing Marxism and kills all prospects before understanding can begin. It is perplexing. I wonder if it is why Vygotsky will remain elusive to us post-moderns. >> >> I wish I could read the Castorina & Baquero paper, but I cannot read Spanish very well. Would it be asking too much of you to list the relevant points made in that paper? I would very much be interested! >> >> Regards, >> >> Annalisa >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Juan Duarte >> Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:39 AM >> To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL >> >> I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- previously. >> But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit of analysis" >> in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and Engels method, as >> Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The historical >> meaning of the chrisis in psychology. >> There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the units of >> analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for me, at least- >> surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and preciselly >> about method, and very few comments about the fact he was marxist. To >> understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for example, the >> method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, unit of >> diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot be separated >> without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of though and >> language), for example. >> >> >> Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake this point >> of view. Andy, for example. >> >> Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. >> I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the marxism in LV (in >> spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo Baquero have >> worked through this line, in a very interesting work. >> Juan Duarte (Argentina). >> >> 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden : >> >>> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that >>> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be the >>> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. But it >>> seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by units >>> allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. If a >>> complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its analysis >>> is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis by units >>> allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis begins from a >>> concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, not the whole, >>> but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be seen as being >>> made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's method of >>> analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of >>> collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Oct 21 11:14:13 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 18:14:13 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net>, <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu>, <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu> Hello! Thanks for directing my attention to your paper. I've downloaded it accordingly. I apologize to the list if as a newcomer I am contributing to any tiresome redundancy; I am not clear whether there is a way to search the list archives or not. Best, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 9:57 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL Hi Juan, Annalisa, The relationship between LSV and Marx is certainly something that we have discussed here on xmca. My own contribution includes a paper published a few years ago, which I would be happy to send to you: Packer, M. J. (2008). Is Vygotsky relevant? Vygotsky?s Marxist psychology. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 15(1), 8-31. Martin On Oct 21, 2014, at 10:27 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello Juan, > > I agree with you that one must understand Marxism to understand Vygotsky clearly. Darwin's theory too. My grasp upon these topics is tenuous and I would benefit to know more. > > In my past, it has been difficult to enjoy dispassionate conversations about Marxism in my circles without the distractions of how much I don't know about Marxism, or how much Marx didn't know about capitalism; neither position is helpful. Perhaps Marxism is a hot potato still. > > Certainly there are claims that even the Soviets did not understood Marxism properly and that that may be why Vygotsky had such a hard time. If Marxism has been so difficult a topic, why should it be different for us who have come late to the table? We do have the power of hindsight, but has this helped? > > For any thinker's work, it is highly relevant to understand the contemporary milieu in which that person worked. That is why I look to historical context to unlock Vygotsky's work, not just his texts. However, I find a political specter rises from the grave when discussing Marxism and kills all prospects before understanding can begin. It is perplexing. I wonder if it is why Vygotsky will remain elusive to us post-moderns. > > I wish I could read the Castorina & Baquero paper, but I cannot read Spanish very well. Would it be asking too much of you to list the relevant points made in that paper? I would very much be interested! > > Regards, > > Annalisa > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Juan Duarte > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:39 AM > To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- previously. > But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit of analysis" > in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and Engels method, as > Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The historical > meaning of the chrisis in psychology. > There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the units of > analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for me, at least- > surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and preciselly > about method, and very few comments about the fact he was marxist. To > understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for example, the > method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, unit of > diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot be separated > without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of though and > language), for example. > > > Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake this point > of view. Andy, for example. > > Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. > I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the marxism in LV (in > spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo Baquero have > worked through this line, in a very interesting work. > Juan Duarte (Argentina). > > 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden : > >> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that >> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be the >> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. But it >> seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by units >> allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. If a >> complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its analysis >> is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis by units >> allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis begins from a >> concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, not the whole, >> but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be seen as being >> made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's method of >> analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of >> collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Oct 21 11:37:38 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 11:37:38 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu> Message-ID: Hi Annalisa, Juan Et al At the home page of Lchc, Lchc at ucsd dot edu, there is a local Google search of the site. I just googled Marx unit of analysis and there appear to be a lot of useful entries. Often that is a good place to start with most of our topics. For reasons I do not understand, people seem to have a hard time remembering that the archives are so easy to access! Maybe we need a banner or something as a reminder? Suggestions for greater user friendliness welcome always. Mike On Tuesday, October 21, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello! > > Thanks for directing my attention to your paper. I've downloaded it > accordingly. > > I apologize to the list if as a newcomer I am contributing to any tiresome > redundancy; I am not clear whether there is a way to search the list > archives or not. > > Best, > > Annalisa > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John > Packer > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 9:57 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > Hi Juan, Annalisa, > > The relationship between LSV and Marx is certainly something that we have > discussed here on xmca. My own contribution includes a paper published a > few years ago, which I would be happy to send to you: > > Packer, M. J. (2008). Is Vygotsky relevant? Vygotsky?s Marxist psychology. > Mind, Culture, and Activity, 15(1), 8-31. > > Martin > > On Oct 21, 2014, at 10:27 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > Hello Juan, > > > > I agree with you that one must understand Marxism to understand Vygotsky > clearly. Darwin's theory too. My grasp upon these topics is tenuous and I > would benefit to know more. > > > > In my past, it has been difficult to enjoy dispassionate conversations > about Marxism in my circles without the distractions of how much I don't > know about Marxism, or how much Marx didn't know about capitalism; neither > position is helpful. Perhaps Marxism is a hot potato still. > > > > Certainly there are claims that even the Soviets did not understood > Marxism properly and that that may be why Vygotsky had such a hard time. If > Marxism has been so difficult a topic, why should it be different for us > who have come late to the table? We do have the power of hindsight, but has > this helped? > > > > For any thinker's work, it is highly relevant to understand the > contemporary milieu in which that person worked. That is why I look to > historical context to unlock Vygotsky's work, not just his texts. However, > I find a political specter rises from the grave when discussing Marxism and > kills all prospects before understanding can begin. It is perplexing. I > wonder if it is why Vygotsky will remain elusive to us post-moderns. > > > > I wish I could read the Castorina & Baquero paper, but I cannot read > Spanish very well. Would it be asking too much of you to list the relevant > points made in that paper? I would very much be interested! > > > > Regards, > > > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Juan Duarte < > juanma.duarte@gmail.com > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:39 AM > > To: ablunden@mira.net ; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- previously. > > But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit of > analysis" > > in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and Engels method, > as > > Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The historical > > meaning of the chrisis in psychology. > > There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the units of > > analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for me, at > least- > > surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and preciselly > > about method, and very few comments about the fact he was marxist. To > > understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for example, the > > method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, unit of > > diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot be > separated > > without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of though and > > language), for example. > > > > > > Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake this point > > of view. Andy, for example. > > > > Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. > > I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the marxism in LV > (in > > spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo Baquero have > > worked through this line, in a very interesting work. > > Juan Duarte (Argentina). > > > > 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden >: > > > >> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that > >> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be the > >> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. But > it > >> seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by > units > >> allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. If a > >> complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its > analysis > >> is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis by units > >> allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis begins from a > >> concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, not the > whole, > >> but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be seen as > being > >> made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's method of > >> analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of > >> collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Oct 21 11:43:22 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 19:43:22 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu> Message-ID: On 21 October 2014 19:14, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello! > > Thanks for directing my attention to your paper. I've downloaded it > accordingly. > > I apologize to the list if as a newcomer I am contributing to any tiresome > redundancy; I am not clear whether there is a way to search the list > archives or not. > > This is one way to search, Annalisa: http://bit.ly/1pxNClw Best, Huw > Best, > > Annalisa > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John Packer > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 9:57 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > Hi Juan, Annalisa, > > The relationship between LSV and Marx is certainly something that we have > discussed here on xmca. My own contribution includes a paper published a > few years ago, which I would be happy to send to you: > > Packer, M. J. (2008). Is Vygotsky relevant? Vygotsky?s Marxist psychology. > Mind, Culture, and Activity, 15(1), 8-31. > > Martin > > On Oct 21, 2014, at 10:27 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > Hello Juan, > > > > I agree with you that one must understand Marxism to understand Vygotsky > clearly. Darwin's theory too. My grasp upon these topics is tenuous and I > would benefit to know more. > > > > In my past, it has been difficult to enjoy dispassionate conversations > about Marxism in my circles without the distractions of how much I don't > know about Marxism, or how much Marx didn't know about capitalism; neither > position is helpful. Perhaps Marxism is a hot potato still. > > > > Certainly there are claims that even the Soviets did not understood > Marxism properly and that that may be why Vygotsky had such a hard time. If > Marxism has been so difficult a topic, why should it be different for us > who have come late to the table? We do have the power of hindsight, but has > this helped? > > > > For any thinker's work, it is highly relevant to understand the > contemporary milieu in which that person worked. That is why I look to > historical context to unlock Vygotsky's work, not just his texts. However, > I find a political specter rises from the grave when discussing Marxism and > kills all prospects before understanding can begin. It is perplexing. I > wonder if it is why Vygotsky will remain elusive to us post-moderns. > > > > I wish I could read the Castorina & Baquero paper, but I cannot read > Spanish very well. Would it be asking too much of you to list the relevant > points made in that paper? I would very much be interested! > > > > Regards, > > > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Juan Duarte > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:39 AM > > To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- previously. > > But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit of > analysis" > > in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and Engels method, > as > > Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The historical > > meaning of the chrisis in psychology. > > There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the units of > > analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for me, at > least- > > surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and preciselly > > about method, and very few comments about the fact he was marxist. To > > understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for example, the > > method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, unit of > > diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot be > separated > > without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of though and > > language), for example. > > > > > > Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake this point > > of view. Andy, for example. > > > > Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. > > I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the marxism in LV > (in > > spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo Baquero have > > worked through this line, in a very interesting work. > > Juan Duarte (Argentina). > > > > 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden : > > > >> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that > >> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be the > >> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. But > it > >> seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by > units > >> allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. If a > >> complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its > analysis > >> is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis by units > >> allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis begins from a > >> concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, not the > whole, > >> but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be seen as > being > >> made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's method of > >> analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of > >> collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > From goncu@uic.edu Tue Oct 21 08:24:38 2014 From: goncu@uic.edu (Goncu, Artin) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 10:24:38 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Introducing the new MCA article for discussion Message-ID: Dear All, We are writing to let you know that the most recent issue of MCA is out. One of the articles published in this issue and being introduced here for discussion in referenced below. The authors of the article have kindly agreed to lead the discussion, and they are on xmca with us now. The free access to the article is possible through the links below. We are looking forward to hearing from you all. Best, ag Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics Practices Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen Wohlwend www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762#.VEZ25Ra_4wI Artin Goncu, Ph.D Co-editor, Mind, Culture, and Activity:An International Journal Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois at Chicago College of Education M/C 147 1040 W. Harrison St. Chicago, IL 60607 From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Oct 21 13:59:33 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 20:59:33 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1413925173607.6843@unm.edu> ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Huw Lloyd Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 12:43 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL This is one way to search, Annalisa: http://bit.ly/1pxNClw Best, Huw Hi Huw, What is the link? I see it is a bit.ly link but that doesn't tell me anything, and I like to know somewhat where I'm going before I click. :) Thanks, Annalisa > Best, > > Annalisa > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John Packer > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 9:57 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > Hi Juan, Annalisa, > > The relationship between LSV and Marx is certainly something that we have > discussed here on xmca. My own contribution includes a paper published a > few years ago, which I would be happy to send to you: > > Packer, M. J. (2008). Is Vygotsky relevant? Vygotsky?s Marxist psychology. > Mind, Culture, and Activity, 15(1), 8-31. > > Martin > > On Oct 21, 2014, at 10:27 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > Hello Juan, > > > > I agree with you that one must understand Marxism to understand Vygotsky > clearly. Darwin's theory too. My grasp upon these topics is tenuous and I > would benefit to know more. > > > > In my past, it has been difficult to enjoy dispassionate conversations > about Marxism in my circles without the distractions of how much I don't > know about Marxism, or how much Marx didn't know about capitalism; neither > position is helpful. Perhaps Marxism is a hot potato still. > > > > Certainly there are claims that even the Soviets did not understood > Marxism properly and that that may be why Vygotsky had such a hard time. If > Marxism has been so difficult a topic, why should it be different for us > who have come late to the table? We do have the power of hindsight, but has > this helped? > > > > For any thinker's work, it is highly relevant to understand the > contemporary milieu in which that person worked. That is why I look to > historical context to unlock Vygotsky's work, not just his texts. However, > I find a political specter rises from the grave when discussing Marxism and > kills all prospects before understanding can begin. It is perplexing. I > wonder if it is why Vygotsky will remain elusive to us post-moderns. > > > > I wish I could read the Castorina & Baquero paper, but I cannot read > Spanish very well. Would it be asking too much of you to list the relevant > points made in that paper? I would very much be interested! > > > > Regards, > > > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Juan Duarte > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:39 AM > > To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- previously. > > But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit of > analysis" > > in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and Engels method, > as > > Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The historical > > meaning of the chrisis in psychology. > > There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the units of > > analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for me, at > least- > > surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and preciselly > > about method, and very few comments about the fact he was marxist. To > > understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for example, the > > method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, unit of > > diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot be > separated > > without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of though and > > language), for example. > > > > > > Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake this point > > of view. Andy, for example. > > > > Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. > > I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the marxism in LV > (in > > spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo Baquero have > > worked through this line, in a very interesting work. > > Juan Duarte (Argentina). > > > > 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden : > > > >> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that > >> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be the > >> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. But > it > >> seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by > units > >> allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. If a > >> complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its > analysis > >> is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis by units > >> allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis begins from a > >> concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, not the > whole, > >> but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be seen as > being > >> made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's method of > >> analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of > >> collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > From goncu@uic.edu Tue Oct 21 14:09:36 2014 From: goncu@uic.edu (Goncu, Artin) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 16:09:36 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Introducing the new MCA article for discussion In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> Message-ID: <39089ddf0ba265a30feb7854f07324c1.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> Dear All, We are writing to let you know that the most recent issue of MCA is out. One of the articles published in this issue and being introduced here for discussion in referenced below. The authors of the article have kindly agreed to lead the discussion, and they are on xmca with us now. The free access to the article is possible through the links below. We are looking forward to hearing from you all. Best, ag Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics Practices Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen Wohlwend www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762#.VEZ25Ra_4wI Artin Goncu, Ph.D Co-editor, Mind, Culture, and Activity:An International Journal Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois at Chicago College of Education M/C 147 1040 W. Harrison St. Chicago, IL 60607 From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Oct 21 15:01:08 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 23:01:08 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <1413925173607.6843@unm.edu> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu> <1413925173607.6843@unm.edu> Message-ID: Ah, quite true. http://lmgtfy.com/?q=site:lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/mail+Marx+and+Vygotsky I am showing you this way so that you see how to write "site:" in the search, which you can then apply to many sites. If I sent you the google link it wouldn't be so clear. Best, Huw On 21 October 2014 21:59, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Huw Lloyd > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 12:43 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > This is one way to search, Annalisa: http://bit.ly/1pxNClw > > Best, > Huw > > Hi Huw, > > What is the link? I see it is a bit.ly link but that doesn't tell me > anything, and I like to know somewhat where I'm going before I click. :) > > Thanks, > > Annalisa > > > > Best, > > > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Martin John Packer > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 9:57 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > Hi Juan, Annalisa, > > > > The relationship between LSV and Marx is certainly something that we have > > discussed here on xmca. My own contribution includes a paper published a > > few years ago, which I would be happy to send to you: > > > > Packer, M. J. (2008). Is Vygotsky relevant? Vygotsky?s Marxist > psychology. > > Mind, Culture, and Activity, 15(1), 8-31. > > > > Martin > > > > On Oct 21, 2014, at 10:27 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > > Hello Juan, > > > > > > I agree with you that one must understand Marxism to understand > Vygotsky > > clearly. Darwin's theory too. My grasp upon these topics is tenuous and I > > would benefit to know more. > > > > > > In my past, it has been difficult to enjoy dispassionate conversations > > about Marxism in my circles without the distractions of how much I don't > > know about Marxism, or how much Marx didn't know about capitalism; > neither > > position is helpful. Perhaps Marxism is a hot potato still. > > > > > > Certainly there are claims that even the Soviets did not understood > > Marxism properly and that that may be why Vygotsky had such a hard time. > If > > Marxism has been so difficult a topic, why should it be different for us > > who have come late to the table? We do have the power of hindsight, but > has > > this helped? > > > > > > For any thinker's work, it is highly relevant to understand the > > contemporary milieu in which that person worked. That is why I look to > > historical context to unlock Vygotsky's work, not just his texts. > However, > > I find a political specter rises from the grave when discussing Marxism > and > > kills all prospects before understanding can begin. It is perplexing. I > > wonder if it is why Vygotsky will remain elusive to us post-moderns. > > > > > > I wish I could read the Castorina & Baquero paper, but I cannot read > > Spanish very well. Would it be asking too much of you to list the > relevant > > points made in that paper? I would very much be interested! > > > > > > Regards, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > on behalf of Juan Duarte > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:39 AM > > > To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > > > I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- > previously. > > > But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit of > > analysis" > > > in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and Engels > method, > > as > > > Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The historical > > > meaning of the chrisis in psychology. > > > There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the units of > > > analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for me, at > > least- > > > surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and > preciselly > > > about method, and very few comments about the fact he was marxist. To > > > understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for example, > the > > > method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, unit of > > > diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot be > > separated > > > without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of though and > > > language), for example. > > > > > > > > > Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake this > point > > > of view. Andy, for example. > > > > > > Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. > > > I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the marxism in LV > > (in > > > spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo Baquero have > > > worked through this line, in a very interesting work. > > > Juan Duarte (Argentina). > > > > > > 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden : > > > > > >> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that > > >> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be > the > > >> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. > But > > it > > >> seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by > > units > > >> allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. If > a > > >> complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its > > analysis > > >> is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis by > units > > >> allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis begins > from a > > >> concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, not the > > whole, > > >> but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be seen as > > being > > >> made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's method of > > >> analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of > > >> collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> > > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Oct 21 15:10:48 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 22:10:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu> <1413925173607.6843@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1413929448815.70870@unm.edu> Thank you for the "site:" tip. I have so many things to discover now! Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Huw Lloyd Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 4:01 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL Ah, quite true. http://lmgtfy.com/?q=site:lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/mail+Marx+and+Vygotsky I am showing you this way so that you see how to write "site:" in the search, which you can then apply to many sites. If I sent you the google link it wouldn't be so clear. Best, Huw From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Oct 21 14:28:10 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 21:28:10 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1413926889885.97463@unm.edu> Hello Mike, Thank you for the heads up. I suppose when the search field is out of sight it's out of site. :) _An idea_: How about a newcomer's page indicating list posting preferences? Every list is its own culture and list cultures are tricky to gauge sometimes for an outsider. I could write a lot about this as I've thought about it a lot, but perhaps I shouldn't do that here or now, anyway. _Another idea_: Are there "Famous Conversations" that seem to embody the most meaning of exchange within the community? Ones that are memorable? Perhaps even a "Hall of Fame"? That would be grand to read and to learn. I would be willing to help collect that material together alongside an list elder, if that is a worthwhile offer. _Third idea_: there could be trigger search links for keywords, such as "unit of analysis," for example. These could be inserted on the vocabulary page, which unfortunately I cannot find from the XCMA homepage even though I know the page exists somewhere. _A last, but fluffy idea_: is it possible to post emoji's here? Or is that too trendy and unsophisticated? Is anyone groaning just about now...? I hope these are useful offerings! Regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 12:37 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL Hi Annalisa, Juan Et al At the home page of Lchc, Lchc at ucsd dot edu, there is a local Google search of the site. I just googled Marx unit of analysis and there appear to be a lot of useful entries. Often that is a good place to start with most of our topics. For reasons I do not understand, people seem to have a hard time remembering that the archives are so easy to access! Maybe we need a banner or something as a reminder? Suggestions for greater user friendliness welcome always. Mike On Tuesday, October 21, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello! > > Thanks for directing my attention to your paper. I've downloaded it > accordingly. > > I apologize to the list if as a newcomer I am contributing to any tiresome > redundancy; I am not clear whether there is a way to search the list > archives or not. > > Best, > > Annalisa > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John > Packer > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 9:57 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > Hi Juan, Annalisa, > > The relationship between LSV and Marx is certainly something that we have > discussed here on xmca. My own contribution includes a paper published a > few years ago, which I would be happy to send to you: > > Packer, M. J. (2008). Is Vygotsky relevant? Vygotsky?s Marxist psychology. > Mind, Culture, and Activity, 15(1), 8-31. > > Martin > > On Oct 21, 2014, at 10:27 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > Hello Juan, > > > > I agree with you that one must understand Marxism to understand Vygotsky > clearly. Darwin's theory too. My grasp upon these topics is tenuous and I > would benefit to know more. > > > > In my past, it has been difficult to enjoy dispassionate conversations > about Marxism in my circles without the distractions of how much I don't > know about Marxism, or how much Marx didn't know about capitalism; neither > position is helpful. Perhaps Marxism is a hot potato still. > > > > Certainly there are claims that even the Soviets did not understood > Marxism properly and that that may be why Vygotsky had such a hard time. If > Marxism has been so difficult a topic, why should it be different for us > who have come late to the table? We do have the power of hindsight, but has > this helped? > > > > For any thinker's work, it is highly relevant to understand the > contemporary milieu in which that person worked. That is why I look to > historical context to unlock Vygotsky's work, not just his texts. However, > I find a political specter rises from the grave when discussing Marxism and > kills all prospects before understanding can begin. It is perplexing. I > wonder if it is why Vygotsky will remain elusive to us post-moderns. > > > > I wish I could read the Castorina & Baquero paper, but I cannot read > Spanish very well. Would it be asking too much of you to list the relevant > points made in that paper? I would very much be interested! > > > > Regards, > > > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Juan Duarte < > juanma.duarte@gmail.com > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:39 AM > > To: ablunden@mira.net ; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- previously. > > But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit of > analysis" > > in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and Engels method, > as > > Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The historical > > meaning of the chrisis in psychology. > > There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the units of > > analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for me, at > least- > > surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and preciselly > > about method, and very few comments about the fact he was marxist. To > > understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for example, the > > method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, unit of > > diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot be > separated > > without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of though and > > language), for example. > > > > > > Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake this point > > of view. Andy, for example. > > > > Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. > > I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the marxism in LV > (in > > spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo Baquero have > > worked through this line, in a very interesting work. > > Juan Duarte (Argentina). > > > > 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden >: > > > >> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that > >> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be the > >> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. But > it > >> seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by > units > >> allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. If a > >> complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its > analysis > >> is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis by units > >> allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis begins from a > >> concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, not the > whole, > >> but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be seen as > being > >> made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's method of > >> analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of > >> collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Oct 21 15:23:24 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (Henry G. Shonerd III) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 16:23:24 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu> <1413925173607.6843@unm.edu> Message-ID: <76EF03BB-F2FC-4229-9DCA-C388E33E6EB7@gmail.com> All, Like Annalisa, I consider myself a neophyte regarding Vygotsky and Marx, and only slightly more informed about Vygotsky "pure and simple". Ha! I found the following article through LCHC website a little while ago (thanks to Mike's encouragement to use the google tool on the website). A fairly short read, it confirmed things that I had suspected about Vygotsky in a Stalinist environment, though very little about Marx, especially dialectical materialism. Those in the XMCA chat that are steeped in the dialectic will probably find the article falls short, but does it look like a fair and accurate account of the context of Vygotsky's work and collaborations? Henry -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: LSV-bio.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 1890438 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141021/126cb2c6/attachment-0001.pdf -------------- next part -------------- On Oct 21, 2014, at 4:01 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Ah, quite true. > > http://lmgtfy.com/?q=site:lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/mail+Marx+and+Vygotsky > > I am showing you this way so that you see how to write "site:" in the > search, which you can then apply to many sites. If I sent you the google > link it wouldn't be so clear. > > Best, > Huw > > On 21 October 2014 21:59, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >> Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 12:43 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL >> >> This is one way to search, Annalisa: http://bit.ly/1pxNClw >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> Hi Huw, >> >> What is the link? I see it is a bit.ly link but that doesn't tell me >> anything, and I like to know somewhat where I'm going before I click. :) >> >> Thanks, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >>> Best, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> on behalf of Martin John Packer >>> Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 9:57 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL >>> >>> Hi Juan, Annalisa, >>> >>> The relationship between LSV and Marx is certainly something that we have >>> discussed here on xmca. My own contribution includes a paper published a >>> few years ago, which I would be happy to send to you: >>> >>> Packer, M. J. (2008). Is Vygotsky relevant? Vygotsky?s Marxist >> psychology. >>> Mind, Culture, and Activity, 15(1), 8-31. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 21, 2014, at 10:27 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>>> Hello Juan, >>>> >>>> I agree with you that one must understand Marxism to understand >> Vygotsky >>> clearly. Darwin's theory too. My grasp upon these topics is tenuous and I >>> would benefit to know more. >>>> >>>> In my past, it has been difficult to enjoy dispassionate conversations >>> about Marxism in my circles without the distractions of how much I don't >>> know about Marxism, or how much Marx didn't know about capitalism; >> neither >>> position is helpful. Perhaps Marxism is a hot potato still. >>>> >>>> Certainly there are claims that even the Soviets did not understood >>> Marxism properly and that that may be why Vygotsky had such a hard time. >> If >>> Marxism has been so difficult a topic, why should it be different for us >>> who have come late to the table? We do have the power of hindsight, but >> has >>> this helped? >>>> >>>> For any thinker's work, it is highly relevant to understand the >>> contemporary milieu in which that person worked. That is why I look to >>> historical context to unlock Vygotsky's work, not just his texts. >> However, >>> I find a political specter rises from the grave when discussing Marxism >> and >>> kills all prospects before understanding can begin. It is perplexing. I >>> wonder if it is why Vygotsky will remain elusive to us post-moderns. >>>> >>>> I wish I could read the Castorina & Baquero paper, but I cannot read >>> Spanish very well. Would it be asking too much of you to list the >> relevant >>> points made in that paper? I would very much be interested! >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >>> on behalf of Juan Duarte >>>> Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:39 AM >>>> To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL >>>> >>>> I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- >> previously. >>>> But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit of >>> analysis" >>>> in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and Engels >> method, >>> as >>>> Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The historical >>>> meaning of the chrisis in psychology. >>>> There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the units of >>>> analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for me, at >>> least- >>>> surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and >> preciselly >>>> about method, and very few comments about the fact he was marxist. To >>>> understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for example, >> the >>>> method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, unit of >>>> diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot be >>> separated >>>> without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of though and >>>> language), for example. >>>> >>>> >>>> Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake this >> point >>>> of view. Andy, for example. >>>> >>>> Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. >>>> I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the marxism in LV >>> (in >>>> spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo Baquero have >>>> worked through this line, in a very interesting work. >>>> Juan Duarte (Argentina). >>>> >>>> 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden : >>>> >>>>> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that >>>>> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be >> the >>>>> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. >> But >>> it >>>>> seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by >>> units >>>>> allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. If >> a >>>>> complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its >>> analysis >>>>> is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis by >> units >>>>> allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis begins >> from a >>>>> concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, not the >>> whole, >>>>> but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be seen as >>> being >>>>> made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's method of >>>>> analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of >>>>> collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Oct 21 15:29:59 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 15:29:59 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <1413926889885.97463@unm.edu> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu> <1413926889885.97463@unm.edu> Message-ID: I do not now about the emoji's, but the other ideas all seem to have merit. The question is, who will do the work? Having begun 30 years ago, the list has a certain fusty old structure and set of practices. When we started, the big new thing was a 300 baud modem. It would be great if we had a small volunteer assistance committee to implement facilitating ideas. But one retiring (as in shy) old guy is not going to get it done(!). I could facilitate if there were helping hands/minds. For now, reverting the what is available at LCHC dot ucsd dot edu (which is a lot!), the XMCA data base there which includes a lot of classic materials, and relying on the willingness of others to help (for example, Martin's 2008 article, which I had forgotten, is a good source) will have to do. If you do not have access to articles suggested, ask if someone else does. With 800+ people getting this discussion, someone is likely to have just what you want. mike On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 2:28 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello Mike, > > Thank you for the heads up. I suppose when the search field is out of > sight it's out of site. :) > > _An idea_: How about a newcomer's page indicating list posting > preferences? Every list is its own culture and list cultures are tricky to > gauge sometimes for an outsider. I could write a lot about this as I've > thought about it a lot, but perhaps I shouldn't do that here or now, anyway. > > _Another idea_: Are there "Famous Conversations" that seem to embody the > most meaning of exchange within the community? Ones that are memorable? > Perhaps even a "Hall of Fame"? That would be grand to read and to learn. I > would be willing to help collect that material together alongside an list > elder, if that is a worthwhile offer. > > _Third idea_: there could be trigger search links for keywords, such as > "unit of analysis," for example. These could be inserted on the vocabulary > page, which unfortunately I cannot find from the XCMA homepage even though > I know the page exists somewhere. > > _A last, but fluffy idea_: is it possible to post emoji's here? Or is that > too trendy and unsophisticated? Is anyone groaning just about now...? > > I hope these are useful offerings! > > Regards, > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of mike cole > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 12:37 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > Hi Annalisa, Juan Et al > > At the home page of Lchc, Lchc at ucsd dot edu, there is a local Google > search of the site. I just googled Marx unit of analysis and there appear > to be a lot of useful entries. Often that is a good place to start with > most of our topics. > > For reasons I do not understand, people seem to have a hard time > remembering that the archives are so easy to access! Maybe we need a banner > or something as a reminder? Suggestions for greater user friendliness > welcome always. > Mike > On Tuesday, October 21, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > Hello! > > > > Thanks for directing my attention to your paper. I've downloaded it > > accordingly. > > > > I apologize to the list if as a newcomer I am contributing to any > tiresome > > redundancy; I am not clear whether there is a way to search the list > > archives or not. > > > > Best, > > > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John > > Packer > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 9:57 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > Hi Juan, Annalisa, > > > > The relationship between LSV and Marx is certainly something that we have > > discussed here on xmca. My own contribution includes a paper published a > > few years ago, which I would be happy to send to you: > > > > Packer, M. J. (2008). Is Vygotsky relevant? Vygotsky?s Marxist > psychology. > > Mind, Culture, and Activity, 15(1), 8-31. > > > > Martin > > > > On Oct 21, 2014, at 10:27 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: > > > > > Hello Juan, > > > > > > I agree with you that one must understand Marxism to understand > Vygotsky > > clearly. Darwin's theory too. My grasp upon these topics is tenuous and I > > would benefit to know more. > > > > > > In my past, it has been difficult to enjoy dispassionate conversations > > about Marxism in my circles without the distractions of how much I don't > > know about Marxism, or how much Marx didn't know about capitalism; > neither > > position is helpful. Perhaps Marxism is a hot potato still. > > > > > > Certainly there are claims that even the Soviets did not understood > > Marxism properly and that that may be why Vygotsky had such a hard time. > If > > Marxism has been so difficult a topic, why should it be different for us > > who have come late to the table? We do have the power of hindsight, but > has > > this helped? > > > > > > For any thinker's work, it is highly relevant to understand the > > contemporary milieu in which that person worked. That is why I look to > > historical context to unlock Vygotsky's work, not just his texts. > However, > > I find a political specter rises from the grave when discussing Marxism > and > > kills all prospects before understanding can begin. It is perplexing. I > > wonder if it is why Vygotsky will remain elusive to us post-moderns. > > > > > > I wish I could read the Castorina & Baquero paper, but I cannot read > > Spanish very well. Would it be asking too much of you to list the > relevant > > points made in that paper? I would very much be interested! > > > > > > Regards, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Juan > Duarte < > > juanma.duarte@gmail.com > > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:39 AM > > > To: ablunden@mira.net ; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > > > I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- > previously. > > > But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit of > > analysis" > > > in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and Engels > method, > > as > > > Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The historical > > > meaning of the chrisis in psychology. > > > There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the units of > > > analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for me, at > > least- > > > surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and > preciselly > > > about method, and very few comments about the fact he was marxist. To > > > understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for example, > the > > > method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, unit of > > > diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot be > > separated > > > without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of though and > > > language), for example. > > > > > > > > > Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake this > point > > > of view. Andy, for example. > > > > > > Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. > > > I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the marxism in LV > > (in > > > spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo Baquero have > > > worked through this line, in a very interesting work. > > > Juan Duarte (Argentina). > > > > > > 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden > >: > > > > > >> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that > > >> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be > the > > >> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. > But > > it > > >> seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by > > units > > >> allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. If > a > > >> complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its > > analysis > > >> is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis by > units > > >> allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis begins > from a > > >> concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, not the > > whole, > > >> but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be seen as > > being > > >> made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's method of > > >> analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of > > >> collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> > > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Oct 21 15:31:25 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 15:31:25 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <76EF03BB-F2FC-4229-9DCA-C388E33E6EB7@gmail.com> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu> <1413925173607.6843@unm.edu> <76EF03BB-F2FC-4229-9DCA-C388E33E6EB7@gmail.com> Message-ID: Thanks Henry-- You are illustrating exactly the point I was making to Annalisa when your message popped up. mike On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 3:23 PM, Henry G. Shonerd III wrote: > All, > Like Annalisa, I consider myself a neophyte regarding Vygotsky and Marx, > and only slightly more informed about Vygotsky "pure and simple". Ha! I > found the following article through LCHC website a little while ago (thanks > to Mike's encouragement to use the google tool on the website). A fairly > short read, it confirmed things that I had suspected about Vygotsky in a > Stalinist environment, though very little about Marx, especially > dialectical materialism. Those in the XMCA chat that are steeped in the > dialectic will probably find the article falls short, but does it look like > a fair and accurate account of the context of Vygotsky's work and > collaborations? > Henry > > > > > > On Oct 21, 2014, at 4:01 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > Ah, quite true. > > > > http://lmgtfy.com/?q=site:lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/mail+Marx+and+Vygotsky > > > > I am showing you this way so that you see how to write "site:" in the > > search, which you can then apply to many sites. If I sent you the google > > link it wouldn't be so clear. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > On 21 October 2014 21:59, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > >> > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> on behalf of Huw Lloyd > >> Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 12:43 PM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > >> > >> This is one way to search, Annalisa: http://bit.ly/1pxNClw > >> > >> Best, > >> Huw > >> > >> Hi Huw, > >> > >> What is the link? I see it is a bit.ly link but that doesn't tell me > >> anything, and I like to know somewhat where I'm going before I click. :) > >> > >> Thanks, > >> > >> Annalisa > >> > >> > >>> Best, > >>> > >>> Annalisa > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >>> on behalf of Martin John Packer > >>> Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 9:57 AM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > >>> > >>> Hi Juan, Annalisa, > >>> > >>> The relationship between LSV and Marx is certainly something that we > have > >>> discussed here on xmca. My own contribution includes a paper > published a > >>> few years ago, which I would be happy to send to you: > >>> > >>> Packer, M. J. (2008). Is Vygotsky relevant? Vygotsky?s Marxist > >> psychology. > >>> Mind, Culture, and Activity, 15(1), 8-31. > >>> > >>> Martin > >>> > >>> On Oct 21, 2014, at 10:27 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > >>> > >>>> Hello Juan, > >>>> > >>>> I agree with you that one must understand Marxism to understand > >> Vygotsky > >>> clearly. Darwin's theory too. My grasp upon these topics is tenuous > and I > >>> would benefit to know more. > >>>> > >>>> In my past, it has been difficult to enjoy dispassionate conversations > >>> about Marxism in my circles without the distractions of how much I > don't > >>> know about Marxism, or how much Marx didn't know about capitalism; > >> neither > >>> position is helpful. Perhaps Marxism is a hot potato still. > >>>> > >>>> Certainly there are claims that even the Soviets did not understood > >>> Marxism properly and that that may be why Vygotsky had such a hard > time. > >> If > >>> Marxism has been so difficult a topic, why should it be different for > us > >>> who have come late to the table? We do have the power of hindsight, but > >> has > >>> this helped? > >>>> > >>>> For any thinker's work, it is highly relevant to understand the > >>> contemporary milieu in which that person worked. That is why I look to > >>> historical context to unlock Vygotsky's work, not just his texts. > >> However, > >>> I find a political specter rises from the grave when discussing Marxism > >> and > >>> kills all prospects before understanding can begin. It is perplexing. I > >>> wonder if it is why Vygotsky will remain elusive to us post-moderns. > >>>> > >>>> I wish I could read the Castorina & Baquero paper, but I cannot read > >>> Spanish very well. Would it be asking too much of you to list the > >> relevant > >>> points made in that paper? I would very much be interested! > >>>> > >>>> Regards, > >>>> > >>>> Annalisa > >>>> ________________________________________ > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>> > >>> on behalf of Juan Duarte > >>>> Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:39 AM > >>>> To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > >>>> > >>>> I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- > >> previously. > >>>> But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit of > >>> analysis" > >>>> in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and Engels > >> method, > >>> as > >>>> Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The historical > >>>> meaning of the chrisis in psychology. > >>>> There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the units of > >>>> analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for me, at > >>> least- > >>>> surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and > >> preciselly > >>>> about method, and very few comments about the fact he was marxist. To > >>>> understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for example, > >> the > >>>> method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, unit of > >>>> diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot be > >>> separated > >>>> without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of though > and > >>>> language), for example. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake this > >> point > >>>> of view. Andy, for example. > >>>> > >>>> Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. > >>>> I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the marxism in > LV > >>> (in > >>>> spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo Baquero have > >>>> worked through this line, in a very interesting work. > >>>> Juan Duarte (Argentina). > >>>> > >>>> 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden : > >>>> > >>>>> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that > >>>>> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be > >> the > >>>>> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. > >> But > >>> it > >>>>> seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by > >>> units > >>>>> allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. If > >> a > >>>>> complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its > >>> analysis > >>>>> is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis by > >> units > >>>>> allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis begins > >> from a > >>>>> concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, not the > >>> whole, > >>>>> but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be seen as > >>> being > >>>>> made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's method of > >>>>> analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of > >>>>> collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. > >>>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>> > >>>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Oct 21 15:40:00 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 23:40:00 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <1413926889885.97463@unm.edu> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu> <1413926889885.97463@unm.edu> Message-ID: On 21 October 2014 22:28, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello Mike, > > Thank you for the heads up. I suppose when the search field is out of > sight it's out of site. :) > > _An idea_: How about a newcomer's page indicating list posting > preferences? Every list is its own culture and list cultures are tricky to > gauge sometimes for an outsider. I could write a lot about this as I've > thought about it a lot, but perhaps I shouldn't do that here or now, anyway. > > _Another idea_: Are there "Famous Conversations" that seem to embody the > most meaning of exchange within the community? Ones that are memorable? > Perhaps even a "Hall of Fame"? That would be grand to read and to learn. I > would be willing to help collect that material together alongside an list > elder, if that is a worthwhile offer. > > _Third idea_: there could be trigger search links for keywords, such as > "unit of analysis," for example. These could be inserted on the vocabulary > page, which unfortunately I cannot find from the XCMA homepage even though > I know the page exists somewhere. > > _A last, but fluffy idea_: is it possible to post emoji's here? Or is that > too trendy and unsophisticated? Is anyone groaning just about now...? > Personally, I would say it wasn't "fluffy" enough, Annalisa. Mental imagery seems to be the preferred currency. https://www.google.com/search?btnG=1&pws=0&q=site:lchc.ucsd.edu%2Fmca%2Fmail+%22mental+image%22 If you keep a list of terms, questions etc, then there are a number of ways these could get used. However, the challenge with a taxonomy here is that you won't get unanimity on the big and little pictures, so it helps to bring your theories with you and to challenge them along the way. Welcome. :) Huw > > I hope these are useful offerings! > > Regards, > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of mike cole > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 12:37 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > Hi Annalisa, Juan Et al > > At the home page of Lchc, Lchc at ucsd dot edu, there is a local Google > search of the site. I just googled Marx unit of analysis and there appear > to be a lot of useful entries. Often that is a good place to start with > most of our topics. > > For reasons I do not understand, people seem to have a hard time > remembering that the archives are so easy to access! Maybe we need a banner > or something as a reminder? Suggestions for greater user friendliness > welcome always. > Mike > On Tuesday, October 21, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > Hello! > > > > Thanks for directing my attention to your paper. I've downloaded it > > accordingly. > > > > I apologize to the list if as a newcomer I am contributing to any > tiresome > > redundancy; I am not clear whether there is a way to search the list > > archives or not. > > > > Best, > > > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John > > Packer > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 9:57 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > Hi Juan, Annalisa, > > > > The relationship between LSV and Marx is certainly something that we have > > discussed here on xmca. My own contribution includes a paper published a > > few years ago, which I would be happy to send to you: > > > > Packer, M. J. (2008). Is Vygotsky relevant? Vygotsky?s Marxist > psychology. > > Mind, Culture, and Activity, 15(1), 8-31. > > > > Martin > > > > On Oct 21, 2014, at 10:27 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: > > > > > Hello Juan, > > > > > > I agree with you that one must understand Marxism to understand > Vygotsky > > clearly. Darwin's theory too. My grasp upon these topics is tenuous and I > > would benefit to know more. > > > > > > In my past, it has been difficult to enjoy dispassionate conversations > > about Marxism in my circles without the distractions of how much I don't > > know about Marxism, or how much Marx didn't know about capitalism; > neither > > position is helpful. Perhaps Marxism is a hot potato still. > > > > > > Certainly there are claims that even the Soviets did not understood > > Marxism properly and that that may be why Vygotsky had such a hard time. > If > > Marxism has been so difficult a topic, why should it be different for us > > who have come late to the table? We do have the power of hindsight, but > has > > this helped? > > > > > > For any thinker's work, it is highly relevant to understand the > > contemporary milieu in which that person worked. That is why I look to > > historical context to unlock Vygotsky's work, not just his texts. > However, > > I find a political specter rises from the grave when discussing Marxism > and > > kills all prospects before understanding can begin. It is perplexing. I > > wonder if it is why Vygotsky will remain elusive to us post-moderns. > > > > > > I wish I could read the Castorina & Baquero paper, but I cannot read > > Spanish very well. Would it be asking too much of you to list the > relevant > > points made in that paper? I would very much be interested! > > > > > > Regards, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Juan > Duarte < > > juanma.duarte@gmail.com > > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:39 AM > > > To: ablunden@mira.net ; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > > > I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- > previously. > > > But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit of > > analysis" > > > in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and Engels > method, > > as > > > Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The historical > > > meaning of the chrisis in psychology. > > > There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the units of > > > analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for me, at > > least- > > > surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and > preciselly > > > about method, and very few comments about the fact he was marxist. To > > > understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for example, > the > > > method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, unit of > > > diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot be > > separated > > > without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of though and > > > language), for example. > > > > > > > > > Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake this > point > > > of view. Andy, for example. > > > > > > Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. > > > I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the marxism in LV > > (in > > > spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo Baquero have > > > worked through this line, in a very interesting work. > > > Juan Duarte (Argentina). > > > > > > 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden > >: > > > > > >> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that > > >> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be > the > > >> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. > But > > it > > >> seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by > > units > > >> allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. If > a > > >> complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its > > analysis > > >> is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis by > units > > >> allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis begins > from a > > >> concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, not the > > whole, > > >> but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be seen as > > being > > >> made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's method of > > >> analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of > > >> collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> > > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Oct 21 15:59:33 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 22:59:33 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: <76EF03BB-F2FC-4229-9DCA-C388E33E6EB7@gmail.com> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu> <1413925173607.6843@unm.edu> , <76EF03BB-F2FC-4229-9DCA-C388E33E6EB7@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1413932372928.37043@unm.edu> This is a great article, Henry! Thank you for posting it. I think I may have read it sometime ago, but I'm not certain from scanning quickly. What is most relevant for me is this quote by Luria on the first page: "My entire generation was infused with the energy of revolutionary change?the liberating energy people feel when they are part of a society that is able to make tremendous progress in a very short time." This spirit and energy of revolution seems to be forgotten in the posts I've read as of late. I hope I am not antagonizing anyone by saying that, but I only mean that the affect and care that was a part of the man himself was very important and shouldn't be divorced, in my estimation, from his intellect. Vygotsky was a remarkably caring individual and looked for the value within every person, no matter what that person's ability, as I understand. It is my view that one with a cold intellect is not as valuable to us as an individual who possesses equal parts of compassion and intellect and Vygotsky had plenty of both. In fact, I'd say the most intelligent people I have come to know have the largest hearts and the most sensitivity for the feelings of others. That is my informal and unsolicited hypothesis, or course :) Best, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Henry G. Shonerd III Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 4:23 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL All, Like Annalisa, I consider myself a neophyte regarding Vygotsky and Marx, and only slightly more informed about Vygotsky "pure and simple". Ha! I found the following article through LCHC website a little while ago (thanks to Mike's encouragement to use the google tool on the website). A fairly short read, it confirmed things that I had suspected about Vygotsky in a Stalinist environment, though very little about Marx, especially dialectical materialism. Those in the XMCA chat that are steeped in the dialectic will probably find the article falls short, but does it look like a fair and accurate account of the context of Vygotsky's work and collaborations? Henry From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Oct 21 16:08:32 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 23:08:32 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu> <1413926889885.97463@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1413932912362.72172@unm.edu> OK, nix the emoji's. :X As far as THE WORK, I would be willing to help, as offered earlier! 30 years at 300 baud is a very long time (tm). How would a project like this manifest, were it to manifest in the most IDEAL way? :) Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 4:29 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL I do not now about the emoji's, but the other ideas all seem to have merit. The question is, who will do the work? Having begun 30 years ago, the list has a certain fusty old structure and set of practices. When we started, the big new thing was a 300 baud modem. It would be great if we had a small volunteer assistance committee to implement facilitating ideas. But one retiring (as in shy) old guy is not going to get it done(!). I could facilitate if there were helping hands/minds. For now, reverting the what is available at LCHC dot ucsd dot edu (which is a lot!), the XMCA data base there which includes a lot of classic materials, and relying on the willingness of others to help (for example, Martin's 2008 article, which I had forgotten, is a good source) will have to do. If you do not have access to articles suggested, ask if someone else does. With 800+ people getting this discussion, someone is likely to have just what you want. mike On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 2:28 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello Mike, > > Thank you for the heads up. I suppose when the search field is out of > sight it's out of site. :) > > _An idea_: How about a newcomer's page indicating list posting > preferences? Every list is its own culture and list cultures are tricky to > gauge sometimes for an outsider. I could write a lot about this as I've > thought about it a lot, but perhaps I shouldn't do that here or now, anyway. > > _Another idea_: Are there "Famous Conversations" that seem to embody the > most meaning of exchange within the community? Ones that are memorable? > Perhaps even a "Hall of Fame"? That would be grand to read and to learn. I > would be willing to help collect that material together alongside an list > elder, if that is a worthwhile offer. > > _Third idea_: there could be trigger search links for keywords, such as > "unit of analysis," for example. These could be inserted on the vocabulary > page, which unfortunately I cannot find from the XCMA homepage even though > I know the page exists somewhere. > > _A last, but fluffy idea_: is it possible to post emoji's here? Or is that > too trendy and unsophisticated? Is anyone groaning just about now...? > > I hope these are useful offerings! > > Regards, > > Annalisa > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Oct 21 16:11:21 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 16:11:21 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu> <1413926889885.97463@unm.edu> Message-ID: No need for a taxonomy, Huw. We have long batted around the idea of a "key word" list. I think the current xmca facilities may make such an undertaking achievable.... if there are achievers around ready to achieve it! :-) mike On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 3:40 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > On 21 October 2014 22:28, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > Hello Mike, > > > > Thank you for the heads up. I suppose when the search field is out of > > sight it's out of site. :) > > > > _An idea_: How about a newcomer's page indicating list posting > > preferences? Every list is its own culture and list cultures are tricky > to > > gauge sometimes for an outsider. I could write a lot about this as I've > > thought about it a lot, but perhaps I shouldn't do that here or now, > anyway. > > > > _Another idea_: Are there "Famous Conversations" that seem to embody the > > most meaning of exchange within the community? Ones that are memorable? > > Perhaps even a "Hall of Fame"? That would be grand to read and to learn. > I > > would be willing to help collect that material together alongside an list > > elder, if that is a worthwhile offer. > > > > _Third idea_: there could be trigger search links for keywords, such as > > "unit of analysis," for example. These could be inserted on the > vocabulary > > page, which unfortunately I cannot find from the XCMA homepage even > though > > I know the page exists somewhere. > > > > _A last, but fluffy idea_: is it possible to post emoji's here? Or is > that > > too trendy and unsophisticated? Is anyone groaning just about now...? > > > > Personally, I would say it wasn't "fluffy" enough, Annalisa. Mental > imagery seems to be the preferred currency. > > > https://www.google.com/search?btnG=1&pws=0&q=site:lchc.ucsd.edu%2Fmca%2Fmail+%22mental+image%22 > > If you keep a list of terms, questions etc, then there are a number of ways > these could get used. However, the challenge with a taxonomy here is that > you won't get unanimity on the big and little pictures, so it helps to > bring your theories with you and to challenge them along the way. > > Welcome. :) > > Huw > > > > > > I hope these are useful offerings! > > > > Regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of mike cole > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 12:37 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > Hi Annalisa, Juan Et al > > > > At the home page of Lchc, Lchc at ucsd dot edu, there is a local Google > > search of the site. I just googled Marx unit of analysis and there appear > > to be a lot of useful entries. Often that is a good place to start with > > most of our topics. > > > > For reasons I do not understand, people seem to have a hard time > > remembering that the archives are so easy to access! Maybe we need a > banner > > or something as a reminder? Suggestions for greater user friendliness > > welcome always. > > Mike > > On Tuesday, October 21, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > > Hello! > > > > > > Thanks for directing my attention to your paper. I've downloaded it > > > accordingly. > > > > > > I apologize to the list if as a newcomer I am contributing to any > > tiresome > > > redundancy; I am not clear whether there is a way to search the list > > > archives or not. > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin > John > > > Packer > > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 9:57 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > > > Hi Juan, Annalisa, > > > > > > The relationship between LSV and Marx is certainly something that we > have > > > discussed here on xmca. My own contribution includes a paper > published a > > > few years ago, which I would be happy to send to you: > > > > > > Packer, M. J. (2008). Is Vygotsky relevant? Vygotsky?s Marxist > > psychology. > > > Mind, Culture, and Activity, 15(1), 8-31. > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > On Oct 21, 2014, at 10:27 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Hello Juan, > > > > > > > > I agree with you that one must understand Marxism to understand > > Vygotsky > > > clearly. Darwin's theory too. My grasp upon these topics is tenuous > and I > > > would benefit to know more. > > > > > > > > In my past, it has been difficult to enjoy dispassionate > conversations > > > about Marxism in my circles without the distractions of how much I > don't > > > know about Marxism, or how much Marx didn't know about capitalism; > > neither > > > position is helpful. Perhaps Marxism is a hot potato still. > > > > > > > > Certainly there are claims that even the Soviets did not understood > > > Marxism properly and that that may be why Vygotsky had such a hard > time. > > If > > > Marxism has been so difficult a topic, why should it be different for > us > > > who have come late to the table? We do have the power of hindsight, but > > has > > > this helped? > > > > > > > > For any thinker's work, it is highly relevant to understand the > > > contemporary milieu in which that person worked. That is why I look to > > > historical context to unlock Vygotsky's work, not just his texts. > > However, > > > I find a political specter rises from the grave when discussing Marxism > > and > > > kills all prospects before understanding can begin. It is perplexing. I > > > wonder if it is why Vygotsky will remain elusive to us post-moderns. > > > > > > > > I wish I could read the Castorina & Baquero paper, but I cannot read > > > Spanish very well. Would it be asking too much of you to list the > > relevant > > > points made in that paper? I would very much be interested! > > > > > > > > Regards, > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Juan > > Duarte < > > > juanma.duarte@gmail.com > > > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:39 AM > > > > To: ablunden@mira.net ; eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > > > > > I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- > > previously. > > > > But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit of > > > analysis" > > > > in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and Engels > > method, > > > as > > > > Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The > historical > > > > meaning of the chrisis in psychology. > > > > There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the units of > > > > analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for me, at > > > least- > > > > surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and > > preciselly > > > > about method, and very few comments about the fact he was marxist. To > > > > understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for example, > > the > > > > method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, unit of > > > > diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot be > > > separated > > > > without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of though > and > > > > language), for example. > > > > > > > > > > > > Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake this > > point > > > > of view. Andy, for example. > > > > > > > > Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. > > > > I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the marxism in > LV > > > (in > > > > spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo Baquero have > > > > worked through this line, in a very interesting work. > > > > Juan Duarte (Argentina). > > > > > > > > 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden > > >: > > > > > > > >> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that > > > >> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be > > the > > > >> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical circle. > > But > > > it > > > >> seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis by > > > units > > > >> allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. > If > > a > > > >> complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its > > > analysis > > > >> is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis by > > units > > > >> allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis begins > > from a > > > >> concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, not the > > > whole, > > > >> but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be seen > as > > > being > > > >> made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's method > of > > > >> analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of > > > >> collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. > > > >> > > > >> Andy > > > >> > > > >> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From ablunden@mira.net Tue Oct 21 16:32:11 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 10:32:11 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <1413867156880.88790@unm.edu> References: <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> , <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413862822335.60795@unm.edu>, <5445DCD6.7080902@mira.net> <1413867156880.88790@unm.edu> Message-ID: <5446ECFB.3000906@mira.net> Responding to your questions, Annalisa: 1. I counted 8 distinct charges. All of them are argued in theoretical terms, not politically, even if we all believe they were politically motivated. https://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky 2. Activity Theory does add a few insights relevant to psychology, especially to do with motivation, which are additional to what Vygotsky had done, but mainly, it opens the way for the theory, grounded in Psychology, to a wider domain of investigation, that is, not only to study the development of the person in connection with their social situation, but also the formation of the social environment in which that situation is located. 3. Yes, why should the difference in UoA be controversial, indeed? ANL introduced new UoAs, and they give insight into new problems, but that in no way invalidates the insights provided by other UoAs such as those that Vygotsky used. 4. It was the shortcomings in ANL's understanding of UoAs which risk making AT reductionist. A UoA has to be an individual entity (by "individual" I do not mean personal, I mean "single"), but for ANL, "activity" is actually particular, rather than single ("a type of activity"). Also, the motive/goal of an activity is external to the activity, and this is where the whole "unit" approach breaks down and tends to an environmental reductionism. AT actually fails to deliver on its potentiality to deliver an interdisciplinary theory, that is, a means of bridging between psychology and social theory. But I believe these shortcomings are fixable and worth fixing. 5. The question of political freedom, or rather the lack of it, ought to just make us a little more forgiving in assessing the work of these writers. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Granted, and I have not yet read your paper on Defense of Vygotsky, and so I will do that after I send this. > > But the questions in me that rise immediately are: > > 1. What exactly is the critique? (filtering out the political issues, if that is germane). > > 2. What is "good and useful" in the Activity Theory in relation to Sociocultural Theory? They seem to have different applications. Or is this the point? Or, was this a philosophical difference of what _should be_ THE unit of analysis? Arguing over UOA (in terms of which unit to pick, not the method) seems silly, unless I suppose, one is subject to Stalin's whims. > > As they say in Monty Python, "No one expects the Spanish Inquisition." > > 3. If the UOA is different, should that difference be controversial? The UOA depends upon what is to be analyzed as a whole. So if ANL has a different objective (of the whole) from LSV, which seems to be the case, the UOAs will of course differ. > > Respectfully, I am ignorant about the nuanced politics of the time and only know a little, so I hope I am not inadvertently trivializing the matter. > > 4. I do understand UOA is difficult to conceive if one's method is to reduce things to the smallest parts (Thank you, Descartes). However I don't think ANL was attempting to do this by choosing activity as his UOA, so I'm a little lost when you say: > > "Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing." > > 5. Further, I am interested in the way intellectual freedom (or rather, the lack of intellectual freedom) shaped these theories. It seems that if we can separate out the forces that encourage or restrict intellectual freedom, we can be left to see what value is there. Like David Kellogg described, the slender reed of Vygotsky's theories seem to be what we are attempting to retrieve. However, it seems you are saying ANL has his own slender reed, as well. > > (I can't help thinking about Spinoza right about now and the way he was marked an atheist. I wonder if it might be worthwhile to compare LSV and ANL with Spinoza and Leibniz. More thinking out loud...) > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Oct 21 16:32:34 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 00:32:34 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu> <1413926889885.97463@unm.edu> Message-ID: On 22 October 2014 00:11, mike cole wrote: > No need for a taxonomy, Huw. We have long batted around the idea of a "key > word" list. > I think the current xmca facilities may make such an undertaking > achievable.... if there are achievers around ready to achieve it! :-) > mike > For sure. And it has been done in at least one variant. This is mostly Andy's take on things: http://wiki.lchc.ucsd.edu/CHAT Best, Huw > > On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 3:40 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > On 21 October 2014 22:28, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > > Hello Mike, > > > > > > Thank you for the heads up. I suppose when the search field is out of > > > sight it's out of site. :) > > > > > > _An idea_: How about a newcomer's page indicating list posting > > > preferences? Every list is its own culture and list cultures are tricky > > to > > > gauge sometimes for an outsider. I could write a lot about this as I've > > > thought about it a lot, but perhaps I shouldn't do that here or now, > > anyway. > > > > > > _Another idea_: Are there "Famous Conversations" that seem to embody > the > > > most meaning of exchange within the community? Ones that are memorable? > > > Perhaps even a "Hall of Fame"? That would be grand to read and to > learn. > > I > > > would be willing to help collect that material together alongside an > list > > > elder, if that is a worthwhile offer. > > > > > > _Third idea_: there could be trigger search links for keywords, such as > > > "unit of analysis," for example. These could be inserted on the > > vocabulary > > > page, which unfortunately I cannot find from the XCMA homepage even > > though > > > I know the page exists somewhere. > > > > > > _A last, but fluffy idea_: is it possible to post emoji's here? Or is > > that > > > too trendy and unsophisticated? Is anyone groaning just about now...? > > > > > > > Personally, I would say it wasn't "fluffy" enough, Annalisa. Mental > > imagery seems to be the preferred currency. > > > > > > > https://www.google.com/search?btnG=1&pws=0&q=site:lchc.ucsd.edu%2Fmca%2Fmail+%22mental+image%22 > > > > If you keep a list of terms, questions etc, then there are a number of > ways > > these could get used. However, the challenge with a taxonomy here is > that > > you won't get unanimity on the big and little pictures, so it helps to > > bring your theories with you and to challenge them along the way. > > > > Welcome. :) > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > I hope these are useful offerings! > > > > > > Regards, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of mike cole > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 12:37 PM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > > > Hi Annalisa, Juan Et al > > > > > > At the home page of Lchc, Lchc at ucsd dot edu, there is a local Google > > > search of the site. I just googled Marx unit of analysis and there > appear > > > to be a lot of useful entries. Often that is a good place to start with > > > most of our topics. > > > > > > For reasons I do not understand, people seem to have a hard time > > > remembering that the archives are so easy to access! Maybe we need a > > banner > > > or something as a reminder? Suggestions for greater user friendliness > > > welcome always. > > > Mike > > > On Tuesday, October 21, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > > > > > Hello! > > > > > > > > Thanks for directing my attention to your paper. I've downloaded it > > > > accordingly. > > > > > > > > I apologize to the list if as a newcomer I am contributing to any > > > tiresome > > > > redundancy; I am not clear whether there is a way to search the list > > > > archives or not. > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin > > John > > > > Packer > > > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 9:57 AM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > > > > > Hi Juan, Annalisa, > > > > > > > > The relationship between LSV and Marx is certainly something that we > > have > > > > discussed here on xmca. My own contribution includes a paper > > published a > > > > few years ago, which I would be happy to send to you: > > > > > > > > Packer, M. J. (2008). Is Vygotsky relevant? Vygotsky?s Marxist > > > psychology. > > > > Mind, Culture, and Activity, 15(1), 8-31. > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > On Oct 21, 2014, at 10:27 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Hello Juan, > > > > > > > > > > I agree with you that one must understand Marxism to understand > > > Vygotsky > > > > clearly. Darwin's theory too. My grasp upon these topics is tenuous > > and I > > > > would benefit to know more. > > > > > > > > > > In my past, it has been difficult to enjoy dispassionate > > conversations > > > > about Marxism in my circles without the distractions of how much I > > don't > > > > know about Marxism, or how much Marx didn't know about capitalism; > > > neither > > > > position is helpful. Perhaps Marxism is a hot potato still. > > > > > > > > > > Certainly there are claims that even the Soviets did not understood > > > > Marxism properly and that that may be why Vygotsky had such a hard > > time. > > > If > > > > Marxism has been so difficult a topic, why should it be different for > > us > > > > who have come late to the table? We do have the power of hindsight, > but > > > has > > > > this helped? > > > > > > > > > > For any thinker's work, it is highly relevant to understand the > > > > contemporary milieu in which that person worked. That is why I look > to > > > > historical context to unlock Vygotsky's work, not just his texts. > > > However, > > > > I find a political specter rises from the grave when discussing > Marxism > > > and > > > > kills all prospects before understanding can begin. It is > perplexing. I > > > > wonder if it is why Vygotsky will remain elusive to us post-moderns. > > > > > > > > > > I wish I could read the Castorina & Baquero paper, but I cannot > read > > > > Spanish very well. Would it be asking too much of you to list the > > > relevant > > > > points made in that paper? I would very much be interested! > > > > > > > > > > Regards, > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Juan > > > Duarte < > > > > juanma.duarte@gmail.com > > > > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:39 AM > > > > > To: ablunden@mira.net ; eXtended Mind, Culture, > > Activity > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > > > > > > > I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- > > > previously. > > > > > But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit of > > > > analysis" > > > > > in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and Engels > > > method, > > > > as > > > > > Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The > > historical > > > > > meaning of the chrisis in psychology. > > > > > There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the units > of > > > > > analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for me, at > > > > least- > > > > > surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and > > > preciselly > > > > > about method, and very few comments about the fact he was marxist. > To > > > > > understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for > example, > > > the > > > > > method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, unit > of > > > > > diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot be > > > > separated > > > > > without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of though > > and > > > > > language), for example. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake this > > > point > > > > > of view. Andy, for example. > > > > > > > > > > Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. > > > > > I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the marxism > in > > LV > > > > (in > > > > > spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo Baquero > have > > > > > worked through this line, in a very interesting work. > > > > > Juan Duarte (Argentina). > > > > > > > > > > 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden > > > >: > > > > > > > > > >> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that > > > > >> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot > be > > > the > > > > >> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical > circle. > > > But > > > > it > > > > >> seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis > by > > > > units > > > > >> allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. > > If > > > a > > > > >> complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its > > > > analysis > > > > >> is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis by > > > units > > > > >> allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis begins > > > from a > > > > >> concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, not > the > > > > whole, > > > > >> but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be seen > > as > > > > being > > > > >> made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's method > > of > > > > >> analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of > > > > >> collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. > > > > >> > > > > >> Andy > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Oct 21 16:49:17 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 23:49:17 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <5446ECFB.3000906@mira.net> References: <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> , <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413862822335.60795@unm.edu>, <5445DCD6.7080902@mira.net> <1413867156880.88790@unm.edu>,<5446ECFB.3000906@mira.net> Message-ID: <1413935356665.52501@unm.edu> Hi Andy, Fantastic! Thank you. I found your paper to be very helpful in cutting away some of the circular and uncomplimentary language. Now digesting... More soon... Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:32 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky Responding to your questions, Annalisa: 1. I counted 8 distinct charges. All of them are argued in theoretical terms, not politically, even if we all believe they were politically motivated. https://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky 2. Activity Theory does add a few insights relevant to psychology, especially to do with motivation, which are additional to what Vygotsky had done, but mainly, it opens the way for the theory, grounded in Psychology, to a wider domain of investigation, that is, not only to study the development of the person in connection with their social situation, but also the formation of the social environment in which that situation is located. 3. Yes, why should the difference in UoA be controversial, indeed? ANL introduced new UoAs, and they give insight into new problems, but that in no way invalidates the insights provided by other UoAs such as those that Vygotsky used. 4. It was the shortcomings in ANL's understanding of UoAs which risk making AT reductionist. A UoA has to be an individual entity (by "individual" I do not mean personal, I mean "single"), but for ANL, "activity" is actually particular, rather than single ("a type of activity"). Also, the motive/goal of an activity is external to the activity, and this is where the whole "unit" approach breaks down and tends to an environmental reductionism. AT actually fails to deliver on its potentiality to deliver an interdisciplinary theory, that is, a means of bridging between psychology and social theory. But I believe these shortcomings are fixable and worth fixing. 5. The question of political freedom, or rather the lack of it, ought to just make us a little more forgiving in assessing the work of these writers. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Granted, and I have not yet read your paper on Defense of Vygotsky, and so I will do that after I send this. > > But the questions in me that rise immediately are: > > 1. What exactly is the critique? (filtering out the political issues, if that is germane). > > 2. What is "good and useful" in the Activity Theory in relation to Sociocultural Theory? They seem to have different applications. Or is this the point? Or, was this a philosophical difference of what _should be_ THE unit of analysis? Arguing over UOA (in terms of which unit to pick, not the method) seems silly, unless I suppose, one is subject to Stalin's whims. > > As they say in Monty Python, "No one expects the Spanish Inquisition." > > 3. If the UOA is different, should that difference be controversial? The UOA depends upon what is to be analyzed as a whole. So if ANL has a different objective (of the whole) from LSV, which seems to be the case, the UOAs will of course differ. > > Respectfully, I am ignorant about the nuanced politics of the time and only know a little, so I hope I am not inadvertently trivializing the matter. > > 4. I do understand UOA is difficult to conceive if one's method is to reduce things to the smallest parts (Thank you, Descartes). However I don't think ANL was attempting to do this by choosing activity as his UOA, so I'm a little lost when you say: > > "Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing." > > 5. Further, I am interested in the way intellectual freedom (or rather, the lack of intellectual freedom) shaped these theories. It seems that if we can separate out the forces that encourage or restrict intellectual freedom, we can be left to see what value is there. Like David Kellogg described, the slender reed of Vygotsky's theories seem to be what we are attempting to retrieve. However, it seems you are saying ANL has his own slender reed, as well. > > (I can't help thinking about Spinoza right about now and the way he was marked an atheist. I wonder if it might be worthwhile to compare LSV and ANL with Spinoza and Leibniz. More thinking out loud...) > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > From juanma.duarte@gmail.com Tue Oct 21 16:52:22 2014 From: juanma.duarte@gmail.com (Juan Duarte) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 20:52:22 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu> <1413926889885.97463@unm.edu> Message-ID: Hello Annalissa, I?ll try to send it. juan 2014-10-21 20:11 GMT-03:00 mike cole : > No need for a taxonomy, Huw. We have long batted around the idea of a "key > word" list. > I think the current xmca facilities may make such an undertaking > achievable.... if there are achievers around ready to achieve it! :-) > mike > > On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 3:40 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > On 21 October 2014 22:28, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > > Hello Mike, > > > > > > Thank you for the heads up. I suppose when the search field is out of > > > sight it's out of site. :) > > > > > > _An idea_: How about a newcomer's page indicating list posting > > > preferences? Every list is its own culture and list cultures are tricky > > to > > > gauge sometimes for an outsider. I could write a lot about this as I've > > > thought about it a lot, but perhaps I shouldn't do that here or now, > > anyway. > > > > > > _Another idea_: Are there "Famous Conversations" that seem to embody > the > > > most meaning of exchange within the community? Ones that are memorable? > > > Perhaps even a "Hall of Fame"? That would be grand to read and to > learn. > > I > > > would be willing to help collect that material together alongside an > list > > > elder, if that is a worthwhile offer. > > > > > > _Third idea_: there could be trigger search links for keywords, such as > > > "unit of analysis," for example. These could be inserted on the > > vocabulary > > > page, which unfortunately I cannot find from the XCMA homepage even > > though > > > I know the page exists somewhere. > > > > > > _A last, but fluffy idea_: is it possible to post emoji's here? Or is > > that > > > too trendy and unsophisticated? Is anyone groaning just about now...? > > > > > > > Personally, I would say it wasn't "fluffy" enough, Annalisa. Mental > > imagery seems to be the preferred currency. > > > > > > > https://www.google.com/search?btnG=1&pws=0&q=site:lchc.ucsd.edu%2Fmca%2Fmail+%22mental+image%22 > > > > If you keep a list of terms, questions etc, then there are a number of > ways > > these could get used. However, the challenge with a taxonomy here is > that > > you won't get unanimity on the big and little pictures, so it helps to > > bring your theories with you and to challenge them along the way. > > > > Welcome. :) > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > I hope these are useful offerings! > > > > > > Regards, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of mike cole > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 12:37 PM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > > > Hi Annalisa, Juan Et al > > > > > > At the home page of Lchc, Lchc at ucsd dot edu, there is a local Google > > > search of the site. I just googled Marx unit of analysis and there > appear > > > to be a lot of useful entries. Often that is a good place to start with > > > most of our topics. > > > > > > For reasons I do not understand, people seem to have a hard time > > > remembering that the archives are so easy to access! Maybe we need a > > banner > > > or something as a reminder? Suggestions for greater user friendliness > > > welcome always. > > > Mike > > > On Tuesday, October 21, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > > > > > Hello! > > > > > > > > Thanks for directing my attention to your paper. I've downloaded it > > > > accordingly. > > > > > > > > I apologize to the list if as a newcomer I am contributing to any > > > tiresome > > > > redundancy; I am not clear whether there is a way to search the list > > > > archives or not. > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin > > John > > > > Packer > > > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 9:57 AM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > > > > > Hi Juan, Annalisa, > > > > > > > > The relationship between LSV and Marx is certainly something that we > > have > > > > discussed here on xmca. My own contribution includes a paper > > published a > > > > few years ago, which I would be happy to send to you: > > > > > > > > Packer, M. J. (2008). Is Vygotsky relevant? Vygotsky?s Marxist > > > psychology. > > > > Mind, Culture, and Activity, 15(1), 8-31. > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > On Oct 21, 2014, at 10:27 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Hello Juan, > > > > > > > > > > I agree with you that one must understand Marxism to understand > > > Vygotsky > > > > clearly. Darwin's theory too. My grasp upon these topics is tenuous > > and I > > > > would benefit to know more. > > > > > > > > > > In my past, it has been difficult to enjoy dispassionate > > conversations > > > > about Marxism in my circles without the distractions of how much I > > don't > > > > know about Marxism, or how much Marx didn't know about capitalism; > > > neither > > > > position is helpful. Perhaps Marxism is a hot potato still. > > > > > > > > > > Certainly there are claims that even the Soviets did not understood > > > > Marxism properly and that that may be why Vygotsky had such a hard > > time. > > > If > > > > Marxism has been so difficult a topic, why should it be different for > > us > > > > who have come late to the table? We do have the power of hindsight, > but > > > has > > > > this helped? > > > > > > > > > > For any thinker's work, it is highly relevant to understand the > > > > contemporary milieu in which that person worked. That is why I look > to > > > > historical context to unlock Vygotsky's work, not just his texts. > > > However, > > > > I find a political specter rises from the grave when discussing > Marxism > > > and > > > > kills all prospects before understanding can begin. It is > perplexing. I > > > > wonder if it is why Vygotsky will remain elusive to us post-moderns. > > > > > > > > > > I wish I could read the Castorina & Baquero paper, but I cannot > read > > > > Spanish very well. Would it be asking too much of you to list the > > > relevant > > > > points made in that paper? I would very much be interested! > > > > > > > > > > Regards, > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Juan > > > Duarte < > > > > juanma.duarte@gmail.com > > > > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:39 AM > > > > > To: ablunden@mira.net ; eXtended Mind, Culture, > > Activity > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > > > > > > > I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- > > > previously. > > > > > But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit of > > > > analysis" > > > > > in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and Engels > > > method, > > > > as > > > > > Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The > > historical > > > > > meaning of the chrisis in psychology. > > > > > There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the units > of > > > > > analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for me, at > > > > least- > > > > > surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and > > > preciselly > > > > > about method, and very few comments about the fact he was marxist. > To > > > > > understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for > example, > > > the > > > > > method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, unit > of > > > > > diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot be > > > > separated > > > > > without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of though > > and > > > > > language), for example. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake this > > > point > > > > > of view. Andy, for example. > > > > > > > > > > Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. > > > > > I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the marxism > in > > LV > > > > (in > > > > > spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo Baquero > have > > > > > worked through this line, in a very interesting work. > > > > > Juan Duarte (Argentina). > > > > > > > > > > 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden > > > >: > > > > > > > > > >> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that > > > > >> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot > be > > > the > > > > >> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical > circle. > > > But > > > > it > > > > >> seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s analysis > by > > > > units > > > > >> allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then ventures. > > If > > > a > > > > >> complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its > > > > analysis > > > > >> is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis by > > > units > > > > >> allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis begins > > > from a > > > > >> concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, not > the > > > > whole, > > > > >> but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be seen > > as > > > > being > > > > >> made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's method > > of > > > > >> analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of > > > > >> collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. > > > > >> > > > > >> Andy > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > -- Juan From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Oct 21 17:05:57 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 17:05:57 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu> <1413926889885.97463@unm.edu> Message-ID: Right Huw. So an infrastructure exists. Building on it and linking it to ongoing discussions might be a challenge. mike On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 4:32 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > On 22 October 2014 00:11, mike cole wrote: > > > No need for a taxonomy, Huw. We have long batted around the idea of a > "key > > word" list. > > I think the current xmca facilities may make such an undertaking > > achievable.... if there are achievers around ready to achieve it! :-) > > mike > > > > For sure. And it has been done in at least one variant. This is mostly > Andy's take on things: > > http://wiki.lchc.ucsd.edu/CHAT > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 3:40 PM, Huw Lloyd > > wrote: > > > > > On 21 October 2014 22:28, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > > > > Hello Mike, > > > > > > > > Thank you for the heads up. I suppose when the search field is out of > > > > sight it's out of site. :) > > > > > > > > _An idea_: How about a newcomer's page indicating list posting > > > > preferences? Every list is its own culture and list cultures are > tricky > > > to > > > > gauge sometimes for an outsider. I could write a lot about this as > I've > > > > thought about it a lot, but perhaps I shouldn't do that here or now, > > > anyway. > > > > > > > > _Another idea_: Are there "Famous Conversations" that seem to embody > > the > > > > most meaning of exchange within the community? Ones that are > memorable? > > > > Perhaps even a "Hall of Fame"? That would be grand to read and to > > learn. > > > I > > > > would be willing to help collect that material together alongside an > > list > > > > elder, if that is a worthwhile offer. > > > > > > > > _Third idea_: there could be trigger search links for keywords, such > as > > > > "unit of analysis," for example. These could be inserted on the > > > vocabulary > > > > page, which unfortunately I cannot find from the XCMA homepage even > > > though > > > > I know the page exists somewhere. > > > > > > > > _A last, but fluffy idea_: is it possible to post emoji's here? Or is > > > that > > > > too trendy and unsophisticated? Is anyone groaning just about now...? > > > > > > > > > > Personally, I would say it wasn't "fluffy" enough, Annalisa. Mental > > > imagery seems to be the preferred currency. > > > > > > > > > > > > https://www.google.com/search?btnG=1&pws=0&q=site:lchc.ucsd.edu%2Fmca%2Fmail+%22mental+image%22 > > > > > > If you keep a list of terms, questions etc, then there are a number of > > ways > > > these could get used. However, the challenge with a taxonomy here is > > that > > > you won't get unanimity on the big and little pictures, so it helps to > > > bring your theories with you and to challenge them along the way. > > > > > > Welcome. :) > > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I hope these are useful offerings! > > > > > > > > Regards, > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > on behalf of mike cole > > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 12:37 PM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > > > > > Hi Annalisa, Juan Et al > > > > > > > > At the home page of Lchc, Lchc at ucsd dot edu, there is a local > Google > > > > search of the site. I just googled Marx unit of analysis and there > > appear > > > > to be a lot of useful entries. Often that is a good place to start > with > > > > most of our topics. > > > > > > > > For reasons I do not understand, people seem to have a hard time > > > > remembering that the archives are so easy to access! Maybe we need a > > > banner > > > > or something as a reminder? Suggestions for greater user > friendliness > > > > welcome always. > > > > Mike > > > > On Tuesday, October 21, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Hello! > > > > > > > > > > Thanks for directing my attention to your paper. I've downloaded it > > > > > accordingly. > > > > > > > > > > I apologize to the list if as a newcomer I am contributing to any > > > > tiresome > > > > > redundancy; I am not clear whether there is a way to search the > list > > > > > archives or not. > > > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Martin > > > John > > > > > Packer > > > > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 9:57 AM > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > > > > > > > Hi Juan, Annalisa, > > > > > > > > > > The relationship between LSV and Marx is certainly something that > we > > > have > > > > > discussed here on xmca. My own contribution includes a paper > > > published a > > > > > few years ago, which I would be happy to send to you: > > > > > > > > > > Packer, M. J. (2008). Is Vygotsky relevant? Vygotsky?s Marxist > > > > psychology. > > > > > Mind, Culture, and Activity, 15(1), 8-31. > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > On Oct 21, 2014, at 10:27 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Hello Juan, > > > > > > > > > > > > I agree with you that one must understand Marxism to understand > > > > Vygotsky > > > > > clearly. Darwin's theory too. My grasp upon these topics is tenuous > > > and I > > > > > would benefit to know more. > > > > > > > > > > > > In my past, it has been difficult to enjoy dispassionate > > > conversations > > > > > about Marxism in my circles without the distractions of how much I > > > don't > > > > > know about Marxism, or how much Marx didn't know about capitalism; > > > > neither > > > > > position is helpful. Perhaps Marxism is a hot potato still. > > > > > > > > > > > > Certainly there are claims that even the Soviets did not > understood > > > > > Marxism properly and that that may be why Vygotsky had such a hard > > > time. > > > > If > > > > > Marxism has been so difficult a topic, why should it be different > for > > > us > > > > > who have come late to the table? We do have the power of hindsight, > > but > > > > has > > > > > this helped? > > > > > > > > > > > > For any thinker's work, it is highly relevant to understand the > > > > > contemporary milieu in which that person worked. That is why I look > > to > > > > > historical context to unlock Vygotsky's work, not just his texts. > > > > However, > > > > > I find a political specter rises from the grave when discussing > > Marxism > > > > and > > > > > kills all prospects before understanding can begin. It is > > perplexing. I > > > > > wonder if it is why Vygotsky will remain elusive to us > post-moderns. > > > > > > > > > > > > I wish I could read the Castorina & Baquero paper, but I cannot > > read > > > > > Spanish very well. Would it be asking too much of you to list the > > > > relevant > > > > > points made in that paper? I would very much be interested! > > > > > > > > > > > > Regards, > > > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Juan > > > > Duarte < > > > > > juanma.duarte@gmail.com > > > > > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:39 AM > > > > > > To: ablunden@mira.net ; eXtended Mind, Culture, > > > Activity > > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > > > > > > > > > I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- > > > > previously. > > > > > > But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit of > > > > > analysis" > > > > > > in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and Engels > > > > method, > > > > > as > > > > > > Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The > > > historical > > > > > > meaning of the chrisis in psychology. > > > > > > There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the > units > > of > > > > > > analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for me, > at > > > > > least- > > > > > > surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and > > > > preciselly > > > > > > about method, and very few comments about the fact he was > marxist. > > To > > > > > > understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for > > example, > > > > the > > > > > > method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, unit > > of > > > > > > diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot be > > > > > separated > > > > > > without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of > though > > > and > > > > > > language), for example. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake > this > > > > point > > > > > > of view. Andy, for example. > > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. > > > > > > I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the marxism > > in > > > LV > > > > > (in > > > > > > spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo Baquero > > have > > > > > > worked through this line, in a very interesting work. > > > > > > Juan Duarte (Argentina). > > > > > > > > > > > > 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden > > > > >: > > > > > > > > > > > >> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that > > > > > >> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, > cannot > > be > > > > the > > > > > >> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical > > circle. > > > > But > > > > > it > > > > > >> seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s > analysis > > by > > > > > units > > > > > >> allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then > ventures. > > > If > > > > a > > > > > >> complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then its > > > > > analysis > > > > > >> is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis > by > > > > units > > > > > >> allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis > begins > > > > from a > > > > > >> concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, not > > the > > > > > whole, > > > > > >> but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be > seen > > > as > > > > > being > > > > > >> made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's > method > > > of > > > > > >> analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger > of > > > > > >> collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Andy > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Oct 21 17:31:30 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 01:31:30 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu> <1413926889885.97463@unm.edu> Message-ID: Right. But not beyond the realm of the practical. I could write activity when I meant it that way. But mail servers and clients would have to keep the links tidy. Huw On 22 October 2014 01:05, mike cole wrote: > Right Huw. So an infrastructure exists. Building on it and linking it to > ongoing discussions might be a challenge. > mike > > On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 4:32 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > On 22 October 2014 00:11, mike cole wrote: > > > > > No need for a taxonomy, Huw. We have long batted around the idea of a > > "key > > > word" list. > > > I think the current xmca facilities may make such an undertaking > > > achievable.... if there are achievers around ready to achieve it! :-) > > > mike > > > > > > > For sure. And it has been done in at least one variant. This is mostly > > Andy's take on things: > > > > http://wiki.lchc.ucsd.edu/CHAT > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 3:40 PM, Huw Lloyd > > > wrote: > > > > > > > On 21 October 2014 22:28, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > > > > > > Hello Mike, > > > > > > > > > > Thank you for the heads up. I suppose when the search field is out > of > > > > > sight it's out of site. :) > > > > > > > > > > _An idea_: How about a newcomer's page indicating list posting > > > > > preferences? Every list is its own culture and list cultures are > > tricky > > > > to > > > > > gauge sometimes for an outsider. I could write a lot about this as > > I've > > > > > thought about it a lot, but perhaps I shouldn't do that here or > now, > > > > anyway. > > > > > > > > > > _Another idea_: Are there "Famous Conversations" that seem to > embody > > > the > > > > > most meaning of exchange within the community? Ones that are > > memorable? > > > > > Perhaps even a "Hall of Fame"? That would be grand to read and to > > > learn. > > > > I > > > > > would be willing to help collect that material together alongside > an > > > list > > > > > elder, if that is a worthwhile offer. > > > > > > > > > > _Third idea_: there could be trigger search links for keywords, > such > > as > > > > > "unit of analysis," for example. These could be inserted on the > > > > vocabulary > > > > > page, which unfortunately I cannot find from the XCMA homepage even > > > > though > > > > > I know the page exists somewhere. > > > > > > > > > > _A last, but fluffy idea_: is it possible to post emoji's here? Or > is > > > > that > > > > > too trendy and unsophisticated? Is anyone groaning just about > now...? > > > > > > > > > > > > > Personally, I would say it wasn't "fluffy" enough, Annalisa. Mental > > > > imagery seems to be the preferred currency. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > https://www.google.com/search?btnG=1&pws=0&q=site:lchc.ucsd.edu%2Fmca%2Fmail+%22mental+image%22 > > > > > > > > If you keep a list of terms, questions etc, then there are a number > of > > > ways > > > > these could get used. However, the challenge with a taxonomy here is > > > that > > > > you won't get unanimity on the big and little pictures, so it helps > to > > > > bring your theories with you and to challenge them along the way. > > > > > > > > Welcome. :) > > > > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I hope these are useful offerings! > > > > > > > > > > Regards, > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > > on behalf of mike cole > > > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 12:37 PM > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > > > > > > > Hi Annalisa, Juan Et al > > > > > > > > > > At the home page of Lchc, Lchc at ucsd dot edu, there is a local > > Google > > > > > search of the site. I just googled Marx unit of analysis and there > > > appear > > > > > to be a lot of useful entries. Often that is a good place to start > > with > > > > > most of our topics. > > > > > > > > > > For reasons I do not understand, people seem to have a hard time > > > > > remembering that the archives are so easy to access! Maybe we need > a > > > > banner > > > > > or something as a reminder? Suggestions for greater user > > friendliness > > > > > welcome always. > > > > > Mike > > > > > On Tuesday, October 21, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Hello! > > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks for directing my attention to your paper. I've downloaded > it > > > > > > accordingly. > > > > > > > > > > > > I apologize to the list if as a newcomer I am contributing to any > > > > > tiresome > > > > > > redundancy; I am not clear whether there is a way to search the > > list > > > > > > archives or not. > > > > > > > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > > Martin > > > > John > > > > > > Packer > > > > > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 9:57 AM > > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > > > > > > > > > Hi Juan, Annalisa, > > > > > > > > > > > > The relationship between LSV and Marx is certainly something that > > we > > > > have > > > > > > discussed here on xmca. My own contribution includes a paper > > > > published a > > > > > > few years ago, which I would be happy to send to you: > > > > > > > > > > > > Packer, M. J. (2008). Is Vygotsky relevant? Vygotsky?s Marxist > > > > > psychology. > > > > > > Mind, Culture, and Activity, 15(1), 8-31. > > > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > On Oct 21, 2014, at 10:27 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > Hello Juan, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I agree with you that one must understand Marxism to understand > > > > > Vygotsky > > > > > > clearly. Darwin's theory too. My grasp upon these topics is > tenuous > > > > and I > > > > > > would benefit to know more. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > In my past, it has been difficult to enjoy dispassionate > > > > conversations > > > > > > about Marxism in my circles without the distractions of how much > I > > > > don't > > > > > > know about Marxism, or how much Marx didn't know about > capitalism; > > > > > neither > > > > > > position is helpful. Perhaps Marxism is a hot potato still. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Certainly there are claims that even the Soviets did not > > understood > > > > > > Marxism properly and that that may be why Vygotsky had such a > hard > > > > time. > > > > > If > > > > > > Marxism has been so difficult a topic, why should it be different > > for > > > > us > > > > > > who have come late to the table? We do have the power of > hindsight, > > > but > > > > > has > > > > > > this helped? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > For any thinker's work, it is highly relevant to understand the > > > > > > contemporary milieu in which that person worked. That is why I > look > > > to > > > > > > historical context to unlock Vygotsky's work, not just his texts. > > > > > However, > > > > > > I find a political specter rises from the grave when discussing > > > Marxism > > > > > and > > > > > > kills all prospects before understanding can begin. It is > > > perplexing. I > > > > > > wonder if it is why Vygotsky will remain elusive to us > > post-moderns. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I wish I could read the Castorina & Baquero paper, but I cannot > > > read > > > > > > Spanish very well. Would it be asking too much of you to list the > > > > > relevant > > > > > > points made in that paper? I would very much be interested! > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Regards, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Juan > > > > > Duarte < > > > > > > juanma.duarte@gmail.com > > > > > > > > Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:39 AM > > > > > > > To: ablunden@mira.net ; eXtended Mind, Culture, > > > > Activity > > > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- > > > > > previously. > > > > > > > But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit > of > > > > > > analysis" > > > > > > > in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and > Engels > > > > > method, > > > > > > as > > > > > > > Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The > > > > historical > > > > > > > meaning of the chrisis in psychology. > > > > > > > There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the > > units > > > of > > > > > > > analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for > me, > > at > > > > > > least- > > > > > > > surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and > > > > > preciselly > > > > > > > about method, and very few comments about the fact he was > > marxist. > > > To > > > > > > > understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for > > > example, > > > > > the > > > > > > > method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, > unit > > > of > > > > > > > diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot > be > > > > > > separated > > > > > > > without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of > > though > > > > and > > > > > > > language), for example. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake > > this > > > > > point > > > > > > > of view. Andy, for example. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. > > > > > > > I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the > marxism > > > in > > > > LV > > > > > > (in > > > > > > > spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo > Baquero > > > have > > > > > > > worked through this line, in a very interesting work. > > > > > > > Juan Duarte (Argentina). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden > > > > > >: > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that > > > > > > >> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, > > cannot > > > be > > > > > the > > > > > > >> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical > > > circle. > > > > > But > > > > > > it > > > > > > >> seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s > > analysis > > > by > > > > > > units > > > > > > >> allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then > > ventures. > > > > If > > > > > a > > > > > > >> complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then > its > > > > > > analysis > > > > > > >> is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis > > by > > > > > units > > > > > > >> allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis > > begins > > > > > from a > > > > > > >> concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, > not > > > the > > > > > > whole, > > > > > > >> but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be > > seen > > > > as > > > > > > being > > > > > > >> made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's > > method > > > > of > > > > > > >> analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger > > of > > > > > > >> collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Andy > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > > an > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Oct 21 17:36:39 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 00:36:39 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu> <1413926889885.97463@unm.edu> Message-ID: Where's the entry for Plump Materialism?!!! :) Martin On Oct 21, 2014, at 7:31 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Right. But not beyond the realm of the practical. I could write activity > when I meant it that way. But > mail servers and clients would have to keep the links tidy. > > Huw > > > > > On 22 October 2014 01:05, mike cole wrote: > >> Right Huw. So an infrastructure exists. Building on it and linking it to >> ongoing discussions might be a challenge. >> mike >> >> On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 4:32 PM, Huw Lloyd >> wrote: >> >>> On 22 October 2014 00:11, mike cole wrote: >>> >>>> No need for a taxonomy, Huw. We have long batted around the idea of a >>> "key >>>> word" list. >>>> I think the current xmca facilities may make such an undertaking >>>> achievable.... if there are achievers around ready to achieve it! :-) >>>> mike >>>> >>> >>> For sure. And it has been done in at least one variant. This is mostly >>> Andy's take on things: >>> >>> http://wiki.lchc.ucsd.edu/CHAT >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 3:40 PM, Huw Lloyd >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 21 October 2014 22:28, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hello Mike, >>>>>> >>>>>> Thank you for the heads up. I suppose when the search field is out >> of >>>>>> sight it's out of site. :) >>>>>> >>>>>> _An idea_: How about a newcomer's page indicating list posting >>>>>> preferences? Every list is its own culture and list cultures are >>> tricky >>>>> to >>>>>> gauge sometimes for an outsider. I could write a lot about this as >>> I've >>>>>> thought about it a lot, but perhaps I shouldn't do that here or >> now, >>>>> anyway. >>>>>> >>>>>> _Another idea_: Are there "Famous Conversations" that seem to >> embody >>>> the >>>>>> most meaning of exchange within the community? Ones that are >>> memorable? >>>>>> Perhaps even a "Hall of Fame"? That would be grand to read and to >>>> learn. >>>>> I >>>>>> would be willing to help collect that material together alongside >> an >>>> list >>>>>> elder, if that is a worthwhile offer. >>>>>> >>>>>> _Third idea_: there could be trigger search links for keywords, >> such >>> as >>>>>> "unit of analysis," for example. These could be inserted on the >>>>> vocabulary >>>>>> page, which unfortunately I cannot find from the XCMA homepage even >>>>> though >>>>>> I know the page exists somewhere. >>>>>> >>>>>> _A last, but fluffy idea_: is it possible to post emoji's here? Or >> is >>>>> that >>>>>> too trendy and unsophisticated? Is anyone groaning just about >> now...? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Personally, I would say it wasn't "fluffy" enough, Annalisa. Mental >>>>> imagery seems to be the preferred currency. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> https://www.google.com/search?btnG=1&pws=0&q=site:lchc.ucsd.edu%2Fmca%2Fmail+%22mental+image%22 >>>>> >>>>> If you keep a list of terms, questions etc, then there are a number >> of >>>> ways >>>>> these could get used. However, the challenge with a taxonomy here is >>>> that >>>>> you won't get unanimity on the big and little pictures, so it helps >> to >>>>> bring your theories with you and to challenge them along the way. >>>>> >>>>> Welcome. :) >>>>> >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I hope these are useful offerings! >>>>>> >>>>>> Regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>> >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 12:37 PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Annalisa, Juan Et al >>>>>> >>>>>> At the home page of Lchc, Lchc at ucsd dot edu, there is a local >>> Google >>>>>> search of the site. I just googled Marx unit of analysis and there >>>> appear >>>>>> to be a lot of useful entries. Often that is a good place to start >>> with >>>>>> most of our topics. >>>>>> >>>>>> For reasons I do not understand, people seem to have a hard time >>>>>> remembering that the archives are so easy to access! Maybe we need >> a >>>>> banner >>>>>> or something as a reminder? Suggestions for greater user >>> friendliness >>>>>> welcome always. >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> On Tuesday, October 21, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Hello! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks for directing my attention to your paper. I've downloaded >> it >>>>>>> accordingly. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I apologize to the list if as a newcomer I am contributing to any >>>>>> tiresome >>>>>>> redundancy; I am not clear whether there is a way to search the >>> list >>>>>>> archives or not. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>> Martin >>>>> John >>>>>>> Packer > >>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 9:57 AM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi Juan, Annalisa, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The relationship between LSV and Marx is certainly something that >>> we >>>>> have >>>>>>> discussed here on xmca. My own contribution includes a paper >>>>> published a >>>>>>> few years ago, which I would be happy to send to you: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Packer, M. J. (2008). Is Vygotsky relevant? Vygotsky?s Marxist >>>>>> psychology. >>>>>>> Mind, Culture, and Activity, 15(1), 8-31. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Oct 21, 2014, at 10:27 AM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hello Juan, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree with you that one must understand Marxism to understand >>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>> clearly. Darwin's theory too. My grasp upon these topics is >> tenuous >>>>> and I >>>>>>> would benefit to know more. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In my past, it has been difficult to enjoy dispassionate >>>>> conversations >>>>>>> about Marxism in my circles without the distractions of how much >> I >>>>> don't >>>>>>> know about Marxism, or how much Marx didn't know about >> capitalism; >>>>>> neither >>>>>>> position is helpful. Perhaps Marxism is a hot potato still. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Certainly there are claims that even the Soviets did not >>> understood >>>>>>> Marxism properly and that that may be why Vygotsky had such a >> hard >>>>> time. >>>>>> If >>>>>>> Marxism has been so difficult a topic, why should it be different >>> for >>>>> us >>>>>>> who have come late to the table? We do have the power of >> hindsight, >>>> but >>>>>> has >>>>>>> this helped? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> For any thinker's work, it is highly relevant to understand the >>>>>>> contemporary milieu in which that person worked. That is why I >> look >>>> to >>>>>>> historical context to unlock Vygotsky's work, not just his texts. >>>>>> However, >>>>>>> I find a political specter rises from the grave when discussing >>>> Marxism >>>>>> and >>>>>>> kills all prospects before understanding can begin. It is >>>> perplexing. I >>>>>>> wonder if it is why Vygotsky will remain elusive to us >>> post-moderns. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I wish I could read the Castorina & Baquero paper, but I cannot >>>> read >>>>>>> Spanish very well. Would it be asking too much of you to list the >>>>>> relevant >>>>>>> points made in that paper? I would very much be interested! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Regards, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >> Juan >>>>>> Duarte < >>>>>>> juanma.duarte@gmail.com > >>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:39 AM >>>>>>>> To: ablunden@mira.net ; eXtended Mind, Culture, >>>>> Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- >>>>>> previously. >>>>>>>> But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit >> of >>>>>>> analysis" >>>>>>>> in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and >> Engels >>>>>> method, >>>>>>> as >>>>>>>> Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The >>>>> historical >>>>>>>> meaning of the chrisis in psychology. >>>>>>>> There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the >>> units >>>> of >>>>>>>> analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for >> me, >>> at >>>>>>> least- >>>>>>>> surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and >>>>>> preciselly >>>>>>>> about method, and very few comments about the fact he was >>> marxist. >>>> To >>>>>>>> understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for >>>> example, >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, >> unit >>>> of >>>>>>>> diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot >> be >>>>>>> separated >>>>>>>> without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of >>> though >>>>> and >>>>>>>> language), for example. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake >>> this >>>>>> point >>>>>>>> of view. Andy, for example. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. >>>>>>>> I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the >> marxism >>>> in >>>>> LV >>>>>>> (in >>>>>>>> spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo >> Baquero >>>> have >>>>>>>> worked through this line, in a very interesting work. >>>>>>>> Juan Duarte (Argentina). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden >>>>>> >: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that >>>>>>>>> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, >>> cannot >>>> be >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical >>>> circle. >>>>>> But >>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>> seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s >>> analysis >>>> by >>>>>>> units >>>>>>>>> allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then >>> ventures. >>>>> If >>>>>> a >>>>>>>>> complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then >> its >>>>>>> analysis >>>>>>>>> is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis >>> by >>>>>> units >>>>>>>>> allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis >>> begins >>>>>> from a >>>>>>>>> concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, >> not >>>> the >>>>>>> whole, >>>>>>>>> but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be >>> seen >>>>> as >>>>>>> being >>>>>>>>> made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's >>> method >>>>> of >>>>>>>>> analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger >>> of >>>>>>>>> collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>> an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Oct 21 18:03:27 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 02:03:27 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413905242916.23708@unm.edu> <26F2A8CF-C359-464B-90C2-67FFF6031E41@uniandes.edu.co> <1413915253038.92636@unm.edu> <1413926889885.97463@unm.edu> Message-ID: On 22 October 2014 01:36, Martin John Packer wrote: > Where's the entry for Plump Materialism?!!! > > :) > > Just beyond your finger tips. :) Huw > Martin > > On Oct 21, 2014, at 7:31 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > Right. But not beyond the realm of the practical. I could write activity > > when I meant it that way. But > > mail servers and clients would have to keep the links tidy. > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > On 22 October 2014 01:05, mike cole wrote: > > > >> Right Huw. So an infrastructure exists. Building on it and linking it to > >> ongoing discussions might be a challenge. > >> mike > >> > >> On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 4:32 PM, Huw Lloyd > >> wrote: > >> > >>> On 22 October 2014 00:11, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>>> No need for a taxonomy, Huw. We have long batted around the idea of a > >>> "key > >>>> word" list. > >>>> I think the current xmca facilities may make such an undertaking > >>>> achievable.... if there are achievers around ready to achieve it! :-) > >>>> mike > >>>> > >>> > >>> For sure. And it has been done in at least one variant. This is > mostly > >>> Andy's take on things: > >>> > >>> http://wiki.lchc.ucsd.edu/CHAT > >>> > >>> Best, > >>> Huw > >>> > >>> > >>>> > >>>> On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 3:40 PM, Huw Lloyd > > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> On 21 October 2014 22:28, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Hello Mike, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Thank you for the heads up. I suppose when the search field is out > >> of > >>>>>> sight it's out of site. :) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> _An idea_: How about a newcomer's page indicating list posting > >>>>>> preferences? Every list is its own culture and list cultures are > >>> tricky > >>>>> to > >>>>>> gauge sometimes for an outsider. I could write a lot about this as > >>> I've > >>>>>> thought about it a lot, but perhaps I shouldn't do that here or > >> now, > >>>>> anyway. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> _Another idea_: Are there "Famous Conversations" that seem to > >> embody > >>>> the > >>>>>> most meaning of exchange within the community? Ones that are > >>> memorable? > >>>>>> Perhaps even a "Hall of Fame"? That would be grand to read and to > >>>> learn. > >>>>> I > >>>>>> would be willing to help collect that material together alongside > >> an > >>>> list > >>>>>> elder, if that is a worthwhile offer. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> _Third idea_: there could be trigger search links for keywords, > >> such > >>> as > >>>>>> "unit of analysis," for example. These could be inserted on the > >>>>> vocabulary > >>>>>> page, which unfortunately I cannot find from the XCMA homepage even > >>>>> though > >>>>>> I know the page exists somewhere. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> _A last, but fluffy idea_: is it possible to post emoji's here? Or > >> is > >>>>> that > >>>>>> too trendy and unsophisticated? Is anyone groaning just about > >> now...? > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Personally, I would say it wasn't "fluffy" enough, Annalisa. Mental > >>>>> imagery seems to be the preferred currency. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >> > https://www.google.com/search?btnG=1&pws=0&q=site:lchc.ucsd.edu%2Fmca%2Fmail+%22mental+image%22 > >>>>> > >>>>> If you keep a list of terms, questions etc, then there are a number > >> of > >>>> ways > >>>>> these could get used. However, the challenge with a taxonomy here is > >>>> that > >>>>> you won't get unanimity on the big and little pictures, so it helps > >> to > >>>>> bring your theories with you and to challenge them along the way. > >>>>> > >>>>> Welcome. :) > >>>>> > >>>>> Huw > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I hope these are useful offerings! > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Regards, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Annalisa > >>>>>> > >>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>> > >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole > >>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 12:37 PM > >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Hi Annalisa, Juan Et al > >>>>>> > >>>>>> At the home page of Lchc, Lchc at ucsd dot edu, there is a local > >>> Google > >>>>>> search of the site. I just googled Marx unit of analysis and there > >>>> appear > >>>>>> to be a lot of useful entries. Often that is a good place to start > >>> with > >>>>>> most of our topics. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> For reasons I do not understand, people seem to have a hard time > >>>>>> remembering that the archives are so easy to access! Maybe we need > >> a > >>>>> banner > >>>>>> or something as a reminder? Suggestions for greater user > >>> friendliness > >>>>>> welcome always. > >>>>>> Mike > >>>>>> On Tuesday, October 21, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > >>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Hello! > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Thanks for directing my attention to your paper. I've downloaded > >> it > >>>>>>> accordingly. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I apologize to the list if as a newcomer I am contributing to any > >>>>>> tiresome > >>>>>>> redundancy; I am not clear whether there is a way to search the > >>> list > >>>>>>> archives or not. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Best, > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Annalisa > >>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > >>> Martin > >>>>> John > >>>>>>> Packer > > >>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 9:57 AM > >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Hi Juan, Annalisa, > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> The relationship between LSV and Marx is certainly something that > >>> we > >>>>> have > >>>>>>> discussed here on xmca. My own contribution includes a paper > >>>>> published a > >>>>>>> few years ago, which I would be happy to send to you: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Packer, M. J. (2008). Is Vygotsky relevant? Vygotsky?s Marxist > >>>>>> psychology. > >>>>>>> Mind, Culture, and Activity, 15(1), 8-31. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Oct 21, 2014, at 10:27 AM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Hello Juan, > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I agree with you that one must understand Marxism to understand > >>>>>> Vygotsky > >>>>>>> clearly. Darwin's theory too. My grasp upon these topics is > >> tenuous > >>>>> and I > >>>>>>> would benefit to know more. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> In my past, it has been difficult to enjoy dispassionate > >>>>> conversations > >>>>>>> about Marxism in my circles without the distractions of how much > >> I > >>>>> don't > >>>>>>> know about Marxism, or how much Marx didn't know about > >> capitalism; > >>>>>> neither > >>>>>>> position is helpful. Perhaps Marxism is a hot potato still. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Certainly there are claims that even the Soviets did not > >>> understood > >>>>>>> Marxism properly and that that may be why Vygotsky had such a > >> hard > >>>>> time. > >>>>>> If > >>>>>>> Marxism has been so difficult a topic, why should it be different > >>> for > >>>>> us > >>>>>>> who have come late to the table? We do have the power of > >> hindsight, > >>>> but > >>>>>> has > >>>>>>> this helped? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> For any thinker's work, it is highly relevant to understand the > >>>>>>> contemporary milieu in which that person worked. That is why I > >> look > >>>> to > >>>>>>> historical context to unlock Vygotsky's work, not just his texts. > >>>>>> However, > >>>>>>> I find a political specter rises from the grave when discussing > >>>> Marxism > >>>>>> and > >>>>>>> kills all prospects before understanding can begin. It is > >>>> perplexing. I > >>>>>>> wonder if it is why Vygotsky will remain elusive to us > >>> post-moderns. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I wish I could read the Castorina & Baquero paper, but I cannot > >>>> read > >>>>>>> Spanish very well. Would it be asking too much of you to list the > >>>>>> relevant > >>>>>>> points made in that paper? I would very much be interested! > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Regards, > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Annalisa > >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > >> Juan > >>>>>> Duarte < > >>>>>>> juanma.duarte@gmail.com > > >>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:39 AM > >>>>>>>> To: ablunden@mira.net ; eXtended Mind, Culture, > >>>>> Activity > >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: LSV versus ANL > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I?m sorry for couldn?t answer -neither red all the messages- > >>>>>> previously. > >>>>>>>> But what i was reffering was precisely the fact that the "unit > >> of > >>>>>>> analysis" > >>>>>>>> in Vigotsky is not understandable without taking Marx and > >> Engels > >>>>>> method, > >>>>>>> as > >>>>>>>> Vygotsky himself writes, for example, in his manuscript The > >>>>> historical > >>>>>>>> meaning of the chrisis in psychology. > >>>>>>>> There?s is the need of psychology?s own Das Kapital. And the > >>> units > >>>> of > >>>>>>>> analisis in LV are built in a dialectical way. So, it?s -for > >> me, > >>> at > >>>>>>> least- > >>>>>>>> surprising to read so much about the marxist psychologist, and > >>>>>> preciselly > >>>>>>>> about method, and very few comments about the fact he was > >>> marxist. > >>>> To > >>>>>>>> understand the concept of "unit of analysis" is to know, for > >>>> example, > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> method of Das Kapital, where Marx takes the value as a cell, > >> unit > >>>> of > >>>>>>>> diverse and opposits, change value and use value, wich cannot > >> be > >>>>>>> separated > >>>>>>>> without loosing the whole. So is the use of Meaning (unit of > >>> though > >>>>> and > >>>>>>>> language), for example. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Well, that?s my point. And know that there are many that thake > >>> this > >>>>>> point > >>>>>>>> of view. Andy, for example. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Thanks a lot for the fruitful interchange. > >>>>>>>> I send you, if anyone is interested, an article about the > >> marxism > >>>> in > >>>>> LV > >>>>>>> (in > >>>>>>>> spanish). Here, in Argentina, Jose Castorina and Ricardo > >> Baquero > >>>> have > >>>>>>>> worked through this line, in a very interesting work. > >>>>>>>> Juan Duarte (Argentina). > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> 2014-10-20 21:08 GMT-03:00 Andy Blunden >>>>>>> >: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Returning to Leontyev's critique of Vygotsky, ANL claimed that > >>>>>>>>> perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, > >>> cannot > >>>> be > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>> determinant of personality, because that would be a logical > >>>> circle. > >>>>>> But > >>>>>>> it > >>>>>>>>> seems to me that ANL failed to understand how Vygotsky?s > >>> analysis > >>>> by > >>>>>>> units > >>>>>>>>> allows him to avoid the reductionism into which ANL then > >>> ventures. > >>>>> If > >>>>>> a > >>>>>>>>> complex process is to be explained by something _else_, then > >> its > >>>>>>> analysis > >>>>>>>>> is _reduced_ to the analysis of that something else. Analysis > >>> by > >>>>>> units > >>>>>>>>> allows Vygotsky to avoid reductionism because the analysis > >>> begins > >>>>>> from a > >>>>>>>>> concept of the whole complex process represented in a unit, > >> not > >>>> the > >>>>>>> whole, > >>>>>>>>> but a small fragment of the whole, such that the whole can be > >>> seen > >>>>> as > >>>>>>> being > >>>>>>>>> made up of very many such fragments only. Absent Vygotsky's > >>> method > >>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> analysis by units, and Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger > >>> of > >>>>>>>>> collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > >>> an > >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> > > > From ablunden@mira.net Tue Oct 21 19:52:38 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 13:52:38 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics Practices In-Reply-To: <39089ddf0ba265a30feb7854f07324c1.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <39089ddf0ba265a30feb7854f07324c1.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> Message-ID: <54471BF6.9010906@mira.net> Here's the article for discussion Artin is introducing: *Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics Practices* Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen Wohlwend. Indiana University. The Maker movement promotes hands-on making, including crafts, robotics, and computing. The movement?s potential to transform education rests in our ability to address notable gender disparities, particularly in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics fields. E-textiles - the first female-dominated computing community - provide inspiration for overcoming long-standing cultural divides in classrooms. Analysis of children?s use of e-textiles reveals that materials like needles, fabric, and conductive thread rupture traditional gender scripts around electronics and implicitly gives girls hands-on access and leadership roles. This reconceptualization of cultural divides as sets of tacitly accepted practices rooted in gendered histories has implications for reconceptualizing traditionally male-dominated areas of schooling. Andy (attached) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Goncu, Artin wrote: > Dear All, > > We are writing to let you know that the most recent issue of MCA is out. > One of the articles published in this issue and being introduced here for > discussion in referenced below. The authors of the article have kindly > agreed to lead the discussion, and they are on xmca with us now. The free > access to the article is possible through the links below. We are looking > forward to hearing from you all. Best, ag > > Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting > and Electronics Practices > Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen Wohlwend > > www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762 > > http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762#.VEZ25Ra_4wI > > Artin Goncu, Ph.D > Co-editor, Mind, Culture, and Activity:An International Journal > Professor Emeritus, > University of Illinois at Chicago > College of Education M/C 147 > 1040 W. Harrison St. > Chicago, IL 60607 > > > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 21-4-buchholz.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 183157 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141022/17050933/attachment.pdf From kpeppler@indiana.edu Tue Oct 21 20:41:57 2014 From: kpeppler@indiana.edu (Kylie Peppler) Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2014 23:41:57 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics Practices In-Reply-To: <54471BF6.9010906@mira.net> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <39089ddf0ba265a30feb7854f07324c1.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> <54471BF6.9010906@mira.net> Message-ID: Thanks Andy! We're excited to discuss with the community and would welcome any comments/questions on this emerging line of research! Kylie --- Kylie A. Peppler Assistant Professor of Learning Sciences Indiana University | School of Education 1900 E 10th Street | Eigenmann 528 | Bloomington | IN | 47406 | 812.856.8381 On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 10:52 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Here's the article for discussion Artin is introducing: > *Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics > Practices* > Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen Wohlwend. Indiana > University. > > The Maker movement promotes hands-on making, including crafts, > robotics, and computing. The movement?s potential to transform > education rests in our ability to address notable gender > disparities, particularly in science, technology, engineering, and > mathematics fields. E-textiles - the first female-dominated > computing community - provide inspiration for overcoming > long-standing cultural divides in classrooms. Analysis of children?s > use of e-textiles reveals that materials like needles, fabric, and > conductive thread rupture traditional gender scripts around > electronics and implicitly gives girls hands-on access and > leadership roles. This reconceptualization of cultural divides as > sets of tacitly accepted practices rooted in gendered histories has > implications for reconceptualizing traditionally male-dominated > areas of schooling. > > Andy > (attached) > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Goncu, Artin wrote: > >> Dear All, >> >> We are writing to let you know that the most recent issue of MCA is out. >> One of the articles published in this issue and being introduced here for >> discussion in referenced below. The authors of the article have kindly >> agreed to lead the discussion, and they are on xmca with us now. The free >> access to the article is possible through the links below. We are looking >> forward to hearing from you all. Best, ag >> >> Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting >> and Electronics Practices >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen Wohlwend >> >> www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762 >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749039.2014. >> 939762#.VEZ25Ra_4wI >> >> Artin Goncu, Ph.D >> Co-editor, Mind, Culture, and Activity:An International Journal >> Professor Emeritus, >> University of Illinois at Chicago >> College of Education M/C 147 >> 1040 W. Harrison St. >> Chicago, IL 60607 >> >> >> >> >> > From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Oct 21 23:28:48 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 06:28:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <5446ECFB.3000906@mira.net> References: <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> , <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413862822335.60795@unm.edu>, <5445DCD6.7080902@mira.net> <1413867156880.88790@unm.edu>,<5446ECFB.3000906@mira.net> Message-ID: <1413959328138.97631@unm.edu> Hello Andy, I hope this is received in the spirit it was intended, however to aid in my learning, I'm listing the eight charges in my own language, using your paper as my scaffold. I realize I am sticking my neck out, but I am motivated to jump into my zone of proximal discomfort because I would like to be clearer about the disparities between ANL and LSV once and for all, and perhaps in my stumbling I shall be caught by others who see this more clearly than I do, including you, of course. I hope there will be something good at the end of this exercise. My process was to go down your prosecution list, which is made of 11 points (not 8). I've picked out what I detect to be these eight charges, but I am not sure if I have captured them correctly. Please take question marks set inside parens to mean the level or force of my cringing. In fact, the subject line of this post should be "One Big Cringe On a Tuesday Evening." Here goes: -------------- _1st charge_: Environment as productive force ---------- ANL states that the relationship LSV claims a child possesses with the environment is based actually upon _productive forces_ the child has with the environment. I am guessing that this translates to what the child can do to transform the environment, or how the environment motivates the child to act? You make the observation that if ANL means "society" to be defined as "nation-state," then in the case of an adult, the relationship is not only with the environment, but with a society of others, and in mediation with them, in concert. Your contention with this line of thought is that we cannot supplant the Vygotsky's outline of the problem of the environment by analogy of the Soviet political system of historical materialism because... [doubt sets in] LSV is talking about the development of children who's minds have not yet formed. (???) ---------- _2nd charge_: It is activity, not perezhivanie, to which the child relates ---------- ANL in his assertion of the child relating to her environment, claims she can only relate to the environment (that is, nature) via objects available to her, and by acting upon those objects. For this reason, ANL challenges LSV's definition of perezhivanie as a unity of the subject and the object. Specifically, personality factors in the child and those "actionable" objects in the environment. (I think you are crying foul here because perezhivanie as a theory had not yet been fully formed (?) or perhaps not fully understood by LSV's students, ANL being one of them.) ---------- _3rd charge_: Perezhivanie is a faulty circular construct ---------- ANL pushes against the legitimacy of perezhivanie as a _determining cause of development_ in the child, one of LSV's major claims, largely because it is circular. ANL claims perezhivanie in the definition actually takes the place of the personality, but how can perezhivanie both develop personality and be the personality? Therefore, ANL asserts that there must be _an activity_ external to the personality that exerts force for transformation upon the personality, making perezhivanie an activity, and not a relationship between the subject and the object/environment. ANL is saying the only pathway for the subject to relate to the environment is through nothing other than activity. ---------- _4th charge_: "Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism ---------- For LSV, in order for perezhivanie to "happen," there is a dependency on the level of sense and meaning in the child in order to detect what presents in the environment. Well, ANL counters, sense and meaning present in the child is really consciousness present in the child. Consciousness is just another word for intellect, as interpreted by ANL, and this is problematic, I think because it implies... [doubt sets in] this is hereditary- or biologically-driven alone. (??) ---------- _5th charge_: The unit of analysis is activity - perezhivanie doesn't exist in the world, while activity does. ---------- ANL poses: Is the matter really about unity of the subject and the environment, or the relationship between the subject's consciousness and activity among objects in the environment (i.e. objective reality)? Thus LSV has failed to see the problem clearly, it is _activity_ that is the appropriate unit of analysis, not perezhivanie. ---------- _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning ---------- ANL believes that the mental representation in a child's awareness must _correspond_ directly to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but also how the object may relate and associate to other objects and their meanings. The example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I will call here for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", ANL takes exception with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a generalization to reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the existence of these word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they are what construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this because he considers consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- I'm not sure if this next is the same charge, if not, it is the... _7th charge_: Over-complexity of concepts and projection of idealism ---------- ANL attacks LSV's notion of concepts (scientific and everyday concepts) because the theory is too complicated (???), the reason being (per ANL) that LSV claims meaning is created through verbal communication --not speech, but communication-- of concepts alone (and not activity). This claim is in conflict with what you indicate is ANL's dogmatic concept of truth (as laid out in para above). The theory as posed by LSV can't involve material dealings, but "merely" communication using language. All this abstraction, according to ANL, effectively removes the child from the environment, rendering the child to be an "ideal subject" and the environment to be an "ideal environment," which, in interaction through communication, is supposed to develop the mind of the child. This is how it is ANL brands LSV an idealist and where the entire "bourgeois psychology" charge is derived. ---------- _8th charge_: Reversion to subjective psychology ---------- In a coup de t?te (pun intended), ANL makes a last charge that LSV has shifted any "problem of the environment" onto an abstract level of the psyche, and as such, this move reverts to the realm of the subjective practices rampant in psychology studies of the day, making it, not only removed from the material methods vital to Marxist thought, but essentially unscientific and specious. ---------- _Caveat_: In my first run down the "prosecution line", I had seemed to miss two charges, that is, if I used your prompt for the "first charge" in your text. However backing up and going over it a second time, I tried to pull out the missing two from higher up the list. I'm fairly confident I did not do this correctly, and that I have failed spectacularly. I anticipate I shall be disabused from what I've set out here, which will make me glad. For what it is worth, this exercise was somewhat painful to do, if only because of my inner speech was screaming, "YEAH, BUT..." Regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2014 5:32 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky Responding to your questions, Annalisa: 1. I counted 8 distinct charges. All of them are argued in theoretical terms, not politically, even if we all believe they were politically motivated. https://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky 2. Activity Theory does add a few insights relevant to psychology, especially to do with motivation, which are additional to what Vygotsky had done, but mainly, it opens the way for the theory, grounded in Psychology, to a wider domain of investigation, that is, not only to study the development of the person in connection with their social situation, but also the formation of the social environment in which that situation is located. 3. Yes, why should the difference in UoA be controversial, indeed? ANL introduced new UoAs, and they give insight into new problems, but that in no way invalidates the insights provided by other UoAs such as those that Vygotsky used. 4. It was the shortcomings in ANL's understanding of UoAs which risk making AT reductionist. A UoA has to be an individual entity (by "individual" I do not mean personal, I mean "single"), but for ANL, "activity" is actually particular, rather than single ("a type of activity"). Also, the motive/goal of an activity is external to the activity, and this is where the whole "unit" approach breaks down and tends to an environmental reductionism. AT actually fails to deliver on its potentiality to deliver an interdisciplinary theory, that is, a means of bridging between psychology and social theory. But I believe these shortcomings are fixable and worth fixing. 5. The question of political freedom, or rather the lack of it, ought to just make us a little more forgiving in assessing the work of these writers. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Granted, and I have not yet read your paper on Defense of Vygotsky, and so I will do that after I send this. > > But the questions in me that rise immediately are: > > 1. What exactly is the critique? (filtering out the political issues, if that is germane). > > 2. What is "good and useful" in the Activity Theory in relation to Sociocultural Theory? They seem to have different applications. Or is this the point? Or, was this a philosophical difference of what _should be_ THE unit of analysis? Arguing over UOA (in terms of which unit to pick, not the method) seems silly, unless I suppose, one is subject to Stalin's whims. > > As they say in Monty Python, "No one expects the Spanish Inquisition." > > 3. If the UOA is different, should that difference be controversial? The UOA depends upon what is to be analyzed as a whole. So if ANL has a different objective (of the whole) from LSV, which seems to be the case, the UOAs will of course differ. > > Respectfully, I am ignorant about the nuanced politics of the time and only know a little, so I hope I am not inadvertently trivializing the matter. > > 4. I do understand UOA is difficult to conceive if one's method is to reduce things to the smallest parts (Thank you, Descartes). However I don't think ANL was attempting to do this by choosing activity as his UOA, so I'm a little lost when you say: > > "Leontyev's Activity Theory is in danger of collapsing to a reductionism that actually explains nothing." > > 5. Further, I am interested in the way intellectual freedom (or rather, the lack of intellectual freedom) shaped these theories. It seems that if we can separate out the forces that encourage or restrict intellectual freedom, we can be left to see what value is there. Like David Kellogg described, the slender reed of Vygotsky's theories seem to be what we are attempting to retrieve. However, it seems you are saying ANL has his own slender reed, as well. > > (I can't help thinking about Spinoza right about now and the way he was marked an atheist. I wonder if it might be worthwhile to compare LSV and ANL with Spinoza and Leibniz. More thinking out loud...) > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Oct 22 00:09:14 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 18:09:14 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <1413959328138.97631@unm.edu> References: <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> , <5445A403.5090005@mira.net> <1413862822335.60795@unm.edu>, <5445DCD6.7080902@mira.net> <1413867156880.88790@unm.edu>, <5446ECFB.3000906@mira.net> <1413959328138.97631@unm.edu> Message-ID: <5447581A.80000@mira.net> Annalisa, this is a lot for the list to handle, but I will insert brief responses to each of your points. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello Andy, > > I hope this is received in the spirit it was intended, however to aid in my learning, I'm listing the eight charges in my own language, using your paper as my scaffold. I realize I am sticking my neck out, but I am motivated to jump into my zone of proximal discomfort because I would like to be clearer about the disparities between ANL and LSV once and for all, and perhaps in my stumbling I shall be caught by others who see this more clearly than I do, including you, of course. I hope there will be something good at the end of this exercise. > > My process was to go down your prosecution list, which is made of 11 points (not 8). I've picked out what I detect to be these eight charges, but I am not sure if I have captured them correctly. Please take question marks set inside parens to mean the level or force of my cringing. In fact, the subject line of this post should be "One Big Cringe On a Tuesday Evening." > > Here goes: > -------------- > > _1st charge_: Environment as productive force > ---------- > ANL states that the relationship LSV claims a child possesses with the environment is based actually upon _productive forces_ the child has with the environment. I am guessing that this translates to what the child can do to transform the environment, or how the environment motivates the child to act? You make the observation that if ANL means "society" to be defined as "nation-state," then in the case of an adult, the relationship is not only with the environment, but with a society of others, and in mediation with them, in concert. > > Your contention with this line of thought is that we cannot supplant the Vygotsky's outline of the problem of the environment by analogy of the Soviet political system of historical materialism because... [doubt sets in] LSV is talking about the development of children who's minds have not yet formed. (???) > ---------- > My criticism is that analogies won't do. The psychological development of an individual is simply not the historical development of a nation's productive forces and an argument by analogy has no merit. > _2nd charge_: It is activity, not perezhivanie, to which the child relates > ---------- > ANL in his assertion of the child relating to her environment, claims she can only relate to the environment (that is, nature) via objects available to her, and by acting upon those objects. For this reason, ANL challenges LSV's definition of perezhivanie as a unity of the subject and the object. Specifically, personality factors in the child and those "actionable" objects in the environment. > > (I think you are crying foul here because perezhivanie as a theory had not yet been fully formed (?) or perhaps not fully understood by LSV's students, ANL being one of them.) > ---------- > Perezhivanie is a Russian word which would have been well understood by Vygotsky's students, even if they had never analysed it before. No, the point is a subtle one: the mediated relation to Nature is not *instead of* an immediate relation to Nature, but *as well as* an immediate relation to Nature. > _3rd charge_: Perezhivanie is a faulty circular construct > ---------- > ANL pushes against the legitimacy of perezhivanie as a _determining cause of development_ in the child, one of LSV's major claims, largely because it is circular. ANL claims perezhivanie in the definition actually takes the place of the personality, but how can perezhivanie both develop personality and be the personality? Therefore, ANL asserts that there must be _an activity_ external to the personality that exerts force for transformation upon the personality, making perezhivanie an activity, and not a relationship between the subject and the object/environment. ANL is saying the only pathway for the subject to relate to the environment is through nothing other than activity. > Yeah, ANL just really doesn't get it here. > ---------- > > _4th charge_: "Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism > ---------- > For LSV, in order for perezhivanie to "happen," there is a dependency on the level of sense and meaning in the child in order to detect what presents in the environment. Well, ANL counters, sense and meaning present in the child is really consciousness present in the child. Consciousness is just another word for intellect, as interpreted by ANL, and this is problematic, I think because it implies... [doubt sets in] this is hereditary- or biologically-driven alone. (??) > The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate at their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an intellectual relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims. > ---------- > > _5th charge_: The unit of analysis is activity - perezhivanie doesn't exist in the world, while activity does. > ---------- > ANL poses: Is the matter really about unity of the subject and the environment, or the relationship between the subject's consciousness and activity among objects in the environment (i.e. objective reality)? Thus LSV has failed to see the problem clearly, it is _activity_ that is the appropriate unit of analysis, not perezhivanie. > ---------- > Yeah, ANL is just posing his theory as against Vygotsky's. > _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning > ---------- > ANL believes that the mental representation in a child's awareness must _correspond_ directly to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but also how the object may relate and associate to other objects and their meanings. The example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I will call here for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", ANL takes exception with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a generalization to reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the existence of these word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they are what construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this because he considers consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. > ---------- > ANL believes that motivation determines perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in this contextt. > I'm not sure if this next is the same charge, if not, it is the... > > _7th charge_: Over-complexity of concepts and projection of idealism > ---------- > ANL attacks LSV's notion of concepts (scientific and everyday concepts) because the theory is too complicated (???), the reason being (per ANL) that LSV claims meaning is created through verbal communication --not speech, but communication-- of concepts alone (and not activity). This claim is in conflict with what you indicate is ANL's dogmatic concept of truth (as laid out in para above). The theory as posed by LSV can't involve material dealings, but "merely" communication using language. All this abstraction, according to ANL, effectively removes the child from the environment, rendering the child to be an "ideal subject" and the environment to be an "ideal environment," which, in interaction through communication, is supposed to develop the mind of the child. This is how it is ANL brands LSV an idealist and where the entire "bourgeois psychology" charge is derived. > ---------- > OK > _8th charge_: Reversion to subjective psychology > ---------- > In a coup de t?te (pun intended), ANL makes a last charge that LSV has shifted any "problem of the environment" onto an abstract level of the psyche, and as such, this move reverts to the realm of the subjective practices rampant in psychology studies of the day, making it, not only removed from the material methods vital to Marxist thought, but essentially unscientific and specious. > Yes, a false charge. > ---------- > > _Caveat_: > In my first run down the "prosecution line", I had seemed to miss two charges, that is, if I used your prompt for the "first charge" in your text. However backing up and going over it a second time, I tried to pull out the missing two from higher up the list. I'm fairly confident I did not do this correctly, and that I have failed spectacularly. I anticipate I shall be disabused from what I've set out here, which will make me glad. > > For what it is worth, this exercise was somewhat painful to do, if only because of my inner speech was screaming, "YEAH, BUT..." > You did a reasonable job there, Annalisa. Go to the top of the class! Andy > Regards, > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Oct 22 04:08:36 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 22:08:36 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics Practices In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <39089ddf0ba265a30feb7854f07324c1.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> <54471BF6.9010906@mira.net> Message-ID: <54479034.6070006@mira.net> Kylie & co., A fascinating study around a truly ingenious approach to the gendered division of labour - giving school kids E-textiles to construct an electronic device - total mixing up and confounding the gender stereotypes about sewing and electronics, etc. Some of the results were quite startling. That the young boy should not just abstain and demonstratively not pay attention, but pay active and supportive attention to the girl making the circuit with her needle-and-thread - an admired female-typical stance one would have thought a young male incapable of adopting with a female workmate. And that the gender-inscription of the sewing tools over-rode the greater experience that in this case the young boy had in using them, with the boy deferring to the less experienced girl in recognition of the gender-appropriateness of her "taking charge" with the needle-and-thread. This does cause one to think a little deeper into how we might conceptualise such gendered behaviours. As you would know, MCA has a strong preference for qualitative research, and studies with small sample sizes are not generally a problem, but so much seemed to hinge on the study of just *one* boy-girl team, that I am concerned about the capacity to generalise from such a base. There were about 80 youth in the activity as a whole, so I can only hope and presume that observation of the other 78 kids in some way guided the work focused on just 2. I must say, the analysis of the video data is very sophisticated and productive and you are to be congratulated on this aspect of the work. I see that you approach the gendering of the activities through the idea of the various *tools* being gendered, rather than the *practices* themselves. This is something that was really necessary for you to be able to make these observations, because the gendering of the activities is ambiguous, but not it seems the gendering of the tools. Is this a result of the study, or is it something you already knew or did you arrive at this by logic? Do you see any other opportunities for confounding gender stereotypes in this way? And finally, does the experience of working in ambiguous, even inverted gender-stereotyped activities like these have any outcome which carries over into a world where the gender division of labour lacks ambiguity? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Kylie Peppler wrote: > Thanks Andy! We're excited to discuss with the community and would > welcome any comments/questions on this emerging line of research! > Kylie > > --- > Kylie A. Peppler > Assistant Professor of Learning Sciences > Indiana University | School of Education > 1900 E 10th Street | Eigenmann 528 | Bloomington | IN | 47406 | > 812.856.8381 > > > On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 10:52 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > Here's the article for discussion Artin is introducing: > *Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics > Practices* > Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen Wohlwend. > Indiana University. > > The Maker movement promotes hands-on making, including crafts, > robotics, and computing. The movement?s potential to transform > education rests in our ability to address notable gender > disparities, particularly in science, technology, engineering, and > mathematics fields. E-textiles - the first female-dominated > computing community - provide inspiration for overcoming > long-standing cultural divides in classrooms. Analysis of > children?s > use of e-textiles reveals that materials like needles, fabric, and > conductive thread rupture traditional gender scripts around > electronics and implicitly gives girls hands-on access and > leadership roles. This reconceptualization of cultural divides as > sets of tacitly accepted practices rooted in gendered histories has > implications for reconceptualizing traditionally male-dominated > areas of schooling. > > Andy > (attached) > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Goncu, Artin wrote: > > Dear All, > > We are writing to let you know that the most recent issue of > MCA is out. > One of the articles published in this issue and being > introduced here for > discussion in referenced below. The authors of the article > have kindly > agreed to lead the discussion, and they are on xmca with us > now. The free > access to the article is possible through the links below. We > are looking > forward to hearing from you all. Best, ag > > Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting > and Electronics Practices > Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen Wohlwend > > www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762 > > > http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762#.VEZ25Ra_4wI > > Artin Goncu, Ph.D > Co-editor, Mind, Culture, and Activity:An International Journal > Professor Emeritus, > University of Illinois at Chicago > College of Education M/C 147 > 1040 W. Harrison St. > Chicago, IL 60607 > > > > > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Wed Oct 22 06:35:01 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 14:35:01 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The mirror has two candles In-Reply-To: <43C977F3-584D-4C36-BB25-6C00BF7FE120@uniandes.edu.co> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9052CB1@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <1413834192.73086.YahooMailNeo@web173203.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <43C977F3-584D-4C36-BB25-6C00BF7FE120@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <1413984901.15001.YahooMailNeo@web173203.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Dear Martin It is not a novel thing from you ; standing on the highest steps , looking down at others ; knowing yourself a continental philosopher , others poorly-trained people uttering trivialities nor even being able to express themselves in bad English !! We know each other from old times ! I didn't expect any response from you and I emphasized what I said was an aside notion and as an act of fulfilling a promise as against you who despise , contempt , come up with big heavy words of a continental philosophy but when cluttered and confused with what you yourself have burdened upon your own shoulders , come up with such a nice highly-appreciated decree that because of the multiplicity of the 'assumptions' , you are not able to provide good logical responses or 'as to your other interesting questions , they need a life's work (sic !)" . Of course , I do know what you mean by these words is because you are not someone and are defective in expression and understanding , you're not worth responding to !! Why are you sorry ? - Because I made you understand that speech is not always an activity . because it is intrinsically and genetically a convector but after it came into being , itself could also be a focal theme for activity proper ? A convinced morally-bound philosopher could as well have come up with a 'thanks ! friend !' which , if ever , would not have added a penny to this uneducated person . - because I kept to my word , read all through the long piece of 'The problem of the environment" --David Kellog as always helped--to find what you had not been able to 'find' ? Here is not a good place to say what comes up when we could accept that the inner speech is a tunnel through pure thinking and what difference it makes if , as I understood it , Vygotsky on one track from potentialities and predispositions to realizations would not use 'pure thinking' while , on the other --expanded utterance to pure thinking --, he quite strongly and splendidly endorses the point . - because you have the habit of refraining from directly getting involved in what is due and relevant to your addressee ? The other time , I put my response under exact numbering but you metamorphosed it outright . The other time , you wrote 'all that i'm saying is this and that about consciousness while it was not my point ; however I tried to have a response . This time , you say : "All that I am saying about LSV's account here , and elsewhere , is that "inner" doesn't mean "in the mind" . This , whatever , was not our point of discussion . It's a flee to darkness ! but how many times ?? Give me time to enlighten you : In the old times ! when you had not yet got to be a plump materialist just because of an act of overseeing images and ideal models times and times again as duplication of ""reality"" and lectured on the relevancy of Marx , you exactly had this to say : A spade is ideal even when used in digging or gardening ; an ax is ideal even when used for chopping a trunk of a tree and concluding thus "all material things (ARE) ideal" with no more explanatory points as to when , where , in what point of a continuum , etc. Today you say consciousness , inner speech (tacit - Vygotsky's) , mind and , forgive , what was the notorious example you gave to Andy which took him to complete silence --honestly I've not talked to Andy-- , and maybe the meaning of a word are all material (corporeal) things . What else could we expect from you ? What you are now saying out of place to the effect that 'inner' does not mean 'in the mind' is exactly what Ilyenko says in his 'ideal' and his 'dialectical logic' and in the whole of his philosophy . And he is just one Stalinist-stricken vein-cut suicider who has quite truthful plump appraisals for Leontiev . Yes , you say , they say , I say 'inner' does not mean 'in the mind' . what has been said is 'with the help of the mind' but within practices or , better , in the process of activity as 'ideal' until reification is reached and finished product at hand . And why 'ideals' are necessary because we cannot directly or unmediatedly get to the work of the world transformation according to our needs and motives just through our senses . All this does not mean I don't accept Vygotsky was a genius of the time or even that activity was a monopoly of Leontiev's . Activity is something always on the tip of Vygotsky's tongue as though he wants to say : It's all there , why more talk about it . And though I'm poor in studying , I could say the tone of Leontiev's piece is 'harsh' and unforgivable and at times groundless and I'm convinced in this and in that , that the dealing of man or child with the world or Nature is quite sufficiently discussed and crystallized in pieces 3 and 4 of Vygosky's work and also , I'm sure , in T&S . in the sense that it's this dealing with , that brings about or necessitates communication and as , some people here have always tried to prove , everything ends primarily with dialogues even to the boundary of 'talk as action' . Dear friend , I think what you present here as a philosophy is a philosophy of 'replacement' or 'substitution' even according to the continental tenets . You had this from another friend also . Best Haydi ________________________________ From: ?Martin John Packer? ?? To: ?Haydi Zulfei? ??; ?"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"? ?? Sent: Monday, 20 October 2014, 21:47:56 Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] The mirror has two candles Hi Haydi, I'm sorry, but I'm not sure what you want to convince us of. All that I am saying about LSV's account here, and elsewhere, is that "inner" doesn't mean "in the mind." For example, in Chapter 7 of T&L there are seven planes, each more "inner" than the last. What could this mean - that each plane is more "mindy"? And earlier in the book, self-directed speech out loud is already "inner speech." No, inner means "personal." Each of us masters our consciousness using the resources made available by our culture. Martin On Oct 20, 2014, at 2:43 PM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: > Dear Martin et al > Excuse me because everybody is tired with the old thread but to keep to my word as posing the idea of 'pure thinkg' as the last phase of the 'internalization process' , I'd like to paste the two last paragraphs of Vygosky's "The problem of the environment" here as a parenthetical notion : > > "With the help of speech [as one component of the environment] a child can converse with other people around him and they, in turn, can talk to him. But now take each of us. You know that each of us possesses so called inner speech and that this inner speech, i.e. the fact that we are able to formulate in silence for ourselves ideas embodied in words, plays a major role in our thinking. This role is so great, that some researchers have (even), albeit incorrectly, identified the process of speech with the process of thinking. But, in actual fact, for every one of us, this inner speech is one of the most important functions we have at our disposal. When this inner speech in human beings becomes disturbed due to some disorder, (it can result in the most severe disruption of the entire thinking process.) > How did this process of inner speech in each of us come about? Research has revealed that the emergence of inner speech is based on external speech. Originally, for a child, speech represents a means of communication between people, it manifests itself as a social function, in its social role. But gradually a child learns how to use speech to serve himself, his internal processes. Now speech becomes not just a means of communication with other people, but also a means for the child?s (own inner thinking processes). Then it no longer represents that speech which we use aloud when we communicate with one another, but it becomes an inner, silent, tacit speech. But where did speech as a means of thinking come from? From speech as a means of communication. From the external activity which the child was involved in with the people around him, appeared one of the most important inner functions without which man?s (very thinking process) could not exist." > > If you are not still convinced , I'll try to find 'pure thinking' as well . > And please note the idea of 'mastering' the consciousness a few paragraphs above . One might think mastering the consciousness how and by what ? > Emphases through parentheses are mine . > Best > Haydi > > > > ________________________________ > From: ?Greg Thompson? ?? > To: ?"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"? ?? > Sent: Monday, 20 October 2014, 10:57:58 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The mirror has two candles > > > > Larry, > Can you help me to think through this: > Are Acheulean hand axes the same as the concept of "symmetry"? > > It seems the critical point about "symmetry" (or any other mathematical > concept) is that it takes on meaning when it is seen in process within some > system of relations. Just as an Acheulean hand axe lying there isn't of > much use - symmetry becomes useful only when it is taken up as a part of a > process, and hence as part of a system of relations (why are we engaging in > making something "symmetrical"?). > > Again here I'm wondering if the metaphor of inside/outside of a system of > relations might be useful for re-thinking the ideal/material in such a way > that avoids seeing this distinction as a matter of ontological dualism. > > I could use some help as to whether or not this would jibe with Vygotsky's > formulation of the problem. (and extending to some related names in Russia > at the time of Vygotsky, I'd be curious if anyone would have any thoughts > on Volosinov's and Bakhtin's metaphor of inside/outside - does it > necessarily have to be based on an ontological dualism?) > > Just trying to get my head around how we might conceive of the plump > doubles that Martin has pointed us to... > > -greg > > > > On Mon, Oct 20, 2014 at 7:44 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > >> I want to respond to this theme by bringing in the notion of *mediated >> action* AS the best *unit of analysis*. Wertsch weaved together Vygotsky >> and Bakhtin and showed utterances AS *mediated actions* >> The place of the *ideal* in relation to *objects* is the theme. >> >> Now I want to weave in Anna Sfard's exploration of mathematical *entities* >> AS having a dual *nature*. This extension is from an article she just >> posted on the web [On the Dual Nature of Mathematical Conceptions] >> >> Page 4 is her elaborating this dual nature as follows. >> >> [is] Treating mathematical conceptions AS IF they referred to some abstract >> OBJECTS the only possibility of relating to mathematical concepts? THIS >> KIND of conception [interpretation] Anna labels *structural*. THIS TYPE of >> utterance [mediated action] prevails in mathematical discourse situations >> as mediational means >> However, there ARE different KINDS of mathematical definitions that >> *reveal* quite a different approach to these same concepts. >> Functions can be defined not only AS *a set of ordered pairs* BUT ALSO AS a >> process of *getting from one system to another* [skemp referenced] >> >> Symmetry can BE conceived [interpreted] AS a static property of geometric >> forms BUT ALSO AS a *kind* of transformation. This latter TYPE of >> description [genre] SPEAKS AS IF the mathematical notion is about >> processes, algorithms, ACTIONS, [rather than speaking of these mathematical >> notions AS IF they ARE *objects* >> THIS TYPE OF GENRE *reflects* an Operational interpretation [rather than >> structural interpretation] of mathematical conceptions. >> >> Seeing a mathematical *entity* AS *an object* *means* being capable of >> gesturing [referring] to the mathematical concept AS IF the mathematical >> concept were A REAL THING [a static structure actually existing somewhere >> in time and space but timeless] It also *means* being able to *recognize* >> the *idea* at a glance AND to manipulate this mathematical conception AS IF >> the structure existed AS A WHOLE [without going into details or analysis] >> AS AN EXISTING OBJECT. >> >> Using Hadamard's *metaphor* we can SAY that *structural genres* endows a >> concept with a KIND of *physiognomy* which ALLOWS a person to think of this >> concept AS a unique, THING [entity] however complicated this concept may >> BE. >> >> JUST AS WE SEE A FACE OF A MAN. >> >> In contrast, interpreting A concept AS A PROCESS implies regarding THIS >> PARTICULAR mathematical concept AS A POTENTIAL [existant] rather than an >> ACTUAL EXISTING ENTITY. In operational kinds of genres the *entity* COMES >> INTO EXISTENCE upon request in a sequence of actions. >> THUS >> whereas the structural genre IS timeless [static] instantaneous, and >> integrative, the operational genre is dynamic, sequential, and detailed. In >> other words different mediational means within *mediated action* produce >> radically different notions of the place of concepts as interpretants that >> exist [in actuality or in potential] >> >> THEREFORE the play involves different TYPES of *seeing* and different TYPES >> of *saying*. >> >> BOTH are equally *true* >> >> I have been exploring *objects of activity* *units of analysis* and >> *mediated action* through Anna Sfard's exploration of mathematical >> conceptions which do not appear through the 5 senses but DO EXIST. >> >> Larry >> >> On Sun, Oct 19, 2014 at 4:00 PM, Huw Lloyd >> wrote: >> >>> Hi David, >>> >>> I don't think anyone is going to argue against the paper's defamatory >>> quality. Everything he says against LSV can be taken with a pinch of >> salt >>> if we assume he was trying to protect his colleagues. >>> >>> What remains is therefore what is countered and proposed with respect to >>> the subject of the environment. >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 19 October 2014 23:38, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>>> First of all, a word of appreciation to Martin for his candle in the >>>> mirror and his delightful formulation of "Plump Materialism", and also >>>> to Michael for recognizing the beauty of the image and using it to >>>> revitalize a thread that was growing somewhat tiresome to me: no fault >>>> of the participants; it was my own inability to see past "fatalistic >>>> determinism", "captive to bourgeois theories", and ANL's other fatuous >>>> formulae. As Mike points out, this is not just name calling: these are >>>> blood libels. >>>> >>>> Secondly, let me put in a word for Andy's counter-blast. For those of >>>> you who have not read it; it is available on Andy's academia.edu page, >>>> and it's well worth a look: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> http://www.academia.edu/7511935/The_Problem_of_the_Environment._A_Defence_of_Vygotsky >>>> >>>> Thirdly--can I draw attention to the top of page fourteen of ANL's >>>> dishonest and dishonorable hatchet job? Here he rounds on Basov for >>>> non-Marxist, idealist notion that humans in some way "double" the >>>> natural environment. ANL returns to this theme at the bottom of the >>>> page where he says: >>>> >>>> "To the animal, however, any ?artificial? object created by humans is >>>> simply >>>> a natural object, it is nature because the animal?s relation toward it >>>> will always >>>> be an instinctive relation. Thus, of course, in reality there is no >>>> doubling of the >>>> environment. The environment as a whole is transformed into a human >>>> environment, >>>> that is, for the human being, into a social environment, based on the >>>> fact that humans themselves relate to it in human terms, that is, as >>>> social humans." >>>> >>>> Note the use of "Thus"; it marks a shameless non sequitur. First of >>>> all, it is a non sequitur to say that because animals and very small >>>> children treat i-phones as natural objects, THEREFORE there is no >>>> doubling of the environment Secondly, it is a non sequitur to say that >>>> the environment "as a whole" becomes a human environment (because >>>> animals and infants do NOT see it that way??) without any trace of the >>>> natural environment. But the biggest non-sequitur is the least >>>> explicit: it is the insinuation that the process of social >>>> idealization of nature that we call enculturation is prima facie >>>> subversive of Marxism. >>>> >>>> Consider the following, from a great subversive of Marxism and primal >>>> plump materialist: >>>> >>>> "We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. >>>> A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a >>>> bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. >>>> But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is >>>> this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he >>>> erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a >>>> result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its >>>> commencement." (Capital, Vol 1, Chapter III, Part 7) >>>> >>>> What is THIS if not a doubling of reality--a mirror with two candles? >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> >>>> have a look: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 20 October 2014 00:15, Huw Lloyd wrote: >>>>> Here's an example memory paper abstract by Sereda (2011), titled "A >>>>> Theoretical Model of Memory >>>>> as a Mechanism for Systematically Organizing Individual Experience" >>>>> >>>>> "In order to improve the explanatory potential of activity theory, >> this >>>>> article >>>>> proposes a theoretical model of human memory as a mechanism for >>>>> the systematic organization of individual experience, organization >> that >>>>> is an essential condition for performing future activity. The model >>> rests >>>>> on the idea that the main factor in human memory is the motivational >>>>> and semantic sets of personality and thus orientation toward the >> future >>>>> (prospective orientation)." >>>>> >>>>> The storehouse metaphor as used in psychology merely reflects a >> rather >>>> poor >>>>> approach. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> On 19 October 2014 15:20, Glassman, Michael >>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hi Larry, >>>>>> >>>>>> I renamed this thread because it seems to be taking a tangent from >> the >>>>>> very rich discussion on LSV and ANL, but perhaps it might circle >> back. >>>>>> Anyway, I thought Martin's very interesting illustration deserves a >>>> moment >>>>>> of fame. I wonder if memory is the right word in current >>>> circumstance. In >>>>>> U.S. psychology memory is very often viewed as a storehouse of >>>> information >>>>>> where you send your messages back to retrieve information when >> needed >>> to >>>>>> apply to the current situation. Do you think Pierce would see the >>>> overall >>>>>> process this way (did he actually talk about memory?) For him it >>> seems >>>> it >>>>>> would be part of a more active process of establishing relationships >>> of >>>>>> that which came before with that which is currently being explored. >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>>> on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com [lpscholar2@gmail.com] >>>>>> Sent: Sunday, October 19, 2014 6:40 AM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael Glassman and Martin and How >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I want to ex-tend the exploration of *models* and *memories* and >>>>>> *contextualism* as linked in Michael?s rejoinder to Martin. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael wrote ?if ALL you can *see* [perceive] is what is IN the >>> mirror >>>>>> [metaphor of reflection AS mirroring] how do you ?know? there IS a >>>> mirror >>>>>> >>>>>> The IF IMPLIED is the ?ALL? . >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> However, is that ?all there IS? in *seeing*? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> IS ?memory* also existent as an existent IN seeing? >>>>>> >>>>>> In other words, do *interpretants* ACTUALLY exist IN FACT? [as such] >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Umberto Eco suggests there is both ORPHIC knowing/seeing [when >> Picasso >>>>>> paints THAT PARTICULAR yellow shoe in a painting the SINGULARITY of >>> THAT >>>>>> experience IS ?orphic? >>>>>> >>>>>> POETS and artists are ?biased? to privilege THIS WAY of knowing >>>> [Peirce's >>>>>> secondness as orphic and possibly orphaned] >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> HOWEVER, Umberto Eco suggests that this orphic ?knowing* is also >>>>>> *indicative* [indexical] of further *interpreting* AND THIS TYPE of >>>>>> *knowing* EX-TENDS Orphic knowing. [Peirce's tiredness] >>>>>> >>>>>> Now in Peirce's metaphysics THIS interpreting creating interpretants >>>> also >>>>>> is EXISTING as facts. >>>>>> >>>>>> Is this transforming orphic [what IS present] TO forming >>> *interpretants* >>>>>> AS *something* that actually exists {through the interpreting >> process} >>>>>> INCLUDE memory but that IS NOT ALL. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> IS creative imagining potentially existent? that goes BEYOND >> memory? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I believe Umberto Eco?s question of a deeper knowing than >>> orphic/orphan >>>>>> knowing *things-in-themselves* EX-tending BEYOND the orphic >>>> [secondness] to >>>>>> INCLUDE interpreting and forming actual *interpretants* [tiredness] >>>> must be >>>>>> considered within the memory process. >>>>>> >>>>>> This returns to *models* that are necessary but NOT ALL there *is*. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> The *relation* between *orphic* knowing and *interpreting* knowing >>>> seems a >>>>>> KEY question [and may ex-tend back into metaphysics? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Larry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Sent from Windows Mail >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> From: Glassman, Michael >>>>>> Sent: ?Saturday?, ?October? ?18?, ?2014 ?5?:?18? ?PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Martin, >>>>>> >>>>>> That's a very interesting metaphor, but let me see if I can take it >> a >>>> step >>>>>> further. Basically you seem to be saying that Vygotsky is making a >>>>>> mechanistic argument - I'm not talking about the more colloquial >>>> expression >>>>>> of mechanistic but the one that Pepper talks about in World >>> Hypothesis. >>>>>> You are looking into the mirror and seeing the reflection of a >> candle >>> - >>>> but >>>>>> you are making the assumption that there must be a mechanism that is >>>>>> causing the reflection of the candle. You cannot know this >> mechanism >>>>>> itself - it is too difficult to reach - but you can build models >> that >>>> bring >>>>>> us closer to understanding. This I think is almost exactly how >> Pepper >>>>>> discusses this root metaphor. Our goal as scientists is to find the >>>>>> mediate description of the underlying mechanism. This >>>>>> Pragmatists/Conextualists would say this is dualism - not the >> dualism >>>> you >>>>>> get from Formism where you depend on your mind to bring you closer >> to >>> a >>>>>> known but unreachable ideal, but in the sense that there is this >>>> mechanism >>>>>> that exists that is somehow separate from and causing the reflection >>> in >>>> the >>>>>> mirror. So the Contextualist asks, if all you can see is what is in >>> the >>>>>> mirror how do you know there is a mirror. That is the only >>> information >>>> you >>>>>> have and you have to base all interpretation of the world on that >>>>>> information - to suggest you are looking at a reflection is an >>>> assumption >>>>>> based on a belief system that there must be causing what you are >>>> seeing. I >>>>>> think you are right, Vygotsky wants to assume the mirror, but in the >>> end >>>>>> doesn't that suggest a dualism to his thinking. >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>>> on behalf of Martin John Packer [mpacker@uniandes.edu.co] >>>>>> Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 6:38 PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of analysis? LSV versus ANL >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Michael, >>>>>> >>>>>> LSV points out that no proper science sets out to study appearances. >>>> Every >>>>>> science studies entities that exist, in order to *explain* >>> appearance. >>>> One >>>>>> of his examples is from the science of optics. When we place a >> burning >>>>>> candle in front of a mirror there *appears* to be a second candle >>>> burning >>>>>> behind the mirror, or 'in' the mirror. The scientist doesn't study >>> that >>>>>> second candle. What he or she studies is the first candle, and the >>>> mirror, >>>>>> in order to discover principles by which to explain why an 'image' >> of >>> a >>>>>> second candle appears, apparently located 'in' the mirror. >>>>>> >>>>>> It's the same with the mind. It *appears* to us (at least to those >> of >>> us >>>>>> raised in western, scientific cultures) that our thoughts and >> feelings >>>>>> exist in a special, internal, subjective, hidden place that we call >>> "the >>>>>> mind." A scientific psychology, says LSV, needs to try to explain >> how >>>> that >>>>>> appearance is possible. It's not too difficult, in fact: our verbal >>>>>> thoughts, our private subvocal speech, is possible, first, because >> we >>>> can >>>>>> use vocal speech to direct our own actions and second, because a >> fibre >>>>>> bundle called the arcuate fasciculus forms between Broca's area and >>>>>> Wernicke's area (to considerably simply the neuroanatomy and >>>>>> neurofunctioning). The appearance of a "mind in the head" is a >> *folk* >>>>>> psychology: it is simply one way, among several, in which people try >>> to >>>>>> make sense of an experience that they have; it is the way our own >>>>>> psychological processes *appear* to us. Scientific psychology cannot >>>> study >>>>>> the mind, any more than it can study the second candle. It can, >>> however, >>>>>> set out to *explain* the mind, and that is part of what LSV did. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Oct 18, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Glassman, Michael >> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I sort of feel like (at this point) Vygotsky did open himself up >>> for >>>>>> being critiqued for going inside the head. It was a choice, I don't >>>> think >>>>>> he was willing to give up the idea of individual development (which >> I >>>> think >>>>>> you have to do if you are going to escape dualism - because what >>>> develops >>>>>> if you can't say there is something inside the head that develops >>>> (remember >>>>>> I am suggesting individual development here). >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 882 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From chronaki@uth.gr Tue Oct 21 22:51:19 2014 From: chronaki@uth.gr (chronaki) Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 08:51:19 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [xmca] Friends from Greece In-Reply-To: <8F1763FF251943AC8F9A3E87BB21F3BE@nikaVAIO> References: <8F1763FF251943AC8F9A3E87BB21F3BE@nikaVAIO> Message-ID: <544745D7.2040707@uth.gr> K???????, ???? ???? ??? ?? ?????? -???? ??? ????. ???????? ??? ????? ??? ??????????? ?? ?????? ?? ??????? ?? ????????? ????! ??????????? ??????? ??????.. ?? ???, ??? ??? ????? ?? ????? ?????? ?????? ?? ??? ?????. ????? ?? ????? ??? ????. ???? ??????????? ?? ????????? ??? ?????????? ?????? ?????? ??? ?? ISCAR ???? ?????. ????? ???????????? ????. On 08-Feb-12 8:19 PM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: > Hello Ulvi, > > if your friend wants to swift his researching line by implementing > Vygotsky's play in science and /or environmental education, I am in. > Let him/her to think of that dimension, it may become very interesting. > > Katerina Plakitsi > Assistant Professor of Science Education > School of Education > University of Ioannina > University Campus Dourouti 45110 > Ioannina > Greece > tel. +302651005771 > fax. +302651005842 > mobile.phone +306972898463 > > http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits > http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr > http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp > > -----?????? ??????----- From: ulvi icil > Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2012 5:59 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [xmca] Friends from Greece > > Hello, > > Is there any friend from Greece interested in Vygotsky's approach to > play? > I have a friend graduated from Greek Language who intends to make a > research on children's play in Greece. > Ulvi > __________________________________________ > _____ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > __________________________________________ > _____ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca From kplakits@gmail.com Wed Oct 22 09:06:04 2014 From: kplakits@gmail.com (Katerina Plakitsi) Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 19:06:04 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [xmca] Friends from Greece In-Reply-To: <544745D7.2040707@uth.gr> References: <8F1763FF251943AC8F9A3E87BB21F3BE@nikaVAIO> <544745D7.2040707@uth.gr> Message-ID: <06F1B613-B4D6-4AA4-90A6-EF2F388BF4B1@gmail.com> ?????. ?? ?????? ????? ??? 19-21 ?????????? ??? ?? ???????? ?????? "?? ?? ??? ???????????". ???????? ??? ?? iPhone ??? 22 ??? 2014, 08:51, ?/? chronaki ??????: > K???????, > ???? ???? ??? ?? ?????? -???? ??? ????. > ???????? ??? ????? ??? ??????????? ?? ?????? ?? ??????? ?? ????????? ????! > ??????????? ??????? ??????.. ?? ???, ??? ??? ????? ?? ????? ?????? ?????? ?? ??? ?????. > ????? ?? ????? ??? ????. ???? ??????????? ?? ????????? ??? ?????????? ?????? ?????? ??? ?? ISCAR ???? ?????. > ????? ???????????? > ????. > > >> On 08-Feb-12 8:19 PM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >> Hello Ulvi, >> >> if your friend wants to swift his researching line by implementing Vygotsky's play in science and /or environmental education, I am in. Let him/her to think of that dimension, it may become very interesting. >> >> Katerina Plakitsi >> Assistant Professor of Science Education >> School of Education >> University of Ioannina >> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >> Ioannina >> Greece >> tel. +302651005771 >> fax. +302651005842 >> mobile.phone +306972898463 >> >> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >> >> -----?????? ??????----- From: ulvi icil >> Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2012 5:59 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [xmca] Friends from Greece >> >> Hello, >> >> Is there any friend from Greece interested in Vygotsky's approach to play? >> I have a friend graduated from Greek Language who intends to make a >> research on children's play in Greece. >> Ulvi >> __________________________________________ >> _____ >> xmca mailing list >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >> __________________________________________ >> _____ >> xmca mailing list >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Oct 22 09:59:27 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 16:59:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [xmca] Friends from Greece In-Reply-To: <06F1B613-B4D6-4AA4-90A6-EF2F388BF4B1@gmail.com> References: <8F1763FF251943AC8F9A3E87BB21F3BE@nikaVAIO> <544745D7.2040707@uth.gr> <06F1B613-B4D6-4AA4-90A6-EF2F388BF4B1@gmail.com> Message-ID: <081333B1-B72B-433B-A25F-C024A9612B7B@uniandes.edu.co> I'm afraid this is all Greek to me... But I like the idea of ISCAR in Crete! Martin On Oct 22, 2014, at 11:06 AM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: > ?????. ?? ?????? ????? ??? 19-21 ?????????? ??? ?? ???????? ?????? "?? ?? ??? ???????????". > > ???????? ??? ?? iPhone ??? > > 22 ??? 2014, 08:51, ?/? chronaki ??????: > >> K???????, >> ???? ???? ??? ?? ?????? -???? ??? ????. >> ???????? ??? ????? ??? ??????????? ?? ?????? ?? ??????? ?? ????????? ????! >> ??????????? ??????? ??????.. ?? ???, ??? ??? ????? ?? ????? ?????? ?????? ?? ??? ?????. >> ????? ?? ????? ??? ????. ???? ??????????? ?? ????????? ??? ?????????? ?????? ?????? ??? ?? ISCAR ???? ?????. >> ????? ???????????? >> ????. >> >> >>> On 08-Feb-12 8:19 PM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>> Hello Ulvi, >>> >>> if your friend wants to swift his researching line by implementing Vygotsky's play in science and /or environmental education, I am in. Let him/her to think of that dimension, it may become very interesting. >>> >>> Katerina Plakitsi >>> Assistant Professor of Science Education >>> School of Education >>> University of Ioannina >>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>> Ioannina >>> Greece >>> tel. +302651005771 >>> fax. +302651005842 >>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>> >>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>> >>> -----?????? ??????----- From: ulvi icil >>> Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2012 5:59 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [xmca] Friends from Greece >>> >>> Hello, >>> >>> Is there any friend from Greece interested in Vygotsky's approach to play? >>> I have a friend graduated from Greek Language who intends to make a >>> research on children's play in Greece. >>> Ulvi >>> __________________________________________ >>> _____ >>> xmca mailing list >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>> __________________________________________ >>> _____ >>> xmca mailing list >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >> > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Wed Oct 22 10:05:58 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 19:05:58 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [xmca] Friends from Greece In-Reply-To: <081333B1-B72B-433B-A25F-C024A9612B7B@uniandes.edu.co> References: <8F1763FF251943AC8F9A3E87BB21F3BE@nikaVAIO> <544745D7.2040707@uth.gr> <06F1B613-B4D6-4AA4-90A6-EF2F388BF4B1@gmail.com> <081333B1-B72B-433B-A25F-C024A9612B7B@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: You use Auto-translate. Carol 2014-10-22 18:59 GMT+02:00 Martin John Packer : > I'm afraid this is all Greek to me... But I like the idea of ISCAR in > Crete! > > Martin > > On Oct 22, 2014, at 11:06 AM, Katerina Plakitsi > wrote: > > > ?????. ?? ?????? ????? ??? 19-21 ?????????? ??? ?? ???????? ?????? "?? > ?? ??? ???????????". > > > > ???????? ??? ?? iPhone ??? > > > > 22 ??? 2014, 08:51, ?/? chronaki ??????: > > > >> K???????, > >> ???? ???? ??? ?? ?????? -???? ??? ????. > >> ???????? ??? ????? ??? ??????????? ?? ?????? ?? ??????? ?? ????????? > ????! > >> ??????????? ??????? ??????.. ?? ???, ??? ??? ????? ?? ????? ?????? > ?????? ?? ??? ?????. > >> ????? ?? ????? ??? ????. ???? ??????????? ?? ????????? ??? ?????????? > ?????? ?????? ??? ?? ISCAR ???? ?????. > >> ????? ???????????? > >> ????. > >> > >> > >>> On 08-Feb-12 8:19 PM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: > >>> Hello Ulvi, > >>> > >>> if your friend wants to swift his researching line by implementing > Vygotsky's play in science and /or environmental education, I am in. Let > him/her to think of that dimension, it may become very interesting. > >>> > >>> Katerina Plakitsi > >>> Assistant Professor of Science Education > >>> School of Education > >>> University of Ioannina > >>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 > >>> Ioannina > >>> Greece > >>> tel. +302651005771 > >>> fax. +302651005842 > >>> mobile.phone +306972898463 > >>> > >>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits > >>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr > >>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp > >>> > >>> -----?????? ??????----- From: ulvi icil > >>> Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2012 5:59 PM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [xmca] Friends from Greece > >>> > >>> Hello, > >>> > >>> Is there any friend from Greece interested in Vygotsky's approach to > play? > >>> I have a friend graduated from Greek Language who intends to make a > >>> research on children's play in Greece. > >>> Ulvi > >>> __________________________________________ > >>> _____ > >>> xmca mailing list > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > >>> __________________________________________ > >>> _____ > >>> xmca mailing list > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > >> > > > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Oct 22 10:46:08 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 17:46:08 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [xmca] Friends from Greece In-Reply-To: References: <8F1763FF251943AC8F9A3E87BB21F3BE@nikaVAIO> <544745D7.2040707@uth.gr> <06F1B613-B4D6-4AA4-90A6-EF2F388BF4B1@gmail.com> <081333B1-B72B-433B-A25F-C024A9612B7B@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: I did! But it still seems like a personal message. Martin On Oct 22, 2014, at 12:05 PM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > You use Auto-translate. > > Carol > > 2014-10-22 18:59 GMT+02:00 Martin John Packer : > >> I'm afraid this is all Greek to me... But I like the idea of ISCAR in >> Crete! >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 22, 2014, at 11:06 AM, Katerina Plakitsi >> wrote: >> >>> ?????. ?? ?????? ????? ??? 19-21 ?????????? ??? ?? ???????? ?????? "?? >> ?? ??? ???????????". >>> >>> ???????? ??? ?? iPhone ??? >>> >>> 22 ??? 2014, 08:51, ?/? chronaki ??????: >>> >>>> K???????, >>>> ???? ???? ??? ?? ?????? -???? ??? ????. >>>> ???????? ??? ????? ??? ??????????? ?? ?????? ?? ??????? ?? ????????? >> ????! >>>> ??????????? ??????? ??????.. ?? ???, ??? ??? ????? ?? ????? ?????? >> ?????? ?? ??? ?????. >>>> ????? ?? ????? ??? ????. ???? ??????????? ?? ????????? ??? ?????????? >> ?????? ?????? ??? ?? ISCAR ???? ?????. >>>> ????? ???????????? >>>> ????. >>>> >>>> >>>>> On 08-Feb-12 8:19 PM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>> Hello Ulvi, >>>>> >>>>> if your friend wants to swift his researching line by implementing >> Vygotsky's play in science and /or environmental education, I am in. Let >> him/her to think of that dimension, it may become very interesting. >>>>> >>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>> Assistant Professor of Science Education >>>>> School of Education >>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>> Ioannina >>>>> Greece >>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>> >>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>> >>>>> -----?????? ??????----- From: ulvi icil >>>>> Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2012 5:59 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [xmca] Friends from Greece >>>>> >>>>> Hello, >>>>> >>>>> Is there any friend from Greece interested in Vygotsky's approach to >> play? >>>>> I have a friend graduated from Greek Language who intends to make a >>>>> research on children's play in Greece. >>>>> Ulvi >>>>> __________________________________________ >>>>> _____ >>>>> xmca mailing list >>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>>> __________________________________________ >>>>> _____ >>>>> xmca mailing list >>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>> >>> >> >> >> > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From carolmacdon@gmail.com Wed Oct 22 12:17:15 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 21:17:15 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [xmca] Friends from Greece In-Reply-To: References: <8F1763FF251943AC8F9A3E87BB21F3BE@nikaVAIO> <544745D7.2040707@uth.gr> <06F1B613-B4D6-4AA4-90A6-EF2F388BF4B1@gmail.com> <081333B1-B72B-433B-A25F-C024A9612B7B@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: It seems the same to me too. But the original message was in a more substantial block. Please check this. Carol On 22 October 2014 19:46, Martin John Packer wrote: > I did! But it still seems like a personal message. > > Martin > > On Oct 22, 2014, at 12:05 PM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > > > You use Auto-translate. > > > > Carol > > > > 2014-10-22 18:59 GMT+02:00 Martin John Packer : > > > >> I'm afraid this is all Greek to me... But I like the idea of ISCAR in > >> Crete! > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Oct 22, 2014, at 11:06 AM, Katerina Plakitsi > >> wrote: > >> > >>> ?????. ?? ?????? ????? ??? 19-21 ?????????? ??? ?? ???????? ?????? "?? > >> ?? ??? ???????????". > >>> > >>> ???????? ??? ?? iPhone ??? > >>> > >>> 22 ??? 2014, 08:51, ?/? chronaki ??????: > >>> > >>>> K???????, > >>>> ???? ???? ??? ?? ?????? -???? ??? ????. > >>>> ???????? ??? ????? ??? ??????????? ?? ?????? ?? ??????? ?? ????????? > >> ????! > >>>> ??????????? ??????? ??????.. ?? ???, ??? ??? ????? ?? ????? ?????? > >> ?????? ?? ??? ?????. > >>>> ????? ?? ????? ??? ????. ???? ??????????? ?? ????????? ??? ?????????? > >> ?????? ?????? ??? ?? ISCAR ???? ?????. > >>>> ????? ???????????? > >>>> ????. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> On 08-Feb-12 8:19 PM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: > >>>>> Hello Ulvi, > >>>>> > >>>>> if your friend wants to swift his researching line by implementing > >> Vygotsky's play in science and /or environmental education, I am in. Let > >> him/her to think of that dimension, it may become very interesting. > >>>>> > >>>>> Katerina Plakitsi > >>>>> Assistant Professor of Science Education > >>>>> School of Education > >>>>> University of Ioannina > >>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 > >>>>> Ioannina > >>>>> Greece > >>>>> tel. +302651005771 > >>>>> fax. +302651005842 > >>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 > >>>>> > >>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits > >>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr > >>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp > >>>>> > >>>>> -----?????? ??????----- From: ulvi icil > >>>>> Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2012 5:59 PM > >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>> Subject: [xmca] Friends from Greece > >>>>> > >>>>> Hello, > >>>>> > >>>>> Is there any friend from Greece interested in Vygotsky's approach to > >> play? > >>>>> I have a friend graduated from Greek Language who intends to make a > >>>>> research on children's play in Greece. > >>>>> Ulvi > >>>>> __________________________________________ > >>>>> _____ > >>>>> xmca mailing list > >>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > >>>>> __________________________________________ > >>>>> _____ > >>>>> xmca mailing list > >>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > >>>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From chronaki@uth.gr Wed Oct 22 12:24:18 2014 From: chronaki@uth.gr (chronaki) Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 22:24:18 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [xmca] Friends from Greece In-Reply-To: References: <8F1763FF251943AC8F9A3E87BB21F3BE@nikaVAIO> <544745D7.2040707@uth.gr> <06F1B613-B4D6-4AA4-90A6-EF2F388BF4B1@gmail.com> <081333B1-B72B-433B-A25F-C024A9612B7B@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <54480462.5040807@uth.gr> Colleagues I do apologize for sending that message to the whole list. It was a personal note and sent out by mistake. all the best! a. PS. If anything related to ISCAR will happen in Crete we will inform the community and we will be happy to host you! On 22-Oct-14 10:17 PM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > It seems the same to me too. But the original message was in a more > substantial block. Please check this. > Carol > > On 22 October 2014 19:46, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> I did! But it still seems like a personal message. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 22, 2014, at 12:05 PM, Carol Macdonald >> wrote: >> >>> You use Auto-translate. >>> >>> Carol >>> >>> 2014-10-22 18:59 GMT+02:00 Martin John Packer : >>> >>>> I'm afraid this is all Greek to me... But I like the idea of ISCAR in >>>> Crete! >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Oct 22, 2014, at 11:06 AM, Katerina Plakitsi >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> ?????. ?? ?????? ????? ??? 19-21 ?????????? ??? ?? ???????? ?????? "?? >>>> ?? ??? ???????????". >>>>> ???????? ??? ?? iPhone ??? >>>>> >>>>> 22 ??? 2014, 08:51, ?/? chronaki ??????: >>>>> >>>>>> K???????, >>>>>> ???? ???? ??? ?? ?????? -???? ??? ????. >>>>>> ???????? ??? ????? ??? ??????????? ?? ?????? ?? ??????? ?? ????????? >>>> ????! >>>>>> ??????????? ??????? ??????.. ?? ???, ??? ??? ????? ?? ????? ?????? >>>> ?????? ?? ??? ?????. >>>>>> ????? ?? ????? ??? ????. ???? ??????????? ?? ????????? ??? ?????????? >>>> ?????? ?????? ??? ?? ISCAR ???? ?????. >>>>>> ????? ???????????? >>>>>> ????. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 08-Feb-12 8:19 PM, Katerina Plakitsi wrote: >>>>>>> Hello Ulvi, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> if your friend wants to swift his researching line by implementing >>>> Vygotsky's play in science and /or environmental education, I am in. Let >>>> him/her to think of that dimension, it may become very interesting. >>>>>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>>>>> Assistant Professor of Science Education >>>>>>> School of Education >>>>>>> University of Ioannina >>>>>>> University Campus Dourouti 45110 >>>>>>> Ioannina >>>>>>> Greece >>>>>>> tel. +302651005771 >>>>>>> fax. +302651005842 >>>>>>> mobile.phone +306972898463 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>>>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr >>>>>>> http://www.lib.uoi.gr/serp >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -----?????? ??????----- From: ulvi icil >>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2012 5:59 PM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [xmca] Friends from Greece >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hello, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Is there any friend from Greece interested in Vygotsky's approach to >>>> play? >>>>>>> I have a friend graduated from Greek Language who intends to make a >>>>>>> research on children's play in Greece. >>>>>>> Ulvi >>>>>>> __________________________________________ >>>>>>> _____ >>>>>>> xmca mailing list >>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>>>>> __________________________________________ >>>>>>> _____ >>>>>>> xmca mailing list >>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>> Developmental psycholinguist >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> > From kwohlwen@gmail.com Wed Oct 22 19:03:05 2014 From: kwohlwen@gmail.com (Karen Wohlwend) Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 22:03:05 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics Practices In-Reply-To: <54479034.6070006@mira.net> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <39089ddf0ba265a30feb7854f07324c1.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> <54471BF6.9010906@mira.net> <54479034.6070006@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, thanks for these generative questions and comments! I'll defer to my co-authors to situate the focal case in the larger study but I'll address how we are considering relationships among gender, practices, and tools. We're conceptualizing tools as anchoring artifacts, that concretize and suggest particular uses and users accrued from cultural histories of access and use (following Holland and Cole's cultural artifacts, and more recently, Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual literacies). Tools index shared histories of use, values, and expectations for who *should *be a user and for how practices *should *be conducted, practices which following Paechter are situated in communities of gendered practice that are multiple, local, and embodied. However, we would not say that a tool is gendered in any fixed or deterministic way. In any given moment of activity, tools signal multiple histories in many nexus of practice (following Ron Scollon, the tacit shared practices that members of a community expect of one another) that lead up to, enter in, and flow from that moment, in contradictory, confounding, and complementary ways, hence the ambiguity you've mentioned. How/whether social actors make use of particular histories in a specific context realizes foregrounds some histories while backgrounding others-- in ways that can reproduce, contest, or blur prevailing expectations for participation. In our analysis, we looked closely at the mediated actions in the handling of tools in the one nexus to understand in a very concrete way how girls were able to gain and maintain control over projects--contrary to histories and expectations for high levels of tool handling, participation, and trajectories of expertise for boys in electronics activity. Looking closely at the mediated action in this transformative moment reveals how changing the electronics tools from wires to needle and thread changes the nexus, activating a powerful perception/expectation for girls as appropriate tool users by signalling histories of sewing practices and feminine communities of practice. In regard to other situations, looking closely at mediated actions, material artifacts, and tacit expectations for participation in the relevant nexus of practice will likely also reveal how materials relate to stereotypical expectations, pointing to places ripe for rupture where changing something small in the local activity (e.g., an action, a tool, a material) in dominant nexus of practice can signal a different kind of user and potentially disrupt persistent and naturalized stereotypes. Looking forward to continuing the conversation, Karen On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:08 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Kylie & co., > A fascinating study around a truly ingenious approach to the gendered > division of labour - giving school kids E-textiles to construct an > electronic device - total mixing up and confounding the gender stereotypes > about sewing and electronics, etc. > > Some of the results were quite startling. That the young boy should not > just abstain and demonstratively not pay attention, but pay active and > supportive attention to the girl making the circuit with her > needle-and-thread - an admired female-typical stance one would have thought > a young male incapable of adopting with a female workmate. And that the > gender-inscription of the sewing tools over-rode the greater experience > that in this case the young boy had in using them, with the boy deferring > to the less experienced girl in recognition of the gender-appropriateness > of her "taking charge" with the needle-and-thread. This does cause one to > think a little deeper into how we might conceptualise such gendered > behaviours. > > As you would know, MCA has a strong preference for qualitative research, > and studies with small sample sizes are not generally a problem, but so > much seemed to hinge on the study of just *one* boy-girl team, that I am > concerned about the capacity to generalise from such a base. There were > about 80 youth in the activity as a whole, so I can only hope and presume > that observation of the other 78 kids in some way guided the work focused > on just 2. > > I must say, the analysis of the video data is very sophisticated and > productive and you are to be congratulated on this aspect of the work. I > see that you approach the gendering of the activities through the idea of > the various *tools* being gendered, rather than the *practices* themselves. > This is something that was really necessary for you to be able to make > these observations, because the gendering of the activities is ambiguous, > but not it seems the gendering of the tools. Is this a result of the study, > or is it something you already knew or did you arrive at this by logic? > > Do you see any other opportunities for confounding gender stereotypes in > this way? > > And finally, does the experience of working in ambiguous, even inverted > gender-stereotyped activities like these have any outcome which carries > over into a world where the gender division of labour lacks ambiguity? > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Kylie Peppler wrote: > >> Thanks Andy! We're excited to discuss with the community and would >> welcome any comments/questions on this emerging line of research! >> Kylie >> >> --- >> Kylie A. Peppler >> Assistant Professor of Learning Sciences >> Indiana University | School of Education >> 1900 E 10th Street | Eigenmann 528 | Bloomington | IN | 47406 | >> 812.856.8381 >> >> >> On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 10:52 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> Here's the article for discussion Artin is introducing: >> *Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics >> Practices* >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen Wohlwend. >> Indiana University. >> >> The Maker movement promotes hands-on making, including crafts, >> robotics, and computing. The movement?s potential to transform >> education rests in our ability to address notable gender >> disparities, particularly in science, technology, engineering, and >> mathematics fields. E-textiles - the first female-dominated >> computing community - provide inspiration for overcoming >> long-standing cultural divides in classrooms. Analysis of >> children?s >> use of e-textiles reveals that materials like needles, fabric, and >> conductive thread rupture traditional gender scripts around >> electronics and implicitly gives girls hands-on access and >> leadership roles. This reconceptualization of cultural divides as >> sets of tacitly accepted practices rooted in gendered histories has >> implications for reconceptualizing traditionally male-dominated >> areas of schooling. >> >> Andy >> (attached) >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Goncu, Artin wrote: >> >> Dear All, >> >> We are writing to let you know that the most recent issue of >> MCA is out. >> One of the articles published in this issue and being >> introduced here for >> discussion in referenced below. The authors of the article >> have kindly >> agreed to lead the discussion, and they are on xmca with us >> now. The free >> access to the article is possible through the links below. We >> are looking >> forward to hearing from you all. Best, ag >> >> Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting >> and Electronics Practices >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen Wohlwend >> >> www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762 >> >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749039.2014. >> 939762#.VEZ25Ra_4wI >> >> Artin Goncu, Ph.D >> Co-editor, Mind, Culture, and Activity:An International Journal >> Professor Emeritus, >> University of Illinois at Chicago >> College of Education M/C 147 >> 1040 W. Harrison St. >> Chicago, IL 60607 >> >> >> >> >> >> > -- Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor Literacy, Culture, & Language Education Indiana University 201 N. Rose Avenue Bloomington, IN 47405 Office: 812-856-8275 Fax: 812-856-8287 kwohlwen@indiana.edu From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Oct 22 21:42:12 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 04:42:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] In defense of Vygotsky [Environment as Productive Force] In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> , Message-ID: <1414039331677.74203@unm.edu> Hi Andy! Thanks for your comments upon my exercise. I have need for further discussion, but I will break the original email (with your replies) down into smaller chunks in hope that others will make some contributions? (Anyone out there? C'mon in, the water's fine!) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Meanwhile... back at the ranch... the numbers in this (and continuing) posts will refer to the "charges" is I numbered them in my previous email, if only for continuity from before, which I use for convenience only. --------------------------------------------------- 1. [Environment as productive force] (see original post below) --------------------------------------------------- Perhaps I am over-extending the argument here, however I would like to ask whether the strategy of "extension of analogy" serves a purpose. I mean, sure, the easy answer is that it was politically expedient. Certainly "extension by analogy" is what we do all the time, but this is as an initial cognitive step of comparing and contrasting. It is useful, but it can also be dangerous if it is only to incite the "reasoning" of superstition over science. I will concede that there may have been reason to incite the superstitious in ANL's case, but I am not satisfied. A small illustration: The meat of the walnut looks like the brain, and it was thought centuries ago that because of its simulation to the brain in form this meant it was good for the brain! And yet we know today that the nutrients in walnuts are in fact helpful to the brain because of their support of the cardiovascular system and aid to promote sleep (anti-clotting/anti-inflammatory minerals and melotonin, respectively). So yes, the walnut is indeed beneficial to the brain. After all is said and done, we can exclaim, "Well, that's just nuts!" and reply, "Yes, it is nuts!" and _mean_ different things. (i.e. "that's the nature of walnuts," or "that's crazy.") So I suppose I wonder what is ANL's true purpose of "extension by analogy," in this case? I accept that it is not scientific, and we can say it's obviously political. But my question is deeper, could there be any other reason behind it? It may be I am poking the worms under the rock too much... --- clip from previous post below >> Wed, 22 Oct 2014 06:28:48 +0000 >> Annalisa wrote: >> _1st charge_: Environment as productive force >> ---------- >> ANL states that the relationship LSV claims a child possesses with the environment is based actually upon _productive forces_ the child has with the environment. I am guessing that this translates to what the child can do to transform the environment, or how the environment motivates the child to act? You make the observation that if ANL means "society" to be defined as "nation-state," then in the case of an adult, the relationship is not only with the environment, but with a society of others, and in mediation with them, in concert. >> >> Your contention with this line of thought is that we cannot supplant the Vygotsky's outline of the problem of the environment by analogy of the Soviet political system of historical materialism because... [doubt sets in] LSV is talking about the development of children who's minds have not yet formed. (???) > ---------- > Andy's reply to #1 above: > >My criticism is that analogies won't do. The psychological development of an individual is simply not the historical development of a nation's productive forces and an argument by analogy has no merit. >--end From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Oct 22 21:55:46 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 04:55:46 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [It is activity, not perezhivanie, to which the child relates] In-Reply-To: <1414039331677.74203@unm.edu> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> , , <1414039331677.74203@unm.edu> Message-ID: <1414040146031.84554@unm.edu> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points total... --------------------------------------------------- 2. [It is activity, not perezhivanie, to which the child relates] (see original post below) --------------------------------------------------- You say we (Enligh speakers) take for granted the meaning of perezhivanie, which I accept, and that it would have _meant_ something to LSV and his students in the contexts in which they lived. I am guessing, then, the word was already in use in the language, and that LSV was enlisting a commonly-used word for a specific purpose, and that was to capture the unit of analysis for the environment (as it presents to the child). I enjoy very much when you you say: "...the mediated relation to Nature is not *instead of* an immediate relation to Nature, but *as well as* an immediate relation to Nature." ...however, I think you have fallen into the pothole I was attempting to avoid. I am not trying to understand Vygotsky at this precise moment, but Leontiev (even if I agree with Vygotsky) What I am trying to tease out is what was it that Leontiev was asserting and why? Is he saying that activity is a substitute for heredity or for transforming heredity as a larger force over heredity (to deter the notion of fatalistic determinism)? I'm sorry if I'm being obtuse, but I am in the dark, because, well, I am in the dark! --- clip from previous post below >> Wed, 22 Oct 2014 06:28:48 +0000 >> Annalisa wrote: > _2nd charge_: It is activity, not perezhivanie, to which the child relates > ---------- > ANL in his assertion of the child relating to her environment, claims she can only relate to the environment (that is, nature) via objects available to her, and by acting upon those objects. For this reason, ANL challenges LSV's definition of perezhivanie as a unity of the subject and the object. Specifically, personality factors in the child and those "actionable" objects in the environment. > > (I think you are crying foul here because perezhivanie as a theory had not yet been fully formed (?) or perhaps not fully understood by LSV's students, ANL being one of them.) > ---------- > Andy's reply to #2 above: Perezhivanie is a Russian word which would have been well understood by Vygotsky's students, even if they had never analysed it before. No, the point is a subtle one: the mediated relation to Nature is not *instead of* an immediate relation to Nature, but *as well as* an immediate relation to Nature. >--end From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Oct 22 22:03:23 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 05:03:23 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie is a faulty circular construct] In-Reply-To: <1414040146031.84554@unm.edu> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> , , <1414039331677.74203@unm.edu>, <1414040146031.84554@unm.edu> Message-ID: <1414040603657.84398@unm.edu> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] --------------------------------------------------- 3. [Perezhivanie is a faulty circular construct] (see original post below) --------------------------------------------------- OK, I got it: ANL with his finger on the materialist scale, could not understand (possibly) the concept of perezhivanie as the UOA, or rather LSV's UOA, for the environment. I say "possibly" because we cannot know how much of it is capitulation. ..or can we....? >> Wed, 22 Oct 2014 06:28:48 +0000 >> Annalisa wrote: >> _3rd charge_: Perezhivanie is a faulty circular construct >> ---------- >> ANL pushes against the legitimacy of perezhivanie as a _determining cause of development_ in the child, one of LSV's major claims, largely because it is circular. ANL claims perezhivanie in the definition actually takes the place of the personality, but how can perezhivanie both develop personality and be the personality? Therefore, ANL asserts that there must be _an activity_ external to the personality that exerts force for transformation upon the personality, making perezhivanie an activity, and not a relationship between the subject and the object/environment. ANL is saying the only pathway for the subject to relate to the environment is through nothing other than activity. >> ---------- > Andy's reply to #3 above: >Yeah, ANL just really doesn't get it here. > ---------- >--end From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Oct 22 22:11:22 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 05:11:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] Message-ID: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] --------------------------------------------------- 4. ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] (see original post below) --------------------------------------------------- Again a pothole. You say: "The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate at their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an intellectual relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims." I think know this, but what is ANL's critique against this? Is it that it is too "intellectual," which is possibly code for elitism or class? Sorry if I wasn't clear. Wed, 22 Oct 2014 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: _4th charge_: "Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism ---------- For LSV, in order for perezhivanie to "happen," there is a dependency on the level of sense and meaning in the child in order to detect what presents in the environment. Well, ANL counters, sense and meaning present in the child is really consciousness present in the child. Consciousness is just another word for intellect, as interpreted by ANL, and this is problematic, I think because it implies... [doubt sets in] this is hereditary- or biologically-driven alone. (??) >> Andy's reply to #4 above: >>The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate at their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an intellectual relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims. From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Oct 22 22:16:05 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 05:16:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] In defense of Vygotsky [The unit of analysis is activity - perezhivanie doesn't exist in the world, while activity does.] Message-ID: <1414041364946.17367@unm.edu> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] --------------------------------------------------- 5. [The unit of analysis is activity - perezhivanie doesn't exist in the world, while activity does.] (see original post below) --------------------------------------------------- OK, he compares his theory with LSV's, but ANL's argument isn't persuasive. What I'm trying to capture is the rhetorical pathway. Sorry if that isn't clear, either. --- clip from previous post below Wed, 22 Oct 2014 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: _5th charge_: The unit of analysis is activity - perezhivanie doesn't exist in the world, while activity does. ---------- ANL poses: Is the matter really about unity of the subject and the environment, or the relationship between the subject's consciousness and activity among objects in the environment (i.e. objective reality)? Thus LSV has failed to see the problem clearly, it is _activity_ that is the appropriate unit of analysis, not perezhivanie. ---------- > Andy's reply to #5 above: > Yeah, ANL is just posing his theory as against Vygotsky's. >--end From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Oct 22 22:29:16 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 05:29:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] Message-ID: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] --------------------------------------------------- 6. [The fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) --------------------------------------------------- You say: "ANL believes that motivation determines perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in this context." So is it the case that word-meaning is denied by ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" cohesive across the culture and cannot have personal or spontaneous meaning? I can see the reason politically to emphasize this, if the State is sanctioned as the sole arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post below Wed, 22 Oct 2014 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning ---------- ANL believes that the mental representation in a child's awareness must _correspond_ directly to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but also how the object may relate and associate to other objects and their meanings. The example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I will call here for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", ANL takes exception with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a generalization to reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the existence of these word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they are what construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this because he considers consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes that motivation determines perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in this context. >--end From ablunden@mira.net Wed Oct 22 22:36:42 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 16:36:42 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [Environment as Productive Force] In-Reply-To: <1414039331677.74203@unm.edu> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> , <1414039331677.74203@unm.edu> Message-ID: <544893EA.4050103@mira.net> Annalisa, ANL point # 2 begins with ?What /defines /the relationship between society and the natural environment ... is the state of its productive forces? and he goes on to reason from this that therefore the relationship between the child and the environment must be defined by "the content of his activity, by the level of development of his activity." This is reasoning by analogy, and a carelessly applied analogy to boot. He begins with a vague proposition which kind of rings true in a country where Marxism is the official religion, and then says "Look, this case is just like that." At this fundamental level, reasoning by analogy is invalid. You could "prove" anything this way. Problems have to be grasped *concretely*, not abstractly, and reasoning by analogy is abstract thinking. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Andy! > > Thanks for your comments upon my exercise. > > I have need for further discussion, but I will break the original email (with your replies) down into smaller chunks in hope that others will make some contributions? (Anyone out there? C'mon in, the water's fine!) > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > Meanwhile... back at the ranch... the numbers in this (and continuing) posts will refer to the "charges" is I numbered them in my previous email, if only for continuity from before, which I use for convenience only. > > --------------------------------------------------- > 1. [Environment as productive force] (see original post below) > --------------------------------------------------- > Perhaps I am over-extending the argument here, however I would like to ask whether the strategy of "extension of analogy" serves a purpose. I mean, sure, the easy answer is that it was politically expedient. > > Certainly "extension by analogy" is what we do all the time, but this is as an initial cognitive step of comparing and contrasting. It is useful, but it can also be dangerous if it is only to incite the "reasoning" of superstition over science. I will concede that there may have been reason to incite the superstitious in ANL's case, but I am not satisfied. > > A small illustration: The meat of the walnut looks like the brain, and it was thought centuries ago that because of its simulation to the brain in form this meant it was good for the brain! And yet we know today that the nutrients in walnuts are in fact helpful to the brain because of their support of the cardiovascular system and aid to promote sleep (anti-clotting/anti-inflammatory minerals and melotonin, respectively). So yes, the walnut is indeed beneficial to the brain. After all is said and done, we can exclaim, "Well, that's just nuts!" and reply, "Yes, it is nuts!" and _mean_ different things. (i.e. "that's the nature of walnuts," or "that's crazy.") > > So I suppose I wonder what is ANL's true purpose of "extension by analogy," in this case? I accept that it is not scientific, and we can say it's obviously political. > > But my question is deeper, could there be any other reason behind it? > > It may be I am poking the worms under the rock too much... > > --- clip from previous post below > > >>> Wed, 22 Oct 2014 06:28:48 +0000 >>> Annalisa wrote: >>> > > >>> _1st charge_: Environment as productive force >>> ---------- >>> ANL states that the relationship LSV claims a child possesses with the environment is based actually upon _productive forces_ the child has with the environment. I am guessing that this translates to what the child can do to transform the environment, or how the environment motivates the child to act? You make the observation that if ANL means "society" to be defined as "nation-state," then in the case of an adult, the relationship is not only with the environment, but with a society of others, and in mediation with them, in concert. >>> >>> Your contention with this line of thought is that we cannot supplant the Vygotsky's outline of the problem of the environment by analogy of the Soviet political system of historical materialism because... [doubt sets in] LSV is talking about the development of children who's minds have not yet formed. (???) >>> >> ---------- >> > > >> Andy's reply to #1 above: >> >> My criticism is that analogies won't do. The psychological development of an individual is simply not the historical development of a nation's productive forces and an argument by analogy has no merit. >> > > >> --end >> > > > > > > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Oct 22 22:40:02 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 05:40:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] In defense of Vygotsky [Over-complexity of concepts & projection of idealism] & [Reversion to subjective psychology] Message-ID: <1414042802482.81905@unm.edu> This continues and extends from (and COMPLETES) my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] --------------------------------------------------- 7. [Over-complexity of concepts and projection of idealism] and 8. [Reversion to subjective psychology] (see original post below) --------------------------------------------------- We seem to agree here. These two points are linked because without #7 he cannot make the claim #8. Now, I'm trying to understand the line of the rhetoric, and how this was motivated to be constructed as such. How transparent would ANL have had to be to twist the original theories? How full-throated was he? How much was "betrayal" and how much was just not understanding. I suppose I am trying to rectify the charge of Leontiev as a Judas. (Of course, there are those who say Judas did not actually betray, but only did what he was asked to do, by the man in question. ) --- clip from previous post below >>Wed, 22 Oct 2014 06:28:48 +0000 >>Annalisa wrote: >>_7th charge_: Over-complexity of concepts and projection of idealism >>---------- >>ANL attacks LSV's notion of concepts (scientific and everyday concepts) because the theory is too complicated (???), the reason being (per ANL) that LSV claims meaning is created through verbal communication --not speech, but communication-- of concepts alone (and not activity). This claim is in conflict with what you indicate is ANL's dogmatic concept of truth (as laid out in para above). The theory as posed by LSV can't involve material dealings, but "merely" communication using language. All this abstraction, according to ANL, effectively removes the child from the environment, rendering the child to be an "ideal subject" and the environment to be an "ideal environment," which, in interaction through communication, is supposed to develop the mind of the child. This is how it is ANL brands LSV an idealist and where the entire "bourgeois psychology" charge is derived. >>---------- >Andy's reply to #7 above: >OK ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- >>_8th charge_: Reversion to subjective psychology >>---------- >> In a coup de t?te (pun intended), ANL makes a last charge that LSV has shifted any "problem of the environment" onto an abstract level of the psyche, and as such, this move reverts to the realm of the subjective practices rampant in psychology studies of the day, making it, not only removed from the material methods vital to Marxist thought, but essentially unscientific and specious. >>---------- > Andy's reply to #8 above: > Yes, a false charge. >>--end of the end!! From ablunden@mira.net Wed Oct 22 23:02:24 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 17:02:24 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu> Message-ID: <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> I would have said that this criticism is a deliberate misrepresentation, except that Lydia Bozhovich makes the same charge of "intellectualism." The charge hinges on phrases like "the significance for the child" and "the meaning for the child," etc., which etymologically suggest the use of signs and words. Thinking with signs and words is intellect. But the thing is that it is almost impossible for us to describe the relationship of a person to their environment psychologically without using words which evoke sign-relations. The relation is a psychological one, not a conditioned-reflex, and the words we have for relations which are mediated through consciousness tend to be words like "meaning" and "significance" which have intellectual connotations. The preintellectual stages of psychological development which Vygotsky himself theorised are not built into the common language. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. > > There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] > --------------------------------------------------- > 4. ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > (see original post below) > --------------------------------------------------- > > Again a pothole. You say: > "The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate at > their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an intellectual > relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims." > > I think know this, but what is ANL's critique against this? Is it that > it is too "intellectual," which is possibly code for elitism or class? > Sorry if I wasn't clear. > > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Oct 22 23:07:01 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 17:07:01 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> Message-ID: <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the one true meaning of something. He does not allow that the meaning of something may be contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of heterogeneity in society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, social movements and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of something which "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which are therefore taken to be subjective. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's > breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points total... [copypasta > is a starch of art] > --------------------------------------------------- 6. [The fallacy of > word-meaning] (see original post below) > --------------------------------------------------- You say: "ANL > believes that motivation determines perception. The norm of > perception, the "true" meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning > it has for the community as a whole. I am questioning the validity of > this concept of "community as a whole" in this context." So is it the > case that word-meaning is denied by ANL because meaning and symbols > "must be" cohesive across the culture and cannot have personal or > spontaneous meaning? I can see the reason politically to emphasize > this, if the State is sanctioned as the sole arbiter of meaning. --- > clip from previous post below Wed, 22 Oct 2014 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa > wrote: >> _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning ---------- ANL believes >> that the mental representation in a child's awareness must >> _correspond_ directly to the object in reality, and not just >> perceptually, but also how the object may relate and associate to >> other objects and their meanings. The example is a table. Because of >> this definition of, what I will call here for convenience (i.e., my >> laziness) "object-awareness", ANL takes exception with LSV's >> rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a generalization to >> reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit >> (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the existence of >> these word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they are >> what construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this because he >> considers consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- >>> Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes that motivation determines >>> perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of an object, >>> is therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. I am >>> questioning the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" >>> in this context. >--end > > From julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk Wed Oct 22 23:33:07 2014 From: julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk (Julian Williams) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 06:33:07 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu>,<54489B05.6090106@mira.net> Message-ID: <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> Andy Yes, just so, this is why I go to social theory eg Marx and Bourdieu to find political-economic contradictions within and between activities. But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the notion in Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or environment is given and the same for all, and the final form of development is given in a final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being then associated with an already given social plane). I'm happy enough to accept that this is a false and undialectical reading of Vygotsky (after all who knows how the concept of perezhivanie might have matured in his hands)... To return to my case - arithmetic. Many will say this exists in ideal form in the culture and all that needs to be done by development is to bring the child into the culture... Then the child is 'schooled'... Passive, lacking in agency, often failed, and at best made obedient to the cultural legacy. AsBourdieu says, through processes in school the class system is reproduced, and this is enculturation into the cultural arbitrary. Julian On 23 Oct 2014, at 07:08, "Andy Blunden" wrote: > No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the one true meaning of something. He does not allow that the meaning of something may be contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of heterogeneity in society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, social movements and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of something which "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which are therefore taken to be subjective. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] --------------------------------------------------- 6. [The fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) --------------------------------------------------- You say: "ANL believes that motivation determines perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in this context." So is it the case that word-meaning is denied by ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" cohesive across the culture and cannot have personal or spontaneous meaning? I can see the reason politically to emphasize this, if the State is sanctioned as the sole arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post below Wed, 22 Oct 2014 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: >>> _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning ---------- ANL believes that the mental representation in a child's awareness must _correspond_ directly to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but also how the object may relate and associate to other objects and their meanings. The example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I will call here for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", ANL takes exception with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a generalization to reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the existence of these word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they are what construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this because he considers consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- >>>> Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes that motivation determines perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in this context. >--end >> >> > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Oct 22 23:42:59 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 23:42:59 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> Message-ID: Annelia, thanks for pursuing your understanding of Leontiev and ANDY'S clarifications. This last post suggesting ANL understands *meaning* AS the ONE TRUE MEANING of something which fails to include meanings can be contested because of heterogeneity in society, different classes, genders, etc. seems to be a radical departure from Wertsch's exploration of *mediated action* . Mediated action refers to the complementary understandings of Vygotsky AND BAKHTIN. Bakhtin's notion of *genres* seems to be moving in a radically different trajectory from how Leontiev's activity theory is being explained. HETEROGENEITY and *multivoicedness of utterances* challenges any notion of *one true* collectively understood *meaning* Radically different trajectories. On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 11:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the one true meaning of > something. He does not allow that the meaning of something may be > contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of heterogeneity in > society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, social movements > and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of something which > "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which are therefore > taken to be subjective. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's >> breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a >> starch of art] --------------------------------------------------- 6. >> [The fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) >> --------------------------------------------------- You say: "ANL >> believes that motivation determines perception. The norm of perception, >> the "true" meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for the >> community as a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of >> "community as a whole" in this context." So is it the case that >> word-meaning is denied by ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" >> cohesive across the culture and cannot have personal or spontaneous >> meaning? I can see the reason politically to emphasize this, if the State >> is sanctioned as the sole arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post >> below Wed, 22 Oct 2014 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: >> >>> _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning ---------- ANL believes that >>> the mental representation in a child's awareness must _correspond_ directly >>> to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but also how the >>> object may relate and associate to other objects and their meanings. The >>> example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I will call here >>> for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", ANL takes exception >>> with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a generalization to >>> reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit >>> (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the existence of these >>> word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they are what >>> construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this because he considers >>> consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- >>> >>>> Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes that motivation determines >>>> perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of an object, is >>>> therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. I am questioning >>>> the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in this context. >>>> >--end >>>> >>> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Oct 22 23:51:31 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 17:51:31 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu>, <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> Message-ID: <5448A573.3090108@mira.net> Well, I think AT has the potential to add new insights to what is available in classical Marxism, Julian. I don't want to abandon Leontyev. But there are problems with his theory which need to be straightened out. The idea of taking activities as units of analysis for an interdisciplinary human science remains a good one. As to "ideal form". The point is, the relative contains the absolute and the absolute is also relative. What the maths teacher teaches the kids in maths class is generally taken to be the "truth." But if the teacher is going to really teach them mathematics, they need to learn that sometimes the accepted truth turns out to be wrong. But that does not lead down the road of relativism, that mathematics is just about learning "the accepted narrative." Mathematics studies objective properties of Nature, and sometimes we have to change our ideas. At ISCAR there was a great presentation about a group teaching natural science in New York, where they took as their case study Colony Collapse Disorder which is threatening to wipe out America's bee population. The point is, this phenomena currently has no accepted scientific explanation. That's how to teach science! In general, it is undeniable that children acquire the language found around them. But there turns out to be a lot of ifs and buts involved in this. But it is a basic proposition from which you have to set out - a first approximation to ontogenesis. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Julian Williams wrote: > Andy > > Yes, just so, this is why I go to social theory eg Marx and Bourdieu to find political-economic contradictions within and between activities. > > But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the notion in Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or environment is given and the same for all, and the final form of development is given in a final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being then associated with an already given social plane). > > I'm happy enough to accept that this is a false and undialectical reading of Vygotsky (after all who knows how the concept of perezhivanie might have matured in his hands)... > > To return to my case - arithmetic. Many will say this exists in ideal form in the culture and all that needs to be done by development is to bring the child into the culture... Then the child is 'schooled'... Passive, lacking in agency, often failed, and at best made obedient to the cultural legacy. AsBourdieu says, through processes in school the class system is reproduced, and this is enculturation into the cultural arbitrary. > > Julian > > > > > On 23 Oct 2014, at 07:08, "Andy Blunden" wrote: > > >> No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the one true meaning of something. He does not allow that the meaning of something may be contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of heterogeneity in society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, social movements and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of something which "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which are therefore taken to be subjective. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >>> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] --------------------------------------------------- 6. [The fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) --------------------------------------------------- You say: "ANL believes that motivation determines perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in this context." So is it the case that word-meaning is denied by ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" cohesive across the culture and cannot have personal or spontaneous meaning? I can see the reason politically to emphasize this, if the State is sanctioned as the sole arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post below Wed, 22 Oct 2014 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: >>> >>>> _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning ---------- ANL believes that the mental representation in a child's awareness must _correspond_ directly to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but also how the object may relate and associate to other objects and their meanings. The example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I will call here for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", ANL takes exception with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a generalization to reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the existence of these word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they are what construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this because he considers consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- >>>> >>>>> Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes that motivation determines perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in this context. >--end >>>>> >>> > > > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Wed Oct 22 23:54:55 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 08:54:55 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> Message-ID: Julian, Andy I think arithmetic is something of a test case. Just as word meaning changes over time in a dynamic way, as recognised by linguists, maths truths don't. It would be difficult to argue that maths truths of basic arithmetic have changed over the centuries. I don't know about maths truths of a higher order. Sorry if I use the terms arithmetic and maths interchangeably; it's a South African usage here in basic education. Carol On 23 October 2014 08:33, Julian Williams wrote: > Andy > > Yes, just so, this is why I go to social theory eg Marx and Bourdieu to > find political-economic contradictions within and between activities. > > But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the notion in > Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or environment is given > and the same for all, and the final form of development is given in a > final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being then associated > with an already given social plane). > > I'm happy enough to accept that this is a false and undialectical reading > of Vygotsky (after all who knows how the concept of perezhivanie might have > matured in his hands)... > > To return to my case - arithmetic. Many will say this exists in ideal form > in the culture and all that needs to be done by development is to bring the > child into the culture... Then the child is 'schooled'... Passive, lacking > in agency, often failed, and at best made obedient to the cultural legacy. > AsBourdieu says, through processes in school the class system is > reproduced, and this is enculturation into the cultural arbitrary. > > Julian > > > > > On 23 Oct 2014, at 07:08, "Andy Blunden" wrote: > > > No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the one true meaning > of something. He does not allow that the meaning of something may be > contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of heterogeneity in > society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, social movements > and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of something which > "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which are therefore > taken to be subjective. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's > breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a > starch of art] --------------------------------------------------- 6. [The > fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) > --------------------------------------------------- You say: "ANL believes > that motivation determines perception. The norm of perception, the "true" > meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for the community as > a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of "community as a > whole" in this context." So is it the case that word-meaning is denied by > ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" cohesive across the culture and > cannot have personal or spontaneous meaning? I can see the reason > politically to emphasize this, if the State is sanctioned as the sole > arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post below Wed, 22 Oct 2014 > 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: > >>> _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning ---------- ANL believes that > the mental representation in a child's awareness must _correspond_ directly > to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but also how the > object may relate and associate to other objects and their meanings. The > example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I will call here > for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", ANL takes exception > with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a generalization to > reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit > (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the existence of these > word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they are what > construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this because he considers > consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- > >>>> Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes that motivation determines > perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of an object, is > therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. I am questioning > the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in this context. > >--end > >> > >> > > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From carolmacdon@gmail.com Wed Oct 22 23:57:56 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 08:57:56 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <5448A573.3090108@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448A573.3090108@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy About those bees...I think there will be a mathematical modelling which is to be developed of those. That is, if the bees don't collapse as a species and take us all into oblivion. Er, smile. Carol On 23 October 2014 08:51, Andy Blunden wrote: > Well, I think AT has the potential to add new insights to what is > available in classical Marxism, Julian. I don't want to abandon Leontyev. > But there are problems with his theory which need to be straightened out. > The idea of taking activities as units of analysis for an interdisciplinary > human science remains a good one. > > As to "ideal form". > > The point is, the relative contains the absolute and the absolute is also > relative. > > What the maths teacher teaches the kids in maths class is generally taken > to be the "truth." But if the teacher is going to really teach them > mathematics, they need to learn that sometimes the accepted truth turns out > to be wrong. But that does not lead down the road of relativism, that > mathematics is just about learning "the accepted narrative." Mathematics > studies objective properties of Nature, and sometimes we have to change our > ideas. > > At ISCAR there was a great presentation about a group teaching natural > science in New York, where they took as their case study Colony Collapse > Disorder which is threatening to wipe out America's bee population. The > point is, this phenomena currently has no accepted scientific explanation. > That's how to teach science! > > In general, it is undeniable that children acquire the language found > around them. But there turns out to be a lot of ifs and buts involved in > this. But it is a basic proposition from which you have to set out - a > first approximation to ontogenesis. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Julian Williams wrote: > >> Andy >> >> Yes, just so, this is why I go to social theory eg Marx and Bourdieu to >> find political-economic contradictions within and between activities. >> >> But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the notion in >> Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or environment is given >> and the same for all, and the final form of development is given in a >> final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being then associated >> with an already given social plane). >> >> I'm happy enough to accept that this is a false and undialectical >> reading of Vygotsky (after all who knows how the concept of perezhivanie >> might have matured in his hands)... >> To return to my case - arithmetic. Many will say this exists in ideal >> form in the culture and all that needs to be done by development is to >> bring the child into the culture... Then the child is 'schooled'... >> Passive, lacking in agency, often failed, and at best made obedient to the >> cultural legacy. AsBourdieu says, through processes in school the class >> system is reproduced, and this is enculturation into the cultural arbitrary. >> >> Julian >> >> >> >> >> On 23 Oct 2014, at 07:08, "Andy Blunden" wrote: >> >> >> >>> No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the one true meaning >>> of something. He does not allow that the meaning of something may be >>> contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of heterogeneity in >>> society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, social movements >>> and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of something which >>> "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which are therefore >>> taken to be subjective. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> >>>> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's >>>> breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a >>>> starch of art] --------------------------------------------------- 6. >>>> [The fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) >>>> --------------------------------------------------- You say: "ANL >>>> believes that motivation determines perception. The norm of perception, >>>> the "true" meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for the >>>> community as a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of >>>> "community as a whole" in this context." So is it the case that >>>> word-meaning is denied by ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" >>>> cohesive across the culture and cannot have personal or spontaneous >>>> meaning? I can see the reason politically to emphasize this, if the State >>>> is sanctioned as the sole arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post >>>> below Wed, 22 Oct 2014 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning ---------- ANL believes that >>>>> the mental representation in a child's awareness must _correspond_ directly >>>>> to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but also how the >>>>> object may relate and associate to other objects and their meanings. The >>>>> example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I will call here >>>>> for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", ANL takes exception >>>>> with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a generalization to >>>>> reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit >>>>> (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the existence of these >>>>> word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they are what >>>>> construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this because he considers >>>>> consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- >>>>> >>>>>> Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes that motivation determines >>>>>> perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of an object, is >>>>>> therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. I am questioning >>>>>> the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in this context. >>>>>> >--end >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> > > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From VanDerRiet@ukzn.ac.za Thu Oct 23 00:37:54 2014 From: VanDerRiet@ukzn.ac.za (Mary van der Riet) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 07:37:54 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] ISCAR 2017 - anybody know the venue? Message-ID: <8f20ef3fc91b411992774551d6024c89@PMB-MBX-1.local.ukzn.ac.za> From ablunden@mira.net Thu Oct 23 01:02:56 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 19:02:56 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> Message-ID: <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> Carol, mathematics is a natural science like any other. It is neither the absolute truth nor merely social convention. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Carol Macdonald wrote: > Julian, Andy > > I think arithmetic is something of a test case. Just as word meaning > changes over time in a dynamic way, as recognised by linguists, maths > truths don't. It would be difficult to argue that maths truths of basic > arithmetic have changed over the centuries. I don't know about maths truths > of a higher order. > > Sorry if I use the terms arithmetic and maths interchangeably; it's a South > African usage here in basic education. > > Carol > > On 23 October 2014 08:33, Julian Williams > wrote: > > >> Andy >> >> Yes, just so, this is why I go to social theory eg Marx and Bourdieu to >> find political-economic contradictions within and between activities. >> >> But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the notion in >> Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or environment is given >> and the same for all, and the final form of development is given in a >> final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being then associated >> with an already given social plane). >> >> I'm happy enough to accept that this is a false and undialectical reading >> of Vygotsky (after all who knows how the concept of perezhivanie might have >> matured in his hands)... >> >> To return to my case - arithmetic. Many will say this exists in ideal form >> in the culture and all that needs to be done by development is to bring the >> child into the culture... Then the child is 'schooled'... Passive, lacking >> in agency, often failed, and at best made obedient to the cultural legacy. >> AsBourdieu says, through processes in school the class system is >> reproduced, and this is enculturation into the cultural arbitrary. >> >> Julian >> >> >> >> >> On 23 Oct 2014, at 07:08, "Andy Blunden" wrote: >> >> >>> No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the one true meaning >>> >> of something. He does not allow that the meaning of something may be >> contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of heterogeneity in >> society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, social movements >> and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of something which >> "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which are therefore >> taken to be subjective. >> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>>> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's >>>> >> breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a >> starch of art] --------------------------------------------------- 6. [The >> fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) >> --------------------------------------------------- You say: "ANL believes >> that motivation determines perception. The norm of perception, the "true" >> meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for the community as >> a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of "community as a >> whole" in this context." So is it the case that word-meaning is denied by >> ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" cohesive across the culture and >> cannot have personal or spontaneous meaning? I can see the reason >> politically to emphasize this, if the State is sanctioned as the sole >> arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post below Wed, 22 Oct 2014 >> 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: >> >>>>> _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning ---------- ANL believes that >>>>> >> the mental representation in a child's awareness must _correspond_ directly >> to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but also how the >> object may relate and associate to other objects and their meanings. The >> example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I will call here >> for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", ANL takes exception >> with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a generalization to >> reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit >> (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the existence of these >> word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they are what >> construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this because he considers >> consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- >> >>>>>> Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes that motivation determines >>>>>> >> perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of an object, is >> therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. I am questioning >> the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in this context. >> >>> --end >>> >>>> >> > > > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Thu Oct 23 05:43:24 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 14:43:24 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy I realise that, but it much more robust than orthodox science; i.e. we are still doing the same maths as 300 years ago, where normal science is very different indeed. If Johnny said that 4+7=10, the teacher is not going to accept that, is she? Carol On 23 October 2014 10:02, Andy Blunden wrote: > Carol, mathematics is a natural science like any other. > It is neither the absolute truth nor merely social convention. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Carol Macdonald wrote: > >> Julian, Andy >> >> I think arithmetic is something of a test case. Just as word meaning >> changes over time in a dynamic way, as recognised by linguists, maths >> truths don't. It would be difficult to argue that maths truths of basic >> arithmetic have changed over the centuries. I don't know about maths >> truths >> of a higher order. >> >> Sorry if I use the terms arithmetic and maths interchangeably; it's a >> South >> African usage here in basic education. >> >> Carol >> >> On 23 October 2014 08:33, Julian Williams > ac.uk> >> wrote: >> >> >> >>> Andy >>> >>> Yes, just so, this is why I go to social theory eg Marx and Bourdieu to >>> find political-economic contradictions within and between activities. >>> >>> But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the notion in >>> Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or environment is given >>> and the same for all, and the final form of development is given in a >>> final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being then >>> associated >>> with an already given social plane). >>> >>> I'm happy enough to accept that this is a false and undialectical >>> reading >>> of Vygotsky (after all who knows how the concept of perezhivanie might >>> have >>> matured in his hands)... >>> >>> To return to my case - arithmetic. Many will say this exists in ideal >>> form >>> in the culture and all that needs to be done by development is to bring >>> the >>> child into the culture... Then the child is 'schooled'... Passive, >>> lacking >>> in agency, often failed, and at best made obedient to the cultural >>> legacy. >>> AsBourdieu says, through processes in school the class system is >>> reproduced, and this is enculturation into the cultural arbitrary. >>> >>> Julian >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 23 Oct 2014, at 07:08, "Andy Blunden" wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the one true meaning >>>> >>>> >>> of something. He does not allow that the meaning of something may be >>> contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of heterogeneity >>> in >>> society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, social >>> movements >>> and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of something which >>> "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which are therefore >>> taken to be subjective. >>> >>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> ------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's >>>>> >>>>> >>>> breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points total... [copypasta >>> is a >>> starch of art] --------------------------------------------------- 6. >>> [The >>> fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) >>> --------------------------------------------------- You say: "ANL >>> believes >>> that motivation determines perception. The norm of perception, the >>> "true" >>> meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for the community >>> as >>> a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of "community as a >>> whole" in this context." So is it the case that word-meaning is denied by >>> ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" cohesive across the culture and >>> cannot have personal or spontaneous meaning? I can see the reason >>> politically to emphasize this, if the State is sanctioned as the sole >>> arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post below Wed, 22 Oct 2014 >>> 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: >>> >>> >>>> _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning ---------- ANL believes that >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> the mental representation in a child's awareness must _correspond_ >>> directly >>> to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but also how the >>> object may relate and associate to other objects and their meanings. The >>> example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I will call here >>> for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", ANL takes >>> exception >>> with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a generalization to >>> reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit >>> (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the existence of these >>> word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they are what >>> construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this because he considers >>> consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- >>> >>> >>>> Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes that motivation determines >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of an object, >>> is >>> therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. I am >>> questioning >>> the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in this context. >>> >>> >>>> --end >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From ablunden@mira.net Thu Oct 23 06:49:38 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 00:49:38 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> Message-ID: <54490772.2020805@mira.net> Mathematics today is nothing like it was 300 years ago, Carol, even if it is in a South African elementary school. And the teacher wouldn't accept it if Johnny said that apes had evolved from human either or that gravity went clockwise. The ability to correctly reproduce things like 4+7=11 is not in my experience any evidence that a child has grasped what + or = means, and certainly no evidence that they have any grasp of mathematics or even number. Of course, we might take the view that they never will anyway, so being able to add is good enough for them. But if we take the view that it is worthwhile that a child learn what science is and what mathematics is about, then in my view, the problems are essentially the same whichever science it is. Of course, in general, the attitude a teacher takes to their material is that it is objectively true and the kids should come to know it. But this stance or attitude to knowledge, or science, is a very poor preparation for adult life and citizenship. I don't see mathematics in principle as being an exception. Perhaps a little teaching of the history of mathematics would help? I don't know. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Carol Macdonald wrote: > Andy > > I realise that, but it much more robust than orthodox science; i.e. we > are still doing the same maths as 300 years ago, where normal science > is very different indeed. > > If Johnny said that 4+7=10, the teacher is not going to accept that, > is she? > > Carol > > On 23 October 2014 10:02, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > Carol, mathematics is a natural science like any other. > It is neither the absolute truth nor merely social convention. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Carol Macdonald wrote: > > Julian, Andy > > I think arithmetic is something of a test case. Just as word > meaning > changes over time in a dynamic way, as recognised by > linguists, maths > truths don't. It would be difficult to argue that maths truths > of basic > arithmetic have changed over the centuries. I don't know about > maths truths > of a higher order. > > Sorry if I use the terms arithmetic and maths interchangeably; > it's a South > African usage here in basic education. > > Carol > > On 23 October 2014 08:33, Julian Williams > > > wrote: > > > > Andy > > Yes, just so, this is why I go to social theory eg Marx > and Bourdieu to > find political-economic contradictions within and between > activities. > > But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the > notion in > Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or > environment is given > and the same for all, and the final form of development is > given in a > final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being > then associated > with an already given social plane). > > I'm happy enough to accept that this is a false and > undialectical reading > of Vygotsky (after all who knows how the concept of > perezhivanie might have > matured in his hands)... > > To return to my case - arithmetic. Many will say this > exists in ideal form > in the culture and all that needs to be done by > development is to bring the > child into the culture... Then the child is 'schooled'... > Passive, lacking > in agency, often failed, and at best made obedient to the > cultural legacy. > AsBourdieu says, through processes in school the class > system is > reproduced, and this is enculturation into the cultural > arbitrary. > > Julian > > > > > On 23 Oct 2014, at 07:08, "Andy Blunden" > > wrote: > > > > No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the > one true meaning > > > of something. He does not allow that the meaning of > something may be > contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of > heterogeneity in > society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, > social movements > and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of > something which > "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which > are therefore > taken to be subjective. > > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > This continues and extends from my original post > concerning Andy's > > > breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points > total... [copypasta is a > starch of art] > --------------------------------------------------- 6. [The > fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) > --------------------------------------------------- You > say: "ANL believes > that motivation determines perception. The norm of > perception, the "true" > meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for > the community as > a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of > "community as a > whole" in this context." So is it the case that > word-meaning is denied by > ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" cohesive across > the culture and > cannot have personal or spontaneous meaning? I can see the > reason > politically to emphasize this, if the State is sanctioned > as the sole > arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post below Wed, > 22 Oct 2014 > 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: > > > _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning > ---------- ANL believes that > > > the mental representation in a child's awareness must > _correspond_ directly > to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but > also how the > object may relate and associate to other objects and their > meanings. The > example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I > will call here > for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", > ANL takes exception > with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a > generalization to > reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit > (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the > existence of these > word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they > are what > construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this > because he considers > consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- > > > Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes > that motivation determines > > > perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of > an object, is > therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. > I am questioning > the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in > this context. > > > --end > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Oct 23 06:50:42 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 00:50:42 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ISCAR 2017 - anybody know the venue? In-Reply-To: <8f20ef3fc91b411992774551d6024c89@PMB-MBX-1.local.ukzn.ac.za> References: <8f20ef3fc91b411992774551d6024c89@PMB-MBX-1.local.ukzn.ac.za> Message-ID: <544907B2.3010007@mira.net> http://convention.qc.ca/en/news/quebec-city-host-5th-iscar-international-congress-2017 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Mary van der Riet wrote: > > > From patrick.jaki@gmail.com Thu Oct 23 07:16:21 2014 From: patrick.jaki@gmail.com (Patrick Jaki) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 16:16:21 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <54490772.2020805@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy on "The ability to correctly reproduce things like 4+7=11 is not in my experience any evidence that a child has grasped what + or = means ..." Yes, teachers have taught these symbols with finality because that is what the syllabus says. In other words, as absolute that will remains fossilized in meaning. If I recall correctly, my friend wrote his masters project in mathematics on the equal sign. It was an eye opener. On 23 October 2014 15:49, Andy Blunden wrote: > Mathematics today is nothing like it was 300 years ago, Carol, even if it > is in a South African elementary school. And the teacher wouldn't accept it > if Johnny said that apes had evolved from human either or that gravity went > clockwise. The ability to correctly reproduce things like 4+7=11 is not in > my experience any evidence that a child has grasped what + or = means, and > certainly no evidence that they have any grasp of mathematics or even > number. Of course, we might take the view that they never will anyway, so > being able to add is good enough for them. > > But if we take the view that it is worthwhile that a child learn what > science is and what mathematics is about, then in my view, the problems are > essentially the same whichever science it is. > > Of course, in general, the attitude a teacher takes to their material is > that it is objectively true and the kids should come to know it. But this > stance or attitude to knowledge, or science, is a very poor preparation for > adult life and citizenship. I don't see mathematics in principle as being > an exception. Perhaps a little teaching of the history of mathematics would > help? I don't know. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Carol Macdonald wrote: > >> Andy >> >> I realise that, but it much more robust than orthodox science; i.e. we >> are still doing the same maths as 300 years ago, where normal science is >> very different indeed. >> If Johnny said that 4+7=10, the teacher is not going to accept that, is >> she? >> >> Carol >> >> On 23 October 2014 10:02, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Carol, mathematics is a natural science like any other. >> It is neither the absolute truth nor merely social convention. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Carol Macdonald wrote: >> >> Julian, Andy >> >> I think arithmetic is something of a test case. Just as word >> meaning >> changes over time in a dynamic way, as recognised by >> linguists, maths >> truths don't. It would be difficult to argue that maths truths >> of basic >> arithmetic have changed over the centuries. I don't know about >> maths truths >> of a higher order. >> >> Sorry if I use the terms arithmetic and maths interchangeably; >> it's a South >> African usage here in basic education. >> >> Carol >> >> On 23 October 2014 08:33, Julian Williams >> > > >> >> wrote: >> >> >> Andy >> >> Yes, just so, this is why I go to social theory eg Marx >> and Bourdieu to >> find political-economic contradictions within and between >> activities. >> >> But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the >> notion in >> Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or >> environment is given >> and the same for all, and the final form of development is >> given in a >> final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being >> then associated >> with an already given social plane). >> >> I'm happy enough to accept that this is a false and >> undialectical reading >> of Vygotsky (after all who knows how the concept of >> perezhivanie might have >> matured in his hands)... >> >> To return to my case - arithmetic. Many will say this >> exists in ideal form >> in the culture and all that needs to be done by >> development is to bring the >> child into the culture... Then the child is 'schooled'... >> Passive, lacking >> in agency, often failed, and at best made obedient to the >> cultural legacy. >> AsBourdieu says, through processes in school the class >> system is >> reproduced, and this is enculturation into the cultural >> arbitrary. >> >> Julian >> >> >> >> >> On 23 Oct 2014, at 07:08, "Andy Blunden" >> > wrote: >> >> >> No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the >> one true meaning >> >> of something. He does not allow that the meaning of >> something may be >> contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of >> heterogeneity in >> society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, >> social movements >> and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of >> something which >> "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which >> are therefore >> taken to be subjective. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> This continues and extends from my original post >> concerning Andy's >> >> breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points >> total... [copypasta is a >> starch of art] >> --------------------------------------------------- 6. [The >> fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) >> --------------------------------------------------- You >> say: "ANL believes >> that motivation determines perception. The norm of >> perception, the "true" >> meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for >> the community as >> a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of >> "community as a >> whole" in this context." So is it the case that >> word-meaning is denied by >> ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" cohesive across >> the culture and >> cannot have personal or spontaneous meaning? I can see the >> reason >> politically to emphasize this, if the State is sanctioned >> as the sole >> arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post below Wed, >> 22 Oct 2014 >> 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: >> >> _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning >> ---------- ANL believes that >> >> the mental representation in a child's awareness must >> _correspond_ directly >> to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but >> also how the >> object may relate and associate to other objects and their >> meanings. The >> example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I >> will call here >> for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", >> ANL takes exception >> with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a >> generalization to >> reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit >> (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the >> existence of these >> word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they >> are what >> construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this >> because he considers >> consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- >> >> Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes >> that motivation determines >> >> perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of >> an object, is >> therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. >> I am questioning >> the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in >> this context. >> >> --end >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> Developmental psycholinguist >> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of >> Linguistics, Unisa >> >> >> >> > -- *Patrick Jaki* *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* From julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk Thu Oct 23 07:18:38 2014 From: julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk (Julian Williams) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 14:18:38 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <54490772.2020805@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> Message-ID: <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> Andy/Carol I would like to expand a bit on Andy's point - First, I have often had very interesting discussions with children who work out that 7+4 = 10 ... this is usually accomplished by a 'counting on' method, which begins with the 7 ("1") and goes 7 ("1"),8 ("2") ,9 ("3") ,10 "4- there we are, 10!" ... 7 -- 8 --- 9 -- 10 1 ... 2 ... 3 ... 4 Similarly 10 - 4 = 7 etc. (It doesn't really matter whether the teacher accepts the answer or not - the kids keep getting the answer 10... and we have data to prove it; until one day they are told they are hopeless and its time for them to leave and go down the mines/factory. See Billy Connolly's youtube hit on 'algebra'..) Second: Im pleased to say that the best arithmetic I am seeing in schools now bears almost no relation to that I experienced 50 odd years ago as a learner, and that I taught as a teacher 30 years ago... although there seems still to be a lot that hasn't changed as much as Id like. Im thinking of a lesson wherein different groups of children modelled their 'proofs' that 3x28 = 84 using various methods, tools, etc. So Im afraid the story that arithmetic already exists in some ideal form in the social - cultural plane (eg in adult practices?), and so can/has to be somehow made present for the youngster in their earlier stages of development (if that's what Vygotsky really meant) is far too simple for me, and at its worst leads to terrible schooling practices, where there is no room for a child's intelligent argument that 7 + 4 really equals 10 :-) Julian Andy: my sleight of hand here is that I translate your formulation of what leontiev says "there is one true object/ive and the kids should come to know it" into Vygotsky's " ideal form of arithmetic" where child development must end up... thus your critique of Leontiev becomes my complaint about Vygtosky's perezhivanie paper. Im sure you will say "not fair"? -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: 23 October 2014 14:50 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] Mathematics today is nothing like it was 300 years ago, Carol, even if it is in a South African elementary school. And the teacher wouldn't accept it if Johnny said that apes had evolved from human either or that gravity went clockwise. The ability to correctly reproduce things like 4+7=11 is not in my experience any evidence that a child has grasped what + or = means, and certainly no evidence that they have any grasp of mathematics or even number. Of course, we might take the view that they never will anyway, so being able to add is good enough for them. But if we take the view that it is worthwhile that a child learn what science is and what mathematics is about, then in my view, the problems are essentially the same whichever science it is. Of course, in general, the attitude a teacher takes to their material is that it is objectively true and the kids should come to know it. But this stance or attitude to knowledge, or science, is a very poor preparation for adult life and citizenship. I don't see mathematics in principle as being an exception. Perhaps a little teaching of the history of mathematics would help? I don't know. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Carol Macdonald wrote: > Andy > > I realise that, but it much more robust than orthodox science; i.e. we > are still doing the same maths as 300 years ago, where normal science > is very different indeed. > > If Johnny said that 4+7=10, the teacher is not going to accept that, > is she? > > Carol > > On 23 October 2014 10:02, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > Carol, mathematics is a natural science like any other. > It is neither the absolute truth nor merely social convention. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Carol Macdonald wrote: > > Julian, Andy > > I think arithmetic is something of a test case. Just as word > meaning > changes over time in a dynamic way, as recognised by > linguists, maths > truths don't. It would be difficult to argue that maths truths > of basic > arithmetic have changed over the centuries. I don't know about > maths truths > of a higher order. > > Sorry if I use the terms arithmetic and maths interchangeably; > it's a South > African usage here in basic education. > > Carol > > On 23 October 2014 08:33, Julian Williams > > > wrote: > > > > Andy > > Yes, just so, this is why I go to social theory eg Marx > and Bourdieu to > find political-economic contradictions within and between > activities. > > But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the > notion in > Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or > environment is given > and the same for all, and the final form of development is > given in a > final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being > then associated > with an already given social plane). > > I'm happy enough to accept that this is a false and > undialectical reading > of Vygotsky (after all who knows how the concept of > perezhivanie might have > matured in his hands)... > > To return to my case - arithmetic. Many will say this > exists in ideal form > in the culture and all that needs to be done by > development is to bring the > child into the culture... Then the child is 'schooled'... > Passive, lacking > in agency, often failed, and at best made obedient to the > cultural legacy. > AsBourdieu says, through processes in school the class > system is > reproduced, and this is enculturation into the cultural > arbitrary. > > Julian > > > > > On 23 Oct 2014, at 07:08, "Andy Blunden" > > wrote: > > > > No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the > one true meaning > > > of something. He does not allow that the meaning of > something may be > contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of > heterogeneity in > society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, > social movements > and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of > something which > "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which > are therefore > taken to be subjective. > > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > This continues and extends from my original post > concerning Andy's > > > breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points > total... [copypasta is a > starch of art] > --------------------------------------------------- 6. [The > fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) > --------------------------------------------------- You > say: "ANL believes > that motivation determines perception. The norm of > perception, the "true" > meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for > the community as > a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of > "community as a > whole" in this context." So is it the case that > word-meaning is denied by > ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" cohesive across > the culture and > cannot have personal or spontaneous meaning? I can see the > reason > politically to emphasize this, if the State is sanctioned > as the sole > arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post below Wed, > 22 Oct 2014 > 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: > > > _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning > ---------- ANL believes that > > > the mental representation in a child's awareness must > _correspond_ directly > to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but > also how the > object may relate and associate to other objects and their > meanings. The > example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I > will call here > for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", > ANL takes exception > with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a > generalization to > reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit > (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the > existence of these > word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they > are what > construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this > because he considers > consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- > > > Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes > that motivation determines > > > perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of > an object, is > therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. > I am questioning > the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in > this context. > > > --end > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Oct 23 07:34:34 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 01:34:34 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> Message-ID: <544911FA.3010808@mira.net> Julian, The claim that the ideal exists in the social environment from the beginning is quite consistent, indeed relies upon, the claim that the ideal is being continuously subject to transformation, that is, that mathematicians are active developing the content of mathematics in the context of the problems and resources the community is generating. Were this not the case, it would be very difficult (though not impossible) for kids to acquire a mathematical disposition. I think the basic ontogenetic principle fully applies to mathematics. But the ideal is certainly not the absolute truths of arithmetic taught in South African elementary schools. The ideal is the *social practice of mathematics*. That is, of course, by its very nature, continually evolving and transforming. The ideal is a pair of shifting goal posts. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Julian Williams wrote: > Andy/Carol > > I would like to expand a bit on Andy's point - > > First, I have often had very interesting discussions with children who work out that 7+4 = 10 ... this is usually accomplished by a 'counting on' method, which begins with the 7 ("1") and goes 7 ("1"),8 ("2") ,9 ("3") ,10 "4- there we are, 10!" ... > > 7 -- 8 --- 9 -- 10 > 1 ... 2 ... 3 ... 4 > > Similarly 10 - 4 = 7 etc. > > (It doesn't really matter whether the teacher accepts the answer or not - the kids keep getting the answer 10... and we have data to prove it; until one day they are told they are hopeless and its time for them to leave and go down the mines/factory. See Billy Connolly's youtube hit on 'algebra'..) > > Second: Im pleased to say that the best arithmetic I am seeing in schools now bears almost no relation to that I experienced 50 odd years ago as a learner, and that I taught as a teacher 30 years ago... although there seems still to be a lot that hasn't changed as much as Id like. Im thinking of a lesson wherein different groups of children modelled their 'proofs' that 3x28 = 84 using various methods, tools, etc. > > So Im afraid the story that arithmetic already exists in some ideal form in the social - cultural plane (eg in adult practices?), and so can/has to be somehow made present for the youngster in their earlier stages of development (if that's what Vygotsky really meant) is far too simple for me, and at its worst leads to terrible schooling practices, where there is no room for a child's intelligent argument that 7 + 4 really equals 10 > > :-) > > Julian > > Andy: my sleight of hand here is that I translate your formulation of what leontiev says "there is one true object/ive and the kids should come to know it" into Vygotsky's " ideal form of arithmetic" where child development must end up... thus your critique of Leontiev becomes my complaint about Vygtosky's perezhivanie paper. Im sure you will say "not fair"? > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: 23 October 2014 14:50 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] > > Mathematics today is nothing like it was 300 years ago, Carol, even if it is in a South African elementary school. And the teacher wouldn't accept it if Johnny said that apes had evolved from human either or that gravity went clockwise. The ability to correctly reproduce things like > 4+7=11 is not in my experience any evidence that a child has grasped > what + or = means, and certainly no evidence that they have any grasp of mathematics or even number. Of course, we might take the view that they never will anyway, so being able to add is good enough for them. > > But if we take the view that it is worthwhile that a child learn what science is and what mathematics is about, then in my view, the problems are essentially the same whichever science it is. > > Of course, in general, the attitude a teacher takes to their material is that it is objectively true and the kids should come to know it. But this stance or attitude to knowledge, or science, is a very poor preparation for adult life and citizenship. I don't see mathematics in principle as being an exception. Perhaps a little teaching of the history of mathematics would help? I don't know. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Carol Macdonald wrote: > >> Andy >> >> I realise that, but it much more robust than orthodox science; i.e. we >> are still doing the same maths as 300 years ago, where normal science >> is very different indeed. >> >> If Johnny said that 4+7=10, the teacher is not going to accept that, >> is she? >> >> Carol >> >> On 23 October 2014 10:02, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> Carol, mathematics is a natural science like any other. >> It is neither the absolute truth nor merely social convention. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Carol Macdonald wrote: >> >> Julian, Andy >> >> I think arithmetic is something of a test case. Just as word >> meaning >> changes over time in a dynamic way, as recognised by >> linguists, maths >> truths don't. It would be difficult to argue that maths truths >> of basic >> arithmetic have changed over the centuries. I don't know about >> maths truths >> of a higher order. >> >> Sorry if I use the terms arithmetic and maths interchangeably; >> it's a South >> African usage here in basic education. >> >> Carol >> >> On 23 October 2014 08:33, Julian Williams >> > > >> wrote: >> >> >> >> Andy >> >> Yes, just so, this is why I go to social theory eg Marx >> and Bourdieu to >> find political-economic contradictions within and between >> activities. >> >> But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the >> notion in >> Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or >> environment is given >> and the same for all, and the final form of development is >> given in a >> final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being >> then associated >> with an already given social plane). >> >> I'm happy enough to accept that this is a false and >> undialectical reading >> of Vygotsky (after all who knows how the concept of >> perezhivanie might have >> matured in his hands)... >> >> To return to my case - arithmetic. Many will say this >> exists in ideal form >> in the culture and all that needs to be done by >> development is to bring the >> child into the culture... Then the child is 'schooled'... >> Passive, lacking >> in agency, often failed, and at best made obedient to the >> cultural legacy. >> AsBourdieu says, through processes in school the class >> system is >> reproduced, and this is enculturation into the cultural >> arbitrary. >> >> Julian >> >> >> >> >> On 23 Oct 2014, at 07:08, "Andy Blunden" >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the >> one true meaning >> >> >> of something. He does not allow that the meaning of >> something may be >> contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of >> heterogeneity in >> society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, >> social movements >> and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of >> something which >> "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which >> are therefore >> taken to be subjective. >> >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> >> This continues and extends from my original post >> concerning Andy's >> >> >> breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points >> total... [copypasta is a >> starch of art] >> --------------------------------------------------- 6. [The >> fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) >> --------------------------------------------------- You >> say: "ANL believes >> that motivation determines perception. The norm of >> perception, the "true" >> meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for >> the community as >> a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of >> "community as a >> whole" in this context." So is it the case that >> word-meaning is denied by >> ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" cohesive across >> the culture and >> cannot have personal or spontaneous meaning? I can see the >> reason >> politically to emphasize this, if the State is sanctioned >> as the sole >> arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post below Wed, >> 22 Oct 2014 >> 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: >> >> >> _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning >> ---------- ANL believes that >> >> >> the mental representation in a child's awareness must >> _correspond_ directly >> to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but >> also how the >> object may relate and associate to other objects and their >> meanings. The >> example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I >> will call here >> for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", >> ANL takes exception >> with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a >> generalization to >> reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit >> (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the >> existence of these >> word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they >> are what >> construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this >> because he considers >> consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- >> >> >> Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes >> that motivation determines >> >> >> perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of >> an object, is >> therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. >> I am questioning >> the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in >> this context. >> >> >> --end >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> Developmental psycholinguist >> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> >> >> >> > > > > From Peg.Griffin@att.net Thu Oct 23 08:25:45 2014 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 11:25:45 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <544911FA.3010808@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net> Message-ID: <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> And thus the importance of finding a good germ cell for mathematics pedagogy -- because a germ cell can "grow with" and "grow" the current "social practice of mathematics." Whether someone agrees with the choice of germ cell made by Davidov (or anyone else), a germ cell needs to be identified, justified and relied on to generate curriculum content and practice, right? PG -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 10:35 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] Julian, The claim that the ideal exists in the social environment from the beginning is quite consistent, indeed relies upon, the claim that the ideal is being continuously subject to transformation, that is, that mathematicians are active developing the content of mathematics in the context of the problems and resources the community is generating. Were this not the case, it would be very difficult (though not impossible) for kids to acquire a mathematical disposition. I think the basic ontogenetic principle fully applies to mathematics. But the ideal is certainly not the absolute truths of arithmetic taught in South African elementary schools. The ideal is the *social practice of mathematics*. That is, of course, by its very nature, continually evolving and transforming. The ideal is a pair of shifting goal posts. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Julian Williams wrote: > Andy/Carol > > I would like to expand a bit on Andy's point - > > First, I have often had very interesting discussions with children who work out that 7+4 = 10 ... this is usually accomplished by a 'counting on' method, which begins with the 7 ("1") and goes 7 ("1"),8 ("2") ,9 ("3") ,10 "4- there we are, 10!" ... > > 7 -- 8 --- 9 -- 10 > 1 ... 2 ... 3 ... 4 > > Similarly 10 - 4 = 7 etc. > > (It doesn't really matter whether the teacher accepts the answer or > not - the kids keep getting the answer 10... and we have data to prove > it; until one day they are told they are hopeless and its time for > them to leave and go down the mines/factory. See Billy Connolly's > youtube hit on 'algebra'..) > > Second: Im pleased to say that the best arithmetic I am seeing in schools now bears almost no relation to that I experienced 50 odd years ago as a learner, and that I taught as a teacher 30 years ago... although there seems still to be a lot that hasn't changed as much as Id like. Im thinking of a lesson wherein different groups of children modelled their 'proofs' that 3x28 = 84 using various methods, tools, etc. > > So Im afraid the story that arithmetic already exists in some ideal > form in the social - cultural plane (eg in adult practices?), and so > can/has to be somehow made present for the youngster in their earlier > stages of development (if that's what Vygotsky really meant) is far > too simple for me, and at its worst leads to terrible schooling > practices, where there is no room for a child's intelligent argument > that 7 + 4 really equals 10 > > :-) > > Julian > > Andy: my sleight of hand here is that I translate your formulation of what leontiev says "there is one true object/ive and the kids should come to know it" into Vygotsky's " ideal form of arithmetic" where child development must end up... thus your critique of Leontiev becomes my complaint about Vygtosky's perezhivanie paper. Im sure you will say "not fair"? > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: 23 October 2014 14:50 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of > word-meaning] > > Mathematics today is nothing like it was 300 years ago, Carol, even if > it is in a South African elementary school. And the teacher wouldn't > accept it if Johnny said that apes had evolved from human either or > that gravity went clockwise. The ability to correctly reproduce > things like > 4+7=11 is not in my experience any evidence that a child has grasped > what + or = means, and certainly no evidence that they have any grasp of mathematics or even number. Of course, we might take the view that they never will anyway, so being able to add is good enough for them. > > But if we take the view that it is worthwhile that a child learn what science is and what mathematics is about, then in my view, the problems are essentially the same whichever science it is. > > Of course, in general, the attitude a teacher takes to their material is that it is objectively true and the kids should come to know it. But this stance or attitude to knowledge, or science, is a very poor preparation for adult life and citizenship. I don't see mathematics in principle as being an exception. Perhaps a little teaching of the history of mathematics would help? I don't know. > > Andy > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Carol Macdonald wrote: > >> Andy >> >> I realise that, but it much more robust than orthodox science; i.e. >> we are still doing the same maths as 300 years ago, where normal >> science is very different indeed. >> >> If Johnny said that 4+7=10, the teacher is not going to accept that, >> is she? >> >> Carol >> >> On 23 October 2014 10:02, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> Carol, mathematics is a natural science like any other. >> It is neither the absolute truth nor merely social convention. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Carol Macdonald wrote: >> >> Julian, Andy >> >> I think arithmetic is something of a test case. Just as word >> meaning >> changes over time in a dynamic way, as recognised by >> linguists, maths >> truths don't. It would be difficult to argue that maths truths >> of basic >> arithmetic have changed over the centuries. I don't know about >> maths truths >> of a higher order. >> >> Sorry if I use the terms arithmetic and maths interchangeably; >> it's a South >> African usage here in basic education. >> >> Carol >> >> On 23 October 2014 08:33, Julian Williams >> > > >> wrote: >> >> >> >> Andy >> >> Yes, just so, this is why I go to social theory eg Marx >> and Bourdieu to >> find political-economic contradictions within and between >> activities. >> >> But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the >> notion in >> Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or >> environment is given >> and the same for all, and the final form of development is >> given in a >> final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being >> then associated >> with an already given social plane). >> >> I'm happy enough to accept that this is a false and >> undialectical reading >> of Vygotsky (after all who knows how the concept of >> perezhivanie might have >> matured in his hands)... >> >> To return to my case - arithmetic. Many will say this >> exists in ideal form >> in the culture and all that needs to be done by >> development is to bring the >> child into the culture... Then the child is 'schooled'... >> Passive, lacking >> in agency, often failed, and at best made obedient to the >> cultural legacy. >> AsBourdieu says, through processes in school the class >> system is >> reproduced, and this is enculturation into the cultural >> arbitrary. >> >> Julian >> >> >> >> >> On 23 Oct 2014, at 07:08, "Andy Blunden" >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the >> one true meaning >> >> >> of something. He does not allow that the meaning of >> something may be >> contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of >> heterogeneity in >> society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, >> social movements >> and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of >> something which >> "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which >> are therefore >> taken to be subjective. >> >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> >> This continues and extends from my original post >> concerning Andy's >> >> >> breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points >> total... [copypasta is a >> starch of art] >> --------------------------------------------------- 6. [The >> fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) >> --------------------------------------------------- You >> say: "ANL believes >> that motivation determines perception. The norm of >> perception, the "true" >> meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for >> the community as >> a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of >> "community as a >> whole" in this context." So is it the case that >> word-meaning is denied by >> ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" cohesive across >> the culture and >> cannot have personal or spontaneous meaning? I can see the >> reason >> politically to emphasize this, if the State is sanctioned >> as the sole >> arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post below Wed, >> 22 Oct 2014 >> 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: >> >> >> _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning >> ---------- ANL believes that >> >> >> the mental representation in a child's awareness must >> _correspond_ directly >> to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but >> also how the >> object may relate and associate to other objects and their >> meanings. The >> example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I >> will call here >> for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", >> ANL takes exception >> with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a >> generalization to >> reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit >> (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the >> existence of these >> word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they >> are what >> construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this >> because he considers >> consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- >> >> >> Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes >> that motivation determines >> >> >> perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of >> an object, is >> therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. >> I am questioning >> the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in >> this context. >> >> >> --end >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> Developmental psycholinguist >> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> >> >> >> > > > > From VanDerRiet@ukzn.ac.za Thu Oct 23 08:29:32 2014 From: VanDerRiet@ukzn.ac.za (Mary van der Riet) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 15:29:32 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ISCAR 2017 - anybody know the venue? In-Reply-To: <544907B2.3010007@mira.net> References: <8f20ef3fc91b411992774551d6024c89@PMB-MBX-1.local.ukzn.ac.za> <544907B2.3010007@mira.net> Message-ID: <1414667191.54260.1414078166254.JavaMail.rim@b13.c6.bise7.blackberry> Thanks Andy Sent from my BlackBerry? wireless device -----Original Message----- From: Andy Blunden Sender: Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 00:50:42 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Reply-To: , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ISCAR 2017 - anybody know the venue? http://convention.qc.ca/en/news/quebec-city-host-5th-iscar-international-congress-2017 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Mary van der Riet wrote: > > > From julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk Thu Oct 23 09:24:17 2014 From: julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk (Julian Williams) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 16:24:17 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>,<003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> Message-ID: Andy: Now I feel we are nearly together, here. There is no 'final' form even of simple arithmetic, because it is (as social practices are) continually evolving. Just one more step then: our conversation with the 7 year old child about the truth of 7plus 4 equals 10 is a part of this social practice, and contributes to it....? The event involved in this Perezhivanie here involves a situation that is created by the joint activity of the child with us? Peg: Germ cell for the social practice of mathematics... I wonder if there is a problem with Davydov's approach, in that it requires a specification of the final form of the mathematics to be learnt (a closed curriculum). But let me try: One candidate might be the 'reasoned justification for a mathematical use/application to our project' ... Implies meaningful verbal thought/interaction, and collective mathematical activity with others. Not sure how this works to define your curriculum content etc. Julian On 23 Oct 2014, at 16:28, "Peg Griffin" wrote: > And thus the importance of finding a good germ cell for mathematics pedagogy > -- because a germ cell can "grow with" and "grow" the current "social > practice of mathematics." Whether someone agrees with the choice of germ > cell made by Davidov (or anyone else), a germ cell needs to be identified, > justified and relied on to generate curriculum content and practice, right? > PG > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 10:35 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] > > Julian, > The claim that the ideal exists in the social environment from the beginning > is quite consistent, indeed relies upon, the claim that the ideal is being > continuously subject to transformation, that is, that mathematicians are > active developing the content of mathematics in the context of the problems > and resources the community is generating. Were this not the case, it would > be very difficult (though not impossible) for kids to acquire a mathematical > disposition. > > I think the basic ontogenetic principle fully applies to mathematics. > But the ideal is certainly not the absolute truths of arithmetic taught in > South African elementary schools. The ideal is the *social practice of > mathematics*. That is, of course, by its very nature, continually evolving > and transforming. The ideal is a pair of shifting goal posts. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Julian Williams wrote: >> Andy/Carol >> >> I would like to expand a bit on Andy's point - >> >> First, I have often had very interesting discussions with children who > work out that 7+4 = 10 ... this is usually accomplished by a 'counting on' > method, which begins with the 7 ("1") and goes 7 ("1"),8 ("2") ,9 ("3") ,10 > "4- there we are, 10!" ... >> >> 7 -- 8 --- 9 -- 10 >> 1 ... 2 ... 3 ... 4 >> >> Similarly 10 - 4 = 7 etc. >> >> (It doesn't really matter whether the teacher accepts the answer or >> not - the kids keep getting the answer 10... and we have data to prove >> it; until one day they are told they are hopeless and its time for >> them to leave and go down the mines/factory. See Billy Connolly's >> youtube hit on 'algebra'..) >> >> Second: Im pleased to say that the best arithmetic I am seeing in schools > now bears almost no relation to that I experienced 50 odd years ago as a > learner, and that I taught as a teacher 30 years ago... although there > seems still to be a lot that hasn't changed as much as Id like. Im thinking > of a lesson wherein different groups of children modelled their 'proofs' > that 3x28 = 84 using various methods, tools, etc. >> >> So Im afraid the story that arithmetic already exists in some ideal >> form in the social - cultural plane (eg in adult practices?), and so >> can/has to be somehow made present for the youngster in their earlier >> stages of development (if that's what Vygotsky really meant) is far >> too simple for me, and at its worst leads to terrible schooling >> practices, where there is no room for a child's intelligent argument >> that 7 + 4 really equals 10 >> >> :-) >> >> Julian >> >> Andy: my sleight of hand here is that I translate your formulation of what > leontiev says "there is one true object/ive and the kids should come to know > it" into Vygotsky's " ideal form of arithmetic" where child development must > end up... thus your critique of Leontiev becomes my complaint about > Vygtosky's perezhivanie paper. Im sure you will say "not fair"? >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: 23 October 2014 14:50 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of >> word-meaning] >> >> Mathematics today is nothing like it was 300 years ago, Carol, even if >> it is in a South African elementary school. And the teacher wouldn't >> accept it if Johnny said that apes had evolved from human either or >> that gravity went clockwise. The ability to correctly reproduce >> things like >> 4+7=11 is not in my experience any evidence that a child has grasped >> what + or = means, and certainly no evidence that they have any grasp of > mathematics or even number. Of course, we might take the view that they > never will anyway, so being able to add is good enough for them. >> >> But if we take the view that it is worthwhile that a child learn what > science is and what mathematics is about, then in my view, the problems are > essentially the same whichever science it is. >> >> Of course, in general, the attitude a teacher takes to their material is > that it is objectively true and the kids should come to know it. But this > stance or attitude to knowledge, or science, is a very poor preparation for > adult life and citizenship. I don't see mathematics in principle as being an > exception. Perhaps a little teaching of the history of mathematics would > help? I don't know. >> >> Andy >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Carol Macdonald wrote: >> >>> Andy >>> >>> I realise that, but it much more robust than orthodox science; i.e. >>> we are still doing the same maths as 300 years ago, where normal >>> science is very different indeed. >>> >>> If Johnny said that 4+7=10, the teacher is not going to accept that, >>> is she? >>> >>> Carol >>> >>> On 23 October 2014 10:02, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >>> >>> Carol, mathematics is a natural science like any other. >>> It is neither the absolute truth nor merely social convention. >>> >>> Andy >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>> >>> Julian, Andy >>> >>> I think arithmetic is something of a test case. Just as word >>> meaning >>> changes over time in a dynamic way, as recognised by >>> linguists, maths >>> truths don't. It would be difficult to argue that maths truths >>> of basic >>> arithmetic have changed over the centuries. I don't know about >>> maths truths >>> of a higher order. >>> >>> Sorry if I use the terms arithmetic and maths interchangeably; >>> it's a South >>> African usage here in basic education. >>> >>> Carol >>> >>> On 23 October 2014 08:33, Julian Williams >>> >> > >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> Yes, just so, this is why I go to social theory eg Marx >>> and Bourdieu to >>> find political-economic contradictions within and between >>> activities. >>> >>> But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the >>> notion in >>> Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or >>> environment is given >>> and the same for all, and the final form of development is >>> given in a >>> final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being >>> then associated >>> with an already given social plane). >>> >>> I'm happy enough to accept that this is a false and >>> undialectical reading >>> of Vygotsky (after all who knows how the concept of >>> perezhivanie might have >>> matured in his hands)... >>> >>> To return to my case - arithmetic. Many will say this >>> exists in ideal form >>> in the culture and all that needs to be done by >>> development is to bring the >>> child into the culture... Then the child is 'schooled'... >>> Passive, lacking >>> in agency, often failed, and at best made obedient to the >>> cultural legacy. >>> AsBourdieu says, through processes in school the class >>> system is >>> reproduced, and this is enculturation into the cultural >>> arbitrary. >>> >>> Julian >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 23 Oct 2014, at 07:08, "Andy Blunden" >>> > wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the >>> one true meaning >>> >>> >>> of something. He does not allow that the meaning of >>> something may be >>> contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of >>> heterogeneity in >>> society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, >>> social movements >>> and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of >>> something which >>> "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which >>> are therefore >>> taken to be subjective. >>> >>> >>> Andy >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> >>> This continues and extends from my original post >>> concerning Andy's >>> >>> >>> breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points >>> total... [copypasta is a >>> starch of art] >>> --------------------------------------------------- 6. [The >>> fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) >>> --------------------------------------------------- You >>> say: "ANL believes >>> that motivation determines perception. The norm of >>> perception, the "true" >>> meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for >>> the community as >>> a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of >>> "community as a >>> whole" in this context." So is it the case that >>> word-meaning is denied by >>> ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" cohesive across >>> the culture and >>> cannot have personal or spontaneous meaning? I can see the >>> reason >>> politically to emphasize this, if the State is sanctioned >>> as the sole >>> arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post below Wed, >>> 22 Oct 2014 >>> 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: >>> >>> >>> _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning >>> ---------- ANL believes that >>> >>> >>> the mental representation in a child's awareness must >>> _correspond_ directly >>> to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but >>> also how the >>> object may relate and associate to other objects and their >>> meanings. The >>> example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I >>> will call here >>> for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", >>> ANL takes exception >>> with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a >>> generalization to >>> reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit >>> (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the >>> existence of these >>> word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they >>> are what >>> construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this >>> because he considers >>> consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- >>> >>> >>> Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes >>> that motivation determines >>> >>> >>> perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of >>> an object, is >>> therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. >>> I am questioning >>> the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in >>> this context. >>> >>> >>> --end >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>> Developmental psycholinguist >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> > From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Oct 23 09:47:55 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 09:47:55 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net> <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> Message-ID: All-- I want to go back to Julian's note in which he writes: (My added emphasis) But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the notion in *Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or environment is given and the same for all,* and the final form of development is given in a final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being then associated with an already given social plane). WHAT? Isn't the core idea that each of the three kids in the initial alcoholic mom story that perezhivanie is a particular relationship between the individual and the situation? Second, regarding *the final form of development is given in a final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being then associated with an already given social plane).* I raised concerns early on about this formulation. On the one hand, it is true (in so far as the ideal is not seen as "the perfected/never to be changed).It is only the given, ideologically and historically shaped "ideal of the group at the given time". How long it remains and how widely it is dispersed is up for grabs. For deaf, home signing kids to be brought together in a school setting where they, collectively, "acquire", use and transform the "ideal" that they encounter, depending upon which generation of local signers they encounter. My concern grew precisely along the lines that worry Julian. But the notion of "the ideal" as not an historically evolved cultural understanding seems to me to play too easily into totalitarian modes of thought. On the other hand, some sorts of ideals seem to have such a long life and seem so useful to us, that they are "as if" unchanging. So, for a (relatively) long time, English can be considered a "mature language." Its hard to see how next generations of kids change the language in a single generation. But for sure it happens and is happening all the time. If you doubt it, imagine your grandmother saying something like "Well,if you are not down with that, just google it." Any acquaintance with the history of English from is precarious beginnings makes the same point on a longer time scale. mike On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:24 AM, Julian Williams < julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote: > Andy: > > Now I feel we are nearly together, here. There is no 'final' form even of > simple arithmetic, because it is (as social practices are) continually > evolving. > > Just one more step then: our conversation with the 7 year old child about > the truth of 7plus 4 equals 10 is a part of this social practice, and > contributes to it....? The event involved in this Perezhivanie here > involves a situation that is created by the joint activity of the child > with us? > > Peg: Germ cell for the social practice of mathematics... I wonder if there > is a problem with Davydov's approach, in that it requires a specification > of the final form of the mathematics to be learnt (a closed curriculum). > But let me try: One candidate might be the 'reasoned justification for a > mathematical use/application to our project' ... Implies meaningful verbal > thought/interaction, and collective mathematical activity with others. Not > sure how this works to define your curriculum content etc. > > Julian > > > On 23 Oct 2014, at 16:28, "Peg Griffin" wrote: > > > And thus the importance of finding a good germ cell for mathematics > pedagogy > > -- because a germ cell can "grow with" and "grow" the current "social > > practice of mathematics." Whether someone agrees with the choice of germ > > cell made by Davidov (or anyone else), a germ cell needs to be > identified, > > justified and relied on to generate curriculum content and practice, > right? > > PG > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 10:35 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of > word-meaning] > > > > Julian, > > The claim that the ideal exists in the social environment from the > beginning > > is quite consistent, indeed relies upon, the claim that the ideal is > being > > continuously subject to transformation, that is, that mathematicians are > > active developing the content of mathematics in the context of the > problems > > and resources the community is generating. Were this not the case, it > would > > be very difficult (though not impossible) for kids to acquire a > mathematical > > disposition. > > > > I think the basic ontogenetic principle fully applies to mathematics. > > But the ideal is certainly not the absolute truths of arithmetic taught > in > > South African elementary schools. The ideal is the *social practice of > > mathematics*. That is, of course, by its very nature, continually > evolving > > and transforming. The ideal is a pair of shifting goal posts. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Julian Williams wrote: > >> Andy/Carol > >> > >> I would like to expand a bit on Andy's point - > >> > >> First, I have often had very interesting discussions with children who > > work out that 7+4 = 10 ... this is usually accomplished by a 'counting > on' > > method, which begins with the 7 ("1") and goes 7 ("1"),8 ("2") ,9 ("3") > ,10 > > "4- there we are, 10!" ... > >> > >> 7 -- 8 --- 9 -- 10 > >> 1 ... 2 ... 3 ... 4 > >> > >> Similarly 10 - 4 = 7 etc. > >> > >> (It doesn't really matter whether the teacher accepts the answer or > >> not - the kids keep getting the answer 10... and we have data to prove > >> it; until one day they are told they are hopeless and its time for > >> them to leave and go down the mines/factory. See Billy Connolly's > >> youtube hit on 'algebra'..) > >> > >> Second: Im pleased to say that the best arithmetic I am seeing in > schools > > now bears almost no relation to that I experienced 50 odd years ago as a > > learner, and that I taught as a teacher 30 years ago... although there > > seems still to be a lot that hasn't changed as much as Id like. Im > thinking > > of a lesson wherein different groups of children modelled their 'proofs' > > that 3x28 = 84 using various methods, tools, etc. > >> > >> So Im afraid the story that arithmetic already exists in some ideal > >> form in the social - cultural plane (eg in adult practices?), and so > >> can/has to be somehow made present for the youngster in their earlier > >> stages of development (if that's what Vygotsky really meant) is far > >> too simple for me, and at its worst leads to terrible schooling > >> practices, where there is no room for a child's intelligent argument > >> that 7 + 4 really equals 10 > >> > >> :-) > >> > >> Julian > >> > >> Andy: my sleight of hand here is that I translate your formulation of > what > > leontiev says "there is one true object/ive and the kids should come to > know > > it" into Vygotsky's " ideal form of arithmetic" where child development > must > > end up... thus your critique of Leontiev becomes my complaint about > > Vygtosky's perezhivanie paper. Im sure you will say "not fair"? > >> > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >> Sent: 23 October 2014 14:50 > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of > >> word-meaning] > >> > >> Mathematics today is nothing like it was 300 years ago, Carol, even if > >> it is in a South African elementary school. And the teacher wouldn't > >> accept it if Johnny said that apes had evolved from human either or > >> that gravity went clockwise. The ability to correctly reproduce > >> things like > >> 4+7=11 is not in my experience any evidence that a child has grasped > >> what + or = means, and certainly no evidence that they have any grasp of > > mathematics or even number. Of course, we might take the view that they > > never will anyway, so being able to add is good enough for them. > >> > >> But if we take the view that it is worthwhile that a child learn what > > science is and what mathematics is about, then in my view, the problems > are > > essentially the same whichever science it is. > >> > >> Of course, in general, the attitude a teacher takes to their material is > > that it is objectively true and the kids should come to know it. But this > > stance or attitude to knowledge, or science, is a very poor preparation > for > > adult life and citizenship. I don't see mathematics in principle as > being an > > exception. Perhaps a little teaching of the history of mathematics would > > help? I don't know. > >> > >> Andy > >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> -- > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> Carol Macdonald wrote: > >> > >>> Andy > >>> > >>> I realise that, but it much more robust than orthodox science; i.e. > >>> we are still doing the same maths as 300 years ago, where normal > >>> science is very different indeed. > >>> > >>> If Johnny said that 4+7=10, the teacher is not going to accept that, > >>> is she? > >>> > >>> Carol > >>> > >>> On 23 October 2014 10:02, Andy Blunden >>> > wrote: > >>> > >>> Carol, mathematics is a natural science like any other. > >>> It is neither the absolute truth nor merely social convention. > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Carol Macdonald wrote: > >>> > >>> Julian, Andy > >>> > >>> I think arithmetic is something of a test case. Just as word > >>> meaning > >>> changes over time in a dynamic way, as recognised by > >>> linguists, maths > >>> truths don't. It would be difficult to argue that maths truths > >>> of basic > >>> arithmetic have changed over the centuries. I don't know about > >>> maths truths > >>> of a higher order. > >>> > >>> Sorry if I use the terms arithmetic and maths interchangeably; > >>> it's a South > >>> African usage here in basic education. > >>> > >>> Carol > >>> > >>> On 23 October 2014 08:33, Julian Williams > >>> >>> > > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> > >>> Yes, just so, this is why I go to social theory eg Marx > >>> and Bourdieu to > >>> find political-economic contradictions within and between > >>> activities. > >>> > >>> But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the > >>> notion in > >>> Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or > >>> environment is given > >>> and the same for all, and the final form of development is > >>> given in a > >>> final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being > >>> then associated > >>> with an already given social plane). > >>> > >>> I'm happy enough to accept that this is a false and > >>> undialectical reading > >>> of Vygotsky (after all who knows how the concept of > >>> perezhivanie might have > >>> matured in his hands)... > >>> > >>> To return to my case - arithmetic. Many will say this > >>> exists in ideal form > >>> in the culture and all that needs to be done by > >>> development is to bring the > >>> child into the culture... Then the child is 'schooled'... > >>> Passive, lacking > >>> in agency, often failed, and at best made obedient to the > >>> cultural legacy. > >>> AsBourdieu says, through processes in school the class > >>> system is > >>> reproduced, and this is enculturation into the cultural > >>> arbitrary. > >>> > >>> Julian > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On 23 Oct 2014, at 07:08, "Andy Blunden" > >>> > wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the > >>> one true meaning > >>> > >>> > >>> of something. He does not allow that the meaning of > >>> something may be > >>> contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of > >>> heterogeneity in > >>> society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, > >>> social movements > >>> and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of > >>> something which > >>> "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which > >>> are therefore > >>> taken to be subjective. > >>> > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>> This continues and extends from my original post > >>> concerning Andy's > >>> > >>> > >>> breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points > >>> total... [copypasta is a > >>> starch of art] > >>> --------------------------------------------------- 6. [The > >>> fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) > >>> --------------------------------------------------- You > >>> say: "ANL believes > >>> that motivation determines perception. The norm of > >>> perception, the "true" > >>> meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for > >>> the community as > >>> a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of > >>> "community as a > >>> whole" in this context." So is it the case that > >>> word-meaning is denied by > >>> ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" cohesive across > >>> the culture and > >>> cannot have personal or spontaneous meaning? I can see the > >>> reason > >>> politically to emphasize this, if the State is sanctioned > >>> as the sole > >>> arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post below Wed, > >>> 22 Oct 2014 > >>> 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>> _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning > >>> ---------- ANL believes that > >>> > >>> > >>> the mental representation in a child's awareness must > >>> _correspond_ directly > >>> to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but > >>> also how the > >>> object may relate and associate to other objects and their > >>> meanings. The > >>> example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I > >>> will call here > >>> for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", > >>> ANL takes exception > >>> with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a > >>> generalization to > >>> reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit > >>> (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the > >>> existence of these > >>> word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they > >>> are what > >>> construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this > >>> because he considers > >>> consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- > >>> > >>> > >>> Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes > >>> that motivation determines > >>> > >>> > >>> perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of > >>> an object, is > >>> therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. > >>> I am questioning > >>> the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in > >>> this context. > >>> > >>> > >>> --end > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor > >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Oct 23 09:56:43 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 09:56:43 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics Practices In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <39089ddf0ba265a30feb7854f07324c1.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> <54471BF6.9010906@mira.net> <54479034.6070006@mira.net> Message-ID: Karen--- I am familiar of course with the notion of artifacts, but I am not familiar with Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual literacies. Could you provide a link or a reference? The phrase has me wondering what a non-artifactual literacy would be. mike On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:03 PM, Karen Wohlwend wrote: > Andy, thanks for these generative questions and comments! I'll defer to my > co-authors to situate the focal case in the larger study but I'll address > how we are considering relationships among gender, practices, and tools. > > We're conceptualizing tools as anchoring artifacts, that concretize and > suggest particular uses and users accrued from cultural histories of > access and use (following Holland and Cole's cultural artifacts, and more > recently, Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual > literacies). Tools index shared histories of use, values, and expectations > for who *should *be a user and for how practices *should *be conducted, > practices which following Paechter are situated in communities of gendered > practice that are multiple, local, and embodied. > > However, we would not say that a tool is gendered in any fixed or > deterministic way. In any given moment of activity, tools signal multiple > histories in many nexus of practice (following Ron Scollon, the tacit > shared practices that members of a community expect of one another) that > lead up to, enter in, and flow from that moment, in contradictory, > confounding, and complementary ways, hence the ambiguity you've mentioned. > How/whether social actors make use of particular histories in a specific > context realizes foregrounds some histories while backgrounding others-- in > ways that can reproduce, contest, or blur prevailing expectations for > participation. In our analysis, we looked closely at the mediated actions > in the handling of tools in the one nexus to understand in a very concrete > way how girls were able to gain and maintain control over > projects--contrary to histories and expectations for high levels of tool > handling, participation, and trajectories of expertise for boys in > electronics activity. > > Looking closely at the mediated action in this transformative moment > reveals how changing the electronics tools from wires to needle and thread > changes the nexus, activating a powerful perception/expectation for girls > as appropriate tool users by signalling histories of sewing practices and > feminine communities of practice. > > In regard to other situations, looking closely at mediated actions, > material artifacts, and tacit expectations for participation in the > relevant nexus of practice will likely also reveal how materials relate to > stereotypical expectations, pointing to places ripe for rupture where > changing something small in the local activity (e.g., an action, a tool, a > material) in dominant nexus of practice can signal a different kind of user > and potentially disrupt persistent and naturalized stereotypes. > > Looking forward to continuing the conversation, > Karen > > > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:08 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Kylie & co., > > A fascinating study around a truly ingenious approach to the gendered > > division of labour - giving school kids E-textiles to construct an > > electronic device - total mixing up and confounding the gender > stereotypes > > about sewing and electronics, etc. > > > > Some of the results were quite startling. That the young boy should not > > just abstain and demonstratively not pay attention, but pay active and > > supportive attention to the girl making the circuit with her > > needle-and-thread - an admired female-typical stance one would have > thought > > a young male incapable of adopting with a female workmate. And that the > > gender-inscription of the sewing tools over-rode the greater experience > > that in this case the young boy had in using them, with the boy deferring > > to the less experienced girl in recognition of the gender-appropriateness > > of her "taking charge" with the needle-and-thread. This does cause one to > > think a little deeper into how we might conceptualise such gendered > > behaviours. > > > > As you would know, MCA has a strong preference for qualitative research, > > and studies with small sample sizes are not generally a problem, but so > > much seemed to hinge on the study of just *one* boy-girl team, that I am > > concerned about the capacity to generalise from such a base. There were > > about 80 youth in the activity as a whole, so I can only hope and presume > > that observation of the other 78 kids in some way guided the work focused > > on just 2. > > > > I must say, the analysis of the video data is very sophisticated and > > productive and you are to be congratulated on this aspect of the work. I > > see that you approach the gendering of the activities through the idea of > > the various *tools* being gendered, rather than the *practices* > themselves. > > This is something that was really necessary for you to be able to make > > these observations, because the gendering of the activities is ambiguous, > > but not it seems the gendering of the tools. Is this a result of the > study, > > or is it something you already knew or did you arrive at this by logic? > > > > Do you see any other opportunities for confounding gender stereotypes in > > this way? > > > > And finally, does the experience of working in ambiguous, even inverted > > gender-stereotyped activities like these have any outcome which carries > > over into a world where the gender division of labour lacks ambiguity? > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Kylie Peppler wrote: > > > >> Thanks Andy! We're excited to discuss with the community and would > >> welcome any comments/questions on this emerging line of research! > >> Kylie > >> > >> --- > >> Kylie A. Peppler > >> Assistant Professor of Learning Sciences > >> Indiana University | School of Education > >> 1900 E 10th Street | Eigenmann 528 | Bloomington | IN | 47406 | > >> 812.856.8381 > >> > >> > >> On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 10:52 PM, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: > >> > >> Here's the article for discussion Artin is introducing: > >> *Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics > >> Practices* > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen Wohlwend. > >> Indiana University. > >> > >> The Maker movement promotes hands-on making, including crafts, > >> robotics, and computing. The movement?s potential to transform > >> education rests in our ability to address notable gender > >> disparities, particularly in science, technology, engineering, > and > >> mathematics fields. E-textiles - the first female-dominated > >> computing community - provide inspiration for overcoming > >> long-standing cultural divides in classrooms. Analysis of > >> children?s > >> use of e-textiles reveals that materials like needles, fabric, > and > >> conductive thread rupture traditional gender scripts around > >> electronics and implicitly gives girls hands-on access and > >> leadership roles. This reconceptualization of cultural divides as > >> sets of tacitly accepted practices rooted in gendered histories > has > >> implications for reconceptualizing traditionally male-dominated > >> areas of schooling. > >> > >> Andy > >> (attached) > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> ------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> > >> Goncu, Artin wrote: > >> > >> Dear All, > >> > >> We are writing to let you know that the most recent issue of > >> MCA is out. > >> One of the articles published in this issue and being > >> introduced here for > >> discussion in referenced below. The authors of the article > >> have kindly > >> agreed to lead the discussion, and they are on xmca with us > >> now. The free > >> access to the article is possible through the links below. We > >> are looking > >> forward to hearing from you all. Best, ag > >> > >> Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting > >> and Electronics Practices > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen Wohlwend > >> > >> www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762 > >> > >> > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749039.2014. > >> 939762#.VEZ25Ra_4wI > >> > >> Artin Goncu, Ph.D > >> Co-editor, Mind, Culture, and Activity:An International Journal > >> Professor Emeritus, > >> University of Illinois at Chicago > >> College of Education M/C 147 > >> 1040 W. Harrison St. > >> Chicago, IL 60607 > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > -- > Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor > Literacy, Culture, & Language Education > Indiana University > 201 N. Rose Avenue > Bloomington, IN 47405 > Office: 812-856-8275 > Fax: 812-856-8287 > kwohlwen@indiana.edu > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From kwohlwen@gmail.com Thu Oct 23 10:35:20 2014 From: kwohlwen@gmail.com (Karen Wohlwend) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 13:35:20 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics Practices In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <39089ddf0ba265a30feb7854f07324c1.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> <54471BF6.9010906@mira.net> <54479034.6070006@mira.net> Message-ID: Certainly-- Rowsell and Pahl take an ethnographic approach to track the practices and user identities involved in the production and previous uses of an artifact. Rowsell, J., & Pahl, K. (2007). Sedimented identities in texts: Instances of practice. Reading Research Quarterly, 42(3), 388-404. Pahl, K., & Rowsell, J. (2010). Artifactual literacies: Every object tells a story. New York: Teachers College Press. On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 12:56 PM, mike cole wrote: > Karen--- I am familiar of course with the notion of artifacts, but I am not > familiar with > Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual literacies. Could > you provide a link or a reference? The phrase has me wondering what a > non-artifactual literacy would be. > mike > > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:03 PM, Karen Wohlwend > wrote: > > > Andy, thanks for these generative questions and comments! I'll defer to > my > > co-authors to situate the focal case in the larger study but I'll address > > how we are considering relationships among gender, practices, and tools. > > > > We're conceptualizing tools as anchoring artifacts, that concretize and > > suggest particular uses and users accrued from cultural histories of > > access and use (following Holland and Cole's cultural artifacts, and more > > recently, Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual > > literacies). Tools index shared histories of use, values, and > expectations > > for who *should *be a user and for how practices *should *be conducted, > > practices which following Paechter are situated in communities of > gendered > > practice that are multiple, local, and embodied. > > > > However, we would not say that a tool is gendered in any fixed or > > deterministic way. In any given moment of activity, tools signal multiple > > histories in many nexus of practice (following Ron Scollon, the tacit > > shared practices that members of a community expect of one another) that > > lead up to, enter in, and flow from that moment, in contradictory, > > confounding, and complementary ways, hence the ambiguity you've > mentioned. > > How/whether social actors make use of particular histories in a specific > > context realizes foregrounds some histories while backgrounding others-- > in > > ways that can reproduce, contest, or blur prevailing expectations for > > participation. In our analysis, we looked closely at the mediated actions > > in the handling of tools in the one nexus to understand in a very > concrete > > way how girls were able to gain and maintain control over > > projects--contrary to histories and expectations for high levels of tool > > handling, participation, and trajectories of expertise for boys in > > electronics activity. > > > > Looking closely at the mediated action in this transformative moment > > reveals how changing the electronics tools from wires to needle and > thread > > changes the nexus, activating a powerful perception/expectation for girls > > as appropriate tool users by signalling histories of sewing practices and > > feminine communities of practice. > > > > In regard to other situations, looking closely at mediated actions, > > material artifacts, and tacit expectations for participation in the > > relevant nexus of practice will likely also reveal how materials relate > to > > stereotypical expectations, pointing to places ripe for rupture where > > changing something small in the local activity (e.g., an action, a tool, > a > > material) in dominant nexus of practice can signal a different kind of > user > > and potentially disrupt persistent and naturalized stereotypes. > > > > Looking forward to continuing the conversation, > > Karen > > > > > > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:08 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > Kylie & co., > > > A fascinating study around a truly ingenious approach to the gendered > > > division of labour - giving school kids E-textiles to construct an > > > electronic device - total mixing up and confounding the gender > > stereotypes > > > about sewing and electronics, etc. > > > > > > Some of the results were quite startling. That the young boy should not > > > just abstain and demonstratively not pay attention, but pay active and > > > supportive attention to the girl making the circuit with her > > > needle-and-thread - an admired female-typical stance one would have > > thought > > > a young male incapable of adopting with a female workmate. And that the > > > gender-inscription of the sewing tools over-rode the greater experience > > > that in this case the young boy had in using them, with the boy > deferring > > > to the less experienced girl in recognition of the > gender-appropriateness > > > of her "taking charge" with the needle-and-thread. This does cause one > to > > > think a little deeper into how we might conceptualise such gendered > > > behaviours. > > > > > > As you would know, MCA has a strong preference for qualitative > research, > > > and studies with small sample sizes are not generally a problem, but so > > > much seemed to hinge on the study of just *one* boy-girl team, that I > am > > > concerned about the capacity to generalise from such a base. There were > > > about 80 youth in the activity as a whole, so I can only hope and > presume > > > that observation of the other 78 kids in some way guided the work > focused > > > on just 2. > > > > > > I must say, the analysis of the video data is very sophisticated and > > > productive and you are to be congratulated on this aspect of the work. > I > > > see that you approach the gendering of the activities through the idea > of > > > the various *tools* being gendered, rather than the *practices* > > themselves. > > > This is something that was really necessary for you to be able to make > > > these observations, because the gendering of the activities is > ambiguous, > > > but not it seems the gendering of the tools. Is this a result of the > > study, > > > or is it something you already knew or did you arrive at this by logic? > > > > > > Do you see any other opportunities for confounding gender stereotypes > in > > > this way? > > > > > > And finally, does the experience of working in ambiguous, even inverted > > > gender-stereotyped activities like these have any outcome which carries > > > over into a world where the gender division of labour lacks ambiguity? > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > Kylie Peppler wrote: > > > > > >> Thanks Andy! We're excited to discuss with the community and would > > >> welcome any comments/questions on this emerging line of research! > > >> Kylie > > >> > > >> --- > > >> Kylie A. Peppler > > >> Assistant Professor of Learning Sciences > > >> Indiana University | School of Education > > >> 1900 E 10th Street | Eigenmann 528 | Bloomington | IN | 47406 | > > >> 812.856.8381 > > >> > > >> > > >> On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 10:52 PM, Andy Blunden > >> > wrote: > > >> > > >> Here's the article for discussion Artin is introducing: > > >> *Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics > > >> Practices* > > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen Wohlwend. > > >> Indiana University. > > >> > > >> The Maker movement promotes hands-on making, including crafts, > > >> robotics, and computing. The movement?s potential to transform > > >> education rests in our ability to address notable gender > > >> disparities, particularly in science, technology, engineering, > > and > > >> mathematics fields. E-textiles - the first female-dominated > > >> computing community - provide inspiration for overcoming > > >> long-standing cultural divides in classrooms. Analysis of > > >> children?s > > >> use of e-textiles reveals that materials like needles, fabric, > > and > > >> conductive thread rupture traditional gender scripts around > > >> electronics and implicitly gives girls hands-on access and > > >> leadership roles. This reconceptualization of cultural divides > as > > >> sets of tacitly accepted practices rooted in gendered histories > > has > > >> implications for reconceptualizing traditionally male-dominated > > >> areas of schooling. > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> (attached) > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> ------------ > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> Goncu, Artin wrote: > > >> > > >> Dear All, > > >> > > >> We are writing to let you know that the most recent issue of > > >> MCA is out. > > >> One of the articles published in this issue and being > > >> introduced here for > > >> discussion in referenced below. The authors of the article > > >> have kindly > > >> agreed to lead the discussion, and they are on xmca with us > > >> now. The free > > >> access to the article is possible through the links below. We > > >> are looking > > >> forward to hearing from you all. Best, ag > > >> > > >> Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting > > >> and Electronics Practices > > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen Wohlwend > > >> > > >> www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762 > > >> > > >> > > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749039.2014. > > >> 939762#.VEZ25Ra_4wI > > >> > > >> Artin Goncu, Ph.D > > >> Co-editor, Mind, Culture, and Activity:An International > Journal > > >> Professor Emeritus, > > >> University of Illinois at Chicago > > >> College of Education M/C 147 > > >> 1040 W. Harrison St. > > >> Chicago, IL 60607 > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- > > Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor > > Literacy, Culture, & Language Education > > Indiana University > > 201 N. Rose Avenue > > Bloomington, IN 47405 > > Office: 812-856-8275 > > Fax: 812-856-8287 > > kwohlwen@indiana.edu > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > -- Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor Literacy, Culture, & Language Education Indiana University 201 N. Rose Avenue Bloomington, IN 47405 Office: 812-856-8275 Fax: 812-856-8287 kwohlwen@indiana.edu From kwohlwen@gmail.com Thu Oct 23 10:37:06 2014 From: kwohlwen@gmail.com (Karen Wohlwend) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 13:37:06 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics Practices In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <39089ddf0ba265a30feb7854f07324c1.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> <54471BF6.9010906@mira.net> <54479034.6070006@mira.net> Message-ID: this time with attachment On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 1:35 PM, Karen Wohlwend wrote: > Certainly-- Rowsell and Pahl take an ethnographic approach to track the > practices and user identities involved in the production and previous uses > of an artifact. > > Rowsell, J., & Pahl, K. (2007). Sedimented identities in texts: Instances > of practice. Reading Research Quarterly, 42(3), 388-404. > > Pahl, K., & Rowsell, J. (2010). Artifactual literacies: Every object tells > a story. New York: Teachers College Press. > > > > > On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 12:56 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> Karen--- I am familiar of course with the notion of artifacts, but I am >> not >> familiar with >> Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual literacies. Could >> you provide a link or a reference? The phrase has me wondering what a >> non-artifactual literacy would be. >> mike >> >> On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:03 PM, Karen Wohlwend >> wrote: >> >> > Andy, thanks for these generative questions and comments! I'll defer to >> my >> > co-authors to situate the focal case in the larger study but I'll >> address >> > how we are considering relationships among gender, practices, and tools. >> > >> > We're conceptualizing tools as anchoring artifacts, that concretize and >> > suggest particular uses and users accrued from cultural histories of >> > access and use (following Holland and Cole's cultural artifacts, and >> more >> > recently, Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual >> > literacies). Tools index shared histories of use, values, and >> expectations >> > for who *should *be a user and for how practices *should *be conducted, >> > practices which following Paechter are situated in communities of >> gendered >> > practice that are multiple, local, and embodied. >> > >> > However, we would not say that a tool is gendered in any fixed or >> > deterministic way. In any given moment of activity, tools signal >> multiple >> > histories in many nexus of practice (following Ron Scollon, the tacit >> > shared practices that members of a community expect of one another) that >> > lead up to, enter in, and flow from that moment, in contradictory, >> > confounding, and complementary ways, hence the ambiguity you've >> mentioned. >> > How/whether social actors make use of particular histories in a specific >> > context realizes foregrounds some histories while backgrounding >> others-- in >> > ways that can reproduce, contest, or blur prevailing expectations for >> > participation. In our analysis, we looked closely at the mediated >> actions >> > in the handling of tools in the one nexus to understand in a very >> concrete >> > way how girls were able to gain and maintain control over >> > projects--contrary to histories and expectations for high levels of tool >> > handling, participation, and trajectories of expertise for boys in >> > electronics activity. >> > >> > Looking closely at the mediated action in this transformative moment >> > reveals how changing the electronics tools from wires to needle and >> thread >> > changes the nexus, activating a powerful perception/expectation for >> girls >> > as appropriate tool users by signalling histories of sewing practices >> and >> > feminine communities of practice. >> > >> > In regard to other situations, looking closely at mediated actions, >> > material artifacts, and tacit expectations for participation in the >> > relevant nexus of practice will likely also reveal how materials relate >> to >> > stereotypical expectations, pointing to places ripe for rupture where >> > changing something small in the local activity (e.g., an action, a >> tool, a >> > material) in dominant nexus of practice can signal a different kind of >> user >> > and potentially disrupt persistent and naturalized stereotypes. >> > >> > Looking forward to continuing the conversation, >> > Karen >> > >> > >> > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:08 AM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >> > >> > > Kylie & co., >> > > A fascinating study around a truly ingenious approach to the gendered >> > > division of labour - giving school kids E-textiles to construct an >> > > electronic device - total mixing up and confounding the gender >> > stereotypes >> > > about sewing and electronics, etc. >> > > >> > > Some of the results were quite startling. That the young boy should >> not >> > > just abstain and demonstratively not pay attention, but pay active and >> > > supportive attention to the girl making the circuit with her >> > > needle-and-thread - an admired female-typical stance one would have >> > thought >> > > a young male incapable of adopting with a female workmate. And that >> the >> > > gender-inscription of the sewing tools over-rode the greater >> experience >> > > that in this case the young boy had in using them, with the boy >> deferring >> > > to the less experienced girl in recognition of the >> gender-appropriateness >> > > of her "taking charge" with the needle-and-thread. This does cause >> one to >> > > think a little deeper into how we might conceptualise such gendered >> > > behaviours. >> > > >> > > As you would know, MCA has a strong preference for qualitative >> research, >> > > and studies with small sample sizes are not generally a problem, but >> so >> > > much seemed to hinge on the study of just *one* boy-girl team, that I >> am >> > > concerned about the capacity to generalise from such a base. There >> were >> > > about 80 youth in the activity as a whole, so I can only hope and >> presume >> > > that observation of the other 78 kids in some way guided the work >> focused >> > > on just 2. >> > > >> > > I must say, the analysis of the video data is very sophisticated and >> > > productive and you are to be congratulated on this aspect of the >> work. I >> > > see that you approach the gendering of the activities through the >> idea of >> > > the various *tools* being gendered, rather than the *practices* >> > themselves. >> > > This is something that was really necessary for you to be able to make >> > > these observations, because the gendering of the activities is >> ambiguous, >> > > but not it seems the gendering of the tools. Is this a result of the >> > study, >> > > or is it something you already knew or did you arrive at this by >> logic? >> > > >> > > Do you see any other opportunities for confounding gender stereotypes >> in >> > > this way? >> > > >> > > And finally, does the experience of working in ambiguous, even >> inverted >> > > gender-stereotyped activities like these have any outcome which >> carries >> > > over into a world where the gender division of labour lacks ambiguity? >> > > >> > > Andy >> > > >> > > >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> > > *Andy Blunden* >> > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> > > >> > > >> > > Kylie Peppler wrote: >> > > >> > >> Thanks Andy! We're excited to discuss with the community and would >> > >> welcome any comments/questions on this emerging line of research! >> > >> Kylie >> > >> >> > >> --- >> > >> Kylie A. Peppler >> > >> Assistant Professor of Learning Sciences >> > >> Indiana University | School of Education >> > >> 1900 E 10th Street | Eigenmann 528 | Bloomington | IN | 47406 | >> > >> 812.856.8381 >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 10:52 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> > wrote: >> > >> >> > >> Here's the article for discussion Artin is introducing: >> > >> *Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics >> > >> Practices* >> > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen Wohlwend. >> > >> Indiana University. >> > >> >> > >> The Maker movement promotes hands-on making, including crafts, >> > >> robotics, and computing. The movement?s potential to transform >> > >> education rests in our ability to address notable gender >> > >> disparities, particularly in science, technology, engineering, >> > and >> > >> mathematics fields. E-textiles - the first female-dominated >> > >> computing community - provide inspiration for overcoming >> > >> long-standing cultural divides in classrooms. Analysis of >> > >> children?s >> > >> use of e-textiles reveals that materials like needles, fabric, >> > and >> > >> conductive thread rupture traditional gender scripts around >> > >> electronics and implicitly gives girls hands-on access and >> > >> leadership roles. This reconceptualization of cultural >> divides as >> > >> sets of tacitly accepted practices rooted in gendered >> histories >> > has >> > >> implications for reconceptualizing traditionally >> male-dominated >> > >> areas of schooling. >> > >> >> > >> Andy >> > >> (attached) >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> > >> ------------ >> > >> *Andy Blunden* >> > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> Goncu, Artin wrote: >> > >> >> > >> Dear All, >> > >> >> > >> We are writing to let you know that the most recent issue of >> > >> MCA is out. >> > >> One of the articles published in this issue and being >> > >> introduced here for >> > >> discussion in referenced below. The authors of the article >> > >> have kindly >> > >> agreed to lead the discussion, and they are on xmca with us >> > >> now. The free >> > >> access to the article is possible through the links below. >> We >> > >> are looking >> > >> forward to hearing from you all. Best, ag >> > >> >> > >> Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting >> > >> and Electronics Practices >> > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen >> Wohlwend >> > >> >> > >> www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762 >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749039.2014. >> > >> 939762#.VEZ25Ra_4wI >> > >> >> > >> Artin Goncu, Ph.D >> > >> Co-editor, Mind, Culture, and Activity:An International >> Journal >> > >> Professor Emeritus, >> > >> University of Illinois at Chicago >> > >> College of Education M/C 147 >> > >> 1040 W. Harrison St. >> > >> Chicago, IL 60607 >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > > >> > >> > >> > -- >> > Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor >> > Literacy, Culture, & Language Education >> > Indiana University >> > 201 N. Rose Avenue >> > Bloomington, IN 47405 >> > Office: 812-856-8275 >> > Fax: 812-856-8287 >> > kwohlwen@indiana.edu >> > >> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > > > > -- > Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor > Literacy, Culture, & Language Education > Indiana University > 201 N. Rose Avenue > Bloomington, IN 47405 > Office: 812-856-8275 > Fax: 812-856-8287 > kwohlwen@indiana.edu > -- Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor Literacy, Culture, & Language Education Indiana University 201 N. Rose Avenue Bloomington, IN 47405 Office: 812-856-8275 Fax: 812-856-8287 kwohlwen@indiana.edu From ewall@umich.edu Thu Oct 23 10:40:30 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 12:40:30 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <544911FA.3010808@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net> Message-ID: <34E7058D-1183-4DDA-A3F4-5B2C21D66445@umich.edu> I've been listening to this conversation and thought I might make a few observations (not absolute truths - smile) As a person who does mathematics, I agree with what Andy writes here although the relevant social is, in a practical sense, often somewhat narrowly restricted. The mathematical problems that interest me are more than often those that interest my colleagues or currently in vogue (especially if by current one means 100 years or so - smile). It might be of interest to note that many mathematicians do not consider 'school arithmetic' mathematics although they consider it a necessary warm up. In my observations and teaching of young children, I note that counting seems to be somewhat foundation to what they latter do in school mathematics. There is a progression through the beginnings of ordinal arithmetic (rather like what happens with the alphabet - I am, by the way, leaving some early beginnings out) where number names predominate, a move into matching objects with names (i.e. 1-1 mappings) and a leap into cardinality with the numeric naming of a collection of objects. The very idea of addition seems to trigger - possibly because of the way we teachers stress fingers - the act of counting on with, at times, the results Julian has noted. Usually, in my experience, the problem is more counting back (i.e. a form of subtraction). That is, the social practice that I see early on in US classrooms is 7 8-9-10-11 (i.e. one is counting on from 7) 11 10-9-8-6 (i.e. one is counting back from 11) Note the consistency as with Julian's example. The key operations (and it is mathematical as well as pedagogical) here (keeping in mind that there are some problems with the notion of subtraction) is not 7 + 4 or 11 - 4, but 7 + 1 and 11 - 1. Children are often quite aware of the social conventions of counting, counting on, and counting back and will correct one another; however, they most often - although they trust us somewhat - do not seem to see these as absolute truths (an observation with which I agree). This trust seems to fade a bit by the time children hit fractions and signed numbers which, unfortunately, are taught as absolute truths or, even worse, meaningful models of objective reality. Anyway, the problem as I see it, is helping kids make sense - within a social grouping (and they are often well aware that adults may see things in a very different and overly complicated way) - of the operations and objects of arithmetic, not getting them to reproduce over and over again some algorithm (as 'counting on' can be). I am not saying 'accuracy' is not important, but one needs to be in the ball park first. I had a horse once who, when reasonably distrustful of some notion of mine, balked; children are a lot smarter. Oh, the problem with 'equality' seems mostly teacher and parent induced. Adult social practices involving mathematics are often quite problematic. Ed On Oct 23, 2014, at 9:34 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Julian, > The claim that the ideal exists in the social environment from the beginning is quite consistent, indeed relies upon, the claim that the ideal is being continuously subject to transformation, that is, that mathematicians are active developing the content of mathematics in the context of the problems and resources the community is generating. Were this not the case, it would be very difficult (though not impossible) for kids to acquire a mathematical disposition. > > I think the basic ontogenetic principle fully applies to mathematics. But the ideal is certainly not the absolute truths of arithmetic taught in South African elementary schools. The ideal is the *social practice of mathematics*. That is, of course, by its very nature, continually evolving and transforming. The ideal is a pair of shifting goal posts. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Julian Williams wrote: >> Andy/Carol >> >> I would like to expand a bit on Andy's point - >> >> First, I have often had very interesting discussions with children who work out that 7+4 = 10 ... this is usually accomplished by a 'counting on' method, which begins with the 7 ("1") and goes 7 ("1"),8 ("2") ,9 ("3") ,10 "4- there we are, 10!" ... >> >> 7 -- 8 --- 9 -- 10 >> 1 ... 2 ... 3 ... 4 >> >> Similarly 10 - 4 = 7 etc. >> >> (It doesn't really matter whether the teacher accepts the answer or not - the kids keep getting the answer 10... and we have data to prove it; until one day they are told they are hopeless and its time for them to leave and go down the mines/factory. See Billy Connolly's youtube hit on 'algebra'..) >> >> Second: Im pleased to say that the best arithmetic I am seeing in schools now bears almost no relation to that I experienced 50 odd years ago as a learner, and that I taught as a teacher 30 years ago... although there seems still to be a lot that hasn't changed as much as Id like. Im thinking of a lesson wherein different groups of children modelled their 'proofs' that 3x28 = 84 using various methods, tools, etc. >> >> So Im afraid the story that arithmetic already exists in some ideal form in the social - cultural plane (eg in adult practices?), and so can/has to be somehow made present for the youngster in their earlier stages of development (if that's what Vygotsky really meant) is far too simple for me, and at its worst leads to terrible schooling practices, where there is no room for a child's intelligent argument that 7 + 4 really equals 10 >> >> :-) >> >> Julian >> >> Andy: my sleight of hand here is that I translate your formulation of what leontiev says "there is one true object/ive and the kids should come to know it" into Vygotsky's " ideal form of arithmetic" where child development must end up... thus your critique of Leontiev becomes my complaint about Vygtosky's perezhivanie paper. Im sure you will say "not fair"? >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: 23 October 2014 14:50 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] >> >> Mathematics today is nothing like it was 300 years ago, Carol, even if it is in a South African elementary school. And the teacher wouldn't accept it if Johnny said that apes had evolved from human either or that gravity went clockwise. The ability to correctly reproduce things like 4+7=11 is not in my experience any evidence that a child has grasped >> what + or = means, and certainly no evidence that they have any grasp of mathematics or even number. Of course, we might take the view that they never will anyway, so being able to add is good enough for them. >> >> But if we take the view that it is worthwhile that a child learn what science is and what mathematics is about, then in my view, the problems are essentially the same whichever science it is. >> >> Of course, in general, the attitude a teacher takes to their material is that it is objectively true and the kids should come to know it. But this stance or attitude to knowledge, or science, is a very poor preparation for adult life and citizenship. I don't see mathematics in principle as being an exception. Perhaps a little teaching of the history of mathematics would help? I don't know. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Carol Macdonald wrote: >> >>> Andy >>> >>> I realise that, but it much more robust than orthodox science; i.e. we are still doing the same maths as 300 years ago, where normal science is very different indeed. >>> If Johnny said that 4+7=10, the teacher is not going to accept that, is she? >>> >>> Carol >>> >>> On 23 October 2014 10:02, Andy Blunden > wrote: >>> >>> Carol, mathematics is a natural science like any other. >>> It is neither the absolute truth nor merely social convention. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>> >>> Julian, Andy >>> >>> I think arithmetic is something of a test case. Just as word >>> meaning >>> changes over time in a dynamic way, as recognised by >>> linguists, maths >>> truths don't. It would be difficult to argue that maths truths >>> of basic >>> arithmetic have changed over the centuries. I don't know about >>> maths truths >>> of a higher order. >>> >>> Sorry if I use the terms arithmetic and maths interchangeably; >>> it's a South >>> African usage here in basic education. >>> >>> Carol >>> >>> On 23 October 2014 08:33, Julian Williams >>> >> > >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> Yes, just so, this is why I go to social theory eg Marx >>> and Bourdieu to >>> find political-economic contradictions within and between >>> activities. >>> >>> But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the >>> notion in >>> Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or >>> environment is given >>> and the same for all, and the final form of development is >>> given in a >>> final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being >>> then associated >>> with an already given social plane). >>> >>> I'm happy enough to accept that this is a false and >>> undialectical reading >>> of Vygotsky (after all who knows how the concept of >>> perezhivanie might have >>> matured in his hands)... >>> >>> To return to my case - arithmetic. Many will say this >>> exists in ideal form >>> in the culture and all that needs to be done by >>> development is to bring the >>> child into the culture... Then the child is 'schooled'... >>> Passive, lacking >>> in agency, often failed, and at best made obedient to the >>> cultural legacy. >>> AsBourdieu says, through processes in school the class >>> system is >>> reproduced, and this is enculturation into the cultural >>> arbitrary. >>> >>> Julian >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 23 Oct 2014, at 07:08, "Andy Blunden" >>> > wrote: >>> >>> >>> No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the >>> one true meaning >>> >>> of something. He does not allow that the meaning of >>> something may be >>> contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of >>> heterogeneity in >>> society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, >>> social movements >>> and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of >>> something which >>> "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which >>> are therefore >>> taken to be subjective. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> This continues and extends from my original post >>> concerning Andy's >>> >>> breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points >>> total... [copypasta is a >>> starch of art] >>> --------------------------------------------------- 6. [The >>> fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) >>> --------------------------------------------------- You >>> say: "ANL believes >>> that motivation determines perception. The norm of perception, the "true" >>> meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for >>> the community as >>> a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of >>> "community as a >>> whole" in this context." So is it the case that >>> word-meaning is denied by >>> ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" cohesive across >>> the culture and >>> cannot have personal or spontaneous meaning? I can see the >>> reason >>> politically to emphasize this, if the State is sanctioned >>> as the sole >>> arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post below Wed, >>> 22 Oct 2014 >>> 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: >>> >>> _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning >>> ---------- ANL believes that >>> >>> the mental representation in a child's awareness must >>> _correspond_ directly >>> to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but >>> also how the >>> object may relate and associate to other objects and their >>> meanings. The >>> example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I >>> will call here >>> for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", >>> ANL takes exception >>> with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a >>> generalization to >>> reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit >>> (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the >>> existence of these >>> word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they >>> are what >>> construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this >>> because he considers >>> consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- >>> >>> Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes >>> that motivation determines >>> >>> perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of >>> an object, is >>> therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. >>> I am questioning >>> the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in >>> this context. >>> >>> --end >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>> Developmental psycholinguist >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> > From kwohlwen@gmail.com Thu Oct 23 10:40:51 2014 From: kwohlwen@gmail.com (Karen Wohlwend) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 13:40:51 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics Practices In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <39089ddf0ba265a30feb7854f07324c1.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> <54471BF6.9010906@mira.net> <54479034.6070006@mira.net> Message-ID: this time with attachment On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 1:37 PM, Karen Wohlwend wrote: > this time with attachment > > On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 1:35 PM, Karen Wohlwend > wrote: > >> Certainly-- Rowsell and Pahl take an ethnographic approach to track the >> practices and user identities involved in the production and previous uses >> of an artifact. >> >> Rowsell, J., & Pahl, K. (2007). Sedimented identities in texts: Instances >> of practice. Reading Research Quarterly, 42(3), 388-404. >> >> Pahl, K., & Rowsell, J. (2010). Artifactual literacies: Every object >> tells a story. New York: Teachers College Press. >> >> >> >> >> On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 12:56 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >>> Karen--- I am familiar of course with the notion of artifacts, but I am >>> not >>> familiar with >>> Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual literacies. >>> Could >>> you provide a link or a reference? The phrase has me wondering what a >>> non-artifactual literacy would be. >>> mike >>> >>> On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:03 PM, Karen Wohlwend >>> wrote: >>> >>> > Andy, thanks for these generative questions and comments! I'll defer >>> to my >>> > co-authors to situate the focal case in the larger study but I'll >>> address >>> > how we are considering relationships among gender, practices, and >>> tools. >>> > >>> > We're conceptualizing tools as anchoring artifacts, that concretize and >>> > suggest particular uses and users accrued from cultural histories of >>> > access and use (following Holland and Cole's cultural artifacts, and >>> more >>> > recently, Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual >>> > literacies). Tools index shared histories of use, values, and >>> expectations >>> > for who *should *be a user and for how practices *should *be conducted, >>> > practices which following Paechter are situated in communities of >>> gendered >>> > practice that are multiple, local, and embodied. >>> > >>> > However, we would not say that a tool is gendered in any fixed or >>> > deterministic way. In any given moment of activity, tools signal >>> multiple >>> > histories in many nexus of practice (following Ron Scollon, the tacit >>> > shared practices that members of a community expect of one another) >>> that >>> > lead up to, enter in, and flow from that moment, in contradictory, >>> > confounding, and complementary ways, hence the ambiguity you've >>> mentioned. >>> > How/whether social actors make use of particular histories in a >>> specific >>> > context realizes foregrounds some histories while backgrounding >>> others-- in >>> > ways that can reproduce, contest, or blur prevailing expectations for >>> > participation. In our analysis, we looked closely at the mediated >>> actions >>> > in the handling of tools in the one nexus to understand in a very >>> concrete >>> > way how girls were able to gain and maintain control over >>> > projects--contrary to histories and expectations for high levels of >>> tool >>> > handling, participation, and trajectories of expertise for boys in >>> > electronics activity. >>> > >>> > Looking closely at the mediated action in this transformative moment >>> > reveals how changing the electronics tools from wires to needle and >>> thread >>> > changes the nexus, activating a powerful perception/expectation for >>> girls >>> > as appropriate tool users by signalling histories of sewing practices >>> and >>> > feminine communities of practice. >>> > >>> > In regard to other situations, looking closely at mediated actions, >>> > material artifacts, and tacit expectations for participation in the >>> > relevant nexus of practice will likely also reveal how materials >>> relate to >>> > stereotypical expectations, pointing to places ripe for rupture where >>> > changing something small in the local activity (e.g., an action, a >>> tool, a >>> > material) in dominant nexus of practice can signal a different kind of >>> user >>> > and potentially disrupt persistent and naturalized stereotypes. >>> > >>> > Looking forward to continuing the conversation, >>> > Karen >>> > >>> > >>> > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:08 AM, Andy Blunden >>> wrote: >>> > >>> > > Kylie & co., >>> > > A fascinating study around a truly ingenious approach to the gendered >>> > > division of labour - giving school kids E-textiles to construct an >>> > > electronic device - total mixing up and confounding the gender >>> > stereotypes >>> > > about sewing and electronics, etc. >>> > > >>> > > Some of the results were quite startling. That the young boy should >>> not >>> > > just abstain and demonstratively not pay attention, but pay active >>> and >>> > > supportive attention to the girl making the circuit with her >>> > > needle-and-thread - an admired female-typical stance one would have >>> > thought >>> > > a young male incapable of adopting with a female workmate. And that >>> the >>> > > gender-inscription of the sewing tools over-rode the greater >>> experience >>> > > that in this case the young boy had in using them, with the boy >>> deferring >>> > > to the less experienced girl in recognition of the >>> gender-appropriateness >>> > > of her "taking charge" with the needle-and-thread. This does cause >>> one to >>> > > think a little deeper into how we might conceptualise such gendered >>> > > behaviours. >>> > > >>> > > As you would know, MCA has a strong preference for qualitative >>> research, >>> > > and studies with small sample sizes are not generally a problem, but >>> so >>> > > much seemed to hinge on the study of just *one* boy-girl team, that >>> I am >>> > > concerned about the capacity to generalise from such a base. There >>> were >>> > > about 80 youth in the activity as a whole, so I can only hope and >>> presume >>> > > that observation of the other 78 kids in some way guided the work >>> focused >>> > > on just 2. >>> > > >>> > > I must say, the analysis of the video data is very sophisticated and >>> > > productive and you are to be congratulated on this aspect of the >>> work. I >>> > > see that you approach the gendering of the activities through the >>> idea of >>> > > the various *tools* being gendered, rather than the *practices* >>> > themselves. >>> > > This is something that was really necessary for you to be able to >>> make >>> > > these observations, because the gendering of the activities is >>> ambiguous, >>> > > but not it seems the gendering of the tools. Is this a result of the >>> > study, >>> > > or is it something you already knew or did you arrive at this by >>> logic? >>> > > >>> > > Do you see any other opportunities for confounding gender >>> stereotypes in >>> > > this way? >>> > > >>> > > And finally, does the experience of working in ambiguous, even >>> inverted >>> > > gender-stereotyped activities like these have any outcome which >>> carries >>> > > over into a world where the gender division of labour lacks >>> ambiguity? >>> > > >>> > > Andy >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> > > *Andy Blunden* >>> > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > Kylie Peppler wrote: >>> > > >>> > >> Thanks Andy! We're excited to discuss with the community and would >>> > >> welcome any comments/questions on this emerging line of research! >>> > >> Kylie >>> > >> >>> > >> --- >>> > >> Kylie A. Peppler >>> > >> Assistant Professor of Learning Sciences >>> > >> Indiana University | School of Education >>> > >> 1900 E 10th Street | Eigenmann 528 | Bloomington | IN | 47406 | >>> > >> 812.856.8381 >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 10:52 PM, Andy Blunden >> > >> > wrote: >>> > >> >>> > >> Here's the article for discussion Artin is introducing: >>> > >> *Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting and >>> Electronics >>> > >> Practices* >>> > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen Wohlwend. >>> > >> Indiana University. >>> > >> >>> > >> The Maker movement promotes hands-on making, including >>> crafts, >>> > >> robotics, and computing. The movement?s potential to >>> transform >>> > >> education rests in our ability to address notable gender >>> > >> disparities, particularly in science, technology, >>> engineering, >>> > and >>> > >> mathematics fields. E-textiles - the first female-dominated >>> > >> computing community - provide inspiration for overcoming >>> > >> long-standing cultural divides in classrooms. Analysis of >>> > >> children?s >>> > >> use of e-textiles reveals that materials like needles, >>> fabric, >>> > and >>> > >> conductive thread rupture traditional gender scripts around >>> > >> electronics and implicitly gives girls hands-on access and >>> > >> leadership roles. This reconceptualization of cultural >>> divides as >>> > >> sets of tacitly accepted practices rooted in gendered >>> histories >>> > has >>> > >> implications for reconceptualizing traditionally >>> male-dominated >>> > >> areas of schooling. >>> > >> >>> > >> Andy >>> > >> (attached) >>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> > >> ------------ >>> > >> *Andy Blunden* >>> > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> Goncu, Artin wrote: >>> > >> >>> > >> Dear All, >>> > >> >>> > >> We are writing to let you know that the most recent issue of >>> > >> MCA is out. >>> > >> One of the articles published in this issue and being >>> > >> introduced here for >>> > >> discussion in referenced below. The authors of the article >>> > >> have kindly >>> > >> agreed to lead the discussion, and they are on xmca with us >>> > >> now. The free >>> > >> access to the article is possible through the links below. >>> We >>> > >> are looking >>> > >> forward to hearing from you all. Best, ag >>> > >> >>> > >> Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting >>> > >> and Electronics Practices >>> > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen >>> Wohlwend >>> > >> >>> > >> www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762 >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749039.2014. >>> > >> 939762#.VEZ25Ra_4wI >>> > >> >>> > >> Artin Goncu, Ph.D >>> > >> Co-editor, Mind, Culture, and Activity:An International >>> Journal >>> > >> Professor Emeritus, >>> > >> University of Illinois at Chicago >>> > >> College of Education M/C 147 >>> > >> 1040 W. Harrison St. >>> > >> Chicago, IL 60607 >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > > >>> > >>> > >>> > -- >>> > Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor >>> > Literacy, Culture, & Language Education >>> > Indiana University >>> > 201 N. Rose Avenue >>> > Bloomington, IN 47405 >>> > Office: 812-856-8275 >>> > Fax: 812-856-8287 >>> > kwohlwen@indiana.edu >>> > >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor >> Literacy, Culture, & Language Education >> Indiana University >> 201 N. Rose Avenue >> Bloomington, IN 47405 >> Office: 812-856-8275 >> Fax: 812-856-8287 >> kwohlwen@indiana.edu >> > > > > -- > Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor > Literacy, Culture, & Language Education > Indiana University > 201 N. Rose Avenue > Bloomington, IN 47405 > Office: 812-856-8275 > Fax: 812-856-8287 > kwohlwen@indiana.edu > -- Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor Literacy, Culture, & Language Education Indiana University 201 N. Rose Avenue Bloomington, IN 47405 Office: 812-856-8275 Fax: 812-856-8287 kwohlwen@indiana.edu -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Rowsell Pahl sedimented texts RRQ 2007.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 447745 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141023/2a1f3e8d/attachment-0001.pdf From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Oct 23 10:47:24 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 17:47:24 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>,<544899F0.2040800@mira.net> Message-ID: <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu> Hi Andy, Again thanks for more! Here's the thing: I may be getting lost in understanding argument positions. Are you saying it is Leontiev, et al's position that thinking with signs and words are intellectual? Because, for me personally, thinking with signs and words involve both affect and intellect and I don't think they can be separated out. For me, a person's intelligence is the mediated unification of affect and intellect, what I believe you are calling consciousness. I feel supported by my position with Vygotsky's discussion of word-meaning (znachenie slova), if I am understanding word-meaning properly. Again, the words "meaning" and "significance" can have affective meaning and significance! :) (is this the adjective? I want to say "affectual," to match "intellectual" but that isn't a word) Now if for *you* these particular words have "intellectual connotations," perhaps this difference between you and I supports LSV's (and my earlier) point that affect and intellect are mediated and will therefore allow each person have a different and nuanced mix of meaning and significance for the same set of words and signs, even if we generally agree on a social meaning and significance, such as the meaning of a flag. This reminds me of the cultural differences regarding the meanings of color. One can't intellectualize red just by its perception. One can't have an affect of red either by perception alone (if one were to see red for the first time), its meaning and significance are socially, historically and culturally generated. Furthermore, I agree with you that our "Western language" to describe the interior mind, if I am allowed to say that, is sparse. We know Freud reached into Greek mythology to give these concepts a handle. This is one reason I look to Eastern thought so I might learn how these dynamics are discussed. They do possess words for which we have none. I might also suggest there are relevant themes in these traditions that apply to Vygotsky's work. In fact, it might amaze us in the West to truly understand the immense literature and legacies on these topics of mind and self. It certainly amazes me. Of course that would be a huge project to be mediated between cultural elders and not a cultural tourist like myself. I only point out that there is something there and we are not the pioneers to wrangle with these problems of mind. I admit that to access these words, one must understand how metaphors are utilized. In rational-logical traditions, metaphors seem to be disagreeable. Also there is discussion of the spiritual, since the problems these traditions hoped to solve were spiritual problems, which may just be their historically-anchored approach to psychological realities. So, these barriers may explain the impasse. But if words are tools, I'm sure we might borrow some and they wouldn't mind. Ha! a pun! "wouldn't mind" get it? :) Best, Annalisa ________________________________________ Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:02 AM I would have said that this criticism is a deliberate misrepresentation, except that Lydia Bozhovich makes the same charge of "intellectualism." The charge hinges on phrases like "the significance for the child" and "the meaning for the child," etc., which etymologically suggest the use of signs and words. Thinking with signs and words is intellect. But the thing is that it is almost impossible for us to describe the relationship of a person to their environment psychologically without using words which evoke sign-relations. The relation is a psychological one, not a conditioned-reflex, and the words we have for relations which are mediated through consciousness tend to be words like "meaning" and "significance" which have intellectual connotations. The preintellectual stages of psychological development which Vygotsky himself theorised are not built into the common language. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. > > There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] > --------------------------------------------------- > 4. ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > (see original post below) > --------------------------------------------------- > > Again a pothole. You say: > "The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate at > their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an intellectual > relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims." > > I think know this, but what is ANL's critique against this? Is it that > it is too "intellectual," which is possibly code for elitism or class? > Sorry if I wasn't clear. > > From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Oct 23 10:56:47 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 17:56:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net>, Message-ID: <1414087007390.52755@unm.edu> Hi Larry, I am grateful for your contribution. I did not know about these generative connections between Bakhtin, Vygotsky, and Wertsch's "mediated action." Thank you for your illumination. :) The matter of conflict between *one true meaning* and "multifarious meaning* is easy to detect. In fact it is so easy that what I want to know is why does the conflict exist? Is it only political expedience that drives *one true meaning*? Are there other reasons? Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:42 AM To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] Annelia, thanks for pursuing your understanding of Leontiev and ANDY'S clarifications. This last post suggesting ANL understands *meaning* AS the ONE TRUE MEANING of something which fails to include meanings can be contested because of heterogeneity in society, different classes, genders, etc. seems to be a radical departure from Wertsch's exploration of *mediated action* . Mediated action refers to the complementary understandings of Vygotsky AND BAKHTIN. Bakhtin's notion of *genres* seems to be moving in a radically different trajectory from how Leontiev's activity theory is being explained. HETEROGENEITY and *multivoicedness of utterances* challenges any notion of *one true* collectively understood *meaning* Radically different trajectories. On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 11:07 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the one true meaning of > something. He does not allow that the meaning of something may be > contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of heterogeneity in > society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, social movements > and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of something which > "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which are therefore > taken to be subjective. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's >> breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a >> starch of art] --------------------------------------------------- 6. >> [The fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) >> --------------------------------------------------- You say: "ANL >> believes that motivation determines perception. The norm of perception, >> the "true" meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for the >> community as a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of >> "community as a whole" in this context." So is it the case that >> word-meaning is denied by ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" >> cohesive across the culture and cannot have personal or spontaneous >> meaning? I can see the reason politically to emphasize this, if the State >> is sanctioned as the sole arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post >> below Wed, 22 Oct 2014 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: >> >>> _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning ---------- ANL believes that >>> the mental representation in a child's awareness must _correspond_ directly >>> to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but also how the >>> object may relate and associate to other objects and their meanings. The >>> example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I will call here >>> for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", ANL takes exception >>> with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a generalization to >>> reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit >>> (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the existence of these >>> word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they are what >>> construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this because he considers >>> consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- >>> >>>> Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes that motivation determines >>>> perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of an object, is >>>> therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. I am questioning >>>> the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in this context. >>>> >--end >>>> >>> >> >> > From julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk Thu Oct 23 12:16:03 2014 From: julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk (Julian Williams) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 19:16:03 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net> <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> , Message-ID: <541188BF-CC6B-4664-9027-2E7AC1578FE0@manchester.ac.uk> Mike Just responding to the first point here. I said this: > But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the notion in *Vygotsky's > Perezhivanie paper that the situation or environment is given and the same > for all,* and the final form of development is given in a final, given > 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being then associated with an > already given social plane). Then You respond with this: > WHAT? Isn't the core idea that each of the three kids in the initial > alcoholic mom story that perezhivanie is a particular relationship between > the individual and the situation? > I think this is what Vygotsky seems to say, and your interpretation seems right... And I think it's a problem - (not sure that Leontiev saw the problem in just the way I do.... And the emotions Leontievs paper raises means I prefer to stand alone on this). IF the 'situation' is the same for each kid, then the difference in perezhivanie will be due solely to their different stages of development, OK. But if the relationship is dialectical, one can surely observe that actually the situation/activity is partly due to and responsive to the acting child... The mother - even when sober - behaves differently to each child, perhaps being angered by the bed-wetting that the youngest exhibits (causing her work and a sense of guilt?) as a result of the stress on the child, etc etc. so the child's stage of development becomes a factor in the context of the situation of the family... I don't think anyone argues with this dialectic in the context of 'activity', do they? I'm suggesting we insist on the same dialectic in the unit of Perezhivanie, or if we don't we will be in trouble. Julian > Second, regarding *the final form of development is given in a final, > given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being then associated with an > already given social plane).* > > I raised concerns early on about this formulation. On the one hand, it is > true (in so far as the ideal is not seen as "the perfected/never to be > changed).It is only the given, ideologically and historically shaped "ideal > of the group at the given time". How long it remains and how widely it is > dispersed is up for grabs. For deaf, home signing kids to be brought > together in a school setting where they, collectively, "acquire", use and > transform the "ideal" that they encounter, depending upon which generation > of local signers they encounter. > > My concern grew precisely along the lines that worry Julian. But the notion > of "the ideal" as not an historically evolved cultural understanding seems > to me to play too easily into totalitarian modes of thought. On the other > hand, some sorts of ideals seem to have such a long life and seem so useful > to us, that they are "as if" unchanging. So, for a (relatively) long time, > English can be considered a "mature language." Its hard to see how next > generations of kids change the language in a single generation. But for > sure it happens and is happening all the time. If you doubt it, imagine > your grandmother saying something like "Well,if you are not down with that, > just google it." Any acquaintance with the history of English from is > precarious beginnings makes the same point on a longer time scale. > > mike > > On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:24 AM, Julian Williams < > julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote: > >> Andy: >> >> Now I feel we are nearly together, here. There is no 'final' form even of >> simple arithmetic, because it is (as social practices are) continually >> evolving. >> >> Just one more step then: our conversation with the 7 year old child about >> the truth of 7plus 4 equals 10 is a part of this social practice, and >> contributes to it....? The event involved in this Perezhivanie here >> involves a situation that is created by the joint activity of the child >> with us? >> >> Peg: Germ cell for the social practice of mathematics... I wonder if there >> is a problem with Davydov's approach, in that it requires a specification >> of the final form of the mathematics to be learnt (a closed curriculum). >> But let me try: One candidate might be the 'reasoned justification for a >> mathematical use/application to our project' ... Implies meaningful verbal >> thought/interaction, and collective mathematical activity with others. Not >> sure how this works to define your curriculum content etc. >> >> Julian >> >> >> On 23 Oct 2014, at 16:28, "Peg Griffin" wrote: >> >>> And thus the importance of finding a good germ cell for mathematics >> pedagogy >>> -- because a germ cell can "grow with" and "grow" the current "social >>> practice of mathematics." Whether someone agrees with the choice of germ >>> cell made by Davidov (or anyone else), a germ cell needs to be >> identified, >>> justified and relied on to generate curriculum content and practice, >> right? >>> PG >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 10:35 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of >> word-meaning] >>> >>> Julian, >>> The claim that the ideal exists in the social environment from the >> beginning >>> is quite consistent, indeed relies upon, the claim that the ideal is >> being >>> continuously subject to transformation, that is, that mathematicians are >>> active developing the content of mathematics in the context of the >> problems >>> and resources the community is generating. Were this not the case, it >> would >>> be very difficult (though not impossible) for kids to acquire a >> mathematical >>> disposition. >>> >>> I think the basic ontogenetic principle fully applies to mathematics. >>> But the ideal is certainly not the absolute truths of arithmetic taught >> in >>> South African elementary schools. The ideal is the *social practice of >>> mathematics*. That is, of course, by its very nature, continually >> evolving >>> and transforming. The ideal is a pair of shifting goal posts. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Julian Williams wrote: >>>> Andy/Carol >>>> >>>> I would like to expand a bit on Andy's point - >>>> >>>> First, I have often had very interesting discussions with children who >>> work out that 7+4 = 10 ... this is usually accomplished by a 'counting >> on' >>> method, which begins with the 7 ("1") and goes 7 ("1"),8 ("2") ,9 ("3") >> ,10 >>> "4- there we are, 10!" ... >>>> >>>> 7 -- 8 --- 9 -- 10 >>>> 1 ... 2 ... 3 ... 4 >>>> >>>> Similarly 10 - 4 = 7 etc. >>>> >>>> (It doesn't really matter whether the teacher accepts the answer or >>>> not - the kids keep getting the answer 10... and we have data to prove >>>> it; until one day they are told they are hopeless and its time for >>>> them to leave and go down the mines/factory. See Billy Connolly's >>>> youtube hit on 'algebra'..) >>>> >>>> Second: Im pleased to say that the best arithmetic I am seeing in >> schools >>> now bears almost no relation to that I experienced 50 odd years ago as a >>> learner, and that I taught as a teacher 30 years ago... although there >>> seems still to be a lot that hasn't changed as much as Id like. Im >> thinking >>> of a lesson wherein different groups of children modelled their 'proofs' >>> that 3x28 = 84 using various methods, tools, etc. >>>> >>>> So Im afraid the story that arithmetic already exists in some ideal >>>> form in the social - cultural plane (eg in adult practices?), and so >>>> can/has to be somehow made present for the youngster in their earlier >>>> stages of development (if that's what Vygotsky really meant) is far >>>> too simple for me, and at its worst leads to terrible schooling >>>> practices, where there is no room for a child's intelligent argument >>>> that 7 + 4 really equals 10 >>>> >>>> :-) >>>> >>>> Julian >>>> >>>> Andy: my sleight of hand here is that I translate your formulation of >> what >>> leontiev says "there is one true object/ive and the kids should come to >> know >>> it" into Vygotsky's " ideal form of arithmetic" where child development >> must >>> end up... thus your critique of Leontiev becomes my complaint about >>> Vygtosky's perezhivanie paper. Im sure you will say "not fair"? >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >>>> Sent: 23 October 2014 14:50 >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of >>>> word-meaning] >>>> >>>> Mathematics today is nothing like it was 300 years ago, Carol, even if >>>> it is in a South African elementary school. And the teacher wouldn't >>>> accept it if Johnny said that apes had evolved from human either or >>>> that gravity went clockwise. The ability to correctly reproduce >>>> things like >>>> 4+7=11 is not in my experience any evidence that a child has grasped >>>> what + or = means, and certainly no evidence that they have any grasp of >>> mathematics or even number. Of course, we might take the view that they >>> never will anyway, so being able to add is good enough for them. >>>> >>>> But if we take the view that it is worthwhile that a child learn what >>> science is and what mathematics is about, then in my view, the problems >> are >>> essentially the same whichever science it is. >>>> >>>> Of course, in general, the attitude a teacher takes to their material is >>> that it is objectively true and the kids should come to know it. But this >>> stance or attitude to knowledge, or science, is a very poor preparation >> for >>> adult life and citizenship. I don't see mathematics in principle as >> being an >>> exception. Perhaps a little teaching of the history of mathematics would >>> help? I don't know. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> -- >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> I realise that, but it much more robust than orthodox science; i.e. >>>>> we are still doing the same maths as 300 years ago, where normal >>>>> science is very different indeed. >>>>> >>>>> If Johnny said that 4+7=10, the teacher is not going to accept that, >>>>> is she? >>>>> >>>>> Carol >>>>> >>>>> On 23 October 2014 10:02, Andy Blunden >>>> > wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Carol, mathematics is a natural science like any other. >>>>> It is neither the absolute truth nor merely social convention. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Julian, Andy >>>>> >>>>> I think arithmetic is something of a test case. Just as word >>>>> meaning >>>>> changes over time in a dynamic way, as recognised by >>>>> linguists, maths >>>>> truths don't. It would be difficult to argue that maths truths >>>>> of basic >>>>> arithmetic have changed over the centuries. I don't know about >>>>> maths truths >>>>> of a higher order. >>>>> >>>>> Sorry if I use the terms arithmetic and maths interchangeably; >>>>> it's a South >>>>> African usage here in basic education. >>>>> >>>>> Carol >>>>> >>>>> On 23 October 2014 08:33, Julian Williams >>>>> >>>> > >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> Yes, just so, this is why I go to social theory eg Marx >>>>> and Bourdieu to >>>>> find political-economic contradictions within and between >>>>> activities. >>>>> >>>>> But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the >>>>> notion in >>>>> Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or >>>>> environment is given >>>>> and the same for all, and the final form of development is >>>>> given in a >>>>> final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being >>>>> then associated >>>>> with an already given social plane). >>>>> >>>>> I'm happy enough to accept that this is a false and >>>>> undialectical reading >>>>> of Vygotsky (after all who knows how the concept of >>>>> perezhivanie might have >>>>> matured in his hands)... >>>>> >>>>> To return to my case - arithmetic. Many will say this >>>>> exists in ideal form >>>>> in the culture and all that needs to be done by >>>>> development is to bring the >>>>> child into the culture... Then the child is 'schooled'... >>>>> Passive, lacking >>>>> in agency, often failed, and at best made obedient to the >>>>> cultural legacy. >>>>> AsBourdieu says, through processes in school the class >>>>> system is >>>>> reproduced, and this is enculturation into the cultural >>>>> arbitrary. >>>>> >>>>> Julian >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 23 Oct 2014, at 07:08, "Andy Blunden" >>>>> > wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the >>>>> one true meaning >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> of something. He does not allow that the meaning of >>>>> something may be >>>>> contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of >>>>> heterogeneity in >>>>> society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, >>>>> social movements >>>>> and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of >>>>> something which >>>>> "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which >>>>> are therefore >>>>> taken to be subjective. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> This continues and extends from my original post >>>>> concerning Andy's >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points >>>>> total... [copypasta is a >>>>> starch of art] >>>>> --------------------------------------------------- 6. [The >>>>> fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) >>>>> --------------------------------------------------- You >>>>> say: "ANL believes >>>>> that motivation determines perception. The norm of >>>>> perception, the "true" >>>>> meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for >>>>> the community as >>>>> a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of >>>>> "community as a >>>>> whole" in this context." So is it the case that >>>>> word-meaning is denied by >>>>> ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" cohesive across >>>>> the culture and >>>>> cannot have personal or spontaneous meaning? I can see the >>>>> reason >>>>> politically to emphasize this, if the State is sanctioned >>>>> as the sole >>>>> arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post below Wed, >>>>> 22 Oct 2014 >>>>> 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning >>>>> ---------- ANL believes that >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> the mental representation in a child's awareness must >>>>> _correspond_ directly >>>>> to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but >>>>> also how the >>>>> object may relate and associate to other objects and their >>>>> meanings. The >>>>> example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I >>>>> will call here >>>>> for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", >>>>> ANL takes exception >>>>> with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a >>>>> generalization to >>>>> reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit >>>>> (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the >>>>> existence of these >>>>> word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they >>>>> are what >>>>> construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this >>>>> because he considers >>>>> consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes >>>>> that motivation determines >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of >>>>> an object, is >>>>> therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. >>>>> I am questioning >>>>> the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in >>>>> this context. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> --end >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Oct 23 13:09:10 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 13:09:10 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <541188BF-CC6B-4664-9027-2E7AC1578FE0@manchester.ac.uk> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net> <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <541188BF-CC6B-4664-9027-2E7AC1578FE0@manchester.ac.uk> Message-ID: Your point about the situation changing as a result of child's response to it (presumably conditioned by its interpretation and accompanying perezhivanie) seems well taken, Julian. mike On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 12:16 PM, Julian Williams < julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote: > Mike > > Just responding to the first point here. > > I said this: > > > But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the notion in > *Vygotsky's > > Perezhivanie paper that the situation or environment is given and the > same > > for all,* and the final form of development is given in a final, given > > 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being then associated with an > > already given social plane). > > Then You respond with this: > > > WHAT? Isn't the core idea that each of the three kids in the initial > > alcoholic mom story that perezhivanie is a particular relationship > between > > the individual and the situation? > > > > I think this is what Vygotsky seems to say, and your interpretation seems > right... And I think it's a problem - (not sure that Leontiev saw the > problem in just the way I do.... And the emotions Leontievs paper raises > means I prefer to stand alone on this). > > IF the 'situation' is the same for each kid, then the difference in > perezhivanie will be due solely to their different stages of development, > OK. But if the relationship is dialectical, one can surely observe that > actually the situation/activity is partly due to and responsive to the > acting child... The mother - even when sober - behaves differently to each > child, perhaps being angered by the bed-wetting that the youngest exhibits > (causing her work and a sense of guilt?) as a result of the stress on the > child, etc etc. so the child's stage of development becomes a factor in the > context of the situation of the family... > > I don't think anyone argues with this dialectic in the context of > 'activity', do they? I'm suggesting we insist on the same dialectic in the > unit of Perezhivanie, or if we don't we will be in trouble. > > Julian > > > Second, regarding *the final form of development is given in a final, > > given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being then associated with > an > > already given social plane).* > > > > I raised concerns early on about this formulation. On the one hand, it is > > true (in so far as the ideal is not seen as "the perfected/never to be > > changed).It is only the given, ideologically and historically shaped > "ideal > > of the group at the given time". How long it remains and how widely it is > > dispersed is up for grabs. For deaf, home signing kids to be brought > > together in a school setting where they, collectively, "acquire", use and > > transform the "ideal" that they encounter, depending upon which > generation > > of local signers they encounter. > > > > My concern grew precisely along the lines that worry Julian. But the > notion > > of "the ideal" as not an historically evolved cultural understanding > seems > > to me to play too easily into totalitarian modes of thought. On the other > > hand, some sorts of ideals seem to have such a long life and seem so > useful > > to us, that they are "as if" unchanging. So, for a (relatively) long > time, > > English can be considered a "mature language." Its hard to see how next > > generations of kids change the language in a single generation. But for > > sure it happens and is happening all the time. If you doubt it, imagine > > your grandmother saying something like "Well,if you are not down with > that, > > just google it." Any acquaintance with the history of English from is > > precarious beginnings makes the same point on a longer time scale. > > > > mike > > > > On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:24 AM, Julian Williams < > > julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote: > > > >> Andy: > >> > >> Now I feel we are nearly together, here. There is no 'final' form even > of > >> simple arithmetic, because it is (as social practices are) continually > >> evolving. > >> > >> Just one more step then: our conversation with the 7 year old child > about > >> the truth of 7plus 4 equals 10 is a part of this social practice, and > >> contributes to it....? The event involved in this Perezhivanie here > >> involves a situation that is created by the joint activity of the child > >> with us? > >> > >> Peg: Germ cell for the social practice of mathematics... I wonder if > there > >> is a problem with Davydov's approach, in that it requires a > specification > >> of the final form of the mathematics to be learnt (a closed curriculum). > >> But let me try: One candidate might be the 'reasoned justification for a > >> mathematical use/application to our project' ... Implies meaningful > verbal > >> thought/interaction, and collective mathematical activity with others. > Not > >> sure how this works to define your curriculum content etc. > >> > >> Julian > >> > >> > >> On 23 Oct 2014, at 16:28, "Peg Griffin" wrote: > >> > >>> And thus the importance of finding a good germ cell for mathematics > >> pedagogy > >>> -- because a germ cell can "grow with" and "grow" the current "social > >>> practice of mathematics." Whether someone agrees with the choice of > germ > >>> cell made by Davidov (or anyone else), a germ cell needs to be > >> identified, > >>> justified and relied on to generate curriculum content and practice, > >> right? > >>> PG > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >>> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 10:35 AM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of > >> word-meaning] > >>> > >>> Julian, > >>> The claim that the ideal exists in the social environment from the > >> beginning > >>> is quite consistent, indeed relies upon, the claim that the ideal is > >> being > >>> continuously subject to transformation, that is, that mathematicians > are > >>> active developing the content of mathematics in the context of the > >> problems > >>> and resources the community is generating. Were this not the case, it > >> would > >>> be very difficult (though not impossible) for kids to acquire a > >> mathematical > >>> disposition. > >>> > >>> I think the basic ontogenetic principle fully applies to mathematics. > >>> But the ideal is certainly not the absolute truths of arithmetic taught > >> in > >>> South African elementary schools. The ideal is the *social practice of > >>> mathematics*. That is, of course, by its very nature, continually > >> evolving > >>> and transforming. The ideal is a pair of shifting goal posts. > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> Julian Williams wrote: > >>>> Andy/Carol > >>>> > >>>> I would like to expand a bit on Andy's point - > >>>> > >>>> First, I have often had very interesting discussions with children who > >>> work out that 7+4 = 10 ... this is usually accomplished by a 'counting > >> on' > >>> method, which begins with the 7 ("1") and goes 7 ("1"),8 ("2") ,9 ("3") > >> ,10 > >>> "4- there we are, 10!" ... > >>>> > >>>> 7 -- 8 --- 9 -- 10 > >>>> 1 ... 2 ... 3 ... 4 > >>>> > >>>> Similarly 10 - 4 = 7 etc. > >>>> > >>>> (It doesn't really matter whether the teacher accepts the answer or > >>>> not - the kids keep getting the answer 10... and we have data to prove > >>>> it; until one day they are told they are hopeless and its time for > >>>> them to leave and go down the mines/factory. See Billy Connolly's > >>>> youtube hit on 'algebra'..) > >>>> > >>>> Second: Im pleased to say that the best arithmetic I am seeing in > >> schools > >>> now bears almost no relation to that I experienced 50 odd years ago as > a > >>> learner, and that I taught as a teacher 30 years ago... although there > >>> seems still to be a lot that hasn't changed as much as Id like. Im > >> thinking > >>> of a lesson wherein different groups of children modelled their > 'proofs' > >>> that 3x28 = 84 using various methods, tools, etc. > >>>> > >>>> So Im afraid the story that arithmetic already exists in some ideal > >>>> form in the social - cultural plane (eg in adult practices?), and so > >>>> can/has to be somehow made present for the youngster in their earlier > >>>> stages of development (if that's what Vygotsky really meant) is far > >>>> too simple for me, and at its worst leads to terrible schooling > >>>> practices, where there is no room for a child's intelligent argument > >>>> that 7 + 4 really equals 10 > >>>> > >>>> :-) > >>>> > >>>> Julian > >>>> > >>>> Andy: my sleight of hand here is that I translate your formulation of > >> what > >>> leontiev says "there is one true object/ive and the kids should come to > >> know > >>> it" into Vygotsky's " ideal form of arithmetic" where child development > >> must > >>> end up... thus your critique of Leontiev becomes my complaint about > >>> Vygtosky's perezhivanie paper. Im sure you will say "not fair"? > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >>>> Sent: 23 October 2014 14:50 > >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of > >>>> word-meaning] > >>>> > >>>> Mathematics today is nothing like it was 300 years ago, Carol, even if > >>>> it is in a South African elementary school. And the teacher wouldn't > >>>> accept it if Johnny said that apes had evolved from human either or > >>>> that gravity went clockwise. The ability to correctly reproduce > >>>> things like > >>>> 4+7=11 is not in my experience any evidence that a child has grasped > >>>> what + or = means, and certainly no evidence that they have any grasp > of > >>> mathematics or even number. Of course, we might take the view that they > >>> never will anyway, so being able to add is good enough for them. > >>>> > >>>> But if we take the view that it is worthwhile that a child learn what > >>> science is and what mathematics is about, then in my view, the problems > >> are > >>> essentially the same whichever science it is. > >>>> > >>>> Of course, in general, the attitude a teacher takes to their material > is > >>> that it is objectively true and the kids should come to know it. But > this > >>> stance or attitude to knowledge, or science, is a very poor preparation > >> for > >>> adult life and citizenship. I don't see mathematics in principle as > >> being an > >>> exception. Perhaps a little teaching of the history of mathematics > would > >>> help? I don't know. > >>>> > >>>> Andy > >>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>>> -- > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>> > >>>>> I realise that, but it much more robust than orthodox science; i.e. > >>>>> we are still doing the same maths as 300 years ago, where normal > >>>>> science is very different indeed. > >>>>> > >>>>> If Johnny said that 4+7=10, the teacher is not going to accept that, > >>>>> is she? > >>>>> > >>>>> Carol > >>>>> > >>>>> On 23 October 2014 10:02, Andy Blunden >>>>> > wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Carol, mathematics is a natural science like any other. > >>>>> It is neither the absolute truth nor merely social convention. > >>>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>> > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Julian, Andy > >>>>> > >>>>> I think arithmetic is something of a test case. Just as word > >>>>> meaning > >>>>> changes over time in a dynamic way, as recognised by > >>>>> linguists, maths > >>>>> truths don't. It would be difficult to argue that maths truths > >>>>> of basic > >>>>> arithmetic have changed over the centuries. I don't know about > >>>>> maths truths > >>>>> of a higher order. > >>>>> > >>>>> Sorry if I use the terms arithmetic and maths interchangeably; > >>>>> it's a South > >>>>> African usage here in basic education. > >>>>> > >>>>> Carol > >>>>> > >>>>> On 23 October 2014 08:33, Julian Williams > >>>>> >>>>> > > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>> > >>>>> Yes, just so, this is why I go to social theory eg Marx > >>>>> and Bourdieu to > >>>>> find political-economic contradictions within and between > >>>>> activities. > >>>>> > >>>>> But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the > >>>>> notion in > >>>>> Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or > >>>>> environment is given > >>>>> and the same for all, and the final form of development is > >>>>> given in a > >>>>> final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being > >>>>> then associated > >>>>> with an already given social plane). > >>>>> > >>>>> I'm happy enough to accept that this is a false and > >>>>> undialectical reading > >>>>> of Vygotsky (after all who knows how the concept of > >>>>> perezhivanie might have > >>>>> matured in his hands)... > >>>>> > >>>>> To return to my case - arithmetic. Many will say this > >>>>> exists in ideal form > >>>>> in the culture and all that needs to be done by > >>>>> development is to bring the > >>>>> child into the culture... Then the child is 'schooled'... > >>>>> Passive, lacking > >>>>> in agency, often failed, and at best made obedient to the > >>>>> cultural legacy. > >>>>> AsBourdieu says, through processes in school the class > >>>>> system is > >>>>> reproduced, and this is enculturation into the cultural > >>>>> arbitrary. > >>>>> > >>>>> Julian > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On 23 Oct 2014, at 07:08, "Andy Blunden" > >>>>> > wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the > >>>>> one true meaning > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> of something. He does not allow that the meaning of > >>>>> something may be > >>>>> contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of > >>>>> heterogeneity in > >>>>> society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, > >>>>> social movements > >>>>> and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of > >>>>> something which > >>>>> "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which > >>>>> are therefore > >>>>> taken to be subjective. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>> > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> This continues and extends from my original post > >>>>> concerning Andy's > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points > >>>>> total... [copypasta is a > >>>>> starch of art] > >>>>> --------------------------------------------------- 6. [The > >>>>> fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) > >>>>> --------------------------------------------------- You > >>>>> say: "ANL believes > >>>>> that motivation determines perception. The norm of > >>>>> perception, the "true" > >>>>> meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for > >>>>> the community as > >>>>> a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of > >>>>> "community as a > >>>>> whole" in this context." So is it the case that > >>>>> word-meaning is denied by > >>>>> ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" cohesive across > >>>>> the culture and > >>>>> cannot have personal or spontaneous meaning? I can see the > >>>>> reason > >>>>> politically to emphasize this, if the State is sanctioned > >>>>> as the sole > >>>>> arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post below Wed, > >>>>> 22 Oct 2014 > >>>>> 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning > >>>>> ---------- ANL believes that > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> the mental representation in a child's awareness must > >>>>> _correspond_ directly > >>>>> to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but > >>>>> also how the > >>>>> object may relate and associate to other objects and their > >>>>> meanings. The > >>>>> example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I > >>>>> will call here > >>>>> for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", > >>>>> ANL takes exception > >>>>> with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a > >>>>> generalization to > >>>>> reference the meaning of the word and as an independent > unit > >>>>> (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the > >>>>> existence of these > >>>>> word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they > >>>>> are what > >>>>> construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this > >>>>> because he considers > >>>>> consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes > >>>>> that motivation determines > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of > >>>>> an object, is > >>>>> therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. > >>>>> I am questioning > >>>>> the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in > >>>>> this context. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> --end > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>>>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor > >>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From ablunden@mira.net Thu Oct 23 13:57:04 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 07:57:04 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> Message-ID: <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> Paul Ernest has a position on the unit of analysis for mathematics teaching: http://www.esri.mmu.ac.uk/mect/papers_11/Ernest.pdf Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Julian Williams wrote: > Andy: > > Now I feel we are nearly together, here. There is no 'final' form even of simple arithmetic, because it is (as social practices are) continually evolving. > > Just one more step then: our conversation with the 7 year old child about the truth of 7plus 4 equals 10 is a part of this social practice, and contributes to it....? The event involved in this Perezhivanie here involves a situation that is created by the joint activity of the child with us? > > Peg: Germ cell for the social practice of mathematics... I wonder if there is a problem with Davydov's approach, in that it requires a specification of the final form of the mathematics to be learnt (a closed curriculum). But let me try: One candidate might be the 'reasoned justification for a mathematical use/application to our project' ... Implies meaningful verbal thought/interaction, and collective mathematical activity with others. Not sure how this works to define your curriculum content etc. > > Julian > > > On 23 Oct 2014, at 16:28, "Peg Griffin" wrote: > > >> And thus the importance of finding a good germ cell for mathematics pedagogy >> -- because a germ cell can "grow with" and "grow" the current "social >> practice of mathematics." Whether someone agrees with the choice of germ >> cell made by Davidov (or anyone else), a germ cell needs to be identified, >> justified and relied on to generate curriculum content and practice, right? >> PG >> >> > From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Oct 23 14:06:40 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 21:06:40 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net>, Message-ID: <1414098399832.86428@unm.edu> Hi Patrick! Is there a grasshopper's chance of seeing this paper on the equal sign by your friend? May I know more what the context is? Is it as history of mathematical notation? or something else? Intrigued! Best, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Patrick Jaki Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 8:16 AM To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] Andy on "The ability to correctly reproduce things like 4+7=11 is not in my experience any evidence that a child has grasped what + or = means ..." Yes, teachers have taught these symbols with finality because that is what the syllabus says. In other words, as absolute that will remains fossilized in meaning. If I recall correctly, my friend wrote his masters project in mathematics on the equal sign. It was an eye opener. On 23 October 2014 15:49, Andy Blunden wrote: > Mathematics today is nothing like it was 300 years ago, Carol, even if it > is in a South African elementary school. And the teacher wouldn't accept it > if Johnny said that apes had evolved from human either or that gravity went > clockwise. The ability to correctly reproduce things like 4+7=11 is not in > my experience any evidence that a child has grasped what + or = means, and > certainly no evidence that they have any grasp of mathematics or even > number. Of course, we might take the view that they never will anyway, so > being able to add is good enough for them. > > But if we take the view that it is worthwhile that a child learn what > science is and what mathematics is about, then in my view, the problems are > essentially the same whichever science it is. > > Of course, in general, the attitude a teacher takes to their material is > that it is objectively true and the kids should come to know it. But this > stance or attitude to knowledge, or science, is a very poor preparation for > adult life and citizenship. I don't see mathematics in principle as being > an exception. Perhaps a little teaching of the history of mathematics would > help? I don't know. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Carol Macdonald wrote: > >> Andy >> >> I realise that, but it much more robust than orthodox science; i.e. we >> are still doing the same maths as 300 years ago, where normal science is >> very different indeed. >> If Johnny said that 4+7=10, the teacher is not going to accept that, is >> she? >> >> Carol >> >> On 23 October 2014 10:02, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Carol, mathematics is a natural science like any other. >> It is neither the absolute truth nor merely social convention. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Carol Macdonald wrote: >> >> Julian, Andy >> >> I think arithmetic is something of a test case. Just as word >> meaning >> changes over time in a dynamic way, as recognised by >> linguists, maths >> truths don't. It would be difficult to argue that maths truths >> of basic >> arithmetic have changed over the centuries. I don't know about >> maths truths >> of a higher order. >> >> Sorry if I use the terms arithmetic and maths interchangeably; >> it's a South >> African usage here in basic education. >> >> Carol >> >> On 23 October 2014 08:33, Julian Williams >> > > >> >> wrote: >> >> >> Andy >> >> Yes, just so, this is why I go to social theory eg Marx >> and Bourdieu to >> find political-economic contradictions within and between >> activities. >> >> But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the >> notion in >> Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or >> environment is given >> and the same for all, and the final form of development is >> given in a >> final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being >> then associated >> with an already given social plane). >> >> I'm happy enough to accept that this is a false and >> undialectical reading >> of Vygotsky (after all who knows how the concept of >> perezhivanie might have >> matured in his hands)... >> >> To return to my case - arithmetic. Many will say this >> exists in ideal form >> in the culture and all that needs to be done by >> development is to bring the >> child into the culture... Then the child is 'schooled'... >> Passive, lacking >> in agency, often failed, and at best made obedient to the >> cultural legacy. >> AsBourdieu says, through processes in school the class >> system is >> reproduced, and this is enculturation into the cultural >> arbitrary. >> >> Julian >> >> >> >> >> On 23 Oct 2014, at 07:08, "Andy Blunden" >> > wrote: >> >> >> No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the >> one true meaning >> >> of something. He does not allow that the meaning of >> something may be >> contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of >> heterogeneity in >> society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, >> social movements >> and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of >> something which >> "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which >> are therefore >> taken to be subjective. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> This continues and extends from my original post >> concerning Andy's >> >> breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points >> total... [copypasta is a >> starch of art] >> --------------------------------------------------- 6. [The >> fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) >> --------------------------------------------------- You >> say: "ANL believes >> that motivation determines perception. The norm of >> perception, the "true" >> meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for >> the community as >> a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of >> "community as a >> whole" in this context." So is it the case that >> word-meaning is denied by >> ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" cohesive across >> the culture and >> cannot have personal or spontaneous meaning? I can see the >> reason >> politically to emphasize this, if the State is sanctioned >> as the sole >> arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post below Wed, >> 22 Oct 2014 >> 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: >> >> _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning >> ---------- ANL believes that >> >> the mental representation in a child's awareness must >> _correspond_ directly >> to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but >> also how the >> object may relate and associate to other objects and their >> meanings. The >> example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I >> will call here >> for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", >> ANL takes exception >> with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a >> generalization to >> reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit >> (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the >> existence of these >> word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they >> are what >> construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this >> because he considers >> consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- >> >> Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes >> that motivation determines >> >> perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of >> an object, is >> therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. >> I am questioning >> the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in >> this context. >> >> --end >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> Developmental psycholinguist >> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of >> Linguistics, Unisa >> >> >> >> > -- *Patrick Jaki* *P. O Box 505 WitsJohannesburg2050South Africa* From ablunden@mira.net Thu Oct 23 14:10:45 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 08:10:45 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu> Message-ID: <54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> Annalisa, it is Leontyev who is pinning the charge of "intellectualism" on Vygotsky because he ascribes "meaning" and "significance" to children, and therefore sign-use. I am not saying that sign-use is not intellectual though. And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" and "affect". Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Andy, > > Again thanks for more! > > Here's the thing: I may be getting lost in understanding argument positions. > > Are you saying it is Leontiev, et al's position that thinking with signs and words are intellectual? > > Because, for me personally, thinking with signs and words involve both affect and intellect and I don't think they can be separated out. For me, a person's intelligence is the mediated unification of affect and intellect, what I believe you are calling consciousness. > > I feel supported by my position with Vygotsky's discussion of word-meaning (znachenie slova), if I am understanding word-meaning properly. > > Again, the words "meaning" and "significance" can have affective meaning and significance! :) (is this the adjective? I want to say "affectual," to match "intellectual" but that isn't a word) > > Now if for *you* these particular words have "intellectual connotations," perhaps this difference between you and I supports LSV's (and my earlier) point that affect and intellect are mediated and will therefore allow each person have a different and nuanced mix of meaning and significance for the same set of words and signs, even if we generally agree on a social meaning and significance, such as the meaning of a flag. > > This reminds me of the cultural differences regarding the meanings of color. One can't intellectualize red just by its perception. One can't have an affect of red either by perception alone (if one were to see red for the first time), its meaning and significance are socially, historically and culturally generated. > > Furthermore, I agree with you that our "Western language" to describe the interior mind, if I am allowed to say that, is sparse. We know Freud reached into Greek mythology to give these concepts a handle. This is one reason I look to Eastern thought so I might learn how these dynamics are discussed. They do possess words for which we have none. I might also suggest there are relevant themes in these traditions that apply to Vygotsky's work. > > In fact, it might amaze us in the West to truly understand the immense literature and legacies on these topics of mind and self. It certainly amazes me. Of course that would be a huge project to be mediated between cultural elders and not a cultural tourist like myself. I only point out that there is something there and we are not the pioneers to wrangle with these problems of mind. > > I admit that to access these words, one must understand how metaphors are utilized. In rational-logical traditions, metaphors seem to be disagreeable. Also there is discussion of the spiritual, since the problems these traditions hoped to solve were spiritual problems, which may just be their historically-anchored approach to psychological realities. So, these barriers may explain the impasse. > > But if words are tools, I'm sure we might borrow some and they wouldn't mind. > > Ha! a pun! "wouldn't mind" get it? :) > > Best, > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:02 AM > > I would have said that this criticism is a deliberate misrepresentation, > except that Lydia Bozhovich makes the same charge of "intellectualism." > The charge hinges on phrases like "the significance for the child" and > "the meaning for the child," etc., which etymologically suggest the use > of signs and words. Thinking with signs and words is intellect. But the > thing is that it is almost impossible for us to describe the > relationship of a person to their environment psychologically without > using words which evoke sign-relations. The relation is a psychological > one, not a conditioned-reflex, and the words we have for relations which > are mediated through consciousness tend to be words like "meaning" and > "significance" which have intellectual connotations. The preintellectual > stages of psychological development which Vygotsky himself theorised are > not built into the common language. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. >> >> There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] >> --------------------------------------------------- >> 4. ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >> (see original post below) >> --------------------------------------------------- >> >> Again a pothole. You say: >> "The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate at >> their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an intellectual >> relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims." >> >> I think know this, but what is ANL's critique against this? Is it that >> it is too "intellectual," which is possibly code for elitism or class? >> Sorry if I wasn't clear. >> >> >> > > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Oct 23 14:18:52 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 08:18:52 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net> <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <541188BF-CC6B-4664-9027-2E7AC1578FE0@manchester.ac.uk> Message-ID: <544970BC.90709@mira.net> It seems to be a point always worth making, Julian, that every child is subject to different expectations according, not just to their actual level of development in fact, but also simply because of their age and their sibling order. As Martin pointed out, in the Environment paper, at least in the translation we have, "situation" is used synonymously with "environment" which hardly helps LSV to make his point. But he is, in my view, quite clear in "The Problem of Age," every child is in a unique situation (stated and repeated numerously) because that situation is constituted by the adults in terms of the expectations they place on the child and how the child responds to those expectations or not. Doubtless this is something we always need to be reminded of though. I really couldn't say if this is found in ANL or not, Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > Your point about the situation changing as a result of child's response to > it (presumably conditioned by its interpretation and accompanying > perezhivanie) seems well taken, Julian. > mike > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Oct 23 14:29:04 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 21:29:04 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net>, <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> Message-ID: <1414099743639.58714@unm.edu> Hi Julian! Perhaps in the world dimension of children 7+4 = 10 is empirically true! :) It is its own mathematical law of counting from where you stand. Makes sense to me! However, perhaps the ideal as Vygotsky means it is more mundane than ideal as it discussed in early Greek philosophy. I haven't done the reading on The Ideal to which Andy directed me (but I will!), so I'm speaking out of turn, most likely, but this never seems to stop me and my curiosity and my question-asking. :) I mean what does math actually mean to a child? As an ideal, it should be magic! When I say that, it may mean how the child internalizes that magical quality she may see when seeing older children fire off toy rockets and being able to estimate where it will land. Or understanding how math will help in the fabrication of a dress, or learning of a woman astronaut who does biotech research in space. Isn't this what ideal means? It isn't math for math's sake, but what math can do in one's life to provide meaning, which means connected to meaningful others in the life of the child. I could probably find better examples that are more magical, but I think I made the point? I don't think a lot of kids do math for the intrinsic value, but if that can happen, it is certainly cherished and will likely make such children our next generation of mathematicians. I wonder if we are overthinking the ideal as LSV means it? Regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Julian Williams Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 8:18 AM To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] Andy/Carol I would like to expand a bit on Andy's point - First, I have often had very interesting discussions with children who work out that 7+4 = 10 ... this is usually accomplished by a 'counting on' method, which begins with the 7 ("1") and goes 7 ("1"),8 ("2") ,9 ("3") ,10 "4- there we are, 10!" ... 7 -- 8 --- 9 -- 10 1 ... 2 ... 3 ... 4 Similarly 10 - 4 = 7 etc. (It doesn't really matter whether the teacher accepts the answer or not - the kids keep getting the answer 10... and we have data to prove it; until one day they are told they are hopeless and its time for them to leave and go down the mines/factory. See Billy Connolly's youtube hit on 'algebra'..) Second: Im pleased to say that the best arithmetic I am seeing in schools now bears almost no relation to that I experienced 50 odd years ago as a learner, and that I taught as a teacher 30 years ago... although there seems still to be a lot that hasn't changed as much as Id like. Im thinking of a lesson wherein different groups of children modelled their 'proofs' that 3x28 = 84 using various methods, tools, etc. So Im afraid the story that arithmetic already exists in some ideal form in the social - cultural plane (eg in adult practices?), and so can/has to be somehow made present for the youngster in their earlier stages of development (if that's what Vygotsky really meant) is far too simple for me, and at its worst leads to terrible schooling practices, where there is no room for a child's intelligent argument that 7 + 4 really equals 10 :-) Julian Andy: my sleight of hand here is that I translate your formulation of what leontiev says "there is one true object/ive and the kids should come to know it" into Vygotsky's " ideal form of arithmetic" where child development must end up... thus your critique of Leontiev becomes my complaint about Vygtosky's perezhivanie paper. Im sure you will say "not fair"? -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: 23 October 2014 14:50 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] Mathematics today is nothing like it was 300 years ago, Carol, even if it is in a South African elementary school. And the teacher wouldn't accept it if Johnny said that apes had evolved from human either or that gravity went clockwise. The ability to correctly reproduce things like 4+7=11 is not in my experience any evidence that a child has grasped what + or = means, and certainly no evidence that they have any grasp of mathematics or even number. Of course, we might take the view that they never will anyway, so being able to add is good enough for them. But if we take the view that it is worthwhile that a child learn what science is and what mathematics is about, then in my view, the problems are essentially the same whichever science it is. Of course, in general, the attitude a teacher takes to their material is that it is objectively true and the kids should come to know it. But this stance or attitude to knowledge, or science, is a very poor preparation for adult life and citizenship. I don't see mathematics in principle as being an exception. Perhaps a little teaching of the history of mathematics would help? I don't know. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Carol Macdonald wrote: > Andy > > I realise that, but it much more robust than orthodox science; i.e. we > are still doing the same maths as 300 years ago, where normal science > is very different indeed. > > If Johnny said that 4+7=10, the teacher is not going to accept that, > is she? > > Carol > > On 23 October 2014 10:02, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > Carol, mathematics is a natural science like any other. > It is neither the absolute truth nor merely social convention. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Carol Macdonald wrote: > > Julian, Andy > > I think arithmetic is something of a test case. Just as word > meaning > changes over time in a dynamic way, as recognised by > linguists, maths > truths don't. It would be difficult to argue that maths truths > of basic > arithmetic have changed over the centuries. I don't know about > maths truths > of a higher order. > > Sorry if I use the terms arithmetic and maths interchangeably; > it's a South > African usage here in basic education. > > Carol > > On 23 October 2014 08:33, Julian Williams > > > wrote: > > > > Andy > > Yes, just so, this is why I go to social theory eg Marx > and Bourdieu to > find political-economic contradictions within and between > activities. > > But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the > notion in > Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or > environment is given > and the same for all, and the final form of development is > given in a > final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being > then associated > with an already given social plane). > > I'm happy enough to accept that this is a false and > undialectical reading > of Vygotsky (after all who knows how the concept of > perezhivanie might have > matured in his hands)... > > To return to my case - arithmetic. Many will say this > exists in ideal form > in the culture and all that needs to be done by > development is to bring the > child into the culture... Then the child is 'schooled'... > Passive, lacking > in agency, often failed, and at best made obedient to the > cultural legacy. > AsBourdieu says, through processes in school the class > system is > reproduced, and this is enculturation into the cultural > arbitrary. > > Julian > > > > > On 23 Oct 2014, at 07:08, "Andy Blunden" > > wrote: > > > > No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the > one true meaning > > > of something. He does not allow that the meaning of > something may be > contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of > heterogeneity in > society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, > social movements > and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of > something which > "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which > are therefore > taken to be subjective. > > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. > There are about 8 points total... > [copypasta is a starch of art] > --------------------------------------------------- > 6. [The > fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) > --------------------------------------------------- > You say: "ANL believes > that motivation determines perception. The norm of > perception, the "true" meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for > the community as a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of > "community as a whole" in this context." So is it the case that word-meaning is denied by ANL > because meaning and symbols "must be" cohesive across > the culture and cannot have personal or spontaneous meaning? I can see the > reason politically to emphasize this, if the State is sanctioned > as the sole arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post below Wed, > > 22 Oct 2014 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: > > _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning > ---------- > ANL believes that the mental representation in a child's awareness must > _correspond_ directly to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but > also how the object may relate and associate to other objects and their > meanings. The example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I > will call here for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", > ANL takes exception with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a > generalization to reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit > (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the > existence of these word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they > are what construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this > because he considers consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- > > > Andy's reply to #6 above: > ANL believes that motivation determines perception. The norm of perception, the > "true" meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. > I am questioning the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in > this context. > > > --end > From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Oct 23 14:31:28 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 21:31:28 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>,<003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> Message-ID: <1414099887882.42155@unm.edu> Hi Peg, What is meant by "germ cell"? Is this a metaphor for a math-teaching tool? Best, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Peg Griffin Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 9:25 AM To: ablunden@mira.net; 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] And thus the importance of finding a good germ cell for mathematics pedagogy -- because a germ cell can "grow with" and "grow" the current "social practice of mathematics." Whether someone agrees with the choice of germ cell made by Davidov (or anyone else), a germ cell needs to be identified, justified and relied on to generate curriculum content and practice, right? PG -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 10:35 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] Julian, The claim that the ideal exists in the social environment from the beginning is quite consistent, indeed relies upon, the claim that the ideal is being continuously subject to transformation, that is, that mathematicians are active developing the content of mathematics in the context of the problems and resources the community is generating. Were this not the case, it would be very difficult (though not impossible) for kids to acquire a mathematical disposition. I think the basic ontogenetic principle fully applies to mathematics. But the ideal is certainly not the absolute truths of arithmetic taught in South African elementary schools. The ideal is the *social practice of mathematics*. That is, of course, by its very nature, continually evolving and transforming. The ideal is a pair of shifting goal posts. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Julian Williams wrote: > Andy/Carol > > I would like to expand a bit on Andy's point - > > First, I have often had very interesting discussions with children who work out that 7+4 = 10 ... this is usually accomplished by a 'counting on' method, which begins with the 7 ("1") and goes 7 ("1"),8 ("2") ,9 ("3") ,10 "4- there we are, 10!" ... > > 7 -- 8 --- 9 -- 10 > 1 ... 2 ... 3 ... 4 > > Similarly 10 - 4 = 7 etc. > > (It doesn't really matter whether the teacher accepts the answer or > not - the kids keep getting the answer 10... and we have data to prove > it; until one day they are told they are hopeless and its time for > them to leave and go down the mines/factory. See Billy Connolly's > youtube hit on 'algebra'..) > > Second: Im pleased to say that the best arithmetic I am seeing in schools now bears almost no relation to that I experienced 50 odd years ago as a learner, and that I taught as a teacher 30 years ago... although there seems still to be a lot that hasn't changed as much as Id like. Im thinking of a lesson wherein different groups of children modelled their 'proofs' that 3x28 = 84 using various methods, tools, etc. > > So Im afraid the story that arithmetic already exists in some ideal > form in the social - cultural plane (eg in adult practices?), and so > can/has to be somehow made present for the youngster in their earlier > stages of development (if that's what Vygotsky really meant) is far > too simple for me, and at its worst leads to terrible schooling > practices, where there is no room for a child's intelligent argument > that 7 + 4 really equals 10 > > :-) > > Julian > > Andy: my sleight of hand here is that I translate your formulation of what leontiev says "there is one true object/ive and the kids should come to know it" into Vygotsky's " ideal form of arithmetic" where child development must end up... thus your critique of Leontiev becomes my complaint about Vygtosky's perezhivanie paper. Im sure you will say "not fair"? > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: 23 October 2014 14:50 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of > word-meaning] > > Mathematics today is nothing like it was 300 years ago, Carol, even if > it is in a South African elementary school. And the teacher wouldn't > accept it if Johnny said that apes had evolved from human either or > that gravity went clockwise. The ability to correctly reproduce > things like > 4+7=11 is not in my experience any evidence that a child has grasped > what + or = means, and certainly no evidence that they have any grasp of mathematics or even number. Of course, we might take the view that they never will anyway, so being able to add is good enough for them. > > But if we take the view that it is worthwhile that a child learn what science is and what mathematics is about, then in my view, the problems are essentially the same whichever science it is. > > Of course, in general, the attitude a teacher takes to their material is that it is objectively true and the kids should come to know it. But this stance or attitude to knowledge, or science, is a very poor preparation for adult life and citizenship. I don't see mathematics in principle as being an exception. Perhaps a little teaching of the history of mathematics would help? I don't know. > > Andy > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Carol Macdonald wrote: > >> Andy >> >> I realise that, but it much more robust than orthodox science; i.e. >> we are still doing the same maths as 300 years ago, where normal >> science is very different indeed. >> >> If Johnny said that 4+7=10, the teacher is not going to accept that, >> is she? >> >> Carol >> >> On 23 October 2014 10:02, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> Carol, mathematics is a natural science like any other. >> It is neither the absolute truth nor merely social convention. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Carol Macdonald wrote: >> >> Julian, Andy >> >> I think arithmetic is something of a test case. Just as word >> meaning >> changes over time in a dynamic way, as recognised by >> linguists, maths >> truths don't. It would be difficult to argue that maths truths >> of basic >> arithmetic have changed over the centuries. I don't know about >> maths truths >> of a higher order. >> >> Sorry if I use the terms arithmetic and maths interchangeably; >> it's a South >> African usage here in basic education. >> >> Carol >> >> On 23 October 2014 08:33, Julian Williams >> > > >> wrote: >> >> >> >> Andy >> >> Yes, just so, this is why I go to social theory eg Marx >> and Bourdieu to >> find political-economic contradictions within and between >> activities. >> >> But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the >> notion in >> Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or >> environment is given >> and the same for all, and the final form of development is >> given in a >> final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being >> then associated >> with an already given social plane). >> >> I'm happy enough to accept that this is a false and >> undialectical reading >> of Vygotsky (after all who knows how the concept of >> perezhivanie might have >> matured in his hands)... >> >> To return to my case - arithmetic. Many will say this >> exists in ideal form >> in the culture and all that needs to be done by >> development is to bring the >> child into the culture... Then the child is 'schooled'... >> Passive, lacking >> in agency, often failed, and at best made obedient to the >> cultural legacy. >> AsBourdieu says, through processes in school the class >> system is >> reproduced, and this is enculturation into the cultural >> arbitrary. >> >> Julian >> >> >> >> >> On 23 Oct 2014, at 07:08, "Andy Blunden" >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the >> one true meaning >> >> >> of something. He does not allow that the meaning of >> something may be >> contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of >> heterogeneity in >> society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, >> social movements >> and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of >> something which >> "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which >> are therefore >> taken to be subjective. >> >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> >> This continues and extends from my original post >> concerning Andy's >> >> >> breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points >> total... [copypasta is a >> starch of art] >> --------------------------------------------------- 6. [The >> fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) >> --------------------------------------------------- You >> say: "ANL believes >> that motivation determines perception. The norm of >> perception, the "true" >> meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for >> the community as >> a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of >> "community as a >> whole" in this context." So is it the case that >> word-meaning is denied by >> ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" cohesive across >> the culture and >> cannot have personal or spontaneous meaning? I can see the >> reason >> politically to emphasize this, if the State is sanctioned >> as the sole >> arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post below Wed, >> 22 Oct 2014 >> 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: >> >> >> _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning >> ---------- ANL believes that >> >> >> the mental representation in a child's awareness must >> _correspond_ directly >> to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but >> also how the >> object may relate and associate to other objects and their >> meanings. The >> example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I >> will call here >> for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", >> ANL takes exception >> with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a >> generalization to >> reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit >> (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the >> existence of these >> word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they >> are what >> construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this >> because he considers >> consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- >> >> >> Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes >> that motivation determines >> >> >> perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of >> an object, is >> therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. >> I am questioning >> the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in >> this context. >> >> >> --end >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> Developmental psycholinguist >> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> >> >> >> > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Oct 23 14:40:05 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 21:40:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net> <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> , Message-ID: <1414100404549.92529@unm.edu> Mike, I should like to know what are the differing argument positions to what "the ideal" means in shaping perezhivanie, as LSV meant it? Then how do these positions lacking a proper fit to the dynamic of perezhivanie? I'm a bit muddled. TIA, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 10:47 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] All-- I want to go back to Julian's note in which he writes: (My added emphasis) But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the notion in *Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or environment is given and the same for all,* and the final form of development is given in a final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being then associated with an already given social plane). WHAT? Isn't the core idea that each of the three kids in the initial alcoholic mom story that perezhivanie is a particular relationship between the individual and the situation? Second, regarding *the final form of development is given in a final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being then associated with an already given social plane).* I raised concerns early on about this formulation. On the one hand, it is true (in so far as the ideal is not seen as "the perfected/never to be changed).It is only the given, ideologically and historically shaped "ideal of the group at the given time". How long it remains and how widely it is dispersed is up for grabs. For deaf, home signing kids to be brought together in a school setting where they, collectively, "acquire", use and transform the "ideal" that they encounter, depending upon which generation of local signers they encounter. My concern grew precisely along the lines that worry Julian. But the notion of "the ideal" as not an historically evolved cultural understanding seems to me to play too easily into totalitarian modes of thought. On the other hand, some sorts of ideals seem to have such a long life and seem so useful to us, that they are "as if" unchanging. So, for a (relatively) long time, English can be considered a "mature language." Its hard to see how next generations of kids change the language in a single generation. But for sure it happens and is happening all the time. If you doubt it, imagine your grandmother saying something like "Well,if you are not down with that, just google it." Any acquaintance with the history of English from is precarious beginnings makes the same point on a longer time scale. mike On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 9:24 AM, Julian Williams < julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk> wrote: > Andy: > > Now I feel we are nearly together, here. There is no 'final' form even of > simple arithmetic, because it is (as social practices are) continually > evolving. > > Just one more step then: our conversation with the 7 year old child about > the truth of 7plus 4 equals 10 is a part of this social practice, and > contributes to it....? The event involved in this Perezhivanie here > involves a situation that is created by the joint activity of the child > with us? > > Peg: Germ cell for the social practice of mathematics... I wonder if there > is a problem with Davydov's approach, in that it requires a specification > of the final form of the mathematics to be learnt (a closed curriculum). > But let me try: One candidate might be the 'reasoned justification for a > mathematical use/application to our project' ... Implies meaningful verbal > thought/interaction, and collective mathematical activity with others. Not > sure how this works to define your curriculum content etc. > > Julian > > > On 23 Oct 2014, at 16:28, "Peg Griffin" wrote: > > > And thus the importance of finding a good germ cell for mathematics > pedagogy > > -- because a germ cell can "grow with" and "grow" the current "social > > practice of mathematics." Whether someone agrees with the choice of germ > > cell made by Davidov (or anyone else), a germ cell needs to be > identified, > > justified and relied on to generate curriculum content and practice, > right? > > PG > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 10:35 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of > word-meaning] > > > > Julian, > > The claim that the ideal exists in the social environment from the > beginning > > is quite consistent, indeed relies upon, the claim that the ideal is > being > > continuously subject to transformation, that is, that mathematicians are > > active developing the content of mathematics in the context of the > problems > > and resources the community is generating. Were this not the case, it > would > > be very difficult (though not impossible) for kids to acquire a > mathematical > > disposition. > > > > I think the basic ontogenetic principle fully applies to mathematics. > > But the ideal is certainly not the absolute truths of arithmetic taught > in > > South African elementary schools. The ideal is the *social practice of > > mathematics*. That is, of course, by its very nature, continually > evolving > > and transforming. The ideal is a pair of shifting goal posts. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Julian Williams wrote: > >> Andy/Carol > >> > >> I would like to expand a bit on Andy's point - > >> > >> First, I have often had very interesting discussions with children who > > work out that 7+4 = 10 ... this is usually accomplished by a 'counting > on' > > method, which begins with the 7 ("1") and goes 7 ("1"),8 ("2") ,9 ("3") > ,10 > > "4- there we are, 10!" ... > >> > >> 7 -- 8 --- 9 -- 10 > >> 1 ... 2 ... 3 ... 4 > >> > >> Similarly 10 - 4 = 7 etc. > >> > >> (It doesn't really matter whether the teacher accepts the answer or > >> not - the kids keep getting the answer 10... and we have data to prove > >> it; until one day they are told they are hopeless and its time for > >> them to leave and go down the mines/factory. See Billy Connolly's > >> youtube hit on 'algebra'..) > >> > >> Second: Im pleased to say that the best arithmetic I am seeing in > schools > > now bears almost no relation to that I experienced 50 odd years ago as a > > learner, and that I taught as a teacher 30 years ago... although there > > seems still to be a lot that hasn't changed as much as Id like. Im > thinking > > of a lesson wherein different groups of children modelled their 'proofs' > > that 3x28 = 84 using various methods, tools, etc. > >> > >> So Im afraid the story that arithmetic already exists in some ideal > >> form in the social - cultural plane (eg in adult practices?), and so > >> can/has to be somehow made present for the youngster in their earlier > >> stages of development (if that's what Vygotsky really meant) is far > >> too simple for me, and at its worst leads to terrible schooling > >> practices, where there is no room for a child's intelligent argument > >> that 7 + 4 really equals 10 > >> > >> :-) > >> > >> Julian > >> > >> Andy: my sleight of hand here is that I translate your formulation of > what > > leontiev says "there is one true object/ive and the kids should come to > know > > it" into Vygotsky's " ideal form of arithmetic" where child development > must > > end up... thus your critique of Leontiev becomes my complaint about > > Vygtosky's perezhivanie paper. Im sure you will say "not fair"? > >> > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > >> Sent: 23 October 2014 14:50 > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of > >> word-meaning] > >> > >> Mathematics today is nothing like it was 300 years ago, Carol, even if > >> it is in a South African elementary school. And the teacher wouldn't > >> accept it if Johnny said that apes had evolved from human either or > >> that gravity went clockwise. The ability to correctly reproduce > >> things like > >> 4+7=11 is not in my experience any evidence that a child has grasped > >> what + or = means, and certainly no evidence that they have any grasp of > > mathematics or even number. Of course, we might take the view that they > > never will anyway, so being able to add is good enough for them. > >> > >> But if we take the view that it is worthwhile that a child learn what > > science is and what mathematics is about, then in my view, the problems > are > > essentially the same whichever science it is. > >> > >> Of course, in general, the attitude a teacher takes to their material is > > that it is objectively true and the kids should come to know it. But this > > stance or attitude to knowledge, or science, is a very poor preparation > for > > adult life and citizenship. I don't see mathematics in principle as > being an > > exception. Perhaps a little teaching of the history of mathematics would > > help? I don't know. > >> > >> Andy > >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> -- > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> Carol Macdonald wrote: > >> > >>> Andy > >>> > >>> I realise that, but it much more robust than orthodox science; i.e. > >>> we are still doing the same maths as 300 years ago, where normal > >>> science is very different indeed. > >>> > >>> If Johnny said that 4+7=10, the teacher is not going to accept that, > >>> is she? > >>> > >>> Carol > >>> > >>> On 23 October 2014 10:02, Andy Blunden >>> > wrote: > >>> > >>> Carol, mathematics is a natural science like any other. > >>> It is neither the absolute truth nor merely social convention. > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Carol Macdonald wrote: > >>> > >>> Julian, Andy > >>> > >>> I think arithmetic is something of a test case. Just as word > >>> meaning > >>> changes over time in a dynamic way, as recognised by > >>> linguists, maths > >>> truths don't. It would be difficult to argue that maths truths > >>> of basic > >>> arithmetic have changed over the centuries. I don't know about > >>> maths truths > >>> of a higher order. > >>> > >>> Sorry if I use the terms arithmetic and maths interchangeably; > >>> it's a South > >>> African usage here in basic education. > >>> > >>> Carol > >>> > >>> On 23 October 2014 08:33, Julian Williams > >>> >>> > > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> > >>> Yes, just so, this is why I go to social theory eg Marx > >>> and Bourdieu to > >>> find political-economic contradictions within and between > >>> activities. > >>> > >>> But before we go there have we finally dispensed with the > >>> notion in > >>> Vygotsky's Perezhivanie paper that the situation or > >>> environment is given > >>> and the same for all, and the final form of development is > >>> given in a > >>> final, given 'ideal' form right from the beginning ( being > >>> then associated > >>> with an already given social plane). > >>> > >>> I'm happy enough to accept that this is a false and > >>> undialectical reading > >>> of Vygotsky (after all who knows how the concept of > >>> perezhivanie might have > >>> matured in his hands)... > >>> > >>> To return to my case - arithmetic. Many will say this > >>> exists in ideal form > >>> in the culture and all that needs to be done by > >>> development is to bring the > >>> child into the culture... Then the child is 'schooled'... > >>> Passive, lacking > >>> in agency, often failed, and at best made obedient to the > >>> cultural legacy. > >>> AsBourdieu says, through processes in school the class > >>> system is > >>> reproduced, and this is enculturation into the cultural > >>> arbitrary. > >>> > >>> Julian > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On 23 Oct 2014, at 07:08, "Andy Blunden" > >>> > wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> No, the point is that for ANL "meaning" refers to the > >>> one true meaning > >>> > >>> > >>> of something. He does not allow that the meaning of > >>> something may be > >>> contested, and that a meaning may be contested because of > >>> heterogeneity in > >>> society, different social classes, genders, ethnic groups, > >>> social movements > >>> and so on. For ANL there is only the one true meaning of > >>> something which > >>> "everyone knows" or individual, personal meanings, which > >>> are therefore > >>> taken to be subjective. > >>> > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>> This continues and extends from my original post > >>> concerning Andy's > >>> > >>> > >>> breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. There are about 8 points > >>> total... [copypasta is a > >>> starch of art] > >>> --------------------------------------------------- 6. [The > >>> fallacy of word-meaning] (see original post below) > >>> --------------------------------------------------- You > >>> say: "ANL believes > >>> that motivation determines perception. The norm of > >>> perception, the "true" > >>> meaning of an object, is therefore the meaning it has for > >>> the community as > >>> a whole. I am questioning the validity of this concept of > >>> "community as a > >>> whole" in this context." So is it the case that > >>> word-meaning is denied by > >>> ANL because meaning and symbols "must be" cohesive across > >>> the culture and > >>> cannot have personal or spontaneous meaning? I can see the > >>> reason > >>> politically to emphasize this, if the State is sanctioned > >>> as the sole > >>> arbiter of meaning. --- clip from previous post below Wed, > >>> 22 Oct 2014 > >>> 06:28:48 +0000 Annalisa wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>> _6th charge_: The fallacy of word-meaning > >>> ---------- ANL believes that > >>> > >>> > >>> the mental representation in a child's awareness must > >>> _correspond_ directly > >>> to the object in reality, and not just perceptually, but > >>> also how the > >>> object may relate and associate to other objects and their > >>> meanings. The > >>> example is a table. Because of this definition of, what I > >>> will call here > >>> for convenience (i.e., my laziness) "object-awareness", > >>> ANL takes exception > >>> with LSV's rendering of a _single word_ to stand as a > >>> generalization to > >>> reference the meaning of the word and as an independent unit > >>> (word-meaning). Furthermore, ANL disagrees with the > >>> existence of these > >>> word-meanings, _as units_, but he also disagrees that they > >>> are what > >>> construct consciousness as a whole. ANL can say this > >>> because he considers > >>> consciousness and intellect to be synonymous. ---------- > >>> > >>> > >>> Andy's reply to #6 above: ANL believes > >>> that motivation determines > >>> > >>> > >>> perception. The norm of perception, the "true" meaning of > >>> an object, is > >>> therefore the meaning it has for the community as a whole. > >>> I am questioning > >>> the validity of this concept of "community as a whole" in > >>> this context. > >>> > >>> > >>> --end > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor > >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Oct 23 15:07:05 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 15:07:05 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics Practices In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <39089ddf0ba265a30feb7854f07324c1.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> <54471BF6.9010906@mira.net> <54479034.6070006@mira.net> Message-ID: Aha! Thanks! So artificial literacies refers to the mediation of reading/writing by a variety of artifacts! Ok, that I can make sense of. And thanks for the RRQ ref on sedimented identities. This phrase is used in discussion of text production. For those ignorant like myself, here is the summary provided by the authors, which also makes the point of their text (and the present one!) cleared: *THE COMMENTARY argues for an understanding of how texts are put together that accounts for multimodality and draws on children?s ways of being and doing in the home, their habitus. It focuses on identities as socially situated. It argues that it is important to trace the process of sedimenting identities during text production. This offers a way of viewing text production that can inform research into children?s text making. Particular attention is paid to the producer, contexts, and practices used during text production and how the text becomes an artifact that holds important information about the meaning maker. Four case studies describe sedimented identities as a lens through which to see a more nuanced perspective on meaning making. This work offers a lens for research and practice in that it enables researchers to question and interrogate the way texts come into being.* mike On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 10:35 AM, Karen Wohlwend wrote: > Certainly-- Rowsell and Pahl take an ethnographic approach to track the > practices and user identities involved in the production and previous uses > of an artifact. > > Rowsell, J., & Pahl, K. (2007). Sedimented identities in texts: Instances > of practice. Reading Research Quarterly, 42(3), 388-404. > > Pahl, K., & Rowsell, J. (2010). Artifactual literacies: Every object tells > a story. New York: Teachers College Press. > > > > > On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 12:56 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Karen--- I am familiar of course with the notion of artifacts, but I am > not > > familiar with > > Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual literacies. > Could > > you provide a link or a reference? The phrase has me wondering what a > > non-artifactual literacy would be. > > mike > > > > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:03 PM, Karen Wohlwend > > wrote: > > > > > Andy, thanks for these generative questions and comments! I'll defer to > > my > > > co-authors to situate the focal case in the larger study but I'll > address > > > how we are considering relationships among gender, practices, and > tools. > > > > > > We're conceptualizing tools as anchoring artifacts, that concretize and > > > suggest particular uses and users accrued from cultural histories of > > > access and use (following Holland and Cole's cultural artifacts, and > more > > > recently, Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual > > > literacies). Tools index shared histories of use, values, and > > expectations > > > for who *should *be a user and for how practices *should *be conducted, > > > practices which following Paechter are situated in communities of > > gendered > > > practice that are multiple, local, and embodied. > > > > > > However, we would not say that a tool is gendered in any fixed or > > > deterministic way. In any given moment of activity, tools signal > multiple > > > histories in many nexus of practice (following Ron Scollon, the tacit > > > shared practices that members of a community expect of one another) > that > > > lead up to, enter in, and flow from that moment, in contradictory, > > > confounding, and complementary ways, hence the ambiguity you've > > mentioned. > > > How/whether social actors make use of particular histories in a > specific > > > context realizes foregrounds some histories while backgrounding > others-- > > in > > > ways that can reproduce, contest, or blur prevailing expectations for > > > participation. In our analysis, we looked closely at the mediated > actions > > > in the handling of tools in the one nexus to understand in a very > > concrete > > > way how girls were able to gain and maintain control over > > > projects--contrary to histories and expectations for high levels of > tool > > > handling, participation, and trajectories of expertise for boys in > > > electronics activity. > > > > > > Looking closely at the mediated action in this transformative moment > > > reveals how changing the electronics tools from wires to needle and > > thread > > > changes the nexus, activating a powerful perception/expectation for > girls > > > as appropriate tool users by signalling histories of sewing practices > and > > > feminine communities of practice. > > > > > > In regard to other situations, looking closely at mediated actions, > > > material artifacts, and tacit expectations for participation in the > > > relevant nexus of practice will likely also reveal how materials relate > > to > > > stereotypical expectations, pointing to places ripe for rupture where > > > changing something small in the local activity (e.g., an action, a > tool, > > a > > > material) in dominant nexus of practice can signal a different kind of > > user > > > and potentially disrupt persistent and naturalized stereotypes. > > > > > > Looking forward to continuing the conversation, > > > Karen > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:08 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > > > > > Kylie & co., > > > > A fascinating study around a truly ingenious approach to the gendered > > > > division of labour - giving school kids E-textiles to construct an > > > > electronic device - total mixing up and confounding the gender > > > stereotypes > > > > about sewing and electronics, etc. > > > > > > > > Some of the results were quite startling. That the young boy should > not > > > > just abstain and demonstratively not pay attention, but pay active > and > > > > supportive attention to the girl making the circuit with her > > > > needle-and-thread - an admired female-typical stance one would have > > > thought > > > > a young male incapable of adopting with a female workmate. And that > the > > > > gender-inscription of the sewing tools over-rode the greater > experience > > > > that in this case the young boy had in using them, with the boy > > deferring > > > > to the less experienced girl in recognition of the > > gender-appropriateness > > > > of her "taking charge" with the needle-and-thread. This does cause > one > > to > > > > think a little deeper into how we might conceptualise such gendered > > > > behaviours. > > > > > > > > As you would know, MCA has a strong preference for qualitative > > research, > > > > and studies with small sample sizes are not generally a problem, but > so > > > > much seemed to hinge on the study of just *one* boy-girl team, that I > > am > > > > concerned about the capacity to generalise from such a base. There > were > > > > about 80 youth in the activity as a whole, so I can only hope and > > presume > > > > that observation of the other 78 kids in some way guided the work > > focused > > > > on just 2. > > > > > > > > I must say, the analysis of the video data is very sophisticated and > > > > productive and you are to be congratulated on this aspect of the > work. > > I > > > > see that you approach the gendering of the activities through the > idea > > of > > > > the various *tools* being gendered, rather than the *practices* > > > themselves. > > > > This is something that was really necessary for you to be able to > make > > > > these observations, because the gendering of the activities is > > ambiguous, > > > > but not it seems the gendering of the tools. Is this a result of the > > > study, > > > > or is it something you already knew or did you arrive at this by > logic? > > > > > > > > Do you see any other opportunities for confounding gender stereotypes > > in > > > > this way? > > > > > > > > And finally, does the experience of working in ambiguous, even > inverted > > > > gender-stereotyped activities like these have any outcome which > carries > > > > over into a world where the gender division of labour lacks > ambiguity? > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > > > Kylie Peppler wrote: > > > > > > > >> Thanks Andy! We're excited to discuss with the community and would > > > >> welcome any comments/questions on this emerging line of research! > > > >> Kylie > > > >> > > > >> --- > > > >> Kylie A. Peppler > > > >> Assistant Professor of Learning Sciences > > > >> Indiana University | School of Education > > > >> 1900 E 10th Street | Eigenmann 528 | Bloomington | IN | 47406 | > > > >> 812.856.8381 > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 10:52 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> > wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Here's the article for discussion Artin is introducing: > > > >> *Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting and > Electronics > > > >> Practices* > > > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen Wohlwend. > > > >> Indiana University. > > > >> > > > >> The Maker movement promotes hands-on making, including > crafts, > > > >> robotics, and computing. The movement?s potential to > transform > > > >> education rests in our ability to address notable gender > > > >> disparities, particularly in science, technology, > engineering, > > > and > > > >> mathematics fields. E-textiles - the first female-dominated > > > >> computing community - provide inspiration for overcoming > > > >> long-standing cultural divides in classrooms. Analysis of > > > >> children?s > > > >> use of e-textiles reveals that materials like needles, > fabric, > > > and > > > >> conductive thread rupture traditional gender scripts around > > > >> electronics and implicitly gives girls hands-on access and > > > >> leadership roles. This reconceptualization of cultural > divides > > as > > > >> sets of tacitly accepted practices rooted in gendered > histories > > > has > > > >> implications for reconceptualizing traditionally > male-dominated > > > >> areas of schooling. > > > >> > > > >> Andy > > > >> (attached) > > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >> ------------ > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> Goncu, Artin wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Dear All, > > > >> > > > >> We are writing to let you know that the most recent issue of > > > >> MCA is out. > > > >> One of the articles published in this issue and being > > > >> introduced here for > > > >> discussion in referenced below. The authors of the article > > > >> have kindly > > > >> agreed to lead the discussion, and they are on xmca with us > > > >> now. The free > > > >> access to the article is possible through the links below. > We > > > >> are looking > > > >> forward to hearing from you all. Best, ag > > > >> > > > >> Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting > > > >> and Electronics Practices > > > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen > Wohlwend > > > >> > > > >> www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762 > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749039.2014. > > > >> 939762#.VEZ25Ra_4wI > > > >> > > > >> Artin Goncu, Ph.D > > > >> Co-editor, Mind, Culture, and Activity:An International > > Journal > > > >> Professor Emeritus, > > > >> University of Illinois at Chicago > > > >> College of Education M/C 147 > > > >> 1040 W. Harrison St. > > > >> Chicago, IL 60607 > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor > > > Literacy, Culture, & Language Education > > > Indiana University > > > 201 N. Rose Avenue > > > Bloomington, IN 47405 > > > Office: 812-856-8275 > > > Fax: 812-856-8287 > > > kwohlwen@indiana.edu > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > -- > Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor > Literacy, Culture, & Language Education > Indiana University > 201 N. Rose Avenue > Bloomington, IN 47405 > Office: 812-856-8275 > Fax: 812-856-8287 > kwohlwen@indiana.edu > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Oct 23 15:14:01 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 22:14:01 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: <54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu>,<54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> Message-ID: <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu> Hi Andy! OK. I'm needing to fill in some blanks here. What is meant exactly by "intellectualism"? Or rather, what did ANL mean? When you say: [And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" and "affect".] Perhaps I am responding to the word "intellectual" in the way it reflects back to me in my culture: that something or someone "intellectual" is void of affect (relatively speaking) and that is why those who spurn intellectuals do so. As such, "intellectuals" will sometimes speak/function at a level "above" most others, and this usually upsets people who do not speak/function on the same level. "Intelligence" is handled differently, though. It seems to me as a concept "intelligence" is more of whole cloth. "Intellect" (to me) is thinking without affect. It is rational and seeks to remove affect, with the "myth" that the products of thought are somehow "better, more pure" with this affect removed. I agree of course that the person is whole first, and that we abstract concepts to describe properties. But there has been a backlash from abstracting out. Isn't this why Descartes has been so problematic? Isn't this why Spinoza sought to understand where the emotions "come from" and what their value is? So given this, I ask the question again and circling back to the original charge in your paper, what does it mean for ANL to levy a charge of "intellectualism" upon LSV? TIA, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 3:10 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] Annalisa, it is Leontyev who is pinning the charge of "intellectualism" on Vygotsky because he ascribes "meaning" and "significance" to children, and therefore sign-use. I am not saying that sign-use is not intellectual though. And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" and "affect". Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Andy, > > Again thanks for more! > > Here's the thing: I may be getting lost in understanding argument positions. > > Are you saying it is Leontiev, et al's position that thinking with signs and words are intellectual? > > Because, for me personally, thinking with signs and words involve both affect and intellect and I don't think they can be separated out. For me, a person's intelligence is the mediated unification of affect and intellect, what I believe you are calling consciousness. > > I feel supported by my position with Vygotsky's discussion of word-meaning (znachenie slova), if I am understanding word-meaning properly. > > Again, the words "meaning" and "significance" can have affective meaning and significance! :) (is this the adjective? I want to say "affectual," to match "intellectual" but that isn't a word) > > Now if for *you* these particular words have "intellectual connotations," perhaps this difference between you and I supports LSV's (and my earlier) point that affect and intellect are mediated and will therefore allow each person have a different and nuanced mix of meaning and significance for the same set of words and signs, even if we generally agree on a social meaning and significance, such as the meaning of a flag. > > This reminds me of the cultural differences regarding the meanings of color. One can't intellectualize red just by its perception. One can't have an affect of red either by perception alone (if one were to see red for the first time), its meaning and significance are socially, historically and culturally generated. > > Furthermore, I agree with you that our "Western language" to describe the interior mind, if I am allowed to say that, is sparse. We know Freud reached into Greek mythology to give these concepts a handle. This is one reason I look to Eastern thought so I might learn how these dynamics are discussed. They do possess words for which we have none. I might also suggest there are relevant themes in these traditions that apply to Vygotsky's work. > > In fact, it might amaze us in the West to truly understand the immense literature and legacies on these topics of mind and self. It certainly amazes me. Of course that would be a huge project to be mediated between cultural elders and not a cultural tourist like myself. I only point out that there is something there and we are not the pioneers to wrangle with these problems of mind. > > I admit that to access these words, one must understand how metaphors are utilized. In rational-logical traditions, metaphors seem to be disagreeable. Also there is discussion of the spiritual, since the problems these traditions hoped to solve were spiritual problems, which may just be their historically-anchored approach to psychological realities. So, these barriers may explain the impasse. > > But if words are tools, I'm sure we might borrow some and they wouldn't mind. > > Ha! a pun! "wouldn't mind" get it? :) > > Best, > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:02 AM > > I would have said that this criticism is a deliberate misrepresentation, > except that Lydia Bozhovich makes the same charge of "intellectualism." > The charge hinges on phrases like "the significance for the child" and > "the meaning for the child," etc., which etymologically suggest the use > of signs and words. Thinking with signs and words is intellect. But the > thing is that it is almost impossible for us to describe the > relationship of a person to their environment psychologically without > using words which evoke sign-relations. The relation is a psychological > one, not a conditioned-reflex, and the words we have for relations which > are mediated through consciousness tend to be words like "meaning" and > "significance" which have intellectual connotations. The preintellectual > stages of psychological development which Vygotsky himself theorised are > not built into the common language. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. >> >> There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] >> --------------------------------------------------- >> 4. ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >> (see original post below) >> --------------------------------------------------- >> >> Again a pothole. You say: >> "The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate at >> their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an intellectual >> relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims." >> >> I think know this, but what is ANL's critique against this? Is it that >> it is too "intellectual," which is possibly code for elitism or class? >> Sorry if I wasn't clear. >> >> >> > > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Oct 23 15:19:19 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 09:19:19 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu>, <54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu> Message-ID: <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net> In this context, "intellectualism" does not mean "void of affect" or have anything to do with lack of affect. "Intellectualism" refers to a theorist who ascribes a capacity for intellectual activity to (for example) an infant, who would in fact not have developed the capacity for an intellectual relation to the world. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Andy! > > OK. I'm needing to fill in some blanks here. > > What is meant exactly by "intellectualism"? Or rather, what did ANL mean? > > When you say: > > [And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. > No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" and "affect".] > > Perhaps I am responding to the word "intellectual" in the way it reflects back to me in my culture: that something or someone "intellectual" is void of affect (relatively speaking) and that is why those who spurn intellectuals do so. As such, "intellectuals" will sometimes speak/function at a level "above" most others, and this usually upsets people who do not speak/function on the same level. > > "Intelligence" is handled differently, though. It seems to me as a concept "intelligence" is more of whole cloth. > > "Intellect" (to me) is thinking without affect. It is rational and seeks to remove affect, with the "myth" that the products of thought are somehow "better, more pure" with this affect removed. > > I agree of course that the person is whole first, and that we abstract concepts to describe properties. But there has been a backlash from abstracting out. Isn't this why Descartes has been so problematic? Isn't this why Spinoza sought to understand where the emotions "come from" and what their value is? > > So given this, I ask the question again and circling back to the original charge in your paper, what does it mean for ANL to levy a charge of "intellectualism" upon LSV? > > TIA, > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 3:10 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > > Annalisa, it is Leontyev who is pinning the charge of "intellectualism" > on Vygotsky because he ascribes "meaning" and "significance" to > children, and therefore sign-use. I am not saying that sign-use is not > intellectual though. And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, > because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. > No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that whole, > by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" > and "affect". > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Hi Andy, >> >> Again thanks for more! >> >> Here's the thing: I may be getting lost in understanding argument positions. >> >> Are you saying it is Leontiev, et al's position that thinking with signs and words are intellectual? >> >> Because, for me personally, thinking with signs and words involve both affect and intellect and I don't think they can be separated out. For me, a person's intelligence is the mediated unification of affect and intellect, what I believe you are calling consciousness. >> >> I feel supported by my position with Vygotsky's discussion of word-meaning (znachenie slova), if I am understanding word-meaning properly. >> >> Again, the words "meaning" and "significance" can have affective meaning and significance! :) (is this the adjective? I want to say "affectual," to match "intellectual" but that isn't a word) >> >> Now if for *you* these particular words have "intellectual connotations," perhaps this difference between you and I supports LSV's (and my earlier) point that affect and intellect are mediated and will therefore allow each person have a different and nuanced mix of meaning and significance for the same set of words and signs, even if we generally agree on a social meaning and significance, such as the meaning of a flag. >> >> This reminds me of the cultural differences regarding the meanings of color. One can't intellectualize red just by its perception. One can't have an affect of red either by perception alone (if one were to see red for the first time), its meaning and significance are socially, historically and culturally generated. >> >> Furthermore, I agree with you that our "Western language" to describe the interior mind, if I am allowed to say that, is sparse. We know Freud reached into Greek mythology to give these concepts a handle. This is one reason I look to Eastern thought so I might learn how these dynamics are discussed. They do possess words for which we have none. I might also suggest there are relevant themes in these traditions that apply to Vygotsky's work. >> >> In fact, it might amaze us in the West to truly understand the immense literature and legacies on these topics of mind and self. It certainly amazes me. Of course that would be a huge project to be mediated between cultural elders and not a cultural tourist like myself. I only point out that there is something there and we are not the pioneers to wrangle with these problems of mind. >> >> I admit that to access these words, one must understand how metaphors are utilized. In rational-logical traditions, metaphors seem to be disagreeable. Also there is discussion of the spiritual, since the problems these traditions hoped to solve were spiritual problems, which may just be their historically-anchored approach to psychological realities. So, these barriers may explain the impasse. >> >> But if words are tools, I'm sure we might borrow some and they wouldn't mind. >> >> Ha! a pun! "wouldn't mind" get it? :) >> >> Best, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:02 AM >> >> I would have said that this criticism is a deliberate misrepresentation, >> except that Lydia Bozhovich makes the same charge of "intellectualism." >> The charge hinges on phrases like "the significance for the child" and >> "the meaning for the child," etc., which etymologically suggest the use >> of signs and words. Thinking with signs and words is intellect. But the >> thing is that it is almost impossible for us to describe the >> relationship of a person to their environment psychologically without >> using words which evoke sign-relations. The relation is a psychological >> one, not a conditioned-reflex, and the words we have for relations which >> are mediated through consciousness tend to be words like "meaning" and >> "significance" which have intellectual connotations. The preintellectual >> stages of psychological development which Vygotsky himself theorised are >> not built into the common language. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> >>> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. >>> >>> There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] >>> --------------------------------------------------- >>> 4. ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >>> (see original post below) >>> --------------------------------------------------- >>> >>> Again a pothole. You say: >>> "The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate at >>> their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an intellectual >>> relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims." >>> >>> I think know this, but what is ANL's critique against this? Is it that >>> it is too "intellectual," which is possibly code for elitism or class? >>> Sorry if I wasn't clear. >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Oct 23 15:27:25 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 22:27:25 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu>, <54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu> <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net> Message-ID: For example, intellectualism is the criticism that LSV makes of William Stern, in the earlier chapters of Thought & Language. Martin On Oct 23, 2014, at 5:19 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > In this context, "intellectualism" does not mean "void of affect" or have anything to do with lack of affect. > "Intellectualism" refers to a theorist who ascribes a capacity for intellectual activity to (for example) an infant, who would in fact not have developed the capacity for an intellectual relation to the world. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> Hi Andy! >> >> OK. I'm needing to fill in some blanks here. >> >> What is meant exactly by "intellectualism"? Or rather, what did ANL mean? >> >> When you say: >> >> [And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. >> No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" and "affect".] >> >> Perhaps I am responding to the word "intellectual" in the way it reflects back to me in my culture: that something or someone "intellectual" is void of affect (relatively speaking) and that is why those who spurn intellectuals do so. As such, "intellectuals" will sometimes speak/function at a level "above" most others, and this usually upsets people who do not speak/function on the same level. >> "Intelligence" is handled differently, though. It seems to me as a concept "intelligence" is more of whole cloth. >> >> "Intellect" (to me) is thinking without affect. It is rational and seeks to remove affect, with the "myth" that the products of thought are somehow "better, more pure" with this affect removed. >> I agree of course that the person is whole first, and that we abstract concepts to describe properties. But there has been a backlash from abstracting out. Isn't this why Descartes has been so problematic? Isn't this why Spinoza sought to understand where the emotions "come from" and what their value is? >> >> So given this, I ask the question again and circling back to the original charge in your paper, what does it mean for ANL to levy a charge of "intellectualism" upon LSV? >> >> TIA, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 3:10 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >> >> Annalisa, it is Leontyev who is pinning the charge of "intellectualism" >> on Vygotsky because he ascribes "meaning" and "significance" to >> children, and therefore sign-use. I am not saying that sign-use is not >> intellectual though. And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, >> because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. >> No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that whole, >> by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" >> and "affect". >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >>> Hi Andy, >>> >>> Again thanks for more! >>> >>> Here's the thing: I may be getting lost in understanding argument positions. >>> >>> Are you saying it is Leontiev, et al's position that thinking with signs and words are intellectual? >>> >>> Because, for me personally, thinking with signs and words involve both affect and intellect and I don't think they can be separated out. For me, a person's intelligence is the mediated unification of affect and intellect, what I believe you are calling consciousness. >>> >>> I feel supported by my position with Vygotsky's discussion of word-meaning (znachenie slova), if I am understanding word-meaning properly. >>> >>> Again, the words "meaning" and "significance" can have affective meaning and significance! :) (is this the adjective? I want to say "affectual," to match "intellectual" but that isn't a word) >>> >>> Now if for *you* these particular words have "intellectual connotations," perhaps this difference between you and I supports LSV's (and my earlier) point that affect and intellect are mediated and will therefore allow each person have a different and nuanced mix of meaning and significance for the same set of words and signs, even if we generally agree on a social meaning and significance, such as the meaning of a flag. >>> >>> This reminds me of the cultural differences regarding the meanings of color. One can't intellectualize red just by its perception. One can't have an affect of red either by perception alone (if one were to see red for the first time), its meaning and significance are socially, historically and culturally generated. >>> >>> Furthermore, I agree with you that our "Western language" to describe the interior mind, if I am allowed to say that, is sparse. We know Freud reached into Greek mythology to give these concepts a handle. This is one reason I look to Eastern thought so I might learn how these dynamics are discussed. They do possess words for which we have none. I might also suggest there are relevant themes in these traditions that apply to Vygotsky's work. >>> >>> In fact, it might amaze us in the West to truly understand the immense literature and legacies on these topics of mind and self. It certainly amazes me. Of course that would be a huge project to be mediated between cultural elders and not a cultural tourist like myself. I only point out that there is something there and we are not the pioneers to wrangle with these problems of mind. >>> >>> I admit that to access these words, one must understand how metaphors are utilized. In rational-logical traditions, metaphors seem to be disagreeable. Also there is discussion of the spiritual, since the problems these traditions hoped to solve were spiritual problems, which may just be their historically-anchored approach to psychological realities. So, these barriers may explain the impasse. >>> >>> But if words are tools, I'm sure we might borrow some and they wouldn't mind. >>> >>> Ha! a pun! "wouldn't mind" get it? :) >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:02 AM >>> >>> I would have said that this criticism is a deliberate misrepresentation, >>> except that Lydia Bozhovich makes the same charge of "intellectualism." >>> The charge hinges on phrases like "the significance for the child" and >>> "the meaning for the child," etc., which etymologically suggest the use >>> of signs and words. Thinking with signs and words is intellect. But the >>> thing is that it is almost impossible for us to describe the >>> relationship of a person to their environment psychologically without >>> using words which evoke sign-relations. The relation is a psychological >>> one, not a conditioned-reflex, and the words we have for relations which >>> are mediated through consciousness tend to be words like "meaning" and >>> "significance" which have intellectual connotations. The preintellectual >>> stages of psychological development which Vygotsky himself theorised are >>> not built into the common language. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> >>>> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. >>>> >>>> There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] >>>> --------------------------------------------------- >>>> 4. ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >>>> (see original post below) >>>> --------------------------------------------------- >>>> >>>> Again a pothole. You say: >>>> "The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate at >>>> their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an intellectual >>>> relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims." >>>> >>>> I think know this, but what is ANL's critique against this? Is it that >>>> it is too "intellectual," which is possibly code for elitism or class? >>>> Sorry if I wasn't clear. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> > From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Oct 23 15:42:23 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 22:42:23 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu>, <54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu> <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net>, Message-ID: <1414104140633.35524@unm.edu> Hi Martin! I was going to ask if you could offer the location, then I checked at marxists.org there is no Chapter 3 which is titled, "Stern's Theory of Language Development" in the T&S text there, and I don't have the book available to me at the moment. Oh well. :/ Still, thank you for pointing that reference out. Best, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 4:27 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] For example, intellectualism is the criticism that LSV makes of William Stern, in the earlier chapters of Thought & Language. Martin On Oct 23, 2014, at 5:19 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > In this context, "intellectualism" does not mean "void of affect" or have anything to do with lack of affect. > "Intellectualism" refers to a theorist who ascribes a capacity for intellectual activity to (for example) an infant, who would in fact not have developed the capacity for an intellectual relation to the world. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> Hi Andy! >> >> OK. I'm needing to fill in some blanks here. >> >> What is meant exactly by "intellectualism"? Or rather, what did ANL mean? >> >> When you say: >> >> [And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. >> No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" and "affect".] >> >> Perhaps I am responding to the word "intellectual" in the way it reflects back to me in my culture: that something or someone "intellectual" is void of affect (relatively speaking) and that is why those who spurn intellectuals do so. As such, "intellectuals" will sometimes speak/function at a level "above" most others, and this usually upsets people who do not speak/function on the same level. >> "Intelligence" is handled differently, though. It seems to me as a concept "intelligence" is more of whole cloth. >> >> "Intellect" (to me) is thinking without affect. It is rational and seeks to remove affect, with the "myth" that the products of thought are somehow "better, more pure" with this affect removed. >> I agree of course that the person is whole first, and that we abstract concepts to describe properties. But there has been a backlash from abstracting out. Isn't this why Descartes has been so problematic? Isn't this why Spinoza sought to understand where the emotions "come from" and what their value is? >> >> So given this, I ask the question again and circling back to the original charge in your paper, what does it mean for ANL to levy a charge of "intellectualism" upon LSV? >> >> TIA, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 3:10 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >> >> Annalisa, it is Leontyev who is pinning the charge of "intellectualism" >> on Vygotsky because he ascribes "meaning" and "significance" to >> children, and therefore sign-use. I am not saying that sign-use is not >> intellectual though. And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, >> because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. >> No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that whole, >> by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" >> and "affect". >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >>> Hi Andy, >>> >>> Again thanks for more! >>> >>> Here's the thing: I may be getting lost in understanding argument positions. >>> >>> Are you saying it is Leontiev, et al's position that thinking with signs and words are intellectual? >>> >>> Because, for me personally, thinking with signs and words involve both affect and intellect and I don't think they can be separated out. For me, a person's intelligence is the mediated unification of affect and intellect, what I believe you are calling consciousness. >>> >>> I feel supported by my position with Vygotsky's discussion of word-meaning (znachenie slova), if I am understanding word-meaning properly. >>> >>> Again, the words "meaning" and "significance" can have affective meaning and significance! :) (is this the adjective? I want to say "affectual," to match "intellectual" but that isn't a word) >>> >>> Now if for *you* these particular words have "intellectual connotations," perhaps this difference between you and I supports LSV's (and my earlier) point that affect and intellect are mediated and will therefore allow each person have a different and nuanced mix of meaning and significance for the same set of words and signs, even if we generally agree on a social meaning and significance, such as the meaning of a flag. >>> >>> This reminds me of the cultural differences regarding the meanings of color. One can't intellectualize red just by its perception. One can't have an affect of red either by perception alone (if one were to see red for the first time), its meaning and significance are socially, historically and culturally generated. >>> >>> Furthermore, I agree with you that our "Western language" to describe the interior mind, if I am allowed to say that, is sparse. We know Freud reached into Greek mythology to give these concepts a handle. This is one reason I look to Eastern thought so I might learn how these dynamics are discussed. They do possess words for which we have none. I might also suggest there are relevant themes in these traditions that apply to Vygotsky's work. >>> >>> In fact, it might amaze us in the West to truly understand the immense literature and legacies on these topics of mind and self. It certainly amazes me. Of course that would be a huge project to be mediated between cultural elders and not a cultural tourist like myself. I only point out that there is something there and we are not the pioneers to wrangle with these problems of mind. >>> >>> I admit that to access these words, one must understand how metaphors are utilized. In rational-logical traditions, metaphors seem to be disagreeable. Also there is discussion of the spiritual, since the problems these traditions hoped to solve were spiritual problems, which may just be their historically-anchored approach to psychological realities. So, these barriers may explain the impasse. >>> >>> But if words are tools, I'm sure we might borrow some and they wouldn't mind. >>> >>> Ha! a pun! "wouldn't mind" get it? :) >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:02 AM >>> >>> I would have said that this criticism is a deliberate misrepresentation, >>> except that Lydia Bozhovich makes the same charge of "intellectualism." >>> The charge hinges on phrases like "the significance for the child" and >>> "the meaning for the child," etc., which etymologically suggest the use >>> of signs and words. Thinking with signs and words is intellect. But the >>> thing is that it is almost impossible for us to describe the >>> relationship of a person to their environment psychologically without >>> using words which evoke sign-relations. The relation is a psychological >>> one, not a conditioned-reflex, and the words we have for relations which >>> are mediated through consciousness tend to be words like "meaning" and >>> "significance" which have intellectual connotations. The preintellectual >>> stages of psychological development which Vygotsky himself theorised are >>> not built into the common language. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> >>>> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. >>>> >>>> There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] >>>> --------------------------------------------------- >>>> 4. ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >>>> (see original post below) >>>> --------------------------------------------------- >>>> >>>> Again a pothole. You say: >>>> "The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate at >>>> their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an intellectual >>>> relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims." >>>> >>>> I think know this, but what is ANL's critique against this? Is it that >>>> it is too "intellectual," which is possibly code for elitism or class? >>>> Sorry if I wasn't clear. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Oct 23 15:50:32 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 09:50:32 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: <1414104140633.35524@unm.edu> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu>, <54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu> <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net>, <1414104140633.35524@unm.edu> Message-ID: <54498638.6090705@mira.net> The attached article includes a section (highlighted) in which Lydia Bozhovich makes what appears to me the same charge against Vygotsky. This is particularly troubling as Bozhovich also wrote extensively explaining, extending and defending Vygotsky's work on development of the intellect, and is remembered for her loyalty to Vygotsky. Other papers by Bozhovich are to be found in English translation in the same volume of JREEP. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Martin! > > I was going to ask if you could offer the location, then I checked at marxists.org there is no Chapter 3 which is titled, "Stern's Theory of Language Development" in the T&S text there, and I don't have the book available to me at the moment. Oh well. :/ > > Still, thank you for pointing that reference out. > > Best, > > Annalisa > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 4:27 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > > For example, intellectualism is the criticism that LSV makes of William Stern, in the earlier chapters of Thought & Language. > > Martin > > On Oct 23, 2014, at 5:19 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> In this context, "intellectualism" does not mean "void of affect" or have anything to do with lack of affect. >> "Intellectualism" refers to a theorist who ascribes a capacity for intellectual activity to (for example) an infant, who would in fact not have developed the capacity for an intellectual relation to the world. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >>> Hi Andy! >>> >>> OK. I'm needing to fill in some blanks here. >>> >>> What is meant exactly by "intellectualism"? Or rather, what did ANL mean? >>> >>> When you say: >>> >>> [And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. >>> No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" and "affect".] >>> >>> Perhaps I am responding to the word "intellectual" in the way it reflects back to me in my culture: that something or someone "intellectual" is void of affect (relatively speaking) and that is why those who spurn intellectuals do so. As such, "intellectuals" will sometimes speak/function at a level "above" most others, and this usually upsets people who do not speak/function on the same level. >>> "Intelligence" is handled differently, though. It seems to me as a concept "intelligence" is more of whole cloth. >>> >>> "Intellect" (to me) is thinking without affect. It is rational and seeks to remove affect, with the "myth" that the products of thought are somehow "better, more pure" with this affect removed. >>> I agree of course that the person is whole first, and that we abstract concepts to describe properties. But there has been a backlash from abstracting out. Isn't this why Descartes has been so problematic? Isn't this why Spinoza sought to understand where the emotions "come from" and what their value is? >>> >>> So given this, I ask the question again and circling back to the original charge in your paper, what does it mean for ANL to levy a charge of "intellectualism" upon LSV? >>> >>> TIA, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 3:10 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >>> >>> Annalisa, it is Leontyev who is pinning the charge of "intellectualism" >>> on Vygotsky because he ascribes "meaning" and "significance" to >>> children, and therefore sign-use. I am not saying that sign-use is not >>> intellectual though. And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, >>> because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. >>> No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that whole, >>> by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" >>> and "affect". >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Hi Andy, >>>> >>>> Again thanks for more! >>>> >>>> Here's the thing: I may be getting lost in understanding argument positions. >>>> >>>> Are you saying it is Leontiev, et al's position that thinking with signs and words are intellectual? >>>> >>>> Because, for me personally, thinking with signs and words involve both affect and intellect and I don't think they can be separated out. For me, a person's intelligence is the mediated unification of affect and intellect, what I believe you are calling consciousness. >>>> >>>> I feel supported by my position with Vygotsky's discussion of word-meaning (znachenie slova), if I am understanding word-meaning properly. >>>> >>>> Again, the words "meaning" and "significance" can have affective meaning and significance! :) (is this the adjective? I want to say "affectual," to match "intellectual" but that isn't a word) >>>> >>>> Now if for *you* these particular words have "intellectual connotations," perhaps this difference between you and I supports LSV's (and my earlier) point that affect and intellect are mediated and will therefore allow each person have a different and nuanced mix of meaning and significance for the same set of words and signs, even if we generally agree on a social meaning and significance, such as the meaning of a flag. >>>> >>>> This reminds me of the cultural differences regarding the meanings of color. One can't intellectualize red just by its perception. One can't have an affect of red either by perception alone (if one were to see red for the first time), its meaning and significance are socially, historically and culturally generated. >>>> >>>> Furthermore, I agree with you that our "Western language" to describe the interior mind, if I am allowed to say that, is sparse. We know Freud reached into Greek mythology to give these concepts a handle. This is one reason I look to Eastern thought so I might learn how these dynamics are discussed. They do possess words for which we have none. I might also suggest there are relevant themes in these traditions that apply to Vygotsky's work. >>>> >>>> In fact, it might amaze us in the West to truly understand the immense literature and legacies on these topics of mind and self. It certainly amazes me. Of course that would be a huge project to be mediated between cultural elders and not a cultural tourist like myself. I only point out that there is something there and we are not the pioneers to wrangle with these problems of mind. >>>> >>>> I admit that to access these words, one must understand how metaphors are utilized. In rational-logical traditions, metaphors seem to be disagreeable. Also there is discussion of the spiritual, since the problems these traditions hoped to solve were spiritual problems, which may just be their historically-anchored approach to psychological realities. So, these barriers may explain the impasse. >>>> >>>> But if words are tools, I'm sure we might borrow some and they wouldn't mind. >>>> >>>> Ha! a pun! "wouldn't mind" get it? :) >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:02 AM >>>> >>>> I would have said that this criticism is a deliberate misrepresentation, >>>> except that Lydia Bozhovich makes the same charge of "intellectualism." >>>> The charge hinges on phrases like "the significance for the child" and >>>> "the meaning for the child," etc., which etymologically suggest the use >>>> of signs and words. Thinking with signs and words is intellect. But the >>>> thing is that it is almost impossible for us to describe the >>>> relationship of a person to their environment psychologically without >>>> using words which evoke sign-relations. The relation is a psychological >>>> one, not a conditioned-reflex, and the words we have for relations which >>>> are mediated through consciousness tend to be words like "meaning" and >>>> "significance" which have intellectual connotations. The preintellectual >>>> stages of psychological development which Vygotsky himself theorised are >>>> not built into the common language. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. >>>>> >>>>> There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] >>>>> --------------------------------------------------- >>>>> 4. ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >>>>> (see original post below) >>>>> --------------------------------------------------- >>>>> >>>>> Again a pothole. You say: >>>>> "The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate at >>>>> their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an intellectual >>>>> relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims." >>>>> >>>>> I think know this, but what is ANL's critique against this? Is it that >>>>> it is too "intellectual," which is possibly code for elitism or class? >>>>> Sorry if I wasn't clear. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> > > > > > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: JREEP-47-Bozhovich-SSD.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 139354 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141024/f2438775/attachment.pdf From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Oct 23 15:54:29 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 22:54:29 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu>,<54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu>, <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net>, <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> Message-ID: <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu> OK! I'm getting somewhere! Thank you for clarifying this term in the context of the controversy. So are you saying that ANL is saying that LSV is saying (sorry to be so convoluted) that there is an "already established intellect" in the infant and ANL is saying this assertion can only be preposterous? I'm sorry if I still haven't nailed it, and I hope you will forgive my persistence to understand this, but it seems pretty important. If I am understanding properly, this is why I believe (intuitively at this juncture), that "consciousness" has an imprecise definition between the parties and its word-meaning is constitutionally different between ANL and LSV, and I would want to better understand what LSV was referencing when he used the word. I think I can understand why ANL would have issue if he sees consciousness possible only if it is derived from activity. If this is the case, then is it possible that this is a philosophical difference as to whether one believes mind to be present before consciousness, or one believes consciousness to be present before mind. Is that fair to say? In a largely materialistic rendering, mind would be first, I am guessing. Regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: Andy Blunden Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 4:19 PM To: Annalisa Aguilar Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In this context, "intellectualism" does not mean "void of affect" or have anything to do with lack of affect. "Intellectualism" refers to a theorist who ascribes a capacity for intellectual activity to (for example) an infant, who would in fact not have developed the capacity for an intellectual relation to the world. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Andy! > > OK. I'm needing to fill in some blanks here. > > What is meant exactly by "intellectualism"? Or rather, what did ANL mean? > > When you say: > > [And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. > No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" and "affect".] > > Perhaps I am responding to the word "intellectual" in the way it reflects back to me in my culture: that something or someone "intellectual" is void of affect (relatively speaking) and that is why those who spurn intellectuals do so. As such, "intellectuals" will sometimes speak/function at a level "above" most others, and this usually upsets people who do not speak/function on the same level. > > "Intelligence" is handled differently, though. It seems to me as a concept "intelligence" is more of whole cloth. > > "Intellect" (to me) is thinking without affect. It is rational and seeks to remove affect, with the "myth" that the products of thought are somehow "better, more pure" with this affect removed. > > I agree of course that the person is whole first, and that we abstract concepts to describe properties. But there has been a backlash from abstracting out. Isn't this why Descartes has been so problematic? Isn't this why Spinoza sought to understand where the emotions "come from" and what their value is? > > So given this, I ask the question again and circling back to the original charge in your paper, what does it mean for ANL to levy a charge of "intellectualism" upon LSV? > > TIA, > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 3:10 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > > Annalisa, it is Leontyev who is pinning the charge of "intellectualism" > on Vygotsky because he ascribes "meaning" and "significance" to > children, and therefore sign-use. I am not saying that sign-use is not > intellectual though. And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, > because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. > No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that whole, > by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" > and "affect". > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Hi Andy, >> >> Again thanks for more! >> >> Here's the thing: I may be getting lost in understanding argument positions. >> >> Are you saying it is Leontiev, et al's position that thinking with signs and words are intellectual? >> >> Because, for me personally, thinking with signs and words involve both affect and intellect and I don't think they can be separated out. For me, a person's intelligence is the mediated unification of affect and intellect, what I believe you are calling consciousness. >> >> I feel supported by my position with Vygotsky's discussion of word-meaning (znachenie slova), if I am understanding word-meaning properly. >> >> Again, the words "meaning" and "significance" can have affective meaning and significance! :) (is this the adjective? I want to say "affectual," to match "intellectual" but that isn't a word) >> >> Now if for *you* these particular words have "intellectual connotations," perhaps this difference between you and I supports LSV's (and my earlier) point that affect and intellect are mediated and will therefore allow each person have a different and nuanced mix of meaning and significance for the same set of words and signs, even if we generally agree on a social meaning and significance, such as the meaning of a flag. >> >> This reminds me of the cultural differences regarding the meanings of color. One can't intellectualize red just by its perception. One can't have an affect of red either by perception alone (if one were to see red for the first time), its meaning and significance are socially, historically and culturally generated. >> >> Furthermore, I agree with you that our "Western language" to describe the interior mind, if I am allowed to say that, is sparse. We know Freud reached into Greek mythology to give these concepts a handle. This is one reason I look to Eastern thought so I might learn how these dynamics are discussed. They do possess words for which we have none. I might also suggest there are relevant themes in these traditions that apply to Vygotsky's work. >> >> In fact, it might amaze us in the West to truly understand the immense literature and legacies on these topics of mind and self. It certainly amazes me. Of course that would be a huge project to be mediated between cultural elders and not a cultural tourist like myself. I only point out that there is something there and we are not the pioneers to wrangle with these problems of mind. >> >> I admit that to access these words, one must understand how metaphors are utilized. In rational-logical traditions, metaphors seem to be disagreeable. Also there is discussion of the spiritual, since the problems these traditions hoped to solve were spiritual problems, which may just be their historically-anchored approach to psychological realities. So, these barriers may explain the impasse. >> >> But if words are tools, I'm sure we might borrow some and they wouldn't mind. >> >> Ha! a pun! "wouldn't mind" get it? :) >> >> Best, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:02 AM >> >> I would have said that this criticism is a deliberate misrepresentation, >> except that Lydia Bozhovich makes the same charge of "intellectualism." >> The charge hinges on phrases like "the significance for the child" and >> "the meaning for the child," etc., which etymologically suggest the use >> of signs and words. Thinking with signs and words is intellect. But the >> thing is that it is almost impossible for us to describe the >> relationship of a person to their environment psychologically without >> using words which evoke sign-relations. The relation is a psychological >> one, not a conditioned-reflex, and the words we have for relations which >> are mediated through consciousness tend to be words like "meaning" and >> "significance" which have intellectual connotations. The preintellectual >> stages of psychological development which Vygotsky himself theorised are >> not built into the common language. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> >>> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. >>> >>> There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] >>> --------------------------------------------------- >>> 4. ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >>> (see original post below) >>> --------------------------------------------------- >>> >>> Again a pothole. You say: >>> "The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate at >>> their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an intellectual >>> relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims." >>> >>> I think know this, but what is ANL's critique against this? Is it that >>> it is too "intellectual," which is possibly code for elitism or class? >>> Sorry if I wasn't clear. >>> >>> --end From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Oct 23 16:00:55 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 23:00:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu>,<54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu>,<54497EE7.2030303@mira.net> Message-ID: <1414105254897.91604@unm.edu> Hi Andy, OK! I'm getting somewhere! Thank you for clarifying this term in the context of the controversy. So are you saying that ANL is saying that LSV is saying (sorry to be so convoluted) that there is an "already established intellect" in the infant and ANL is saying this assertion can only be preposterous? I'm sorry if I still haven't nailed it, and I hope you will forgive my persistence to understand this, but it seems pretty important. If I am understanding properly, this is why I believe (intuitively at this juncture), that "consciousness" has an imprecise definition between the parties and its word-meaning is constitutionally different between ANL and LSV, and I would want to better understand what LSV was referencing when he used the word. I think I can understand why ANL would have issue if he sees consciousness possible only if it is derived from activity. If this is the case, then is it possible that this is a philosophical difference as to whether one believes mind to be present before consciousness, or one believes consciousness to be present before mind. Is that fair to say? In a largely materialistic rendering, mind would be first, I am guessing. Regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: Andy Blunden Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 4:19 PM To: Annalisa Aguilar Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In this context, "intellectualism" does not mean "void of affect" or have anything to do with lack of affect. "Intellectualism" refers to a theorist who ascribes a capacity for intellectual activity to (for example) an infant, who would in fact not have developed the capacity for an intellectual relation to the world. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Andy! > > OK. I'm needing to fill in some blanks here. > > What is meant exactly by "intellectualism"? Or rather, what did ANL mean? > > When you say: > > [And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. > No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" and "affect".] > > Perhaps I am responding to the word "intellectual" in the way it reflects back to me in my culture: that something or someone "intellectual" is void of affect (relatively speaking) and that is why those who spurn intellectuals do so. As such, "intellectuals" will sometimes speak/function at a level "above" most others, and this usually upsets people who do not speak/function on the same level. > > "Intelligence" is handled differently, though. It seems to me as a concept "intelligence" is more of whole cloth. > > "Intellect" (to me) is thinking without affect. It is rational and seeks to remove affect, with the "myth" that the products of thought are somehow "better, more pure" with this affect removed. > > I agree of course that the person is whole first, and that we abstract concepts to describe properties. But there has been a backlash from abstracting out. Isn't this why Descartes has been so problematic? Isn't this why Spinoza sought to understand where the emotions "come from" and what their value is? > > So given this, I ask the question again and circling back to the original charge in your paper, what does it mean for ANL to levy a charge of "intellectualism" upon LSV? > > TIA, > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 3:10 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > > Annalisa, it is Leontyev who is pinning the charge of "intellectualism" > on Vygotsky because he ascribes "meaning" and "significance" to > children, and therefore sign-use. I am not saying that sign-use is not > intellectual though. And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, > because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. > No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that whole, > by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" > and "affect". > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Hi Andy, >> >> Again thanks for more! >> >> Here's the thing: I may be getting lost in understanding argument positions. >> >> Are you saying it is Leontiev, et al's position that thinking with signs and words are intellectual? >> >> Because, for me personally, thinking with signs and words involve both affect and intellect and I don't think they can be separated out. For me, a person's intelligence is the mediated unification of affect and intellect, what I believe you are calling consciousness. >> >> I feel supported by my position with Vygotsky's discussion of word-meaning (znachenie slova), if I am understanding word-meaning properly. >> >> Again, the words "meaning" and "significance" can have affective meaning and significance! :) (is this the adjective? I want to say "affectual," to match "intellectual" but that isn't a word) >> >> Now if for *you* these particular words have "intellectual connotations," perhaps this difference between you and I supports LSV's (and my earlier) point that affect and intellect are mediated and will therefore allow each person have a different and nuanced mix of meaning and significance for the same set of words and signs, even if we generally agree on a social meaning and significance, such as the meaning of a flag. >> >> This reminds me of the cultural differences regarding the meanings of color. One can't intellectualize red just by its perception. One can't have an affect of red either by perception alone (if one were to see red for the first time), its meaning and significance are socially, historically and culturally generated. >> >> Furthermore, I agree with you that our "Western language" to describe the interior mind, if I am allowed to say that, is sparse. We know Freud reached into Greek mythology to give these concepts a handle. This is one reason I look to Eastern thought so I might learn how these dynamics are discussed. They do possess words for which we have none. I might also suggest there are relevant themes in these traditions that apply to Vygotsky's work. >> >> In fact, it might amaze us in the West to truly understand the immense literature and legacies on these topics of mind and self. It certainly amazes me. Of course that would be a huge project to be mediated between cultural elders and not a cultural tourist like myself. I only point out that there is something there and we are not the pioneers to wrangle with these problems of mind. >> >> I admit that to access these words, one must understand how metaphors are utilized. In rational-logical traditions, metaphors seem to be disagreeable. Also there is discussion of the spiritual, since the problems these traditions hoped to solve were spiritual problems, which may just be their historically-anchored approach to psychological realities. So, these barriers may explain the impasse. >> >> But if words are tools, I'm sure we might borrow some and they wouldn't mind. >> >> Ha! a pun! "wouldn't mind" get it? :) >> >> Best, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:02 AM >> >> I would have said that this criticism is a deliberate misrepresentation, >> except that Lydia Bozhovich makes the same charge of "intellectualism." >> The charge hinges on phrases like "the significance for the child" and >> "the meaning for the child," etc., which etymologically suggest the use >> of signs and words. Thinking with signs and words is intellect. But the >> thing is that it is almost impossible for us to describe the >> relationship of a person to their environment psychologically without >> using words which evoke sign-relations. The relation is a psychological >> one, not a conditioned-reflex, and the words we have for relations which >> are mediated through consciousness tend to be words like "meaning" and >> "significance" which have intellectual connotations. The preintellectual >> stages of psychological development which Vygotsky himself theorised are >> not built into the common language. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> >>> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. >>> >>> There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] >>> --------------------------------------------------- >>> 4. ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >>> (see original post below) >>> --------------------------------------------------- >>> >>> Again a pothole. You say: >>> "The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate at >>> their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an intellectual >>> relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims." >>> >>> I think know this, but what is ANL's critique against this? Is it that >>> it is too "intellectual," which is possibly code for elitism or class? >>> Sorry if I wasn't clear. >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Oct 23 16:08:13 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 23:08:13 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: <1414105254897.91604@unm.edu> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu>,<54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu>, <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net>, <1414105254897.91604@unm.edu> Message-ID: <1414105693479.75037@unm.edu> Apologies to everyone about my double post. I'm having issues with Outlook's UI. To the list moderator: Feel free to delete this email and my double post I just made. Best, Annalisa From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Oct 23 16:41:56 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 23:41:56 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: <1414104140633.35524@unm.edu> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu>, <54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu> <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net>, <1414104140633.35524@unm.edu> Message-ID: <49793593-D10A-494B-AA7B-F1F94DD549E7@uniandes.edu.co> Annalisa, I'm sure that David Kellogg would be happy to send you his translation of this chapter. Martin On Oct 23, 2014, at 5:42 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Martin! > > I was going to ask if you could offer the location, then I checked at marxists.org there is no Chapter 3 which is titled, "Stern's Theory of Language Development" in the T&S text there, and I don't have the book available to me at the moment. Oh well. :/ > > Still, thank you for pointing that reference out. > > Best, > > Annalisa > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 4:27 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > > For example, intellectualism is the criticism that LSV makes of William Stern, in the earlier chapters of Thought & Language. > > Martin > > On Oct 23, 2014, at 5:19 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> In this context, "intellectualism" does not mean "void of affect" or have anything to do with lack of affect. >> "Intellectualism" refers to a theorist who ascribes a capacity for intellectual activity to (for example) an infant, who would in fact not have developed the capacity for an intellectual relation to the world. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> Hi Andy! >>> >>> OK. I'm needing to fill in some blanks here. >>> >>> What is meant exactly by "intellectualism"? Or rather, what did ANL mean? >>> >>> When you say: >>> >>> [And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. >>> No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" and "affect".] >>> >>> Perhaps I am responding to the word "intellectual" in the way it reflects back to me in my culture: that something or someone "intellectual" is void of affect (relatively speaking) and that is why those who spurn intellectuals do so. As such, "intellectuals" will sometimes speak/function at a level "above" most others, and this usually upsets people who do not speak/function on the same level. >>> "Intelligence" is handled differently, though. It seems to me as a concept "intelligence" is more of whole cloth. >>> >>> "Intellect" (to me) is thinking without affect. It is rational and seeks to remove affect, with the "myth" that the products of thought are somehow "better, more pure" with this affect removed. >>> I agree of course that the person is whole first, and that we abstract concepts to describe properties. But there has been a backlash from abstracting out. Isn't this why Descartes has been so problematic? Isn't this why Spinoza sought to understand where the emotions "come from" and what their value is? >>> >>> So given this, I ask the question again and circling back to the original charge in your paper, what does it mean for ANL to levy a charge of "intellectualism" upon LSV? >>> >>> TIA, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >>> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 3:10 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >>> >>> Annalisa, it is Leontyev who is pinning the charge of "intellectualism" >>> on Vygotsky because he ascribes "meaning" and "significance" to >>> children, and therefore sign-use. I am not saying that sign-use is not >>> intellectual though. And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, >>> because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. >>> No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that whole, >>> by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" >>> and "affect". >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Andy, >>>> >>>> Again thanks for more! >>>> >>>> Here's the thing: I may be getting lost in understanding argument positions. >>>> >>>> Are you saying it is Leontiev, et al's position that thinking with signs and words are intellectual? >>>> >>>> Because, for me personally, thinking with signs and words involve both affect and intellect and I don't think they can be separated out. For me, a person's intelligence is the mediated unification of affect and intellect, what I believe you are calling consciousness. >>>> >>>> I feel supported by my position with Vygotsky's discussion of word-meaning (znachenie slova), if I am understanding word-meaning properly. >>>> >>>> Again, the words "meaning" and "significance" can have affective meaning and significance! :) (is this the adjective? I want to say "affectual," to match "intellectual" but that isn't a word) >>>> >>>> Now if for *you* these particular words have "intellectual connotations," perhaps this difference between you and I supports LSV's (and my earlier) point that affect and intellect are mediated and will therefore allow each person have a different and nuanced mix of meaning and significance for the same set of words and signs, even if we generally agree on a social meaning and significance, such as the meaning of a flag. >>>> >>>> This reminds me of the cultural differences regarding the meanings of color. One can't intellectualize red just by its perception. One can't have an affect of red either by perception alone (if one were to see red for the first time), its meaning and significance are socially, historically and culturally generated. >>>> >>>> Furthermore, I agree with you that our "Western language" to describe the interior mind, if I am allowed to say that, is sparse. We know Freud reached into Greek mythology to give these concepts a handle. This is one reason I look to Eastern thought so I might learn how these dynamics are discussed. They do possess words for which we have none. I might also suggest there are relevant themes in these traditions that apply to Vygotsky's work. >>>> >>>> In fact, it might amaze us in the West to truly understand the immense literature and legacies on these topics of mind and self. It certainly amazes me. Of course that would be a huge project to be mediated between cultural elders and not a cultural tourist like myself. I only point out that there is something there and we are not the pioneers to wrangle with these problems of mind. >>>> >>>> I admit that to access these words, one must understand how metaphors are utilized. In rational-logical traditions, metaphors seem to be disagreeable. Also there is discussion of the spiritual, since the problems these traditions hoped to solve were spiritual problems, which may just be their historically-anchored approach to psychological realities. So, these barriers may explain the impasse. >>>> >>>> But if words are tools, I'm sure we might borrow some and they wouldn't mind. >>>> >>>> Ha! a pun! "wouldn't mind" get it? :) >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:02 AM >>>> >>>> I would have said that this criticism is a deliberate misrepresentation, >>>> except that Lydia Bozhovich makes the same charge of "intellectualism." >>>> The charge hinges on phrases like "the significance for the child" and >>>> "the meaning for the child," etc., which etymologically suggest the use >>>> of signs and words. Thinking with signs and words is intellect. But the >>>> thing is that it is almost impossible for us to describe the >>>> relationship of a person to their environment psychologically without >>>> using words which evoke sign-relations. The relation is a psychological >>>> one, not a conditioned-reflex, and the words we have for relations which >>>> are mediated through consciousness tend to be words like "meaning" and >>>> "significance" which have intellectual connotations. The preintellectual >>>> stages of psychological development which Vygotsky himself theorised are >>>> not built into the common language. >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. >>>>> >>>>> There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] >>>>> --------------------------------------------------- >>>>> 4. ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >>>>> (see original post below) >>>>> --------------------------------------------------- >>>>> >>>>> Again a pothole. You say: >>>>> "The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate at >>>>> their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an intellectual >>>>> relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims." >>>>> >>>>> I think know this, but what is ANL's critique against this? Is it that >>>>> it is too "intellectual," which is possibly code for elitism or class? >>>>> Sorry if I wasn't clear. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> > > > From ewall@umich.edu Thu Oct 23 17:44:27 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 19:44:27 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> Message-ID: <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> Andy The paper seems to be about unifying mathematics education research. Parts are a bit open to debate (especially arguments concerning the 'nature' of mathematics) and Ernest tends to somewhat gloss over this. However that is not relevant and you are correct Ernest does, among other things, put forth a unit of analysis for mathematics teaching which, as he admits is simplified for the purposes of the paper; i.e. the usual triad of teacher, student, and text (which is hardly unique to Ernest as he notes). At this point I have a question that I've been pondering about concerning such triads and their elaborations (and this goes back in a sense to things Schwab said elsewhere - the Schwab he quotes in the beginning of his paper) and, as he quotes you heavily, I will ask you: If this triad is indeed a prototype of mathematics teaching (i.e. posses all the basic characteristics of the whole), what makes this a prototype of mathematics teaching and not a prototype of, say, the teaching of reading? This is not a spurious question since, as a mathematics educator (of the type that Ernest wishes to unify - smile), I often find myself needing to help elementary school teachers realize there are actually substantial and observable differences (and substantial similarities) between teaching reading and teaching mathematics and, for sundry reasons, they tend to favor something like the former and cause their students some anguish in the learning of mathematics as time passes. Hmm, I guess I am asking whether the unit of the analysis can, in effect, be the 'world' or should it be, so to speak, among the 'minimum' relevant prototypes. It seems that it would be somewhat worthless otherwise (again similarities are important). Ed On Oct 23, 2014, at 3:57 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Paul Ernest has a position on the unit of analysis for mathematics teaching: > http://www.esri.mmu.ac.uk/mect/papers_11/Ernest.pdf > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Julian Williams wrote: >> Andy: >> >> Now I feel we are nearly together, here. There is no 'final' form even of simple arithmetic, because it is (as social practices are) continually evolving. >> >> Just one more step then: our conversation with the 7 year old child about the truth of 7plus 4 equals 10 is a part of this social practice, and contributes to it....? The event involved in this Perezhivanie here involves a situation that is created by the joint activity of the child with us? >> >> Peg: Germ cell for the social practice of mathematics... I wonder if there is a problem with Davydov's approach, in that it requires a specification of the final form of the mathematics to be learnt (a closed curriculum). But let me try: One candidate might be the 'reasoned justification for a mathematical use/application to our project' ... Implies meaningful verbal thought/interaction, and collective mathematical activity with others. Not sure how this works to define your curriculum content etc. >> >> Julian >> >> >> On 23 Oct 2014, at 16:28, "Peg Griffin" wrote: >> >> >>> And thus the importance of finding a good germ cell for mathematics pedagogy >>> -- because a germ cell can "grow with" and "grow" the current "social >>> practice of mathematics." Whether someone agrees with the choice of germ >>> cell made by Davidov (or anyone else), a germ cell needs to be identified, >>> justified and relied on to generate curriculum content and practice, right? >>> PG >>> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Oct 23 19:28:40 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 13:28:40 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: <49793593-D10A-494B-AA7B-F1F94DD549E7@uniandes.edu.co> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu>, <54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu> <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net>, <1414104140633.35524@unm.edu> <49793593-D10A-494B-AA7B-F1F94DD549E7@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <5449B958.6020506@mira.net> Attached is the complete text of Thinking and Speech, the LSVCW version. The Chapter on Stern is Chapter 3 beginning on page 93 (55th page of the document) Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Annalisa, > > I'm sure that David Kellogg would be happy to send you his translation of this chapter. > > Martin > > On Oct 23, 2014, at 5:42 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > >> Hi Martin! >> >> I was going to ask if you could offer the location, then I checked at marxists.org there is no Chapter 3 which is titled, "Stern's Theory of Language Development" in the T&S text there, and I don't have the book available to me at the moment. Oh well. :/ >> >> Still, thank you for pointing that reference out. >> >> Best, >> >> Annalisa >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer >> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 4:27 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >> >> For example, intellectualism is the criticism that LSV makes of William Stern, in the earlier chapters of Thought & Language. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 23, 2014, at 5:19 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> In this context, "intellectualism" does not mean "void of affect" or have anything to do with lack of affect. >>> "Intellectualism" refers to a theorist who ascribes a capacity for intellectual activity to (for example) an infant, who would in fact not have developed the capacity for an intellectual relation to the world. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Andy! >>>> >>>> OK. I'm needing to fill in some blanks here. >>>> >>>> What is meant exactly by "intellectualism"? Or rather, what did ANL mean? >>>> >>>> When you say: >>>> >>>> [And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. >>>> No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" and "affect".] >>>> >>>> Perhaps I am responding to the word "intellectual" in the way it reflects back to me in my culture: that something or someone "intellectual" is void of affect (relatively speaking) and that is why those who spurn intellectuals do so. As such, "intellectuals" will sometimes speak/function at a level "above" most others, and this usually upsets people who do not speak/function on the same level. >>>> "Intelligence" is handled differently, though. It seems to me as a concept "intelligence" is more of whole cloth. >>>> >>>> "Intellect" (to me) is thinking without affect. It is rational and seeks to remove affect, with the "myth" that the products of thought are somehow "better, more pure" with this affect removed. >>>> I agree of course that the person is whole first, and that we abstract concepts to describe properties. But there has been a backlash from abstracting out. Isn't this why Descartes has been so problematic? Isn't this why Spinoza sought to understand where the emotions "come from" and what their value is? >>>> >>>> So given this, I ask the question again and circling back to the original charge in your paper, what does it mean for ANL to levy a charge of "intellectualism" upon LSV? >>>> >>>> TIA, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >>>> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 3:10 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >>>> >>>> Annalisa, it is Leontyev who is pinning the charge of "intellectualism" >>>> on Vygotsky because he ascribes "meaning" and "significance" to >>>> children, and therefore sign-use. I am not saying that sign-use is not >>>> intellectual though. And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, >>>> because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. >>>> No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that whole, >>>> by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" >>>> and "affect". >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Hi Andy, >>>>> >>>>> Again thanks for more! >>>>> >>>>> Here's the thing: I may be getting lost in understanding argument positions. >>>>> >>>>> Are you saying it is Leontiev, et al's position that thinking with signs and words are intellectual? >>>>> >>>>> Because, for me personally, thinking with signs and words involve both affect and intellect and I don't think they can be separated out. For me, a person's intelligence is the mediated unification of affect and intellect, what I believe you are calling consciousness. >>>>> >>>>> I feel supported by my position with Vygotsky's discussion of word-meaning (znachenie slova), if I am understanding word-meaning properly. >>>>> >>>>> Again, the words "meaning" and "significance" can have affective meaning and significance! :) (is this the adjective? I want to say "affectual," to match "intellectual" but that isn't a word) >>>>> >>>>> Now if for *you* these particular words have "intellectual connotations," perhaps this difference between you and I supports LSV's (and my earlier) point that affect and intellect are mediated and will therefore allow each person have a different and nuanced mix of meaning and significance for the same set of words and signs, even if we generally agree on a social meaning and significance, such as the meaning of a flag. >>>>> >>>>> This reminds me of the cultural differences regarding the meanings of color. One can't intellectualize red just by its perception. One can't have an affect of red either by perception alone (if one were to see red for the first time), its meaning and significance are socially, historically and culturally generated. >>>>> >>>>> Furthermore, I agree with you that our "Western language" to describe the interior mind, if I am allowed to say that, is sparse. We know Freud reached into Greek mythology to give these concepts a handle. This is one reason I look to Eastern thought so I might learn how these dynamics are discussed. They do possess words for which we have none. I might also suggest there are relevant themes in these traditions that apply to Vygotsky's work. >>>>> >>>>> In fact, it might amaze us in the West to truly understand the immense literature and legacies on these topics of mind and self. It certainly amazes me. Of course that would be a huge project to be mediated between cultural elders and not a cultural tourist like myself. I only point out that there is something there and we are not the pioneers to wrangle with these problems of mind. >>>>> >>>>> I admit that to access these words, one must understand how metaphors are utilized. In rational-logical traditions, metaphors seem to be disagreeable. Also there is discussion of the spiritual, since the problems these traditions hoped to solve were spiritual problems, which may just be their historically-anchored approach to psychological realities. So, these barriers may explain the impasse. >>>>> >>>>> But if words are tools, I'm sure we might borrow some and they wouldn't mind. >>>>> >>>>> Ha! a pun! "wouldn't mind" get it? :) >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:02 AM >>>>> >>>>> I would have said that this criticism is a deliberate misrepresentation, >>>>> except that Lydia Bozhovich makes the same charge of "intellectualism." >>>>> The charge hinges on phrases like "the significance for the child" and >>>>> "the meaning for the child," etc., which etymologically suggest the use >>>>> of signs and words. Thinking with signs and words is intellect. But the >>>>> thing is that it is almost impossible for us to describe the >>>>> relationship of a person to their environment psychologically without >>>>> using words which evoke sign-relations. The relation is a psychological >>>>> one, not a conditioned-reflex, and the words we have for relations which >>>>> are mediated through consciousness tend to be words like "meaning" and >>>>> "significance" which have intellectual connotations. The preintellectual >>>>> stages of psychological development which Vygotsky himself theorised are >>>>> not built into the common language. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. >>>>>> >>>>>> There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] >>>>>> --------------------------------------------------- >>>>>> 4. ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >>>>>> (see original post below) >>>>>> --------------------------------------------------- >>>>>> >>>>>> Again a pothole. You say: >>>>>> "The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate at >>>>>> their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an intellectual >>>>>> relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims." >>>>>> >>>>>> I think know this, but what is ANL's critique against this? Is it that >>>>>> it is too "intellectual," which is possibly code for elitism or class? >>>>>> Sorry if I wasn't clear. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> > > > > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Thinking-and-Speech.doc Type: application/msword Size: 999424 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141024/1c3fda09/attachment-0001.doc From ablunden@mira.net Thu Oct 23 19:41:15 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 13:41:15 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> Message-ID: <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> Ed, Paul may quote me, but I actually know little about his work or mathematics education itself. But isn't he discussing a number of different proposals for a unit of analysis for mathematics teaching, one of which is the one you refer to. I take it that he is critically reviewing all such proposals before making his own proposal. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Ed Wall wrote: > Andy > > The paper seems to be about unifying mathematics education research. Parts are a bit open to debate (especially arguments concerning the 'nature' of mathematics) and Ernest tends to somewhat gloss over this. However that is not relevant and you are correct Ernest does, among other things, put forth a unit of analysis for mathematics teaching which, as he admits is simplified for the purposes of the paper; i.e. the usual triad of teacher, student, and text (which is hardly unique to Ernest as he notes). At this point I have a question that I've been pondering about concerning such triads and their elaborations (and this goes back in a sense to things Schwab said elsewhere - the Schwab he quotes in the beginning of his paper) and, as he quotes you heavily, I will ask you: If this triad is indeed a prototype of mathematics teaching (i.e. posses all the basic characteristics of the whole), what makes this a prototype of mathematics teaching and not a prototype of, say, the teaching of reading? This is not a spurious question since, as a mathematics educator (of the type that Ernest wishes to unify - smile), I often find myself needing to help elementary school teachers realize there are actually substantial and observable differences (and substantial similarities) between teaching reading and teaching mathematics and, for sundry reasons, they tend to favor something like the former and cause their students some anguish in the learning of mathematics as time passes. Hmm, I guess I am asking whether the unit of the analysis can, in effect, be the 'world' or should it be, so to speak, among the 'minimum' relevant prototypes. It seems that it would be somewhat worthless otherwise (again similarities are important). > > Ed > > On Oct 23, 2014, at 3:57 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Paul Ernest has a position on the unit of analysis for mathematics teaching: >> http://www.esri.mmu.ac.uk/mect/papers_11/Ernest.pdf >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Julian Williams wrote: >> >>> Andy: >>> >>> Now I feel we are nearly together, here. There is no 'final' form even of simple arithmetic, because it is (as social practices are) continually evolving. >>> >>> Just one more step then: our conversation with the 7 year old child about the truth of 7plus 4 equals 10 is a part of this social practice, and contributes to it....? The event involved in this Perezhivanie here involves a situation that is created by the joint activity of the child with us? >>> >>> Peg: Germ cell for the social practice of mathematics... I wonder if there is a problem with Davydov's approach, in that it requires a specification of the final form of the mathematics to be learnt (a closed curriculum). But let me try: One candidate might be the 'reasoned justification for a mathematical use/application to our project' ... Implies meaningful verbal thought/interaction, and collective mathematical activity with others. Not sure how this works to define your curriculum content etc. >>> >>> Julian >>> >>> >>> On 23 Oct 2014, at 16:28, "Peg Griffin" wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> And thus the importance of finding a good germ cell for mathematics pedagogy >>>> -- because a germ cell can "grow with" and "grow" the current "social >>>> practice of mathematics." Whether someone agrees with the choice of germ >>>> cell made by Davidov (or anyone else), a germ cell needs to be identified, >>>> justified and relied on to generate curriculum content and practice, right? >>>> PG >>>> >>>> > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Oct 23 19:49:52 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 02:49:52 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: <5449B958.6020506@mira.net> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu>, <54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu> <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net>, <1414104140633.35524@unm.edu> <49793593-D10A-494B-AA7B-F1F94DD549E7@uniandes.edu.co>, <5449B958.6020506@mira.net> Message-ID: <1414118990187.55523@unm.edu> Thanks Andy! I believe I have more reading than I can stand at the moment. I'm going to be up late tonight! Regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 8:28 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] Attached is the complete text of Thinking and Speech, the LSVCW version. The Chapter on Stern is Chapter 3 beginning on page 93 (55th page of the document) Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Annalisa, > > I'm sure that David Kellogg would be happy to send you his translation of this chapter. > > Martin > > On Oct 23, 2014, at 5:42 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > >> Hi Martin! >> >> I was going to ask if you could offer the location, then I checked at marxists.org there is no Chapter 3 which is titled, "Stern's Theory of Language Development" in the T&S text there, and I don't have the book available to me at the moment. Oh well. :/ >> >> Still, thank you for pointing that reference out. >> >> Best, >> >> Annalisa >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer >> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 4:27 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >> >> For example, intellectualism is the criticism that LSV makes of William Stern, in the earlier chapters of Thought & Language. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 23, 2014, at 5:19 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> In this context, "intellectualism" does not mean "void of affect" or have anything to do with lack of affect. >>> "Intellectualism" refers to a theorist who ascribes a capacity for intellectual activity to (for example) an infant, who would in fact not have developed the capacity for an intellectual relation to the world. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Andy! >>>> >>>> OK. I'm needing to fill in some blanks here. >>>> >>>> What is meant exactly by "intellectualism"? Or rather, what did ANL mean? >>>> >>>> When you say: >>>> >>>> [And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. >>>> No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" and "affect".] >>>> >>>> Perhaps I am responding to the word "intellectual" in the way it reflects back to me in my culture: that something or someone "intellectual" is void of affect (relatively speaking) and that is why those who spurn intellectuals do so. As such, "intellectuals" will sometimes speak/function at a level "above" most others, and this usually upsets people who do not speak/function on the same level. >>>> "Intelligence" is handled differently, though. It seems to me as a concept "intelligence" is more of whole cloth. >>>> >>>> "Intellect" (to me) is thinking without affect. It is rational and seeks to remove affect, with the "myth" that the products of thought are somehow "better, more pure" with this affect removed. >>>> I agree of course that the person is whole first, and that we abstract concepts to describe properties. But there has been a backlash from abstracting out. Isn't this why Descartes has been so problematic? Isn't this why Spinoza sought to understand where the emotions "come from" and what their value is? >>>> >>>> So given this, I ask the question again and circling back to the original charge in your paper, what does it mean for ANL to levy a charge of "intellectualism" upon LSV? >>>> >>>> TIA, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >>>> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 3:10 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >>>> >>>> Annalisa, it is Leontyev who is pinning the charge of "intellectualism" >>>> on Vygotsky because he ascribes "meaning" and "significance" to >>>> children, and therefore sign-use. I am not saying that sign-use is not >>>> intellectual though. And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, >>>> because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. >>>> No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that whole, >>>> by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" >>>> and "affect". >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Hi Andy, >>>>> >>>>> Again thanks for more! >>>>> >>>>> Here's the thing: I may be getting lost in understanding argument positions. >>>>> >>>>> Are you saying it is Leontiev, et al's position that thinking with signs and words are intellectual? >>>>> >>>>> Because, for me personally, thinking with signs and words involve both affect and intellect and I don't think they can be separated out. For me, a person's intelligence is the mediated unification of affect and intellect, what I believe you are calling consciousness. >>>>> >>>>> I feel supported by my position with Vygotsky's discussion of word-meaning (znachenie slova), if I am understanding word-meaning properly. >>>>> >>>>> Again, the words "meaning" and "significance" can have affective meaning and significance! :) (is this the adjective? I want to say "affectual," to match "intellectual" but that isn't a word) >>>>> >>>>> Now if for *you* these particular words have "intellectual connotations," perhaps this difference between you and I supports LSV's (and my earlier) point that affect and intellect are mediated and will therefore allow each person have a different and nuanced mix of meaning and significance for the same set of words and signs, even if we generally agree on a social meaning and significance, such as the meaning of a flag. >>>>> >>>>> This reminds me of the cultural differences regarding the meanings of color. One can't intellectualize red just by its perception. One can't have an affect of red either by perception alone (if one were to see red for the first time), its meaning and significance are socially, historically and culturally generated. >>>>> >>>>> Furthermore, I agree with you that our "Western language" to describe the interior mind, if I am allowed to say that, is sparse. We know Freud reached into Greek mythology to give these concepts a handle. This is one reason I look to Eastern thought so I might learn how these dynamics are discussed. They do possess words for which we have none. I might also suggest there are relevant themes in these traditions that apply to Vygotsky's work. >>>>> >>>>> In fact, it might amaze us in the West to truly understand the immense literature and legacies on these topics of mind and self. It certainly amazes me. Of course that would be a huge project to be mediated between cultural elders and not a cultural tourist like myself. I only point out that there is something there and we are not the pioneers to wrangle with these problems of mind. >>>>> >>>>> I admit that to access these words, one must understand how metaphors are utilized. In rational-logical traditions, metaphors seem to be disagreeable. Also there is discussion of the spiritual, since the problems these traditions hoped to solve were spiritual problems, which may just be their historically-anchored approach to psychological realities. So, these barriers may explain the impasse. >>>>> >>>>> But if words are tools, I'm sure we might borrow some and they wouldn't mind. >>>>> >>>>> Ha! a pun! "wouldn't mind" get it? :) >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:02 AM >>>>> >>>>> I would have said that this criticism is a deliberate misrepresentation, >>>>> except that Lydia Bozhovich makes the same charge of "intellectualism." >>>>> The charge hinges on phrases like "the significance for the child" and >>>>> "the meaning for the child," etc., which etymologically suggest the use >>>>> of signs and words. Thinking with signs and words is intellect. But the >>>>> thing is that it is almost impossible for us to describe the >>>>> relationship of a person to their environment psychologically without >>>>> using words which evoke sign-relations. The relation is a psychological >>>>> one, not a conditioned-reflex, and the words we have for relations which >>>>> are mediated through consciousness tend to be words like "meaning" and >>>>> "significance" which have intellectual connotations. The preintellectual >>>>> stages of psychological development which Vygotsky himself theorised are >>>>> not built into the common language. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. >>>>>> >>>>>> There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] >>>>>> --------------------------------------------------- >>>>>> 4. ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >>>>>> (see original post below) >>>>>> --------------------------------------------------- >>>>>> >>>>>> Again a pothole. You say: >>>>>> "The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate at >>>>>> their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an intellectual >>>>>> relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims." >>>>>> >>>>>> I think know this, but what is ANL's critique against this? Is it that >>>>>> it is too "intellectual," which is possibly code for elitism or class? >>>>>> Sorry if I wasn't clear. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> > > > > > From ewall@umich.edu Thu Oct 23 21:08:14 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 23:08:14 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> Message-ID: <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> Andy The paper ("The Unit of Analysis in Mathematics Education") is about unifying branches of mathematical education research: nature and philosophy of mathematics, teaching of mathematics, learning of mathematics, and sociology of mathematics (this last something he has promoted for a number of years) under one unit of analysis (i.e. collaborative projects). Insofar as the section on mathematics teaching goes he just says the triad (and he fleshes it out a bit) isn't controversial so I wouldn't say he is always 'critically' reviewing, but that may be a matter of opinion. My question isn't directed at Ernest, but at you. I'm interested in the very idea of a unit of analysis possessing all the basic characteristics of the whole. The problem I am having with all varieties of the triad is that they seem yet too 'large'; i.e. in a sense the grain size is too large to, one might say, pick up the mathematical flavor that differentiates mathematics teaching from, say, reading teaching. So it would seem that the choice of the unit of analysis also needs to be done in a minimal fashion? Without such a unit of analysis, I find myself unable to talk usefully and coherently with my students about what I observe that is mathematically problematic (and I don't mean mistakes) in their planning and teaching of mathematics. There are times, unfortunately, when it appears I am viewing a well thought-out reading or grammar lesson. Anyway I doubt whether mathematics is unique in this regard and that teachers of all stripes aren't having similar problems with such units of analysis. Ed On Oct 23, 2014, at 9:41 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Ed, Paul may quote me, but I actually know little about his work or mathematics education itself. > But isn't he discussing a number of different proposals for a unit of analysis for mathematics teaching, one of which is the one you refer to. I take it that he is critically reviewing all such proposals before making his own proposal. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Ed Wall wrote: >> Andy >> >> The paper seems to be about unifying mathematics education research. Parts are a bit open to debate (especially arguments concerning the 'nature' of mathematics) and Ernest tends to somewhat gloss over this. However that is not relevant and you are correct Ernest does, among other things, put forth a unit of analysis for mathematics teaching which, as he admits is simplified for the purposes of the paper; i.e. the usual triad of teacher, student, and text (which is hardly unique to Ernest as he notes). At this point I have a question that I've been pondering about concerning such triads and their elaborations (and this goes back in a sense to things Schwab said elsewhere - the Schwab he quotes in the beginning of his paper) and, as he quotes you heavily, I will ask you: If this triad is indeed a prototype of mathematics teaching (i.e. posses all the basic characteristics of the whole), what makes this a prototype of mathematics teaching and not a prototype of, say, the teaching of reading? This is not a spurious question since, as a mathematics educator (of the type that Ernest wishes to unify - smile), I often find myself needing to help elementary school teachers realize there are actually substantial and observable differences (and substantial similarities) between teaching reading and teaching mathematics and, for sundry reasons, they tend to favor something like the former and cause their students some anguish in the learning of mathematics as time passes. Hmm, I guess I am asking whether the unit of the analysis can, in effect, be the 'world' or should it be, so to speak, among the 'minimum' relevant prototypes. It seems that it would be somewhat worthless otherwise (again similarities are important). >> >> Ed >> >> On Oct 23, 2014, at 3:57 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> Paul Ernest has a position on the unit of analysis for mathematics teaching: >>> http://www.esri.mmu.ac.uk/mect/papers_11/Ernest.pdf >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Julian Williams wrote: >>> >>>> Andy: >>>> >>>> Now I feel we are nearly together, here. There is no 'final' form even of simple arithmetic, because it is (as social practices are) continually evolving. >>>> >>>> Just one more step then: our conversation with the 7 year old child about the truth of 7plus 4 equals 10 is a part of this social practice, and contributes to it....? The event involved in this Perezhivanie here involves a situation that is created by the joint activity of the child with us? >>>> >>>> Peg: Germ cell for the social practice of mathematics... I wonder if there is a problem with Davydov's approach, in that it requires a specification of the final form of the mathematics to be learnt (a closed curriculum). But let me try: One candidate might be the 'reasoned justification for a mathematical use/application to our project' ... Implies meaningful verbal thought/interaction, and collective mathematical activity with others. Not sure how this works to define your curriculum content etc. >>>> >>>> Julian >>>> >>>> >>>> On 23 Oct 2014, at 16:28, "Peg Griffin" wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> And thus the importance of finding a good germ cell for mathematics pedagogy >>>>> -- because a germ cell can "grow with" and "grow" the current "social >>>>> practice of mathematics." Whether someone agrees with the choice of germ >>>>> cell made by Davidov (or anyone else), a germ cell needs to be identified, >>>>> justified and relied on to generate curriculum content and practice, right? >>>>> PG >> >> >> >> > > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Oct 23 23:24:54 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 17:24:54 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> Message-ID: <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net> I see. The text which is makes up the third point of the triangle with the teacher and student is in this case a mathematical text, yes? So for example, completely different problems arise than would arise in the case of reading a story or some other piece of writing. I can see the idea that that teacher-text-pupil relation is an archetype for a whole range of teaching. In itself, it certainly doesn't tell you anything distinctive about teaching mathematics in particular. I think you need to turn to other units specific to different topics being taught. Different units give different insights. For example, Vygotsky used word meaning while Bakhtin used utterance. Utterance is a much larger unit than word meaning, but it proves useful for providing insights into communication and handling the framing and context, whilst word meaning is useful for understanding concepts and the development of conceptual thought. Davydov's germ cell in which two objects are compared in length is an elementary act of abstraction, and therefore captures the idea of quantity, which should take a student to the point of grasping the general idea of mathematical text and abstracting quantities from real situations. But that doesn't really do for the whole subject or tell you anything about the teacher-pupil relation. I would not get obsessed on this phrase: "possessing all the basic characteristics of the whole." That phrase can lead you up a blind alley. I think it originates from Engestrom's 1987 book: ?a viable root model of human activity ... [must be] the smallest unit that still preserves the essential unity and quality behind any complex activity," which is somewhat more precise than the phrase you have used, but can still lead to misconceptions. The interpretation "possessing all the basic characteristics of the whole," leads to a logical circle: which characteristics are essential, which characteristics are basic? You need to form a concept of teaching mathematics. Perhaps you could elaborate a little, Ed, on your ideas for a unit of analysis for mathematics teaching? Why do you need a smaller unit? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Ed Wall wrote: > Andy > > The paper ("The Unit of Analysis in Mathematics Education") is about unifying branches of mathematical education research: nature and philosophy of mathematics, teaching of mathematics, learning of mathematics, and sociology of mathematics (this last something he has promoted for a number of years) under one unit of analysis (i.e. collaborative projects). Insofar as the section on mathematics teaching goes he just says the triad (and he fleshes it out a bit) isn't controversial so I wouldn't say he is always 'critically' reviewing, but that may be a matter of opinion. > My question isn't directed at Ernest, but at you. I'm interested in the very idea of a unit of analysis possessing all the basic characteristics of the whole. The problem I am having with all varieties of the triad is that they seem yet too 'large'; i.e. in a sense the grain size is too large to, one might say, pick up the mathematical flavor that differentiates mathematics teaching from, say, reading teaching. So it would seem that the choice of the unit of analysis also needs to be done in a minimal fashion? Without such a unit of analysis, I find myself unable to talk usefully and coherently with my students about what I observe that is mathematically problematic (and I don't mean mistakes) in their planning and teaching of mathematics. There are times, unfortunately, when it appears I am viewing a well thought-out reading or grammar lesson. > Anyway I doubt whether mathematics is unique in this regard and that teachers of all stripes aren't having similar problems with such units of analysis. > > Ed > > On Oct 23, 2014, at 9:41 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Ed, Paul may quote me, but I actually know little about his work or mathematics education itself. >> But isn't he discussing a number of different proposals for a unit of analysis for mathematics teaching, one of which is the one you refer to. I take it that he is critically reviewing all such proposals before making his own proposal. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Ed Wall wrote: >> >>> Andy >>> >>> The paper seems to be about unifying mathematics education research. Parts are a bit open to debate (especially arguments concerning the 'nature' of mathematics) and Ernest tends to somewhat gloss over this. However that is not relevant and you are correct Ernest does, among other things, put forth a unit of analysis for mathematics teaching which, as he admits is simplified for the purposes of the paper; i.e. the usual triad of teacher, student, and text (which is hardly unique to Ernest as he notes). At this point I have a question that I've been pondering about concerning such triads and their elaborations (and this goes back in a sense to things Schwab said elsewhere - the Schwab he quotes in the beginning of his paper) and, as he quotes you heavily, I will ask you: If this triad is indeed a prototype of mathematics teaching (i.e. posses all the basic characteristics of the whole), what makes this a prototype of mathematics teaching and not a prototype of, say, the >>> teaching of reading? This is not a spurious question since, as a mathematics educator (of the type that Ernest wishes to unify - smile), I often find myself needing to help elementary school teachers realize there are actually substantial and observable differences (and substantial similarities) between teaching reading and teaching mathematics and, for sundry reasons, they tend to favor something like the former and cause their students some anguish in the learning of mathematics as time passes. Hmm, I guess I am asking whether the unit of the analysis can, in effect, be the 'world' or should it be, so to speak, among the 'minimum' relevant prototypes. It seems that it would be somewhat worthless otherwise (again similarities are important). >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> On Oct 23, 2014, at 3:57 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Paul Ernest has a position on the unit of analysis for mathematics teaching: >>>> http://www.esri.mmu.ac.uk/mect/papers_11/Ernest.pdf >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Julian Williams wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Andy: >>>>> >>>>> Now I feel we are nearly together, here. There is no 'final' form even of simple arithmetic, because it is (as social practices are) continually evolving. >>>>> >>>>> Just one more step then: our conversation with the 7 year old child about the truth of 7plus 4 equals 10 is a part of this social practice, and contributes to it....? The event involved in this Perezhivanie here involves a situation that is created by the joint activity of the child with us? >>>>> >>>>> Peg: Germ cell for the social practice of mathematics... I wonder if there is a problem with Davydov's approach, in that it requires a specification of the final form of the mathematics to be learnt (a closed curriculum). But let me try: One candidate might be the 'reasoned justification for a mathematical use/application to our project' ... Implies meaningful verbal thought/interaction, and collective mathematical activity with others. Not sure how this works to define your curriculum content etc. >>>>> >>>>> Julian >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 23 Oct 2014, at 16:28, "Peg Griffin" wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> And thus the importance of finding a good germ cell for mathematics pedagogy >>>>>> -- because a germ cell can "grow with" and "grow" the current "social >>>>>> practice of mathematics." Whether someone agrees with the choice of germ >>>>>> cell made by Davidov (or anyone else), a germ cell needs to be identified, >>>>>> justified and relied on to generate curriculum content and practice, right? >>>>>> PG >>>>>> >>> >>> >> > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Oct 24 00:24:07 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 16:24:07 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics Practices In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <39089ddf0ba265a30feb7854f07324c1.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> <54471BF6.9010906@mira.net> <54479034.6070006@mira.net> Message-ID: I have a bunch of rather silly questions, and then a comment about the interpretation of the data. p. 280: Why do we assume that nonverbal handing money to a cashier or handing a birthday present to a friend is an unspoken agreement? It is certainly true that the nonverbal component of the interaction may be abstracted away from it. But there are actually very few nonverbal handings, of either money or birthday presents, that would have the same meaning. Isn't it more useful to consider that speech can play varying degrees of importance in an interactioni (e.g. it can be "ancillary" where the commodity being exchanged is goods or services and it is essential when, as is normally the case in both handing money to a cashier and handing a birthday present to a friend, information is exchanged as well? p. 283: Puppets are unusual in that, unlike socks, they necessarily have symbolic meaning (that is, a sock puppet that is not a symbol for some imaginary character is a sock and not a puppet). Was there any character that went with the sock puppets? Was there any story that went with the character? If so, where did the story come from, and was there any jockeying for control over the story? Note the titillating potential of characters that "light up" when they touch! Did this create any visible titillation for embarrassment? p. 283: I can sort of follow why stitching, knotting, and threading might be gendered (a kind of washback from the world of work, I suppose). Why gluing? p. 289: Why does Amber refer to Antoine as "Nicholas"? p. 293: The first sentence of the section "Hands-On Materials as Gendered Access" refers to "two focal girls". Is this a mistake, or am I missing somebody? And my comment. It seems to me that a lot of studies (not this one in particular but many studies of this type in general) tend to view gendered access as a matter of gendered access to property or power or both. But this is very often an adult view; we adults are obsessed with power and property and we assume that it is only right that children are. Isn't it possible that to the children what is really gendered is access to aesthetic concepts versus access to technical expertise? Both orientations address the tension between form and material, but they address it from very different sides and are ultimately indispensible to each other (which is notoriously not the case with disputes over property and power). Note, however, that when the teacher says that it is decorating that is the fun part, the teacher is biasing the children towards the aesthetic and away from the technical!) David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 24 October 2014 07:07, mike cole wrote: > Aha! Thanks! > > So artificial literacies refers to the mediation of reading/writing by a > variety of artifacts! Ok, that I can make sense of. And thanks for the RRQ > ref on sedimented identities. This phrase is used in discussion of text > production. For those ignorant like myself, here is the summary provided by > the authors, which also makes the point of their text (and the present > one!) cleared: > > *THE COMMENTARY argues for an understanding of how texts are put together > that accounts for multimodality and draws on children?s ways of being and > doing in the home, their habitus. It focuses on identities as socially > situated. It argues that it is important to trace the process of > sedimenting identities during text production. This offers a way of viewing > text production that can inform research into children?s text making. > Particular attention is paid to the producer, contexts, and practices used > during text production and how the text becomes an artifact that holds > important information about the meaning maker. Four case studies describe > sedimented identities as a lens through which to see a more nuanced > perspective on meaning making. This work offers a lens for research and > practice in that it enables researchers to question and interrogate the way > texts come into being.* > > > mike > > On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 10:35 AM, Karen Wohlwend wrote: > >> Certainly-- Rowsell and Pahl take an ethnographic approach to track the >> practices and user identities involved in the production and previous uses >> of an artifact. >> >> Rowsell, J., & Pahl, K. (2007). Sedimented identities in texts: Instances >> of practice. Reading Research Quarterly, 42(3), 388-404. >> >> Pahl, K., & Rowsell, J. (2010). Artifactual literacies: Every object tells >> a story. New York: Teachers College Press. >> >> >> >> >> On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 12:56 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> > Karen--- I am familiar of course with the notion of artifacts, but I am >> not >> > familiar with >> > Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual literacies. >> Could >> > you provide a link or a reference? The phrase has me wondering what a >> > non-artifactual literacy would be. >> > mike >> > >> > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:03 PM, Karen Wohlwend >> > wrote: >> > >> > > Andy, thanks for these generative questions and comments! I'll defer to >> > my >> > > co-authors to situate the focal case in the larger study but I'll >> address >> > > how we are considering relationships among gender, practices, and >> tools. >> > > >> > > We're conceptualizing tools as anchoring artifacts, that concretize and >> > > suggest particular uses and users accrued from cultural histories of >> > > access and use (following Holland and Cole's cultural artifacts, and >> more >> > > recently, Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual >> > > literacies). Tools index shared histories of use, values, and >> > expectations >> > > for who *should *be a user and for how practices *should *be conducted, >> > > practices which following Paechter are situated in communities of >> > gendered >> > > practice that are multiple, local, and embodied. >> > > >> > > However, we would not say that a tool is gendered in any fixed or >> > > deterministic way. In any given moment of activity, tools signal >> multiple >> > > histories in many nexus of practice (following Ron Scollon, the tacit >> > > shared practices that members of a community expect of one another) >> that >> > > lead up to, enter in, and flow from that moment, in contradictory, >> > > confounding, and complementary ways, hence the ambiguity you've >> > mentioned. >> > > How/whether social actors make use of particular histories in a >> specific >> > > context realizes foregrounds some histories while backgrounding >> others-- >> > in >> > > ways that can reproduce, contest, or blur prevailing expectations for >> > > participation. In our analysis, we looked closely at the mediated >> actions >> > > in the handling of tools in the one nexus to understand in a very >> > concrete >> > > way how girls were able to gain and maintain control over >> > > projects--contrary to histories and expectations for high levels of >> tool >> > > handling, participation, and trajectories of expertise for boys in >> > > electronics activity. >> > > >> > > Looking closely at the mediated action in this transformative moment >> > > reveals how changing the electronics tools from wires to needle and >> > thread >> > > changes the nexus, activating a powerful perception/expectation for >> girls >> > > as appropriate tool users by signalling histories of sewing practices >> and >> > > feminine communities of practice. >> > > >> > > In regard to other situations, looking closely at mediated actions, >> > > material artifacts, and tacit expectations for participation in the >> > > relevant nexus of practice will likely also reveal how materials relate >> > to >> > > stereotypical expectations, pointing to places ripe for rupture where >> > > changing something small in the local activity (e.g., an action, a >> tool, >> > a >> > > material) in dominant nexus of practice can signal a different kind of >> > user >> > > and potentially disrupt persistent and naturalized stereotypes. >> > > >> > > Looking forward to continuing the conversation, >> > > Karen >> > > >> > > >> > > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:08 AM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >> > > >> > > > Kylie & co., >> > > > A fascinating study around a truly ingenious approach to the gendered >> > > > division of labour - giving school kids E-textiles to construct an >> > > > electronic device - total mixing up and confounding the gender >> > > stereotypes >> > > > about sewing and electronics, etc. >> > > > >> > > > Some of the results were quite startling. That the young boy should >> not >> > > > just abstain and demonstratively not pay attention, but pay active >> and >> > > > supportive attention to the girl making the circuit with her >> > > > needle-and-thread - an admired female-typical stance one would have >> > > thought >> > > > a young male incapable of adopting with a female workmate. And that >> the >> > > > gender-inscription of the sewing tools over-rode the greater >> experience >> > > > that in this case the young boy had in using them, with the boy >> > deferring >> > > > to the less experienced girl in recognition of the >> > gender-appropriateness >> > > > of her "taking charge" with the needle-and-thread. This does cause >> one >> > to >> > > > think a little deeper into how we might conceptualise such gendered >> > > > behaviours. >> > > > >> > > > As you would know, MCA has a strong preference for qualitative >> > research, >> > > > and studies with small sample sizes are not generally a problem, but >> so >> > > > much seemed to hinge on the study of just *one* boy-girl team, that I >> > am >> > > > concerned about the capacity to generalise from such a base. There >> were >> > > > about 80 youth in the activity as a whole, so I can only hope and >> > presume >> > > > that observation of the other 78 kids in some way guided the work >> > focused >> > > > on just 2. >> > > > >> > > > I must say, the analysis of the video data is very sophisticated and >> > > > productive and you are to be congratulated on this aspect of the >> work. >> > I >> > > > see that you approach the gendering of the activities through the >> idea >> > of >> > > > the various *tools* being gendered, rather than the *practices* >> > > themselves. >> > > > This is something that was really necessary for you to be able to >> make >> > > > these observations, because the gendering of the activities is >> > ambiguous, >> > > > but not it seems the gendering of the tools. Is this a result of the >> > > study, >> > > > or is it something you already knew or did you arrive at this by >> logic? >> > > > >> > > > Do you see any other opportunities for confounding gender stereotypes >> > in >> > > > this way? >> > > > >> > > > And finally, does the experience of working in ambiguous, even >> inverted >> > > > gender-stereotyped activities like these have any outcome which >> carries >> > > > over into a world where the gender division of labour lacks >> ambiguity? >> > > > >> > > > Andy >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> > > > *Andy Blunden* >> > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > Kylie Peppler wrote: >> > > > >> > > >> Thanks Andy! We're excited to discuss with the community and would >> > > >> welcome any comments/questions on this emerging line of research! >> > > >> Kylie >> > > >> >> > > >> --- >> > > >> Kylie A. Peppler >> > > >> Assistant Professor of Learning Sciences >> > > >> Indiana University | School of Education >> > > >> 1900 E 10th Street | Eigenmann 528 | Bloomington | IN | 47406 | >> > > >> 812.856.8381 >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 10:52 PM, Andy Blunden > > > >> > wrote: >> > > >> >> > > >> Here's the article for discussion Artin is introducing: >> > > >> *Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting and >> Electronics >> > > >> Practices* >> > > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen Wohlwend. >> > > >> Indiana University. >> > > >> >> > > >> The Maker movement promotes hands-on making, including >> crafts, >> > > >> robotics, and computing. The movement?s potential to >> transform >> > > >> education rests in our ability to address notable gender >> > > >> disparities, particularly in science, technology, >> engineering, >> > > and >> > > >> mathematics fields. E-textiles - the first female-dominated >> > > >> computing community - provide inspiration for overcoming >> > > >> long-standing cultural divides in classrooms. Analysis of >> > > >> children?s >> > > >> use of e-textiles reveals that materials like needles, >> fabric, >> > > and >> > > >> conductive thread rupture traditional gender scripts around >> > > >> electronics and implicitly gives girls hands-on access and >> > > >> leadership roles. This reconceptualization of cultural >> divides >> > as >> > > >> sets of tacitly accepted practices rooted in gendered >> histories >> > > has >> > > >> implications for reconceptualizing traditionally >> male-dominated >> > > >> areas of schooling. >> > > >> >> > > >> Andy >> > > >> (attached) >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> > > >> ------------ >> > > >> *Andy Blunden* >> > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> Goncu, Artin wrote: >> > > >> >> > > >> Dear All, >> > > >> >> > > >> We are writing to let you know that the most recent issue of >> > > >> MCA is out. >> > > >> One of the articles published in this issue and being >> > > >> introduced here for >> > > >> discussion in referenced below. The authors of the article >> > > >> have kindly >> > > >> agreed to lead the discussion, and they are on xmca with us >> > > >> now. The free >> > > >> access to the article is possible through the links below. >> We >> > > >> are looking >> > > >> forward to hearing from you all. Best, ag >> > > >> >> > > >> Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting >> > > >> and Electronics Practices >> > > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen >> Wohlwend >> > > >> >> > > >> www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762 >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749039.2014. >> > > >> 939762#.VEZ25Ra_4wI >> > > >> >> > > >> Artin Goncu, Ph.D >> > > >> Co-editor, Mind, Culture, and Activity:An International >> > Journal >> > > >> Professor Emeritus, >> > > >> University of Illinois at Chicago >> > > >> College of Education M/C 147 >> > > >> 1040 W. Harrison St. >> > > >> Chicago, IL 60607 >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > -- >> > > Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor >> > > Literacy, Culture, & Language Education >> > > Indiana University >> > > 201 N. Rose Avenue >> > > Bloomington, IN 47405 >> > > Office: 812-856-8275 >> > > Fax: 812-856-8287 >> > > kwohlwen@indiana.edu >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> > -- >> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > >> >> >> >> -- >> Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor >> Literacy, Culture, & Language Education >> Indiana University >> 201 N. Rose Avenue >> Bloomington, IN 47405 >> Office: 812-856-8275 >> Fax: 812-856-8287 >> kwohlwen@indiana.edu >> > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From smago@uga.edu Fri Oct 24 03:06:24 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 10:06:24 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] 33 more signatures needed! Message-ID: <192ddd0038df43e4a20c54b4bffbfb6a@CO1PR02MB175.namprd02.prod.outlook.com> http://www.change.org/p/russian-academy-of-education-keep-the-institute-of-psychology-open?share_id=CdfPRdoLNk&utm_campaign=friend_inviter_chat&utm_medium=facebook&utm_source=share_petition&utm_term=permissions_dialog_false Keep the Institute of Psychology open There is a clear and present danger that a very important and famous research institute in Moscow-- The Institute of Psychology belonging to the Russian Academy of Education will cease to exist. The Institute was opened in 1914 and was the first in Russia and perhaps in the whole world in which deep and highly professional research projects were conducted by famous scientists of the XX century: G. Chelpanov, L. Vygotsky, S. Rubinshtein, A. Smirnov, B. Teplov, D.Elkonin, V.Davidov and many others. The Institute survived two world wars, post-revolutionary hardships, times of dictatorship and the chaotic conditions of the 1990s, but was able to preserve the scientific solidarity and moral values of the staff, and a high level of professionalism. Today there is a kind of turmoil of reforms in Russian Academies of Science striving to gain "optimization" through monetization of science, education and culture. Taking into account the lack of reliable information we feel that the danger to the institute's existence is real. The institute staff believes that one of the reasons is that the beautiful turn of the century building of the institute, close to the Kremlin, is one of the targets of some real estate entrepreneurs. This building was erected especially for the institute by the philanthropist, Shchukin. There are other dangers related to financial aspects. Let us unite our efforts to help to preserve this institute in order to celebrate in March 100 years since the opening of this venerable institute and not to mourn its disappearance. To: Russian Academy of Education Russian Academy Institute of Psychology Keep the Institute of Psychology open Sincerely, [Your name] From ablunden@mira.net Fri Oct 24 03:49:01 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 21:49:01 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net> Message-ID: <544A2E9D.10806@mira.net> I have to correct myself here: the phrase "all the basic characteristics of ..." is a quote from Vygotsky, Ch. 1 of "Thinking and Speech" - one of a number of formulations which Vygotsky uses. I do find though that this particular formulation is one which has led to a lot of confusion. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Andy Blunden wrote: > I see. > The text which is makes up the third point of the triangle with the > teacher and student is in this case a mathematical text, yes? So for > example, completely different problems arise than would arise in the > case of reading a story or some other piece of writing. I can see the > idea that that teacher-text-pupil relation is an archetype for a whole > range of teaching. In itself, it certainly doesn't tell you anything > distinctive about teaching mathematics in particular. I think you need > to turn to other units specific to different topics being taught. > > Different units give different insights. For example, Vygotsky used > word meaning while Bakhtin used utterance. Utterance is a much larger > unit than word meaning, but it proves useful for providing insights > into communication and handling the framing and context, whilst word > meaning is useful for understanding concepts and the development of > conceptual thought. Davydov's germ cell in which two objects are > compared in length is an elementary act of abstraction, and therefore > captures the idea of quantity, which should take a student to the > point of grasping the general idea of mathematical text and > abstracting quantities from real situations. But that doesn't really > do for the whole subject or tell you anything about the teacher-pupil > relation. > > I would not get obsessed on this phrase: "possessing all the basic > characteristics of the whole." That phrase can lead you up a blind > alley. I think it originates from Engestrom's 1987 book: ?a viable > root model of human activity ... [must be] the smallest unit that > still preserves the essential unity and quality behind any complex > activity," which is somewhat more precise than the phrase you have > used, but can still lead to misconceptions. The interpretation > "possessing all the basic characteristics of the whole," leads to a > logical circle: which characteristics are essential, which > characteristics are basic? > > You need to form a concept of teaching mathematics. > > Perhaps you could elaborate a little, Ed, on your ideas for a unit of > analysis for mathematics teaching? Why do you need a smaller unit? > > Andy > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Ed Wall wrote: >> Andy >> >> The paper ("The Unit of Analysis in Mathematics Education") is >> about unifying branches of mathematical education research: nature >> and philosophy of mathematics, teaching of mathematics, learning of >> mathematics, and sociology of mathematics (this last something he has >> promoted for a number of years) under one unit of analysis (i.e. >> collaborative projects). Insofar as the section on mathematics >> teaching goes he just says the triad (and he fleshes it out a bit) >> isn't controversial so I wouldn't say he is always 'critically' >> reviewing, but that may be a matter of opinion. My question >> isn't directed at Ernest, but at you. I'm interested in the very idea >> of a unit of analysis possessing all the basic characteristics of the >> whole. The problem I am having with all varieties of the triad is >> that they seem yet too 'large'; i.e. in a sense the grain size is too >> large to, one might say, pick up the mathematical flavor that >> differentiates mathematics teaching from, say, reading teaching. So >> it would seem that the choice of the unit of analysis also needs to >> be done in a minimal fashion? Without such a unit of analysis, I find >> myself unable to talk usefully and coherently with my students about >> what I observe that is mathematically problematic (and I don't mean >> mistakes) in their planning and teaching of mathematics. There are >> times, unfortunately, when it appears I am viewing a well thought-out >> reading or grammar lesson. >> Anyway I doubt whether mathematics is unique in this regard >> and that teachers of all stripes aren't having similar problems with >> such units of analysis. >> >> Ed >> >> On Oct 23, 2014, at 9:41 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> Ed, Paul may quote me, but I actually know little about his work or >>> mathematics education itself. >>> But isn't he discussing a number of different proposals for a unit >>> of analysis for mathematics teaching, one of which is the one you >>> refer to. I take it that he is critically reviewing all such >>> proposals before making his own proposal. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Ed Wall wrote: >>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> The paper seems to be about unifying mathematics education >>>> research. Parts are a bit open to debate (especially arguments >>>> concerning the 'nature' of mathematics) and Ernest tends to >>>> somewhat gloss over this. However that is not relevant and you are >>>> correct Ernest does, among other things, put forth a unit of >>>> analysis for mathematics teaching which, as he admits is simplified >>>> for the purposes of the paper; i.e. the usual triad of teacher, >>>> student, and text (which is hardly unique to Ernest as he notes). >>>> At this point I have a question that I've been pondering about >>>> concerning such triads and their elaborations (and this goes back >>>> in a sense to things Schwab said elsewhere - the Schwab he quotes >>>> in the beginning of his paper) and, as he quotes you heavily, I >>>> will ask you: If this triad is indeed a prototype of mathematics >>>> teaching (i.e. posses all the basic characteristics of the whole), >>>> what makes this a prototype of mathematics teaching and not a >>>> prototype of, say, > the >>>> teaching of reading? This is not a spurious question since, as a >>>> mathematics educator (of the type that Ernest wishes to unify - >>>> smile), I often find myself needing to help elementary school >>>> teachers realize there are actually substantial and observable >>>> differences (and substantial similarities) between teaching reading >>>> and teaching mathematics and, for sundry reasons, they tend to >>>> favor something like the former and cause their students some >>>> anguish in the learning of mathematics as time passes. Hmm, I guess >>>> I am asking whether the unit of the analysis can, in effect, be the >>>> 'world' or should it be, so to speak, among the 'minimum' relevant >>>> prototypes. It seems that it would be somewhat worthless otherwise >>>> (again similarities are important). >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> On Oct 23, 2014, at 3:57 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Paul Ernest has a position on the unit of analysis for mathematics >>>>> teaching: >>>>> http://www.esri.mmu.ac.uk/mect/papers_11/Ernest.pdf >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Julian Williams wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Andy: >>>>>> >>>>>> Now I feel we are nearly together, here. There is no 'final' form >>>>>> even of simple arithmetic, because it is (as social practices >>>>>> are) continually evolving. >>>>>> >>>>>> Just one more step then: our conversation with the 7 year old >>>>>> child about the truth of 7plus 4 equals 10 is a part of this >>>>>> social practice, and contributes to it....? The event involved in >>>>>> this Perezhivanie here involves a situation that is created by >>>>>> the joint activity of the child with us? >>>>>> >>>>>> Peg: Germ cell for the social practice of mathematics... I wonder >>>>>> if there is a problem with Davydov's approach, in that it >>>>>> requires a specification of the final form of the mathematics to >>>>>> be learnt (a closed curriculum). But let me try: One candidate >>>>>> might be the 'reasoned justification for a mathematical >>>>>> use/application to our project' ... Implies meaningful verbal >>>>>> thought/interaction, and collective mathematical activity with >>>>>> others. Not sure how this works to define your curriculum content >>>>>> etc. >>>>>> >>>>>> Julian >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 23 Oct 2014, at 16:28, "Peg Griffin" wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> And thus the importance of finding a good germ cell for >>>>>>> mathematics pedagogy >>>>>>> -- because a germ cell can "grow with" and "grow" the current >>>>>>> "social >>>>>>> practice of mathematics." Whether someone agrees with the choice >>>>>>> of germ >>>>>>> cell made by Davidov (or anyone else), a germ cell needs to be >>>>>>> identified, >>>>>>> justified and relied on to generate curriculum content and >>>>>>> practice, right? >>>>>>> PG >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Oct 24 11:43:39 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 11:43:39 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Brown University: Assistant Professor Position in Social Psychology In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Melissa Koenig Date: Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 10:46 AM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Brown University: Assistant Professor Position in Social Psychology To: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org Please see below on behalf of Dave Sobel. Assistant Professor Position in Social Psychology The Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences (CLPS) invites applications for a tenure-track Assistant Professor position in Social Psychology, beginning July 1, 2015. Research focus is open, but we especially value programs of research that cross traditional boundaries of topics and methodology. Successful candidates have (1) a track record of excellence in research, (2) a well-specified research plan that is likely to lead to research funding, (3) a readiness to contribute to undergraduate and graduate teaching and mentoring, and (4) the ability to connect to other areas of the CLPS department. All Ph.D. requirements must be completed beforeJuly 1, 2015. Following the integration of the Department of Psychology and the Department of Cognitive and Linguistic Sciences in 2010, the new CLPS department moved into a dedicated state-of-the-art building in the heart of campus. The department offers a highly interdisciplinary research environment in the study of mind, brain, behavior, and language. Strong connections also exist to the Brown Institute of Brain Sciences and the Humanity-Centered Robotics Initiative. Curriculum vitae, publication reprints and preprints of most recent work, a maximum two-page statement of research, a one-page statement of teaching, and three letters of reference should be submitted on-line as PDFs to http://apply.interfolio.com/26542. Applications received by November 15 are assured full review. Position will be open until filled. Qualifications PhD requirements must be completed before July 1, 2015. Application Instructions Curriculum vitae, publication reprints and preprints of most recent work, a maximum two-page statement of research, a one-page statement of teaching, and three letters of reference should be submitted on-line as PDFs to http://apply.interfolio.com/26542. Brown University is committed to fostering a diverse and inclusive academic global community; as an EEO/AA employer, Brown considers applicants for employment without regard to, and does not discriminate on the basis of, gender, race, protected veteran status, disability, or any other legally protected status. -- Melissa Koenig Associate Professor Institute of Child Development University of Minnesota Minneapolis, MN 55455 (o) 612-625-6251 Lab: http://www.cehd.umn.edu/icd/research/elel/default.html _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From ewall@umich.edu Fri Oct 24 21:22:06 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2014 23:22:06 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net> Message-ID: <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> Andy Apologies, I thought the triangle and its variations were somewhat common knowledge on xmca. Anyway, what you say is what Ernest is 'using' as a unit of analysis. He assumes that, as most, what is critical is the dialogical. By the way that the text (written large or small) is mathematical doesn't make the teaching/learning mathematical. Actually, I rather like the idea of basic characteristics (I tend to do hermeneutic phenomenology) and really find the idea of 'smallest' troubling. I have, in a sense, been thinking about something like a unit of analysis for mathematics teaching for some time and to go into that in detail as it spans a number of papers would be a bit much. However, let me say a bit why I need a 'smaller' unit. I'll take this from a paper I'm working on so perhaps all this will make somewhat more sense. Let me tell a story (this story is more or less true, but it is intended as a case in point than data): > Ms. Pe?a has, in previous years, noticed that her fourth graders, at times, struggle to make sense of multi-step word problems. Many seem confused about both the nature of the required operations?most usually, addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division?or the order in which these operations are to be applied. Today she has put together an activity which she hopes will alleviate their difficulties. She begins by writing the following problem on the board Pedro has five dollars. He wants to buy 6 pens. If each pen costs 80 cents apiece and he buys 6, how much money will he have left? She asks Elvina to read the problem. Noticing that several students have their pencils out and are writing on paper, she admonishes them saying, ?Put down your pencils and listen.? After Elvina reads the problem, Ms. Pe?a points out that it is a two-step word problem. She asks the her students to say the word and then, asking for a definition of two-step, calls on Jorge. Jorge replies that two-step means ?More than one step.? Ms. Pe?a restates writing the word operation on the board, ?A two-step problem is a word problem where there is more than one operation? and she gives possible arithmetic examples. She then calls on her students to identify the operations in this word problem. After some discussion, the students identify multiplication?that is, multiply the number of pens by eighty cents?and subtraction?that is, subtract that product from five dollars. She tells her students they?herself and the class?will be solving two step problems; that is, problems that usually require more than one operation. Then, after checking to make sure that her students understand the term operation, ]s. In summary Ms. Pe?a writes and speaks 80? $5.00 x 6 -$4.80 ------- ------- $4.80 20? Ms. Pe?a then divides her class into four groups and giving each group a slightly different two-step problem sets them to work. As students work, she circulates reminding each group that there are two-steps and that they need to identify the operations comprising these steps. Towards the end of the period she has each group diagram their solutions on provided chart paper. As class comes to a close, Tanil raises her hand. ?Couldn?t you just subtract? Y?know, subtract six times.? > Note my story has a number of basic characteristics which include for instance, managing those bodily senses relevant to a mathematics problem, producing meaning from a mathematics problem, and developing a view of a mathematics problem that is shared by a community. Most of the teachers I work with and a number of people in mathematics education would agree that this is an exemplar for 'teaching' making sense (one could argue that it is actually impossible to teach a student how to make sense although a student can learn how to do so) in an elementary school mathematical classroom (I happen to think it is a thoughtful lesson, but). The problem is that this is more of a literacy lesson than a mathematics lesson and, on purpose, I picked Tanil to indicate this. Mathematics is, in a sense, the science of patterns and this is the very thing this lesson is not about. The pattern, by the way, is 'profit' minus 'loss' not a series of two-, three-, or four-steps. However, the triad seems to be too coarse for to pick this 'omission' up and in my next story (in the paper) I show 'word' and 'phrase' seem to be too coarse also (somewhat against Halliday, one might say). I could perhaps use something to do with patterns like Davydov uses comparisons in length, but this for various reasons doesn't seem quite right (although that may be because I am still not sure about a 'unit of analysis'). In the third section of the paper you might say I make a suggestion for a unit of analysis. I have some ideas, but none sufficiently argued that I wish to publicly put in print (smile). Why do I care? The best I can say is that as a teacher of teachers it is very disconcerting to think, "Well, it strikes me what you are doing bears very little relationship to the teaching of mathematics" and be unable to create a context which is jointly meaningful within which my gut feelings as a teacher of elementary school mathematics can be respectfully, coherently, and helpfully expressed. perhaps to put it another way, the people I work with are serious and talented, but they haven't thought some things through nor have they been given the opportunity to do so. Ed On Oct 24, 2014, at 1:24 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I see. > The text which is makes up the third point of the triangle with the teacher and student is in this case a mathematical text, yes? So for example, completely different problems arise than would arise in the case of reading a story or some other piece of writing. I can see the idea that that teacher-text-pupil relation is an archetype for a whole range of teaching. In itself, it certainly doesn't tell you anything distinctive about teaching mathematics in particular. I think you need to turn to other units specific to different topics being taught. > > Different units give different insights. For example, Vygotsky used word meaning while Bakhtin used utterance. Utterance is a much larger unit than word meaning, but it proves useful for providing insights into communication and handling the framing and context, whilst word meaning is useful for understanding concepts and the development of conceptual thought. Davydov's germ cell in which two objects are compared in length is an elementary act of abstraction, and therefore captures the idea of quantity, which should take a student to the point of grasping the general idea of mathematical text and abstracting quantities from real situations. But that doesn't really do for the whole subject or tell you anything about the teacher-pupil relation. > > I would not get obsessed on this phrase: "possessing all the basic characteristics of the whole." That phrase can lead you up a blind alley. I think it originates from Engestrom's 1987 book: ?a viable root model of human activity ... [must be] the smallest unit that still preserves the essential unity and quality behind any complex activity," which is somewhat more precise than the phrase you have used, but can still lead to misconceptions. The interpretation "possessing all the basic characteristics of the whole," leads to a logical circle: which characteristics are essential, which characteristics are basic? > > You need to form a concept of teaching mathematics. > > Perhaps you could elaborate a little, Ed, on your ideas for a unit of analysis for mathematics teaching? Why do you need a smaller unit? > > Andy > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Ed Wall wrote: >> Andy >> >> The paper ("The Unit of Analysis in Mathematics Education") is about unifying branches of mathematical education research: nature and philosophy of mathematics, teaching of mathematics, learning of mathematics, and sociology of mathematics (this last something he has promoted for a number of years) under one unit of analysis (i.e. collaborative projects). Insofar as the section on mathematics teaching goes he just says the triad (and he fleshes it out a bit) isn't controversial so I wouldn't say he is always 'critically' reviewing, but that may be a matter of opinion. My question isn't directed at Ernest, but at you. I'm interested in the very idea of a unit of analysis possessing all the basic characteristics of the whole. The problem I am having with all varieties of the triad is that they seem yet too 'large'; i.e. in a sense the grain size is too large to, one might say, pick up the mathematical flavor that differentiates mathematics teaching from, say, reading teaching. So it would seem that the choice of the unit of analysis also needs to be done in a minimal fashion? Without such a unit of analysis, I find myself unable to talk usefully and coherently with my students about what I observe that is mathematically problematic (and I don't mean mistakes) in their planning and teaching of mathematics. There are times, unfortunately, when it appears I am viewing a well thought-out reading or grammar lesson. >> Anyway I doubt whether mathematics is unique in this regard and that teachers of all stripes aren't having similar problems with such units of analysis. >> >> Ed >> >> On Oct 23, 2014, at 9:41 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> Ed, Paul may quote me, but I actually know little about his work or mathematics education itself. >>> But isn't he discussing a number of different proposals for a unit of analysis for mathematics teaching, one of which is the one you refer to. I take it that he is critically reviewing all such proposals before making his own proposal. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Ed Wall wrote: >>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> The paper seems to be about unifying mathematics education research. Parts are a bit open to debate (especially arguments concerning the 'nature' of mathematics) and Ernest tends to somewhat gloss over this. However that is not relevant and you are correct Ernest does, among other things, put forth a unit of analysis for mathematics teaching which, as he admits is simplified for the purposes of the paper; i.e. the usual triad of teacher, student, and text (which is hardly unique to Ernest as he notes). At this point I have a question that I've been pondering about concerning such triads and their elaborations (and this goes back in a sense to things Schwab said elsewhere - the Schwab he quotes in the beginning of his paper) and, as he quotes you heavily, I will ask you: If this triad is indeed a prototype of mathematics teaching (i.e. posses all the basic characteristics of the whole), what makes this a prototype of mathematics teaching and not a prototype of, say, the >>>> teaching of reading? This is not a spurious question since, as a mathematics educator (of the type that Ernest wishes to unify - smile), I often find myself needing to help elementary school teachers realize there are actually substantial and observable differences (and substantial similarities) between teaching reading and teaching mathematics and, for sundry reasons, they tend to favor something like the former and cause their students some anguish in the learning of mathematics as time passes. Hmm, I guess I am asking whether the unit of the analysis can, in effect, be the 'world' or should it be, so to speak, among the 'minimum' relevant prototypes. It seems that it would be somewhat worthless otherwise (again similarities are important). >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> On Oct 23, 2014, at 3:57 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Paul Ernest has a position on the unit of analysis for mathematics teaching: >>>>> http://www.esri.mmu.ac.uk/mect/papers_11/Ernest.pdf >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Julian Williams wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Andy: >>>>>> >>>>>> Now I feel we are nearly together, here. There is no 'final' form even of simple arithmetic, because it is (as social practices are) continually evolving. >>>>>> >>>>>> Just one more step then: our conversation with the 7 year old child about the truth of 7plus 4 equals 10 is a part of this social practice, and contributes to it....? The event involved in this Perezhivanie here involves a situation that is created by the joint activity of the child with us? >>>>>> >>>>>> Peg: Germ cell for the social practice of mathematics... I wonder if there is a problem with Davydov's approach, in that it requires a specification of the final form of the mathematics to be learnt (a closed curriculum). But let me try: One candidate might be the 'reasoned justification for a mathematical use/application to our project' ... Implies meaningful verbal thought/interaction, and collective mathematical activity with others. Not sure how this works to define your curriculum content etc. >>>>>> >>>>>> Julian >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 23 Oct 2014, at 16:28, "Peg Griffin" wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> And thus the importance of finding a good germ cell for mathematics pedagogy >>>>>>> -- because a germ cell can "grow with" and "grow" the current "social >>>>>>> practice of mathematics." Whether someone agrees with the choice of germ >>>>>>> cell made by Davidov (or anyone else), a germ cell needs to be identified, >>>>>>> justified and relied on to generate curriculum content and practice, right? >>>>>>> PG >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> > > From ablunden@mira.net Fri Oct 24 21:43:10 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 25 Oct 2014 15:43:10 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net> <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> Message-ID: <544B2A5E.3010006@mira.net> Thanks for this, Ed. Could make more explicit for me the point you are making in this example? What happened or failed to happen? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Ed Wall wrote: > Andy > > Apologies, I thought the triangle and its variations were somewhat common knowledge on xmca. Anyway, what you say is what Ernest is 'using' as a unit of analysis. He assumes that, as most, what is critical is the dialogical. > > By the way that the text (written large or small) is mathematical doesn't make the teaching/learning mathematical. > > Actually, I rather like the idea of basic characteristics (I tend to do hermeneutic phenomenology) and really find the idea of 'smallest' troubling. > > I have, in a sense, been thinking about something like a unit of analysis for mathematics teaching for some time and to go into that in detail as it spans a number of papers would be a bit much. However, let me say a bit why I need a 'smaller' unit. I'll take this from a paper I'm working on so perhaps all this will make somewhat more sense. Let me tell a story (this story is more or less true, but it is intended as a case in point than data): > > > > Ms. Pe?a has, in previous years, noticed that her fourth graders, at times, struggle to make sense of multi-step word problems. Many seem confused about both the nature of the required operations?most usually, addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division?or the order in which these operations are to be applied. Today she has put together an activity which she hopes will alleviate their difficulties. She begins by writing the following problem on the board > > Pedro has five dollars. He wants to buy 6 pens. If each pen costs 80 cents apiece and he buys 6, how much money will he have left? > > She asks Elvina to read the problem. Noticing that several students have their pencils out and are writing on paper, she admonishes them saying, ?Put down your pencils and listen.? After Elvina reads the problem, Ms. Pe?a points out that it is a two-step word problem. She asks the her students to say the word and then, asking for a definition of two-step, calls on Jorge. Jorge replies that two-step means ?More than one step.? Ms. Pe?a restates writing the word operation on the board, ?A two-step problem is a word problem where there is more than one operation? and she gives possible arithmetic examples. She then calls on her students to identify the operations in this word problem. After some discussion, the students identify multiplication?that is, multiply the number of pens by eighty cents?and subtraction?that is, subtract that product from five dollars. > > She tells her students they?herself and the class?will be solving two step problems; that is, problems that usually require more than one operation. Then, after checking to make sure that her students understand the term operation, ]s. In summary Ms. Pe?a writes and speaks > > 80? $5.00 > x 6 -$4.80 > ------- ------- > $4.80 20? > > Ms. Pe?a then divides her class into four groups and giving each group a slightly different two-step problem sets them to work. As students work, she circulates reminding each group that there are two-steps and that they need to identify the operations comprising these steps. Towards the end of the period she has each group diagram their solutions on provided chart paper. > > As class comes to a close, Tanil raises her hand. ?Couldn?t you just subtract? Y?know, subtract six times.? > > > > Note my story has a number of basic characteristics which include for instance, managing those bodily senses relevant to a mathematics problem, producing meaning from a mathematics problem, and developing a view of a mathematics problem that is shared by a community. > > Most of the teachers I work with and a number of people in mathematics education would agree that this is an exemplar for 'teaching' making sense (one could argue that it is actually impossible to teach a student how to make sense although a student can learn how to do so) in an elementary school mathematical classroom (I happen to think it is a thoughtful lesson, but). The problem is that this is more of a literacy lesson than a mathematics lesson and, on purpose, I picked Tanil to indicate this. Mathematics is, in a sense, the science of patterns and this is the very thing this lesson is not about. The pattern, by the way, is 'profit' minus 'loss' not a series of two-, three-, or four-steps. However, the triad seems to be too coarse for to pick this 'omission' up and in my next story (in the paper) I show 'word' and 'phrase' seem to be too coarse also (somewhat against Halliday, one might say). I could perhaps use something to do with patterns like Davydov uses comparisons in length, but this for various reasons doesn't seem quite right (although that may be because I am still not sure about a 'unit of analysis'). In the third section of the paper you might say I make a suggestion for a unit of analysis. I have some ideas, but none sufficiently argued that I wish to publicly put in print (smile). > Why do I care? The best I can say is that as a teacher of teachers it is very disconcerting to think, "Well, it strikes me what you are doing bears very little relationship to the teaching of mathematics" and be unable to create a context which is jointly meaningful within which my gut feelings as a teacher of elementary school mathematics can be respectfully, coherently, and helpfully expressed. perhaps to put it another way, the people I work with are serious and talented, but they haven't thought some things through nor have they been given the opportunity to do so. > > > > > > Ed > > On Oct 24, 2014, at 1:24 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > From ewall@umich.edu Fri Oct 24 23:26:50 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sat, 25 Oct 2014 01:26:50 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <544B2A5E.3010006@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net> <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <544B2A5E.3010006@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy It wasn't, in a sense, a mathematics lesson. Mathematics is, in a sense, the science of patterns. Part of its usefulness is in reproducing generalized patterns 'accurately'. A child might after experiencing this lesson begin to think that one masters one-step problems, then two-step problems, three-step and so on. That, I think, is a rather depressing and inaccurate image of mathematics and one that many children experience and buy into (I can think of a *lot* of examples). Also, you might take Tanil's comment as indicating that, in fact, the proposed taxonomy is ambiguous as this could also be a one-step or a six-step problem. Categorizing it as two-step significantly impacts the possibly of alternate techniques of solution. Making sense mathematically would entail recognizing a pattern and generalizing it. Tanil has an inkling of this and has produced a possibly productive 'counter-example' to the proposed taxonomy. There are a few other problems here that I take up in the second part of the paper (this one I don't actually take up until the third); this is one of the easiest to explain. Ed On Oct 24, 2014, at 11:43 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Thanks for this, Ed. > Could make more explicit for me the point you are making in this example? What happened or failed to happen? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Ed Wall wrote: >> Andy >> >> Apologies, I thought the triangle and its variations were somewhat common knowledge on xmca. Anyway, what you say is what Ernest is 'using' as a unit of analysis. He assumes that, as most, what is critical is the dialogical. >> >> By the way that the text (written large or small) is mathematical doesn't make the teaching/learning mathematical. >> >> Actually, I rather like the idea of basic characteristics (I tend to do hermeneutic phenomenology) and really find the idea of 'smallest' troubling. >> >> I have, in a sense, been thinking about something like a unit of analysis for mathematics teaching for some time and to go into that in detail as it spans a number of papers would be a bit much. However, let me say a bit why I need a 'smaller' unit. I'll take this from a paper I'm working on so perhaps all this will make somewhat more sense. Let me tell a story (this story is more or less true, but it is intended as a case in point than data): >> >> Ms. Pe?a has, in previous years, noticed that her fourth graders, at times, struggle to make sense of multi-step word problems. Many seem confused about both the nature of the required operations?most usually, addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division?or the order in which these operations are to be applied. Today she has put together an activity which she hopes will alleviate their difficulties. She begins by writing the following problem on the board >> >> Pedro has five dollars. He wants to buy 6 pens. If each pen costs 80 cents apiece and he buys 6, how much money will he have left? >> >> She asks Elvina to read the problem. Noticing that several students have their pencils out and are writing on paper, she admonishes them saying, ?Put down your pencils and listen.? After Elvina reads the problem, Ms. Pe?a points out that it is a two-step word problem. She asks the her students to say the word and then, asking for a definition of two-step, calls on Jorge. Jorge replies that two-step means ?More than one step.? Ms. Pe?a restates writing the word operation on the board, ?A two-step problem is a word problem where there is more than one operation? and she gives possible arithmetic examples. She then calls on her students to identify the operations in this word problem. After some discussion, the students identify multiplication?that is, multiply the number of pens by eighty cents?and subtraction?that is, subtract that product from five dollars. >> >> She tells her students they?herself and the class?will be solving two step problems; that is, problems that usually require more than one operation. Then, after checking to make sure that her students understand the term operation, ]s. In summary Ms. Pe?a writes and speaks >> >> 80? $5.00 >> x 6 -$4.80 >> ------- ------- >> $4.80 20? >> >> Ms. Pe?a then divides her class into four groups and giving each group a slightly different two-step problem sets them to work. As students work, she circulates reminding each group that there are two-steps and that they need to identify the operations comprising these steps. Towards the end of the period she has each group diagram their solutions on provided chart paper. >> >> As class comes to a close, Tanil raises her hand. ?Couldn?t you just subtract? Y?know, subtract six times.? >> >> >> Note my story has a number of basic characteristics which include for instance, managing those bodily senses relevant to a mathematics problem, producing meaning from a mathematics problem, and developing a view of a mathematics problem that is shared by a community. >> >> Most of the teachers I work with and a number of people in mathematics education would agree that this is an exemplar for 'teaching' making sense (one could argue that it is actually impossible to teach a student how to make sense although a student can learn how to do so) in an elementary school mathematical classroom (I happen to think it is a thoughtful lesson, but). The problem is that this is more of a literacy lesson than a mathematics lesson and, on purpose, I picked Tanil to indicate this. Mathematics is, in a sense, the science of patterns and this is the very thing this lesson is not about. The pattern, by the way, is 'profit' minus 'loss' not a series of two-, three-, or four-steps. However, the triad seems to be too coarse for to pick this 'omission' up and in my next story (in the paper) I show 'word' and 'phrase' seem to be too coarse also (somewhat against Halliday, one might say). I could perhaps use something to do with patterns like Davydov uses comparisons in length, but this for various reasons doesn't seem quite right (although that may be because I am still not sure about a 'unit of analysis'). In the third section of the paper you might say I make a suggestion for a unit of analysis. I have some ideas, but none sufficiently argued that I wish to publicly put in print (smile). Why do I care? The best I can say is that as a teacher of teachers it is very disconcerting to think, "Well, it strikes me what you are doing bears very little relationship to the teaching of mathematics" and be unable to create a context which is jointly meaningful within which my gut feelings as a teacher of elementary school mathematics can be respectfully, coherently, and helpfully expressed. perhaps to put it another way, the people I work with are serious and talented, but they haven't thought some things through nor have they been given the opportunity to do so. >> >> >> >> >> Ed >> >> On Oct 24, 2014, at 1:24 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> > > > From ablunden@mira.net Fri Oct 24 23:54:00 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 25 Oct 2014 17:54:00 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net> <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <544B2A5E.3010006@mira.net> Message-ID: <544B4908.2010809@mira.net> But isn't it the case that Tanil hasn't grasped that repeated subtraction (or addition) is multiplication? S/he didn't see the pattern which she should have recognised as an instance of multiplication? Aside from that: speaking as a novice in this area, isn't it the case that there are two distinct processes involved in doing mathematics, being able to abstract the "mathematical problem" from a situation, and being able to correctly manipulate the symbols to solve the problem. I gather it is the first which is the focus here. Yes? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Ed Wall wrote: > Andy > > It wasn't, in a sense, a mathematics lesson. Mathematics is, in a sense, the science of patterns. Part of its usefulness is in reproducing generalized patterns 'accurately'. A child might after experiencing this lesson begin to think that one masters one-step problems, then two-step problems, three-step and so on. That, I think, is a rather depressing and inaccurate image of mathematics and one that many children experience and buy into (I can think of a *lot* of examples). Also, you might take Tanil's comment as indicating that, in fact, the proposed taxonomy is ambiguous as this could also be a one-step or a six-step problem. Categorizing it as two-step significantly impacts the possibly of alternate techniques of solution. > Making sense mathematically would entail recognizing a pattern and generalizing it. Tanil has an inkling of this and has produced a possibly productive 'counter-example' to the proposed taxonomy. There are a few other problems here that I take up in the second part of the paper (this one I don't actually take up until the third); this is one of the easiest to explain. > > Ed > > On Oct 24, 2014, at 11:43 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Thanks for this, Ed. >> Could make more explicit for me the point you are making in this example? What happened or failed to happen? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Ed Wall wrote: >> >>> Andy >>> >>> Apologies, I thought the triangle and its variations were somewhat common knowledge on xmca. Anyway, what you say is what Ernest is 'using' as a unit of analysis. He assumes that, as most, what is critical is the dialogical. >>> >>> By the way that the text (written large or small) is mathematical doesn't make the teaching/learning mathematical. >>> >>> Actually, I rather like the idea of basic characteristics (I tend to do hermeneutic phenomenology) and really find the idea of 'smallest' troubling. >>> >>> I have, in a sense, been thinking about something like a unit of analysis for mathematics teaching for some time and to go into that in detail as it spans a number of papers would be a bit much. However, let me say a bit why I need a 'smaller' unit. I'll take this from a paper I'm working on so perhaps all this will make somewhat more sense. Let me tell a story (this story is more or less true, but it is intended as a case in point than data): >>> >>> Ms. Pe?a has, in previous years, noticed that her fourth graders, at times, struggle to make sense of multi-step word problems. Many seem confused about both the nature of the required operations?most usually, addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division?or the order in which these operations are to be applied. Today she has put together an activity which she hopes will alleviate their difficulties. She begins by writing the following problem on the board >>> >>> Pedro has five dollars. He wants to buy 6 pens. If each pen costs 80 cents apiece and he buys 6, how much money will he have left? >>> >>> She asks Elvina to read the problem. Noticing that several students have their pencils out and are writing on paper, she admonishes them saying, ?Put down your pencils and listen.? After Elvina reads the problem, Ms. Pe?a points out that it is a two-step word problem. She asks the her students to say the word and then, asking for a definition of two-step, calls on Jorge. Jorge replies that two-step means ?More than one step.? Ms. Pe?a restates writing the word operation on the board, ?A two-step problem is a word problem where there is more than one operation? and she gives possible arithmetic examples. She then calls on her students to identify the operations in this word problem. After some discussion, the students identify multiplication?that is, multiply the number of pens by eighty cents?and subtraction?that is, subtract that product from five dollars. >>> >>> She tells her students they?herself and the class?will be solving two step problems; that is, problems that usually require more than one operation. Then, after checking to make sure that her students understand the term operation, ]s. In summary Ms. Pe?a writes and speaks >>> >>> 80? $5.00 >>> x 6 -$4.80 >>> ------- ------- >>> $4.80 20? >>> >>> Ms. Pe?a then divides her class into four groups and giving each group a slightly different two-step problem sets them to work. As students work, she circulates reminding each group that there are two-steps and that they need to identify the operations comprising these steps. Towards the end of the period she has each group diagram their solutions on provided chart paper. >>> >>> As class comes to a close, Tanil raises her hand. ?Couldn?t you just subtract? Y?know, subtract six times.? >>> >>> >>> Note my story has a number of basic characteristics which include for instance, managing those bodily senses relevant to a mathematics problem, producing meaning from a mathematics problem, and developing a view of a mathematics problem that is shared by a community. >>> >>> Most of the teachers I work with and a number of people in mathematics education would agree that this is an exemplar for 'teaching' making sense (one could argue that it is actually impossible to teach a student how to make sense although a student can learn how to do so) in an elementary school mathematical classroom (I happen to think it is a thoughtful lesson, but). The problem is that this is more of a literacy lesson than a mathematics lesson and, on purpose, I picked Tanil to indicate this. Mathematics is, in a sense, the science of patterns and this is the very thing this lesson is not about. The pattern, by the way, is 'profit' minus 'loss' not a series of two-, three-, or four-steps. However, the triad seems to be too coarse for to pick this 'omission' up and in my next story (in the paper) I show 'word' and 'phrase' seem to be too coarse also (somewhat against Halliday, one might say). I could perhaps use something to do with patterns like Davydov uses comparisons in length, but this for various reasons doesn't seem quite right (although that may be because I am still not sure about a 'unit of analysis'). In the third section of the paper you might say I make a suggestion for a unit of analysis. I have some ideas, but none sufficiently argued that I wish to publicly put in print (smile). Why do I care? The best I can say is that as a teacher of teachers it is very disconcerting to think, "Well, it strikes me what you are doing bears very little relationship to the teaching of mathematics" and be unable to create a context which is jointly meaningful within which my gut feelings as a teacher of elementary school mathematics can be respectfully, coherently, and helpfully expressed. perhaps to put it another way, the people I work with are serious and talented, but they haven't thought some things through nor have they been given the opportunity to do so. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> On Oct 24, 2014, at 1:24 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > > From samuel.veissiere@mcgill.ca Sat Oct 25 11:09:06 2014 From: samuel.veissiere@mcgill.ca (=?Windows-1252?Q?Samuel_Paul_Louis_Veissi=E8re=2C_Dr?=) Date: Sat, 25 Oct 2014 18:09:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] CFP: SfAA 2015: Why do Social and Environmental Problems Persist? Critical Perspectives on Ritual, Practice, and Cognition Message-ID: Hello all, We are looking for one more paper for our panel on Ritual at the SfAA 2015 (Pittsburg). Any takers? Cheers Samuel Samuel Veissi?re, PhD Visiting Professor | Transcultural Psychiatry, Cognitive Science, & Anthropology Department of Psychiatry | Department of Anthropology | McGill University 1033 Pine Avenue West - Room 103 |Montreal, Quebec | H3A 1Y1 Tel: (514) 506-7094 | Fax: (514) 375-2498 Email: samuel.veissiere@mcgill.ca SfAA 2015: Why do Social and Environmental Problems Persist? Critical Perspectives on Ritual, Practice, and Cognition In this panel, we engage with Bourdieu?s notion of practice and habitus to theorize persisting social and environmental problems as ?neither the exclusive product of free will nor of underlying principles, but [as] actively constructed from social actors from cultural dispositions and structured by previous events? (Bourdieu, 2012). Problems like racism, xenophobia, environmental degradation, or unwillingness to address individual and collective responsibilities in the crisis of the Anthropocene, as such, can be theorized as ?institutional facts?. They are, in John Searle?s (2001) terms, beliefs and practices, which, like money, marriages or nation states, only exist because we implicitly agree to believe in them and reenact them through practice. Could it be, as Boyer & Li?nard (2006) suggested in their re-reading of Rappaport?s (1979) ?obvious aspects of ritual?, that collective behaviour is driven by a phylogenetically evolved propensity for compulsion, rigidity, redundancy, and reiteration, regardless of the ?content? of belief and action? Are social and environmental problems forms of ritual? Doxa? Do they stem from reflective beliefs that become intuitive? We seek ethnographically or experimentally grounded case studies that critically discuss how such abstractions as ?power?, ?discourse?, "ideology" or ?collective representations? that are usually theorized as causal variables in socio-environmental problems are enacted by ordinary people through ordinary action. We are particularly interested in papers that discuss how problematic forms of action are learned implicitly and imitatively through infra-linguistic, minimally representational cues. Only by addressing this learning process, we argue, can we work toward resignification and social change from the ground up. Works cited: Bourdieu, Pierre- ?An Anthropology of Practice,? in ed. Jerry D. Moore, Visions of Culture: an Introduction to Anthropological Theories and Theorists. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press, 2012. pp. 325-342 Li?nard, Pierre & Pascal Boyer, ?Whence Collective Rituals? A Cultural Selection Model of Ritualized Behavior.? American Anthropologist, 108(4): 2006. pp. 814-827 Rappaport, Roy A. Ecology, Meaning and Religion. 1979. Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books Searle, John, ?Chapter Two: Creating Institutional Facts,? in The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free Press, 1995. pp. 31-57 Panel organizers: Samuel Veissi?re (McGill) and Frank Muttenzer (McGill/Luzern) Papers: ?Frank Muttenzer (McGill/Luzern) - How ritual contributes to the creation and persistence of ideology: the case of Vezo foragers and coastal reef degradation in southwest Madagascar Samuel Veissi?re (McGill). Kids and Kinds in Mind and Culture: Racism and Sexism as Enskillment Monika Barbe (Mcgill) . Learning Race, Class, and Gender in a Peruvian Household Melissa Maldonado-Salcedo (CUNY), The (Narcissistic) Mother of the Nation wears Black: Cristina Kirchner and Argentina?s ?problem? with ambivalent Sexism From ewall@umich.edu Sat Oct 25 11:19:57 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sat, 25 Oct 2014 13:19:57 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <544B4908.2010809@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net> <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <544B2A5E.3010006@mira.net> <544B4908.2010809@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy Tanil's comment is at the end of the lesson after she together with her peers have, in effect, given their explanations and after the teacher has used multiplication in her initial demonstration. While your interpretation is possible, an reasonable alternate interpretation would be Tanil is indeed aware that multiplication is a possibility, but so is repeated subtraction (however, she may not realize the mathematical equivalence: i.e. -.80 - .80 - .80 -.80 -.80 -.80 = -4.80 for obvious reasons). Multiplication, by the way, is not necessarily part of the pattern I was pointing at. I think the teacher has both the processes you mention in mind. However, there is a sense in which the work of abstracting (although they are not 'abstracting', but making 'concrete') is presented as decoding and the work of manipulating is presented as filling in a template. I don't necessarily have a problem with 'making sense' being 'do what I do' (i.e. there is a place for mimesis in teaching/learning), but again I would want to complicate such a lesson for a teacher who so argued. I think you said something about the social practice of mathematics evolving. It might be difficult to participate 'socially' in such evolution in such a classroom. Perhaps a story will help convey what I am pointing at: A number of years ago I was teaching a somewhat advanced mathematics class. One of my students was failing and he complained, "You never give the same problems for homework! In my other classes we always had a lot of practice and once I learned how to do a problem I got good grades." I explained to him that while each one of a particular set of problems looked textually different, they all referenced a pattern we had recently discussed in class. Yes, seeing patterns is difficult for a novice, but that is true in any field. However with the appropriate experiences there is the possibility of one 'evolving' to later stages of expertise. If you are asking about my focus. I have both of your processes in mind (although conceptualized a bit differently - see 'abstraction' above) and quite a bit more. However, I want to emphasize I am not engaging in the paper in a critique of this teacher (I did that only to try to answer your question "why" ), but, you might say, engaged in trying to iterate a 'smallest' unit of analysis. Making sense is worked on in a certain way in this classroom and I find that interesting. My gut feeling (as a mathematics teacher and doer of mathematics) is there is the possibility of 'more' to such work. The question I have for myself is can I characterize (and I have chosen to do the characterization hermeneutically) this 'more' in a respectful, coherent, and useful fashion. So the important point is, for this teacher, teaching 'making sense' seems to include teaching students how to manage those bodily senses relevant to a mathematics problem, how to produce meaning from a mathematics problem, and how to develop a view of a mathematics problem that is shared by a community (these somewhat reflect the processes you mention, which are not unimportant, but neither are those processes necessarily 'mathematical'). In the next section of the paper, I question this viewpoint of mine so as to iterate. Ed On Oct 25, 2014, at 1:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > But isn't it the case that Tanil hasn't grasped that repeated subtraction (or addition) is multiplication? S/he didn't see the pattern which she should have recognised as an instance of multiplication? > > Aside from that: speaking as a novice in this area, isn't it the case that there are two distinct processes involved in doing mathematics, being able to abstract the "mathematical problem" from a situation, and being able to correctly manipulate the symbols to solve the problem. I gather it is the first which is the focus here. Yes? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Ed Wall wrote: >> Andy >> >> It wasn't, in a sense, a mathematics lesson. Mathematics is, in a sense, the science of patterns. Part of its usefulness is in reproducing generalized patterns 'accurately'. A child might after experiencing this lesson begin to think that one masters one-step problems, then two-step problems, three-step and so on. That, I think, is a rather depressing and inaccurate image of mathematics and one that many children experience and buy into (I can think of a *lot* of examples). Also, you might take Tanil's comment as indicating that, in fact, the proposed taxonomy is ambiguous as this could also be a one-step or a six-step problem. Categorizing it as two-step significantly impacts the possibly of alternate techniques of solution. Making sense mathematically would entail recognizing a pattern and generalizing it. Tanil has an inkling of this and has produced a possibly productive 'counter-example' to the proposed taxonomy. There are a few other problems here that I take up in the second part of the paper (this one I don't actually take up until the third); this is one of the easiest to explain. >> >> Ed >> >> On Oct 24, 2014, at 11:43 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> Thanks for this, Ed. >>> Could make more explicit for me the point you are making in this example? What happened or failed to happen? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Ed Wall wrote: >>> >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> Apologies, I thought the triangle and its variations were somewhat common knowledge on xmca. Anyway, what you say is what Ernest is 'using' as a unit of analysis. He assumes that, as most, what is critical is the dialogical. >>>> >>>> By the way that the text (written large or small) is mathematical doesn't make the teaching/learning mathematical. >>>> >>>> Actually, I rather like the idea of basic characteristics (I tend to do hermeneutic phenomenology) and really find the idea of 'smallest' troubling. >>>> >>>> I have, in a sense, been thinking about something like a unit of analysis for mathematics teaching for some time and to go into that in detail as it spans a number of papers would be a bit much. However, let me say a bit why I need a 'smaller' unit. I'll take this from a paper I'm working on so perhaps all this will make somewhat more sense. Let me tell a story (this story is more or less true, but it is intended as a case in point than data): >>>> >>>> Ms. Pe?a has, in previous years, noticed that her fourth graders, at times, struggle to make sense of multi-step word problems. Many seem confused about both the nature of the required operations?most usually, addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division?or the order in which these operations are to be applied. Today she has put together an activity which she hopes will alleviate their difficulties. She begins by writing the following problem on the board >>>> >>>> Pedro has five dollars. He wants to buy 6 pens. If each pen costs 80 cents apiece and he buys 6, how much money will he have left? >>>> >>>> She asks Elvina to read the problem. Noticing that several students have their pencils out and are writing on paper, she admonishes them saying, ?Put down your pencils and listen.? After Elvina reads the problem, Ms. Pe?a points out that it is a two-step word problem. She asks the her students to say the word and then, asking for a definition of two-step, calls on Jorge. Jorge replies that two-step means ?More than one step.? Ms. Pe?a restates writing the word operation on the board, ?A two-step problem is a word problem where there is more than one operation? and she gives possible arithmetic examples. She then calls on her students to identify the operations in this word problem. After some discussion, the students identify multiplication?that is, multiply the number of pens by eighty cents?and subtraction?that is, subtract that product from five dollars. >>>> >>>> She tells her students they?herself and the class?will be solving two step problems; that is, problems that usually require more than one operation. Then, after checking to make sure that her students understand the term operation, ]s. In summary Ms. Pe?a writes and speaks >>>> >>>> 80? $5.00 >>>> x 6 -$4.80 >>>> ------- ------- >>>> $4.80 20? >>>> >>>> Ms. Pe?a then divides her class into four groups and giving each group a slightly different two-step problem sets them to work. As students work, she circulates reminding each group that there are two-steps and that they need to identify the operations comprising these steps. Towards the end of the period she has each group diagram their solutions on provided chart paper. >>>> >>>> As class comes to a close, Tanil raises her hand. ?Couldn?t you just subtract? Y?know, subtract six times.? >>>> >>>> Note my story has a number of basic characteristics which include for instance, managing those bodily senses relevant to a mathematics problem, producing meaning from a mathematics problem, and developing a view of a mathematics problem that is shared by a community. >>>> >>>> Most of the teachers I work with and a number of people in mathematics education would agree that this is an exemplar for 'teaching' making sense (one could argue that it is actually impossible to teach a student how to make sense although a student can learn how to do so) in an elementary school mathematical classroom (I happen to think it is a thoughtful lesson, but). The problem is that this is more of a literacy lesson than a mathematics lesson and, on purpose, I picked Tanil to indicate this. Mathematics is, in a sense, the science of patterns and this is the very thing this lesson is not about. The pattern, by the way, is 'profit' minus 'loss' not a series of two-, three-, or four-steps. However, the triad seems to be too coarse for to pick this 'omission' up and in my next story (in the paper) I show 'word' and 'phrase' seem to be too coarse also (somewhat against Halliday, one might say). I could perhaps use something to do with patterns like Davydov uses comparisons in length, but this for various reasons doesn't seem quite right (although that may be because I am still not sure about a 'unit of analysis'). In the third section of the paper you might say I make a suggestion for a unit of analysis. I have some ideas, but none sufficiently argued that I wish to publicly put in print (smile). Why do I care? The best I can say is that as a teacher of teachers it is very disconcerting to think, "Well, it strikes me what you are doing bears very little relationship to the teaching of mathematics" and be unable to create a context which is jointly meaningful within which my gut feelings as a teacher of elementary school mathematics can be respectfully, coherently, and helpfully expressed. perhaps to put it another way, the people I work with are serious and talented, but they haven't thought some things through nor have they been given the opportunity to do so. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> On Oct 24, 2014, at 1:24 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> > > > From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Sat Oct 25 16:40:33 2014 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Sat, 25 Oct 2014 23:40:33 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> Message-ID: <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu> Ed, Andy, here's my two-bits response to the practice of Ms Pena. the unit of analysis i'm using here is each sequence, or turn, of the larger activity of the practice of doing math in Ms Pena's class. turn one: She writes the problem on the board: "Pedro has five dollars. He wants to buy 6 pens. If each pen costs 80 cents apiece and he buys 6, how much money will he have left? turn two: "She asks Elvina to read the problem." turn three: " Noticing that several students have their pencils out and are writing on paper, she admonishes them saying, ?Put down your pencils and listen.? turn four: After Elvina reads the problem, Ms. Pe?a points out that it is a two-step word problem. She asks the her students to say the word and turn five: then, asking for a definition of two-step, calls on Jorge. turn six: Jorge replies that two-step means ?More than one step.? turn seven: Ms. Pe?a restates writing the word operation on the board, ?A two-step problem is a word problem where there is more than one operation? and she gives possible arithmetic examples. turn eight: She then calls on her students to identify the operations in this word problem. turn nine: After some discussion, the students identify multiplication?that is, multiply the number of pens by eighty cents?and subtraction?that is, subtract that product from five dollars." turn ten: She tells her students they?herself and the class?will be solving two step problems; that is, problems that usually require more than one operation. Then, after checking to make sure that her students understand the term operation, ]s. In summary Ms. Pe?a writes and speaks 80? $5.00 x 6 -$4.80 ------- ------- $4.80 20? turn eleven: Ms. Pe?a then divides her class into four groups and giving each group a slightly different two-step problem sets them to work. turn twelve: As students work, she circulates reminding each group that there are two-steps and that they need to identify the operations comprising these steps. turn thirteen: Towards the end of the period she has each group diagram their solutions on provided chart paper. turn fourteen: As class comes to a close, Tanil raises her hand. ?Couldn?t you just subtract? Y?know, subtract six times.? Ed, you now comment that: Note my story has a number of basic characteristics which include for instance, managing those bodily senses relevant to a mathematics problem, producing meaning from a mathematics problem, and developing a view of a mathematics problem that is shared by a community. what i think, Ed, is that the meaning and the view shared by the community isn't exactly managing bodily senses relevant to a mathematics problem, but rather that, for this math class community, a shared understanding is that it is the teacher who does the work. out of the roughly 14 turns - actually i should have counted Elvina as well - the teacher had done about eleven of them. in other words, it's the teacher who is doing the actual activity of "learning". and, Tanil is absolutely correct, and in the school i work in, the response of the teacher would have been to elicit how Tanil came up with that solution process, and then follow that it with the question, which solution was more efficient. (by the way, there is no right answer to the question about efficiency, except for the student's perspective. (my guess is that the student is using a older process learned six or nine months ago. Ed, you also wrote: "Why do I care? The best I can say is that as a teacher of teachers it is very disconcerting to think, "Well, it strikes me what you are doing bears very little relationship to the teaching of mathematics" and be unable to create a context which is jointly meaningful within which my gut feelings as a teacher of elementary school mathematics can be respectfully, coherently, and helpfully expressed. perhaps to put it another way, the people I work with are serious and talented, but they haven't thought some things through nor have they been given the opportunity to do so." i agree wholeheartedly here, and i'd look for opening within the system of activities of the school to begin to bring about this conversation. in the school that i'm at, the teacher would have written the problem up on the board, _not_ told the students that it was a two part math lesson, and asked for what students thought the answer was. possible answers would have been written up on the board. then a student would have been asked to come up and show how they got the answer, or, would have told the teacher what steps to go through to get the answer. (personally i prefer to have the student tell me what to write on the board. and the equations would have been written as: .80 X 6 = and $5.00 - $4.80 = not as an algorithm. because, for Ms Pena, the question is not whether or not the students can do an algorithm, but rather can they parse out the part of the math problem. (and yes, for many student, especially second language learners, this is also a literacy lesson.) my apologies for going on at such a length - and really i've described the barest essentials of what a classroom teacher could do to get the students to take on the responsibility of learning how to solve math problems, rather than have the classroom teacher perseverate in the practice of mistaking telling students how to solve a math problem is the same as having students solve the problem of solving math problems. finally, i think that breaking down a large activity into turns or sequences - who is doing what and how does the doing support the supposed goal of the activity - greatly helps in figuring out a unit of analysis. phillip From ablunden@mira.net Sat Oct 25 18:13:52 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 12:13:52 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu> Message-ID: <544C4AD0.5020102@mira.net> Philip, I can see (especially given your breakdown) that student-text-teacher is indeed the unit of what is going on here. It seems that this is the case for *any* example of classroom teaching. Also, of course for some students parsing the "word problem" is an English language literacy challenge, but also, even if they speak perfect English, learning maths means not only understanding the scenario being word-painted, but being able to abstract from that the maths problem to be posed and then solved. This just seems to be missing from this discussion. It seems to me that if we want to represent what is going on in *maths* teaching and learning in particular, there has to be an element of learning to read the world, and the teacher's role is to facilitate the student learning to read the world mathematically, and the various texts used in the class are useless unless they are achieving that. A bit like the Question Asking Reading approach. Doing maths is not, in my view, decoding the "word problem." Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ White, Phillip wrote: > Ed, Andy, here's my two-bits response to the practice of Ms Pena. > > the unit of analysis i'm using here is each sequence, or turn, of the larger activity of the practice of doing math in Ms Pena's class. > > turn one: > > She writes the problem on the board: > > "Pedro has five dollars. He wants to buy 6 pens. If each pen costs 80 cents apiece and he buys 6, how much money will he have left? > > turn two: > > "She asks Elvina to read the problem." > > turn three: > > " Noticing that several students have their pencils out and are writing on paper, she admonishes them saying, ?Put down your pencils and listen.? > > turn four: > > After Elvina reads the problem, Ms. Pe?a points out that it is a two-step word problem. She asks the her students to say the word and > > turn five: > > then, asking for a definition of two-step, calls on Jorge. > > turn six: > > Jorge replies that two-step means ?More than one step.? > > > turn seven: > > Ms. Pe?a restates writing the word operation on the board, ?A two-step problem is a word problem where there is more than one operation? and she gives possible arithmetic examples. > > turn eight: > > She then calls on her students to identify the operations in this word problem. > > turn nine: > > After some discussion, the students identify multiplication?that is, multiply the number of pens by eighty cents?and subtraction?that is, subtract that product from five dollars." > > turn ten: > > She tells her students they?herself and the class?will be solving two step problems; that is, problems that usually require more than one operation. Then, after checking to make sure that her students understand the term operation, ]s. In summary Ms. Pe?a writes and speaks > > 80? $5.00 > x 6 -$4.80 > ------- ------- > $4.80 20? > > turn eleven: > > Ms. Pe?a then divides her class into four groups and giving each group a slightly different two-step problem sets them to work. > > turn twelve: > > As students work, she circulates reminding each group that there are two-steps and that they need to identify the operations comprising these steps. > > turn thirteen: > > Towards the end of the period she has each group diagram their solutions on provided chart paper. > > turn fourteen: > > As class comes to a close, Tanil raises her hand. ?Couldn?t you just subtract? Y?know, subtract six times.? > > Ed, you now comment that: > > Note my story has a number of basic characteristics which include for instance, managing those bodily senses relevant to a mathematics problem, producing meaning from a mathematics problem, and developing a view of a mathematics problem that is shared by a community. > > what i think, Ed, is that the meaning and the view shared by the community isn't exactly managing bodily senses relevant to a mathematics problem, but rather that, for this math class community, a shared understanding is that it is the teacher who does the work. > > out of the roughly 14 turns - actually i should have counted Elvina as well - the teacher had done about eleven of them. in other words, it's the teacher who is doing the actual activity of "learning". > > and, Tanil is absolutely correct, and in the school i work in, the response of the teacher would have been to elicit how Tanil came up with that solution process, and then follow that it with the question, which solution was more efficient. (by the way, there is no right answer to the question about efficiency, except for the student's perspective. > > (my guess is that the student is using a older process learned six or nine months ago. > > Ed, you also wrote: > > "Why do I care? The best I can say is that as a teacher of teachers it is very disconcerting to think, "Well, it strikes me what you are doing bears very little relationship to the teaching of mathematics" and be unable to create a context which is jointly meaningful within which my gut feelings as a teacher of elementary school mathematics can be respectfully, coherently, and helpfully expressed. perhaps to put it another way, the people I work with are serious and talented, but they haven't thought some things through nor have they been given the opportunity to do so." > > i agree wholeheartedly here, and i'd look for opening within the system of activities of the school to begin to bring about this conversation. > > in the school that i'm at, the teacher would have written the problem up on the board, _not_ told the students that it was a two part math lesson, and asked for what students thought the answer was. > > possible answers would have been written up on the board. > > then a student would have been asked to come up and show how they got the answer, or, would have told the teacher what steps to go through to get the answer. (personally i prefer to have the student tell me what to write on the board. > > and the equations would have been written as: > > .80 X 6 = > > and > > $5.00 - $4.80 = > > not as an algorithm. > > because, for Ms Pena, the question is not whether or not the students can do an algorithm, but rather can they parse out the part of the math problem. > > (and yes, for many student, especially second language learners, this is also a literacy lesson.) > > my apologies for going on at such a length - and really i've described the barest essentials of what a classroom teacher could do to get the students to take on the responsibility of learning how to solve math problems, rather than have the classroom teacher perseverate in the practice of mistaking telling students how to solve a math problem is the same as having students solve the problem of solving math problems. > > finally, i think that breaking down a large activity into turns or sequences - who is doing what and how does the doing support the supposed goal of the activity - greatly helps in figuring out a unit of analysis. > > phillip > > > > From ewall@umich.edu Sat Oct 25 19:58:30 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sat, 25 Oct 2014 21:58:30 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu> Message-ID: <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> Philip This is a reasonable analysis (although you are counting turns in my story and this, as I said, is not data - smile) and you are quite possibly correct as to the view shared by the community. However, I would argue that this is really a quite well thought-out lesson and this teacher is really trying to help her students make sense of word problems. She has somebody read the problem and insists the students listen (keep in mind in the early grades work with the senses are not unimportant - Elena Bodrova and Deborah Leong give some nice examples); she introduces some possibly helpful vocabulary, she works though the problem with the students, she has them practice and monitors that practice, and she has them report out. She is, in sense, quite a bit above average and I have viewed a lot of experienced elementary school teachers. I happen to know - keeping in mind this is a story - that a teacher somewhat like this one was 'nominated,' in a sense, as exemplary. I agree that the teacher might have taken up Tanil's response; however, in my story (smile), it is the end of the period. In any case, my problem is your unit of analysis seems to be too large to pick up, one might say,my gut feeling that when I 'see' something like this I am not viewing a mathematics lesson. I think you might be arguing that adding student turns by having Tanil demonstrate her thinking and then have the class decide which is more efficient would make the lesson mathematical. While I think doing that is important for a number of reasons, I can imagine doing something similar in, say, a reading class. Years ago I tried an experiment. Some colleagues and I were watching video of a elementary school teacher who seems, for the most part, to teach mathematics lessons of the type I am arguing for. I asked that we turn off the sound and then try to point out somethings we noticed that somehow made us think this was a mathematics lesson. It was interesting. I have no problems with this being, in addition, a literacy lesson (this is normal practice in the elementary grades) and I think teaching kids to take responsibility for their own learning is more than a little important, It even could be that the next day was very different in how turns were allocated. Unfortunately that would not necessarily make that lesson a mathematics lesson. In the next section of the paper I take up a different math lesson with ostensibly the same purpose (i.e. making sense of 'word' problems). Some different things will show up which perhaps get me a little closer to a 'smallest' unit of analysis. It will, in a sense, be the 'kinds' of turns not the number of turns (although chidden will have more turns) that are interesting (or so I think - smile). Ed On Oct 25, 2014, at 6:40 PM, White, Phillip wrote: > Ed, Andy, here's my two-bits response to the practice of Ms Pena. > > the unit of analysis i'm using here is each sequence, or turn, of the larger activity of the practice of doing math in Ms Pena's class. > > turn one: > > She writes the problem on the board: > > "Pedro has five dollars. He wants to buy 6 pens. If each pen costs 80 cents apiece and he buys 6, how much money will he have left? > > turn two: > > "She asks Elvina to read the problem." > > turn three: > > " Noticing that several students have their pencils out and are writing on paper, she admonishes them saying, ?Put down your pencils and listen.? > > turn four: > > After Elvina reads the problem, Ms. Pe?a points out that it is a two-step word problem. She asks the her students to say the word and > > turn five: > > then, asking for a definition of two-step, calls on Jorge. > > turn six: > > Jorge replies that two-step means ?More than one step.? > > > turn seven: > > Ms. Pe?a restates writing the word operation on the board, ?A two-step problem is a word problem where there is more than one operation? and she gives possible arithmetic examples. > > turn eight: > > She then calls on her students to identify the operations in this word problem. > > turn nine: > > After some discussion, the students identify multiplication?that is, multiply the number of pens by eighty cents?and subtraction?that is, subtract that product from five dollars." > > turn ten: > > She tells her students they?herself and the class?will be solving two step problems; that is, problems that usually require more than one operation. Then, after checking to make sure that her students understand the term operation, ]s. In summary Ms. Pe?a writes and speaks > > 80? $5.00 > x 6 -$4.80 > ------- ------- > $4.80 20? > > turn eleven: > > Ms. Pe?a then divides her class into four groups and giving each group a slightly different two-step problem sets them to work. > > turn twelve: > > As students work, she circulates reminding each group that there are two-steps and that they need to identify the operations comprising these steps. > > turn thirteen: > > Towards the end of the period she has each group diagram their solutions on provided chart paper. > > turn fourteen: > > As class comes to a close, Tanil raises her hand. ?Couldn?t you just subtract? Y?know, subtract six times.? > > Ed, you now comment that: > > Note my story has a number of basic characteristics which include for instance, managing those bodily senses relevant to a mathematics problem, producing meaning from a mathematics problem, and developing a view of a mathematics problem that is shared by a community. > > what i think, Ed, is that the meaning and the view shared by the community isn't exactly managing bodily senses relevant to a mathematics problem, but rather that, for this math class community, a shared understanding is that it is the teacher who does the work. > > out of the roughly 14 turns - actually i should have counted Elvina as well - the teacher had done about eleven of them. in other words, it's the teacher who is doing the actual activity of "learning". > > and, Tanil is absolutely correct, and in the school i work in, the response of the teacher would have been to elicit how Tanil came up with that solution process, and then follow that it with the question, which solution was more efficient. (by the way, there is no right answer to the question about efficiency, except for the student's perspective. > > (my guess is that the student is using a older process learned six or nine months ago. > > Ed, you also wrote: > > "Why do I care? The best I can say is that as a teacher of teachers it is very disconcerting to think, "Well, it strikes me what you are doing bears very little relationship to the teaching of mathematics" and be unable to create a context which is jointly meaningful within which my gut feelings as a teacher of elementary school mathematics can be respectfully, coherently, and helpfully expressed. perhaps to put it another way, the people I work with are serious and talented, but they haven't thought some things through nor have they been given the opportunity to do so." > > i agree wholeheartedly here, and i'd look for opening within the system of activities of the school to begin to bring about this conversation. > > in the school that i'm at, the teacher would have written the problem up on the board, _not_ told the students that it was a two part math lesson, and asked for what students thought the answer was. > > possible answers would have been written up on the board. > > then a student would have been asked to come up and show how they got the answer, or, would have told the teacher what steps to go through to get the answer. (personally i prefer to have the student tell me what to write on the board. > > and the equations would have been written as: > > .80 X 6 = > > and > > $5.00 - $4.80 = > > not as an algorithm. > > because, for Ms Pena, the question is not whether or not the students can do an algorithm, but rather can they parse out the part of the math problem. > > (and yes, for many student, especially second language learners, this is also a literacy lesson.) > > my apologies for going on at such a length - and really i've described the barest essentials of what a classroom teacher could do to get the students to take on the responsibility of learning how to solve math problems, rather than have the classroom teacher perseverate in the practice of mistaking telling students how to solve a math problem is the same as having students solve the problem of solving math problems. > > finally, i think that breaking down a large activity into turns or sequences - who is doing what and how does the doing support the supposed goal of the activity - greatly helps in figuring out a unit of analysis. > > phillip > > From babuchho@umail.iu.edu Sun Oct 26 08:15:33 2014 From: babuchho@umail.iu.edu (Beth Buchholz) Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 11:15:33 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics Practices Message-ID: Thanks for this discussion! I can quickly address a couple of these questions: *Was there any character that went with the sock puppets? Was there any story that went with the character? If so, where did the story come from, and was **there any jockeying for control over the story?* (p. 283): Yes, youth did create stories for their puppets/characters. Kylie described Antoine and Amber's characters' fascinating back story in a paper for AERA last year: "One of the hand puppets was intended to be ?reddit robot,? who is the ?mascot? of reddit.com, a web community where users vote on what's new and popular online. In a storyboard that Amber and Antoine later created around their puppets, reddit robot sets out to ?make people lazyer? [sic] by adding the music to the bewilderingly infectious Nyan Cat Internet meme?the animated GIF of a flying cat with a pop-tart body that has generated over 81 million views on YouTube since its appearance in Spring 2011. (The Nyan Cat was a top hit on reddit.com at the time of the e-textiles workshop)." (Peppler, 2013) *The first sentence of the section "Hands-On Materials as Gendered Access" refers to "two focal girls". Is this a mistake, or am **I missing somebody?* (p. 293) Sorry that this is confusing to readers. This section moves away from Amber and Antoine to consider broader patterns observed across *both *dyads studied (see pp. 283-284 for frequency counts and other noted patterns across both dyads). We qualitatively focused on one dyad in the article, but data from *two* *mixed-gender dyads *informed the larger findings--thus "two focal girls" [across both mixed-gender dyads]. Does this help? --Beth Buchholz On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 3:24 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > I have a bunch of rather silly questions, and then a comment about the > interpretation of the data. > > p. 280: Why do we assume that nonverbal handing money to a cashier or > handing a birthday present to a friend is an unspoken agreement? It is > certainly true that the nonverbal component of the interaction may be > abstracted away from it. But there are actually very few nonverbal > handings, of either money or birthday presents, that would have the > same meaning. Isn't it more useful to consider that speech can play > varying degrees of importance in an interactioni (e.g. it can be > "ancillary" where the commodity being exchanged is goods or services > and it is essential when, as is normally the case in both handing > money to a cashier and handing a birthday present to a friend, > information is exchanged as well? > > p. 283: Puppets are unusual in that, unlike socks, they necessarily > have symbolic meaning (that is, a sock puppet that is not a symbol for > some imaginary character is a sock and not a puppet). Was there any > character that went with the sock puppets? Was there any story that > went with the character? If so, where did the story come from, and was > there any jockeying for control over the story? Note the titillating > potential of characters that "light up" when they touch! Did this > create any visible titillation for embarrassment? > > p. 283: I can sort of follow why stitching, knotting, and threading > might be gendered (a kind of washback from the world of work, I > suppose). Why gluing? > > p. 289: Why does Amber refer to Antoine as "Nicholas"? > > p. 293: The first sentence of the section "Hands-On Materials as > Gendered Access" refers to "two focal girls". Is this a mistake, or am > I missing somebody? > > And my comment. It seems to me that a lot of studies (not this one in > particular but many studies of this type in general) tend to view > gendered access as a matter of gendered access to property or power or > both. But this is very often an adult view; we adults are obsessed > with power and property and we assume that it is only right that > children are. Isn't it possible that to the children what is really > gendered is access to aesthetic concepts versus access to technical > expertise? Both orientations address the tension between form and > material, but they address it from very different sides and are > ultimately indispensible to each other (which is notoriously not the > case with disputes over property and power). Note, however, that when > the teacher says that it is decorating that is the fun part, the > teacher is biasing the children towards the aesthetic and away from > the technical!) > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 24 October 2014 07:07, mike cole wrote: > > Aha! Thanks! > > > > So artificial literacies refers to the mediation of reading/writing by a > > variety of artifacts! Ok, that I can make sense of. And thanks for the > RRQ > > ref on sedimented identities. This phrase is used in discussion of text > > production. For those ignorant like myself, here is the summary provided > by > > the authors, which also makes the point of their text (and the present > > one!) cleared: > > > > *THE COMMENTARY argues for an understanding of how texts are put together > > that accounts for multimodality and draws on children?s ways of being and > > doing in the home, their habitus. It focuses on identities as socially > > situated. It argues that it is important to trace the process of > > sedimenting identities during text production. This offers a way of > viewing > > text production that can inform research into children?s text making. > > Particular attention is paid to the producer, contexts, and practices > used > > during text production and how the text becomes an artifact that holds > > important information about the meaning maker. Four case studies describe > > sedimented identities as a lens through which to see a more nuanced > > perspective on meaning making. This work offers a lens for research and > > practice in that it enables researchers to question and interrogate the > way > > texts come into being.* > > > > > > mike > > > > On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 10:35 AM, Karen Wohlwend > wrote: > > > >> Certainly-- Rowsell and Pahl take an ethnographic approach to track the > >> practices and user identities involved in the production and previous > uses > >> of an artifact. > >> > >> Rowsell, J., & Pahl, K. (2007). Sedimented identities in texts: > Instances > >> of practice. Reading Research Quarterly, 42(3), 388-404. > >> > >> Pahl, K., & Rowsell, J. (2010). Artifactual literacies: Every object > tells > >> a story. New York: Teachers College Press. > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 12:56 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> > Karen--- I am familiar of course with the notion of artifacts, but I > am > >> not > >> > familiar with > >> > Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual literacies. > >> Could > >> > you provide a link or a reference? The phrase has me wondering what a > >> > non-artifactual literacy would be. > >> > mike > >> > > >> > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:03 PM, Karen Wohlwend > >> > wrote: > >> > > >> > > Andy, thanks for these generative questions and comments! I'll > defer to > >> > my > >> > > co-authors to situate the focal case in the larger study but I'll > >> address > >> > > how we are considering relationships among gender, practices, and > >> tools. > >> > > > >> > > We're conceptualizing tools as anchoring artifacts, that concretize > and > >> > > suggest particular uses and users accrued from cultural histories > of > >> > > access and use (following Holland and Cole's cultural artifacts, and > >> more > >> > > recently, Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual > >> > > literacies). Tools index shared histories of use, values, and > >> > expectations > >> > > for who *should *be a user and for how practices *should *be > conducted, > >> > > practices which following Paechter are situated in communities of > >> > gendered > >> > > practice that are multiple, local, and embodied. > >> > > > >> > > However, we would not say that a tool is gendered in any fixed or > >> > > deterministic way. In any given moment of activity, tools signal > >> multiple > >> > > histories in many nexus of practice (following Ron Scollon, the > tacit > >> > > shared practices that members of a community expect of one another) > >> that > >> > > lead up to, enter in, and flow from that moment, in contradictory, > >> > > confounding, and complementary ways, hence the ambiguity you've > >> > mentioned. > >> > > How/whether social actors make use of particular histories in a > >> specific > >> > > context realizes foregrounds some histories while backgrounding > >> others-- > >> > in > >> > > ways that can reproduce, contest, or blur prevailing expectations > for > >> > > participation. In our analysis, we looked closely at the mediated > >> actions > >> > > in the handling of tools in the one nexus to understand in a very > >> > concrete > >> > > way how girls were able to gain and maintain control over > >> > > projects--contrary to histories and expectations for high levels of > >> tool > >> > > handling, participation, and trajectories of expertise for boys in > >> > > electronics activity. > >> > > > >> > > Looking closely at the mediated action in this transformative moment > >> > > reveals how changing the electronics tools from wires to needle and > >> > thread > >> > > changes the nexus, activating a powerful perception/expectation for > >> girls > >> > > as appropriate tool users by signalling histories of sewing > practices > >> and > >> > > feminine communities of practice. > >> > > > >> > > In regard to other situations, looking closely at mediated actions, > >> > > material artifacts, and tacit expectations for participation in the > >> > > relevant nexus of practice will likely also reveal how materials > relate > >> > to > >> > > stereotypical expectations, pointing to places ripe for rupture > where > >> > > changing something small in the local activity (e.g., an action, a > >> tool, > >> > a > >> > > material) in dominant nexus of practice can signal a different kind > of > >> > user > >> > > and potentially disrupt persistent and naturalized stereotypes. > >> > > > >> > > Looking forward to continuing the conversation, > >> > > Karen > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:08 AM, Andy Blunden > >> wrote: > >> > > > >> > > > Kylie & co., > >> > > > A fascinating study around a truly ingenious approach to the > gendered > >> > > > division of labour - giving school kids E-textiles to construct an > >> > > > electronic device - total mixing up and confounding the gender > >> > > stereotypes > >> > > > about sewing and electronics, etc. > >> > > > > >> > > > Some of the results were quite startling. That the young boy > should > >> not > >> > > > just abstain and demonstratively not pay attention, but pay active > >> and > >> > > > supportive attention to the girl making the circuit with her > >> > > > needle-and-thread - an admired female-typical stance one would > have > >> > > thought > >> > > > a young male incapable of adopting with a female workmate. And > that > >> the > >> > > > gender-inscription of the sewing tools over-rode the greater > >> experience > >> > > > that in this case the young boy had in using them, with the boy > >> > deferring > >> > > > to the less experienced girl in recognition of the > >> > gender-appropriateness > >> > > > of her "taking charge" with the needle-and-thread. This does cause > >> one > >> > to > >> > > > think a little deeper into how we might conceptualise such > gendered > >> > > > behaviours. > >> > > > > >> > > > As you would know, MCA has a strong preference for qualitative > >> > research, > >> > > > and studies with small sample sizes are not generally a problem, > but > >> so > >> > > > much seemed to hinge on the study of just *one* boy-girl team, > that I > >> > am > >> > > > concerned about the capacity to generalise from such a base. There > >> were > >> > > > about 80 youth in the activity as a whole, so I can only hope and > >> > presume > >> > > > that observation of the other 78 kids in some way guided the work > >> > focused > >> > > > on just 2. > >> > > > > >> > > > I must say, the analysis of the video data is very sophisticated > and > >> > > > productive and you are to be congratulated on this aspect of the > >> work. > >> > I > >> > > > see that you approach the gendering of the activities through the > >> idea > >> > of > >> > > > the various *tools* being gendered, rather than the *practices* > >> > > themselves. > >> > > > This is something that was really necessary for you to be able to > >> make > >> > > > these observations, because the gendering of the activities is > >> > ambiguous, > >> > > > but not it seems the gendering of the tools. Is this a result of > the > >> > > study, > >> > > > or is it something you already knew or did you arrive at this by > >> logic? > >> > > > > >> > > > Do you see any other opportunities for confounding gender > stereotypes > >> > in > >> > > > this way? > >> > > > > >> > > > And finally, does the experience of working in ambiguous, even > >> inverted > >> > > > gender-stereotyped activities like these have any outcome which > >> carries > >> > > > over into a world where the gender division of labour lacks > >> ambiguity? > >> > > > > >> > > > Andy > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> > > > *Andy Blunden* > >> > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > Kylie Peppler wrote: > >> > > > > >> > > >> Thanks Andy! We're excited to discuss with the community and > would > >> > > >> welcome any comments/questions on this emerging line of research! > >> > > >> Kylie > >> > > >> > >> > > >> --- > >> > > >> Kylie A. Peppler > >> > > >> Assistant Professor of Learning Sciences > >> > > >> Indiana University | School of Education > >> > > >> 1900 E 10th Street | Eigenmann 528 | Bloomington | IN | 47406 | > >> > > >> 812.856.8381 > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 10:52 PM, Andy Blunden < > ablunden@mira.net > >> > > >> > wrote: > >> > > >> > >> > > >> Here's the article for discussion Artin is introducing: > >> > > >> *Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting and > >> Electronics > >> > > >> Practices* > >> > > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen > Wohlwend. > >> > > >> Indiana University. > >> > > >> > >> > > >> The Maker movement promotes hands-on making, including > >> crafts, > >> > > >> robotics, and computing. The movement?s potential to > >> transform > >> > > >> education rests in our ability to address notable gender > >> > > >> disparities, particularly in science, technology, > >> engineering, > >> > > and > >> > > >> mathematics fields. E-textiles - the first > female-dominated > >> > > >> computing community - provide inspiration for overcoming > >> > > >> long-standing cultural divides in classrooms. Analysis of > >> > > >> children?s > >> > > >> use of e-textiles reveals that materials like needles, > >> fabric, > >> > > and > >> > > >> conductive thread rupture traditional gender scripts > around > >> > > >> electronics and implicitly gives girls hands-on access and > >> > > >> leadership roles. This reconceptualization of cultural > >> divides > >> > as > >> > > >> sets of tacitly accepted practices rooted in gendered > >> histories > >> > > has > >> > > >> implications for reconceptualizing traditionally > >> male-dominated > >> > > >> areas of schooling. > >> > > >> > >> > > >> Andy > >> > > >> (attached) > >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> > > >> ------------ > >> > > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> Goncu, Artin wrote: > >> > > >> > >> > > >> Dear All, > >> > > >> > >> > > >> We are writing to let you know that the most recent > issue of > >> > > >> MCA is out. > >> > > >> One of the articles published in this issue and being > >> > > >> introduced here for > >> > > >> discussion in referenced below. The authors of the > article > >> > > >> have kindly > >> > > >> agreed to lead the discussion, and they are on xmca with > us > >> > > >> now. The free > >> > > >> access to the article is possible through the links > below. > >> We > >> > > >> are looking > >> > > >> forward to hearing from you all. Best, ag > >> > > >> > >> > > >> Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting > >> > > >> and Electronics Practices > >> > > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen > >> Wohlwend > >> > > >> > >> > > >> www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762 > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > >> > > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749039.2014 > . > >> > > >> 939762#.VEZ25Ra_4wI > >> > > >> > >> > > >> Artin Goncu, Ph.D > >> > > >> Co-editor, Mind, Culture, and Activity:An International > >> > Journal > >> > > >> Professor Emeritus, > >> > > >> University of Illinois at Chicago > >> > > >> College of Education M/C 147 > >> > > >> 1040 W. Harrison St. > >> > > >> Chicago, IL 60607 > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > -- > >> > > Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor > >> > > Literacy, Culture, & Language Education > >> > > Indiana University > >> > > 201 N. Rose Avenue > >> > > Bloomington, IN 47405 > >> > > Office: 812-856-8275 > >> > > Fax: 812-856-8287 > >> > > kwohlwen@indiana.edu > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > -- > >> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor > >> Literacy, Culture, & Language Education > >> Indiana University > >> 201 N. Rose Avenue > >> Bloomington, IN 47405 > >> Office: 812-856-8275 > >> Fax: 812-856-8287 > >> kwohlwen@indiana.edu > >> > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- "Education is not preparation for life; education is life itself." - John Dewey Beth A. Buchholz Indiana University, Doctoral Student Literacy, Culture, and Language Education 3048 Wright Education Building (434) 227-9993 From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Sun Oct 26 08:24:22 2014 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 15:24:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <544C4AD0.5020102@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>,<544C4AD0.5020102@mira.net> Message-ID: <1414337061518.47684@ucdenver.edu> as you write, Andy, Doing maths is not, in my view, decoding the "word problem." absolutely - decoding is not comprehension. what i didn't make clear was that if the students had done 80% of the classroom discussion, instead of the teacher, it would have become clear the students' number fluency and understanding of math operations necessary for solving the problem. i'm guessing that the teacher was more interested in students getting the right answer than students demonstrating understanding and practicing math strategies. phillip From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Sun Oct 26 08:31:28 2014 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 15:31:28 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> Message-ID: <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> as you wrote, Ed: " In the next section of the paper I take up a different math lesson with ostensibly the same purpose (i.e. making sense of 'word' problems). Some different things will show up which perhaps get me a little closer to a 'smallest' unit of analysis. It will, in a sense, be the 'kinds' of turns not the number of turns (although chidden will have more turns) that are interesting (or so I think - smile)." clearly i did not express myself coherently, this this is exactly the point i was attempting to make - that it was the 'kinds' of turns, the action within the turn, that was of paramount importance. i interpreted the teacher's turns as actions that the students could have been doing. which is why i noted that the teacher produced the greatest number of turns. as a teacher of teachers i would have preferred to see the great majority of turns having been done by the students - preferably student to student responses. and thanks for the smiles! phillip From ewall@umich.edu Sun Oct 26 12:52:13 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 14:52:13 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> Message-ID: <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> Philip To first comment on your note to Andy. The teacher was not necessarily interested in students' fluency with the operations (in fact she may have thought there were more than fluent). The first sentence of my story reads: >Ms. Pe?a has, in previous years, noticed that her fourth graders, at times, struggle to make sense of multi-step word problems. Many seem confused about both the nature of the required operations?most usually, addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division?or the order in which these operations are to be applied. Second, we may see teaching mathematics (and see teaching teachers) differently (which is fine as I certainly do have all or even significant number of the answers - I am right now working on the questions). A story might be helpful: A number of years ago I was asked to view an 'exemplarily' mathematics class for pre-service teachers taught by a mathematician (he had received a grant to design this special class). He began the class by clearly and succinctly introducing the mathematics problem(s) to be considered and when all seemed to have a good idea what was to be done, the pre-service teachers - about five or six to a table - began talking and working. Students definitely seemed engaged, there was a lot of good discussion, and I think the teacher walked around a bit making comments and asking questions. The class ended and he asked me what I thought. I told him nicely it was among one of the worst taught classes I had ever seen (I did tell him why). Why do you think I said that? Student turns were certainly in the 90s. Ed On Oct 26, 2014, at 10:31 AM, White, Phillip wrote: > > > as you wrote, Ed: > > " In the next section of the paper I take up a different math lesson with ostensibly the same purpose (i.e. making sense of 'word' problems). Some different things will show up which perhaps get me a little closer to a 'smallest' unit of analysis. It will, in a sense, be the 'kinds' of turns not the number of turns (although chidden will have more turns) that are interesting (or so I think - smile)." > > clearly i did not express myself coherently, this this is exactly the point i was attempting to make - that it was the 'kinds' of turns, the action within the turn, that was of paramount importance. i interpreted the teacher's turns as actions that the students could have been doing. which is why i noted that the teacher produced the greatest number of turns. as a teacher of teachers i would have preferred to see the great majority of turns having been done by the students - preferably student to student responses. > > and thanks for the smiles! > > phillip > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Oct 26 13:14:57 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 13:14:57 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Genevieve Patthey uploaded "How Far Do They Get? Tracking Students with Different Literacies through..." In-Reply-To: <000001494e074fbc-db57507a-754a-4838-a113-737610ba34db-000000@email.amazonses.com> References: <000001494e074fbc-db57507a-754a-4838-a113-737610ba34db-000000@email.amazonses.com> Message-ID: Of interest to several, I suspect. mike Subject: Genevieve Patthey uploaded "How Far Do They Get? Tracking Students with Different Literacies through..." [image: Academia.edu] Hi Mike, Genevieve Patthey (Los Angeles City College, English & ESL) just uploaded a paper on Academia.edu: How Far Do They Get? Tracking Students with Different Literacies through Community College Remediation by Genevieve Patthey This study follows the progress of 238,032 students who enrolled in either an ESL composition, a developmental composition, or a college composition course at one of nine community colleges for a minimum of three and a maximum of eleven years. View Paper Download Thanks, The Academia.edu Team You can disable these alerts in your Notification Settings Academia.edu, 251 Kearny St., Suite 520, San Francisco, CA, 94108 -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From dkirsh@lsu.edu Sun Oct 26 14:06:38 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 21:06:38 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> Message-ID: Ed, The question wasn't directed at me, but I'd like to share some perspectives on the problems of this kind of reform-oriented instruction, and the broader question of appropriate units of analysis for classroom teaching--perhaps they bear on your particular response/interpretation of this class. Reform-oriented instruction generally is informed by two theoretical trajectories, of independent origin: the Piagetian theorization of conceptual development based on schemas that derive from the individual's reflective abstraction of their own actions; and the Vygotskyan theorization of development through interiorization of cultural practices. Each of these is relevant to student development in the context of reform-oriented instruction such as the group work you described, below. In particular, a teacher can attend to the particular conceptual constructions that students are wrestling with as their current conceptual structures are challenged and reorganized--a focus that requires engagement with individual students; or the teacher can attend to the corporate engagement of the classroom in increasingly sophisticated practices of thinking, reasoning, and communicating. Unfortunately, our efforts as theorists to understand and support effective teaching in this kind of landscape all too often consist in recognizing the dialectical opposition of the alternative perspectives, and therefore to claim we are on the track of identifying a satisfactory unit of analysis to ground a science of education. However, I think Jean Lave (1988) got it right as she laid out the challenge as establishing coherence across "units of analysis [that], though traditionally elaborated separately, must be defined together and consistently" (p. 146). What ensues from claims of victory, when all we've done is identify the problem, is a false sense that the priorities a teacher might attend to in engaging students in reform-oriented group work are mutually consistent. In my experience, it is this false sense of good teaching as a mutually coherent set of practices that obscures from teachers the real challenges of reform-oriented instruction, which only can be properly engaged with recognition that the agendas one pursues with individuals and groups are not reconciled with one another, and often work at cross purposes to one another. Absent this perspective, the teacher really has no way to make sense of either branch of the reform agenda or the teaching practices that support it. As a result, all too often, the reform-oriented teacher is simply engaging students in group discussion with no real sense of how that activity is supposed to lead to learning or development in any sense--an enjoyable, but banal pedagogical exercise. Of course, finding ways to theorize social and individual perspectives as mutually consistent remains a viable theoretical project. But let's not mistake naming the problem for offering a solution. And in the meantime, perhaps our best service to teachers lies in sharing the richness of the Piagetian and Vygotskyan traditions independently of one another. Because absent epistemic resolution, teachers need to be prepared to engage in the delicate art of balancing and managing inconsistent priorities and methods. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 2:52 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] Philip To first comment on your note to Andy. The teacher was not necessarily interested in students' fluency with the operations (in fact she may have thought there were more than fluent). The first sentence of my story reads: >Ms. Pe?a has, in previous years, noticed that her fourth graders, at times, struggle to make sense of multi-step word problems. Many seem confused about both the nature of the required operations-most usually, addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division-or the order in which these operations are to be applied. Second, we may see teaching mathematics (and see teaching teachers) differently (which is fine as I certainly do have all or even significant number of the answers - I am right now working on the questions). A story might be helpful: A number of years ago I was asked to view an 'exemplarily' mathematics class for pre-service teachers taught by a mathematician (he had received a grant to design this special class). He began the class by clearly and succinctly introducing the mathematics problem(s) to be considered and when all seemed to have a good idea what was to be done, the pre-service teachers - about five or six to a table - began talking and working. Students definitely seemed engaged, there was a lot of good discussion, and I think the teacher walked around a bit making comments and asking questions. The class ended and he asked me what I thought. I told him nicely it was among one of the worst taught classes I had ever seen (I did tell him why). Why do you think I said that? Student turns were certainly in the 90s. Ed On Oct 26, 2014, at 10:31 AM, White, Phillip wrote: > > > as you wrote, Ed: > > " In the next section of the paper I take up a different math lesson with ostensibly the same purpose (i.e. making sense of 'word' problems). Some different things will show up which perhaps get me a little closer to a 'smallest' unit of analysis. It will, in a sense, be the 'kinds' of turns not the number of turns (although chidden will have more turns) that are interesting (or so I think - smile)." > > clearly i did not express myself coherently, this this is exactly the point i was attempting to make - that it was the 'kinds' of turns, the action within the turn, that was of paramount importance. i interpreted the teacher's turns as actions that the students could have been doing. which is why i noted that the teacher produced the greatest number of turns. as a teacher of teachers i would have preferred to see the great majority of turns having been done by the students - preferably student to student responses. > > and thanks for the smiles! > > phillip > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Oct 26 14:26:22 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 06:26:22 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics Practices In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dear Beth: Yes, that disambiguates marvelously--at least, your answer to the second question does. I spent some time on reddit.com trying to reconstruct the back story and must confess myself rather bewildered. As Andy says, a unit of analysis always depends on the particular problem you are trying to solve (and in fact I think a lot of the confusion over the formulation 'the minimal unit retains the essential properties under investigation' can be cleared up if you just keep this caveat in mind). So let me begin with my particular problem. I'm interested in Ruqaiya Hasan's idea of a Generalized Structure Potential in children's stories--a model which she developed with Basil Bernstein in the sixties to describe nursery tales. It supposes that every story has, at least, a "Placement"--that is, a setting of the participants in a time and a place. And of course that's just what you have to invent when you use puppets, because unlike pictures puppets do not give us circumstances. In some ways, the "memes" on reddit.com are the opposite of stories, or at least narratives. So for example if you take the usual Labov and Waletzky '(A) OCER (C)' structure (Orientation-Complication-Evaluation-Resolution with an optional Abstract at the beginning and Coda at the end) a meme doesn't have either Abstract or Orientation, and tends to begin with a Complication or an Evaluation instead. In some ways, then, a meme on reddit.com is more like a dialogue: I just go ahead and initiate with some Complication and hope that somebody will give me an Evaluation. From what you say, though, the back story that Antoine and Amber came up with is really a story and not a meme. But the crucial element (either Complication or Resolution) of the story has to involve the touching of the puppets, doesn't it? And...if one puppet is "reddit robot", is the other one nyan cat? While reading over the exchange on the other thread (LSV vs. ANL, units of analysis, etc.) I was wondering what our authors were making of all this: xmca must seem a little like reddit.com. But in fact it seems to me that as usual the two threads are related. You see, one of the big differences between Vygotsky and Leontiev is precisely over whether an analysis should focus on the material activities that go into meaning-making or whether we can understand it better by approach the semantic products that come out of it. In some ways, the argument is reproducing itself: do we understand the conflict between Vygotsky and Leontiev better by looking at the texts they wrote (Leontiev did write some very useful texts on semantic products such as memory and of course he did take part in the presentation in New Haven of the critique of Piaget's work on egocentric speech in 1929) or do we understand it better by looking carefully at the material conditions of text production? So too with Antoine and Amber. The article is an excellent, terse, but nevertheless quite rich presentation of the material conditions of story production. But for readers like me, the back story has to be up front. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 27 October 2014 00:15, Beth Buchholz wrote: > Thanks for this discussion! I can quickly address a couple of these > questions: > > *Was there any character that went with the sock puppets? Was there any > story that went with the character? If so, where did the story come from, > and was **there any jockeying for control over the story?* (p. 283): > > Yes, youth did create stories for their puppets/characters. Kylie described > Antoine and Amber's characters' fascinating back story in a paper for AERA > last year: "One of the hand puppets was intended to be ?reddit robot,? who > is the ?mascot? of reddit.com, a web community where users vote on what's > new and popular online. In a storyboard that Amber and Antoine later > created around their puppets, reddit robot sets out to ?make people lazyer? > [sic] by adding the music to the bewilderingly infectious Nyan Cat Internet > meme?the animated GIF of a flying cat with a pop-tart body that has > generated over 81 million views on YouTube since its appearance in Spring > 2011. (The Nyan Cat was a top hit on reddit.com at the time of the > e-textiles workshop)." (Peppler, 2013) > > *The first sentence of the section "Hands-On Materials as Gendered Access" > refers to "two focal girls". Is this a mistake, or am **I missing somebody?* > (p. 293) > > Sorry that this is confusing to readers. This section moves away from Amber > and Antoine to consider broader patterns observed across *both *dyads > studied (see pp. 283-284 for frequency counts and other noted patterns > across both dyads). We qualitatively focused on one dyad in the article, > but data from *two* *mixed-gender dyads *informed the larger findings--thus > "two focal girls" [across both mixed-gender dyads]. Does this help? > > > --Beth Buchholz > > > On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 3:24 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> I have a bunch of rather silly questions, and then a comment about the >> interpretation of the data. >> >> p. 280: Why do we assume that nonverbal handing money to a cashier or >> handing a birthday present to a friend is an unspoken agreement? It is >> certainly true that the nonverbal component of the interaction may be >> abstracted away from it. But there are actually very few nonverbal >> handings, of either money or birthday presents, that would have the >> same meaning. Isn't it more useful to consider that speech can play >> varying degrees of importance in an interactioni (e.g. it can be >> "ancillary" where the commodity being exchanged is goods or services >> and it is essential when, as is normally the case in both handing >> money to a cashier and handing a birthday present to a friend, >> information is exchanged as well? >> >> p. 283: Puppets are unusual in that, unlike socks, they necessarily >> have symbolic meaning (that is, a sock puppet that is not a symbol for >> some imaginary character is a sock and not a puppet). Was there any >> character that went with the sock puppets? Was there any story that >> went with the character? If so, where did the story come from, and was >> there any jockeying for control over the story? Note the titillating >> potential of characters that "light up" when they touch! Did this >> create any visible titillation for embarrassment? >> >> p. 283: I can sort of follow why stitching, knotting, and threading >> might be gendered (a kind of washback from the world of work, I >> suppose). Why gluing? >> >> p. 289: Why does Amber refer to Antoine as "Nicholas"? >> >> p. 293: The first sentence of the section "Hands-On Materials as >> Gendered Access" refers to "two focal girls". Is this a mistake, or am >> I missing somebody? >> >> And my comment. It seems to me that a lot of studies (not this one in >> particular but many studies of this type in general) tend to view >> gendered access as a matter of gendered access to property or power or >> both. But this is very often an adult view; we adults are obsessed >> with power and property and we assume that it is only right that >> children are. Isn't it possible that to the children what is really >> gendered is access to aesthetic concepts versus access to technical >> expertise? Both orientations address the tension between form and >> material, but they address it from very different sides and are >> ultimately indispensible to each other (which is notoriously not the >> case with disputes over property and power). Note, however, that when >> the teacher says that it is decorating that is the fun part, the >> teacher is biasing the children towards the aesthetic and away from >> the technical!) >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> On 24 October 2014 07:07, mike cole wrote: >> > Aha! Thanks! >> > >> > So artificial literacies refers to the mediation of reading/writing by a >> > variety of artifacts! Ok, that I can make sense of. And thanks for the >> RRQ >> > ref on sedimented identities. This phrase is used in discussion of text >> > production. For those ignorant like myself, here is the summary provided >> by >> > the authors, which also makes the point of their text (and the present >> > one!) cleared: >> > >> > *THE COMMENTARY argues for an understanding of how texts are put together >> > that accounts for multimodality and draws on children?s ways of being and >> > doing in the home, their habitus. It focuses on identities as socially >> > situated. It argues that it is important to trace the process of >> > sedimenting identities during text production. This offers a way of >> viewing >> > text production that can inform research into children?s text making. >> > Particular attention is paid to the producer, contexts, and practices >> used >> > during text production and how the text becomes an artifact that holds >> > important information about the meaning maker. Four case studies describe >> > sedimented identities as a lens through which to see a more nuanced >> > perspective on meaning making. This work offers a lens for research and >> > practice in that it enables researchers to question and interrogate the >> way >> > texts come into being.* >> > >> > >> > mike >> > >> > On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 10:35 AM, Karen Wohlwend >> wrote: >> > >> >> Certainly-- Rowsell and Pahl take an ethnographic approach to track the >> >> practices and user identities involved in the production and previous >> uses >> >> of an artifact. >> >> >> >> Rowsell, J., & Pahl, K. (2007). Sedimented identities in texts: >> Instances >> >> of practice. Reading Research Quarterly, 42(3), 388-404. >> >> >> >> Pahl, K., & Rowsell, J. (2010). Artifactual literacies: Every object >> tells >> >> a story. New York: Teachers College Press. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 12:56 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> >> >> > Karen--- I am familiar of course with the notion of artifacts, but I >> am >> >> not >> >> > familiar with >> >> > Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual literacies. >> >> Could >> >> > you provide a link or a reference? The phrase has me wondering what a >> >> > non-artifactual literacy would be. >> >> > mike >> >> > >> >> > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:03 PM, Karen Wohlwend >> >> > wrote: >> >> > >> >> > > Andy, thanks for these generative questions and comments! I'll >> defer to >> >> > my >> >> > > co-authors to situate the focal case in the larger study but I'll >> >> address >> >> > > how we are considering relationships among gender, practices, and >> >> tools. >> >> > > >> >> > > We're conceptualizing tools as anchoring artifacts, that concretize >> and >> >> > > suggest particular uses and users accrued from cultural histories >> of >> >> > > access and use (following Holland and Cole's cultural artifacts, and >> >> more >> >> > > recently, Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual >> >> > > literacies). Tools index shared histories of use, values, and >> >> > expectations >> >> > > for who *should *be a user and for how practices *should *be >> conducted, >> >> > > practices which following Paechter are situated in communities of >> >> > gendered >> >> > > practice that are multiple, local, and embodied. >> >> > > >> >> > > However, we would not say that a tool is gendered in any fixed or >> >> > > deterministic way. In any given moment of activity, tools signal >> >> multiple >> >> > > histories in many nexus of practice (following Ron Scollon, the >> tacit >> >> > > shared practices that members of a community expect of one another) >> >> that >> >> > > lead up to, enter in, and flow from that moment, in contradictory, >> >> > > confounding, and complementary ways, hence the ambiguity you've >> >> > mentioned. >> >> > > How/whether social actors make use of particular histories in a >> >> specific >> >> > > context realizes foregrounds some histories while backgrounding >> >> others-- >> >> > in >> >> > > ways that can reproduce, contest, or blur prevailing expectations >> for >> >> > > participation. In our analysis, we looked closely at the mediated >> >> actions >> >> > > in the handling of tools in the one nexus to understand in a very >> >> > concrete >> >> > > way how girls were able to gain and maintain control over >> >> > > projects--contrary to histories and expectations for high levels of >> >> tool >> >> > > handling, participation, and trajectories of expertise for boys in >> >> > > electronics activity. >> >> > > >> >> > > Looking closely at the mediated action in this transformative moment >> >> > > reveals how changing the electronics tools from wires to needle and >> >> > thread >> >> > > changes the nexus, activating a powerful perception/expectation for >> >> girls >> >> > > as appropriate tool users by signalling histories of sewing >> practices >> >> and >> >> > > feminine communities of practice. >> >> > > >> >> > > In regard to other situations, looking closely at mediated actions, >> >> > > material artifacts, and tacit expectations for participation in the >> >> > > relevant nexus of practice will likely also reveal how materials >> relate >> >> > to >> >> > > stereotypical expectations, pointing to places ripe for rupture >> where >> >> > > changing something small in the local activity (e.g., an action, a >> >> tool, >> >> > a >> >> > > material) in dominant nexus of practice can signal a different kind >> of >> >> > user >> >> > > and potentially disrupt persistent and naturalized stereotypes. >> >> > > >> >> > > Looking forward to continuing the conversation, >> >> > > Karen >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:08 AM, Andy Blunden >> >> wrote: >> >> > > >> >> > > > Kylie & co., >> >> > > > A fascinating study around a truly ingenious approach to the >> gendered >> >> > > > division of labour - giving school kids E-textiles to construct an >> >> > > > electronic device - total mixing up and confounding the gender >> >> > > stereotypes >> >> > > > about sewing and electronics, etc. >> >> > > > >> >> > > > Some of the results were quite startling. That the young boy >> should >> >> not >> >> > > > just abstain and demonstratively not pay attention, but pay active >> >> and >> >> > > > supportive attention to the girl making the circuit with her >> >> > > > needle-and-thread - an admired female-typical stance one would >> have >> >> > > thought >> >> > > > a young male incapable of adopting with a female workmate. And >> that >> >> the >> >> > > > gender-inscription of the sewing tools over-rode the greater >> >> experience >> >> > > > that in this case the young boy had in using them, with the boy >> >> > deferring >> >> > > > to the less experienced girl in recognition of the >> >> > gender-appropriateness >> >> > > > of her "taking charge" with the needle-and-thread. This does cause >> >> one >> >> > to >> >> > > > think a little deeper into how we might conceptualise such >> gendered >> >> > > > behaviours. >> >> > > > >> >> > > > As you would know, MCA has a strong preference for qualitative >> >> > research, >> >> > > > and studies with small sample sizes are not generally a problem, >> but >> >> so >> >> > > > much seemed to hinge on the study of just *one* boy-girl team, >> that I >> >> > am >> >> > > > concerned about the capacity to generalise from such a base. There >> >> were >> >> > > > about 80 youth in the activity as a whole, so I can only hope and >> >> > presume >> >> > > > that observation of the other 78 kids in some way guided the work >> >> > focused >> >> > > > on just 2. >> >> > > > >> >> > > > I must say, the analysis of the video data is very sophisticated >> and >> >> > > > productive and you are to be congratulated on this aspect of the >> >> work. >> >> > I >> >> > > > see that you approach the gendering of the activities through the >> >> idea >> >> > of >> >> > > > the various *tools* being gendered, rather than the *practices* >> >> > > themselves. >> >> > > > This is something that was really necessary for you to be able to >> >> make >> >> > > > these observations, because the gendering of the activities is >> >> > ambiguous, >> >> > > > but not it seems the gendering of the tools. Is this a result of >> the >> >> > > study, >> >> > > > or is it something you already knew or did you arrive at this by >> >> logic? >> >> > > > >> >> > > > Do you see any other opportunities for confounding gender >> stereotypes >> >> > in >> >> > > > this way? >> >> > > > >> >> > > > And finally, does the experience of working in ambiguous, even >> >> inverted >> >> > > > gender-stereotyped activities like these have any outcome which >> >> carries >> >> > > > over into a world where the gender division of labour lacks >> >> ambiguity? >> >> > > > >> >> > > > Andy >> >> > > > >> >> > > > >> >> > > > >> >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> > > > *Andy Blunden* >> >> > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> > > > >> >> > > > >> >> > > > Kylie Peppler wrote: >> >> > > > >> >> > > >> Thanks Andy! We're excited to discuss with the community and >> would >> >> > > >> welcome any comments/questions on this emerging line of research! >> >> > > >> Kylie >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> --- >> >> > > >> Kylie A. Peppler >> >> > > >> Assistant Professor of Learning Sciences >> >> > > >> Indiana University | School of Education >> >> > > >> 1900 E 10th Street | Eigenmann 528 | Bloomington | IN | 47406 | >> >> > > >> 812.856.8381 >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 10:52 PM, Andy Blunden < >> ablunden@mira.net >> >> > > >> > wrote: >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> Here's the article for discussion Artin is introducing: >> >> > > >> *Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting and >> >> Electronics >> >> > > >> Practices* >> >> > > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen >> Wohlwend. >> >> > > >> Indiana University. >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> The Maker movement promotes hands-on making, including >> >> crafts, >> >> > > >> robotics, and computing. The movement?s potential to >> >> transform >> >> > > >> education rests in our ability to address notable gender >> >> > > >> disparities, particularly in science, technology, >> >> engineering, >> >> > > and >> >> > > >> mathematics fields. E-textiles - the first >> female-dominated >> >> > > >> computing community - provide inspiration for overcoming >> >> > > >> long-standing cultural divides in classrooms. Analysis of >> >> > > >> children?s >> >> > > >> use of e-textiles reveals that materials like needles, >> >> fabric, >> >> > > and >> >> > > >> conductive thread rupture traditional gender scripts >> around >> >> > > >> electronics and implicitly gives girls hands-on access and >> >> > > >> leadership roles. This reconceptualization of cultural >> >> divides >> >> > as >> >> > > >> sets of tacitly accepted practices rooted in gendered >> >> histories >> >> > > has >> >> > > >> implications for reconceptualizing traditionally >> >> male-dominated >> >> > > >> areas of schooling. >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> Andy >> >> > > >> (attached) >> >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> > > >> ------------ >> >> > > >> *Andy Blunden* >> >> > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> Goncu, Artin wrote: >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> Dear All, >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> We are writing to let you know that the most recent >> issue of >> >> > > >> MCA is out. >> >> > > >> One of the articles published in this issue and being >> >> > > >> introduced here for >> >> > > >> discussion in referenced below. The authors of the >> article >> >> > > >> have kindly >> >> > > >> agreed to lead the discussion, and they are on xmca with >> us >> >> > > >> now. The free >> >> > > >> access to the article is possible through the links >> below. >> >> We >> >> > > >> are looking >> >> > > >> forward to hearing from you all. Best, ag >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting >> >> > > >> and Electronics Practices >> >> > > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen >> >> Wohlwend >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762 >> >> > > >> > > >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749039.2014 >> . >> >> > > >> 939762#.VEZ25Ra_4wI >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> Artin Goncu, Ph.D >> >> > > >> Co-editor, Mind, Culture, and Activity:An International >> >> > Journal >> >> > > >> Professor Emeritus, >> >> > > >> University of Illinois at Chicago >> >> > > >> College of Education M/C 147 >> >> > > >> 1040 W. Harrison St. >> >> > > >> Chicago, IL 60607 >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > -- >> >> > > Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor >> >> > > Literacy, Culture, & Language Education >> >> > > Indiana University >> >> > > 201 N. Rose Avenue >> >> > > Bloomington, IN 47405 >> >> > > Office: 812-856-8275 >> >> > > Fax: 812-856-8287 >> >> > > kwohlwen@indiana.edu >> >> > > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > -- >> >> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> >> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor >> >> Literacy, Culture, & Language Education >> >> Indiana University >> >> 201 N. Rose Avenue >> >> Bloomington, IN 47405 >> >> Office: 812-856-8275 >> >> Fax: 812-856-8287 >> >> kwohlwen@indiana.edu >> >> >> > >> > >> > >> > -- >> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> > > > -- > "Education is not preparation for life; education is life itself." - John > Dewey > > Beth A. Buchholz > Indiana University, Doctoral Student > Literacy, Culture, and Language Education > 3048 Wright Education Building > (434) 227-9993 From ewall@umich.edu Sun Oct 26 15:42:11 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 17:42:11 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> Message-ID: <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> David I have never really figured out what reform-oriented oriented or, I guess the other, traditional, meant. If I ask many who name themselves as traditionalists to describe a reform-oriented classroom, they paint an inaccurate picture and, if I ask many who name themselves reform-oriented to describe a traditionalist classroom, they paint a picture just as inaccurate. Even worse if I go back and look at comments from the past, I find that the golden years of traditionalism were as contested (i.e. if transported back today's traditionalists would find themselves labeled reform-oriented). So I guess I more or less agree with Lave as regards consistency. Insofar as Piaget and Vygotsky are concerned, they both add things I think are useful to the mix and I discuss them both with my students (unfortunately my colleagues know little about Vygotsky so my students come a little less knowledgeable than I might wish). I really wouldn't know what it means for teaching to be consistent. I do have commitments as a mathematics teacher which I try to honor (I think you were part of the discussion when I laid these out on the list), but teaching is isn't a static profession (which I really like!) and I am always learning from my students and my colleagues. I agree with what you say about individuals and groups and grumble at my colleagues and my students (teachers-to-be) about "simply engaging students in group discussion with no real sense of how that activity is supposed to lead to learning or development in any sense." Even worse is the way quiet students are viewed and mentored. Insofar as my original story was concerned, I can easily imagine some reform-oriented people thinking she was an excellent teacher and I can easily imagine some traditionalist teachers thinking the same (and vice-versa). As far as the story I asked Phillip about (and I was assuming others might answer), I know some mathematicians would see this class as a good idea and others would not. However, my objection was, in a sense, that it wasn't consistent (although perhaps not in the way you mean). So, directing the question at you (and others if they wish), why did I tell him nicely it was among one of the worst taught classes I had ever seen? I have given you a hint (smile) and I didn't have, I think, a theoretical reason (smile). Ed On Oct 26, 2014, at 4:06 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > Ed, > > The question wasn't directed at me, but I'd like to share some perspectives on the problems of this kind of reform-oriented instruction, and the broader question of appropriate units of analysis for classroom teaching--perhaps they bear on your particular response/interpretation of this class. > > Reform-oriented instruction generally is informed by two theoretical trajectories, of independent origin: the Piagetian theorization of conceptual development based on schemas that derive from the individual's reflective abstraction of their own actions; and the Vygotskyan theorization of development through interiorization of cultural practices. Each of these is relevant to student development in the context of reform-oriented instruction such as the group work you described, below. In particular, a teacher can attend to the particular conceptual constructions that students are wrestling with as their current conceptual structures are challenged and reorganized--a focus that requires engagement with individual students; or the teacher can attend to the corporate engagement of the classroom in increasingly sophisticated practices of thinking, reasoning, and communicating. > > Unfortunately, our efforts as theorists to understand and support effective teaching in this kind of landscape all too often consist in recognizing the dialectical opposition of the alternative perspectives, and therefore to claim we are on the track of identifying a satisfactory unit of analysis to ground a science of education. However, I think Jean Lave (1988) got it right as she laid out the challenge as establishing coherence across "units of analysis [that], though traditionally elaborated separately, must be defined together and consistently" (p. 146). > > What ensues from claims of victory, when all we've done is identify the problem, is a false sense that the priorities a teacher might attend to in engaging students in reform-oriented group work are mutually consistent. In my experience, it is this false sense of good teaching as a mutually coherent set of practices that obscures from teachers the real challenges of reform-oriented instruction, which only can be properly engaged with recognition that the agendas one pursues with individuals and groups are not reconciled with one another, and often work at cross purposes to one another. Absent this perspective, the teacher really has no way to make sense of either branch of the reform agenda or the teaching practices that support it. As a result, all too often, the reform-oriented teacher is simply engaging students in group discussion with no real sense of how that activity is supposed to lead to learning or development in any sense--an enjoyable, but banal pedagogical exercise. > > Of course, finding ways to theorize social and individual perspectives as mutually consistent remains a viable theoretical project. But let's not mistake naming the problem for offering a solution. And in the meantime, perhaps our best service to teachers lies in sharing the richness of the Piagetian and Vygotskyan traditions independently of one another. Because absent epistemic resolution, teachers need to be prepared to engage in the delicate art of balancing and managing inconsistent priorities and methods. > > David > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall > Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 2:52 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] > > Philip > > To first comment on your note to Andy. The teacher was not necessarily interested in students' fluency with the operations (in fact she may have thought there were more than fluent). The first sentence of my story reads: > >> Ms. Pe?a has, in previous years, noticed that her fourth graders, at times, struggle to make sense of multi-step word problems. Many seem confused about both the nature of the required operations-most usually, addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division-or the order in which these operations are to be applied. > > Second, we may see teaching mathematics (and see teaching teachers) differently (which is fine as I certainly do have all or even significant number of the answers - I am right now working on the questions). A story might be helpful: > > A number of years ago I was asked to view an 'exemplarily' mathematics class for pre-service teachers taught by a mathematician (he had received a grant to design this special class). He began the class by clearly and succinctly introducing the mathematics problem(s) to be considered and when all seemed to have a good idea what was to be done, the pre-service teachers - about five or six to a table - began talking and working. Students definitely seemed engaged, there was a lot of good discussion, and I think the teacher walked around a bit making comments and asking questions. The class ended and he asked me what I thought. I told him nicely it was among one of the worst taught classes I had ever seen (I did tell him why). Why do you think I said that? Student turns were certainly in the 90s. > > Ed > > On Oct 26, 2014, at 10:31 AM, White, Phillip wrote: > >> >> >> as you wrote, Ed: >> >> " In the next section of the paper I take up a different math lesson with ostensibly the same purpose (i.e. making sense of 'word' problems). Some different things will show up which perhaps get me a little closer to a 'smallest' unit of analysis. It will, in a sense, be the 'kinds' of turns not the number of turns (although chidden will have more turns) that are interesting (or so I think - smile)." >> >> clearly i did not express myself coherently, this this is exactly the point i was attempting to make - that it was the 'kinds' of turns, the action within the turn, that was of paramount importance. i interpreted the teacher's turns as actions that the students could have been doing. which is why i noted that the teacher produced the greatest number of turns. as a teacher of teachers i would have preferred to see the great majority of turns having been done by the students - preferably student to student responses. >> >> and thanks for the smiles! >> >> phillip >> > > > From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Sun Oct 26 17:16:54 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 21:16:54 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Escape from Microsoft Word by Edward Mendelson | NYRblog | The New York Review of Books Message-ID: <6D3AA2A2-0A50-49F8-A8A0-A6981F6E04AD@gmail.com> www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/oct/21/escape-microsoft-word For those of you with an interest in the minutiae of the writing process. A great piece on word processors. Descarga la aplicaci?n oficial de Twitter aqu? Enviado desde mi iPhone From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Oct 26 17:56:22 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 00:56:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Escape from Microsoft Word by Edward Mendelson | NYRblog | The New York Review of Books In-Reply-To: <6D3AA2A2-0A50-49F8-A8A0-A6981F6E04AD@gmail.com> References: <6D3AA2A2-0A50-49F8-A8A0-A6981F6E04AD@gmail.com> Message-ID: <9AD56DE9-2C3B-4D50-A2D3-E450ACFF936C@uniandes.edu.co> How odd and anachronistic to see a blog in favor of Word Perfect, created in 1978! I use Scrivener: Martin On Oct 26, 2014, at 7:16 PM, David Preiss wrote: > www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/oct/21/escape-microsoft-word > > For those of you with an interest in the minutiae of the writing process. A great piece on word processors. > > Descarga la aplicaci?n oficial de Twitter aqu? > > > Enviado desde mi iPhone From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Sun Oct 26 17:59:12 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 21:59:12 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Escape from Microsoft Word by Edward Mendelson | NYRblog | The New York Review of Books In-Reply-To: <9AD56DE9-2C3B-4D50-A2D3-E450ACFF936C@uniandes.edu.co> References: <6D3AA2A2-0A50-49F8-A8A0-A6981F6E04AD@gmail.com> <9AD56DE9-2C3B-4D50-A2D3-E450ACFF936C@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Call it digital nostalgia! Enviado desde mi iPhone > El 26-10-2014, a las 21:56, Martin John Packer escribi?: > > How odd and anachronistic to see a blog in favor of Word Perfect, created in 1978! I use Scrivener: > > > > Martin > >> On Oct 26, 2014, at 7:16 PM, David Preiss wrote: >> >> www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/oct/21/escape-microsoft-word >> >> For those of you with an interest in the minutiae of the writing process. A great piece on word processors. >> >> Descarga la aplicaci?n oficial de Twitter aqu? >> >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone > > From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Oct 26 18:02:35 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 01:02:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] Message-ID: <1414371755253.24181@unm.edu> Hi Andy, I must explain: Since I hadn't read the entire paper, I was searching for the 8 points in the first half of the paper, which is The Prosecution half. This is to say the "8 charges" you had indicated in your post, are actually listed in the second half, the Defense half. So I suppose the structure threw me. (Sorry to create any confusion, all!) But I'd like to continue my exercise openly, as it appears there are watchers who are benefiting. So here goes (I will go more slowly and not flood the list). #1) The charge by Leontiev (Ad. 4): Perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality. One nagging question: Vygotsky, while living (as I understand), had a large social group in which they openly discussed all of these theories. If Leontiev was privy to this community, how could he not have understood the points concerning perezhivanie? It is not that I accuse Leontiev as being obstinate or thick (that would be an easy thing to do), but that I want to understand how could he have missed this if there were other parties available to discuss the nature of Vygotsky's perezhivanie? The community must have discussed these concepts without Vygotsky present, among each other. Am I wrong in this thinking? I don't think Vygotsky was like Jesus with confused disciples. It seemed that he treated his students as equals and that he himself benefited from their input to the theories. If I may, I position this question with the imagination as-if Vygotsky and Leontiev were here on this list discussing various theories, as we are here. There was a lot of discussion going on, sharing and the like. Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't these lectures on perezhivanie happen earlier in the decade of time Vygotsky graced us? Or am I mistaken? I suppose I am attempting to answer the question, How did Leontiev not understand perezhivanie as a determinant? And perhaps in gaining an answer to this question, we might learn something about *teaching* the concept of perezhivanie? Of course it is possible that this was entirely caused by political expediency. But if that is the case, how can we know this? But to the content of the charge: "Perezhivanie, as a manifestation of the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality." I am having a hard time discussing perezhivanie as a "fragment of the whole." If only because fragment means "a part of", and I don't think "unit" is necessarily a material thing, but also an abstraction like the whole is an abstraction. For example: The water molecule metaphor. (I hope we do not reduce the molecule to hydrogen and oxygen and begin flames on the list). In our perception, we *imagine* the molecule. We know that molecules exist, just like we know that the ocean exists. But when we perceive the ocean, it's also not a perception in its entirety, but completed in our imagination like the molecule is, and this is why I feel the unit, seen as a fragment, seems problematic. If we want to study the nature of oceans we want to study the nature of water, since water is the material of the ocean. Also, the water molecule is the unit we must use to understand the behavior of the water. And so the molecule becomes the unit of analysis. If the metaphor works, the ocean is the ideal, and final form. Can we say that the water molecule determines the nature of the ocean? It seems so, since the behavior of water (as indicated by the nature of its molecule) will reveal significantly the nature of the ocean, moreso than dividing the ocean into fragments, and I'm not sure how one would divide the ocean into fragments, anyway! BTW, I am proposing this metaphor because we know that LSV used the metaphor of the water molecule himself, though I don't think he spoke of oceans, just water. Still, I wonder if it works? Kind regards, Annalisa From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Oct 26 18:26:22 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 01:26:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Escape from Microsoft Word by Edward Mendelson | NYRblog | The New York Review of Books In-Reply-To: References: <6D3AA2A2-0A50-49F8-A8A0-A6981F6E04AD@gmail.com> <9AD56DE9-2C3B-4D50-A2D3-E450ACFF936C@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <33E884DD-EB4C-4A04-8449-805D43A38286@uniandes.edu.co> Since the blogger is celebrating the way WordPerfect emulates a typewriter, I'd say it's positively analog! Martin On Oct 26, 2014, at 7:59 PM, David Preiss wrote: > Call it digital nostalgia! > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > >> El 26-10-2014, a las 21:56, Martin John Packer escribi?: >> >> How odd and anachronistic to see a blog in favor of Word Perfect, created in 1978! I use Scrivener: >> >> >> >> Martin >> >>> On Oct 26, 2014, at 7:16 PM, David Preiss wrote: >>> >>> www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/oct/21/escape-microsoft-word >>> >>> For those of you with an interest in the minutiae of the writing process. A great piece on word processors. >>> >>> Descarga la aplicaci?n oficial de Twitter aqu? >>> >>> >>> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Oct 26 18:39:00 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 12:39:00 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] In-Reply-To: <1414371755253.24181@unm.edu> References: <1414371755253.24181@unm.edu> Message-ID: <544DA234.1080608@mira.net> Annalisa, I don't know exactly when the ANL document was written or where/if it was published originally, but it was certainly after LSV's death and before ANL's death (i.e. some time 1935-1975), most likely during Stalin's time. "Political expediency" somewhat understates the issue. A convincing denunciation of a colleague's theory was very often a matter of life and death. Which is not to say that the honourable choice may not have been to speak the truth and take the consequences, rather than lie and enjoy promotion. In that sense, this document, being dishonest, is not the ideal medium for understanding the real differences between these two former comrades. Nonetheless, I think the real differences show through. On the question of units. The idea is that a person's character develops through a series of experiences. Each experiences adds a new sensibility, a new aversion, a new preference, a new insight, etc., so from that point of view a person's character can be understand as the product or sum of a series of such experiences, as for example, when someone writes their autobiography, especially if they follow in the Goethean tradition of Bildungsromanen. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Andy, > > > I must explain: Since I hadn't read the entire paper, I was searching > for the 8 points in the first half of the paper, which is The > Prosecution half. This is to say the "8 charges" you had indicated in > your post, are actually listed in the second half, the Defense half. > So I suppose the structure threw me. (Sorry to create any confusion, all!) > > But I'd like to continue my exercise openly, as it appears there are > watchers who are benefiting. So here goes (I will go more slowly and > not flood the list). > > #1) The charge by Leontiev (Ad. 4): Perezhivanie, as a manifestation > of the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality. > > One nagging question: Vygotsky, while living (as I understand), had a > large social group in which they openly discussed all of these > theories. If Leontiev was privy to this community, how could he not > have understood the points concerning perezhivanie? It is not that I > accuse Leontiev as being obstinate or thick (that would be an easy > thing to do), but that I want to understand how could he have missed > this if there were other parties available to discuss the nature of > Vygotsky's perezhivanie? The community must have discussed these > concepts without Vygotsky present, among each other. Am I wrong in > this thinking? > > I don't think Vygotsky was like Jesus with confused disciples. It > seemed that he treated his students as equals and that he himself > benefited from their input to the theories. > > If I may, I position this question with the imagination as-if Vygotsky > and Leontiev were here on this list discussing various theories, as we > are here. There was a lot of discussion going on, sharing and the like. > > Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't these lectures on perezhivanie > happen earlier in the decade of time Vygotsky graced us? Or am I mistaken? > > I suppose I am attempting to answer the question, How did Leontiev not > understand perezhivanie as a determinant? And perhaps in gaining an > answer to this question, we might learn something about *teaching* the > concept of perezhivanie? > > Of course it is possible that this was entirely caused by political > expediency. But if that is the case, how can we know this? > > But to the content of the charge: "Perezhivanie, as a manifestation of > the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality." > > I am having a hard time discussing perezhivanie as a "fragment of the > whole." If only because fragment means "a part of", and I don't think > "unit" is necessarily a material thing, but also an abstraction like > the whole is an abstraction. > > For example: The water molecule metaphor. (I hope we do not reduce the > molecule to hydrogen and oxygen and begin flames on the list). In our > perception, we *imagine* the molecule. We know that molecules exist, > just like we know that the ocean exists. But when we perceive the > ocean, it's also not a perception in its entirety, but completed in > our imagination like the molecule is, and this is why I feel the unit, > seen as a fragment, seems problematic. > > If we want to study the nature of oceans we want to study the nature > of water, since water is the material of the ocean. Also, the water > molecule is the unit we must use to understand the behavior of the > water. And so the molecule becomes the unit of analysis. > > If the metaphor works, the ocean is the ideal, and final form. Can we > say that the water molecule determines the nature of the ocean? It > seems so, since the behavior of water (as indicated by the nature of > its molecule) will reveal significantly the nature of the ocean, > moreso than dividing the ocean into fragments, and I'm not sure how > one would divide the ocean into fragments, anyway! > > BTW, I am proposing this metaphor because we know that LSV used the > metaphor of the water molecule himself, though I don't think he spoke > of oceans, just water. Still, I wonder if it works? > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > From dkirsh@lsu.edu Sun Oct 26 18:59:20 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 01:59:20 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> Message-ID: <05dc839009084d559560a2b5852168b8@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Ed, Your hint seems to be: "my objection was, in a sense, that it wasn't consistent (although perhaps not in the way you mean)." Okay, I'm officially stumped. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 6:42 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] David I have never really figured out what reform-oriented oriented or, I guess the other, traditional, meant. If I ask many who name themselves as traditionalists to describe a reform-oriented classroom, they paint an inaccurate picture and, if I ask many who name themselves reform-oriented to describe a traditionalist classroom, they paint a picture just as inaccurate. Even worse if I go back and look at comments from the past, I find that the golden years of traditionalism were as contested (i.e. if transported back today's traditionalists would find themselves labeled reform-oriented). So I guess I more or less agree with Lave as regards consistency. Insofar as Piaget and Vygotsky are concerned, they both add things I think are useful to the mix and I discuss them both with my students (unfortunately my colleagues know little about Vygotsky so my students come a little less knowledgeable than I might wish). I really wouldn't know what it means for teaching to be consistent. I do have commitments as a mathematics teacher which I try to honor (I think you were part of the discussion when I laid these out on the list), but teaching is isn't a static profession (which I really like!) and I am always learning from my students and my colleagues. I agree with what you say about individuals and groups and grumble at my colleagues and my students (teachers-to-be) about "simply engaging students in group discussion with no real sense of how that activity is supposed to lead to learning or development in any sense." Even worse is the way quiet students are viewed and mentored. Insofar as my original story was concerned, I can easily imagine some reform-oriented people thinking she was an excellent teacher and I can easily imagine some traditionalist teachers thinking the same (and vice-versa). As far as the story I asked Phillip about (and I was assuming others might answer), I know some mathematicians would see this class as a good idea and others would not. However, my objection was, in a sense, that it wasn't consistent (although perhaps not in the way you mean). So, directing the question at you (and others if they wish), why did I tell him nicely it was among one of the worst taught classes I had ever seen? I have given you a hint (smile) and I didn't have, I think, a theoretical reason (smile). Ed On Oct 26, 2014, at 4:06 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > Ed, > > The question wasn't directed at me, but I'd like to share some perspectives on the problems of this kind of reform-oriented instruction, and the broader question of appropriate units of analysis for classroom teaching--perhaps they bear on your particular response/interpretation of this class. > > Reform-oriented instruction generally is informed by two theoretical trajectories, of independent origin: the Piagetian theorization of conceptual development based on schemas that derive from the individual's reflective abstraction of their own actions; and the Vygotskyan theorization of development through interiorization of cultural practices. Each of these is relevant to student development in the context of reform-oriented instruction such as the group work you described, below. In particular, a teacher can attend to the particular conceptual constructions that students are wrestling with as their current conceptual structures are challenged and reorganized--a focus that requires engagement with individual students; or the teacher can attend to the corporate engagement of the classroom in increasingly sophisticated practices of thinking, reasoning, and communicating. > > Unfortunately, our efforts as theorists to understand and support effective teaching in this kind of landscape all too often consist in recognizing the dialectical opposition of the alternative perspectives, and therefore to claim we are on the track of identifying a satisfactory unit of analysis to ground a science of education. However, I think Jean Lave (1988) got it right as she laid out the challenge as establishing coherence across "units of analysis [that], though traditionally elaborated separately, must be defined together and consistently" (p. 146). > > What ensues from claims of victory, when all we've done is identify the problem, is a false sense that the priorities a teacher might attend to in engaging students in reform-oriented group work are mutually consistent. In my experience, it is this false sense of good teaching as a mutually coherent set of practices that obscures from teachers the real challenges of reform-oriented instruction, which only can be properly engaged with recognition that the agendas one pursues with individuals and groups are not reconciled with one another, and often work at cross purposes to one another. Absent this perspective, the teacher really has no way to make sense of either branch of the reform agenda or the teaching practices that support it. As a result, all too often, the reform-oriented teacher is simply engaging students in group discussion with no real sense of how that activity is supposed to lead to learning or development in any sense--an enjoyable, but banal pedagogical exercise. > > Of course, finding ways to theorize social and individual perspectives as mutually consistent remains a viable theoretical project. But let's not mistake naming the problem for offering a solution. And in the meantime, perhaps our best service to teachers lies in sharing the richness of the Piagetian and Vygotskyan traditions independently of one another. Because absent epistemic resolution, teachers need to be prepared to engage in the delicate art of balancing and managing inconsistent priorities and methods. > > David > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall > Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 2:52 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] > > Philip > > To first comment on your note to Andy. The teacher was not necessarily interested in students' fluency with the operations (in fact she may have thought there were more than fluent). The first sentence of my story reads: > >> Ms. Pe?a has, in previous years, noticed that her fourth graders, at times, struggle to make sense of multi-step word problems. Many seem confused about both the nature of the required operations-most usually, addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division-or the order in which these operations are to be applied. > > Second, we may see teaching mathematics (and see teaching teachers) differently (which is fine as I certainly do have all or even significant number of the answers - I am right now working on the questions). A story might be helpful: > > A number of years ago I was asked to view an 'exemplarily' mathematics class for pre-service teachers taught by a mathematician (he had received a grant to design this special class). He began the class by clearly and succinctly introducing the mathematics problem(s) to be considered and when all seemed to have a good idea what was to be done, the pre-service teachers - about five or six to a table - began talking and working. Students definitely seemed engaged, there was a lot of good discussion, and I think the teacher walked around a bit making comments and asking questions. The class ended and he asked me what I thought. I told him nicely it was among one of the worst taught classes I had ever seen (I did tell him why). Why do you think I said that? Student turns were certainly in the 90s. > > Ed > > On Oct 26, 2014, at 10:31 AM, White, Phillip wrote: > >> >> >> as you wrote, Ed: >> >> " In the next section of the paper I take up a different math lesson with ostensibly the same purpose (i.e. making sense of 'word' problems). Some different things will show up which perhaps get me a little closer to a 'smallest' unit of analysis. It will, in a sense, be the 'kinds' of turns not the number of turns (although chidden will have more turns) that are interesting (or so I think - smile)." >> >> clearly i did not express myself coherently, this this is exactly the point i was attempting to make - that it was the 'kinds' of turns, the action within the turn, that was of paramount importance. i interpreted the teacher's turns as actions that the students could have been doing. which is why i noted that the teacher produced the greatest number of turns. as a teacher of teachers i would have preferred to see the great majority of turns having been done by the students - preferably student to student responses. >> >> and thanks for the smiles! >> >> phillip >> > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Oct 26 19:25:06 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 13:25:06 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> Message-ID: <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> Ed, I can't answer your question, so I'll to revert to the other subject line. A few ill-informed observations on the unit of analysis. Philip's analysis into turns is of course a Bakhtinian analysis of classroom activity. Whatever else it may show, it is not going to tell us anything about the formation of concepts, mathematical or other. I agree with you, Ed., that the text-mediated teacher-student interaction is "too big" to tell us anything about the learning of mathematical ideas. It is a lens for shedding light on the relation between teacher and student, which is doubtless helpful but still does not help us understand how a child may develop mathematical insight, only how to emulate what the teacher does, and after all, sometimes the teacher is wrong. Vygotsky did come to the brink of talking about this topic when he studied the development of what he called pre-concepts, didn't he? "Pre-Concepts," in Vygotsky's lexicon, form only in older children, typically those who are already attending school and being confronted with school-like tasks, or engaged in social activities including processes such as measuring, buying and selling, calculating time, and so on. Such activities oblige the child to use culturally transmitted symbols of some kind (not necessarily numbers, for example coins or measuring sticks) to carry out processes requiring the abstraction of features from a concrete situation. And famously, Vygotsky used the artefact-mediated action as his unit for these studies. The teacher and the wider culture only entered the picture in the selection of the artefact and (presumably) the setting of the task (Vygotsky glossed over this). In a brief off-line exchange, Ed has made me accept that mathematics, as practised by mathematicians, is a formal science. It is actually concerned only with sequences of symbols, not any material process outside the text. But I still think that mathematics is a science. Even symbols are material things. Mathematics is not merely a social convention, and I don't believe it can be learnt if it is taught as a formal discipline. Of course, if you believe that mathematics is just a social convention, then decoding texts under teacher direction is the essence of doing mathematics. I accept that decoding word problems may be a typical way that mathematics is taught in school, but unless we are content to simply describe existing practices I am not satisfied that this unit, based on decoding texts, captures how students learn mathematics. And indeed it may obscure that. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Ed Wall wrote: > David > > I have never really figured out what reform-oriented oriented or, I guess the other, traditional, meant. If I ask many who name themselves as traditionalists to describe a reform-oriented classroom, they paint an inaccurate picture and, if I ask many who name themselves reform-oriented to describe a traditionalist classroom, they paint a picture just as inaccurate. Even worse if I go back and look at comments from the past, I find that the golden years of traditionalism were as contested (i.e. if transported back today's traditionalists would find themselves labeled reform-oriented). So I guess I more or less agree with Lave as regards consistency. Insofar as Piaget and Vygotsky are concerned, they both add things I think are useful to the mix and I discuss them both with my students (unfortunately my colleagues know little about Vygotsky so my students come a little less knowledgeable than I might wish). > I really wouldn't know what it means for teaching to be consistent. I do have commitments as a mathematics teacher which I try to honor (I think you were part of the discussion when I laid these out on the list), but teaching is isn't a static profession (which I really like!) and I am always learning from my students and my colleagues. I agree with what you say about individuals and groups and grumble at my colleagues and my students (teachers-to-be) about "simply engaging students in group discussion with no real sense of how that activity is supposed to lead to learning or development in any sense." Even worse is the way quiet students are viewed and mentored. > Insofar as my original story was concerned, I can easily imagine some reform-oriented people thinking she was an excellent teacher and I can easily imagine some traditionalist teachers thinking the same (and vice-versa). As far as the story I asked Phillip about (and I was assuming others might answer), I know some mathematicians would see this class as a good idea and others would not. However, my objection was, in a sense, that it wasn't consistent (although perhaps not in the way you mean). > > So, directing the question at you (and others if they wish), why did I tell him nicely it was among one of the worst taught classes I had ever seen? I have given you a hint (smile) and I didn't have, I think, a theoretical reason (smile). > > Ed > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Oct 26 19:38:06 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 02:38:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] In-Reply-To: <544DA234.1080608@mira.net> References: <1414371755253.24181@unm.edu>,<544DA234.1080608@mira.net> Message-ID: <1414377486343.33343@unm.edu> Hi Andy, Thanks for some additional information. Yes, "political expediency" (PE) is an understatement to be sure, from the sound of it. I don't know if I can imagine myself to denounce my own beloved teachers in order that I may live and be promoted. The idea makes me quite ill, and certainly more sympathetic to Leontiev. However, the challenge seems to be that we must tease away the PE aspect to try to clear the view to the generation of the theories (or divergence thereof). If that isn't reasonable, let me know. I do not mean to be reductive and minimize the political issues in any way. I am merely attempting to go slowly over this so that I gain a clear picture of the collision of ideas and the apparent wreckage and what pieces were retrieved and extended upon. So I suppose there are a few things I would enjoy clarity about. First is historical: How much do we know that is factual in Leontiev's motivation to deny the theories? What is speculative? This is not a flippant two questions. What I mean is are there contemporary documents (or any other documents that come after Stalin's death, or any other time) that discuss this parting of the ways and motivations for doing so? Is this Leontiev paper all that we possess? What do you mean that the differences show through, despite the PE factor? We cannot fully remove the PE factor, I know, but how much does it explain the "real differences" if it is clouding the view? Second is theoretical: I understand perezhivanie is experiential, specific to the individual in question, based upon the person's genetics, level of development, emotional awareness, and intellectual ability at the time of the situation (event), but importantly that the perezhivanie is also inclusive of aspects of the environment itself and how the environment exerts force on the person (combined or in interaction with the more personal or "internal" factors). [I'm afraid I was lost at the reference to the autobiography. Goethe is beyond the limits of my knowledge at this time. :) ] Furthermore, that the development of the person is not necessarily a "summation of all perezhivanies." If only because a single experience can radically change a person's makeup entirely, whether for good or ill. That a single "unit" can possibly transform the entire whole? (I'm thinking for example the impact of PTSD. I hesitate to resort to a pathological example, it just what seems to illustrate the best about experiences affecting the whole). However I agree that my personality is the manifest expression of the "collection" of all my experiences, I'm not sure if I could say "summation," since this sounds mechanical in nature, rather than systemic. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 7:39 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] Annalisa, I don't know exactly when the ANL document was written or where/if it was published originally, but it was certainly after LSV's death and before ANL's death (i.e. some time 1935-1975), most likely during Stalin's time. "Political expediency" somewhat understates the issue. A convincing denunciation of a colleague's theory was very often a matter of life and death. Which is not to say that the honourable choice may not have been to speak the truth and take the consequences, rather than lie and enjoy promotion. In that sense, this document, being dishonest, is not the ideal medium for understanding the real differences between these two former comrades. Nonetheless, I think the real differences show through. On the question of units. The idea is that a person's character develops through a series of experiences. Each experiences adds a new sensibility, a new aversion, a new preference, a new insight, etc., so from that point of view a person's character can be understand as the product or sum of a series of such experiences, as for example, when someone writes their autobiography, especially if they follow in the Goethean tradition of Bildungsromanen. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Andy, > > > I must explain: Since I hadn't read the entire paper, I was searching > for the 8 points in the first half of the paper, which is The > Prosecution half. This is to say the "8 charges" you had indicated in > your post, are actually listed in the second half, the Defense half. > So I suppose the structure threw me. (Sorry to create any confusion, all!) > > But I'd like to continue my exercise openly, as it appears there are > watchers who are benefiting. So here goes (I will go more slowly and > not flood the list). > > #1) The charge by Leontiev (Ad. 4): Perezhivanie, as a manifestation > of the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality. > > One nagging question: Vygotsky, while living (as I understand), had a > large social group in which they openly discussed all of these > theories. If Leontiev was privy to this community, how could he not > have understood the points concerning perezhivanie? It is not that I > accuse Leontiev as being obstinate or thick (that would be an easy > thing to do), but that I want to understand how could he have missed > this if there were other parties available to discuss the nature of > Vygotsky's perezhivanie? The community must have discussed these > concepts without Vygotsky present, among each other. Am I wrong in > this thinking? > > I don't think Vygotsky was like Jesus with confused disciples. It > seemed that he treated his students as equals and that he himself > benefited from their input to the theories. > > If I may, I position this question with the imagination as-if Vygotsky > and Leontiev were here on this list discussing various theories, as we > are here. There was a lot of discussion going on, sharing and the like. > > Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't these lectures on perezhivanie > happen earlier in the decade of time Vygotsky graced us? Or am I mistaken? > > I suppose I am attempting to answer the question, How did Leontiev not > understand perezhivanie as a determinant? And perhaps in gaining an > answer to this question, we might learn something about *teaching* the > concept of perezhivanie? > > Of course it is possible that this was entirely caused by political > expediency. But if that is the case, how can we know this? > > But to the content of the charge: "Perezhivanie, as a manifestation of > the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality." > > I am having a hard time discussing perezhivanie as a "fragment of the > whole." If only because fragment means "a part of", and I don't think > "unit" is necessarily a material thing, but also an abstraction like > the whole is an abstraction. > > For example: The water molecule metaphor. (I hope we do not reduce the > molecule to hydrogen and oxygen and begin flames on the list). In our > perception, we *imagine* the molecule. We know that molecules exist, > just like we know that the ocean exists. But when we perceive the > ocean, it's also not a perception in its entirety, but completed in > our imagination like the molecule is, and this is why I feel the unit, > seen as a fragment, seems problematic. > > If we want to study the nature of oceans we want to study the nature > of water, since water is the material of the ocean. Also, the water > molecule is the unit we must use to understand the behavior of the > water. And so the molecule becomes the unit of analysis. > > If the metaphor works, the ocean is the ideal, and final form. Can we > say that the water molecule determines the nature of the ocean? It > seems so, since the behavior of water (as indicated by the nature of > its molecule) will reveal significantly the nature of the ocean, > moreso than dividing the ocean into fragments, and I'm not sure how > one would divide the ocean into fragments, anyway! > > BTW, I am proposing this metaphor because we know that LSV used the > metaphor of the water molecule himself, though I don't think he spoke > of oceans, just water. Still, I wonder if it works? > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Oct 26 20:01:36 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 14:01:36 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> Message-ID: <544DB590.5080403@mira.net> I'll have a go at your puzzle, Ed. You didn't like the lesson because the two parts (1. a lecture on maths, 2. the students talking to each other) did not contain any interaction between student and teacher over the text and the students' interpretations of it. Probably 1. the students didn't understand the lecture and then 2. reinforced each others' misconceptions. Or, he was lecturing them on something they all already understood, but he never knew. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Ed Wall wrote: > A number of years ago I was asked to view an 'exemplarily' mathematics class for pre-service teachers taught by a mathematician (he had received a grant to design this special class). He began the class by clearly and succinctly introducing the mathematics problem(s) to be considered and when all seemed to have a good idea what was to be done, the pre-service teachers - about five or six to a table - began talking and working. Students definitely seemed engaged, there was a lot of good discussion, and I think the teacher walked around a bit making comments and asking questions. The class ended and he asked me what I thought. I told him nicely it was among one of the worst taught classes I had ever seen (I did tell him why). Why do you think I said that? Student turns were certainly in the 90s. > > Ed > > From ewall@umich.edu Sun Oct 26 20:01:32 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 22:01:32 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <05dc839009084d559560a2b5852168b8@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <05dc839009084d559560a2b5852168b8@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: David This teacher was trying to engage in some aspects of 'reform-oriented' instruction. He seems to have interpreted this, in part, as ' put the students in groups and let them do some relevant problem solving.' This is fine, but in reform-oriented instruction students report out to the whole class or you do some sort of summary with input from the groups. The idea being, in part, to use the insights of peers to leverage the learning of all. So, basically this teacher was inconsistent in the way you mentioned. Our final conversation went roughly like this: Me: Why did you put people in groups? He: Because they talk more if they do it with peers. Me: I heard some really thoughtful insights from that table. He: Yes! Me: Don't you think the people at the other tables could have benefited from that discussion? He: Oh. Me: Don't you think it would have been a much, much more productive lesson if people could have shared across tables? He: Yeah, but how would you do that? We talked a little more about the complexities of reporting out (and this can be done 'inconsistently' also). I don't present all this as something one needs to do all the time (or, for that matter, ever do), but, if you are developing a classroom community (some reform-oriented jargon here), some follow-through seems needed. My point in all this seems to be essentially your point. That is, a lot of group talking isn't necessarily a productive use of class time; the 'kinds' of teacher allocated turns are critical (reform or traditional). There is a time for talking within whole class and a time for talking with a group (and I would say a time for talking one-on-one). Ed On Oct 26, 2014, at 8:59 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > Ed, > Your hint seems to be: "my objection was, in a sense, that it wasn't consistent (although perhaps not in the way you mean)." > > Okay, I'm officially stumped. > > David > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall > Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 6:42 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] > > David > > I have never really figured out what reform-oriented oriented or, I guess the other, traditional, meant. If I ask many who name themselves as traditionalists to describe a reform-oriented classroom, they paint an inaccurate picture and, if I ask many who name themselves reform-oriented to describe a traditionalist classroom, they paint a picture just as inaccurate. Even worse if I go back and look at comments from the past, I find that the golden years of traditionalism were as contested (i.e. if transported back today's traditionalists would find themselves labeled reform-oriented). So I guess I more or less agree with Lave as regards consistency. Insofar as Piaget and Vygotsky are concerned, they both add things I think are useful to the mix and I discuss them both with my students (unfortunately my colleagues know little about Vygotsky so my students come a little less knowledgeable than I might wish). > I really wouldn't know what it means for teaching to be consistent. I do have commitments as a mathematics teacher which I try to honor (I think you were part of the discussion when I laid these out on the list), but teaching is isn't a static profession (which I really like!) and I am always learning from my students and my colleagues. I agree with what you say about individuals and groups and grumble at my colleagues and my students (teachers-to-be) about "simply engaging students in group discussion with no real sense of how that activity is supposed to lead to learning or development in any sense." Even worse is the way quiet students are viewed and mentored. > Insofar as my original story was concerned, I can easily imagine some reform-oriented people thinking she was an excellent teacher and I can easily imagine some traditionalist teachers thinking the same (and vice-versa). As far as the story I asked Phillip about (and I was assuming others might answer), I know some mathematicians would see this class as a good idea and others would not. However, my objection was, in a sense, that it wasn't consistent (although perhaps not in the way you mean). > > So, directing the question at you (and others if they wish), why did I tell him nicely it was among one of the worst taught classes I had ever seen? I have given you a hint (smile) and I didn't have, I think, a theoretical reason (smile). > > Ed > > > On Oct 26, 2014, at 4:06 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > >> Ed, >> >> The question wasn't directed at me, but I'd like to share some perspectives on the problems of this kind of reform-oriented instruction, and the broader question of appropriate units of analysis for classroom teaching--perhaps they bear on your particular response/interpretation of this class. >> >> Reform-oriented instruction generally is informed by two theoretical trajectories, of independent origin: the Piagetian theorization of conceptual development based on schemas that derive from the individual's reflective abstraction of their own actions; and the Vygotskyan theorization of development through interiorization of cultural practices. Each of these is relevant to student development in the context of reform-oriented instruction such as the group work you described, below. In particular, a teacher can attend to the particular conceptual constructions that students are wrestling with as their current conceptual structures are challenged and reorganized--a focus that requires engagement with individual students; or the teacher can attend to the corporate engagement of the classroom in increasingly sophisticated practices of thinking, reasoning, and communicating. >> >> Unfortunately, our efforts as theorists to understand and support effective teaching in this kind of landscape all too often consist in recognizing the dialectical opposition of the alternative perspectives, and therefore to claim we are on the track of identifying a satisfactory unit of analysis to ground a science of education. However, I think Jean Lave (1988) got it right as she laid out the challenge as establishing coherence across "units of analysis [that], though traditionally elaborated separately, must be defined together and consistently" (p. 146). >> >> What ensues from claims of victory, when all we've done is identify the problem, is a false sense that the priorities a teacher might attend to in engaging students in reform-oriented group work are mutually consistent. In my experience, it is this false sense of good teaching as a mutually coherent set of practices that obscures from teachers the real challenges of reform-oriented instruction, which only can be properly engaged with recognition that the agendas one pursues with individuals and groups are not reconciled with one another, and often work at cross purposes to one another. Absent this perspective, the teacher really has no way to make sense of either branch of the reform agenda or the teaching practices that support it. As a result, all too often, the reform-oriented teacher is simply engaging students in group discussion with no real sense of how that activity is supposed to lead to learning or development in any sense--an enjoyable, but banal pedagogical exercise. >> >> Of course, finding ways to theorize social and individual perspectives as mutually consistent remains a viable theoretical project. But let's not mistake naming the problem for offering a solution. And in the meantime, perhaps our best service to teachers lies in sharing the richness of the Piagetian and Vygotskyan traditions independently of one another. Because absent epistemic resolution, teachers need to be prepared to engage in the delicate art of balancing and managing inconsistent priorities and methods. >> >> David >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >> Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 2:52 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] >> >> Philip >> >> To first comment on your note to Andy. The teacher was not necessarily interested in students' fluency with the operations (in fact she may have thought there were more than fluent). The first sentence of my story reads: >> >>> Ms. Pe?a has, in previous years, noticed that her fourth graders, at times, struggle to make sense of multi-step word problems. Many seem confused about both the nature of the required operations-most usually, addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division-or the order in which these operations are to be applied. >> >> Second, we may see teaching mathematics (and see teaching teachers) differently (which is fine as I certainly do have all or even significant number of the answers - I am right now working on the questions). A story might be helpful: >> >> A number of years ago I was asked to view an 'exemplarily' mathematics class for pre-service teachers taught by a mathematician (he had received a grant to design this special class). He began the class by clearly and succinctly introducing the mathematics problem(s) to be considered and when all seemed to have a good idea what was to be done, the pre-service teachers - about five or six to a table - began talking and working. Students definitely seemed engaged, there was a lot of good discussion, and I think the teacher walked around a bit making comments and asking questions. The class ended and he asked me what I thought. I told him nicely it was among one of the worst taught classes I had ever seen (I did tell him why). Why do you think I said that? Student turns were certainly in the 90s. >> >> Ed >> >> On Oct 26, 2014, at 10:31 AM, White, Phillip wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> as you wrote, Ed: >>> >>> " In the next section of the paper I take up a different math lesson with ostensibly the same purpose (i.e. making sense of 'word' problems). Some different things will show up which perhaps get me a little closer to a 'smallest' unit of analysis. It will, in a sense, be the 'kinds' of turns not the number of turns (although chidden will have more turns) that are interesting (or so I think - smile)." >>> >>> clearly i did not express myself coherently, this this is exactly the point i was attempting to make - that it was the 'kinds' of turns, the action within the turn, that was of paramount importance. i interpreted the teacher's turns as actions that the students could have been doing. which is why i noted that the teacher produced the greatest number of turns. as a teacher of teachers i would have preferred to see the great majority of turns having been done by the students - preferably student to student responses. >>> >>> and thanks for the smiles! >>> >>> phillip >>> >> >> >> > > > From ewall@umich.edu Sun Oct 26 20:41:23 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 22:41:23 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: <544DB590.5080403@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <544DB590.5080403@mira.net> Message-ID: <05F1BDD1-1A6E-4DAB-811D-4F55F6F3D3DE@umich.edu> Andy Basically you got it Andy although I thought it was problematic because all the students and the teacher didn't engage in discussion so as to share misconceptions and insights. Ed On Oct 26, 2014, at 10:01 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I'll have a go at your puzzle, Ed. > You didn't like the lesson because the two parts (1. a lecture on maths, 2. the students talking to each other) did not contain any interaction between student and teacher over the text and the students' interpretations of it. Probably 1. the students didn't understand the lecture and then 2. reinforced each others' misconceptions. Or, he was lecturing them on something they all already understood, but he never knew. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Ed Wall wrote: >> A number of years ago I was asked to view an 'exemplarily' mathematics class for pre-service teachers taught by a mathematician (he had received a grant to design this special class). He began the class by clearly and succinctly introducing the mathematics problem(s) to be considered and when all seemed to have a good idea what was to be done, the pre-service teachers - about five or six to a table - began talking and working. Students definitely seemed engaged, there was a lot of good discussion, and I think the teacher walked around a bit making comments and asking questions. The class ended and he asked me what I thought. I told him nicely it was among one of the worst taught classes I had ever seen (I did tell him why). Why do you think I said that? Student turns were certainly in the 90s. >> >> Ed >> > From ewall@umich.edu Sun Oct 26 21:21:02 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 23:21:02 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> Message-ID: <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> Andy Asking that question was one of the dumber things I've done on this list. Apologies to all Thanks for reminding me about pre-concepts. I've been thinking about something similar and wondering if this is part of what makes doing mathematics 'mathematical.' Historically, by the way, mathematics grew out of manipulating such material objects; however, there are indications that, at some point (and it may have happened more than once), there was sort of a leap. Mathematics is considered a science; for instance, of patterns or, as Hegel puts it, quantity. I agree for a mathematician symbols of various sorts are effectively 'things'. In the 80s some mathematicians (School Mathematics Study Group) in the US put together a formal curriculum - my aunt used it - which was a disaster (and a real pain for the kids involved). Indications are children learned little. So to add a little to a discussion that possibly has continued far longer than it should. Mathematics may have a few characteristics that may distinguish it from other disciplines such as 1. A student has the ability, in principle, to be able to independently of teachers or peers verify a grade appropriate mathematics statement (not a definition although definitions admit, in a sense, a sort of empirical verification). 2. Solutions to problems are, in general, not subject to social conventions (which probably is included in the above). Amusingly, I believe in the US a state legislature once tried to set the value of pi to 3.1417 However, I'm not sure how such would fit together into a useful unit of analysis. Ed On Oct 26, 2014, at 9:25 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Ed, I can't answer your question, so I'll to revert to the other subject line. > > A few ill-informed observations on the unit of analysis. > > Philip's analysis into turns is of course a Bakhtinian analysis of classroom activity. Whatever else it may show, it is not going to tell us anything about the formation of concepts, mathematical or other. > > I agree with you, Ed., that the text-mediated teacher-student interaction is "too big" to tell us anything about the learning of mathematical ideas. It is a lens for shedding light on the relation between teacher and student, which is doubtless helpful but still does not help us understand how a child may develop mathematical insight, only how to emulate what the teacher does, and after all, sometimes the teacher is wrong. > > Vygotsky did come to the brink of talking about this topic when he studied the development of what he called pre-concepts, didn't he? "Pre-Concepts," in Vygotsky's lexicon, form only in older children, typically those who are already attending school and being confronted with school-like tasks, or engaged in social activities including processes such as measuring, buying and selling, calculating time, and so on. Such activities oblige the child to use culturally transmitted symbols of some kind (not necessarily numbers, for example coins or measuring sticks) to carry out processes requiring the abstraction of features from a concrete situation. And famously, Vygotsky used the artefact-mediated action as his unit for these studies. The teacher and the wider culture only entered the picture in the selection of the artefact and (presumably) the setting of the task (Vygotsky glossed over this). > > In a brief off-line exchange, Ed has made me accept that mathematics, as practised by mathematicians, is a formal science. It is actually concerned only with sequences of symbols, not any material process outside the text. But I still think that mathematics is a science. Even symbols are material things. Mathematics is not merely a social convention, and I don't believe it can be learnt if it is taught as a formal discipline. Of course, if you believe that mathematics is just a social convention, then decoding texts under teacher direction is the essence of doing mathematics. > > I accept that decoding word problems may be a typical way that mathematics is taught in school, but unless we are content to simply describe existing practices I am not satisfied that this unit, based on decoding texts, captures how students learn mathematics. And indeed it may obscure that. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Ed Wall wrote: >> David >> >> I have never really figured out what reform-oriented oriented or, I guess the other, traditional, meant. If I ask many who name themselves as traditionalists to describe a reform-oriented classroom, they paint an inaccurate picture and, if I ask many who name themselves reform-oriented to describe a traditionalist classroom, they paint a picture just as inaccurate. Even worse if I go back and look at comments from the past, I find that the golden years of traditionalism were as contested (i.e. if transported back today's traditionalists would find themselves labeled reform-oriented). So I guess I more or less agree with Lave as regards consistency. Insofar as Piaget and Vygotsky are concerned, they both add things I think are useful to the mix and I discuss them both with my students (unfortunately my colleagues know little about Vygotsky so my students come a little less knowledgeable than I might wish). >> I really wouldn't know what it means for teaching to be consistent. I do have commitments as a mathematics teacher which I try to honor (I think you were part of the discussion when I laid these out on the list), but teaching is isn't a static profession (which I really like!) and I am always learning from my students and my colleagues. I agree with what you say about individuals and groups and grumble at my colleagues and my students (teachers-to-be) about "simply engaging students in group discussion with no real sense of how that activity is supposed to lead to learning or development in any sense." Even worse is the way quiet students are viewed and mentored. >> Insofar as my original story was concerned, I can easily imagine some reform-oriented people thinking she was an excellent teacher and I can easily imagine some traditionalist teachers thinking the same (and vice-versa). As far as the story I asked Phillip about (and I was assuming others might answer), I know some mathematicians would see this class as a good idea and others would not. However, my objection was, in a sense, that it wasn't consistent (although perhaps not in the way you mean). >> So, directing the question at you (and others if they wish), why did I tell him nicely it was among one of the worst taught classes I had ever seen? I have given you a hint (smile) and I didn't have, I think, a theoretical reason (smile). >> >> Ed >> >> > > > From dkirsh@lsu.edu Sun Oct 26 21:23:55 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 04:23:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <05dc839009084d559560a2b5852168b8@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: Ed, You talk about this teacher as failing, in some respects, in not reconvening the groups as a whole class: "if you are developing a classroom community (some reform-oriented jargon here), some follow-through seems needed." On the other hand, your vision of reform-oriented teaching seems to recognize sufficient latitude so that even this basic premise is undone: "I don't present all this as something one needs to do all the time (or, for that matter, ever do)." You conclude with: "There is a time for talking within whole class and a time for talking with a group (and I would say a time for talking one-on-one)." Yes, Ed, maybe there is, but then again, maybe there isn't. The challenge is to be able to articulate exactly what that time is, and what you, the teacher, want/hope will be happening during those interactions, what you will do if they don't happen, and what goals are subserved. I maintain that simply stretching a unit of analysis across incommensurable perspectives and theorizations never answers these questions. It leaves us with an impression that we have structure--that structure is immanent--but the incommensurables glide past each other with nary a bump or jolt. Eventually the desire for solidity leads to classroom research as "design science" (Cobb, 2007) in which theoretical tools are marshaled anew for each classroom situation. It's a wonderland for theorists, but a desert for teachers, excepting those lucky few who have a team of researchers analyzing each classroom move, and collaboratively co-producing the next lesson plan with them. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 10:02 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] David This teacher was trying to engage in some aspects of 'reform-oriented' instruction. He seems to have interpreted this, in part, as ' put the students in groups and let them do some relevant problem solving.' This is fine, but in reform-oriented instruction students report out to the whole class or you do some sort of summary with input from the groups. The idea being, in part, to use the insights of peers to leverage the learning of all. So, basically this teacher was inconsistent in the way you mentioned. Our final conversation went roughly like this: Me: Why did you put people in groups? He: Because they talk more if they do it with peers. Me: I heard some really thoughtful insights from that table. He: Yes! Me: Don't you think the people at the other tables could have benefited from that discussion? He: Oh. Me: Don't you think it would have been a much, much more productive lesson if people could have shared across tables? He: Yeah, but how would you do that? We talked a little more about the complexities of reporting out (and this can be done 'inconsistently' also). I don't present all this as something one needs to do all the time (or, for that matter, ever do), but, if you are developing a classroom community (some reform-oriented jargon here), some follow-through seems needed. My point in all this seems to be essentially your point. That is, a lot of group talking isn't necessarily a productive use of class time; the 'kinds' of teacher allocated turns are critical (reform or traditional). There is a time for talking within whole class and a time for talking with a group (and I would say a time for talking one-on-one). Ed On Oct 26, 2014, at 8:59 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > Ed, > Your hint seems to be: "my objection was, in a sense, that it wasn't consistent (although perhaps not in the way you mean)." > > Okay, I'm officially stumped. > > David > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall > Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 6:42 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] > > David > > I have never really figured out what reform-oriented oriented or, I guess the other, traditional, meant. If I ask many who name themselves as traditionalists to describe a reform-oriented classroom, they paint an inaccurate picture and, if I ask many who name themselves reform-oriented to describe a traditionalist classroom, they paint a picture just as inaccurate. Even worse if I go back and look at comments from the past, I find that the golden years of traditionalism were as contested (i.e. if transported back today's traditionalists would find themselves labeled reform-oriented). So I guess I more or less agree with Lave as regards consistency. Insofar as Piaget and Vygotsky are concerned, they both add things I think are useful to the mix and I discuss them both with my students (unfortunately my colleagues know little about Vygotsky so my students come a little less knowledgeable than I might wish). > I really wouldn't know what it means for teaching to be consistent. I do have commitments as a mathematics teacher which I try to honor (I think you were part of the discussion when I laid these out on the list), but teaching is isn't a static profession (which I really like!) and I am always learning from my students and my colleagues. I agree with what you say about individuals and groups and grumble at my colleagues and my students (teachers-to-be) about "simply engaging students in group discussion with no real sense of how that activity is supposed to lead to learning or development in any sense." Even worse is the way quiet students are viewed and mentored. > Insofar as my original story was concerned, I can easily imagine some reform-oriented people thinking she was an excellent teacher and I can easily imagine some traditionalist teachers thinking the same (and vice-versa). As far as the story I asked Phillip about (and I was assuming others might answer), I know some mathematicians would see this class as a good idea and others would not. However, my objection was, in a sense, that it wasn't consistent (although perhaps not in the way you mean). > > So, directing the question at you (and others if they wish), why did I tell him nicely it was among one of the worst taught classes I had ever seen? I have given you a hint (smile) and I didn't have, I think, a theoretical reason (smile). > > Ed > > > On Oct 26, 2014, at 4:06 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > >> Ed, >> >> The question wasn't directed at me, but I'd like to share some perspectives on the problems of this kind of reform-oriented instruction, and the broader question of appropriate units of analysis for classroom teaching--perhaps they bear on your particular response/interpretation of this class. >> >> Reform-oriented instruction generally is informed by two theoretical trajectories, of independent origin: the Piagetian theorization of conceptual development based on schemas that derive from the individual's reflective abstraction of their own actions; and the Vygotskyan theorization of development through interiorization of cultural practices. Each of these is relevant to student development in the context of reform-oriented instruction such as the group work you described, below. In particular, a teacher can attend to the particular conceptual constructions that students are wrestling with as their current conceptual structures are challenged and reorganized--a focus that requires engagement with individual students; or the teacher can attend to the corporate engagement of the classroom in increasingly sophisticated practices of thinking, reasoning, and communicating. >> >> Unfortunately, our efforts as theorists to understand and support effective teaching in this kind of landscape all too often consist in recognizing the dialectical opposition of the alternative perspectives, and therefore to claim we are on the track of identifying a satisfactory unit of analysis to ground a science of education. However, I think Jean Lave (1988) got it right as she laid out the challenge as establishing coherence across "units of analysis [that], though traditionally elaborated separately, must be defined together and consistently" (p. 146). >> >> What ensues from claims of victory, when all we've done is identify the problem, is a false sense that the priorities a teacher might attend to in engaging students in reform-oriented group work are mutually consistent. In my experience, it is this false sense of good teaching as a mutually coherent set of practices that obscures from teachers the real challenges of reform-oriented instruction, which only can be properly engaged with recognition that the agendas one pursues with individuals and groups are not reconciled with one another, and often work at cross purposes to one another. Absent this perspective, the teacher really has no way to make sense of either branch of the reform agenda or the teaching practices that support it. As a result, all too often, the reform-oriented teacher is simply engaging students in group discussion with no real sense of how that activity is supposed to lead to learning or development in any sense--an enjoyable, but banal pedagogical exercise. >> >> Of course, finding ways to theorize social and individual perspectives as mutually consistent remains a viable theoretical project. But let's not mistake naming the problem for offering a solution. And in the meantime, perhaps our best service to teachers lies in sharing the richness of the Piagetian and Vygotskyan traditions independently of one another. Because absent epistemic resolution, teachers need to be prepared to engage in the delicate art of balancing and managing inconsistent priorities and methods. >> >> David >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >> Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 2:52 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] >> >> Philip >> >> To first comment on your note to Andy. The teacher was not necessarily interested in students' fluency with the operations (in fact she may have thought there were more than fluent). The first sentence of my story reads: >> >>> Ms. Pe?a has, in previous years, noticed that her fourth graders, at times, struggle to make sense of multi-step word problems. Many seem confused about both the nature of the required operations-most usually, addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division-or the order in which these operations are to be applied. >> >> Second, we may see teaching mathematics (and see teaching teachers) differently (which is fine as I certainly do have all or even significant number of the answers - I am right now working on the questions). A story might be helpful: >> >> A number of years ago I was asked to view an 'exemplarily' mathematics class for pre-service teachers taught by a mathematician (he had received a grant to design this special class). He began the class by clearly and succinctly introducing the mathematics problem(s) to be considered and when all seemed to have a good idea what was to be done, the pre-service teachers - about five or six to a table - began talking and working. Students definitely seemed engaged, there was a lot of good discussion, and I think the teacher walked around a bit making comments and asking questions. The class ended and he asked me what I thought. I told him nicely it was among one of the worst taught classes I had ever seen (I did tell him why). Why do you think I said that? Student turns were certainly in the 90s. >> >> Ed >> >> On Oct 26, 2014, at 10:31 AM, White, Phillip wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> as you wrote, Ed: >>> >>> " In the next section of the paper I take up a different math lesson with ostensibly the same purpose (i.e. making sense of 'word' problems). Some different things will show up which perhaps get me a little closer to a 'smallest' unit of analysis. It will, in a sense, be the 'kinds' of turns not the number of turns (although chidden will have more turns) that are interesting (or so I think - smile)." >>> >>> clearly i did not express myself coherently, this this is exactly the point i was attempting to make - that it was the 'kinds' of turns, the action within the turn, that was of paramount importance. i interpreted the teacher's turns as actions that the students could have been doing. which is why i noted that the teacher produced the greatest number of turns. as a teacher of teachers i would have preferred to see the great majority of turns having been done by the students - preferably student to student responses. >>> >>> and thanks for the smiles! >>> >>> phillip >>> >> >> >> > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Oct 26 21:31:15 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 15:31:15 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> Message-ID: <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> Well, I think that if you make a decision that mathematics is *not* essentially a social convention, but something which is essentially grasping something objective, then that affects what you choose as your unit of analysis. Student-text-teacher is all about acquiring a social convention. Remember that when Marx chose an exchange of commodities as a unit of analysis of bourgeois society, he knew full-well that commodities are rarely exchanged - they are bought and sold. But Marx did not "include" money in the unit of analysis. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Ed Wall wrote: > Andy > > Asking that question was one of the dumber things I've done on this list. Apologies to all > > Thanks for reminding me about pre-concepts. I've been thinking about something similar and wondering if this is part of what makes doing mathematics 'mathematical.' Historically, by the way, mathematics grew out of manipulating such material objects; however, there are indications that, at some point (and it may have happened more than once), there was sort of a leap. > > Mathematics is considered a science; for instance, of patterns or, as Hegel puts it, quantity. I agree for a mathematician symbols of various sorts are effectively 'things'. > > In the 80s some mathematicians (School Mathematics Study Group) in the US put together a formal curriculum - my aunt used it - which was a disaster (and a real pain for the kids involved). Indications are children learned little. > > > So to add a little to a discussion that possibly has continued far longer than it should. Mathematics may have a few characteristics that may distinguish it from other disciplines such as > > 1. A student has the ability, in principle, to be able to independently of teachers or peers verify a grade appropriate mathematics statement (not a definition although definitions admit, in a sense, a sort of empirical verification). > > 2. Solutions to problems are, in general, not subject to social conventions (which probably is included in the above). Amusingly, I believe in the US a state legislature once tried to set the value of pi to 3.1417 > > However, I'm not sure how such would fit together into a useful unit of analysis. > > Ed > > > From ewall@umich.edu Sun Oct 26 22:36:30 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 00:36:30 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <05dc839009084d559560a2b5852168b8@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: David Quite frankly I am unsure what to write. So let me say I more or less agree with all the general points you seem to want to make and am unsure why you think I would do otherwise. I actually don't have a vision of reform-oriented teaching, but currently what I observe is such follow-through is productive and I seldom observe that step untaken. Since I don't consider that observation a basic premise (and we may have greatly differing ideas as to what a basic premise is), I have little qualms "undoing" it. I assume the last paragraph is somewhat addressed to me. I am unsure why you are maintaining "stretching a unit of analysis across incommensurable perspectives and theorizations never answers these questions." What unit of analysis, what stretching? However, I would greatly appreciate it if you could name a little more precisely the structures you think I think are immanent, the incommensurables of which I am blissfully unaware, the desires I have for solidity, and the theoretical tools I think should be marshaled anew for each classroom situation. On the other hand if the last paragraph is a general comment, I have no qualms 'undoing' this assumption and the request for clarification as well. David, I recently taught teachers in NYC and I resisted involving them in 'experimental' curriculums. The bulk of my 'methods' instruction pragmatically focused on what you term the challenge (although I think you have oversimplified) . Thus you are, regardless of what you label premise' or 'vision', singing to the choir. That is not to say, by the way, we agree on the interrelationship of theory and practice. Ed On Oct 26, 2014, at 11:23 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > Ed, > > You talk about this teacher as failing, in some respects, in not reconvening the groups as a whole class: "if you are developing a classroom community (some reform-oriented jargon here), some follow-through seems needed." > > On the other hand, your vision of reform-oriented teaching seems to recognize sufficient latitude so that even this basic premise is undone: "I don't present all this as something one needs to do all the time (or, for that matter, ever do)." > > You conclude with: "There is a time for talking within whole class and a time for talking with a group (and I would say a time for talking one-on-one)." > > Yes, Ed, maybe there is, but then again, maybe there isn't. > > The challenge is to be able to articulate exactly what that time is, and what you, the teacher, want/hope will be happening during those interactions, what you will do if they don't happen, and what goals are subserved. > > I maintain that simply stretching a unit of analysis across incommensurable perspectives and theorizations never answers these questions. It leaves us with an impression that we have structure--that structure is immanent--but the incommensurables glide past each other with nary a bump or jolt. Eventually the desire for solidity leads to classroom research as "design science" (Cobb, 2007) in which theoretical tools are marshaled anew for each classroom situation. It's a wonderland for theorists, but a desert for teachers, excepting those lucky few who have a team of researchers analyzing each classroom move, and collaboratively co-producing the next lesson plan with them. > > David > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall > Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 10:02 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] > > David > > This teacher was trying to engage in some aspects of 'reform-oriented' instruction. He seems to have interpreted this, in part, as ' put the students in groups and let them do some relevant problem solving.' This is fine, but in reform-oriented instruction students report out to the whole class or you do some sort of summary with input from the groups. The idea being, in part, to use the insights of peers to leverage the learning of all. So, basically this teacher was inconsistent in the way you mentioned. > > Our final conversation went roughly like this: > > Me: Why did you put people in groups? > He: Because they talk more if they do it with peers. > Me: I heard some really thoughtful insights from that table. > He: Yes! > Me: Don't you think the people at the other tables could have benefited from that discussion? > He: Oh. > Me: Don't you think it would have been a much, much more productive lesson if people could have shared across tables? > He: Yeah, but how would you do that? > > We talked a little more about the complexities of reporting out (and this can be done 'inconsistently' also). > > I don't present all this as something one needs to do all the time (or, for that matter, ever do), but, if you are developing a classroom community (some reform-oriented jargon here), some follow-through seems needed. > > My point in all this seems to be essentially your point. That is, a lot of group talking isn't necessarily a productive use of class time; the 'kinds' of teacher allocated turns are critical (reform or traditional). There is a time for talking within whole class and a time for talking with a group (and I would say a time for talking one-on-one). > > Ed > > On Oct 26, 2014, at 8:59 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > >> Ed, >> Your hint seems to be: "my objection was, in a sense, that it wasn't consistent (although perhaps not in the way you mean)." >> >> Okay, I'm officially stumped. >> >> David >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >> Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 6:42 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] >> >> David >> >> I have never really figured out what reform-oriented oriented or, I guess the other, traditional, meant. If I ask many who name themselves as traditionalists to describe a reform-oriented classroom, they paint an inaccurate picture and, if I ask many who name themselves reform-oriented to describe a traditionalist classroom, they paint a picture just as inaccurate. Even worse if I go back and look at comments from the past, I find that the golden years of traditionalism were as contested (i.e. if transported back today's traditionalists would find themselves labeled reform-oriented). So I guess I more or less agree with Lave as regards consistency. Insofar as Piaget and Vygotsky are concerned, they both add things I think are useful to the mix and I discuss them both with my students (unfortunately my colleagues know little about Vygotsky so my students come a little less knowledgeable than I might wish). >> I really wouldn't know what it means for teaching to be consistent. I do have commitments as a mathematics teacher which I try to honor (I think you were part of the discussion when I laid these out on the list), but teaching is isn't a static profession (which I really like!) and I am always learning from my students and my colleagues. I agree with what you say about individuals and groups and grumble at my colleagues and my students (teachers-to-be) about "simply engaging students in group discussion with no real sense of how that activity is supposed to lead to learning or development in any sense." Even worse is the way quiet students are viewed and mentored. >> Insofar as my original story was concerned, I can easily imagine some reform-oriented people thinking she was an excellent teacher and I can easily imagine some traditionalist teachers thinking the same (and vice-versa). As far as the story I asked Phillip about (and I was assuming others might answer), I know some mathematicians would see this class as a good idea and others would not. However, my objection was, in a sense, that it wasn't consistent (although perhaps not in the way you mean). >> >> So, directing the question at you (and others if they wish), why did I tell him nicely it was among one of the worst taught classes I had ever seen? I have given you a hint (smile) and I didn't have, I think, a theoretical reason (smile). >> >> Ed >> >> >> On Oct 26, 2014, at 4:06 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: >> >>> Ed, >>> >>> The question wasn't directed at me, but I'd like to share some perspectives on the problems of this kind of reform-oriented instruction, and the broader question of appropriate units of analysis for classroom teaching--perhaps they bear on your particular response/interpretation of this class. >>> >>> Reform-oriented instruction generally is informed by two theoretical trajectories, of independent origin: the Piagetian theorization of conceptual development based on schemas that derive from the individual's reflective abstraction of their own actions; and the Vygotskyan theorization of development through interiorization of cultural practices. Each of these is relevant to student development in the context of reform-oriented instruction such as the group work you described, below. In particular, a teacher can attend to the particular conceptual constructions that students are wrestling with as their current conceptual structures are challenged and reorganized--a focus that requires engagement with individual students; or the teacher can attend to the corporate engagement of the classroom in increasingly sophisticated practices of thinking, reasoning, and communicating. >>> >>> Unfortunately, our efforts as theorists to understand and support effective teaching in this kind of landscape all too often consist in recognizing the dialectical opposition of the alternative perspectives, and therefore to claim we are on the track of identifying a satisfactory unit of analysis to ground a science of education. However, I think Jean Lave (1988) got it right as she laid out the challenge as establishing coherence across "units of analysis [that], though traditionally elaborated separately, must be defined together and consistently" (p. 146). >>> >>> What ensues from claims of victory, when all we've done is identify the problem, is a false sense that the priorities a teacher might attend to in engaging students in reform-oriented group work are mutually consistent. In my experience, it is this false sense of good teaching as a mutually coherent set of practices that obscures from teachers the real challenges of reform-oriented instruction, which only can be properly engaged with recognition that the agendas one pursues with individuals and groups are not reconciled with one another, and often work at cross purposes to one another. Absent this perspective, the teacher really has no way to make sense of either branch of the reform agenda or the teaching practices that support it. As a result, all too often, the reform-oriented teacher is simply engaging students in group discussion with no real sense of how that activity is supposed to lead to learning or development in any sense--an enjoyable, but banal pedagogical exercise. >>> >>> Of course, finding ways to theorize social and individual perspectives as mutually consistent remains a viable theoretical project. But let's not mistake naming the problem for offering a solution. And in the meantime, perhaps our best service to teachers lies in sharing the richness of the Piagetian and Vygotskyan traditions independently of one another. Because absent epistemic resolution, teachers need to be prepared to engage in the delicate art of balancing and managing inconsistent priorities and methods. >>> >>> David >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >>> Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 2:52 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] >>> >>> Philip >>> >>> To first comment on your note to Andy. The teacher was not necessarily interested in students' fluency with the operations (in fact she may have thought there were more than fluent). The first sentence of my story reads: >>> >>>> Ms. Pe?a has, in previous years, noticed that her fourth graders, at times, struggle to make sense of multi-step word problems. Many seem confused about both the nature of the required operations-most usually, addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division-or the order in which these operations are to be applied. >>> >>> Second, we may see teaching mathematics (and see teaching teachers) differently (which is fine as I certainly do have all or even significant number of the answers - I am right now working on the questions). A story might be helpful: >>> >>> A number of years ago I was asked to view an 'exemplarily' mathematics class for pre-service teachers taught by a mathematician (he had received a grant to design this special class). He began the class by clearly and succinctly introducing the mathematics problem(s) to be considered and when all seemed to have a good idea what was to be done, the pre-service teachers - about five or six to a table - began talking and working. Students definitely seemed engaged, there was a lot of good discussion, and I think the teacher walked around a bit making comments and asking questions. The class ended and he asked me what I thought. I told him nicely it was among one of the worst taught classes I had ever seen (I did tell him why). Why do you think I said that? Student turns were certainly in the 90s. >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> On Oct 26, 2014, at 10:31 AM, White, Phillip wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> as you wrote, Ed: >>>> >>>> " In the next section of the paper I take up a different math lesson with ostensibly the same purpose (i.e. making sense of 'word' problems). Some different things will show up which perhaps get me a little closer to a 'smallest' unit of analysis. It will, in a sense, be the 'kinds' of turns not the number of turns (although chidden will have more turns) that are interesting (or so I think - smile)." >>>> >>>> clearly i did not express myself coherently, this this is exactly the point i was attempting to make - that it was the 'kinds' of turns, the action within the turn, that was of paramount importance. i interpreted the teacher's turns as actions that the students could have been doing. which is why i noted that the teacher produced the greatest number of turns. as a teacher of teachers i would have preferred to see the great majority of turns having been done by the students - preferably student to student responses. >>>> >>>> and thanks for the smiles! >>>> >>>> phillip >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Oct 26 07:59:36 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 07:59:36 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] SENSE and PURPORT Message-ID: Greg, The exploration of the term *sens* [in French] that includes BOTH meaning and tendency as a helpful way to understand *sense* was being elaborated recently. Here is the way Umberto Eco relates to the English term *sense* as he differentiates *sense* from *purport*. This discussion is on page 53 of his book "Kant and the "Platypus" Eco opens this reflection by exploring Hjelmslev's Danish term [menings] which he allowed to be translated into English with the term *purport*. Here is Eco's rejoinder to the translation of [mens] AS *purport* Different expressions for Hjelmselv have a factor in COMMON, namely the *purport* [the thought itself] - even though this *purport* exists as an amorphous mass and RECEIVES a particular form in and THROUGH language. Eco asks the question "What does it mean to say there IS purport BEFORE any SENSATE articulation effected by human cognition?" Eco's answer to this question is to translate Hjelmslev's [mens] not as *purport* but rather as *sense*. His reason is that *sense* [French sens] can suggest BOTH meaning (but there is no meaning before a given language has segmented and organized the CONTINUUM) AND DIRECTION OR TENDENCY. Eco then uses a metaphor to try to help us grasp his meaning of the term *sense* "AS IF to say that in the magma of the continuum there are lines of RESISTANCE and POSSIBILITIES of flow, AS in the grain of wood or marble, which makes it easier to cut in one DIRECTION RATHER THAN ANOTHER" Martin's *plump materialism* may be understood within this metaphor of *sense* [rather than *purport*] as both meaning and the resistance [and limits] of *tendency* [direction]. Also seems to be relevant to *labeling* theory as you explore in your article recently posted. Not sure if I have offered enough context but also wanted to remain brief. Larry From ewall@umich.edu Sun Oct 26 23:20:29 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 01:20:29 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy Nice and important points. Thanks! Ed On Oct 26, 2014, at 11:31 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Well, I think that if you make a decision that mathematics is *not* essentially a social convention, but something which is essentially grasping something objective, then that affects what you choose as your unit of analysis. Student-text-teacher is all about acquiring a social convention. > > Remember that when Marx chose an exchange of commodities as a unit of analysis of bourgeois society, he knew full-well that commodities are rarely exchanged - they are bought and sold. But Marx did not "include" money in the unit of analysis. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Ed Wall wrote: >> Andy >> >> Asking that question was one of the dumber things I've done on this list. Apologies to all >> >> Thanks for reminding me about pre-concepts. I've been thinking about something similar and wondering if this is part of what makes doing mathematics 'mathematical.' Historically, by the way, mathematics grew out of manipulating such material objects; however, there are indications that, at some point (and it may have happened more than once), there was sort of a leap. >> Mathematics is considered a science; for instance, of patterns or, as Hegel puts it, quantity. I agree for a mathematician symbols of various sorts are effectively 'things'. >> >> In the 80s some mathematicians (School Mathematics Study Group) in the US put together a formal curriculum - my aunt used it - which was a disaster (and a real pain for the kids involved). Indications are children learned little. >> >> So to add a little to a discussion that possibly has continued far longer than it should. Mathematics may have a few characteristics that may distinguish it from other disciplines such as >> >> 1. A student has the ability, in principle, to be able to independently of teachers or peers verify a grade appropriate mathematics statement (not a definition although definitions admit, in a sense, a sort of empirical verification). >> >> 2. Solutions to problems are, in general, not subject to social conventions (which probably is included in the above). Amusingly, I believe in the US a state legislature once tried to set the value of pi to 3.1417 >> >> However, I'm not sure how such would fit together into a useful unit of analysis. >> >> Ed >> >> > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Mon Oct 27 00:39:05 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 09:39:05 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net> <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net> <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu> <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi Andy What about simply teaching symbol manipulation? Just as 50 - 48 = 2, children can readily do. We know, by the way that children find word problems very difficult, and can't see the clues readily in language text. Word problems are for them translating real-life situations into symbols They are if they are half well taught. Otherwise teachers simply teach word triggers like "shared" means divided. Carol On 27 October 2014 08:20, Ed Wall wrote: > Andy > > Nice and important points. Thanks! > > Ed > > > On Oct 26, 2014, at 11:31 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Well, I think that if you make a decision that mathematics is *not* > essentially a social convention, but something which is essentially > grasping something objective, then that affects what you choose as your > unit of analysis. Student-text-teacher is all about acquiring a social > convention. > > > > Remember that when Marx chose an exchange of commodities as a unit of > analysis of bourgeois society, he knew full-well that commodities are > rarely exchanged - they are bought and sold. But Marx did not "include" > money in the unit of analysis. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Ed Wall wrote: > >> Andy > >> > >> Asking that question was one of the dumber things I've done on this > list. Apologies to all > >> > >> Thanks for reminding me about pre-concepts. I've been thinking > about something similar and wondering if this is part of what makes doing > mathematics 'mathematical.' Historically, by the way, mathematics grew out > of manipulating such material objects; however, there are indications that, > at some point (and it may have happened more than once), there was sort of > a leap. > >> Mathematics is considered a science; for instance, of patterns or, > as Hegel puts it, quantity. I agree for a mathematician symbols of various > sorts are effectively 'things'. > >> > >> In the 80s some mathematicians (School Mathematics Study Group) > in the US put together a formal curriculum - my aunt used it - which was a > disaster (and a real pain for the kids involved). Indications are children > learned little. > >> > >> So to add a little to a discussion that possibly has continued > far longer than it should. Mathematics may have a few characteristics that > may distinguish it from other disciplines such as > >> > >> 1. A student has the ability, in principle, to be able to > independently of teachers or peers verify a grade appropriate mathematics > statement (not a definition although definitions admit, in a sense, a sort > of empirical verification). > >> > >> 2. Solutions to problems are, in general, not subject to social > conventions (which probably is included in the above). Amusingly, I believe > in the US a state legislature once tried to set the value of pi to 3.1417 > >> > >> However, I'm not sure how such would fit together into a useful unit of > analysis. > >> > >> Ed > >> > >> > > > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From ablunden@mira.net Mon Oct 27 01:30:18 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 19:30:18 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net> <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net> <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu> <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> Message-ID: <544E029A.5080404@mira.net> Sure, Carol. You can teach children to manipulate children according to a set of rules. In my very limited experience, when kids learn how to manipulate symbols according to a social convention, they do not grasp the concept behind the rule, consequently when the rules get to a certain level of difficulty they just can't cope any longer and give up. Like learning to navigate a city by memorising the directions. I imagine it is difficult to extract "divide" from "share" by decoding a text, and so on, but I guess if kids are taught to do this and practise it for hours each day they will learn to do it. I take it that you are suggesting, Carol, that a "word problem" is in fact a way of presenting the child a real-life situation. This leaves the child the task of (1) understanding the words, (2) abstracting the maths problem, (3) successfully manipulating the symbols to a solution. I think the issue is to grasp the problem here "genetically." A professional mathematician manipulates symbols. A preschool child counts real objects. To get from one to the other, is not, in my view, a jump from handling objects to handling symbols, it is a long drawn out process in which the rules of symbol manipulation still carry the marks of their origin in object manipulation, psychologically and logically. I think the "unit of analysis" problem is also the "germ-cell" problem. I think we have to conceive of learning mathematics genetically. All this with the caveat that I know next to nothing about teaching maths. But I think this is the nub of the matter: are we teaching kids to manipulate symbols according to a social convention, or to solve real problems mathematically. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Carol Macdonald wrote: > Hi Andy > > What about simply teaching symbol manipulation? Just as 50 - 48 = 2, > children can readily do. We know, by the way that children find word > problems very difficult, and can't see the clues readily in language text. > Word problems are for them translating real-life situations into symbols > They are if they are half well taught. Otherwise teachers simply teach > word triggers like "shared" means divided. > > Carol > > On 27 October 2014 08:20, Ed Wall wrote: > > >> Andy >> >> Nice and important points. Thanks! >> >> Ed >> >> >> On Oct 26, 2014, at 11:31 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> Well, I think that if you make a decision that mathematics is *not* >>> >> essentially a social convention, but something which is essentially >> grasping something objective, then that affects what you choose as your >> unit of analysis. Student-text-teacher is all about acquiring a social >> convention. >> >>> Remember that when Marx chose an exchange of commodities as a unit of analysis of bourgeois society, he knew full-well that commodities are rarely exchanged - they are bought and sold. But Marx did not "include" money in the unit of analysis. >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> > From dkirsh@lsu.edu Mon Oct 27 08:26:37 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 15:26:37 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <05dc839009084d559560a2b5852168b8@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: Apologies, Ed. I'm boxing at shadows. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 12:37 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] David Quite frankly I am unsure what to write. So let me say I more or less agree with all the general points you seem to want to make and am unsure why you think I would do otherwise. I actually don't have a vision of reform-oriented teaching, but currently what I observe is such follow-through is productive and I seldom observe that step untaken. Since I don't consider that observation a basic premise (and we may have greatly differing ideas as to what a basic premise is), I have little qualms "undoing" it. I assume the last paragraph is somewhat addressed to me. I am unsure why you are maintaining "stretching a unit of analysis across incommensurable perspectives and theorizations never answers these questions." What unit of analysis, what stretching? However, I would greatly appreciate it if you could name a little more precisely the structures you think I think are immanent, the incommensurables of which I am blissfully unaware, the desires I have for solidity, and the theoretical tools I think should be marshaled anew for each classroom situation. On the other hand if the last paragraph is a general comment, I have no qualms 'undoing' this assumption and the request for clarification as well. David, I recently taught teachers in NYC and I resisted involving them in 'experimental' curriculums. The bulk of my 'methods' instruction pragmatically focused on what you term the challenge (although I think you have oversimplified) . Thus you are, regardless of what you label premise' or 'vision', singing to the choir. That is not to say, by the way, we agree on the interrelationship of theory and practice. Ed On Oct 26, 2014, at 11:23 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > Ed, > > You talk about this teacher as failing, in some respects, in not reconvening the groups as a whole class: "if you are developing a classroom community (some reform-oriented jargon here), some follow-through seems needed." > > On the other hand, your vision of reform-oriented teaching seems to recognize sufficient latitude so that even this basic premise is undone: "I don't present all this as something one needs to do all the time (or, for that matter, ever do)." > > You conclude with: "There is a time for talking within whole class and a time for talking with a group (and I would say a time for talking one-on-one)." > > Yes, Ed, maybe there is, but then again, maybe there isn't. > > The challenge is to be able to articulate exactly what that time is, and what you, the teacher, want/hope will be happening during those interactions, what you will do if they don't happen, and what goals are subserved. > > I maintain that simply stretching a unit of analysis across incommensurable perspectives and theorizations never answers these questions. It leaves us with an impression that we have structure--that structure is immanent--but the incommensurables glide past each other with nary a bump or jolt. Eventually the desire for solidity leads to classroom research as "design science" (Cobb, 2007) in which theoretical tools are marshaled anew for each classroom situation. It's a wonderland for theorists, but a desert for teachers, excepting those lucky few who have a team of researchers analyzing each classroom move, and collaboratively co-producing the next lesson plan with them. > > David > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall > Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 10:02 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] > > David > > This teacher was trying to engage in some aspects of 'reform-oriented' instruction. He seems to have interpreted this, in part, as ' put the students in groups and let them do some relevant problem solving.' This is fine, but in reform-oriented instruction students report out to the whole class or you do some sort of summary with input from the groups. The idea being, in part, to use the insights of peers to leverage the learning of all. So, basically this teacher was inconsistent in the way you mentioned. > > Our final conversation went roughly like this: > > Me: Why did you put people in groups? > He: Because they talk more if they do it with peers. > Me: I heard some really thoughtful insights from that table. > He: Yes! > Me: Don't you think the people at the other tables could have benefited from that discussion? > He: Oh. > Me: Don't you think it would have been a much, much more productive lesson if people could have shared across tables? > He: Yeah, but how would you do that? > > We talked a little more about the complexities of reporting out (and this can be done 'inconsistently' also). > > I don't present all this as something one needs to do all the time (or, for that matter, ever do), but, if you are developing a classroom community (some reform-oriented jargon here), some follow-through seems needed. > > My point in all this seems to be essentially your point. That is, a lot of group talking isn't necessarily a productive use of class time; the 'kinds' of teacher allocated turns are critical (reform or traditional). There is a time for talking within whole class and a time for talking with a group (and I would say a time for talking one-on-one). > > Ed > > On Oct 26, 2014, at 8:59 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > >> Ed, >> Your hint seems to be: "my objection was, in a sense, that it wasn't consistent (although perhaps not in the way you mean)." >> >> Okay, I'm officially stumped. >> >> David >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >> Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 6:42 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] >> >> David >> >> I have never really figured out what reform-oriented oriented or, I guess the other, traditional, meant. If I ask many who name themselves as traditionalists to describe a reform-oriented classroom, they paint an inaccurate picture and, if I ask many who name themselves reform-oriented to describe a traditionalist classroom, they paint a picture just as inaccurate. Even worse if I go back and look at comments from the past, I find that the golden years of traditionalism were as contested (i.e. if transported back today's traditionalists would find themselves labeled reform-oriented). So I guess I more or less agree with Lave as regards consistency. Insofar as Piaget and Vygotsky are concerned, they both add things I think are useful to the mix and I discuss them both with my students (unfortunately my colleagues know little about Vygotsky so my students come a little less knowledgeable than I might wish). >> I really wouldn't know what it means for teaching to be consistent. I do have commitments as a mathematics teacher which I try to honor (I think you were part of the discussion when I laid these out on the list), but teaching is isn't a static profession (which I really like!) and I am always learning from my students and my colleagues. I agree with what you say about individuals and groups and grumble at my colleagues and my students (teachers-to-be) about "simply engaging students in group discussion with no real sense of how that activity is supposed to lead to learning or development in any sense." Even worse is the way quiet students are viewed and mentored. >> Insofar as my original story was concerned, I can easily imagine some reform-oriented people thinking she was an excellent teacher and I can easily imagine some traditionalist teachers thinking the same (and vice-versa). As far as the story I asked Phillip about (and I was assuming others might answer), I know some mathematicians would see this class as a good idea and others would not. However, my objection was, in a sense, that it wasn't consistent (although perhaps not in the way you mean). >> >> So, directing the question at you (and others if they wish), why did I tell him nicely it was among one of the worst taught classes I had ever seen? I have given you a hint (smile) and I didn't have, I think, a theoretical reason (smile). >> >> Ed >> >> >> On Oct 26, 2014, at 4:06 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: >> >>> Ed, >>> >>> The question wasn't directed at me, but I'd like to share some perspectives on the problems of this kind of reform-oriented instruction, and the broader question of appropriate units of analysis for classroom teaching--perhaps they bear on your particular response/interpretation of this class. >>> >>> Reform-oriented instruction generally is informed by two theoretical trajectories, of independent origin: the Piagetian theorization of conceptual development based on schemas that derive from the individual's reflective abstraction of their own actions; and the Vygotskyan theorization of development through interiorization of cultural practices. Each of these is relevant to student development in the context of reform-oriented instruction such as the group work you described, below. In particular, a teacher can attend to the particular conceptual constructions that students are wrestling with as their current conceptual structures are challenged and reorganized--a focus that requires engagement with individual students; or the teacher can attend to the corporate engagement of the classroom in increasingly sophisticated practices of thinking, reasoning, and communicating. >>> >>> Unfortunately, our efforts as theorists to understand and support effective teaching in this kind of landscape all too often consist in recognizing the dialectical opposition of the alternative perspectives, and therefore to claim we are on the track of identifying a satisfactory unit of analysis to ground a science of education. However, I think Jean Lave (1988) got it right as she laid out the challenge as establishing coherence across "units of analysis [that], though traditionally elaborated separately, must be defined together and consistently" (p. 146). >>> >>> What ensues from claims of victory, when all we've done is identify the problem, is a false sense that the priorities a teacher might attend to in engaging students in reform-oriented group work are mutually consistent. In my experience, it is this false sense of good teaching as a mutually coherent set of practices that obscures from teachers the real challenges of reform-oriented instruction, which only can be properly engaged with recognition that the agendas one pursues with individuals and groups are not reconciled with one another, and often work at cross purposes to one another. Absent this perspective, the teacher really has no way to make sense of either branch of the reform agenda or the teaching practices that support it. As a result, all too often, the reform-oriented teacher is simply engaging students in group discussion with no real sense of how that activity is supposed to lead to learning or development in any sense--an enjoyable, but banal pedagogical exercise. >>> >>> Of course, finding ways to theorize social and individual perspectives as mutually consistent remains a viable theoretical project. But let's not mistake naming the problem for offering a solution. And in the meantime, perhaps our best service to teachers lies in sharing the richness of the Piagetian and Vygotskyan traditions independently of one another. Because absent epistemic resolution, teachers need to be prepared to engage in the delicate art of balancing and managing inconsistent priorities and methods. >>> >>> David >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >>> Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 2:52 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] >>> >>> Philip >>> >>> To first comment on your note to Andy. The teacher was not necessarily interested in students' fluency with the operations (in fact she may have thought there were more than fluent). The first sentence of my story reads: >>> >>>> Ms. Pe?a has, in previous years, noticed that her fourth graders, at times, struggle to make sense of multi-step word problems. Many seem confused about both the nature of the required operations-most usually, addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division-or the order in which these operations are to be applied. >>> >>> Second, we may see teaching mathematics (and see teaching teachers) differently (which is fine as I certainly do have all or even significant number of the answers - I am right now working on the questions). A story might be helpful: >>> >>> A number of years ago I was asked to view an 'exemplarily' mathematics class for pre-service teachers taught by a mathematician (he had received a grant to design this special class). He began the class by clearly and succinctly introducing the mathematics problem(s) to be considered and when all seemed to have a good idea what was to be done, the pre-service teachers - about five or six to a table - began talking and working. Students definitely seemed engaged, there was a lot of good discussion, and I think the teacher walked around a bit making comments and asking questions. The class ended and he asked me what I thought. I told him nicely it was among one of the worst taught classes I had ever seen (I did tell him why). Why do you think I said that? Student turns were certainly in the 90s. >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> On Oct 26, 2014, at 10:31 AM, White, Phillip wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> as you wrote, Ed: >>>> >>>> " In the next section of the paper I take up a different math lesson with ostensibly the same purpose (i.e. making sense of 'word' problems). Some different things will show up which perhaps get me a little closer to a 'smallest' unit of analysis. It will, in a sense, be the 'kinds' of turns not the number of turns (although chidden will have more turns) that are interesting (or so I think - smile)." >>>> >>>> clearly i did not express myself coherently, this this is exactly the point i was attempting to make - that it was the 'kinds' of turns, the action within the turn, that was of paramount importance. i interpreted the teacher's turns as actions that the students could have been doing. which is why i noted that the teacher produced the greatest number of turns. as a teacher of teachers i would have preferred to see the great majority of turns having been done by the students - preferably student to student responses. >>>> >>>> and thanks for the smiles! >>>> >>>> phillip >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Oct 27 10:29:45 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 10:29:45 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: New Episode: Translation In-Reply-To: <4109fdd323aaac7078eadaa8fae64e803ce.20141027155108@mail63.us4.mcsv.net> References: <4109fdd323aaac7078eadaa8fae64e803ce.20141027155108@mail63.us4.mcsv.net> Message-ID: A timely topic! Mike ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Radiolab* Date: Monday, October 27, 2014 Subject: New Episode: Translation To: Friend View this email in your browser New Episode: Translation October 27 How close can words get you to the truth and feel and force of life? That's the question poking at our ribs this hour, as we wonder how it is that the right words can have the wrong meanings, and why sometimes the best translations lead us to an understanding that's way deeper than language. This episode, 8 stories that play out in the middle space between one reality and another ? where poetry, insult comedy, 911 calls, and even our own bodies work to close the gap. Listen to Translation Share Tweet Forward to Friend Musical Translations Already listened to the ?Translation ? episode? Then you probably noticed some very familiar songs that sounded very different from what you'd expect. Get the full scoop and listen to all the recordings from the episode here . Radiolab en Espa?ol *Spanish speakers*, we'd love some feedback. How does Radiolab sound in Spanish? Does it translate? Take a listen to this experiment -- a translation of our Unraveling Bolero podcast produced by Alberto Ferreras and Walyce Almeida, two fans of the show who volunteered to take this on in the hopes that we might make it a regular thing available to Spanish speakers. We'd love to know what you think . Support Radiolab Follow us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter *Copyright ? 2014, WNYC Radio, All rights reserved.* *Our mailing address is:* radiolab@wnyc.org unsubscribe from this list update subscription preferences -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From Peg.Griffin@att.net Mon Oct 27 10:15:41 2014 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 13:15:41 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> Message-ID: <006a01cff209$a388c230$ea9a4690$@att.net> Interesting about money not being in Marx?s unit of analysis, Andy. As I understand what educators following Davidov?s math curriculum were doing, numbers were not involved in the mathematics education germ cells. Here?s a glimpse of the scenario as I understand it (which could be wrong): Children start with strings or lumps of clay or what not (not easily countable). Alyosha?s object is greater than Borja?s. Anyone can perceive the difference. The mathematical recording of that is A>B. In the very same situation, one is less than the other, mathematically, B, <, ? and = and the mathematically recordings with + and -. The whole situation of transformations takes this nice set mathematically recorded as: A?B B?A A>B A-X= B+X A?=B? B?=A? Then of course there?s more fun when Katya?s in on it and transitivity pops in so that even without direct perceptual comparisons mathematics comes to the rescue so you can figure out stuff you wouldn?t know otherwise (do I smell motivation here?): A>B B>K A?K A>K And they work out proudly that you keep the ? (don?t know) answer in the following situation A>B A>K B?K It remains forever a ? for mathematics, maybe direct percept will help but current mathematics for the current situation takes a pass on it. We might use mathematics to come up with some nice questions and suppositions and come to more or less likely answers but? And then you can get to precision with measurement tools that work for the kinds of objects and ? It's apparent that mathematics can serve social justice sometimes. As I understand it, the Davidov mathematics educators take it for granted that in ?non-mathematics? everyday life learning, children learn counting (including the cardinality principle alluded to earlier in the discussion and others that I associate a lot with the work developed by Gelman, Gallistel, and her colleagues). And, as I understand it, the great day of the coming together of mathematics and counting doesn?t happen for the Davidov folks until later - maybe even fourth grade. Mathematics of the type discussed above can start in the Davidov style Kindergartens. In the US where we start off with numbers right away, in fourth grade, there have been many children who are confident that 9>7 and 9-2=7 but can get nowhere with working out all those wonderful equivalences if there are no numbers - i.e., they count but don?t do mathematics. Of course, that?s what I understand but I could be wrong. Peg -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 12:31 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education Well, I think that if you make a decision that mathematics is *not* essentially a social convention, but something which is essentially grasping something objective, then that affects what you choose as your unit of analysis. Student-text-teacher is all about acquiring a social convention. Remember that when Marx chose an exchange of commodities as a unit of analysis of bourgeois society, he knew full-well that commodities are rarely exchanged - they are bought and sold. But Marx did not "include" money in the unit of analysis. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Ed Wall wrote: > Andy > > Asking that question was one of the dumber things I've done on > this list. Apologies to all > > Thanks for reminding me about pre-concepts. I've been thinking about something similar and wondering if this is part of what makes doing mathematics 'mathematical.' Historically, by the way, mathematics grew out of manipulating such material objects; however, there are indications that, at some point (and it may have happened more than once), there was sort of a leap. > > Mathematics is considered a science; for instance, of patterns or, as Hegel puts it, quantity. I agree for a mathematician symbols of various sorts are effectively 'things'. > > In the 80s some mathematicians (School Mathematics Study Group) in the US put together a formal curriculum - my aunt used it - which was a disaster (and a real pain for the kids involved). Indications are children learned little. > > > So to add a little to a discussion that possibly has continued > far longer than it should. Mathematics may have a few characteristics > that may distinguish it from other disciplines such as > > 1. A student has the ability, in principle, to be able to independently of teachers or peers verify a grade appropriate mathematics statement (not a definition although definitions admit, in a sense, a sort of empirical verification). > > 2. Solutions to problems are, in general, not subject to > social conventions (which probably is included in the above). > Amusingly, I believe in the US a state legislature once tried to set > the value of pi to 3.1417 > > However, I'm not sure how such would fit together into a useful unit of analysis. > > Ed > > > From ewall@umich.edu Mon Oct 27 10:43:54 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 12:43:54 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54489B05.6090106@mira.net> <8EF148FA-21A2-4C87-A365-458C24F79107@manchester.ac.uk> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <05dc839009084d559560a2b5852168b8@SN2PR0601MB798.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: David Those are not shadows at which you are boxing and things I daily wrestled with as a methods teacher. Ed On Oct 27, 2014, at 10:26 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: > Apologies, Ed. > I'm boxing at shadows. > David > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall > Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 12:37 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] > > David > > Quite frankly I am unsure what to write. > > So let me say I more or less agree with all the general points you seem to want to make and am unsure why you think I would do otherwise. > > I actually don't have a vision of reform-oriented teaching, but currently what I observe is such follow-through is productive and I seldom observe that step untaken. Since I don't consider that observation a basic premise (and we may have greatly differing ideas as to what a basic premise is), I have little qualms "undoing" it. > > I assume the last paragraph is somewhat addressed to me. I am unsure why you are maintaining "stretching a unit of analysis across incommensurable perspectives and theorizations never answers these questions." What unit of analysis, what stretching? However, I would greatly appreciate it if you could name a little more precisely the structures you think I think are immanent, the incommensurables of which I am blissfully unaware, the desires I have for solidity, and the theoretical tools I think should be marshaled anew for each classroom situation. > > On the other hand if the last paragraph is a general comment, I have no qualms 'undoing' this assumption and the request for clarification as well. > > David, I recently taught teachers in NYC and I resisted involving them in 'experimental' curriculums. The bulk of my 'methods' instruction pragmatically focused on what you term the challenge (although I think you have oversimplified) . Thus you are, regardless of what you label premise' or 'vision', singing to the choir. That is not to say, by the way, we agree on the interrelationship of theory and practice. > > Ed > > On Oct 26, 2014, at 11:23 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > >> Ed, >> >> You talk about this teacher as failing, in some respects, in not reconvening the groups as a whole class: "if you are developing a classroom community (some reform-oriented jargon here), some follow-through seems needed." >> >> On the other hand, your vision of reform-oriented teaching seems to recognize sufficient latitude so that even this basic premise is undone: "I don't present all this as something one needs to do all the time (or, for that matter, ever do)." >> >> You conclude with: "There is a time for talking within whole class and a time for talking with a group (and I would say a time for talking one-on-one)." >> >> Yes, Ed, maybe there is, but then again, maybe there isn't. >> >> The challenge is to be able to articulate exactly what that time is, and what you, the teacher, want/hope will be happening during those interactions, what you will do if they don't happen, and what goals are subserved. >> >> I maintain that simply stretching a unit of analysis across incommensurable perspectives and theorizations never answers these questions. It leaves us with an impression that we have structure--that structure is immanent--but the incommensurables glide past each other with nary a bump or jolt. Eventually the desire for solidity leads to classroom research as "design science" (Cobb, 2007) in which theoretical tools are marshaled anew for each classroom situation. It's a wonderland for theorists, but a desert for teachers, excepting those lucky few who have a team of researchers analyzing each classroom move, and collaboratively co-producing the next lesson plan with them. >> >> David >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >> Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 10:02 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] >> >> David >> >> This teacher was trying to engage in some aspects of 'reform-oriented' instruction. He seems to have interpreted this, in part, as ' put the students in groups and let them do some relevant problem solving.' This is fine, but in reform-oriented instruction students report out to the whole class or you do some sort of summary with input from the groups. The idea being, in part, to use the insights of peers to leverage the learning of all. So, basically this teacher was inconsistent in the way you mentioned. >> >> Our final conversation went roughly like this: >> >> Me: Why did you put people in groups? >> He: Because they talk more if they do it with peers. >> Me: I heard some really thoughtful insights from that table. >> He: Yes! >> Me: Don't you think the people at the other tables could have benefited from that discussion? >> He: Oh. >> Me: Don't you think it would have been a much, much more productive lesson if people could have shared across tables? >> He: Yeah, but how would you do that? >> >> We talked a little more about the complexities of reporting out (and this can be done 'inconsistently' also). >> >> I don't present all this as something one needs to do all the time (or, for that matter, ever do), but, if you are developing a classroom community (some reform-oriented jargon here), some follow-through seems needed. >> >> My point in all this seems to be essentially your point. That is, a lot of group talking isn't necessarily a productive use of class time; the 'kinds' of teacher allocated turns are critical (reform or traditional). There is a time for talking within whole class and a time for talking with a group (and I would say a time for talking one-on-one). >> >> Ed >> >> On Oct 26, 2014, at 8:59 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: >> >>> Ed, >>> Your hint seems to be: "my objection was, in a sense, that it wasn't consistent (although perhaps not in the way you mean)." >>> >>> Okay, I'm officially stumped. >>> >>> David >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >>> Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 6:42 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] >>> >>> David >>> >>> I have never really figured out what reform-oriented oriented or, I guess the other, traditional, meant. If I ask many who name themselves as traditionalists to describe a reform-oriented classroom, they paint an inaccurate picture and, if I ask many who name themselves reform-oriented to describe a traditionalist classroom, they paint a picture just as inaccurate. Even worse if I go back and look at comments from the past, I find that the golden years of traditionalism were as contested (i.e. if transported back today's traditionalists would find themselves labeled reform-oriented). So I guess I more or less agree with Lave as regards consistency. Insofar as Piaget and Vygotsky are concerned, they both add things I think are useful to the mix and I discuss them both with my students (unfortunately my colleagues know little about Vygotsky so my students come a little less knowledgeable than I might wish). >>> I really wouldn't know what it means for teaching to be consistent. I do have commitments as a mathematics teacher which I try to honor (I think you were part of the discussion when I laid these out on the list), but teaching is isn't a static profession (which I really like!) and I am always learning from my students and my colleagues. I agree with what you say about individuals and groups and grumble at my colleagues and my students (teachers-to-be) about "simply engaging students in group discussion with no real sense of how that activity is supposed to lead to learning or development in any sense." Even worse is the way quiet students are viewed and mentored. >>> Insofar as my original story was concerned, I can easily imagine some reform-oriented people thinking she was an excellent teacher and I can easily imagine some traditionalist teachers thinking the same (and vice-versa). As far as the story I asked Phillip about (and I was assuming others might answer), I know some mathematicians would see this class as a good idea and others would not. However, my objection was, in a sense, that it wasn't consistent (although perhaps not in the way you mean). >>> >>> So, directing the question at you (and others if they wish), why did I tell him nicely it was among one of the worst taught classes I had ever seen? I have given you a hint (smile) and I didn't have, I think, a theoretical reason (smile). >>> >>> Ed >>> >>> >>> On Oct 26, 2014, at 4:06 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: >>> >>>> Ed, >>>> >>>> The question wasn't directed at me, but I'd like to share some perspectives on the problems of this kind of reform-oriented instruction, and the broader question of appropriate units of analysis for classroom teaching--perhaps they bear on your particular response/interpretation of this class. >>>> >>>> Reform-oriented instruction generally is informed by two theoretical trajectories, of independent origin: the Piagetian theorization of conceptual development based on schemas that derive from the individual's reflective abstraction of their own actions; and the Vygotskyan theorization of development through interiorization of cultural practices. Each of these is relevant to student development in the context of reform-oriented instruction such as the group work you described, below. In particular, a teacher can attend to the particular conceptual constructions that students are wrestling with as their current conceptual structures are challenged and reorganized--a focus that requires engagement with individual students; or the teacher can attend to the corporate engagement of the classroom in increasingly sophisticated practices of thinking, reasoning, and communicating. >>>> >>>> Unfortunately, our efforts as theorists to understand and support effective teaching in this kind of landscape all too often consist in recognizing the dialectical opposition of the alternative perspectives, and therefore to claim we are on the track of identifying a satisfactory unit of analysis to ground a science of education. However, I think Jean Lave (1988) got it right as she laid out the challenge as establishing coherence across "units of analysis [that], though traditionally elaborated separately, must be defined together and consistently" (p. 146). >>>> >>>> What ensues from claims of victory, when all we've done is identify the problem, is a false sense that the priorities a teacher might attend to in engaging students in reform-oriented group work are mutually consistent. In my experience, it is this false sense of good teaching as a mutually coherent set of practices that obscures from teachers the real challenges of reform-oriented instruction, which only can be properly engaged with recognition that the agendas one pursues with individuals and groups are not reconciled with one another, and often work at cross purposes to one another. Absent this perspective, the teacher really has no way to make sense of either branch of the reform agenda or the teaching practices that support it. As a result, all too often, the reform-oriented teacher is simply engaging students in group discussion with no real sense of how that activity is supposed to lead to learning or development in any sense--an enjoyable, but banal pedagogical exercise. >>>> >>>> Of course, finding ways to theorize social and individual perspectives as mutually consistent remains a viable theoretical project. But let's not mistake naming the problem for offering a solution. And in the meantime, perhaps our best service to teachers lies in sharing the richness of the Piagetian and Vygotskyan traditions independently of one another. Because absent epistemic resolution, teachers need to be prepared to engage in the delicate art of balancing and managing inconsistent priorities and methods. >>>> >>>> David >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Ed Wall >>>> Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 2:52 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky [[The fallacy of word-meaning] >>>> >>>> Philip >>>> >>>> To first comment on your note to Andy. The teacher was not necessarily interested in students' fluency with the operations (in fact she may have thought there were more than fluent). The first sentence of my story reads: >>>> >>>>> Ms. Pe?a has, in previous years, noticed that her fourth graders, at times, struggle to make sense of multi-step word problems. Many seem confused about both the nature of the required operations-most usually, addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division-or the order in which these operations are to be applied. >>>> >>>> Second, we may see teaching mathematics (and see teaching teachers) differently (which is fine as I certainly do have all or even significant number of the answers - I am right now working on the questions). A story might be helpful: >>>> >>>> A number of years ago I was asked to view an 'exemplarily' mathematics class for pre-service teachers taught by a mathematician (he had received a grant to design this special class). He began the class by clearly and succinctly introducing the mathematics problem(s) to be considered and when all seemed to have a good idea what was to be done, the pre-service teachers - about five or six to a table - began talking and working. Students definitely seemed engaged, there was a lot of good discussion, and I think the teacher walked around a bit making comments and asking questions. The class ended and he asked me what I thought. I told him nicely it was among one of the worst taught classes I had ever seen (I did tell him why). Why do you think I said that? Student turns were certainly in the 90s. >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> On Oct 26, 2014, at 10:31 AM, White, Phillip wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> as you wrote, Ed: >>>>> >>>>> " In the next section of the paper I take up a different math lesson with ostensibly the same purpose (i.e. making sense of 'word' problems). Some different things will show up which perhaps get me a little closer to a 'smallest' unit of analysis. It will, in a sense, be the 'kinds' of turns not the number of turns (although chidden will have more turns) that are interesting (or so I think - smile)." >>>>> >>>>> clearly i did not express myself coherently, this this is exactly the point i was attempting to make - that it was the 'kinds' of turns, the action within the turn, that was of paramount importance. i interpreted the teacher's turns as actions that the students could have been doing. which is why i noted that the teacher produced the greatest number of turns. as a teacher of teachers i would have preferred to see the great majority of turns having been done by the students - preferably student to student responses. >>>>> >>>>> and thanks for the smiles! >>>>> >>>>> phillip >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Oct 27 11:02:47 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 18:02:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> Message-ID: <31360D7D-7475-4492-BECC-CAE2B65EC2F3@uniandes.edu.co> Marx's unit of analysis in Capital was the commodity, right? Not the exchange of commodities. "The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as ?an immense accumulation of commodities,? its unit being a single commodity. Our investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity." "A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, and easily understood. Its analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties." Martin On Oct 26, 2014, at 11:31 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Remember that when Marx chose an exchange of commodities as a unit of analysis of bourgeois society, he knew full-well that commodities are rarely exchanged - they are bought and sold. But Marx did not "include" money in the unit of analysis. From ewall@umich.edu Mon Oct 27 11:48:15 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 13:48:15 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <006a01cff209$a388c230$ea9a4690$@att.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <5448B630.8060503@mira.net> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <006a01cff209$a388c230$ea9a4690$@att.net> Message-ID: <90885BAC-5412-4206-8E4A-AADB6FAA38F7@umich.edu> Peg Quite nice and almost perfect for what I had in mind as a teaching of mathematics (although I am inferring a bit as to the actions of the teacher). Number is actually in the works, the As and Bs are the usual precursors (counting numbers early on are just labels). Ordinality is being constructed (although that may not be a purpose of the teacher). The critical point is how to get to B=A and A=B. I one time asked some experienced teachers I was working with to prove that, in effect, if A Interesting about money not being in Marx?s unit of analysis, Andy. > As I understand what educators following Davidov?s math curriculum were > doing, numbers were not involved in the mathematics education germ cells. > Here?s a glimpse of the scenario as I understand it (which could be wrong): > Children start with strings or lumps of clay or what not > (not easily countable). > Alyosha?s object is greater than Borja?s. Anyone can > perceive the difference. The mathematical recording of that is A>B. > In the very same situation, one is less than the other, > mathematically, B It isn?t nice or fair that one child?s object should be > greater than and another less than, mathematically recorded as A ?B and as > B?A. How to get to B=A and A=B? > How to have a nice, fair situation? The teacher and > children work it about and discover the important operations that > mathematics has for working on >, <, ? and = and the mathematically > recordings with + and -. The whole situation of transformations takes this > nice set mathematically recorded as: > A?B > B?A > A>B > A-X= B+X > A?=B? > B?=A? > Then of course there?s more fun when Katya?s in on it and > transitivity pops in so that even without direct perceptual comparisons > mathematics comes to the rescue so you can figure out stuff you wouldn?t > know otherwise (do I smell motivation here?): > A>B > B>K > A?K > A>K > And they work out proudly that you keep the ? (don?t know) > answer in the following situation > A>B > A>K > B?K > It remains forever a ? for mathematics, maybe direct percept > will help but current mathematics for the current situation takes a pass on > it. We might use mathematics to come up with some nice questions and > suppositions and come to more or less likely answers but? > And then you can get to precision with measurement tools > that work for the kinds of objects and ? > > It's apparent that mathematics can serve social justice sometimes. As I > understand it, the Davidov mathematics educators take it for granted that in > ?non-mathematics? everyday life learning, children learn counting > (including the cardinality principle alluded to earlier in the discussion > and others that I associate a lot with the work developed by Gelman, > Gallistel, and her colleagues). > And, as I understand it, the great day of the coming together of mathematics > and counting doesn?t happen for the Davidov folks until later - maybe even > fourth grade. Mathematics of the type discussed above can start in the > Davidov style Kindergartens. > > In the US where we start off with numbers right away, in fourth grade, there > have been many children who are confident that 9>7 and 9-2=7 but can get > nowhere with working out all those wonderful equivalences if there are no > numbers - i.e., they count but don?t do mathematics. > > Of course, that?s what I understand but I could be wrong. > Peg > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 12:31 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > > Well, I think that if you make a decision that mathematics is *not* > essentially a social convention, but something which is essentially grasping > something objective, then that affects what you choose as your unit of > analysis. Student-text-teacher is all about acquiring a social convention. > > Remember that when Marx chose an exchange of commodities as a unit of > analysis of bourgeois society, he knew full-well that commodities are rarely > exchanged - they are bought and sold. But Marx did not "include" > money in the unit of analysis. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Ed Wall wrote: >> Andy >> >> Asking that question was one of the dumber things I've done on >> this list. Apologies to all >> >> Thanks for reminding me about pre-concepts. I've been thinking about > something similar and wondering if this is part of what makes doing > mathematics 'mathematical.' Historically, by the way, mathematics grew out > of manipulating such material objects; however, there are indications that, > at some point (and it may have happened more than once), there was sort of a > leap. >> >> Mathematics is considered a science; for instance, of patterns or, > as Hegel puts it, quantity. I agree for a mathematician symbols of various > sorts are effectively 'things'. >> >> In the 80s some mathematicians (School Mathematics Study Group) in > the US put together a formal curriculum - my aunt used it - which was a > disaster (and a real pain for the kids involved). Indications are children > learned little. >> >> >> So to add a little to a discussion that possibly has continued >> far longer than it should. Mathematics may have a few characteristics >> that may distinguish it from other disciplines such as >> >> 1. A student has the ability, in principle, to be able to > independently of teachers or peers verify a grade appropriate mathematics > statement (not a definition although definitions admit, in a sense, a sort > of empirical verification). >> >> 2. Solutions to problems are, in general, not subject to >> social conventions (which probably is included in the above). >> Amusingly, I believe in the US a state legislature once tried to set >> the value of pi to 3.1417 >> >> However, I'm not sure how such would fit together into a useful unit of > analysis. >> >> Ed >> >> >> From kwohlwen@gmail.com Mon Oct 27 13:26:21 2014 From: kwohlwen@gmail.com (Karen Wohlwend) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 16:26:21 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics Practices In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <39089ddf0ba265a30feb7854f07324c1.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> <54471BF6.9010906@mira.net> <54479034.6070006@mira.net> Message-ID: Hello David, I'll respond to your question about the social practice of handing and your point that of course spoken language is involved. We agree with you that the role of speech is a matter of degree--or perhaps a matter of immediacy. However, in the paper we've just given a brief description to offer quick examples to readers so that we could suggest a few recognizable contexts for interpreting handing practices. The introductory examples in the article (buying a cup of coffee, giving a birthday gift) are drawn directly from Scollon's 2001 work (for a much more thorough discussion, I highly recommend his wonderful analysis of the discourses that are embedded in context and for his description of the nexus at work in the development of his own expertise and insider status as a customer in a Starbucks transaction, from *Mediated Discourse: The Nexus of Practice*). Scollon's point is not that actions are strictly nonverbal but that we give more attention to the ways that actions convey nonverbal meanings and represent tacit understandings about how members are to behave and interact within a culture. We share understandings of which embodied actions are expected in a situation by other social actors within that cultural context. These interactions can play out in routines that often require little talk but produce automatic response--handing a cashier a credit card and receiving the card back with a product and receipt. The physical action of handing is situated activity in a cultural context--a context that includes the immediate language and materials as well as histories of prior conversations, practices, etc. Language is one means through which a physical mediated action is categorized as a particular social practice and as a valued way of participating within a particular nexus of practice, which includes not only the practice of handing but a mesh of social practices that are also expected within that context, including expectations for who should hand an object and how others should respond. Karen On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 3:24 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > I have a bunch of rather silly questions, and then a comment about the > interpretation of the data. > > p. 280: Why do we assume that nonverbal handing money to a cashier or > handing a birthday present to a friend is an unspoken agreement? It is > certainly true that the nonverbal component of the interaction may be > abstracted away from it. But there are actually very few nonverbal > handings, of either money or birthday presents, that would have the > same meaning. Isn't it more useful to consider that speech can play > varying degrees of importance in an interactioni (e.g. it can be > "ancillary" where the commodity being exchanged is goods or services > and it is essential when, as is normally the case in both handing > money to a cashier and handing a birthday present to a friend, > information is exchanged as well? > > p. 283: Puppets are unusual in that, unlike socks, they necessarily > have symbolic meaning (that is, a sock puppet that is not a symbol for > some imaginary character is a sock and not a puppet). Was there any > character that went with the sock puppets? Was there any story that > went with the character? If so, where did the story come from, and was > there any jockeying for control over the story? Note the titillating > potential of characters that "light up" when they touch! Did this > create any visible titillation for embarrassment? > > p. 283: I can sort of follow why stitching, knotting, and threading > might be gendered (a kind of washback from the world of work, I > suppose). Why gluing? > > p. 289: Why does Amber refer to Antoine as "Nicholas"? > > p. 293: The first sentence of the section "Hands-On Materials as > Gendered Access" refers to "two focal girls". Is this a mistake, or am > I missing somebody? > > And my comment. It seems to me that a lot of studies (not this one in > particular but many studies of this type in general) tend to view > gendered access as a matter of gendered access to property or power or > both. But this is very often an adult view; we adults are obsessed > with power and property and we assume that it is only right that > children are. Isn't it possible that to the children what is really > gendered is access to aesthetic concepts versus access to technical > expertise? Both orientations address the tension between form and > material, but they address it from very different sides and are > ultimately indispensible to each other (which is notoriously not the > case with disputes over property and power). Note, however, that when > the teacher says that it is decorating that is the fun part, the > teacher is biasing the children towards the aesthetic and away from > the technical!) > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 24 October 2014 07:07, mike cole wrote: > > Aha! Thanks! > > > > So artificial literacies refers to the mediation of reading/writing by a > > variety of artifacts! Ok, that I can make sense of. And thanks for the > RRQ > > ref on sedimented identities. This phrase is used in discussion of text > > production. For those ignorant like myself, here is the summary provided > by > > the authors, which also makes the point of their text (and the present > > one!) cleared: > > > > *THE COMMENTARY argues for an understanding of how texts are put together > > that accounts for multimodality and draws on children?s ways of being and > > doing in the home, their habitus. It focuses on identities as socially > > situated. It argues that it is important to trace the process of > > sedimenting identities during text production. This offers a way of > viewing > > text production that can inform research into children?s text making. > > Particular attention is paid to the producer, contexts, and practices > used > > during text production and how the text becomes an artifact that holds > > important information about the meaning maker. Four case studies describe > > sedimented identities as a lens through which to see a more nuanced > > perspective on meaning making. This work offers a lens for research and > > practice in that it enables researchers to question and interrogate the > way > > texts come into being.* > > > > > > mike > > > > On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 10:35 AM, Karen Wohlwend > wrote: > > > >> Certainly-- Rowsell and Pahl take an ethnographic approach to track the > >> practices and user identities involved in the production and previous > uses > >> of an artifact. > >> > >> Rowsell, J., & Pahl, K. (2007). Sedimented identities in texts: > Instances > >> of practice. Reading Research Quarterly, 42(3), 388-404. > >> > >> Pahl, K., & Rowsell, J. (2010). Artifactual literacies: Every object > tells > >> a story. New York: Teachers College Press. > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 12:56 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> > Karen--- I am familiar of course with the notion of artifacts, but I > am > >> not > >> > familiar with > >> > Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual literacies. > >> Could > >> > you provide a link or a reference? The phrase has me wondering what a > >> > non-artifactual literacy would be. > >> > mike > >> > > >> > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:03 PM, Karen Wohlwend > >> > wrote: > >> > > >> > > Andy, thanks for these generative questions and comments! I'll > defer to > >> > my > >> > > co-authors to situate the focal case in the larger study but I'll > >> address > >> > > how we are considering relationships among gender, practices, and > >> tools. > >> > > > >> > > We're conceptualizing tools as anchoring artifacts, that concretize > and > >> > > suggest particular uses and users accrued from cultural histories > of > >> > > access and use (following Holland and Cole's cultural artifacts, and > >> more > >> > > recently, Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual > >> > > literacies). Tools index shared histories of use, values, and > >> > expectations > >> > > for who *should *be a user and for how practices *should *be > conducted, > >> > > practices which following Paechter are situated in communities of > >> > gendered > >> > > practice that are multiple, local, and embodied. > >> > > > >> > > However, we would not say that a tool is gendered in any fixed or > >> > > deterministic way. In any given moment of activity, tools signal > >> multiple > >> > > histories in many nexus of practice (following Ron Scollon, the > tacit > >> > > shared practices that members of a community expect of one another) > >> that > >> > > lead up to, enter in, and flow from that moment, in contradictory, > >> > > confounding, and complementary ways, hence the ambiguity you've > >> > mentioned. > >> > > How/whether social actors make use of particular histories in a > >> specific > >> > > context realizes foregrounds some histories while backgrounding > >> others-- > >> > in > >> > > ways that can reproduce, contest, or blur prevailing expectations > for > >> > > participation. In our analysis, we looked closely at the mediated > >> actions > >> > > in the handling of tools in the one nexus to understand in a very > >> > concrete > >> > > way how girls were able to gain and maintain control over > >> > > projects--contrary to histories and expectations for high levels of > >> tool > >> > > handling, participation, and trajectories of expertise for boys in > >> > > electronics activity. > >> > > > >> > > Looking closely at the mediated action in this transformative moment > >> > > reveals how changing the electronics tools from wires to needle and > >> > thread > >> > > changes the nexus, activating a powerful perception/expectation for > >> girls > >> > > as appropriate tool users by signalling histories of sewing > practices > >> and > >> > > feminine communities of practice. > >> > > > >> > > In regard to other situations, looking closely at mediated actions, > >> > > material artifacts, and tacit expectations for participation in the > >> > > relevant nexus of practice will likely also reveal how materials > relate > >> > to > >> > > stereotypical expectations, pointing to places ripe for rupture > where > >> > > changing something small in the local activity (e.g., an action, a > >> tool, > >> > a > >> > > material) in dominant nexus of practice can signal a different kind > of > >> > user > >> > > and potentially disrupt persistent and naturalized stereotypes. > >> > > > >> > > Looking forward to continuing the conversation, > >> > > Karen > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:08 AM, Andy Blunden > >> wrote: > >> > > > >> > > > Kylie & co., > >> > > > A fascinating study around a truly ingenious approach to the > gendered > >> > > > division of labour - giving school kids E-textiles to construct an > >> > > > electronic device - total mixing up and confounding the gender > >> > > stereotypes > >> > > > about sewing and electronics, etc. > >> > > > > >> > > > Some of the results were quite startling. That the young boy > should > >> not > >> > > > just abstain and demonstratively not pay attention, but pay active > >> and > >> > > > supportive attention to the girl making the circuit with her > >> > > > needle-and-thread - an admired female-typical stance one would > have > >> > > thought > >> > > > a young male incapable of adopting with a female workmate. And > that > >> the > >> > > > gender-inscription of the sewing tools over-rode the greater > >> experience > >> > > > that in this case the young boy had in using them, with the boy > >> > deferring > >> > > > to the less experienced girl in recognition of the > >> > gender-appropriateness > >> > > > of her "taking charge" with the needle-and-thread. This does cause > >> one > >> > to > >> > > > think a little deeper into how we might conceptualise such > gendered > >> > > > behaviours. > >> > > > > >> > > > As you would know, MCA has a strong preference for qualitative > >> > research, > >> > > > and studies with small sample sizes are not generally a problem, > but > >> so > >> > > > much seemed to hinge on the study of just *one* boy-girl team, > that I > >> > am > >> > > > concerned about the capacity to generalise from such a base. There > >> were > >> > > > about 80 youth in the activity as a whole, so I can only hope and > >> > presume > >> > > > that observation of the other 78 kids in some way guided the work > >> > focused > >> > > > on just 2. > >> > > > > >> > > > I must say, the analysis of the video data is very sophisticated > and > >> > > > productive and you are to be congratulated on this aspect of the > >> work. > >> > I > >> > > > see that you approach the gendering of the activities through the > >> idea > >> > of > >> > > > the various *tools* being gendered, rather than the *practices* > >> > > themselves. > >> > > > This is something that was really necessary for you to be able to > >> make > >> > > > these observations, because the gendering of the activities is > >> > ambiguous, > >> > > > but not it seems the gendering of the tools. Is this a result of > the > >> > > study, > >> > > > or is it something you already knew or did you arrive at this by > >> logic? > >> > > > > >> > > > Do you see any other opportunities for confounding gender > stereotypes > >> > in > >> > > > this way? > >> > > > > >> > > > And finally, does the experience of working in ambiguous, even > >> inverted > >> > > > gender-stereotyped activities like these have any outcome which > >> carries > >> > > > over into a world where the gender division of labour lacks > >> ambiguity? > >> > > > > >> > > > Andy > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> > > > *Andy Blunden* > >> > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > Kylie Peppler wrote: > >> > > > > >> > > >> Thanks Andy! We're excited to discuss with the community and > would > >> > > >> welcome any comments/questions on this emerging line of research! > >> > > >> Kylie > >> > > >> > >> > > >> --- > >> > > >> Kylie A. Peppler > >> > > >> Assistant Professor of Learning Sciences > >> > > >> Indiana University | School of Education > >> > > >> 1900 E 10th Street | Eigenmann 528 | Bloomington | IN | 47406 | > >> > > >> 812.856.8381 > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 10:52 PM, Andy Blunden < > ablunden@mira.net > >> > > >> > wrote: > >> > > >> > >> > > >> Here's the article for discussion Artin is introducing: > >> > > >> *Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting and > >> Electronics > >> > > >> Practices* > >> > > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen > Wohlwend. > >> > > >> Indiana University. > >> > > >> > >> > > >> The Maker movement promotes hands-on making, including > >> crafts, > >> > > >> robotics, and computing. The movement?s potential to > >> transform > >> > > >> education rests in our ability to address notable gender > >> > > >> disparities, particularly in science, technology, > >> engineering, > >> > > and > >> > > >> mathematics fields. E-textiles - the first > female-dominated > >> > > >> computing community - provide inspiration for overcoming > >> > > >> long-standing cultural divides in classrooms. Analysis of > >> > > >> children?s > >> > > >> use of e-textiles reveals that materials like needles, > >> fabric, > >> > > and > >> > > >> conductive thread rupture traditional gender scripts > around > >> > > >> electronics and implicitly gives girls hands-on access and > >> > > >> leadership roles. This reconceptualization of cultural > >> divides > >> > as > >> > > >> sets of tacitly accepted practices rooted in gendered > >> histories > >> > > has > >> > > >> implications for reconceptualizing traditionally > >> male-dominated > >> > > >> areas of schooling. > >> > > >> > >> > > >> Andy > >> > > >> (attached) > >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> > > >> ------------ > >> > > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> Goncu, Artin wrote: > >> > > >> > >> > > >> Dear All, > >> > > >> > >> > > >> We are writing to let you know that the most recent > issue of > >> > > >> MCA is out. > >> > > >> One of the articles published in this issue and being > >> > > >> introduced here for > >> > > >> discussion in referenced below. The authors of the > article > >> > > >> have kindly > >> > > >> agreed to lead the discussion, and they are on xmca with > us > >> > > >> now. The free > >> > > >> access to the article is possible through the links > below. > >> We > >> > > >> are looking > >> > > >> forward to hearing from you all. Best, ag > >> > > >> > >> > > >> Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting > >> > > >> and Electronics Practices > >> > > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen > >> Wohlwend > >> > > >> > >> > > >> www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762 > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > >> > > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749039.2014 > . > >> > > >> 939762#.VEZ25Ra_4wI > >> > > >> > >> > > >> Artin Goncu, Ph.D > >> > > >> Co-editor, Mind, Culture, and Activity:An International > >> > Journal > >> > > >> Professor Emeritus, > >> > > >> University of Illinois at Chicago > >> > > >> College of Education M/C 147 > >> > > >> 1040 W. Harrison St. > >> > > >> Chicago, IL 60607 > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > -- > >> > > Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor > >> > > Literacy, Culture, & Language Education > >> > > Indiana University > >> > > 201 N. Rose Avenue > >> > > Bloomington, IN 47405 > >> > > Office: 812-856-8275 > >> > > Fax: 812-856-8287 > >> > > kwohlwen@indiana.edu > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > -- > >> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor > >> Literacy, Culture, & Language Education > >> Indiana University > >> 201 N. Rose Avenue > >> Bloomington, IN 47405 > >> Office: 812-856-8275 > >> Fax: 812-856-8287 > >> kwohlwen@indiana.edu > >> > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor Literacy, Culture, & Language Education Indiana University 201 N. Rose Avenue Bloomington, IN 47405 Office: 812-856-8275 Fax: 812-856-8287 kwohlwen@indiana.edu From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Oct 27 14:18:46 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 21:18:46 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: New Episode: Translation In-Reply-To: References: <4109fdd323aaac7078eadaa8fae64e803ce.20141027155108@mail63.us4.mcsv.net>, Message-ID: <1414444726115.95576@unm.edu> Hi Mike! I was truly intrigued by the "Eagle Eyes" segment about the work of neuroscientist David Eagleman. It ties in directly to perezhivanie. And sense and meaning of language! Literally! :) Of course I'm saying this because that's what's translating into my thinking as of late. I hope list members will have the time to listen to this show. It is superb and very relevant. I love RadioLab. Thanks so much for posting it. Best, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 11:29 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: New Episode: Translation A timely topic! Mike ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Radiolab* Date: Monday, October 27, 2014 Subject: New Episode: Translation To: Friend View this email in your browser New Episode: Translation October 27 How close can words get you to the truth and feel and force of life? That's the question poking at our ribs this hour, as we wonder how it is that the right words can have the wrong meanings, and why sometimes the best translations lead us to an understanding that's way deeper than language. This episode, 8 stories that play out in the middle space between one reality and another ? where poetry, insult comedy, 911 calls, and even our own bodies work to close the gap. Listen to Translation Share Tweet Forward to Friend Musical Translations Already listened to the ?Translation ? episode? Then you probably noticed some very familiar songs that sounded very different from what you'd expect. Get the full scoop and listen to all the recordings from the episode here . Radiolab en Espa?ol *Spanish speakers*, we'd love some feedback. How does Radiolab sound in Spanish? Does it translate? Take a listen to this experiment -- a translation of our Unraveling Bolero podcast produced by Alberto Ferreras and Walyce Almeida, two fans of the show who volunteered to take this on in the hopes that we might make it a regular thing available to Spanish speakers. We'd love to know what you think . Support Radiolab Follow us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter *Copyright ? 2014, WNYC Radio, All rights reserved.* *Our mailing address is:* radiolab@wnyc.org unsubscribe from this list update subscription preferences -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Oct 27 14:28:40 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 06:28:40 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] In-Reply-To: <1414377486343.33343@unm.edu> References: <1414371755253.24181@unm.edu> <544DA234.1080608@mira.net> <1414377486343.33343@unm.edu> Message-ID: Dear Annalisa: Yes, you are right--there are watchers who are benefiting. In particular, I am watching as the discussion gradually seems to come over to two points that were initially pared away but which I find essential to the whole puzzle. And there too you are right--they are historical and theoretical, first of all Leontiev's "politically expedient" support for Stalinism (and consequently his rejection of genuine Marxism, and even basic Darwinism), and secondly the question of whether personality stands alone as the object of psychology. First of all, I don't know of the circumstances of Leontiev's writings on the environment any more than Andy does. But the split between Vygotsky and Leontiev is well documented. We have letters, in which Vygotsky first tries to convince "A.N." of the importance of consciousness and fails (in 1931), where he remarks to Luria the importance of trying to convince Leontiev, the "breakup" of the original group in 1931 (a heartbreaking letter) and then Vygotsky's much more reserved letters to Leontiev just before his death (May 1934). All of this in "In Memory of L.S. Vygotsky: Letters to Students and Colleagues", Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, vol. 45, No. 2 (pp. 11-60), See also Anton Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12124-011-9168-5/fulltext.html#Sec1 I feel as you do, that under the circumstances, the criticisms of Leontiev and P.I. Zinchenko and others were acts of betrayal, similar to what Lysenko did to his old professor Vavilov, the would-be founder of modern Soviet genetics. But I also think that the best we can do now is to try to locate and counter the long term effects upon our understanding of Vygotsky's ideas. It seems to me that there are (at least) three: a) As Kozulin has remarked (and Andy came very close to admitting), Leontiev made "activity" into both the object of investigation and the explanatory principle. This is essentially what Leontiev himself accused Vygotsky of doing with "perezhivanie", and it is indeed a form of circular reasoning: activity is explained by activity itself. This revisionism is a long term effect because very few people who use activity as a unit of analysis realize that although activity is made up of action and nothing but, action is not simply a microcosm of activity. b) Leontiev and Zinchenko (and later Wertsch) rejected word meaning as a unit of analysis for verbal thinking as "idealist". This has meant rejection of what to me is Vygotsky's most important and lasting contribution, something he shares with Volosinov, which is the discovery that the developed mind has a semantic structure rather than a "behavioral" or "cognitive" one. This revisionism is a long-term effect because it has divided Vygotsky in two, particularly in the anglophone world (a Vygotsky of "Mind in Society" which scarcely mentions language and one of "Thinking and Speech" which scarcely mentions anything without mentioning language). c) Leontiev's concept of development is Lamarckian and not Darwinian--it cannot involve the nasty surprises of real development (e.g. the crisis, which Leontiev explicitly rejects on p. 362 of his book Problems of the Development of the Mind).This is a long term effect because it has been taken up by the so-called "Neo-Vygotskyans" (see Karpov's book, "The Neo-Vygotskyan Approach to Child Development", CUP 2005). Leontiev embraced Lysenkoism, and never renounced it; and in the twentieth century, you cannot write scientifically about development without a scientific understanding of modern genetics that is incompatible with Lysenkoism. The second, theoretical, issue that you raise actually follows on from point a). Why isn't "perizhivanie" a circular construction the same way that "activity" is? The answer is that it is--if you use perizhivanie to investigate perizhivanie--or even some kind of mega-perizhivanie called "personality". But of course that isn't what Vygotsky does at all. a) First of all, in Vygotsky's essay perizhivanie is a unit of analysis for a very specific problem: differentiating the contribution of the environment from the contribution of the child in the understanding of experience. Perizhivanie includes both in a very simplified form: the emotional response of the child to the environment. At the same time, however, it is not circular because it is an open system--open to the contribution from the child's hereditary endowment (which as Vygotsky says in the lecture on heredity can actually change as the child develops) as well as open to the various contributions from the child's cultural endowment that Leontiev and his followers insisted were the alpha and omega of development. b) Secondly, personality is not so much a "mega-perizhivanie" as a "meta-perezhivanie", since, as Vygotsky makes very clear in the last chapter of the History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, personality is really only half of the unit he posits for child development, the other half of which he calls "world outlook". What is the difference? It is tempting to say that the difference is that one is more subjective and the other more objective, but it's not really reducible to that. I think, if I had to point to a single criterion for differentiating the two, I would say that "perezhivanie" is retroleptic, looking back to emotion and reflecting upon it, while "world outlook" is proleptic. c) Thirdly, Vygotsky's theory of development is a second order theory: the means of development itself develops. So you notice that in the lecture on the environment, he begins with a very short passage on perezhivanie but then segues almost seamlessly--so that you scarcely notice it--into a discussion of sense and signification in word meaning. To me, this suggests that the development of personality is eventually subsumed (or sublated, if you prefer) by something else--the development of verbal thinking. This is rather hard for us to accept; we all feel as if we are basically personalities and nothing else. But of course the personality must come to the end of its useful life sometime, in much the same way that Vygotsky's spoken lectures were subsumed by his written speech at the moment of his death. Let me just finish by saying that I was a bit thrown by the ref to the Bildungsroman too! But I think Andy is referring to Goethe's "Life of Wilhelm Meister" or perhaps to "Elective Affinities" (which is where Vygotsky probably got the spiel about the water molecule, though John Stuart Mill uses it too). Andy's ref, like his idea that personality is the object of psychology, is too narrativistic for my taste--I think that the mind does indeed have a semantic structure, but that semantic structure is really more like a dialogue than a text. A narrative without dialogue is a little like the sound of one sock puppet clapping. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 27 October 2014 11:38, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Andy, > > Thanks for some additional information. > > Yes, "political expediency" (PE) is an understatement to be sure, from the sound of it. I don't know if I can imagine myself to denounce my own beloved teachers in order that I may live and be promoted. The idea makes me quite ill, and certainly more sympathetic to Leontiev. > > However, the challenge seems to be that we must tease away the PE aspect to try to clear the view to the generation of the theories (or divergence thereof). If that isn't reasonable, let me know. I do not mean to be reductive and minimize the political issues in any way. > > I am merely attempting to go slowly over this so that I gain a clear picture of the collision of ideas and the apparent wreckage and what pieces were retrieved and extended upon. > > So I suppose there are a few things I would enjoy clarity about. > > First is historical: > > How much do we know that is factual in Leontiev's motivation to deny the theories? What is speculative? This is not a flippant two questions. What I mean is are there contemporary documents (or any other documents that come after Stalin's death, or any other time) that discuss this parting of the ways and motivations for doing so? Is this Leontiev paper all that we possess? > > What do you mean that the differences show through, despite the PE factor? We cannot fully remove the PE factor, I know, but how much does it explain the "real differences" if it is clouding the view? > > Second is theoretical: > > I understand perezhivanie is experiential, specific to the individual in question, based upon the person's genetics, level of development, emotional awareness, and intellectual ability at the time of the situation (event), but importantly that the perezhivanie is also inclusive of aspects of the environment itself and how the environment exerts force on the person (combined or in interaction with the more personal or "internal" factors). > > [I'm afraid I was lost at the reference to the autobiography. Goethe is beyond the limits of my knowledge at this time. :) ] > > Furthermore, that the development of the person is not necessarily a "summation of all perezhivanies." If only because a single experience can radically change a person's makeup entirely, whether for good or ill. That a single "unit" can possibly transform the entire whole? (I'm thinking for example the impact of PTSD. I hesitate to resort to a pathological example, it just what seems to illustrate the best about experiences affecting the whole). > > However I agree that my personality is the manifest expression of the "collection" of all my experiences, I'm not sure if I could say "summation," since this sounds mechanical in nature, rather than systemic. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 7:39 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] > > Annalisa, > I don't know exactly when the ANL document was written or where/if it > was published originally, but it was certainly after LSV's death and > before ANL's death (i.e. some time 1935-1975), most likely during > Stalin's time. "Political expediency" somewhat understates the issue. A > convincing denunciation of a colleague's theory was very often a matter > of life and death. Which is not to say that the honourable choice may > not have been to speak the truth and take the consequences, rather than > lie and enjoy promotion. In that sense, this document, being dishonest, > is not the ideal medium for understanding the real differences between > these two former comrades. Nonetheless, I think the real differences > show through. > > On the question of units. The idea is that a person's character develops > through a series of experiences. Each experiences adds a new > sensibility, a new aversion, a new preference, a new insight, etc., so > from that point of view a person's character can be understand as the > product or sum of a series of such experiences, as for example, when > someone writes their autobiography, especially if they follow in the > Goethean tradition of Bildungsromanen. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> Hi Andy, >> >> >> I must explain: Since I hadn't read the entire paper, I was searching >> for the 8 points in the first half of the paper, which is The >> Prosecution half. This is to say the "8 charges" you had indicated in >> your post, are actually listed in the second half, the Defense half. >> So I suppose the structure threw me. (Sorry to create any confusion, all!) >> >> But I'd like to continue my exercise openly, as it appears there are >> watchers who are benefiting. So here goes (I will go more slowly and >> not flood the list). >> >> #1) The charge by Leontiev (Ad. 4): Perezhivanie, as a manifestation >> of the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality. >> >> One nagging question: Vygotsky, while living (as I understand), had a >> large social group in which they openly discussed all of these >> theories. If Leontiev was privy to this community, how could he not >> have understood the points concerning perezhivanie? It is not that I >> accuse Leontiev as being obstinate or thick (that would be an easy >> thing to do), but that I want to understand how could he have missed >> this if there were other parties available to discuss the nature of >> Vygotsky's perezhivanie? The community must have discussed these >> concepts without Vygotsky present, among each other. Am I wrong in >> this thinking? >> >> I don't think Vygotsky was like Jesus with confused disciples. It >> seemed that he treated his students as equals and that he himself >> benefited from their input to the theories. >> >> If I may, I position this question with the imagination as-if Vygotsky >> and Leontiev were here on this list discussing various theories, as we >> are here. There was a lot of discussion going on, sharing and the like. >> >> Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't these lectures on perezhivanie >> happen earlier in the decade of time Vygotsky graced us? Or am I mistaken? >> >> I suppose I am attempting to answer the question, How did Leontiev not >> understand perezhivanie as a determinant? And perhaps in gaining an >> answer to this question, we might learn something about *teaching* the >> concept of perezhivanie? >> >> Of course it is possible that this was entirely caused by political >> expediency. But if that is the case, how can we know this? >> >> But to the content of the charge: "Perezhivanie, as a manifestation of >> the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality." >> >> I am having a hard time discussing perezhivanie as a "fragment of the >> whole." If only because fragment means "a part of", and I don't think >> "unit" is necessarily a material thing, but also an abstraction like >> the whole is an abstraction. >> >> For example: The water molecule metaphor. (I hope we do not reduce the >> molecule to hydrogen and oxygen and begin flames on the list). In our >> perception, we *imagine* the molecule. We know that molecules exist, >> just like we know that the ocean exists. But when we perceive the >> ocean, it's also not a perception in its entirety, but completed in >> our imagination like the molecule is, and this is why I feel the unit, >> seen as a fragment, seems problematic. >> >> If we want to study the nature of oceans we want to study the nature >> of water, since water is the material of the ocean. Also, the water >> molecule is the unit we must use to understand the behavior of the >> water. And so the molecule becomes the unit of analysis. >> >> If the metaphor works, the ocean is the ideal, and final form. Can we >> say that the water molecule determines the nature of the ocean? It >> seems so, since the behavior of water (as indicated by the nature of >> its molecule) will reveal significantly the nature of the ocean, >> moreso than dividing the ocean into fragments, and I'm not sure how >> one would divide the ocean into fragments, anyway! >> >> BTW, I am proposing this metaphor because we know that LSV used the >> metaphor of the water molecule himself, though I don't think he spoke >> of oceans, just water. Still, I wonder if it works? >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Oct 27 16:16:48 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 10:16:48 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <31360D7D-7475-4492-BECC-CAE2B65EC2F3@uniandes.edu.co> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <31360D7D-7475-4492-BECC-CAE2B65EC2F3@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <544ED260.6000106@mira.net> I agree that Marx's formulation in the beginning of Chapter 1 and also in the Preface are ambiguous, but the whole drift of the work is that value is not a property of a material artefact but of a social relation. "In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both. But in bourgeois society, the commodity-form of the product of labour ? or value-form of the commodity ? is the economic cell-form." (Preface to First German Edition) Marx goes to great lengths to show that there is nothing about the commodity itself - the material object - which gives it value or human powers. See the concluding paragraph of Chapter 1: "So far no chemist has ever discovered exchange value either in a pearl or a diamond." Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Marx's unit of analysis in Capital was the commodity, right? Not the exchange of commodities. > > "The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as ?an immense accumulation of commodities,? its unit being a single commodity. Our investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity." > > "A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, and easily understood. Its analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties." > > Martin > > On Oct 26, 2014, at 11:31 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Remember that when Marx chose an exchange of commodities as a unit of analysis of bourgeois society, he knew full-well that commodities are rarely exchanged - they are bought and sold. But Marx did not "include" money in the unit of analysis. >> > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Oct 27 16:53:59 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 10:53:59 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <006a01cff209$a388c230$ea9a4690$@att.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <006a01cff209$a388c230$ea9a4690$@att.net> Message-ID: <544EDB17.6040700@mira.net> Thanks for that, Peg. I have read Davodov's book on Generalisation http://www.marxists.org/archive/davydov/generalization/generalization.pdf but I have never known exactly how his idea were implemented beyond those germ cell operations comparing the size of objects. I lost interest in Davydov when I saw that (in my view) he failed to understand Vygotsky on scientific and everyday concepts. Peg, recall that other interest of yours, in the Question Asking Reading: http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/NEWTECHN.pdf where you suggest that reading is not just being able to decode a text, but in being able to "read the world" and consequently introduce the idea of a double mediation between the world and the child - by the text and by the adult, with all the mediations that go along with this. It seems to me that learning mathematics is like that as well. In the end, the child can manage the text without reference to the world, but if we are concerned with teaching and learning, we need a germ cell which can grow from its roots in the world. Marx's unit of analysis/germ cell was genetic in that sense. He started with the exchange of commodities, and very quickly (still in chapter 1, volume 1) shows how money arises historically as a special type of commodity, and subsequently also how capital arises as a specific type of commodity relation. But the essential relation was the commodity relation. Even though we do mathematics without natural objects, genetically, that is the germ cell. Each topic has to begin, surely, with a situation to be analysed until students have become at home in the world of mathematical texts in which the world is only implicit. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Peg Griffin wrote: > > Interesting about money not being in Marx?s unit of analysis, Andy. > > As I understand what educators following Davidov?s math curriculum > were doing, numbers were not involved in the mathematics education > germ cells. > > Here?s a glimpse of the scenario as I understand it (which could be > wrong): > > Children start with strings or lumps of clay or what not > (not easily countable). > > Alyosha?s object is greater than Borja?s. Anyone can > perceive the difference. The mathematical recording of > that is A>B. > > In the very same situation, one is less than the other, > mathematically, B > It isn?t nice or fair that one child?s object should be > greater than and another less than, mathematically > recorded as A ?B and as B?A. How to get to B=A and A=B? > > How to have a nice, fair situation? The teacher and > children work it about and discover the important > operations that mathematics has for working on >, <, ? and > = and the mathematically recordings with + and -. The > whole situation of transformations takes this nice set > mathematically recorded as: > > A?B > > B?A > > A>B > > A-X= B+X > > A?=B? > > B?=A? > > Then of course there?s more fun when Katya?s in on it and > transitivity pops in so that even without direct > perceptual comparisons mathematics comes to the rescue so > you can figure out stuff you wouldn?t know otherwise (do I > smell motivation here?): > > A>B > > B>K > > A?K > > A>K > > And they work out proudly that you keep the ? (don?t know) > answer in the following situation > > A>B > > A>K > > B?K > > It remains forever a ? for mathematics, maybe direct > percept will help but current mathematics for the current > situation takes a pass on it. We might use mathematics to > come up with some nice questions and suppositions and come > to more or less likely answers but? > > And then you can get to precision with measurement tools > that work for the kinds of objects and ? > > It's apparent that mathematics can serve social justice sometimes. As > I understand it, the Davidov mathematics educators take it for granted > that in ?non-mathematics? everyday life learning, children learn > counting (including the cardinality principle alluded to earlier in > the discussion and others that I associate a lot with the work > developed by Gelman, Gallistel, and her colleagues). > > And, as I understand it, the great day of the coming together of > mathematics and counting doesn?t happen for the Davidov folks until > later ? maybe even fourth grade. Mathematics of the type discussed > above can start in the Davidov style Kindergartens. > > In the US where we start off with numbers right away, in fourth grade, > there have been many children who are confident that 9>7 and 9-2=7 but > can get nowhere with working out all those wonderful equivalences if > there are no numbers ? i.e., they count but don?t do mathematics. > > Of course, that?s what I understand but I could be wrong. > > Peg > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 12:31 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > > Well, I think that if you make a decision that mathematics is *not* > essentially a social convention, but something which is essentially > grasping something objective, then that affects what you choose as > your unit of analysis. Student-text-teacher is all about acquiring a > social convention. > > Remember that when Marx chose an exchange of commodities as a unit of > analysis of bourgeois society, he knew full-well that commodities are > rarely exchanged - they are bought and sold. But Marx did not "include" > > money in the unit of analysis. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Ed Wall wrote: > > > Andy > > > > > > Asking that question was one of the dumber things I've done on > > > this list. Apologies to all > > > > > > Thanks for reminding me about pre-concepts. I've been thinking about > something similar and wondering if this is part of what makes doing > mathematics 'mathematical.' Historically, by the way, mathematics grew > out of manipulating such material objects; however, there are > indications that, at some point (and it may have happened more than > once), there was sort of a leap. > > > > > > Mathematics is considered a science; for instance, of patterns or, as > Hegel puts it, quantity. I agree for a mathematician symbols of > various sorts are effectively 'things'. > > > > > > In the 80s some mathematicians (School Mathematics Study Group) in > the US put together a formal curriculum - my aunt used it - which was > a disaster (and a real pain for the kids involved). Indications are > children learned little. > > > > > > > > > So to add a little to a discussion that possibly has continued > > > far longer than it should. Mathematics may have a few characteristics > > > that may distinguish it from other disciplines such as > > > > > > 1. A student has the ability, in principle, to be able to > independently of teachers or peers verify a grade appropriate > mathematics statement (not a definition although definitions admit, in > a sense, a sort of empirical verification). > > > > > > 2. Solutions to problems are, in general, not subject to > > > social conventions (which probably is included in the above). > > > Amusingly, I believe in the US a state legislature once tried to set > > > the value of pi to 3.1417 > > > > > > However, I'm not sure how such would fit together into a useful unit > of analysis. > > > > > > Ed > > > > > > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Oct 27 17:14:55 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 00:14:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <544ED260.6000106@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <31360D7D-7475-4492-BECC-CAE2B65EC2F3@uniandes.edu.co> <544ED260.6000106@mira.net> Message-ID: <19A200D9-4E43-4008-A4D0-1D8DEDECE355@uniandes.edu.co> Yes, of course the commodity has its genesis and its demise in cycles of production, exchange, distribution, and consumption, in which its value(s) are created and dissipated. Its material properties are hardly irrelevant to its value - it's just that a chemist is not doing the right kind of science to detect value. It seems very odd to suggest that "exchange of commodities" is the unit of analysis here, since Marx insists that production always has priority over exchange and consumption. It is the commodity itself which in its form contains the central contradiction between use value and exchange value. Martin On Oct 27, 2014, at 6:16 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I agree that Marx's formulation in the beginning of Chapter 1 and also in the Preface are ambiguous, but the whole drift of the work is that value is not a property of a material artefact but of a social relation. > > "In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes > nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must > replace both. But in bourgeois society, the commodity-form of the > product of labour ? or value-form of the commodity ? is the economic > cell-form." (Preface to First German Edition) > > Marx goes to great lengths to show that there is nothing about the commodity itself - the material object - which gives it value or human powers. See the concluding paragraph of Chapter 1: "So far no chemist has ever discovered exchange value either in a pearl or a diamond." > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Marx's unit of analysis in Capital was the commodity, right? Not the exchange of commodities. >> >> "The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as ?an immense accumulation of commodities,? its unit being a single commodity. Our investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity." >> >> "A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, and easily understood. Its analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties." >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 26, 2014, at 11:31 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> Remember that when Marx chose an exchange of commodities as a unit of analysis of bourgeois society, he knew full-well that commodities are rarely exchanged - they are bought and sold. But Marx did not "include" money in the unit of analysis. >>> >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Oct 27 17:31:49 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 11:31:49 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <19A200D9-4E43-4008-A4D0-1D8DEDECE355@uniandes.edu.co> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <31360D7D-7475-4492-BECC-CAE2B65EC2F3@uniandes.edu.co> <544ED260.6000106@mira.net> <19A200D9-4E43-4008-A4D0-1D8DEDECE355@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <544EE3F5.8080707@mira.net> A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men?s labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour. This is the reason why the products of labour become commodities, social things whose qualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses. In the same way the light from an object is perceived by us not as the subjective excitation of our optic nerve, but as the objective form of something outside the eye itself. But, in the act of seeing, there is at all events, an actual passage of light from one thing to another, from the external object to the eye. There is a physical relation between physical things. But it is different with commodities. There, the existence of the things /qu? /commodities, and the value relation between the products of labour which stamps them as commodities, have absolutely no connection with their physical properties and with the material relations arising therefrom. There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men?s hands. This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities. This Fetishism of commodities has its origin, as the foregoing analysis has already shown, in the peculiar social character of the labour that produces them. http://marx.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm#S4 Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Martin John Packer wrote: > Yes, of course the commodity has its genesis and its demise in cycles of production, exchange, distribution, and consumption, in which its value(s) are created and dissipated. Its material properties are hardly irrelevant to its value - it's just that a chemist is not doing the right kind of science to detect value. It seems very odd to suggest that "exchange of commodities" is the unit of analysis here, since Marx insists that production always has priority over exchange and consumption. It is the commodity itself which in its form contains the central contradiction between use value and exchange value. > > Martin > > On Oct 27, 2014, at 6:16 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> I agree that Marx's formulation in the beginning of Chapter 1 and also in the Preface are ambiguous, but the whole drift of the work is that value is not a property of a material artefact but of a social relation. >> >> "In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes >> nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must >> replace both. But in bourgeois society, the commodity-form of the >> product of labour ? or value-form of the commodity ? is the economic >> cell-form." (Preface to First German Edition) >> >> Marx goes to great lengths to show that there is nothing about the commodity itself - the material object - which gives it value or human powers. See the concluding paragraph of Chapter 1: "So far no chemist has ever discovered exchange value either in a pearl or a diamond." >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> Marx's unit of analysis in Capital was the commodity, right? Not the exchange of commodities. >>> >>> "The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as ?an immense accumulation of commodities,? its unit being a single commodity. Our investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity." >>> >>> "A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, and easily understood. Its analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties." >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 26, 2014, at 11:31 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Remember that when Marx chose an exchange of commodities as a unit of analysis of bourgeois society, he knew full-well that commodities are rarely exchanged - they are bought and sold. But Marx did not "include" money in the unit of analysis. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> > > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Oct 27 17:33:59 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 09:33:59 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics Practices In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <39089ddf0ba265a30feb7854f07324c1.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> <54471BF6.9010906@mira.net> <54479034.6070006@mira.net> Message-ID: Dear Karen (if I may--people don't use salutations much on the list, but there is something unbearably memo-like about using a bare given name and a colon, and to my ear "Hi!" suggests face to face interaction, which I will argue below is qualitatively different from computer mediated and even telephonically mediated interaction): Yes, I must read more Scollon. But every time I sit down to do so, I end up going back to his 1976 Ph.D. work "Conversations with a One Year Old", which is really about the last moment in anybody's live when transactions can be said to be entirely non-verbal. You say: "Scollon's point is not that actions are strictly nonverbal but that we give more attention to the ways that actions convey nonverbal meanings and represent tacit understandings about how members are to behave and interact within a culture." Do you mean that we give more attention to the ways that actions convey nonverbal meanings and represent tacit understandings than to the ways that words convey non-verbal meanings? I thought about this for a moment, and I thought of instances where it was true (e.g. we pay more attention to actual automobile accidents that we witness than to passing mention of automobile accidents) but I also thought of instances where it was not true (e.g. we actually find out more about the nonverbal meanings of characters in Virginia Woolf's "To the Lighthouse" than in reading a comic strip). The main thing that occurred to me is that one of the most important ways in which actions convey meanings in handings is best described as 'semi-verbal"--facial expression, and above all tone of voice. Above all, I find myself disagreeing with the idea that language is "just one" of a set of practices that surround the essentially nonverbal nature of your data. You write: " We share understandings of which embodied actions are expected in a situation by other social actors within that cultural context. These interactions can play out in routines that often require little talk but produce automatic response--handing a cashier a credit card and receiving the card back with a product and receipt.The physical action of handing is situated activity in a cultural context--a context that includes the immediate language and materials as well as histories of prior conversations, practices, etc." I have several times had the experience of living in a country where I have to do this sort of thing without the benefit of language. I have then experienced the benefits of doing it with language, and then a kind of third stage, where I do it largely without the benefit of language. Why, then, when I now go shopping largely without the benefit of my hard-learned Korean do I feel so much closer to the second stage than to the first? It is, I think, because I feel that if something goes wrong (i.e. if there is automobile accident on the street outside the store as I am paying), I now have the option of switching to language, and that really does make all the difference in the world. As Vygotsky says, there are kinds of non-verbal thinking that only verbal thinking makes possible. Volosinov says somewhere that at the end of every century, and even more at the end of every millenium, and "d'avantage" at the end of every great civilization, as culture and society collapse and people seem to have nothing at all to cling to, intellectuals turn away from language and declare, in unison, that man is a beast. But when they do this, they use language to do it. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 28 October 2014 05:26, Karen Wohlwend wrote: > Hello David, > I'll respond to your question about the social practice of handing and your > point that of course spoken language is involved. We agree with you that > the role of speech is a matter of degree--or perhaps a matter of immediacy. > However, in the paper we've just given a brief description to offer quick > examples to readers so that we could suggest a few recognizable contexts > for interpreting handing practices. > > The introductory examples in the article (buying a cup of coffee, giving a > birthday gift) are drawn directly from Scollon's 2001 work (for a much more > thorough discussion, I highly recommend his wonderful analysis of the > discourses that are embedded in context and for his description of the > nexus at work in the development of his own expertise and insider status as > a customer in a Starbucks transaction, from *Mediated Discourse: The Nexus > of Practice*). Scollon's point is not that actions are strictly nonverbal > but that we give more attention to the ways that actions convey nonverbal > meanings and represent tacit understandings about how members are to behave > and interact within a culture. We share understandings of which embodied > actions are expected in a situation by other social actors within that > cultural context. These interactions can play out in routines that often > require little talk but produce automatic response--handing a cashier a > credit card and receiving the card back with a product and receipt. > The physical > action of handing is situated activity in a cultural context--a context > that includes the immediate language and materials as well as histories of > prior conversations, practices, etc. > Language is one means through which a physical mediated action is > categorized as a particular social practice and as a valued way of > participating within a particular nexus of practice, which includes not > only the practice of handing but a mesh of social practices that are also > expected within that context, including expectations for who should hand an > object and how others should respond. > Karen > > On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 3:24 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> I have a bunch of rather silly questions, and then a comment about the >> interpretation of the data. >> >> p. 280: Why do we assume that nonverbal handing money to a cashier or >> handing a birthday present to a friend is an unspoken agreement? It is >> certainly true that the nonverbal component of the interaction may be >> abstracted away from it. But there are actually very few nonverbal >> handings, of either money or birthday presents, that would have the >> same meaning. Isn't it more useful to consider that speech can play >> varying degrees of importance in an interactioni (e.g. it can be >> "ancillary" where the commodity being exchanged is goods or services >> and it is essential when, as is normally the case in both handing >> money to a cashier and handing a birthday present to a friend, >> information is exchanged as well? >> >> p. 283: Puppets are unusual in that, unlike socks, they necessarily >> have symbolic meaning (that is, a sock puppet that is not a symbol for >> some imaginary character is a sock and not a puppet). Was there any >> character that went with the sock puppets? Was there any story that >> went with the character? If so, where did the story come from, and was >> there any jockeying for control over the story? Note the titillating >> potential of characters that "light up" when they touch! Did this >> create any visible titillation for embarrassment? >> >> p. 283: I can sort of follow why stitching, knotting, and threading >> might be gendered (a kind of washback from the world of work, I >> suppose). Why gluing? >> >> p. 289: Why does Amber refer to Antoine as "Nicholas"? >> >> p. 293: The first sentence of the section "Hands-On Materials as >> Gendered Access" refers to "two focal girls". Is this a mistake, or am >> I missing somebody? >> >> And my comment. It seems to me that a lot of studies (not this one in >> particular but many studies of this type in general) tend to view >> gendered access as a matter of gendered access to property or power or >> both. But this is very often an adult view; we adults are obsessed >> with power and property and we assume that it is only right that >> children are. Isn't it possible that to the children what is really >> gendered is access to aesthetic concepts versus access to technical >> expertise? Both orientations address the tension between form and >> material, but they address it from very different sides and are >> ultimately indispensible to each other (which is notoriously not the >> case with disputes over property and power). Note, however, that when >> the teacher says that it is decorating that is the fun part, the >> teacher is biasing the children towards the aesthetic and away from >> the technical!) >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> On 24 October 2014 07:07, mike cole wrote: >> > Aha! Thanks! >> > >> > So artificial literacies refers to the mediation of reading/writing by a >> > variety of artifacts! Ok, that I can make sense of. And thanks for the >> RRQ >> > ref on sedimented identities. This phrase is used in discussion of text >> > production. For those ignorant like myself, here is the summary provided >> by >> > the authors, which also makes the point of their text (and the present >> > one!) cleared: >> > >> > *THE COMMENTARY argues for an understanding of how texts are put together >> > that accounts for multimodality and draws on children?s ways of being and >> > doing in the home, their habitus. It focuses on identities as socially >> > situated. It argues that it is important to trace the process of >> > sedimenting identities during text production. This offers a way of >> viewing >> > text production that can inform research into children?s text making. >> > Particular attention is paid to the producer, contexts, and practices >> used >> > during text production and how the text becomes an artifact that holds >> > important information about the meaning maker. Four case studies describe >> > sedimented identities as a lens through which to see a more nuanced >> > perspective on meaning making. This work offers a lens for research and >> > practice in that it enables researchers to question and interrogate the >> way >> > texts come into being.* >> > >> > >> > mike >> > >> > On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 10:35 AM, Karen Wohlwend >> wrote: >> > >> >> Certainly-- Rowsell and Pahl take an ethnographic approach to track the >> >> practices and user identities involved in the production and previous >> uses >> >> of an artifact. >> >> >> >> Rowsell, J., & Pahl, K. (2007). Sedimented identities in texts: >> Instances >> >> of practice. Reading Research Quarterly, 42(3), 388-404. >> >> >> >> Pahl, K., & Rowsell, J. (2010). Artifactual literacies: Every object >> tells >> >> a story. New York: Teachers College Press. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 12:56 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> >> >> > Karen--- I am familiar of course with the notion of artifacts, but I >> am >> >> not >> >> > familiar with >> >> > Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual literacies. >> >> Could >> >> > you provide a link or a reference? The phrase has me wondering what a >> >> > non-artifactual literacy would be. >> >> > mike >> >> > >> >> > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:03 PM, Karen Wohlwend >> >> > wrote: >> >> > >> >> > > Andy, thanks for these generative questions and comments! I'll >> defer to >> >> > my >> >> > > co-authors to situate the focal case in the larger study but I'll >> >> address >> >> > > how we are considering relationships among gender, practices, and >> >> tools. >> >> > > >> >> > > We're conceptualizing tools as anchoring artifacts, that concretize >> and >> >> > > suggest particular uses and users accrued from cultural histories >> of >> >> > > access and use (following Holland and Cole's cultural artifacts, and >> >> more >> >> > > recently, Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual >> >> > > literacies). Tools index shared histories of use, values, and >> >> > expectations >> >> > > for who *should *be a user and for how practices *should *be >> conducted, >> >> > > practices which following Paechter are situated in communities of >> >> > gendered >> >> > > practice that are multiple, local, and embodied. >> >> > > >> >> > > However, we would not say that a tool is gendered in any fixed or >> >> > > deterministic way. In any given moment of activity, tools signal >> >> multiple >> >> > > histories in many nexus of practice (following Ron Scollon, the >> tacit >> >> > > shared practices that members of a community expect of one another) >> >> that >> >> > > lead up to, enter in, and flow from that moment, in contradictory, >> >> > > confounding, and complementary ways, hence the ambiguity you've >> >> > mentioned. >> >> > > How/whether social actors make use of particular histories in a >> >> specific >> >> > > context realizes foregrounds some histories while backgrounding >> >> others-- >> >> > in >> >> > > ways that can reproduce, contest, or blur prevailing expectations >> for >> >> > > participation. In our analysis, we looked closely at the mediated >> >> actions >> >> > > in the handling of tools in the one nexus to understand in a very >> >> > concrete >> >> > > way how girls were able to gain and maintain control over >> >> > > projects--contrary to histories and expectations for high levels of >> >> tool >> >> > > handling, participation, and trajectories of expertise for boys in >> >> > > electronics activity. >> >> > > >> >> > > Looking closely at the mediated action in this transformative moment >> >> > > reveals how changing the electronics tools from wires to needle and >> >> > thread >> >> > > changes the nexus, activating a powerful perception/expectation for >> >> girls >> >> > > as appropriate tool users by signalling histories of sewing >> practices >> >> and >> >> > > feminine communities of practice. >> >> > > >> >> > > In regard to other situations, looking closely at mediated actions, >> >> > > material artifacts, and tacit expectations for participation in the >> >> > > relevant nexus of practice will likely also reveal how materials >> relate >> >> > to >> >> > > stereotypical expectations, pointing to places ripe for rupture >> where >> >> > > changing something small in the local activity (e.g., an action, a >> >> tool, >> >> > a >> >> > > material) in dominant nexus of practice can signal a different kind >> of >> >> > user >> >> > > and potentially disrupt persistent and naturalized stereotypes. >> >> > > >> >> > > Looking forward to continuing the conversation, >> >> > > Karen >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:08 AM, Andy Blunden >> >> wrote: >> >> > > >> >> > > > Kylie & co., >> >> > > > A fascinating study around a truly ingenious approach to the >> gendered >> >> > > > division of labour - giving school kids E-textiles to construct an >> >> > > > electronic device - total mixing up and confounding the gender >> >> > > stereotypes >> >> > > > about sewing and electronics, etc. >> >> > > > >> >> > > > Some of the results were quite startling. That the young boy >> should >> >> not >> >> > > > just abstain and demonstratively not pay attention, but pay active >> >> and >> >> > > > supportive attention to the girl making the circuit with her >> >> > > > needle-and-thread - an admired female-typical stance one would >> have >> >> > > thought >> >> > > > a young male incapable of adopting with a female workmate. And >> that >> >> the >> >> > > > gender-inscription of the sewing tools over-rode the greater >> >> experience >> >> > > > that in this case the young boy had in using them, with the boy >> >> > deferring >> >> > > > to the less experienced girl in recognition of the >> >> > gender-appropriateness >> >> > > > of her "taking charge" with the needle-and-thread. This does cause >> >> one >> >> > to >> >> > > > think a little deeper into how we might conceptualise such >> gendered >> >> > > > behaviours. >> >> > > > >> >> > > > As you would know, MCA has a strong preference for qualitative >> >> > research, >> >> > > > and studies with small sample sizes are not generally a problem, >> but >> >> so >> >> > > > much seemed to hinge on the study of just *one* boy-girl team, >> that I >> >> > am >> >> > > > concerned about the capacity to generalise from such a base. There >> >> were >> >> > > > about 80 youth in the activity as a whole, so I can only hope and >> >> > presume >> >> > > > that observation of the other 78 kids in some way guided the work >> >> > focused >> >> > > > on just 2. >> >> > > > >> >> > > > I must say, the analysis of the video data is very sophisticated >> and >> >> > > > productive and you are to be congratulated on this aspect of the >> >> work. >> >> > I >> >> > > > see that you approach the gendering of the activities through the >> >> idea >> >> > of >> >> > > > the various *tools* being gendered, rather than the *practices* >> >> > > themselves. >> >> > > > This is something that was really necessary for you to be able to >> >> make >> >> > > > these observations, because the gendering of the activities is >> >> > ambiguous, >> >> > > > but not it seems the gendering of the tools. Is this a result of >> the >> >> > > study, >> >> > > > or is it something you already knew or did you arrive at this by >> >> logic? >> >> > > > >> >> > > > Do you see any other opportunities for confounding gender >> stereotypes >> >> > in >> >> > > > this way? >> >> > > > >> >> > > > And finally, does the experience of working in ambiguous, even >> >> inverted >> >> > > > gender-stereotyped activities like these have any outcome which >> >> carries >> >> > > > over into a world where the gender division of labour lacks >> >> ambiguity? >> >> > > > >> >> > > > Andy >> >> > > > >> >> > > > >> >> > > > >> >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> > > > *Andy Blunden* >> >> > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> > > > >> >> > > > >> >> > > > Kylie Peppler wrote: >> >> > > > >> >> > > >> Thanks Andy! We're excited to discuss with the community and >> would >> >> > > >> welcome any comments/questions on this emerging line of research! >> >> > > >> Kylie >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> --- >> >> > > >> Kylie A. Peppler >> >> > > >> Assistant Professor of Learning Sciences >> >> > > >> Indiana University | School of Education >> >> > > >> 1900 E 10th Street | Eigenmann 528 | Bloomington | IN | 47406 | >> >> > > >> 812.856.8381 >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 10:52 PM, Andy Blunden < >> ablunden@mira.net >> >> > > >> > wrote: >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> Here's the article for discussion Artin is introducing: >> >> > > >> *Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting and >> >> Electronics >> >> > > >> Practices* >> >> > > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen >> Wohlwend. >> >> > > >> Indiana University. >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> The Maker movement promotes hands-on making, including >> >> crafts, >> >> > > >> robotics, and computing. The movement?s potential to >> >> transform >> >> > > >> education rests in our ability to address notable gender >> >> > > >> disparities, particularly in science, technology, >> >> engineering, >> >> > > and >> >> > > >> mathematics fields. E-textiles - the first >> female-dominated >> >> > > >> computing community - provide inspiration for overcoming >> >> > > >> long-standing cultural divides in classrooms. Analysis of >> >> > > >> children?s >> >> > > >> use of e-textiles reveals that materials like needles, >> >> fabric, >> >> > > and >> >> > > >> conductive thread rupture traditional gender scripts >> around >> >> > > >> electronics and implicitly gives girls hands-on access and >> >> > > >> leadership roles. This reconceptualization of cultural >> >> divides >> >> > as >> >> > > >> sets of tacitly accepted practices rooted in gendered >> >> histories >> >> > > has >> >> > > >> implications for reconceptualizing traditionally >> >> male-dominated >> >> > > >> areas of schooling. >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> Andy >> >> > > >> (attached) >> >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> > > >> ------------ >> >> > > >> *Andy Blunden* >> >> > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> Goncu, Artin wrote: >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> Dear All, >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> We are writing to let you know that the most recent >> issue of >> >> > > >> MCA is out. >> >> > > >> One of the articles published in this issue and being >> >> > > >> introduced here for >> >> > > >> discussion in referenced below. The authors of the >> article >> >> > > >> have kindly >> >> > > >> agreed to lead the discussion, and they are on xmca with >> us >> >> > > >> now. The free >> >> > > >> access to the article is possible through the links >> below. >> >> We >> >> > > >> are looking >> >> > > >> forward to hearing from you all. Best, ag >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting >> >> > > >> and Electronics Practices >> >> > > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen >> >> Wohlwend >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762 >> >> > > >> > > >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749039.2014 >> . >> >> > > >> 939762#.VEZ25Ra_4wI >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> Artin Goncu, Ph.D >> >> > > >> Co-editor, Mind, Culture, and Activity:An International >> >> > Journal >> >> > > >> Professor Emeritus, >> >> > > >> University of Illinois at Chicago >> >> > > >> College of Education M/C 147 >> >> > > >> 1040 W. Harrison St. >> >> > > >> Chicago, IL 60607 >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > -- >> >> > > Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor >> >> > > Literacy, Culture, & Language Education >> >> > > Indiana University >> >> > > 201 N. Rose Avenue >> >> > > Bloomington, IN 47405 >> >> > > Office: 812-856-8275 >> >> > > Fax: 812-856-8287 >> >> > > kwohlwen@indiana.edu >> >> > > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > -- >> >> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> >> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor >> >> Literacy, Culture, & Language Education >> >> Indiana University >> >> 201 N. Rose Avenue >> >> Bloomington, IN 47405 >> >> Office: 812-856-8275 >> >> Fax: 812-856-8287 >> >> kwohlwen@indiana.edu >> >> >> > >> > >> > >> > -- >> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> > > > -- > Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor > Literacy, Culture, & Language Education > Indiana University > 201 N. Rose Avenue > Bloomington, IN 47405 > Office: 812-856-8275 > Fax: 812-856-8287 > kwohlwen@indiana.edu From kwohlwen@gmail.com Mon Oct 27 18:52:24 2014 From: kwohlwen@gmail.com (Karen Wohlwend) Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 21:52:24 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics Practices In-Reply-To: References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <39089ddf0ba265a30feb7854f07324c1.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> <54471BF6.9010906@mira.net> <54479034.6070006@mira.net> Message-ID: Interesting points! I think I phrased my response in a confusing way--I should have said: "Scollon's point is not that actions are strictly nonverbal but that we *[as researchers should]* give more attention to the ways that actions convey nonverbal meanings and represent tacit understandings about how members are to behave and interact within a culture." Here, we aren't arguing that people pay more or less to action over language, rather that actions are visible indicators that reveal tacitly accepted practices and social relationships. Accordingly in our analysis, we intentionally foreground actions as our primary focus and look for analytic methods and tools that reduce the need to describe action through language but that allow us to examine action through video (which of course is still a distortion in the move from live action to video). Karen On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 8:33 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Dear Karen (if I may--people don't use salutations much on the list, > but there is something unbearably memo-like about using a bare given > name and a colon, and to my ear "Hi!" suggests face to face > interaction, which I will argue below is qualitatively different from > computer mediated and even telephonically mediated interaction): > > Yes, I must read more Scollon. But every time I sit down to do so, I > end up going back to his 1976 Ph.D. work "Conversations with a One > Year Old", which is really about the last moment in anybody's live > when transactions can be said to be entirely non-verbal. > > You say: > > "Scollon's point is not that actions are strictly nonverbal but that > we give more attention to the ways that actions convey nonverbal > meanings and represent tacit understandings about how members are to > behave and interact within a culture." > > Do you mean that we give more attention to the ways that actions > convey nonverbal meanings and represent tacit understandings than to > the ways that words convey non-verbal meanings? I thought about this > for a moment, and I thought of instances where it was true (e.g. we > pay more attention to actual automobile accidents that we witness than > to passing mention of automobile accidents) but I also thought of > instances where it was not true (e.g. we actually find out more about > the nonverbal meanings of characters in Virginia Woolf's "To the > Lighthouse" than in reading a comic strip). The main thing that > occurred to me is that one of the most important ways in which actions > convey meanings in handings is best described as 'semi-verbal"--facial > expression, and above all tone of voice. > > Above all, I find myself disagreeing with the idea that language is > "just one" of a set of practices that surround the essentially > nonverbal nature of your data. You write: > > " We share understandings of which embodied actions are expected in a > situation by other social actors within that > cultural context. These interactions can play out in routines that > often require little talk but produce automatic response--handing a > cashier a credit card and receiving the card back with a product and > receipt.The physical action of handing is situated activity in a > cultural context--a context that includes the immediate language and > materials as well as histories of prior conversations, practices, > etc." > > I have several times had the experience of living in a country where I > have to do this sort of thing without the benefit of language. I have > then experienced the benefits of doing it with language, and then a > kind of third stage, where I do it largely without the benefit of > language. Why, then, when I now go shopping largely without the > benefit of my hard-learned Korean do I feel so much closer to the > second stage than to the first? It is, I think, because I feel that if > something goes wrong (i.e. if there is automobile accident on the > street outside the store as I am paying), I now have the option of > switching to language, and that really does make all the difference in > the world. As Vygotsky says, there are kinds of non-verbal thinking > that only verbal thinking makes possible. > > Volosinov says somewhere that at the end of every century, and even > more at the end of every millenium, and "d'avantage" at the end of > every great civilization, as culture and society collapse and people > seem to have nothing at all to cling to, intellectuals turn away from > language and declare, in unison, that man is a beast. But when they do > this, they use language to do it. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > On 28 October 2014 05:26, Karen Wohlwend wrote: > > Hello David, > > I'll respond to your question about the social practice of handing and > your > > point that of course spoken language is involved. We agree with you that > > the role of speech is a matter of degree--or perhaps a matter of > immediacy. > > However, in the paper we've just given a brief description to offer quick > > examples to readers so that we could suggest a few recognizable contexts > > for interpreting handing practices. > > > > The introductory examples in the article (buying a cup of coffee, giving > a > > birthday gift) are drawn directly from Scollon's 2001 work (for a much > more > > thorough discussion, I highly recommend his wonderful analysis of the > > discourses that are embedded in context and for his description of the > > nexus at work in the development of his own expertise and insider status > as > > a customer in a Starbucks transaction, from *Mediated Discourse: The > Nexus > > of Practice*). Scollon's point is not that actions are strictly nonverbal > > but that we give more attention to the ways that actions convey nonverbal > > meanings and represent tacit understandings about how members are to > behave > > and interact within a culture. We share understandings of which embodied > > actions are expected in a situation by other social actors within that > > cultural context. These interactions can play out in routines that often > > require little talk but produce automatic response--handing a cashier a > > credit card and receiving the card back with a product and receipt. > > The physical > > action of handing is situated activity in a cultural context--a context > > that includes the immediate language and materials as well as histories > of > > prior conversations, practices, etc. > > Language is one means through which a physical mediated action is > > categorized as a particular social practice and as a valued way of > > participating within a particular nexus of practice, which includes not > > only the practice of handing but a mesh of social practices that are also > > expected within that context, including expectations for who should hand > an > > object and how others should respond. > > Karen > > > > On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 3:24 AM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > >> I have a bunch of rather silly questions, and then a comment about the > >> interpretation of the data. > >> > >> p. 280: Why do we assume that nonverbal handing money to a cashier or > >> handing a birthday present to a friend is an unspoken agreement? It is > >> certainly true that the nonverbal component of the interaction may be > >> abstracted away from it. But there are actually very few nonverbal > >> handings, of either money or birthday presents, that would have the > >> same meaning. Isn't it more useful to consider that speech can play > >> varying degrees of importance in an interactioni (e.g. it can be > >> "ancillary" where the commodity being exchanged is goods or services > >> and it is essential when, as is normally the case in both handing > >> money to a cashier and handing a birthday present to a friend, > >> information is exchanged as well? > >> > >> p. 283: Puppets are unusual in that, unlike socks, they necessarily > >> have symbolic meaning (that is, a sock puppet that is not a symbol for > >> some imaginary character is a sock and not a puppet). Was there any > >> character that went with the sock puppets? Was there any story that > >> went with the character? If so, where did the story come from, and was > >> there any jockeying for control over the story? Note the titillating > >> potential of characters that "light up" when they touch! Did this > >> create any visible titillation for embarrassment? > >> > >> p. 283: I can sort of follow why stitching, knotting, and threading > >> might be gendered (a kind of washback from the world of work, I > >> suppose). Why gluing? > >> > >> p. 289: Why does Amber refer to Antoine as "Nicholas"? > >> > >> p. 293: The first sentence of the section "Hands-On Materials as > >> Gendered Access" refers to "two focal girls". Is this a mistake, or am > >> I missing somebody? > >> > >> And my comment. It seems to me that a lot of studies (not this one in > >> particular but many studies of this type in general) tend to view > >> gendered access as a matter of gendered access to property or power or > >> both. But this is very often an adult view; we adults are obsessed > >> with power and property and we assume that it is only right that > >> children are. Isn't it possible that to the children what is really > >> gendered is access to aesthetic concepts versus access to technical > >> expertise? Both orientations address the tension between form and > >> material, but they address it from very different sides and are > >> ultimately indispensible to each other (which is notoriously not the > >> case with disputes over property and power). Note, however, that when > >> the teacher says that it is decorating that is the fun part, the > >> teacher is biasing the children towards the aesthetic and away from > >> the technical!) > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > >> On 24 October 2014 07:07, mike cole wrote: > >> > Aha! Thanks! > >> > > >> > So artificial literacies refers to the mediation of reading/writing > by a > >> > variety of artifacts! Ok, that I can make sense of. And thanks for the > >> RRQ > >> > ref on sedimented identities. This phrase is used in discussion of > text > >> > production. For those ignorant like myself, here is the summary > provided > >> by > >> > the authors, which also makes the point of their text (and the present > >> > one!) cleared: > >> > > >> > *THE COMMENTARY argues for an understanding of how texts are put > together > >> > that accounts for multimodality and draws on children?s ways of being > and > >> > doing in the home, their habitus. It focuses on identities as socially > >> > situated. It argues that it is important to trace the process of > >> > sedimenting identities during text production. This offers a way of > >> viewing > >> > text production that can inform research into children?s text making. > >> > Particular attention is paid to the producer, contexts, and practices > >> used > >> > during text production and how the text becomes an artifact that holds > >> > important information about the meaning maker. Four case studies > describe > >> > sedimented identities as a lens through which to see a more nuanced > >> > perspective on meaning making. This work offers a lens for research > and > >> > practice in that it enables researchers to question and interrogate > the > >> way > >> > texts come into being.* > >> > > >> > > >> > mike > >> > > >> > On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 10:35 AM, Karen Wohlwend > >> wrote: > >> > > >> >> Certainly-- Rowsell and Pahl take an ethnographic approach to track > the > >> >> practices and user identities involved in the production and previous > >> uses > >> >> of an artifact. > >> >> > >> >> Rowsell, J., & Pahl, K. (2007). Sedimented identities in texts: > >> Instances > >> >> of practice. Reading Research Quarterly, 42(3), 388-404. > >> >> > >> >> Pahl, K., & Rowsell, J. (2010). Artifactual literacies: Every object > >> tells > >> >> a story. New York: Teachers College Press. > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 12:56 PM, mike cole wrote: > >> >> > >> >> > Karen--- I am familiar of course with the notion of artifacts, but > I > >> am > >> >> not > >> >> > familiar with > >> >> > Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and artifactual > literacies. > >> >> Could > >> >> > you provide a link or a reference? The phrase has me wondering > what a > >> >> > non-artifactual literacy would be. > >> >> > mike > >> >> > > >> >> > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:03 PM, Karen Wohlwend < > kwohlwen@gmail.com> > >> >> > wrote: > >> >> > > >> >> > > Andy, thanks for these generative questions and comments! I'll > >> defer to > >> >> > my > >> >> > > co-authors to situate the focal case in the larger study but I'll > >> >> address > >> >> > > how we are considering relationships among gender, practices, and > >> >> tools. > >> >> > > > >> >> > > We're conceptualizing tools as anchoring artifacts, that > concretize > >> and > >> >> > > suggest particular uses and users accrued from cultural > histories > >> of > >> >> > > access and use (following Holland and Cole's cultural artifacts, > and > >> >> more > >> >> > > recently, Rowsell and Pahl's sedimented identities and > artifactual > >> >> > > literacies). Tools index shared histories of use, values, and > >> >> > expectations > >> >> > > for who *should *be a user and for how practices *should *be > >> conducted, > >> >> > > practices which following Paechter are situated in communities of > >> >> > gendered > >> >> > > practice that are multiple, local, and embodied. > >> >> > > > >> >> > > However, we would not say that a tool is gendered in any fixed or > >> >> > > deterministic way. In any given moment of activity, tools signal > >> >> multiple > >> >> > > histories in many nexus of practice (following Ron Scollon, the > >> tacit > >> >> > > shared practices that members of a community expect of one > another) > >> >> that > >> >> > > lead up to, enter in, and flow from that moment, in > contradictory, > >> >> > > confounding, and complementary ways, hence the ambiguity you've > >> >> > mentioned. > >> >> > > How/whether social actors make use of particular histories in a > >> >> specific > >> >> > > context realizes foregrounds some histories while backgrounding > >> >> others-- > >> >> > in > >> >> > > ways that can reproduce, contest, or blur prevailing expectations > >> for > >> >> > > participation. In our analysis, we looked closely at the mediated > >> >> actions > >> >> > > in the handling of tools in the one nexus to understand in a very > >> >> > concrete > >> >> > > way how girls were able to gain and maintain control over > >> >> > > projects--contrary to histories and expectations for high levels > of > >> >> tool > >> >> > > handling, participation, and trajectories of expertise for boys > in > >> >> > > electronics activity. > >> >> > > > >> >> > > Looking closely at the mediated action in this transformative > moment > >> >> > > reveals how changing the electronics tools from wires to needle > and > >> >> > thread > >> >> > > changes the nexus, activating a powerful perception/expectation > for > >> >> girls > >> >> > > as appropriate tool users by signalling histories of sewing > >> practices > >> >> and > >> >> > > feminine communities of practice. > >> >> > > > >> >> > > In regard to other situations, looking closely at mediated > actions, > >> >> > > material artifacts, and tacit expectations for participation in > the > >> >> > > relevant nexus of practice will likely also reveal how materials > >> relate > >> >> > to > >> >> > > stereotypical expectations, pointing to places ripe for rupture > >> where > >> >> > > changing something small in the local activity (e.g., an action, > a > >> >> tool, > >> >> > a > >> >> > > material) in dominant nexus of practice can signal a different > kind > >> of > >> >> > user > >> >> > > and potentially disrupt persistent and naturalized stereotypes. > >> >> > > > >> >> > > Looking forward to continuing the conversation, > >> >> > > Karen > >> >> > > > >> >> > > > >> >> > > On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:08 AM, Andy Blunden > > >> >> wrote: > >> >> > > > >> >> > > > Kylie & co., > >> >> > > > A fascinating study around a truly ingenious approach to the > >> gendered > >> >> > > > division of labour - giving school kids E-textiles to > construct an > >> >> > > > electronic device - total mixing up and confounding the gender > >> >> > > stereotypes > >> >> > > > about sewing and electronics, etc. > >> >> > > > > >> >> > > > Some of the results were quite startling. That the young boy > >> should > >> >> not > >> >> > > > just abstain and demonstratively not pay attention, but pay > active > >> >> and > >> >> > > > supportive attention to the girl making the circuit with her > >> >> > > > needle-and-thread - an admired female-typical stance one would > >> have > >> >> > > thought > >> >> > > > a young male incapable of adopting with a female workmate. And > >> that > >> >> the > >> >> > > > gender-inscription of the sewing tools over-rode the greater > >> >> experience > >> >> > > > that in this case the young boy had in using them, with the boy > >> >> > deferring > >> >> > > > to the less experienced girl in recognition of the > >> >> > gender-appropriateness > >> >> > > > of her "taking charge" with the needle-and-thread. This does > cause > >> >> one > >> >> > to > >> >> > > > think a little deeper into how we might conceptualise such > >> gendered > >> >> > > > behaviours. > >> >> > > > > >> >> > > > As you would know, MCA has a strong preference for qualitative > >> >> > research, > >> >> > > > and studies with small sample sizes are not generally a > problem, > >> but > >> >> so > >> >> > > > much seemed to hinge on the study of just *one* boy-girl team, > >> that I > >> >> > am > >> >> > > > concerned about the capacity to generalise from such a base. > There > >> >> were > >> >> > > > about 80 youth in the activity as a whole, so I can only hope > and > >> >> > presume > >> >> > > > that observation of the other 78 kids in some way guided the > work > >> >> > focused > >> >> > > > on just 2. > >> >> > > > > >> >> > > > I must say, the analysis of the video data is very > sophisticated > >> and > >> >> > > > productive and you are to be congratulated on this aspect of > the > >> >> work. > >> >> > I > >> >> > > > see that you approach the gendering of the activities through > the > >> >> idea > >> >> > of > >> >> > > > the various *tools* being gendered, rather than the *practices* > >> >> > > themselves. > >> >> > > > This is something that was really necessary for you to be able > to > >> >> make > >> >> > > > these observations, because the gendering of the activities is > >> >> > ambiguous, > >> >> > > > but not it seems the gendering of the tools. Is this a result > of > >> the > >> >> > > study, > >> >> > > > or is it something you already knew or did you arrive at this > by > >> >> logic? > >> >> > > > > >> >> > > > Do you see any other opportunities for confounding gender > >> stereotypes > >> >> > in > >> >> > > > this way? > >> >> > > > > >> >> > > > And finally, does the experience of working in ambiguous, even > >> >> inverted > >> >> > > > gender-stereotyped activities like these have any outcome which > >> >> carries > >> >> > > > over into a world where the gender division of labour lacks > >> >> ambiguity? > >> >> > > > > >> >> > > > Andy > >> >> > > > > >> >> > > > > >> >> > > > > >> >> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> >> > > > *Andy Blunden* > >> >> > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> >> > > > > >> >> > > > > >> >> > > > Kylie Peppler wrote: > >> >> > > > > >> >> > > >> Thanks Andy! We're excited to discuss with the community and > >> would > >> >> > > >> welcome any comments/questions on this emerging line of > research! > >> >> > > >> Kylie > >> >> > > >> > >> >> > > >> --- > >> >> > > >> Kylie A. Peppler > >> >> > > >> Assistant Professor of Learning Sciences > >> >> > > >> Indiana University | School of Education > >> >> > > >> 1900 E 10th Street | Eigenmann 528 | Bloomington | IN | 47406 > | > >> >> > > >> 812.856.8381 > >> >> > > >> > >> >> > > >> > >> >> > > >> On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 10:52 PM, Andy Blunden < > >> ablunden@mira.net > >> >> > > >> > wrote: > >> >> > > >> > >> >> > > >> Here's the article for discussion Artin is introducing: > >> >> > > >> *Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting and > >> >> Electronics > >> >> > > >> Practices* > >> >> > > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen > >> Wohlwend. > >> >> > > >> Indiana University. > >> >> > > >> > >> >> > > >> The Maker movement promotes hands-on making, including > >> >> crafts, > >> >> > > >> robotics, and computing. The movement?s potential to > >> >> transform > >> >> > > >> education rests in our ability to address notable > gender > >> >> > > >> disparities, particularly in science, technology, > >> >> engineering, > >> >> > > and > >> >> > > >> mathematics fields. E-textiles - the first > >> female-dominated > >> >> > > >> computing community - provide inspiration for > overcoming > >> >> > > >> long-standing cultural divides in classrooms. Analysis > of > >> >> > > >> children?s > >> >> > > >> use of e-textiles reveals that materials like needles, > >> >> fabric, > >> >> > > and > >> >> > > >> conductive thread rupture traditional gender scripts > >> around > >> >> > > >> electronics and implicitly gives girls hands-on access > and > >> >> > > >> leadership roles. This reconceptualization of cultural > >> >> divides > >> >> > as > >> >> > > >> sets of tacitly accepted practices rooted in gendered > >> >> histories > >> >> > > has > >> >> > > >> implications for reconceptualizing traditionally > >> >> male-dominated > >> >> > > >> areas of schooling. > >> >> > > >> > >> >> > > >> Andy > >> >> > > >> (attached) > >> >> > > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------ > >> >> > > >> ------------ > >> >> > > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> >> > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> >> > > >> > >> >> > > >> > >> >> > > >> > >> >> > > >> Goncu, Artin wrote: > >> >> > > >> > >> >> > > >> Dear All, > >> >> > > >> > >> >> > > >> We are writing to let you know that the most recent > >> issue of > >> >> > > >> MCA is out. > >> >> > > >> One of the articles published in this issue and being > >> >> > > >> introduced here for > >> >> > > >> discussion in referenced below. The authors of the > >> article > >> >> > > >> have kindly > >> >> > > >> agreed to lead the discussion, and they are on xmca > with > >> us > >> >> > > >> now. The free > >> >> > > >> access to the article is possible through the links > >> below. > >> >> We > >> >> > > >> are looking > >> >> > > >> forward to hearing from you all. Best, ag > >> >> > > >> > >> >> > > >> Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting > >> >> > > >> and Electronics Practices > >> >> > > >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen > >> >> Wohlwend > >> >> > > >> > >> >> > > >> www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762 > >> >> > > >> < > http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762 > >> > > >> >> > > >> > >> >> > > >> > http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749039.2014 > >> . > >> >> > > >> 939762#.VEZ25Ra_4wI > >> >> > > >> > >> >> > > >> Artin Goncu, Ph.D > >> >> > > >> Co-editor, Mind, Culture, and Activity:An > International > >> >> > Journal > >> >> > > >> Professor Emeritus, > >> >> > > >> University of Illinois at Chicago > >> >> > > >> College of Education M/C 147 > >> >> > > >> 1040 W. Harrison St. > >> >> > > >> Chicago, IL 60607 > >> >> > > >> > >> >> > > >> > >> >> > > >> > >> >> > > >> > >> >> > > >> > >> >> > > >> > >> >> > > > > >> >> > > > >> >> > > > >> >> > > -- > >> >> > > Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor > >> >> > > Literacy, Culture, & Language Education > >> >> > > Indiana University > >> >> > > 201 N. Rose Avenue > >> >> > > Bloomington, IN 47405 > >> >> > > Office: 812-856-8275 > >> >> > > Fax: 812-856-8287 > >> >> > > kwohlwen@indiana.edu > >> >> > > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > -- > >> >> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with an > >> >> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> >> > > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> -- > >> >> Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor > >> >> Literacy, Culture, & Language Education > >> >> Indiana University > >> >> 201 N. Rose Avenue > >> >> Bloomington, IN 47405 > >> >> Office: 812-856-8275 > >> >> Fax: 812-856-8287 > >> >> kwohlwen@indiana.edu > >> >> > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > -- > >> > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >> > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor > > Literacy, Culture, & Language Education > > Indiana University > > 201 N. Rose Avenue > > Bloomington, IN 47405 > > Office: 812-856-8275 > > Fax: 812-856-8287 > > kwohlwen@indiana.edu > > -- Karen Wohlwend, Associate Professor Literacy, Culture, & Language Education Indiana University 201 N. Rose Avenue Bloomington, IN 47405 Office: 812-856-8275 Fax: 812-856-8287 kwohlwen@indiana.edu From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Oct 27 20:06:20 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 03:06:20 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [A person's relation to the environment is intellectual] Message-ID: <1414465579714.39679@unm.edu> Hi Andy (and others), This post is in relation to the first one labeled [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] and informed by Andy's paper "The Problem of the Environment: In Defence of Vygotsky." I'll continue with the second charge of Leontiev regarding the environment, as indicated in your Defense of Vygotsky paper (hosted on your page on academia.edu, for anyone late to the discussion). #2) The charge of Leontiev (Ad. 5): "Vygotsky takes relation of the person to their environment to be an intellectual relation." It is difficult to understand how sense and meaning as represented in perezhivanie could be taken as intellectual, especially when considering infants, to which the same theory applies (concerning environment and its impact upon the child). I agree with you (and Vygotsky) 100% "The relation in question is always an age-specific relation, and not an intellectual relation." However the theory is not Piagetian (sp?), made of stairsteps, but a _unifying_ theory. Infants clearly do not possess intellects, or do they? As feeling masses, bundles of joy, and other emotions, infants take in all their perceptions based upon their capacity of understanding (and is at the same time dependent upon their forming brains and bodies) and all this input stimulates and internalizes and eventually creates what will become a child and eventually an adult. Everything is in motion. Thought as reflected by infants is very affect laden. Even single words are bursting with emotion and sense as reflected back by the environment in which the child interacts. These don't seem "intellectual." But then Andy, you had said previously that intellect is not devoid of affect in this definition. So I suppose the question that falls out for me is: where is the snag of misunderstanding? We might say it is "political expediency" generated (historical) or it is cognitively generated (theoretical). Now in Leontiev's case we can say it can be a little of both. However in Bozhovich's case, it must be theoretical, so I am comparing that, or better, I am suggesting a comparison of that. Again I suppose to be more obvious, *I'm curious to understand where the disconnect happens and why.* Is it the way "intellectual" is translated/interpreted? Must we be careful about defining this word and how Vygotsky. or rather, Leontiev used it? Or does it have to do with projecting words that pertain to _states of completed development_ and misusing them to describe _developmental events_? If that is the case, the trap here is that we cannot use the naming of what is already developed to name and define what is still developing. An acorn is not a tree; there are no branches in an acorn, so in terms of an acorn it makes no sense to talk about branches inside the acorn. Yet at the same time, it seems LSV is saying the final form determines development. So I wonder if there is a language-to-concept correspondence snafu here too, not just using a "wrong" word. I hope I made that understandable, I can't say if it is sensible, however! :) Kind regards, Annalisa From ablunden@mira.net Mon Oct 27 20:32:48 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 14:32:48 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [A person's relation to the environment is intellectual] In-Reply-To: <1414465579714.39679@unm.edu> References: <1414465579714.39679@unm.edu> Message-ID: <544F0E60.3050509@mira.net> Yes, Annalisa, it is that ANL is accusing LSV of finding branches in the acorn, to use your metaphor, based on what I think may be a deliberate misunderstanding of how LSV represents the specificity of the relation of the child to the environment. Tatania Akhutina, a Russian supporter of Vygotsky, pointed me to the entry for "perezhivanie" in the Bolshoi Dictionary of Psychology, which I translate as follows: "From the point of view of Vygotsky's theory, perezhivanie can be approached like any other mental function that develops in the ontogenesis of involuntary and immediate forms to higher forms, having the status of actions or the activities. This approach opens up possibilities to distinguish between several genetic forms of perezhivanie, as well as to search for cultural-historical means of mastering perezhivanie.? So the kind of perezhivanie will develop as the child develops. If I understand Vygotsky correctly, it is between the ages of 3-7 (in his experience) that the intellect develops. Perception of the environment mediated by signs does not in any way suggest the absence of affective content in those signs however, Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Andy (and others), > > > This post is in relation to the first one labeled [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] and informed by Andy's paper "The Problem of the Environment: In Defence of Vygotsky." > > > I'll continue with the second charge of Leontiev regarding the environment, as indicated in your Defense of Vygotsky paper (hosted on your page on academia.edu, for anyone late to the discussion). > > > #2) The charge of Leontiev (Ad. 5): "Vygotsky takes relation of the person to their environment to be an intellectual relation." > > > It is difficult to understand how sense and meaning as represented in perezhivanie could be taken as intellectual, especially when considering infants, to which the same theory applies (concerning environment and its impact upon the child). > > > I agree with you (and Vygotsky) 100% "The relation in question is always an age-specific relation, and not an intellectual relation." However the theory is not Piagetian (sp?), made of stairsteps, but a _unifying_ theory. > > > Infants clearly do not possess intellects, or do they? As feeling masses, bundles of joy, and other emotions, infants take in all their perceptions based upon their capacity of understanding (and is at the same time dependent upon their forming brains and bodies) and all this input stimulates and internalizes and eventually creates what will become a child and eventually an adult. Everything is in motion. Thought as reflected by infants is very affect laden. Even single words are bursting with emotion and sense as reflected back by the environment in which the child interacts. These don't seem "intellectual." > > > But then Andy, you had said previously that intellect is not devoid of affect in this definition. > > > So I suppose the question that falls out for me is: where is the snag of misunderstanding? > > > We might say it is "political expediency" generated (historical) or it is cognitively generated (theoretical). Now in Leontiev's case we can say it can be a little of both. However in Bozhovich's case, it must be theoretical, so I am comparing that, or better, I am suggesting a comparison of that. > > > Again I suppose to be more obvious, *I'm curious to understand where the disconnect happens and why.* > > > Is it the way "intellectual" is translated/interpreted? Must we be careful about defining this word and how Vygotsky. or rather, Leontiev used it? > > > Or does it have to do with projecting words that pertain to _states of completed development_ and misusing them to describe _developmental events_? If that is the case, the trap here is that we cannot use the naming of what is already developed to name and define what is still developing. > > > An acorn is not a tree; there are no branches in an acorn, so in terms of an acorn it makes no sense to talk about branches inside the acorn. > > > Yet at the same time, it seems LSV is saying the final form determines development. So I wonder if there is a language-to-concept correspondence snafu here too, not just using a "wrong" word. > > > I hope I made that understandable, I can't say if it is sensible, however! :) > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Oct 27 21:04:24 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 04:04:24 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [A person's relation to the environment is intellectual] In-Reply-To: <544F0E60.3050509@mira.net> References: <1414465579714.39679@unm.edu>,<544F0E60.3050509@mira.net> Message-ID: <1414469063714.50530@unm.edu> Hi Andy! I'm pleased the metaphor communicates. I love it when that happens! The dictionary definition is intriguing, however I detect one sticking point and that is the part that says: "...having the status of actions or the activities..." That seems a gotcha to me. Is this a Leontiev artifact? What does having a status of actions or activities _mean_? This appears to be a distortion of the original definition and sounds almost behaviorist, as if one detects a single perezhivanie from an activity. Is this to remove subjectivity? I don't think the eldest child's perezhivanie from suffering an alcoholic mother is equaled to his actions. If anything, perezhivanie stands on its own, activities can flow from it, but I don't see perezhivanie as having the status of activities. The rest I do not have issue with as a definition. So much for arguing with Russian dictionaries! :) But please, before muddying the already muddy puddle, what about the question I first asked. Where is the snag of understanding? Yes, the intellect as you say is not devoid of affect. Got that part. But why the charge of a relation to the environment as intellectual? Where does this _come from_? I tried my best to speculate about that. I'd like some clarification only to tease away the where is the confusion, whether created intentionally or not, where does it happen and why? Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 9:32 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [A person's relation to the environment is intellectual] Yes, Annalisa, it is that ANL is accusing LSV of finding branches in the acorn, to use your metaphor, based on what I think may be a deliberate misunderstanding of how LSV represents the specificity of the relation of the child to the environment. Tatania Akhutina, a Russian supporter of Vygotsky, pointed me to the entry for "perezhivanie" in the Bolshoi Dictionary of Psychology, which I translate as follows: "From the point of view of Vygotsky's theory, perezhivanie can be approached like any other mental function that develops in the ontogenesis of involuntary and immediate forms to higher forms, having the status of actions or the activities. This approach opens up possibilities to distinguish between several genetic forms of perezhivanie, as well as to search for cultural-historical means of mastering perezhivanie.? So the kind of perezhivanie will develop as the child develops. If I understand Vygotsky correctly, it is between the ages of 3-7 (in his experience) that the intellect develops. Perception of the environment mediated by signs does not in any way suggest the absence of affective content in those signs however, Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Andy (and others), > > > This post is in relation to the first one labeled [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] and informed by Andy's paper "The Problem of the Environment: In Defence of Vygotsky." > > > I'll continue with the second charge of Leontiev regarding the environment, as indicated in your Defense of Vygotsky paper (hosted on your page on academia.edu, for anyone late to the discussion). > > > #2) The charge of Leontiev (Ad. 5): "Vygotsky takes relation of the person to their environment to be an intellectual relation." > > > It is difficult to understand how sense and meaning as represented in perezhivanie could be taken as intellectual, especially when considering infants, to which the same theory applies (concerning environment and its impact upon the child). > > > I agree with you (and Vygotsky) 100% "The relation in question is always an age-specific relation, and not an intellectual relation." However the theory is not Piagetian (sp?), made of stairsteps, but a _unifying_ theory. > > > Infants clearly do not possess intellects, or do they? As feeling masses, bundles of joy, and other emotions, infants take in all their perceptions based upon their capacity of understanding (and is at the same time dependent upon their forming brains and bodies) and all this input stimulates and internalizes and eventually creates what will become a child and eventually an adult. Everything is in motion. Thought as reflected by infants is very affect laden. Even single words are bursting with emotion and sense as reflected back by the environment in which the child interacts. These don't seem "intellectual." > > > But then Andy, you had said previously that intellect is not devoid of affect in this definition. > > > So I suppose the question that falls out for me is: where is the snag of misunderstanding? > > > We might say it is "political expediency" generated (historical) or it is cognitively generated (theoretical). Now in Leontiev's case we can say it can be a little of both. However in Bozhovich's case, it must be theoretical, so I am comparing that, or better, I am suggesting a comparison of that. > > > Again I suppose to be more obvious, *I'm curious to understand where the disconnect happens and why.* > > > Is it the way "intellectual" is translated/interpreted? Must we be careful about defining this word and how Vygotsky. or rather, Leontiev used it? > > > Or does it have to do with projecting words that pertain to _states of completed development_ and misusing them to describe _developmental events_? If that is the case, the trap here is that we cannot use the naming of what is already developed to name and define what is still developing. > > > An acorn is not a tree; there are no branches in an acorn, so in terms of an acorn it makes no sense to talk about branches inside the acorn. > > > Yet at the same time, it seems LSV is saying the final form determines development. So I wonder if there is a language-to-concept correspondence snafu here too, not just using a "wrong" word. > > > I hope I made that understandable, I can't say if it is sensible, however! :) > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Oct 27 21:27:52 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 15:27:52 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [A person's relation to the environment is intellectual] In-Reply-To: <1414469063714.50530@unm.edu> References: <1414465579714.39679@unm.edu>, <544F0E60.3050509@mira.net> <1414469063714.50530@unm.edu> Message-ID: <544F1B48.8050409@mira.net> (1) What does the Dictionary mean by a "mental function" such as a perezhivanie "having the status of actions or activities"? This is the nub of Marxist psychology, Annalisa. We don't think one has a psychological state/function (eg perezhivanie) and then as a result, you do something. The unit of analysis is an artefact mediated action; not a mental state or a thought. Consciousness is a part, or an aspect, of actions, of doings, which we 21st century theoreticians abstract from the whole which is actions and activities. Experiencing is doing. Seeing is doing. (2) Vygotsky says: "the child understands what is going on and its true significance, he will react to it in a different way than another child who fails to understand it." ANL interprets "understanding" and "understanding the significance" as essentially actions requiring an intellect. That was the point of my quote from the Dictionary. It's an acorn of course, not an oak tree. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Andy! > > I'm pleased the metaphor communicates. I love it when that happens! > > The dictionary definition is intriguing, however I detect one sticking point and that is the part that says: > > "...having the status of actions or activities..." > > That seems a gotcha to me. Is this a Leontiev artifact? What does having a status of actions or activities _mean_? This appears to be a distortion of the original definition and sounds almost behaviorist, as if one detects a single perezhivanie from an activity. Is this to remove subjectivity? > > I don't think the eldest child's perezhivanie from suffering an alcoholic mother is equaled to his actions. If anything, perezhivanie stands on its own, activities can flow from it, but I don't see perezhivanie as having the status of activities. > > The rest I do not have issue with as a definition. So much for arguing with Russian dictionaries! :) > > But please, before muddying the already muddy puddle, what about the question I first asked. Where is the snag of understanding? > > Yes, the intellect as you say is not devoid of affect. Got that part. But why the charge of a relation to the environment as intellectual? > > Where does this _come from_? > > I tried my best to speculate about that. I'd like some clarification only to tease away the where is the confusion, whether created intentionally or not, where does it happen and why? > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 9:32 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [A person's relation to the environment is intellectual] > > Yes, Annalisa, it is that ANL is accusing LSV of finding branches in the > acorn, to use your metaphor, based on what I think may be a deliberate > misunderstanding of how LSV represents the specificity of the relation > of the child to the environment. > Tatania Akhutina, a Russian supporter of Vygotsky, pointed me to the > entry for "perezhivanie" in the Bolshoi Dictionary of Psychology, which > I translate as follows: "From the point of view of Vygotsky's theory, > perezhivanie can be approached like any other mental function that > develops in the ontogenesis of involuntary and immediate forms to higher > forms, having the status of actions or activities. This approach > opens up possibilities to distinguish between several genetic forms of > perezhivanie, as well as to search for cultural-historical means of > mastering perezhivanie.? > So the kind of perezhivanie will develop as the child develops. > If I understand Vygotsky correctly, it is between the ages of 3-7 (in > his experience) that the intellect develops. Perception of the > environment mediated by signs does not in any way suggest the absence of > affective content in those signs however, > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Hi Andy (and others), >> >> >> This post is in relation to the first one labeled [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] and informed by Andy's paper "The Problem of the Environment: In Defence of Vygotsky." >> >> >> I'll continue with the second charge of Leontiev regarding the environment, as indicated in your Defense of Vygotsky paper (hosted on your page on academia.edu, for anyone late to the discussion). >> >> >> #2) The charge of Leontiev (Ad. 5): "Vygotsky takes relation of the person to their environment to be an intellectual relation." >> >> >> It is difficult to understand how sense and meaning as represented in perezhivanie could be taken as intellectual, especially when considering infants, to which the same theory applies (concerning environment and its impact upon the child). >> >> >> I agree with you (and Vygotsky) 100% "The relation in question is always an age-specific relation, and not an intellectual relation." However the theory is not Piagetian (sp?), made of stairsteps, but a _unifying_ theory. >> >> >> Infants clearly do not possess intellects, or do they? As feeling masses, bundles of joy, and other emotions, infants take in all their perceptions based upon their capacity of understanding (and is at the same time dependent upon their forming brains and bodies) and all this input stimulates and internalizes and eventually creates what will become a child and eventually an adult. Everything is in motion. Thought as reflected by infants is very affect laden. Even single words are bursting with emotion and sense as reflected back by the environment in which the child interacts. These don't seem "intellectual." >> >> >> But then Andy, you had said previously that intellect is not devoid of affect in this definition. >> >> >> So I suppose the question that falls out for me is: where is the snag of misunderstanding? >> >> >> We might say it is "political expediency" generated (historical) or it is cognitively generated (theoretical). Now in Leontiev's case we can say it can be a little of both. However in Bozhovich's case, it must be theoretical, so I am comparing that, or better, I am suggesting a comparison of that. >> >> >> Again I suppose to be more obvious, *I'm curious to understand where the disconnect happens and why.* >> >> >> Is it the way "intellectual" is translated/interpreted? Must we be careful about defining this word and how Vygotsky. or rather, Leontiev used it? >> >> >> Or does it have to do with projecting words that pertain to _states of completed development_ and misusing them to describe _developmental events_? If that is the case, the trap here is that we cannot use the naming of what is already developed to name and define what is still developing. >> >> >> An acorn is not a tree; there are no branches in an acorn, so in terms of an acorn it makes no sense to talk about branches inside the acorn. >> >> >> Yet at the same time, it seems LSV is saying the final form determines development. So I wonder if there is a language-to-concept correspondence snafu here too, not just using a "wrong" word. >> >> >> I hope I made that understandable, I can't say if it is sensible, however! :) >> >> >> Kind regards, >> >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Oct 27 22:34:13 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 05:34:13 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [A person's relation to the environment is intellectual] In-Reply-To: <544F1B48.8050409@mira.net> References: <1414465579714.39679@unm.edu>, <544F0E60.3050509@mira.net> <1414469063714.50530@unm.edu>,<544F1B48.8050409@mira.net> Message-ID: <1414474452674.62014@unm.edu> Hi, I'm a bit thrown by the line of reasoning here. Consequently, I appeal for some help. in reference to #1) I don't see how a relationship of the child to the environment *is* a mental function. This means that the perezhivanie is located "in" the person. That doesn't seem right to me. Yes it is subjective, but it depends upon what is apparent to the child *in the environment*. If it is something like a perception, which I take to be a mental function (and an embodied one, combined), then perezhivanie could be called it a perception, but LSV didn't call it that. I also don't understand an activity to be a mental function either. So I have to say the phrase about activity within the definition doesn't make sense to me. I didn't suppose that we have a perezhivanie and then do something. So let's not argue about something I didn't say. I said activities *can* flow from perezhivanie. But activities can flow from many things, either consciously or unconsciously. Perezhivanie is emotional and cognitive (a word I prefer over "intellect" or "intellectual") but I don't see that as equal to activity. I could have a perezhivanie and do nothing, just ask a philosopher. :) I do not see experiencing as doing. Everything we do is in experience, but everything we experience is not doing. If you can tell me what you can do without experiencing it, let me know. :) Consider the experience of love, or fear. What is the activity of being? There is no activity inherently within these experiences. Or how about an experience of memory. Having an attachment to a preference is an experience, a very subjective one, but that can be experienced without doing anything. Activity (as I define it) is a semi-conscious endeavor by an agent with an objective for an outcome. It is hard for me to conceive of an unconscious activity. Maybe sleep, but that doesn't seem correct. Just because we use verbs to describe these experiences doesn't make them activities. I'm really not clear about why you introduced the dictionary entry, honestly. How is that an acorn? in reference to #2) This answers my question! ANL did not understand how LSV meant "understand." or "understanding the significance"! OK, now I understand the snag. I did miss this part. So thanks for hitting me over the head with it. Though I'm not understanding why the dictionary entry. Some reference must have passed me by. When I return to the LSV quote in #2 and then I consider where does "understanding" happen, I don't think it happens as a mental function in the way a perception does. Understanding is a distributed event. A mental function is a part of it, but it is not the entirety of understanding. It depends upon the child, but also the environment. This is why I find perezhivanie to be similar to an affordance. Et VOILA! I have opened a can of worms... I'll venture. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 10:27 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [A person's relation to the environment is intellectual] (1) What does the Dictionary mean by a "mental function" such as a perezhivanie "having the status of actions or activities"? This is the nub of Marxist psychology, Annalisa. We don't think one has a psychological state/function (eg perezhivanie) and then as a result, you do something. The unit of analysis is an artefact mediated action; not a mental state or a thought. Consciousness is a part, or an aspect, of actions, of doings, which we 21st century theoreticians abstract from the whole which is actions and activities. Experiencing is doing. Seeing is doing. (2) Vygotsky says: "the child understands what is going on and its true significance, he will react to it in a different way than another child who fails to understand it." ANL interprets "understanding" and "understanding the significance" as essentially actions requiring an intellect. That was the point of my quote from the Dictionary. It's an acorn of course, not an oak tree. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Andy! > > I'm pleased the metaphor communicates. I love it when that happens! > > The dictionary definition is intriguing, however I detect one sticking point and that is the part that says: > > "...having the status of actions or activities..." > > That seems a gotcha to me. Is this a Leontiev artifact? What does having a status of actions or activities _mean_? This appears to be a distortion of the original definition and sounds almost behaviorist, as if one detects a single perezhivanie from an activity. Is this to remove subjectivity? > > I don't think the eldest child's perezhivanie from suffering an alcoholic mother is equaled to his actions. If anything, perezhivanie stands on its own, activities can flow from it, but I don't see perezhivanie as having the status of activities. > > The rest I do not have issue with as a definition. So much for arguing with Russian dictionaries! :) > > But please, before muddying the already muddy puddle, what about the question I first asked. Where is the snag of understanding? > > Yes, the intellect as you say is not devoid of affect. Got that part. But why the charge of a relation to the environment as intellectual? > > Where does this _come from_? > > I tried my best to speculate about that. I'd like some clarification only to tease away the where is the confusion, whether created intentionally or not, where does it happen and why? > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 9:32 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [A person's relation to the environment is intellectual] > > Yes, Annalisa, it is that ANL is accusing LSV of finding branches in the > acorn, to use your metaphor, based on what I think may be a deliberate > misunderstanding of how LSV represents the specificity of the relation > of the child to the environment. > Tatania Akhutina, a Russian supporter of Vygotsky, pointed me to the > entry for "perezhivanie" in the Bolshoi Dictionary of Psychology, which > I translate as follows: "From the point of view of Vygotsky's theory, > perezhivanie can be approached like any other mental function that > develops in the ontogenesis of involuntary and immediate forms to higher > forms, having the status of actions or activities. This approach > opens up possibilities to distinguish between several genetic forms of > perezhivanie, as well as to search for cultural-historical means of > mastering perezhivanie.? > So the kind of perezhivanie will develop as the child develops. > If I understand Vygotsky correctly, it is between the ages of 3-7 (in > his experience) that the intellect develops. Perception of the > environment mediated by signs does not in any way suggest the absence of > affective content in those signs however, > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Hi Andy (and others), >> >> >> This post is in relation to the first one labeled [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] and informed by Andy's paper "The Problem of the Environment: In Defence of Vygotsky." >> >> >> I'll continue with the second charge of Leontiev regarding the environment, as indicated in your Defense of Vygotsky paper (hosted on your page on academia.edu, for anyone late to the discussion). >> >> >> #2) The charge of Leontiev (Ad. 5): "Vygotsky takes relation of the person to their environment to be an intellectual relation." >> >> >> It is difficult to understand how sense and meaning as represented in perezhivanie could be taken as intellectual, especially when considering infants, to which the same theory applies (concerning environment and its impact upon the child). >> >> >> I agree with you (and Vygotsky) 100% "The relation in question is always an age-specific relation, and not an intellectual relation." However the theory is not Piagetian (sp?), made of stairsteps, but a _unifying_ theory. >> >> >> Infants clearly do not possess intellects, or do they? As feeling masses, bundles of joy, and other emotions, infants take in all their perceptions based upon their capacity of understanding (and is at the same time dependent upon their forming brains and bodies) and all this input stimulates and internalizes and eventually creates what will become a child and eventually an adult. Everything is in motion. Thought as reflected by infants is very affect laden. Even single words are bursting with emotion and sense as reflected back by the environment in which the child interacts. These don't seem "intellectual." >> >> >> But then Andy, you had said previously that intellect is not devoid of affect in this definition. >> >> >> So I suppose the question that falls out for me is: where is the snag of misunderstanding? >> >> >> We might say it is "political expediency" generated (historical) or it is cognitively generated (theoretical). Now in Leontiev's case we can say it can be a little of both. However in Bozhovich's case, it must be theoretical, so I am comparing that, or better, I am suggesting a comparison of that. >> >> >> Again I suppose to be more obvious, *I'm curious to understand where the disconnect happens and why.* >> >> >> Is it the way "intellectual" is translated/interpreted? Must we be careful about defining this word and how Vygotsky. or rather, Leontiev used it? >> >> >> Or does it have to do with projecting words that pertain to _states of completed development_ and misusing them to describe _developmental events_? If that is the case, the trap here is that we cannot use the naming of what is already developed to name and define what is still developing. >> >> >> An acorn is not a tree; there are no branches in an acorn, so in terms of an acorn it makes no sense to talk about branches inside the acorn. >> >> >> Yet at the same time, it seems LSV is saying the final form determines development. So I wonder if there is a language-to-concept correspondence snafu here too, not just using a "wrong" word. >> >> >> I hope I made that understandable, I can't say if it is sensible, however! :) >> >> >> Kind regards, >> >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Oct 27 23:13:46 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 17:13:46 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [A person's relation to the environment is intellectual] In-Reply-To: <1414474452674.62014@unm.edu> References: <1414465579714.39679@unm.edu>, <544F0E60.3050509@mira.net> <1414469063714.50530@unm.edu>, <544F1B48.8050409@mira.net> <1414474452674.62014@unm.edu> Message-ID: <544F341A.9070809@mira.net> Annalisa, I think there is a limit to what can be achieved with back and forth dialogue like this. You have your view about what perezhivanie, experience, activity, mental function, consciousness, ... mean, and I understand something different by any of these terms. In order to progress we need to be talking in the same frame. Can I suggest you start reading your way through Vygotsky? http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/ Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi, > > I'm a bit thrown by the line of reasoning here. Consequently, I appeal for some help. > > in reference to #1) I don't see how a relationship of the child to the environment *is* a mental function. This means that the perezhivanie is located "in" the person. That doesn't seem right to me. Yes it is subjective, but it depends upon what is apparent to the child *in the environment*. If it is something like a perception, which I take to be a mental function (and an embodied one, combined), then perezhivanie could be called it a perception, but LSV didn't call it that. > > I also don't understand an activity to be a mental function either. So I have to say the phrase about activity within the definition doesn't make sense to me. > > I didn't suppose that we have a perezhivanie and then do something. So let's not argue about something I didn't say. I said activities *can* flow from perezhivanie. But activities can flow from many things, either consciously or unconsciously. > > Perezhivanie is emotional and cognitive (a word I prefer over "intellect" or "intellectual") but I don't see that as equal to activity. I could have a perezhivanie and do nothing, just ask a philosopher. :) > > I do not see experiencing as doing. Everything we do is in experience, but everything we experience is not doing. If you can tell me what you can do without experiencing it, let me know. :) > > Consider the experience of love, or fear. What is the activity of being? There is no activity inherently within these experiences. Or how about an experience of memory. Having an attachment to a preference is an experience, a very subjective one, but that can be experienced without doing anything. Activity (as I define it) is a semi-conscious endeavor by an agent with an objective for an outcome. It is hard for me to conceive of an unconscious activity. Maybe sleep, but that doesn't seem correct. Just because we use verbs to describe these experiences doesn't make them activities. > > I'm really not clear about why you introduced the dictionary entry, honestly. How is that an acorn? > > in reference to #2) This answers my question! ANL did not understand how LSV meant "understand." or "understanding the significance"! OK, now I understand the snag. I did miss this part. So thanks for hitting me over the head with it. > > Though I'm not understanding why the dictionary entry. Some reference must have passed me by. > > When I return to the LSV quote in #2 and then I consider where does "understanding" happen, I don't think it happens as a mental function in the way a perception does. Understanding is a distributed event. A mental function is a part of it, but it is not the entirety of understanding. It depends upon the child, but also the environment. > > This is why I find perezhivanie to be similar to an affordance. > > Et VOILA! I have opened a can of worms... I'll venture. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 10:27 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [A person's relation to the environment is intellectual] > > (1) What does the Dictionary mean by a "mental function" such as a > perezhivanie "having the status of actions or activities"? > > This is the nub of Marxist psychology, Annalisa. We don't think one has > a psychological state/function (eg perezhivanie) and then as a result, > you do something. The unit of analysis is an artefact mediated action; > not a mental state or a thought. Consciousness is a part, or an aspect, > of actions, of doings, which we 21st century theoreticians abstract from > the whole which is actions and activities. Experiencing is doing. Seeing > is doing. > > (2) Vygotsky says: "the child understands what is going on and its true > significance, he will react to it in a different way than another child > who fails to understand it." ANL interprets "understanding" and > "understanding the significance" as essentially actions requiring an > intellect. That was the point of my quote from the Dictionary. It's an > acorn of course, not an oak tree. > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Hi Andy! >> >> I'm pleased the metaphor communicates. I love it when that happens! >> >> The dictionary definition is intriguing, however I detect one sticking point and that is the part that says: >> >> "...having the status of actions or activities..." >> >> That seems a gotcha to me. Is this a Leontiev artifact? What does having a status of actions or activities _mean_? This appears to be a distortion of the original definition and sounds almost behaviorist, as if one detects a single perezhivanie from an activity. Is this to remove subjectivity? >> >> I don't think the eldest child's perezhivanie from suffering an alcoholic mother is equaled to his actions. If anything, perezhivanie stands on its own, activities can flow from it, but I don't see perezhivanie as having the status of activities. >> >> The rest I do not have issue with as a definition. So much for arguing with Russian dictionaries! :) >> >> But please, before muddying the already muddy puddle, what about the question I first asked. Where is the snag of understanding? >> >> Yes, the intellect as you say is not devoid of affect. Got that part. But why the charge of a relation to the environment as intellectual? >> >> Where does this _come from_? >> >> I tried my best to speculate about that. I'd like some clarification only to tease away the where is the confusion, whether created intentionally or not, where does it happen and why? >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 9:32 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [A person's relation to the environment is intellectual] >> >> Yes, Annalisa, it is that ANL is accusing LSV of finding branches in the >> acorn, to use your metaphor, based on what I think may be a deliberate >> misunderstanding of how LSV represents the specificity of the relation >> of the child to the environment. >> Tatania Akhutina, a Russian supporter of Vygotsky, pointed me to the >> entry for "perezhivanie" in the Bolshoi Dictionary of Psychology, which >> I translate as follows: "From the point of view of Vygotsky's theory, >> perezhivanie can be approached like any other mental function that >> develops in the ontogenesis of involuntary and immediate forms to higher >> forms, having the status of actions or activities. This approach >> opens up possibilities to distinguish between several genetic forms of >> perezhivanie, as well as to search for cultural-historical means of >> mastering perezhivanie.? >> So the kind of perezhivanie will develop as the child develops. >> If I understand Vygotsky correctly, it is between the ages of 3-7 (in >> his experience) that the intellect develops. Perception of the >> environment mediated by signs does not in any way suggest the absence of >> affective content in those signs however, >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> >>> Hi Andy (and others), >>> >>> >>> This post is in relation to the first one labeled [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] and informed by Andy's paper "The Problem of the Environment: In Defence of Vygotsky." >>> >>> >>> I'll continue with the second charge of Leontiev regarding the environment, as indicated in your Defense of Vygotsky paper (hosted on your page on academia.edu, for anyone late to the discussion). >>> >>> >>> #2) The charge of Leontiev (Ad. 5): "Vygotsky takes relation of the person to their environment to be an intellectual relation." >>> >>> >>> It is difficult to understand how sense and meaning as represented in perezhivanie could be taken as intellectual, especially when considering infants, to which the same theory applies (concerning environment and its impact upon the child). >>> >>> >>> I agree with you (and Vygotsky) 100% "The relation in question is always an age-specific relation, and not an intellectual relation." However the theory is not Piagetian (sp?), made of stairsteps, but a _unifying_ theory. >>> >>> >>> Infants clearly do not possess intellects, or do they? As feeling masses, bundles of joy, and other emotions, infants take in all their perceptions based upon their capacity of understanding (and is at the same time dependent upon their forming brains and bodies) and all this input stimulates and internalizes and eventually creates what will become a child and eventually an adult. Everything is in motion. Thought as reflected by infants is very affect laden. Even single words are bursting with emotion and sense as reflected back by the environment in which the child interacts. These don't seem "intellectual." >>> >>> >>> But then Andy, you had said previously that intellect is not devoid of affect in this definition. >>> >>> >>> So I suppose the question that falls out for me is: where is the snag of misunderstanding? >>> >>> >>> We might say it is "political expediency" generated (historical) or it is cognitively generated (theoretical). Now in Leontiev's case we can say it can be a little of both. However in Bozhovich's case, it must be theoretical, so I am comparing that, or better, I am suggesting a comparison of that. >>> >>> >>> Again I suppose to be more obvious, *I'm curious to understand where the disconnect happens and why.* >>> >>> >>> Is it the way "intellectual" is translated/interpreted? Must we be careful about defining this word and how Vygotsky. or rather, Leontiev used it? >>> >>> >>> Or does it have to do with projecting words that pertain to _states of completed development_ and misusing them to describe _developmental events_? If that is the case, the trap here is that we cannot use the naming of what is already developed to name and define what is still developing. >>> >>> >>> An acorn is not a tree; there are no branches in an acorn, so in terms of an acorn it makes no sense to talk about branches inside the acorn. >>> >>> >>> Yet at the same time, it seems LSV is saying the final form determines development. So I wonder if there is a language-to-concept correspondence snafu here too, not just using a "wrong" word. >>> >>> >>> I hope I made that understandable, I can't say if it is sensible, however! :) >>> >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Oct 28 05:09:09 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 12:09:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <544EE3F5.8080707@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <31360D7D-7475-4492-BECC-CAE2B65EC2F3@uniandes.edu.co> <544ED260.6000106@mira.net> <19A200D9-4E43-4008-A4D0-1D8DEDECE355@uniandes.edu.co> <544EE3F5.8080707@mira.net> Message-ID: Right. So how does this suggest that "Marx chose an exchange of commodities as a unit of analysis of bourgeois society"? Marx goes to pains to point out that no value is created in exchange. Value, in his analysis, is created in labor. And since it is the value of a commodity - the contradiction between its two kind of value - that needs to be understood, exchange cannot be the unit of analysis. Martin On Oct 27, 2014, at 7:31 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men?s labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour. This is the reason why the products of labour become commodities, social things whose qualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses. In the same way the light from an object is perceived by us not as the subjective excitation of our optic nerve, but as the objective form of something outside the eye itself. But, in the act of seeing, there is at all events, an actual passage of light from one thing to another, from the external object to the eye. There is a physical relation between physical things. But it is different with commodities. There, the existence of the things /qu? /commodities, and the value relation between the products of labour which stamps them as commodities, have absolutely no connection with their physical properties and with the material relations arising therefrom. There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men?s hands. This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities. > > This Fetishism of commodities has its origin, as the foregoing analysis has already shown, in the peculiar social character of the labour that produces them. > http://marx.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm#S4 > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Martin John Packer wrote: >> Yes, of course the commodity has its genesis and its demise in cycles of production, exchange, distribution, and consumption, in which its value(s) are created and dissipated. Its material properties are hardly irrelevant to its value - it's just that a chemist is not doing the right kind of science to detect value. It seems very odd to suggest that "exchange of commodities" is the unit of analysis here, since Marx insists that production always has priority over exchange and consumption. It is the commodity itself which in its form contains the central contradiction between use value and exchange value. >> >> Martin >> >> On Oct 27, 2014, at 6:16 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >>> I agree that Marx's formulation in the beginning of Chapter 1 and also in the Preface are ambiguous, but the whole drift of the work is that value is not a property of a material artefact but of a social relation. >>> >>> "In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes >>> nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must >>> replace both. But in bourgeois society, the commodity-form of the >>> product of labour ? or value-form of the commodity ? is the economic >>> cell-form." (Preface to First German Edition) >>> >>> Marx goes to great lengths to show that there is nothing about the commodity itself - the material object - which gives it value or human powers. See the concluding paragraph of Chapter 1: "So far no chemist has ever discovered exchange value either in a pearl or a diamond." >>> >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> >>>> Marx's unit of analysis in Capital was the commodity, right? Not the exchange of commodities. >>>> >>>> "The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as ?an immense accumulation of commodities,? its unit being a single commodity. Our investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity." >>>> >>>> "A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, and easily understood. Its analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties." >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Oct 26, 2014, at 11:31 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Remember that when Marx chose an exchange of commodities as a unit of analysis of bourgeois society, he knew full-well that commodities are rarely exchanged - they are bought and sold. But Marx did not "include" money in the unit of analysis. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> >> >> > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Oct 28 05:45:05 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 12:45:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <31360D7D-7475-4492-BECC-CAE2B65EC2F3@uniandes.edu.co> <544ED260.6000106@mira.net> <19A200D9-4E43-4008-A4D0-1D8DEDECE355@uniandes.edu.co> <544EE3F5.8080707@mira.net> Message-ID: <0B306692-F298-408E-BE6D-6CBB67366B8E@uniandes.edu.co> Next you'll be saying that the value of commodities is in the minds of the people who exchange them! Martin On Oct 28, 2014, at 7:09 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Right. So how does this suggest that "Marx chose an exchange of commodities as a unit of analysis of bourgeois society"? Marx goes to pains to point out that no value is created in exchange. Value, in his analysis, is created in labor. And since it is the value of a commodity - the contradiction between its two kind of value - that needs to be understood, exchange cannot be the unit of analysis. > > Martin > > On Oct 27, 2014, at 7:31 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men?s labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour. This is the reason why the products of labour become commodities, social things whose qualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses. In the same way the light from an object is perceived by us not as the subjective excitation of our optic nerve, but as the objective form of something outside the eye itself. But, in the act of seeing, there is at all events, an actual passage of light from one thing to another, from the external object to the eye. There is a physical relation between physical things. But it is different with commodities. There, the existence of the things /qu? /commodities, and the value relation between the products of labour which stamps them as commodities, have absolutely no connection with their physical properties and with the material relations arising therefrom. There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men?s hands. This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities. >> >> This Fetishism of commodities has its origin, as the foregoing analysis has already shown, in the peculiar social character of the labour that produces them. >> http://marx.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm#S4 >> >> Andy >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Martin John Packer wrote: >>> Yes, of course the commodity has its genesis and its demise in cycles of production, exchange, distribution, and consumption, in which its value(s) are created and dissipated. Its material properties are hardly irrelevant to its value - it's just that a chemist is not doing the right kind of science to detect value. It seems very odd to suggest that "exchange of commodities" is the unit of analysis here, since Marx insists that production always has priority over exchange and consumption. It is the commodity itself which in its form contains the central contradiction between use value and exchange value. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Oct 27, 2014, at 6:16 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> >>>> I agree that Marx's formulation in the beginning of Chapter 1 and also in the Preface are ambiguous, but the whole drift of the work is that value is not a property of a material artefact but of a social relation. >>>> >>>> "In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes >>>> nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must >>>> replace both. But in bourgeois society, the commodity-form of the >>>> product of labour ? or value-form of the commodity ? is the economic >>>> cell-form." (Preface to First German Edition) >>>> >>>> Marx goes to great lengths to show that there is nothing about the commodity itself - the material object - which gives it value or human powers. See the concluding paragraph of Chapter 1: "So far no chemist has ever discovered exchange value either in a pearl or a diamond." >>>> >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Martin John Packer wrote: >>>> >>>>> Marx's unit of analysis in Capital was the commodity, right? Not the exchange of commodities. >>>>> >>>>> "The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as ?an immense accumulation of commodities,? its unit being a single commodity. Our investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity." >>>>> >>>>> "A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, and easily understood. Its analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties." >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Oct 26, 2014, at 11:31 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Remember that when Marx chose an exchange of commodities as a unit of analysis of bourgeois society, he knew full-well that commodities are rarely exchanged - they are bought and sold. But Marx did not "include" money in the unit of analysis. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> > > From smago@uga.edu Tue Oct 28 05:57:08 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 12:57:08 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: New Education Research Books - October 28, 2014 - Free Previews In-Reply-To: <1118960062969.1102329572549.7766.0.660800JL.1002@scheduler.constantcontact.com> References: <1118960062969.1102329572549.7766.0.660800JL.1002@scheduler.constantcontact.com> Message-ID: New book by David: The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Halliday, Vygotsky, and Shakespeare David Kellogg Subject: Literacy, Storytelling, Teaching, Teacher Education Every storyteller soon discovers the difference between putting a story inside children and trying to extract it with comprehension questions and putting children inside a story and having them act it out. Teachers may experience this as a difference in "difficulty", or in the level of motivation and enthusiasm, or even in the engagement of creativity ... Click here for free preview and full description. From: Sense Publishers [mailto:paul.chambers@sensepublishers.com] Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2014 8:04 AM To: Peter Smagorinsky Subject: New Education Research Books - October 28, 2014 - Free Previews Having trouble viewing this email? Click here [http://ih.constantcontact.com/fs005/1102329572549/img/27.jpg]Sense Publishers October 28, 2014 Greetings ... Below you'll find New Books in Educational Research and more. Click on the links to see full descriptions and free previews of each book. Best, The Sense Team Twitter - Follow us @SensePublishers Facebook - Like Us! www.facebook.com/SensePublishers _________________________________________________ NEW BOOKS! New Visions of Collective Achievement The Cross-Generational Schooling Experiences of African American Males Darrell Cleveland Hucks (Keene State College, New Hampshire, USA) Subject: Urban Education This book takes you on a journey into the lives of three families of African American males, each with an elementary aged boy. Bear witness to each boy's observations and insights on his current schooling experiences, also hear what older males in his family have to say regarding their schooling experiences. Employing qualitative methodology to ... Click here for a free preview and full description. Haunting and the Educational Imagination Barbara Regenspan (Colgate University, New York, USA) Subject: Philosophy of Education, Education General In a time when it seems like we've run into the limits on what Marx, Dewey, and Freud might hold for liberatory critique, this peculiarly uplifting book seeks to identify some promising thinking and teaching practices, especially for work in our contemporary "corporate university of excellence." With auto-ethnography as a baseline for reflection ... Click here for a free preview and full description. Global Opportunities and Challenges for Higher Education Leaders: Briefs on Key Themes Laura E. Rumbley (Center for International Higher Education, Boston College, USA), Robin Matross Helms (American Council on Education, USA), Patti McGill Peterson (American Council on Education, USA) and Philip G. Altbach (Center for International Higher Education, Boston College, USA) (Eds.) Subject: Higher Education Higher education leaders today recognize the need to develop an international strategy for their institutions but may lack the knowledge and perspective required to inform good decisions. Institutions must create educational environments where students will begin to appreciate the complexity of global integration and develop skills to navigate ... Click here for a free preview and full description. Using Data to Improve Higher Education Research, Policy and Practice Maria Eliophotou Menon (University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus), Dawn Geronimo Terkla (Tufts University, Medford, USA) and Paul Gibbs (Middlesex University London, UK) (Eds.) Subject: Higher Education In recent decades, higher education systems and institutions have been called to respond to an unprecedented number of challenges. Major challenges emerged with the phenomenal increase in the demand for higher education and the associated massive expansion of higher education systems. In response universities were called to adopt planning and research methods that would enable them to identify and address the needs ... Click here for a free preview and full description. Leaders in Philosophy of Education Intellectual Self-Portraits (Second Series) Leonard J. Waks (Temple University, Philadelphia, USA) (Ed.) Subject: Philosophy of Education In the late 1950s plans were initiated to bring a higher level of professionalism to the training of educational professionals. New projects included introducing contemporary scholarship from the humanities and social sciences into colleges of education to revitalize the education knowledge base. In North America and the United Kingdom ... Click here for a free preview and full description. How Parents Deal with the Education of Their Child on the Autism Spectrum The Stories and Research They Don't and Won't Tell You Jasmine McDonald (Telethon Kids Institute, The University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia) Subject: Inclusive Education, Youth Powerful moral, social justice and political arguments have convinced parents that it is their democratic right to place their children on the autism spectrum into mainstream educational environments so that their children may eventually take up their rightful place in a mainstream adult life. But what is really happening for some of these parents ... Click here for a free preview and full description. MORE NEW BOOKS! Previously announced in early October ... Forging a Rewarding Career in the Humanities Advice for Academics Karla P. Zepeda (Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne, Fort Wayne, IN, USA) and Ellen Mayock (Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA, USA) (Eds.) Subject: Higher Education As has been abundantly documented in the popular and academic press, the humanities are facing challenging times marked by national debate regarding the importance of the humanities in higher education, program and budget cuts, and an ever-decreasing number of tenure-track jobs. In addition, the humanities face quite literally a ... Click here for a free preview and full description Adapting to Teaching and Learning in Open-Plan Schools Vaughan Prain (La Trobe University, Australia), Peter Cox (La Trobe University, Australia), Craig Deed (La Trobe University, Australia), Debra Edwards (La Trobe University, Australia), Cathleen Farrelly (La Trobe University, Australia), Mary Keeffe (La Trobe University, Australia), Valerie Lovejoy (La Trobe University, Australia), Lucy Mow (La Trobe University, Australia), Peter Sellings (Federation University, Australia), Bruce Waldrip (University of Tasmania, Australia) and Zali Yager (Victoria University, Australia) (Eds.) Subject: Education General, Teacher Education, Classroom Research In recent years many countries have built or renovated schools incorporating open plan design. These new spaces are advocated on the basis of claims that they promote fresh, productive ways to teach and learn that address the needs of students in this century, resulting in improved academic and well-being outcomes. These new approaches ... Click here for a free preview and full description Finnish Innovations and Technologies in Schools A Guide towards New Ecosystems of Learning Hannele Niemi (University of Helsinki, Finland), Jari Multisilta (University of Helsinki, Finland), Lasse Lipponen (University of Helsinki, Finland) and Marianna Vivitsou (University of Helsinki, Finland) (Eds.) Subject: Teacher Education, Educational Technology This book combines several perspectives on the steps the Finnish educational system has taken to provide students with the skills and competences needed for living in today's society and in the future. The ecosystem is used as a metaphor for the educational system. The Finnish system aims to achieve sustainable education by ... Click here for a free preview and full description Family Stories, Poetry, and Women's Work Knit Four, Frog One (Poems) Sandra L. Faulkner (Bowling Green State University, USA) Subject: Social Fiction, Women's Studies This book is a memoir in poetry about family stories, mother-daughter relationships, women's work, mothering, writing, family secrets, and patterns of communication in close relationships. Faulkner knits connections between a DIY (do-it-yourself) value, economics, and family culture through the use of poems and images, which present ... Click here for a free preview and full description Erich Fromm's Revolutionary Hope Prophetic Messianism as a Critical Theory of the Future Joan Braune (Mount Mary University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, USA) Subject: Critical Thinking, Sociology of Education, Education General Joan Braune's work on Erich Fromm is indispensable for students of Frankfurt School critical theory ... Braune reveals the central role that Fromm played in the early development of Frankfurt School critical theory. She also discloses the role that Fromm played in shaping some of the most important debates in critical theory. One of ... Click here for a free preview and full description Remapping Africa in the Global Space Propositions for Change Edward Shizha (Wilfrid Laurier University, Brantford, Canada) (Ed.) Subject: Educational Policy What are the benefits and risks for Africa's participation in the globalisation nexus? Remapping Africa in the Global Space is a visionary and interdisciplinary volume that restores Africa's image using a multidisciplinary lens. It incorporates disciplines such as sociology, education, global studies, economics, development studies, political ... Click here for a free preview and full description 'Cadjan - Kiduhu' Global Perspectives on Youth Work Brian Belton (Ed.) Subject: Education General, Youthwork In this book academics, practitioners and scholars from all over the planet present relatively heterogeneous perspectives to produce something of the homogenous whole that youth work might be understood to be. This promotes the understanding that to lock down youth work in notional stasis (bolt it into a 'carceral archipelago') would ... Click here for a free preview and full description African Indigenous Knowledge and the Disciplines Gloria Emeagwali (Central Connecticut State University, USA) and George J. Sefa Dei (University of Toronto, Canada) (Eds.) Subject: Education General This text explores the multidisciplinary context of African Indigenous Knowledge Systems from scholars and scholar activists committed to the interrogation, production, articulation, dissemination and general development of endogenous and indigenous modes of intellectual activity and praxis. The work reinforces the demand ... Click here for a free preview and full description Geometry with Applications and Proofs Advanced Geometry for Senior High School, Student Text and Background Information Aad Goddijn (Freudenthal Institute for Science and Mathematics Education, Utrecht, The Netherlands), Martin Kindt (Freudenthal Institute for Science and Mathematics Education, Utrecht, The Netherlands) and Wolfgang Reuter (Schoter Scholengemeenschap, Haarlem, The Netherlands) Subject: Mathematics Education This book shows how geometry can be learned by starting with real world problems which are solved by intuition, common sense reasoning and experiments. Gradually the more formal demands of mathematical proofs get their proper place ... Click here for a free preview and full description Graphic Texts Literacy Enhancing Tools in Early Childhood Eva Teubal (David Yellin Academic College of Education, Jerusalem, Israel) and Ainat Guberman (The MOFET Institute, Tel Aviv, Israel and David Yellin Academic College of Education, Jerusalem, Israel) Subject: Teacher Education The message of the book is straightforward and easy to apply: it derives from the interweaving of long years of field work with a solid theoretical background. The practice advocated presents children with the opportunity to confront contents and situations which are only too often considered inaccessible for them. The abundant examples presented ... Click here for free preview and full description. The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit Narrative and Dialogue in Story-telling with Halliday, Vygotsky, and Shakespeare David Kellogg Subject: Literacy, Storytelling, Teaching, Teacher Education Every storyteller soon discovers the difference between putting a story inside children and trying to extract it with comprehension questions and putting children inside a story and having them act it out. Teachers may experience this as a difference in "difficulty", or in the level of motivation and enthusiasm, or even in the engagement of creativity ... Click here for free preview and full description. Leaders in Mathematics Education: Experience and Vision Alexander Karp (Teachers College, Columbia University) (Ed.) Subject: Mathematics Education This book consists of interviews with the most important mathematics educators of our time. These interviews were originally published in the International Journal for the History of Mathematics Education and are now being offered to a wider readership for the first time, collected in a single volume. Among the individuals ... Click here for free preview and full description. How World-Class Universities Affect Global Higher Education Influences and Responses Ying Cheng (Shanghai Jiao Tong University, P.R. China), Qi Wang (Shanghai Jiao Tong University, P.R. China) and Nian Cai Liu (Shanghai Jiao Tong University, P.R. China) (Eds.) Subject: Higher Education Number 30 of the series: Global Perspectives on Higher Education World-class universities, commonly recognized as global research universities or flagship universities, are cornerstone institutions embedded in any academic system and play an important role in developing a nation's competitiveness in the global knowledge economy. The development of world-class universities is high on the policy ... Click here for free preview and full description. A Critique of Creativity and Complexity Deconstructing Clich?s Don Ambrose (Rider University, USA), Bharath Sriraman (The University of Montana, USA) and Kathleen M. Pierce (Rider University, USA) (Eds.) Subject: Education General, Sociology of Education, Gifted Education In an increasingly complex world, the natural human inclination is to oversimplify issues and problems to make them seem more comprehensible and less threatening. This tendency usually generates forms of dogmatism that diminish our ability to think creatively and to develop worthy talents. Fortunately, complexity theory is giving us ... Click here for free preview and full description. Scars A Black Lesbian Experience in Rural White England A. Breeze Harper (University of California, Davis, USA & The Sistah Vegan Project) Subject: Education General, Gender Studies, Race Scars is a novel about whiteness, racism, and breaking past the normative boundaries of heterosexuality, as experienced through eighteen year old Savannah Penelope Sales. Savannah is a Black girl, born and raised in a white, working class, and rural New England town. She is in denial of her lesbian sexuality, harbors internalized ... Click here for free preview and full description. Crafting Creativity & Creating Craft Craftivism, Art Education, and Contemporary Craft Culture Courtney Lee Weida (Adelphi University, New York, USA) (Ed.) Subject: Education General, Creativity, Art Education, Music Education Number 8 of the series: Advances in Creativity and Giftedness This nine chapter volume explores creativity in art teaching through contemporary craft. A variety of artists, educators and historians share with readers their wealth of practical resources and frameworks for utilizing craft media (fiber, ceramics, baskets, needlepoint, knitting, etc.) and craft approaches (grassroots projects, digital ... Click here for free preview and full description. Being "In and Out": Providing Voice to Early Career Women in Academia Narelle Lemon (La Trobe University, Australia) and Susanne Garvis (Monash University, Australia) (Eds.) Subject: Education General, Gender Studies, Higher Education This book is about a network of women who as a collective and individuals can share their stories to indeed help themselves as well as others. Our stories as?sist in the telling and retelling of important events. Reflecting on these events allow the 'processing', 'figuring out' and 'inquiring', leading to behavioural actions to change ... Click here for free preview and full description. Student Voice, Teacher Action Research and Classroom Improvement Lisa M. Bell (University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia) and Jill M. Aldridge (Curtin University, Perth, Australia) Subject: Education General, Professional Development, Learning Environments, Classroom Research The issue of teacher quality is increasingly seen as being central to education policy development and this emphasis highlights the role teacher professional development plays in improving teacher effectiveness and the quality of learning in the classroom. This book describes a large-scale research program which ... Click here for free preview and full description. A Few of Our Favorite Things Teaching Ideas for K-12 Science Methods Instructors Patricia D. Morrell (University of Portland, USA) and Kate Popejoy (DaVinci Discovery Center of Science and Technology, USA) (Eds.) Subject: Education General, Science Education, Teacher Education We are all familiar with the expression "teachers' bag of tricks." It is fairly easy for K-12 teachers to do a quick web search, scan library shelves, and browse through journals to provide them with numerous lessons and ideas to keep their bags filled. Science teacher educators need to not only provide preservice teachers with resources ... Click here for free preview and full description. Trayvon Martin, Race, and American Justice Writing Wrong Kenneth J. Fasching-Varner (Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, USA), Rema E. Reynolds (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA), Katrice A. Albert (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, USA) and Lori L. Martin (Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, USA) (Eds.) Subject: Social Justice, Race, Race Education, Social Education Here is the first comprehensive text to analyze not only the killing of Trayvon Martin, but the implications of this event for the state of race in the United States. Bringing together contributions from a variety of disciplines and approaches, this text pushes readers to answer the question: "In the wake of the killing of Trayvon Martin, and the ... Click here for free preview and full description. Promoting Change through Action Research Franz Rauch, Angela Schuster, Thomas Stern, Maria Pribila, and Andrew Townsend (all of Institute of Instructional and School Development, University of Klagenfurt, Austria) (Eds.) Subject: Teacher Education, Professional Development, Action Research "Bringing a different world into existence - Action Research as a trigger for innovations" was the overarching theme and vision of the international CARN Conference 2011 in Vienna. The chapters in this book are drawn mainly from conference contributions. The authors share practical knowledge which has arisen from their work, and reflect on ... Click here for free preview and full description. Lost in Practice: Transforming Nordic Educational Action Research Karin R?nnerman (University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden) and Petri Salo (?bo Akademi University, Vasa, Finland) (Eds.) Subject: Teacher Education Lost in Practice offers a further development of the notion of Nordic educational action research (as described in an earlier volume, Nurturing Praxis, in 2008), aiming to deepen and enrich understandings of the Nordic educational tradition and its various practices. It explores Nordic traditions and theories, such as Bildung, practical knowledge ... Click here for free preview and full description. Foregrounds Opaque Stories about Learning Ole Skovsmose (Aalborg University, Denmark & State University of S?o Paulo, Brazil) Subject: Mathematics Education Foregrounds contributes to the development of theories of learning, in particular to theories of learning mathematics. It is relevant to students, student teachers, and researchers in the field of education as well as in mathematics education. Foregrounds contains six parts. Part I provides a summary of the notion of foreground as it has ... Click here for free preview and full description. Critical Pedagogy for a Polymodal World Douglas J. Loveless (James Madison University, USA) and Bryant Griffith (Texas A&M University - Corpus Christi, USA) Subject: Education General This book explores the complexity of communication and understanding as a possible asset in formal education rather than a problem that needs to be "fixed". The authors examine the question and experience as pedagogical tools, challenging readers to play the critic and ask hard questions, beginning with: Why do the ideas discussed within ... Click here for free preview and full description. Leaders in Educational Research Intellectual Self Portraits by Fellows of the International Academy of Education Mar?a de Ibarrola (Department of Educational Research, Center for Research and Advanced Studies, Mexico) and D.C. Phillips (Stanford University, USA) (Eds.) Subject: Educational Research In this volume fourteen fellows of the International Academy of Education, whose research work is known internationally, reflect upon the ways in which their careers have been shaped by early family influences, by random events and surprise opportunities, and by nascent intellectual interests and academic mentoring. The authors ... Click here for free preview and full description. Stories of Transformative Learning Michael Kroth (University of Idaho Boise, USA) and Patricia Cranton (University of New Brunswick, Canada) Subject: Adult Education Stories of Transformative Learning is intended to encourage people to explore the potential for transformative learning in their lives, practices, and communities. This book illustrates the transformative learning process through ten stories of individuals from both inside and outside of the classroom. Adult educators ... Click here for free preview and full description. www.sensepublishers.com Course Examination Copies ... are available for most titles. Send email to course-exam@sensepublishers.com and include the title you wish to examine, along with course information, expected enrollment, semester to be taught, and your full street address where you wish the examination copy to be sent. 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[http://img.constantcontact.com/letters/images/CC_Footer_Logo_New.png] Sense Publishers | Educational Research | Boston | MA | 02205 From kpeppler@indiana.edu Tue Oct 28 08:24:07 2014 From: kpeppler@indiana.edu (Kylie Peppler) Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 11:24:07 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics Practices In-Reply-To: <54479034.6070006@mira.net> References: <16E632C3-F0B2-412A-99CD-8F24BB22D17E@uniandes.edu.co> <84835D07-C12A-4ECB-A42F-76344E1C27B3@uniandes.edu.co> <1E1201D3-EC65-4022-820E-91B830F49AE9@uniandes.edu.co> <7431C36E-CF7D-42C9-9B55-EAAB35D0F5E5@uniandes.edu.co> <5441EDAC.9080607@mira.net> <10AD6FE6-0B96-413D-860C-420B04ACADC2@csun.edu> <39089ddf0ba265a30feb7854f07324c1.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> <54471BF6.9010906@mira.net> <54479034.6070006@mira.net> Message-ID: Thank you Andy for starting this thread and Mike and David for chiming in! I know my co-authors plan to respond in further depth to some of the other questions raised but wanted to give a sense of where we think this work is heading. We see this study as a starting point for looking more closely at gendered interactions around a host of new commercial materials popular in making as well as across same gender and mixed gender dyads. We would also like to start problematizing our notions of gender further in this work. Many of these studies are currently under way and some interesting findings are emerging that we're excited to share out soon! This really opens up a line of research questions for us but anecdotally most of the folks in computing, for example, are shocked to see how different these interactions look as compared to typical interactions around computers and robotics kits like Lego Mindstorms. best- Kylie On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:08 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Kylie & co., > A fascinating study around a truly ingenious approach to the gendered > division of labour - giving school kids E-textiles to construct an > electronic device - total mixing up and confounding the gender stereotypes > about sewing and electronics, etc. > > Some of the results were quite startling. That the young boy should not > just abstain and demonstratively not pay attention, but pay active and > supportive attention to the girl making the circuit with her > needle-and-thread - an admired female-typical stance one would have thought > a young male incapable of adopting with a female workmate. And that the > gender-inscription of the sewing tools over-rode the greater experience > that in this case the young boy had in using them, with the boy deferring > to the less experienced girl in recognition of the gender-appropriateness > of her "taking charge" with the needle-and-thread. This does cause one to > think a little deeper into how we might conceptualise such gendered > behaviours. > > As you would know, MCA has a strong preference for qualitative research, > and studies with small sample sizes are not generally a problem, but so > much seemed to hinge on the study of just *one* boy-girl team, that I am > concerned about the capacity to generalise from such a base. There were > about 80 youth in the activity as a whole, so I can only hope and presume > that observation of the other 78 kids in some way guided the work focused > on just 2. > > I must say, the analysis of the video data is very sophisticated and > productive and you are to be congratulated on this aspect of the work. I > see that you approach the gendering of the activities through the idea of > the various *tools* being gendered, rather than the *practices* themselves. > This is something that was really necessary for you to be able to make > these observations, because the gendering of the activities is ambiguous, > but not it seems the gendering of the tools. Is this a result of the study, > or is it something you already knew or did you arrive at this by logic? > > Do you see any other opportunities for confounding gender stereotypes in > this way? > > And finally, does the experience of working in ambiguous, even inverted > gender-stereotyped activities like these have any outcome which carries > over into a world where the gender division of labour lacks ambiguity? > > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Kylie Peppler wrote: > >> Thanks Andy! We're excited to discuss with the community and would >> welcome any comments/questions on this emerging line of research! >> Kylie >> >> --- >> Kylie A. Peppler >> Assistant Professor of Learning Sciences >> Indiana University | School of Education >> 1900 E 10th Street | Eigenmann 528 | Bloomington | IN | 47406 | >> 812.856.8381 >> >> >> On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 10:52 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> Here's the article for discussion Artin is introducing: >> *Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting and Electronics >> Practices* >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen Wohlwend. >> Indiana University. >> >> The Maker movement promotes hands-on making, including crafts, >> robotics, and computing. The movement?s potential to transform >> education rests in our ability to address notable gender >> disparities, particularly in science, technology, engineering, and >> mathematics fields. E-textiles - the first female-dominated >> computing community - provide inspiration for overcoming >> long-standing cultural divides in classrooms. Analysis of >> children?s >> use of e-textiles reveals that materials like needles, fabric, and >> conductive thread rupture traditional gender scripts around >> electronics and implicitly gives girls hands-on access and >> leadership roles. This reconceptualization of cultural divides as >> sets of tacitly accepted practices rooted in gendered histories has >> implications for reconceptualizing traditionally male-dominated >> areas of schooling. >> >> Andy >> (attached) >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Goncu, Artin wrote: >> >> Dear All, >> >> We are writing to let you know that the most recent issue of >> MCA is out. >> One of the articles published in this issue and being >> introduced here for >> discussion in referenced below. The authors of the article >> have kindly >> agreed to lead the discussion, and they are on xmca with us >> now. The free >> access to the article is possible through the links below. We >> are looking >> forward to hearing from you all. Best, ag >> >> Hands On, Hands Off: Gendered Access in Crafting >> and Electronics Practices >> Beth Buchholz, Kate Shively, Kylie Peppler, and Karen Wohlwend >> >> www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10749039.2014.939762 >> >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10749039.2014. >> 939762#.VEZ25Ra_4wI >> >> Artin Goncu, Ph.D >> Co-editor, Mind, Culture, and Activity:An International Journal >> Professor Emeritus, >> University of Illinois at Chicago >> College of Education M/C 147 >> 1040 W. Harrison St. >> Chicago, IL 60607 >> >> >> >> >> >> > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Tue Oct 28 08:26:50 2014 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 15:26:50 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu>,<54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu>, <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net>, <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu> Message-ID: Hi Annalisa, I was waiting a bit to see if someone else will chime in. If we refer to Soviet (now Russian) psychology: -- They prefer to talk about consciousness rather than mind. -- All psychological functions and states emerge in the process of human activity. --Consciousness is a major category in historical materialism and therefore has to be accepted as a major category by the social science disciplines. There are different interpretation of the concept of consciousness in different social science disciplines. However, they all had to refer to historical materialism. No one was bigger than historical materialism. Consciousness is also used in several ways in everyday life. But that is another story. The kinds of usage should not be mixed. Also: --LSV was sidelined pretty early by Rubinstein. The interest in LSV resurfaced in the 1980s, but was not too strong. ANL and his students were reigning and that time. --ANL had quite of a power struggle with Rubinstein. ANL and his students/prot?g?s ruled the psychology domain in the USSR at their life time. -- Almost all textbooks in psychology after 1970 were written by the ANL circle. After 1970 Rubinstein was not published much and maybe not at all. The last psychology textbook by Rubinstein that I have seen was from the 1960s (first edition 1940). -- Rubinstein was the first (if memory serves) to formulate the principle of the unity of consciousness and activity. However, many sources claim he heavily used works of LSV. Of course, all historical materialists hold to the principle that consciousness emerges in the process of activity; it is a product of activity and everyday life environment of the subject. Researchers from Russia can provide more precise account. Best wishes, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Annalisa Aguilar Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 6:54 PM To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] OK! I'm getting somewhere! Thank you for clarifying this term in the context of the controversy. So are you saying that ANL is saying that LSV is saying (sorry to be so convoluted) that there is an "already established intellect" in the infant and ANL is saying this assertion can only be preposterous? I'm sorry if I still haven't nailed it, and I hope you will forgive my persistence to understand this, but it seems pretty important. If I am understanding properly, this is why I believe (intuitively at this juncture), that "consciousness" has an imprecise definition between the parties and its word-meaning is constitutionally different between ANL and LSV, and I would want to better understand what LSV was referencing when he used the word. I think I can understand why ANL would have issue if he sees consciousness possible only if it is derived from activity. If this is the case, then is it possible that this is a philosophical difference as to whether one believes mind to be present before consciousness, or one believes consciousness to be present before mind. Is that fair to say? In a largely materialistic rendering, mind would be first, I am guessing. Regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: Andy Blunden Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 4:19 PM To: Annalisa Aguilar Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In this context, "intellectualism" does not mean "void of affect" or have anything to do with lack of affect. "Intellectualism" refers to a theorist who ascribes a capacity for intellectual activity to (for example) an infant, who would in fact not have developed the capacity for an intellectual relation to the world. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Andy! > > OK. I'm needing to fill in some blanks here. > > What is meant exactly by "intellectualism"? Or rather, what did ANL mean? > > When you say: > > [And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. > No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that > whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like > "intellect" and "affect".] > > Perhaps I am responding to the word "intellectual" in the way it reflects back to me in my culture: that something or someone "intellectual" is void of affect (relatively speaking) and that is why those who spurn intellectuals do so. As such, "intellectuals" will sometimes speak/function at a level "above" most others, and this usually upsets people who do not speak/function on the same level. > > "Intelligence" is handled differently, though. It seems to me as a concept "intelligence" is more of whole cloth. > > "Intellect" (to me) is thinking without affect. It is rational and seeks to remove affect, with the "myth" that the products of thought are somehow "better, more pure" with this affect removed. > > I agree of course that the person is whole first, and that we abstract concepts to describe properties. But there has been a backlash from abstracting out. Isn't this why Descartes has been so problematic? Isn't this why Spinoza sought to understand where the emotions "come from" and what their value is? > > So given this, I ask the question again and circling back to the original charge in your paper, what does it mean for ANL to levy a charge of "intellectualism" upon LSV? > > TIA, > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 3:10 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" > really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > > Annalisa, it is Leontyev who is pinning the charge of "intellectualism" > on Vygotsky because he ascribes "meaning" and "significance" to > children, and therefore sign-use. I am not saying that sign-use is not > intellectual though. And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, > because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. > No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that > whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" > and "affect". > > Andy > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Hi Andy, >> >> Again thanks for more! >> >> Here's the thing: I may be getting lost in understanding argument positions. >> >> Are you saying it is Leontiev, et al's position that thinking with signs and words are intellectual? >> >> Because, for me personally, thinking with signs and words involve both affect and intellect and I don't think they can be separated out. For me, a person's intelligence is the mediated unification of affect and intellect, what I believe you are calling consciousness. >> >> I feel supported by my position with Vygotsky's discussion of word-meaning (znachenie slova), if I am understanding word-meaning properly. >> >> Again, the words "meaning" and "significance" can have affective >> meaning and significance! :) (is this the adjective? I want to say >> "affectual," to match "intellectual" but that isn't a word) >> >> Now if for *you* these particular words have "intellectual connotations," perhaps this difference between you and I supports LSV's (and my earlier) point that affect and intellect are mediated and will therefore allow each person have a different and nuanced mix of meaning and significance for the same set of words and signs, even if we generally agree on a social meaning and significance, such as the meaning of a flag. >> >> This reminds me of the cultural differences regarding the meanings of color. One can't intellectualize red just by its perception. One can't have an affect of red either by perception alone (if one were to see red for the first time), its meaning and significance are socially, historically and culturally generated. >> >> Furthermore, I agree with you that our "Western language" to describe the interior mind, if I am allowed to say that, is sparse. We know Freud reached into Greek mythology to give these concepts a handle. This is one reason I look to Eastern thought so I might learn how these dynamics are discussed. They do possess words for which we have none. I might also suggest there are relevant themes in these traditions that apply to Vygotsky's work. >> >> In fact, it might amaze us in the West to truly understand the immense literature and legacies on these topics of mind and self. It certainly amazes me. Of course that would be a huge project to be mediated between cultural elders and not a cultural tourist like myself. I only point out that there is something there and we are not the pioneers to wrangle with these problems of mind. >> >> I admit that to access these words, one must understand how metaphors are utilized. In rational-logical traditions, metaphors seem to be disagreeable. Also there is discussion of the spiritual, since the problems these traditions hoped to solve were spiritual problems, which may just be their historically-anchored approach to psychological realities. So, these barriers may explain the impasse. >> >> But if words are tools, I'm sure we might borrow some and they wouldn't mind. >> >> Ha! a pun! "wouldn't mind" get it? :) >> >> Best, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:02 AM >> >> I would have said that this criticism is a deliberate >> misrepresentation, except that Lydia Bozhovich makes the same charge of "intellectualism." >> The charge hinges on phrases like "the significance for the child" >> and "the meaning for the child," etc., which etymologically suggest >> the use of signs and words. Thinking with signs and words is >> intellect. But the thing is that it is almost impossible for us to >> describe the relationship of a person to their environment >> psychologically without using words which evoke sign-relations. The >> relation is a psychological one, not a conditioned-reflex, and the >> words we have for relations which are mediated through consciousness >> tend to be words like "meaning" and "significance" which have >> intellectual connotations. The preintellectual stages of >> psychological development which Vygotsky himself theorised are not built into the common language. >> >> Andy >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> --- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> >>> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. >>> >>> There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] >>> --------------------------------------------------- >>> 4. ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really >>> means intellectualism] (see original post below) >>> --------------------------------------------------- >>> >>> Again a pothole. You say: >>> "The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate >>> at their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an >>> intellectual relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims." >>> >>> I think know this, but what is ANL's critique against this? Is it >>> that it is too "intellectual," which is possibly code for elitism or class? >>> Sorry if I wasn't clear. >>> >>> --end From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Oct 28 09:40:04 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 16:40:04 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu>,<54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu>, <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net>, <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu> Message-ID: Lubomir, I think this is a very helpful characterization. I think it also fits very well with the "plump materialism" that Latour spells out, and that I would attribute to SV. Martin On Oct 28, 2014, at 10:26 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > If we refer to Soviet (now Russian) psychology: > -- They prefer to talk about consciousness rather than mind. > -- All psychological functions and states emerge in the process of human activity. > --Consciousness is a major category in historical materialism and therefore has to be accepted as a major category by the social science disciplines. There are different interpretation of the concept of consciousness in different social science disciplines. However, they all had to refer to historical materialism. No one was bigger than historical materialism. Consciousness is also used in several ways in everyday life. But that is another story. The kinds of usage should not be mixed. From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Oct 28 10:21:09 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 17:21:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu>,<54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu>, <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net>, <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1414516868304.10622@unm.edu> Hello Lubomir! Thank you so much for your explanation. I would guess none of this would be possible to know just reading the texts themselves. It is why I value the xmca list discourse and perhaps is the value and purpose of the list to all of us. I am grateful for the variety of voices and I hope others will come forward knowing they are welcome. At least by me, anyway! :) It is true that a lot of arguing over matters can be avoided by understanding the technical terms at the outset, and so clearing this up is important. Understanding how the word "consciousness" is used and where the usage derives also appears to be a common misunderstanding by outsiders coming into the topic. As you say, there are many ways the word is used. I agree. It seems a little silly to expect people outside of a tradition or culture to understand a cultural reality not their own including its contexts. As is the case, there is a lot of progress to be made when there are allowances made for common misunderstandings. What I am trying to understand in the theoretical split between ANL and LSV is: Where are these mistakes commonly made by those of us looking back at the history and the theoretical content? By understanding these "common" mistakes, allowances can be made to pass over those areas more carefully. This is my objective and intention. How do we create an environment of better understanding? And then, we hope, from creating a positive perezhivanie we are all transformed! :) I am at a disadvantage that I am not well-read in Marx. But I hope that that deficiency doesn't bar me from the conversation. Russian psychology and its proponents will be floating in the broth of Marxist thought, and I recognize one cannot grasp the essential theoretical points to LSV's work without wading into the soup. With this in mind, an important first barrier to overcome and yet not get too bogged down when learning the work of Vygotsky is the meaning of Marxist thought as a cultural reality. It is important and should not be dismissed. However, I have witnessed several times it is common occurrence that by going over the matter of "What is Marxism" the conversation just stalls and no progress is made. If the objective is better understanding, this seems a pothole that needs mending. What should be the focus then is not "What is Marxism," but "What were the aspects of the contemporary cultural reality (in which Vygotsky lived) which influenced his theories and influenced their distribution after his death?" It seems that even among the historical players the question "What is Marxism" was prohibitive to idea exchange, so it seems worthwhile in this case not to let history repeat itself. :) It seems unrealistic to expect people, who will have much to offer, to come to the discussion steeped in Marxist theory, and so my search right now is how we might overcome this very real barrier so newcomers have the ability access the content of LSV's work. It seems more realistic to say that we must know "enough" Marxist thought to place cultural contexts where they stand to open the door to the work. The question is what is "enough" ? After having said all that (and thank you for reading all that), I'll reply more to the content of your post and the specific matter of "consciousness" as a technical term. I'm curious why "consciousness" is used instead of "mind." Is there an answer to this other than philosophical? Or is it the case that the matter is accepted as settled because of historical materialism's prerogatives? In other words, is the use of the word just accepted as such because it has become a convention? Do people today question the use of the word as it has been used? The political fallout between ANL and Rubenstein is also helpful to know. I did not know about it and that is not anything that could be found from reading the texts themselves. If this is common knowledge, I appreciate your patience with me and my ignorance about it. Thank you for your contribution to my better understanding! Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Lubomir Savov Popov Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2014 9:26 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] Hi Annalisa, I was waiting a bit to see if someone else will chime in. If we refer to Soviet (now Russian) psychology: -- They prefer to talk about consciousness rather than mind. -- All psychological functions and states emerge in the process of human activity. --Consciousness is a major category in historical materialism and therefore has to be accepted as a major category by the social science disciplines. There are different interpretation of the concept of consciousness in different social science disciplines. However, they all had to refer to historical materialism. No one was bigger than historical materialism. Consciousness is also used in several ways in everyday life. But that is another story. The kinds of usage should not be mixed. Also: --LSV was sidelined pretty early by Rubinstein. The interest in LSV resurfaced in the 1980s, but was not too strong. ANL and his students were reigning and that time. --ANL had quite of a power struggle with Rubinstein. ANL and his students/prot?g?s ruled the psychology domain in the USSR at their life time. -- Almost all textbooks in psychology after 1970 were written by the ANL circle. After 1970 Rubinstein was not published much and maybe not at all. The last psychology textbook by Rubinstein that I have seen was from the 1960s (first edition 1940). -- Rubinstein was the first (if memory serves) to formulate the principle of the unity of consciousness and activity. However, many sources claim he heavily used works of LSV. Of course, all historical materialists hold to the principle that consciousness emerges in the process of activity; it is a product of activity and everyday life environment of the subject. Researchers from Russia can provide more precise account. Best wishes, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Annalisa Aguilar Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 6:54 PM To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] OK! I'm getting somewhere! Thank you for clarifying this term in the context of the controversy. So are you saying that ANL is saying that LSV is saying (sorry to be so convoluted) that there is an "already established intellect" in the infant and ANL is saying this assertion can only be preposterous? I'm sorry if I still haven't nailed it, and I hope you will forgive my persistence to understand this, but it seems pretty important. If I am understanding properly, this is why I believe (intuitively at this juncture), that "consciousness" has an imprecise definition between the parties and its word-meaning is constitutionally different between ANL and LSV, and I would want to better understand what LSV was referencing when he used the word. I think I can understand why ANL would have issue if he sees consciousness possible only if it is derived from activity. If this is the case, then is it possible that this is a philosophical difference as to whether one believes mind to be present before consciousness, or one believes consciousness to be present before mind. Is that fair to say? In a largely materialistic rendering, mind would be first, I am guessing. Regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: Andy Blunden Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 4:19 PM To: Annalisa Aguilar Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In this context, "intellectualism" does not mean "void of affect" or have anything to do with lack of affect. "Intellectualism" refers to a theorist who ascribes a capacity for intellectual activity to (for example) an infant, who would in fact not have developed the capacity for an intellectual relation to the world. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Andy! > > OK. I'm needing to fill in some blanks here. > > What is meant exactly by "intellectualism"? Or rather, what did ANL mean? > > When you say: > > [And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. > No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that > whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like > "intellect" and "affect".] > > Perhaps I am responding to the word "intellectual" in the way it reflects back to me in my culture: that something or someone "intellectual" is void of affect (relatively speaking) and that is why those who spurn intellectuals do so. As such, "intellectuals" will sometimes speak/function at a level "above" most others, and this usually upsets people who do not speak/function on the same level. > > "Intelligence" is handled differently, though. It seems to me as a concept "intelligence" is more of whole cloth. > > "Intellect" (to me) is thinking without affect. It is rational and seeks to remove affect, with the "myth" that the products of thought are somehow "better, more pure" with this affect removed. > > I agree of course that the person is whole first, and that we abstract concepts to describe properties. But there has been a backlash from abstracting out. Isn't this why Descartes has been so problematic? Isn't this why Spinoza sought to understand where the emotions "come from" and what their value is? > > So given this, I ask the question again and circling back to the original charge in your paper, what does it mean for ANL to levy a charge of "intellectualism" upon LSV? > > TIA, > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 3:10 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" > really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > > Annalisa, it is Leontyev who is pinning the charge of "intellectualism" > on Vygotsky because he ascribes "meaning" and "significance" to > children, and therefore sign-use. I am not saying that sign-use is not > intellectual though. And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, > because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. > No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that > whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like "intellect" > and "affect". > > Andy > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Hi Andy, >> >> Again thanks for more! >> >> Here's the thing: I may be getting lost in understanding argument positions. >> >> Are you saying it is Leontiev, et al's position that thinking with signs and words are intellectual? >> >> Because, for me personally, thinking with signs and words involve both affect and intellect and I don't think they can be separated out. For me, a person's intelligence is the mediated unification of affect and intellect, what I believe you are calling consciousness. >> >> I feel supported by my position with Vygotsky's discussion of word-meaning (znachenie slova), if I am understanding word-meaning properly. >> >> Again, the words "meaning" and "significance" can have affective >> meaning and significance! :) (is this the adjective? I want to say >> "affectual," to match "intellectual" but that isn't a word) >> >> Now if for *you* these particular words have "intellectual connotations," perhaps this difference between you and I supports LSV's (and my earlier) point that affect and intellect are mediated and will therefore allow each person have a different and nuanced mix of meaning and significance for the same set of words and signs, even if we generally agree on a social meaning and significance, such as the meaning of a flag. >> >> This reminds me of the cultural differences regarding the meanings of color. One can't intellectualize red just by its perception. One can't have an affect of red either by perception alone (if one were to see red for the first time), its meaning and significance are socially, historically and culturally generated. >> >> Furthermore, I agree with you that our "Western language" to describe the interior mind, if I am allowed to say that, is sparse. We know Freud reached into Greek mythology to give these concepts a handle. This is one reason I look to Eastern thought so I might learn how these dynamics are discussed. They do possess words for which we have none. I might also suggest there are relevant themes in these traditions that apply to Vygotsky's work. >> >> In fact, it might amaze us in the West to truly understand the immense literature and legacies on these topics of mind and self. It certainly amazes me. Of course that would be a huge project to be mediated between cultural elders and not a cultural tourist like myself. I only point out that there is something there and we are not the pioneers to wrangle with these problems of mind. >> >> I admit that to access these words, one must understand how metaphors are utilized. In rational-logical traditions, metaphors seem to be disagreeable. Also there is discussion of the spiritual, since the problems these traditions hoped to solve were spiritual problems, which may just be their historically-anchored approach to psychological realities. So, these barriers may explain the impasse. >> >> But if words are tools, I'm sure we might borrow some and they wouldn't mind. >> >> Ha! a pun! "wouldn't mind" get it? :) >> >> Best, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:02 AM >> >> I would have said that this criticism is a deliberate >> misrepresentation, except that Lydia Bozhovich makes the same charge of "intellectualism." >> The charge hinges on phrases like "the significance for the child" >> and "the meaning for the child," etc., which etymologically suggest >> the use of signs and words. Thinking with signs and words is >> intellect. But the thing is that it is almost impossible for us to >> describe the relationship of a person to their environment >> psychologically without using words which evoke sign-relations. The >> relation is a psychological one, not a conditioned-reflex, and the >> words we have for relations which are mediated through consciousness >> tend to be words like "meaning" and "significance" which have >> intellectual connotations. The preintellectual stages of >> psychological development which Vygotsky himself theorised are not built into the common language. >> >> Andy >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> --- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> >>> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. >>> >>> There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] >>> --------------------------------------------------- >>> 4. ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really >>> means intellectualism] (see original post below) >>> --------------------------------------------------- >>> >>> Again a pothole. You say: >>> "The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate >>> at their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an >>> intellectual relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims." >>> >>> I think know this, but what is ANL's critique against this? Is it >>> that it is too "intellectual," which is possibly code for elitism or class? >>> Sorry if I wasn't clear. >>> >>> --end From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Oct 28 10:58:27 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 10:58:27 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu> <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu> <54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu> <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net> <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu> Message-ID: Lubomir, Annalisa, and Martin [and also Andy who was active in addressing Annalisa] When discussing the twists and turns between ANL circle and the history of Vygotsky's is it helpful to also include Rubenstein?? if he was engaged in formulating a *principle* of the UNITY of consciousness and activity. Where would we situate Rubenstein in the notion of *plump materialism* and *modal SIMULATION*?? As well as [this] linking *consciousness* AND activity* as a UNITY there is also the other UNITY of *thought* AND *LANGUAGE* [as formed] AND also the third UNITY of *thinking* and *speech* [as forming] Very fertile unities On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Hi Annalisa, > > I was waiting a bit to see if someone else will chime in. > > If we refer to Soviet (now Russian) psychology: > -- They prefer to talk about consciousness rather than mind. > -- All psychological functions and states emerge in the process of human > activity. > --Consciousness is a major category in historical materialism and > therefore has to be accepted as a major category by the social science > disciplines. There are different interpretation of the concept of > consciousness in different social science disciplines. However, they all > had to refer to historical materialism. No one was bigger than historical > materialism. Consciousness is also used in several ways in everyday life. > But that is another story. The kinds of usage should not be mixed. > > Also: > --LSV was sidelined pretty early by Rubinstein. The interest in LSV > resurfaced in the 1980s, but was not too strong. ANL and his students were > reigning and that time. > --ANL had quite of a power struggle with Rubinstein. ANL and his > students/prot?g?s ruled the psychology domain in the USSR at their life > time. > -- Almost all textbooks in psychology after 1970 were written by the ANL > circle. After 1970 Rubinstein was not published much and maybe not at all. > The last psychology textbook by Rubinstein that I have seen was from the > 1960s (first edition 1940). > -- Rubinstein was the first (if memory serves) to formulate the principle > of the unity of consciousness and activity. However, many sources claim he > heavily used works of LSV. Of course, all historical materialists hold to > the principle that consciousness emerges in the process of activity; it is > a product of activity and everyday life environment of the subject. > > Researchers from Russia can provide more precise account. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Annalisa > Aguilar > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 6:54 PM > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really > means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > > > OK! I'm getting somewhere! Thank you for clarifying this term in the > context of the controversy. > > So are you saying that ANL is saying that LSV is saying (sorry to be so > convoluted) that there is an "already established intellect" in the infant > and ANL is saying this assertion can only be preposterous? > > I'm sorry if I still haven't nailed it, and I hope you will forgive my > persistence to understand this, but it seems pretty important. > > If I am understanding properly, this is why I believe (intuitively at this > juncture), that "consciousness" has an imprecise definition between the > parties and its word-meaning is constitutionally different between ANL and > LSV, and I would want to better understand what LSV was referencing when he > used the word. > > I think I can understand why ANL would have issue if he sees consciousness > possible only if it is derived from activity. If this is the case, then is > it possible that this is a philosophical difference as to whether one > believes mind to be present before consciousness, or one believes > consciousness to be present before mind. > > Is that fair to say? > > In a largely materialistic rendering, mind would be first, I am guessing. > > Regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: Andy Blunden > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 4:19 PM > To: Annalisa Aguilar > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" > really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > > In this context, "intellectualism" does not mean "void of affect" or have > anything to do with lack of affect. > "Intellectualism" refers to a theorist who ascribes a capacity for > intellectual activity to (for example) an infant, who would in fact not > have developed the capacity for an intellectual relation to the world. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Andy! > > > > OK. I'm needing to fill in some blanks here. > > > > What is meant exactly by "intellectualism"? Or rather, what did ANL mean? > > > > When you say: > > > > [And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, because it is > intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. > > No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that > > whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like > > "intellect" and "affect".] > > > > Perhaps I am responding to the word "intellectual" in the way it > reflects back to me in my culture: that something or someone "intellectual" > is void of affect (relatively speaking) and that is why those who spurn > intellectuals do so. As such, "intellectuals" will sometimes speak/function > at a level "above" most others, and this usually upsets people who do not > speak/function on the same level. > > > > "Intelligence" is handled differently, though. It seems to me as a > concept "intelligence" is more of whole cloth. > > > > "Intellect" (to me) is thinking without affect. It is rational and seeks > to remove affect, with the "myth" that the products of thought are somehow > "better, more pure" with this affect removed. > > > > I agree of course that the person is whole first, and that we abstract > concepts to describe properties. But there has been a backlash from > abstracting out. Isn't this why Descartes has been so problematic? Isn't > this why Spinoza sought to understand where the emotions "come from" and > what their value is? > > > > So given this, I ask the question again and circling back to the > original charge in your paper, what does it mean for ANL to levy a charge > of "intellectualism" upon LSV? > > > > TIA, > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > > > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 3:10 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" > > really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > > > > Annalisa, it is Leontyev who is pinning the charge of "intellectualism" > > on Vygotsky because he ascribes "meaning" and "significance" to > > children, and therefore sign-use. I am not saying that sign-use is not > > intellectual though. And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, > > because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. > > No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that > > whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like > "intellect" > > and "affect". > > > > Andy > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > >> Hi Andy, > >> > >> Again thanks for more! > >> > >> Here's the thing: I may be getting lost in understanding argument > positions. > >> > >> Are you saying it is Leontiev, et al's position that thinking with > signs and words are intellectual? > >> > >> Because, for me personally, thinking with signs and words involve both > affect and intellect and I don't think they can be separated out. For me, a > person's intelligence is the mediated unification of affect and intellect, > what I believe you are calling consciousness. > >> > >> I feel supported by my position with Vygotsky's discussion of > word-meaning (znachenie slova), if I am understanding word-meaning properly. > >> > >> Again, the words "meaning" and "significance" can have affective > >> meaning and significance! :) (is this the adjective? I want to say > >> "affectual," to match "intellectual" but that isn't a word) > >> > >> Now if for *you* these particular words have "intellectual > connotations," perhaps this difference between you and I supports LSV's > (and my earlier) point that affect and intellect are mediated and will > therefore allow each person have a different and nuanced mix of meaning and > significance for the same set of words and signs, even if we generally > agree on a social meaning and significance, such as the meaning of a flag. > >> > >> This reminds me of the cultural differences regarding the meanings of > color. One can't intellectualize red just by its perception. One can't have > an affect of red either by perception alone (if one were to see red for the > first time), its meaning and significance are socially, historically and > culturally generated. > >> > >> Furthermore, I agree with you that our "Western language" to describe > the interior mind, if I am allowed to say that, is sparse. We know Freud > reached into Greek mythology to give these concepts a handle. This is one > reason I look to Eastern thought so I might learn how these dynamics are > discussed. They do possess words for which we have none. I might also > suggest there are relevant themes in these traditions that apply to > Vygotsky's work. > >> > >> In fact, it might amaze us in the West to truly understand the immense > literature and legacies on these topics of mind and self. It certainly > amazes me. Of course that would be a huge project to be mediated between > cultural elders and not a cultural tourist like myself. I only point out > that there is something there and we are not the pioneers to wrangle with > these problems of mind. > >> > >> I admit that to access these words, one must understand how metaphors > are utilized. In rational-logical traditions, metaphors seem to be > disagreeable. Also there is discussion of the spiritual, since the problems > these traditions hoped to solve were spiritual problems, which may just be > their historically-anchored approach to psychological realities. So, these > barriers may explain the impasse. > >> > >> But if words are tools, I'm sure we might borrow some and they wouldn't > mind. > >> > >> Ha! a pun! "wouldn't mind" get it? :) > >> > >> Best, > >> > >> Annalisa > >> > >> > >> > >> ________________________________________ > >> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:02 AM > >> > >> I would have said that this criticism is a deliberate > >> misrepresentation, except that Lydia Bozhovich makes the same charge of > "intellectualism." > >> The charge hinges on phrases like "the significance for the child" > >> and "the meaning for the child," etc., which etymologically suggest > >> the use of signs and words. Thinking with signs and words is > >> intellect. But the thing is that it is almost impossible for us to > >> describe the relationship of a person to their environment > >> psychologically without using words which evoke sign-relations. The > >> relation is a psychological one, not a conditioned-reflex, and the > >> words we have for relations which are mediated through consciousness > >> tend to be words like "meaning" and "significance" which have > >> intellectual connotations. The preintellectual stages of > >> psychological development which Vygotsky himself theorised are not > built into the common language. > >> > >> Andy > >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> --- > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> > >> > >>> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's > breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. > >>> > >>> There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] > >>> --------------------------------------------------- > >>> 4. ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really > >>> means intellectualism] (see original post below) > >>> --------------------------------------------------- > >>> > >>> Again a pothole. You say: > >>> "The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate > >>> at their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an > >>> intellectual relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims." > >>> > >>> I think know this, but what is ANL's critique against this? Is it > >>> that it is too "intellectual," which is possibly code for elitism or > class? > >>> Sorry if I wasn't clear. > >>> > >>> --end > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Oct 28 11:39:13 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 18:39:13 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: <1414516868304.10622@unm.edu> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu>,<54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu>, <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net>, <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu>, <1414516868304.10622@unm.edu> Message-ID: In my view, Annalisa, "consciousness" is used instead of "mind" because if we don't take that step it is all to easy to fall into the assumption that mind is a separate kind of entity from matter; that is, to adopt the ontological dualism of 'the mental' versus 'the material.' That confusion then leads to questions like "what can 'material' mean when mind is material?" Whereas if we ask instead "what can 'material' mean when consciousness is material?" we should be a lot less baffled, because it is evident that various arrangements of matter do indeed support consciousness. Martin On Oct 28, 2014, at 12:21 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > I'm curious why "consciousness" is used instead of "mind." Is there an answer to this other than philosophical? Or is it the case that the matter is accepted as settled because of historical materialism's prerogatives? In other words, is the use of the word just accepted as such because it has become a convention? Do people today question the use of the word as it has been used? From ablunden@mira.net Tue Oct 28 17:30:46 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 11:30:46 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: <1414516868304.10622@unm.edu> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu>, <54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu>, <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net>, <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu>, <1414516868304.10622@unm.edu> Message-ID: <54503536.5080603@mira.net> These words gained their meaning in German philosophy and subsequently in Marx. So the reasons lie in the German language. In German, the word for "mind" is Geist, which is usually translated as "spirit" and is a highly polysemous word with a host of connotations which make it difficult for social or natural science to use. Bewusstsein, the German version of con-scio-usness, does not have these far reaching connotations, being derived from "being in the know" and references both psychological ideas and forms of ideology. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > I'm curious why "consciousness" is used instead of "mind." Is there an answer to this other than philosophical? Or is it the case that the matter is accepted as settled because of historical materialism's prerogatives? In other words, is the use of the word just accepted as such because it has become a convention? Do people today question the use of the word as it has been used? > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Oct 28 21:40:38 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 04:40:38 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu>,<54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu>, <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net>, <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu>, <1414516868304.10622@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1414557637926.61380@unm.edu> Hello Martin, I hesitate to have this conversation on consciousness, because I am not sure if it is of interest to the members of the list. I also do not want to create a tempestuous discussion on a very tricky topic such as consciousness. You indicate there are implications of mind and material duality, with which I do not believe I disagree. However, I believe likewise there are implications for assigning consciousness as a product of mental and other processes, and this is why I would prefer to say that the mind is a product of mental and other processes, not consciousness. My position may seem to run counter to a materialist rendering of mind (or consciousness as the word is typically used in materialist discourse), but I don't believe that it has to. Unfortunately (or fortunately), I feel obliged to do more reading on this before openly discussing it. I did by accident discover an intriguing paper by K.E. Levitin called, "Always a Meaningful Pattern." from JREEP Vol. 36.No. 6. which I am currently wading through. It discusses Charles Sherrington a British neuroscientist who received the Nobel Prize in 1932, and his resistance to materialist theories of consciousness that were prevalent with Russian counterparts. Sarkarov evidently wrote a paper about the contention between Sherrington and Pavlov titled, "The Cunning of Sir Charles," which evidently "reads like a detective story" and I may try to find it, if it has been translated from the Russian. ...in case anyone's curious about that. Andy seems to have a good story of how "consciousness" came into usage and that this usage is from the German. Seems like a reasonable explanation. Given that Freud and other prominent psychologists were German, as was Marx and various other muscular philosophers of the 19th Century, it makes sense. Regardless of how engrained it is, for me, it doesn't seem like a good use of the word, but that is me. I'm not attempting to change anyone's consciousness on that. Just because mind means "spirit" in German, seems like a bad reason to give up using "mind" in English. It's almost as if "mind" has become a profanity. Vygotsky's book was titled "Mind in Society," not "Consciousness in Society" which as a title would really not work, as I see it. Martin, I also do not see how various arrangements of matter indeed support consciousness so I'd have to ask your clarity upon that idea, because no where I look in the world where there is consciousness and I rearrange it does it seem to make a difference. Somehow I don't think you are talking about Feng Shui! :) Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2014 12:39 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In my view, Annalisa, "consciousness" is used instead of "mind" because if we don't take that step it is all to easy to fall into the assumption that mind is a separate kind of entity from matter; that is, to adopt the ontological dualism of 'the mental' versus 'the material.' That confusion then leads to questions like "what can 'material' mean when mind is material?" Whereas if we ask instead "what can 'material' mean when consciousness is material?" we should be a lot less baffled, because it is evident that various arrangements of matter do indeed support consciousness. Martin On Oct 28, 2014, at 12:21 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > I'm curious why "consciousness" is used instead of "mind." Is there an answer to this other than philosophical? Or is it the case that the matter is accepted as settled because of historical materialism's prerogatives? In other words, is the use of the word just accepted as such because it has become a convention? Do people today question the use of the word as it has been used? From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Oct 28 22:18:25 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 05:18:25 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] In-Reply-To: References: <1414371755253.24181@unm.edu> <544DA234.1080608@mira.net> <1414377486343.33343@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1414559904205.28945@unm.edu> Hi David! I was so happy to read your post. Thank you for going through it so carefully. Immediate things I have learned from your post: 1. Leontiev not only rejected Marxism (for Stalinism) but also Darwinism for Lamarck. I'm not sure what this means at this point, because I am not familiar with Lamarck's work. But dismissing Darwin seems non-trivial. 2. "Is personality all that matters?" as a question in psychology at that time. Is that a fair statement? 3. I am grateful for your rendering of the events as the split occurred, and I have downloaded the letters and will read these as soon as I can. As you say, we must pick up the wreckage to understand the causes. What I think about is how we may have moved forward without the missing pieces without perhaps noticing that there were missing pieces! With truth as the baseline, and science as the means, we must filter out the parts that are wrong and not useful, and doing so need not be controversial, but unifying. This seems to be a good thing. Anyone is free to correct me, but perhaps what makes this situation so peculiar, is that Vygotsky and his cohorts lived in something of a bubble. We know he did meet some researchers in the West (the train to London), but most of his work was generated from reading the work of others and his experiments were based upon those readings. I seem to recall Piaget did not hear about him until long after LSV's passing (I may not have that exactly right). Then the fact that the texts were banned and everything and everyone associated with LSV was forced underground. Fast forward to the future and we have Luria meeting Bruner as the first point of contact in the US. I'm only an armchair historian, so I don't have all the facts. However, I can certainly understand the disruption in the exchange of ideas evident in 20th Century psychology because Vygotsky's work was not available to contemporaries for international peer review and compare this to, say, the disruption in the exchange of ideas in 17th Century physics because Galileo was under house arrest. Somehow I think Galileo had an easier time as did other scientists of his time to access his work, which may not be saying much, or it may be saying a lot, depending upon how ironic you feel when you read this. My point is everyone suffers when there is no intellectual freedom. We suffer today for not having had access to LSV's work, as did his contemporaries, who either were forced to disavow it or who did not even know it existed. I value intellectual freedom probably more than other kinds of freedoms. I always like to say I will gain more freedom by giving freedom to others. :) David, I'd like to reply further to the rest your email in another post, which I hope I have time to address tomorrow. Until then... Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 3:28 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] Dear Annalisa: Yes, you are right--there are watchers who are benefiting. In particular, I am watching as the discussion gradually seems to come over to two points that were initially pared away but which I find essential to the whole puzzle. And there too you are right--they are historical and theoretical, first of all Leontiev's "politically expedient" support for Stalinism (and consequently his rejection of genuine Marxism, and even basic Darwinism), and secondly the question of whether personality stands alone as the object of psychology. First of all, I don't know of the circumstances of Leontiev's writings on the environment any more than Andy does. But the split between Vygotsky and Leontiev is well documented. We have letters, in which Vygotsky first tries to convince "A.N." of the importance of consciousness and fails (in 1931), where he remarks to Luria the importance of trying to convince Leontiev, the "breakup" of the original group in 1931 (a heartbreaking letter) and then Vygotsky's much more reserved letters to Leontiev just before his death (May 1934). All of this in "In Memory of L.S. Vygotsky: Letters to Students and Colleagues", Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, vol. 45, No. 2 (pp. 11-60), See also Anton Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12124-011-9168-5/fulltext.html#Sec1 I feel as you do, that under the circumstances, the criticisms of Leontiev and P.I. Zinchenko and others were acts of betrayal, similar to what Lysenko did to his old professor Vavilov, the would-be founder of modern Soviet genetics. But I also think that the best we can do now is to try to locate and counter the long term effects upon our understanding of Vygotsky's ideas. It seems to me that there are (at least) three: a) As Kozulin has remarked (and Andy came very close to admitting), Leontiev made "activity" into both the object of investigation and the explanatory principle. This is essentially what Leontiev himself accused Vygotsky of doing with "perezhivanie", and it is indeed a form of circular reasoning: activity is explained by activity itself. This revisionism is a long term effect because very few people who use activity as a unit of analysis realize that although activity is made up of action and nothing but, action is not simply a microcosm of activity. b) Leontiev and Zinchenko (and later Wertsch) rejected word meaning as a unit of analysis for verbal thinking as "idealist". This has meant rejection of what to me is Vygotsky's most important and lasting contribution, something he shares with Volosinov, which is the discovery that the developed mind has a semantic structure rather than a "behavioral" or "cognitive" one. This revisionism is a long-term effect because it has divided Vygotsky in two, particularly in the anglophone world (a Vygotsky of "Mind in Society" which scarcely mentions language and one of "Thinking and Speech" which scarcely mentions anything without mentioning language). c) Leontiev's concept of development is Lamarckian and not Darwinian--it cannot involve the nasty surprises of real development (e.g. the crisis, which Leontiev explicitly rejects on p. 362 of his book Problems of the Development of the Mind).This is a long term effect because it has been taken up by the so-called "Neo-Vygotskyans" (see Karpov's book, "The Neo-Vygotskyan Approach to Child Development", CUP 2005). Leontiev embraced Lysenkoism, and never renounced it; and in the twentieth century, you cannot write scientifically about development without a scientific understanding of modern genetics that is incompatible with Lysenkoism. The second, theoretical, issue that you raise actually follows on from point a). Why isn't "perizhivanie" a circular construction the same way that "activity" is? The answer is that it is--if you use perizhivanie to investigate perizhivanie--or even some kind of mega-perizhivanie called "personality". But of course that isn't what Vygotsky does at all. a) First of all, in Vygotsky's essay perizhivanie is a unit of analysis for a very specific problem: differentiating the contribution of the environment from the contribution of the child in the understanding of experience. Perizhivanie includes both in a very simplified form: the emotional response of the child to the environment. At the same time, however, it is not circular because it is an open system--open to the contribution from the child's hereditary endowment (which as Vygotsky says in the lecture on heredity can actually change as the child develops) as well as open to the various contributions from the child's cultural endowment that Leontiev and his followers insisted were the alpha and omega of development. b) Secondly, personality is not so much a "mega-perizhivanie" as a "meta-perezhivanie", since, as Vygotsky makes very clear in the last chapter of the History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, personality is really only half of the unit he posits for child development, the other half of which he calls "world outlook". What is the difference? It is tempting to say that the difference is that one is more subjective and the other more objective, but it's not really reducible to that. I think, if I had to point to a single criterion for differentiating the two, I would say that "perezhivanie" is retroleptic, looking back to emotion and reflecting upon it, while "world outlook" is proleptic. c) Thirdly, Vygotsky's theory of development is a second order theory: the means of development itself develops. So you notice that in the lecture on the environment, he begins with a very short passage on perezhivanie but then segues almost seamlessly--so that you scarcely notice it--into a discussion of sense and signification in word meaning. To me, this suggests that the development of personality is eventually subsumed (or sublated, if you prefer) by something else--the development of verbal thinking. This is rather hard for us to accept; we all feel as if we are basically personalities and nothing else. But of course the personality must come to the end of its useful life sometime, in much the same way that Vygotsky's spoken lectures were subsumed by his written speech at the moment of his death. Let me just finish by saying that I was a bit thrown by the ref to the Bildungsroman too! But I think Andy is referring to Goethe's "Life of Wilhelm Meister" or perhaps to "Elective Affinities" (which is where Vygotsky probably got the spiel about the water molecule, though John Stuart Mill uses it too). Andy's ref, like his idea that personality is the object of psychology, is too narrativistic for my taste--I think that the mind does indeed have a semantic structure, but that semantic structure is really more like a dialogue than a text. A narrative without dialogue is a little like the sound of one sock puppet clapping. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 27 October 2014 11:38, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Andy, > > Thanks for some additional information. > > Yes, "political expediency" (PE) is an understatement to be sure, from the sound of it. I don't know if I can imagine myself to denounce my own beloved teachers in order that I may live and be promoted. The idea makes me quite ill, and certainly more sympathetic to Leontiev. > > However, the challenge seems to be that we must tease away the PE aspect to try to clear the view to the generation of the theories (or divergence thereof). If that isn't reasonable, let me know. I do not mean to be reductive and minimize the political issues in any way. > > I am merely attempting to go slowly over this so that I gain a clear picture of the collision of ideas and the apparent wreckage and what pieces were retrieved and extended upon. > > So I suppose there are a few things I would enjoy clarity about. > > First is historical: > > How much do we know that is factual in Leontiev's motivation to deny the theories? What is speculative? This is not a flippant two questions. What I mean is are there contemporary documents (or any other documents that come after Stalin's death, or any other time) that discuss this parting of the ways and motivations for doing so? Is this Leontiev paper all that we possess? > > What do you mean that the differences show through, despite the PE factor? We cannot fully remove the PE factor, I know, but how much does it explain the "real differences" if it is clouding the view? > > Second is theoretical: > > I understand perezhivanie is experiential, specific to the individual in question, based upon the person's genetics, level of development, emotional awareness, and intellectual ability at the time of the situation (event), but importantly that the perezhivanie is also inclusive of aspects of the environment itself and how the environment exerts force on the person (combined or in interaction with the more personal or "internal" factors). > > [I'm afraid I was lost at the reference to the autobiography. Goethe is beyond the limits of my knowledge at this time. :) ] > > Furthermore, that the development of the person is not necessarily a "summation of all perezhivanies." If only because a single experience can radically change a person's makeup entirely, whether for good or ill. That a single "unit" can possibly transform the entire whole? (I'm thinking for example the impact of PTSD. I hesitate to resort to a pathological example, it just what seems to illustrate the best about experiences affecting the whole). > > However I agree that my personality is the manifest expression of the "collection" of all my experiences, I'm not sure if I could say "summation," since this sounds mechanical in nature, rather than systemic. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 7:39 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] > > Annalisa, > I don't know exactly when the ANL document was written or where/if it > was published originally, but it was certainly after LSV's death and > before ANL's death (i.e. some time 1935-1975), most likely during > Stalin's time. "Political expediency" somewhat understates the issue. A > convincing denunciation of a colleague's theory was very often a matter > of life and death. Which is not to say that the honourable choice may > not have been to speak the truth and take the consequences, rather than > lie and enjoy promotion. In that sense, this document, being dishonest, > is not the ideal medium for understanding the real differences between > these two former comrades. Nonetheless, I think the real differences > show through. > > On the question of units. The idea is that a person's character develops > through a series of experiences. Each experiences adds a new > sensibility, a new aversion, a new preference, a new insight, etc., so > from that point of view a person's character can be understand as the > product or sum of a series of such experiences, as for example, when > someone writes their autobiography, especially if they follow in the > Goethean tradition of Bildungsromanen. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> Hi Andy, >> >> >> I must explain: Since I hadn't read the entire paper, I was searching >> for the 8 points in the first half of the paper, which is The >> Prosecution half. This is to say the "8 charges" you had indicated in >> your post, are actually listed in the second half, the Defense half. >> So I suppose the structure threw me. (Sorry to create any confusion, all!) >> >> But I'd like to continue my exercise openly, as it appears there are >> watchers who are benefiting. So here goes (I will go more slowly and >> not flood the list). >> >> #1) The charge by Leontiev (Ad. 4): Perezhivanie, as a manifestation >> of the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality. >> >> One nagging question: Vygotsky, while living (as I understand), had a >> large social group in which they openly discussed all of these >> theories. If Leontiev was privy to this community, how could he not >> have understood the points concerning perezhivanie? It is not that I >> accuse Leontiev as being obstinate or thick (that would be an easy >> thing to do), but that I want to understand how could he have missed >> this if there were other parties available to discuss the nature of >> Vygotsky's perezhivanie? The community must have discussed these >> concepts without Vygotsky present, among each other. Am I wrong in >> this thinking? >> >> I don't think Vygotsky was like Jesus with confused disciples. It >> seemed that he treated his students as equals and that he himself >> benefited from their input to the theories. >> >> If I may, I position this question with the imagination as-if Vygotsky >> and Leontiev were here on this list discussing various theories, as we >> are here. There was a lot of discussion going on, sharing and the like. >> >> Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't these lectures on perezhivanie >> happen earlier in the decade of time Vygotsky graced us? Or am I mistaken? >> >> I suppose I am attempting to answer the question, How did Leontiev not >> understand perezhivanie as a determinant? And perhaps in gaining an >> answer to this question, we might learn something about *teaching* the >> concept of perezhivanie? >> >> Of course it is possible that this was entirely caused by political >> expediency. But if that is the case, how can we know this? >> >> But to the content of the charge: "Perezhivanie, as a manifestation of >> the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality." >> >> I am having a hard time discussing perezhivanie as a "fragment of the >> whole." If only because fragment means "a part of", and I don't think >> "unit" is necessarily a material thing, but also an abstraction like >> the whole is an abstraction. >> >> For example: The water molecule metaphor. (I hope we do not reduce the >> molecule to hydrogen and oxygen and begin flames on the list). In our >> perception, we *imagine* the molecule. We know that molecules exist, >> just like we know that the ocean exists. But when we perceive the >> ocean, it's also not a perception in its entirety, but completed in >> our imagination like the molecule is, and this is why I feel the unit, >> seen as a fragment, seems problematic. >> >> If we want to study the nature of oceans we want to study the nature >> of water, since water is the material of the ocean. Also, the water >> molecule is the unit we must use to understand the behavior of the >> water. And so the molecule becomes the unit of analysis. >> >> If the metaphor works, the ocean is the ideal, and final form. Can we >> say that the water molecule determines the nature of the ocean? It >> seems so, since the behavior of water (as indicated by the nature of >> its molecule) will reveal significantly the nature of the ocean, >> moreso than dividing the ocean into fragments, and I'm not sure how >> one would divide the ocean into fragments, anyway! >> >> BTW, I am proposing this metaphor because we know that LSV used the >> metaphor of the water molecule himself, though I don't think he spoke >> of oceans, just water. Still, I wonder if it works? >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Oct 29 04:21:55 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 11:21:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: <1414557637926.61380@unm.edu> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu>,<54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu>, <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net>, <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu>, <1414516868304.10622@unm.edu>, <1414557637926.61380@unm.edu> Message-ID: Hi Annalisa, In Germany the social sciences are still known today as the "Geisteswissenschaften," and what would be called in English 'philosophy of mind' is "Philosophie des Geistes." The root of English "consciousness" is the Latin "conscire," ?to be privy to,' so its components are consc-ious-ness, not con-scio-usness. The word that LSV uses that is generally translated as 'consciousness' is "soznanie." Back in 2007 there was a discussion here of that term. "Mind in Society" was an edited compilation of LSV's texts, and so the title was not his. Martin On Oct 28, 2014, at 11:40 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Andy seems to have a good story of how "consciousness" came into usage and that this usage is from the German. Seems like a reasonable explanation. Given that Freud and other prominent psychologists were German, as was Marx and various other muscular philosophers of the 19th Century, it makes sense. Regardless of how engrained it is, for me, it doesn't seem like a good use of the word, but that is me. I'm not attempting to change anyone's consciousness on that. Just because mind means "spirit" in German, seems like a bad reason to give up using "mind" in English. It's almost as if "mind" has become a profanity. From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Wed Oct 29 05:42:12 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 12:42:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu>,<54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu>, <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net>, <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu>, <1414516868304.10622@unm.edu>, <1414557637926.61380@unm.edu> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102239DA3@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Martin, I am not sure why you argue that consciousness should be thought of as consc-ious-ness , since the root, 'conscire' is clearly itself a compound (con-scire - know together/know in common - be privy to). 'Understand' also has its origins in a use of 'under' to mean 'among' (as in 'under certain circumstances') so this too refers to the shared nature of understanding - not just knowing something but also knowing how it is known by others (and who knows it and who doesn't). My own understanding of 'mind' is something close to an internalised awareness of how things are known, making for very indistinct boundaries between what is our 'own' thought and what is remembered, reconstructed or (often unwittingly) borrowed from others. Among older people it is not uncommon to hear something one has recently said returned as if it had appeared in the speaker's mind as an original thought. I think our (relatively recent) preference for thinking of our thoughts as spontaneously generated 'in' our brains may allow us to overlook how much of our thinking (and our feeling about our thinking) is grounded in a history of social experience. I think we have touched on the ideas of Julian Jaynes in this forum in the past and I think his ideas are relevant here - as might be Karen Barad's arguments about the moveable nature of 'agential cuts' between what we think/feel is 'inside me' and what we put 'outside' as 'my environment'. All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: 29 October 2014 11:22 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] Hi Annalisa, In Germany the social sciences are still known today as the "Geisteswissenschaften," and what would be called in English 'philosophy of mind' is "Philosophie des Geistes." The root of English "consciousness" is the Latin "conscire," 'to be privy to,' so its components are consc-ious-ness, not con-scio-usness. The word that LSV uses that is generally translated as 'consciousness' is "soznanie." Back in 2007 there was a discussion here of that term. "Mind in Society" was an edited compilation of LSV's texts, and so the title was not his. Martin On Oct 28, 2014, at 11:40 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Andy seems to have a good story of how "consciousness" came into usage and that this usage is from the German. Seems like a reasonable explanation. Given that Freud and other prominent psychologists were German, as was Marx and various other muscular philosophers of the 19th Century, it makes sense. Regardless of how engrained it is, for me, it doesn't seem like a good use of the word, but that is me. I'm not attempting to change anyone's consciousness on that. Just because mind means "spirit" in German, seems like a bad reason to give up using "mind" in English. It's almost as if "mind" has become a profanity. ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Oct 29 06:19:22 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 13:19:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102239DA3@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu>,<54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu>, <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net>, <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu>, <1414516868304.10622@unm.edu>, <1414557637926.61380@unm.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102239DA3@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <406FA302-719C-4996-89EE-46B642B59310@uniandes.edu.co> Hi Rod, Yes, I agree - "mind" has become very much part of our Western folk psychology, so much so that it's very difficult to remove it from a scientific psychology. Why, for example, does awareness have to be "internal" or "internalized"? The 2007 discussion that I pointed to was in part about the shared character of consciousness. Martin On Oct 29, 2014, at 7:42 AM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > Martin, > > I am not sure why you argue that consciousness should be thought of as consc-ious-ness , since the root, 'conscire' is clearly itself a compound (con-scire - know together/know in common - be privy to). 'Understand' also has its origins in a use of 'under' to mean 'among' (as in 'under certain circumstances') so this too refers to the shared nature of understanding - not just knowing something but also knowing how it is known by others (and who knows it and who doesn't). My own understanding of 'mind' is something close to an internalised awareness of how things are known, making for very indistinct boundaries between what is our 'own' thought and what is remembered, reconstructed or (often unwittingly) borrowed from others. > > Among older people it is not uncommon to hear something one has recently said returned as if it had appeared in the speaker's mind as an original thought. I think our (relatively recent) preference for thinking of our thoughts as spontaneously generated 'in' our brains may allow us to overlook how much of our thinking (and our feeling about our thinking) is grounded in a history of social experience. I think we have touched on the ideas of Julian Jaynes in this forum in the past and I think his ideas are relevant here - as might be Karen Barad's arguments about the moveable nature of 'agential cuts' between what we think/feel is 'inside me' and what we put 'outside' as 'my environment'. > > All the best, > > Rod > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > Sent: 29 October 2014 11:22 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > > Hi Annalisa, > > In Germany the social sciences are still known today as the "Geisteswissenschaften," and what would be called in English 'philosophy of mind' is "Philosophie des Geistes." > > The root of English "consciousness" is the Latin "conscire," 'to be privy to,' so its components are consc-ious-ness, not con-scio-usness. > > The word that LSV uses that is generally translated as 'consciousness' is "soznanie." Back in 2007 there was a discussion here of that term. "Mind in Society" was an edited compilation of LSV's texts, and so the title was not his. > > Martin > > On Oct 28, 2014, at 11:40 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Andy seems to have a good story of how "consciousness" came into usage and that this usage is from the German. Seems like a reasonable explanation. Given that Freud and other prominent psychologists were German, as was Marx and various other muscular philosophers of the 19th Century, it makes sense. Regardless of how engrained it is, for me, it doesn't seem like a good use of the word, but that is me. I'm not attempting to change anyone's consciousness on that. Just because mind means "spirit" in German, seems like a bad reason to give up using "mind" in English. It's almost as if "mind" has become a profanity. > > > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Oct 29 08:13:57 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 15:13:57 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102239DA3@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu>, <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu>,<54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu>, <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net>, <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu>, <1414516868304.10622@unm.edu>, <1414557637926.61380@unm.edu> <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102239DA3@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <5225ED5C-674C-436F-9B86-4184AD66D5D2@uniandes.edu.co> There is an interesting discussion of the equivalents of 'consciousness' in various languages, their histories, and the difficulties of translating the term, in The Dictionary of Untranslatables: Martin From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Oct 29 14:37:08 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2014 06:37:08 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] In-Reply-To: <1414559904205.28945@unm.edu> References: <1414371755253.24181@unm.edu> <544DA234.1080608@mira.net> <1414377486343.33343@unm.edu> <1414559904205.28945@unm.edu> Message-ID: Dear Annalisa: What a marvelous muddle of misinterpretations I appear to have made! As Huw points out, I am always doing this. It's not deliberate, but nevertheless over the years I have grown rather fond of some of them. And, as Leonard Cohen says, there is a crack in everything, but that's how the light gets in. Point One: Stalinism vs. Marxism, and Lysenkoism vs. Darwinism: Of course, to most people in Russia and outside Russia, Stalinism WAS Marxism. But Vygotsky certainly knew better. Take this, from the first lecture on pedology. Vygotsky is discussing three theories of how development might take place--the theory that it is preformed, the theory that it is entirely determined, and the theory that development must NECESSARILY involve structures that are NOT preformed but also NOT environmentally determined. He has just disposed of the first of these, the "personality theory" of Stern (which is the idea that intellect comes pre-formed in the child, something Vygotsky refers to as "intellectualism", because it leads to the circular idea that the explanation for intellect is nothing more than pre-existing intellect). Vygotsky says: 1-51] ??????, ??????????????? ???? ? ????? ??, ??? ???????, ???????????? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ???????? ??????????????? ??? ???????, ????????????? ?? ??????????? ?????? ????????, ? ??? ???????, ??????? ??????? ???????????? ?????, ??????. ????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ? ? ?????????? ????? ? ????? ????? ? ? ????????? ????????? ? ??????? ??????? ???????. ????????, ??? ??????? ???? ????????? ???????, ??????? ?????????? ??????, ??? ????? ???????????? ??????? ???????????? ?? ???????, ???, ????? ???????, ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ??????? ????????? ? ????, ??????? ? ????, ?????? ? ???? ????? ????? ???????????, ??????? ????????? ????? ?????????? ??? ?????. ????????, ???????: ???????? ??????? ???? ?????????? ??????, ??? ??????? ??????, - ?????? ???? ???????, ?? ???????? ????????? ? ???? ???????? ????????, ?? ?????? ????????? ????, ????????? ????. ????????????, ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ? 1,5 ?? 5 ???, ? ?? ?????? ? ?? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ???????? ???????????? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ????????? ? ????? ?????-?????? ????? ?? ??? ??? ??????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ???? ??????. ?? ??? ?? ????? ????????? ???? ????? ??????, ???????????? ???????, ??? ?????-?? ?????????????, ?? ??? ?????????? ????????? (??? ?????? ???????????), ? ??? "tabula rasa" - ?? ???????, ????????, ??? ?????????. ?????? ????????, ?????? ???????? ??????????? ????? ????? ??????, ??? ??????? ???? "tabula rasa" - ????? ???? ??????, ?????? ?????, ??? ??? ??????? (??????? ?????? ?? ?????? ?????), ?? ??????? ?????? ?? ????????, ? ??? ?? ?? ??? ????????, ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ???????????; ?.?. ??????? ???? ????? ????????? ???????, ??????? ? ????? ?? ????????? ? ?????? ?????? ??????? ????????, ???????????? ??? ??? ????????. ??? ???? ?????? ?????????????? ???????, ?????? ?????, ??????? ? ???? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ???, ??? ?????????? ?????????? ??? ?????. ??????? ???? ?????? ????????? ?????, ?? ??????? ????? ?? ???? ????? ????????? ? ??????????? ???? ??, ??? ?? ????? ? ?????????? ??? ?????. ("Another developmental theory, opposed to this and equally, it seems to me, wrong, is that development is seen as a process which is not due to its own internal laws but as a process that is entirely determined externally by the environment. Such points of view have been developed in bourgeois science and have occurred in Soviet pedology for a long time. The belief that the child is a passive product arose because of the specific impact of the environment on the child; thus the development is only that the child absorbs, acquires and assimilates into himself outside such features that enter into the milieu of people around him. We say, for example, that the development of the child's speech is because the child hears what is said around him, he begins to imitate it and thus also begins to speak; he merely absorbs it, learning it. The question is, why does he learn it from 1.5 to 5 years, and not earlier or later? Why does he learn it in a way that goes through defined stages? Why does he not learn it just as any lesson is memorized at school? None of these questions can be answered by this theory. Instead, it develops a point of view which considers the child, not as once he was considered, a young adult (the theory of preformism) but instead as a ?tabula rasa? (Vygotsky uses the Latin original here?DK), an expression that you have probably heard: a white sheet of paper, a blank slate, as they say (the Romans wrote on a clean slate) on which nothing is written and that will take whatever you write on it; i.e. the child is a purely passive product which does not bring with him from the outset any of the moments that will determine the course of his development. He is simply a perceiving machine, a vessel that, during its development, is filled with the content of his experience. The child is simply imprinted by the environment; through the external path of the environment he acquires and assigns to himself what he sees in the people around him.) You notice how Vygotsky rather mischievously points out that these "Marxist" ideas are simplly the equivalent of bourgeois behaviorism (but notice that, unlike Leontiev, he does not name names, and that he picks on a trend that is dominant rather than on the dead and the dying). Similarly, to most people inside Russia, Lysenkoism WAS Darwinism (Lysenko put forward the Lamarckian theory that learned characteristics could then be handed down genetically to offspring--this has been interpreted by people as a statement about eugenically creating a perfect socialist man within a single generation, but at the time it had more to do with growing wheat in winter). But Vygotsky knew better--in Chapter Five of "The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions" (p. 100, if you have the English Collected Works), Vygotsky spends a page or two contrasting Lamarck to Darwin. ( He doesn't condemn Buhler for trying to combine them; interestingly, he leaves open the possibility that Lamarckianism DOES work--for cultural functions, and not for biological ones. Point Two: Personalism. Vygotsky was NOT in a bubble, and that was part of his problem; he was living in a country which was trying to create one. Remember that Vygotsky was a Jew, that is, what Stalin would later call a "rootless cosmopolitan". Jews in Russia were not really considered Russians. They benefitted enormously from the Bolshevik Revolution (Vygotsky was preparing himself for either medicine or the law, because those were the only professions open to Jews, but with the Revolution suddenly every door was open to him--except, of course, for that of physical health and it is somewhat ironic that he spent his last three years trying to become a doctor after all). He was ferociously literate (you remember that German was quite literally his mother's tongue, and so I think Andy's speculation that he never read Hegel must be taken as both unproven and unlikely). He was particularly well read in the very latest in German psychology--which in his time was the very latest on earth--and his work is full of references to the most obscure writers, including Realschule teachers in Saxony and Ph.D. students in Leipzig. So Vygotsky read and actually met Wilhelm Stern, who was creating a kind of psychology of the personality which later became immensely popular with the Catholic church (and remains quite dominant in Germany today). As we saw above, it's a preformist theory: it says the child comes with a personality and with the idea of speech all hard-wired (and of course this latter idea is still at the core of Chomskyan linguistics today). Vygotsky's criticism of "intellectualism" is that if we want to explain the intellect we need to start with something that is manifestly NOT intellect, or at least not intellect in its finished form (e.g. emotion). If you begin with something that is already intellect, what you have is not an explanation of development but only a description of growth. The same criticism can, of course, be applied to the concept of "personality", and it's why Levitin calls his book about the Vygotsky school "One Is Not Born a Personality". Point Three: Most people consider that Vygotsky's August 2, 1933, letter to Leontiev signals their definitive break-up. I'm not so sure; it seems to me the parting of ways occurred earlier in some way and later in others. I prefer to think of it as a geological movement rather than an interpersonal drama. But you read it and decide! David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 29 October 2014 14:18, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi David! > > I was so happy to read your post. Thank you for going through it so carefully. > > Immediate things I have learned from your post: > 1. Leontiev not only rejected Marxism (for Stalinism) but also Darwinism for Lamarck. I'm not sure what this means at this point, because I am not familiar with Lamarck's work. But dismissing Darwin seems non-trivial. > > 2. "Is personality all that matters?" as a question in psychology at that time. Is that a fair statement? > > 3. I am grateful for your rendering of the events as the split occurred, and I have downloaded the letters and will read these as soon as I can. > > As you say, we must pick up the wreckage to understand the causes. What I think about is how we may have moved forward without the missing pieces without perhaps noticing that there were missing pieces! > > With truth as the baseline, and science as the means, we must filter out the parts that are wrong and not useful, and doing so need not be controversial, but unifying. This seems to be a good thing. > > Anyone is free to correct me, but perhaps what makes this situation so peculiar, is that Vygotsky and his cohorts lived in something of a bubble. We know he did meet some researchers in the West (the train to London), but most of his work was generated from reading the work of others and his experiments were based upon those readings. I seem to recall Piaget did not hear about him until long after LSV's passing (I may not have that exactly right). Then the fact that the texts were banned and everything and everyone associated with LSV was forced underground. > > Fast forward to the future and we have Luria meeting Bruner as the first point of contact in the US. I'm only an armchair historian, so I don't have all the facts. However, I can certainly understand the disruption in the exchange of ideas evident in 20th Century psychology because Vygotsky's work was not available to contemporaries for international peer review and compare this to, say, the disruption in the exchange of ideas in 17th Century physics because Galileo was under house arrest. Somehow I think Galileo had an easier time as did other scientists of his time to access his work, which may not be saying much, or it may be saying a lot, depending upon how ironic you feel when you read this. > > My point is everyone suffers when there is no intellectual freedom. We suffer today for not having had access to LSV's work, as did his contemporaries, who either were forced to disavow it or who did not even know it existed. > > I value intellectual freedom probably more than other kinds of freedoms. I always like to say I will gain more freedom by giving freedom to others. :) > > David, I'd like to reply further to the rest your email in another post, which I hope I have time to address tomorrow. > > Until then... > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg > Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 3:28 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] > > Dear Annalisa: > > Yes, you are right--there are watchers who are benefiting. In > particular, I am watching as the discussion gradually seems to come > over to two points that were initially pared away but which I find > essential to the whole puzzle. And there too you are right--they are > historical and theoretical, first of all Leontiev's "politically > expedient" support for Stalinism (and consequently his rejection of > genuine Marxism, and even basic Darwinism), and secondly the question > of whether personality stands alone as the object of psychology. > > First of all, I don't know of the circumstances of Leontiev's writings > on the environment any more than Andy does. But the split between > Vygotsky and Leontiev is well documented. We have letters, in which > Vygotsky first tries to convince "A.N." of the importance of > consciousness and fails (in 1931), where he remarks to Luria the > importance of trying to convince Leontiev, the "breakup" of the > original group in 1931 (a heartbreaking letter) and then Vygotsky's > much more reserved letters to Leontiev just before his death (May > 1934). All of this in "In Memory of L.S. Vygotsky: Letters to Students > and Colleagues", Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, vol. > 45, No. 2 (pp. 11-60), See also Anton Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work: > > http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12124-011-9168-5/fulltext.html#Sec1 > > I feel as you do, that under the circumstances, the criticisms of > Leontiev and P.I. Zinchenko and others were acts of betrayal, similar > to what Lysenko did to his old professor Vavilov, the would-be founder > of modern Soviet genetics. But I also think that the best we can do > now is to try to locate and counter the long term effects upon our > understanding of Vygotsky's ideas. It seems to me that there are (at > least) three: > > a) As Kozulin has remarked (and Andy came very close to admitting), > Leontiev made "activity" into both the object of investigation and the > explanatory principle. This is essentially what Leontiev himself > accused Vygotsky of doing with "perezhivanie", and it is indeed a form > of circular reasoning: activity is explained by activity itself. This > revisionism is a long term effect because very few people who use > activity as a unit of analysis realize that although activity is made > up of action and nothing but, action is not simply a microcosm of > activity. > > b) Leontiev and Zinchenko (and later Wertsch) rejected word meaning as > a unit of analysis for verbal thinking as "idealist". This has meant > rejection of what to me is Vygotsky's most important and lasting > contribution, something he shares with Volosinov, which is the > discovery that the developed mind has a semantic structure rather than > a "behavioral" or "cognitive" one. This revisionism is a long-term > effect because it has divided Vygotsky in two, particularly in the > anglophone world (a Vygotsky of "Mind in Society" which scarcely > mentions language and one of "Thinking and Speech" which scarcely > mentions anything without mentioning language). > > c) Leontiev's concept of development is Lamarckian and not > Darwinian--it cannot involve the nasty surprises of real development > (e.g. the crisis, which Leontiev explicitly rejects on p. 362 of his > book Problems of the Development of the Mind).This is a long term > effect because it has been taken up by the so-called "Neo-Vygotskyans" > (see Karpov's book, "The Neo-Vygotskyan Approach to Child > Development", CUP 2005). Leontiev embraced Lysenkoism, and never > renounced it; and in the twentieth century, you cannot write > scientifically about development without a scientific understanding of > modern genetics that is incompatible with Lysenkoism. > > The second, theoretical, issue that you raise actually follows on from > point a). Why isn't "perizhivanie" a circular construction the same > way that "activity" is? The answer is that it is--if you use > perizhivanie to investigate perizhivanie--or even some kind of > mega-perizhivanie called "personality". But of course that isn't what > Vygotsky does at all. > > a) First of all, in Vygotsky's essay perizhivanie is a unit of > analysis for a very specific problem: differentiating the contribution > of the environment from the contribution of the child in the > understanding of experience. Perizhivanie includes both in a very > simplified form: the emotional response of the child to the > environment. At the same time, however, it is not circular because it > is an open system--open to the contribution from the child's > hereditary endowment (which as Vygotsky says in the lecture on > heredity can actually change as the child develops) as well as open to > the various contributions from the child's cultural endowment that > Leontiev and his followers insisted were the alpha and omega of > development. > > b) Secondly, personality is not so much a "mega-perizhivanie" as a > "meta-perezhivanie", since, as Vygotsky makes very clear in the last > chapter of the History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, > personality is really only half of the unit he posits for child > development, the other half of which he calls "world outlook". What is > the difference? It is tempting to say that the difference is that one > is more subjective and the other more objective, but it's not really > reducible to that. I think, if I had to point to a single criterion > for differentiating the two, I would say that "perezhivanie" is > retroleptic, looking back to emotion and reflecting upon it, while > "world outlook" is proleptic. > > c) Thirdly, Vygotsky's theory of development is a second order theory: > the means of development itself develops. So you notice that in the > lecture on the environment, he begins with a very short passage on > perezhivanie but then segues almost seamlessly--so that you scarcely > notice it--into a discussion of sense and signification in word > meaning. To me, this suggests that the development of personality is > eventually subsumed (or sublated, if you prefer) by something > else--the development of verbal thinking. This is rather hard for us > to accept; we all feel as if we are basically personalities and > nothing else. But of course the personality must come to the end of > its useful life sometime, in much the same way that Vygotsky's spoken > lectures were subsumed by his written speech at the moment of his > death. > > Let me just finish by saying that I was a bit thrown by the ref to the > Bildungsroman too! But I think Andy is referring to Goethe's "Life of > Wilhelm Meister" or perhaps to "Elective Affinities" (which is where > Vygotsky probably got the spiel about the water molecule, though John > Stuart Mill uses it too). Andy's ref, like his idea that personality > is the object of psychology, is too narrativistic for my taste--I > think that the mind does indeed have a semantic structure, but that > semantic structure is really more like a dialogue than a text. A > narrative without dialogue is a little like the sound of one sock > puppet clapping. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > On 27 October 2014 11:38, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> Hi Andy, >> >> Thanks for some additional information. >> >> Yes, "political expediency" (PE) is an understatement to be sure, from the sound of it. I don't know if I can imagine myself to denounce my own beloved teachers in order that I may live and be promoted. The idea makes me quite ill, and certainly more sympathetic to Leontiev. >> >> However, the challenge seems to be that we must tease away the PE aspect to try to clear the view to the generation of the theories (or divergence thereof). If that isn't reasonable, let me know. I do not mean to be reductive and minimize the political issues in any way. >> >> I am merely attempting to go slowly over this so that I gain a clear picture of the collision of ideas and the apparent wreckage and what pieces were retrieved and extended upon. >> >> So I suppose there are a few things I would enjoy clarity about. >> >> First is historical: >> >> How much do we know that is factual in Leontiev's motivation to deny the theories? What is speculative? This is not a flippant two questions. What I mean is are there contemporary documents (or any other documents that come after Stalin's death, or any other time) that discuss this parting of the ways and motivations for doing so? Is this Leontiev paper all that we possess? >> >> What do you mean that the differences show through, despite the PE factor? We cannot fully remove the PE factor, I know, but how much does it explain the "real differences" if it is clouding the view? >> >> Second is theoretical: >> >> I understand perezhivanie is experiential, specific to the individual in question, based upon the person's genetics, level of development, emotional awareness, and intellectual ability at the time of the situation (event), but importantly that the perezhivanie is also inclusive of aspects of the environment itself and how the environment exerts force on the person (combined or in interaction with the more personal or "internal" factors). >> >> [I'm afraid I was lost at the reference to the autobiography. Goethe is beyond the limits of my knowledge at this time. :) ] >> >> Furthermore, that the development of the person is not necessarily a "summation of all perezhivanies." If only because a single experience can radically change a person's makeup entirely, whether for good or ill. That a single "unit" can possibly transform the entire whole? (I'm thinking for example the impact of PTSD. I hesitate to resort to a pathological example, it just what seems to illustrate the best about experiences affecting the whole). >> >> However I agree that my personality is the manifest expression of the "collection" of all my experiences, I'm not sure if I could say "summation," since this sounds mechanical in nature, rather than systemic. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 7:39 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] >> >> Annalisa, >> I don't know exactly when the ANL document was written or where/if it >> was published originally, but it was certainly after LSV's death and >> before ANL's death (i.e. some time 1935-1975), most likely during >> Stalin's time. "Political expediency" somewhat understates the issue. A >> convincing denunciation of a colleague's theory was very often a matter >> of life and death. Which is not to say that the honourable choice may >> not have been to speak the truth and take the consequences, rather than >> lie and enjoy promotion. In that sense, this document, being dishonest, >> is not the ideal medium for understanding the real differences between >> these two former comrades. Nonetheless, I think the real differences >> show through. >> >> On the question of units. The idea is that a person's character develops >> through a series of experiences. Each experiences adds a new >> sensibility, a new aversion, a new preference, a new insight, etc., so >> from that point of view a person's character can be understand as the >> product or sum of a series of such experiences, as for example, when >> someone writes their autobiography, especially if they follow in the >> Goethean tradition of Bildungsromanen. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> Hi Andy, >>> >>> >>> I must explain: Since I hadn't read the entire paper, I was searching >>> for the 8 points in the first half of the paper, which is The >>> Prosecution half. This is to say the "8 charges" you had indicated in >>> your post, are actually listed in the second half, the Defense half. >>> So I suppose the structure threw me. (Sorry to create any confusion, all!) >>> >>> But I'd like to continue my exercise openly, as it appears there are >>> watchers who are benefiting. So here goes (I will go more slowly and >>> not flood the list). >>> >>> #1) The charge by Leontiev (Ad. 4): Perezhivanie, as a manifestation >>> of the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality. >>> >>> One nagging question: Vygotsky, while living (as I understand), had a >>> large social group in which they openly discussed all of these >>> theories. If Leontiev was privy to this community, how could he not >>> have understood the points concerning perezhivanie? It is not that I >>> accuse Leontiev as being obstinate or thick (that would be an easy >>> thing to do), but that I want to understand how could he have missed >>> this if there were other parties available to discuss the nature of >>> Vygotsky's perezhivanie? The community must have discussed these >>> concepts without Vygotsky present, among each other. Am I wrong in >>> this thinking? >>> >>> I don't think Vygotsky was like Jesus with confused disciples. It >>> seemed that he treated his students as equals and that he himself >>> benefited from their input to the theories. >>> >>> If I may, I position this question with the imagination as-if Vygotsky >>> and Leontiev were here on this list discussing various theories, as we >>> are here. There was a lot of discussion going on, sharing and the like. >>> >>> Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't these lectures on perezhivanie >>> happen earlier in the decade of time Vygotsky graced us? Or am I mistaken? >>> >>> I suppose I am attempting to answer the question, How did Leontiev not >>> understand perezhivanie as a determinant? And perhaps in gaining an >>> answer to this question, we might learn something about *teaching* the >>> concept of perezhivanie? >>> >>> Of course it is possible that this was entirely caused by political >>> expediency. But if that is the case, how can we know this? >>> >>> But to the content of the charge: "Perezhivanie, as a manifestation of >>> the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality." >>> >>> I am having a hard time discussing perezhivanie as a "fragment of the >>> whole." If only because fragment means "a part of", and I don't think >>> "unit" is necessarily a material thing, but also an abstraction like >>> the whole is an abstraction. >>> >>> For example: The water molecule metaphor. (I hope we do not reduce the >>> molecule to hydrogen and oxygen and begin flames on the list). In our >>> perception, we *imagine* the molecule. We know that molecules exist, >>> just like we know that the ocean exists. But when we perceive the >>> ocean, it's also not a perception in its entirety, but completed in >>> our imagination like the molecule is, and this is why I feel the unit, >>> seen as a fragment, seems problematic. >>> >>> If we want to study the nature of oceans we want to study the nature >>> of water, since water is the material of the ocean. Also, the water >>> molecule is the unit we must use to understand the behavior of the >>> water. And so the molecule becomes the unit of analysis. >>> >>> If the metaphor works, the ocean is the ideal, and final form. Can we >>> say that the water molecule determines the nature of the ocean? It >>> seems so, since the behavior of water (as indicated by the nature of >>> its molecule) will reveal significantly the nature of the ocean, >>> moreso than dividing the ocean into fragments, and I'm not sure how >>> one would divide the ocean into fragments, anyway! >>> >>> BTW, I am proposing this metaphor because we know that LSV used the >>> metaphor of the water molecule himself, though I don't think he spoke >>> of oceans, just water. Still, I wonder if it works? >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Oct 29 16:20:02 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 23:20:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] In-Reply-To: References: <1414371755253.24181@unm.edu> <544DA234.1080608@mira.net> <1414377486343.33343@unm.edu> <1414559904205.28945@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1414624801569.9794@unm.edu> Hi David, Actually it is probably me who is muddling, like a mud puddle! How wonderful that you provide the Russian! I am presuming that you do the Russian of course. What I want to say quickly is regarding 1) Darwin v. Lamarck - You have gone quickly over and beyond what I know and so I will have to catch up with this. However, one area I have wanted to go over more closely is the connection to Darwinism. Vera covered this in her seminar, but it has been sometime ago now and I would not mind a refresher. Having said that, because we covered so much material, I don't recall if we covered competing "evolution" theories contemporary to the work. If we did, it was very quickly. So thank you for these references! I appreciate the "tabla rasa" quote. I seem to recall this. 2) Stalinist Bubbles - I have failed to use a good metaphor by saying "bubble." I didn't mean "living in a bubble" as if to create voluntary or desired insulation from the rest of the world, as perhaps a kind of narcissism. No. I meant bubble in the sense the reality of the closure of intellectual borders between the countries (and institutions abroad), where things look transparent but the membrane tends to actually keep everything out or in. I didn't mean at all to imply that he was not aware of his contemporaries. What I meant to say is the West was not aware of him! I hope I have corrected that line of thinking. 3) Geological Movements Between Giants - I will keep your note in mind, as I get to this reading. Again thanks! I have a feeling I will be moved to return to this email and comment more upon it, with hopes you will too. More in the not so immediate future (on this thread anyway). Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 3:37 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] Dear Annalisa: What a marvelous muddle of misinterpretations I appear to have made! As Huw points out, I am always doing this. It's not deliberate, but nevertheless over the years I have grown rather fond of some of them. And, as Leonard Cohen says, there is a crack in everything, but that's how the light gets in. Point One: Stalinism vs. Marxism, and Lysenkoism vs. Darwinism: Of course, to most people in Russia and outside Russia, Stalinism WAS Marxism. But Vygotsky certainly knew better. Take this, from the first lecture on pedology. Vygotsky is discussing three theories of how development might take place--the theory that it is preformed, the theory that it is entirely determined, and the theory that development must NECESSARILY involve structures that are NOT preformed but also NOT environmentally determined. He has just disposed of the first of these, the "personality theory" of Stern (which is the idea that intellect comes pre-formed in the child, something Vygotsky refers to as "intellectualism", because it leads to the circular idea that the explanation for intellect is nothing more than pre-existing intellect). Vygotsky says: 1-51] ??????, ??????????????? ???? ? ????? ??, ??? ???????, ???????????? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ???????? ??????????????? ??? ???????, ????????????? ?? ??????????? ?????? ????????, ? ??? ???????, ??????? ??????? ???????????? ?????, ??????. ????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ? ? ?????????? ????? ? ????? ????? ? ? ????????? ????????? ? ??????? ??????? ???????. ????????, ??? ??????? ???? ????????? ???????, ??????? ?????????? ??????, ??? ????? ???????????? ??????? ???????????? ?? ???????, ???, ????? ???????, ???????? ??????????? ? ???, ??? ??????? ????????? ? ????, ??????? ? ????, ?????? ? ???? ????? ????? ???????????, ??????? ????????? ????? ?????????? ??? ?????. ????????, ???????: ???????? ??????? ???? ?????????? ??????, ??? ??????? ??????, - ?????? ???? ???????, ?? ???????? ????????? ? ???? ???????? ????????, ?? ?????? ????????? ????, ????????? ????. ????????????, ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ? 1,5 ?? 5 ???, ? ?? ?????? ? ?? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ???????? ???????????? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ?? ????????? ???, ??? ????????? ? ????? ?????-?????? ????? ?? ??? ??? ??????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ???? ??????. ?? ??? ?? ????? ????????? ???? ????? ??????, ???????????? ???????, ??? ?????-?? ?????????????, ?? ??? ?????????? ????????? (??? ?????? ???????????), ? ??? "tabula rasa" - ?? ???????, ????????, ??? ?????????. ?????? ????????, ?????? ???????? ??????????? ????? ????? ??????, ??? ??????? ???? "tabula rasa" - ????? ???? ??????, ?????? ?????, ??? ??? ??????? (??????? ?????? ?? ?????? ?????), ?? ??????? ?????? ?? ????????, ? ??? ?? ?? ??? ????????, ?? ?? ??? ? ????? ???????????; ?.?. ??????? ???? ????? ????????? ???????, ??????? ? ????? ?? ????????? ? ?????? ?????? ??????? ????????, ???????????? ??? ??? ????????. ??? ???? ?????? ?????????????? ???????, ?????? ?????, ??????? ? ???? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ???, ??? ?????????? ?????????? ??? ?????. ??????? ???? ?????? ????????? ?????, ?? ??????? ????? ?? ???? ????? ????????? ? ??????????? ???? ??, ??? ?? ????? ? ?????????? ??? ?????. ("Another developmental theory, opposed to this and equally, it seems to me, wrong, is that development is seen as a process which is not due to its own internal laws but as a process that is entirely determined externally by the environment. Such points of view have been developed in bourgeois science and have occurred in Soviet pedology for a long time. The belief that the child is a passive product arose because of the specific impact of the environment on the child; thus the development is only that the child absorbs, acquires and assimilates into himself outside such features that enter into the milieu of people around him. We say, for example, that the development of the child's speech is because the child hears what is said around him, he begins to imitate it and thus also begins to speak; he merely absorbs it, learning it. The question is, why does he learn it from 1.5 to 5 years, and not earlier or later? Why does he learn it in a way that goes through defined stages? Why does he not learn it just as any lesson is memorized at school? None of these questions can be answered by this theory. Instead, it develops a point of view which considers the child, not as once he was considered, a young adult (the theory of preformism) but instead as a ?tabula rasa? (Vygotsky uses the Latin original here?DK), an expression that you have probably heard: a white sheet of paper, a blank slate, as they say (the Romans wrote on a clean slate) on which nothing is written and that will take whatever you write on it; i.e. the child is a purely passive product which does not bring with him from the outset any of the moments that will determine the course of his development. He is simply a perceiving machine, a vessel that, during its development, is filled with the content of his experience. The child is simply imprinted by the environment; through the external path of the environment he acquires and assigns to himself what he sees in the people around him.) You notice how Vygotsky rather mischievously points out that these "Marxist" ideas are simply the equivalent of bourgeois behaviorism (but notice that, unlike Leontiev, he does not name names, and that he picks on a trend that is dominant rather than on the dead and the dying). Similarly, to most people inside Russia, Lysenkoism WAS Darwinism (Lysenko put forward the Lamarckian theory that learned characteristics could then be handed down genetically to offspring--this has been interpreted by people as a statement about eugenically creating a perfect socialist man within a single generation, but at the time it had more to do with growing wheat in winter). But Vygotsky knew better--in Chapter Five of "The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions" (p. 100, if you have the English Collected Works), Vygotsky spends a page or two contrasting Lamarck to Darwin. ( He doesn't condemn Buhler for trying to combine them; interestingly, he leaves open the possibility that Lamarckianism DOES work--for cultural functions, and not for biological ones. Point Two: Personalism. Vygotsky was NOT in a bubble, and that was part of his problem; he was living in a country which was trying to create one. Remember that Vygotsky was a Jew, that is, what Stalin would later call a "rootless cosmopolitan". Jews in Russia were not really considered Russians. They benefitted enormously from the Bolshevik Revolution (Vygotsky was preparing himself for either medicine or the law, because those were the only professions open to Jews, but with the Revolution suddenly every door was open to him--except, of course, for that of physical health and it is somewhat ironic that he spent his last three years trying to become a doctor after all). He was ferociously literate (you remember that German was quite literally his mother's tongue, and so I think Andy's speculation that he never read Hegel must be taken as both unproven and unlikely). He was particularly well read in the very latest in German psychology--which in his time was the very latest on earth--and his work is full of references to the most obscure writers, including Realschule teachers in Saxony and Ph.D. students in Leipzig. So Vygotsky read and actually met Wilhelm Stern, who was creating a kind of psychology of the personality which later became immensely popular with the Catholic church (and remains quite dominant in Germany today). As we saw above, it's a preformist theory: it says the child comes with a personality and with the idea of speech all hard-wired (and of course this latter idea is still at the core of Chomskyan linguistics today). Vygotsky's criticism of "intellectualism" is that if we want to explain the intellect we need to start with something that is manifestly NOT intellect, or at least not intellect in its finished form (e.g. emotion). If you begin with something that is already intellect, what you have is not an explanation of development but only a description of growth. The same criticism can, of course, be applied to the concept of "personality", and it's why Levitin calls his book about the Vygotsky school "One Is Not Born a Personality". Point Three: Most people consider that Vygotsky's August 2, 1933, letter to Leontiev signals their definitive break-up. I'm not so sure; it seems to me the parting of ways occurred earlier in some way and later in others. I prefer to think of it as a geological movement rather than an interpersonal drama. But you read it and decide! David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 29 October 2014 14:18, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi David! > > I was so happy to read your post. Thank you for going through it so carefully. > > Immediate things I have learned from your post: > 1. Leontiev not only rejected Marxism (for Stalinism) but also Darwinism for Lamarck. I'm not sure what this means at this point, because I am not familiar with Lamarck's work. But dismissing Darwin seems non-trivial. > > 2. "Is personality all that matters?" as a question in psychology at that time. Is that a fair statement? > > 3. I am grateful for your rendering of the events as the split occurred, and I have downloaded the letters and will read these as soon as I can. > > As you say, we must pick up the wreckage to understand the causes. What I think about is how we may have moved forward without the missing pieces without perhaps noticing that there were missing pieces! > > With truth as the baseline, and science as the means, we must filter out the parts that are wrong and not useful, and doing so need not be controversial, but unifying. This seems to be a good thing. > > Anyone is free to correct me, but perhaps what makes this situation so peculiar, is that Vygotsky and his cohorts lived in something of a bubble. We know he did meet some researchers in the West (the train to London), but most of his work was generated from reading the work of others and his experiments were based upon those readings. I seem to recall Piaget did not hear about him until long after LSV's passing (I may not have that exactly right). Then the fact that the texts were banned and everything and everyone associated with LSV was forced underground. > > Fast forward to the future and we have Luria meeting Bruner as the first point of contact in the US. I'm only an armchair historian, so I don't have all the facts. However, I can certainly understand the disruption in the exchange of ideas evident in 20th Century psychology because Vygotsky's work was not available to contemporaries for international peer review and compare this to, say, the disruption in the exchange of ideas in 17th Century physics because Galileo was under house arrest. Somehow I think Galileo had an easier time as did other scientists of his time to access his work, which may not be saying much, or it may be saying a lot, depending upon how ironic you feel when you read this. > > My point is everyone suffers when there is no intellectual freedom. We suffer today for not having had access to LSV's work, as did his contemporaries, who either were forced to disavow it or who did not even know it existed. > > I value intellectual freedom probably more than other kinds of freedoms. I always like to say I will gain more freedom by giving freedom to others. :) > > David, I'd like to reply further to the rest your email in another post, which I hope I have time to address tomorrow. > > Until then... > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg > Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 3:28 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] > > Dear Annalisa: > > Yes, you are right--there are watchers who are benefiting. In > particular, I am watching as the discussion gradually seems to come > over to two points that were initially pared away but which I find > essential to the whole puzzle. And there too you are right--they are > historical and theoretical, first of all Leontiev's "politically > expedient" support for Stalinism (and consequently his rejection of > genuine Marxism, and even basic Darwinism), and secondly the question > of whether personality stands alone as the object of psychology. > > First of all, I don't know of the circumstances of Leontiev's writings > on the environment any more than Andy does. But the split between > Vygotsky and Leontiev is well documented. We have letters, in which > Vygotsky first tries to convince "A.N." of the importance of > consciousness and fails (in 1931), where he remarks to Luria the > importance of trying to convince Leontiev, the "breakup" of the > original group in 1931 (a heartbreaking letter) and then Vygotsky's > much more reserved letters to Leontiev just before his death (May > 1934). All of this in "In Memory of L.S. Vygotsky: Letters to Students > and Colleagues", Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, vol. > 45, No. 2 (pp. 11-60), See also Anton Yasnitsky's Ph.D. work: > > http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12124-011-9168-5/fulltext.html#Sec1 > > I feel as you do, that under the circumstances, the criticisms of > Leontiev and P.I. Zinchenko and others were acts of betrayal, similar > to what Lysenko did to his old professor Vavilov, the would-be founder > of modern Soviet genetics. But I also think that the best we can do > now is to try to locate and counter the long term effects upon our > understanding of Vygotsky's ideas. It seems to me that there are (at > least) three: > > a) As Kozulin has remarked (and Andy came very close to admitting), > Leontiev made "activity" into both the object of investigation and the > explanatory principle. This is essentially what Leontiev himself > accused Vygotsky of doing with "perezhivanie", and it is indeed a form > of circular reasoning: activity is explained by activity itself. This > revisionism is a long term effect because very few people who use > activity as a unit of analysis realize that although activity is made > up of action and nothing but, action is not simply a microcosm of > activity. > > b) Leontiev and Zinchenko (and later Wertsch) rejected word meaning as > a unit of analysis for verbal thinking as "idealist". This has meant > rejection of what to me is Vygotsky's most important and lasting > contribution, something he shares with Volosinov, which is the > discovery that the developed mind has a semantic structure rather than > a "behavioral" or "cognitive" one. This revisionism is a long-term > effect because it has divided Vygotsky in two, particularly in the > anglophone world (a Vygotsky of "Mind in Society" which scarcely > mentions language and one of "Thinking and Speech" which scarcely > mentions anything without mentioning language). > > c) Leontiev's concept of development is Lamarckian and not > Darwinian--it cannot involve the nasty surprises of real development > (e.g. the crisis, which Leontiev explicitly rejects on p. 362 of his > book Problems of the Development of the Mind).This is a long term > effect because it has been taken up by the so-called "Neo-Vygotskyans" > (see Karpov's book, "The Neo-Vygotskyan Approach to Child > Development", CUP 2005). Leontiev embraced Lysenkoism, and never > renounced it; and in the twentieth century, you cannot write > scientifically about development without a scientific understanding of > modern genetics that is incompatible with Lysenkoism. > > The second, theoretical, issue that you raise actually follows on from > point a). Why isn't "perizhivanie" a circular construction the same > way that "activity" is? The answer is that it is--if you use > perizhivanie to investigate perizhivanie--or even some kind of > mega-perizhivanie called "personality". But of course that isn't what > Vygotsky does at all. > > a) First of all, in Vygotsky's essay perizhivanie is a unit of > analysis for a very specific problem: differentiating the contribution > of the environment from the contribution of the child in the > understanding of experience. Perizhivanie includes both in a very > simplified form: the emotional response of the child to the > environment. At the same time, however, it is not circular because it > is an open system--open to the contribution from the child's > hereditary endowment (which as Vygotsky says in the lecture on > heredity can actually change as the child develops) as well as open to > the various contributions from the child's cultural endowment that > Leontiev and his followers insisted were the alpha and omega of > development. > > b) Secondly, personality is not so much a "mega-perizhivanie" as a > "meta-perezhivanie", since, as Vygotsky makes very clear in the last > chapter of the History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, > personality is really only half of the unit he posits for child > development, the other half of which he calls "world outlook". What is > the difference? It is tempting to say that the difference is that one > is more subjective and the other more objective, but it's not really > reducible to that. I think, if I had to point to a single criterion > for differentiating the two, I would say that "perezhivanie" is > retroleptic, looking back to emotion and reflecting upon it, while > "world outlook" is proleptic. > > c) Thirdly, Vygotsky's theory of development is a second order theory: > the means of development itself develops. So you notice that in the > lecture on the environment, he begins with a very short passage on > perezhivanie but then segues almost seamlessly--so that you scarcely > notice it--into a discussion of sense and signification in word > meaning. To me, this suggests that the development of personality is > eventually subsumed (or sublated, if you prefer) by something > else--the development of verbal thinking. This is rather hard for us > to accept; we all feel as if we are basically personalities and > nothing else. But of course the personality must come to the end of > its useful life sometime, in much the same way that Vygotsky's spoken > lectures were subsumed by his written speech at the moment of his > death. > > Let me just finish by saying that I was a bit thrown by the ref to the > Bildungsroman too! But I think Andy is referring to Goethe's "Life of > Wilhelm Meister" or perhaps to "Elective Affinities" (which is where > Vygotsky probably got the spiel about the water molecule, though John > Stuart Mill uses it too). Andy's ref, like his idea that personality > is the object of psychology, is too narrativistic for my taste--I > think that the mind does indeed have a semantic structure, but that > semantic structure is really more like a dialogue than a text. A > narrative without dialogue is a little like the sound of one sock > puppet clapping. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > On 27 October 2014 11:38, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> Hi Andy, >> >> Thanks for some additional information. >> >> Yes, "political expediency" (PE) is an understatement to be sure, from the sound of it. I don't know if I can imagine myself to denounce my own beloved teachers in order that I may live and be promoted. The idea makes me quite ill, and certainly more sympathetic to Leontiev. >> >> However, the challenge seems to be that we must tease away the PE aspect to try to clear the view to the generation of the theories (or divergence thereof). If that isn't reasonable, let me know. I do not mean to be reductive and minimize the political issues in any way. >> >> I am merely attempting to go slowly over this so that I gain a clear picture of the collision of ideas and the apparent wreckage and what pieces were retrieved and extended upon. >> >> So I suppose there are a few things I would enjoy clarity about. >> >> First is historical: >> >> How much do we know that is factual in Leontiev's motivation to deny the theories? What is speculative? This is not a flippant two questions. What I mean is are there contemporary documents (or any other documents that come after Stalin's death, or any other time) that discuss this parting of the ways and motivations for doing so? Is this Leontiev paper all that we possess? >> >> What do you mean that the differences show through, despite the PE factor? We cannot fully remove the PE factor, I know, but how much does it explain the "real differences" if it is clouding the view? >> >> Second is theoretical: >> >> I understand perezhivanie is experiential, specific to the individual in question, based upon the person's genetics, level of development, emotional awareness, and intellectual ability at the time of the situation (event), but importantly that the perezhivanie is also inclusive of aspects of the environment itself and how the environment exerts force on the person (combined or in interaction with the more personal or "internal" factors). >> >> [I'm afraid I was lost at the reference to the autobiography. Goethe is beyond the limits of my knowledge at this time. :) ] >> >> Furthermore, that the development of the person is not necessarily a "summation of all perezhivanies." If only because a single experience can radically change a person's makeup entirely, whether for good or ill. That a single "unit" can possibly transform the entire whole? (I'm thinking for example the impact of PTSD. I hesitate to resort to a pathological example, it just what seems to illustrate the best about experiences affecting the whole). >> >> However I agree that my personality is the manifest expression of the "collection" of all my experiences, I'm not sure if I could say "summation," since this sounds mechanical in nature, rather than systemic. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2014 7:39 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Xcma-l] In Defense of Vygotsky [Perezhivanie cannot determine the personality] >> >> Annalisa, >> I don't know exactly when the ANL document was written or where/if it >> was published originally, but it was certainly after LSV's death and >> before ANL's death (i.e. some time 1935-1975), most likely during >> Stalin's time. "Political expediency" somewhat understates the issue. A >> convincing denunciation of a colleague's theory was very often a matter >> of life and death. Which is not to say that the honourable choice may >> not have been to speak the truth and take the consequences, rather than >> lie and enjoy promotion. In that sense, this document, being dishonest, >> is not the ideal medium for understanding the real differences between >> these two former comrades. Nonetheless, I think the real differences >> show through. >> >> On the question of units. The idea is that a person's character develops >> through a series of experiences. Each experiences adds a new >> sensibility, a new aversion, a new preference, a new insight, etc., so >> from that point of view a person's character can be understand as the >> product or sum of a series of such experiences, as for example, when >> someone writes their autobiography, especially if they follow in the >> Goethean tradition of Bildungsromanen. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> Hi Andy, >>> >>> >>> I must explain: Since I hadn't read the entire paper, I was searching >>> for the 8 points in the first half of the paper, which is The >>> Prosecution half. This is to say the "8 charges" you had indicated in >>> your post, are actually listed in the second half, the Defense half. >>> So I suppose the structure threw me. (Sorry to create any confusion, all!) >>> >>> But I'd like to continue my exercise openly, as it appears there are >>> watchers who are benefiting. So here goes (I will go more slowly and >>> not flood the list). >>> >>> #1) The charge by Leontiev (Ad. 4): Perezhivanie, as a manifestation >>> of the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality. >>> >>> One nagging question: Vygotsky, while living (as I understand), had a >>> large social group in which they openly discussed all of these >>> theories. If Leontiev was privy to this community, how could he not >>> have understood the points concerning perezhivanie? It is not that I >>> accuse Leontiev as being obstinate or thick (that would be an easy >>> thing to do), but that I want to understand how could he have missed >>> this if there were other parties available to discuss the nature of >>> Vygotsky's perezhivanie? The community must have discussed these >>> concepts without Vygotsky present, among each other. Am I wrong in >>> this thinking? >>> >>> I don't think Vygotsky was like Jesus with confused disciples. It >>> seemed that he treated his students as equals and that he himself >>> benefited from their input to the theories. >>> >>> If I may, I position this question with the imagination as-if Vygotsky >>> and Leontiev were here on this list discussing various theories, as we >>> are here. There was a lot of discussion going on, sharing and the like. >>> >>> Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't these lectures on perezhivanie >>> happen earlier in the decade of time Vygotsky graced us? Or am I mistaken? >>> >>> I suppose I am attempting to answer the question, How did Leontiev not >>> understand perezhivanie as a determinant? And perhaps in gaining an >>> answer to this question, we might learn something about *teaching* the >>> concept of perezhivanie? >>> >>> Of course it is possible that this was entirely caused by political >>> expediency. But if that is the case, how can we know this? >>> >>> But to the content of the charge: "Perezhivanie, as a manifestation of >>> the whole personality, cannot be the determinant of personality." >>> >>> I am having a hard time discussing perezhivanie as a "fragment of the >>> whole." If only because fragment means "a part of", and I don't think >>> "unit" is necessarily a material thing, but also an abstraction like >>> the whole is an abstraction. >>> >>> For example: The water molecule metaphor. (I hope we do not reduce the >>> molecule to hydrogen and oxygen and begin flames on the list). In our >>> perception, we *imagine* the molecule. We know that molecules exist, >>> just like we know that the ocean exists. But when we perceive the >>> ocean, it's also not a perception in its entirety, but completed in >>> our imagination like the molecule is, and this is why I feel the unit, >>> seen as a fragment, seems problematic. >>> >>> If we want to study the nature of oceans we want to study the nature >>> of water, since water is the material of the ocean. Also, the water >>> molecule is the unit we must use to understand the behavior of the >>> water. And so the molecule becomes the unit of analysis. >>> >>> If the metaphor works, the ocean is the ideal, and final form. Can we >>> say that the water molecule determines the nature of the ocean? It >>> seems so, since the behavior of water (as indicated by the nature of >>> its molecule) will reveal significantly the nature of the ocean, >>> moreso than dividing the ocean into fragments, and I'm not sure how >>> one would divide the ocean into fragments, anyway! >>> >>> BTW, I am proposing this metaphor because we know that LSV used the >>> metaphor of the water molecule himself, though I don't think he spoke >>> of oceans, just water. Still, I wonder if it works? >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Oct 29 16:28:23 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 23:28:23 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu> <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu> <54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu> <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net> <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu> , Message-ID: <1414625302971.97734@unm.edu> Hello Larry, I can't comment on "plump materialism," or "modal simulation" as these concepts are unfamiliar to me. However, it might be helpful for us now to learn about the other forces and exchanges that were ebbing and flowing within Vygotsky's world and that of his students. If Rubenstein and ANL were at odds, that might mean something. What is fascinating to me is how the theories "echo," as if something were picking up fragments of ideas in the air. Now it could be that no one could cite Vygotsky without unhappy consequences, but they chose to integrate the "flavor" of his work. It almost seems like a soap opera, which does resonate with my Stalinist bubble metaphor, strangely enough! :) Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2014 11:58 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] Lubomir, Annalisa, and Martin [and also Andy who was active in addressing Annalisa] When discussing the twists and turns between ANL circle and the history of Vygotsky's is it helpful to also include Rubenstein?? if he was engaged in formulating a *principle* of the UNITY of consciousness and activity. Where would we situate Rubenstein in the notion of *plump materialism* and *modal SIMULATION*?? As well as [this] linking *consciousness* AND activity* as a UNITY there is also the other UNITY of *thought* AND *LANGUAGE* [as formed] AND also the third UNITY of *thinking* and *speech* [as forming] Very fertile unities On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Hi Annalisa, > > I was waiting a bit to see if someone else will chime in. > > If we refer to Soviet (now Russian) psychology: > -- They prefer to talk about consciousness rather than mind. > -- All psychological functions and states emerge in the process of human > activity. > --Consciousness is a major category in historical materialism and > therefore has to be accepted as a major category by the social science > disciplines. There are different interpretation of the concept of > consciousness in different social science disciplines. However, they all > had to refer to historical materialism. No one was bigger than historical > materialism. Consciousness is also used in several ways in everyday life. > But that is another story. The kinds of usage should not be mixed. > > Also: > --LSV was sidelined pretty early by Rubinstein. The interest in LSV > resurfaced in the 1980s, but was not too strong. ANL and his students were > reigning and that time. > --ANL had quite of a power struggle with Rubinstein. ANL and his > students/prot?g?s ruled the psychology domain in the USSR at their life > time. > -- Almost all textbooks in psychology after 1970 were written by the ANL > circle. After 1970 Rubinstein was not published much and maybe not at all. > The last psychology textbook by Rubinstein that I have seen was from the > 1960s (first edition 1940). > -- Rubinstein was the first (if memory serves) to formulate the principle > of the unity of consciousness and activity. However, many sources claim he > heavily used works of LSV. Of course, all historical materialists hold to > the principle that consciousness emerges in the process of activity; it is > a product of activity and everyday life environment of the subject. > > Researchers from Russia can provide more precise account. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Annalisa > Aguilar > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 6:54 PM > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really > means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > > > OK! I'm getting somewhere! Thank you for clarifying this term in the > context of the controversy. > > So are you saying that ANL is saying that LSV is saying (sorry to be so > convoluted) that there is an "already established intellect" in the infant > and ANL is saying this assertion can only be preposterous? > > I'm sorry if I still haven't nailed it, and I hope you will forgive my > persistence to understand this, but it seems pretty important. > > If I am understanding properly, this is why I believe (intuitively at this > juncture), that "consciousness" has an imprecise definition between the > parties and its word-meaning is constitutionally different between ANL and > LSV, and I would want to better understand what LSV was referencing when he > used the word. > > I think I can understand why ANL would have issue if he sees consciousness > possible only if it is derived from activity. If this is the case, then is > it possible that this is a philosophical difference as to whether one > believes mind to be present before consciousness, or one believes > consciousness to be present before mind. > > Is that fair to say? > > In a largely materialistic rendering, mind would be first, I am guessing. > > Regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: Andy Blunden > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 4:19 PM > To: Annalisa Aguilar > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" > really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > > In this context, "intellectualism" does not mean "void of affect" or have > anything to do with lack of affect. > "Intellectualism" refers to a theorist who ascribes a capacity for > intellectual activity to (for example) an infant, who would in fact not > have developed the capacity for an intellectual relation to the world. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Andy! > > > > OK. I'm needing to fill in some blanks here. > > > > What is meant exactly by "intellectualism"? Or rather, what did ANL mean? > > > > When you say: > > > > [And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, because it is > intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. > > No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that > > whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like > > "intellect" and "affect".] > > > > Perhaps I am responding to the word "intellectual" in the way it > reflects back to me in my culture: that something or someone "intellectual" > is void of affect (relatively speaking) and that is why those who spurn > intellectuals do so. As such, "intellectuals" will sometimes speak/function > at a level "above" most others, and this usually upsets people who do not > speak/function on the same level. > > > > "Intelligence" is handled differently, though. It seems to me as a > concept "intelligence" is more of whole cloth. > > > > "Intellect" (to me) is thinking without affect. It is rational and seeks > to remove affect, with the "myth" that the products of thought are somehow > "better, more pure" with this affect removed. > > > > I agree of course that the person is whole first, and that we abstract > concepts to describe properties. But there has been a backlash from > abstracting out. Isn't this why Descartes has been so problematic? Isn't > this why Spinoza sought to understand where the emotions "come from" and > what their value is? > > > > So given this, I ask the question again and circling back to the > original charge in your paper, what does it mean for ANL to levy a charge > of "intellectualism" upon LSV? > > > > TIA, > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > > > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 3:10 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" > > really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > > > > Annalisa, it is Leontyev who is pinning the charge of "intellectualism" > > on Vygotsky because he ascribes "meaning" and "significance" to > > children, and therefore sign-use. I am not saying that sign-use is not > > intellectual though. And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, > > because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. > > No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that > > whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like > "intellect" > > and "affect". > > > > Andy > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > >> Hi Andy, > >> > >> Again thanks for more! > >> > >> Here's the thing: I may be getting lost in understanding argument > positions. > >> > >> Are you saying it is Leontiev, et al's position that thinking with > signs and words are intellectual? > >> > >> Because, for me personally, thinking with signs and words involve both > affect and intellect and I don't think they can be separated out. For me, a > person's intelligence is the mediated unification of affect and intellect, > what I believe you are calling consciousness. > >> > >> I feel supported by my position with Vygotsky's discussion of > word-meaning (znachenie slova), if I am understanding word-meaning properly. > >> > >> Again, the words "meaning" and "significance" can have affective > >> meaning and significance! :) (is this the adjective? I want to say > >> "affectual," to match "intellectual" but that isn't a word) > >> > >> Now if for *you* these particular words have "intellectual > connotations," perhaps this difference between you and I supports LSV's > (and my earlier) point that affect and intellect are mediated and will > therefore allow each person have a different and nuanced mix of meaning and > significance for the same set of words and signs, even if we generally > agree on a social meaning and significance, such as the meaning of a flag. > >> > >> This reminds me of the cultural differences regarding the meanings of > color. One can't intellectualize red just by its perception. One can't have > an affect of red either by perception alone (if one were to see red for the > first time), its meaning and significance are socially, historically and > culturally generated. > >> > >> Furthermore, I agree with you that our "Western language" to describe > the interior mind, if I am allowed to say that, is sparse. We know Freud > reached into Greek mythology to give these concepts a handle. This is one > reason I look to Eastern thought so I might learn how these dynamics are > discussed. They do possess words for which we have none. I might also > suggest there are relevant themes in these traditions that apply to > Vygotsky's work. > >> > >> In fact, it might amaze us in the West to truly understand the immense > literature and legacies on these topics of mind and self. It certainly > amazes me. Of course that would be a huge project to be mediated between > cultural elders and not a cultural tourist like myself. I only point out > that there is something there and we are not the pioneers to wrangle with > these problems of mind. > >> > >> I admit that to access these words, one must understand how metaphors > are utilized. In rational-logical traditions, metaphors seem to be > disagreeable. Also there is discussion of the spiritual, since the problems > these traditions hoped to solve were spiritual problems, which may just be > their historically-anchored approach to psychological realities. So, these > barriers may explain the impasse. > >> > >> But if words are tools, I'm sure we might borrow some and they wouldn't > mind. > >> > >> Ha! a pun! "wouldn't mind" get it? :) > >> > >> Best, > >> > >> Annalisa > >> > >> > >> > >> ________________________________________ > >> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:02 AM > >> > >> I would have said that this criticism is a deliberate > >> misrepresentation, except that Lydia Bozhovich makes the same charge of > "intellectualism." > >> The charge hinges on phrases like "the significance for the child" > >> and "the meaning for the child," etc., which etymologically suggest > >> the use of signs and words. Thinking with signs and words is > >> intellect. But the thing is that it is almost impossible for us to > >> describe the relationship of a person to their environment > >> psychologically without using words which evoke sign-relations. The > >> relation is a psychological one, not a conditioned-reflex, and the > >> words we have for relations which are mediated through consciousness > >> tend to be words like "meaning" and "significance" which have > >> intellectual connotations. The preintellectual stages of > >> psychological development which Vygotsky himself theorised are not > built into the common language. > >> > >> Andy > >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> --- > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> > >> > >>> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's > breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. > >>> > >>> There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] > >>> --------------------------------------------------- > >>> 4. ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really > >>> means intellectualism] (see original post below) > >>> --------------------------------------------------- > >>> > >>> Again a pothole. You say: > >>> "The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate > >>> at their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an > >>> intellectual relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims." > >>> > >>> I think know this, but what is ANL's critique against this? Is it > >>> that it is too "intellectual," which is possibly code for elitism or > class? > >>> Sorry if I wasn't clear. > >>> > >>> --end > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Oct 29 17:52:54 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 17:52:54 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu> <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu> <54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu> <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net> <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu> Message-ID: Lubomir-- A couple of comments that i put in the text in red On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Hi Annalisa, > > I was waiting a bit to see if someone else will chime in. > > If we refer to Soviet (now Russian) psychology: > -- They prefer to talk about consciousness rather than mind. > -- All psychological functions and states emerge in the process of human > activity. > --Consciousness is a major category in historical materialism and > therefore has to be accepted as a major category by the social science > disciplines. There are different interpretation of the concept of > consciousness in different social science disciplines. However, they all > had to refer to historical materialism. No one was bigger than historical > materialism. Consciousness is also used in several ways in everyday life. > But that is another story. The kinds of usage should not be mixed. > ?At that time American psychologists could not talk about or think as professionals about a category called consciousness. I wrote a review of the Payne book about Rubenshtein a loooooooooooooong time ago. I will try to find and reproduce as an artifact of one encounter of the two ways of thinking. ? > > Also: > --LSV was sidelined pretty early by Rubinstein. The interest in LSV > resurfaced in the 1980s, but was not too strong. ANL and his students were > reigning and that time. > ?Here you want to be more careful. The period of ANL's ascendancy declined after 1966 and it was Rubensteinians who gained power. Epitome of that counter-development in the appointment of Lomov to head of Academy Institute, to be followed by Brushlinskii. ? > --ANL had quite of a power struggle with Rubinstein. ANL and his > students/prot?g?s ruled the psychology domain in the USSR at their life > time. > ? An overstatement as above.? > > -- Almost all textbooks in psychology after 1970 were written by the ANL > circle. After 1970 Rubinstein was not published much and maybe not at all. > The last psychology textbook by Rubinstein that I have seen was from the > 1960s (first edition 1940). > -- Rubinstein was the first (if memory serves) to formulate the principle > of the unity of consciousness and activity. However, many sources claim he > heavily used works of LSV. ?This is really news to me. Who claimed that and did anyone believe them?? > Of course, all historical materialists hold to the principle that > consciousness emerges in the process of activity; it is a product of > activity and everyday life environment of the subject. > ?It is so-znanie, with-knowledge, knowledge-with-an other. In my view, > the residue of joint mediated actions-in-activity. All full of holes and > gaps, but recountable.? > > Researchers from Russia can provide more precise account. > ?that would be great. ? > > Best wishes, > ?Mike (too)? > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Annalisa > Aguilar > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 6:54 PM > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really > means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > > > OK! I'm getting somewhere! Thank you for clarifying this term in the > context of the controversy. > > So are you saying that ANL is saying that LSV is saying (sorry to be so > convoluted) that there is an "already established intellect" in the infant > and ANL is saying this assertion can only be preposterous? > > I'm sorry if I still haven't nailed it, and I hope you will forgive my > persistence to understand this, but it seems pretty important. > > If I am understanding properly, this is why I believe (intuitively at this > juncture), that "consciousness" has an imprecise definition between the > parties and its word-meaning is constitutionally different between ANL and > LSV, and I would want to better understand what LSV was referencing when he > used the word. > > I think I can understand why ANL would have issue if he sees consciousness > possible only if it is derived from activity. If this is the case, then is > it possible that this is a philosophical difference as to whether one > believes mind to be present before consciousness, or one believes > consciousness to be present before mind. > > Is that fair to say? > > In a largely materialistic rendering, mind would be first, I am guessing. > > Regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: Andy Blunden > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 4:19 PM > To: Annalisa Aguilar > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" > really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > > In this context, "intellectualism" does not mean "void of affect" or have > anything to do with lack of affect. > "Intellectualism" refers to a theorist who ascribes a capacity for > intellectual activity to (for example) an infant, who would in fact not > have developed the capacity for an intellectual relation to the world. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Andy! > > > > OK. I'm needing to fill in some blanks here. > > > > What is meant exactly by "intellectualism"? Or rather, what did ANL mean? > > > > When you say: > > > > [And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, because it is > intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. > > No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that > > whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like > > "intellect" and "affect".] > > > > Perhaps I am responding to the word "intellectual" in the way it > reflects back to me in my culture: that something or someone "intellectual" > is void of affect (relatively speaking) and that is why those who spurn > intellectuals do so. As such, "intellectuals" will sometimes speak/function > at a level "above" most others, and this usually upsets people who do not > speak/function on the same level. > > > > "Intelligence" is handled differently, though. It seems to me as a > concept "intelligence" is more of whole cloth. > > > > "Intellect" (to me) is thinking without affect. It is rational and seeks > to remove affect, with the "myth" that the products of thought are somehow > "better, more pure" with this affect removed. > > > > I agree of course that the person is whole first, and that we abstract > concepts to describe properties. But there has been a backlash from > abstracting out. Isn't this why Descartes has been so problematic? Isn't > this why Spinoza sought to understand where the emotions "come from" and > what their value is? > > > > So given this, I ask the question again and circling back to the > original charge in your paper, what does it mean for ANL to levy a charge > of "intellectualism" upon LSV? > > > > TIA, > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > > > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 3:10 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" > > really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > > > > Annalisa, it is Leontyev who is pinning the charge of "intellectualism" > > on Vygotsky because he ascribes "meaning" and "significance" to > > children, and therefore sign-use. I am not saying that sign-use is not > > intellectual though. And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, > > because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. > > No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that > > whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like > "intellect" > > and "affect". > > > > Andy > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > >> Hi Andy, > >> > >> Again thanks for more! > >> > >> Here's the thing: I may be getting lost in understanding argument > positions. > >> > >> Are you saying it is Leontiev, et al's position that thinking with > signs and words are intellectual? > >> > >> Because, for me personally, thinking with signs and words involve both > affect and intellect and I don't think they can be separated out. For me, a > person's intelligence is the mediated unification of affect and intellect, > what I believe you are calling consciousness. > >> > >> I feel supported by my position with Vygotsky's discussion of > word-meaning (znachenie slova), if I am understanding word-meaning properly. > >> > >> Again, the words "meaning" and "significance" can have affective > >> meaning and significance! :) (is this the adjective? I want to say > >> "affectual," to match "intellectual" but that isn't a word) > >> > >> Now if for *you* these particular words have "intellectual > connotations," perhaps this difference between you and I supports LSV's > (and my earlier) point that affect and intellect are mediated and will > therefore allow each person have a different and nuanced mix of meaning and > significance for the same set of words and signs, even if we generally > agree on a social meaning and significance, such as the meaning of a flag. > >> > >> This reminds me of the cultural differences regarding the meanings of > color. One can't intellectualize red just by its perception. One can't have > an affect of red either by perception alone (if one were to see red for the > first time), its meaning and significance are socially, historically and > culturally generated. > >> > >> Furthermore, I agree with you that our "Western language" to describe > the interior mind, if I am allowed to say that, is sparse. We know Freud > reached into Greek mythology to give these concepts a handle. This is one > reason I look to Eastern thought so I might learn how these dynamics are > discussed. They do possess words for which we have none. I might also > suggest there are relevant themes in these traditions that apply to > Vygotsky's work. > >> > >> In fact, it might amaze us in the West to truly understand the immense > literature and legacies on these topics of mind and self. It certainly > amazes me. Of course that would be a huge project to be mediated between > cultural elders and not a cultural tourist like myself. I only point out > that there is something there and we are not the pioneers to wrangle with > these problems of mind. > >> > >> I admit that to access these words, one must understand how metaphors > are utilized. In rational-logical traditions, metaphors seem to be > disagreeable. Also there is discussion of the spiritual, since the problems > these traditions hoped to solve were spiritual problems, which may just be > their historically-anchored approach to psychological realities. So, these > barriers may explain the impasse. > >> > >> But if words are tools, I'm sure we might borrow some and they wouldn't > mind. > >> > >> Ha! a pun! "wouldn't mind" get it? :) > >> > >> Best, > >> > >> Annalisa > >> > >> > >> > >> ________________________________________ > >> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:02 AM > >> > >> I would have said that this criticism is a deliberate > >> misrepresentation, except that Lydia Bozhovich makes the same charge of > "intellectualism." > >> The charge hinges on phrases like "the significance for the child" > >> and "the meaning for the child," etc., which etymologically suggest > >> the use of signs and words. Thinking with signs and words is > >> intellect. But the thing is that it is almost impossible for us to > >> describe the relationship of a person to their environment > >> psychologically without using words which evoke sign-relations. The > >> relation is a psychological one, not a conditioned-reflex, and the > >> words we have for relations which are mediated through consciousness > >> tend to be words like "meaning" and "significance" which have > >> intellectual connotations. The preintellectual stages of > >> psychological development which Vygotsky himself theorised are not > built into the common language. > >> > >> Andy > >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> --- > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> > >> > >>> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's > breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. > >>> > >>> There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] > >>> --------------------------------------------------- > >>> 4. ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really > >>> means intellectualism] (see original post below) > >>> --------------------------------------------------- > >>> > >>> Again a pothole. You say: > >>> "The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate > >>> at their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an > >>> intellectual relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims." > >>> > >>> I think know this, but what is ANL's critique against this? Is it > >>> that it is too "intellectual," which is possibly code for elitism or > class? > >>> Sorry if I wasn't clear. > >>> > >>> --end > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Thu Oct 30 02:25:33 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2014 09:25:33 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] In-Reply-To: References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu> <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu> <54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu> <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net> <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu> Message-ID: <1414661133.14486.YahooMailNeo@web173203.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Dear all, The biased pretension is that Vygotsky was absolutely alienated in regard to the concept of 'activity' . First , because Vygotsky died at an early time and did have too much upon his shoulders to resolve , not being able to read more of the 'beautiful sayings of Engels' like the one in which he stated that 'work created man' , he left a space for motley maneuverings and inserting all kinds of ideas from the West into his own original ideas and concepts which were nothing but local and native . Today , the 'rift' has become so deep not to be bridged by even a divine hand . Who invested so heavily on the rift ? His sacrificial industrious unfatiguable disciples ?? World politics , World decaying Capitalism , the number one horrendous criminal (Please have a look at Kobane , Syria , and at the whole Middle East areas and elsewhere in the World) for decades and decades tried to justify every act of onslaught , murder , plunder , terror , filth and dirt , under the banner of fear and threat of 'communism' and 'Stalinism' . West tried to make people forget the crimes of Hitlerism , Francoism , Tszarism and now while they try to incessantly ring in our own ears the terrifying crashing sound of the Big Bang of the Soviet Collapse , still they don't cease to adulterate the scientific findings and concepts with the dirt of Stalinism ; they don't have ears to hear Luria's invitation to pay tribute to the just one WHOLE GENERATION of giving and inspiring people who worked for their land ; they don't have ears to hear Davydov saying 'I'm a convinced Marxist' just two or three months before his homeland went to ruin and conspiracy and selfishness of three traitors as Presidents . They don't have ears to hear 'if all science then was Stalin-made , then yours is also Bush-made' and we laugh if you talk of the open society in which you live because ... If Academics prefer to be away from politics , then please away from all politics !! Your administration uses 'double standards' . you please don't !! Please don't create such an atmosphere in which one cannot say as his opinion that 'Stalin was not the same as Hitler' --this once happened in the past with attacks and insults -- or 'Bush is no less than Stalin' . Your digestion for freedom and liberty should be great as Heavens !! Second , Vygotsky believes in 'activity proper' ; please don't burden him with your own tendencies . He didn't like Americans to confiscate his own ideas ; he , first of all , credited his true disciples with his great heritage ! He just out of momentary negligence uses the word 'activity' with all kinds of names : speech activity , attention activity , sign activity , etc. and for 'activity proper' also he uses 'behaviour' , 'operation' , 'external and internal activity' , 'action , act' , etc. as he uses feeling , passion , emotion , etc without any precise distinction when he begins the discussion but ultimately he comes true with every aspect of his concepts . One cannot deny his 'redundancies' and 'overuses' . Third , please , if possible , read volume six , conclusion , word and act , and see where he is different from ANL . He almost argues the way L does , except when and where he reaches the 'word' by which he means 'now the word becomes the act' . But is this not just a metaphor ? Could Vygotsky have believed that 'word' , 'discourse' , 'genre' , 'dialogue' , 'talk' coming out of 'activity' according to his strong undeniable irrefutable belief , had given 'word' prevalence and precedence over 'material activity' , had driven this latter out of the domain , had announced itself not needy and quite free of 'material activity' ?? Always Primary ?? Yes , is this the case ?? Yes , I know all about its impact : organizing , communicating , cognizing , conceptualizing , sublimating , novel-forming , etc. etc. but let's remind ourselves of his ... IN THE BEGINNING ... IN THE END ... as things forgotten by his readers !! It seems that an allergy is to be found here that logically and unpolitically should be wiped out ; otherwise , there would not be so much room for its being libertarian and scientific !! Best Haydi ________________________________ From: ?mike cole? ?? To: ?"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"? ?? Sent: Wednesday, 29 October 2014, 17:52:54 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] Lubomir-- A couple of comments that i put in the text in red On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Hi Annalisa, > > I was waiting a bit to see if someone else will chime in. > > If we refer to Soviet (now Russian) psychology: > -- They prefer to talk about consciousness rather than mind. > -- All psychological functions and states emerge in the process of human > activity. > --Consciousness is a major category in historical materialism and > therefore has to be accepted as a major category by the social science > disciplines. There are different interpretation of the concept of > consciousness in different social science disciplines. However, they all > had to refer to historical materialism. No one was bigger than historical > materialism. Consciousness is also used in several ways in everyday life. > But that is another story. The kinds of usage should not be mixed. > ?At that time American psychologists could not talk about or think as professionals about a category called consciousness. I wrote a review of the Payne book about Rubenshtein a loooooooooooooong time ago. I will try to find and reproduce as an artifact of one encounter of the two ways of thinking. ? > > Also: > --LSV was sidelined pretty early by Rubinstein. The interest in LSV > resurfaced in the 1980s, but was not too strong. ANL and his students were > reigning and that time. > ?Here you want to be more careful. The period of ANL's ascendancy declined after 1966 and it was Rubensteinians who gained power. Epitome of that counter-development in the appointment of Lomov to head of Academy Institute, to be followed by Brushlinskii. ? > --ANL had quite of a power struggle with Rubinstein. ANL and his > students/prot?g?s ruled the psychology domain in the USSR at their life > time. > ? An overstatement as above.? > > -- Almost all textbooks in psychology after 1970 were written by the ANL > circle. After 1970 Rubinstein was not published much and maybe not at all. > The last psychology textbook by Rubinstein that I have seen was from the > 1960s (first edition 1940). > -- Rubinstein was the first (if memory serves) to formulate the principle > of the unity of consciousness and activity. However, many sources claim he > heavily used works of LSV. ?This is really news to me. Who claimed that and did anyone believe them?? > Of course, all historical materialists hold to the principle that > consciousness emerges in the process of activity; it is a product of > activity and everyday life environment of the subject. > ?It is so-znanie, with-knowledge, knowledge-with-an other. In my view, > the residue of joint mediated actions-in-activity. All full of holes and > gaps, but recountable.? > > Researchers from Russia can provide more precise account. > ?that would be great. ? > > Best wishes, > ?Mike (too)? > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+lspopov=bgsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Annalisa > Aguilar > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 6:54 PM > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really > means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > > > OK! I'm getting somewhere! Thank you for clarifying this term in the > context of the controversy. > > So are you saying that ANL is saying that LSV is saying (sorry to be so > convoluted) that there is an "already established intellect" in the infant > and ANL is saying this assertion can only be preposterous? > > I'm sorry if I still haven't nailed it, and I hope you will forgive my > persistence to understand this, but it seems pretty important. > > If I am understanding properly, this is why I believe (intuitively at this > juncture), that "consciousness" has an imprecise definition between the > parties and its word-meaning is constitutionally different between ANL and > LSV, and I would want to better understand what LSV was referencing when he > used the word. > > I think I can understand why ANL would have issue if he sees consciousness > possible only if it is derived from activity. If this is the case, then is > it possible that this is a philosophical difference as to whether one > believes mind to be present before consciousness, or one believes > consciousness to be present before mind. > > Is that fair to say? > > In a largely materialistic rendering, mind would be first, I am guessing. > > Regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: Andy Blunden > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 4:19 PM > To: Annalisa Aguilar > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" > really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > > In this context, "intellectualism" does not mean "void of affect" or have > anything to do with lack of affect. > "Intellectualism" refers to a theorist who ascribes a capacity for > intellectual activity to (for example) an infant, who would in fact not > have developed the capacity for an intellectual relation to the world. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Andy! > > > > OK. I'm needing to fill in some blanks here. > > > > What is meant exactly by "intellectualism"? Or rather, what did ANL mean? > > > > When you say: > > > > [And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, because it is > intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. > > No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that > > whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like > > "intellect" and "affect".] > > > > Perhaps I am responding to the word "intellectual" in the way it > reflects back to me in my culture: that something or someone "intellectual" > is void of affect (relatively speaking) and that is why those who spurn > intellectuals do so. As such, "intellectuals" will sometimes speak/function > at a level "above" most others, and this usually upsets people who do not > speak/function on the same level. > > > > "Intelligence" is handled differently, though. It seems to me as a > concept "intelligence" is more of whole cloth. > > > > "Intellect" (to me) is thinking without affect. It is rational and seeks > to remove affect, with the "myth" that the products of thought are somehow > "better, more pure" with this affect removed. > > > > I agree of course that the person is whole first, and that we abstract > concepts to describe properties. But there has been a backlash from > abstracting out. Isn't this why Descartes has been so problematic? Isn't > this why Spinoza sought to understand where the emotions "come from" and > what their value is? > > > > So given this, I ask the question again and circling back to the > original charge in your paper, what does it mean for ANL to levy a charge > of "intellectualism" upon LSV? > > > > TIA, > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Andy Blunden > > > > Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 3:10 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" > > really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > > > > Annalisa, it is Leontyev who is pinning the charge of "intellectualism" > > on Vygotsky because he ascribes "meaning" and "significance" to > > children, and therefore sign-use. I am not saying that sign-use is not > > intellectual though. And no-one is saying that sign- and word-use, > > because it is intellectual, is therefore somehow lacking in affect. > > No-one is saying that. The person is first a whole, and from that > > whole, by reflection and analysis, we can abstract functions like > "intellect" > > and "affect". > > > > Andy > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > >> Hi Andy, > >> > >> Again thanks for more! > >> > >> Here's the thing: I may be getting lost in understanding argument > positions. > >> > >> Are you saying it is Leontiev, et al's position that thinking with > signs and words are intellectual? > >> > >> Because, for me personally, thinking with signs and words involve both > affect and intellect and I don't think they can be separated out. For me, a > person's intelligence is the mediated unification of affect and intellect, > what I believe you are calling consciousness. > >> > >> I feel supported by my position with Vygotsky's discussion of > word-meaning (znachenie slova), if I am understanding word-meaning properly. > >> > >> Again, the words "meaning" and "significance" can have affective > >> meaning and significance! :) (is this the adjective? I want to say > >> "affectual," to match "intellectual" but that isn't a word) > >> > >> Now if for *you* these particular words have "intellectual > connotations," perhaps this difference between you and I supports LSV's > (and my earlier) point that affect and intellect are mediated and will > therefore allow each person have a different and nuanced mix of meaning and > significance for the same set of words and signs, even if we generally > agree on a social meaning and significance, such as the meaning of a flag. > >> > >> This reminds me of the cultural differences regarding the meanings of > color. One can't intellectualize red just by its perception. One can't have > an affect of red either by perception alone (if one were to see red for the > first time), its meaning and significance are socially, historically and > culturally generated. > >> > >> Furthermore, I agree with you that our "Western language" to describe > the interior mind, if I am allowed to say that, is sparse. We know Freud > reached into Greek mythology to give these concepts a handle. This is one > reason I look to Eastern thought so I might learn how these dynamics are > discussed. They do possess words for which we have none. I might also > suggest there are relevant themes in these traditions that apply to > Vygotsky's work. > >> > >> In fact, it might amaze us in the West to truly understand the immense > literature and legacies on these topics of mind and self. It certainly > amazes me. Of course that would be a huge project to be mediated between > cultural elders and not a cultural tourist like myself. I only point out > that there is something there and we are not the pioneers to wrangle with > these problems of mind. > >> > >> I admit that to access these words, one must understand how metaphors > are utilized. In rational-logical traditions, metaphors seem to be > disagreeable. Also there is discussion of the spiritual, since the problems > these traditions hoped to solve were spiritual problems, which may just be > their historically-anchored approach to psychological realities. So, these > barriers may explain the impasse. > >> > >> But if words are tools, I'm sure we might borrow some and they wouldn't > mind. > >> > >> Ha! a pun! "wouldn't mind" get it? :) > >> > >> Best, > >> > >> Annalisa > >> > >> > >> > >> ________________________________________ > >> Sent: Thursday, October 23, 2014 12:02 AM > >> > >> I would have said that this criticism is a deliberate > >> misrepresentation, except that Lydia Bozhovich makes the same charge of > "intellectualism." > >> The charge hinges on phrases like "the significance for the child" > >> and "the meaning for the child," etc., which etymologically suggest > >> the use of signs and words. Thinking with signs and words is > >> intellect. But the thing is that it is almost impossible for us to > >> describe the relationship of a person to their environment > >> psychologically without using words which evoke sign-relations. The > >> relation is a psychological one, not a conditioned-reflex, and the > >> words we have for relations which are mediated through consciousness > >> tend to be words like "meaning" and "significance" which have > >> intellectual connotations. The preintellectual stages of > >> psychological development which Vygotsky himself theorised are not > built into the common language. > >> > >> Andy > >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> --- > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> > >> > >>> This continues and extends from my original post concerning Andy's > breakdown of ANL vs. LSV. > >>> > >>> There are about 8 points total... [copypasta is a starch of art] > >>> --------------------------------------------------- > >>> 4. ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really > >>> means intellectualism] (see original post below) > >>> --------------------------------------------------- > >>> > >>> Again a pothole. You say: > >>> "The child's relation to the environment is whatever is appropriate > >>> at their level of development, not necessarily if at all, an > >>> intellectual relationship, that's all that Vygotsky claims." > >>> > >>> I think know this, but what is ANL's critique against this? Is it > >>> that it is too "intellectual," which is possibly code for elitism or > class? > >>> Sorry if I wasn't clear. > >>> > >>> --end > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From ablunden@mira.net Thu Oct 30 03:02:33 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2014 21:02:33 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Word and Act In-Reply-To: <1414661133.14486.YahooMailNeo@web173203.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu> <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu> <54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu> <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net> <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu> <1414661133.14486.YahooMailNeo@web173203.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <54520CB9.7090409@mira.net> Attached is a PDF of the article Haydi was talking about, "Word and Act." Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Haydi Zulfei wrote: > Dear all, > The biased pretension is that Vygotsky was absolutely alienated in regard to the concept of 'activity' . > First , because Vygotsky died at an early time and did have too much upon his shoulders to resolve , not being able to read more of the 'beautiful sayings of Engels' like the one in which he stated that 'work created man' , he left a space for motley maneuverings and inserting all kinds of ideas from the West into his own original ideas and concepts which were nothing but local and native . Today , the 'rift' has become so deep not to be bridged by even a divine hand . Who invested so heavily on the rift ? His sacrificial industrious unfatiguable disciples ?? World politics , World decaying Capitalism , the number one horrendous criminal (Please have a look at Kobane , Syria , and at the whole Middle East areas and elsewhere in the World) for decades and decades tried to justify every act of onslaught , murder , plunder , terror , filth and dirt , under the banner of fear and threat of 'communism' and 'Stalinism' . West tried to make people forget the > crimes of Hitlerism , Francoism , Tszarism and now while they try to incessantly ring in our own ears the terrifying crashing sound of the Big Bang of the Soviet Collapse , still they don't cease to adulterate the scientific findings and concepts with the dirt of Stalinism ; they don't have ears to hear Luria's invitation to pay tribute to the just one WHOLE GENERATION of giving and inspiring people who worked for their land ; they don't have ears to hear Davydov saying 'I'm a convinced Marxist' just two or three months before his homeland went to ruin and conspiracy and selfishness of three traitors as Presidents . They don't have ears to hear 'if all science then was Stalin-made , then yours is also Bush-made' and we laugh if you talk of the open society in which you live because ... If Academics prefer to be away from politics , then please away from all politics !! Your administration uses 'double standards' . you please don't !! Please don't > create such an atmosphere in which one cannot say as his opinion that 'Stalin was not the same as Hitler' --this once happened in the past with attacks and insults -- or 'Bush is no less than Stalin' . Your digestion for freedom and liberty should be great as Heavens !! > Second , Vygotsky believes in 'activity proper' ; please don't burden him with your own tendencies . He didn't like Americans to confiscate his own ideas ; he , first of all , credited his true disciples with his great heritage ! > He just out of momentary negligence uses the word 'activity' with all kinds of names : speech activity , attention activity , sign activity , etc. and for 'activity proper' also he uses 'behaviour' , 'operation' , 'external and internal activity' , 'action , act' , etc. as he uses feeling , passion , emotion , etc without any precise distinction when he begins the discussion but ultimately he comes true with every aspect of his concepts . One cannot deny his 'redundancies' and 'overuses' . > Third , please , if possible , read volume six , conclusion , word and act , and see where he is different from ANL . > He almost argues the way L does , except when and where he reaches the 'word' by which he means 'now the word becomes the act' . > But is this not just a metaphor ? Could Vygotsky have believed that 'word' , 'discourse' , 'genre' , 'dialogue' , 'talk' coming out of 'activity' according to his strong undeniable irrefutable belief , had given 'word' prevalence and precedence over 'material activity' , had driven this latter out of the domain , had announced itself not needy and quite free of 'material activity' ?? Always Primary ?? Yes , is this the case ?? > Yes , I know all about its impact : organizing , communicating , cognizing , conceptualizing , sublimating , novel-forming , etc. etc. but let's remind ourselves of his ... IN THE BEGINNING ... IN THE END ... as things forgotten by his readers !! It seems that an allergy is to be found here that logically and unpolitically should be wiped out ; otherwise , there would not be so much room for its being libertarian and scientific !! > Best > Haydi > > > > > ________________________________ > From: ?mike cole? ?? > To: ?"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"? ?? > Sent: Wednesday, 29 October 2014, 17:52:54 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > > > > Lubomir-- > > A couple of comments that i put in the text in red > > > > On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov > wrote: > > >> Hi Annalisa, >> >> I was waiting a bit to see if someone else will chime in. >> >> If we refer to Soviet (now Russian) psychology: >> -- They prefer to talk about consciousness rather than mind. >> -- All psychological functions and states emerge in the process of human >> activity. >> --Consciousness is a major category in historical materialism and >> therefore has to be accepted as a major category by the social science >> disciplines. There are >> > different interpretation of the concept of > >> consciousness in different social science disciplines. However, they all >> had to refer to historical materialism. No one was bigger than historical >> materialism. Consciousness is also used in several ways in everyday life. >> But that is another story. The kinds of usage should not be mixed. >> >> > ?At that time American psychologists could not talk about or think as > professionals about a category called consciousness. > > I wrote a review of the Payne book about Rubenshtein a loooooooooooooong > time ago. I will try to find and reproduce as an artifact of one > encounter > of the two ways of thinking. ? > > > > >> Also: >> --LSV was sidelined pretty early by Rubinstein. The interest in LSV >> resurfaced in the 1980s, but was not too strong. ANL and his students were >> reigning and that time. >> >> > > ?Here you want to be more careful. The period of ANL's ascendancy declined > after 1966 and it was Rubensteinians who gained power. Epitome of that > counter-development in the appointment of Lomov to head of Academy > Institute, to be followed by Brushlinskii. ? > > > >> --ANL had quite of a power struggle with Rubinstein. ANL and his >> students/prot?g?s ruled the psychology domain in the USSR at their life >> time. >> ? An overstatement as above.? >> >> -- Almost all textbooks in psychology after 1970 were written by the ANL >> circle. After 1970 Rubinstein was not published much and maybe not at all. >> The last psychology textbook by Rubinstein that I have seen was from the >> 1960s (first edition 1940). >> -- Rubinstein was the >> > first (if memory serves) to formulate the principle > >> of the unity of consciousness and activity. However, many sources claim he >> heavily used works of LSV. >> > > ?This is really news to me. Who claimed that and did anyone believe them?? > > > >> Of course, all historical materialists hold to the principle that >> consciousness emerges in the process of activity; it is a product of >> activity and everyday life environment of the subject. >> ?It is so-znanie, with-knowledge, knowledge-with-an other. In my view, >> the residue of joint mediated actions-in-activity. All full >> > of holes and > >> gaps, but recountable.? >> >> Researchers from Russia can provide more precise account. >> ?that would be great. ? >> >> Best wishes, >> ?Mike (too)? >> > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: word+act.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 1234704 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141030/cb610686/attachment-0001.pdf From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Oct 30 06:36:53 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2014 06:36:53 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Word and Act In-Reply-To: <54520CB9.7090409@mira.net> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu> <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu> <54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu> <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net> <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu> <1414661133.14486.YahooMailNeo@web173203.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <54520CB9.7090409@mira.net> Message-ID: Haydi and Andy Thanks for this rejoinder to the complexity of receiving Vygotsky's work in the West. I do wonder if it is possible to maintain the *purity* of the *whole generation* that was engaged in exploring the *developing relation* between the function of word and act. I was left wondering at the meaning of the very last sentence of this 4 page PDF. At *the end* the *functional transformation* of the relation between word and act and the possibility of future *disintegration* [and return to earlier forms of functioning] between the word and act. Haydi, *in the end* THIS Vygotsky has traveled to the West and is now transforming western notions of psychology as [genetically psycho-social processes. The question you raise is if in this traveling what is ESSENTIAL is lost or corrupted? I am left wondering about the notion of *horizons* of UNDERstanding. When I read that Anna Stetsenko, [who in the beginning formed her ideas within the horizon of THIS Vygotsky], indicates that the relation of *subjectivity* AND *objectivity* continues to BE an *open* question I wonder if THIS Vygotsky will inevitably remain Para-Doxical and be open to multiple other interpretations?. Haydi, your passion to return to Vygotsky's ACTUAL words [and this 4 page PDF is an excellent example of this return] does stop us in our tracks and gives us pause. I myself am left to puzzle the various [multiple] Vygotsky's [yes multiple versions or genres] OF Vygotsky's works AS INTERPRETED. Reading the rejoinders between Martin, Andy, and the multitude of other participants on this site I find in ITSELF a dialectical AND dialogical PROCESS that highlights in FACT the developing subject matter of the functional relations between word act, AND *image*. I do NOT know who is *right* but I trust in THIS process that opens a space [place] to bring us together. IN THE END *is* the beginning. This seems to be a *truth* that puts the emphasis on a different aspect of this 4 page PDF. Larry On Thu, Oct 30, 2014 at 3:02 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Attached is a PDF of the article Haydi was talking about, "Word and Act." > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Haydi Zulfei wrote: > >> Dear all, >> The biased pretension is that Vygotsky was absolutely alienated in regard >> to the concept of 'activity' . First , because Vygotsky died at an early >> time and did have too much upon his shoulders to resolve , not being able >> to read more of the 'beautiful sayings of Engels' like the one in which he >> stated that 'work created man' , he left a space for motley maneuverings >> and inserting all kinds of ideas from the West into his own original ideas >> and concepts which were nothing but local and native . Today , the 'rift' >> has become so deep not to be bridged by even a divine hand . Who invested >> so heavily on the rift ? His sacrificial industrious unfatiguable disciples >> ?? World politics , World decaying Capitalism , the number one horrendous >> criminal (Please have a look at Kobane , Syria , and at the whole Middle >> East areas and elsewhere in the World) for decades and decades tried to >> justify every act of onslaught , murder , plunder , terror , filth and dirt >> , under the banner of fear and threat of 'communism' and 'Stalinism' . West >> tried to make people forget the >> crimes of Hitlerism , Francoism , Tszarism and now while they try to >> incessantly ring in our own ears the terrifying crashing sound of the Big >> Bang of the Soviet Collapse , still they don't cease to adulterate the >> scientific findings and concepts with the dirt of Stalinism ; they don't >> have ears to hear Luria's invitation to pay tribute to the just one WHOLE >> GENERATION of giving and inspiring people who worked for their land ; they >> don't have ears to hear Davydov saying 'I'm a convinced Marxist' just two >> or three months before his homeland went to ruin and conspiracy and >> selfishness of three traitors as Presidents . They don't have ears to hear >> 'if all science then was Stalin-made , then yours is also Bush-made' and we >> laugh if you talk of the open society in which you live because ... If >> Academics prefer to be away from politics , then please away from all >> politics !! Your administration uses 'double standards' . you please don't >> !! Please don't >> create such an atmosphere in which one cannot say as his opinion that >> 'Stalin was not the same as Hitler' --this once happened in the past with >> attacks and insults -- or 'Bush is no less than Stalin' . Your digestion >> for freedom and liberty should be great as Heavens !! >> Second , Vygotsky believes in 'activity proper' ; please don't burden him >> with your own tendencies . He didn't like Americans to confiscate his own >> ideas ; he , first of all , credited his true disciples with his great >> heritage ! He just out of momentary negligence uses the word 'activity' >> with all kinds of names : speech activity , attention activity , sign >> activity , etc. and for 'activity proper' also he uses 'behaviour' , >> 'operation' , 'external and internal activity' , 'action , act' , etc. as >> he uses feeling , passion , emotion , etc without any precise distinction >> when he begins the discussion but ultimately he comes true with every >> aspect of his concepts . One cannot deny his 'redundancies' and 'overuses' >> . Third , please , if possible , read volume six , conclusion , word and >> act , and see where he is different from ANL . >> He almost argues the way L does , except when and where he reaches the >> 'word' by which he means 'now the word becomes the act' . But is this not >> just a metaphor ? Could Vygotsky have believed that 'word' , 'discourse' , >> 'genre' , 'dialogue' , 'talk' coming out of 'activity' according to his >> strong undeniable irrefutable belief , had given 'word' prevalence and >> precedence over 'material activity' , had driven this latter out of the >> domain , had announced itself not needy and quite free of 'material >> activity' ?? Always Primary ?? Yes , is this the case ?? >> Yes , I know all about its impact : organizing , communicating , >> cognizing , conceptualizing , sublimating , novel-forming , etc. etc. but >> let's remind ourselves of his ... IN THE BEGINNING ... IN THE END ... as >> things forgotten by his readers !! It seems that an allergy is to be found >> here that logically and unpolitically should be wiped out ; otherwise , >> there would not be so much room for its being libertarian and scientific !! >> Best >> Haydi >> >> >> >> ________________________________ >> From: ?mike cole? ?? >> To: ?"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"? ?? >> Sent: Wednesday, 29 October 2014, 17:52:54 >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really >> means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >> >> >> Lubomir-- >> >> A couple of comments that i put in the text in red >> >> >> >> On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov >> wrote: >> >> >> >>> Hi Annalisa, >>> >>> I was waiting a bit to see if someone else will chime in. >>> >>> If we refer to Soviet (now Russian) psychology: >>> -- They prefer to talk about consciousness rather than mind. >>> -- All psychological functions and states emerge in the process of human >>> activity. >>> --Consciousness is a major category in historical materialism and >>> therefore has to be accepted as a major category by the social science >>> disciplines. There are >>> >>> >> different interpretation of the concept of >> >> >>> consciousness in different social science disciplines. However, they all >>> had to refer to historical materialism. No one was bigger than historical >>> materialism. Consciousness is also used in several ways in everyday life. >>> But that is another story. The kinds of usage should not be mixed. >>> >>> >>> >> ?At that time American psychologists could not talk about or think as >> professionals about a category called consciousness. >> >> I wrote a review of the Payne book about Rubenshtein a loooooooooooooong >> time ago. I will try to find and reproduce as an artifact of one >> encounter >> of the two ways of thinking. ? >> >> >> >> >> >>> Also: >>> --LSV was sidelined pretty early by Rubinstein. The interest in LSV >>> resurfaced in the 1980s, but was not too strong. ANL and his students >>> were >>> reigning and that time. >>> >>> >>> >> >> ?Here you want to be more careful. The period of ANL's ascendancy declined >> after 1966 and it was Rubensteinians who gained power. Epitome of that >> counter-development in the appointment of Lomov to head of Academy >> Institute, to be followed by Brushlinskii. ? >> >> >> >> >>> --ANL had quite of a power struggle with Rubinstein. ANL and his >>> students/prot?g?s ruled the psychology domain in the USSR at their life >>> time. >>> ? An overstatement as above.? >>> >>> -- Almost all textbooks in psychology after 1970 were written by the ANL >>> circle. After 1970 Rubinstein was not published much and maybe not at >>> all. >>> The last psychology textbook by Rubinstein that I have seen was from the >>> 1960s (first edition 1940). >>> -- Rubinstein was the >>> >>> >> first (if memory serves) to formulate the principle >> >> >>> of the unity of consciousness and activity. However, many sources claim >>> he >>> heavily used works of LSV. >>> >>> >> >> ?This is really news to me. Who claimed that and did anyone believe them?? >> >> >> >> >>> Of course, all historical materialists hold to the principle that >>> consciousness emerges in the process of activity; it is a product of >>> activity and everyday life environment of the subject. >>> ?It is so-znanie, with-knowledge, knowledge-with-an other. In my view, >>> the residue of joint mediated actions-in-activity. All full >>> >>> >> of holes and >> >> >>> gaps, but recountable.? >>> >>> Researchers from Russia can provide more precise account. >>> ?that would be great. ? >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> ?Mike (too)? >>> >>> >> >> From ablunden@mira.net Thu Oct 30 17:32:15 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 11:32:15 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> Message-ID: <5452D88F.3090401@mira.net> Let's not let this thread drop, Ed. To my mind, understanding that mathematics is constrained by objective relations, and is not just a social convention, and therefore *reveals* objective relations, quite distinct from relations discoverable by "experimenting" in the world beyond the text, and opens the possibility for students to *explore and discover*. Such an experience has a very different content from that of acquiring a social convention. So I think it is important that the unit of analysis reflect this. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Ed Wall wrote: > Andy > > Nice and important points. Thanks! > > Ed > > > On Oct 26, 2014, at 11:31 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Well, I think that if you make a decision that mathematics is *not* essentially a social convention, but something which is essentially grasping something objective, then that affects what you choose as your unit of analysis. Student-text-teacher is all about acquiring a social convention. >> >> Remember that when Marx chose an exchange of commodities as a unit of analysis of bourgeois society, he knew full-well that commodities are rarely exchanged - they are bought and sold. But Marx did not "include" money in the unit of analysis. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> > From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Thu Oct 30 18:49:55 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2014 22:49:55 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Most cited works in SCI and Google Scholar Message-ID: <67EF96B3-8E68-4DCE-8FE2-970B1F3C9292@gmail.com> www.nature.com/news/the-top-100-papers-1.16224 They also report the top 100 references in Google Scholar. Vygotsky is there as well as other spirits sensible to cultural issues. Enjoy. David Descarga la aplicaci?n oficial de Twitter aqu? Enviado desde mi iPhone From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Fri Oct 31 04:53:34 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 11:53:34 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Word and Act In-Reply-To: References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu> <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu> <54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu> <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net> <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu> <1414661133.14486.YahooMailNeo@web173203.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <54520CB9.7090409@mira.net> Message-ID: <1414756414.61185.YahooMailNeo@web173204.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Dear Larry Please find my responses in the body of the message : Apologies ! I lost my responses ; had to use an attachment . ________________________________ From: ?Larry Purss? ?? To: ?Andy Blunden? ??; ?"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"? ?? Sent: Thursday, 30 October 2014, 6:36:53 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Word and Act Haydi and Andy Thanks for this rejoinder to the complexity of receiving Vygotsky's work in the West. I do wonder if it is possible to maintain the *purity* of the *whole generation* that was engaged in exploring the *developing relation* between the function of word and act. [[Deal all are referees to my talk not addressees . It's not a matter of 'maintaining purity of a generation' . I was left wondering at the meaning of the very last sentence of this 4 page PDF. At *the end* the *functional transformation* of the relation between word and act and the possibility of future *disintegration* [and return to earlier forms of functioning] between the word and act. Haydi, *in the end* THIS Vygotsky has traveled to the West and is now transforming western notions of psychology as [genetically psycho-social processes. The question you raise is if in this traveling what is ESSENTIAL is lost or corrupted? I am left wondering about the notion of *horizons* of UNDERstanding. When I read that Anna Stetsenko, [who in the beginning formed her ideas within the horizon of THIS Vygotsky], indicates that the relation of *subjectivity* AND *objectivity* continues to BE an *open* question I wonder if THIS Vygotsky will inevitably remain Para-Doxical and be open to multiple other interpretations?. Haydi, your passion to return to Vygotsky's ACTUAL words [and this 4 page PDF is an excellent example of this return] does stop us in our tracks and gives us pause. I myself am left to puzzle the various [multiple] Vygotsky's [yes multiple versions or genres] OF Vygotsky's works AS INTERPRETED. Reading the rejoinders between Martin, Andy, and the multitude of other participants on this site I find in ITSELF a dialectical AND dialogical PROCESS that highlights in FACT the developing subject matter of the functional relations between word act, AND *image*. I do NOT know who is *right* but I trust in THIS process that opens a space [place] to bring us together. IN THE END *is* the beginning. This seems to be a *truth* that puts the emphasis on a different aspect of this 4 page PDF. Larry On Thu, Oct 30, 2014 at 3:02 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Attached is a PDF of the article Haydi was talking about, "Word and Act." > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Haydi Zulfei wrote: > >> Dear all, >> The biased pretension is that Vygotsky was absolutely alienated in regard >> to the concept of 'activity' . First , because Vygotsky died at an early >> time and did have too much upon his shoulders to resolve , not being able >> to read more of the 'beautiful sayings of Engels' like the one in which he >> stated that 'work created man' , he left a space for motley maneuverings >> and inserting all kinds of ideas from the West into his own original ideas >> and concepts which were nothing but local and native . Today , the 'rift' >> has become so deep not to be bridged by even a divine hand . Who invested >> so heavily on the rift ? His sacrificial industrious unfatiguable disciples >> ?? World politics , World decaying Capitalism , the number one horrendous >> criminal (Please have a look at Kobane , Syria , and at the whole Middle >> East areas and elsewhere in the World) for decades and decades tried to >> justify every act of onslaught , murder , plunder , terror , filth and dirt >> , under the banner of fear and threat of 'communism' and 'Stalinism' . West >> tried to make people forget the >> crimes of Hitlerism , Francoism , Tszarism and now while they try to >> incessantly ring in our own ears the terrifying crashing sound of the Big >> Bang of the Soviet Collapse , still they don't cease to adulterate the >> scientific findings and concepts with the dirt of Stalinism ; they don't >> have ears to hear Luria's invitation to pay tribute to the just one WHOLE >> GENERATION of giving and inspiring people who worked for their land ; they >> don't have ears to hear Davydov saying 'I'm a convinced Marxist' just two >> or three months before his homeland went to ruin and conspiracy and >> selfishness of three traitors as Presidents . They don't have ears to hear >> 'if all science then was Stalin-made , then yours is also Bush-made' and we >> laugh if you talk of the open society in which you live because ... If >> Academics prefer to be away from politics , then please away from all >> politics !! Your administration uses 'double standards' . you please don't >> !! Please don't >> create such an atmosphere in which one cannot say as his opinion that >> 'Stalin was not the same as Hitler' --this once happened in the past with >> attacks and insults -- or 'Bush is no less than Stalin' . Your digestion >> for freedom and liberty should be great as Heavens !! >> Second , Vygotsky believes in 'activity proper' ; please don't burden him >> with your own tendencies . He didn't like Americans to confiscate his own >> ideas ; he , first of all , credited his true disciples with his great >> heritage ! He just out of momentary negligence uses the word 'activity' >> with all kinds of names : speech activity , attention activity , sign >> activity , etc. and for 'activity proper' also he uses 'behaviour' , >> 'operation' , 'external and internal activity' , 'action , act' , etc. as >> he uses feeling , passion , emotion , etc without any precise distinction >> when he begins the discussion but ultimately he comes true with every >> aspect of his concepts . One cannot deny his 'redundancies' and 'overuses' >> . Third , please , if possible , read volume six , conclusion , word and >> act , and see where he is different from ANL . >> He almost argues the way L does , except when and where he reaches the >> 'word' by which he means 'now the word becomes the act' . But is this not >> just a metaphor ? Could Vygotsky have believed that 'word' , 'discourse' , >> 'genre' , 'dialogue' , 'talk' coming out of 'activity' according to his >> strong undeniable irrefutable belief , had given 'word' prevalence and >> precedence over 'material activity' , had driven this latter out of the >> domain , had announced itself not needy and quite free of 'material >> activity' ?? Always Primary ?? Yes , is this the case ?? >> Yes , I know all about its impact : organizing , communicating , >> cognizing , conceptualizing , sublimating , novel-forming , etc. etc. but >> let's remind ourselves of his ... IN THE BEGINNING ... IN THE END ... as >> things forgotten by his readers !! It seems that an allergy is to be found >> here that logically and unpolitically should be wiped out ; otherwise , >> there would not be so much room for its being libertarian and scientific !! >> Best >> Haydi >> >> >> >> ________________________________ >> From: ?mike cole? ?? >> To: ?"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"? ?? >> Sent: Wednesday, 29 October 2014, 17:52:54 >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really >> means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] >> >> >> Lubomir-- >> >> A couple of comments that i put in the text in red >> >> >> >> On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov >> wrote: >> >> >> >>> Hi Annalisa, >>> >>> I was waiting a bit to see if someone else will chime in. >>> >>> If we refer to Soviet (now Russian) psychology: >>> -- They prefer to talk about consciousness rather than mind. >>> -- All psychological functions and states emerge in the process of human >>> activity. >>> --Consciousness is a major category in historical materialism and >>> therefore has to be accepted as a major category by the social science >>> disciplines. There are >>> >>> >> different interpretation of the concept of >> >> >>> consciousness in different social science disciplines. However, they all >>> had to refer to historical materialism. No one was bigger than historical >>> materialism. Consciousness is also used in several ways in everyday life. >>> But that is another story. The kinds of usage should not be mixed. >>> >>> >>> >> ?At that time American psychologists could not talk about or think as >> professionals about a category called consciousness. >> >> I wrote a review of the Payne book about Rubenshtein a loooooooooooooong >> time ago. I will try to find and reproduce as an artifact of one >> encounter >> of the two ways of thinking. ? >> >> >> >> >> >>> Also: >>> --LSV was sidelined pretty early by Rubinstein. The interest in LSV >>> resurfaced in the 1980s, but was not too strong. ANL and his students >>> were >>> reigning and that time. >>> >>> >>> >> >> ?Here you want to be more careful. The period of ANL's ascendancy declined >> after 1966 and it was Rubensteinians who gained power. Epitome of that >> counter-development in the appointment of Lomov to head of Academy >> Institute, to be followed by Brushlinskii. ? >> >> >> >> >>> --ANL had quite of a power struggle with Rubinstein. ANL and his >>> students/prot?g?s ruled the psychology domain in the USSR at their life >>> time. >>> ? An overstatement as above.? >>> >>> -- Almost all textbooks in psychology after 1970 were written by the ANL >>> circle. After 1970 Rubinstein was not published much and maybe not at >>> all. >>> The last psychology textbook by Rubinstein that I have seen was from the >>> 1960s (first edition 1940). >>> -- Rubinstein was the >>> >>> >> first (if memory serves) to formulate the principle >> >> >>> of the unity of consciousness and activity. However, many sources claim >>> he >>> heavily used works of LSV. >>> >>> >> >> ?This is really news to me. Who claimed that and did anyone believe them?? >> >> >> >> >>> Of course, all historical materialists hold to the principle that >>> consciousness emerges in the process of activity; it is a product of >>> activity and everyday life environment of the subject. >>> ?It is so-znanie, with-knowledge, knowledge-with-an other. In my view, >>> the residue of joint mediated actions-in-activity. All full >>> >>> >> of holes and >> >> >>> gaps, but recountable.? >>> >>> Researchers from Russia can provide more precise account. >>> ?that would be great. ? >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> ?Mike (too)? >>> >>> >> >> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Dear Larry.docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 20631 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141031/e843f10a/attachment.bin From Peg.Griffin@att.net Fri Oct 31 08:10:14 2014 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 11:10:14 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <5452D88F.3090401@mira.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <5452D88F.3090401@mira.net> Message-ID: <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> A small continuation that might help this along: In my understanding of the Davidov mathematics educators, it?s all about the objects (literal cloth strings or the clay etc.). They actually use Alyosha?s string and Borya?s string in their mathematical recording - they just use the letters when the strings get tattered or scarce or too troublesome or they are sick of being slowed down by drawing them so do what grown-ups do and give them names like A and B. And their direct perception of the cloth strings is crucial to using the initial symbols: = ? > < and the operation symbols + and -. Order doesn? t matter for recording symmetric relations among strings (= and ? ). Put Alyosha?s string on top of Borya?s or Borya?s on top of Alyosha?s and perception remains the same; it is either = or ? no matter the ordering. But digging a little deeper into inequality gets to the non-symmetric relations recorded with the symbols > and <, perception supporting the demand that ordering matters for those symbols. The real cloth strings and the children?s perceptions make it that they CANNOT ever ?see? or ?feel? that ?Alyosha?s string > Borya?s string = Alyosha?s string < Borya?s string.? That mathematical model (*A>B=AB = B and < and the complex relations among their combinations. The cultural value of mathematics for me is not so much the specific answers folks can arrive at. I value two characteristics: On one end is the certainty of the ?don?t know-no one can know? reached in some situations and the certainty of ?NOT possible mathematical model? in some situations. At the other end is the persistence of mathematicians when they grasp these limits and gleefully set about re-phrasing, re-framing, what -if-ing, and re-presenting to push the edges of what could be known, what could be possible. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Thursday, October 30, 2014 8:32 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education Let's not let this thread drop, Ed. To my mind, understanding that mathematics is constrained by objective relations, and is not just a social convention, and therefore *reveals* objective relations, quite distinct from relations discoverable by "experimenting" in the world beyond the text, and opens the possibility for students to *explore and discover*. Such an experience has a very different content from that of acquiring a social convention. So I think it is important that the unit of analysis reflect this. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Ed Wall wrote: > Andy > > Nice and important points. Thanks! > > Ed > > > On Oct 26, 2014, at 11:31 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> Well, I think that if you make a decision that mathematics is *not* essentially a social convention, but something which is essentially grasping something objective, then that affects what you choose as your unit of analysis. Student-text-teacher is all about acquiring a social convention. >> >> Remember that when Marx chose an exchange of commodities as a unit of analysis of bourgeois society, he knew full-well that commodities are rarely exchanged - they are bought and sold. But Marx did not "include" money in the unit of analysis. >> >> Andy >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> --- >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Oct 31 09:55:27 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 09:55:27 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <54490772.2020805@mira.net> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net> <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net> <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu> <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <5452D88F.3090401@mira.net> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> Message-ID: Peg, Andy, Ed, and Martin This thread is exploring a theme at the edge of my ZPD but I do *sense* the central key theme being pointed to. In this spirit I want to link up a few ideas. Peg, you wrote: That mathematical model (*A>B=AB = B wrote: > A small continuation that might help this along: > In my understanding of the Davidov mathematics educators, it?s all about > the objects (literal cloth strings or the clay etc.). They actually use > Alyosha?s string and Borya?s string in their mathematical recording - they > just use the letters when the strings get tattered or scarce or too > troublesome or they are sick of being slowed down by drawing them so do > what > grown-ups do and give them names like A and B. > And their direct perception of the cloth strings is crucial to using the > initial symbols: = ? > < and the operation symbols + and -. Order doesn? > t matter for recording symmetric relations among strings (= and ? ). Put > Alyosha?s string on top of Borya?s or Borya?s on top of Alyosha?s and > perception remains the same; it is either = or ? no matter the ordering. > But digging a little deeper into inequality gets to the non-symmetric > relations recorded with the symbols > and <, perception supporting the > demand that ordering matters for those symbols. The real cloth strings and > the children?s perceptions make it that they CANNOT ever ?see? or > ?feel? that ?Alyosha?s string > Borya?s string = Alyosha?s string < > Borya?s string.? That mathematical model (*A>B=A concrete world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the > strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = B exciting. The mathematics operations + and - grow from these relations > among relations and so on. > So in my understanding, the answer of the Davidov mathematics educators to > Ed?s question about ?equal? would involve the following: The symmetry of > equality is known (buttressed by direct percepts of objects in the world) > only in the whole system with ? and the non-symmetrical relations > and < > and the complex relations among their combinations. > The cultural value of mathematics for me is not so much the specific > answers > folks can arrive at. I value two characteristics: On one end is the > certainty of the ?don?t know-no one can know? reached in some situations > and the certainty of ?NOT possible mathematical model? in some situations. > At the other end is the persistence of mathematicians when they grasp these > limits and gleefully set about re-phrasing, re-framing, what -if-ing, and > re-presenting to push the edges of what could be known, what could be > possible. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Thursday, October 30, 2014 8:32 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education > > Let's not let this thread drop, Ed. > To my mind, understanding that mathematics is constrained by objective > relations, and is not just a social convention, and therefore *reveals* > objective relations, quite distinct from relations discoverable by > "experimenting" in the world beyond the text, and opens the possibility for > students to *explore and discover*. Such an experience has a very different > content from that of acquiring a social convention. So I think it is > important that the unit of analysis reflect this. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Ed Wall wrote: > > Andy > > > > Nice and important points. Thanks! > > > > Ed > > > > > > On Oct 26, 2014, at 11:31 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > >> Well, I think that if you make a decision that mathematics is *not* > essentially a social convention, but something which is essentially > grasping > something objective, then that affects what you choose as your unit of > analysis. Student-text-teacher is all about acquiring a social convention. > >> > >> Remember that when Marx chose an exchange of commodities as a unit of > analysis of bourgeois society, he knew full-well that commodities are > rarely > exchanged - they are bought and sold. But Marx did not "include" money in > the unit of analysis. > >> > >> Andy > >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> --- > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Fri Oct 31 16:58:18 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 01 Nov 2014 10:58:18 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: units of mathematics education In-Reply-To: <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> References: <1414042156116.36175@unm.edu> <49BC6E1396C8F94B92715533ED4D20DC1DAE749B@MBXP03.ds.man.ac.uk> <544911FA.3010808@mira.net>, <003a01cfeed5$9e928180$dbb78480$@att.net> <54496BA0.6080104@mira.net> <803A57FD-ED25-490E-847E-71B4E2490A63@umich.edu> <5449BC4B.1020504@mira.net> <15A0050C-24E2-4D3D-A4BD-7C8FBE47F907@umich.edu> <5449F0B6.5040902@mira.net>, <6073CDA7-B612-4CC2-AB79-312CE63F78BB@umich.edu> <1414280432557.55592@ucdenver.edu>, <700B31E6-4D18-43A1-8357-47B8EAF5D08F@umich.edu> <1414337487568.10699@ucdenver.edu> <66AA7EEB-1F34-485D-9227-5F8EB31A56F8@umich.edu> <4E081611-A3BD-46F3-AE79-BB41E08CCF87@umich.edu> <544DAD02.9070005@mira.net> <95546616-8723-4803-A0D9-72ECAF4F5143@umich.edu> <544DCA93.1050502@mira.net> <5452D88F.3090401@mira.net> <012a01cff51c$c6d1c780$54755680$@att.net> Message-ID: <5454221A.3070407@mira.net> Could you elaborate on what is meant by this passage, Peg? I am not familiar with this use of * in mathematics, and I am not sure how the > and < relations are being evaluated here. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Peg Griffin wrote: > ... That mathematical model (*A>B=A concrete world to rise to! Instead, the children see/feel/perceive the > strings and symbols having a relation among relations: A>B = B From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Oct 31 23:59:33 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 23:59:33 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Word and Act In-Reply-To: <1414756414.61185.YahooMailNeo@web173204.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> References: <1414041082116.71182@unm.edu> <544899F0.2040800@mira.net> <1414086444019.14081@unm.edu> <54496ED5.2040103@mira.net> <1414102439120.63459@unm.edu> <54497EE7.2030303@mira.net> <1414103642233.21509@unm.edu> <1414104866980.73624@unm.edu> <1414661133.14486.YahooMailNeo@web173203.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <54520CB9.7090409@mira.net> <1414756414.61185.YahooMailNeo@web173204.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Haydi, Once again thank you for your thoughtful [and informative] reply. It is an amazingly complex undertaking to explore the relations of word and activity and how the relations between these aspects as a *unity* should forever be engaged. As you mention, Leontiev calls our attention and focus to the centrality of the *objects* [the material] as fundamental to any understanding of human *nature* I seem to be drawn to not forgetting the subjective aspects of the *unity*. Wertsch uses the notion of *mediated action* as his attempt to find a term that bridges dialectical methods and dialogical methods within activity as a unity. Haydi, I have to admit when I read Andy, Martin, and David Kellogg I find myself seeing the *reasonableness* of each position as if there is a unity which embraces their subject matter, and each of these scholars is exploring a different aspect of our human *nature*. I continue to be nourished by the contrasts and I let myself move between their positions and realize they are operating from different *traditions* Vygotsky's book "Thought and Language* seems to be the book that each of them returns to but each enters the SAME book from different backgrounds. This leaves me personally fascinated with the recognition of the transformative power of the activity of *reading*. I am trying to follow each of their understandings and I realize to do this I must enter into the *traditions* that each author brings to Vygotsky. Their arguments are very subtle and nuanced and I am often confused by their differences. I do accept that the particular time and place that the cultural-historical and activity models were being developed was a transformative time and their love for their country illuminated all their work. I also understand that I come to this historically formed work from out of a *humanistic psychology* background [counselling psychology] and this particular tradition makes it difficult to enter a radically alternative worldview that radically puts into question the foundations of humanistic psychology. When confused I do return to Vygotsky's book *thought and language* to get re-grounded on the central thesis of interfunctional relations that are developmentally transformed as speech transforms from a focus on communication to an additional focus on self-mastery. It remain an open question to myself the particular relations between self-mastery and social communication. Mike Cole's description of his thought processes while driving in the car. Haydi, I am also trying to understand the place of the *figural* and perception within activity and language and this complicates things further. I do want to explore the connections between perception, concepts, and activity and you may notice my responses recently tending towards the figural and the notion of *schemas* that are possibly pre-linguistic. When I am looking closely at the *figural* I am inevitably loosing focus [at that moment] on activity or the word as central. However it is the *unity* of all three aspects I am attempting to hold together over time. Haydi, I appreciate your reminding me not to loose focus on activity as I try to follow David Kellogg or Martin. Andy attempting to expand activity as a psychological methodology to the social sciences I also am trying to understand. At some point I also want to understand Marx [the philosopher] and his theory of *labour* AS ONTOLOGICAL [as *being*] Is there a unity within the concept of *labour* that Marx shares with Heidegger and Vygotsky? These are vague, fuzzy questions. Haydi, the central theme of *sign* as *indicating* is where I will leave our conversation. Your being a referee calls be back to the truth of activity, action, and operations. You are *signalling* and I am listening. THIS movement is what I find magical leaving me with more to *figure* out. Larry On Fri, Oct 31, 2014 at 4:53 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: > Dear Larry > Please find my responses in the body of the message : > Apologies ! I lost my responses ; had to use an attachment . > > ________________________________ > From: ?Larry Purss? ?? > To: ?Andy Blunden? ??; ?"eXtended Mind, Culture, > Activity"? ?? > Sent: Thursday, 30 October 2014, 6:36:53 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Word and Act > > > > Haydi and Andy > Thanks for this rejoinder to the complexity of receiving Vygotsky's work in > the West. > I do wonder if it is possible to maintain the *purity* of the *whole > generation* that was engaged in exploring the *developing relation* between > the function of word and act. > [[Deal all are referees to my talk not addressees . It's not a matter of > 'maintaining purity of a generation' . > > > > > I was left wondering at the meaning of the very last sentence of this 4 > page PDF. > > At *the end* the *functional transformation* of the relation between word > and act and the possibility of future *disintegration* [and return to > earlier forms of functioning] between the word and act. > > Haydi, *in the end* THIS Vygotsky has traveled to the West and is now > transforming western notions > of psychology as [genetically psycho-social > processes. > The question you raise is if in this traveling what is ESSENTIAL is lost or > corrupted? > I am left wondering about the notion of *horizons* of UNDERstanding. > When I read that Anna Stetsenko, [who in the beginning formed her ideas > within the horizon of THIS Vygotsky], indicates that the relation of > *subjectivity* AND *objectivity* continues to BE an *open* question I > wonder if THIS Vygotsky will inevitably remain Para-Doxical and be open to > multiple other interpretations?. > > Haydi, your passion to return to Vygotsky's ACTUAL words [and this 4 page > PDF is an excellent example of this return] does stop us in our tracks and > gives us pause. I myself am left to puzzle the various [multiple] > Vygotsky's [yes multiple versions or genres] OF Vygotsky's works AS > INTERPRETED. > > Reading the rejoinders between Martin, Andy, and the multitude of other > participants on this site I find in ITSELF a dialectical AND dialogical > PROCESS that highlights in FACT the developing subject matter of the > functional relations between word act, AND *image*. > > I do NOT know who is *right* but I trust in THIS process that opens a space > [place] to bring us together. > > IN THE END *is* the beginning. This seems to be a *truth* that puts the > emphasis on a different aspect of this 4 page PDF. > > Larry > > > > On Thu, Oct 30, 2014 at 3:02 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Attached is a PDF of the article Haydi was talking about, "Word and Act." > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Haydi Zulfei wrote: > > > >> Dear all, > >> The biased pretension is that Vygotsky was absolutely alienated in > regard > >> to the concept of 'activity' . First , because Vygotsky died at an early > >> time and did have too much upon his shoulders to resolve , not being > able > >> to read more of the 'beautiful sayings of Engels' like the one in which > he > >> stated that 'work created man' , he left a space for motley maneuverings > >> and inserting all kinds of ideas from the West into his own original > ideas > >> and concepts which were nothing but local and native . Today , the > 'rift' > >> has become so deep not to be bridged by even a divine hand . Who > invested > >> so heavily on the rift ? His sacrificial industrious unfatiguable > disciples > >> ?? World politics , World decaying Capitalism , the number one > horrendous > >> criminal (Please have a look at Kobane , Syria , and at the whole Middle > >> East areas and elsewhere in the World) for decades and decades tried to > >> justify every act of onslaught , murder , plunder , > terror , filth and dirt > >> , under the banner of fear and threat of 'communism' and 'Stalinism' . > West > >> tried to make people forget the > >> crimes of Hitlerism , Francoism , Tszarism and now while they try to > >> incessantly ring in our own ears the terrifying crashing sound of the > Big > >> Bang of the Soviet Collapse , still they don't cease to adulterate the > >> scientific findings and concepts with the dirt of Stalinism ; they don't > >> have ears to hear Luria's invitation to pay tribute to the just one > WHOLE > >> GENERATION of giving and inspiring people who worked for their land ; > they > >> don't have ears to hear Davydov saying 'I'm a convinced Marxist' just > two > >> or three months before his homeland went to ruin and conspiracy > and > >> selfishness of three traitors as Presidents . They don't have ears to > hear > >> 'if all science then was Stalin-made , then yours is also Bush-made' > and we > >> laugh if you talk of the open society in which you live because ... If > >> Academics prefer to be away from politics , then please away from all > >> politics !! Your administration uses 'double standards' . you please > don't > >> !! Please don't > >> create such an atmosphere in which one cannot say as his opinion that > >> 'Stalin was not the same as Hitler' --this once happened in the past > with > >> attacks and insults -- or 'Bush is no less than Stalin' . Your digestion > >> for freedom and liberty should be great as Heavens !! > >> Second , Vygotsky > believes in 'activity proper' ; please don't burden him > >> with your own tendencies . He didn't like Americans to confiscate his > own > >> ideas ; he , first of all , credited his true disciples with his great > >> heritage ! He just out of momentary negligence uses the word 'activity' > >> with all kinds of names : speech activity , attention activity , sign > >> activity , etc. and for 'activity proper' also he uses 'behaviour' , > >> 'operation' , 'external and internal activity' , 'action , act' , etc. > as > >> he uses feeling , passion , emotion , etc without any precise > distinction > >> when he begins the discussion but ultimately he comes true with every > >> aspect of his concepts . One cannot deny his 'redundancies' and > 'overuses' > >> . Third , > please , if possible , read volume six , conclusion , word and > >> act , and see where he is different from ANL . > >> He almost argues the way L does , except when and where he reaches the > >> 'word' by which he means 'now the word becomes the act' . But is this > not > >> just a metaphor ? Could Vygotsky have believed that 'word' , > 'discourse' , > >> 'genre' , 'dialogue' , 'talk' coming out of 'activity' according to his > >> strong undeniable irrefutable belief , had given 'word' prevalence and > >> precedence over 'material activity' , had driven this latter out of the > >> domain , had announced itself not needy and quite free of 'material > >> activity' ?? Always Primary ?? Yes , is this the case ?? > >> Yes , I know all about its impact : > organizing , communicating , > >> cognizing , conceptualizing , sublimating , novel-forming , etc. etc. > but > >> let's remind ourselves of his ... IN THE BEGINNING ... IN THE END ... as > >> things forgotten by his readers !! It seems that an allergy is to be > found > >> here that logically and unpolitically should be wiped out ; otherwise , > >> there would not be so much room for its being libertarian and > scientific !! > >> Best > >> Haydi > >> > >> > >> > >> ________________________________ > >> From: ?mike cole? ?? > >> To: ?"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"? ?? > >> Sent: Wednesday, 29 October 2014, 17:52:54 > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In defense of Vygotsky ["Sense and meaning" really > >> means consciousness, which really means intellectualism] > >> > >> > >> Lubomir-- > >> > >> A couple of comments that i put in the text in red > >> > >> > >> > >> On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov > >> wrote: > >> > >> > >> > >>> Hi > Annalisa, > >>> > >>> I was waiting a bit to see if someone else will chime in. > >>> > >>> If we refer to Soviet (now Russian) psychology: > >>> -- They prefer to talk about consciousness rather than mind. > >>> -- All psychological functions and states emerge in the process of > human > >>> activity. > >>> --Consciousness is a major category in historical materialism and > >>> therefore has to be accepted as a major category by the social science > >>> disciplines. There are > >>> > >>> > >> different interpretation of the concept of > >> > >> > >>> consciousness in different social science > disciplines. However, they all > >>> had to refer to historical materialism. No one was bigger than > historical > >>> materialism. Consciousness is also used in several ways in everyday > life. > >>> But that is another story. The kinds of usage should not be mixed. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> ?At that time American psychologists could not talk about or think as > >> professionals about a category called consciousness. > >> > >> I wrote a review of the Payne book about Rubenshtein a loooooooooooooong > >> time ago. I will try to find and reproduce as an artifact of one > >> encounter > >> of the two ways of thinking. ? > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >>> Also: > >>> --LSV was sidelined pretty early by Rubinstein. The interest in LSV > >>> resurfaced in the 1980s, but was not too strong. ANL and his students > >>> were > >>> reigning and that time. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> ?Here you want to be more careful. The period of ANL's ascendancy > declined > >> after 1966 and it was Rubensteinians who gained power. Epitome of that > >> counter-development in the appointment of Lomov to head of Academy > >> Institute, to be followed by Brushlinskii. ? > >> > >> > >> > >> > >>> --ANL had quite of a power struggle with Rubinstein. ANL and his > >>> students/prot?g?s ruled the psychology domain in the USSR at their life > >>> time. > >>> ? An overstatement as above.? > >>> > >>> -- Almost all textbooks in psychology after 1970 were written by the > ANL > >>> circle. After 1970 Rubinstein was not published much and maybe not at > >>> all. > >>> The last psychology textbook by Rubinstein that I have seen was from > the > >>> 1960s (first edition 1940). > >>> -- Rubinstein was the > >>> > >>> > >> first (if memory serves) to formulate the principle > >> > >> > >>> of the unity of consciousness and activity. However, many sources claim > >>> he > >>> heavily used works of LSV. > >>> > >>> > >> > >> ?This is really news to me. Who claimed that and did anyone believe > them?? > >> > >> > >> > >> > >>> Of course, all historical materialists hold to the principle that > >>> consciousness emerges in the process of activity; it is a product of > >>> activity and everyday life environment of the subject. > >>> ?It is so-znanie, with-knowledge, knowledge-with-an other. In my view, > >>> the residue of joint mediated actions-in-activity. All full > >>> > >>> > >> of holes and > >> > >> > >>> gaps, but recountable.? > >>> > >>> Researchers from Russia can provide more precise account. > >>> ?that would be great. ? > >>> > >>> Best wishes, > >>> ?Mike (too)? > >>> > >>> > >> > >> >